



Walk the Line: Examining the factors that enable
peacekeepers to influence their local security
environment

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Abstract

This thesis uses an ethnographic approach to investigate the microprocesses of a peace operation to understand whether peacekeepers on the ground can make a difference to their security environment. I examine the work of UNIFIL in South Lebanon since the implementation of Resolution 1701 in 2006 and describe the work of local actors in the UNIFIL mission and their engagement at three levels: the local, the national and the international. This thesis asked the following research questions: (1) How do peace operations influence their security environment? and; (2) What factors effect UNIFIL local engagement? This research has found that at the subnational or local level, UNIFIL is able to influence its security environment and thus contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. It does this by sustaining local connections that serve to alert the mission to small incidents that it prevents from developing into bigger conflicts.

The area of operations has experienced peace for almost eight years and this would suggest that these activities at the micro level have helped to provide an environment conducive to peace. On a practical level, the UNIFIL mission has achieved this in three main ways: first by monitoring, reporting and intervening in Blue Line violations as part of a response mechanism, to avoid escalation. Second, through the preventative mechanisms of liaising between the IDF and the LAF to encourage local level cooperation and produce micro security agreements to prevent misunderstandings. Third, UNIFIL has a very comprehensive local engagement mechanism that enables the mission to maintain local consent and avoid being affected by intrastate conflict.

This research has identified three factors: time, autonomy and local knowledge that facilitate the above mechanisms and therefore agency at the local level. Prior to this research, these three factors have not previously been linked together as key facilitators of agency amongst peacekeepers at the local level. What this thesis also extrapolates out are the benefits that accrue

from these three factors: time is linked to the benefits of trust, institutional memory and consistency of effort. Autonomy is linked with the benefits of creativity and spontaneity. Local knowledge produces cultural sensitivity and contingency in emergency situations.

This thesis also revealed that the main constraints faced by UNIFIL currently are the local-international legitimacy gap in the mandate, local agency and a lack of national and international support for peacebuilding projects and the Middle East peace process. This thesis also revealed the nuances in relationships between peace operations and civilians of the host country in terms of how their interests divide and coincide at different points. This involves all the parties in a balancing act –the most noticeable contradiction for civilians was their desire for peace versus their support for national resistance movements. For UNIFIL staff, it was balancing the international demands of the mandate with local consent for the mission.

This thesis acknowledges the important role key regional actors play in the maintenance of international peace and security: should any party choose to recommence hostilities, there is little UNIFIL can do. But thus far a resumption of war based on the escalation of a security incident has not occurred in the UNIFIL area of operations. This has been achieved in large part by the actions of a small group of highly committed staff who operate at the subnational level.

Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

(Signed) _____

Disclosure:

This research was undertaken with human ethical clearance (ER2) protocol GIR/07/12/HREC. I have identified the place and location of all interviews throughout this thesis. The names of interviewees I have kept confidential according to the preferences of interviewees. I can provide a list of names of all interviewees to an examiner on request.

One publication in a peer-reviewed journal has been drawn from this research although in considerably different form to what appears in the dissertation.

Newby, V (2013) Playing With Fire: Understanding the Sunni-Shia Sectarian Lifecycle, *Griffith Asia Quarterly*, 1:2/3, pp. 77-105.

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
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Last but not least, I owe dinner and drinks to most of the people noted above.

Map 1: The Blue Line



Map 2: The UNIFIL Area of Operations




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List of Acronyms

| | |
|---------|--|
| AO | Area of Operations |
| APC | Armoured Personnel Carrier |
| CAO | Civil Affairs Officer |
| CIMIC | Civil Military Cooperation |
| DFS | Department of Field Support (UN Secretariat) |
| DPKO | Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN Secretariat) |
| IDF | Israeli Defence Force |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |
| LAF | Lebanese Armed Forces |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| ONUC | United Nations Operation in Congo |
| PAO | Political Affairs Officer |
| QIP | Quick Impact Project |
| RPG | Rocket Propelled Grenade |
| SLA | South Lebanon Army |
| SOFA | Statement of Forces Agreement |
| STL | Special Tribunal for Lebanon |
| TCC | Troop Contributing Country |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDOF | United Nations Disengagement Observer Force |
| UNFICYP | United Nations Force in Cyprus |

| | |
|---------|--|
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNIFIL | United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon |
| UNMOGIP | United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSCOL | United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon |
| UNSF | United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea |
| UNTAC | United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia |
| UNTSO | United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation |
| US | United States |

Introduction

On the outskirts of Kfar Shuba there is big pond, they collect the water for draining. This pond is used for cattle, mainly in summertime. Now this pond is exactly on the Blue Line. It's edge [is] on the Blue Line. And the Blue Line here is far from the technical fence some places [by] 100 metres, some 75, something like that...and the technical fence is not a new one up there, it's a very old one. One day, a cow came from the Israeli side, found a gap in the technical fence, pushed the gap here and there and succeeded to come inside to come and drink water from the pond. What is the force up there? It's Indian. Ok the first day it was one cow, the next day it was five cows, and so on and until it was 60 cows! Now you can't say the cows were Israeli, they were just cows from the Israeli side. Now who got upset? The shepherds, the Lebanese shepherds! They keep the drinking water in the summer for their cattle. And this big flood of cows from the Israeli side, they will lose water. So they complained to LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces], LAF transferred the problem to UNIFIL. UNIFIL asked the Israelis to stop allowing the cows to come in. They said we cannot stop the cows – they are cows come on, they are not people. You ask the cow to stop going outside? If the Lebanese side doesn't want the cows to come there, let them build a technical fence. Of course, this is the technical fence, this is the Blue Line. So if the LAF will build the line here, the Israeli's will consider it as a border, they swallow this place, about 2 km. So LAF said no, we are not going to build anything. Israeli's responsibility is to prevent this violation, otherwise we will let the shepherds kill the cows. The Israelis said, if you kill the cows this is aggression against us! It was rising tension. And unfortunately if it was any other contingent, it was easy because the soldier will go to the cow and kick her away! But they are Indians! They do not approach the cows! It's impossible story but it happened! And it took months to solve it. How did we solve it at the end? UNIFIL decided to build a technical fence around the pond only and with doors. Whenever the cows come, they cannot get to the water. But when the Lebanese Shepherds will come, they will open the door let their sheep inside and they will close it when they leave. They made 3 doors for this technical fence around the pond.¹

Introduction

Since 2006, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has stationed up to 15,000 troops² to act as a buffer between the states of Israel and Lebanon. As the above quote demonstrates, the challenges faced by UNIFIL troops on the ground can at times seem almost farcical. But it also highlights the sensitivity to territorial violations felt by both the named parties to the conflict. One day it is cows, but on another day, peacekeepers can be confronted with random rocket attacks from sub-state militias, violent civilian protests or a confrontation between

¹ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

² The mission mandate provides for up to 15,000. The current number of troops serving on the ground is 10, 224.

two militaries that has the potential to trigger a regional war. Managing both inter and intrastate conflicts make UNIFIL a complex mission despite the fact that was borne of an era when peacekeeping missions tended to be kept simple. How do we understand UNIFIL today in the context of the changes that have occurred in peacekeeping over the past twenty years?

I undertook to explore the work of the UNIFIL mission because I wanted to understand this question. This thesis therefore investigates the work of UNIFIL since the implementation of Resolution 1701 in 2006. I examine how the UNIFIL mission continues to learn from developments in the peacekeeping literature. In particular, how does UNIFIL negotiate a security role for itself in an environment where local civilians do not automatically view it as being on the side of 'right', but yet need it to feel secure from attacks launched by either of the warring parties?

To date, there have been no in-depth detailed studies on the post-2006 UNIFIL mission (sometimes referred to as UNIFIL II). Since the 2006 war and the revised mandate of Resolution 1701, there has been a very small body of literature on south Lebanon which has looked at the effects of the war and the revised mandate,³ and peacebuilding efforts.⁴

Scholarship that has examined the work of the UNIFIL mission specifically is limited and mostly focused on technical aspects of the mission. For example, most research since UNIFIL's revised mandate has explored the legality and politics of the mission. Murphy (2009) examined the use

³ Makdisi, Karim, Timur Goksul, Hans Bastian Hauck, and Stuart Reigeluth, *UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East*, Euromesco Paper, 2009); Makdisi, Karim, 'Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the War on Terror,' *International Peacekeeping*, 18/1: 4-20 (2011); Hovsepian, Nubar, ed., *The War on Lebanon: A Reader* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2007); Nasu, Hitoshi, 'The Responsibility to React? Lessons from the Security Council's Response to the Southern Lebanon Crisis of 2006,' *International Peacekeeping*, 14/3: 339-352 (2007); Jones, Bruce, and Andrew Hart, 'Keeping Middle East Peace?,' *International Peacekeeping*, 15/1: 102-117 (2008).

⁴ Hamieh, Sylvia Christine, and Roger Mac Ginty, 'A Very Political Reconstruction: Governance and Reconstruction in Lebanon After the 2006 War,' *Disasters*, 34/S1: S103-S123 (2010); Kingston, Paul, 'The Pitfalls of Peacebuilding From Below,' *International Journal*, 67/2: 333-350 (2012), Zahar, Marie-Joelle, 'Liberal Interventions, Illiberal Outcomes: The United Nations, Western Powers and Lebanon', in Edward Newman, Roland Paris and Oliver Richmond, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2009); Mac Ginty, Roger, 'Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon: A Challenge to the Liberal Peace?,' *Conflict, Security & Development*, 7/3: 457-482 (2007); Abi-Ezzi, Karen, 'Lebanon: Confessionalism, Insitution Building, and the Challenges of Securing Peace', in Vanessa Shields and Nicholas D. J. Baldwin, *Beyond Settlement: Making Peace Last After Civil Conflict* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2008).

of force and rules of engagement;⁵ while Hatto (2009) has examined the impact of the Strategic Military Cell (SMC) established in August 2006 to supervise the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon.⁶ The character of the UNIFIL mission itself has received most focus from the perspective of how troops, from a variety of cultural and geopolitical backgrounds, navigate their roles and responsibilities with their rules of engagement. Vuga (2010), for example, used the UNIFIL mission to investigate the effect of cultural differences between troop contingents in multinational peace operations.⁷ Liegeois (2012) used the example of Belgian peacekeepers to examine whether francophone peacekeepers deployed to francophone areas were more efficient.⁸ Ruffa (2013) analysed the drivers of perceptions of security of different nationality troops in the UNIFIL mission and how this affected the way they behaved towards the local population.⁹ In sum, there are currently few studies that examine the interactions between both military and civilian staff within UNIFIL, and local actors (civilian, military and political) from both perspectives.

In terms of the broader literature, the majority of research in the past twenty years analysing peace operations has researched intrastate war, rather than interstate war and this research has also largely focused on heavy footprint missions in the post cold war era. Researching the UNIFIL mission is useful to help identify how much effect light footprint missions have on their security environments, particularly in light of current debates about the right weight of a peacebuilding operation footprint.¹⁰ **Therefore this thesis asks 1) How do peace operations influence their security environment at the local level? and 2) What factors effect local engagement?**

⁵ Murphy, Ray, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁶ Hatto, Ronald, 'UN Command and Control Capabilities: Lessons from UNIFIL's Strategic Military Cell,' *International Peacekeeping*, 16/2: 186-198 (2009).

⁷ Vuga, Janja, 'Cultural Differences in Multinational Peace Operations: A Slovenian Perspective,' *International Peacekeeping*, 17/4: 554-565 (2010).

⁸ Liégeois, Michel, 'Making Sense of a Francophone Perspective on Peace Operations: The Case of Belgium as a Minofrancophone State,' *International Peacekeeping*, 19/3: 316-332 (2012).

⁹ Ruffa, Chiara, 'What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian, and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,' *Armed Forces and Society*, Prepublished/04 April 2013: 1-27 (2013).

¹⁰ Paris, Roland, 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,' *Review of International Studies*, 36/2: 337-365 (2010), see page 343.

Peacekeeping Operations

UN peacekeeping has existed in some form since 1948, with the creation of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in (then) Palestine; but it was never part of the original mandate of the United Nations. The enormous changes that have been made to peacekeeping since the early missions reflect how the organisation was learning on the job. Another surprising element is that many of the oldest peacekeeping missions are still going today, situated as they are in the buffer zones of unresolved conflicts: Kashmir, Cyprus, Palestine and Lebanon.¹¹ This is reflective of the nature of peacekeeping today: older style missions exist alongside more modern operations with complex mandates; and older style missions have over time incorporated more complex peacebuilding tasks into their operations. Peacekeeping operations have changed over time, and so too have the peacekeepers themselves, the level of civilian staff in peacekeeping missions has increased, as have police forces and other specialists in justice and governance.

The UN itself does not have a definition of peacekeeping in its Charter. However, there are two articles that refer to the concept of the maintenance of international peace and security, Chapter VI and Chapter VII. Chapter VI provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes by, among other things, negotiation and adjudication; and Chapter VII contains the collective security provisions which were intended to be the foundation of its policy on the maintenance of global peace.¹² The UN has largely avoided providing strict definitions of peacekeeping; however in 2003 it did provide a taxonomy of the tasks that comprise peacekeeping which help to provide clarity on the many varied roles of peacekeepers:

¹¹ These are the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Jerusalem; United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP); and United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Lebanon.

¹² Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo*.

| Military | Civilian |
|--|--|
| Assist in implementing peace agreement | Help former belligerents implement complex peace agreements |
| Monitor a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities | Support delivery of humanitarian assistance |
| Provide a secure environment | Assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants |
| Prevent the outbreak or spillover of conflict | Supervise elections |
| Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles. | Build rule of law capacity |
| Administer a territory for a transitional period | Promote respect for human rights |
| | Assist economic recovery |
| | Set up transitional administration as a territory moves to independence |

Table 1: United Nations Peacekeeper Tasks¹³

As the above table shows, peacekeeping operations no longer simply comprise a military force on the ground acting as a buffer between two states at war. Peacebuilding activities have been incorporated into most peace operations with key roles for both military and civilian actors. This thesis further illustrates the fact that UNIFIL has incorporated both traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks into its operational remit.

Further development of the UN definition of peacekeeping has been the creation of five different categories under the heading of ‘peace and security activities’ of which peacekeeping is listed as being one of a number. This emerged as part of a 2008 UN publication detailing the principles and guidelines of peacekeeping operations in an attempt to clarify a peacekeeping doctrine. The categories listed in this document were: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. Here peacekeeping was defined as: ‘the use of military, police and civilian personnel to lay the foundations of sustainable peace.’¹⁴ The blurring of the lines therefore between peacekeeping and peacebuilding has gradually meant that peace operations comprise a range of functions from all five of these categories.

¹³ Format taken from Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) p.15. Original content from United Nations, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, (New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, 2003), pp.1-2.

¹⁴ Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, (New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, 2008), p.19.

A review of the literature on defining peacekeeping by Bellamy and Williams,¹⁵ reveals that the necessary components of a useful definition are the following: 1) they must take account of the fact that peacekeeping operations are not always run by the UN; 2) they must explain the underlying purpose of a peacekeeping operation; and 3) they must be explicit enough to explain what a peacekeeping force consists of. In their book *Understanding Peacekeeping*, they provide a definition of peacekeeping which takes account of these issues:

Peace operations involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN authorisation, with a mandate or programme to:

- 1) assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process;
- 2) serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or
- 3) enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace.¹⁶

The UN Peacekeeping Operations Manual (2008) makes clearer mention of the civilian role in peace operations:

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.¹⁷

Both definitions are useful for clarifying what peacekeeping is for the purpose of this thesis.

UNIFIL is classified in the literature as a 'traditional' mission and therefore it is important to briefly explain what this term means. This label refers to peacekeeping missions that hew closely to the traditional principles of peacekeeping which are consent, impartiality and minimal use of force.¹⁸ The majority of this type of mission were established before the end of the cold war and often involved the imposition of a neutral force between the armies of two states at war. There are a number of traditional missions based in the Middle East. This is due to the dynamics of the

¹⁵ Bellamy and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines'.

¹⁸ United Nations, 'Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations'.

bipolar international system during the Cold War, which meant that certain areas were considered by Russia and the US to be 'off limits' for peacekeeping missions as they lay too close to their spheres of influence.¹⁹ The Middle East was considered not to be firmly placed in either's sphere, but conflicts that took place there had the capacity to escalate and draw both the great powers into a war, which neither of them wanted. A number of these missions remain there today in the absence of a resolution to the conflicts that triggered the interventions in the first place.

Traditional peacekeeping usually takes place in the period between a ceasefire and a political settlement and is comprised of activities that are suited to a holding phase or the creation of 'a political space that will facilitate a political resolution of the conflict'.²⁰ As such the activities usually attributed to a traditional mission are those of monitoring borders, verifying demilitarization and establishing buffer zones. However, Bellamy and Williams make the point that there is no consensus on what activities constitute traditional peacekeeping.²¹ This thesis demonstrates that the UNIFIL mission has evolved to include both traditional and more modern peacebuilding activities.

Currently in the peacekeeping literature two competing models of peacekeeping exist which are termed 'heavy footprint' and 'light footprint'. Since the creation of more complex peace operations, (to be discussed in Chapter One), there has been a debate about how involved peace operations should be in the political and institutional structures of the states in which they intervene. This debate has come about as the result of the failure of more complex peace operations to achieve their goals. Paris (2010) describes the issues in the debate thus:

On one hand... [international peacebuilders] were under pressure to expand the scope and duration of operations in order to build functioning and effective governmental institutions in war-torn states, and to avoid problems of incomplete reform and premature departure seen in East Timor and elsewhere. On the other

¹⁹ MacQueen, Norrie, *Peacekeeping and the International System* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

²⁰ Bellamy and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, p.175

²¹ *Ibid.*

hand, they were also under pressure to reduce the level of international intrusion in the domestic political process of the host states. Achieving the first goal seemed to require a relatively 'heavy footprint', or a large and long-term international presence with extensive powers, particularly in cases where governmental institutions are dysfunctional or non-existent; whereas the second goal seemed to require a relatively 'light footprint', a small and unobtrusive presence that would maximise the freedom of local actors to pursue their own peacebuilding goals. Squaring these two objectives became – and remains today – a crucial conceptual and strategic challenge for practitioners. Simply put, if both the heavy footprint and the light footprint are problematic, what is the 'right' footprint?²²

Traditional missions usually fall into the category of light footprint. This is in no small part due to the era in which they were born whereby cold war politics meant that there was far greater emphasis on ensuring non-interference in the internal political structures of states in ideologically 'neutral' territory.²³ This is the case with the UNIFIL mission as its work is based at the subnational level and it is uninvolved in Lebanese domestic political processes.

In order to examine the details of the day-to-day work of peacekeepers, this thesis divides the praxis of the UNIFIL peace operation into three levels of engagement: the international, national and local. At the international level of engagement I describe how peacekeeping troops (who monitor the Blue Line) and Political Affairs Officers (PAOs) liaise with the named parties to prevent the resumption of conflict and provide solutions when incidents occur. At the national level, I show how PAOs and Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) are engaged in confidence and capacity building two national institutions: the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and local government. At the local level, I focus on the work of CAOs and Civil Military Cooperation Officers (CIMIC) who liaise with civilians in the area of operations to maintain local consent for the mission in order to ensure the security of peacekeeping patrols on the ground, and work to prevent and resolve problems that arise between the local population and the peacekeeping troops. The research questions asked in this thesis ultimately examine the relationship between UNIFIL staff and those local actors who must engage with UNIFIL on a regular basis.

²² Paris, 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding', p. 343.

²³ Although it should be noted that in international relations, the concept of state sovereignty was then and still is applied in a highly selective manner.

Case Study Selection and Methodology:

The case of UNIFIL can be classified as a deviant case according to a list of classifications provided by Gerring (2007). A deviant case is one that 'by reference to some general understanding of a topic (either a specific theory or common sense), demonstrates a surprising value'.²⁴ UNIFIL is a deviant case because it differs considerably from all other traditional missions that are still running.²⁵ It does so in a number of ways: (1) it has a revised mandate (2) the mission has had to deal with the effects of both inter and intra-state war; and (3) it is much larger than all the other missions that are its logical comparators. Ultimately UNIFIL is an 'old' mission with modern components: it has a new revised mandate (2006) which comprises 'old' inter-state buffer zone responsibilities but it also has newer peacebuilding activities which have been incorporated in line with the developments that have occurred in peacebuilding praxis in the past twenty years.

One purpose of using a deviant case study as an exploratory form of analysis is to understand whether the case is genuinely unique or whether findings from this case can be generalised across to other case studies. The findings generated from this research at the micro-level have identified traits consistent with those found in the literature on other peace operations (this is discussed in Chapter One), as well as identifying new linkages between different factors that promote agency on the ground.

Given this analysis requires a sense of the mutual perceptions of UNIFIL officers and civilians on the ground, it requires a qualitative, ethnographic approach. This is described by Bray (2008) as 'a naturalistic approach whose main data-gathering and analysing techniques consist of

²⁴ Gerring, John, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.105.

²⁵ The UNIFIL mission currently has 10,200 troops, but is mandated for up to 15,000. Of the other four traditional missions, UNDOF has 1,243 troops and UNFICYP 857. UNTSO and UNMOGIP are observer missions only with no peacekeeping troops assigned to the mission.

participant observation and open-ended interviewing'.²⁶ The purpose of ethnography is to understand interactions, power relations and micro processes in the actual environment they occur. The aim here is not to conclusively prove something, rather it is to explore and understand the 'why and how' of processes in order to formulate a hypothesis for testing across multiple case studies.²⁷

Conducting research using ethnographic methods means the researcher must be reflexive and aware of their influence of their presence on proceedings. Neufeld (1993) defines reflexivity thus:

[reflexivity] can be understood to entail three core elements: (i) self-awareness regarding underlying premises, (ii) the recognition of the inherently politico-normative dimension of paradigms and the normal science tradition they sustain, and (iii) the affirmation that reasoned judgements about the merits of contending paradigms are possible in the absence of a neutral observation language.²⁸

My main impressions in terms of observing my influence on the ground as I conducted the research was that all respondents felt very comfortable telling me what they thought of UNIFIL, good and bad. They did not appear to be shy or nervous about this. I never obtained the feeling that respondents were reluctant to speak with me, or did not want to share their true feelings on the topic. As the year passed, I realised that my presence engendered a stronger reaction from some participants than they might ordinarily express possibly because they believed that perhaps what they said would be relayed back to the international community through my thesis.

To conduct this research I spent a year in Lebanon conducting interviews and observing the UNIFIL mission at work in the area of operations. Within that time I lived for six months in the Shi'ite neighbourhood of Dahiyeh which is a suburb south of Beirut known to be predominantly

²⁶ Bray, Zoe, 'Ethnographic Approaches', in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.314.

²⁷ Della Porta and Keating argue that qualitative methods enable the researcher to understand the 'why and how' of a research topic more than the 'what, where and when' obtained from quantitative methodology. See della Porta, Donatella, and Michael Keating, *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

²⁸ Neufeld, Mark, 'Reflexivity and International Relations Theory,' *Millennium*, 22/1: 53-76 (1993), pp.54-55.

occupied by southern Lebanese who migrated to Beirut in waves as a result of the five successive conflicts in south Lebanon. It is also a known Hizbullah stronghold. I lived there because I wanted to observe the type of civilians that UNIFIL interact with on a regular basis, the majority of whom are Shi'a. Owing to security reasons it was not possible for me to live in the area of operations, and therefore residing in Dahiyeh was a good way of interacting informally with Shi'a from the south of Lebanon, many of whom retain property in the south and visit there frequently.²⁹ This enabled me to observe informally the local culture but also to establish informally whether or not what I heard about UNIFIL in interviews conducted in the area of operations corresponded with what people from the area said informally about UNIFIL. As an Arabic speaker, and a speaker of Lebanese dialect, this experience provided a deeply ethnographic insight into local southern culture

The techniques I employed in this research were participant observation and semi-structured interviews.

Participant Observation

Over the course of a year, I observed a variety of interactions between UNIFIL and stakeholders in the UNIFIL mission whom I classify as members of the Lebanese public and individuals in the named parties to the conflict.³⁰ During the research, I was afforded many opportunities to observe UNIFIL in the area of operations, interacting with the local population: on border patrols, medical and veterinary outreach visits, national day celebrations and the social calls of civil affairs officers. This enabled me to understand more about the 'why and how' of the interaction between UNIFIL and the local population in terms of what UNIFIL did and the local population response.³¹

²⁹ In this area of Beirut most people do not speak English or French, only Arabic.

³⁰ Owing to political issues it was not possible to observe/interview members of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in Israel or Lebanon.

³¹ della Porta and Keating, *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences*.

Interviews

I conducted fifty interviews, of which thirty-seven were face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with a cross-section of stakeholders. All of these interviews were recorded and transcribed in full. These included UNIFIL military staff which included CIMIC officers and peacekeepers themselves from three battalions (Irish, Indian and Ghanaian). Within the UNIFIL mission I also interviewed civilian staff, namely political affairs officers (PAOs) and civil affairs officers (CAOs). Other interviewees included LAF officers; a journalist who specialises in reporting on UNIFIL and the south of Lebanon, local academics, UNIFIL's former spokesperson (1978-2006); and a wide variety of local civilians. Civilians interviewed ranged from agricultural workers and villagers, to local business owners, local municipality politicians, former local politicians and local journalists from the area who still work and live there. Some respondents had limited interaction with UNIFIL and provided their impressions more through observations. Others were more involved with UNIFIL and had more to say about their dealings with them on a regular basis.

Some of the fifty interviews conducted were conducted informally with people from the south of Lebanon during my time living in Dahiyeh and were not recorded and transcribed. In general these were people who had properties in the area and who spent a fair amount of time in the south during their lifetime. Other researchers using ethnographic methods have used the same approach in order to canvas as wide an opinion as possible and as part of the observational, 'in situ' aspect of this type of research.³² I did not use quotes from these informal encounters in my research for ethical reasons as I had not asked permission to use their comments in my research. I merely used the material as information to inform the thesis and to corroborate views that I heard in my formal interviews with civilians.

All the formal interviews were recorded and transcribed. Around 75 percent of interviews were conducted in English according to the preference of the interviewee. Those conducted in Arabic

³² For example, Autessere, Severine, *The Trouble with the Congo. Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

were translated and transcribed into English. All formal interviewees gave their consent to participate in the research and their identity has been kept anonymous with the exception of two interviewees.³³

Both Pouligny and Autesserre note that this kind of ethnographic research generates ‘inconvenient truths’,³⁴ whereby no matter how many interviews one conducts, it is impossible to simplify views into discrete categories because for every person who expresses one opinion, someone else will have a different view. Whilst this research was unable, owing to time and resources, to conduct as many interviews as the above two studies, the same issue arose. I have tried to incorporate the myriad voices into this research without coming across as too contradictory. There is, as I note later, a plurality to be found in the views of all respondents. Official views differed from personal views; religious views clashed with the desire for personal security; political views about the UNIFIL mission clashed with personal views about individual UNIFIL staff, many of whom were loved.

Interviews were sourced on a rolling basis, termed ‘snowballing’ whereby a respondent will recommend another person who might be suitable for interviewing. UNIFIL CAOs were extremely helpful in providing me access to civilians in the course of my research, who as noted above were happy to speak with me openly on the topic. My own knowledge of the region also afforded me access to respondents as I have lived and studied in Syria and Lebanon periodically since 2009.

What the ethnographic method identified is that within the structure of the UNIFIL peace operation, certain variables improved the opportunity for individuals to effect influence over their environment. In the case of UNIFIL staff, these factors were time, autonomy and local knowledge.

³³ I interviewed the journalist Nick Blanford and the former spokesman for UNIFIL Timor Goksul, both of whom were more than happy to go on the record.

³⁴ Pouligny, Beatrice, *Peace Operations From Below: UN Missions and Local People* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006); Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo. Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*.

The Argument

This thesis asks two main questions: (1) How do peace operations influence their security environment? (2) What factors effect UNIFIL local engagement?

This thesis identified three factors – time, autonomy and local knowledge – and argues that the presence of these factors improve the agency of UNIFIL officers on the ground. Furthermore I argue that each of these three factors generate benefits that also work to enhance effectiveness.

For clarity, a diagram is provided below:




Figure 1: The factors that facilitate agency amongst UNIFIL staff

The first factor of time, relates to the importance of temporality in the work of actors at the subnational level; in particular continuity. PAOs and CAOs who have worked with UNIFIL in excess of ten years have developed strong relationships with key individuals amongst the named parties: the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces. This generates three key benefits: trust, institutional memory and consistency of effort. I argue these are the positive benefits that come from retaining staff over a longer period of time. Whilst there is an argument which contends that long-term staff can become stale or corrupt,³⁵ my research found that the constant rotations provided more of a problem for peacekeepers and the local population owing

³⁵ Moore, Adam, *Peacebuilding in Practice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp.168-170.

to the lack of institutional memory. There are several examples: in the case of peacekeepers, it is always the newly rotated troops who commit cultural errors, or take a wrong turn on a patrol causing annoyance to locals. At the level of the Force Commander, LAF officers complained about the time it took for Force Commanders to learn about what had gone before in order for them to become useful. Civilians complained about the rotations of peacekeepers because no sooner had they built a relationship with a battalion then they were gone again. The problem of short-termism also became apparent in the different relationship CIMIC officers have with the municipalities which is instrumental and based on material factors, as compared to the relationship that CAOs have which appears to be based on relationships built over time which have generated genuine trust and liking. This is not just because CAOs are Lebanese, PAOs, many of whom are international staff, also generated trustful relationships with the named parties.

The issue of time and continuity is of course a double-edged sword. Had there been a successful peace process in the last thirty years, the UNIFIL mission would not still be there. However, the experience of the last twenty years has shown that peace operations that simply aim for a quick exit are not always the most successful.³⁶ As a result, in situations where a peace process has not been formalised, it stands to reason that maintaining the status quo can be more of a positive than a negative, as this thesis argues.

The second factor that facilitates the success of actors at the subnational level is autonomy. This issue was also identified by Howard (2008) and Moore (2013) who found in their comparative studies of peace operations that high levels of interference by the international community made officers less effective on the ground.³⁷ In the UNIFIL mission at both the local and international levels of engagement, incidents arise that have the potential to destroy it: at the international level, that is resumption of war and at the local level, that is the loss of consent for the mission. This

³⁶ Paris, Roland, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jett, Dennis C., *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000); Sending, Ole Jacob, *Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context*, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2009); Polman, Linda, *We Did Nothing: Why The Truth Doesn't Always Come Out When The UN Goes In* (London: Penguin, 2004).

³⁷ Howard, Lise Morje, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice*.

this thesis found that autonomy facilitated creativity and spontaneity in working practices. Examples provided in this thesis show how these traits enabled PAOs and CAOs to problem solve effectively in situations of high tension where failure would have had serious consequences. Equally, UNIFIL's peacebuilding work at the national level demonstrates how a lack of autonomy hinders progress.

Local knowledge was the final overarching factor that assisted actors working at the local level in successfully maintaining international peace and security. This thesis found that high levels of local knowledge facilitated contingency and sensitivity to local sentiment. The environment in which UNIFIL officers work has experienced both interstate and intrastate conflict in the past thirty years. Tensions still exist between the different religious communities; and sub-state militias representing a variety of political interests receive support from the local population. Hizbullah is the main faction but Sunni-backed Islamic groups also still operate in the area. As such, UNIFIL officers at the subnational level need to carefully consider local political and religious sentiment in the course of their interactions with the local population to avoid giving offence. Furthermore, contingency is facilitated by local knowledge when problem-solving and in crisis management situations with the local population.

Contributions of the Study

This thesis asked the following questions: (1) How do peace operations influence their security environment? and (2) What factors effect local engagement? This research has found that at the subnational or local level, UNIFIL are able to influence their security environment and contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. They do this by working at the local level to prevent small incidents from developing into larger conflicts. The UNIFIL mission has achieved this in three main of ways: first by monitoring, reporting and intervening in Blue Line violations as part of a response mechanism, to avoid escalation. Second, through the preventative mechanisms of liaising between the IDF and the LAF to encourage cooperation and produce micro security agreements to prevent misunderstandings. Third, UNIFIL has a very

comprehensive local engagement mechanism that enables the mission to maintain local consent and avoid being affected by intrastate conflict. In sum, this thesis demonstrates how management of every aspect of potential Blue Line violations prevents incidents from escalating into sustained conflict. And the last eight years of peace would suggest that these micro-protocols have added up to form a continuing peace.

This research has identified three factors that effect or facilitate the above mechanisms and therefore agency at the local level. They are: time, autonomy and local knowledge. This research has identified that benefits accrue from these three factors: time is linked to the benefits of trust, institutional memory and consistency of effort. Autonomy is linked with the benefits of creativity and spontaneity. Local knowledge produces cultural sensitivity and contingency in emergency situations.

This research also highlighted the problem of the gap between the international legitimacy of the mandate and its local legitimacy. Resolution 1701 is accepted by the international community as being a just solution to the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah. This view is not shared by the local population, who view it as not having taken account of the conditions under which the conflict began and is therefore biased towards Israel. This acts as a constraint on UNIFIL staff at the local and international levels of engagement. This research also discovered that there is a dual dynamic in the relationship between local civilians and international interveners: both parties have agency. Currently there has been a focus in the peacebuilding literature on the importance of local engagement. I contend engaging with local actors on the ground is crucial, but those at the local level have the capacity for agency and desired outcomes and this should receive more critical acknowledgement in the literature. Local actors are adept at pursuing their own goals and objectives in the relationship as political actors and not just as non-descript civilians.

This research also shows how research at the micro-level of a peace operation reveals the contradictions and nuances in the relationship a peacekeeping mission has with the local

population. Amongst all interviewees, both UNIFIL staff and civilians, contradictions emerged between personal views, religious-political views, and security needs. Amongst the civilian population lay the biggest challenge lay in managing their relationship with Hizbullah and UNIFIL in light of these conflicting loyalties.

The Structure of the Thesis

The remainder of this thesis comprises five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One provides a discussion of the current literature on peace operations. Section One provides a definition of liberal peacebuilding and establishes that most missions running today comprise elements of peacekeeping and peacebuilding and therefore a review of the peacebuilding literature is relevant to the research in this thesis. Section Two provides a brief history of the concept to illustrate how peacekeeping missions evolved into missions that comprise both peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Section Three then presents a discussion of the literature on peacebuilding and the debates in scholarship on the topic which come from two main theoretical perspectives: liberalism and critical theory. I argue that the recent critical turn in the peace operations literature is helping to make the study of peace operations a richer theoretical endeavour and enable scholars to connect up the practice of peacebuilding with theories of power and make it more relevant to the study of international relations. I note that the majority of research on peacebuilding has focused on the international and national levels and has not explored the local level interactions of peace operations. However, there is a small, emerging body of literature on the local level of peace operations that has developed over the past ten years, which is discussed in Section Four of this chapter. The importance of this new literature is expressed well by Jeni Whalan who makes the point that peace operations have a ‘two-faced’ nature in that they ‘straddle the international-domestic divide of international relations theory’, but as Whalan notes, ‘analysis of their local face is sorely lacking’.³⁸ In the chapter, I identify a growing interest in focusing on the local level interactions of peace operations in order to

³⁸ Whalan, Jeni, *How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, Effectiveness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.19.

understand how agency at this level informs outcomes. I identify studies that have made the case for understanding how contemporary peacekeeping missions engage at the local, or 'subnational' level, but few have sought to apply these new methods to the few traditional 'light footprint' missions that remain in place today – this is my contribution in seeking to understand the 'local face' of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon.

Chapter Two provides context for the fieldwork chapters with a brief history of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon from 1978 to the present day. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the early days of the mission and demonstrates two important factors that are relevant to the mission today. First, that the UNIFIL mission (sometimes called UNIFIL I) was established in the absence of there being a peace to keep, something that is not recommended in peacekeeping practice currently³⁹ and this has shaped how the mission developed into what it is today. In addition some of the parties to the conflict were not named in the original mandate: this point is also relevant when considering the security challenges faced by the UNIFIL operation in its current form. The second point of note from this era, is that the humanitarian work performed by the peacekeeping troops in the early days of the mission (prior to 2006 and Resolution 1701) remains appreciated today. Affection for UNIFIL under the new mandate is in no small way due to local historical memory of the humanitarian acts of peacekeepers in the first UNIFIL mission whilst the area was under Israeli occupation. Section Two of this chapter discusses the circumstances that gave rise to the United Nations Security Council issuing a new mandate for the mission in the form of Resolution 1701. This mandate brokered peace between Israel and Hizbullah but did not name Hizbullah as a party to the agreement;⁴⁰ this has made maintaining the peace harder for UNIFIL as they are not able to deal directly with Hizbullah's military wing in the post-1701 era. Furthermore, this section explains why there is currently gap in perceptions of the legitimacy of the revised mandate at the international and local levels. The final section discusses the current strategic environment in the south of Lebanon. I describe the

³⁹ See for example Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines'.

⁴⁰ As will be shown in this chapter, the second mandate repeated many of the mistakes of the first.

position of all the relevant parties to the mandate – named and unnamed - in order to clarify the political position of all the stakeholders. I also briefly discuss how the Syrian crisis has affected the area of operations and the calculations of key stakeholders, Israel and Hizbullah.

Chapter Three describes how UNIFIL works at the local level to reduce international tensions and this is one way it influences its security environment. Management of the Blue Line is the most important activity of the UNIFIL peacekeeping force owing to the potential for violations to escalate into full-scale conflict. This research reveals that that time and local knowledge play a key role in enabling UNIFIL PAOs and peacekeepers to work effectively. This chapter divides UNIFIL's work at the international level into two categories: response and prevention. Section One discusses UNIFIL's response tactics to Blue Line violations. These tactics are employed on a daily basis and involve peacekeeping troops and the LAF on the ground. Their activities include: attending to all violations at the scene; providing a visible security presence; dispensing cautions to potential and actual violators of the Blue Line; educating locals on the location of the Blue Line; patrolling with the LAF and using the LAF to disperse citizens where needed. In situations where peacekeepers have to advise locals on respecting the Blue Line they need to demonstrate sensitivity to local sentiment. Working alongside them in the background are the Political Affairs Officers (PAOs) who are: liaising between the parties in cases where hostilities break out; reporting all violations to UNIFIL headquarters (and subsequently to New York); conducting investigations and reporting the results to both the named parties and UN headquarters in New York. Section Two evaluates the preventative mechanisms PAOs have put in place at the international level in order to prevent a recommencement of hostilities. This section shows how time plays an important role in trust generation which assist UNIFIL's preventative mechanisms. This section includes a discussion of: the tripartite monthly meetings as a mechanism for building trust and confidence; liaison as a strategy for de-escalating incidents in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities; and brokering micro security arrangements between the named parties to 1701. Section Two also examines more deeply how PAOs demonstrate impartiality and build trust between the parties and themselves. I discuss the

professional and personal attributes required by staff to conduct their work as they manage one of the world's most sensitive and potentially explosive 'borders'.⁴¹ In the final part examples of actual incidents are provided to illustrate how UNIFIL has dealt with actual confrontations that have occurred.

Chapter Four explores UNIFIL's peacebuilding work at the national level and argues that the mission does not only engage in a traditional 'keeping the peace' role, but has proactively sought a peacebuilding role. It reveals that that autonomy, time and local knowledge are the key factors enabling UNIFIL CAOs and PAOs to work effectively. In this chapter I also present the point of view of senior LAF officers and civilians to provide a multidimensional view of UNIFIL engagement at the national level. I argue time plays a positive role in the peacebuilding work of UNIFIL because it enables consistency of effort and institutional memory. CAOs and PAOs demonstrate creativity in the way they attempt to raise the profile of both the LAF and municipal government and this is driven by the relative autonomy in the way they work which means they are able to spontaneously grasp opportunities for funding and profile building as and when they occur. This chapter also illustrates how a lack of international and national cooperation constrains UNIFIL actors at the subnational level. UNIFIL assists the national government of Lebanon in two main ways: capacity building the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and local government; and working to consolidate the authority of both institutions in the south. The first section assesses the limitations of UNIFIL's ability to generate local confidence in municipal government and explains how budgetary constraints by national government are the main hindrance. The second section discusses UNIFIL's work in capacity building the LAF and again highlights how the Israel lobby constrains UNIFIL's ability to build up the capacity of the LAF.

In Chapter Five I examine the local engagement of UNIFIL actors at the subnational level: specifically the work of CAOs and CIMIC and identifies the challenges faced by peacekeeping

⁴¹ I have tried to avoid use of the word border owing to the fact that the Blue Line is a line of withdrawal. Currently there is no officially agreed border between the two states. However, as the line divides two states I have used it here to clarify this point, in speech marks to highlight its non-legal status under international law.

missions on the ground. It reveals that that autonomy, time and local knowledge are all key factors enabling UNIFIL CAOs and PAOs to work effectively. I use commentary from both UNIFIL staff and local civilians to describe the misunderstandings that occur between the two groups and how UNIFIL respond to them. Examination of the local relationship with UNIFIL reveals that both sides have agency. I illustrate how time matters at this level of engagement, in that the constant rotations of peacekeepers causes problems for UNIFIL staff and locals in terms of cultural misunderstandings and lack of awareness of local sensitivities, but also in preventing the formation of long-term relationships in the case of CIMIC. Both CIMIC and CAOs work creatively to prevent and resolve problems at the local level and are spontaneous in responding to changing local circumstances where possible. But time (continuity), local knowledge and autonomy give CAOs the ability to go further in reducing the risk of conflict between locals and UNIFIL peacekeepers which could do irreparable damage to UNIFIL's local consent. In the final sections I provide case studies to clearly illustrate this point.

The Conclusion of this thesis presents a summation of the main findings of this thesis, and presents ideas for further research programs based on these findings. The next chapter, Chapter One, will now critically explore how peace operations have been researched and how contemporary analysis has informed my approach to the UNIFIL case. I identify how the evolution of new methods and frameworks have led to arguments for greater understanding of the local factors (not just international and national) that affect the daily operations of peacekeeping missions.

Chapter 1: A Review of the Literature on Peace Operations

Introduction

How do peace operations influence their security environment? What factors effect UNIFIL's local engagement? This chapter provides a discussion of the existing literature on peacebuilding in relation to the research in this thesis. I argue that whilst there is a growing body of literature that discusses peace operations at the local level; traditional, light footprint missions such as UNIFIL have not been evaluated according to this new frame of viewing peacekeeping operations.

Section One of this chapter provides a definition of liberal peacebuilding for the purpose of clarifying this aspect of UNIFIL's work. Section Two provides a brief history of the concept to illustrate how peacekeeping missions evolved into operations that comprise both peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Section Three presents a discussion of the literature on peacebuilding and the debates in scholarship on the topic which come from two main theoretical perspectives: liberal and critical theory. I argue that the recent critical turn in the peace operations literature is helping to make the study of peace operations a richer theoretical endeavour and enable scholars to connect up the practice of peacebuilding with theories of power and therefore make it more relevant to the study of international relations. However, the majority of research on peacebuilding has focused on the international and national levels and has not explored the local level interactions of peace operations.

There is however a small, emerging body of literature on the local level of peace operations that has developed over the past ten years which is discussed in Section Four of this chapter. The importance of this new literature is expressed well by Jeni Whalan who makes the point that peace operations have a 'two-faced' nature in that they 'straddle the international-domestic divide of international relations theory', but as Whalan notes, 'analysis of their local face is sorely

lacking'.¹ This literature review finds that there is growing interest in focusing on the local level interactions of peace operations in order to understand how agency at this level informs outcomes. However, whilst studies have focused on the role of civil affairs and CIMIC activities, there is currently little work that specifically investigates how peace operations influence their security environment using a structured approach at three different levels of engagement: international, national and local. This thesis therefore contributes to existing scholarship in identifying a third face of peace operations - local agency. Certainly the combination of scholarship focusing on communities, culture and identity at the local level would lend itself to a deeper analysis of power/knowledge relationships between peacekeepers and the peacekept² possibly using poststructural or other critical theories.³ I will discuss this in more detail in the conclusion of this thesis.

UNIFIL is what is termed a 'traditional' or 'classic' peacekeeping mission. As such it may appear at first glance that a discussion on peacebuilding is an irrelevance. As noted in the introduction chapter, UNIFIL's mandate does not incorporate as many peacebuilding activities relative to newer missions. However, this research identifies that the UNIFIL mission is very much involved in peacebuilding work, engaging at the international, national and local levels and this is why the term is used to define the work of UNIFIL in this thesis. Call and Cousens (2008) refer to the increased incorporation of peacebuilding into the praxis of 'international agencies, parts of the UN system, and nongovernmental organisations over the course of the 1990s'.⁴ UNIFIL too has been influenced by this trend albeit later than most, in the post-1701 environment of late 2006. As such, a discussion of existing literature on peacebuilding is important to locate the findings of this thesis within current peacebuilding debates.

¹ Whalan, *How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, Effectiveness*, p.19.

² I use here the term 'peacekept' introduced by Fortna (2008). See Fortna, Virginia Page, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

³ There is currently some work at the local level that has used feminist and critical anthropology, for example Whitworth, Sandra., *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping : A Gendered Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2004) and Rubinstein, Robert A., *Peacekeeping Under Fire: Culture and Intervention* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), Richmond, Oliver, *A Post-Liberal Peace* (London: Routledge, 2011) but clearly the field remains open for further endeavours in this direction.

⁴ Call, Charles T., and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies,' *International Studies Perspectives*, 9/1: 1-21 (2008), p.3.

Prior to a discussion of the literature and for the purposes of clarity, a brief discussion of the definition of peacebuilding is provided below to broadly define the activities described in the following chapters.

Section One: Definition of Peacebuilding

Definitions of peacebuilding range from being extremely limited, to quite detailed. There remains contention over what peacebuilding should comprise, and what it should not. These debates are reflected in the different definitions provided by scholars and key practitioners, such as the UN. Newman (2009) states that those who are keen to be able to measure the effects of peacebuilding tend to use more simplistic definitions, and those who wish to explore the effects of peacebuilding more deeply, tend to provide more detailed definitions.⁵ This in part relates to a debate around what peacebuilding should, or should not be, and resides in a discussion of whether or not peacebuilders are aiming for what is termed a 'negative peace', i.e. the absence of conflict, or a 'positive peace', i.e. a peace that can be 'sustained in the absence of an international peace operation...that is inclusive of justice, equity and other core social and political goods'.⁶

However of note is that definitions provided by scholars of the field are often not consistently applied. Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell and Sitea (2007) analysed 24 governmental and intergovernmental bodies active in peacebuilding, to identify how they conceptualised their mandate and found whilst there were common priorities, each organisation had a different definition of peacebuilding.⁷ Roland Paris, a key scholar in the field of the study of peacebuilding, as both a critic and supporter of it, has varied his definitions over the course of the past ten years. In 2002 he chose to use a United Nations definition given by Kofi Annan which is: 'actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed

⁵ Newman, Edward, "'Liberal' Peacebuilding Debates', in Edward Newman, Roland Paris and Oliver Richmond, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009).

⁶ Call and Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies', pp.3-4.

⁷ Barnett, Michael N., Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea, 'Peacebuilding: What's In A Name?,' *Global Governance*, 13/1: 35-58 (2007).

confrontation.⁸ Later, he defines it as ‘an activity that takes place in post-civil-war environment, the purpose of which is to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace and to prevent the recurrence of large-scale violence’.⁹ Still later, he chooses to use the definition provided by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’.¹⁰

In comparison, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) define peacebuilding in far more detail:

[P]eacebuilding is an attempt after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of current hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution. Stronger state institutions, broader political participation, land reform, a deepening of civil society, and respect for ethnic identities are all seen as ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance... The aim of peacebuilding is to foster the social, economic and political institutions and attitudes that will prevent these conflicts from turning violent. In effect, peacebuilding is the front line of preventative action.¹¹

This detailed definition would appear to support the observations of Paris (2002) who argued that peacebuilding is underwritten by an acceptance by the international community, of the aim of creating liberal free-market democracies,¹² and this view is shared by other key scholars in the field.¹³ However, the idea that peacebuilding reflects liberal peace theory is not a given in all the peacebuilding literature. Newman (2009) for example argues that peacebuilding is based on realism as it is oriented around the creation of strong states and ‘in reality tends to be aimed at containing or repressing conflict in the interests of international peace and stability in general or

⁸ Annan, Kofi, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary General to the United Nations Security Council, S/1998/318* (New York: United Nations, 1998) cited in Paris, Roland, 'International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice', *Review of International Studies*, 28/4: 637-656 (2002), p.637.

⁹ ———, 'Towards More Effective Peace Building: A Conversation with Roland Paris,' *Development in Practice*, 15/6: 767-777 (2005), p.767.

¹⁰ Boutros-Ghali, B., *An Agenda for Peace*, (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1992)cited in Paris, 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding', p.337 [footnotes].

¹¹ Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,' *American Political Science Review*, 94/4: 779-801 (2000), p.779.

¹² Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'".

¹³ Pugh, Michael, 'The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective,' *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 10/2: 23-42 (2005); Bendana, Alejandro, 'From Peacebuilding to State Building: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back?,' *Development*, 48/3: 5-15 (2005).

of particular hegemonic strategic interests, in line with the “new” security agenda.¹⁴ Richmond too defines the theoretical approach underpinning peacebuilding as realist/liberal.¹⁵

Another interesting facet of the Doyle and Sambanis definition above is that they define peacebuilding as a ‘preventative action’. As does Lacher (2007) who terms peacebuilding ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ and defines it as: ‘a wide range of efforts directed at rebuilding and transforming the institutions of state, society and economy in order to consolidate peace and prevent conflict from re-igniting.’¹⁶

According to Newman the ‘preventative’ aspect of peacebuilding remains under contention amongst scholars and practitioners and as yet the UN has not defined peacebuilding in such a way as to include use of the term ‘prevention’. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission for example, lists its objectives thus, which do not specifically include treating peacebuilding activities as a preventative action:

- to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to postconflict recovery.¹⁷

Many authors also disagree over whether or not peacebuilding should be conflated with the term statebuilding. Barnett (2004) contends ‘Peacebuilders must recognise that peacebuilding is

¹⁴ Newman, “*Liberal*” *Peacebuilding Debates*. p.15

¹⁵ Richmond, Oliver, ‘The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding,’ *The International Spectator*, 44/1: 149-169 (2009).

¹⁶ Lacher, Wolfram, ‘Iraq: Exception to, or Epitome of Contemporary Post-conflict Reconstruction?’, *International Peacekeeping*, 14/2: 237-250 (2007), p.238.

¹⁷ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission Website, *Mandate*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml> [accessed 9 March 2014].

statebuilding'.¹⁸ Richmond (2009) on the other hand, posits that liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding should be regarded as separate concepts. He elucidates the differences between the two thus:

The statebuilding agenda is focused on political, economic and security architecture, and determines its outcomes as a neoliberal, sovereign and territorial state. This is in contrast to peacebuilding, which, we argue, focuses on the needs and rights of individuals, on sustainable communities and on the requirements for a self-sustaining polity of equitable representation without placing sovereignty, territory and the institutions of the state before that of the mundane needs of everyday life.¹⁹

Clearly the type of peacebuilding that Richmond refers to here is a specific conception of what peacebuilding is that differs from other definitions, once again highlighting the inconsistency in approaches and beliefs scholars and practitioners have about what peacebuilding is or should be. This difference is reflective of the different theoretical approaches taken by scholars of peacebuilding, which is further discussed in Section Three.

There is an inference in the above definitions of peacebuilding that it only occurs in a post-conflict environment. Call and Cousens (2008) refer to the fact that peacebuilding can take place in the absence of a peace agreement. Their definition of peacebuilding states:

Actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalise peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics. Post-conflict peacebuilding is the subset of such actions undertaken after the termination of armed hostilities.²⁰

Cockell (2000) also makes the point that peacebuilding can occur at all phases of a conflict, not just in the post-conflict stage and that the conceptualisation of the concept of peacebuilding itself should not be conflated with sequencing of activities, many of which do take place in the

¹⁸ Barnett, Michael N., 'Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War,' *International Security*, 30/4: 87-112 (2006), p.89.

¹⁹ Richmond, Oliver, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p.182.

²⁰ Call and Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies', p.4.

transition phase from peace accord to stable peace.²¹ He notes that the UN Department of Political Affairs currently understands peacebuilding to be a ‘continuum of activities, which may be present in all phases of a conflict cycle’.²²

John Braithwaite (2012) makes possibly the clearest statement on the need to reject the idea of sequencing the concepts of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking, stating:

Peacekeepers are both in the business of abating the last conflict and preventing the next one... ‘Peacebuilding’ is a ‘postconflict’ activity that is at the same time about building sustainable peace on the ashes of the last conflict and building capacity to prevent the next conflict.²³

The United Nations definition on the website of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) currently states:

Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.²⁴

For the purposes of this thesis, the UN definition used by the DPKO is used as it can be said to encompass all the levels of peacebuilding included in this thesis by its use of the words ‘strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management’.²⁵ It is appropriate also because it does not use the terms ‘after conflict has ended’ nor does it refer specifically to intra-state war.

²¹ Cockell, John G, 'Conceptualising Peacebuilding', in Michael Pugh, *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).

²² Ibid., p.18.

²³ Braithwaite, John, 'Evaluating the Timor-Leste Peace Operation,' *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 16/3/4: 282-305 (2012).

²⁴ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Peace and Security - Peacebuilding*, <https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml> [accessed 2 March 2014].

²⁵ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Peace and Security – Peacebuilding*, <https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml> [accessed 2 March 2014].

Peacebuilding Models

There are now a number of typologies of peacebuilding, most of which use case studies from the past fifteen years to analyse post-cold war peace operations. Richmond (2009) has identified three types of peacebuilding: the conservative model, the orthodox model and the emancipatory model. The conservative model is ‘characterised by top down approaches to peacebuilding and shaped by techniques of coercion, domination and hegemony’.²⁶ This approach is characterised by military intervention, unstable or divided political conditions and the imposition of peace. Richmond argues examples of this type of peacebuilding can be found in some Chapter VII peacekeeping missions and in the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The orthodox model of peacebuilding centres on the idea of building liberal institutions, and the ‘claim of the normative universality of the liberal peace’.²⁷ This model mixes bottom-up approaches with top-down, involves international organisations, institutions and NGOs, but also attempts to promote local ownership. Its primary goals are to implement democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the free market. This model in Richmond’s view, concurs with the conservative peacebuilding model, in that it believes in prioritising security first. In many ways, this model embodies what many scholars and practitioners classify as a typical peacebuilding mission.

The third type, the emancipatory model of the liberal peace emphasises local ownership and consent. Richmond describes this as a bottom-up approach which allows ‘for a stronger concern for social justice and people’s needs and assumption of far greater local agency’.²⁸ The major actors involved in this model are local and international NGOs as well as major agencies and state donors. Richmond equates this model with the civil peace (noted above) and it is largely driven by private actors and social movements. Of all three models, this is perhaps the hardest to conceptualise, as there is currently no exemplar of such a form of peacebuilding to refer to.

²⁶ Richmond, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*, p.7.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.8.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.8.

This may well be due to the fact that this type of model appears to be devoid of security concerns, and without those concerns it is unlikely a peacebuilding mission would have been deployed in the first place.

Newman (2009) also puts forward three different models of peacebuilding which he terms: transformatory peacebuilding; realist peacebuilding; and liberal peacebuilding.²⁹ These models are very similar to those espoused by Richmond. Transformatory peacebuilding equates with Richmond's model of emancipatory peacebuilding. Newman criticises this model for romanticising the local aspect of peacebuilding and neglecting the reality and importance of power both at the local and international levels.³⁰ Realist peacebuilding correlates with what Richmond calls conservative peacebuilding. The obvious criticism of this model is that it prioritises security at the expense of all other considerations, and tends to only engage with local power holders thus possibly perpetuating existing tensions. Richmond's orthodox model of peacebuilding then corresponds to Newman's liberal model, although here Newman differentiates between two strands of liberal peacebuilding: Wilsonian and hegemonic neo-liberal approaches. His distinction between these two sub-types however is a fuzzy as he describes the former approach as 'promoting democracy and market economies as a means of building peace' and the latter as involving 'top-down promotion (or imposition) of political and economic values'.³¹ Identifying the differences between these two methodologies on the ground may come down to semantics. Other authors have alluded to these same types of models, for example Ian Spears presents two models which he describes as 'Realist' and 'Liberal' which correspond to those of Newman, noted previously.³²

If the typologies described above were put on a continuum which ran from a top-down approach on the right hand side, and bottom-up on the left, it is very likely that the realist/conservative models (based on realist/neorealist theory) would reside on the right, the orthodox/liberal

²⁹ Newman, "*Liberal*" *Peacebuilding Debates*.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.49.

³² Spears, Ian, 'The False Promise of Peacebuilding,' *International Journal*, 67/2: 295-311 (2012).

models in the centre (based on liberalism/neoliberalism) and the emancipatory/transformatory models on the far left (based on critical theories). In reality, peacebuilding missions run up and down these continuums, and as Cooper et al note: ‘peace operations can move backwards and forwards along a spectrum of consent and coercion over time.’³³ Whilst it is helpful to conceive of peacebuilding tasks along this continuum, it is unlikely that any one mission would fall discretely into any particular category. As such, the term peacebuilding should take account of all of these typologies and should be regarded as housing all of them under one umbrella. The following section provides a brief history of peacebuilding.

Section Two: A Brief History of Peacebuilding

Prior to the end of the cold war, peacekeeping missions comprised what are known as ‘traditional’ or ‘classic’ missions. They were predominantly military in nature, stationed in hot spots where there existed inter-state conflict. Peacekeepers acted as a buffer between two states at war and were specifically instructed not to become involved in the domestic politics of the country.³⁴ The reason for this was due to a conflict of interests between the major powers governing the Security Council. Disputes over the funding and the terms under which a mission should operate were commonplace.³⁵ Norrie MacQueen notes that owing to competition for influence, only certain parts of the world were regarded as acceptable for the establishment of missions by the US and Russia.³⁶ In order to secure Security Council agreement for peacekeeping operations, the question of the internal organisation of the state was avoided to bypass ideological battles over the best way to restructure a state. This also largely prevented clashes between the Great Powers over the amount of influence that any one power could exert over the internal politics of the host country.³⁷ Two exceptions to this were the ill-fated Congo mission of 1960 (ONUC) which became susceptible to this very problem, and a short running mission in West New

³³ Cooper, Neil, Mandy Turner, and Michael Pugh, 'The End of History and the Last Liberal Peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland Paris,' *Review of International Studies*, 37/4: 1995-2007 (2011), p.1999.

³⁴ Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*; Bellamy and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

³⁵ MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System*.

³⁶ *Ibid.* For example, Eastern Europe in the case of Russia and Latin America in the case of the US were considered off-limits for peace operations as they were regarded as providing strategic depth for the two superpowers.

³⁷ Bellamy and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

Guinea (now part of Indonesia), the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF). The latter succeeded because the two parties, Indonesia and the Netherlands had already agreed upon the terms of the transfer of sovereignty between them.³⁸

At the end of the Cold War, the international zeitgeist changed as communism fell out of favour as a competing ideology to liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama pronounced that the 'End of History' had arrived and that liberal democracy was now considered by nations to be the only workable state model.³⁹ Within the United Nations, there now opened up new freedom for peacekeeping missions to comprise additional elements that would assist states in recovering from conflict. As Paris and Barnett argue, the peacebuilding activities of the international community is underwritten by an unstated belief in the principles of liberalism and the liberal peace theory.⁴⁰

The post-Cold War era, heralded a new kind of warfare, whereby civil war became the predominant form of conflict, as opposed to war between states. Paris states that by 1993, 94% of all conflicts were internecine civil wars.⁴¹ Two factors were at the root of many of these wars: the US and Russia withdrawing their patronage of small states in Africa, Asia and Latin America; and secessionism by breakaway states from the former Soviet empire.

In order to address these 'new wars',⁴² the UN conceived of a new type of mission. One that would not only put an end to fighting, but assist states in building up the capacity to maintain peace and stability over time. This became possible because there was no longer a debate among most member states in the organisation about what was the best model of government; China and Russia were opening up and old divisions over political-economic models became less pronounced. As such, a large number of peacekeeping missions were launched from 1989

³⁸ MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System*.

³⁹ Fukiyama, Francis, *The End of History and The Last Man* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993).

⁴⁰ Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice''; Barnett, 'Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War'.

⁴¹ Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*.

⁴² Kaldor, Mary, *New and Old Wars* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

onwards that comprised elements of peacebuilding. To emphasise this shift in the political willingness to launch peace operations, and the rise in conflicts that arose in the post-cold war era, the following comparison is illustrative. From 1948 to 1989, the UN launched 14 peacekeeping missions; since 1989 through to 2013, 54 missions were launched and the vast majority of them had a far broader remit than the early 'traditional' peacekeeping missions.⁴³ The remit of peacebuilding missions became extensive and a full list will not be provided here but broadly most missions comprised some of the following tasks: reforming or strengthening deficient structures and institutions of governance (judicial, constitutional, electoral, bureaucratic); disarmament and demobilisation of warring factions; restoration of public order and the rule of law for example, training/creating police forces; demining activities; provision of technical assistance for independent media; building space within civil society for political mobilisation; monitoring, organising or supervising transitional elections and plebiscites; and support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure.⁴⁴

As the 1990's progressed and not all missions proved successful, questions began to be raised as to the effectiveness of these new missions, termed 'second generation' peacekeeping missions,⁴⁵ or 'wider peacekeeping'.⁴⁶ Examples of the failures of these missions were states such as Angola, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, where violence and genocide broke out during and after interventions. In Cambodia and Liberia, elections were held quickly and success for these missions was claimed. However democracy was swiftly subverted by the election victors in both states to the point where corruption and autocracy became defining features of the state regimes.⁴⁷ Examples like these, and others raised questions as to whether the interventions themselves had in fact

⁴³ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Website, *Current Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Operations Timeline*, <https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml> [accessed 11 March 2014].

⁴⁴ Selected from a list in Cockell, *Conceptualising Peacebuilding*, pp.25-26.

⁴⁵ Mackinlay, J., and J. Chopra, 'Second Generation Multinational Operations,' *Washington Quarterly*, 15/3: 113-131 (1992).

⁴⁶ Bellamy and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

⁴⁷ Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, Chapter Three.

worsened the situation rather than improving it.⁴⁸ The following section reviews the debates about peacebuilding that emerged following these failures.

Section Three: Past and Current Debates on Peacebuilding

There are two main bodies of literature that discuss and critique the liberal peacebuilding project. These two bodies of literature fall into what Robert Cox (1981) calls ‘problem-solving approaches’ and ‘critical approaches’ respectively.⁴⁹ The first body is grounded in the liberal peace literature and is what Cox would label, a problem-solving approach because it accepts the need for peacebuilding operations, but disagrees on how missions should be carried out or their functionality. Newman (2009) provides an efficient summary of this idea:

Problem-solving approaches take prevailing social relationships and the institutions into which they are organised as the given and inevitable framework for action. They accept the assumptions that underpin existing policy and focus upon optimum effectiveness and performance.⁵⁰

The second body of literature comes from critical theory, and this challenges the liberal literature on the very premise of peacebuilding itself. In other words it questions whether the act of peacebuilding should be undertaken at all, or its legitimacy, as well as commenting on its functionality. This critical approach, is again summarised nicely by Newman:

Critical approaches in contrast, question how institutions emerge and are maintained, and do not accept existing policy parameters as a given or as necessarily legitimate. A critical approach questions – and if necessary challenges – prevailing structures of power and power relations, prevailing discourses or ways of thinking, and the interests they serve. Indeed, a critical approach interrogates the institutions, and our understanding of “reality”.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Cox, Robert, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,' *Millennium*, 10/2: 126-155 (1981).

⁵⁰ Newman, "*Liberal*" *Peacebuilding Debates*, p.38.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.38.

Whilst these divisions are apparent in a review of the literature, it should be noted that there is considerable crossover between the two schools especially where criticism of peace operations is concerned. Some liberal scholars such as Paris, critique missions on the same grounds as critical scholars.⁵² Equally, critical scholars such as Richmond can be found making suggestions for improvements to future missions.⁵³

In the body of literature on peacebuilding that is written within the problem-solving approach, one of the main criticisms levied at it, relates to how success should be measured.⁵⁴ Newman states that most scholars and practitioners favour a simplified definition of 'maintaining a ceasefire' as it enables a clear and feasible benchmark for judging the success of a mission which would be taken to be based on a negative peace.⁵⁵ However, as noted above, some scholars are prepared to provide a richer definition because they are more interested in understanding the effects of complex missions on recipient states, or a positive peace.⁵⁶

Research on peacebuilding has been both qualitative and quantitative in nature. The research of Doyle and Sambanis is quantitative and establishes whether or not missions have succeeded or failed using a number of set indicators: Hostility; Local Capacities and International Capacities in an attempt to understand the factors that promote a stable and lasting peace.⁵⁷ They found that multidimensional peacekeeping missions with extensive civilian functions including economic reconstruction, institutional reform and election oversight did help to end wars. Other scholars, such as Barbara Walter used the coding criteria proposed by the University of Michigan's Correlates of War project to classify and distinguish civil wars from other types of war. She then

⁵² Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*.

⁵³ Richmond, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*.

⁵⁴ Call and Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies'.

⁵⁵ Newman, "*Liberal*" *Peacebuilding Debates* p.27.

⁵⁶ Doyle and Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis'; Richmond, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*; Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010).

⁵⁷ Doyle and Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis'; Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace : United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

used comparative case studies to examine what has the greatest effect on ending conflicts.⁵⁸ One of her key findings, relevant to this thesis, is that the presence of a third party to enforce or verify peace agreements between warring parties can assist the parties in upholding the treaties they have agreed to.⁵⁹ Richmond (2009) on the other hand used qualitative research to investigate the success of a selected group of peacebuilding missions on the following factors: democratisation, the development of the rule of law, of human rights, civil society, and free market reform and development. Each factor was assessed in the context of their claimed objectives, and actual outcomes and consequences.⁶⁰ Moore (2013) used a comparative study of two cities in the same country in order to assess why peacebuilding worked in one town, but not in another.⁶¹

The way peacebuilding missions are measured very often dictates the level of success afforded to them. Quantitative research seeks easily measurable markers to evaluate the ‘what’ that occurs in peacebuilding. Hence Doyle and Sambanis (2000) found that a multidimensional UN mission and a peace treaty can help to end conflict and violence and can contribute to the building of institutions that it is hoped will help generate a stable and lasting peace. In contrast Richmond and Moore (above) demonstrate the value of qualitative research which often provides the ‘why’. Richmond researched UN case studies after peacebuilding interventions and found the presence of a ‘virtual peace’, which is to say, not really a stable and lasting peace at all.⁶² Moore (2013) identified how peacebuilding activities need to be shaped to be appropriate to the local conditions in order to succeed.

In the literature there is broad agreement on some of the more spectacular failures, such as Angola and Rwanda, but less so on other missions. The issue of measuring the success of peacebuilding missions has been so diverse that it has led Bellamy (2004) to argue that ‘there are no common criteria by which to evaluate the success or failure of peace operations because such

⁵⁸ Walter, Barbara, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp.47-69.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.4.

⁶⁰ Richmond, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*.

⁶¹ Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice*.

⁶² Richmond, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*.

judgements are framed by actors beliefs about the appropriate role for peace operations in global politics'.⁶³ As such the concept of 'success' in a peacekeeping/peacebuilding mission is highly subjective. This thesis posits that in the absence of an effective peace process, a negative peace is the best outcome that can be hoped for in the case of Lebanon and the UNIFIL mission. What is unique about the UNIFIL case is that in the pursuit of negative peace, UNIFIL is going beyond its traditional mandate in order to help the Lebanese people prepare for lasting peace.

Another critique of peacebuilding by liberal theorists has centred on the timeframe for such missions when it became clear that holding quick elections and then exiting the country was not the best way to ensure continued stability and democracy.⁶⁴ The cases of Liberia and Cambodia highlighted how democratic systems set up by the UN could be subverted by those who won the elections,⁶⁵ and the potential for states to revert to war, such as the case of Angola.⁶⁶ Paris has argued for 'institutionalisation before liberalisation' or IBL. He argues that states need to have solid institutions in place before they make the transition to democracy and market-oriented economic policies. He contends that states require political stability and the effective administration of institutions prior to the upheaval of moving towards a market-oriented economy or liberal democracy. Whilst Paris acknowledges the risk of this strategy is missions that never end, he states that the 'quick and dirty' approach to peace missions is 'fundamentally flawed'.⁶⁷ Paris believes that a stable and lasting peace will take time and missions should be undertaken with a recognition that they may take several years to complete, if they wish to be effective.⁶⁸ The issue of time is highlighted in this thesis as one of the most important factors that affords actors in a peace operation influence and this is discussed in the introduction and throughout the thesis.

⁶³ Bellamy, Alex J., 'The Next Stage in Peace Operations Theory?', *International Peacekeeping*, 11/1: 17-38 (2004), p.22.

⁶⁴ Lacher, 'Iraq: Exception to, or Epitome of Contemporary Post-conflict Reconstruction?'

⁶⁵ Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*.

⁶⁶ Lacher, 'Iraq: Exception to, or Epitome of Contemporary Post-conflict Reconstruction?'

⁶⁷ Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, p.208.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter Ten.

Another key debate in the liberal peacebuilding literature relates to how all-encompassing peacebuilding missions should be and whether they should comprise a 'light' or 'heavy footprint' – the idea being that a heavy footprint mission incorporates a wide range of functions, to the extent in some missions, of the UN taking over the bureaucracy of a state in order to establish government institutions.⁶⁹ A light footprint mission would not be as all encompassing. Krasner (2004) argues for a heavy intervention which he terms 'trusteeship' and 'shared sovereignty contracts' for collapsed or failing states.⁷⁰ Other scholars have questioned imposing authority and ideas at such an integral level of the State arguing it would have a negative impact on local buy-in and the ability of the nation to generate local solutions to local problems.⁷¹ Barnett (2004) implies that the weight of the mission (heavy or light) is not the main issue at stake in peacebuilding projects. Rather it is the style by which peacebuilders attempt to state-build (which he equates with peacebuilding). He argues instead for a 'republican' model of statebuilding which incorporates local voices through the 'holy trinity' of deliberation, representation and constitutionalism.⁷² Whilst Barnett's idea comes across as a better idea than a 'quick fix' solution of holding elections, he ignores the issue of external powers who are just as capable of subverting the peacebuilding process if it does not serve their interests no matter how inclusive of the views of the nation the peacebuilding process is.⁷³

Other key questions in the liberal peacebuilding literature include in what sequence peacebuilding efforts should occur, e.g. whether or not it is important to lock down security in a country before proceeding with elections;⁷⁴ whether or not peace and stability should be obtained at all costs, e.g. to what extent should there be retribution for those who are known to have committed human

⁶⁹ For example the United Nations Transitional Mission in East Timor (UNTAET).

⁷⁰ Krasner, Stephen D., 'Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,' *International Security*, 29/2: 85-120 (2004).

⁷¹ Richmond, 'The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding'; Chesterman, Simon, *Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan: The Future of UN Statebuilding*, (New York: International Peace Academy, 2002).

⁷² Barnett, 'Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War'.

⁷³ Lebanon over the years has been particularly prone to external influence in its internal affairs particular from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, France and the US and even further back, Turkey during the Ottoman Empire. See for example: Traboulsi, Fawwaz, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007); Hirst, David, *Beware Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (New York: Nation Books, 2011); Fisk, Robert, *Pity the Nation: Lebanon At War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁷⁴ Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*; Richmond, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*.

rights abuses during the state of war;⁷⁵ to what extent, and what kind of coercion should be employed to push through the liberal peacebuilding agenda;⁷⁶ should some societies be divided in order to obtain peace;⁷⁷ and finally, if it is wise to suspend the sovereignty of a state and allow the international community to intervene and act as a defacto government.⁷⁸

Paris (2010), whilst an advocate for peacebuilding and one of the most prolific authors on the subject, has also provided an extensive list of its flaws:

...inadequate attention to domestic institutional conditions for successful democratisation and marketization; insufficient appreciation of the tensions and contradictions between the various goals of peacebuilding; poor strategic coordination among the various actors involved in these missions; lack of political will and attention on the part of peacebuilding sponsors to complete the tasks they undertake, and insufficient commitment of resources; unresolved tensions in relations between the military and non-military participants in these operations; limited knowledge of distinctive local conditions and variations across the societies hosting these missions; insufficient 'local ownership' over the strategic direction and daily activities of such operations; and continued conceptual challenges in defining the conditions for 'success' and strategies for bringing operations to an effective close.⁷⁹

The main difference between critical approaches to peacebuilding and problem-solving (liberal) approaches relates to the issue of legitimacy. Criticisms of peacebuilding from those taking a critical approach, question the right of the 'core' countries (the most developed and wealthy countries in the international system) to dictate terms to the 'periphery' (i.e. less developed and less wealthy states). The questions asked by critical theorists about liberal peacebuilding are, as Pugh (2005) notes: 'Who is peacebuilding for, and what purpose does it serve?'.⁸⁰ The answer for most critical theorists is that it serves the interests of wealthier, developed states.

⁷⁵ Richmond, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*; Spears, 'The False Promise of Peacebuilding'.

⁷⁶ Doyle and Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis'.

⁷⁷ Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*.

⁷⁸ Spears, 'The False Promise of Peacebuilding'.

⁷⁹ Paris, 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding', p.347.

⁸⁰ Pugh, 'The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective' p.38.

Critical theorists contend that the peacebuilding project promoted and operated by international institutions and states is part of the liberal project whose primary objective in its interventions is to maintain international order by creating states in their own image – that is liberal market democracies.⁸¹ Proponents of the liberal peacebuilding project include the World Bank, the IMF, Western donor states, the United Nations and its associated agencies and many NGOs. They have according to critical theorists generated a model of peacebuilding that focuses heavily on security, economic liberalisation and institution-building at the cost of other important variables within the communities of host states. The rationale for this model comes from what Richmond terms ‘the de-contextualisation of classical political theory and history’ which has been used to support a metanarrative of ‘liberal norms of market democracy, all of which are supposed to represent inclusiveness and plurality’.⁸² Critical theorists argue that the idea of civil society and plurality espoused within liberal peacebuilding is artificial as it only engages with a thin veneer of society in recipient states who have been co-opted to cooperate with peacebuilding institutions. This means that large sections of the population are necessarily excluded from the liberal peacebuilding project. Furthermore, the idea of liberal peacebuilding is that the economic benefits of the free market economy will trickle down to the lower levels, and that individual political rights are of greater priority than others, therefore again excluding the consideration of other local needs such as those of welfare and culture.⁸³ Ultimately, the critical approach to peacebuilding praxis aims to unpack and challenge the assumptions of the liberal peacebuilding project because it believes that it is imposed at great cost to local and indigenous interests on the ground. The critical peacebuilding literature therefore focuses more on local ownership, local capacity, local agency and even resistance to imposed interventions.

Bendana (2005) argues that the peacebuilding projects of both the US and the UN have shifted towards ‘nation building’ and he questions the right of the developed world to enforce their model of the State onto selectively chosen recipients. The selectivity of the global

⁸¹ Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p.9.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

peacebuilding/nation-building project in his view is reflective of the geopolitical interests of the developed world and is not driven by genuine humanitarian interests.⁸⁴ Furthermore, he shares with Cox the idea that economic reforms which push liberal market economies onto 'failed' or 'failing' states, is in fact a political issue that has been deliberately depoliticised in order to come across as being the natural, and correct order of things.⁸⁵ Bendana argues that the 'good state' is 'defined as how well the State enacts reforms featuring policies to privatise and liberalise.'⁸⁶

Encarnacion (2005) also challenges the success of statebuilding or rather, intervention to promote the democratisation of states, on methodological grounds. He states that the modern method of attempting to transform states into democracies in a short time (using the above mentioned strategies) is unlikely to succeed, arguing that democracies emerge from societies that are already highly economically developed. He cites the evidence of post-war Japan and Germany; as well as Latin American states that moved towards democracy once they had developed economically and possessed a unified national identity.⁸⁷ Encarnacion also points out the flaws in liberal peace theory arguing that the 'rule' stating liberal democracies do not go to war with each other only applies in the case of advanced democracies; states during the early phases of democratization often become more aggressive and war-prone⁸⁸ and that democratic peace theory does not necessarily apply to civil wars in the same way as it might to inter-state war.⁸⁹ Finally, he also notes that in the pursuit of promoting democracy overseas, the US engages in distinctly undemocratic behaviour. However, these comments are directed at the US invasion of Iraq, and he does not mention UN peacebuilding missions.

Richmond (2009) argues that the liberal peacebuilding model is flawed because Western liberal peacebuilders imagine civil society in a different way to the local populations they engage with.

⁸⁴ See also MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System*.

⁸⁵ Cox, Robert, 'Globalization, Multilateralism and Democracy,' The ACUNS 1992 John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture (Dartmouth College:1992).

⁸⁶ Bendana, 'From Peacebuilding to State Building: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back?'

⁸⁷ Encarnacion, Omar G., 'The Follies of Democratic Imperialism,' *World Policy Journal*, 22/1: 47-60 (2005).

⁸⁸ Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and War,' *Foreign Affairs*, 74/May/June: 79-80 (1995).

⁸⁹ See for example, Vreeland, James, 'The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52/3: 401-425 (2008).

He posits that liberal peacebuilding sacrifices community and culture for individual rights and the state. In doing so, it causes local culture to reassert itself in ways that are detrimental to the peacebuilding project and the society at large.⁹⁰ His point about the hypocrisy of peacebuilding that tries to impose 'best practice' liberalisation strategies that have often failed to work in advanced liberal democracies onto post-conflict states is well made.⁹¹ He is also very likely correct when he assumes that most peacebuilders envisage civil society and the state very differently to the local population. For this research Richmond conducted interviews across a range of peacebuilding projects which include Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Kosovo, Bosnia, Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, Guatemala, and the Solomon Islands. However, his methodology still hinges on a top-down approach whereby he employs postcolonial and poststructuralist theories (broadly termed critical theory) to examine local peacebuilding practices. As such, he does not employ the ethnographic research methods that he argues are necessary to truly understand 'the local, locality, contexts and their interactions with and against the liberal peacebuilding architecture that has developed'.⁹²

Paris (2010) defends liberal peacebuilding from critical theorists and argues that 'there is no realistic alternative to *some form* of liberal peacebuilding'⁹³ highlighting a set of criticisms in the critical theory literature that he feels are based on five mistaken assumptions: conflating post-conquest and post-settlement peacebuilding; equating peacebuilding with imperialism or colonialism; defining the liberal peace too broadly; mischaracterising the peacebuilding record; and oversimplifying moral complexity.⁹⁴

Within the peacebuilding literature generally, there does appear to be a tendency to conflate peacebuilding with the unilateral statebuilding projects of Iraq (and to an extent Afghanistan), which is problematic as they have not been constructed in the same manner, and as noted above,

⁹⁰ Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*.

⁹¹ Ibid. Also see Ashdown, Paddy, *Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007).

⁹² Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*, p.14.

⁹³ Paris, 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding' p.340.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

there is disagreement as to whether or not the two concepts should be merged.⁹⁵ Paris's second criticism is less convincing, because whilst the objectives of the UN in peacebuilding missions can be said to be more altruistic, there is no doubt that UN missions, ultimately reflect the interests of their members, which are rarely philanthropic.

With regards to his criticisms of the liberal peace being interpreted too broadly and the peacebuilding project being misrepresented, Paris alludes again to the tendency of critical theorists to conflate unilateral military interventions, such as Iraq, with UN peacebuilding missions that operate on a consensual basis after a ceasefire between the parties has been agreed. He also argues that some authors tend to take the ideas underlying a peacebuilding mission to extremes and have equated them with the containment politics of the cold war, which he believes is a misrepresentation of the current liberal peacebuilding project.⁹⁶

On the final point, Paris's critique is most salient. For example, in relation to peacebuilding missions, critical theorists talk about the need to work more closely with the local population to obtain locally owned solutions,⁹⁷ but as Spears (2012) notes, 'whose vision prevails when there are differences that cannot be reconciled?'⁹⁸ Issues like these speak to some of the broader criticisms of critical theory: that it fails to provide solutions to the issues it problematizes; and that it itself is hostage to Western viewpoints that are equally as prescriptive in terms of the ethnocentrism of its approach. This is presumably why Paris argues that critical theorists are in fact arguing against peacebuilding from within a liberal ideology themselves – he uses the term 'liberals in disguise'.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Richmond, 'The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding'; Cooper, Neil, 'Review Article: On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace,' *Conflict, Security & Development*, 7/4: 605-616 (2007); Barnes, Catherine, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Mapping Functions in Working for Peace,' *The Italian Spectator*, 44/1: 131-147 (2009).

⁹⁸ Spears, 'The False Promise of Peacebuilding', p.308.

⁹⁹ Paris, 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding', p.354.

Cooper, Turner and Pugh (2011), produced a paper in response to Paris's criticisms. To his first observation that there is no viable alternative to the liberal peace they argue instead that it is more 'constructive' to 'investigate the variety of political economies in post-conflict societies rather than measuring them against a liberal norm'.¹⁰⁰ They propose that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the neoliberal economic model requires regulation and that more controlled, or dirigiste economic approaches can and have been successful in developing successful democracies. On this point, they may be correct as the development of South Korea and Taiwan depended for a long time on the dirigiste practices of their governments rather than open market economies. It may well be that post-conflict states may benefit from heavy state-led regulation of the economy during the early stages of reconstruction.¹⁰¹

In their response, the authors also challenge a number of other claims made by Paris. Firstly, they argue that there have been occasions when armed coercion has been used in peacebuilding missions (they cite Sierra Leone and Somalia) and therefore it is correct to critique UN peacebuilding missions alongside US-led military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Secondly that the literature focusing on the similarity between peacebuilding and colonialism occurs across a diverse range of theoretical approaches (not just critical ones), and therefore this is a legitimate comparison. They also posit that there are scholars coming from a critical approach who have in fact argued against this comparison, whilst describing new forms of a 'diffuse and non-territorial kind of empire' which they equate with the liberal peacebuilding project.¹⁰² But the question of whether it is legitimate to compare unilateral statebuilding interventions like Iraq with UN peacebuilding missions remains debateable. It is not just the use of force that defines the difference between unilateral statebuilding projects and UN peace operations, it is the consensus of the international community and - post-Cold War – intervention is based on under the conditions that there is a peace to keep. Scholars have found that the UN is more effective than

¹⁰⁰ Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, 'The End of History and the Last Liberal Peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland Paris'.

¹⁰¹ Helleiner, Eric, 'Economic Liberalism and Its Critics: The Past as Prologue?', *Review of International Political Economy*, 10/4: 685-696 (2003).; Pugh, 'The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective'.

¹⁰² Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, 'The End of History and the Last Liberal Peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland Paris', p.2002.

the US when it comes to ‘nation-building’;¹⁰³ and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) found that UN peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions are most effective when supported by a pre-existing peace treaty which in their words ‘do the heavy lifting’.¹⁰⁴ This highlights the important role that consent plays in interventions. This research in part confirms the findings of Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and demonstrates that the fact of broad agreement to 1701 is what helps to constrain potential ‘spoilers’, and this is discussed in Chapter Five.

Cooper et al’s claims can also be challenged on other points. In his article Paris is not arguing solely for a liberal free-market economy, rather he believes the liberal peacebuilding model provides the right framework, and with adjustments can be made to be more successful. As such, there is nothing in Paris’s (2010) paper to suggest that greater regulation of the economy could not be employed. The authors also infer that security is not necessarily prior to development, stating that peacebuilding strategies are based on ‘the now near-universal conceit that “development requires security”’.¹⁰⁵ This thesis contends that at the local level, security is prior to any other concerns. The suggestion that it may not be, strongly contradicts this research conducted amongst a local civilian population in a state that has been at war on and off for over half a century.

As well as questioning the legitimacy of state intervention, some critical theorists also provide critiques of the methods by which peacebuilding enacts its role. Most critical theorists and liberal theorists are increasingly taking the line that there is a need for greater local participation and local ownership of projects in any peacebuilding initiative.¹⁰⁶ Richmond (2009) advocates for more money to be disbursed on welfare, social and civic projects as opposed to purely

¹⁰³ Dobbins, J, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005); Sambanis, Nicholas, and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, 'Evaluating Multilateral Interventions in Civil Wars: A Comparison of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations.', in Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis and Panayotis Tsakonas, *Multilateralism and Security Institutions in the Era of Globalization* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

¹⁰⁴ Doyle and Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', p.789.

¹⁰⁵ Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, 'The End of History and the Last Liberal Peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland Paris', p.2001.

¹⁰⁶ Bendana, 'From Peacebuilding to State Building: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back?'; Pugh, Michael, 'The Social-Civil Dimension', in Michael Pugh, *The Regeneration of War-Torn Societies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009); Richmond, 'The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding'; Sending, 'Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context'.

infrastructural ones,¹⁰⁷ and advocates a more contextualised approach that uses local knowledge and avoids working from generalised 'blueprints'.¹⁰⁸ Roger Mac Ginty advocates a hybrid peace whereby both liberal and critical models of peace can co-exist and this also advocates for greater agency at the local level.¹⁰⁹ Paffenholz (2010) suggests that civil society can contribute in limited ways to peacebuilding in the following ways: protection; monitoring; advocacy; socialization; social cohesion; facilitation; and service delivery as an entry point for peacebuilding.¹¹⁰

The new critical literature on peacebuilding has been useful in terms of broadening the peacebuilding literature and making it more relevant to the field of international relations. It has connected up the practice of peacebuilding with theories of power distribution, a key aspect of study in the field of IR. As such, scholars of peacebuilding are now able to engage with the IR literature using different theoretical approaches. This makes the study of peacebuilding less niche and a richer theoretical endeavour. Both approaches, problem-solving and critical, have their weaknesses. The commitment to economic liberalisation in post-conflict states is rightfully questioned by the critical-approach literature. In the course of my research I bore witness to a great deal of poverty amongst the 'losers' in the free-market system in post-conflict society. Ironically this was not imposed by the UNIFIL mission, but it is something that it has sought to compensate for, as I demonstrate in Chapter Five.

However, critical theory attributes too much forward planning and Machiavellian scheming to the UN - an organisation which is not always that organised; and to the developed 'core' of countries. In doing so, critical theorists themselves appear not to afford local participants living under current peacebuilding missions any agency of their own. This research in contrast has identified that the peacebuilding tasks employed by UNIFIL have come from directives from

¹⁰⁷ Richmond, 'The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding'.

¹⁰⁸ Richmond, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*.

¹⁰⁹ Mac Ginty, Roger, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

¹¹⁰ Paffenholz, Thania, 'What Civil Society Can Contribute to Peacebuilding', in Thania Paffenholz, *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner, 2010). By service delivery, the author means civil society organisations that can help peacebuilders deliver services in the absence of a functioning state, for example Islamic charities in Somalia.

New York, but the way they are employed and approached is spontaneous. In addition, this research corresponds to the findings of Goodhand and Walton (2009) who identified that locals also have agency, and the ability to co-opt the UN to achieve their goals.¹¹¹

This review of the literature shows that there has been a heavier emphasis on critiquing peacebuilding projects and less emphasis on providing practical alternatives.¹¹² Of note, is that the majority of scholarship on peacebuilding has used a top-down analytical approach and with some exceptions, has not tended to analyse the success or failure of missions at the local level.¹¹³ It follows that perhaps the best way to investigate how missions can work more effectively at the local level is to examine how peace operations work on the ground. The next section discusses research that has been conducted at the grass roots level of peacebuilding e.g. the work of peace operations on the ground and local civilian responses to interventions.

Section Four: Subnational Peacebuilding Activities

This thesis employed ethnographic research to investigate the question: How do peace operations influence their security environment? This section reviews scholarship that has also examined peacekeeping missions at the ‘micro-level’ in order to locate this thesis in the literature that currently exists on this topic.

Over the course of the last ten years, the peacebuilding literature has seen the growth of a small but emerging body of scholarship that investigates peacebuilding/peacekeeping missions on the ground. These studies have taken a micro-level approach that investigate the daily activities of peacebuilders and how they engage with civilians in the course of their work. This research also provides a voice for recipients of peacebuilding – the local voice that top-down scholarship calls for, but does not illustrate in depth. Work conducted at this level falls into two categories, the

¹¹¹ Goodhand, Jonathan, and Oliver Walton, 'The Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding? International Engagement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process,' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3/3: 303-323 (2009); Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*.

¹¹² Paris is an exception here.

¹¹³ Exceptions can be found in Richmond, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*.

first use mixed methods (case study comparisons, discourse analysis and process tracing) and the second are far more ethnographic (using interviews and observational evidence). The first category are described below, followed by the second which have more in common with the approach taken in this research.

Sandra Whitworth (2004) is one of the earliest authors to examine UN missions on the ground. Her research compared official discourse on missions with evidence from observers and civilians on the ground. She identified problems with peacekeeper behaviour in the form of sexual harassment and racism in Cambodia and Somalia. She argued this behaviour is borne of the contradiction between being a peacekeeper and a soldier and that the two cultures are inherently incompatible.¹¹⁴ Of note in this research is that during my research I did not come across any reports of sexual misconduct or corrupt activity. As part of my ethnographic research I lived among civilians from the south and as the area of operation is small and the local population are very open in their views about UNIFIL, it is unlikely that an incident could have occurred and I would not have heard about it.

Whitworth puts forward the recommendation that peacekeeping missions need to comprise a larger element of civilian officers as a way of balancing out and reducing the effects of creating a highly militarised environment when a peacekeeping/peacebuilding mission comes to town. Of relevance to this thesis is that Whitworth specifically recommends that the UN and scholars learn from those who have had positive experiences of peacekeeping missions:

Some of these solutions might actually begin by listening to the people who have lived through both contemporary conflict and the peacekeeping missions deployed there, those who remember peacekeepers for the parks, the hospitals, the schools and the health services they provided. Those who remember peacekeepers not for their warrior qualities, but for the moments in which they could contribute to 'those tiny, cumulative efforts by which individuals and families reclaim their lives – a shutter repaired, a class taught, a palm-tree tended.'¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping : A Gendered Analysis*.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.186.

This research into the work of UNIFIL can be said to be comprise much of what Whitworth has described above.

Jeni Whalan (2013) used process tracing of secondary source documents and interviews to investigate how peacekeeping missions work on the ground in a structured focused comparison of two case studies: Cambodia and the Solomon Islands. She argued that peace operations can only work with the cooperation of the local population. Whalan uses a model that incorporates the concepts of power and legitimacy to explain why local populations choose to cooperate with UN missions. She finds that when local peace operations are believed to be legitimate, they have a greater chance of succeeding.¹¹⁶ Whalan also describes three forms of legitimacy: source, substantive and procedural. The latter two forms essentially differentiate between the goods and services offered by a peacekeeping mission, and the manner in which mission staff carry out their mandate.¹¹⁷ The first form, source legitimacy, is slightly more complex and relates to the mission's claim to authority and credibility on its arrival in the host state; meaning how an initial show of security and aid can improve public perceptions of the good intentions of the peace operation.

Whalan also makes a salient point that local and international legitimacy can be at odds in a mission which she terms the 'legitimacy gap'.¹¹⁸ As will be discussed in this thesis, this argument is particularly true of Lebanon and Resolution 1701, where civilians feel that the terms of the agreement are biased in favour of Israel. As such, UNIFIL staff are engaged in a constant balancing act whereby they need to maintain legitimacy at the local level for the mission, despite the fact that the terms of their mandate are regarded as inherently unjust by the local population.

Within the ethnographic literature, one of the earliest works on understanding peace operations at the level of civilians was the work of Beatrice Pouligny. Pouligny (2006) wrote about the

¹¹⁶ Whalan, *How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, Effectiveness*.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

experience of civilians during peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, Mozambique, Haiti and Sierra Leone. She found that local civilians felt excluded from peace operations; regarding their work as either imposed upon them from above, or as not being serious. This view stemmed from civilian perceptions that peacekeeping forces did not understand the real nature of the threats to their life and property, or if they did, they were afraid to deal with them. Pouligny's finding contradicts the work of some critical theorists who argue that liberal peace operations are over-securitised.¹¹⁹ But this thesis also found that if anything, civilians wanted peacekeepers to do more for them, not less when it came to the security of their environment. However, contrary to Pouligny's findings, this thesis finds that the local population experience a feeling of shared suffering with the UNIFIL troops. This is borne of the long-term nature of the mission which has been present since 1978. As such, local perceptions of UNIFIL have less of the 'them and us' quality that Pouligny identifies in her book.¹²⁰

The next major work to discuss UN operations at the local level was that of Severine Autesserre (2010) who researched the UN operation in the Congo (MONUC). Autesserre found that a failure to resolve disputes at the subnational level in the Congo was a major cause of on-going violence in the Eastern part of the country.¹²¹ These disputes tended to be over land, mining sites, collection of local taxes, local authority appointments and the relative social status of groups and individuals. Top-down pressures also sustained the violence owing to national and regional interference in local politics. However, Autesserre argued that the Congo case is reflective of a wider problem in international interventions whereby there are no comprehensive grassroots conflict resolution programs. Her finding certainly can be said to be true in the case of Lebanon, where there are currently no such programs included in the UNIFIL mission.

¹¹⁹ In particular Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*.

¹²⁰ Pouligny, *Peace Operations From Below: UN Missions and Local People*.

¹²¹ Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo. Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*.

Autesserre attributed her findings to what she calls a 'dominant international peacebuilding culture' which constrained the actions of all interveners, whether UN, diplomatic or military.¹²² She contends this was behind the failure to acknowledge that it was in fact local conflicts driving the continuation of violence in Eastern Congo. She identified a prevalent belief amongst peacebuilders that top-down causes were responsible for the majority of violence; and that the people of the region were inherently violent. In her view, these factors were the main roadblocks to the development of local conflict resolution programs. In addition the way peacebuilders framed the Congo mission, as being a post-conflict environment, meant they invested too much effort in the election process and not enough on resolving conflicts at the local level.

The factor of time, which is regarded as a key variable in this thesis, was also identified as an issue in the work of Pouligny and Autesserre. Their research found negative local perceptions of peacebuilders because of their swift entry and exit from the host states. Conversely, this research finds that the long duration of the UNIFIL presence in South Lebanon has been to their advantage in their civilian relations. The local population has become used to UNIFIL's presence and is accepting of it. Local civilians experienced warm feelings towards the peacekeepers borne of the shared suffering they endured under the occupation, and UNIFIL troops' willingness to provide humanitarian assistance from their own supplies.

Rubinstein (2008) stands out as one recent scholar who chose to write about an older style mission arguing he did so because:

I recognised that many of the new challenges and complications had resonances with earlier peacekeeping activities. Indeed, it seemed to me that the range of functions carried out by observer missions and early peacekeeping forces was quite wide and actually involved considerable civilian effort. I began to suspect that traditional peacekeeping could help us understand and improve the new peace operations.¹²³

¹²² *Ibid.*, p.23.

¹²³ Rubinstein, *Peacekeeping Under Fire: Culture and Intervention*, p.xiv.

Taking a mixed method approach, that included archival research, interviews and some use of ethnography, Rubinstein takes an anthropological approach to the study of the culture of peacekeeping. He argues that non-material and moral factors play important roles in international security and examines the symbols generated by the military aspect of peacekeeping missions. Rubinstein contends the inversion of 'normal' military activity is how peacekeeping missions obtain local legitimacy. Rubinstein considers that later missions (post-1990s) started to blur the lines between normal and inverse military activity which weakens peacekeeping's moral capital and puts missions at risk of being viewed as imperial invaders. He considers the option of separating fighting troops from non-fighting troops in his recommendations, as one way of retaining local confidence in the peaceful nature of peacekeeping missions and avoiding this blurring of lines, stating 'like humanitarian space, the actions of peacekeepers are wrapped in the moral authority that the cultural inversions create'.¹²⁴ He argues that in order to maintain confidence in peacekeepers, there needs to be absolute consistency between the strategic goals of the mission and their enactment at every level of the operation; but those goals should stress the peaceful intent of peacekeeping – as most of the early peacekeeping missions did.

Rubinstein's findings are relevant to this thesis in two main ways. First, this author shares my view that traditional missions can offer lessons for later peacekeeping models and that they comprise a wide range of activities and are not limited to patrolling. Second, since 2006 UNIFIL have not used force in any situations involving the local population or local political movements; as such their moral authority is reasonably high. It does however mean that they have been involved in a number of incidents with locals involving theft or damage to their vehicles, and they have chosen to stand back rather than defend their equipment. Elements of the local population know this and as such will try to take advantage of it. But this thesis finds, along with Rubinstein that this pacific behaviour leads to better outcomes for peacekeepers in the long term.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, p.145.

Another ethnographic study of grass roots peacebuilding was conducted by Adam Moore (2013). He researched micro-level peacebuilding missions from the perspective of a comparison of two cities in Bosnia that experienced very different outcomes from the peacebuilding process. Moore's principal finding is that all peacebuilding activities need to be appropriate to local conditions and properly implemented.¹²⁵ Moore concludes that when multiple agencies work on the same peacebuilding project it leads to a lack of information sharing and differing priorities which can conflict with each other in the practice of peacebuilding. Moore argues that coordinating and centralising peacebuilding efforts would have led to better outcomes in the towns he studied.¹²⁶ This thesis argues that this is one of UNIFIL's strengths, in that they are highly coordinated, with the civil operations working in tandem with the military, under a military commander. The result is that there is minimal duplication and clarity over shared objectives. Even the troop contributing countries, which have their own separate budgets consult with UNIFIL headquarters prior to making a decision to fund QIPs projects.

Moore also posits that the lack of independence of some international staff officers led to reduced authority and therefore an inability to 'devise and execute context-specific solutions'.¹²⁷ This meant that local authorities often tended to ignore field officers and try to circumvent them in order to liaise directly with their superiors; Moore here hints at local agency in achieving desired outcomes. Again, UNIFIL affords its civilian officers enough autonomy to avoid this problem and during the course of my observational research, I never came across an example of a civil affairs or political affairs officer being placed in a subordinate position in the local environment. Of note, is that Moore refers to the shifting priorities of European Union interfering with the work of peacebuilders on the ground. Here then we can see how UNIFIL's relative anonymity is a distinct advantage. UNIFIL have to a large extent been able to work without highly publicised political pressure from the international community quite simply because the project is regarded largely as a 'failure'. As such, UNIFIL is not the hot topic of the

¹²⁵ Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice*.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.165-167.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.167.

international media, and therefore is able to fly under the radar and get its job done with minimal external interference. Lise Howard noted in her work on peacekeeping that missions that were not micro-managed from above tended to be more successful.¹²⁸

Moore's final finding of relevance to this thesis is that 'embeddedness' matters in international peacebuilding projects which he defines as 'the degree to which international officials become effectively localized in relation to the social patterns, political networks and institutions that mediate relations at the sites in which they operate'.¹²⁹ Moore argues that embeddedness 'enhances the ability of international officials to develop productive relationships with local actors and read situations on the ground correctly'.¹³⁰ Moore's finding supports that of the work of Holohan (2005) who argued that 'social embeddedness' is an important factor contributing to the success of peacebuilding missions.¹³¹ This thesis finds that embeddedness is useful, in terms of UNIFIL's employment of local staff, who are able to read the situation on the ground more accurately than international staff, but like Moore, I would also argue that deep embeddedness of a mission can become a double-edged sword in that staff could become too used to routines and fail to employ fresh thinking to their environment. In the case of UNIFIL stale thinking came across occasionally but from the peacekeeping troops who rotate quickly, rather than from long-term staff.

Research on the local engagement of peacebuilders has also identified successes in their local level engagement.¹³² Schia and Karlsrud (2013) conducted a study of civil affairs officers (CAOs) in the Sudan, Haiti and Liberia. The authors found that not only are CAOs able to assist

¹²⁸ Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*.

¹²⁹ Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice*, p.168.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.168.

¹³¹ Holohan, Anne, *Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond* (Stanford, CA: University of California Press, 2005).

¹³² Karlsrud, John, and Diana Felix Da Costa, 'Contextualising Liberal Peacebuilding for Local Circumstances: UNMISS and Local Peacebuilding In South Sudan,' *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 7/2: 53-66 (2012); Felix Da Costa, Diana, and John Karlsrud, *UN Local Peacebuilding and Transition in Haiti: Contextualising Early Peacebuilding Activities to Local Circumstances, Haiti Case Study Field Report*, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2012); Schia, Niels Nagelhus, and John Karlsrud, 'Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Friction Sites and Local Level Peacebuilding in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan,' *International Peacekeeping*, 20/2: 233-248 (2013); ———, *Contextualising Peacebuilding Activities to Local Circumstances: Local Level Peacebuilding in South Sudan, Liberia and Haiti*, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2012).

with locally generated solutions, but they are also in a position to flexibly interpret their mandates (or peacebuilding activities) and fit them in with the needs of the population on the ground.¹³³

The full report of this project also found that 'UN components to some degree do contextualise their peacebuilding activities to local circumstances, especially as regards the subnational level'.¹³⁴

The importance of continuity in managing local relations was identified as a positive by Felix Da Costa and Karlsrud (2012) who found that 90% of the Civil Affairs staff in the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had over five years experience with the mission; the long-term tenure of staff was seen as a positive in terms of growing and maintaining local civilian relations.¹³⁵

The recent critical turn in the study of peacebuilding has prompted greater focus on 'local solutions' more broadly in the literature and a number of scholars have cited the importance of prioritising local solutions, local cooperation and local peacebuilders over and above top-down mandates and encouraging local ownership in peacebuilding projects.¹³⁶ This focus on local solutions also implies an increase in civilian staff. De Coning, Karlsrud and Breidlid (2013) argue that the role of civilians in peacekeeping missions has increased in part because of their value in the provision of services at national and local levels.¹³⁷ Barnes (2009) argued for an increased role for civil society in peacebuilding efforts, positing that:

¹³³ Schia and Karlsrud, 'Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Friction Sites and Local Level Peacebuilding in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan'.

¹³⁴ Schia and Karlsrud, 'Contextualising Peacebuilding Activities to Local Circumstances: Local Level Peacebuilding in South Sudan, Liberia and Haiti'.

¹³⁵ Felix Da Costa and Karlsrud, 'UN Local Peacebuilding and Transition in Haiti: Contextualising Early Peacebuilding Activities to Local Circumstances, Haiti Case Study Field Report'. This research by authors made the point that long term staff bring considerable contextual knowledge and institutional memory however there is a risk that they could become too settled into routines and not see how needs on the ground might be changing.

¹³⁶ Barnes, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Mapping Functions in Working for Peace'; Hayman, Carolyn, 'Local First in Peacebuilding,' *Peace Review*, 25/1: 17-23 (2013); Caplan, Richard, 'Partner or Patron? International Civil Administration and Local Capacity-Building,' *International Peacekeeping*, 11/22: 229-247 (2006); Schia and Karlsrud, 'Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Friction Sites and Local Level Peacebuilding in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan'; Schia and Karlsrud, 'Contextualising Peacebuilding Activities to Local Circumstances: Local Level Peacebuilding in South Sudan, Liberia and Haiti'; Keane, Rory, 'The Partnership-Conditionality Binary in the Western Balkans: Promoting Local Ownership for Sustainable Democratic Transition,' *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 18/2: 247-257 (2005); Felix Da Costa, Diana, and John Karlsrud, *Moving Towards Local-Level Peacebuilding? Contextualizing Early Peacebuilding Activities to Local Circumstances: South Sudan Case-Study*, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 2012); Whalan, *How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, Effectiveness*.

¹³⁷ De Coning, Cedric, John Karlsrud, and Marie Breidlid, 'Turning to the South: Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict' *Global Insights*, 19/2: 135-152 (2013).

...the primary role of outsiders is to create spaces and support inclusive processes that enable those directly involved to make decisions about the specific arrangements for addressing the causes of conflict. Outsiders should help to build on the capacities that exist and avoid actions that displace or undermine home-grown initiatives or that promote short-term objectives at the expense of long-term prevention.¹³⁸

Hayman (2013) posited that local civilians engaged in local peacebuilding projects often have a clearer idea of how to use the funds they are given effectively, relative to international staff and that financing of projects should lie in the hands of local NGOs and organisations.¹³⁹ She stated that peacebuilders need to 'ensure that assessment of impact is based on factors perceived to be important by the organisation and the community it serves'.¹⁴⁰ Conversely, this thesis found that because UNIFIL, has been present for many years, the local population has become adept at 'managing the peacekeepers' to serve their own ends. There is a two-way dynamic in the local/international relationship. Recipients of aid are not passive, they have their own objectives as well. Therefore, the use of local civilian staff was important to avoid corruption and misuse of funds. Local civilian staff understand the political and social order within the villages of south Lebanon, they are better equipped to perceive when a request by a mayor is going to be for the benefit of the village or for an elite minority.

The small but growing body of literature that examines peacekeeping missions at the local level has thus far described civilian reactions to peace operations; explained how peacekeepers fail to address violence and conflict at the local level; peacekeeper misconduct; and described how the peacebuilding system often fails to facilitate more localised solutions in conflicts and post-conflict societies. Despite the growth in literature that examines the micro processes of peace operations, scholars in the field recently argued that 'how peacebuilders actually interact at the local level is still significantly under-researched'¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Barnes, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Mapping Functions in Working for Peace'.

¹³⁹ Hayman, 'Local First in Peacebuilding'.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.23.

¹⁴¹ Schia and Karlsrud, 'Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Friction Sites and Local Level Peacebuilding in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan'.

In general, empirical research on post-conflict countries has not been able to integrate the heterogeneity of international organisations at the subnational level. This shortcoming is only slowly being remedied. The UN components present at the subnational level that are designed to engage with local actors and deal with local conflict - such as the UN's Civil Affairs section - are under-represented in the literature, which too often is dominated by a perspective that analyses the actions of international actors under the term 'peacebuilders', without acknowledging the substantial range of mandates and modes of interaction with local authorities and populations that exist. Research has centred on national policies and the capital regions, ignoring efforts on the lower, subnational levels.¹⁴²

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a review of the literature on peace operations and identified two main theoretical approaches: liberalism and 'critical theories' which appear to largely come from poststructuralism, postcolonialism and some Gramscian/Marxist thinking. In this thesis I take a broadly liberal perspective because ultimately I do believe that security is prior to other needs. I do not believe that UN peace operations that are a product of international consensus should be compared to other unilateral interventions because as the above research by Doyle and Sambanis (2006) has shown, agreement to the terms and conditions to some form of peace agreement is important for the continued success of a peace operation. I would also contend, that in the absence of the political will at the international level to move towards a peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel, a negative peace (e.g. the absence of fighting) is the best that UNIFIL can hope for. As the literature review has shown, these assumptions are based on liberal or neoliberal views of peace operations.

The above review has demonstrated that the majority of research on peacebuilding praxis thus far, from both theoretical strands has taken a top-down approach which has not sought to uncover the micro-processes of peace operations on the ground – in other words – how peace operations actually 'do' the job. More recent work in the past ten years has researched peace operations at the micro level from a variety of perspectives: to understand the perceptions of civilians, such as Pouligny and Whitworth; to understand the perceptions of those working in

¹⁴² *ibid.*, p.235.

peace operations such as Schia and Karlsrud and Bernstein; and finally some research has sought to understand both perspectives including Autesserre, Moore and Whalan. This thesis sits in the third category of research as it uses evidence from both the peacekeepers and civilians in the area to understand the dynamics of the local peacekeeping environment.

This localised research has uncovered a number of interesting findings: that the legitimacy of the mission is important;¹⁴³ that top-down approaches cannot resolve local problems;¹⁴⁴ that local knowledge is important;¹⁴⁵ and that peacekeeper morality¹⁴⁶ and aggression¹⁴⁷ must be kept strongly in check if an operation is to retain local support. All these findings are deepened in this research, but what this thesis brings that is different, is a specific focus on the local aspects of the securitisation of a peace operation which takes into account both civilian and staff views.

Specifically the research questions asked in this thesis are: (1) how do peace operations influence their security environment and (2) what factors effect UNIFIL local engagement?

Furthermore, this research identifies three factors – time, autonomy and local knowledge - that work to facilitate improved local engagement and effectiveness in terms of enabling peace operations to influence their security environment. The factor of time is not discussed in any great detail in the above literature, presumably because the objective of most missions is to exit the host state as quickly as possible. However, the short-term nature of peace operations does come through as a problem for civilians in the work of Pouligny,¹⁴⁸ and the Schia and Karlsrud¹⁴⁹ point to greater success for civil affairs officers who have remained in their jobs for over five years. Moore implies the need for greater autonomy in his book about Bosnia, when he states that officers suffered from a lack of independence and overt interference from above in the

¹⁴³ Whalan, *How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, Effectiveness*.

¹⁴⁴ Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo. Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*.

¹⁴⁵ Schia and Karlsrud, 'Contextualising Peacebuilding Activities to Local Circumstances: Local Level Peacebuilding in South Sudan, Liberia and Haiti'; Schia and Karlsrud, 'Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Friction Sites and Local Level Peacebuilding in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan'; Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice*; Pouligny, *Peace Operations From Below: UN Missions and Local People*.

¹⁴⁶ Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping : A Gendered Analysis*.

¹⁴⁷ Rubinstein, *Peacekeeping Under Fire: Culture and Intervention*.

¹⁴⁸ Pouligny, *Peace Operations From Below: UN Missions and Local People*.

¹⁴⁹ Schia and Karlsrud, 'Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Friction Sites and Local Level Peacebuilding in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan'.

course of their duties.¹⁵⁰ As noted above, local knowledge is clearly stated as being important in maintaining local support for peace operations across all studies that reflect on local engagement.

What this thesis extrapolates however is the sub-factors that sit beneath these three factors. I show how time (the long term nature of the mission) has three positive effects– it generates trust, institutional memory and drives consistency of effort. Autonomy generates creativity and spontaneity amongst staff which helps them to be truly responsive to local needs. Local knowledge affords staff the ability to be sensitive to their environment and work contingently according to the requirements of a situation. Prior to this these thesis, these three factors have not previously been discussed together as having an impact on the effectiveness peace operations at the local level.

The following chapter provides a brief history of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon in order to provide context for the three fieldwork chapters that follow it. I explain the history of UNIFIL in Lebanon before Resolution 1701, provide a discussion on the terms and conditions of the current mandate and then provide an up-to-date discussion of the strategic environment from the perspectives of the main stakeholders in the UNIFIL mission

¹⁵⁰ Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice*.

Chapter Two: A Brief History of the UNIFIL Mission in South Lebanon

Introduction

Chapter One provided a review of the scholarship on peace operations to argue the case for deeper examination of how peace operations maintain security at the micro level through local actors. This chapter provides context for the fieldwork chapters with a brief history of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon from 1978 to the present day. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the early days of the mission and demonstrates two important factors that are relevant to the mission today. First, that the UNIFIL mission (sometimes called UNIFIL I) was established in the absence of there being a peace to keep, something that is not recommended in peacekeeping practice currently.¹ In addition some of the parties to the conflict were not named in the original mandate. This point is relevant when considering the security challenges faced by the UNIFIL operation in its current form. The second point of note from this era, is that the humanitarian work performed by the peacekeeping troops in the early days of the mission (prior to 2006 and Resolution 1701) remains appreciated today. Affection for UNIFIL under the new mandate is in no small way due to local historical memory of the humanitarian acts of peacekeepers in the first UNIFIL mission whilst the area was under Israeli occupation.

Section Two of this chapter discusses the circumstances that gave rise to the United Nations Security Council issuing a new mandate for the mission in the form of Resolution 1701. This mandate brokered peace between Israel and Hizbullah but did not name Hizbullah as a party to the agreement;² this has made maintaining the peace harder for UNIFIL as they are not able to deal directly with Hizbullah's military wing in the post-1701 era. This section also illustrates why

¹ See for example Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines'.

² As will be shown in this chapter, the second mandate repeated many of the mistakes of the first.

the terms of Resolution 1701 are viewed as unfair by the local population which affects the legitimacy of the mission at the local level.

The final section discusses the current strategic environment in the south of Lebanon. I describe the position of all the relevant parties to the mandate – named and unnamed - in order to clarify the political position of all the stakeholders. I also briefly discuss how the Syrian crisis affects the area of operations and the calculations of key stakeholders, Israel and Hizbullah.

UNIFIL I: UNIFIL Prior to Resolution 1701

The acronym UNIFIL stands for United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Despite the inclusion of the word ‘interim’ in its name, UNIFIL is one of the longest running UN peacekeeping missions since the inception of peacekeeping missions in 1948. Despite its longevity, like all UN operations its mandate is reviewed and renewed periodically by the Security Council. The periods of renewal for UNIFIL have varied, from one month to one year, demonstrating concern on behalf of the Security Council as to the effectiveness of UNIFIL in light of its difficult mandate. However, currently, its renewal period comes up annually on 31st August each year. Like all older UN missions established prior to 1989, UNIFIL is labelled a ‘traditional’ peacekeeping mission in that it exists to act as a buffer between two states that remain at war.³

The UNIFIL mandate began in 1978 in response to the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon up to the Litani River, which was termed ‘Operation Litani’. Israeli forces invaded in response to continued attacks on Israel by pro-Palestinian groups operating in the south of Lebanon. These had begun in the early 1970s, caused by the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation

³ On 14 May 1948, when the independent state of Israel was announced, Lebanon along with other Arab states (Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq) declared they were in a state of war with Israel. Owing to internal tensions however, Lebanon as a state never actually went to war against Israel. The first UN peace operation ever established - the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) - was able to swiftly supervise a truce between Lebanon and Israel that continued to exist up until 1978. See UNSC Resolution 425, 19 March 1978.

(PLO) from Jordan⁴ in 1971 which resulted in the Palestinian resistance movement moving its base from Jordan to Lebanon.

UN Security Council Resolution 425 was issued on 19 March 1978 to address the deteriorating security situation in Lebanon. The resolution requested approval from the Secretary General for the establishment of an interim force comprised of 4,000 troops, drawn from member states, in the area south of the Litani river. The aims of the operation were stated as being:

...for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security, and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.⁵

A second resolution, UNSC Resolution 426 also on 19 March 1978, approved the duration of the mission for six months,⁶ and on 3 May, 1978, a third resolution (UNSC 427) approved an increase in troops from the original 4,000 to 6,000.⁷ The initial troop composition of UNIFIL was regionally diverse and comprised of troops from the following states: Canada, Fiji, France, Iran,⁸ Ireland, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway and Senegal.⁹

Israel had unilaterally declared a ceasefire at the Litani River on 21 March 1978 and the first contingents of UNIFIL arrived the following day. However, Israel initially made it clear that it had no intention of leaving southern Lebanon until the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) had been cleared from the area, and that they had zero confidence in UNIFIL being able to undertake this objective for them.¹⁰ Israeli troops were therefore under their own orders from

⁴ Seaver, Brenda M., 'The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon,' *Political Science Quarterly*, 115/2: 247-271 (2000).

⁵ UNSC Resolution 425, 19 March 1978, p.5.

⁶ UNSC Resolution 426, 19 March 1978.

⁷ UNSC Resolution 427, 3 May 1978.

⁸ Iranian troops were withdrawn after the 1979 revolution and replaced by troops from France, Nepal and Norway.

⁹ James, Alan, 'Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982,' *International Journal*, 38/Autumn: 613-634 (1983).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

the Israeli government and had no intention of fulfilling the terms of the UN instruction to leave until they had fulfilled their own objectives.

Other local militia were also predisposed to attack UNIFIL. These groups were initially Palestinian, or Lebanese militia run by Palestinians who had other international objectives and to whom the domestic concerns of the Lebanon were of little interest. Local doubts as to UNIFIL's neutrality were not helped by the fact that the largest UNIFIL troop contingent was the former colonial power France (who provided 1,244 troops).¹¹ Rather the troops were seen by many on the ground as yet another foreign intervention aimed at consolidating the goals of Western powers, who supported and bankrolled the state of Israel with whom they were at war.

It should be noted that later UN peacekeeping missions have only been established when there is considered to be a peace to keep. UNIFIL was created and organised at a time when Lebanon was in the midst (and as it turned out, at the very beginning), of a civil war and whilst the country remained victim to a hostile act by another state. Furthermore the area of operation of UNIFIL, the region south of the Litani river in south Lebanon, was suffering from a power vacuum that had been filled by competing armed militia groups. These circumstances meant that from the beginning, whilst operating under a mandate more consistent with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, peacekeepers were placed in an environment whereby their very survival and protection necessitated the use of force, which would be more consistent with a Chapter VII mission.¹²

The initial period after deployment was therefore one of great danger owing to the security threats faced by UNIFIL who were considered to be foreign invaders by many groups operating in the south. Their position was precarious and they faced constant attacks on their personnel, their bases and equipment. They suffered from constraints on their freedom of movement and communication. In the first four years of the mission, 36 UNIFIL personnel died as a result of

¹¹ Boerma, Maureen, 'The United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon: Peacekeeping in a Domestic Conflict,' *Millennium*, 8/1: 51-63 (1979).

¹² It should be noted of course, that there is no specific mention of peacekeeping missions in the UN Charter itself.

direct attacks (due to shootings and mine explosions).¹³ Of the three UNIFIL mandate objectives: re-establishing international peace and security, confirming the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the re-establishment of the authority of the Lebanese Government in the area; it is clear that at least two of these three goals had no credibility with the political organisations operating out of the south.

[F]irst of all they were at a total loss. They didn't know why they were here – nobody was telling them. That was the Palestinian time. The whole of the south was under Palestinian control and they were told by the UN that Yasser Arafat will be responsible for them. They were told, go and do your best. They were just thrown in here, without any clue. It was definitely not an environment conducive to peacekeeping. There's a war going on in Beirut, there's a war going on in the south, and any peacekeeping force will need some kind of local authority to back them up. There was no state. Well-meaning people here said, "Oh yes, we love you, welcome" and all that but basically you are on your own.¹⁴

Ultimately, the tasks that UNIFIL did manage to achieve during the early years of its mandate included:

...establishing roadblocks and checkpoints, setting up observation posts along key infiltration routes, engaging in foot and mobile patrols by day and night, and organizing night-time listening posts on a random basis. It also established a presence in as many populated areas as possible. After about a year efforts were made to improve UNIFIL's attempts to limit infiltration and incursions. Troops were deployed in greater density along the perimeter of the UNIFIL area, and the technical surveillance and detection capacities of the force were improved. Thus the number of night vision binoculars and strong searchlights was increased, while sophisticated ground surveillance radars were introduced. Towards the same end, a number of contingents making up the force brought in armoured personnel carriers.¹⁵

The three main groups that UNIFIL had to negotiate with in the early years of deployment are described next.

¹³ James, 'Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982'.

¹⁴ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

¹⁵ James, 'Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982'.

The Palestinians

The problem was the interference of the PLO in everything. Because they really saw themselves as the rulers of the land. And it took some time to settle that down, but you are dealing with 14 groups of Palestinians – each of them had one or two Lebanese proxy groups. You are dealing with the mess of 30-40 armed groups all running around and here you are international force – official forces and all that – dealing with these people.¹⁶

After Israel, the largest militia confronting UNIFIL upon commencement of its operations in 1978 were the PLO. By 1975 it is estimated that around 400,000 Palestinians were living in Lebanon, a country with a population of 4 million at the time. The PLO had established their base in Tyre prior to the arrival of UNIFIL, and possessed a large number of weapons caches around southern Lebanon. They resisted any interference in their ability to access these arms in order to conduct military offensives against Israel. As such they were a considerable force to contend with, and according to Israel, the justification for the 1978 (and later 1982) invasions.

Relations between UNIFIL and the PLO were made more difficult by the fact that the Palestinians were not considered a party to the mandate, which mentioned only Lebanon and Israel. As such, the PLO argued they should be left alone by UNIFIL. Furthermore they justified their continued presence in south Lebanon, under the terms of the Cairo Agreement of 1969, which stated that the Palestinians were entitled to operate in southern Lebanon and in particular maintain control of Tyre.¹⁷

But elements within the Lebanese Government were keen to re-establish authority in the south, and were pushing UNIFIL to take control of Tyre irrespective of these issues. In essence, the central government in Beirut, weak as it was, wanted UNIFIL to take on the PLO on their behalf.¹⁸ The French were willing to attempt this goal at the outset of the mission, and this led to several serious confrontations with the PLO who were determined to maintain their positions.

¹⁶ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

¹⁷ The Cairo Accord of 1969 between Lebanon and the Palestinians was an agreement whereby Lebanon had given Palestinian guerrilla fighters positions in south Lebanon.

¹⁸ Murphy, Ray, 'UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon and the Use of Force,' *International Peacekeeping*, 6/2: 38-63 (1999).

After a plea from the UN Secretary General to the PLO, UNIFIL was able to come to a political agreement with the PLO. On 24 May, 1979 Yasser Arafat agreed to cooperate with UNIFIL and to refrain from launching attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon. In addition, UNIFIL agreed to the PLO demand that those armed elements that were said by the PLO to have held their positions in the area throughout Operation Litani should be allowed to remain and that non-military supplies should be allowed through to them; not least their headquarters area in Tyre. As the Israelis themselves had avoided invading Tyre owing to the strength of the PLO position there, the PLO argued there was no need for UNIFIL to take over an area that had never been occupied.¹⁹

On the ground Palestinians entering into the UNIFIL area routinely flouted the agreement. Despite recording almost 500 incidents of turning back militia members carrying weapons to the Palestinians from 1979 through to 1981, UNIFIL estimated that the number of Palestinian guerrilla fighters accessing the caches of weapons stored by the PLO had increased from 140 to 450 by 1981.²⁰ In terms of the relationship between UNIFIL and the PLO itself, Arafat is noted to have worked hard to maintain good public relations with UNIFIL, and to be seen to curtail attacks on UN personnel as much as possible.²¹ When attacks did occur, the PLO was always quick to apologise.²²

[W]e had an old PLO guy who was the official liaison to UNIFIL. They designated a liaison officer to UNIFIL. PLO guys around Arafat usually weren't that educated... We had confrontations with them, we had occasional clashes. We killed each other actually. They didn't like the idea that UNIFIL soldiers were telling them not to carry guns, or not to go here. But we told them, "Look you agreed at the beginning that this is the UNIFIL area and you will not be in it". But for them, guns are everything. It's an honour you know? So we had problems like this with them and technically whenever we had a problem like this we had to go to the PLO. But Yasser Arafat was such a character. Whenever he felt he was not in good standing with the UN he would say "Oh! I don't know those guys, I don't know

¹⁹ Eventually UNIFIL were able to conduct patrols in Tyre, see James, 'Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982'.

²⁰ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations Organization, 1985).

²¹ Boerma, 'The United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon: Peacekeeping in a Domestic Conflict'.

²² Makdisi et al., 'UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East'.

who they are, ill-disciplined elements my brother.” Meanwhile of course you know he is paying their salaries...²³

In their attempts to manage the situation and prevent troop casualties there is evidence to suggest, that at times peacekeeping troops cooperated a little too closely with the PLO as Nachmias (2006) notes:

...during the 1982 invasion Israeli troops captured a PLO bunker and discovered a written agreement between the commander of NORBAT and the PLO, promising non-interference by the Norwegians in any terrorist activity that took place in their 'Zone'. Kurt Waldheim's response was that UNIFIL was only permitting the delivery of 'supplies' to limited Palestinian groups still in its area of operation. On another occasion, a senior UNIFIL officer from Nigeria was arrested near Jerusalem with two suitcases full of explosives, detonators, machine-guns and ammunition that he was going to deliver to a PLO gang. Thus, Israel argued that UNIFIL was a biased, anti-Israeli organization, supported by over 400 Lebanese military people.²⁴

UNIFIL headquarters also had a tough time managing those peacekeeping troops that were committed to deterring the PLO. As a former UNIFIL officer relates, some battalions, took matters into their hands at the checkpoints they established to try and prevent weapons transfers.

They [militias] had very severe problems with the Fijians. Because the Fijians they are very strict and tough guys. And Fijians used to beat them up at the checkpoint - when they had a checkpoint. They couldn't shoot them. So I mean we had problems like this...²⁵

Those peacekeepers that operated within the confines of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) found themselves ineffective.

...for example the Dutch came. Well the Dutch don't have any violent bone in their bodies, they don't want to fight anybody and they want to enjoy themselves. And the PLO really pushed them. Instead of going to the Fijian area, they moved south and decided to go to the Dutch area. And then they exploited that.²⁶

²³ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

²⁴ Nachmias, Nitza, 'UNIFIL: When Peace is Non-existent, Peacekeeping is Impossible,' *International Peacekeeping*, 6/3: 95-112 (2006), p.105

²⁵ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

²⁶ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and the South Lebanon Army (SLA)

The Israeli withdrawal was planned to take place in 1979 in four stages. In the first three of those stages the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) handed over small pieces of territory to the auspices of UNIFIL.²⁷ However in the fourth and final stage, the IDF ignored the UN resolution, and refused to withdraw from the final sector in the south. Maintaining a skeleton of IDF troops, they initially handed over authority to a Christian militia whom they continued to support. This was the South Lebanon Army (SLA) run by a former Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) officer, Major Saad Haddad.²⁸ Their presence prevented UNIFIL troops from conducting their operations up to the internationally recognised border. The literature on the UNIFIL mission during the period of 1979 through to 2000 reports that of all the factions operating in the south at this time, Israel, and its proxy force the SLA, were by far the biggest problem for UNIFIL.²⁹

According to a former UNIFIL officer, the Israelis refused to take responsibility for the activities of the SLA during the early stages of their military occupation which were extremely challenging for UNIFIL. Twice the UNIFIL base was attacked and shelled by the SLA; and peacekeepers were regularly attacked whilst out on patrols.

[The SLA] Most of them were Lebanese Armed soldiers who had come to the south with Haddad and stayed there and they were totally cut off from Beirut. They were communicating through Haifa and the Israelis they made use of this. They opened this Fatimah gate, for humanitarian services initially, and then it went to military assistance, then they started giving them weapons, then they started giving them training, then they start teaching them Hebrew, right? It came to the point that when I met most of these guys, they were in Israeli army uniforms. And the Israelis would tell you, “We have no control over these guys, they are independent Lebanese militia” whenever we had problems.³⁰

²⁷ Boerma, 'The United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon: Peacekeeping in a Domestic Conflict'.

²⁸ Lia, Brynjar, 'Islamist Perceptions of the United Nations and its Peacekeeping Missions: Some Preliminary Findings,' *International Peacekeeping*, 5/2: 38-63 (1998).

²⁹ Thakur, Ramesh, *International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987); James, 'Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982'; Lia, 'Islamist Perceptions of the United Nations and its Peacekeeping Missions: Some Preliminary Findings'; Murphy, 'UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon and the Use of Force'; Doyle, E.D., 'Reflections of a UN Peacekeeper: The Changing Fortunes of Conflict Control,' *International Peacekeeping*, 10/4: 24-39 (2003); Makdisi et al., 'UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East'.

³⁰ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

Unfortunately for UNIFIL, their headquarters was located in Israeli/SLA territory which meant they could only leave the base with the permission of the SLA. This created immense problems for UNIFIL because they were instructed by New York to deal only with Israel.

[O]ur headquarters was stupidly right there in the middle of their area. It was really stupid. And so I mean, anytime he [Major Haddad] wanted he could put pressure on the UN, he could close the roads, do this, do that. And we had rules that we don't deal with these guys. We deal with the Israelis. The Israelis would say, "No no you deal with them, they are independent, we don't know them. We are good friends but...". It was a game that was being played.³¹

In addition, once the enclave had been established, UNIFIL noted that the IDF moved freely about within it, staging regular incursions into the UNIFIL area of operations to pursue Palestinian fighters.³²

Despite the SLA's rather obvious role as an IDF proxy force, UNIFIL had no choice but work out a compromise deal with them in order to be able to operate. As such, they came to an arrangement with Haddad's militia (and by default, Israel). UNIFIL would be allowed to move freely on the main roads in SLA territory for five days a week for the purpose of re-supply and the rotation of personnel and UNIFIL helicopters were permitted to fly over the area but only after advance ad hoc clearance.³³

As time went on, it has been noted that the Israeli government took every opportunity to discredit UNIFIL at the UN and internationally in their attempts to have the mission withdrawn from South Lebanon.³⁴ Israeli contempt for UNIFIL was ultimately demonstrated when Israel re-invaded Lebanon in 1982: the UNIFIL Force Commander was given 28 minutes advance notice. At the time of the second invasion, some UNIFIL contingents, particularly the French

³¹ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

³² Ibid.

³³ Thakur, *International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force*

³⁴ Ibid.

and the Fijian and the Nepalese, erected roadblocks and laid their flags on the road challenging the IDF to drive over them. The IDF is reported to have extended the UNIFIL troops the courtesy of driving round the roadblocks for the most part rather than through them.³⁵

In 1985, the Israelis announced the official establishment of the 'security zone', which stretched from Naqoura in the West through to the southern end of the Beqaa valley in the East. This made it easier for UNIFIL as they were now able to deal directly with the Israelis. Once the IDF had taken over formally, UNIFIL had more scope to operate within the occupied zone. Up until this point UNIFIL had been given a limited number of static positions which were cut off from the rest of the area, more symbolic than anything else which they often had to reach by helicopter. In 1986, UNIFIL came to a further compromise with both the PLO and SLA whereby they agreed not to interfere in any clashes between them unless it directly threatened UNIFIL staff.³⁶ Civilian assistance and protection became UNIFIL's primary role up until the Israeli withdrawal in 2000.

The reason UNIFIL stayed during the Israeli occupation was based on a decision from New York. The view there was that there was little point in drawing down the mission because they believed that the Israelis would withdraw from Lebanon at some point. The feeling was that if the Israelis withdrew, it was very likely that they would be asked to establish a new UN mission to keep the peace in the area, so it was better to retain with what they already had.

UNIFIL became more visible on the ground after the Israeli invasion. I thought we would all be going home, why should a peacekeeping force be running around in an occupied area? But they told us, look you stay because these guys will leave one day and we will need another UN force, so why destroy what you have?³⁷

³⁵ James, 'Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982'

³⁶ Thakur, *International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force*

³⁷ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

In fact, the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon lasted until 2000, well after the end of the Civil War which ended in 1990 and culminated in the Ta'if Accords of 1991 that established the current framework of Lebanon's confessional political system.³⁸

The Lebanese Resistance

Aside from the Christians, the Israelis and the PLO, the other critical factions involved in South Lebanon were the Shi'a factions of Amal and later Hizbullah. Initially UNIFIL had no great problems with Amal, the original Shi'a resistance movement of the south, who saw greater benefit in cooperating with UNIFIL than in attacking it.³⁹ This was not the case with Hizbullah, who emerged in the south in the mid-1980s.

In the summer of 1980 UNIFIL formally recognized two Amal officials as liaison officers, reflecting the growing influence of Amal in the south. For Amal the relationship with UNIFIL was important and sensible, as in the absence of a legitimate Lebanese government the UN presence in the south stood for legitimacy. Moreover, in the light of assiduous Israeli efforts to undermine UNIFIL, they had certain interests in common and the UNIFIL zone gave a certain degree of protection to Amal from the IDF. Amal officials strove to 'wed themselves with UNIFIL',⁴⁰ which at times created strains in the relationship as Amal attempted to get too close, risking perceptions of UNIFIL impartiality. Cooperation essentially consisted of Amal assisting UNIFIL in preventing Hizbullah and Palestinian groups from launching attacks on Israel which would have led to further retaliatory attacks from Israel on the people of the south. In addition, assisting UNIFIL with checkpoints enabled Amal to intercept the flow of arms to Hizbullah, their political rival.⁴¹ However, as with all the groups that had a de-facto peace agreement with UNIFIL, incidents between UNIFIL contingents and Amal still occurred from time to time.⁴²

³⁸ See Appendix B for a full copy of the English version of the Ta'if Accords that ended the Lebanese civil war.

³⁹ Lia, 'Islamist Perceptions of the United Nations and its Peacekeeping Missions: Some Preliminary Findings'.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p.55.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Murphy, 'UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon and the Use of Force'.

In 1984, a new source of political authority emerged with the formation of the Shi'ite group Hizbullah. The evolution of the organisation is attributed to three factors: (1) the perception that the needs of the growing Shi'a population were not being served by existing factions in the civil war (Christian and Sunni but including Amal); (2) the impact of the Iranian revolution and the radicalisation of Shi'a worldwide; and (3) the acceptance by Amal of a role in the newly formed Maronite Christian dominated National Salvation Committee in 1982, which was seen as a betrayal of Shi'ite interests.⁴³ The movement swiftly gained popularity in the Beqaa Valley and they began to infiltrate the south competing with Amal for popular Shi'a support. By 1986, Amal and Hizbullah were conducting their own war for control of the south and this continued until they resolved their differences in the Damascus Agreement of 1990.⁴⁴ At the initiative of the Iranians and the Syrians, both Shi'ite parties were summoned to Damascus in order to find resolution.⁴⁵ The agreement in Damascus was that Amal would allow Hizbullah access to the south, but they could not conduct military activities.⁴⁶ Of note is that the leader of Amal (both then and today, Nabih Berri) insisted that UNIFIL must remain untouchable.⁴⁷ Since 1990, there have been no major disagreements between Amal and Hizbullah, at least none that are openly discussed in public. From this point on, Hizbullah were free to concentrate their energies on attacking Israeli troops in Lebanon. And this they did with increasing success.⁴⁸

Unlike Amal, Hizbullah was extremely hostile towards UNIFIL throughout the 1980s. This was due to the organisation's belief that UNIFIL and Resolution 425, was a move on behalf of the international community to protect Israel rather than the people of the south. As a result, Hizbullah adopted a confrontational approach towards UNIFIL and unlike the other militias, they rejected all attempts by UNIFIL to come to compatible working arrangements with them.

⁴³ Lia, 'Islamist Perceptions of the United Nations and its Peacekeeping Missions: Some Preliminary Findings'.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Hizbullah soon chose to ignore that part of the agreement.

⁴⁷ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁴⁸ For more details on this period from 1992 – 2000, see Blanford, Nicholas, *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty Year Struggle* (New York: Random House, 2011).

Hizbullah's aggression towards UNIFIL placed the peacekeepers at significant risk owing to a number of checkpoint confrontations which resulted in fatal shooting incidents, and Hizbullah's use of roadside bombs to attack UNIFIL patrols. However, UNIFIL worked hard to normalise relations with Hizbullah as quickly as possible. In 1992 the Israelis assassinated the leader of Hizbullah Sheikh Abbas Musawi in his car with his wife and child.⁴⁹ His replacement was Hassan Nasrallah, only 32 years old at the time. Nasrallah was known for his commitment to troops on the ground, his intelligence, charisma and an exceptional sense of humour.⁵⁰ The former spokesman for UNIFIL immediately went to see him to negotiate a deal between Hizbullah and UNIFIL.

[A] few months after he was appointed, I went to Nasrallah and said, "Look Sheikh, we don't have to like each other, we don't have to agree on everything. Certainly we won't agree on anything. All I want is that we don't shoot each other. If you think that UNIFIL is doing a good service for your people in the south, then let us stay. We will be careful in our dealings with the people but we are not going to replace you. So at least let's stop shooting each other." He said, "OK". So right then he appointed, this was a first, an official liaison officer for UNIFIL. For the first time. And he said to me: "Whenever you have a problem with our guys, you find this guy. He will report directly to me. But in return I want to be able to directly send you a message". So I had an office in Tyre which became my contact point.⁵¹

It should be noted that attacks believed to be from Hizbullah did not cease entirely after the aforementioned agreement. But these attacks occurred when the military wing of Hizbullah perceived there had been a violation of their security or a direct attack on their personnel, and not because of a continued commitment to attack UNIFIL for existential reasons.⁵² The vagueness of the UNIFIL mandate prior to Resolution 1701 was in many ways to blame as whilst it instructed UNIFIL to prevent armed groups from infiltrating the area of operations, it did not take account of the Lebanese right to resist occupation of their land. As such, Lebanese armed elements felt justified in preventing UNIFIL from interfering with their operations, even if that meant attacking UNIFIL.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.; ———, *Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafiq Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East* (London: IB Tauris, 2006).

⁵¹ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2014.

⁵² Lia, 'Islamist Perceptions of the United Nations and its Peacekeeping Missions: Some Preliminary Findings'.

Therefore UNIFIL continued to receive attacks on its personnel and property up until the Israeli withdrawal of 2000. Not all attacks came from Lebanese and Palestinian militias. Between 1990 – 2000 there were two further Israeli invasions into south Lebanon: Operation Accountability in 1994 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. UNIFIL could merely watch and record the series of events that unfolded. One of the most serious events for UNIFIL and civilians during this time was the Israeli bombing of the Fijian compound at Qana in 1996 referred to widely as the Qana massacre. Here 106 civilians died when the Israeli air force bombed the hospital in the Fijian UN compound.⁵³ The attack was condemned by the UN and human rights groups, but Israel determined it an accident and refused to take responsibility for costs or compensation, despite evidence clarifying that the pilots had known exactly what they were bombing at the time.⁵⁴

UNIFIL I and Civilian Protection

Whilst UNIFIL I were in many ways unable to fulfil the terms of the mandate, peacekeepers found other ways to make themselves useful during their time in South Lebanon in the form of providing civilian protection and assistance. What emerged from this research is that affection for UNIFIL is based a great deal on the historical memory of civilians during the Israeli occupation.⁵⁵ During this time UNIFIL battalions gave the people what they could from their own national resources. At a time where life was very hard for southerners owing to constant invasions and occupation.

The south was totally empty. People had escaped, and they were not going to come back. The Palestinians were holding the place and at war with the Israelis so whoever was left behind was typical Lebanese scene. Usually they leave behind their old people to take care of the property. All that sort of thing. And those

⁵³ Bassil, Noah, 'Israel: International Rogue?', *AQ: Journal of Contemporary Analysis*, 81/1: 10-16 (2009).

⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch, *Israel/Lebanon 'Operation Grapes of Wrath': The Civilian Victims*, Human Rights Watch, 1997); United Nations, 'Israel's Shelling of UNIFIL,' *International Peacekeeping*, 3/3: 137-143 (1996).

⁵⁵ Makdisi et al., 'UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East'.

people were absolutely dependent for everything, they had nothing. Medical care, this, nothing! Sometimes they didn't have food.⁵⁶

As such, UNIFIL were regarded by many civilians as saviours.

I tell you during the occupation for the people they were the saviours...UNIFIL were for the local people like life raft for them. Because they felt they are protected. If in the occupied area they [Israelis] want to enter any house, UNIFIL try to stop them. And that's why for the people UNIFIL were like this. But now as we have the local army and the situation is different. But I tell you when ever any UNIFIL soldier want to come in to any house he will be welcome.⁵⁷

So it was like a very warm and friendly relationship. Because they came here in a very critical situation and they were the only refuge for the people. That's why the relation was very strong and memorable until now.⁵⁸

There was a strong sense that despite their limited resources, UNIFIL troops would go the extra mile to help the Lebanese. During the time of the Israeli occupation, UNIFIL battalions did not have the kind of numbers on the ground or resources that they have today. As such, they gave much of what they could from their own supplies. The locals knew this and appreciated it deeply.

I can remember that we had no electricity – they provided the people with electricity. They used to have their own generators and they used to give them to the people. And they used to provide them with water. They used to...they started from the very beginning these humanitarian activities, providing people with services like medical, dental, even vet. So from the very beginning the Norwegians started this initiative and the people got used to that.⁵⁹

UNIFIL troops also tried to protect local civilians from the worst effects of the occupying force.

There was one scene I will never forget. In a village called Burj Ahal – it was raided by the Israelis. And they were looking for some people. So they collected all the women and children in the school and they took the men some place else. And it was a village in a French battalion area. And they wanted to blow up a house. So immediately the French Commander, without asking, he ordered his guys to climb to the roof of the building and sit there. So fifteen French ran to the roof of the building and sat there. People saw those things and it became legends.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

⁵⁷ Interview with Respondent D, Civilian, Hebbariyeh, South Lebanon, 18 June 2013.

⁵⁸ Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁵⁹ Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁶⁰ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

We can say because the Israeli occupation didn't allow [you] to have a normal life. So they started to like, err, arrest people and the Norwegians used to try their level best to prevent that within their limits and their mandate.⁶¹

The local population also spoke of their sadness when UNIFIL soldiers paid the ultimate price for their tour of duty.

We used to feel bad whenever we used to lose one of their lives because they are here for our sake and they used to die. They used to be young soldiers who came here just for ah – supposed to be here as peacekeepers. But some of them unfortunately they used to lose their lives and die here. It used to be really like pain for everyone.⁶²

All the UNIFIL soldiers who died are martyrs. We have great appreciation for the soldiers who came from a foreign place and died for our land.⁶³

Leading Up to the 2006 War

UNIFIL's work with civilians during the Israeli invasions and in the subsequent recovery periods helped to further ameliorate tensions between them and Hizbullah. Hizbullah saw that UNIFIL were genuinely caring towards the local population, and as a partly social organisation, they appreciated this.⁶⁴ As a result, the relationship between the parties continued to improve. This paved the way later for UNIFIL to be able to engage with Hizbullah at the national level when they became involved officially in Lebanese politics.

The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon should have heralded a more successful era for UNIFIL in terms of the completion of their mandate, and in many ways it did. The dismemberment of the 'zone of security' meant that UNIFIL was able to operate up to the internationally recognised boundaries, and was no longer the target of attacks from the troublesome SLA which had been disbanded the instant Israel withdrew (with many of its members and their families going to live in Israel, fearing reprisals).

⁶¹ Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁶² Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁶³ Interview with Respondent D1, Civilian, Qlayli, South Lebanon, 22 August 2013.

⁶⁴ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

However, a number of factors conspired to prevent the long dreamed of peace for the region. Israel had failed to withdraw from two small sections of internationally recognised Lebanese land: Shebaa Farms and half of the town of Ghajar. As Israel had failed to coordinate its withdrawal in advance with the Lebanese Government, the vacuum that emerged in the area was quickly filled by Hizbullah who were determined to get back the remaining pieces of Lebanese land, as well as a significant number of Lebanese prisoners who had been abducted during the Israeli/SLA occupation and remained in jails in Israel. Extremely organised as ever, Hizbullah set up checkpoints, observation posts and a visible military infrastructure across the area of operations and became the de-facto politico-military authority in the area. Their presence prevented the deployment of joint patrols between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), for political and logistical reasons which will be discussed in Chapter Four.⁶⁵

Furthermore, the Line of Withdrawal (the Blue Line) remained contested in parts as the boundary was often unmarked leading to intentional and unintended violations that led to confrontations between the Lebanese and the Israeli troops. This meant that Hizbullah continued to have a *raison d'être* for its existence in South Lebanon, by arguing that Israel had not withdrawn from all Lebanese territory; but there were other reasons too. In the absence of LAF, Hizbullah felt justified in continuing to maintain its forces on the Blue Line, in case of future attack by Israel. For UNIFIL, this meant they required the continued cooperation of Hizbullah in order carry out their duties. For the most part, they had it but there continued to be incidents – some fatal – between Hizbullah and UNIFIL, as well between UNIFIL and the IDF.

Despite the constant insecurity during this period as a result of frequent clashes between the IDF and Hizbullah, some civilian respondents argue the presence of Hizbullah on the border made

⁶⁵ The LAF did not feel confident that they would be accepted in the south alongside the presence of Hizbullah. There also remained a desperate shortage of equipment for the LAF which (as noted later) prevented full deployment during this period.

them feel more secure than they do currently whilst there is peace. The frankest expression of this was provided by one Shi'ite civilian respondent:

During the resistance existence on the borders, the Israelis used to pass on the borders, we were chanting at them, cursing them etc. But they never dared to answer back because they were afraid of the resistance. After 2006, the Israelis started to give the finger because they feel more secure because Hizbullah is away (more) from their borders... For example, this Fatimah Gate, there was only one person from Hizbullah, just observing, it was enough to make the Israelis feel scared. Even if he didn't have weapons and was having slipper on his foot, but they were scared of him... Israel only counts Hizbullah. So they don't care about UNIFIL. Because Israel knows very well that Hizbullah exists in every place on the borders and that's what's they are afraid of, not UNIFIL. So the confidence that people have in UNIFIL is a temporary confidence. But if something occurred, if an incident occurred, people know very well that UNIFIL will not be in the middle. They will escape, they will leave, they will not confront the Israelis. And who will confront Israel is the resistance.⁶⁶

The belief of the local population in Hizbullah's ability to defend them remains pertinent today, and it is for this reason that UNIFIL cannot say they have obtained the full trust of the local population. Experience has taught civilians that when hostilities break out, UNIFIL will not be able to defend them, but Hizbullah will. As such, many civilians maintain plurality of consent: consent for the LAF and UNIFIL on the one hand, and consent for the presence of Hizbullah on the other. This comes into conflict only when the LAF or UNIFIL are alerted to explosions near the border, or when UNIFIL (as occurred in the past) has attempted to monitor Hizbullah activities too closely. As will be noted in the following chapters, on these occasions, the locals will close ranks and work to prevent UNIFIL from entering certain areas.

The strategic environment between 2000 and 2006 was not conducive to UNIFIL doing any more than what they had done before, with one difference; they were able to now patrol the border areas. But they were not able to prevent altercations between Hizbullah and Israel. This meant that another major confrontation between Hizbullah and the IDF became inevitable. It occurred on 12 July 2006 at the height of the summer tourism season.

⁶⁶ Interview with Respondent Q, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

Hizbullah had been taunting the IDF in the years prior to the 33-day war or the July War as it is called in Lebanon (Harb al-Tamooz). But they had always operated with the intention of hurting the IDF enough to obtain a stronger bargaining position. They maintain publicly that they never intended to start a war.⁶⁷ However, there is no doubt that their actions on 12 July were highly provocative and what Hizbullah had not counted on was a shift in the strategy of Israel. There is a small body of literature that points to the fact that Israel, tired of Hizbullah attacks on the IDF, was preparing for a war with Hizbullah with the aim of eradicating the organisation and was therefore waiting for legitimate justification to begin a new conflict.⁶⁸

On 12 July 2006, it came. Hizbullah ambushed an IDF patrol in the area of Zar'it-Shtula on the border with Israel. They kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed five more in the attack. Hizbullah has always claimed they launched the attack to obtain a bargaining chip with Israel on the issue of the imprisoned Lebanese and Palestinians in Israeli jails.⁶⁹ Immediately after the kidnapping, Hizbullah demanded the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel in exchange for the release of the abducted soldiers. Israel however perceived their actions as an act of war and immediately launched a retaliatory response. This began with airstrikes and artillery fire on targets in Lebanon aimed at Lebanese civilian infrastructure, including Beirut's Rafiq Hariri International Airport; an air and naval blockade; and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. Hizbullah then launched more rockets into northern Israel and engaged the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in guerrilla warfare from hardened positions.

The war raged for 33 days and ended with the implementation of Resolution 1701 on 14 August 2006. During the course of the war it is estimated to have killed at least 1,191–1,300 Lebanese

⁶⁷ Shadid, Anthony, 'Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations', New York Times, 8 October 2006.

⁶⁸ Zunes, Stephen, 'Washington's Proxy War', in Nubar Hovsepian, *The War on Lebanon: A Reader* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2007); Gendzier, Irene L., 'Exporting Death as Democracy: US Foreign Policy in Lebanon', in Nubar Hovsepian, *The War on Lebanon: A Reader* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2007).

⁶⁹ Shadid, 'Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations'.

people, and 61 Israelis.⁷⁰ It severely damaged Lebanese civil infrastructure, and displaced approximately one million Lebanese and 300,000–500,000 Israelis.⁷¹

The next section provides a description of the revised UNIFIL in order to clarify the remit of the UNIFIL mission today. This section also discusses the terms and conditions of Resolution 1701 to explain why there exists a gap between the international and local legitimacy of the resolution which affect UNIFIL's operations on the ground.

The Post Resolution 1701 Phase

Resolution 1701 was issued on 11 August 2006,⁷² however, in contrast to all other UNSC resolutions, the ceasefire did not come into effect until three days later, at 08:00 am on 14 August.⁷³ It is noted in the literature on the war, that this enabled Israel to continue and intensify its bombing campaign of South Lebanon and so-called Hizbullah strongholds, in the last three days of the war.⁷⁴ The effect of the Israeli efforts were the strewing of up to an estimated one million cluster bomblets (illegal under international law) across the width and breadth of South Lebanon which continue to kill, maim and injure civilians in the area.⁷⁵ Falk (2007) argues the delay was engineered by the US to afford the Israeli forces some political cover to 'seize some vestiges of victory from the jaws of its defeat'.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ Falk, Richard, and Asli Bali, 'International Law and the Vanishing Point', in Nubar Hovsepian, *The War on Lebanon: A Reader* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2007).

⁷¹ Fisk, Robert, 'Lebanon Death Toll Hits 1,300', *The Independent*, 17 August 2006; *Country Report—Lebanon*, (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006).

⁷² UNSC Resolution 1701, 11 August 2006.

⁷³ Makdisi, 'Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the War on Terror'; Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*.

⁷⁴ Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*; Makdisi, 'Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the War on Terror'; Bennis, Phyllis, 'The Lebanon War in the UN, The UN in the Lebanon War', in Nubar Hovsepian, *The War on Lebanon: A Reader* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2007); Gendzier, *Exporting Death as Democracy: US Foreign Policy in Lebanon*.

⁷⁵ Gendzier, *Exporting Death as Democracy: US Foreign Policy in Lebanon*; Bennis, *The Lebanon War in the UN, The UN in the Lebanon War*; Berrigan, Frida, and William D. Hartung, 'US Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to Israel', in Nubar Hovsepian, *The War on Lebanon: A Reader* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2006).

⁷⁶ Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*, p.217.

There is speculation among those who have studied the war, that Resolution 1701 only came into being in its current form, after it became apparent that Israel would be unable achieve its objectives if it continued prosecuting the war.⁷⁷ Up until 5 August, America was pushing Israel to continue the conflict in order to eliminate the problem of Hizbullah once and for all.⁷⁸ The first draft ceasefire agreement put forward by the US and France on 5th August demanded a cessation of all attacks by Hizbullah and permitted Israel to continue acting in 'self-defence'. As the legality of what constitutes 'self-defence' by a state is unclear this could have allowed Israel to remain in Lebanon and to continue to conduct any military exercises it chose.⁷⁹ As a result, the Government of Lebanon rejected the terms of the initial draft on 6th August, and was accused by Condoleezza Rice, of not being prepared to make peace.⁸⁰ The second draft of the Resolution was finally agreed on 11 August by all parties and passed on the same day.

There are a number of reasons why Resolution 1701 has been critiqued for being fundamentally unfair.⁸¹ First, an examination of the text reveals a lack of context when articulating blame for the start of the war, which is clearly laid at the feet of Hizbullah for conducting the kidnappings which were illegal under international law.

Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbullah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons...⁸²

The reference to injuries on 'both sides' does not reflect the disproportionality of Israel's response to the kidnappings: a bombing campaign which resulted in over 1000 civilian deaths on the Lebanese side (not counting further deaths as a result of unexploded ordinance) compared

⁷⁷ Makdisi, 'Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the War on Terror'; Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*; Hoge, Warren, and Steven Erlanger, 'The Cease-Fire: UN Council Backs Measure to Halt War in Lebanon', *New York Times*, 12 August 2006.

⁷⁸ Zunes, *Washington's Proxy War*; Jones and Hart, 'Keeping Middle East Peace? '.

⁷⁹ Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*; Makdisi, 'Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the War on Terror'; Zunes, *Washington's Proxy War*.

⁸² United Nations, 'UNSC Resolution 1701, 11 August 2006', p.1.

with 61 deaths (39 of which were civilians) on the Israeli side of the Blue Line.⁸³ It is argued that this disproportionality contravened the international laws of war, but this was not acknowledged in the resolution.⁸⁴

Second, Israel had been illegally abducting and withholding Lebanese and Palestinian nationals over the course of many years during their occupation of South Lebanon. These acts were what Hizbullah used to justify the kidnappings, whereby they argued that they were not trying to start a war and were simply trying to effect an exchange of prisoners. Observers of the peace settlement argue that this should have been relevant in this context.⁸⁵ As it is, the mandate alludes to Israeli capture of civilians, but does not call directly for their release in the same urgent and unconditional terms:

Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel.⁸⁶

Thirdly some scholars contend that by failing to call a ceasefire for 34 days, the UN was complicit in allowing an aggressor state to wage a military campaign which contravened the UN Charter and its prohibition on aggressive war.⁸⁷ Fourth, there is no mention in the Resolution of Israel's use of illegal weapons Israel's: phosphorous and cluster bombs which are also widely regarded as being illegal under international law (although neither Israel nor the US have signed the treaty banning their use).⁸⁸

⁸³ Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*.

⁸⁴ Makdisi, 'Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the War on Terror'.

⁸⁵ Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*.

⁸⁶ UNSC 1701, 11 August 2006, p.1.

⁸⁷ Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*; Nasu, 'The Responsibility to React? Lessons from the Security Council's Response to the Southern Lebanon Crisis of 2006'.

⁸⁸ Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*.

This imbalance in apportioning blame leads the local population in South Lebanon, who bore the brunt of the war, to regard Resolution 1701 as a fundamentally unfair and biased document. The lack of acknowledgement of Israeli culpability means that Hizbullah's continues to elicit support from the population in the UNIFIL area of operation. As such, UNIFIL and LAF attempts to disarm and disband the organisation, and therefore fulfil a significant aspect of their mandate are quite simply impossible tasks.

In the mandate UNIFIL is specifically charged with assisting the LAF to ensure the area of operations is 'an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons',⁸⁹ in other words, an area free of Hizbullah and other militias, specifically:

- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Ta'if Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;⁹⁰

Falk (2007) has commented that by calling for the disarmament of military groups in the area, the main aggressor in the war, Israel, was rewarded by an acknowledgement that intervention to disarm and attack Hizbullah is legitimate.⁹¹ This 'Chapter VII-like' aspect of Resolution 1701, has raised the question of how much force should be applied in the enforcement of the disarmament aspect of the current UN mandate.⁹²

⁸⁹ UNSC Resolution 1701, 11 August 2006, p.2.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.2.

⁹¹ Falk and Bali, *International Law and the Vanishing Point*. In comparison the mandate called for Israel to stop all offensive military action which enabled it to retain its troops on Lebanese soil and conduct some commando operations in the Beqaa Valley a week after the ceasefire, under the cover of its right of self-defence. This again raises questions about the legitimacy of states claiming the right of self-defence in order to engage in disproportionate acts of aggression towards other states.

⁹² Tardy, Thierry, 'A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations,' *International Peacekeeping*, 18/2: 152-167 (2011) Jones and Hart, 'Keeping Middle East Peace?'

In addition to the above tasks, Resolution 1701 significantly increased the troop numbers patrolling the Blue Line from 7,000 to a recommended 15,000. Bearing in mind the small size of the area of operation, these high troop numbers are rare in UN peacekeeping missions, demonstrating the force of political will involved in crafting the new resolution.⁹³ The Resolution also called for UN troops:

- ...in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):
- (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
 - (b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;
 - (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
 - (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
 - (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;
 - (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;⁹⁴

Since the implementation of Resolution 1701, the predominant concerns of the Security Council have been that UNIFIL prevent hostilities from breaking out along the Blue Line; increasing cooperation and capacity building between UNIFIL and the LAF; ensuring the removal of weapons from the area and the transit of new weapons into the area; and the prevention of attacks against UNIFIL in the course of their duties.

Since Resolution 1701, later resolutions reflected an increase in cooperation between UNIFIL and the LAF with the stated purpose of establishing ‘a new strategic environment’,⁹⁵ which should probably be interpreted as meaning one without the presence of Hizbullah. The establishment of a LAF liaison office at Naqoura in 2006 was enhanced by the addition of an extra LAF battalion in 2010 to assist UNIFIL and the commencement of a strategic dialogue

⁹³ A useful comparison is the Democratic Republic of Congo, an area the size of Western Europe where the UN has currently stationed just over 19,000 troops. The area south of the Litani river is an area two thirds the size of the US state of Connecticut and is authorised for up to 15,000 troops.

⁹⁴ UNSC Resolution 1701, 11 August 2006, p.2. See Appendix E for the full version of Resolution 1701.

⁹⁵ See for example UNSC Resolution 1773, 24 August 2007.

between the LAF and UNIFIL. These efforts have culminated thus far in tripartite monthly discussions between the LAF and the IDF, mediated by UNIFIL.

To promote peace and security along the Blue Line, resolutions since 2006 have repeatedly referred to the need for clear demarcation of the Blue Line by UNIFIL⁹⁶ to limit the scope for unintended violations by civilians and troops on both sides of the line alike. Mandates since 2007 have called upon Israel to withdraw from the Lebanese side of the town of Ghajar currently occupied by Israel which is divided by the Blue Line (owing to half of it residing in what is internationally recognised as the Golan region of Syria).⁹⁷ Perhaps in recognition of the difficulty UNIFIL troops face carrying out their mandate, owing to popular support for the very organisations they are being asked to assist with disarming, post-1701 mandates have frequently ‘encouraged efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of Lebanese prisoners in Israel’.⁹⁸

Problems along the Blue Line continue to concern the Security Council in terms of their effects on UNIFIL, the LAF and civilians. These are discussed in detail in the following chapter on the international engagement of UNIFIL staff, but they include roadside bombs, illegal incursions by Israel and a brief outbreak of hostilities between the named parties (the LAF and the IDF). However, since 1701, no major changes to the nature of the mandates have occurred, and the mission continues to boast one of the larger UN peacekeeping forces currently.

Section One discussed the history of UNIFIL I, the challenges it faced owing to the flaws in the original mandate and how the relationship between UNIFIL troops and stakeholders in the area (militias and civilians) developed over time. Section Two described the changes to UNIFIL’s mandate since 2006. This final section of this chapter outlines the current concerns of all the parties (official and unofficial) with Resolution 1701 to present the strategic environment that

⁹⁶ UNSC Resolution 1365, 31 July 2001.

⁹⁷ See for example UNSC Resolution 1937, 30 August 2010.

⁹⁸ See for example, UNSC Resolution 1773 24 August 2007.

UNIFIL operates in today and which contextualises the next three chapters on UNIFIL's current operations.

The Strategic Environment 2006 – Present

There has been a strategic change subsequent to Resolution 1701. There have not been major military clashes across the Blue Line. There have been a couple of problems, a number of rockets, but nothing like before, an absolute sea change, as to what existed prior to the war in 2006.⁹⁹

The difference between the pre and post-2006 environments in the area of operations has been commented upon by both UNIFIL staff and local civilians. There is no doubt that the area is experiencing a period of peace longer than any other in the history of the UNIFIL mission.¹⁰⁰

What remains to be clarified for the purpose of this thesis is the political and strategic considerations of the named parties to Resolution 1701 which are: Israel, the Lebanese Government, and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The considerations of another unofficial party to the resolution – Hizbullah - are also described here as they play a significant role in influencing the actions and beliefs of the named parties. This section begins by outlining the major issues of contention between all the parties at the current time and then presents the position of each party to the conflict. This section concludes with a brief discussion of the effect of the Syrian crisis on the area of operations.

Unresolved Issues of Contention

The major issues of contention that exist currently between all the parties (Israel, the Lebanese Government and Hizbullah)¹⁰¹ and which are recognised by the UN and the international community are the following; the continued Israeli occupation of the northern half of Ghajar and Shebaa Farms area; a number of points on the Blue Line that relate to territorial disputes and

⁹⁹ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

¹⁰⁰ In reality possibly before that since the late 1960s when the PLO started to move into the area. Incidents that have occurred are discussed in Chapter Three.

¹⁰¹ All the parties includes Hizbullah; where I used the term 'named parties' I refer to those named in Resolution 1701 which are Israel, and the Lebanese Government.

unresolved markings;¹⁰² Lebanese (and Palestinian¹⁰³) prisoners still being held in Israeli jails; Israeli air and sea violations of Lebanese sovereignty; and rocket attacks into northern Israel by armed elements from South Lebanon.¹⁰⁴

Other Complications

Unofficially however there is another story. The major issue for the Israelis is not minor points of contention over the marking of the Blue Line, but the presence of the sub-state militia Hizbullah on the Blue Line. The major issue for the Lebanese Government and for Hizbullah is the existence of Israel but on this issue the two parties digress in their views. The Lebanese Government is far less concerned with the existence of the state of Israel, and far more concerned with getting rid of between 400,000 and 600,000 Palestinians residing in camps in Lebanon.¹⁰⁵ The Lebanese Government's official position on the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is that they cannot be naturalised as this will irreparably alter the delicate sectarian balance between the religions in Lebanon that exists currently.¹⁰⁶ The view is that the majority of Palestinians in Lebanon are Sunni and in a population of 4.5 million people, the addition of this many Sunni will give them an overwhelming majority. The Lebanese Government position is also that the problem of displaced Palestinians is an international one that needs to be resolved internationally and Lebanon is therefore not responsible for solving this problem alone. In other words, Israel and the international community need to take responsibility for displaced Palestinians in Lebanon and not Lebanon. The view is that Lebanon has been a victim of

¹⁰² UNIFIL has thus far constructed 215 points along the Blue Line, and verified 194 with both the named parties (with the remaining 21 markers awaiting verification). At the time of writing this thesis UNIFIL also had a further 20 markers under construction. UNIFIL declined to answer how many points along the Blue Line have yet to be agreed. Private correspondence with a UNIFIL Political Affairs Officer, 8 May 2014.

¹⁰³ The issue of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails is an issue that concerns Hizbullah and not the Lebanese Government.

¹⁰⁴ The issue of Israel air and sea violations, occupation of Ghajar, and Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails are raised in every single Secretary General report on Resolution 1701. See for example Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S /2013/650, 13 November 2013.

¹⁰⁵ This number has been increasing during the Syrian crisis.

¹⁰⁶ Norton, Augustus Richard, 'The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,' *The International Spectator*, 42/4: 475-491 (2007).

circumstance and should not be made accountable for the actions of other states (Israel, US and British policy from 1917 onwards).¹⁰⁷

Hizbullah's position is simply that the state of Israel should not exist. What this means in practice is somewhat less clear. However, Hizbullah's stated position is that all Palestinians should be free to return to Palestine. The two-state solution is not something Hizbullah have ever stated that they agree with.¹⁰⁸

One of the reasons therefore that the border dispute between Lebanon and Israel is so intractable is because it is linked to that other intractable Middle East problem of the Palestinians. And this is what ultimately prevents progress towards a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon. The actual issues between the Governments of the two countries - small territorial disputes and the release of Lebanese prisoners - are viewed by staff at UNIFIL as not impossible to resolve.

I actually personally don't think it would take much to see some form of agreement. Lebanese Government to Israeli Government. Now the issue of the Palestinians and the presence of the Palestinians is something else, and in this sense, because of the weakness of the Lebanese state, I don't think you can possibly see an Israeli-Lebanese agreement coming out, happening before an agreement with the Palestinians that settles the issue of the Palestinian refugees on Lebanese territory. I don't think you can see that. It is linked, it is irrevocably linked. This government is not able to make an agreement like Egypt or like Jordan. And before we see a realignment, well no I wouldn't say a realignment, but before you deal with the issue of the Palestinian presence on Lebanese territory I think it would be very very hard for an agreement to be reached.¹⁰⁹

The real problem therefore resides between Hizbullah and Israel; neither will acknowledge the other's right to exist. The weakness of the Lebanese Government means they are not equipped to confront Hizbullah politically or militarily; and the Government of Israel are not prepared to take back around half a million Palestinians in order to make peace with Lebanon. Nor are they

¹⁰⁷ 'Lebanon Accused of Turning Away Some Palestinian Syrian Refugees', *The Guardian*, 6 May 2014.

¹⁰⁸ Qassem, Naim, *Hizbullah: The Story From Within* (London: Saqi, 2005), see for example Chapter Four, pp-261-

³¹⁰ Whilst Hizbullah do not expressly state that Israel should be destroyed it is implied in Hizbullah's approach to resistance against Israel and its refusal to accept the two-state solution.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

prepared to work towards the eradication of their own state! So there is an impasse that observers of the region will only be resolved by a large-scale, long and vicious region-wide war.¹¹⁰ The positions of all of the parties are described below in greater detail.

Israel

The Israeli position can be summarised thus: Israel is primarily interested in maintaining its security and by default its very existence. As such, along with its main ally, the United States, Israel maintains a policy of ensuring that it possesses a qualitative military edge over all its neighbours in the region (including non-neighbouring Iran). This policy means that for Israel, the presence of any military force that is capable of compromising its security must be destroyed or disabled to the extent it can no longer pose a significant threat.¹¹¹ This policy extends naturally to the destruction of Hizbullah, and the prevention of weapons transfer to Hizbullah. On a regional scale it involves the prevention of any state obtaining nuclear weapons such as Syria or Iran.¹¹² But this policy also means that Israel has extensively lobbied over the years to prevent the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from obtaining any serious weaponry. Israel will currently not allow the LAF to use tanks in the area of operation and has lobbied against the LAF obtaining any kind of military hardware particularly weapons such as surface-to-air missiles. However, at the same time, Israel argues that it wants to see LAF authority extended down to the border and the removal of Hizbullah from the area of operations.¹¹³

The Israeli position is that peace could be made if Hizbullah no longer poses any kind of military threat to Israel. In reality this would mean the disbanding of Hizbullah as an organisation

¹¹⁰ Blanford, *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty Year Struggle*; Hirst, *Beware Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East*.

¹¹¹ See for example Wunderle, William, and Andre Briere, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Israel's Qualitative Military Edge: The Need for a Common Vision* (Washington D.C.: Washington Institute, 2008).

¹¹² For example in 2005 Israel is widely acknowledged to have bombed a site in northern Syria that was believed to be enriching uranium, see for example: Sanger, David E., and Mark Mazzetti, 'Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say', *New York Times*, 14 October 2007; Follath, Erich, and Holger Stark, 'The Story of Operation Orchard: How Israel Destroyed Syria's Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor', *Spiegel Online*, 11 February 2009, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-story-of-operation-orchard-how-israel-destroyed-syria-s-al-kibar-nuclear-reactor-a-658663-druck.html> [accessed 13 May 2014]. The Iran-Israel debate on nuclear weapons for Iran is well known and will not be discussed here.

¹¹³ This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

entirely as Hizbullah has a significant military presence in the East of Lebanon in the Beqaa valley and it is unlikely Israel would accept this bearing in mind the close proximity of the Beqaa valley to Israel.¹¹⁴ However, as Hizbullah is currently a significant part of the Lebanese Government and refuses to distinguish between its political and military wings, it is unlikely that this will occur. This is not least because the political party of Hizbullah maintains significant support from the Shi'a across Lebanon and from some Lebanese Christian factions.

In terms of their support of Resolution 1701, it can be said that Israel tolerates the presence of UNIFIL but they do not regard them as a serious obstacle. One UNIFIL officer informed me off the record that an Israeli officer informed him that Israel views UNIFIL as a 'speed bump' should they choose to invade Lebanon again.¹¹⁵

In sum, the issues around the marking of the Blue Line, Israeli air violations, occupation of Lebanese land and Lebanese detainees in Israel would very likely be able to be resolved. But as Israel perceives Hizbullah as an existential threat peace with Lebanon is not possible. The other issue at stake is of course how to deal with the large number of displaced Palestinians in Lebanon. It is highly unlikely that Israel would be willing to take them back for the sake of a peace agreement with Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government

The position of the Lebanese Government regarding peace with Israel is harder to define owing to the varying interests of the different religious parties that comprise its whole which means it rarely speaks with one voice.¹¹⁶ The views of Hizbullah, who until recently formed the majority in government, will be discussed below. The Lebanese Government is divided on the issue of Israel, mainly because of the issue of Hizbullah.

¹¹⁴ Israel recently bombed a suspected Hizbullah arms convoy in the Beqaa Valley, suggesting that this is in fact the case. See 'Israeli Strike on Rakan al-Fakih, Hezbollah Missiles Killed Four', *Daily Star*, 26 February 2014.

¹¹⁵ Private conversation with a UNIFIL officer, South Lebanon, 2013.

¹¹⁶ See Appendix C for a list of the political parties that comprise the government of Lebanon.

Broadly speaking the main rival faction to Hizbullah that is also in Government is termed locally 'the March 14 movement'. It comprises the two major Christian parties: The Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb Party; and the largest Sunni party: The Future Movement. At the international level the March 14th group is aligned with: the US; the Gulf States of Qatar; the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Both at the local and the international level, the March 14th group oppose Hizbullah. They argue that Hizbullah is the cause of trouble with Israel and would like Hizbullah to disband and hand over its weapons to the LAF.¹¹⁷

To some extent, this view is driven by a shift in local power politics. Hizbullah and the power of the Shi'a is a relatively new phenomena in Lebanon. The reason for this is historical. For decades in Lebanon, the Christians dominated culture and education, and Sunnis the trade and business; relegating the Shi'a to the lower socio-economic strata of the population.¹¹⁸ There is unquestionably some resentment around the rise of the Shi'a to prominence in Lebanese politics. However, it is also understood that the March 14th faction, aligned as it is with Western interests is opposed to Hizbullah for reasons of compatibility with its allies.¹¹⁹

In comparison to the resistance movement, the March 14th faction are viewed by supporters of the resistance as having a more conciliatory approach to Israel as they share its views on ridding the country of Hizbullah.¹²⁰ As such, the March 14th movement are extremely supportive of Resolution 1701, in particular towards the goal of disbanding and disarming of non-state militias, and through the LAF, extending the authority of the Government of Lebanon down to the internationally recognised 'borders'.

¹¹⁷ Sakr, Elias, 'Hariri Slams Hezbollah's Arms as March 14 Steps Up Rhetoric', *Daily Star*, 19 February 2011; Wilkins, Henrietta, *The Making of Lebanese Foreign Policy: Understanding the Hezbollah Israeli War* (London: Routledge, 2013).

¹¹⁸ Shaery-Eisenlohr, Roschanack Shi'ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty Year Struggle, Norton, Augustus Richard Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); McKay, Sandra, *Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009).

¹¹⁹ Slackman, Michael, 'U.S.-Backed Alliance Wins in Lebanon ', *New York Times*, 7 June 2009; Wilkins, *The Making of Lebanese Foreign Policy: Understanding the Hezbollah Israeli War*.

¹²⁰ Wilkins, *The Making of Lebanese Foreign Policy: Understanding the Hezbollah Israeli War*.

That is not to say that the March 14th movement is pro-Israeli; the rhetoric of all political parties in Lebanon is strongly anti-Israel. As with many Arab states, it is forbidden to travel to Lebanon if you have an Israeli stamp in your passport. But, other than Hizbullah, the impression obtained from UNIFIL is that for many of the parties in the Lebanese Government it is the Palestinian issue and small territorial disputes that prevent a peace agreement between the two states.

Hizbullah (and Amal)

The position of Hizbullah on Resolution 1701 is that it is an agreement that favours Israel over Lebanon. They argue that if UNIFIL are impartial, why are UN peacekeepers only on one side of the line (the Lebanese side)?¹²¹ Like all political parties at the time, Hizbullah agreed to Resolution 1701.¹²² So although consent for Resolution 1701 was obtained, Hizbullah have no intention of assisting UNIFIL with its mandated objective of disarming and disbanding non-state militias (unless it is Palestinian militias). In fact Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbullah has stated publicly that he does not believe that the disarming Hizbullah is in the mandate of Resolution 1701.¹²³ It does however support the deployment of the LAF down into the area of operations, and has managed to align itself with the LAF with the slogan 'The Army, The People and The Resistance'. This is because Hizbullah's legitimacy within Lebanon depends upon them being seen as a national organisation and they are part of the national government.¹²⁴

Hizbullah was created in part as a resistance movement against the state of Israel, and in their words, against Israeli aggression towards Lebanon.¹²⁵ This position became less tenable after the

¹²¹ This is a comment that supporters of the resistance movement often make to UNIFIL officers when they hold information sessions to educate local people on the Blue Line, interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon. 13 August 2013.

¹²² This is believed to be due to the fact that Hizbullah did not want to be seen to be continuing to prosecute the war when so many civilians were dying as a result of it and for how long Hizbullah could have held out against Israel in a long war is questionable. Therefore peace had to be sought. See Noe, Nicholas, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah* (London: Verso, 2007).

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Norton, 'The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics'; Hazmeh, A. Nizar, 'Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation,' *Third World Quarterly*, 14/2: 321-337 (1993).

¹²⁵ Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story From Within.

Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon. However, Hizbullah have managed to maintain their *raison d'être* with the argument that Israel has not fully withdrawn from 'every inch of Lebanese land', which is one of their demands. In this respect they refer to the continued occupation of Northern Ghajar, Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shouba Hills.¹²⁶ They also continue to cite the need for Israel to hand over all Lebanese prisoners that were imprisoned in Israel during the Israeli occupation. The third and oft used justification for their continued existence is their argument that they are the only force that have thus far managed to 'win' a war against Israel and eject them from Lebanese soil.¹²⁷ As noted above, Israeli intransigence in disallowing the LAF to obtain serious weaponry does prevent the LAF from becoming a credible deterrent. In contrast, Hizbullah have been trained, primarily by Iranian forces, in guerrilla tactics that make them extremely effective against conventional forces in a situation of asymmetric power. Hizbullah argue that currently the LAF do not have their level of expertise in this area to present a credible deterrent against Israel.¹²⁸ With regards to handing over their weapons to the LAF, the other issue for Hizbullah is that they do not trust the March 14th movement not to use those weapons against them to destroy the group entirely. This is not an unreasonable suspicion. The Wikileaks documents revealed that during the 2006 war, elements within the March 14th movement were discreetly advising the Israelis where to hit Hizbullah the hardest.¹²⁹ Furthermore, Hizbullah argues that the March 14th movement is soft on Israel and cannot be trusted to use the LAF against Israel to ensure that Lebanese sovereignty is respected in its entirety. So in other words, Hizbullah feels it cannot sufficiently trust the state to put its weapons to good use if it were to hand them over.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* Of note is that Hizbullah consistently mention the Kfar Shouba Hills, the UN does not refer to them as contested territory.

¹²⁷ Noe, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*.

¹²⁸ Blanford, *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty Year Struggle*. Whilst Hizbullah did not technically 'win' the war against Israel in 2006, they didn't lose and created a stalemate that generated human costs that Israel was unwilling to bear.

¹²⁹ See for example, 'Give Me A Chance And I Will F*** Hizbullah', *Al Akhbar*, May 2011 http://www.al-akhbar.com/2006war_cables [accessed 18 May 2014]. The cables were published in May in the then Arab Language paper *Al-Akhbar* newspaper. They revealed that Christian and Sunni leaders had indirectly advised the Israelis to continue the bombing campaign in the south in order to eliminate Hizbullah from the area.

Hizbullah's position on the state of Israel itself is unequivocal; it should not exist,¹³⁰ but the organisation is deliberately unclear as to what this means in practice. As such Hizbullah's position on the Blue Line is theoretically that it should not exist in its current form unless it demarcates the legal border between Palestine and Lebanon (with Israel no longer a state). However, as will be noted in following chapters, Hizbullah has not violated the Blue Line since July 2006, if they have, this has gone under the radar of both Israel and UNIFIL.¹³¹ Hizbullah also no longer have visible military positions in the area of operations and have *officially* pulled back to the north of the Litani river. They tolerate the presence of UNIFIL as long as it does not interfere too closely with their military operations. As such Hizbullah can be said to have given local consent to Resolution 1701 in the sense that they *largely* refrain from obstructing UNIFIL militarily and will engage with UNIFIL politically.

Syria: Caution is the Better Part of Valour

The Syrian crisis is briefly discussed here as it informs the strategic environment in Lebanon at the time of this research and continues to unfold. During the course of this research, the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon rose from around 200,000 in 2012 to 1 million in 2014.¹³² The area of operations has generally suffered less than the rest of the country as access to it from northern Lebanon is restricted to Lebanese citizens; Palestinians and other foreigners require a pass from the military to enter the area. However, several thousand Syrians have managed to enter the area, presumably from the Eastern side that borders onto Syria. Currently they total an estimated 42,900 in the area of operations.¹³³ They are mainly located in rural areas and they often work for Lebanese farmers as agricultural workers or shepherds. UNIFIL has been allowing Syrians access to their free medical services for humanitarian reasons.

¹³⁰ Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story From Within.

¹³¹ Private correspondence, UNIFIL Political Affairs Officer, 23 April 2013.

¹³² The UNHCR has listed over 1 million persons of concern, and just under a million registered Syrian refugees (999, 131). UNHCR, Syrian Regional Refugee Response, <https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122> [accessed 7 May 2014].

¹³³ Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2014/130, 26 February 2014, p.10.

The political effects of the Syrian crisis appear to have been to put hostilities on hold. It is likely that from the point of view of Israel, the threat posed by rogue militia operating inside Syria means that maintaining the status quo with Lebanon is the safest policy for now. Should a war break out with Hizbullah, the border area between Syria and Lebanon could become highly porous and lead to an influx of Islamic extremists who might be happy to take their fight to Israel.¹³⁴

Aside from the issues of the refugees, the main issue currently for Lebanon in relation to the Syrian crisis is Hizbullah's involvement in it. Hizbullah is believed to have begun providing military support to President Bashar al-Assad from December 2012, but this cannot be confirmed. Hizbullah openly admitted they were providing support in April 2013.¹³⁵ Their actions have contributed to a number of political and security problems for Lebanon. In 2012, the Lebanese Government signed a resolution – the Baabda Declaration – which was a commitment to remain neutral and dissociated from the Syrian crisis.¹³⁶ As Hizbullah is now in contravention of that agreement, politicians from opposing sides have tried to block Hizbullah's inclusion in a new government arguing that they are prosecuting a war in another state without securing the agreement of the Lebanese people. This has led to a political stalemate which at the time of writing appears to have been resolved with the formation of a new government on 15 February 2014.¹³⁷ However, Lebanon was without a functioning government from April 2013 partly as a result of this issue.

¹³⁴ Rabinovich, Itamar, 'Syria: The View From Israel', *The Guardian*, 2 August 2012; Herzog, Michael, 'New Israeli Policy Dilemmas in the Syrian Crisis', *Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM)*, 11 June, 2013 <http://www.bicom.org.uk/analysis-article/14915/> [accessed 26 May 2014]; Yaari, Ehud, 'Israel's Growing Role in Southern Syria', *The Washington Institute*, 29 January, 2014 <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israels-growing-role-in-southern-syria> [accessed 26 May 2014].

¹³⁵ Sullivan, Marisa, *Hezbollah in Syria*, (Washington: Institute for the Study of War, 2014).

¹³⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Identical letters dated 13 June 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, A/66/849 - S/2012/477*, 21 June 2012; Nader, Sami, 'Lebanese independence from 1943 pact to Baabda Declaration', *Al Monitor*, 26 November, 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/lebanon-independence-baabda-declaration-syria.html> [accessed 26 May 2013].

¹³⁷ 'Lebanon Forms New Government After Ten Months of Deadlock', *The Guardian*, 16 February 2014.

The second and equally as serious effect of Hizbullah's involvement in Syria has been that it has drawn fighters from Syria into Lebanon to enact their revenge against Hizbullah. They have chosen to do this by targeting the civilian population in Shi'ite areas that are known to be pro-Hizbullah – predominantly an area to the south of Beirut called Dahiyeh. As yet, the bomb attacks have not spread to the area of operations and so they will not be discussed here.¹³⁸

As Hizbullah is already involved in Syria, it stands to reason that they have fewer forces left on the ground in Lebanon and with their resources stretched they could not manage a war on two fronts. As such is it likely that they are unwilling to trigger a confrontation with Israel at the current time.¹³⁹ Even if Hizbullah pulled out of Syria in order to fight Israel, which for strategic reasons would be very hard for them to do, they might well face attacks from Sunni militants in Lebanon as revenge for their Syrian adventure.

These issues would suggest that both sides feel constrained because of the unknown variable of the effect of the Syrian crisis on them. Whilst Israel could conceive that Hizbullah has more at risk than they do, should a war break out, this is not guaranteed. Israel has an unstable Egypt on its southern border and Jordan has experienced political unrest in the last year. In short, the region is currently highly unstable and under such conditions, maintaining the status quo would appear to be the safest course of action. Whether or not politicians in Israel or senior Hizbullah officials subscribe to this view is unclear. But the low level of incidents in the area of operations in 2013 and early 2014 would suggest they might.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a history of the UNIFIL mission in south Lebanon since 1978; the background to Resolution 1701 and the revised mandate of 2006; and an analysis of the strategic

¹³⁸ Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2014/130.

¹³⁹ Blanford, Nick, 'Hizbullah Silence on Israeli Raids Conveys Burdens at Home, In Syria', *Daily Star*, 25 February 2014.

environment in Lebanon and how it relates to the UNIFIL mission in the south. This chapter demonstrates how UNIFIL have always needed to use local means of persuasion over coercion in order to conduct operations. I highlight how UNIFIL built relationships over time with political organisations Amal and Hizbullah and civilians; both relationships remain important to the mission to this day.

Section Two of this chapter discussed the circumstances that gave rise to the United Nations Security Council issuing a new mandate for the mission in the form of Resolution 1701 and explained why the terms of Resolution 1701 are viewed as unfair by the local population which affects the legitimacy of the mission at the local level. The final section of the chapter discussed the current strategic environment in the south of Lebanon. I showed that the issues of Hizbullah and the Palestinians that are the main roadblocks to peace between Lebanon and Israel and not the other issues of contention such as minor land disputes, Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails and aerial violations of territory. However, these ‘minor’ issues do present significant risks to the region as they are the sparks that can light the fire of a larger existential conflict.

The following chapter investigates just how UNIFIL manage these issues on the ground to avoid escalation to maintain international peace and security. I describes how UNIFIL influences its security environment by responding to incidents on the Blue Line; and working on prevention strategies behind the scenes with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israeli Defence Forces to build trust through the use of micro-security arrangements and regular liaison.

Chapter Three : Maintaining Peace at the International Level

Seven years is a long time in the Middle East. And in this sense, this is one of our great successes that the two parties have chosen not to go back to conflict. As I said, obviously if any political decision is made then the situation would change, but then going back to our role, it is to try to ensure that there are no accidental triggers. Something could happen, some small incident that could easily flare up into something much much larger that both parties, all parties end up regretting. As I think they did in 2006.¹

Introduction

This chapter will describe how UNIFIL works at the local level to reduce international tensions and in this way influences its security environment. Management of the Blue Line is the most important activity of the UNIFIL peacekeeping force owing to the potential for violations to escalate into full-scale conflict, as was the case in 2006. As a Chapter VI mission, UNIFIL is not able to adopt peace enforcement measures therefore obtaining cooperation from all sides is necessary to maintain international peace and security. This chapter will discuss the myriad issues faced by UNIFIL in its key role of maintaining peace and security on one of the world's most highly contested state frontiers.

At the international level of engagement, I argue that UNIFIL is deeply involved in preventing incidents from escalating. Through the use of liaison, reporting and regular tripartite meetings, PAOs engage with both the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to reduce tensions. They have established mechanisms which reduce or eradicate the 'unknown' factor when violations of the Blue Line occur. The factors that facilitate the work of actors at the subnational level are time, autonomy, spontaneity and local knowledge which increases their effectiveness on the ground.

This chapter divides UNIFIL's work at the international level into two categories: response and prevention. Section One discusses UNIFIL's response tactics to Blue Line violations. These

¹ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

tactics are employed on a daily basis and usually involve peacekeeping troops and the LAF on the ground. Their activities include: attending to all violations at the scene; providing a visible security presence; dispensing cautions to potential and actual violators of the Blue Line; educating locals on the location of the Blue Line; patrolling with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and using the LAF to disperse citizens where needed. Working alongside them in the background are the PAOs who are: liaising between the parties in cases where hostilities break out; reporting all violations to UNIFIL headquarters (and subsequently to New York); conducting investigations and reporting the results to both the named parties and UN headquarters in New York.

Section Two evaluates the preventative mechanisms that political affairs officers (PAOs) have put in place at the international level in order to prevent a recommencement of hostilities. This section includes a discussion of: the tripartite monthly meetings as a mechanism for building trust and confidence; liaison as a strategy for de-escalating incidents in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities; and brokering micro security arrangements between the named parties to 1701. Section Two also examines more deeply how PAOs demonstrate impartiality and build trust between the parties and themselves. I discuss the professional and personal attributes required by staff to conduct their work as they manage one of the world's most sensitive and potentially explosive 'borders'.² In the final part of Section Two examples of actual incidents are provided to illustrate how UNIFIL has dealt with actual confrontations that have occurred.

Section One: Response

Maintaining Peace and Security on the Ground: Walking the Blue Line

UNIFIL's area of operation extends from the Litani River, which lies in the main just south of Tyre, down to the Blue Line. As noted previously in Chapter Two, the Blue Line is a UN created

² As noted previously, I have tried to avoid the use of the word border owing to the fact that the Blue Line is a line of withdrawal. Currently there is no officially agreed border between the two states. However, as the line divides two states I have used it here to clarify this point, in speech marks to highlight its non-legal status under international law.

(and therefore geographically artificial) Line of Withdrawal. Maintenance of the security of the Line is a priority for UNIFIL owing to its importance to international security. As such, between 350 and 400 patrols of the Blue Line are conducted each day; of which a number, one estimate provided by a senior LAF official was around 16-20,³ are conducted with the LAF. Currently, on average UNIFIL conducts almost 10,000 activities, including some 1,100 in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces per month.⁴

The main challenges faced by UNIFIL on the ground are Blue Line violations which include accidental and deliberate land crossings as well as missile attacks by armed elements that cross the Blue Line into Israel. A further challenge to UNIFIL troops is the need to maintain local consent to operate on the ground. This issue will be discussed in a later chapter on UNIFIL's local engagement.

By and large many Blue Line violations occur by accident as a result of the lack of clear markings of the Line. But they can also be due to intentional violations. These intentional violations occur either as a result of a deliberate incursion by one of the named parties to the conflict or as a result of the actions of another party – traditionally referred to as a 'spoiler' in the peacekeeping literature.⁵ As the main aim of the mission is to prevent the occurrence of a violation that could trigger a resumption of hostilities, de-escalation is UNIFIL's main objective as outlined by a senior member of UNIFIL staff:

Our words are to keep the place quiet. Keep the south of the country quiet to try to ensure that there are no outbreaks of hostilities as what happened in July 2006.⁶

³ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

⁴ See for example United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2013/120, 27 February 2013 p.4; ———, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2013/650, 13 November 2013, p.5. Figures vary, especially at the present time because of the tense security situation in Lebanon owing to the Syrian crisis. The LAF has been extremely stretched across the country and have had to withdraw some troops from the area of operation as a result.

⁵ United Nations, *Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*, (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, 2008) p.35; Newman, Edward, and Oliver Richmond, eds., *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006).

⁶ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

One senior LAF officer described the situation taking into account the fact that there is no current peace agreement in place with Israel and the status of the current arrangement is simply the cessation of hostilities.

And we worked hard in seven years in order not to go to war, without a decision to go to war. If there is no decision to go to war, we must not go to war over an incident, which can raise the tension in order to go to war...⁷

As noted in the introduction, the risk of war breaking out on the Blue Line remains quite high despite seven years of peace. In such an environment, it is important that no accidental violations of the Blue Line are misconstrued by either side as an act of aggression.

One way to ensure that accidental violations of the Blue Line do not occur is by monitoring each and every transgression and managing the outcome. Monitoring by the Israelis consists of surveillance towers that work 24/7 to monitor the Blue Line including regular military patrols; sensors on the ground and a highly sophisticated electronic surveillance and communications network,⁸ which functions on both sides of the Blue Line.⁹ On the Lebanese side of the Line, where UNIFIL operates in conjunction with the LAF, violations of the line are also monitored and reported. In addition to reporting each violation, UNIFIL, alongside the LAF, attend to the site where the violation occurred to resolve the situation. The aim is either to prevent the violation from continuing or in some cases, to prevent any aggressive action being taken towards Israeli Forces. Different types of violations call for different responses from UNIFIL depending on their seriousness. The seriousness of the violation can be classified in the following order, the least serious being wandering shepherds, the next level up are repeated violations by farmers,

⁷ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

⁸ See Chapter 11 of Blanford, *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty Year Struggle*.

⁹ *Ibid.* Blanford discusses here the fact that Israel possesses a number of surveillance mechanisms within the state of Lebanon which is a violation of Lebanese sovereignty. On a number of occasions Hizbullah and the LAF have discovered these mechanisms and dismantled them.

resort visitors and hunters, and the most serious being a deliberate violation with the intention to commit harm.¹⁰ Each type of violation will be addressed in the following passages.

Accidental Violations

Shepherd Violations

Accidental breaches of the Line occur firstly, because a visible marking of the actual line is often not present (as noted in Chapter Two). These breaches are usually committed by shepherds, farmers and hunters. In the case of shepherds the violation is often initially committed by a roaming animal, be it cattle, sheep or goats. Once the animal has wandered, the shepherd is forced to try and retrieve it, in the process violating the Blue Line. Even if the shepherd knows he is committing a violation, his livelihood depends on maintaining his stock so he will go after it.¹¹ The other potential cause for a shepherd crossing the Blue Line will be due to him being unaware of where the Blue Line actually is. In recent months, this occurrence has become more common owing to the increased use of Syrian refugees as stockmen.

...We've also had a number of Syrian refugees who are employed to look after sheep and goats in that area, and they don't know where the Blue Line is. So we've had an increase in Blue Line violations in recent months...¹²

On the Lebanese side, UNIFIL soldiers patrolling the Blue Line will call out to the shepherd to advise him that he is crossing the Line and that he needs to move back into Lebanese territory. UNIFIL are unable to actually detain or prevent the Lebanese from crossing the Line should they wish to do so. According to UNIFIL staff, the majority of violations occur in the Shebaa region where the line is not marked at all owing to the conflict over this particular area of territory between Syria, Israel and Lebanon. In this scenario, close communication with the local population is used to prevent incursions.

¹⁰ The author cross-checked this hierarchy of violations with a number of UNIFIL staff to ensure that it was in line with UNIFIL's view of priorities over the seriousness of violations.

¹¹ To date, this researcher has not come across the incidence of female shepherdesses in Lebanon and as such uses the masculine pronoun.

¹² Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

...our Indian battalion over there talk a lot to the local people on the ground. They have their cell phones, they try to call them to ensure they do not cross the Blue Line. A lot of violations I think are prevented by the close relations but sometimes people do cross.¹³

So what happens, there are instances where the shepherds who are grazing their... maybe by mistake they ... you know a few goats go into the Blue Line. Because there are no borders there is nothing. They say that 'the stone here - to that stone' this is the Blue Line'. So there's nothing marked. So there are a few incidences where violations take place. They call it violations, but it's basically because of ignorance you know shepherds. So you know, we do butt in, during those times, whenever there is something. Whenever there is someone approaching the Blue Line he patrols they go there, they caution them. They say, you know 'We see you are going closer to the Blue Line'. So maybe he tries to get everybody back. So you know basically the goats go for the greener side right? So if it finds green somewhere so it starts drifting so we have to go there and say no, you're going closer to the Blue Line. So we push them back.¹⁴

The Indian battalion also conduct regular seminars to educate local peasants about where the Blue Line is.

For instance, it's almost on a regular basis, on a bi-monthly basis we have a shepherds meeting. We call all the shepherds in the area. We sensitize them on the Blue Line. We tell them because generally these violations I am talking about happen with the shepherds. So we call them. We tell them, we have a small tea party with them, we exchange our ideas. Then we tell them see this is the fact of the Blue Line, this is how you are supposed to be you know it's advisable. So they do take it in good heart.¹⁵

Of course on occasion, shepherds will cross the Blue Line intentionally as they and their families have lived in the area for generations. This has substantial risks, not only due to the risk of being apprehended by the Israelis, but also because many of the areas close to the Blue Line have been identified as containing unexploded ordinance. Many locals are so familiar with the landscape, they will traverse these areas as they believe they are aware of where each and every type of mine is. But it should be noted that there remain thousands of unexploded cluster bomblets left over from the 2006 war,¹⁶ so they do this at great risk, as the following example shows. In this

¹³ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

¹⁴ Interview with Respondent C, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

¹⁵ Interview with Respondent C, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

¹⁶ Hamyeh, Rajana, 'Clearing Cluster Bombs and Landmines: Lebanon's Long and Winding Road', *Al-Akhbar*, 13 September 2011; See Mines Advisory Group (MAG), <http://www.maginternational.org/where-mag->

instance, local confidence in the location of unexploded ordinance even led civilians to persuade UNIFIL troops and a language assistant to come and assist them after the accidental death of a young shepherd, even though his death had been caused by stepping on a mine.

I tell you one episode. It was one explosion once, there was a mined area close to al-Wazzani. Once one boy he stepped on a mine I think, a young boy and he was injured and killed. The people they came to the battalion – ‘Oh you should come there, you should go inside’. Some people there they know, they are walking between the mines. They get used, they are shepherds, they get used to do that. It was me and another colleague and the Commanding Officer (CO) at that time and his duty officer. They were asking us to come...The people they thought, oh why you are so careless and why you don’t go etc. In this way they are talking. And at that time it was not really wise, the CO and the officer they went and I and my colleague, we went with them. And then in the middle of the road, the CO said, please stop. Don’t go any further. It’s very dangerous. And then we went back with my colleague. And then one little boy, he is a shepherd and he was telling us. ‘Here mine for heavy vehicle! Here anti-personnel mine.’ ... I realised when we reached the road I start to shake because when I was there I was walking but when I reached the road I was ah... You can imagine.¹⁷

Some shepherds will also knowingly cross the Blue Line because of on-going territorial disputes, particularly in the region of Shebaa. As one peacekeeper informed me:

We just tell him “You are crossing the Blue Line”. We look to the Lebanese [LAF] to police their own people. We won’t stop them. We can only advise. It’s difficult for us, but it’s even more difficult for the Lebanese because in this area that you’re talking about it’s not too bad but if you go up to Shebaa Farms, to the Shebaa area, the Lebanese see Shebaa, as Lebanese. The Israelis, and the UN consider Shebaa as Syrian. So if I ask a Lebanese soldier “Stop that shepherd from going in there”, he says, “How can I stop him, he’s going into his own country”. You know so?¹⁸

The peacekeepers interviewed all indicated their sympathy with the local shepherds and despite the fact they cause them daily alerts and reporting duties, they understand why they do it. There was never a sense of impatience from respondents over the issue:

But again, saying this to a guy whose concerned about his livelihood, whose here all his life and will be here a lot longer than we’ll be here. You know you can only kind

[works/lebanon/#.UtJ3HvYjRzI](#) [accessed 12 January 2014]; United Nations Mine Action Support (UNMAS) in Lebanon, <http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/lebanon> [accessed 12 January 2014].

¹⁷ Interview with Respondent D, Hebbariyah, South Lebanon, 18 June 2013.

¹⁸ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

of ... you can only bring the horse to the trough as they say. It's up to him I suppose, but just on a given day, you try to lead him off it. May be a bit of indifference there because they are used to hearing it, all their lives. So you're not going to change their mentality a whole lot, but look once you're forewarned them, I don't know what more you can do after that you know?¹⁹

Whenever a shepherd is caught entering Israeli territory by the IDF, he will be captured and questioned for a period of between 24 – 72 hours before being released back to the Lebanese Authorities. This happens on a fairly regular basis. UNIFIL has appealed to Israel to liaise directly with UNIFIL when ground violations of this nature occur, but thus far the practice of detention has continued.²⁰

If a shepherd should resist arrest by the Israeli forces and run away, there have been occasions where the animals are captured and detained (presumably not questioned) for period of up to a week.²¹ Perhaps this is done in order to punish the shepherd for his transgression. However, this 'punishment' has on occasion turned out to be a blessing. One UNIFIL officer related the story thus:

Shebaa is always an issue. Shepherds often cross the Blue Line with their sheep. Sometimes it leads to shepherd apprehension. Or an abduction, as the Lebanese side refers to them. Once a flock of goats crossed, they were kidnapped if you like, and they were vaccinated and sent back. The Israelis offered a free veterinary service for the goats!²²

Farmers, Hunters and Resorts

Violations by farmers in the region constitute a slightly more serious problem because of their repeated nature in the same area. This is regarded as more serious by the IDF because of the potential for repeated transgressors to obtain intelligence about the border area. The issue here is that the Blue Line crosses farmland that is owned by Lebanese farmers. There are number of

¹⁹ Interview with Respondent G1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

²⁰ United Nations Secretary General, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2013/120'.

²¹ Zaatari, Mohammed, 'Israeli Soldiers Kidnap Lebanese Goats', *Daily Star*, 09 May 2014; Dockery, Stephen, 'Goats Taken By Israeli Forces Returned', *Daily Star*, 18 July 2012.

²² Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

such farms along the Blue Line – mainly tobacco and olive farms – which have been there for generations. There are two main causes of farmer violations of the Blue Line. Firstly, the Blue Line, has been present since 2000. As such, the farmers who work on the field often have trouble with the idea that they are not allowed to farm their own land in certain sections when they have been farming it for generations. The result is that even if farmers are aware they are committing a violation, they continue to farm their land as they always have. The other main cause of repeated violations lies in the fact of the Israeli technical fence which is often confused for the Blue Line itself. This is because it runs close to the Blue Line but is set back farther south into Israeli territory by a few hundred metres in most areas. As a result, some farmers do not really understand where the Blue Line is and therefore believe they are not in violation of it because they are not crossing over the fence.

One such case occurs regularly in the Ghanaian area close to the Blue Line:

For instance we have a place we call TA16 there is this farm that the Blue Line divides into two. OK so this farmer initially demands why we should tell him not to go to the other parts of the farm – it's a tobacco farm – why we wouldn't want him to go. And anytime he's on his farm harvesting, we keep reporting, anytime he crosses to the other side to harvest, we have to send a report to say that – that there is a Blue Line violation. He crosses back to the other side he is in Lebanon. You know these things initially he did not understand why he should be – because he thought he was in his country. But it took intervention of the Company Commander there who initially had a chat with him and he did not understand. Eventually it went to the Mayor of the place who came but it has still not been able to be resolved. Fortunately the farm has been harvested now, and so the Blue Line violation has virtually stopped. But any time there is replanting we will find ourselves going back to the same situation. It is difficult sometimes. Sometimes a person decides not to understand and there is nothing you can do. You can't use force, you can't – only you can go there. Sometimes you are provoked and if you don't take time you may do something outside your mandate. We are trained to control our temper, yeah we, that's how we handle issues. It's challenging sometimes.²³

UNIFIL's method of dealing with regular transgressions is to contact the LAF and together with a UNIFIL patrol they will go to the location of the transgression and try to prevent further transgressions. LAF can physically prevent the transgressor however, owing to their own

²³ Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlay'aa, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

concern with their image in the south, they are highly reluctant to use force. UNIFIL can only advise the transgressor not to go any further. If there is no resolution for frequent violations by the same person, as noted above, a local official is brought in to explain to the farmer why he is unable to farm all of his land. If this fails, UNIFIL have on occasion, brought in staff to demarcate the Line on the farmer's land so that he is clear as to where he can, or cannot go. One UNIFIL peacekeeper showed how this worked in the case of the farm in area TA16 by the use of photographs on his computer screen.

One day we can report a violation of the blue line, 20 times... You see, we had to bring these UN people in to come and tell us exactly where the Blue Line is. They told us exactly where the Blue Line passes – it is still within the farm. So you see [from a photo] we are walking on the Blue Line now. And this part is Lebanon, and this part is Israel and every day there is a violation.²⁴

If the violations continue then the matter is passed up to the tripartite meetings between the two named parties and UNIFIL in order to try to reach an agreement on how the issue can be managed. This will be discussed further in the later section on the tripartite meetings.

The issue of repeated violations occurs also with hunters. However, these issues are a little more serious from the Israeli point of view because the hunters carry guns. In Lebanon, the sport of hunting involves a group of men with shotguns trying to kill any bird that happens to be flying overhead. As such it can take hunters anywhere as in Lebanon there is no such thing as game reserves. Hunting is actually banned in the UNIFIL area of operations, however – as is the case with many laws in Lebanon – this fact is overlooked by the general population when it suits.

What we normally – the problems we normally encounter - are hunters. They keep crossing the Blue Line virtually daily. And Israel will call us and say, there is a man with a weapon who has crossed the Blue Line. So they give us the grid reference, you go and yes it's a hunter with a locally made weapon. That is a normal hunting gun or whatever. You are not able to physically prevent him from doing anything so you talk to him most of the time and this is also done in coordination with LAF. When we receive such information we call LAF so we move with LAF together and

²⁴ Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlay'aa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

LAF, go to get the people out of the place. The same way when it's sheep crossing or whatever.²⁵

The way UNIFIL deals with these transgressions was described thus:

You hear the shots, the guys have a 24/7 watch on the post. And it will literally be 2 km to your left. You would hear the shots fired, a patrol will be sent out and it could very well be that the guy has done his business and gone, or if he's there he's just questioned. But he could be there with what they're after shooting or whatever. That goes up to the reporting line and the next day people are made aware. It's just obviously if there's shooting going on it's of concern. We wouldn't be doing our job if we didn't report because what's not to say it's the worst case scenario. But that's how routine it is – I'd say the guys on the post would 99% of the time, would know that it's just an armed hunter, but it's just healthy paranoia, that you have to go through the procedure, send out a patrol and report.²⁶

Potential repeated violation also come from resorts which have sprung up along the Wazzani river which lies in places right next to the Blue Line. Where the river is divided in half by the Blue Line, a line of string is used to demarcate it.

²⁵ Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlay'aa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

²⁶ Interview with Respondent G1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.



Figure 1: Picture of the Wazzani River. Blue rope seen tied to a tree at the top of the photo demarcates the Blue Line.²⁷

One resort on the Wazzani River caused a great many problems for UNIFIL when it opened in 2010. The Israelis were concerned it would be used as a launch pad for attacks by armed groups posing as tourists. As such there was a great deal of liaison involved between the parties as the

²⁷ Photo taken by author, August 2013.

resort was being built. Water disputes between Lebanon and Israel are common,²⁸ and in this instance, the issue was used in an attempt to prevent the resort from obtaining planning permission. The Israelis argued that the resort would use up more than its fair share of the water from the Wazzani.²⁹ The relevant authorities did not support this claim and the resort exists today and is extremely popular in summertime. The Israelis have built a road down to the river, and a helicopter pad opposite the resort in case of emergency; but thus far no serious incidents from the Lebanese side at the site of the resort have been reported. The only effect thus far of the resort has been the odd swimmer in the river who has inadvertently crossed the Blue Line, lying as it does down the middle of the waterway (see above photograph).³⁰

UNIFIL visit the owner and sometimes eat in the restaurant. But as it is a Lebanese owned business on Lebanese land there is little they can do in terms of meeting the security demands of the Israelis, certainly UNIFIL is unable to interfere in the day-to-day management of the resort. As the owner stated:

They have a very limited mandate, so they cannot do anything. They can observe and report. But anyhow so far the Israelis didn't make any direct aggression against us.³¹

However, tension remains over the water:

We asked permission to clean the river here, but the Israelis refused. Because any work here, because we are on the Blue Line, so you need the approval of the two sides. So the Israeli's refused to allow us to do it, and UNIFIL did nothing so far to help us with cleaning it. Though, the last two years the Israelis didn't object to cleaning the river and now they are. We don't know why.³²

²⁸ Blanford, Nicholas, 'Whose Water Is It anyways? Resentment Pools on Israel-Lebanon Border', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 May 2014.

²⁹ Hamdan, Tarek Abou, 'A Lebanese Resort Emerges on Anxious Israel's Border', *Al-Monitor*, 19 October 2012, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2012/10/the-south-lebanon-resort-village-attracting-tourists-meters-from-the-enemy.html> [accessed 31 March 2014]; Luca, Ana Maria, 'Much Ado About a Summer Resort', *NOW Lebanon*, 12 July 2012, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/much_ado_about_a_summer_resort [accessed 31 March 2014].

³⁰ See for example: United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2013/650'.

³¹ Interview with Respondent R, Civilian, Wazzani Resort, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

³² Interview with Respondent R, Civilian, Wazzani Resort, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

All the above types of violations reside in the category of non-deliberate violations because over time they have been shown to lack intent to commit harm to Israel or the IDF. The issue of farmers, hunters and hotels are perceived as more serious within this category because they have the potential to be repeated, which could mean (from the Israeli perspective) that the transgressor could be laying IEDs or gathering some kind of intelligence on a regular basis. Violations by hunters with guns are viewed by the Israelis as more serious than that of shepherds owing to the arms carried by the transgressors and so UNIFIL needs to take every incident seriously. On the ground, peacekeepers use negotiation, persuasion and advice to manage accidental transgressions. They demonstrate sympathy for the local civilians in terms of ensuring they remain calm and respect local sentiment. Peacekeepers interviewed understood that accidental transgressors feel they have the right to walk wherever they want on Lebanese land, and simply aren't aware of every twist and turn of the Blue Line. In addition, sensitivity to local feelings about the fact of Israel means peacekeepers refrain from addressing transgressions in a forceful manner. Accidental violations do ultimately cause a lot of work for UNIFIL, and it is questionable as to how many of them are truly accidental and instead are more reflective of local agency whereby individuals chose not to respond to peacekeepers requests. In some cases these violations necessitate the need to come to a micro-security agreement with Israel to manage the situation such as the case of the farmer in TA16 (as will be shown in Section Two).

The second category of violations discussed in the following section are more serious as they have the potential to reignite hostilities between the two sides. This is the category of deliberate violations by parties on both sides of the line and they are described below.

Deliberate Blue Line Violations

Deliberate violations are categorised here as referring to violations by persons who carry an intent to commit an unlawful act whether it be simply breaking international law by violating the Blue Line, causing damage to the Israeli state, harm to the IDF or Israeli citizens. Within this

category, the main transgressors are in order of seriousness: protestors, various armed groups, confrontations between the LAF and the IDF, and finally, in the view of the Israelis, the most serious are violations involving engagement with Hizbullah.

Stone-throwing and Lone Transgressors

Protests against the state of Israel happen at a very disorganised and local level and can consist of stone-throwing incidents by local Lebanese. They occur at points where Lebanese roads come close to the Israeli technical fence where military patrols pass or where Israeli troops are standing in position. These events are dealt with by UNIFIL and the LAF, with the LAF taking the key role in dispersing Lebanese citizens. For example a Secretary General Report on Resolution 1701 notes:

On 11 August, Lebanese civilians threw stones at an Israel Defence Forces patrol passing south of the Blue Line before the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and removed the civilians from the area.³³

UNIFIL also do their best to prevent such incidents by increasing their presence in specific areas where tensions can develop.

[F]rom Al-Addaïseh to Kfar Kila, where there is an Israeli Road running very close to a main Lebanese Road, and very close to the centre of Kfar Kila, we put in various de-confliction measures there. Increased our presence. Tried to impose ourselves whenever people came to throw stones on the Lebanese side, which quite a few people tried to do. We have quite a heavy presence in that area.³⁴

However these measures were not considered sufficiently effective, and a stronger defensive measure was installed by the Israelis: the construction of a wall in the village of Metulla where the Blue Line passes right up against the village. It should be noted that the wall was also justified by the Israelis as being necessary to deter other types of attacks.

³³ United Nations Secretary General, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2013/650', p.5.

³⁴ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

Now the Israelis eventually decided to build a wall. This came after a series of weapons aiming incidents that we were extremely worried about – that there were weapons aiming into each other between two armies could escalate rapidly. So the Israelis went ahead building the wall. This was done in extremely close coordination with us, and through us, with the LAF to ensure that no part of that wall, the wall itself, it's foundations below ground, barbed wire on the top, did not protrude into Lebanese territory. And it's right there, it is on the Blue Line...All the parties felt they didn't want to do that. But the Israelis decided that operationally that was the decision they were going to take. Which has obviously helped to decrease incidents a lot in that area...³⁵

Whilst this measure has reduced the incidence of stone throwing and weapons pointing it again demonstrates the constraints placed on UNIFIL by the parties which reduces their agency to manage the situation on the ground in the way they see fit. In this instance the preference would have been not to have built the wall which would have been more sensitive to the local village on the Lebanese side, as the following photos amply demonstrate.



Figure 2: Photo of the Blue Line in Metulla, prior to the building of the security wall.³⁶

³⁵ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

³⁶ Photo by author, January 2012.



Figure 3: The Blue Line after the construction of the security wall in the village of Metulla (taken in the same location as the above photo).³⁷

Still minor, but slightly more serious violations occur when local residents cross the Blue Line.

This happens infrequently but in 2013 there were two incidents of this nature undertaken by Israeli citizens.

On 1 May, near Ras Naqoura (Sector West), an Israeli civilian crossed the technical fence into Lebanon and was apprehended by a Lebanese Armed Forces patrol. Following questioning by the Lebanese Armed Forces, the man was voluntarily repatriated to Israel on 5 May under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, with the support of UNIFIL. In a separate incident, on 6 April, UNIFIL observed one Israeli civilian, who had climbed the T-wall along the Blue Line in Kafr Kela (Sector East), shouting at Lebanese Armed Forces personnel and civilians on the other side. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defence Forces.³⁸

³⁷ Photo by author, August 2012.

³⁸ United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2013/381, 26 June 2013, p.4.

However, it should be noted that these incidents vary from year to year and other years they could just as well be committed by Lebanese civilians as reports from the year before amply demonstrate.³⁹

On 25 April, a Lebanese national and his two children crossed the technical fence from Lebanon into Israel near Fatima Gate in Kafr Kila (Sector East), and crossed back to Lebanon the following day, after the Israel Defence Forces opened the gate at Ras Naqoura. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Armed Forces, who took charge of the three Lebanese nationals.⁴⁰

In all cases these violation occur quite rarely, the civilians are unarmed and on one recent occasion a man apprehended in this way was found to be suffering from a mental disorder.⁴¹

Organised Protests

More serious, are the organised protests that occur on the Blue Line on significant days in the calendar of the Palestinian resistance movement. These are days like Land Day (30th March), which commemorates resistance by Palestinians in 1976 in response to forced Israeli land appropriations; Nakba Day (the tragedy, 15th May), which marks the Israeli announcement of the independent state of Israel; and Al-Naksah (the setback, 5th June) which commemorates Palestinian dismay at the Israelis winning the 6 day war. On these occasions, there will often be a gathering of Palestinians and supporters of the Palestinian cause which more often than not, leads to some kind of confrontation with Israeli troops. The worst case in recent years was on 15th May 2011 when protestors attempted to scale the technical fence and enter the state of Israel itself. The Secretary General reported the event thus:

UNIFIL estimates that around 8,000 to 10,000 demonstrators, mostly Palestinian refugees, participated in the event. Organizers included Palestinian and Lebanese organizations, among them Hizbullah. While the majority of demonstrators

³⁹ See for example ———, *United Nations Secretary General's Report, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2012/837, 14 November 2012.; ———, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2012/502, 28 June 2012.

⁴⁰ *United Nations Secretary General, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2012/502', p.3.

⁴¹ Yaakov Lappin, 'Man Who Crossed Lebanon Border Returned to Israel', *Jerusalem Post*, 5 May 2013.

commemorated the day peacefully at the site prepared for the occasion, away from the Blue Line, around 1,000 protesters left the main gathering and, crossing through a minefield, moved towards the Blue Line and the Israeli technical fence. Using cordons and firing in the air, the Lebanese Armed Forces was able to stop a first attempt by a smaller group to reach the technical fence but was not able to prevent the second attempt by the demonstrators. At the technical fence, demonstrators unearthed 23 anti-tank mines, threw stones and two petrol bombs across the fence and attempted to climb it and bring it down. Following a verbal warning and firing into the air, the Israel Defence Forces then directed live fire at the protesters at the fence. After the arrival of reinforcements, Lebanese Armed Forces Special Forces reserve moved the protesters away from the fence. The Lebanese Armed Forces initially informed UNIFIL that 11 persons were killed. This figure was later revised to 7, with 111 people injured. In addition, the respective parties informed UNIFIL that 70 Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers and 4 Israel Defence Forces troops were lightly wounded by stones. One UNIFIL soldier also sustained light wounds from a thrown stone.⁴²

The result of the events of May 2011, led to intense discussions between Israel, Lebanon and UNIFIL as to how operations could be mitigated to prevent death, injury and escalation. These discussions will be dealt with in the following section on the tripartite meetings and bilateral liaison.

Air Violations

There is another major source of tension at the international level which UNIFIL has to deal with and this is the daily air violations conducted by Israel in the form of drone and fixed-wing aircraft surveillance. This takes place over the whole of Lebanon and UNIFIL protests these infringements of Resolution 1701 on a regular basis.

You have over-flights would be a continuous violation you know. I believe in the tripartite meetings it's a continuous thing. And again, guys on the post would report, you can see them as clear as day, that would be a daily thing that's going on also. It's when there's a spike in it, that it would be of interest to me.⁴³

As mentioned above, at times the Israelis will increase aerial activity or conduct war-like manoeuvres over local towns in the south.⁴⁴ UNIFIL can only record and protest these

⁴² United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2011/406*, 1 July 2011, p.2.

⁴³ Interview with Respondent G1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

⁴⁴ 'UNIFIL Complains to UN over Israel Overflights', *Daily Star*, 8 May 2013; 'IAF jets fly mock raids over south Lebanon after mysterious aircraft shot down over Israel', *Haaretz*, 7 October 2012.

violations at the tripartite meetings and in their report to the Secretary General who unfailingly mentions them in every report on 1701. An example of Israeli aerial activity is detailed here in one Secretary General's report:

The Israel Defence Forces continued to violate Lebanese airspace almost daily during the reporting period, with overflights of Lebanese territory and territorial waters by unmanned aerial vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft, including fighter jets. On 29 January alone, there were some 34 air violations involving multiple fighter jets. On 28 November, at least six Israeli attack helicopters entered Lebanese airspace and flew at low altitude in the general vicinity of Tyre, an action that could have resulted in a serious security incident, in addition to putting at risk UNIFIL helicopters normally operating in the area. UNIFIL protested about all the air violations to the Israel Defence Forces, calling upon the authorities to cease them immediately. The Government of Lebanon also protested, while the Government of Israel continued to maintain that the overflights were a necessary security measure.⁴⁵

UNIFIL recognises that the air violations are a major source of irritation to the local population who view UNIFIL's inability to prevent them as an indication of their weak position against Israel or as a sign that they do not do enough to stop them and are therefore complicit in them.

Weapons Pointing

On a regular basis, incidents of weapons pointing occur which have the potential to escalate between the two named parties – the LAF and the IDF. These situations of tension take place between both the named parties in broad daylight. In these instances, UNIFIL troops have been known to intercept any potential military action by either of the parties by walking in-between them. At other times, the IDF have pointed their weapons at UNIFIL. Reports by the Secretary General often detail these types of incidents and one example will be given below. An examination of all the Secretary General's Reports on Resolution 1701 has shown that this type of confrontation occurs sporadically. In the example given below, ten cases were reported, but in 2013 only one.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2013/120', p.3.

⁴⁶ Incidences vary year on year since 2006. It is too soon to imply that the lack of incidents this year can be fully attributed to the work on UNIFIL.

UNIFIL observed 10 cases of weapons pointing across the Blue Line. Four instances involved Israel Defence Forces soldiers pointing their weapons in the direction of UNIFIL personnel; in five other instances the Israel Defence Forces pointed their weapons in the direction of Lebanese civilians or Lebanese Armed Forces personnel. The most serious incident happened on 1 June, when Israel Defence Forces soldiers pointed a mounted heavy machine gun towards soldiers at a Lebanese Army checkpoint on the western side of Ghajar. The incident temporarily escalated tensions on both sides of the Blue Line, and the situation returned to normal only when the Israel Defence Forces patrol left the location. On one occasion, a Lebanese Armed Forces soldier pointed his weapon towards Israel in the vicinity of Israel Defence Forces soldiers. UNIFIL has protested against all incidents involving weapons being pointed and, when required and possible, interposed its soldiers between Lebanese Armed Forces and Israel Defence Forces soldiers, seeking to prevent such incidents from escalating. There were also a number of allegations of weapons being pointed, particularly in the areas of El Adeisse and KafrKila, as a result of which UNIFIL has established an additional observation point in the area of El Adeisse.⁴⁷

The next level of Blue Line breaches are the most serious and they comprise deliberate violations of the Blue Line by military or armed personnel and rocket attacks from armed elements which are directed at Israel. As noted above, since 2006, Hizbullah has not claimed to have conducted any incursions south of the Blue Line into Israeli territory.⁴⁸ The IDF has committed a number of land incursions into Lebanese territory which increases tension between the IDF and the LAF.

Rocket Attacks

Rocket attacks from Lebanon into Israel naturally constitute a serious violation of the Blue Line. Since the 2006 war, Hizbullah has not claimed responsibility for any rocket attacks that have been launched against Israel. However, other armed groups in the area have done so and claimed responsibility. These incidents cause insignificant damage owing to the inaccuracy of the rocket which rarely pierce the 'Iron Dome' created by Israel.⁴⁹

But, when a rocket attack occurs, UNIFIL are quick to conduct an investigation in order to reassure the Israelis that in fact it was not launched by Hizbullah. This is because of the

⁴⁷ United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2011/406*, p.5.

⁴⁸ It should be noted that the LAF were not present in the south of Lebanon until late 2006. As they patrol with UNIFIL and never alone, they have never been found to have violated the Blue Line.

⁴⁹ Israeli's Iron Dome is a mobile all-weather air defence system developed by Rafael Advanced Defence Systems. The system is designed to intercept and destroy short-range rockets and artillery shells fired from distances of 4 to 70 kilometres away and whose trajectory would take them to a populated area.

seriousness of the perceived threat level Israel attributes to a Hizbullah attack relative to an attack by another less organised group. The most common source of random rocket attacks are al-Qaeda affiliated groups and pro-Palestinian groups that operate in the area. Often a random rocket attack will not receive a response in kind from Israel as UNIFIL work hard to liaise with the IDF to reassure them that this event is in fact a one-off and not the resumption of hostilities by Hizbullah.

You see for example, you have from time to time, firing of rockets. This is not the main players who are doing it. Let's say Hizbullah and Israel. And immediately we tell Israel it is not Hizbullah, things cool down.⁵⁰

However, this scenario is starting to change, possibly due to Israeli impatience with the inability of UNIFIL to prevent such attacks. During the course of this research, on a day I was in the area of operations, a rocket was launched from nearby Tyre into northern Israel. UNIFIL staff were immediately recalled to headquarters in Naqoura and an investigation was launched by the LAF and UNIFIL to determine the source of the attack. The attack was claimed quite swiftly an al-Qaeda linked group calling themselves the Abdullah Azzam Brigades.⁵¹ Israel conducted a proportionate response the following night by launching several rockets into a known base of the group the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) at Naameh, an area 15 kilometres south of Beirut.⁵²

In the case of rocket attacks, the parties on both sides of the Blue Line do not always cooperate with UNIFIL. After the rocket-launching incident on 22 August 2013, UNIFIL were denied permission to investigate the site of the rocket landings in Israel until the Israelis themselves had investigated and removed the remnants of the rockets. UNIFIL were then taken to a laboratory in Israel and shown the remains of the rockets but could not verify whether or not these were the actual rockets that had been fired on 22 August as they had not been allowed to access the site before it was tampered with.

⁵⁰ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

⁵¹ Hussein Dakroub, 'Lebanese leaders condemn rocket attack on Israel', *Daily Star*, 23 August 2013.

⁵² Quilty, Jim, 'Israeli Warplane Strikes Area South of Beirut', *Daily Star*, 23 August 2013.

At the impact sites in Israel, remnants of the rockets had been removed by the Israeli authorities prior to the visit of the UNIFIL investigation team. On 27 August, UNIFIL investigators inspected the purported remnants of the rockets at a laboratory in Israel and found them to be 122-mm calibre rockets. The “Brigades of Abdullah Azzam, Ziad Jarrah Battalions” claimed responsibility for the rocket attacks, but UNIFIL is not in a position to determine the veracity of this claim.⁵³

Equally, the Secretary General’s report of 26 June 2013, noted that UNIFIL requested permission from LAF to excavate a rocket-launching site after they had been denied access by local civilians to the site shortly after the launch had occurred. The LAF also refused them permission.⁵⁴

With regard to the explosion in Tayr Harfa (Sector West) on 17 December, UNIFIL found that eyewitness accounts, the material damage caused and the metallic ordnance fragments collected at the site all pointed to the detonation of a large quantity of explosives. UNIFIL was unable to determine the cause of the explosion definitively, however, as the site had been disturbed before UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces investigation teams could access it, leaving the possibility that evidence had been lost. The UNIFIL request to excavate the explosion site was not accepted by the Lebanese Armed Forces.⁵⁵

Naturally it is a source of frustration for UNIFIL that they are unable to fully and effectively play their role as neutral observers to the situation if they cannot be relied upon to provide a clear and full explanation of these attacks when they occur.

Random rocket attacks work to erode trust between the parties, most particularly on the Israeli side, who use these incidents to justify intrusive security measures on the Blue Line, such as building defensive walls, conducting ground incursions, and installing electronic surveillance equipment along the technical fence which is capable of eavesdropping on the entire population of Lebanon.⁵⁶ The attacks also weaken the LAF’s standing with the IDF as they demonstrate

⁵³ United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2013/650, p.3.

⁵⁴ As will be explained in the following chapter, the LAF has to walk a political tightrope to avoid being seen as impartial by any one sect. As the LAF still view themselves as in the process of winning hearts and minds in the south, they are disinclined to place too much pressure on Hizbullah.

⁵⁵ United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2013/381, p.3.

⁵⁶ ‘Lebanon Files Complaint to U.N. Over Israeli Spying’, *Daily Star*, 8 January 2014.

that they are unable to guarantee Israel's security against such attacks. This is frustrating for UNIFIL as it is in their interests that the LAF are viewed by Israel as a capable defence force as they work towards the long-term goal of withdrawal from South Lebanon.

Confrontation Between the Parties

A confrontation between two parties is naturally the highest level of security threat to the UNIFIL mission. It is during such an event that the work of the PAOs is most relevant, as such the process for managing confrontations and two case studies are provided in the following section.

Summary of Section One

This section has described how the UNIFIL peace operation responds to Blue Line violations in order to influence its security environment to maintain international peace and security. The factors that facilitate the effectiveness of actors, primarily peacekeepers on the ground are local knowledge, in particular sensitivity to local concerns. In the absence of a Chapter VII mandate, UNIFIL peacekeepers use a combination of negotiation, persuasion and advice to manage accidental transgressions. They demonstrate sympathy for local civilians in terms of ensuring they remain calm and respect local sentiment when dealing first hand with transgressors. Where possible, they involve local government figures and the LAF wherever possible to assist them.

UNIFIL ensure a LAF presence when they are dealing with violations conducted by local civilians because they know it presents a localised solution. This helps to not only increase LAF's presence in the area, and remind the local population that LAF are there to serve them. But it also helps UNIFIL to stand back, play more of an observational role and not be viewed as foreign interveners in Lebanese security issues. Most importantly, it reduces the risk of a violent confrontation between a Lebanese citizen and a UNIFIL peacekeeper which would have extremely negative effects on local perceptions of the mission.

Where the international character of UNIFIL is a positive, is that they ensure everything is recorded and subsequently reported to Headquarters at Naqoura, who will then include all violations in the report that will be sent to the Secretary General in New York. In the case of deliberate violations, UNIFIL also conduct an investigation which is subsequently reported to both the named parties and New York. This acts as a constraint on the parties, neither of whom wish to receive negative international attention. As noted by MacQueen (2006) ‘providing a certain element of political theatre has always been a significant part of the peacekeeping role’.⁵⁷

Section One has described in detail UNIFIL’s response tactics to violations of the Blue Line. Section Two will discuss the preventative mechanisms UNIFIL has put in place to maximise opportunities for managing security crises along the Blue Line and building trust between the parties in order to prevent further incidents and escalations of such incidents into full scale war.

Section Two: Prevention

Liaison and Communication at the International Level

As noted in the introduction, at the international level, operations on the ground are not the only components of UNIFIL’s work towards maintaining peace on the Blue Line. UNIFIL are highly engaged with the military forces of both the named parties at the strategic level to try to prevent confrontations. This work is conducted largely by UNIFIL political affairs officers (PAOs) and the Force Commander. The mechanisms employed by PAOs include bilateral liaison between UNIFIL and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); the tripartite meetings and brokering micro security agreements.

⁵⁷ MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System*, p.134.

The Tripartite Meetings

The tripartite meetings are held on average once a month or every six weeks. They take place in a building in Ras Naqoura, a village on the border with Israel.⁵⁸ Present at the meeting are the Force Commander of UNIFIL, and several senior staff from the UNIFIL political affairs department. Also present are senior staff from the LAF and the IDF. The tripartite meetings are regarded by UN headquarters in New York as an extremely positive aspect of UNIFIL's work in maintaining international peace and security, as evidenced by their frequent mention in Secretary General reports who has described them as:

...the most significant stabilizing factor within the framework of resolution 1701 (2006), serving to build confidence between the parties and defuse tension in potential flashpoints, as well as providing a platform through which UNIFIL can facilitate practical arrangements on the ground between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defence Forces.⁵⁹

The meetings are unusual as both states remain technically at war, and at the political level of government, neither side has met in a very long time. However, here representatives of the military of both states come together to debate and discuss their on-going security concerns. Israel and Lebanon never speak directly to one another at these meetings despite being across the meeting table from one another. Instead each side addresses the UNIFIL Force Commander who then relays the information to the other side. Informally, UNIFIL staff have told me that sometimes the Israelis will try to speak directly to members of LAF, but they refuse to engage directly with the IDF, rather they always speak through the Force Commander.⁶⁰

The benefits of the tripartite meetings according to UNIFIL staff are multiple. First, because they provide an opportunity for liaison on key security issues without recourse to arms. As a result of

⁵⁸ Israeli citizens are not permitted to visit Lebanon. Therefore the meeting has to take place in a special building that essentially sits on the Blue Line.

⁵⁹ United Nations Secretary General, '*Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2013/381', p.7.

⁶⁰ This is due to a great deal of resentment in Lebanon towards Israelis, borne largely of the five invasions they have conducted since 1978, which the LAF have been unable prevent.

the tripartite meetings, liaison agreements have been struck between the parties in order to better manage security incidents. The procedural terms of the liaison agreement was described thus, by a senior LAF officer:

The most important thing in this protocol was that we have to assign a senior officer who will be always ready when the First Commander ask for a meeting – if he wants he can contact 24 hours and 7 days the General and the General in Israel. The first thing that is important is that this person needs to be able to come to a meeting whenever the First Commander asks for a meeting. The second thing that is important, that any movement of the armies of both sides must be in coordination with UNIFIL and give the other side notification if there is any abnormal movement. They have to tell UNIFIL what's going on and UNIFIL tell us. There is a system but we can put it as goodwill, it's not a document, but goodwill they can put it. And so, this worked very well really, in six years, this is the seventh year, it works like that. Always we are in contact at any time, 24 hours, 7 days, the First Commander can contact us, and contact the other Israeli General. He may put me on hold and speak with him at the same time. Sometimes in my office when something is urgent we do it on speakerphone.⁶¹

The second benefit of the tripartite meetings is as a communication forum. The tripartite meetings also afford UNIFIL the opportunity to protest violations to both the named parties, and explain to both sides the UNIFIL perspective on what occurred. One senior UNIFIL officer described the liaison and communication benefits of the meetings thus:

And so it's a forum for liaison and coordination. It's a forum for us to discuss all security and operational matters. So whenever we have an incident, a violation of 1701, or an incident, we report it in full. We obviously protest any incidents of violations to both parties immediately but then we report it in full at the tripartite meeting. We explain what happened, our understanding of what happened, and what we observed, the allegations of the parties, and then if it's a serious violation or serious incident, we will actually send an investigation team and we will carry out an investigation, into what happened... Once we've written these reports we give them to the parties and we discuss them. And the parties protest or say they like this, or they don't like this etc. But generally we have a basic agreement on what needs to be done to ensure these incidents don't happen again.⁶²

⁶¹ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

⁶² Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

The meetings provide an effective forum for both sides to air their grievances and vent their feelings, for either side to protest over an incident, or for UNIFIL to make an official protest to either of the named parties directly: in sum to vent their feelings over a particular issue.

...the tripartite meetings allow them to let off steam. If both sides want to shout and yell at each other they can do so. They can let off steam, they can put their points of view, they have very different points of view, they have very forceful arguments but it is an effective forum in that sense. Both sides get a lot out of it.⁶³

The final benefit of the tripartite meetings is that they have enabled both sides to come to agreement on micro security arrangements.

Brokering Micro-Security Agreements

Arguably the most practical use of the tripartite meetings is that they facilitate the creation of micro security agreements between the named parties. These agreements are not only helpful in the pursuit of maintaining peace and security on the Blue Line, they also demonstrate how liaison at the subnational level can generate localised agreements to maintain peace and security. Specific examples of these micro-agreements were hard to source from respondents who were reluctant to reveal too much detail as they regarded these agreements as highly confidential and sensitive.

However, one example was provided:

Like, for example we have olive fields at Rueda, where we have 9 or 11 fields that cross the Blue Line. In 2010 we were able to persuade the Israelis to allow, certain farmers to cultivate their olives south of the Blue Line, we had to fence them in. This was on the understanding that we would mark the Blue Line, but because of lack of agreement between the two parties we weren't able to finalise that marking. We did most of it but we weren't able to finalise that marking. But it was an effective way, at least for that year, for farmers to cultivate their olives.⁶⁴

Another officer alluded to the same agreement and how the deal was struck:

⁶³ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

⁶⁴ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

So what we try to do with the Israelis is say, OK, let's try and put some kind of an arrangement in here, so this guy can get to his olive trees. So you know we put a fence here like this around the area, so when the farmer comes in he can't go any further you know? So this kind of agreement or something like that. So then we, on this side [Lebanon], we have to say, "OK, we need to know who the farmer is. And whose coming with him, is it his first cousin, second cousin, his wife and his kids and all that kind of stuff." Because what this side [Israeli] will say to you is "Ah but he's not a farmer. He's Hizbullah in disguise." Everyone is a Hizbullah guy because they [Israel] see everyone under a rock. So these are the kind of things you can do, at the local level.⁶⁵

The number of micro security arrangements that UNIFIL have been able to strike with both the parties is not clear. Respondents did make it clear that they are not easy to achieve:

You know it's so difficult to even get the smallest little step because there is such mistrust between the two sides. We've had successes, we've had a lot of failures. And then we've had successes that last for a little while and then evaporate. You just, you know, there's no mystery to it either, you just use your common sense, you try and get them to agree to a small, little agreement. Something at the local level. You can look at the local level, not at the political level. I can arbitrate between this guy and this guy, ok you do this, and you do that, that way I can do it. And that can work, and then you get a little bit of confidence in that and then you try ... it's like going up the stairs, one step at a time. But you can be sometimes, go one up and two back.⁶⁶

The liaison and communication channels that UNIFIL have set up in the last seven years appear to make a strong contribution to the prevention of war. They demonstrate first and foremost that even when states are technically at war and only under the conditions of a cessation of hostilities they can come to agreement on some of the smaller issues that will prevent further conflagrations between the parties. That UNIFIL has managed to establish these meetings and furthermore, maintain them is no small achievement. However, as noted in Chapter Two, the strategic environment is currently conducive to both sides not wishing to engage militarily. Should the environment change significantly; there is every chance that these important mechanisms for conflict prevention could be discarded. But whilst both parties remain in agreement to the terms of 1701, these agreements help to prevent needless security incidents which always have the potential to escalate.

⁶⁵ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁶⁶ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

Maintaining Impartiality and Trust

All the PAOs interviewed, made the point that a lot of the liaison work they do at the international level involves building up strong relationships with personnel within the LAF and also the IDF. In the Middle East, personal relationships are extremely important. Once you have established a relationship it is extremely important to maintain it in order to build trust. This is the advantage that UNIFIL has over and above most UN missions owing to its longstanding nature. As noted in earlier chapters, one of the most frustrating aspects of UNIFIL's work are the constant rotations of troops which means valuable experience is frequently lost and new members of staff need to be educated and socialised which takes up time.

Owing to the length of time UNIFIL has been present in South Lebanon, there are some key members of staff in the Political Affairs and Civil Affairs sections who have been working for UNIFIL for almost thirty years. These staff members are invaluable in terms of enabling UNIFIL to maintain important relationships over time, educate newcomers, retain both institutional memory and the trust of the named parties. Simply having been involved with UNIFIL for a long period of time affords some staff members a great deal of leverage with the parties and the benefit of historical context. One staff member spoke at length about the issues he faced as a long-time staff member and they are detailed in this section.

And I have my own credibility, I've been working with them a long time, you know? So they know my, the cut of my jib... this job that I do, is all personal. There's no, like, if I get a degree from somewhere, that won't stand with me. It's purely personal. It's a personal relationship you have with the two sides, simple as that. It's how you do business with them. Just try to be honest with them and hopefully they will see you for the honest broker that you are. But sometimes they doubt you because you are telling them things that they don't want to hear. Or you're telling them things that the other guys are going to do...so.⁶⁷

But this is not always an easy task. The same staff member commented on the difficulties in particular of maintaining trust.

⁶⁷ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

My major concern, as I said is the level of trust. That we never lose that level of trust. That's my major concern. That is paramount to me being successful and being able to do my job. That would be my biggest concern that some guy doesn't try to blacklist me or try to say things, and you never know. Yeah that would be my biggest concern, that I would be misunderstood but I mean, not necessarily misunderstood...People will try to fuck you. So you just have to take care of people who will screw you. I don't know, for personal reasons or something like that.⁶⁸

The staff member went on to stress that he had on many occasions had to put a stop to rumours about him which actually put him at a security risk, owing to his work on liaison with the IDF. Despite his long relationship with both the named parties, he still has to prove himself on a continuous basis. This demonstrates how much work it takes to build trust and this is not something that can be achieved and maintained in a two year (or less) rotation. The relationship requires constant attention.

I had people say, I am soft on the Israelis, now telling people here on this side, telling people I am soft on the Israelis could be very dangerous for me, you know? So then, the only thing I can say to people is: 'Look, you know me, you know my history, you know the way I operate.' And you know the expression, 'You're only as good as your last game?' That's here. You're only as good as your last game. Institutional memory, so you have to be continuously on your guard.⁶⁹

The second key issue for UNIFIL political staff is that of maintaining impartiality at both the professional and the personal level. Just as the troops on the ground also have to maintain the same posture irrespective of whom they are dealing with, so they do at the higher political level, irrespective of their personal perspective on the security policies of either of the named parties.

UNIFIL's approach to ensuring that both named parties view them as impartial is to maintain transparency and honesty in all aspects of their dealings with both sides.

I think the transparency is the main thing. I mean, you have to be honest in this game ... and to be honest with both sides. Because you will very easily trip yourself up, or you'll get yourself exposed. Very quickly...[I]f you're dealing with one crowd, you can't say, "Oh I'll look after you now" [winks], you know? Because they don't know if you are saying the same to the other guys. So you can't kind of say, a nod

⁶⁸ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁶⁹ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

and a wink, you can't be like, that you know? Although you might be trying to give them a break, trying to guide them in a certain way, to give them a bit of advice. But basically it has to be transparency and you have to be honest. If you're not honest and therefore not transparent, you're history.⁷⁰

As part of this, it is important that key staff members do not make the mistake of being credited by either side for having been the decision maker. It is important that both of the named parties understand that liaison officers are simply passing on the message, they are not the generators of the message itself.

Transparency is easy. But honesty, because sometimes you don't want to tell it. Because sometimes when you come, sometimes you have to deliver information that they don't want to hear and that they don't accept. And they don't like it. You know the story 'Don't shoot the messenger'? You know we are often the messenger and we have to be very careful and sometimes the message that you have to deliver comes you know, I am only passing the message. I am not the originator of the message, so in that respect we have to be very careful as well... And then you have to be very careful. What you have to be careful of, when you're doing a deal, is that YOU'RE not making the deal. Don't put yourself out on a limb, like if I go to one side, and say "Listen, look, ok we can fix that now" and don't give guarantees to the other guys. You've got to get those from the other guys. Because again, you're a messenger... Sometimes I've seen people write back and say "[Name of interviewee] said that they wouldn't do this". I said "Hang on a minute. This isn't ME speaking – they are doing the deal." Sometimes, this is where you can get caught. Again this is with trust and transparency. I've seen a letter come from and they've said that I said they wouldn't do this or that. And I've said, "Hang on a minute, it's not me"... And this goes back to the trust, and your modus operandi like. You are the messenger, and the go-between, I'm trying to do the exchange, but it's not me. I am not negotiating for myself. For him or for him I am doing it. And that's where you have to be careful in that respect.⁷¹

The Secretary General reports on Resolution 1701 regularly documents the fact that UNIFIL has been unable to establish an office in Tel Aviv, in Israel.⁷² However, the fact that key senior UNIFIL staff reside on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line is recognised by UNIFIL as giving the IDF the perception that UNIFIL staff are biased.

I think for the Israelis, I have a good relationship with the Israelis. I am not too sure, how far that extends with certain people because they see me sometimes as being... because I am living here. And my close proximity to the people, and I am

⁷⁰ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013

⁷¹ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁷² See for example *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2013/120; S/2013/381; S/2013/650.

living in this environment and let's say I have friends in the LAF and so on. Or just in Lebanese society. So I think sometimes they are a little bit suspicious of me... Because they might not be sure of where my loyalties lie sometimes. You know, you have to work at it.⁷³

On the personal level, the officer admitted he has to watch himself to ensure his is not swayed by his environment. This is not always easy because UNIFIL staff live on one side of the line only, the Lebanese side and so naturally have been witness to many events that have had a negative impact on the Lebanese people.

So not to allow your own sentiments to get involved in your business you know, what I might say in private, you know, I might say in private, like you know. But basically on a day-to-day basis, you can't afford that luxury, you just can't. Because then you are one-sided you know? And then you can't ...because the problem is that we are trying to do deals with them and stuff like that. Very difficult, very very difficult, because there is a lot of bad history there. And what you are trying to do, is you're trying to see the gap, but in trying to see the gap, you have to ensure, that you're not from one side or the other. So you're trying to find a gap that suits, the two of them can pass through. Not just a gap for him, or him.⁷⁴

The issue of the nationality of staff members also plays a role in these liaisons. One senior member of staff, noted that his own nationality is considered a problem by the Israeli side.

And then again, you know, not necessarily on the record, I have to look at my own nationality when dealing with the Israelis. The Israelis and Ireland haven't got a very good relationship, Ireland is very pro-Palestinian you know.⁷⁵

Managing An Incident between the States of Israel and Lebanon

The following sections will first outline how UNIFIL use liaison to prevent the escalation of an incident, and the second section provides examples of two actual confrontations that took place since 2006, the first between the LAF and the IDF, the second between Hizbullah and the IDF.

⁷³ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁷⁴ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁷⁵ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

The Mechanisms of Constant Liaison and Communication.

The above sections have described in detail how UNIFIL troops work with the LAF to manage Blue Line and Resolution 1701 violations on the ground. At the international level, one of the most serious violations of Resolution 1701 occurs when the armies of Lebanon and Israel engage.

The first thing that will happen when an incident between the two armies occurs, will be a report from the UNIFIL troops on the ground back to headquarters. As the LAF do not patrol on their own and always travel with UNIFIL, there is no occasion whereby they would be able to engage or confront the IDF without the presence of UN troops. This is the primary level of prevention that UNIFIL is able to employ to prevent escalations – the ability to immediately report to UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura that an incident is taking place between the named parties.

The process as explained to this researcher was that more often than not the Force Commander is immediately notified. The next step is that headquarters will contact the closest UN battalion near to the scene and attempt to saturate the area with UN troops. This is done to ensure that both sides are aware of an international presence which it is hoped will reduce the chance of escalation owing to the fact that both sides will be aware that their actions will be monitored and reported.

In the meantime, senior liaison staff are on the telephone to both the named parties. The process is described thus by one such UNIFIL staff member who is primarily responsible for these matters.⁷⁶

If we see something developing...we can see the writing on the wall, the Force Commander usually gets involved. We have hotlines. We have hotlines to the sides. Tick tack, tick tack...the whole time, checking this. It's as simple as that, nothing special about it, other than telling your guys, "Listen relax we are sending people there. We are reinforcing the area, it's saturated with UNIFIL, we'll do a blanket

⁷⁶ It should be noted that owing to the small number of staff at this level, one PAO deals most heavily with this aspect of work and as such is referenced frequently in the next few pages.

job on it,” and you know that kind of way, you know just tick tack the whole time. We get onto Tel Aviv, to IDF headquarters and then from there onto Northern Command of the IDF, and we say “Listen tell your guys to back off, cool down”, same with the other side, “pull back, pull back, stop the firing, you know relax” and that said we’ve got people on the ground just trying. No mystery, other than talking.⁷⁷

The key issue, as noted above is the risk that one actor termed by UNIFIL as the strategic corporal⁷⁸ will take an action that is not supported at the higher levels. Because, as previously stated, neither side wants to go to war on the basis of a single incident.

So the strategic corporal is the guy on the ground who can do something that can cause a war. Because the guy on the ground can do something, some soldier, some officer on the ground can make a stupid mistake, or make a stupid decision, that brings his country to war. And that’s the chap you have to watch out for. If you want to go to war, that’s your decision, but we don’t want to be sucked into a war, not of our intention. That’s the strategic corporal... but no mystery Vanessa. When the shit hits the fan, on the phones at all levels. Operational, strategic level, bom bom bom. Get the phones going you know? We ring whomever we have to ring.⁷⁹

The most nerve-wracking element confronting the UNIFIL liaison officer when managing an incident is time. He/she has to work as quickly as possible, with the aid of other senior colleagues to ensure that both sides at the senior level are able to contact their troops on the ground to cool them down.

Often the situation is started not with the intention of the higher level. So when this situation develops, we can talk to the higher level, and just give them time to impose themselves on their side at the lower level. Because at a higher level, it was never their intention to start that. So they want to stop it as well, so they’re trying to intervene themselves, but it takes a while to pull back the dogs of war – they’ve got to be pulled back in. So generally the people we are tick tacking with, they want to stop it as well. But we just have to give them time.⁸⁰

Another frustrating element for the liaison staff is trying to intervene in a situation where both sides are keen to respond. And as the senior staff are often not present at the site, they can only

⁷⁷ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁷⁸ The term ‘strategic corporal’ is a military term and refers to the decision maker on the ground on the day as events unfold.

⁷⁹ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁸⁰ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

take the word of the parties at the time - prior to UN troops present submitting a report – of what is occurring.

[We need to] get a ceasefire in place. Because with a ceasefire, one guy [will say], “They’re still firing”. [We say] “Where are they still firing?”, [then they say] “Well we stopped firing, but they started firing. We stopped, but they didn’t so we returned the fire because they didn’t”. So we’ve got to go through all this kind of stuff, so eventually you’ve got to kinda, put the fire out.⁸¹

Once the incident has been de-escalated, the process of investigation takes place and UNIFIL will liaise with both sides to establish what has occurred. The incident will be reported back to UN headquarters in New York and receive mention in the Secretary General reports which are submitted three times a year. Back in Lebanon, UNIFIL will either convene an emergency tripartite meeting or wait for the next one in order to discuss the incident and its repercussions. Most importantly, once they do meet, UNIFIL will seek agreement between the named parties on putting measures in place to prevent a similar incident from occurring.

One example of how this is achieved was after the events of 15th May 2011, when the pro-Palestinian protests escalated and civilians were killed (see subsection on organised protests in Section One). After an investigation, an agreement was made with both sides on what measures could be employed to prevent incidents of a similar nature later on.

What I would argue was one of our most successful investigations was following the Nakba Day incident on 15 May 2011, when seven Palestinians were killed – six Palestinians were killed. Where we conducted a very thorough investigation, and we recommended that the LAF do more to ensure, well firstly do not allow such demonstrations so close to the Blue Line. And secondly, make proper assurances that they will be policed to ensure that people do not move to the Blue Line. And on the other side, we said to the Israelis that they should use rubber bullets and various anti-riot gear, tear gas etcetera along the Blue Line... [W]e very clearly laid out our recommendations, we very strongly implored the parties to fulfil those recommendations... [A]nd both parties have implemented those. We haven’t had another problem on the Blue Line, on this side since then, and the Israelis as I understand have implemented quite a few changes to the way that their soldiers comport themselves along the Blue Line.⁸²

⁸¹ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁸² Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

What has not been mentioned above, but which needs to be taken into consideration, is the issue of non-named parties to the conflict. The acts of either random groups or the more organised non-state actor group, Hizbullah, cannot be prevented by UNIFIL using the same strategies. Whilst UNIFIL do work with Hizbullah at the political level, within the municipalities, they do not have the mandate to liaise directly with Hizbullah's military wing. However, as noted in Chapter Two on the history of UNIFIL, the visible armed presence of Hizbullah is no longer present on the border. As such, face-to-face stand-offs in broad daylight between Hizbullah and the IDF have not occurred since 2006. And no rocket attacks into Israel have been publicly claimed by Hizbullah since 2006.

In sum, when an incident occurs, PAOs liaise frequently with both the named parties in order to calm the situation down. It is felt that at the present time, neither side is itching for another war, and as a result both sides are keen to make the effort to prevent the escalation of incidents. But it is the work of the PAOs alongside their partners LAF that has established processes and protocols that can be followed instantly to resolve a situation of tension. These processes enable PAOs to be spontaneous and therefore effective as they can respond quickly and speak to the right people.

Case Studies:

The following 'case studies' evaluate two serious security incidents that have occurred since 2006 in light of the processes described above. In other words, this section highlights how things can go wrong on the ground.

Confrontation Between the Named Parties: The Case of Al-Addaisseh

In July 2010, the most serious outbreak of hostilities to date occurred between the LAF and the IDF at a point along the Blue Line at the village of Al-Addaisseh. This research uncovered three perspectives on this incident, the official UN report, an unofficial recounting from a UNIFIL

staff member and the perspective of the local population, as recounted by a local journalist and an officer with the LAF. The incident highlights several issues that UNIFIL have to deal with: first, that the Blue Line is a volatile place where the smallest of issues can trigger an outbreak of hostilities; second that liaison with both sides cannot always prevent such an outbreak; third that when hostilities do occur, the reputation of the peacekeepers is damaged when the local population see that they are unable to intervene militarily.

The issue that precipitated the stand-off was over the trimming of a tree which was overhanging the Israeli technical fence causing the sensors to go off on a regular basis. Any alert from the sensors necessitated a response from the IDF who would have to go and inspect the cause of the trigger. As such, the Israelis decided it would be helpful if they could trim the tree to prevent accidental triggers. Unfortunately the tree itself was located in what is termed a 'reserve area', this is an area of land that neither of the named parties have yet reached final agreement over with regards to marking the Blue Line. In consequence, when the Israelis arrived to trim the tree by use of a cherry picker, the LAF were waiting on the other side to prevent any incursions into contested territory.

The report by the UN Secretary General on the event reported it thus:

UNIFIL completed its investigation into the 3 August incident and shared the investigation report with the parties in late August. The UNIFIL investigation found that the location of the Israeli tree cutting works and the deployment of Israel Defence Forces troops were approximately 93 metres south of the Blue Line. Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL personnel were deployed along the main road in El Adeisse, which is customarily used, with no objections from the Israel Defence Forces, by the Lebanese Armed Forces, Lebanese civilians and UNIFIL, although it is located some metres south of the Blue Line. As part of its efforts to prevent an escalation of the situation, UNIFIL called on the Lebanese Armed Forces not to open fire and proposed to the Israel Defence Forces to delay work for one day and for UNIFIL to carry out the work. Both parties rejected the proposals of UNIFIL. The Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers were the first to take combat positions, aiming their weapons in the direction of Israeli troops. Immediately thereafter, the Israel Defence Forces soldiers also took up combat positions, aiming their weapons in the direction of the Lebanese troops. The investigation found that the first shot was fired into the air by a Lebanese soldier, which was followed, within seconds, by two additional shots and a burst of fire by other Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers. The Israel Defence Forces deployed at the

location subsequently opened fire in the direction of the Lebanese Armed Forces troops. The Israel Defence Forces fire at the Lebanese Armed Forces, including across the Blue Line, was subsequent to the Lebanese Armed Forces fire directed at the Israel Defence Forces. The exchange of fire lasted approximately three hours, with varying intensity and intermittent lulls. The Lebanese Armed Forces used personal weapons, medium machine guns and, at least on one occasion, a rocket-propelled grenade. The Israel Defence Forces used personal and heavy weapons, tank rounds, artillery rounds and missiles fired from attack helicopters. The investigation found that, in all probability, the Israel Defence Forces officers were hit by aimed fire originating from the general area behind the Lebanese Armed Forces deployment on the El Adeisse road. In the course of the exchange of fire, the Israel Defence Forces fired at Lebanese Armed Forces positions located some distance away from the site of the incident.⁸³

Lebanese journalists present on the ground informed me that in fact the Indonesians started to cry and it was they who carried them to a nearby safe-house before returning to the scene to witness events as they unfolded. This version of events was reported in the international media.⁸⁴

When in 2010 there was an incident between LAF and Israeli army, the Indonesians were there they started crying. So journalists there carried them to a safe place while they were crying and the journalists returned to the place where the fighting was taking place to cover the story. Yeah and one of our colleagues was killed...⁸⁵

As a civilian, and a local journalist, this respondent wanted to know why the rapid deployment force didn't show up. It shows how the local population expect UNIFIL to take up arms to defend them on the ground.

The Israelis came to cut the tree. LAF refused and asked UNIFIL to interfere. The Israelis didn't care for the position of UNIFIL. LAF threatened to shoot, they directly went on alert on the other side, and in this situation fighting erupted... And for example, the example of the Addaïseh incident, we had this rapid deployment force of the French and it didn't show up - at all. The Spanish battalion didn't show up - at all. And they left the Indonesians on their own and the Indonesians were crying and we took them away from the scene. So in total UNIFIL did nothing! Just was making the contacts between the two sides to calm the situation down. But on the ground there was nothing.⁸⁶

⁸³ United Nations Secretary General, *United Nations Secretary General's Report, Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2010/565, 1 November 2010, p.3.

⁸⁴ 'Criticism and Two Indonesian Soldiers Flee Lebanese, Israeli Battle in Taxi', *Agence France Press*, 5 August 2010.

⁸⁵ Interview with Respondent Q, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

⁸⁶ Interview with Respondent Q, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

In addition, a senior officer with the LAF also commented on the failure of UNIFIL to assist in the Addaïsseh incident:

But we have a bad thing, a bad example [of UNIFIL]. For example the Addaïsseh operation when the LAF need the assistance of the UNIFIL, the UNIFIL soldiers disappear in the field... When the LAF, the Chief Commander of the Brigade there, ask the UNIFIL to do some intervention to stop the Israeli intervention – no response.⁸⁷

Behind the scenes it was the PAOs at UNIFIL who were able to liaise with the Israeli side and the LAF by telephone in order to get both sides to stand down as quickly as possible to prevent further escalation. The after-effects of the event were then dealt with in an emergency tripartite meeting convened shortly afterwards with the IDF, the LAF, UNIFIL's Commanding Officer and some PAOs. An investigation was subsequently carried out by UNIFIL and reported (above) in the UN Secretary General's regular thrice yearly report on the UNIFIL mission.

The effect of the event on local opinion was more serious because it re-affirmed the view of locals that UNIFIL was not prepared to defend the Lebanese against Israeli aggression, nor assist LAF in deterring Israeli aggression; which in the view of some civilians, is the only point of having UNIFIL around. At the international level, whilst UNIFIL were able to contribute heavily to the prevention of another war through their liaison with both sides at the time of the incident; one UNIFIL official told me the incident had destroyed about 'two years' worth of trust', which UNIFIL then had to try to rebuild.⁸⁸

This incident illustrates first of all the constraints UNIFIL face in terms of their mandate which is Chapter VI and therefore cannot support peace enforcement measures. It also shows that civilians have expectations that the security offered by a peacekeeping mission should extend to the use of force. This contradicts the idea of some scholars of peace who contend that peace

⁸⁷ Interview with Respondent Y, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 September 2013.

⁸⁸ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

operations and interventions in states have been over securitised.⁸⁹ Local sentiment suggests that this is what civilians in host states require in order to feel secure; on more than one occasion locals expressed their frustration to me that UNIFIL could not do more when confrontations with Israel occur.

Hizbullah vs. Israel: The Case of Labouneh

The most serious violations of all are ones that occur as a result of Hizbullah activity on the Blue Line. They are considered the most serious by all the parties because of the level of seriousness that Israel accords to the Hizbullah threat. The risk of violent escalation is therefore at its highest when such an event like this occurs not least because UNIFIL cannot liaise with Hizbullah's military wing as it is not listed as a named party to the conflict.

However, a deliberate incursion by the Israeli side in August 2013 did demonstrate the continued presence of Hizbullah in the area of operations. The Secretary General's report describes it thus:

In the early hours of 7 August, UNIFIL observed and heard two explosions and gunfire, as well as flashes apparently from a trip flare, near United Nations position 1-31 in the general area of Labouneh, in southern Lebanon. The Israel Defence Forces subsequently confirmed that its soldiers had been involved in an operational activity north of the Blue Line related to its country's concern about the alleged reactivation of Hizbullah infrastructure and the presence of unauthorized armed personnel and weapons in the area. The Israel Defence Forces also informed UNIFIL that four of its soldiers had been slightly injured after they had crossed the Line and that they had been engaged by another group, believed to be Hizbullah. The latter stated publicly that it had taken action against the Israel Defence Forces soldiers.⁹⁰

The event was used by Hizbullah to demonstrate their readiness to protect every inch of Lebanese soil against Israeli incursions. It also however demonstrated to the international community (and in particular to the Israelis) that the area of operations is not free from all weapons or armed elements as per the requirement of Resolution 1701.

⁸⁹ Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*; Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*; Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, 'The End of History and the Last Liberal Peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland Paris'.

⁹⁰ United Nations Secretary General, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2013/650', p.2.

It is this issue that is the hardest for UNIFIL to deal with. They are required to ensure the area of operations is free and clear of any weapons other than that of the Lebanese Armed Forces. However in practice, this is an impossible task to achieve owing to local and national concerns that the LAF is currently unable to defend Lebanese soil in the event of another Israeli invasion. UNIFIL is not permitted to enter private property which in reality means that is precisely where any weapons will be stored by armed elements in the area of operation. Unless UNIFIL come across a stash of weapons in open sight, they are unable to investigate. The best that they can do is inform the LAF of their suspicions and then LAF is expected to conduct an investigation. This issue is also a balancing act for the LAF which will be discussed in Chapter Four which discusses UNIFIL's national operations.

In terms of dealing with a deliberate violation of the Blue Line by Israel (as per the above case) there is little UNIFIL can do other than conduct an investigation after the fact. This is due to the covert nature of the incursion which was designed to avoid attention. In this case, as described in the Secretary General's report above, UNIFIL concluded that both Israel and Hizbullah had violated Resolution 1701.

The UNIFIL investigation concluded that the presence of Israel Defence Forces soldiers inside Lebanese territory in violation of the Blue Line constituted a serious breach of the cessation of hostilities and the terms of resolution 1701 (2006), including the provision that there should be no armed personnel, assets or weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River. The presence of Hizbullah armed personnel and weapons, as well as munitions that caused the explosions in the area, also constituted a violation of the resolution.⁹¹

Prior to 2006, border clashes between Israel and Hizbullah were frequent. This was due to Hizbullah's presence on the Line itself in UNIFIL's area of operation. Since 2006 Hizbullah has withdrawn north of the Litani river and it is generally acknowledged by LAF and UNIFIL staff, that their physical armed presence in the area of operations has been greatly reduced. Of those

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.3.

UNIFIL staff that would give a direct answer to how this has been achieved, some UNIFIL staff attributed this fact to the increased presence of UNIFIL troops and the LAF:

Obviously the recent incidents in Labouneh on August 7th when Nasrallah came out very clearly and said that this was – that the Israeli infiltration unit was stopped by Hizbullah personnel and Hizbullah would work to ensure that no Israeli would set foot north of the Blue Line again. Clearly, and the very presence of the rockets that have gone over including on 22 August, clearly state that there are uncontrolled, unauthorised weapons but I would strongly dispute what other parties say, that Hizbullah still has thousands and thousands of rockets inside our area of operations. We do what we can under our mandate. Some people say it isn't enough and we should do more but then, you know if you want to do more, you have to have a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate, you'd be acting without the authority of the Government and you would come across widespread opposition from the local people, and you'd probably end up similar to what happened to the MNF⁹² in 1983.⁹³

Another UNIFIL staff member felt that the reduced visibility of a Hizbullah presence was down to the fact that they had made the decision to pull back in order to demonstrate consent to Resolution 1701.

Look when 1701 was signed, Hizbullah were part of the Government. Right? So they knew what they were signing themselves up to. So they removed themselves from the south. They weren't kicked out. They removed themselves. You know, we didn't push them out – they left. Because you can never push these guys out, you can't. It's like back in my country, you couldn't kill off the IRA. You could do it internally amongst themselves, and that is maybe the process some day in this country. But these guys left because they wanted to leave. And they signed up to something and they left. They only left across the river. But they're just on the other side, fine, but they left. So we don't see Hizbullah, I was here before the war, and during the war, you don't see Hizbullah day-to-day.⁹⁴

As a result of this, the potential for Hizbullah to launch operations from the area of operation is a great deal more constrained. But this is not the only reason for their lack of action in recent years. The current strategic environment, as outlined in the previous chapter, precludes

⁹² The respondent here is referring to the peacekeeping force comprised of American, British and Italian soldiers that was stationed in Lebanon during the civil war to oversee the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut in 1983. The MNF (Multinational Force in Lebanon) had a robust mandate and it ended up becoming embroiled in local wars. The force withdrew from Lebanon in March 1984 after the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983.

⁹³ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

⁹⁴ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

aggressive action by Hizbullah against Israel. In fact, since 2006 there have been no open 'border' clashes between Hizbullah and Israel. As one UNIFIL officer put it:

But I don't think the situation is calm because Hizbullah left. I think it's calm because until now, the parties are living up to 1701 like the said they would. That's why it's calm. Because there is no intention to start shooting, no side wants to start shooting.⁹⁵

The above events demonstrate a number of weaknesses in UNIFIL's ability to maintain calm in the area of operations once an incident occurs. First, they cannot control for individual actions (the actions of the strategic corporal on the ground), second their protocol for dealing with incidents does not appear to have been fully followed in the case of Addaïseh; and third, they are unable to deal directly with other non-named parties to Resolution 1701 of which Hizbullah is one. Hizbullah is officially included along with other al-Qaeda or Palestinian militias under the term 'armed elements' which UNIFIL are officially supposed to be working towards eliminating in the area of operations. However, local support for Hizbullah in the area of operations is high and this makes it impossible for UNIFIL place too much emphasis on this aspect of their mandate without risking the loss of local consent. This issue has been highlighted by Whalan (2012) who speaks of the legitimacy gap between the terms of the mandate as set by the international community, and local perceptions of what the mandate should look like.⁹⁶ However, despite these constraints, UNIFIL did manage to end the fighting and more importantly, convene a meeting to ensure that peace was maintained afterwards.

Conclusion

The two examples described above at Al-Addaïseh and Labouneh, show how (PAOs) and peacekeepers, are at times constrained by the terms of their mandate and the will of the named parties. The Chapter VI nature of their mandate means that UNIFIL is unable to act more forcefully on the ground when conflict breaks out. The fact that Hizbullah are not a named party

⁹⁵ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁹⁶ Whalan, *How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, Effectiveness*.

to the conflict means that UNIFIL are unable to negotiate with them over the issue of arms in the area of operations. Chapter Five illustrates more fully how the local environment also constrains UNIFIL's ability to influence its security environment, and how this is related to the international/local legitimacy gap that exists in Resolution 1701.

What the second half of this chapter highlights is the preventative aspects of the mission's security strategy and how staff continuity enables them to use three practical measures on the ground to influence their security environment: the tripartite meetings, liaison and micro-security agreements.

The factors that facilitate PAO effectiveness in implementing these practical measures are their relative autonomy and their long-standing relationships with all the parties. As a long-term or some might say 'failed' mission, UNIFIL is currently out of the international spotlight. This means they are generally left alone and not micro-managed by members of the international community; as noted by several authors, this is a distinct advantage.⁹⁷ I contend it allows actors at the subnational level to interpret their mandate contextually and act spontaneously at critical moments.

The factor of time relates to the long-term contracts of key staff which I argue affords them three key advantages: institutional memory; consistency of effort and trust. Whilst the long-term nature of staff at UNIFIL could be regarded as a disadvantage, I argue that it is not. First because it is the enduring nature of the relationships that PAOs have developed that enables them to win trust at crucial moments from key actors within the IDF and the LAF. Second, their persistence and consistency in working towards generating solutions is what has obtained results. Thirdly the institutional memory that these actors have enable them to respond swiftly to emergency situations to contain the violence. Finally, it is well known that the UN finds it hard to fill posts in certain countries. Lebanon is not a safe country and in practical terms, it is more

⁹⁷ Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice*; Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*.

productive to have posts filled by long-term staff, rather than empty posts because of an institutional requirement for constant rotations.

But although UNIFIL demonstrated flaws in their approach to the al-Addaïseh incident in terms of how they managed the situation on the ground, it was the actions of the PAOs that prevented the situation from exploding back into full-blown war, not the international community or national government. Even though on the ground UNIFIL could not prevent the outbreak of hostilities, they were able to end them from behind the scenes through the use of liaison.

Yes we are a stabilising force, because the Al-Addaïseh and lots of other incidents. We are the water on the fire, we can put out the wars. If we weren't there in Al-Addaïseh that day we probably still be in the bunkers, or you and I would still be in the bunkers. Because there still could be fighting. So yes, UNIFIL can intervene and stop at that critical time. That if we weren't there, there would be another shooting match for sure. There would have been a few of them. So yes we are that force that stops the fighting, can stop the fighting, we do stop the fighting and we have stopped the fighting. We have stopped a war breaking out on a few occasions. For sure we have stopped it. But if they decide to go at it they'll do it, they'll do it. Like at Al-Addaïseh, somebody decided they wanted to fire.⁹⁸

As noted by the above respondent, peace can only be maintained where there is a will for peace by the parties concerned. But this is true of all peacekeeping missions.

The following chapter discusses the issue of Hizbullah as an unofficial party to the mandate in greater detail as it outlines the national engagement of UNIFIL staff. Here the relationship between UNIFIL and local government, and the LAF are explored in more detail in terms of how Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) and PAOs engage in peacebuilding activities.

⁹⁸ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

Chapter Four: Capacity-building National Institutions

Sometimes we find ourselves to be a bit of a political football, kicked around. But our primary focus is to stay out of Lebanese politics as far as possible. We do not want to be sucked into Lebanese politics and be used as a political football by any one side. And I think we are quite successful at staying out. So we ensure that our main messages remain the same. Our key central message is that we are here to support the LAF and Resolution 1701 in our area of operations in the south of Lebanon. And it will remain like that unless the Security Council were to change it.¹

Introduction

The preceding chapter discussed UNIFIL's work at the international level and identified longstanding relationships (time), and autonomy and local knowledge as the key factors that enable UNIFIL to maintain international peace and security. This chapter explores UNIFIL's peacebuilding work at the national level. It also reveals that that autonomy, time and local knowledge are the key factors of influence in enabling UNIFIL CAOs and PAOs to work effectively. This chapter also illustrates how a lack of international and national level cooperation acts to constrain UNIFIL actors at the subnational level.

UNIFIL assists the national government of Lebanon in two main ways: capacity building the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and local government; and working to consolidate the authority of both institutions in the south. This chapter analyses the work of UNIFIL at the national level and argues that the mission does not only engage in a traditional 'keeping the peace' role, but has proactively sought a peacebuilding role.

At UNIFIL headquarters, at Naqoura, the staff involved in national institution building are the political advisers (PAOs) and civil affairs officers (CAOs). The main work of the PAOs was described by PAOs as: ensuring the Force Commander is informed of political developments; producing reports for UN headquarters in New York, including reports to the Secretary General;

¹ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

managing tripartite and bilateral liaison with Israel; liaising with UNSCOL and capacity building the LAF.² CAOs work at the local level, liaising with the local population, managing the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) funding process and working with local government or ‘municipalities’ as they are termed.³

Despite UNIFIL’s long-term presence in the region, the mission does have an ‘exit strategy’, albeit a distant goal. In the absence of a peace agreement between the Lebanese and Israeli Governments, UNIFIL’s key objectives are to ensure that the southern region possesses a functioning local government to ensure that there is not an administrative vacuum in the region. The objective in building up LAF capabilities is to facilitate the presence of the national army on the Lebanese side of the Israeli border to maintain peace and security and prevent random attacks on Israel from non-state militia. The corollary of this is the idea that a secure environment coupled with a national government presence in the south will facilitate the necessary stability to stimulate economic growth.

Despite their subnational remit, UNIFIL PAOs engage with members of the national government to a limited extent. The relationship between UNIFIL and the national government of Lebanon is described below.

Working with the National Government

In Lebanese politics there are three key individuals who sit in the highest positions in the Lebanese Parliament, and whose permission is required before approval for anything can hope to be achieved. As Lebanon follows a confessional political system, these roles are both political and religious in nature and comprise: the President, who is always a Maronite Christian, currently this is Michel Sleiman; the Prime Minister, currently Tamam Salaam, who is always a Sunni; and the Speaker of the House, who is always a Shi’ite, currently Nabih Berri. It should be noted

² Based on interviews with UNIFIL PAOs.

³ Based on interviews with UNIFIL CAOs.

however, that within the workings of the government, Speaker Nabih Berri is considered an elder statesman and so obtaining his assistance in any matter usually means a request will be successful. Nabih Berri is also the leader of Amal, the main Shi'ite party other than Hizbullah, and his views tend to be more sensitive than Hizbullah to international concerns about Lebanon. He is and has always been a staunch supporter of UNIFIL since the early days of the mission.⁴ However, as Amal is aligned officially with Hizbullah, Berri is able to speak on behalf of Hizbullah, in so far as he can speak for Shi'a constituents within Lebanon: many Hizbullah supporters in Lebanon also have enormous respect for Nabih Berri. In the absence of a functioning government, when decisions need to be sought from UNIFIL, the strategy is to contact these senior statesmen individually.

Most Lebanese national political parties appreciate the presence of UNIFIL for a number of reasons. The south of the country needs an operational security mechanism to act as a deterrent against a take-over of the area by a militia group (as happened in the past). This in turn reduces the risk of war breaking out again with Israel which would destroy the country economically and physically. As UNIFIL provide so many services to the people of the south, their presence means there is one less part of the country to worry about in light of the current shortage of power, water and municipal services in general. Whilst a signatory to Resolution 1701, Hizbullah has reservations about the presence of UNIFIL in the south because of the potential threat of exposure it poses to their military operations close to the border (some political parties in Lebanon opposed to Hizbullah view this as being yet another advantage of UNIFIL). But broadly speaking UNIFIL has multi-party support and is generally left alone to get on with its business.

⁴ In the Damascus Agreement of 1990 which made the peace between Amal and Hizbullah, Nabih Berri who was leader of Amal even then, insisted on a clause that stated that UNIFIL was untouchable and should not be attacked by Hizbullah (as they had done previously). Since the earliest days of the UNIFIL mission Amal have been extremely protective of the UNIFIL mission. Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 May 2013.

Staff at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura are not mandated to work directly with the Lebanese government or political parties at the national level. Their strategic partner in Lebanon is the LAF and so it is not in their remit to engage directly with government at the national level. This is the job of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), a position currently held by Derek Plumbly (from Britain), who works on behalf of the Secretary General with the Lebanese Government. The main role of UNSCOL is to coordinate the work of the UN in Lebanon with the Lebanese Government and its key focus is the implementation of Resolution 1701. This includes liaising with Lebanon's neighbours in order to obtain full adherence to Resolution 1701; liaising with political parties in Lebanon on issues that concern the full implementation of Resolution 1701; coordinating donor assistance by the Core Group of donor countries supporting Lebanon; and advocating for coordinated donor assistance to Lebanon in consultation with the UN Country Team and the Government of Lebanon.

However, this research identified that UNIFIL PAOs do liaise with national government in the course of their work on an informal basis. PAOs appeared to visit Beirut regularly for meetings with national government officials. As such, it can be surmised that they operate outside of the mandate on certain issues in order to obtain the necessary support for peacebuilding activities in the area of operations. This is presumably because the experience of several long-serving PAOs means that they are best placed to explain UNIFIL's requirements to Lebanese politicians and overseas visitors.

At the time of writing this thesis and during fieldwork, Lebanon had no functioning cabinet and so as such, when UNIFIL does require assistance on an issue from the Lebanese 'Government', it necessary for the Special Coordinator to contact key individuals of influence to ensure consensus.

So our primary contact with the political parties in the government here is Derek Plumbly, the UN Special Coordinator. He has the role of being in touch with the political leaders. Our main Lebanese Government coordinator to UNIFIL is a Lebanese Brigadier General...And our main contact is with him. However, when the

Force Commander wants to have meetings with the senior political leadership of the country – President Sleiman, Prime Minister Mikati, Prime Minister Hariri before him, Speaker Berri – [all of them] have always been extremely generous with their time and have been available to see him – General Serra and his predecessors. Whenever we have asked for meetings, I would say Speaker Berri especially plays a very very important role for us in that regard so as I say so we have contact with them when required but the bread and butter of what we do, our work, is with the LAF.⁵

UNIFIL PAOs are involved in lobbying the national government on two main issues: for UNIFIL's operational budget and for the establishment of national government offices in the south. According to the Statement of Forces Agreement (SOFA,) signed in 1996, the Government of Lebanon is bound to provide UNIFIL with all the facilities they require and for which UNIFIL does not have to pay rent. Over the years UNIFIL have acquired many sites, some of which are on private property rented from the local population. At times this rent has gone into arrears which has led to anger from local landlords. It is then that UNIFIL has to lobby hard to ensure that whatever government exists at the time passes an agreement in cabinet to pay the debts. The last time this occurred was in 2012 and UNIFIL managed to secure the assistance of the Prime Minister at the time, Najib Mikati, to procure agreement to release the necessary funds.⁶ Unfortunately for UNIFIL, the local perception is that it is UNIFIL paying the rent and not the central government. As such they bear the brunt of the negative publicity when this occurs.⁷ The current lack of government means that this problem will doubtless reoccur.

UNIFIL have been working for some time to try and persuade the national government to establish regional offices in the area of operations. As has been noted previously, the lack of any kind of government south of the Litani led to considerable neglect of the area. Owing to the large presence of a Shi'ite population (74% of the population of the south), politicians from other political parties have been hesitant to visit the area. PAOs however have made some progress in persuading local politicians from across the political spectrum to come and visit.

⁵ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013

⁶ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

⁷ Information based on interviews with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013; Respondent L, Civilian, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 9 October 2013.

Now we are in a phase for the first time in history, since 1978, ministers are visiting UNIFIL. We have Minister of Social Affairs came here. We are bringing the government back you see?...The Minister of Information came, Minister of Social Affairs came, Minister of Environment came you know? So this is also part to assist the Lebanese Government to restore law and order, which brings the police bringing the law, bringing the administration and all this.⁸

The objective is to have ministries establish regional offices in order to prevent a political vacuum from emerging when UNIFIL do eventually leave. As one PAO noted, if this is not put in place, there is a high risk of other non-state groups coming in to fill the void. If this happens then the area of operations could yet again become an ungovernable area that will heighten Israeli security concerns and prevent movement towards a permanent ceasefire agreement.

So the Government wasn't in the south. It's not just the military, it's health, education, all these other offices. Environment, all these other offices are not evident in the south either. So we try to engage these other ministries and say "Look guys you need to get your people, get your offices down to the south to support the people. Because if you don't you have a vacuum. If you have a vacuum, somebody else is going to fill it." And somebody else like lightening will fill it. And they did after the war. Because after the war was a real example of that. After the war Hizbullah were down overnight, round to the people. "Your house is damaged". Next week, guy comes along, does an inspection of the house, "Here's a thousand dollars, maybe \$10,000, OK look after your family and we'll give you more later when you build a house." You know this kind of stuff. You know so they were very quick to get in there.⁹

Finally, UNIFIL PAOs and public affairs officers, together with UNSCOL, have to work to clarify their role in Lebanon so that they are not drawn into other debates on national security.

We often have a certain misunderstanding of our mandate. Many political party leaders, particularly from the 14th of March have been calling for UNIFIL to be deployed on the border with Syria.¹⁰

The broad coalition of parties entitled the March 14th alliance is keen to rid Lebanon of Hizbullah and they view UNIFIL as one way of constraining Hizbullah's operations. Their view is based

⁸ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

⁹ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

¹⁰ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

on the fact of Hizbullah's 'withdrawal' from the area of operations and the lack of hostilities in the area of operations since 2006. The idea is that if UNIFIL were deployed to Lebanon's border with Syria, their presence would prevent Syrian infiltration of Lebanese territory and provide an international spotlight on the activities there which would have the effect of constraining militias (both Syrian and Lebanese) operating in the area.¹¹

In sum, UNIFIL's involvement with the Government of Lebanon is largely managed by UNSCOL, their strategic partner is actually the Lebanese Armed Forces;¹² but PAOs go beyond their mandate and engage with officials at the national level on an informal basis. The following two sections discuss the work of PAOs and CAOs in capacity building two national institutions, the LAF and the municipalities.

Section One: Local Government

This section comprises four subsections. The first subsection describes what Resolution 1701 says about government in the south, and how CAOs choose to interpret the mandate in light of the political situation on the ground. It also briefly explains the reasons for the absence of local government in the area of operations. Subsection Two presents local views of the municipalities to illustrate why UNIFIL CAOs believe they need to promote the municipalities amongst the local population. Subsection Three discusses the work of CAOs with local government and how local conditions present challenges. Finally Subsection Four describes the strategies CAOs employ to successfully maintain relationships with the municipalities which in turn, enables them to do their job.

¹¹ There are several reasons why this idea is unlikely to work in practice. First and foremost because the criteria for a successful peacekeeping mission are absent in this part of Lebanon. Syrian militia groups would not be bound by any agreement made between the UN, Lebanon and the Syrian Government. As such there would be no peace to keep. The area contains myriad local family-run militias and a vibrant drug and weapons smuggling industry. Therefore, the chance of a UN peacekeeping mission being able to prevent outbreaks of fighting is minimal. Secondly, it is unlikely Hizbullah would sign up to such an agreement as the area is known to be their supply route for arms from Iran. Thirdly, even if agreement from Hizbullah were obtained, it would be difficult for the UN to source troops for a mission operating under such dangerous circumstances.

¹² It is worth noting that the LAF role in the south includes policing duties. The reason for this is sectarian. The police force in Lebanon is Sunni-dominated, and as such is not trusted by the Shi'a. UNIFIL officers did not discuss the issue of reintroducing the police force; their priorities currently are focused on building up the national army and local government.

Resolution 1701 and Local Government

Resolution 1701 calls for the restoration of government authority in the area of operations; the priority being the elimination of illegal weapons and armed militias. Resolution 1701 does not direct UNIFIL to work with local government. The mandate of 1701 does however refer back to two other important UNSC resolutions, Resolution 1559 (2004) and Resolution 1680 (2006).¹³ Both resolutions support ‘the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory’;¹⁴ and furthermore Resolution 1559 states:

Calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully and urgently with the Security Council for the full implementation of this and all relevant resolutions concerning the restoration of the territorial integrity, full sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon;¹⁵

Support for Resolution 1559 is reiterated in Resolution 1680. Resolution 1701 continues Security Council support for the extension of Lebanese Government Authority over all Lebanese territory by supporting the two previous resolutions, and calling for:

...full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolution 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;¹⁶

Several additional paragraphs reiterate the need for ‘the Government of Lebanon...to extend its authority over its territory’.¹⁷ In other words, whilst not specifically spelled out, it would appear that the UN Security Council is concerned that the Lebanese Government have a visible presence in the south along with the LAF to ensure its authority over the area.

¹³ See UNSC Resolution 1559, 2 September 2004 and UNSC Resolution 1680, 17 May 2006.

¹⁴ UNSC Resolution 1559, 2 September 2004, p.1.

¹⁵ UNSC Resolution 1559, 2 September 2004, p.2.

¹⁶ United Nations, 'UNSC Resolution 1701, 11 August 2006', p.3, para.8.

¹⁷ This can be found in paragraphs 5 of the preamble, and paras 3, 8, and 12.

What this means for actors at the subnational level on the ground is unclear. As such, CAOs choose to interpret the mandate thus:

Ah it means for me on the ground...we succeed to help the local authority understand their role, their job. And help them against their shoulder to go ahead in doing their job. This is the way we are fulfilling our mandate.¹⁸

As such, UNIFIL CAOs work closely with the municipalities in a number of ways to raise their profile amongst the local population. CAOs work autonomously which facilitates creativity and spontaneity in their dealings with the local population. As will be shown below, their local knowledge means that they appreciate the political situation, as it exists on the ground. This means they work contextually, in accordance with local needs within the municipalities themselves and within communities.

For over thirty years there was no local government presence in the south. The term of municipal officers is six years, but the 1963 elections were the last to be held in the area of operations before the civil war.¹⁹ The first local elections since that date were held in 2004, prior to Resolution 1701.

So the Lebanese institutions, state institutions were absent from 1963 until 2004. So you can imagine this big area of the country which represents more than 15% of the area of the country – without any representation of the government for three decades. So UNIFIL's main task is not only to maintain peace and stability, but also to help the state takeover its role in this area of the country. And we do this through various ways.²⁰

¹⁸ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

¹⁹ This was because the Palestinians arrived and took over the area in the early 1970s, and the area became too unstable to hold elections. Owing to the presence of the militias, local government was unable to extend its authority over the area. The militias set up their own de-facto authority south of the Litani by the use of the gun, which rendered municipal government impotent. Civil war then came to Lebanon, and then finally the Israeli occupation. None of these environments were suitable for the holding of local elections. After the Israelis left the area in 2000, Hizbullah operated in the area of operations as the de-facto authority because the LAF were not present in the area. Prior to 1701, elections were held and Hizbullah (along with other political parties) took part. Since 1701 and the decision by Hizbullah's military wing to officially pull back to north of the Litani river, there is political space for a legitimate form of local government authority.

²⁰ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

The municipalities' main problem is securing funding in order to provide the necessary services to the population. Firstly, the local population are not used to paying taxes for services provided by the municipality.

[T]his area of Lebanon, was out of any kind of state control. So people are not used to pay taxes here for example. They are not used to pay for electricity or for water or whatever. Everything was free of charge here...simply this was under occupation and the government cannot cut the water supply or the electricity supply for the area because it is under occupation. But it cannot collect the revenue of the supply because there was occupation you see? So people used not to pay taxes also for the municipalities and during occupation, 22 years of occupation here you didn't have municipalities.²¹

The second major problem faced by the municipalities is caused by constant political crises at the national level. As a result the national government is often unable to agree and assign budgets to the regional municipalities. This means that most municipalities are doubly underfunded: receiving little tax revenue from the local population and minimal funding from national government. When funds are allocated they are often paid two or three years in arrears making it impossible for municipalities to plan ahead.

Local Views of the Municipalities

Some locals tended to view their municipality as useless because they do not have money.

This area, follows the municipality of Wazzani, which is a very very poor municipality. It cannot help with anything.²²

Others acknowledged that many of the problems faced by the local municipalities originated from the national problems that besiege Lebanon.

I think our municipality is a good municipality. Because they are trying to help. But still the people complains. We are still part of this big country which has many problems with electricity and with the whole system. So we are still part of this, even in the south or in Beirut it's the same.²³

²¹ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

²² Interview with Respondent R, Civilian, Wazzani, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

²³ Interview with Respondent L, Civilian, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 8 October 2013.

We know that when they do projects, they do according to what capabilities do they have. How much money do they have. They cannot spend more than what they have and we can understand this.²⁴

The level of trust civilians appeared to have for their municipalities came across a lukewarm. In part because of their low capacity to assist the population, but sectarianism also influenced perceptions.

It's about 40% confidence, because...here also the prejudice of the sectarian problem...for example when they have festival in Marja'youn, you see this is an annual festival. And they know that I have all the facilities, light and sound facilities, for the festival. They don't bring me, even though I give a lower price than the Christian guy. So they bring the Christians. I make a big festival in Qatar and Kuwait, but they don't want to work with me because I am Shi'a.²⁵

Whilst the local population appear to appreciate the limitations of their local government, rather than resenting them for it, they are still heavily reliant on UNIFIL to fill gaps in public spending. Where a local municipality does have money, this is due to the personal wealth of the mayor, who in some areas will use his money to fund local projects.

Oh the municipality...They are not so bad, they are good. They are doing something for the town, not too much but they are doing something... Not the municipality, there are some people, for example in Marja'youn. The Head of the Municipality ...he is a rich man. And all the projects he is making is from his own pocket. You know, it is not the municipality is working, he is working to improve the town. He help too much people, too much schools, everybody that wants help he is opening his arms and he is very helpful. When he will go, I don't know if we will repeat it again. I don't know. Because not too much people pay their taxes. Collecting money is impossible.²⁶

As a long-term strategy, the presence of magnanimous mayors still presents a problem for UNIFIL as this does not contribute to the long-term strategy of having a functional local government in place. Once a wealthy mayor has left his post, there are no guarantees that an equally wealthy or generous mayor will replace him.

²⁴ Interview with Respondent N, Civilian, Deir Mimas, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

²⁵ Interview with Respondent Q, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

²⁶ Interview with Respondent P, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

One strategy CAOs employ locally is to educate the local population on the need to pay taxes to help fund the municipality, and explain that this is their civic duty. They do this on an informal basis of roaming the area of operations and stopping to talk to local civilians about their needs. This process is described in more detail in Chapter Five which discusses UNIFIL's local level engagement.

In Lebanon and in the south particularly, owing to the years of poor infrastructure, there is a tendency towards resources theft. In poorer areas it is possible to see a network of unofficial cables hanging from power company wires. CAOs therefore also try to educate people about the need to think of the larger community as opposed to just one's own family.

...when you hang on the electricity line and to steal power so you are damaging the whole network of the power. And then you are damaging the interests of the village. Of the entire village. So this they have to discover it by time. If everybody made this hanging on the electricity poles it means there will be no power for the whole village. You see if everybody starts to steal water from the pipe, without paying. At the end, there will be no water supply. And this they needed time to understand this.²⁷

CAOs work to raise the profile of the municipalities amongst the population as they believe this will help to convince locals to pay their taxes and become responsible citizens. CAOs also encourage locals to approach the municipalities first when they are seeking project funding in order to help them learn how to view the municipality as the first port of call, rather than UNIFIL.

How UNIFIL Works to Support the Municipalities

UNIFIL currently has 162 municipalities in their area of operation.²⁸ Each municipality consists of a mayor, a deputy mayor and some councillors. Depending on the size of the town or village,

²⁷ interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

²⁸ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

the number of members in a municipality varies from nine to fifteen in the region.²⁹ CAOs are Lebanese and therefore have a good understanding of the problems that beset the area.

There is little UNIFIL can do to alleviate the problem of national underfunding at this juncture. Until such time as the national government is able to function, this problem will continue to exist.

UNIFIL works to support the municipalities in three ways: by providing education to municipality members; communicating the importance of the municipalities to the local population and running Quick Impact Projects which involve the local municipality. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are short-term projects that are financed by peace operations to assist local populations with reconstruction. Within UNIFIL, the budget for QIPs is \$25,000 per project and owing to the damage caused to the infrastructure in south Lebanon, the majority of project money is spent on improvements to road, water and power facilities. These types of projects are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five which describes UNIFIL's local relations with civilians.

Education is provided in the form of workshops for local municipalities to assist them in understanding what their role in the community should be. The workshops are one-off events which are run where they can secure agreement from the municipality to participate.

Sometimes we succeeded to make workshops for the local authorities, how to make the local authority function in a better way. Members of the municipal councils they come and take part in a workshop for 3 days, in which we bring high academic professors, to explain to them how to prepare their plan, how to prepare the budget for the municipality, how to do it, in a very technical way. You see this is also capability building for the local authorities. To strengthen the local authority, regardless of what political affiliation for this municipality or that. You see, we just give them the project and we tell them we have this project, are you interested or not? If we say they are interested we do it.³⁰

In educating the municipalities about their role in the community, CAOs are encouraging responsible governance.

²⁹ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

³⁰ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

We started to have elections for municipalities, those who came to be in power in these elections, didn't know how to practice their role. So how to practice? It's not just by making favours for the people. Sometimes you have to collect taxes! And to prevent any law violation.³¹

The bulk of the work of civil affairs with the municipalities comprises involving the mayors in the implementation of the QIPs projects in order to raise the profile of the municipalities amongst the local population. In effect they are trying to demonstrate to the local population that the municipalities are the source of local authority in the area.

All this, always you have to remember it. Whatever information or project you reach through contact with normal people, we have to go back to the municipality, we have to go back to the mayor, the deputy mayor or the municipality.³²

UNIFIL CAOs ensure that they work on every QIPs project together with the municipalities from inception through to the finish. This includes ensuring the municipality is involved in the ceremonies that occur on completion of a project. The details of how they collaborate are expounded in Chapter Five.

Another form of funding for municipalities is from local charities and NGOs. UNIFIL Civil Affairs officers often connect up charitable organisations with municipalities.

But we are not involved directly. We just connect them and coordinate their work with the municipality to play its role. And here we are under our mandate. To support the local authority maintain its power over the area.³³

Other than the problem of the lack of national funding for the municipalities, CAOs face other localised challenges. The role of mayor in the villages is often more ceremonial than anything else; regarded as a prestigious appointment more than a democratically elected office. The same principle applies to other members of the municipal council. One respondent explained how

³¹ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

³² Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

³³ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

influential families nominate a candidate for the municipality who is expected to 'win' by virtue of his family name.³⁴

OK it's like this. First of all the municipality is a mix between politics and families. So our municipality is a mix between who runs it is Hizbullah and Amal but through families. So some families will say this the name of our candidate, and we are just going to say that he is neutral for example. And he's not Amal or Hizbullah. So some families do this. But some families don't. Some families maybe they have 2 representatives, one Amal, one Hizbullah.³⁵

As such, members of the municipality do not like to be unpopular, as losing the election would be an embarrassment to their families. This in turn affects their ability to do their job effectively.

Now local authorities is tricky issue because first of all if he pressures to have a good collection of taxes, then people will hate him! If he doesn't then he will not have enough money to make projects in the village. You see it's a tricky issue.³⁶

Another challenge for CAOs is the problem of absentee mayors. Many elected officials live and work in Beirut during the week and only visit their village on weekends.

Let me tell you something. Here elections, it's typical Lebanese way of elections. The post of the mayor is not, a place to serve. It's a place to show off. "I am elected as a mayor" you see it's a show off. OK he doesn't show in the village, but he is elected. Why? Because his family is big, because he is affiliated to a strong party, and his party decided to make him a mayor because his father was very important person, for so many reasons. You see? So they elect him and the next day he disappears – for 6 years.³⁷

If the mayor is rarely present in the village this means that when decisions need to be made, the rest of the municipality have to wait for his return. This can be up to over a month.

If the mayor didn't come for one month, then the whole administrative issues will stay for one month waiting for him.³⁸

³⁴ This system is known locally as the Zuama (pl.) system in Arabic.

³⁵ Interview with Respondent L, Civilian, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 8 October 2013.

³⁶ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

³⁷ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

³⁸ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

This kind of inefficiency undermines CAO efforts to promote municipalities as committed local authorities. It also causes logistical problems for CAOs as the mayor is not available for meetings in the area of operation during the working week.

The constraints that national factors place on UNIFIL mean that CAO agency is impeded. Without sufficient funding from the national government, it is impossible for local government to run efficient services. In the absence of decent infrastructure, the local population will continue to refuse to pay taxes; engage in resource theft in order to protect themselves from the deficit in state provision of these services; and continue to rely on UNIFIL to make up the worst of the shortfall.

Strategies for Success

CAOs are keen to stress their impartiality in all their dealings with the local authorities in the area of operations. In practice this means observing three key rules which are: only dealing with the municipality; impartiality regarding the political affiliation of municipalities and respecting the hierarchy within municipalities.

First, CAOs are committed to dealing only with the local municipality. They do not approach any other kind of community leader (such as the mukhtar³⁹ or religious leaders) when they first make contact with a village, or even after they have made contact. The only time that a CAO will contact a mukhtar directly is if the village is too small to have its own municipality, and it sits under the umbrella of the municipality of another town. Whilst CAOs talk to civilians at any level in the course of their duties, when they are seeking to establish ties with the village the municipality is always their first point of contact, particularly the mayor.

³⁹ The mukhtar, is the local record keeper of the village. He records all the details of each family, the births, deaths and marriages. Depending on the size of the village, he will also have some other administrative duties. Usually a mukhtar will collect the details of his particular religion, so in larger towns you will have more than one.

So the main authority is the municipality, not the mukhtar. So because if you go the mukhtar, and you have a municipality then you will make problems with the mayor. Conflict of interests. So the only time you go to the mukhtar, is where there is no municipality. So the main authority then will be the mukhtar. See? This is a very important issue. But whenever you have a municipality you have to be with the municipality. If the mayor is not there then the deputy mayor.⁴⁰

The second rule is that UNIFIL CAOs do not differentiate between political parties in the region. They operate using the hierarchy of the system as it is exists on the ground. This means that they are as happy to contact a mayor from Hizbullah as they are to contact a mayor from one of the Christian parties. As will be discussed in the chapter on local engagement, building relationships with municipalities is not always easy, but CAOs practice a policy of strict impartiality in this regard. It is crucial that UNIFIL do business with everyone because to refuse to do so would lead to their marginalisation.

You see here we are playing our role impartially, very objectively. We deal with people as what they represent. They represent the local authority. Regardless of what political parties they are from. You see and this is very important. And it is not a secret here, but most of the villages are either ruled by a local authority that is affiliated by Hizbullah, or to Amal. So we have to deal with them, this is the reality. But we deal them not as political parties, we deal with them as local authorities and here we start to by practice, teach them how to be an authority. Because the municipality is the highest authority of this village or this town.⁴¹

The biggest challenge for CAOs is engaging with municipalities that are wary of dealing with them because the mayor's political party is that of Hizbullah. Here is one area where the gap between international and local legitimacy in missions is demonstrated and has to be managed by UNIFIL. Despite Hizbullah consent to Resolution 1701, many Hizbullah supporters view it as a one-sided agreement that favours Israel. This means some Hizbullah dominated municipalities view UNIFIL as a pro-Israeli organisation who may be spying for the state of Israel. However, officially, Hizbullah municipalities are given a free reign by the party to liaise with UNIFIL as they see fit.

⁴⁰ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁴¹ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013

I know that the political ceiling for Hizbullah in the relation with UNIFIL, I know that they don't have official position on preserving their relations with UNIFIL. They are cautious of course, they are cautious about how to deal with UNIFIL. But in general their directives to their people is to have positive relations with UNIFIL. Even after the EU decision to consider the military wing of Hizbullah as terrorists, I wrote a feature about the reaction of the municipalities to this decision. All of them said it will not affect their relations with UNIFIL. The situation you are talking about, about some reservations by some members, it depends upon the nature of the person himself – individuals not a political decision. They know the ceiling, but they are flexible in this and some have more reservations than others, but in general their political decision is to have positive relations with UNIFIL.⁴²

For many municipalities however the assistance UNIFIL provides is appreciated. And this is not down to political affiliation alone, but rather on the basis of personal relationships. Just as one mayor can refuse to do business with UNIFIL because he is affiliated with Hizbullah, another Hizbullah mayor is very happy to work with them.

This is human beings and they are not the same everywhere. Even though they are from the same party. I know people, a mayor of Hizbullah in this village is different to a mayor in that village. Completely different. One of them you cannot say hello to him. He is all the time like that [makes a face], not friendly with you etc. And the other guy welcomes you, “Hi how are you? How's the family?” He takes 15 minutes just asking about them before you discuss anything just asking about your health and your family. You see? These are human beings.⁴³

One civilian respondent made the point that friendly Hizbullah-run municipalities are in a position to take advantage of UNIFIL resources; taking credit for projects and ensuring that they are not being spied upon.

But it's clever from the municipalities, it's really clever, even though if they don't feel safe, they should do this. Because it's making the place better. Plus, it's not – they [UNIFIL] are not going to put some cameras in the water pump. They can know that, it is an integration with people. So both Hizbullah and UNIFIL are getting some positives through municipality and UNIFIL work.⁴⁴

UNIFIL also have to be careful not to become too close to any one municipality because they need them to be seen by the local population as independent and not co-dependent. As such, CAOs walk a fine line in terms of how much contact they maintain with each municipality.

⁴² Interview with Respondent Z, Civilian, Tayredebba, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

⁴³ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁴⁴ Interview with Respondent L, Civilian, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 8 October 2013.

This some places, the municipality council became very friendly with us. When they made the elections they were accused to be puppets of UNIFIL! So you can imagine how things might reach. So we had to decrease our contact with them in order not to put them in this embarrassing situation.⁴⁵

But the issue of trust remains pertinent; CAOs often have to reassure locals of their impartiality.

In particular, the incidence of photo-taking by UNIFIL peacekeepers is a constant problem that

CAOs have to deal with.

So I went to see the mayor. And he is the senior Hizbullah official of this village. He said, “Come and see. Can you explain to me, why UNIFIL soldier is taking photo for this bridge? It’s a small bridge – it’s over a channel. Why they are taking pictures for this bridge? From both sides? This is the picture, we took it from the memory chip of the camera. Ok, why they are taking picture for my house? This is my house. I am the mayor, OK I am the Chief of Hizbullah, but I am the mayor also. And even if I am the Chief of Hizbullah they don’t have the right to be taking pictures of my house.” It’s a very embarrassing situation for us. This is wrong action.⁴⁶

The third rule that CAOs follow is to work according to the established hierarchy within the municipalities themselves. This means dealing with the mayor first and foremost, then the deputy mayor. This can be tricky when there are divisions within the municipality, but UNIFIL avoid becoming embroiled by sticking to the rule of law to demonstrate their impartiality.

If the deputy mayor and the mayor are not on good terms it’s not our business. We deal with the mayor. He is the authority and we explain it for the deputy mayor. Because according to the law of municipalities, the mayor is the real leader of the municipality. So, and you explain to the deputy mayor, if he is on bad terms with him, that democratically, you have to accept the fact, and we as UNIFIL, are not allowed to violate the Lebanese law. According to the Lebanese law, this guy represents the authority and we have to deal with him. So we are sorry, we cannot deal with you as a representative for the municipality unless the mayor resigns. And sometimes, the mayor is from one party and the deputy mayor is from another party. What we do? What you do, is just deal with the authority. And so you explain it to the other guy that it’s not that we are not taking sides. It’s not that we don’t want to deal with your party. It’s the matter that we are dealing with the authority, and the authority is in the hands of this guy. So this time he is in power, next time you might be in power. We will do the same.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁴⁶ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁴⁷ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

Summary of Section One

UNIFIL PAOs' national engagement is supposed to be limited to liaising with UNSCOL as their strategic partner is the LAF and not the Government of Lebanon. However, PAOs engage with officials at the national level on an ad hoc but regular basis to lobby the government on issues of concern to them. These are primarily: LAF funding, the establishment of national government south of the Litani and the UNIFIL budget. To avoid being drawn into political debates about their mandate they rely on the public affairs office to re-state and reiterate the purpose of their mission according to Resolution 1701. UNIFIL are however largely left alone by national politicians and this provides them the autonomy to focus on the issues that they consider important within the area of operations.

Part of UNIFIL's revised mandate (Resolution 1701) states that they should assist in re-establishing the authority of the government throughout the area of operations. CAOs have chosen to interpret the mandate as meaning they should promote good governance at the local level and where possible build the capacity of the municipality. This demonstrates the importance of the local knowledge possessed by the CAOs who understand the political context in which they operate. Their autonomy enables them to work creatively and spontaneously according to local preferences. At the community level they spontaneously drop in for chats to discuss local needs for public goods and services. They consult and liaise with the municipality on every QIP project they run and ensure these projects raise the profile of the municipalities in the area. They also provide optional education workshops to promote good governance practices amongst local officials.

UNIFIL are careful to demonstrate impartiality in their dealings with municipalities to avoid perceptions of bias. Currently their approach of adhering strictly to three key rules of engagement, all of which work towards the goal of demonstrating impartiality, appear to be

working. This research has found that the vast majority of municipalities are happy to work with UNIFIL, although trust remains an issue with some Hezbollah run councils.

Section Two: Working With the LAF

UNIFIL PAOs are engaged at the national level in peacebuilding activities with UNIFIL's strategic partner, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

We are here to monitor the cessation of hostilities, to assist the Lebanese Army in the South of Lebanon, to ensure that there is no entry of weapons into the south of Lebanon. And we also assist the Lebanese Army, to ensure that in the future, in the long-term, the idea is for the Lebanese Army to be fully in charge of the south of Lebanon. Important also to mention that the Lebanese Army were not present in the south of Lebanon until 2006. So after the cessation of hostilities, we've seen the deployment of the Lebanese Army here. We have been assisting them, and important role of UNIFIL is to support the Lebanese Army in the south of Lebanon.⁴⁸

Obviously the relations we have with the Lebanese are more important than the other side because we are physically present here in Lebanese territory. It is critically important that we work closely with the LAF.⁴⁹

This section discusses the work of PAOs with UNIFIL's national strategic partner the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). UNIFIL PAOs have three main objectives in their work with the LAF. The first is to assist with the re-introduction of LAF into the area of operations; the second is to work with the LAF to improve their operational capabilities; and third is to seek international funding for the LAF in order to improve their technical capabilities. The overall objective for UNIFIL in this project is part of their stated exit strategy: to ensure LAF have full authority in the south of Lebanon to the extent that they are able to control the security of the area. In practice this would mean the elimination of Hezbollah's military wing and other armed groups in the area.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Interview with Respondent J, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁴⁹ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

⁵⁰ It should be noted that Hezbollah state that they do not separate their military wing from their political wing. This issue arose when the EU listed Hezbollah's military wing on its list of named terrorist organisations. Nasrallah, Hezbollah's Secretary-General, made several public statements at the time to the effect that Hezbollah did not accept this distinction between Hezbollah's activities. See for example Chararah, Nasser, 'No Separation in Hezbollah Military and Political Wings', *Al-Monitor*, 26 July, 2013.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have a similar problem to the municipalities in that they were not present in the south until 2006. This was due to multiple factors. During the civil war the military did not have the reach to be able to operate in the south owing to a lack of equipment and defections to sectarian militia. The occupation of the south from 1982 by Israel also meant that there was no place for the LAF, as the Israeli proxy force of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) acted as the 'national' army in the area until 2000. When Hizbullah drove the SLA and the Israelis into Israel in 2000, the LAF was not sufficiently equipped to re-take the south and did not have the confidence of the people in the area to do so.⁵¹ So it is UNIFIL that have facilitated the return of the national army by including them on their patrols, providing them with equipment and resources and placing the LAF at the frontline in dealing with both local and international incidents since 2006.

In the remainder of Section Two I address the stated role of LAF in the area of operations according to Resolution 1701. I then describe the mechanisms UNIFIL and LAF have in place to foster cooperation and the work they conduct together. The following subsections discuss UNIFIL-LAF relations from the perspective of UNIFIL and LAF officers, and describe how the local population views LAF since they returned to the area. The final section discusses how UNIFIL work to help improve LAF's operational and technical capabilities.

The Role of LAF in Resolution 1701

Resolution 1701 clearly states that the reintroduction of the Lebanese Armed Forces throughout Lebanon is a major goal of the mandate. It appears in no less than four separate clauses:

Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon... (Preamble, para.5).⁵²

⁵¹ Barak, Oren, *The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in A Divided Society* (New York: SUNY Press, 2009), chapter 11.

⁵² UNSC Res. 1701, 12 August 2006, p.1.

Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties... (Preamble, para. 8).⁵³

2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South...⁵⁴

3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;⁵⁵

The Resolution also states clearly several times that one of the duties of UNIFIL is to provide assistance to LAF.

11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

(b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;

(e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;⁵⁶

The objective of the above was to satisfy Israel that the armed presence of Hizbullah would not remain on the border. Ideally, the international powers (and some national Lebanese political groups) were keen to eliminate Hizbullah from the whole of Lebanon but this would not have been possible within the scope of the mandate.

⁵³ UNSC Res. 1701, 12 August 2006, pp.1-2.

⁵⁴ UNSC Res. 1701, 12 August 2006, p.2.

⁵⁵ UNSC Res. 1701, 12 August 2006, p.2.

⁵⁶ UNSC Res. 1701, 12 August 2006, p.2.

Cooperation Between LAF and UNIFIL

And everything we do, the patrolling, everything is done in coordination with the LAF.⁵⁷

On the ground LAF and UNIFIL cooperate by conducting joint patrols in the area of operations. This was initiated as part of the objective of reintroducing LAF to the area of Lebanon south of the Litani river. Cooperation is not limited to this; at every level of LAF and UNIFIL command structures there is a liaison officer on both sides. These officers communicate on a daily basis to ensure both parties are across the day's events, planned or otherwise. The Head of the South of the Litani branch of the LAF liaises directly with the Force Commander of UNIFIL. Below that UNIFIL is divided into two sectors, Sector East and Sector West. LAF's liaison officer at this level are brigade commanders and they liaise with the commanders of each UNIFIL sector: Sector East is currently headed by the Spanish Battalion and Sector West by the Italians.

Every morning at UNIFIL headquarters a summary is produced of what occurred over the past 24 hours. If there has been a serious incident then UNIFIL and LAF will discuss this, usually at the most senior levels between the liaison officers of both organisations at UNIFIL headquarters. If necessary, the issue is raised to the level of the Head of the South of the Litani branch of LAF and the Force Commander respectively.

In this way the two forces aim to monitor the situation on the ground as closely as possible. One PAO described it thus:

So they really are, almost integrated with us...so there's a total day-to-day level, you know at the tactical level, I said with the soldier on the ground patrolling. At the operational level – when I say operational level, I am talking about – you know we have 2 sectors? So at the sector headquarters. And at the Chief of Staff, they are dealing day-to-day with the Generals of the LAF Brigades or the General in charge of the South of the Litani Sector in Tyre. So tick tack the whole time. So when something is happening, tick tacking the whole way, you know, on the phone the whole time, if not meeting with each other. So that's on-going. The whole time.

⁵⁷ Interview with Respondent J, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

Then at the strategic level, by that I'd say, our office and the Force Commanders office are liaising the whole time with LAF. We have a meeting there once a week so we're talking about all kinds of stuff, so at every level, tic tacking the whole time. Very strong coordination, very strong interaction on the phone the whole time, if not in person, you know it's throughout, at all the different levels you know?⁵⁸

In addition the headquarters of every UNIFIL battalion has a LAF officer who lives in the compound 24/7. This is to ensure that there is full communication between UNIFIL and LAF at every level.

And don't forget in every single headquarters of the battalions around here we have a liaison officer sleeping there 24 hours from Lebanese Army. To deal with us on a daily basis.⁵⁹

From the perspective of UNIFIL, the fact that the LAF are able to act relatively autonomously of the Lebanese Government is an advantage. This makes UNIFIL's work considerably easier because decisions are made without delay. In addition when the situation in Beirut or other parts of the country is tense, the continual presence of LAF gives the area a strong sense of stability.

Actually one thing that's good to point out is that even in times when the country didn't have a Prime Minister, a President, Government. The south was always OK. We were always able to conduct our activities. Because the Lebanese Army has always been there. Even in times when no one was around, the Lebanese Army was there. Which is a big plus, I have to say.⁶⁰

They have strict orders to solve any problem without going to the cabinet. There is a liaison mechanism. Their mandate – it is all technical on the ground – you cannot go to the government for every single step. It will take time, bureaucracy. They are very cooperative. Excellent relationship.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁵⁹ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

⁶⁰ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁶¹ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

The Work of UNIFIL and LAF

The main purpose of UNIFIL/LAF joint patrols is to prevent Blue Line violations and search for unexploded ordinance or illegal weapons. As the UNIFIL mission expanded in 2006, LAF battalions were moved down to the south to accompany them on their patrols. LAF accompany UNIFIL on an estimated 1000 patrols each month. Peacekeepers stress that they work closely with LAF and play the role of observer as much as possible. The only time UNIFIL consider intervening is when there is a stand-off between the LAF and the IDF.

UNIFIL place LAF at the forefront of any Blue Line violations involving locals.

We only operate with the LAF. When there is an incident, the first people we call in to assist because it has to do with the locals, it's the LAF...so when it happens the IDF contacts the Force HQ and send it down to us, and we are informed that within this grid reference, there is this violation happening. We call the LAF and we move in with them. They are able to talk to their people and then they bring the situation under control because we are not allowed to physically prevent somebody. We are not allowed to stop somebody who is determined to cross the blue line. You can't do that, it is the LAF that is supposed to do it. So whatever, happens afterwards, we send our reports to the sector headquarters, and that's how it works.⁶²

In terms of intentional violations, such as stone throwing at the IDF, LAF are called upon to disperse the local population, but UNIFIL will maintain a presence to ensure that LAF and the IDF do not engage directly.

So there has been a number of occasions where the Lebanese will throw stones at the IDF and when it happens they reinforce their troops there and GHANBATT will have to go in. But always you have to do that with LAF. And you try and prevent – normally you can't talk to the Israelis so you talk to – you try and calm the Lebanese down. And you are able to disperse them. That has happened on a number of occasions.⁶³

⁶² Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

⁶³ Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

Despite their broad popularity in the area, UNIFIL are involved in incidents with local civilians.⁶⁴ Usually these are minor and relate to UNIFIL patrols taking the wrong road or patrolling at night and making noise. Occasionally criminals will hold up the convoys in order to steal equipment from them. On such occasions, UNIFIL's strategy is always to stand back, take a passive posture, and call in the LAF who diffuse the situation. This strategy works because the local population will not attack their own army and it reinforces the idea that the LAF are primarily responsible for security in the area. It also reinforces UNIFIL's image as a peaceful force, which Rubenstein (2008) identified as important if peacekeepers are to retain their credibility.⁶⁵

LAF work closely with the peacekeepers on the retrieval of unexploded ordinance (UXO) left over from the many wars in the area. As in the cases of local incidents, LAF are always called in to manage the retrieval and disposal of UXOs or any other kind of explosives. The policy of UNIFIL is to cordon off the area once the explosives are found and call the LAF who take over from there under the observation of UNIFIL. UNIFIL peacekeepers themselves simply observe the whole process.

If we find a UXO or a IED⁶⁶ of some sort – they are rang initially. Practically on the ground it would be a case of us securing the area until they arrive, and they come in and deal with the situation, which is right I think. Because it gives them... the authority to go in and deal with it, in their own country and I think that's the way it should be done. And I'd imagine they would like to come to the day when they would have the numbers to be able to come and do this themselves on their own. You know...we try and provide them with as much professional aid as we could, and experience, but it's definitely their country and their place to carry out that side of things.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Secretary General Reports include all incidents that occur between locals and UNIFIL. On average there is one or two a month.

⁶⁵ Rubenstein, *Peacekeeping Under Fire: Culture and Intervention*.

⁶⁶ Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

⁶⁷ Interview with Respondent G1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

UNIFIL Views of the Relationship With LAF

The relationship between UNIFIL soldiers and LAF appears to be very congenial apart from the language barrier. UNIFIL peacekeepers spoke highly of the LAF in terms of their manner and their professionalism as a force.

Sometimes of course the language barrier is there. But they have most of them officers coming along – a captain or a major. So that makes it comfortable and of course they are now used to us so they are comfortable. You find the same bunch of guys in circulation. So you'll find them off and on same guys and the same fellows. It's quite congenial actually.⁶⁸

And I must say they are very cooperative. Any time there is a situation and you call, immediately they come and they are assisting in bringing down tensions. So it's been a very good working relations we have had with them.⁶⁹

LAF is good. They are professional and in many ways, like the patrolling and other things we have timings for that. They are very professional in that way. Dealing with things. They come in time. Whenever they are required they are available. It's a very professional interaction that they have. It's good.⁷⁰

UNIFIL peacekeepers were keen to stress that they do not interfere with the LAF in the course of their duties. Their role is very much an observational one in order to help bolster LAF's credibility.

We basically are, you know, you can say, trying to help LAF with carrying out their patrolling. We are not superimposing ourselves not imposing ourselves at all. We are with the LAF. And LAF carry out the entire thing, we just help them with patrolling, some checkpoints and that's it. If they stop vehicles we are just trying to help them out. That's it.⁷¹

Peacekeepers also stressed that they found the LAF incredibly responsive to their requests for assistance.

⁶⁸ Interview with Respondent F, UNIFIL, Kfar Hammam, South Lebanon, 24 July 2013.

⁶⁹ Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

⁷⁰ Interview with Respondent B, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁷¹ Interview with Respondent F, UNIFIL, Kfar Hammam, South Lebanon, 24 July 2013.

We have had enormous operational support from the LAF from 2006 onwards. They have consistently told us that they are ready to act when information is received, that they will go and search and check places.⁷²

UNIFIL staff from headquarters are always highly complimentary about the LAF, describing the relationship as very positive and trusting. UNIFIL also understand that the LAF do not always have the same priorities, and they appear to accept that.

I think at the strategic level, at the operational level, I think it's very good. But notwithstanding that we have to always remember, that the LAF are representatives of their government – when we have a government. So you know and their agenda, might not be our agenda, and they are the defence of their state so we mightn't necessarily agree on things, because they're coming at it from a different angle. So even if they are coming at it from a different angle, it doesn't mean that we have fallen out with each other. But they have different agendas. They are a state institution and all that, so we mightn't agree on what they're doing, we might have wanted to stop it and all that, but that doesn't mean that we are at odds with them. But I would say the relationship is very good. But they have to do what they have to do sometimes, and we have to respect that because we are not occupiers we are guests here and we are only here to support them.⁷³

At the present time the LAF are highly under resourced. As the army of the land, they are currently the only symbol of a unified Lebanon and the Syrian crisis is stretching their capabilities to the limit as they have had to be stationed all over Lebanon. This has taken its toll on their numbers down in the south, but UNIFIL are careful not to push LAF for more brigades. They recognise the pressure the LAF are under at the present time.

You see we also cannot break the bone of the LAF... because if the security of the whole country is civilised by the LAF it will have a positive effect here. If you have tension in Tripoli it will affect us here. So we have to also help the LAF to be flexible. This army has not been reactivated or re-equipped and all this stuff since the civil war.⁷⁴

Once again, the most important aspect is for us to do most of our activities with the LAF. Of course in recent months, several units from the Lebanese Army have been moving to the north. And we have been trying to explain to the people through the Lebanese Army, that although there has been a movement of troops we would be patrolling as we did before. Always in coordination with them, even if we don't have them all the time. So it will be very useful of course to get more Lebanese Army in the south, and work more with them. But we do understand that

⁷² Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

⁷³ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁷⁴ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

this is not something feasible because there are other issues in the rest of the country.⁷⁵

LAF Views of UNIFIL

LAF perceptions of UNIFIL are also worth noting here to provide an holistic picture of the cooperation between the two parties. Senior officers interviewed spoke highly of UNIFIL.⁷⁶

There was recognition that UNIFIL work hard to maintain a close relationship with the LAF and LAF officers interviewed spoke highly of UNIFIL's commitment to resolving problems when they arose:

Yes. They always do their best. If you ask for an appointment – they say it's up to you. Afternoon, morning whenever – they are ready to come. They try their best not to disturb us and not to put us under tension, they want us to work in a good mood. They don't put us under tension. There are many incidents happen they really they help us a lot. When they [Israelis] were building a wall at Kfar Kila, we was going to war at that time, they still in my office from 11 o'clock in the morning until 7pm at night. First Commander and Political Officers. From my office, they called Israel many times, and speak to this Israelis in order that they can continue the work and finish. It's not easy it's very difficult.⁷⁷

The most frustrating aspect of working with UNIFIL for LAF officers was the constant staff rotations.

These commanders changed, and the battalion changes, the First Commander changed – everyone changed. And one was coming, he needs time to know how to deal with this. And everyone has to discover how to deal with this culture, how to deal with these people, something not easy. So the people that are spending more time in Lebanon, they know our culture, they know how to be with the issue, they know how to ...now we are losing them one by one. X will leave, he is the key of everything. Y also works very hard always. He was a very hard worker Y. It's not easy to change the people like this. New people always make problems for us.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Interview with Respondent J, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁷⁶ Interviewing the LAF in relation to any topic is highly sensitive in Lebanon. As such, I was only given permission to speak with the two most senior officers that have dealt with UNIFIL for many years.

⁷⁷ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

⁷⁸ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

A related issue is that of the level of commitment of the UNIFIL Force Commander. The same officer felt that some have not been as committed as others over the years.

It depends on the commander. Some commanders work bureaucratically. When they work like this, they sit in their office, he has his mandate under him and everyone must do as he wants. This case doesn't work now in the south. If the First Commander is not interested in going into the details of the details and knowing everything by his eye and be on the spot at the critical time the situation will deteriorate very fast. Whenever we have a commander who is prepared to be deeply involved in the details we have no problems, whenever we have a commander who is bureaucratic and no interested in the details, we have problems. And we have had both kinds.⁷⁹

Both officers interviewed commented that the initial behaviour of some of the European troops on the ground immediately after the implementation of Resolution 1701 was not suited to the environment in which they were working.

At the beginning we had a problem with the officers that was coming to UNIFIL [from overseas] that they were coming to an area of operation and it's called an area of operation. We told them "Look, it's not an area of operation. It's like your villages in your countries there are people living here. You cannot work with them as an area of operation. You cannot move in your tanks, you cannot move as if you are in the field. It's not a field. It's villages, people living in villages. If you want to drive your tanks you will destroy the roads and you will have problems"... The French always have wars outside France and they work as if they are in an area of operations and this makes problems between them and the people.⁸⁰

But the NATO troops, especially the French and the Spanish troops, do not have good image in the Lebanese view. The Spanish, when they are coming here began the mission like foreign enemy troops. And their input in the Lebanese heart had bad expression.⁸¹

The political leanings of the officers were reflected in the way they talked about UNIFIL. The Sunni officer in general was more supportive of the work of UNIFIL, and his criticisms were more from an operational perspective. The Shi'a officer (who is known to be a keen supporter of the Resistance) was more critical and took more of a political perspective. But this difference

⁷⁹ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

⁸⁰ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013. It is worth noting that UNIFIL returned the tanks they had originally shipped over to south Lebanon in 2006 largely because of the damage they did to roads in the area. The force now only use Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) to patrol.

⁸¹ Interview with Respondent Y, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 September 2013.

in views is one of the key strengths of LAF. It is able to tolerate widely differing political perspectives and still function efficiently.

Both officers criticised the mannerism of European troops, accusing them of being arrogant. But they differed in their comments on the non-European troops, the Sunni officer was highly critical of non-EU troops:

They are nothing. The Indians, they are drunk in the evening. They are not serious. We don't see that they are serious enough... They are from people who are not serious. They are there for money. If there is something wrong they don't try to stop it.⁸²

This view corresponds with the officer's sympathies as part of the Sunni population who are generally anti-Hizbullah. It suggests he was happy for UNIFIL to find and destroy weapons caches, and this indicated that the soldier was doing his job. In that sense his view is more aligned with that of the international community. However, the Shi'a officer liked the non-European troops, possibly because they did not try to find weapons. His view corresponds much more closely to that of the local population.

All the non-NATO troops in the south are good troops. It is not a question mark about their behaviour.⁸³

These differences in perspective on the different nationality troops did not appear to affect LAF officers' commitment to working with UNIFIL. However both officers felt that UNIFIL was biased towards Israel, reflecting again, local sentiment that the principles underlying 1701 are unfair.

For example, when do Israel do something wrong, the UNIFIL stop to speak. But when the Lebanese do any little wrong things – oh that grow and grow and grow. And this behaviour let us understand that UNIFIL is here against us – not for us.⁸⁴

⁸² Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

⁸³ Interview with Respondent Y, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 September 2013.

⁸⁴ Interview with Respondent Y, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 September 2013.

They [UNIFIL] had problems because for the people of the south, they look at UNIFIL – they are Western and they like Israel more than Lebanon and they help Israel more than Lebanon.⁸⁵

The LAF officers confirmed UNIFIL's view that two strategic partners work independently of central government. One of the officers summarised it thus:

The Lebanese Government? I spent seven years in the south. I never saw any of them there. When they have problems they pay attention but if everything is going ok, they don't care. They have seven years until now, they have enough problems to deal with. And we don't have – we get a government for 1 month after 1 month, no government. Always like this, so we have to depend on ourselves and UNIFIL. Always I put the Prime Minister in the picture, but they have so many other problems. They say we trust you, and leave you to it. Only Siniora was taking care of every step. And after Siniora, nobody cared. I was dealing with it, as if I was the country. Only the Commander of the Army beside me. I spent about 5 years, alone.⁸⁶

Local Views of LAF

The process of re-integrating the LAF into the southern community has on the whole not been overly difficult. Local residents appeared to be very happy to see the presence of LAF in the area. They demonstrate understanding that the LAF is underfunded and under-equipped and they don't blame their national army for being unable to fully be in control of the security situation.

This was our demand, long, long ago to have our army spread or deployed on the borders. When you have money to invest in this area, you would like to see your national army protecting this area, not any other organisation...but as far as we don't have thinking of peace in this part of the world, it's very difficult to see LAF taking over from UNIFIL.⁸⁷

Yes of course. Nobody prefer other soldiers to have positions or existence in your own country. You prefer that your own army will protect you alone. But in these circumstances, you prefer the existence of foreign countries to protect you, with the help of LAF, in order to establish the peace, because the Lebanese Army alone, cannot do their job.⁸⁸

LAF is very weak, it cannot defend people. Because if LAF was strong enough, Israel wouldn't dare to enter our country and occupy it. But nothing is changed

⁸⁵ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

⁸⁶ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

⁸⁷ Interview with Respondent R, Civilian, Wazzani, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

⁸⁸ Interview with Respondent P, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

regarding the LAF. LAF is still as weak as it used to be. So LAF cannot defend us.⁸⁹

The level of trust civilian respondents had for LAF however was noticeably high despite their lack of resources. There was always a feeling from respondents that LAF is valued and respected, it is just not able to operate as it should owing to the political situation, both local and international.

I don't know why but people feel safety to the army. Very safe. Yeah so. I don't know why they weren't there before. It's a stupid decision because they should be there because the people loves the army. But the army is part of the people. It is big part of southerners in the army.⁹⁰

UNIFIL staff had different views regarding local perceptions of LAF. Peacekeepers themselves had a more reserved view of LAF popularity.

I won't say popular, but they maintain an influence actually.⁹¹

Their comfort level of course is ah, you know equal in cases. Because we are going along on an operation and we are going along with LAF. So we find them [civilians] friendly, we find them happy, so this is ah I can say, this is both good towards UNIFIL and LAF. Now I can't differentiate how they are with UNIFIL and how they are with LAF. I would not be able to comment on this, but as I see when we go on patrol and other things, they are very friendly with us. Well we are with LAF, so the good will goes equally to LAF and us.⁹²

Long-serving staff at headquarters were more positive in their assessments of LAF popularity in the region. It is possible this is because they have witnessed the development of the relationship between LAF and the locals over time, unlike peacekeeping troops who rotate frequently.

[F]rom the moment the Lebanese Army came to the south of Lebanon, you can see from people's perception that they – their initial understanding of the LAF was very poor, and they were more trusting of different political groups in the south of Lebanon. More than the Lebanese Army. So state authority was not something that has ever been present in the south of Lebanon. Little by little, we could see that actually the trust, for the Lebanese Army has been increasing. So they are not just understanding but see the Lebanese Army as the Army of the South. This has

⁸⁹ Interview with Respondent Q, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

⁹⁰ Interview with Respondent L, Civilian, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 8 October 2013.

⁹¹ Interview with Respondent F, UNIFIL, Kfar Hammam, South Lebanon, 24 July 2013.

⁹² Interview with Respondent B, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

been, you know really increasing since 2006...Increasing their credibility means increasing our own credibility. Because the long term goal of the mission is to handover the responsibilities to the Lebanese Army. So once again, the importance of what the people think about the Lebanese Army is also like increasing the credibility of the mission.⁹³

Since the LAF was reintroduced to the area, the impression I obtained is that they are very popular with the people, but are viewed as incapable of acting alone. Civilians all stressed that they will be happy to see the LAF take over – one day.

We would prefer that the international community made a decision to allow the military to be armed properly, and then we don't need the resistance.⁹⁴

We are against Israeli aggression and we support whoever can prevent it. So far it is the resistance and that's fine. If UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces can do it, no problem. But so far, only Hizbullah has succeeded.⁹⁵

None of the civilian respondents suggested that the LAF are ready to do that now. There is an understanding amongst locals that the strategic environment is not favourable enough for this to happen. Those who support Hizbullah do not wish to see them leave until the LAF is fully equipped or if Hizbullah and LAF join forces (as described in Chapter Two on the strategic environment). Those who do not support Hizbullah simply wanted the LAF to be better equipped and for UNIFIL to stay until they are.

I am very patriotic. I think this point will happen sooner or later...I don't like politics but what I am saying that, because there is parties here in the region and all Lebanon and they have unfortunately arms. Not only the Lebanese Army have the arms. When there will be no arms in the normal people, outside of the Lebanese Army, the LAF will get the mission instead of UNIFIL. When there is other parties that can get war with Israel or with any town else, then the LAF has a big problem. Then he cannot confront all the people that has illegal arms. It's out of the power of the LAF.⁹⁶

⁹³ Interview with Respondent J, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁹⁴ Interview with Respondent B1, Civilian, Village, South Lebanon, 21 August 2013.

⁹⁵ Interview with Respondent C1, Civilian, Village, South Lebanon, 21 August 2013.

⁹⁶ Interview with Respondent P, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

Walking the Line between International and Local Politics

The LAF are extremely popular throughout Lebanon. Their popularity is largely based on the refusal by many of their officers to defect to sectarian militias during the civil war. They were the first state institution to rebuild after the civil war and are regarded by the Lebanese as a symbol of state unity.⁹⁷ National Day in Lebanon on the 22 November is primarily organised around the LAF and the symbols of the military are ubiquitous – for example schoolchildren dress up in military attire whilst waving the Lebanese flag on this day.

But like all national armies who try to rebuild after internecine conflict, the LAF face challenges to obtaining nationwide support from civilians.⁹⁸ Despite their nationwide popularity, LAF walk a fine line in the south of Lebanon and Tripoli where there are concentrations of sectarian political movements: Sunnis in Tripoli⁹⁹ and Hizbullah in the south. They are aware that if they are drawn into a fight against these groups they may lose their own form of national impartiality that in many ways mirrors that of a UN mission. Whilst they are able to fight they cannot be seen to be waging a war against sections of their own population. In the past year, this has proven an enormous challenge for the LAF in Tripoli where there is a large pro-Salafi population who consistently attack the minority population of Syrian Alawites who live there.¹⁰⁰ The LAF are called in to calm the situation, but in many cases are forced to act more like peacekeepers to avoid being drawn into the fight.

One of the main tasks of Resolution 1701 is ensuring the area south of the Litani is free from armed personnel, weapons or assets other than those of the Government of Lebanon.

⁹⁷ Barak, *The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in A Divided Society*

⁹⁸ The issues faced in rebuilding militaries after conflict are described well and in more detail in Edmunds, Timothy, 'Civil–military Relations in Serbia–Montenegro: An Army in Search of a State,' *European Security*, 14/1: 115-135 (2005) and Bellamy, Alex J., and Timothy Edmunds, 'Civil–military Relations in Croatia: Politicisation and Politics of Reform,' *European Security*, 14/1: 71-93 (2005).

⁹⁹ There is in Tripoli a concentration of Salafist-leaning Sunnis who believe that the LAF is biased towards the Shi'a, and have been launching attacks on the LAF see for example; Amrieh, Antoine, 'Tripoli Death Toll Hits 25 As Clashes Intensify,' *Daily Star*, 22 March 2014.

¹⁰⁰ See for example, 'Army Capable of Combating Terrorism: Kahwagi,' *Daily Star*, Beirut, Lebanon, 29 January 2014; Misbah al-Ali, 'Tripoli Death Toll Rises After Overnight Clashes,' *Daily Star*, Beirut, Lebanon, 20 January 2014.

Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;

And the Lebanese Government is *called upon* to guarantee:

- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;

As noted above, the LAF are expected to perform these duties with the assistance of UNIFIL;

the idea being that the LAF is more acceptable to the local population than a foreign force.

However, owing to local support for Hizbullah, LAF also have to walk the line between fully enforcing the mandate and retaining popular support themselves. Fully implementing the terms of the mandate is a concern for LAF, not just from the perspective of managing their relationship with Hizbullah, but also from a legal standpoint. Their position was summed up by a PAO:

But they are also very concerned about their own image, their own standing in the south. Just a couple of days ago, we were told that in the civil war years, LAF were quite active in confiscating property – I wasn't aware of this – and they faced a number of court cases, since the war ended, about their confiscations of property and their actions towards private property during the civil war years. And they are very very cautious about ensuring that they have the right legal documentation and the right grounds to search private property. Now it's obviously very easy for local people to say, ah you're on private property, UNIFIL can't go on private property and we advertise the fact, every SG report, every 4 months we say we can't go on private property. So it is very very easy for other people to say: "Ah you can't go on private property, LAF are not willing to search private property". But again the

LAF who are on a political tightrope – they walk a very very tight narrow tightrope – often for them political cover from the government here in Beirut is extremely important. Often it's very difficult for them to have that full cover when there is only a caretaker government in charge.¹⁰¹

The storage of Hizbullah weapons on private land is an open secret amongst the public, the authorities and some members of the international community.¹⁰² This is a sensitive issue for UNIFIL who are constantly criticised as being ineffectual for not going onto private property to search and seize illegal weapons. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Five on local engagement, it is simply not possible for UNIFIL to adopt a more 'Chapter VII-like' approach in the region without running the risk of losing local consent.

You might report to LAF. You might report that there is information that there is some kind of cache and some arms and ammunition at some places. But you will not try and go in and probably try and catch it up, because we need some support from the local army. So once the local army is in place and we get the clearance from the UNIFIL Headquarters then obviously we go ahead and get it done. But we have to report back to our chain of command, and then they decide and we can only, you can say ah, we can indicate as to where the caches are or we can indicate where the arms are. But the final action, the final recover action has to be done by the LAF. Along with us, actually. So it's very clearly and very set in demarcated lines that we can operate and we cannot operate within.¹⁰³

But LAF also have to walk this fine line, because as one respondent noted, when UNIFIL leave, it will be they who remain with the people.

So the LAF came back, a state institution, they had to first of all have a presence; to assert themselves. And also they had to work out how they were going to dovetail with the resistance on certain issues. They have to live with these guys, you know how do you, on a day-to-day, at a working level, how do you do business you know? And with some things they are still struggling you know.¹⁰⁴

In relation to the role of the LAF in Lebanon, Hizbullah employ an intelligent strategy. They never criticise the LAF or work against them publicly in any way shape or form. They have even woven the LAF into one of their popularist slogans which reads: 'The Army, The People and the Resistance' indicating that they are as much as part of Lebanon as the LAF and that the LAF are

¹⁰¹ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

¹⁰² Interview with Nicholas Blanford, Journalist, Beirut, 27 January 2012.

¹⁰³ Interview with Respondent I, UNIFIL, Kfar Hammam, South Lebanon, 24 July 2013.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

connected to them as such. But at the same time they continue to flout the authority of the LAF by maintaining weapons caches, and possibly tunnels and other material inside the area of operations.¹⁰⁵

One civilian respondent acknowledged that the army often knows where arms caches are stored but deliberately turns a blind eye:

Army they know about the activities of Hizbullah. They know where they are, where their positions are and what is their role. But at the same time...some of them are covering their activities. Before, UNIFIL, before Israel. Because also the LAF know that after all, UNIFIL troops will withdraw, and those people will remain here. And tomorrow if we come to certain agreement that UNIFIL should go, that means the people of the area should protect the area no matter what. Maybe then, as they were talking before that Hizbullah should be part of the LAF, that they should be disarmed and then join the army. And this is as they say, if you see it on the border, they say 'The Army, The People, and the Resistance'.¹⁰⁶

This conflict of interests at times places the LAF's relationship with UNIFIL under pressure. But UNIFIL senior staff who liaise with the LAF on a regular basis make the point that despite the difficulties LAF face, they have demonstrated a commitment to showing that they are the authority.

I won't lie to you and say that life is very easy in our dealings with the Lebanese Armed Forces all the time, but on the whole, we found the LAF to be dedicated to be fulfilling Resolution 1701 ensuring that the area does remain clear of armed personnel weapons. But you know it's clear that they say they are in a very very tricky political situation and a lot of security incidents outside the AO means they don't have as many forces in the south as had originally been envisaged back in 2006.¹⁰⁷

Respondents spoke about LAF's determination to prove that they are as tough as Hizbullah in terms of confronting Israel.

¹⁰⁵ The extent of Hizbullah's operational capacity within the area of operation cannot be confirmed.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Respondent X, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 30 August 2013.

But I think for the LAF, want to be themselves, the people who are in charge of security. It's clear in their minds. They don't see a role for Hizbullah. They want to take ownership of this. And we've seen this on a number of occasions, where the LAF, have shown their assertiveness, in dealing with the IDF and stuff. No backing down. No backing down. Even when they know they are facing superior technology, superior weapons, whatever. They still won't back down, they are prepared to take casualties to prove their point that they are as brave as the resistance and they are here to stay. You know, so from that point of view, I think they are very highly motivated as a force.¹⁰⁸

One LAF officer interviewed attributed to the situation with Hizbullah to global politics and not just LAF's physical capabilities. His assessment reflects the psychological comfort that Lebanese draw from having the resistance as a deterrent.

Hizbullah doesn't recognise or trust Israel. If we [the LAF] told them [Hizbullah] "Go home, we are going to be safe", they don't trust us. And if the UN tell them that, they don't trust them because they will say that Israel always doesn't apply the international law, and will not apply it and therefore they can't be trusted and you cannot protect us. The most important thing is to have a government and army who is strong enough who can say, we can protect our country. If all people feel they have the protection, and they are protected enough, politically and military – the weapons means nothing in this case. Whenever in Lebanon we feel that we are not protected politically and we are not protected militarily so how we can tell the people they are safe and nobody will come?¹⁰⁹

The same officer was pragmatic about the presence of Hizbullah in the area of operations. He made the point that although Hizbullah are still present, they are no longer out in the open and this has been one of the effects of 1701 since 2006.

There are Hizbullah and other groups south of the Litani – we know that – but it's invisible. You can tell us there are weapons in a house, and we are ok, but it's a house and we cannot go there – you must have a judge to give an order to search it. It's not important not to have the weapon. It's most important not to use them.¹¹⁰

This section has discussed how UNIFIL has worked to reintroduce LAF into the south of Lebanon. In doing so it has discussed how UNIFIL work with LAF to put them at the forefront of their operations to improve their credibility amongst the local population and help them establish a presence. The political balance that the LAF has to manage is not easy, but they have

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Respondent S, LAF, Beirut, Lebanon, 28 August 2013.

got the sympathy of the local population who recognise that they do not have the capability to take over the area south of the Litani at this present time. UNIFIL work to support LAF and their efforts have been aided by LAF's positive attitude towards cooperating with UNIFIL.

But the LAF are engaged in a battle with Hizbullah over their identity as 'defenders of the land'. The LAF clearly wish to be seen as the only defence force in Lebanon but Hizbullah's *raison d'être* is based on a similar idea. Currently both parties have to work together for reasons of legitimacy as both require local support to survive politically. UNIFIL PAOs take the lead from LAF as to how they negotiate their relationship with Hizbullah who remain an important unnamed party to the conflict which constrain UNIFIL's agency particularly in terms of searching for illegal weapons and preventing an outbreak of hostilities along the Blue Line.

The final section discusses how PAOs help LAF improve their operational and technical capabilities.

Improving LAF's Operational Capabilities

UNIFIL works to help build LAF's capabilities in two main ways: First by contributing to the campaign amongst the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and other states to raise money to provide the LAF with the necessary equipment required of a modern day force. Secondly UNIFIL also work with the LAF to help them make improvements at the operational level.

The problem of LAF's lack of resources, like so many of Lebanon's political problems, is deeply connected to international politics. There are two main problems. The first is the lack of a set budget from the national government meaning LAF sometimes do not have even the most basic of equipment:

And I don't only mean the weapons. I am not talking about anti-aircraft missiles, I am not talking about sophisticated stuff. I am talking about – the soldier on the ground needs a uniform, he needs a rifle, he needs a place to stay, he needs food.

Basic things – we are not talking about – you know, giving them surface-to-air missiles or anything.¹¹¹

The other main problem for LAF is their inability to procure modern weaponry. This is in no small part down to the lobbying of the Israeli Government who campaign internationally against any of the states on its borders obtaining weapons that will pose a threat to Israeli security. This strategy has been termed ‘The Qualitative Military Edge’ or QME by some analysts and it refers to the idea that Israel, with the support of the US, will prevent any state in Israel’s neighbourhood (described as ‘numerically superior adversaries’) from obtaining weapons that provide technological, tactical, and other advantages over Israel.¹¹² One PAO who works the most closely with LAF discussed Israel’s approach to the problem of LAF resources in a frank manner:

[T]he LAF have suffered greatly because Israel have always had very strong lobbying NOT to support the LAF. Don’t give them weapons, don’t give them the technology. But at the same time the IDF are accusing – accusing is too strong a word – the IDF berate the LAF for not doing the job. But at the same time, they won’t give them the means to do it. So you say, “What do you want guys? ... You can’t expect us to do the job if we haven’t got the weapons”... But the Israelis do a lot of lobbying.¹¹³

PAOs do not allow this element to interfere in their negotiations with Israel. Instead they lobby the international community hard to gain support and donations from the international community for LAF.

I think supporting the LAF, not only physically on the ground in our area of operations but also supporting the LAF at the political level in our daily contacts with the TCCs, the troop contributing countries and other non-contributing countries, to bring out the point, to make the point at all political levels in all our dealings with the embassies, to make the point you know, that there is only one game in town, it’s the LAF, you’ve got to get behind them, you’ve got to support them.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

¹¹² See for example: William Wunderle and Andre Briere, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy and Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge: The Need for a Common Vision’, Washington Institute, Policy Focus 80, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-foreign-policy-and-israels-qualitative-military-edge-the-need-for-a-co> [accessed 30 January 2014].

¹¹³ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

UNIFIL's work to obtain support for the LAF (in conjunction with UNSCOL) often goes beyond the mandate of Resolution 1701 and demonstrates how their autonomy facilitates creativity in their working practice. But as one PAO pointed out, working to improve LAF capabilities is an essential part of UNIFIL's exit strategy.

It's not 1701, it's outside of it, but it's fringed on it. For us, what we are saying is, look UNIFIL will forever here, if we don't build up the LAF!¹¹⁵

One major joint project is the Strategic Dialogue. In recent years UNIFIL PAOs and LAF engaged in a full analysis of the LAF structure and capabilities and produced a joint report identifying where the gaps in the LAF exist. This process enabled PAOs to organise a coordinating mechanism¹¹⁶ with UNSCOL and they now work jointly to seek contributions from European states to specifically fill the gaps that have been identified. UNIFIL also seek funding for the LAF all over Lebanon, not just for the battalions south of the Litani; thus they offer countries a choice of donating to the area of operations or outside of it. The point of this is to prevent countries from being deterred from investing and at the same time, ensuring that the increase in the LAF's resources do not make the Israelis nervous.

We make this distinction, because if it's just the south, for example, we'll just take the Germans for example, so if the Germans wanted to give the LAF some main battle tanks, we would say, the LAF don't need any tanks down south, you know? ...so this is trying to watch the line between what the IDF will complain about. But they can have the main battle tanks everywhere north of the Litani, but not south of it. So we are looking at all these structures. And so we have a very highly developed document and that has helped them to, the LAF to build up their army.¹¹⁷

UNIFIL also assist by securing money from the UN for the LAF for basic resources. In the early days of Resolution 1701, UNIFIL quickly realised that the LAF would be incapable of accompanying them on patrols because they did not have any fuel for their vehicles. As a result

¹¹⁵ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

PAOs lobbied the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) successfully for a sum of money, estimated by one respondent to be around half a million dollars, for the purposes of assisting the LAF in purchasing essential supplies e.g. fuel.

[A]nd in the beginning in 2006 when the LAF deployed down to the south after the war, we needed to patrol the area to have a presence. The LAF couldn't come with us because they had no fuel you know? This is as basic as it is, you know? And LAF have not had a budget for you know, I don't know how many years, they have no bloody budget. So their minister can't say OK your budget is 10, 20, 30, 40 million. So they are on a day-to-day thing. It's very difficult to operate in that situation. So when we are patrolling we want LAF with us, you know, in the cars, we don't travel in each other's cars, we travel in our own vehicles. So we had to get fuel for the LAF, we got money for them to begin with – which was a REAL exception for the UN...But we got them some money, and a really big once off, the UNGA made this big exception to give them this money because the UN doesn't normally support in that way.¹¹⁸

Another area UNIFIL have worked on with LAF is to help them develop CIMIC activities – a function they did not have previously. As noted above, the LAF works hard to maintain its impartiality throughout Lebanon and be seen as a truly national institution. Having CIMIC offices in key areas of tension (such as Palestinian camps) will help improve relations between the LAF and the civilian population, much as it has done for UNIFIL over the years. UNIFIL is currently seeking funding for this from the EU Peacebuilding Fund:

So now what we have done is we have taken in LAF officers and given them CIMIC training. We've got the LAF now to put within their structure a CIMIC unit – they are still working on it. We got peacebuilding funding money last year – we went to bat for them and got peacebuilding fund – which is very rare because normally they don't give it for military. But we got it under CIMIC...Now we are tapping into the EU now, to try and get the EU to support them financially as well. Because the EU peacebuilding fund, it's very difficult for them to support a military institution. But we are doing it under the auspices of civil military operations - it's not bombs and bullets. So that seems to be taking a little bit of traction so these are other areas we work in that wouldn't necessarily be in 1701.¹¹⁹

UNIFIL also support LAF materially with resources. For example when UNIFIL vehicles come to the end of their lifecycle, UNIFIL donate them to LAF. When they have compounds vacated by a battalion, they ask the relevant TCC to allow UNIFIL to donate it to the LAF, rather than

¹¹⁸ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

selling off the resources inside the compound and returning the land to its owner. This they have done successfully on a number of occasions.

The final element of UNIFIL assistance to LAF is training. However, UNIFIL were quick to point out that they do not train the LAF, rather they train *with* the LAF. This is because this is not in the mandate, but more importantly it could be sensitive for LAF if they were seen to be trained by UNIFIL. However, respondents alluded to various types of exercises that UNIFIL run with the LAF including joint exercises, shooting, artillery, computer exercises, and administrative training. One respondent referred to the amount of joint training as ‘a lot’.¹²⁰

There are the joint exercises which are being conducted regularly between the LAF and the battalions. This is in rotation, it happens frequently. So what happens is this becomes a platform for all of us to exchange our military you know thoughts for better coordination...So that helps us. You know joint firing exercises. We do all these things. So this is another field where the cooperation is there between LAF and UNIFIL.¹²¹

PAOs also bring down senior officers in the LAF from other parts of the country in order to show them the liaison work between LAF and UNIFIL in the south. One such officer was due to arrive on the day I was in Naqoura interviewing a PAO.

We will have the whole day with him, to tell him how we work, you see I am going to propose to them if they need training or you see? This is one of the things we do you know?¹²²

Conclusion

Despite operating under what is termed in the peacekeeping literature as a ‘traditional’ peacekeeping mission, UNIFIL engage in peacebuilding activities at the national level. Their main objective in doing so is to work towards an exit strategy for the mission even if that

¹²⁰ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

¹²¹ Interview with Respondent B, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

¹²² Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

objective is currently a long way off owing to the regional political situation. In doing so UNIFIL staff go above and beyond their mandate to facilitate change on the ground.

The constraints faced by UNIFIL in their work at the national level are mainly those of underfunding at the national level. Both the municipalities and the LAF suffer from a lack of regular funding for their activities. This reduces the impact of CAO efforts to increase local government authority in the community as UNIFIL is forced to continue funding reconstruction projects. Pressure from Israel at the international level constrains UNIFIL's ability to secure funding for the LAF for capacity-building purposes; despite the fact that this could ultimately render Hizbullah superfluous to the region were LAF to develop into a fully functioning military force.

Nonetheless, in their work with the LAF, UNIFIL staff work to build LAF's profile in the area of operations; improve their operational capabilities; and seek funding to improve their technical capabilities. PAOs possess autonomy and demonstrate creativity in their interpretation of their mandate. This is illustrated most clearly in their work of building up the LAF's operational and technical capabilities. Their approach goes some way beyond their mandate and they have initiated strategies to raise funds to improve the technical capacity of LAF that enable them to circumvent the roadblock of Israeli security concerns. At the operational level, UNIFIL also show creativity by initiating joint exercises with LAF and seek additional funding to for basic equipment from the EU and the UN under the umbrella of peacebuilding and civil military cooperation (CIMIC). Time, in particular continuity of staff in political affairs also plays an important role as the factor that facilitates consistency of effort on the above projects which take time to gain momentum and which are now beginning to reap rewards.

Local knowledge assists UNIFIL PAOs in their relationship with the LAF. PAOs take a pragmatic approach to the presence of Hizbullah; they appreciate the delicate relationship LAF have with the population of the south and do not place them under undue pressure as a result.

They also show sensitivity in recognising the LAF's need to prove themselves as the defender of the land and maintain an observational role as much as possible to place LAF at the forefront of the patrols where possible. This also assists UNIFIL in maintaining its image as a peaceful force which helps to retain local consent for the mission.

The final fieldwork chapter discusses UNIFIL's work at the local level from the perspective of UNIFIL actors at the subnational level, predominantly CAOs and CIMIC officers. It describes how UNIFIL influence their security environment by maintaining local consent to operate. This is essential to preserve the security of peacekeeping troops who patrol the Blue Line and therefore maintain international peace and security.

Chapter Five: Maintaining Consent at the Local Level

UNIFIL don't want problems with towns you know. They respect, the mentality or habits of the town. And for security reasons, you know they don't want problems. In 2007 there was a bomb and soldiers were killed from UNIFIL, from the Spanish. And from that time there were some restrictions to go into the towns and there was some alerts... or security measures. For this they cannot go into towns and talk to everybody without the interference of the mukhtars, or municipalities or the LAF.¹

Introduction

This thesis asks how peace operations influence their security environment. Chapter Three and Chapter Four examined the peacebuilding/peacekeeping work of UNIFIL officers at the international and national levels of engagement. This chapter examines the local engagement of UNIFIL actors at the subnational level; specifically the work of Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) and Civil Military Cooperation Officers (CIMIC).

Maintaining local consent is a crucial issue for UNIFIL as it is a Chapter VI mission and therefore unable to enforce peace. UNIFIL face two risks if they fail to maintain local consent. The first is that they would not be able to operate, in other words, conduct patrols. The second follows from the first in that if the UNIFIL mission were unable to carry out its duties, this would trigger an erosion of trust with one of the main parties to the conflict, namely Israel. Israel's cooperation with Resolution 1701 is dependent on their trust in the LAF and UNIFIL to maintain peace and security in the area of operations. If UNIFIL is unable to conduct basic peacekeeping activities the Israeli government could deem them incapable of preventing attacks on the state of Israel. This would in all likelihood prompt the IDF to unilaterally implement measures to securitise the area which would doubtless trigger a resumption of hostilities. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to UNIFIL that they maintain local support for their

¹ Interview with Respondent P, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

operations. As one UNIFIL staff respondent put it: 'You cannot impose peace, if the people want you, you will succeed'.²

This chapter analyses in depth the work of CAOs and CIMIC at the local level of engagement and identifies the challenges faced by peacekeeping missions on the ground. In doing so I use commentary from both UNIFIL staff and local civilians to describe the misunderstandings that occur between the two groups and how UNIFIL respond to them. Examination of the local relationship with UNIFIL reveals that both sides have agency. Local civilians are capable of determining the relationship as much as UNIFIL staff. I illustrate how time matters at this level of engagement, in that the constant rotations of peacekeepers causes problems for UNIFIL staff and locals in terms of cultural misunderstandings and lack of awareness of local sensitivities, but also in preventing the formation of long-term relationships in the case of CIMIC.

Both CIMIC and CAOs work creatively to prevent and resolve problems at the local level and are spontaneous in responding to changing local circumstances where possible. But time (continuity), local knowledge and autonomy give CAOs the ability to go further in reducing the risk of conflict between locals and UNIFIL peacekeepers which could do irreparable damage to UNIFIL's local consent. This chapter begins with a brief explanation of why maintaining consent is particularly important in the case of UNIFIL.

Why Maintaining Consent is Crucial to the Operation

The most serious attack on a UNIFIL battalion that occurred after Resolution 1701 was on 24 June 2007 when a Spanish battalion was attacked on the road to Al-Khiam, a town near the Blue Line in the area of operations. The journalist Nicholas Blanford, who is considered a specialist on Hizbullah and the South Lebanon, writes that the suspected reason for the attack was because the Spanish were overreaching the mandate, and had been seen monitoring Hizbullah activity

² Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL staff, Naqoura, Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

north of the Litani river, which is outside the area of operations.³ The attack was deadly, triggered as it was by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) close to the road and six peacekeepers were killed. The attack is suspected to have been carried out by Hizbullah as a warning to UNIFIL not to interfere with their operations north of the Litani, but there has never been any confirmation of this.⁴ Subsequent to the attack security measures for all UNIFIL troops were greatly enhanced, such as ensuring mobile phone jammers were used by Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) on patrols. The incident was a painful reminder to UNIFIL that despite their best efforts to obtain consent to operate, their security cannot be guaranteed. This has not been the only IED attack on UNIFIL patrols since 2006 but it was by far the most serious. Other attacks have been launched, such as one on a Tanzanian patrol on 16 July 2007, but in this case there were no human injuries. The perpetrators of this attack were suspected as being members of a radical Palestinian group Fatah Al-Islam.⁵

Other less deadly reminders of the need to maintain local consent come in the form of regular incidents involving the local population. These are recorded by UNIFIL and reported in the thrice-yearly reports of the Secretary General. A content analysis performed on the Secretary General Reports on Resolution 1701 in the year 2013 found UNIFIL experienced a total of 16 incidents with the local population. These consisted of confrontations with hostile groups of locals, stone-throwing incidents, crimes against UNIFIL troops (including armed theft and theft) and a brief kidnapping incident.

Not all these incidents took place in the area of operations. Often they occur when UNIFIL troops are north of the Litani river because civilians there do not benefit from UNIFIL goods and services. The route from Beirut down to the south is a single road and therefore it is relatively easy to ambush UNIFIL troops and supplies en route. In 2013, for example, a UNIFIL logistics convoy and its occupants were held for several hours outside the area of

³ Blanford, *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty Year Struggle*, pp.422-423.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2007/641, 20 October 2007.

operations by armed civilians before the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were able to secure their release.⁶

Within the area of operations a number of incidents occur between peacekeepers and hostile locals each year. These types of confrontations are attributed by CIMIC officers as often being caused by new battalions losing their way and taking a wrong turn:

Again some places might be more sensitive than others, with regard to travelling in and out of their villages at certain times of the evening or something like that. And it could be something as basic as unfamiliarisation at the start of a mission. Guys are getting a handover from the guys that are going home which takes a week you know, and then you have a young – the strategic corporal or the patrol commander and he might just overshoot a specific turn by 200 metres and find himself in a village in the middle of the night where it might not be viewed upon in the best light you know?⁷

Confrontations usually involve civilians blocking UNIFIL vehicles and sometimes snatching items and equipment from them.⁸ One incident on 29 February 2013 involved a man trying to hold up a UNIFIL vehicle with a shotgun.⁹ Another incident involved peacekeepers inadvertently approaching a mosque for women which aroused civilian ire and led to a brief confrontation.¹⁰ In all these types of incidents, the LAF are called and they defuse the situation.

For UNIFIL, when they are in these situations, the role of the strategic corporal is again highly important; this time the strategic corporal is part of UNIFIL and he or she has to play their hand extremely carefully:

The worst-case scenario for us is that, we have to defend ourselves by the maximum, if you know what I mean. So we would always try to err on the side of common sense, you know. There's different degrees of use of force, but there's an

⁶ United Nations Secretary General, *'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2013/120'*.

⁷ Interview with Respondent G1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

⁸ United Nations Secretary General, *'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2013/381'*.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ United Nations Secretary General, *'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2013/120'*.

awful lot to be said, for the guy who's in charge on the ground at the time showing a bit of restraint and common sense...it's called the strategic corporal...Common sense and having a bit of manners goes an awful long way when it comes to certain things like that.¹¹

Whilst these incidents are not regarded as serious, they do reflect the very real concerns UNIFIL have about the potential to lose consent on the ground which would very quickly make their mission impossible to execute. Of crucial importance is that these incidents do not descend into fighting which would incur costs to UNIFIL's reputation that are hard to quantify. Suffice to say, the blowback from such an event has the potential to threaten the viability of the entire mission. The area of operations is simply too small to allow UNIFIL the space to avoid direct attacks on a regular basis; as the Israelis discovered to their cost when they were occupiers. If an occupying force cannot withstand the guerrilla warfare tactics that would undoubtedly be used to eject foreign forces; lightly armed peacekeepers most certainly could not.

After incidents such as these, CIMIC officers work with the municipalities in the vicinity of the incident to further reduce tensions:

[M]aybe through CIMIC or [we] go out and meet with the local village leader – the mukhtar or whatever. And then just try and say that it was human error you know? So it's that kind of...they appreciate it, a lot of the locals. If you can give them as much of a heads up as possible without infringing on your own security measures as to what your plans are, or what you are trying to achieve you know, I think that's a big deal with them, which is understandable you know it's their country at the end of the day.¹²

These types of incidents, whilst a regular occurrence, do not reflect local commitment to drive UNIFIL from the area. As will be shown below, it is more a case of an underlying level of mistrust that exists among certain elements of the population and a desire by locals to protect areas that they feel are sensitive. In addition, hospitality is such an entrenched aspect of village and Arab culture that many local people feel very uncomfortable when UNIFIL are attacked because they are guests in their country.

¹¹ Interview with Respondent G1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

¹² Interview with Respondent G1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

The above section has highlighted threats to UNIFIL peacekeepers on patrols to illustrate how important it is for UNIFIL to prevent the erosion of local consent. The rest of this chapter discusses the myriad factors that influence public perceptions of UNIFIL in order to better understand how CAOs and CIMIC respond to the different voices at the local level.

CIMIC Activities

The purpose of CIMIC is to support the peacekeeping battalions as they conduct their operations south of the Litani river. Force protection remains a key concern for UNIFIL and as a result CIMIC activities are extensive at the level of headquarters and throughout the battalions.

The purpose of CIMIC was described thus by a member of CIMIC staff from headquarters:

All those activities are aimed at supporting the mission mandate. So whatever we are going to do, of course we are going to support the local population, but primarily to support the mission.¹³

In other words, whilst UNIFIL is happy to assist the local population, the primary reason for the existence of CIMIC is to ensure the security of peacekeepers on the ground.

Because CIMIC is not a humanitarian asset. It could be of course like a catalyser that enables those humanitarian assets to perform their task that is humanitarian or delivery or activity or whatever. So the most important point is, support to the mission by enhancing and enabling those that are deputised we can say, to perform humanitarian activities.¹⁴

Local civilians understand the nature of this relationship.

So from the first moment we build up a friendship relation with them [UNIFIL] because there was a mutual need for both of us to have this kind of relation. They needed to have stability, security and peace. We needed so many things for the needs of the village.¹⁵

¹³ Interview with Respondent M, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

¹⁴ Interview with Respondent M, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

¹⁵ Interview with Respondent Z, Civilian, Tayrdebba, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

This is in essence the main difference between the approach of CIMIC compared to Civil Affairs which the local population recognises. CIMIC officers are time-bound in that they need to perform their duties in a short space of time before the next battalion rotation. As such their approach tends to be more instrumental in that they are strictly focused on providing material support for the purpose of maintaining a secure environment for the peacekeeping troops. CAOs were more focused on the well being of the community and on building long-term trusted relationships.

CIMIC Services

The CIMIC services UNIFIL battalions offer the local population in the area of operations are prolific. Each battalion has a specific area of operation (within the larger UNIFIL area of operation) and each is assigned a number of towns and villages in which to conduct their CIMIC activities. Most UNIFIL battalions provide some form of medical care for the local population living in their area. Some have a hospital which local residents are able to visit 24 hours a day for medical care. All medical services and medication provided by battalions are free. In addition, many battalions also operate what they call an outreach service whereby they visit the villages in their area on a rolling basis and set up a medical centre to provide care more locally. The frequency of these services varies greatly as they are dependent on the resources of each battalion. India for example visits all the villages in its area on a bi-weekly basis, whereas Ghana rolls out the service on a six monthly basis. Dental care is also offered by many of the battalions under the same conditions as medical care, detailed above.

UNIFIL headquarters also possess advanced medical facilities which include a physiotherapy unit and specialised medical care. Headquarters take the cases that the battalions are unable to treat. In cases of severe emergency UNIFIL dispatch a helicopter to collect patients and take them to Naqoura. One CAO estimated that UNIFIL treat around 47,000 people a month across the

UNIFIL area of operations.¹⁶ These medical services make UNIFIL extremely popular owing to the lack of medical services available in the region and the fact that those that are available are often unaffordable for many locals. Of late, UNIFIL has also been treating Syrian refugees who continue to flood into Lebanon. There are fewer Syrian refugees in the area relative to other parts of Lebanon, owing to the control exercised over entry and exit.¹⁷ However, those who do make it through are usually very poor and therefore need to take advantage of the services provided. UNIFIL are aware it is not part of their mandate to assist the Syrian population but for humanitarian reasons they allow Syrians to use it. As the numbers of refugees in the south is lower than in the rest of the country, currently the southern Lebanese do not appear to mind, or at least mention was not made of it by any of the civilian respondents, except to note that owing to UNIFIL's presence they were grateful not to have been touched by the Syrian crisis as much as other parts of the country.

In these two years that we are passing through the circumstances in Syria, for example, has affected too much Lebanon, and thanks to the existence of UNIFIL here we are a little apart. You know the conflict has transmitted to the towns of North Lebanon and the Beqaa but here in the area, thanks God, we not notice this although we have Syrians here for example. But we don't have problems with them...and the existence of UNIFIL makes us somehow protected.¹⁸

Should the number of refugees in the area increase substantially it is unclear how UNIFIL will address this issue, especially battalions who are already short of resources.

UNIFIL battalions demonstrate creativity in that they have identified some important gaps in local services that they have been able to fill. One unique service that only the Spanish and the Indian contingents offer is a veterinary service in Sector East. These services amongst the farming community are even more popular than the medical services. Many respondents

¹⁶ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

¹⁷ The UNHCR has listed over 1 million persons of concern, and just under a million registered Syrian refugees (999, 131). UNHCR, Syrian Regional Refugee Response, <https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122> [accessed 7 May 2014]. In the area of operations, the latest Secretary General Report states that there are currently 42,900 number of Syrian refugees in the area of operations. See United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, S/2014/130, 26 February 2014, p.10.

¹⁸ Interview with Respondent P, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

mentioned them as being an incredible advantage for the region in a country where there are few vets who charge exorbitantly high fees for their services. One farmer, a retired soldier, informed me that without this service he would be unable to operate his farm. Assisting farmers with their veterinary needs is one way that UNIFIL helps to improve the economic environment of the region as it enables farmers to continue to function and therefore produce goods for sale on the market. But it also enables UNIFIL to exert some influence over the local population when it comes to maintaining peace and security.

If you look at a veterinary here in Lebanon. Firstly he is not available, and secondly, if you do get him from outside, then ah, you end up paying quite a hefty sum. I think it's about \$50 which is too much for a shepherd...So when a shepherd gets a doctor who comes to his flock and then treats them it goes a long way in establishing a relationship. Then it's easier for us to tell the shepherd, because we do have a point of contact. Because the vet has met him earlier, the men have also met him, so it's easier for us to tell him you know, OK this is the Blue Line, respect it.¹⁹

The scheme also affords the battalions access to local intelligence from civilians:

[W]e do get a lot of intelligence. For instance, the veterinarian, when he went on a normal veterinarian rounds. A guy, a farmer who was there, after he was treating his goat or something, so after that he told us "there is something happening three kilometres from here. So there is likely something happening"... So the veterinarian approached the operational branch here and we sent a patrol there and we found some rockets and something. It was ah ... also this helps in our operational activity to a greater extent.²⁰

Other schemes that CIMIC officers from the battalions have run include training for farmers and agricultural cooperatives in organic agriculture and manufacturing agricultural products;²¹ training for medical staff;²² donating computers;²³ donating sewing machines and providing training in sewing.²⁴

¹⁹ Interview with Respondent E, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 24 July 2013.

²⁰ Interview with Respondent B, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

²¹ Interview with Respondent N, Civilian Deir Mimas, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

²² Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

²³ Interview with Respondent Z, Civilian, Tayrdebba, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

²⁴ Interview with Respondent Z, Civilian, Tayrdebba, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

Since 2006, the CIMIC teams in the battalions also meet with the municipalities to assess village needs. This activity serves two purposes: firstly it enables members of the battalion to engage with key civilians in the villages within their area. This is important for maintaining good relations to enable the battalions to conduct their patrols without fear of security incidents.

Obviously the locals here – and you wouldn't like it wherever you lived, if there was a foreign army running up and down your village at night time maybe keeping you awake, of course you are not going to like it. But we can maybe iron out these issues. We can meet key leaders with the company commanders and say "Listen, they have an issue with this and the issue is because...is there some way we can maybe change the patrolling timetable, or maybe we won't go through the village at night time or we won't go down this narrow street." And all these things can be sorted out at these key leader engagement meetings. CIMIC has to be central to that.²⁵

Secondly it enables the battalion to conduct a needs assessment in each village that inform their decisions to fund projects for the villages. CIMIC and CAOs are responsible for assisting villages across the region with QIPs projects that have made their lives considerably easier. These types of projects include, but are not restricted to: building underground sewage systems, roads, water pumps, providing street lighting, building public parks, school playgrounds, and repairing important civic buildings and support walls on the roads. These services are invaluable to locals who greatly appreciate that without UNIFIL's assistance, their lives would have been much harder because of a lack of funding or interest from central government.

Simply we can say that the Korean contingent gave us more than what the central government gave us...And now they are working on the pavement of the main road of the village. Since four years the Ministry of Public Works promised us and they didn't do it. Now the Koreans are doing it.²⁶

After the 2006 war UNIFIL contributed a lot. Our infrastructure was destroyed, our roads, water system, telecommunications, electric, everything. They helped us rebuild our water and electric system and cleared the roads.²⁷

The money for the QIPs projects, comes from two main sources. The first is from UNIFIL headquarters who since 2006 have had a remit to assist the local population in order to improve

²⁵ Interview with Respondent H1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

²⁶ Interview with Respondent Z, Civilian, Tayrdebba, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

²⁷ Interview with Respondent C1, Civilian, Al-Amriyeh, South Lebanon,

civil-military relations. Funds are provided by Naqoura to each battalion for spending on local projects according to local needs. CIMIC officers send through proposals for funding based on their village assessments which are subject to the approval of a committee at headquarters.

The total budget of UNIFIL for QIPs is US\$0.5 million per year. The three conditions for QIPs funding are designed to afford the current rotation of troops the maximum benefits of civilian goodwill. They are (1) the cost of the project must not exceed US\$25,000; (2) it must be completed in three months or less, and (3) that the project should benefit the maximum number of people possible in any village. In other words, it is essential that the project is not designed to only benefit one or two people, or a certain group of people.²⁸

[W]hat we try to do is we get the local mayor, or whomever...[to] get three quotes for a project. And our job then is obviously to monitor the progress of the project as well and you know check up and make sure everything is going as it should be. We pay the contractors maybe 2 or 3 times over the duration of the project and then of course then we will inaugurate the project at the end. We put up a plaque to say this project was supported by FinnAid or IrishAid, whoever is in, whoever is working in that AO at the time.²⁹

The QIPs are a recent innovation, prior to 2006 battalions donated goods and services to the local population that were paid for by their nation states.³⁰ The QIPs were designed in recognition of the need to win local consent.

So they came with the policy after 2006, that we should have relations with the local authorities, which could be a mayor, a mukhtar, and with those people they can ask, how can we assist you in improving the condition of the village. And this will reflect positively on their relations with the locals. This policy was not [there] before 2006...and they started to go out in the villages and ask them, "How can we assist, how can we assist?" And this is how we started these Quick Impact Projects so this is now very famous and very popular in the area after 2006.³¹

Peacekeepers interviewed were of the opinion that CIMIC activities were important in improving and maintaining local relations: first because of the opportunity to communicate with local

²⁸ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

²⁹ Interview with Respondent H1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

³⁰ With the exception of the Indian and Ghanaian battalions who have always received money from headquarters.

³¹ Interview with Respondent C, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

officials in the villages and secondly to win hearts and minds by showing that UNIFIL is there to assist the local population.

Battalions from poorer countries run QIPs using only the money provided by HQ at Naqoura. As such, they tend to only run two or three projects a year. Battalions from wealthier TCCs however have the advantage of access to direct funding for these purposes from their own country and run projects more often than that. Projects run independently by the wealthier battalions can cost up to \$40,000 but owing to the swift troop rotations, they too are strictly time bound and monitored. These tend to be from the European countries: mainly the French, Spanish and Italians and also the Koreans.

If you go to most of the villages here [in the Spanish area] they are having the solar system lights. Why? Because these projects are funded by the Spanish Kingdom.³²

It was universally acknowledged that the Koreans were by far the most generous of all the battalions. They have a small area to cover which comprises 5-6 villages and once they had saturated the area with infrastructure projects, they began to take Lebanese civilians on cultural trips to South Korea.

Villages that lie in areas with poorer battalions tend to envy those that sit close to the wealthy ones. One civilian told me, “The other villages say: “We envy you, you have the Koreans in your area””.³³ However, the relatively high level of global awareness of the population means they understand that poorer nation states are unable to provide a lot of services and these battalions are not resented for their fiscal poverty.

On the financial level, people can understand clearly that some of the units cannot do any help – like the Ghanaians for example – and people here understand their situation. And they say, “God help them, they can hardly find food to eat to they cannot help us. So no problem”.³⁴

³² Interview with Respondent C, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

³³ Interview with Respondent Z, Civilian, Tayrdebba, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

³⁴ Interview with Respondent Z, Civilian, Tayrdebba, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

This is somewhat of an exaggeration as, thanks to the support of UNIFIL HQ, even the poorest battalions are now able to fund two or three projects a year. But poorer battalions demonstrate creativity by undertaking other projects for the community that don't require a big spend. The Indians were especially motivated to engage with the community in this way.

[T]here are activities that we carry out which doesn't involve the financial part. That is within our capabilities like classes, yoga classes, computer classes, English classes. So that empowers them in a way. So these are the things that we are doing. In addition to that we do participate in community activities, if in villages they are having a party or some function. We go and help them out and any arrangements that they want to do, you know we participate in those. So for example last year during the summer vacation there were a lot of village festivals that were there. Every village had a festival. So we did go, we did establish a stall for us we made a stall for Indian snacks. So we distributed Indian snacks to them. So we gave them some decorations, some carpets and stuff. With any assistance they needed we helped them with that.³⁵

Sometimes the smallest of gestures can go a long way to improving local relations. A spontaneous project run by the Irish battalion demonstrates this:

Another one, we did just last week, because there was a fire in the church at Ayn Ibli. Smoke damage, the crib caught fire. It was bad smoke damage. No structural damage but they wanted us to do something. So we went down there, sent our fire brigade and we cleaned the place and they were delighted with that. And things like that then, you know, with the local population you gain support for why we're here. And we always hammer home the message we are here to monitor and support and assist you, and that's our job. And we can do it very well through CIMIC.³⁶

This kind of activity is not restricted to the less wealthy battalions for example, the Spanish and French run language courses; the Italians teach pizza making; and the Koreans run Taekwondo classes. These activities are again an important vehicle through which battalions can engage with the local population and show their human face.

Another feature of CIMIC activities run by some battalions, are public information sessions on the Blue Line. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Blue Line is still a relatively new concept for

³⁵ Interview with Respondent B, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

³⁶ Interview with Respondent H1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

the Lebanese and in the unmarked areas is easily crossed. The Indian battalion run evening briefing sessions for shepherds and farmers on a bi-monthly basis to educate them about the Blue Line so that they are able to avoid committing a violation. The meeting is another opportunity for civilian engagement:

What happens is also...this meeting is not just for passing one-way information. It's for two-way information. They give their point of view and they tell us their problems. So whatever is within our capacity, we help them out with it.³⁷

The CIMIC activities of UNIFIL battalions are designed to promote good relations between the peacekeeping troops and civilians. The consent of the local population is essential in order for UNIFIL to carry out its duties according to the mandate. The primary purpose of these services is to obtain local consent in order to ensure the safety and security of UNIFIL troops as they conduct their patrols. As well as providing humanitarian services to the local community, CIMIC activities afford UNIFIL battalions on the ground an opportunity to engage with the local population to build trust, obtain local intelligence and effect some influence over local observance of the Blue Line.

Challenges Faced and Lessons Learned

This thesis thus far has highlighted many of the positive aspects of the issue of time in UNIFIL's work in terms of local knowledge, building trusted relationships and working consistently towards long-term goals. But as noted in the introduction, time is a double-edged sword. One negative aspect is that local councils and civilians now have high expectations of what UNIFIL can do for them. The local population have become very savvy about knowing what they can get from UNIFIL battalions.

There's an element to it – your cheque book – of course, I mean, I've gone to meetings where they can be very dour toward my battalion commander. When they

³⁷ Interview with Respondent B, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

find out I am CIMIC, they start smiling – and really. So you have to be careful of that.³⁸

There is a great deal of appreciation amongst the local population for the work that UNIFIL conduct with civilians, but as noted above, there are a number of issues that CIMIC officers and CAOs face in the course of their work liaising with the population. They are: high local expectations, corruption, wastage, demonstrating impartiality and transparency and maintaining relationships over time. The more serious challenge for CIMIC officers is forging relationships with villages that are unfriendly towards UNIFIL.

Civilians are all too aware that UNIFIL has money to spend and many municipalities will not hesitate to ask for it, or try to play off one battalion over another:

I've been to a lot of meetings over the last three weeks where "UNIFIL have promised us this, UNIFIL have promised us that, the Irish have promised us this, the Italians have promised us that." You know what I mean... so when you go into a mayors meeting, they are keen to see what you're going to do, but you can't just hand it out. You have to ensure that there's a proper structure going into projects and again that they are sustainable and that the village really need it you know?³⁹

It has become sort of competition now. If you look at the sort of projects being undertaken in the European areas, OK with all their money yes. And so sometimes they feel we are not doing enough.⁴⁰

Another key issue for CIMIC is ensuring that they do not create more tension in the local communities by making promises they cannot keep; there is a need for transparency. Here the approach to this problem differed between different nationality contingents. The Irish battalion were very clear about not over promising and had a strict policy of not making the local municipalities wait around for an answer. This was because they felt it would do their relations with the locals more damage than saying no in the first place.

And one of the most important things as well is that you cannot delay on an answer. You either tell them yes or no. Well you know, they are hoping, they are hoping and then all of a sudden six months later you tell them no. And that

³⁸ Interview with Respondent H1, UNIFIL, At-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013

³⁹ Interview with Respondent H1, UNIFIL, At-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

⁴⁰ Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

doesn't...that's no good. So if you do decide to do a project, as quickly as you possibly can you have to tell them yes or no. If it's no, you move on to the next one. If it's yes then you do the project. And I think there's nothing worse than dragging a situation out. Because it doesn't improve relations.⁴¹

The Ghanaians however, did not see this as a problem as long as they were clear with the local municipality about what was happening:

Sometimes my Commander wants to meet a mayor or a mukhtar, we go and they tell you, "We have this problem, we don't have street lights in the community and the night is very dark. We've put in this request for the past 2 years and nothing has happened and you keep coming and we have the same problem. We don't know what you are doing." So sometimes it's frustrating but we are able to explain to them and they take it, they understand. So we explain that we are limited in whatever help we can give, it is limited and they know...Some of them we tell them to their face that this one is beyond our battalion. We are forwarding the request to the Force HQ. And so whatever response will come we will communicate to them. So we keep going and in a diplomatic way, tell them it is still being considered. And so when the time comes if it is approved, we will communicate it to them. And that is how it goes.⁴²

It is very likely that the Irish, as a European battalion, experience higher expectations from the local population compared to the Ghanaians. As noted previously, the local population understand the limitations of the non-EU battalions and as such, it is possible that the Ghanaian strategy works, simply because they are Ghanaian. If the Spanish or another wealthier battalion employed that approach, it would not work because locals would assume they were lying and that they simply did not wish to spend the money.

Maintaining relationships is an on-going concern, not least because of constant troop rotations.

To maintain the relationship. Sometimes it is even I mean more tough than to set up the relationship. Because it's quite demanding you know? When you have set up relations with someone and then you have to set up relations with other authority and then go ahead in other villages, other municipalities and other provinces, districts etc. You have to maintain these relations with the same level of quality in the same time and it's sometimes its very tough. So the holding phase is fundamental.⁴³

⁴¹ Interview with Respondent H1, UNIFIL, Al-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

⁴² Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

⁴³ Interview with Respondent M, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon 13 August 2013.

The issue of constant rotations was also frustrating to local civilians, particularly those who wanted to maintain good relations with UNIFIL peacekeepers.

This frequent rotations hurts the relations a lot. Because as soon as you make relations with someone they disappear and you have to start from zero.⁴⁴

CIMIC and CAOs have to also be very careful of ensuring that the money they approve for a project, is actually going to last into the future and is useful. Avoiding corruption is important.

[S]ometimes what happens in the past is when a garbage truck might have been provided and then sold on by the municipality – so you have to be careful about things like that.⁴⁵

A further issue is ensuring projects benefit the maximum number of people in a village. This requirement is keenly felt owing to UNIFIL's experience of receiving project proposals that in fact are for the benefit of members of municipal council only.

In one village the mayor asked for a public park and he told them "We want it here". And it ended up that this 'here' was near his own house and it ended up this public park was a garden for him!⁴⁶

The CIMIC team will go down to the villages, speak with the community leaders within the communities. They would then tell us what their priorities are. But their priorities may not be what we think is very important for them. Basically we look at what will benefit the general population and not individuals or whatever. So when it comes to, let's say, provision of potable water, renovation of schools and those things. Those are what we think should be the priority and not renovating a mayors house and those things. So these projects will benefit the entire population and not individuals so those are the things we look out for.⁴⁷

Officers also need to avoid wastage and duplication. One good example is the incidence of solar lights, which have been installed in a good number of villages in south Lebanon (as previously there was no lighting at night). One local municipality who had not yet received solar lights

⁴⁴ Interview with Respondent R, Civilian, Wazzani, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

⁴⁵ Interview with Respondent H1, UNIFIL, At-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

⁴⁶ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon 13 August 2013.

⁴⁷ Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon 29 August 2013.

decided that it would be a good idea to ask for them when a CAO came along to assess the village needs:

We went to a village in Sector East called Abu Qamerah – it's a really tiny village. And it's mostly Christian. It's only Christian. And there is no municipality there. So I went to visit the mukhtar...I asked him, "What do you think that you need in this village?" He said, "You know this solar system street lamps?" He saw it in so many places, he liked the idea so he said "I want this kind of things". Now before I went there I did my homework, to see what it is, how many people do they have in this village. There are only 99 people living in this village! And I told him, "Would you mind if we walk together on the streets, just to see?" He said "No come on", and I saw on the streets, there are on each electrical pole, two lamps! I told him where will you put the solar system lamps? You see you don't even have place for them. In addition, you don't have big number of people here. I can buy you, from my pocket – this light – you know what this torch. It costs \$2. So I give you \$200 and you can buy for each person, a torch for light! And think about a different project that will benefit for you. This will not be a benefit!⁴⁸

Another example is the building of public parks. In the early days of the new mandate there was a tendency to build public parks, at the request of the village mayors. As shown in the national chapter, owing to absenteeism mayors often do not have a good idea of the needs of their village. As a result, when CAOs or CIMIC asks them what the village needed, they often request a public park. As I drove around the area of operations, I was conscious of seeing a great many public parks, but they were rarely, if ever being used. UNIFIL has learned to avoid spending their money in this way.

We really look at the requirements as far as the population is concerned. We can go in for large projects where we make say a playground. It is there obviously but it is hardly being used. We can look at building say a football ground – but is it being used by locals? To a very limited extent it might be during the summer, for maximum maybe an hour a day or something. But if you look at an activity, where you give them medical cover or you give them veterinary aid, this is really very important as far as the shepherds of my area is concerned. Then it really goes a long way in helping them.⁴⁹

[H]ave you been to Shebaa? You know this hospital – this never working hospital? Well above it is the public park made by UNIFIL...You have a public park. It's bullshit, wasting money, wasting efforts and nobody will benefit from it. But the local authorities said, we want public park. Now, since that time, my idea was in this area we don't need public park. Every house is a public park here. Because every house has a garden here. We are not in city here, it's not Tyre. It's a village

⁴⁸ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁴⁹ Interview with Respondent E, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 24 July 2013.

and in each village you have the house near it and there is a small garden at least. So why do you need a park for? You can make a barbecue in it, you can let your kids play, whatever. If you take care of your garden, then you can use it as public park for your family. And if you don't take care for your own garden, you are not going to take care for the public park! So that's why I was against this idea, and we had so many bad examples about public parks.⁵⁰

At the local level, just as at the international level, demonstrating impartiality is crucial to avoid isolating certain groups. In the context of CIMIC activities, the process of managing this issue is fairly straightforward. Officers track the projects completed in each village to ensure that each village receives an equal number of projects.

We have to look at where the money has gone in the past and you know, you have to spread that money out. And if I look at a spreadsheet and say well- yeah. They are pretty much all the same. We try to keep a balance – there might be one or two that have a few more.⁵¹

We have as now, we have ten villages in our area. So we make it as a rule that every week, or a few villages every two weeks, a doctor or the veterinarian visits each village.⁵²

We visit all of the area villages every six months, so maybe in every month we do two or three just to cover for all twenty. Because when you do for one and you don't do for another it's a problem.⁵³

Of course, certain villages will have been more damaged than others or simply their needs are greater. As UNIFIL have to evaluate each case on the tripartite criteria mentioned above, this does mean that some villages will receive more than others and it can lead to resentment towards UNIFIL. However, the aim is to ensure that all the villages in the assigned area of a battalion receive a similar level of attention. Where this plan can go wrong is if a village mayor is opposed to UNIFIL's presence and refuses to meet with CIMIC to discuss projects on the village.

I have 12 villages in the AO. There's two villages that wouldn't have had any projects, or have had very little projects in the last number of years, so obviously they are a priority. And whether that's because, they didn't wish to speak. Sometimes you'd try and book appointments with the mayors and all of a sudden they don't show up, or they cancel. And you can't get in there to have that actual

⁵⁰ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁵¹ Interview with Respondent J, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁵² Interview with Respondent B, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁵³ Interview with Respondent U, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

discussion to say, you know, “We’re here to help, we’re here to support, and we’re here assist you. And is there something that we can do – maybe that we can help?”

The problem for UNIFIL battalions when this happens is that the lack of communication between UNIFIL and the village can evolve into a security problem for the battalion.

But other villages, if they don’t engage with you, then you can’t do anything. So I think they know that. One of the villages –Sadata - that just wouldn’t engage with us. They just wouldn’t and as a result the CIMIC projects are very low.... It’s just something I need to be aware of as a CIMIC officer. Constantly trying to engage and if they say, no no no then you can’t do anything for them... And that then sometimes causes a problem operationally in that it’s a no-go area. Incidents happening there with local people.⁵⁴

This issue is at the heart of the civilian engagement work that UNIFIL do. Simply put, if UNIFIL are unable to conduct patrols in a secure environment, then they cannot in effect do the work they are there to do. A local Christian civilian who runs a pharmacy in one of the towns provided an example of how local politicians unfriendly to UNIFIL work as gatekeepers to ensure that the local population in ‘hostile villages’ do not engage with UNIFIL.

Not in all the villages they have the opportunity to contact with people because there is restrictions unfortunately. Some people, some towns, prohibit, if we can say this, the UNIFIL to contact directly with the people without the intervention of the municipality. I had a bad experience in this. Because one time, once, a woman came to me from a town nearby, and she told me that she has sick cats. And she want me to talk to the Spanish veterinarian to go and consult to see them and give them the medicine. And I have good relation with the medical staff as I said. I contact with the veterinarian that was here, and I sent him to her. When the Chief of Municipality knew they make a big problem with me, and the veterinarian. They said to me: “Who told you to send this guy directly to this woman? You are making a big problem because there will be a danger for them if they go to the town without our company and something like that, blah blah blah.” Then I get embarrassed in front of the veterinarian, in front of myself, because I did not know all these complications. You know, and this town is Shi’a and unfortunately I am saying this. Because they said: “If someone will make harm to the veterinarian who will be the responsible. You must go through us, to accompany them to go to the house of this woman and to protect them.” Yes. This was my bad experience and from that time I did not interfere with anybody. They forbid to me have the sense of helping people. I was shocked. Really. This is embarrassing.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Interview with Respondent H1, UNIFIL, At-Tiri, South Lebanon, 20 November 2013.

⁵⁵ Interview with Respondent P, Civilian, Marja’youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

In these cases, where the personal opinion of the mayor dictates that a village has limited or no contact with UNIFIL, I was informed that this did not necessarily extend to the local opinion of the population. Rather it is a political decision that is enforced upon the population of the villages.

It's political unfortunately yes. Because in the towns of the Muslim area, there are political parties, Hizbullah and Amal, you know. And these laws are from this part, I think. In contrast in the Christian area, there is no political parties that are governing the mentality of the people. Everybody can do what he wants, without restrictions, without of course, in some limits, that he will not violate the general security of the town, but I don't need to go to the municipality to get the permission to get the Spanish people in my house, for example. But a woman from Tibnin needs that. You know? Unfortunately. Yes. And it puts barrier. Even when they are going to make the medical visit, every week? They need the permission of the municipality of the towns. The people have the confidence in UNIFIL. They like to contact with UNIFIL, but they don't dare. To say it loudly. You understand me? Everybody love the Blue Helmets but they don't dare to say it. You know because all the UNIFIL have good reputation, they don't differentiate between Muslim and Christian. They treat them almost equally.⁵⁶

UNIFIL are extremely conscious of the fact they are guests in Lebanon and operating under a Chapter VI mandate. As such it is impossible for them to force themselves on a local community. Where it has not been possible to make contact with a village, there is little than can be done and the area remains off-limits. For CIMIC and CAOs, the challenge then is always to keep trying to get through to a village where the municipality is not in favour of UNIFIL to try and turn the relationship around. There are cases where battalions have been successful in doing so but the factor of importance here was the length of time the battalion were in the area:

When we came initially we realised that there were one or two communities that were not too welcoming of UN persons. Not because it's GHANBATT, but they have the perception that UNIFIL in general. So they were not in favour of us, and I think one of them, as of now, we have not been able to make a contact with their mayor or mukhtar or whatever, because of this perception. But I am happy to note that there is one, and I can mention it – Ayt Al-Shab – it's predominantly Hizbullah dominated OK, initially it was a no-go area at all for GHANBATT. But with persistence, we managed to get a mayor, to talk to him and I think after we sat down and had a lengthy chat with my Commander and the CIMIC team and now their doors are open and we are always welcome.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Interview with Respondent P, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

⁵⁷ Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

However, the material nature of the services offered by CIMIC can lead to a situation whereby locals take what they can get from UNIFIL without actually building a trustful relationship.

They accept them, within like ... "I am a civilian. I am happy with UNIFIL as long they are doing humanitarian services, they are socialising, they are visiting me for tea or coffee. But if they are seeking information, or going to places where they are not supposed to go, I turn against them." I'll give you an example, like in Blat village. The village is under the Spanish, we have like the Litani river nearby, it's outside UNIFIL border[area of operations]. The Litani is known place for the Hizbullah, or the armed elements, whatever you want to say. So people they know that, the Spanish, if they want to carry out patrols they should go to the border yes? So the moment they feel that they are coming, they try to give signals to the people, that say "Don't encourage them, don't let them go, try to stop them". You feel that if there is a movement for the Hizbullah, they try to make sure that the UNIFIL vehicles are not there. If they know that they are monitoring from one place, they make sure that as long as the patrol is there, no one moves. So people cooperate with the UNIFIL to certain extent. And protect their own people in the other way. So they are playing a smart role I can say.⁵⁸

The above section has discussed the local engagement of CIMIC officers as actors at the subnational level. I argue CIMIC officers demonstrate creativity and spontaneity in their work but are hampered by the factor of time in two ways. First owing to the fast rotations of staff, their approach towards the local population is time-bound and instrumental and the local population have picked up on this. As a result they have high expectations of the material benefits UNIFIL can offer which can lead to misappropriation or tension when battalions cannot or will not deliver, and which does not necessarily lead to building a trustful relationship. Those civilians that do wish to build a sincere relationship with UNIFIL peacekeepers are prevented from doing so because of the short time they are there.

Nonetheless, CIMIC officers need to be in constant liaison with civilians in the villages to ensure that issues do not go unresolved. If they do not, then they run the risk of encountering problems with the locals which they need to avoid at all costs. However, where through persistence, some battalions have managed to overcome village suspicions about their intentions. This is not something that can be achieved overnight and the long-term presence of the *same* nationality battalions in the same area has enabled some breakthroughs.

⁵⁸ Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

Civil Affairs

As noted above, the course of civilian relations does not always run smooth. As a result, it is locally employed staff in the form of Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) who try to prevent (first and foremost) and then manage problems between the local population and battalions. The role of civil affairs is to: liaise between the local population and UNIFIL to ensure that the message of UNIFIL's mandate is clearly conveyed to the population at every level; ensure that any problems or misunderstandings on the ground are prevented or resolved as quickly as possible; and convey public concerns about UNIFIL back to UNIFIL staff and battalions to avoid future misunderstandings. (There is a fourth role for civil affairs, and that is to assist in building up the authority of the municipal authorities in the area; this has been discussed already in Chapter Four.)

Civil Affairs exists in part to support CIMIC services offered by the individual battalions. CAOs believe it is more important to afford battalions credit for QIPs to provide them the greatest opportunity to build local relationships with the municipalities. Usually battalions who are looking to fund projects from their own national funds will ask Civil Affairs for their advice on what they think of a project proposal from a village. It is not incumbent on the battalions to listen to the advice of Civil Affairs, but CIMIC recognise the department has local knowledge and experience that they themselves lack owing to the constant troop rotations.

Two characteristics of Civil Affairs differentiate them from Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Whilst both activities liaise with the local population over service provision and problem resolution, Civil Affairs' approach is more social. CAOs spend a great deal of time simply talking to members of the local population, sometimes about their issues, but sometimes they are simply passing the time of day. They attend local ceremonies, which are common, and which celebrate either local achievements or the completion of a QIPs project that UNIFIL has sponsored. The second key differentiator is that CAOs are Lebanese civilians (as opposed to military) which

affords them local cultural knowledge which can be essential when problems arise and the long-term nature of their posts means they are able to develop lasting relationships with members of the local population.

[W]e have this daily contact with the local people. It starts from building friendly relations. I just go to a shopkeeper and sit with him, to take a cup of coffee. To make friendship with this guy. And through this friendship he starts to talk about the needs of the village or whatever. So I catch it and I discuss it...chat with them about their problems, what they think. All this stuff you can raise it later with the local authority. This shopkeeper might tell you that, you know we have a problem with the sewage system, we don't have sewage system, we are digging, I don't know. So we go to the municipality and say, this is the problem. What we can help in solving this problem? In some cases we cannot help, or we can help. But even when we cannot help we will not raise their expectations by telling them, we are going to solve it don't worry. No, we tell them we cannot solve it. And we think that the best way to solve it is to this, and that....So we teach them how to do it. At least we show them the path to reach how to do this. And this makes us have good relations with these people.⁵⁹

Civil Affairs also help to connect up schools and villagers with the battalions through the use of cultural performances. These are particularly helpful for the poorer battalions who may not be able to fund large-scale projects. Even when a charity has donated funds towards a particular project, Civil Affairs will try to involve a local battalion with the project. For example, in one case they asked the Ghanaians to come and give a dancing performance during the handover of new computers for a school.⁶⁰

Problem Prevention

CAOs act as the liaison between the local community and the peacekeeping operation. The use of local civilian staff presents a more informal interface to a population wary of militia and the military and enables CAOs to interact easily with the local population. They ensure that where possible, problems are resolved or even better, prevented from occurring in the first place.

There are three main problems that CAOs contend with on a regular basis: lack of cultural and religious awareness, troops taking photographs and speeding vehicles. These three issues

⁵⁹ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August, 2013.

⁶⁰ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

generate the most complaints from locals about UNIFIL. They are for the most part caused by the frequent constant troop rotations. Some battalions such as the Indians, rotate once a year, some like the Irish and Ghanaians, every six months; and some, such as the Spanish every four months.

In the course of their work, CAOs work hard to educate battalions on local religious norms.

I am Lebanese so I know exactly what the tradition is, and we transfer this cultural awareness to the military contingents. You see from different countries. You know UNIFIL has 37 countries has troops in this country. So imagine you have 37 cultures, 37 ethnicities. So its not easy job that they are dealing with different culture here. And every 6 months or 4 months or 1 year this contingent is changed, so new soldiers come. Old soldiers go and new soldiers come, so we have to begin this process again. Because even that those soldiers have some training about cultural awareness in their countries before coming here but having the training is something, and living the reality is something else. You see, so this is the kind of our work.⁶¹

[S]o we have problems, we rotate constantly, new guys the whole time, so then it becomes very difficult. We have to repeat ourselves, mistakes are made the whole time.⁶²

The first of the most commonly made mistakes by UNIFIL troops is a lack of awareness of religious customs. Simply knowing these small details can prevent many unintentional mistakes.

Misunderstandings...you know here they occur mostly at Ramadan times and all these people who drink these things...And I don't blame them because they don't know and we keep teaching them you know?⁶³

The second issue that CAOs are on the alert for relates to a political issue. The population of the south are extremely sensitive about foreigners taking photographs of the area. This issue is connected to the mandate's local/international legitimacy gap and the perceived political preferences of European troops.

⁶¹ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August, 2013.

⁶² Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁶³ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October, 2013.

Political and religious beliefs do influence local perceptions of UNIFIL. Owing to the demographics of the region, the high number of Shi'a in the region mean that there exists a crucial conflict of interests for many in terms of their relationship with UNIFIL. This research identified a difference in attitudes towards UNIFIL amongst the civilian population. Those differences were not simply a Shia/Christian split, but can be broken-down further to reflect the different views of the Shi'a population. Those Shi'a who belonged to the Shi'ite political party, Amal were more vocal in their support of UNIFIL compared to those aligned with Hizbullah. Levels of support for Hizbullah also varies between the population, many Shi'a are committed followers, others less so. In interviews, Shi'a tended to be less effusive about UNIFIL than the Christians, and more sceptical about their 'true' intentions. This reflects the beliefs of Hizbullah who argue that 1701 has been constructed to benefit Israel more than it does Lebanon. Otherwise, they argue, why is UNIFIL not on both sides of the line? This idea comes across in Shi'a respondent discourse on UNIFIL, whereas it is absent from Christian discussions of UNIFIL. However, the extent of true and unflinching support amongst locals for Hizbullah is impossible to gauge because of the overriding desire for peace that exists amongst southern people. I received the impression that sometimes respondents spoke the discourse of resistance, but they were more concerned to maintain the peace which they know that UNIFIL can assist with far more than Hizbullah. That is to say, that ultimately it will not be UNIFIL who starts another war; Hizbullah can provide no such guarantees. As such it is possible that respondents speak the language of resistance, but unless Israel was to launch an unprovoked attack, they would prefer that Hizbullah do not engage in provocative manoeuvres that could trigger another invasion.

This is the mentality of the people. Like OK, they don't encourage Hizbullah to provoke, but or to create the troubles or clashes because this will have a bad effect on them. But at the same time they don't accept that people like, they will never encourage that you will tell where are they, where they gather, where their positions. They just give a blank about any information they ask in this regard.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

The Hizbullah perspective is that any foreigners taking photos in the area of operations poses a security risk (tourists included), because if they were to pass into the hands of Israel they would provide important strategic geographical information. When foreign troops take photos of the region many in the local population view the risk as being even more severe. Therefore many of the Shi'a, have a fundamental lack of trust in UNIFIL soldiers who come from states that are friendly to Israel. Civilian respondents expressed their belief that troops from these countries can and do pass security information on to Israel.

[T]hey are always afraid of UNIFIL because they think that maybe they will take photographs and information and give it to Israel. This is the only thing that they are scared of. And this is the only thing that they don't trust in UNIFIL. As long as they don't touch their own people, their own roots, they have no problem. But the moment they feel that, "OK they are like cooking for something", they turn against.⁶⁵

The local Shi'a population in many places will be friendly and welcoming to UNIFIL, but the bottom line is, they are suspicious that UNIFIL are spying on them.

[P]eople in south are very welcoming, but at the same time, some people are just not feel, very comfortable with UNIFIL, maybe... it's people there they have a long war with Israel, so they think that maybe the UNIFIL are there to protect Israel, not protect the south. So they will feel not comfortable...they say that they are sure that the UNIFIL soldiers are there, to protect Israel.⁶⁶

As a result, the taking of photographs by UNIFIL soldiers is regarded as being highly suspicious by many locals in the population. Whilst this is seen as being predominantly a suspicion held by the Shi'a, as they comprise around 74% of the local population, this is not an issue UNIFIL can ignore. UNIFIL officers, both international and national understood very well local sentiment and do not have a problem with it because they appear to understand where it comes from.

[Y]ou know, people can be sympathisers they don't have to be activists. So for me...they're all sympathisers with Hizbullah like, I mean you know the country I come from, I come from Ireland. we had our own internal problems you know. I know lots of people who are sympathisers with the IRA, but that doesn't mean they have a weapon in their hands. But they're nationalists, I know I grew up in this

⁶⁵ Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁶⁶ Interview with Respondent L, Civilian, At-Tiri, South Lebanon, 8 October 2013.

environment. So for me it's not a problem. I see the local Lebanese in the south, I know where their loyalties are. They don't have to explain to me, it's not a problem for me. It doesn't mean they are a raving Hizbullah guy who wants to go running over the hill like. It doesn't mean that.⁶⁷

[Support for Hizbullah] This is in their blood...I don't see these people will give them up. Because in every single house you have someone who is killed. It is not easy to inhale the wound.⁶⁸

As a result, UNIFIL officers demonstrated sensitivity towards complaints from local municipalities and civilians on the issue of photo taking and CAOs consistently remind battalions not to do it. In every battalion compound I visited, there was a sign at the main gate instructing soldiers not to take photographs. UNIFIL officers explained why it still happens:

[B]ecause our guys, some of them it's like a bit of military tourism. The guys are only over here for six months, it's a big deal, they want to take photographs and take them home. But the people in the south are very sensitive to this because they feel, again it's the perceptions. They feel if we are taking photographs, we are sending them to the Israelis. And they feel that their house, will be in the next bombing raid, in the next war and that it will be destroyed. So I can understand where the local people are coming from, very clearly you know?⁶⁹

We always lecture our people we tell them don't take photos. You see it's not an easy job, you have people from all different cultures. I understand the poor Italian who comes here, I understand this poor European who comes here or anyone from Asia. When he see in the morning a woman hitting the donkey to go and get the harvesting and all this, he want to take a photo and send it to his mum. And say "Look mum where I am". And innocent people. But these people, when they see camera they are sensitive to this. But the poor guy... We get report from a mayor, he say 'Please your people, we need the camera are you spying for Israel?' This one of the things you know? But we keep making our people aware about this.⁷⁰

One further issue that UNIFIL CAOs are concerned about is speeding vehicles on the local roads. APCs are heavy and sometimes can damage local roads which upsets the locals. In addition, all the civilians I interviewed listed speeding as one of the main problems with UNIFIL troops. UNIFIL are aware of this issue:

⁶⁷ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁶⁸ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

⁶⁹ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁷⁰ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

Oh yes, I will tell you. My main worry is car accident. Our APCs are very heavy if we smash a family in a car, kill them all. This is one of the things I am afraid of.⁷¹

You know the main ones [problems] are running into the villagers with our big trucks.⁷²

[I]they are not sometimes comfortable with our vehicles - the size of the vehicles through their villages. Yes sometimes they complain about that. You know their roads are very tiny, so sometimes they complain that the size of the vehicle on that road will damage the route. So they complain about that and sometimes too on rare occasions they talk about speed. When you think on some of their roads, their children play so...⁷³

UNIFIL are very aware of the disruption the constant patrolling causes to the daily lives of villagers. In fact most villagers did not seem to mind it as it made them feel more secure. But patrolling in areas unfriendly to UNIFIL needs to be done with care to avoid causing further friction. Ensuring that the APCs do not regularly go through narrow or damaged roads is regarded as important.

Cultural Sensitivity

Aside from religious misunderstandings and the suspicions that some locals hold towards European troops, the issue of communication style is also very important on the ground. At the personal level, some civilians found certain battalions easier to deal with than others.

[B]ecause face-to-face, especially here in the Middle East, I think it's very important. When they trust you as a person, they will trust the whole mission. You know it's important that the individual relationship that you may have with someone is paramount.⁷⁴

In general, the personal characteristics of Asian battalions were more popular than that of the Europeans. Many civilians spoke of the respectful nature of Asian battalions, their friendliness and their shared values, such as family ties and hospitality towards guests.

⁷¹ Interview with Respondent A1, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

⁷² Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

⁷³ Interview with Respondent U, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

⁷⁴ Interview with Respondent J, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

The Indians, they have the Oriental habits, traditions and for the locals here, their traditions are similar. And there are some common things between the people here... The relations between the family, they are stronger than the Europeans. They are similar to the Middle East – the Indians I mean.⁷⁵

The Indians, they are very good. They are like, very friendly, they have almost the same culture as we have, same family ties and things like that. You don't feel that there is a difference between you and them, and you have the same way of thinking also. With the Norwegians in the beginning we used to feel a big gap between our way of thinking and their way of thinking.⁷⁶

They are nice people [the Koreans]. They highly respect the traditions and the culture of the village. They take good care of this part in the relations, to respect the culture and the traditions.⁷⁷

Usually the Asian approach is a very respectful one. You know the Asian system, so they are different to the Europeans.⁷⁸

The Europeans face a far harder time in the area of operations. They already have to deal with the fact that many civilians view them as spies for Israel, but in addition their mannerisms have often given offence.

The European are very straightforward, they don't ah, try to bend the rules. The Asians, sometimes they work by their emotions and their sympathies. Sometimes they bend the rules. But Europeans they don't.⁷⁹

People of this area are more friendly with the non-Europeans because according to what they say, some of the soldiers of the European countries deal with them arrogantly. "They come to talk to us as if they are smarter than us. Or they are giving us charity. We don't need their charity and we are smarter than them. We succeeded to overcome Israel which is the strongest army in the Middle East."⁸⁰

One CIMIC officer raised this issue as a concern for UNIFIL troops.

The military operations can reflect the cultural differences...Northern European are more direct, you know, are more, serious when they approach someone. Even though they are the best, warm and simple person. Southern people like me, I am from the south of Italy...We do move our hands a lot when we talk, we smile a lot, and we are more friendly, but it doesn't mean we are easy people.⁸¹

⁷⁵ Interview with Respondent D, Civilian, Hebbariyah, South Lebanon, 18 June 2013.

⁷⁶ Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁷⁷ Interview with Respondent Z, Civilian, Tayrdebba, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

⁷⁸ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, Lebanon, 13 August, 2013.

⁷⁹ Interview with Respondent C, Civilian, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁸⁰ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, Lebanon, 13 August, 2013.

⁸¹ Interview with Respondent M, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

One CAO commented on the need for the Europeans in particular to avoid coming across as arrogant.

Yeah, for example passing by in the patrol and throwing chocolate for the kids. This is very bad. If you to give [it] to them, stop your patrol and give it by hand. And shake hands with the kid. This is the way to give help. Even if it's charity. If you want to give them a bottle of water, don't throw it from the window or off the top of the vehicle. This is arrogant.⁸²

From the local perspective there is even a hierarchy of preference amongst the different European battalions:

[T]hey feel more comfortable with non-European soldiers. Now among the non-European soldiers, they prefer to deal with the Italians rather than with the French and Spanish. You see even in this you have categories. Because they consider the most arrogant of the Europeans is the French. This is their feeling. And then after the French comes the Spanish.⁸³

For Asian peacekeepers, local sympathy is a distinct advantage:

Well to be very frank I will say that the threats especially to our battalion are very low. Very low as compared to that of the Europeans.⁸⁴

[Y]ou know, in India we have a system, it means anybody who is a guest, he is a God. So we treat them that way. Similarly you know people over here also have a good attitude towards the guests. We share that cultural link. So that helps in a way to actually bond with them well. So that helps us.⁸⁵

Due to security concerns, the Spanish in particular have experienced more problems than other European battalions. As noted by Ruffa (2013) in her paper on the security concerns of UNIFIL troops, the Spanish, have been affected by past experience of other peacekeeping missions.⁸⁶

Civilians in the south explained to me that the Spanish adopted an attitude at the beginning of their time in the mission that came across to locals as aggressive.

⁸² Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, Lebanon, 13 August, 2013.

⁸³ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁸⁴ Interview with Respondent T, UNIFIL, Qlayaa, South Lebanon, 29 August 2013.

⁸⁵ Interview with Respondent B, UNIFIL, Blat, South Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

⁸⁶ Ruffa, 'What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian, and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon'.

Once I was on Taybeh road, the village called Taybeh, I met the Spanish battalion patrol. It was the beginning of the arrival in the area. I felt surprised that all the vehicles were still military colour it was not, painted with white. And they had assaulting guns, not defensive guns... The UNIFIL that I used to know before, they were very friendly. But those Spanish on their first arrival, they were very aggressive with us. And unfortunately until now the Spanish still making this mistake.⁸⁷

European troops may well be under greater threat than non-European troops as far as their security is concerned. However, it is important for UNIFIL peacekeepers to adapt their behaviour and remember that they are in a civilian area and not a war zone. CAOs try to ameliorate this issue by first, reassuring the community that all troops are under UNIFIL and the United Nations flag; they are not representing their individual countries.

Secondly, CAO are frank with battalions when they feel they have behaved insensitively towards the local population, as the example of how the Spanish behaved at a local school for children with special-needs shows.

Let me tell you something. I recently met up with the Force Commander who is Spanish, we went to a school which is for kids with special needs. OK and the guy who performed the entertainment is an officer of the Spanish battalion. I was shocked to see that the soldiers who are coming to the performance, they are coming to the school with their pistols on their belt. Come on. Kids with special needs, coming inside the classrooms with your pistol? I can understand you have soldiers outside with their guns outside the school. But inside the school, inside the room, playing with the kids and your pistol is on your belt. And I told the Spanish Commander, "I told him this is unacceptable. If I were the Principal of the School I would kick you out."... Now I cannot tell the officer, get out with your pistol. But I can report to his boss that this is not good for your relations. I gave you the good and bad side of the story. They are doing something great, they are making an entertainment performance, magic games and all this stuff. With your pistol on your side? Come on! And with your uniform, OK your uniform I understand. You are a soldier. But carrying a pistol in a school with kids for special needs?⁸⁸

In light of their suspicions about European troops, locals always complained about European troops taking photos and not the non-European troops.

⁸⁷ Interview with Respondent Q, Civilian, Marja'youn, South Lebanon, 27 August 2013.

⁸⁸ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

It was some separate cases some of the units behaviours were not that good. Mainly the Western Europeans, the French, Spanish and Italians. In some villages, they exceeded their limits, for example taking pictures in some places, some sensitive places. And they were taking pictures in an environment that follows Hizbullah, and people here have a high security sense. So this created so many problems in different places...And it was made to clear to them by Hizbullah that you are welcome to do your work here, but your work is limited to the mandate which you have according to 1701. And you should not exceed it. And this does not include taking pictures of our houses.⁸⁹

The issue of the behaviour of battalions is important in an area of the world where personal relationships are paramount. CAOs, as noted previously are aware of this issue and work hard to sensitise troops to the problem. It is however impossible to eradicate the problem as each nation state has its own style of communication and deportment that comes from national character and military training. Sometimes, battalions are simply loved for their personal style which other nationalities cannot mimic.

You know what the difference is? The Indonesian battalion for example, smile and wave at the people as they go past! They smile and wave.⁹⁰

The experience of this researcher can attest to this. Once whilst driving along a deserted road in Sector East, members of the Spanish contingent drove past at high speed and ignored me and my driving companion. Five minutes later on the same road, an Indonesian battalion drove past, slowed down, smiled and waved at us. There is no doubt it left a very different impression from the battalion that had passed by minutes before.

Whilst the issue of cultural compatibility may seem a frivolous factor to focus on in terms of its power to inform local perceptions of peacekeepers, it is not. Firstly because of the importance attributed to face-to-face contact in the region, and secondly because of its potential to turn a bad situation into a serious security incident as the following section demonstrates.

⁸⁹ Interview with Respondent Z, Civilian, Tayrdebba, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

⁹⁰ Interview with Respondent A, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 29 May 2013.

The above section has discussed the role CAOs play in attempting to prevent problems with the population. In doing so they demonstrate sensitivity to local concerns which is crucial for the successful management of issues when they arise amongst the local population. The next section describes how CAOs solve problems when they occur and how the autonomy of CAOs enables them to be creative and spontaneous in their dealings with civilians on the ground.

Problem Solving

The Spanish Bus Crash

On a cold winter's morning in Sector East, a UNIFIL CAO was instructed to go to Marja'youn, a small town in Sector East with a mixed Christian and Muslim population. There had been a bus accident in the centre of Marja'youn between a Spanish APC and a bus full of schoolchildren. When the CAO arrived on the scene, he found an angry mob surrounding the Spanish APC which included Hizbullah. Senior Lebanese Army officers were present but they had been unable to control the crowd and prevent them from encircling the APC. The crowd had blocked off the APC through the use of parked cars in order to prevent it from leaving the area. The Spanish troops were outside the APC with their weapons cocked. Making the situation far worse than it already was, were the cultural misunderstandings between the locals and the Spanish.

I reached there, there were 2 APCs and local people put, a civilian car in front and behind each vehicle to prevent them from moving and they want the driver of the APC. Why? Now you see the difference in culture. Here in Lebanon, if a car accident occurs and there are wounded people what do people do usually? They do not wait for the ambulance, they just take the wounded people to the hospital. The Spanish culture is, that you are not allowed to touch the wounded people you wait for the ambulance until it comes and then the ambulance will take you. And the accident occurred with a school bus. Ten wounded children, shouting in the bus, blood coming in their faces... and the soldiers not allowing anybody to approach the bus.⁹¹

The situation was also aggravated by Spanish security precautions which meant they were using technology that jams all the mobile phones around the APC - a precaution most European troops use to avoid remote detonation of IEDs on the roads they patrol. So locals who had tried

⁹¹ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

to call ambulances had been unable to get through. The situation was turning nasty. As noted by the respondent:

I reached there, everybody was shouting. LAF can't prevent people from approaching the APCs. Soldiers on the APCs, their finger on the trigger, they are afraid because any wrong move might lead to a massacre out there.⁹²

The outcome of this incident was in fact a very positive one. And this can in no small way be attributed to the skill and dexterity with which the Civil Affairs officer diffused the situation. It demonstrates how invaluable the presence of local staff are to a UNIFIL mission.

I reached there and I know the people of the area and I know who is leading them. The guy of Hizb is leading them. "We want the driver who wounded our children." I told them, "I am the UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer, my name is... You know me as a reporter, now I am UNIFIL, and those kids are my kids, you trust me or you don't trust me?" They said, "We trust you." I said, "Ok. I will be with you until we solve the problem. What we need now is to provide medical help for the kids. Isn't it?" They said yes. I said, "OK, I will remain with you until you receive confirmation from UNIFIL that your kids will be treated on our account. Regardless of who is responsible for the accident, those are kids." Here I have to take the initiative. First of all to prevent contact between soldiers of UNIFIL and the local people. Because any contact might lead to a massacre. I told them "The first thing now is to see the military here go from here. Let them leave, and if you trust me, I will stay with you." And they allowed the Spanish troops to leave. So I diffused the tension. Now also I am a UN Officer, so I can be a hostage in this case. So how to solve it? LAF intelligence was there, I told them, is it possible to stay here in the winter on the street? It started to rain, let's go to LAF office. It's our partner. As if I brought them to my office. So in LAF office I know I won't be taken hostage.

The outcome was that the Spanish Embassy in Lebanon covered all the costs for the wounded children in hospital. It should be noted that the CAO at the time had no way of knowing this. He simply knew he had to take the initiative himself in order to prevent what would have been a disaster for UNIFIL in terms of retaining local consent to operate in the area.

So regardless of who is responsible about the accident, we should help because this is very important to us. And the accident did not happen with a small car, it's an APC it's like a tank so they must drive more carefully. And the tank hit the bus in the middle. You see, this is confidence-building. To take a courageous decision at

⁹² Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

a crucial time, in a crucial situation, you have to take the initiative....by the end of it the local people were kissing my hand.⁹³

Personal experience of UNIFIL troops plays a big part in civilian views of UNIFIL, highlighting again the importance of making contact with as many people as possible. Those who had good experiences with UNIFIL were full of praise for them. This suggests that politico-religious prejudices can be overcome to a large extent simply by building relationships. It also suggests that those municipalities who forbid their villagers from making contact with UNIFIL are all too aware of this.

Syrian Refugees

Another example of CAO creativity and spontaneity relates to the current influx of Syrian refugees into the area of operations.⁹⁴ UNIFIL is unable to directly provide assistance to the refugees, other than allowing them to use the free medical and dental services that the battalions offer. In the area of Shebaa, the population are Sunni Muslims, and as many of the refugees fleeing Syria are Sunni, they have gravitated to Shebaa. A CAO related to me the story of how he helped resolve the problem the local mayor was having in regard to the sudden influx of Syrian refugees into his town.

Look now we have a very crucial issue. The Syrian refugees. It's not in our mandate and we don't have the right to interfere. But, in the Sector East area, we have a lot of them – in Shebaa, in Kfar Shuba, so how to help the local authorities without violating our mandate? How to do it? ... When this wave of refugees came to Shebaa one of my contacts called me. "Hundreds of Syrians are coming to our village! We don't have food, we don't have place"... So I went up there to assess the situation. It happened that my friend, is the adviser of Minister of Social Affairs. I called my friend I told him, you should have an emergency situation here, this is the case in Shebaa and they need help. And I was talking with this guy in front of the deputy mayor. My friend said, "Within a few minutes somebody will call you on behalf of the ministry and you will tell them what is the situation". While I was sitting with the deputy mayor I received a call from this guy, I told him what's happening and he said, "During the day we are going to send you help". And he

⁹³ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

⁹⁴ Whilst refugee numbers are low in the area of operation (as noted previously) they remain a concern particularly in Sunni areas as many of those fleeing are Sunni and they therefore gravitate towards Sunni-majority towns and villages.

sent a truck full of food and blankets and etc from the ministry to Shebaa. You see? And the deputy mayor saw that and he was telling to people (that told me later) that “Oh this UNIFIL guy he is better than a president. He gave us the direct help in the same day”. Now how make other UN organisations involved? I called UNHCR and I told them “There is this case, and you need to do something”. In the same day, they sent a committee up there, assessed the situation and directly in the same day they send them food and blankets. It was an emergency situation. And they started working and making lists and all this stuff.⁹⁵

This kind of assistance goes above and beyond the mandate of UNIFIL staff and it again reflects the autonomous conditions under which CAOs operate enabling them to be spontaneous and use informal networks in order to respond as quickly as possible to changing circumstances.

Going Beyond the Mandate

Even where problems do not exist, some CAOs work to assist the population in any way they can irrespective of the constraints of their mandate. They do this because they know that every positive connection or incident contributes to the success of the mission as a whole and helps in building long-term, trusted relationships with the local population. They recognise the importance of relating to the concerns of the local population, because they are Lebanese. They demonstrate creativity by assisting local people without having to use UNIFIL resources. One local school benefitted from the media attention a CAO generated for them when the headmaster had a problem accommodating all his students in the class.

This school, they had an extra number of students and there is no place for them. So what the Principal did? He bought 3 containers and put them on top of the roof of the building and made them classrooms. He made windows in them, he put some stove warming the room etc and he made them a classroom. 3 classrooms made of containers. Yes, shipping containers. So I went one day and I saw them. Why there are 3 containers on the roof of the school? So I went to the Principal and I asked him, “What are you doing with these containers?” He said, “I have an extra number of students and you know we are very far village and people are very poor. Those who send their kids to a public school are poor people. I am not going to say no for them, there is no place. So, I use my budget. I cannot build a new building but I bought these containers and I made them classroom”. I told him, “Are you crazy? In winter you are there are 1700 metres above the sea shore and it snows in winter up there. You are putting them in a refrigerator! And unless the student is very close to the stove, the others will feel cold!” He said: “Yeah, better them feeling cold than being illiterate”. I told him: “And even during the sunny

⁹⁵ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August, 2013.

days, it will be very hot, putting them in an oven". He said "What to do? Do you have any other proposal?" I told him, "No, we cannot build this school". So what I did, through my contacts with journalists, I raised the issue. I made the journalists make reports about it. You see this is the way to help also. You see to push the media to do something. I told a journalist: "You know? I found a very nice story. My God it's fantastic! Can you imagine writing a story about students studying in containers?" He said: "Do you have this story?" I said: "Yeah I saw it in Shebaa! Go and see it!" Without telling them go and write. This is just to raise their curiosity. And see they did a big story in the newspapers about it. Ask for, education even in the containers... You know prophet Mohammed, said, "Ask for education even in China". So they used this part of Mohammed's speech: "Ask for education even in a container". And they made a report. And immediately the government was embarrassed and started to make plans to build another floor for the school and it was very good.⁹⁶

Civil Affairs officers are prepared to go down to the micro-level of society to assist one particular individual as this example shows:

In one small village called Halta, it's beneath Kfar Shuba. It's a small village about 1000 people. This was a few years ago. I went to this village, just assessment visit. They don't have municipality because they are under the municipality of Kfar Shuba, it's a small village. And they were having celebration. Why the celebration? For the first time in the history of this village, a boy succeeded in the public exam of the baccalaureate. So his family doesn't have money to send him to the university. It is pity, so he had to work as a shepherd. So the whole celebration is bullshit! They celebrate that he succeeded but what else? And of course I cannot help as part of UNIFIL. So I went to the media people. They are my friends, they like me a lot, and I told them: "You can't imagine how nice this story will be?" And they did the story about it. And this village is a Sunni village. So the story was in a newspaper that was for Sunnis. So he made a big report about it. And it ended up that Bahia Hariri,⁹⁷ called the reporter asking him about this case, and told him I need his phone number to call him. She called his family and she decided to cover all the expenses of his studies for his university until he finishes. You see? This is a way. People know very well that I send this guy. OK UNIFIL didn't pay us money but helped us to do something. You see this is another way.⁹⁸

Civil Affairs officers also work to connect up NGOs and charities with villages and towns in the area of operations. Often Civil Affairs officers find out the needs of the villages, and they will put them in touch with charities in Beirut who are looking to make donations in rural parts of the country that are less developed. In this way, UNIFIL acts as a facilitator and gains recognition for their role in a project without needing to draw on UNIFIL resources. Villages have benefited

⁹⁶ Interview with Respondent A1 UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 10 October 2013.

⁹⁷ Bahia Hariri is the sister of assassinated former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri.

⁹⁸ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

from tree planting projects, computers for schools, and bags for school children, funded by charities in Beirut whom CAOs have put them in touch.

Bridging Difficult Relationships

As noted in Chapter Four, it is difficult for UNIFIL to engage with all the municipalities as some hold prejudices against the mission. This is often more of a personality issue than a political one. CAOs have to work to convince the local mayor that UNIFIL is impartial and wants to help.

Through the use of national charities and NGOs, Civil Affairs also help to build bridges between UNIFIL and the local population. In situations where you have unfriendly municipalities (as noted above), Civil Affairs can sometimes find a way through in ways that the military – CIMIC officers – cannot by using local connections and knowledge of local sensibilities.

I can give you a fine example in a village called Ayn Etta. The mayor is Hizbullah and I know that he is Hizbullah but I don't know him personally. But I know that he is. I went to meet him and I told him that there is an NGO in Beirut that wants to help giving some trees. "Are you interested to have trees? Because I heard that you have a project of planting I don't know how many trees in the outskirts of the village?". He said, "What is this organisation?" I was joking with him! I said, "This is a Zionist organisation, why do you care what is this? Take the trees, plant them in your area and hide some rockets under them. I don't mind what it the political affiliation of this organisation. They want to help. You want the help or you don't want it?". And he said, "Let me think about it". You know I have my contacts, even with Hizbullah. So I told a Member of Parliament, he is Hizbullah, "Do you know this guy the mayor of this village?"... The next day the mayor called me and said, "Yes, we want this thing."⁹⁹

In facilitating this project, the Civil Affairs officer managed to build up a relationship with a mayor of a village who otherwise would have rejected contact with UNIFIL. Now thanks to this project, UNIFIL are able to visit the municipality and maintain relations with them.

⁹⁹ Interview with Respondent K, UNIFIL, Naqoura, South Lebanon, 13 August 2013.

Conclusion

This chapter has described how UNIFIL influences its security environment at the local level by maintaining civilian consent for the mission. It has shown how CIMIC and CAOs use QIPs to build relationships with the local population and how CAOs train peacekeeping troops in cultural awareness and are at the frontline when problems arise for UNIFIL with the local population.

This chapter has also shown how the local population has agency which can constrain UNIFIL officers by preventing contact with certain villages which potentially poses a security risk to peacekeeping troops. UNIFIL also have to control for corruption, wastage and duplication when financing projects. Local politics and historical memory of previous invasions has also taught the local population to maintain a plurality in their dealings with UNIFIL. Whilst the majority will engage with UNIFIL and are friendly towards them; at the same time they retain their loyalty towards Hizbullah. This means that UNIFIL have not always secured the trust of the local population over and above local resistance movements.

As a Chapter VI mission, UNIFIL need to maintain the cooperation and consent of the local population through persuasion and not coercion. I argue that actors at the subnational level influence UNIFIL's local security environment by building and maintaining regular and face-to-face contact with the local population. The factors of time helps CAOs to build long-standing relationships with the civilian population. Local knowledge and the fact of their being Lebanese means that CAOs speak to members of local society at all levels, from tobacco workers to mayors. The autonomy with which they work enables CAOs in particular to be spontaneous and contingent when problem solving in situations of tension between UNIFIL peacekeepers and the local population. In addition, CAOs demonstrate creativity when assisting the local population in all areas of their life, especially when they are unable to help them within the framework of their role within UNIFIL. CAOs in particular go beyond their mandate to help the local population and as a result are appreciated for genuinely caring about the area which wins them support across all the religions. However, UNIFIL also have to be aware of CAO power and influence in

the community. The lack of locally-run, home-grown conflict resolution projects suggest that there is a risk that local civil affairs officers are failing to take the initiative of helping civilians build their own organisations. This issue is explored more deeply in the conclusion, but in the course of conducting my research I detected an element of patriarchy on more than one occasion in terms of UNIFIL being the provider of all resources and civilians the willing recipients.

CIMIC officers also demonstrate creativity in assisting the populations, particularly the poorer battalions who use their cultural strengths (such as dance and yoga) to engage with the local population when there is no money for projects. However, the swift rotation of troops, particularly European troops, prevents the development of trust between peacekeepers and the local population. As such, there appears to be more of an instrumental quality to the relationship between CIMIC officers and the local population. This is not necessarily a negative for UNIFIL but it does highlight the fact that money alone cannot win hearts and minds.

Maintaining local consent is a crucial aspect of the security environment for any peace operation if it is to succeed, and the UNIFIL mission appears to have been effective in this regard. This in turn enables the mission to meet its primary objective, the maintenance of international peace and security.

Conclusion

[T]here's a balance to it. There's definitely a balance between what we are trying to achieve out here and the mission mandate, you know?¹

The title of this thesis is 'Walk the Line' taken from a well-known Johnny Cash song.² I selected it initially because I felt it described very well the actions of the peacekeepers who patrol and monitor the Blue Line that divides two states that remain technically at war. However, in the course of this research, I found that all the actors involved in the mission, peacekeeping troops, PAOs, CAOs, CIMIC, the LAF, Hizbullah and civilians, are engaged in a balancing act in their daily lives – walking a line - between defending local interests versus keeping international peace. More often than not, they walk this line together rather than separately but when there is separation it is invariably because UNIFIL staff have had to balance a need for the good will of the local population with the rules of their mandate. Equally, civilians who are deeply committed to the resistance movement often have to balance their political affiliations with their friendship with individual UNIFIL officers.

One the biggest balancing acts is how UNIFIL staff interact with a local population that has to reconcile their need for peace with their political and religious affiliations. As one respondent informed me 'everything is connected' in this part of the world. The problems between Lebanon and Israel are deeply connected with the Israel/Palestine issue. The inherent power imbalance that exists between Israel and the states that surround it, and how Israel has chosen to exercise its power in the last thirty years has led to such deep, painful wounds in Lebanese society that generations are needed before the people of these lands can feel a will to peace in their hearts. But at the same time, this research exposed the deep-seated need that the people of the south have for sustained peace. This is what sustains local support for the UNIFIL mission - even

¹ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

² *I Walk the Line*, by Johnny Cash, released as a single on 1 May 1956 from his album entitled 'From His Hot and Blue Guitar', produced by Sun Records.

when the presence and actions of troops, in particular, gives rise to local tension. One respondent expressed the deep contradictions felt by civilians about this issue:

Well I think the majority of the people, you know, irrespective of who they might support, I think the majority of people in every country you go to – they just want normality...When you take away the – how would you call it – the past difficulties. People just want to get back to normality. It's just like everybody else – you know – you just want to your kids to grow up and go to school, you want to go on a holiday, you want to be able to – you know. And that's what most of the people in the south are striving for and they know I think realistically, in their heart and soul – that while the resistance is necessary in their minds, and probably is, necessary, they know that they have to move beyond that too. They would like things to be normal and let the state cater for their security and their needs.³

Main Findings

This thesis asked the following questions: (1) How do peace operations influence their security environment? and; (2) What factors effect UNIFIL local engagement? This research has found that at the subnational or local level, UNIFIL is able to influence its security environment and thus contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. It does this by sustaining local connections that serve to alert the mission to small incidents that it prevents from developing into bigger conflicts. The area of operations has experienced peace for almost eight years and this would suggest that these activities at the micro level have helped to provide an environment conducive to peace.

On a practical level, the UNIFIL mission has achieved this in three main ways: first by monitoring, reporting and intervening in Blue Line violations as part of a response mechanism, to avoid escalation. Second, through the preventative mechanisms of liaising between the IDF and the LAF to encourage local level cooperation and produce micro security agreements to prevent misunderstandings. Third, UNIFIL has a very comprehensive local engagement mechanism that enables the mission to maintain local consent and avoid being affected by intrastate conflict.

³ Interview with Respondent F1, UNIFIL, Beirut, Lebanon, 15 November 2013.

This research has identified three factors: time, autonomy and local knowledge that facilitate the above mechanisms and therefore agency at the local level. Prior to this research, these three factors have not previously been linked together as key facilitators of agency amongst peacekeepers at the local level. What this thesis also extrapolates out are the benefits that accrue from these three factors: time is linked to the benefits of trust, institutional memory and consistency of effort. Autonomy is linked with the benefits of creativity and spontaneity. Local knowledge produces cultural sensitivity and contingency in emergency situations.




Figure 2: The factors that facilitate agency amongst UNIFIL staff

Temporality in the form of continuity plays a big role in contributing to the management of smooth relations between the named parties. Long-term UNIFIL staff have built trusted relations over time which enables them to generate solutions and introduce them to the parties as an ‘honest broker’. Continuity also generates institutional memory and therefore PAOs understand ‘the rules’ that govern the perceptions of both parties. They have proved their impartiality and competence to both sides which has been key to enabling stand-downs at critical moments. Temporality also facilitates consistency of effort which is all important in moving forward towards a sustainable peace. PAO efforts in capacity building the LAF are starting to reap rewards but this has been the result of years of effort and is not something that can be executed as a short-term goal.

Temporality was found to affect all levels of engagement of UNIFIL officers. The constant rotation of staff is acknowledged to be a problem both on the ground and at the top (in terms of the replacement of Force Commanders). This negatively affects UNIFIL staff and civilians alike. Civilians complained that it was hard to get to know the battalions because no sooner had they arrived but they left again. The LAF, the institutional partner of UNIFIL noted that without the presence of certain long-term staff little progress would have been made. One LAF officer credited a long-term PAO with helping to prevent the outbreak of war on one occasion. Furthermore, the LAF dislike having to re-educate a new Force Commander every two years. At the local level, the long-term appointments of CAOs also enables them to see shifts in the local environment (such as the effect the refugees are having) and build lasting relationships based on trust and genuine liking. This was most noticeable among respondents who were pro-Hizbullah. Even when they disagreed in principle with the UNIFIL mission objectives, many civilians appeared to have a deep liking for the UNIFIL CAO they engaged with.

Autonomy, the second key factor was found to play the strongest role at the local level although it facilitated the agency of actors at all levels of engagement to some degree. The autonomy of CAOs enables them to be creative and spontaneous in their approach to their work which in turn makes them highly responsive to the needs of the local population. CAOs demonstrated the ability and willingness to go above and beyond their mandates to use their local contacts in order to assist anyone who asked for their help. This has also won hearts and minds across the area of operations because locals can see that the CAOs are authentic – they are going out of their way to assist and not just throwing money at a problem. At the international level, autonomy is provided by the fact that the UNIFIL mission is out of the international spotlight. This means staff are generally left alone by the international community and not micro-managed. This naturally facilitates quick decision-making (spontaneity) and creativity in seeking solutions to problems. A good example of this at the national level is the way in which PAOs seek funding for the LAF across the whole of Lebanon to enable them to receive the maximum amount of resources without triggering Israeli security concerns.

Local knowledge has a strong impact on UNIFIL officers' ability to influence their security environment. At the international level of engagement, as noted above, PAOs know the 'rules of the game' and this enables them to take short cuts when making decisions under pressure. By this I mean PAOs understand the concerns of both parties and know how to find a way through – the 'gap' as one respondent termed it – through which they can pass to avert military confrontation. At the national level, local knowledge is demonstrated by CAOs when they work with the municipalities. The CAOs understand the concerns of the people on the ground and the constraints faced by members of local government – the political context in which they operate. As such they ensure that they deal with all parties equally and do not allow international concerns about who are the 'right' parties to deal with to interfere with operations on the ground. This encourages communication between UNIFIL with villages that may be predisposed to think negatively of the mission and therefore facilitates a more secure environment for the troops. At the level of local engagement, CAOs train peacekeeping troops in local etiquette to reduce the risk of offending local sensibilities. In addition they use their extensive networks of local contacts to meet local needs – whether it is obtaining a scholarship for a young Sunni student or helping a deputy mayor manage a refugee influx. These small endeavours build up over time into social capital for UNIFIL. This eye for detail is often borne of local knowledge.

Constraints

This thesis also revealed that the main constraints faced by UNIFIL currently are the local-international legitimacy gap in the mandate, local agency and the lack of international and national support for peacebuilding projects and the Middle East peace process.

Legitimacy

The lack of international will to resolve the dispute between Lebanon and Israel comes through most strongly on the issue of the legitimacy of Resolution 1701. This research highlighted the gap between the international legitimacy of the mandate and its local legitimacy. Resolution 1701

is accepted by the international community as being a just solution to the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah. This view is not shared by the local population, who view it as not having taken account of the conditions under which the conflict began and is therefore biased towards Israel. This affects the international engagement of senior UNIFIL staff who are frustrated by the Catch-22-like situation of the LAF being prevented from obtaining serious weaponry by the Israel lobby whilst at the same time, being asked to securitise the border regions and eradicate Hizbullah. The issue of legitimacy affects UNIFIL peacekeeping troops on a daily basis at the local level of engagement. It provides the justification for locals who wish to attack patrols (usually to steal) and it makes traversing through some areas unsafe as a result of local hostility to the mission on account of the mandate. It also means UNIFIL are prevented ultimately from conducting the full range of activities specified in the mandate owing to the lack of local cooperation.

Another way this issue is demonstrated is in the way that the local population talk about UNIFIL's use of force. As noted above, the local population regard security as important and often demanded more security, not less of UNIFIL peacekeepers. However, *how* the local population wanted UNIFIL to use force was the opposite of the mandate guidelines. Locals became particularly frustrated that UNIFIL were not willing to fight back during the incident at Al-Addaish. Locals see themselves as impotent against Israeli aggression and believe that UNIFIL should exist to protect them from it. Of course, according to their mandate, UNIFIL are unable to use force against either of the named parties to the conflict. Conversely the majority of the population do not want to see UNIFIL use force against Hizbullah to drive them from the area of operations even though, to the extent of conducting weapons searches and preventing any activity from armed elements, this is actually part of UNIFIL's mandate.

Whalan's categories of procedural and substantive legitimacy are helpful for disaggregating different types of legitimacy within a peace operation.⁴ But what this thesis shows is that the different types of legitimacy that Whalan outlines: international/local, substantive, and procedural co-exist, and are related to each other in ways that Whalan's discrete categories cannot explain. Whalan's point about source legitimacy can also be questioned. The findings of this thesis are that when the 2006 UNIFIL II mission arrived in a show of force, the local population found this off-putting rather than reassuring despite the fact the area was just coming out of another war. The findings of other authors also refer to local discomfort with sudden shows of force, which civilians soon learn does not mean the soldiers will use it to protect them.⁵ As such, the concept of source legitimacy is debateable and possibly epiphenomenal to Whalan's choice of case studies rather than peace operations more broadly.

Local Agency

Local agency acts to constrain UNIFIL physically, but also by subverting the goals of peacekeepers. This research discovered that there is a dual dynamic in the relationship between local civilians and international interveners: both parties have agency. Currently there has been a focus in the peacebuilding literature on the importance of local engagement. I argue the importance of engaging with local actors on the ground is crucial, but it must be regulated somehow. Local actors are adept at pursuing their own goals and objectives in the relationship and this should be acknowledged more realistically in the literature on peace operations. Corruption and duplication need to be avoided, and therefore UN funded projects require mutual input from both local actors and those acting on behalf of international organisations. As noted by Barnett and Zurcher (2009), local elites can subvert the goals of the peacebuilding

⁴ Whalan identifies three forms of legitimacy: source, substantive and procedural. The latter two forms essentially differentiate between the goods and services offered by a peacekeeping mission, and the manner in which mission staff carry out their mandate. The first form, source legitimacy, is slightly more complex and relates to the mission's claim to authority and credibility on its arrival in the host state; meaning how an initial show of security and aid can improve public perceptions of the good intentions of the peace operation.

⁵ Pouligny, *Peace Operations From Below: UN Missions and Local People*; Autessere, *The Trouble with the Congo. Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*.

project to their own interests.⁶ This research identified that this dynamic operates at the level of local government and citizens who will happily pursue their own interests using international resources but allow the structures that created the conflict in the first place to remain in place. This dynamic was particularly noticeable in the relationship between CIMIC and the local population. The quality of the relationship between CIMIC and the local population was found to be very instrumental owing to the short time frames of projects coupled with frequent rotations. Locals viewed the battalions as cash cows, as opposed to forces for change, which I attribute to the short-term postings of CIMIC officers. CIMIC did demonstrate institutional learning in terms of avoiding duplication and corruption, but my research found that soldiers regard the post of CIMIC Officer as more of an opportunity to obtain public relations and media experience more than it is to get to know the local population. The local population appear to understand this and as a result respond differently to CIMIC compared to CAOs. In other words, they are not deceived by financial reward; the personal motivation of the officer is an important variable.

UNIFIL are physically constrained by local agency in that they need to balance pursuing the mandate and keeping the local population happy in order to retain consent. UNIFIL's moral authority, that Rubinstein (2008) discusses,⁷ is reasonably high because they do not use force against the local population. It does mean however that when local civilians attack their vehicles and steal equipment, peacekeepers stand back rather than defend.

National and International Support

At the national level, this research has revealed that top-down input is key to success in institution building. This was demonstrated clearly in Chapter Four, which described UNIFIL's efforts in building up the capacity of the LAF, and local support and trust in municipal government. Both institutions require the financial support of national government on a

⁶ Barnett, Michael N., and Christoph Zurcher, 'The Peacebuilders Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood', in Roland Paris and Tomothy D. Sisk, *Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (London: Routledge, 2009).

⁷ Rubinstein, *Peacekeeping Under Fire: Culture and Intervention*.

sustained basis if they are to convince the local population that they are superior to other non-state actors in the area - Hezbollah and UNIFIL. Currently both UNIFIL (economically) and Hezbollah (security-wise) supplant government institutions in Lebanon. In the case of the LAF, the international community can play an important role in ensuring that the LAF receives the necessary funding, training and support so that it can evolve into an effective deterrent force that convinces the local population that there is no longer any need for sub-state militias. At the political level, the international community needs to convince politicians in Israel that building LAF capacity does not present a threat to their national interests. At the national level, politicians need to work hard to ensure that the LAF retains its neutral image as a force that protects all Lebanese and whose interests will not be hijacked by interested foreign parties. The issue of the effectiveness of the LAF is highly interconnected with international politics and will not be easily resolved.

The Lebanese Government has the ability to influence local perceptions of the municipal governments if it chooses to invest more money in them to enable them to take over the work of UNIFIL in rebuilding the infrastructure of the south. Municipal government, as with the LAF, does have legitimacy with the population of the south, owing to the fact that democracy as a system of government is accepted in Lebanon. But without sufficient financial support, municipalities simply cannot offer as much support to locals as UNIFIL currently does. At the national level too, there is a need for national offices to be placed down in the south to ensure that a vacuum does not emerge in the provision of government services that sub-state actors in the region would be only too happy to fill. The effectiveness of actors within the UNIFIL mission engaging at the national level is constrained by actors at the national and international levels.

Where UNIFIL Does Not Succeed

This thesis has not talked extensively about the inevitable long-term problems that accompany the UNIFIL mission: for example the problem of the mission never being completed until the

larger political problems of the Middle East peace process are resolved, and the risk of local dependence on UNIFIL resources. This is mainly because I was more interested in understanding what works in a mission than what does not. As noted in the literature review in Chapter One, there is scholarship aplenty on failed missions and therefore I was keen to understand despite, inevitable problems, how this peace mission overcomes those problems. In the UNIFIL mission, I sought to identify what particular factors have worked best for the mission's engagement at the local level - in an environment that is relatively hostile to the mandate which includes disarmament of those non-state actors who civilians see as defenders of their territory. What I found, paradoxically, is that the civilian population in the area of operations is largely supportive of UNIFIL and this view was corroborated to me formally through interviews and informally through my ethnographic experience of residing in Lebanon for a year. However, there are a number of issues that I noted in the course of my research which I felt require future focus.

The first is the issue of generating large-scale, coordinated, home grown conflict resolution programs, as described by Autesserre,⁸ which are noticeably absent from Lebanese society and certainly in the area of operations. It is possible that this is a direct result of the long-term presence of UNIFIL in the area whereby civilians have devolved themselves of the responsibility of forming their own organisations to address the sectarian issue that continue to haunt Lebanon post-civil war. If so this fits in with Chandler's arguments about the risk of dependency arising in peacebuilding missions.⁹ Or it is possible that civilians in the area are primarily concerned with physical security and inter-state conflict which takes priority over domestic issues. UNIFIL staff never alluded to the establishment of local organisations to work alongside them in their peacebuilding efforts. Rather key individuals were used to broadcast the message of the benefits of the mission and the peacebuilding goals in general. Whilst their mandate does not specifically support the creation of such programs (being an interstate conflict mission), it can be argued that

⁸ Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo. Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*.

⁹ Chandler, David, 'The Limits of Peacebuilding: International Regulation and Civil Society Development in Bosnia,' *International Peacekeeping*, 6/1: 109-125 (1999b); ———, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (London: Pluto Press, 1999a).

working on such programs would benefit the area in the long-term. Also, according to the Civil Affairs policy directive of 2008, one of the key roles of Civil Affairs Officers is ‘confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation’.¹⁰ Chapters Three to Five provide examples of UNIFIL going beyond their mission in some circumstances, so why not on this one? This is something that UNIFIL should be criticised for bearing in mind their network of contacts and the length of time they have spent in the region.

There is no doubt that UNIFIL has been dealt a tough hand when it comes to balancing local versus international interests, perhaps even more so after the events of 2006. However, the impression I received from myriad private conversations is that attempts to clear the area of weapons are relatively benign. UNIFIL rely on national laws about private property to avoid seeking out weapons and aggravating the local population in any way. Overt attempts to fulfil their mandate may, perhaps, bring into question the factors that have explained their success in local engagement since 2006. As such, it should be acknowledged that amongst some locals and local figures outside the region, UNIFIL are regarded as ‘tourists’ and ineffectual.

Of course the biggest ‘criticism’ of UNIFIL that I came across related to their inability to prevent the outbreak of another war. But this is perhaps a critique true of many peacekeeping missions in that there has to be a peace to keep in order for a peacekeeping force to function. Should one of the parties choose to restart hostilities again there is little that UNIFIL can do to prevent this. As such, it was all the more interesting to observe the degree to which mandated parties respected the processes and efforts put in place by UNIFIL since 2006 to build trust amongst all parties and to make the mission the place that people should turn to if they wish to prevent a return to conflict.

¹⁰ United Nations, *Policy Directive: Civil Affairs*, (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008).

Future Research

Understanding what facilitates the agency of peace operations at the micro level has been what this thesis has attempted to explain. There are a number of ways this research could be developed further. The most straightforward would be to test this question, using the same interpretative approach using multiple cases studies to understand if the same local factors identified here emerge across other peace operations – and note variations between ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ footprint missions.

Understanding local agency in peace operations requires further research. The current literature on peacebuilding is theoretically divided between liberal and critical strands. The increase in theoretical literature that looks at peacekeeping missions from the top-down has been an improvement in terms of making the study of peace operations a richer theoretical endeavour and more relevant to the field of international relations. Future research that takes an ethnographic approach but examines peace operations at the local level from a critical approach would produce some interesting findings. Thus far the work of Rubinstein (2008) in the field of anthropology comes the closest to doing this.¹¹ For example, using critical approaches to understand concepts such as representation, symbols, meaning and the identity in both peacekeepers and civilians on the ground could lead to some interesting findings as to how each sees the other *and themselves* within a conflict. For example, how do civilians view their own agency within a peace operation? This could in turn lead to improvements in local relations and greater understanding of how peace operations should present themselves to the local population.

This thesis has argued that sub-national actors are able to influence their security environment and the factors of time, autonomy and local knowledge facilitate their effectiveness. However local agency on the ground has the capacity to constrain and subvert peacekeeping praxis and further research in this area needs to be conducted. For now, the area of Lebanon south of the Litani remains at peace, eight years after the implementation of Resolution 1701. This thesis

¹¹ Rubinstein, *Peacekeeping Under Fire: Culture and Intervention*

acknowledges the important role key regional actors play in the maintenance of peace: should any party choose to recommence hostilities, there is little UNIFIL can do. But thus far a resumption of war based on the escalation of a security incident has not occurred. This has been achieved in large part by the actions of a small group of highly committed staff who operate at the subnational level – walking the line between their responsibilities under the international mandate and their need to gain the trust and respect of the local population.

United Nations

S/RES/1701 (2006)



Security Council

Distr.: General
11 August 2006

Resolution 1701 (2006)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on
11 August 2006**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time *emphasizing* the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and *encouraging* the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, *welcoming also* its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and *bearing in mind* its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,

Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area,

Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of

06-46503 (E)



additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties,

Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Calls for* a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, *calls upon* the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and *calls upon* the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

5. *Also reiterates* its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

6. *Calls on* the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and *calls on* it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

7. *Affirms* that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and *calls on* all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

8. *Calls for* Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any

armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;

- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;
- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

9. *Invites* the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and *expresses* its intention to be actively involved;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;

11. *Decides*, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

- (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- (b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;
- (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
- (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;
- (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, *authorizes* UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations

is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, *urges* Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and *expresses* its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

14. *Calls upon* the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and *requests* UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

15. *Decides* further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft:

(a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and

(b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above;

except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11;

16. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and *expresses its intention* to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

18. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

19. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Appendix B: The Taif Agreement

The Taif Agreement

This agreement, which ended the civil war in Lebanon, was negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, in September 1989 and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989.

First, General Principles and Reforms:

I. General Principles

- A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens.
- B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception.
- C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or preference.
- D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovereign and they shall exercise their sovereignty through the constitutional institutions.
- E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.
- F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state's unity and of the system's stability.
- G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, and social reform.
- H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon].
- I. No authority violating the common co-existence charter shall be legitimate

II. Political Reforms

A. Chamber of Deputies:

The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full control over government policy and activities.

1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the chamber's term.
2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the chamber may vote only once to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in accordance with a petition submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall convene immediately to fill the vacant post.

3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is included in the agenda of a public session and read in such a session, and unless the grace period stipulated by the constitution passes without a resolution on such a bill with the approval of the cabinet.
4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.
5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases:
 - a. Equally between Christians and Muslims.
 - b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.
 - c. Proportionately between the districts.
6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the basis of this document and the districts whose seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis through appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be formed.
7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues.

B. President of Republic:

The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of the country's unity. He shall contribute to enhancing the constitution and to preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces which are subject to the power of the cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.
2. Head the Supreme Defense Council.
3. Issue decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of deposition of the resolution with the presidential office. Should the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution, or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning the decree, the decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published.
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the constitution and demand their publication upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. After notifying the cabinet, the president may also request reexamination of the laws within the grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of the constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned before the end of the grace periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be published.
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which the president shall officially familiarize the speaker on.
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet.
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and decrees relieving them from their duties.

10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state medals by decree.
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing of international treaties which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. The cabinet shall familiarize the Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the country's interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As for treaties involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which may not be abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber of Deputies' approval.
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies.
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to hold special sessions by decree.
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent issue beyond the agenda.
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session whenever he deems it necessary.
16. Grant special pardon by decree.
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates the constitution or commits high treason.

C. Prime Minister:

The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it and speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by the cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet.
2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the president the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 days [of its formation]. The cabinet may not exercise its powers before gaining the confidence, after its resignation, or when it is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of affairs.
3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees accepting cabinet resignation or considering it retired.
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting the reexamination of laws.
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the republic in advance with the issues included in the agenda and with the urgent issues to be discussed, and sign the usual session minutes.
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions; coordinate between the ministers, and issue general instructions to ensure the smooth progress of work.
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the minister concerned.
9. By law, act as the Supreme Defense Council's deputy chairman.

D. Cabinet:

The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

The following are among the powers exercised by it:

- 1- Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills and decrees, and takes the necessary decisions for its implementation.
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the activities of all the state agencies without exception, including the civilian, military, and security departments and institutions.
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance with the law.
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president of the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special session lasting no less than one month, even though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the government. This right may not be exercised again for the same reasons which called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance.
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent. If impossible, then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the members present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the cabinet members. The following shall be considered major issues: The state of emergency and its abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.

E. Minister:

The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the government's general policy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister shall not be relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from him individually

F. Cabinet Resignation:

Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:

1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases:
 - a. If its chairman resigns.
 - b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree forming it.
 - c. If its chairman dies.
 - d. At the beginning of a president's term.
 - e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term.
 - f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote of confidence.
2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and the prime minister, with cabinet approval.

3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, by law, be considered to be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is formed. A vote-of-confidence session shall follow.

G. Abolition of Political Sectarianism:

Abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective.

To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies election the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables. The council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim period:

- a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.
- b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.

III. Other Reforms

A. Administrative Decentralism:

1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority.
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all state administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and institutions.
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the smaller administrative units [district and smaller units] through the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation.
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.

B. Courts:

[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common coexistence and the basic rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the constitution on the other hand:

1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to try presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before this council shall be promulgated.
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections.
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the constitutionality of the laws:
 - a. The president of the republic.
 - b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker.
 - c. The prime minister.
 - d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies.

[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to:

1. Personal status affairs.
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites.
3. Freedom of religious education.

[3]. To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the Higher Judiciary Council shall be elected by the judiciary body.

D. Parliamentary Election Law:

Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common coexistence between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and efficient political representation of all the people's factions and generations. This shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context of unity of the people, the land, and the institutions.

E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development:

A socioeconomic council shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting the state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.

F. Education:

1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary stage at least.
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws and regulations.
3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and textbooks shall be strengthened.
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, and developed in a manner that meets the country's development and reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges.

5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education.

G. Information:

All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war.

Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories:

Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be as follows:

A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning with the approval of the national accord charter. The president of the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political reforms shall be approved constitutionally.

B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:

1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, beginning the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in the governorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic training courses.
2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and departure of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea.

C. Strengthening the armed forces:

1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own.
2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet.
3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression.
4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the armed forces shall return to their barracks.
5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military objectives exclusively.

D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established. Legislation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding

Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments -- the Syrian Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government -- shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define these forces' relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist. The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop this agreement.

Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation:

Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-recognized Lebanese borders requires the following:

A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation.

B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.

C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to

Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.

Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations:

Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.

Appendix C: Key Political Parties and Movements in Lebanon

| Name of Party | Meaning | Main base of support | Leadership |
|-----------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| Hizbullah/Hezbollah | Party of God (lit.) | Shi'ite | Hassan Nasrallah |
| Harakat Amal | Hope Movement (lit.) The other main Shi'ite party in Lebanon. | Shi'ite | Nabih Berri |
| al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniyya | Kataeb Party Previously known as the Phalange. | Maronite Christian | Sami Gemayal |
| al-Tayyar al-Watani al-Hurr | Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) | Christian | Michel Aoun |
| al-Hizb at-Taqaddumi al-Ishtiraki | Progressive Socialist Party The main Druze political party in Lebanon | Druze (largest Druze faction) | Walid Jumblatt |
| al-Quwat al-Lubnaniyya | Lebanese Forces | Maronite Christian | Samir Geagea |
| Tayyar al-Mustaqbal | Future Movement | Sunni Muslim | Michel Aoun |
| March 8 th Movement | | Shi'ite Muslim, Christian, Druze | Hizballah |
| March 14 th Movement | | Sunni Muslim, Christian, Druze | Future Movement |

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