'THE PLEASURES OF MERELY CIRCULATING1 

— THE INTERPETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CLIFFORD GEERTZ 

AND THE 'POSTMODERN1 ANTHROPOLOGY OF JAMES CLIFFORD: 

A DECONSTRUCTIVE READING 

By 

K. JOANNE RICHARDSON 

B.A. ( E n g l i s h ) , The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1971 
M.A. (Anthropology), The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i s t i s h Columbia, 1982 

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF 

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 

i n 

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 

(Department of Anthropology and S o c i o l o g y ) 

t 

We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming 

to the r e q u i r e d standard 

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 

August 1989 

© K. Joanne Richardson, 1989 



In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced 

degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it 

freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive 

copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my 

department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or 

publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 

permission. 

Department of ftuTHUGPoUhy fiuO ioCXOLoCy 

The University of British Columbia 
Vancouver, Canada 

Date Au& 

DE-6 (2/88) 



ABSTRACT 

In t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n I attempt to e x p l i c a t e Jacques 

D e r r i d a ' s s t r a t e g y of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n and, through a 

d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g of C l i f f o r d Geertz's i n t e r p r e t i v e 

anthropology and James C l i f f o r d ' s 'postmodern' anthropology 

r e s p e c t i v e l y , to show i t s relevance to the d i s c i p l i n e of 

anthropology i n g e n e r a l . The f o l l o w i n g i s a s k e l e t a l o u t l i n e 

of how I s e t about t h i s endeavour. 

In my I n t r o d u c t o r y chapter, I attempt to i n d i c a t e the way 

i n which the n o t i o n of logos or presence has dominated Western 

p h i l o s o p h y from i t s i n c e p t i o n i n a n c i e n t Greece up to and 

i n c l u d i n g the present day. As D e r r l d a u t i l i z e s i t , the term 

•presence' has to do with the assumption of and d e s i r e f o r the 

e x i s t e n c e of a s e l f - c e r t a i n and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l b a s i s f o r a l l 

extant phenomena and i s manifested i n such n o t i o n s as t r u t h , 

meaning, God, s e l f , concept and so on. Because i t i s always 

d e f i n e d as s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l , wherever i t 

operates, presence e n t a i l s the s u p p r e s s i o n of d i f f e r e n c e and 

otherness. In Chapter Two, I o f f e r an e x p l i c a t i o n of 

D e r r i d a ' s s t r a t e g y f o r exposing and d e l i m i t i n g presence as i t 

manifests i t s e l f through and throughout Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y , 

paying p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to h i s work on u n d e c i d a b i l i t y . 

B r i e f l y , t h i s has to do with arguing t h a t concepts, as such, 

are always a l r e a d y o r i g i n a r l l y doubled and hence, A r i s t o t e l i a n 



l o g i c notwithstanding, are both p o s s i b l e (as e f f e c t s of 

u n d e c i d a b l l i t y ) and Impossible (as s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and s e l f -

i d e n t i c a l i d e a s ) . T h i s c a l l s r a d i c a l l y i n t o q u e s t i o n our 

assumptions about the nature of c o n c e p t u a l i t y and i n d i c a t e s 

the way i n which these assumptions ensure the r e p r e s s i o n of 

d i f f e r e n c e and otherness. In Chapter Three, I look a t the 

phenomenological (Husserl) and hermeneutic (esp. Heidegger, 

Gadamer, Ricoeur) background of contemporary i n t e r p r e t i v e and 

•postmodern' anthropology and, i n so doing, attempt to show 

t h a t i t i s premised upon an assumption of presence. In 

Chapter Four, I o f f e r a d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g of c e r t a i n 

works by C l i f f o r d Geertz and by James C l i f f o r d r e s p e c t i v e l y , 

and attempt to show t h a t t h e i r unrecognized d e d i c a t i o n to an 

assumed n o t i o n of presence prevents them from s e e i n g the 

r e p r e s s i v e / o p p r e s s i v e nature of t h e i r chosen c o n c e p t u a l i t y . 

And, f i n a l l y , i n my c o n c l u d i n g chapter, I argue t h a t G e e r t z i a n 

i n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology and C l i f f o r d i a n 'postmodern' 

anthropology are two s i d e s of the same o l d c o i n and t h a t , with 

r e s p e c t to the l a t t e r ' s work, the term 'postmodern' i s a 

misnomer. I f u r t h e r argue t h a t Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y i s , by 

d e f i n i t i o n and i n p r i n c i p l e , both r e p r e s s i v e and oppressive 

and t h a t , t h i s being the case, anthropology must e i t h e r r e -

examine and r e - e v a l u a t e i t s most b a s i c assumptions or, f a i l i n g 

t h a t , r e s i g n i t s e l f to p e r p e t u a t i n g the i n h e r i t e d l e g a c y of 

a r u t h l e s s metaphysics. 

i i i 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

A b s t r a c t i i 

Acknowledgements i v 

I. I n t r o d u c t o r y Comments: P h i l o s o p h i c a l Background 

and Statement o£ Ijp&sf}t 1 

I I . An E x p l i c a t i o n of Derridean D e c o n s t r u c t i o n 22 

I I I . P h i l o s o p h i c a l Background of I n t e r p r e t i v e 

and •Postmodern' Anthropology: Phenomenology 

and Hermeneutics 1 60 

IV. C l i f f o r d Geertz and James C l i f f o r d : 

A D e c o n s t r u c t i v e Reading 106 

V. Concluding Assessments 165 

B i b l i o g r a p h y 188 

i v 



Ah the o l d q u e s t i o n s , the o l d answers, 
t h e r e ' s nothing l i k e them! 

(Samuel Beckett, Endgame) 

. . . t h a t t h i n g s go round and a g a i n go round 
Has r a t h e r a c l a s s i c a l sound. 

(Wallace Stevens, 
"The P l e a s u r e s o£ Merely C i r c u l a t i n g " ) 

What c o n n e c t i o n i s t h e r e 
b e t w e e n t h e s a r t o r i a l 
splendours of the educated man 
and the photograph of r u i n e d 
houses and dead bodies? 

( V i r g i n i a Woolf, Three Guineas) 

Daddy, daddy, you b a s t a r d , I'm through. 
( S y l v i a P l a t h , "Daddy") 

v 



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

I would l i k e to thank my a d v i s o r , Dr. E l v i Whittaker, and 
my committee members, Dr. Kenelm Burridge and Dr. Marie-
F r a n c o i s e Guidon, f o r r e a d i n g and commenting on t h i s 
d i s s e r t a t i o n . 

I would l i k e to thank Dianne T l e f e n s e e f o r her love and 
support and f o r g u i d i n g me through the treacherous world of 
computer technology. 

I would l i k e to thank my many f r i e n d s f o r t h e i r a f f e c t i o n 
and camaraderie. 

I would l i k e to thank my parents, Jean and Fred 
Richardson, f o r t h e i r constant love and d e v o t i o n . 

v i 



Chapter One 

I n t r o d u c t o r y Comments: P h i l o s o p h i c a l Background and 

Statement of I j a ^ a t 

1) P h i l o s o p h i c a l Background 

In h i s h i s t o r i c a l l e x i c o n of Greek p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms 

F.E. P e t e r s o f f e r s the f o l l o w i n g e n t r y concerning Logos: 

lOgos: speech, account, reason, 
d e f i n i t i o n , r a t i o n a l f a c u l t y , p r o p o r t i o n . 

1. . . . [For] H e r a c l i t u s logos i s 
ah u n d e r l y i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e of 
the u n i v e r s e . . . . And t h i s harmony, 
which i s r e a l l y a t e n s i o n of o p p o s i t e s , 
i s not to be understood i n the sense of 
a c y c l i c r e t u r n , but as a s t a b l e s t a t e 
( f r s . 10, 51). 1 T h i s logos p r i n c i p l e , 

1 I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a c c o r d i n g to K i r k , Raven and S c h o f i e l d , 
the common n o t i o n t h a t H e r a c l i t u s was predominantly, i f not 
e n t i r e l y , concerned with f l u x and change as opposed to 
s t a b i l i t y and order has to do with h i s having been misread by 
P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e : 

As f o r P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e , there i s l i t t l e 
verbatim q u o t a t i o n of H e r a c l i t u s i n e i t h e r , nor were 
they r e a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the a c c u r a t e o b j e c t i v e 
assessment of e a r l y p r e d e c e s s o r s . P l a t o 
o c c a s i o n a l l y mentions him, mainly i n a humorous or 
i r o n i c a l way and with emphasis on a view f r e e l y 
a t t r i b u t e d to him i n the d i a l o g u e s , t h a t ' a l l t h i n g s 
are i n f l u x ' . . . . According to A r i s t o t l e a t Met. 
A6, 987a32, P l a t o was i n f l u e n c e d i n youth by the 
emphasis l a i d by C r a t y l u s on t h i s k i n d of view. But 
a l l P r e s o c r a t i c t h i n k e r s were s t r u c k by the 
dominance of change i n the world of our experience. 
H e r a c l i t u s was o b v i o u s l y no e x c e p t i o n , indeed he 
probably expressed the u n i v e r s a l i t y of change more 
c l e a r l y and more d r a m a t i c a l l y than h i s predecessors; 
but f o r him i t was the complementary idea of the 
measure i n h e r i n g i n change, the s t a b i l i t y t h a t 
p e r s i s t s through i t and c o n t r o l s i t , t h a t was of 
v i t a l importance. P l a t o may have been g e n u i n e l y 
m i s l e d , e s p e c i a l l y by f i f t h - c e n t u r y s o p h i s t i c 



2 

though i t i s hidden and p e r c e p t i b l e o n l y 
to the i n t e l l i g e n c e ( f r s . 54, 114. . . ), 
i s s t i l l m a t e r i a l , as can be seen from 
the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the H e r a c l i t a n 
logos with cosmic f i r e . . . . 

2. P l a t o . . . used the term logos 
i n a v a r i e t y of ways, i n c l u d i n g the 
o p p o s i t i o n between mythos and logos . . 
. , where the l a t t e r s i g n i f i e s a t r u e , 
a n a l y t i c a l account. T h i s i s common 
usage, but i t leads o f f i n t o an 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l theory. In Phaedo 766 
P l a t o marks as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t r u e 
knowledge (eplsteme) the a b i l i t y to g i v e 
an account (logos) of what one knows. In 
Theat. 201c-d t h i s aspect of logos i s 
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the d e f i n i t i o n of 
eplsteme: t r u e o p i n i o n (doxa) accompanied 
by an account. Socrates d i s c u s s e s what 
logos would mean i n t h i s context ( i b i d . 
206c-2106), and from h i s a n a l y s i s emerges 
a d e s c r i p t i o n of logos as the statement 
of a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a 
t h i n g ( i b i d . 2086). The v a l i d i t y of t h i s 
i s denied on the ground of i t s being of 
no value i n the case of s e n s i b l e , 
i n d i v i d u a l beings (compare A r i s t o t l e , 
Meta. 1039b). 

3. But when t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of logos 
i s moved higher up the P l a t o n i c s c a l e of 
being i t o b v i o u s l y does have a r o l e to 
p l a y ; i n Rep. 534b P l a t o d e s c r i b e s the 

exaggerations, i n h i s d i s t o r t i o n of H e r a c l i t u s ' 
emphasis here; and A r i s t o t l e accepted the P l a t o n i c 
f l u x - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and c a r r i e d i t s t i l l f u r t h e r . 
Other r e f e r e n c e s to H e r a c l i t u s i n A r i s t o t l e a t t a c k 
him f o r denying the law of c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n h i s 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t o p p o s i t e s are 'the same.' Again t h i s 
i s a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by A r i s t o t l e , who a p p l i e d h i s 
own t i g h t l o g i c a l standards a n a c h r o n i s t i c a l l y ; by 
the 'same' H e r a c l i t u s e v i d e n t l y meant not 
' i d e n t i c a l ' so much as 'not e s s e n t i a l l y d i s t i n c t . ' 

[In any case, H e r a c l i t u s was] l e s s 
concerned with the mechanics of development and 
change than with the u n i f y i n g r e a l i t y t h a t underlay 
them. 

( K i r k , Raven and S c h o f i e l d , 1984: 185-186) 



3 

d i a l e c t i c i a n . . . as one who can give an 
account (logos) of the t r u e being (or 
essence, ousla) of something, i . e . the 
term of the process of d i v i s i o n 
( d l a l r e s i s ) d e s c r i b e d i n the S o p h i s t , the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n d e f i n i t i o n (. . . horos) 
by genera and s p e c i e s ; indeed, A r i s t o t l e 
f r e q u e n t l y uses logos as a synonym f o r 
[ d e f i n i t i o n ] . A n o t h e r t y p i c a l 
A r i s t o t e l i a n use i s logos as reason, 
r a t i o n a l i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n an e t h i c a l 
context, e.g. P o l . 1332a, E t h . Nlch. V. 
1134a, and f r e q u e n t l y In the combination 
" r i g h t reason" (orthos logos, the S t o i c 
r e c t a r a t i o ) . . . . He a l s o understands 
logos as mathematical p r o p o r t i o n , r a t i o 
(Meta, 991b), a usage probably going back 
to the Pythagoreans, even though i t i s 
u n a t t e s t e d i n t h e i r fragments. . . . 

4. The S t o i c p o i n t of departure on 
logos i s H e r a c l i t u s ' d o c t r i n e of an a l l -
p e r v a s i v e formula of o r g a n i z a t i o n , which 
the S t o i c s c o n s i d e r e d d i v i n e . 
Logos i s the a c t i v e . . . f o r c e i n the 
u n i v e r s e (D^L. V I I , 134), 8 c r e a t i v e i n 
the f a s h i o n of sperm (SVF I, 87;a D.L. 
V I I , 135; see l o g o ! s p e r m a t l k o l 4 ) . As i n 

a Diogenes L a e r t i u s , L i v e s of the Eminent P h i l o s o p h e r s , 
ed. and t r a n s . R.D. H i c k s , Loeb C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y , London, 
1925. 

3 J . von Arnim, Stolcorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 v o l s . , 
L e i p z i g , 1903-1924. 

4 According to P e t e r s : 
The S t o i c l o g o ! s p e r m a t l k o l , which are designed 

to e x p l a i n both p l u r a l i t y and t e l e o l o g y i n a 
m o n i s t i c system, appear to be p a t t e r n e d a f t e r the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n e i d o s . . . i n i t s r o l e as p h y s l s 
[ n a t u r e ] . The logos c o n s i d e r e d as a u n i f i e d e n t i t y 
c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t s e l f , on the analogy of animal 
sperm, the growth powers of exemplars of a l l the 
i n d i v i d u a l s (SVF I I , 1027; D^L. V I I , 135). These 
i n d i v i d u a l l o g o ! are imperishable (SVF I I , 717), 
i . e . they s u r v i v e the c y c l i c a l c o n f l a g r a t i o n 
( e k p y r o s l s ) t h a t consumes the kosmos and are the 
s e e d l i n g s of the next kosmos ( I b i d . I, 497). 
Despite t h e i r paradigmatic c h a r a c t e r they are more 



4 

H e r a c l i t u s i t i s m a t e r i a l and i d e n t i f i e d 
with f i r e . . . . I t i s a l s o i d e n t i c a l 
with nature (physls . . .) and Zeus (see 
Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus; SVF I, 534). 
T h i s p e r v a s i v e presence i n the u n i v e r s e 
develops i n s e v e r a l d i r e c t i o n s : s i n c e i t 
i s a u n i t y i t grounds the theory of 
cosmic sympathy . . . and of n a t u r a l law 
and the e t h i c a l imperative "to l i v e 
a c c o r d i n g to nature". . . . S t o i c 
l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y f u r t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
i n t e r i o r logos (=thought) and e x t e r i o r 
logos (=speech) (SVF I I , 135; Sextus 
Emplricus, Adv. Math. V I I I , 275" . . . ) , 
a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t c l e a r l y i n f l u e n c e d 
P h i l o ' s n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t v i s i o n of 
l o g o s . 

5. P h i l o knew the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between i n t e r i o r and e x t e r i o r logos and 
c o u l d a p p l y i t i n an orthodox S t o i c 
f a s h i o n (De V i t a Mos. I I , 137 s ), and i t 
was perhaps t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , together 
with the Jewish s c r i p t u r a l t r a d i t i o n 
about the "Word of God," t h a t l e d to h i s 
new treatment of l o g o s . In the f i r s t 
i n s t a n c e logos i s the D i v i n e Reason t h a t 
embraces the a r c h e t y p a l complex of elde 
t h a t w i l l serve as the models of 
c r e a t i o n . . . . Next, t h i s logos t h a t i s 
God's mind i s e x t e r n a l i z e d i n the form of 
the kosmos noetos . . ., the u n i v e r s e 

A r i s t o t e l i a n than P l a t o n i c i n t h a t they are immanent 
i n matter ( i b i d . I I , 1074). They a l s o p l a y a major 
r o l e i n P l o t i n u s : they r e s i d e i n the psyche (Enn. 
I I , 3,14; IV, 3,10) where they are the cause of i t s 
movement ( i b i d . IV, 3,15), the l o g o l c o n t a i n a l l the 
d e t a i l s of the being ( i b i d . I l l , 2,1) and are the 
reasons why i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r ( i b i d . IV, 4,12); 
unextended themselves, they are i n d i v i d u a l i z e d o n l y 
by the matter i n which they Inhere ( i b i d . IV, 9,5). 

( P e t e r s , 1967: 110) 

5 Sextus E m p i r i c u s , Adversus Mathematicos, 3 v o l s . , ed. 
and t r a n s . R.G. Bury,Loeb C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y , London. 1935-
1953. 

6 P h i l o , Works, ed. and t r a n s . F.H. Colson e t a l . , 10 
v o l s . , Loeb C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y , London, 1929 to date. 



a p p r e h e n s i b l e o n l y to the i n t e l l i g e n c e 
( i b i d . 7,29). I t i s transcendent . . . 
and i t i s God, although not the God . . 
., but r a t h e r the " e l d e r son of God". . 
. . With the c r e a t i o n of the v i s i b l e 
world (kosmos a l s t h e t o s ) the logos begins 
to p l a y an immanent r o l e as the " s e a l " of 
c r e a t i o n (De fuga 2,12), the S t o i c "bond 
of the u n i v e r s e " . . . and helmarmene 
t f a t e ] . P h i l o d i f f e r s from the S t o i c s i n 
denying t h a t t h i s immanent logos i s God 
(De mlgre. Abr. 32, 179-181); f o r the 
p r o v i d e n t i a l r o l e of F h i l o ' s logos, see 
p r o n o l a . 7 P h i l o g i v e s h i s logos a 

7 According to P e t e r s , pronola means 'forethought' 
providence': 

1. The e a r l i e r h i s t o r y of the concept of 
providence i s to be seen i n the 
emergence, from Diogenes to A r i s t o t l e , of 
a n o t i o n of an i n t e l l i g e n t purpose ( t e l o s 
. . .) o p e r a t i n g i n the u n i v e r s e . In a l l 
of these t h i n k e r s i t i s c l e a r l y 
a s s o c i a t e d with the i n t e l l i g e n t God whose 
f e a t u r e s begin to appear i n the l a t e r 
P l a t o (see Laws 899 where the d e n i a l of 
pronola i s reckoned blasphemy) and i n 
A r i s t o t l e . For the S t o i c s the immanent 
Logos governs a l l by nous and pronola 
(D.L. V I I , 138; SVF I, 176). I t i s given 
a new t u r n i n the d i r e c t i o n of 
anthropocentrism by Chrysippus 
where the r e s t of the kosmos i s s u b j e c t e d 
to the good of man. S t o i c p r o n o l a , 
i d e n t i f i e d as i t was with p h y s i s , was 
e s s e n t i a l l y immanent. 2. L a t e r 
Platonism, l i k e the newly appeared 
S e m i t i c t r a d i t i o n , was transcendent and 
b e l i e v e d i n a s e r i e s of intermediate 
d e i t i e s . . ., with the r e s u l t t h a t 
p r o n o l a began to be d i s t r i b u t e d through 
the e n t i r e range of d e i t i e s ( P l u t a r c h , De  
f a c t o 572f-273b; A p u l e i u s , De Platone I, 
12). As the supreme p r i n c i p l e grows more 
remote, i t s d i r e c t involvement i n p r o n o l a 
becomes markedly l e s s . So i n P h i l o , De  
fuga 101, the Logos e x e r c i s e s providence 
through the immanent dynamels, j u s t as i n 
P l o t i n u s (Enn. IV, 8,2) the World Soul 
has a g e n e r a l providence and the 
i n d i v i d u a l s o u l s a p a r t i c u l a r providence 



6 

d i s t i n c t r o l e i n c r e a t i o n : i t i s the 
i n s t r u m e n t a l cause (De_ cher. 35, 126-
127); i t i s a l s o an a r c h e t y p a l l i g h t . . 
., t h i s l a t t e r image reappearing i n 
P l o t i n u s , Enn. I l l , 2,16.8 But there i s 
a d i f f e r e n c e between the two t h i n k e r s ; 
what was i n P h i l o both logos and nous 
[ i n t e l l i g e n c e , i n t e l l e c t , mind] i s 
d i v i d e d i n P l o t i n u s who uses the l o g o l 
concept i n a f a s h i o n a k i n to the s t o i c 
l o g o i s p e r m a t i k o i . . . . 

( P e t e r s , 1967: 110-112) 

From the f o r e g o i n g extended q u o t a t i o n i t may be seen t h a t 

throughout a n c i e n t Greek p h i l o s o p h y , up to and i n c l u d i n g the 

f i r s t i n t i m a t i o n s of C h r i s t i a n i t y , the concept of logos i s 

always, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , a s s o c i a t e d with some 

n o t i o n of the e x i s t e n c e of an a b s o l u t e — of a changeless 

e n t i t y a g a i n s t which a l l e l s e may be measured. However, i t 

i s the P r e s o c r a t i c n o t i o n of logos as 'the u n d e r l y i n g 

o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e of the u n i v e r s e ' , a p r i n c i p l e which, 

i n v a r i o u s forms, p e r s i s t s through to the present day, t h a t 

i n s p i r e d Jacques D e r r i d a to c o i n the term 'logocentrism.' 

Logocentrism r e f e r s to Western p h i l o s o p h y ' s assumption of 

f o r the bodies they i n h a b i t ; the One, of 
course, i s beyond providence. 
I m p l i c i t i n t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between 
g e n e r a l and p a r t i c u l a r providence, i . e . , 
between command and e x e c u t i o n , i s the 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the necessary 
transcendence of God and the necessary 
immanence of p r o v i d e n t i a l a c t i v i t y . . . 

( P e t e r s , 1967: p. 164) 
0 P l o t i n u s , Enneads, 6 v o l s . , ed. E. B r e h i e r , P a r i s , 

1924-1938; t r a n s . S. MacKenna, 2nd ed., London, 1956. 



7 

presence, t h a t i s , i t s assumption of an essence, an a b s o l u t e , 

a p l e n i t u d e , e t c . which, i n the process of grounding and 

a c c o u n t i n g f o r a l l extant phenomena, subsumes d i f f e r e n c e 

w i t h i n i d e n t i t y and/or the other w i t h i n the s e l f . 

Thus, f o r example, P l a t o n i c and A r i s t o t e l i a n n o t i o n s of 

eidos (idea) presuppose a d i v i s i o n between what i s a b s o l u t e 

and what i s t r a n s i e n t . For P l a t o the changing world of 

mortal e x i s t e n t s i s a r e f l e c t i o n of the unchanging realm of 

the eide or i d e a s . As P e t e r s expresses i t , 

The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i s i b l e , 
e t e r n a l eide and t r a n s i e n t , s e n s i b l e 
phenomena ( a l s t h e t a ) i s d e s c r i b e d i n a 
number of d i f f e r e n t ways. The eide are 
the cause . . . of the a i s t h e t a (Phaedo 
l O O b - l O l c ) , and the l a t t e r are s a i d t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e . . . i n the eide.. In an 
e l a b o r a t e metaphor, p e r v a s i v e i n P l a t o , 
the a l s t h e t o n i s s a i d to be a copy (eikon 
. . .) of the e t e r n a l model (paradelgma), 
the e i d o s . T h i s a c t of a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n 
(mimesis . . .) i s the work of a supreme 
craftsman (demiourgos . . . ) . 

. . . . [Where] i s one to 
l o c a t e the eide? Here analogy comes i n t o 
p l a y . J u s t as the a l s t h e t a are c o n t a i n e d 
i n some s o r t of o r g a n i c u n i t y t h a t i s the 
kosmos, so the eide e x i s t i n some 
" i n t e l l i g i b l e p l a c e " (topos noetos. Rep. 
508c, 517b . . . ) l o c a t e d "beyond the 
heavens" (Phaedrus 247c). 

( P e t e r s , 1967: 48) 

Thus P l a t o p o s i t s a transcendent realm capable of grounding 

and a c c o u n t i n g f o r the e a r t h l y realm. As f o r A r i s t o t l e , 



8 

The c h i e f d i f f e r e n c e between the 
P l a t o n i c and A r i s t o t e l i a n view of the 
e i d e i s t h a t f o r the l a t t e r the eidos i s 
not (except i n the cases of the f i r s t 
mover and/or movers, and t h a t of the nous 
[mind, i n t e l l e c t , i n t e l l i g e n c e ] " t h a t 
comes from o u t s i d e " . . .) a separate 
s u b s i s t e n t . . ., but a p r i n c i p l e of 
complete substances. I t i s the formal 
cause of t h i n g s (Phys. I I , 1946), a 
c o r r e l a t i v e of matter i n composite beings 
( i b i d . I, 190b), and the i n t e l l i g i b l e 
essence (ousla) of an e x i s t e n t (Meta. 
1013a . . . ) . In knowing t h i n g s we know 
t h e i r e i d o s (Meta. 1010a), i . e . , the 
a p p r o p r i a t e f a c u l t y (nous or a i s t h e s l s ) 
becomes the t h i n g i t knows by reason of 
the e i d o s of the known o b j e c t e n t e r i n g 
the s o u l (De_ an. I l l , 431b-432a). E i d o s 
i s , i n b r i e f , an a c t u a l i z a t i o n ( e n e r g e l a , 
e n t e l e c h l a . . .; De an. I I , 412a). 

( P e t e r s , 1967: 49-50) 

In other words, A r i s t o t l e takes the P l a t o n i c n o t i o n of e i d o s 

and views i t not o n l y as transcendent (e.g. f i r s t mover), but 

a l s o as immanent (e.g. 'the i n t e l l i g i b l e essence (ousla) of 

an e x i s t e n t ' ) . But the p o s i t i o n of the e i d o s as a b s o l u t e and 

unmoving remains c o n s t a n t . Given A r i s t o t l e ' s acceptance of 

e i d o s as a b s o l u t e and complete In and of i t s e l f , i t i s a 

s h o r t s t e p to h i s p o s i t i n g of the founding p r i n c i p l e of the 

l o g i c of i d e n t i t y — the p r i n c i p l e of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n : 

For the same t h i n g to h o l d good and not  
t o hold good s i m u l t a n e o u s l y of the same  
t h i n g and i n the same r e s p e c t i s  
i m p o s s i b l e . . . . T h i s , then, i s the 
f i r m e s t of a l l p r i n c i p l e s . . . . For i t 
i s impossible f o r anyone t o b e l i e v e t h a t 
the same t h i n g i s and i s not. . . . But 
i f i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r c o n t r a r i e s to 
hold good of the same t h i n g 



9 

s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . . ., and the o p i n i o n 
c o n t r a r y to an o p i n i o n i s t h a t of the 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y , then o b v i o u s l y i t i s 
impossible f o r the same person t o b e l i e v e 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t h a t the same t h i n g i s and 
i s not; f o r anyone who made t h a t e r r o r 
would be h o l d i n g c o n t r a r y o p i n i o n s 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . That i s why a l l those 
who demonstrate go back to t h i s o p i n i o n 
i n the end: i t i s , JLn the nature of  
t h i n g s , the p r i n c i p l e of a l l the other 
axioms a l s o . 

( A r i s t o t l e , 1987: 267) 
(emphasis A r i s t o t l e ' s and mine) 

T h i s p r i n c i p l e of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n and i t s concomitant l o g i c 

of i d e n t i t y , premised as they are on an assumption of eidos 

as a b s o l u t e and e s s e n t i a l , have never ceased haunting Western 

p h i l o s o p h y and/or theology.* 

The two main branches of p o s t - P l a t o n i c and p o s t -

A r i s t o t e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y are E m p i r i c i s m and R a t i o n a l i s m . 

G e n e r a l l y speaking, the seventeenth c e n t u r y and e i g h t e e n t h 

c e n t u r y e m p i r i c i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s (e.g. Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, 

Hume) h e l d t h a t knowledge d e r i v e s not from innate or a p r i o r i 

ideas but from the accumulation of concrete sensory 

9 With r e s p e c t to C h r i s t i a n theology, whether the 
emphasis i s on God as transcendent (and hence the need f o r a 
c h a i n of i n t e r m e d i a r i e s schooled i n t r a n s l a t i n g His ways to 
humanity (e.g. Roman C a t h o l i c i s m ) ) or on God as immanent (and 
hence the need o n l y f o r an 'open heart and r e c e p t i v e mind' 
(e.g. P r o t e s t a n t i s m ) ) the important p o i n t i s t h a t God i s 
i n v a r i a b l y viewed as omnipotent and omnipresent ( a l s o , 
i n t e r e s t i n g l y , as male — metaphorics n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ) . In 
other words, whatever p a r t i c u l a r aspect of the concept of God 
one chooses, f o r whatever reasons, to s t r e s s , God, as such, 
i s assumed to be a b s o l u t e , unchanging and e t e r n a l — t h a t 
which both accounts f o r and c o n t a i n s a l l known (and, by 
e x t e n s i o n , unknown) phenomena. 



e x p e r i e n c e s . Here, of course, we see the glimmerings of an 

I n d u c t i v e ' s c i e n t i f i c method' premised on the n o t i o n t h a t 

c e r t a i n t y i s determinable through d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n and 

e x p e r i e n c e . However, l i k e the r a t i o n a l i s t s (and P l a t o and 

A r i s t o t l e before them), what Is of primary concern to the 

e m p i r i c i s t s i s s t i l l c e r t a i n t y , and, l i k e the r a t i o n a l i s t s , 

they assume t h a t c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e , by d e f i n i t i o n , 

i n d u b i t a b l e . Thus the e m p i r i c i s t s r a r e l y questioned the 

e x i s t e n c e of God and, i n any case, never questioned the 

e x i s t e n c e of necessary t r u t h s — they merely h e l d t h a t the 

former was not s u b j e c t to concrete o b s e r v a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e 

not the business of s c i e n c e and t h a t the l a t t e r , being 

l o g i c a l l y necessary, c o u l d not be questioned without 

r e s u l t i n g i n a b s u r d i t y . For example, Bacon b e l i e v e d i n the 

s e p a r a t i o n of reason and r e v e l a t i o n ; Locke b e l i e v e d t h a t 

there was n o n e m p l r i c a l a p r i o r i knowledge of n o n s e n s l b l e 

phenomena; Berkeley b e l i e v e d t h a t knowledge of God was a 

g i v e n ; Hume, u n l i k e the o t h e r s , questioned the e x i s t e n c e of 

God, but, l i k e the o t h e r s , b e l i e v e d t h a t c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s of 

ideas (e.g. a n a l y t i c p r o p o s i t i o n s and mathematics) 

c o n s t i t u t e d necessary t r u t h s , and so on. 

The e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n , i n s p i t e of i t s s t a t e d 

o p p o s i t i o n to the P l a t o n i c dualism of unchanging transcendent 

i d e a s / t r a n s i e n t e a r t h l y phenomena and the g e n e r a l r a t i o n a l i s t 

dualism of a p r i o r i / a p o s t e r i o r i i d e a s , i t s e l f remains 

e s s e n t i a l l y d u a l l s t i c i n t h a t i t assumes the v a l i d i t y of the 



11 

d i s t i n c t i o n between necessary and c o n t i n g e n t t r u t h s — an 

assumption which, except i n so f a r as i t l o c a t e s necessary 

t r u t h s w i t h i n the t e n e t s of u n i v e r s a l l o g i c r a t h e r than i n 

the human mind, does not d i f f e r i n any fundamental r e s p e c t 

from the aforementioned r a t i o n a l i s t assumption of the 

d i s t i n c t i o n between a p r i o r i / a p o s t e r i o r i i d e a s . Hence, 

methodological d i f f e r e n c e s a s i d e , the e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n , 

every b i t as much as the r a t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n , assumes the 

e x i s t e n c e of s e l f - c e r t a i n and s e l f - e v i d e n t t r u t h s which are 

p r e d i c a t e d upon an acceptance of the i n d u b l t a b l l i t y of the 

l o g i c of i d e n t i t y (as evinced i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n p r i n c i p l e 

of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) and a g a i n s t which a l l c o n c r e t e l y 

observed and/or experienced phenomena must be measured. 

Thus, f o r example, both t r a d i t i o n s assume concepts, as such, 

to be, by d e f i n i t i o n and i n p r i n c i p l e , s e l f - i d e n t i c a l and 

i n d i v i s i b l e because, f o l l o w i n g the l o g i c of non-

c o n t r a d i c t i o n , a concept, being t h a t which i s d e f i n i t i v e of 

the essence or meaning of a c a t e g o r y or c l a s s of phenomena, 

cannot be what i t i s not: i . e . i t cannot, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , be 

both p o s s i b l e and i m p o s s i b l e . 1 0 T h i s being the case, both 

t r a d i t i o n s , e i t h e r i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y , assume the 

p r i o r i t y of i d e n t i t y over d i f f e r e n c e and, as w i l l become 

1 0 I t should be noted t h a t , n o t i o n s of 'good' and 'bad' 
t h e o r i z i n g about c o n c e p t u a l i t y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h i s i s the 
standard d e f i n i t i o n of 'concept* as i t f u n c t i o n s throughout 
the Western p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n . (The reader may c o n s u l t 
the Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y or any r e p u t a b l e d i c t i o n a r y of 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms.) 



12 

c l e a r In the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n on R a t i o n a l i s m , s e l f over 

o t h e r . 

Of the three l e a d i n g seventeenth c e n t u r y and e i g h t e e n t h 

c e n t u r y r a t i o n a l i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s , Descartes, L e i b n i z and 

Spinoza, i t i s Descartes who has had by f a r the most 

i n f l u e n c e on l a t e r p h i l o s o p h y . I t i s g e n e r a l l y acknowledged 

t h a t modern p h i l o s o p h y begins with Descartes's demonstration 

t h a t c e r t i t u d e i s grounded i n the t h i n k i n g i n d i v i d u a l ' s 

i n d u b i t a b l e awareness of her own thought processes — the 

famous c o g l t o ergo sum. In other words, one may doubt 

e v e r y t h i n g but the f a c t of one's own t h i n k i n g / d o u b t i n g s e l f . 

Thus f o r the f i r s t time i n Western p h i l o s o p h y knowledge i s 

grounded i n the p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t r a t h e r than i n an assumed 

transcendent form(s) or i n a world t h a t Is presumed to e x i s t 

o u t s i d e of one's own c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h i s i s not to say t h a t 

Descartes dispensed with a n o t i o n of God — on the c o n t r a r y , 

he undertook to prove the l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y of God's 

e x i s t e n c e . " Moreover, Descartes b e l i e v e d i n the e x i s t e n c e of 

innate or a p r i o r i i d e a s , such as the p r i n c i p l e s of knowledge 

and s c i e n c e (e.g. the p r i n c i p l e of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) which 

" Descartes argued t h a t to know was a g r e a t e r p e r f e c t i o n 
than to doubt, and t h a t t h e r e f o r e , he h i m s e l f must be an 
imperfect being who, nonetheless, was capable of having an 
idea of p e r f e c t i o n . T h i s idea of p e r f e c t i o n c o u l d o n l y have 
come from a p e r f e c t being, i . e . God. F u r t h e r to t h i s , 
Descartes argued t h a t e x i s t e n c e , being a p e r f e c t i o n , c o u l d no 
more be separated from the n o t i o n of a supremely p e r f e c t being 
than having three angles c o u l d be separated from the n o t i o n 
of a t r i a n g l e . 



13 

are present i n the human mind from b i r t h and which, being 

e v i d e n t to the ' n a t u r a l l i g h t of reason,' are immune from 

doubt. However, Descartes's Importance f o r l a t e r p h i l o s o p h y 

c e n t r e s on h i s l i n k i n g of c e r t i t u d e with the t h i n k i n g s e l f 

and the concomitant n o t i o n of the mind/body s p l i t . As he 

reasons i n the f o u r t h D i s c o u r s e , 

. . . examining a t t e n t i v e l y what I was, 
and s e e i n g t h a t I c o u l d pretend t h a t I 
had no body and t h a t there was no world 
or p l a c e t h a t I was i n , but t h a t I c o u l d 
not, f o r a l l t h a t , pretend t h a t I d i d not 
e x i s t , and t h a t , on the c o n t r a r y , from 
the v e r y f a c t t h a t I thought of doubting 
the t r u t h of other t h i n g s , i t f o l l o w e d 
v e r y e v i d e n t l y and v e r y c e r t a i n l y t h a t I 
e x i s t e d ; while on the other hand, i f I 
had o n l y ceased to t h i n k , although a l l 
the r e s t of what I had ever Imagined had 
been t r u e , I would have no reason to 
b e l i e v e t h a t I e x i s t e d ; I thereby 
concluded t h a t I was a substance, of 
which the whole essence or nature 
c o n s i s t s i n t h i n k i n g , and which, i n order 
to e x i s t , needs no p l a c e and depends on 
no m a t e r i a l t h i n g ; so t h a t t h i s ' I ' , t h a t 
i s to say, the mind, by which I am what 
I am, i s e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t from the body, 
and even t h a t i t i s e a s i e r to know than 
the body, and moreover, t h a t even i f the 
body were not, i t would not cease to be 
a l l t h a t i t i s . 

(Descartes, 1980: 54) 

Descartes reasoned t h a t the mind or s e l f (res c o g l t a n s ) was 

unextended and i n d i v i s i b l e and hence t o t a l l y d i s t i n c t from 

the body or matter (res extensa) which was extended and 

d i v i s i b l e . And because c e r t i t u d e can o n l y be achieved by and 



through the thought processes of the t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t , f o r 

Descartes, knowledge of otherness (res extensa) must, by 

d e f i n i t i o n , be d e r i v e d from and determined by the s e l f (res  

c o g i t a n s ) . 

The seventeenth c e n t u r y and e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y 

e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n , with i t s n o t i o n s of l o g i c a l i n d u c t i o n 

and necessary t r u t h s and i t s emphasis on sensory experience 

as the barometer of c e r t i t u d e , c a r r i e d on through Auguste 

Comte up through Bertrand R u s s e l l , the e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n and 

the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m of Hempel, Carnap e t a l . , and 

i n f l u e n c e d much of n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y 

anthropology (e.g. T y l o r , F r a s e r , Boas, R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n , 

Murdock, Stewart, white, L 6 v l - s t r a u s s , e t c . ) . The hallmarks 

of t h i s t r a d i t i o n i n c l u d e a r e l i a n c e on t e s t a b i l i t y , 

r e p l i c a b i l i t y , o b j e c t i v i t y , q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s , f a c t s , 

c a u s a l or d e t e r m i n i s t i c e x p l a n a t i o n , a fundamental s e p a r a t i o n 

between the observer and the observed, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of 

e s t a b l i s h i n g laws based on c o n c l u s i o n s drawn from observable 

d a t a . The seventeenth c e n t u r y and e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y 

r a t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n , with i t s n o t i o n of l o g i c a l deduction 

from a p r i o r i ideas and i t s emphasis on the 

t h i n k i n g / p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t as the barometer of c e r t i t u d e , 

c a r r i e d on through Kant, Hegel, the phenomenology of H u s s e r l 

and the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, D i l t h e y , Heidegger, 

Gadamer and Ricoeur and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n c e d t w e n t i e t h 

c e n t u r y i n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology (e.g. Geertz, Sperber, 



Rabinow, Boon, Hymes, e t c . ) and 'postmodern' anthropology 

(e.g. C l i f f o r d , T y l e r , Marcus, F i s c h e r , e t c . ) . The hallmarks 

of t h i s t r a d i t i o n i n c l u d e an emphasis on s u b j e c t i v i t y , a 

b e l i e f i n the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of an 

always mediated ' r e a l i t y ' and the importance of i n t e r p r e t e d 

meanings as opposed to analyzed f a c t s . 

However, both t r a d i t i o n s , i n t h a t they whole-heartedly 

embrace the l o g i c of i d e n t i t y ( i . e . l o g i c premised on the 

v a l i d i t y of the p r i n c i p l e of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) and i n t h a t 

they both a s p i r e to the attainment of c e r t i t u d e , remain 

p r o f o u n d l y m e t a p h y s i c a l . That i s to say, they both assume 

and r e l y on a n o t i o n of presence, i . e . a guarantee of s e l f -

e v i d e n t and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l c e r t a i n t y which expresses I t s e l f 

i n such n o t i o n s as essence, i d e a , t r u t h , s e l f , d i a l e c t i c , 

c o n s c i o u s n e s s , concept, and so on. T h i s n o t i o n of presence, 

through p h e n o m e n o l o g l c a l / e x l s t e n t i a l i s t / h e r m e n e u t l c a l ideas 

concerning s e l f and/or d i a l e c t i c i t y and through s e m i o l o g i c a l / 

s t r u c t u r a l i s t ideas concerning b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n a l i t y , 

dominates t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y thought every b i t as much as i t 

dominated P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e . I t i s t h i s i m p l i c i t or 

e x p l i c i t n o t i o n of presence which Jacques DerrIda's 

d e c o n s t r u c t i o n seeks to expose and to d e l i m i t w i t h i n the 

works of Western p h i l o s o p h y and, i n so doing, to i n d i c a t e the 

way i n which, due to the v e r y nature of our most c h e r i s h e d 

concepts, indeed, due to the v e r y nature of concepts as such, 

we, a l b e i t unknowingly, c o n s t a n t l y r e p r e s s otherness and 



16 

d i f f e r e n c e . 

i i ) Statement of JjfrfcgjTt 

In t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n I attempt to accomplish three 

g o a l s : (1) to provide an e x p l i c a t i o n of Derridean thought and 

to demonstrate the r e l e v a n c e of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o 

anthropology, (2) to d e l i n e a t e the p h i l o s o p h i c a l background 

and p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of i n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology (as evinced 

i n the w r i t i n g s of C l i f f o r d Geertz) and 'postmodern 1 

anthropology (as evinced i n the w r i t i n g s of James C l i f f o r d ) 

and to s u b j e c t them to a d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g and (3) to 

show t h a t Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y , by d e f i n i t i o n and i n 

p r i n c i p l e , i s both r e p r e s s i v e and o p p r e s s i v e and t h a t , t h i s 

being the case, anthropology must begin to engage i n a 

fundamental r e - e v a l u a t i o n of i t s most b a s i c assumptions. 

I choose to c o n c e n t r a t e on the work of Jacques D e r r i d a 

because, N i e t z s c h e and Heidegger n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , , a the o n l y 

1 2 F r i e d r i c h N i e t z s c h e (1844 - 1900) i s of g r e a t i n t e r e s t to 
D e r r i d a i n t h a t the former d e d i c a t e d h i s l i f e ' s work to a r a d i c a l 
c r i t i q u e of the t r u t h c l a i m s of Western p h i l o s o p h y . In a d d r e s s i n g 
the concept of t r u t h N i e t z s c h e expresses h i m s e l f as f o l l o w s : 

What, then, i s t r u t h ? A mobile army of metaphors, 
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms — i n s h o r t , a sum of 
human r e l a t i o n s , which have been enhanced, transposed, 
and embellished p o e t i c a l l y and r h e t o r i c a l l y , and which 
a f t e r long use seem f i r m , c a n o n i c a l , and o b l i g a t o r y to 
a people: t r u t h s are i l l u s i o n s about which one has 
f o r g o t t e n t h a t t h i s i s what they are; metaphors which are 
worn out and without sensuous power; c o i n s which have 
l o s t t h e i r p i c t u r e s and now matter o n l y as metal, no 
longer as c o i n s . 

We s t i l l do not know where the urge f o r t r u t h comes 
from; f o r as yet we have heard o n l y of the o b l i g a t i o n 



17 

imposed by s o c i e t y t h a t i t should e x i s t : to be t r u t h f u l 
means u s i n g the customary metaphors — i n moral terms: 
the o b l i g a t i o n to l i e a c c o r d i n g to a f i x e d convention, 
to l i e h e r d - l i k e i n a s t y l e o b l i g a t o r y f o r a l l . . . . 

(Nietzsche i n T a y l o r , 1986a: 219) 

In other words, a c c o r d i n g to N i e t z s c h e , Western metaphysics, from 
P l a t o on, has engaged i n a prolonged process of m i s t a k i n g 
r h e t o r i c a l convention f o r i n d i s p u t a b l e t r u t h . He f u r t h e r argues 
t h a t human consciousness i s an e f f e c t of the i n t e r p l a y of 
d i f f e r e n t i a l f o r c e s and t h a t f o r c e i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , r e l a t i o n a l -
- i . e . t h a t f o r c e , as such, cannot e x i s t as a s i n g u l a r u n i t y but 
must always e x i s t i n r e l a t i o n to another f o r c e . In t h i s way 
N i e t z s c h e c h a l l e n g e s the g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l assumption of s e l f -
i d e n t i c a l , s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t u n i t y . For N i e t z s c h e , 

. . . every t h i n g i s f i s s u r e d and every consciousness 
d u p l i c i t o u s . [He] b e l i e v e s t h a t the search f o r t r u t h i s 
a c t u a l l y an e x e r c i s e of "the w i l l to power" through which 
one t r i e s to master the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of the human 
c o n d i t i o n by r e p r e s s i n g the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of 
fragmentation and d i s c l o c a t i o n . . . . N i e t z s c h e ' s "gay 
wisdom" j o y f u l l y a f f i r m s the i n e s c a p a b i l i t y of 
i n c o m p l e t i o n and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge. 

( T a y l o r , 1986a: 16) 

Despite N i e t z s c h e ' s attempt to u n s e t t l e the s e l f - a s s u r e d 
assumptions of Western metaphysics, M a r t i n Heidegger (1889 - 1976) 
c o n s i d e r e d him to be v e r y much a proponent of t h a t which he sought 
to d i s c r e d i t . (Indeed, Heidegger r e f e r s to N i e t z s c h e as the l a s t 
g r e a t metaphysician.) As f a r as Heidegger was concerned, 
N i e t z s c h e , l i k e a l l those who preceded him back to and i n c l u d i n g 
P l a t o , was mired i n a concern with knowledge which precluded any 
s e r i o u s a t t e n t i o n to the q u e s t i o n of the meaning of Being. 
A c c o r d i n g to Heidegger, 

N e i t h e r N i e t z s c h e nor any t h i n k e r before him . . . come 
to the commencing beginning, r a t h e r they see the 
b e g i n n i n g a l r e a d y and o n l y i n the l i g h t of what i s 
a l r e a d y a f a l l i n g o f f from the beginning and a q u i e t e n i n g 
of t h a t b e g i n n i n g : i n the l i g h t of P l a t o n i c p h i l o s o p h y 
. . . N i e t z s c h e h i m s e l f a l r e a d y e a r l y on d e s i g n a t e s h i s 
p h i l o s o p h y as r e v e r s e d P l a t o n i s m . The r e v e r s a l does not 
e l i m i n a t e the P l a t o n i c premise, but r a t h e r s o l i d i f i e s i t 
e x a c t l y through the appearance of e l i m i n a t i o n . 

(Heidegger i n Spivak i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: xxxiv) 

In other words, because N i e t z s c h e does not go f a r enough, because 
he does not q u e s t i o n the meaning of Being ( i . e . the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
presence as such), he i s l e f t with no c h o i c e but to operate by a 



18 

method of simple r e v e r s a l (e.g. a n t i - C h r i s t as opposed to C h r i s t , 
D i o n y s l a n as opposed to A p p o l l o n i a n e t c . ) which, Heidegger argues 
(and D e r r i d a would a g r e e ) , leaves the p h i l o s o p h i c a l f i e l d 
e s s e n t i a l l y untouched. 

Heidegger s e t s out to address the p o s s i b i l i t y of presence 
through attempting to t h i n k d i f f e r e n c e as d i f f e r e n c e . He r e f e r s 
to d i f f e r e n c e as 'the same' which, f o r Heidegger, i s t h a t which 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y j o i n s and s e p a r a t e s . In other words, Heidegger 
attempts to move away from the standard Western p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
n o t i o n of presence as, by d e f i n i t i o n , u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , and 
attempts to t h i n k presence as the 'luminous s e l f - c o n c e a l i n g ' of the 
•same.' However, as Mark T a y l o r p o i n t s out, 

I t Is c l e a r t h a t i n s t r u g g l i n g to t h i n k the unthought, 
Heidegger t r i e s to t h i n k p h i l o s o p h y ' s o t h e r . Yet does 
he s t i l l t h i n k t h i s other p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y or even  
m e t a p h y s i c a l l y , and, thus, not t h i n k i t as other? 
I n s o f a r as Heidegger continues to value u n i t y over 
p l u r a l i t y , he remains t r u e t o the most important 
assumption of Western p h i l o s o p h y . Though intended to 
overcome metaphysical n o t i o n s of i d e n t i t y , Heidegger's 
concept of the same approaches the n o t i o n of i d e n t i t y -
i n - d i f f e r e n c e t h a t Hegel develops i n response to what he 
regards as S c h e l l i n g ' s inadequate " p h i l o s o p h y of 
i d e n t i t y . " The Logos t h a t a r t i c u l a t e s Heidegger's same 
i s , l i k e the Hegelian Logos, a "primal phenomenon," t h a t 
"draws and j o i n s together what i s h e l d a p a r t i n 
s e p a r a t i o n . " By attempting to t h i n k d i f f e r e n c e as same, 
Heidegger seems to extend the p h i l o s o p h i c a l search f o r 
o r i g i n s . In e x p l o r i n g the d i f f e r e n c e l e f t unthought by 
p h i l o s o p h y , Heidegger seeks what he e x p l i c i t l y l a b e l s an 
" e s s e n t i a l o r i g i n . " From t h i s p o i n t of view, the problem 
with the t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n of Being, as w e l l as i t s 
modern m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n phenomenology's " p r i n c i p l e of 
p r i n c i p l e s " ( i . e . t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y ) , i s t h a t 
both Being and s u b j e c t i v i t y are i n s u f f i c i e n t l y 
p r i m o r d i a l , and, hence, cannot provide a proper 
f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h i n k i n g . As a more o r i g i n a l o r i g i n , 
d i f f e r e n c e can answer the q u e s t i o n of how presence 
becomes present. 

( T a y l o r , 1986a: 20-21) 

As w i l l become c l e a r i n the course of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , 
D e r r i d a has a g r e a t d e a l of sympathy with p a r t s of the Nietzschean 
and Heideggerian e f f o r t s — much of h i s work being concerned with 
m a i n t a i n i n g and d e v e l o p i n g many of t h e i r i n s i g h t s while a v o i d i n g 
t h e i r e s s e n t i a l acceptance of presence. For, although both 
N i e t z s c h e and Heidegger a t t a c k the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of Western 
metaphysics, both, u l t i m a t e l y , remain d e d i c a t e d to t h a t metaphysics 
— N i e t z s c h e through the r e t e n t i o n of a metaphorics which i s 



19 

t h i n k e r of whom I am aware who manages, through h i s use of 

such •psuedo-concepts 1 as o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g and 

u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , , a to i n d i c a t e the way i n which Western 

metaphysics r e p r e s s e s otherness and d i f f e r e n c e without, 

h i m s e l f , succumbing to such r e p r e s s i o n . I choose to 

c o n c e n t r a t e on i n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology because i t i s w i d e l y 

p e r c e i v e d to be a r e a c t i o n t o , and more r i g o r o u s l y 

comprehensive than, t r a d i t i o n a l i s t p o s i t i v i s t l c approaches to 

anthropology ( S c h o l t e , 1974; Hymes ed., 1974; Watson-Franke 

and Watson, 1975; Rabinow and S u l l i v a n eds., 1979; Ruby ed., 

1982; Geertz, 1973, 1983, 1988; Boon, 1982; Whittaker, 1986; 

C l i f f o r d , 1988). As has been s a i d , p o s i t i v l s t approaches to 

anthropology modelled themselves on e m p i r i c i s t n o t i o n s of 

f a c t , o b j e c t i v i t y , the s e p a r a t i o n between observer and 

observed and so on. In o p p o s i t i o n to t h i s view, i n t e r p r e t i v e 

anthropology argues t h a t • o b j e c t i v i t y ' i s an e p i s t e m o l o g l c a l 

c o n s t r u c t which e n t a i l s the unwarranted and unacceptable 

assumption t h a t the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t can e x i s t as an 

u n p r e j u d i c e d observer who i s capable of w r i t i n g up a 

d i s p a s s i o n a t e , ' f a c t u a l * account of whatever she observes. 

I n t e r p r e t i v e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s introduce phenomenological/ 

steeped i n P l a t o n i c / C a r t e s i a n dualism (e.g. t r u t h / e r r o r , 
appearance/ r e a l i t y e t c . ) and Heidegger through a n o s t a l g i a f o r 
r e c o v e r i n g the moment of the meaning of Being. 

, a Why these are not t r a d i t i o n a l concepts i s e x p l a i n e d 
i n Chapter Two. 



20 

hermeneutical n o t i o n s of i n t e r 3 u b j e c t l v i t y , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
and d i a l e c t i c i t y i n t o t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e and maintain t h a t 

whatever the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t produces, so f a r from being an 

u n p r e j u d i c e d , d i s p a s s i o n a t e account, i s always a t h o r o u g h l y 

mediated s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n which d e a l s not with analyzed 

f a c t s but with i n t e r p r e t e d meanings — hence doing away with 

any n o t i o n of the v a l i d i t y of o b j e c t i v e , s c l e n t l s t l c 

p r i v i l e g e on the p a r t of the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t . I choose to 

c o n c e n t r a t e on 'postmodern' anthropology because i t s e t s 

i t s e l f up as an improvement over i n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology 

and as embodying what i s au courant w i t h i n the d i s c i p l i n e as 

a whole (Marcus and F i s h e r eds., 1986; C l i f f o r d and Marcus 

eds., 1986; Rabinow, 1986; T y l o r , 1987; C l i f f o r d , 1988; 

Sangren, 1988; Geertz, 1988; K a p f e r e r , 1989; Whittaker, 

1990). 'Postmodern' anthropology argues t h a t I n t e r p r e t i v e 

anthropology, i t s improvement over p o s l t i v i s t anthropology 

n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , merely i n t e r p r e t s , r a t h e r than a c t i v e l y  

engaging with, other c u l t u r e s . Thus, while a c c e p t i n g the 

I n t e r p r e t i v e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s emphasis on t h e 

phenomenological n o t i o n of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , 'postmodern' 

anthropology p l a c e s an emphasis on the Gadamerian 

hermeneutics of d i a l o g u e r a t h e r than on the D i l t h e y a n or 

Ricoeurean hermeneutics of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In t h i s way, 

•postmodern' anthropology seeks to ensure t h a t whatever the 

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t produces w i l l be In the form of a 'negotiated 

r e a l i t y ' and, as such, u n l i k e I n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology, w i l l 



d i s a l l o w any p o s s i b i l i t y of being skewed i n favour of the 

remnants of a p r i v i l e g e d p o i n t of view. I choose to 

c o n c e n t r a t e on C l i f f o r d Geertz as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 

i n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology and on James C l i f f o r d as 

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 'postmodern* anthropology because t h a t i s 

how they are c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n the c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 

l i t e r a t u r e ( r e . Geertz: Rabinow and S u l l i v a n eds., 1979; 

Ruby ed., 1982; Boon, 1982; Webster, 1982, 1983; Parker, 

1985; Marcus and F i s c h e r eds., 1986; S c h o l t e , 1986; C l i f f o r d , 

1988. r e : C l i f f o r d : Marcus and Cushman, 1982; Marcus and 

F i s c h e r eds., 1986; Rabinow, 1986; Geertz, 1988; Sangren, 

1988; K a p f e r e r , 1989; Whittaker, 1990). I argue t h a t both 

G e e r t z i a n i n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology and C l i f f o r d i a n 

'postmodern' anthropology are f i r m l y embedded w i t h i n an 

unexamined c o n c e p t u a l i t y which ensures t h a t they continue to 

perpetuate the l e g a c y of Western metaphysics through the 

unacknowledged and, indeed, unrecognized r e p r e s s i o n of 

d i f f e r e n c e and otherness. 



22 

Chapter Two 

An E x p l i c a t i o n of Derrldean D e c o n s t r u c t l o n 

Jacques D e r r i d a maintains t h a t the e n t i r e h i s t o r y of 

Western metaphysics, from i t s i n c e p t i o n i n a n c i e n t Greece to 

i t s e x p r e s s i o n i n modern day hermeneutics, grounds i t s e l f i n 

a concept of presence; t h a t i s , i n the assumption of and 

d e s i r e f o r a ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i g n i f i e d ' — an a b s o l u t e l y 

c e r t a i n because s e l f - i d e n t i c a l and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t source of 

being and knowledge which manifests i t s e l f i n such concepts 

as t r u t h , essence, substance, meaning, God, and so on. 1 4 

Whether presence i s expressed as a P r e s o c r a t i c n o t i o n of 

l o g o s , as a P l a t o n i c or A r i s t o t e l i a n n o t i o n of e i d o s , as a 

C h r i s t i a n n o t i o n of God, as a C a r t e s i a n n o t i o n of c o g i t o , as 

a K a n t i a n n o t i o n of s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i , as a Hegelian n o t i o n 

of Absolute S p i r i t , as a Rousseauian n o t i o n of nature, as a 

Husserlean n o t i o n of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y , as a 

Saussurian n o t i o n of the Inner system of language or as a 

Heideggerian n o t i o n of the meaning of Being as a l e t h e l a , i t 

always expresses both the p o s s i b i l i t y and the n e c e s s i t y of an 

a b s o l u t e and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t ground f o r a l l human experience. 

And because presence must be assumed to account f o r any and 

1 4 The reader should be aware t h a t , throughout t h i s work, 
i t i s D e r r l d a ' s view of Western metaphysics with which I am 
concerned. I t should not be assumed t h a t t h i s i s a view which 
i s commonly shared by a l l p h i l o s o p h e r s . 



a l l d i s c r e t e phenomena, because nothing must be allowed to 

f a l l o u t s i d e i t s purview ( f o r , i f t h i s were to happen, the 

unquestionable would have to be questioned and chaos would 

t h r e a t e n logos) i t i s p e r c e i v e d to be homogeneous — to be the 

u l t i m a t e u n i t y which c o n t a i n s and allows f o r a l l m u l t i p l i c i t y 

but which i s not i n i t s e l f m u l t i p l e . 

A c o r o l l a r y of the f o r e g o i n g view of presence i s t h a t 

Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y abounds with innumerable h i e r a r c h i c a l l y 

s t r u c t u r e d o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r s such as s p e e c h / w r i t i n g , t r u t h / 

e r r o r , c e r t a i n t y / u n c e r t a i n t y , r e f e r e n t / s i g n , s i g n i f i e d / 

s i g n i f i e r , i d e n t i t y / d i f f e r e n c e , meaning/absurdity, s e l f / o t h e r , 

wherein the l a t t e r term of each p a i r i s viewed as a c o r r u p t i o n 

of the former. Thus, to use the s p e e c h / w r i t i n g o p p o s i t i o n as 

an example, D e r r i d a a s s e r t s t h a t : 

.phonocentrism merges with the 
h i s t o r i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the meaning 
of being i n g e n e r a l as presence, with a l l 
the subdeterminations which depend on 
t h i s g e n e r a l form and which organize 
w i t h i n i t t h e i r system and t h e i r 
h i s t o r i c a l sequence (presence of the 
t h i n g to s i g h t as e i d o s , presence as 
substance/essence/existence [ o u s i a ] , 
temporal presence as p o i n t [stlgm6] of 
the now or of the moment [nun], the s e l f -
presence of the c o g i t o , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , 
s u b j e c t i v i t y , the co-presence of the 
other and of the s e l f , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y 
as the I n t e n t i o n a l phenomenon of the ego, 
and so f o r t h ) . Logocentrism [supports] 
the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the being of the 
e n t i t y as presence [and the] epoch of the 
logos thus debases w r i t i n g c o n s i d e r e d as 
mediation of mediation and as a f a l l i n t o 



24 

the e x t e r i o r i t y of meaning. 1 3 
( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 12-13) 

In other words, speech i s e x a l t e d because i t i s c o n s i d e r e d to 

be c l o s e to an o r i g i n a r y presence, t r u t h or meaning, while 

w r i t i n g i s scorned because i t i s a •mediation of mediation' 

and consequently twice removed from t h a t which i t attempts to 

approximate. D e r r i d a contends t h a t , so f a r from being a 

secondary or d e r i v a t i v e form of speech, w r i t i n g i s a c t u a l l y 

a p r e c o n d i t i o n of language and t h a t speech has always a l r e a d y 

been w r i t t e n . C l e a r l y , D e r r i d a i s not r e f e r r i n g to w r i t i n g 

i n the standard sense of symbols r e p r e s e n t i n g words: 

As D e r r i d a deploys i t , the term [ w r i t i n g ! 
i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to t h a t element of 
s i g n i f y i n g d i f f e r e n c e which Saussure 
thought e s s e n t i a l to the workings of 
language. W r i t i n g , f o r D e r r i d a , i s the 
'free p l a y ' or element of 'undecid-
a b i l i t y ' w i t h i n every system of 
communication. I t s o p e r a t i o n s are 
p r e c i s e l y those which escape the s e l f -
consciousness of speech and i t s deluded 
sense of the mastery of concept over 
language. W r i t i n g i s the endless 
displacement of meaning which both 
governs language and p l a c e s I t f o r e v e r 
beyond the reach of a s t a b l e , s e l f -

1 3 At t h i s p o i n t i t should be noted t h a t , throughout t h i s 
study, I have c o n s u l t e d E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s of DerrIda's 
works. I have not read D e r r i d a i n French and I do not c l a i m 
to account f o r the French v e r s i o n s of D e r r i d a . My s o l e 
concern i s with the E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s . 



a u t h e n t i c a t i n g knowledge. 1 6 
( N o r r i s , 1986: 28-29) 

25 

D e r r i d a ' s b a s i c endeavour Is to demonstrate t h a t the key 

n o t i o n s of Western metaphysics are rooted i n , and determined 

by, the concept of presence, a concept which cannot h e l p but 

c o n t a i n i t s own absence — i t s own o r i g i n a r y d i f f e r e n c e from 

i t s e l f as such — and t h a t i t i s the d e n i a l or, more 

a p p r o p r i a t e l y , the r e p r e s s i o n of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e which has 

ensured t h a t our predominant modes of thought have so f a r 

remained u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . D e r r i d a ' s s t r a t e g y f o r c a l l i n g i n t o 

q u e s t i o n the concept of presence i n v o l v e s a c l o s e and 

r i g o r o u s examination of s p e c i f i c t e x t s with the i n t e n t i o n of 

d e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e i r fundamental premises through exposing 

the p o i n t beyond which, f o l l o w i n g and because of t h e i r own  

l o g i c , they i n e v i t a b l y lapse i n t o a p o r i a — i n t o an i n s o l u b l e 

problem f o r which Western metaphysics, due to i t s own b a s i c 

assumptions, simply cannot account. 

D e r r i d a ' s assessment of Saussure's Course In General  

L i n g u i s t i c s may serve as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of how he (Derrida) 

goes about d e c o n s t r u c t i n g unexamined n o t i o n s of presence 

w i t h i n Western thought. With r e s p e c t to t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 

t e x t , D e r r i d a a p p r o v i n g l y notes how Saussure maintains t h a t 

, s As D e r r i d a u t i l i z e s i t , ' w r i t i n g ' i s a s s o c i a t e d with 
an open-ended c h a i n of terms which he r e f e r s to as 
'undecldables.' These w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n a l a t e r p o r t i o n 
of t h i s chapter. 



language i s a system o£ s i g n s and t h a t s i g n s are a r b i t r a r y -

- t h a t they are not d e f i n e d i n r e l a t i o n to an unchangeable 

essence or presence but by the d i f f e r e n c e s which d i s t i n g u i s h 

them from other s i g n s . D e r r i d a sees t h i s as a r a d i c a l 

f o r m u l a t i o n which, had i t been followed through, would have 

r e s u l t e d i n the r e c o g n i t i o n of a n o t i o n of w r i t i n g wherein: 

The p l a y of d i f f e r e n c e supposes, i n 
e f f e c t , syntheses and r e f e r r a l s which 
f o r b i d at any moment, or i n any sense, 
t h a t a simple element be present i n and 
of I t s e l f , r e f e r r i n g o n l y to I t s e l f . 
Whether i n the order of spoken or w r i t t e n 
d i s c o u r s e , no element can f u n c t i o n as a 
s i g n without r e f e r r i n g to another element 
which i t s e l f i s not simply p r e s e n t . T h i s 
interweaving r e s u l t s i n each 'element* -

phoneme or grapheme — being 
c o n s t i t u t e d on the b a s i s of the t r a c e 
w i t h i n i t of the other elements of the 
c h a i n or system. T h i s interweaving, 
t h i s t e x t i l e , i s the t e x t produced o n l y 
i n the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of another t e x t . 
Nothing, n e i t h e r among the elements nor 
w i t h i n the system, i s anywhere ever 
simply present or absent. There are 
only, everywhere, d i f f e r e n c e s and t r a c e s 
of t r a c e s . 

( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 26) 

However, Saussure remains d e d i c a t e d to a n o t i o n of p h o n e t i c 

w r i t i n g and thus views "[language] and w r i t i n g [as] two 

d i s t i n c t systems of s i g n s [with] the second [ e x i s t i n g ] f o r 

the s o l e purpose of r e p r e s e n t i n g the f i r s t " (Saussure i n 

D e r r i d a , 1982e: 30). Through t h i s l i m i t a t i o n he r e i n f o r c e s 

the t r a d i t i o n a l s p e e c h / w r i t i n g dichotomy and f u r t h e r contends 



t h a t : "The l i n g u i s t i c o b j e c t i s not d e f i n e d by the 

combination of the w r i t t e n and the spoken word: the spoken 

word alone c o n s t i t u t e s the o b j e c t " (Saussure i n D e r r i d a , 

1982e: 31). In Saussurian l i n g u i s t i c s w r i t i n g i s " u n r e l a t e d 

to the inner system of language" (Saussure i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 

33) and i s doomed to wander the misty f l a t s of e x t e r i o r i t y . 

A c c o r d i n g to D e r r i d a , 

The b a s i c f u n c t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e of 
phonetic w r i t i n g i s p r e c i s e l y to r e s p e c t 
and p r o t e c t the i n t e g r i t y of the 
• i n t e r n a l system* of the language, even 
i f i n f a c t i t does not succeed i n doing 
so. The S a u s s u r i a n l i m i t a t i o n does not 
respond, by a mere happy convenience, to 
the s c i e n t i f i c exigency of the ' i n t e r n a l 
system.* That exigency i s I t s e l f 
c o n s t i t u t e d , as the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
exigency i n g e n e r a l , by the v e r y 
p o s s i b i l i t y of phonetic w r i t i n g and by 
the e x t e r i o r i t y of the ' n o t a t i o n ' to 
i n t e r n a l l o g i c . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 33-34) 

In other words, the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l concept of presence 

n e c e s s i t a t e s the concept of i t s own absence i n order to 

underscore i t s always assumed but never r e a l i z e d e x i s t e n c e . 

The Inside can o n l y be I n f e r r e d from the o u t s i d e . So w r i t i n g 

(the o u t s i d e ) , whose s o l e purpose i s to r e p r e s e n t language 

(the I n s i d e ) , r e p r e s e n t s presence by p r e s e n t i n g i t s absence. 

There i s here a danger to the e n t i r e e d i f i c e of the 

metaphysics of presence which D e r r i d a maintains i t i s c r u c i a l 

to develop. Saussure h i m s e l f i s not unaware of t h i s danger: 



"Writing, though unrelated to i t s inner system, i s used 

continually to represent language. We cannot simply 

disregard i t . We must be acquainted with i t s usefulness, 

shortcomings, and dangers" (Saussure in Derrida, 1982e: 34). 

To develop t h i s further, consider some of Saussure's 

comments concerning writing: 

Writing v e i l s the appearance of language; 
i t Is not a guise for language but a 
disguise. 

(Saussure in Derrida, 1982e: 35) 

The graphic form [image] manages to force 
i t s e l f upon [people] at the expense of 
sound . . . and the natural sequence i s 
reversed. 

(Saussure in Derrida, 1982e: 35) 

. . . the graphic form [image] of words 
s t r i k e s us as being something permanent 
and stable, better suited than sound to 
constitute the unity of language 
throughout time. Though i t creates a 
purely f i c t i t i o u s unity, the s u p e r f i c i a l 
bond of writing i s much easier to grasp 
than the natural bond, the only true 
bond, the bond of sound . . . . But the 
spoken word i s so Intimately bound to i t s 
written image that the l a t t e r manages to 
usurp the main r o l e . 

(Saussure in Derrida, 1982e: 35-36) 
(emphasis Derrida's) 

Derrida points out that Saussure*s castigatlon of writing i s 

fundamentally m o r a l i s t i c in tone. Writing forces i t s e l f on 

speech, i t usurps the p r i v i l e g e d position of speech, i t 

reverses a natural sequence — i t i s , in i t s essence, a 



29 

p e r v e r s i o n . And w r i t i n g i s a dangerous p e r v e r s i o n p r e c i s e l y 

because i t t h r e a t e n s the n a t u r a l p r i o r i t y accorded to speech 

by v i r t u e o£ i t s i n t i m a t e a s s o c i a t i o n with an assumed, 

i n t u i t e d presence: 

The a f f i r m a t i o n of the e s s e n t i a l and 
' n a t u r a l ' bond between the phon6 and the 
sense, the p r i v i l e g e accorded to an order 
of s i g n i f i e r (which then becomes the 
major s i g n i f i e d of a l l other s i g n i f i e r s ) 
depends e x p r e s s l y , and iin c o n t r a d i c t i o n  
to the other l e v e l s of the S a u s s u r i a n 
d i s c o u r s e , upon a psychology of 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s and of i n t u i t i v e 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . What Saussure does not 
q u e s t i o n here i s the e s s e n t i a l  
p o s s i b i l i t y of n o n l n t u l t l o n . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 40) 
(emphasis mine) 

That i s , what Saussure does not q u e s t i o n i s the e x i s t e n c e of 

a determining presence. The v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y of the 

phenomenon of w r i t i n g , because i t i s d e f i n e d as both e x t e r i o r 

t o , yet r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f , language, c a r r i e s w i t h i n i t the 

t h r e a t of the absence of presence — of presence as absence. 

I f Saussure d i d not d e r i d e w r i t i n g , i f he took i t s 

r a m i f i c a t i o n s s e r i o u s l y , he would soon be dangerously c l o s e 

to D e r r i d a ' s v i s i o n of there being "only, everywhere, 

d i f f e r e n c e s and t r a c e s of t r a c e s . " 

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , D e r r i d a p o i n t s out t h a t : 

. . . i t i s when he i s not e x p r e s s l y 
d e a l i n g with w r i t i n g , when he f e e l s he 
has c l o s e d the parentheses on t h a t 



30 

s u b j e c t , t h a t Saussure opens the f i e l d of 
a g e n e r a l grammatology. 1 7 Which would no 
longer be excluded from g e n e r a l 
l i n g u i s t i c s , but would dominate i t and 
c o n t a i n i t w i t h i n i t s e l f . Then one 
r e a l i z e s t h a t what was chased o f f l i m i t s , 
the wandering o u t c a s t of l i n g u i s t i c s , has 
indeed never ceased to haunt language as 
i t s most i n t i m a t e p o s s i b i l i t y . Then 
something which was never spoken and 
which i s nothing other than w r i t i n g 
i t s e l f as the o r i g i n of language w r i t e s 
i t s e l f w i t h i n Saussure's d i s c o u r s e . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 43-44) 

Saussure s t a t e s t h a t : 

I t i s impossible f o r sound alone, a 
n a t u r a l element, to belong to language. 
I t i s o n l y a secondary t h i n g , substance 
to be put to use. A l l our c o n v e n t i o n a l 
v a l u e s have the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of not 
being confused with the t a n g i b l e element 
which supports them. . . . The l i n g u i s t i c 
s i g n i f i e r . . . i s not [ i n essence] 
phonic but i n c o r p o r e a l -- c o n s t i t u t e d not 
by the m a t e r i a l substance but by the 
d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t separate the sound-image 
from a l l o t h e r s . . . .The idea or phonic 
substance t h a t the s i g n c o n t a i n s i s of 
l e s s Importance than the other s i g n s t h a t 
surround i t . 

(Saussure i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 53) 

Thus, i r o n i c a l l y , when Saussure i s not d e a l i n g with speech i n 

r e l a t i o n to w r i t i n g , he opens up the v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y of 

w r i t i n g which, e a r l i e r , he i s a t such pains to r e p r e s s . He 

has gone from "the spoken word alone c o n s t i t u t e s the 

1 7 In D e r r i d a ' s usage 'grammatology' (which comes from 
L i t t r 6 : "A t r e a t i s e upon L e t t e r s , upon the alphabet, 
s y l l a b a t i o n , r e a d i n g , and w r i t i n g " ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 323)) i s 
used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y with ' w r i t i n g ' i n the undecidable sense. 



l i n g u i s t i c o b j e c t " (Saussure In D e r r i d a , 1982e: 31) to "the 

l i n g u i s t i c s i g n i f i e r . . . i s not . . . phonic but 

i n c o r p o r e a l " (Saussure i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 53). And, to 

emphasize the c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n Saussure's work, D e r r i d a 

p o i n t s out t h a t : 

By d e f i n i t i o n , d i f f e r e n c e i s never i n 
i t s e l f a s e n s i b l e p l e n i t u d e . T h e r e f o r e , 
i t s n e c e s s i t y c o n t r a d i c t s the a l l e g a t i o n 
of a n a t u r a l l y phonic essence of 
language. I t c o n t e s t s by the same token 
the p r o f e s s e d n a t u r a l dependence of the 
g r a p h i c s i g n i f i e r . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 53) 

D e r r i d a contends t h a t i t i s Saussure's d e d i c a t i o n to a 

metaphysics of presence t h a t n e c e s s i t a t e s the s e l f -

c o n t r a d i c t o r y nature of the Course i n General L i n g u i s t i c s : 

the i n t e n t i o n t h a t I n s t i t u t e s 
g e n e r a l l i n g u i s t i c s as a s c i e n c e remains 

w i t h i n a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I t s 
d e c l a r e d purpose indeed c o n f i r m s , s a y i n g 
what goes without s a y i n g , the 
s u b o r d i n a t i o n of grammatology, the 
h i s t o r i c o - m e t a p h y s i c a l r e d u c t i o n of 
w r i t i n g to the rank of an instrument 
enslaved to a f u l l and o r i g i n a r i l y spoken 
language. But another gesture (not 
another statement of purpose, f o r here 
what does not go without s a y i n g i s done 
without being s a i d , w r i t t e n without being 
u t t e r e d ) l i b e r a t e s the f u t u r e of a 
g e n e r a l grammatology of which 
l i n g u i s t i c s - p h o n o l o g y would be o n l y a 
dependent and c i r c u m s c r i b e d a r e a . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 29-30) 



32 

In m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t "nothing . . . i s anywhere ever 

simply present or absent" D e r r i d a i s proposing t h a t concepts 

such as presence, essence, meaning e t c . , are always a l r e a d y 

doubled — t h a t I s , t h a t they are always a l r e a d y i n s c r i b e d 

with the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r own otherness — t h a t they are 

heterogeneous as opposed to homogeneous from t h e i r v e r y  

I n c e p t i o n . In d i s c u s s i n g D e r r i d a ' s *psuedo-concept' of 

i t e r a b i l i t y , 1 8 Rodolphe Gasch6 puts i t t h i s way: 

. . . what i s i n q u e s t i o n here i s not 
I t e r a t i o n or r e p e t i t i o n but o n l y t h e i r 
p o s s i b i l i t y , or i t e r a b i l i t y , which can 
occur as a p o s s i b i l i t y to any u n i t and 
i s , consequently, a necessary p o s s i b i l i t y 
t h a t must be i n s c r i b e d i n the essence of 
t h a t u n i t I t s e l f . A p r i o r i , then, the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of i t e r a t i o n d i v i d e s the 
i d e n t i t y of a l l u n i t s ; i t e r a b i l i t y i s the 
i m p u r i t y of an absence t h a t , from the 
s t a r t , p r o h i b i t s the f u l l and r i g o r o u s 
attainment of the p l e n i t u d e of a u n i t , 
and t h a t i n p r i n c i p l e subverts i t s s e l f -
i d e n t i t y . 

(Gasch6, 1986: 213) 

As D e r r i d a says, 

. the being-present (on) i n i t s 
t r u t h , i n the presence of i t s i d e n t i t y 
and i n the i d e n t i t y of i t s presence, i s 
doubled as soon as i t appears, as soon as 
i t presents i t s e l f . It_ appears. In i t s  
essence, as the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s own 
most proper non-truth, of i t s psuedo-
t r u t h r e f l e c t e d i n the i c o n , the 
phantasm, or the simulacrum. What i s i s 
not what i t i s , i d e n t i c a l and I d e n t i c a l 
to i t s e l f , unique, unless i t adds to 

• I t e r a b i l i t y ' i s another Derridean 'undecidable.' 



33 

I t s e l f the p o s s i b i l i t y of being repeated 
as such. And i t s i d e n t i t y i s hollowed 
out by t h a t a d d i t i o n , withdraws i t s e l f i n 
the supplement t h a t presents i t . 

( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 168) 

Thus, f o r example, to r e f e r back to the e x p l i c a t i o n of 

Saussure's t e x t , the supposed o r i g i n a r y presence of the 

spoken word i s , because of i t s e s s e n t i a l l t e r a b i l i t y , always 

a l r e a d y w r i t t e n with the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s own absence, i t s 

own non-presence, and, as such, with i t s own i m p o s s i b i l i t y as 

a s e l f - i d e n t i c a l concept. 

I t i s important to r e a l i z e t h a t D e r r i d a i s concerned 

n e i t h e r with a simple r e v e r s a l of o p p o s i t i o n a l concepts (e.g. 

w r i t i n g / s p e e c h i n s t e a d of speech/writing) nor with t h e i r 

n e u t r a l i z a t i o n : "[A g e n e r a l s t r a t e g y of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ] i s to 

a v o i d both simply n e u t r a l i z i n g the b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n s of 

metaphysics and simply r e s i d i n g w i t h i n the c l o s e d f i e l d of 

these o p p o s i t i o n s , thereby c o n f i r m i n g i t " ( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 

41). A r e v e r s a l of these o p p o s i t i o n s would merely l e a d to a 

Y e a t s i a n v i s i o n of r e v o l u t i o n wherein " t t l h e beggars have 

changed p l a c e s , but the l a s h goes on" (Yeats, 1973: 358) 

whereas a n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of these o p p o s i t i o n s would preclude 

any p o s s i b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n c e and hence r e s u l t i n a 

s p e e c h l e s s homogeneity. D e r r i d a does not attempt to do away 

with p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p p o s i t i o n — he attempts to address the 

p o s s i b i l i t y of o p p o s i t i o n a l i t y as such, and, i n so doing, to 

c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n the e x i s t e n c e of presence as an 



o r i g i n a r l l y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t e n t i t y capable of grounding and 

hence of accounting f o r a seemingly endless c h a i n of 

h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d conceptual p a i r s . In other words, 

the purpose of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s not simply to i s o l a t e 

i n s t a n c e s of c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n any g i v e n t e x t or oeuvre 

and to say t h a t these c o n t r a d i c t i o n s are the l o g i c a l r e s u l t 

of Western p h i l o s o p h y ' s s u b s c r i b i n g to the v a l i d i t y of p a i r e d 

h i e r a r c h i c a l o p p o s i t i o n s which are both premised on and 

r e s o l v e d by a concept of presence, but tp_ show the c o n t i n g e n t  

nature of t h i s e n t i r e view and to t r y to u n s e t t l e or d i s p l a c e 

i t by i n d i c a t i n g other p o s s i b i l i t i e s . As Gasch6 p o i n t s out: 

D e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s . . . the attempt to 
a c c o u n t f o r t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y 
c o n s t i t u t i v e of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
d i s c o u r s e , not by t r y i n g to overcome I t s 
inner d i f f e r e n c e s but by m a i n t a i n i n g 
them. . . . 

. . . d e c o n s t r u c t i o n s t a r t s with a 
s y s t e m a t i c e l u c i d a t i o n of c o n t r a d i c t i o n , 
paradoxes, i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s , and a p o r i a s 
c o n s t i t u t i v e o f c o n c e p t u a 1 i t y , 
argumentation, and the d i s c u r s i v e n e s s of 
p h i l o s o p h y . Yet these d i s c r e p a n c i e s are 
not l o g i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , the o n l y 
d i s c r e p a n c i e s f o r which the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
d i s c o u r s e can account. Eluded by the 
l o g i c of i d e n t i t y , they are consequently 
not c o n t r a d i c t i o n s p r o p e r l y speaking. 
Nor are these necessary i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s 
the r e s u l t of i n e q u a l i t y between form and 
content. T h e i r e x c l u s i o n from the canon 
of p h i l o s o p h i c a l themes i s p r e c i s e l y what 
makes i t p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h between 
form and content, a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t 
takes p l a c e s o l e l y a g a i n s t the h o r i z o n of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r homogeneous 
r e u n i f i c a t i o n . 

(Gasch6, 1986: 135) 



I f one q u e s t i o n s the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 'homogeneous 

r e u n i f i c a t i o n ' of o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r s then one has to r e - t h i n k 

the nature of p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n . Rather than 

viewing c o n t r a d i c t i o n as something which i s a c t u a l l y 

r e s o l v a b l e , because, a c c o r d i n g to Western thought, both terms 

of o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r s such as s i g n i f i e d / s l g n i f i e r are 

premised upon and contained w i t h i n a n o t i o n of o r i g i n a r y 

presence, the o n l y d i v i s i o n between them being t h a t the 

former i s c l o s e r to the o r g a n i z i n g source than the l a t t e r , 

one must view presence i t s e l f as o r i g i n a r l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , 

i . e . as i t s e l f always a l r e a d y d i v i d e d by c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 

Thus c o n t r a d i c t i o n becomes something t h a t not o n l y cannot be 

r e s o l v e d i n an o r i g i n a r y and transcendent u n i t y , but must be 

viewed as t h a t which a l l o w s the thought of u n i t y to be 

p o s s i b l e a t a l l . Hence, the concept of a u n i f y i n g presence 

i s o n l y p o s s i b l e due to i t s i m p o s s i b i l i t y as a s e l f - i d e n t i c a l 

e n t i t y , and c o n t r a d i c t i o n , which i s , of course, an e x p r e s s i o n 

of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n or h e t e r o g e n e i t y , so f a r from being a 

p h i l o s o p h i c a l dead end — something which must be e i t h e r 

overcome ( i . e . transcended) or abandoned — i s a c t u a l l y t h a t 

which a l l o w s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of p h i l o s o p h y i n the f i r s t 

p l a c e (pace A r i s t o t l e ) . Again, to r e f e r to Gasch6, 

. . . d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . . . presupposes a 
c o n c r e t e l y developed demonstration of the 
f a c t t h a t concepts and d i s c u r s i v e 
t o t a l i t i e s are a l r e a d y cracked and 
f i s s u r e d by necessary c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and 
h e t e r o g e n e i t i e s t h a t the d i s c o u r s e of 



36 

p h i l o s o p h y f a l l s to take Into account, 
e i t h e r because they are not, r i g o r o u s l y 
speaking, l o g i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , or 
because a r e g u l a t e d (conceptual) economy 
must a v o i d them i n order to safeguard the 
e t h i c o - t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n s t h a t o r i e n t 
i t s d i s c o u r s e . These f i s s u r e s become 
apparent when we f o l l o w to i t s l o g i c a l 
end t h a t which i n the process of 
c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n or argumentation i s 
o n l y i n a c e r t a i n manner s a i d . 
D e c o n s t r u c t i o n thus begins by t a k i n g up 
broached but d i s c o n t i n u e d I m p l i c a t i o n s -
- d i s c o n t i n u e d because they would have 
c o n t r a d i c t e d the i n t e n t i o n s of 
philosophy. 

(Gasch6, 1986: 136) 

We have a l r e a d y seen how t h i s works i n Saussure -- how 

Saussure, i n s p i t e of a s s e r t i n g t h a t "the l i n g u i s t i c 

s i g n i f i e r . . . i s not . . . phonic but i n c o r p o r e a l — 

c o n s t i t u t e d not by the m a t e r i a l substance but by the 

d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t separate the sound image from a l l o t h e r s " 

(Saussure i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 53), yet maintains, i n d i r e c t 

c o n t r a d i c t i o n to t h i s p o i n t , t h a t " . . . the spoken word 

alone c o n s t i t u t e s the [ l i n g u i s t i c ] o b j e c t " (Saussure i n 

D e r r i d a , 1982e: 31). And t h a t he maintains t h i s , not because 

i t i s supported by what he i s 'almosting' i n h i s work, but 

because of an e t h i c o - t h e o r e t i c a l d e d i c a t i o n to a n o t i o n of 

presence: "What Saussure does not q u e s t i o n here i s the 

e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of n o n i n t u i t i o n " ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 40). 

D e r r i d a ' s work on Rousseau p r o v i d e s another of numerous 

examples of how the r e f u s a l to l e t go of the Western 

metaphysical concept of presence prevents a w r i t e r from 



37 

s e e i n g the i m p l i c a t i o n s o£ h i s own work. L i k e Saussure, 

Rousseau p r i v i l e g e s speech over w r i t i n g : 

Languages are made to be spoken, w r i t i n g 
serves o n l y as a supplement to speech. . 

Speech r e p r e s e n t s thought by 
c o n v e n t i o n a l s i g n s , and w r i t i n g 
r e p r e s e n t s the same with regard to 
speech. Thus the a r t of w r i t i n g i s 
nothing but a mediated r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
thought. 

(Rousseau i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 144) 

What i s i n t e r e s t i n g here i s Rousseau's use of the term 

•supplement,' 1 9 f o r , as D e r r i d a p o i n t s out, i t "harbours 

w i t h i n i t s e l f two s i g n i f i c a t i o n s whose c o h a b i t a t i o n i s as 

strange as i t i s necessary" ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 144). On the 

one hand, a supplement i s added to something which i s 

supposedly complete i n i t s e l f — i t i s , i n t h i s sense, an 

a d d i t i o n , an i n e s s e n t i a l e x t r a ; on the other hand, the v e r y 

e x i s t e n c e of a supplement i m p l i e s an incompleteness i n t h a t 

which i t not o n l y supplements but e f f e c t i v e l y r e p l a c e s . 

A c c o r d i n g to Rousseau a supplement i s dangerous p r e c i s e l y 

because i t leads to a p r e f e r e n c e f o r a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 

phenomenon r a t h e r than f o r the phenomenon i t s e l f . And 

although he scorns w r i t i n g as a supplement of speech, "as 

d e s t r u c t i o n of presence and as d i s e a s e of speech" ( D e r r i d a , 

1982e: 142), he f i n d s h i m s e l f attempting to supplement, 

1 9 'Supplement' a l s o belongs to the open-ended company 
of D e r r i d e a n 'undecidables.' 



38 

through the absence o£ w r i t i n g , a presence t h a t i s absent 

from speech: 

I would love s o c i e t y as others do i f I 
were not sure of showing myself not j u s t 
at a disadvantage but as completely 
d i f f e r e n t from what I am. The d e c i s i o n 
I have taken to w r i t e and to hide myself 
away i s p r e c i s e l y the one t h a t s u i t s me. 
I f I were present people would never have 
known what I was worth. 

(Rousseau In D e r r i d a , 1982e: 142) 

What does t h i s p o i n t to but the i n t i m a t i o n t h a t speech i s 

always a l r e a d y r i d d l e d with absence -- t h a t i t , too, i s a 

supplement and t h a t l i k e a l l supplements i t , too, may be 

supplemented? The phenomenon, as such, as the s e l f - i d e n t i c a l 

and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t e n t i t y with which Rousseau so concerns 

h i m s e l f , does not and has never e x i s t e d : 

the i n d e f i n i t e process of 
s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y has always a l r e a d y 
I n f i l t r a t e d presence, always a l r e a d y 
i n s c r i b e d there the space of r e p e t i t i o n 
and the s p l i t t i n g of the s e l f . 
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n iri the abyss [en abyme] a o 
of presence i s not an a c c i d e n t of 
presence; the d e s i r e of presence i s , on 
the c o n t r a r y , born from the abyss (the 
i n d e f i n i t e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n ) o f 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , from the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 

2 0 A c c o r d i n g to Barbara Johnson, t r a n s l a t o r of D e r r i d a ' s 
D i s s e m i n a t i o n : "The e x p r e s s i o n en abyme, p o p u l a r i z e d by Gide, 
was o r i g i n a l l y used i n h e r a l d r y to designate the s t a t u s of the 
f i g u r e of a s m a l l s h i e l d used to decorate a s h i e l d . Now used 
whenever some p a r t of a whole can be seen as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
of t h a t whole . . . ad i n f i n i t u m , as i n the Quaker Oats box 
on which a man holds up a Quaker Oats box on which a 
man...etc." (Johnson i n D e r r i d a , 1981a: 265) 

/ 



o£ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , e t c . 
( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 163) 

39 

In other words, presence, so f a r from being the p r i m o r d i a l 

r a l s o n d ' e t r e of the supplement, i s i t s e l f merely an e f f e c t 

of s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y . 

Throughout Rousseau's work, D e r r i d a underscores 

i n s t a n c e s of s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y : c u l t u r e i s a supplement of 

nature, masturbation i s a supplement of s o - c a l l e d 'normal 

s e x u a l i t y , ' Th6rdse i s a supplement of a ' r e a l mother,' 

w r i t i n g i s a supplement of speech, speech i s a supplement of 

thought and e v e r y t h i n g i s a supplement of presence — which 

i s i t s e l f always and everywhere o n l y approximated through i t s 

absence. I t i s Rousseau's commitment to a concept of 

presence t h a t leads him i n t o the t o r t u o u s by-ways of a 

complex s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y which, a c c o r d i n g to him, i s by 

d e f i n i t i o n never good enough but which i s always a l l there 

i s . What D e r r i d a attempts to show i n d e c o n s t r u c t i n g 

Rousseau's use of the supplement i s t h a t : 

. . . i n what one c a l l s the r e a l l i f e of 
these e x i s t e n c e s of " f l e s h and bone," 
beyond and behind what one b e l i e v e s can 
be c i r c u m s c r i b e d as Rousseau's t e x t , 
there has never been anything but 
w r i t i n g ; there have never been anything 
b u t s u p p l e m e n t s , s u b s t i t u t i v e 
s i g n i f i c a t i o n s which c o u l d o n l y come 
f o r t h i n a c h a i n of d i f f e r e n t i a l 
r e f e r e n c e s , the " r e a l " supervening and 
being added o n l y while t a k i n g on meaning 
from a t r a c e and from an I n v o c a t i o n of 
the supplement, e t c . And thus to 



40 

i n f i n i t y , f o r we have read, iri the t e x t , 
t h a t the a b s o l u t e present, Nature, t h a t 
which words l i k e " r e a l mother" name, have 
always a l r e a d y escaped, have never 
e x i s t e d ; t h a t what opens meaning and 
language i s w r i t i n g as the disappearance 
of n a t u r a l presence. 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 158-159) 

Although w r i t t e n e x p l i c i t l y about Rousseau, the 

f o l l o w i n g may be a p p l i e d to any w r i t e r o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n 

Western metaphysics: 

Rousseau's t e x t must c o n s t a n t l y be 
c o n s i d e r e d as a complex and many-leveled 
s t r u c t u r e ; In i t , c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s 
may be read as i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of other 
p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t we a r e , up to a c e r t a i n 
p o i n t and with c e r t a i n p r e c a u t i o n s , f r e e 
to read otherwise. Rousseau says A, then 
f o r reasons t h a t we must determine, he 
i n t e r p r e t s A i n t o B. A, which was 
a l r e a d y an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i s 
r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n t o B. A f t e r t a k i n g 
cognizance of i t , we may, without l e a v i n g 
Rousseau's t e x t , i s o l a t e A from i t s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t o B, and d i s c o v e r 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s and resources there t h a t 
indeed belong to Rousseau's t e x t , but 
were not e x p l o i t e d by him, which, f o r 
e q u a l l y l e g i b l e motives, he p r e f e r r e d to  
cut s h o r t . 

( D e r r i d a 1982e: 307) 

What t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics c o n s i s t e n t l y p r e f e r s to cut 

s h o r t (and, as D e r r i d a p o i n t s out, i t i s d i f f i c u l t not to 

surmise t h a t , whether conscious or not, t h i s i s an e t h i c o -

t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n ) i s any e x p l o r a t i o n t h a t t h r e a t e n s to 

l e a d to a r a d i c a l q u e s t i o n i n g of presence. Thus, f o r 



example, In the case o£ Rousseau, he does not e x p l o r e the 

p o s s i b i l i t i e s of s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y t h a t l i e untouched w i t h i n 

h i s t e x t . Being committed to presence as a s e l f - I d e n t i c a l , 

s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t e n t i t y , 

Rousseau c o u l d not t h i n k t h i s 
w r i t i n g [supplementarity] t h a t takes 
p l a c e before and w i t h i n speech. To the 
extent t h a t he belonged to the 
metaphysics of presence, he dreamed of 
the simple e x t e r i o r i t y of death to l i f e , 
e v i l to good, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to presence, 
s i g n i f i e r to s i g n i f i e d , r e p r e s e n t e r to 
r e p r e s e n t e d , mask to f a c e , w r i t i n g to 
speech. But a l l such o p p o s i t i o n s are  
i r r e d u c i b l y rooted i n t h a t metaphysics.  
Using them, one can o n l y operate by  
r e v e r s a l s , t h a t i s to say by  
c o n f i r m a t i o n s . The supplement i s none of  
these terms. I t i s e s p e c i a l l y not more 
a s i g n i f i e r than a s i g n i f i e d , a 
r e p r e s e n t e r than a presence, a w r i t i n g  
than a speech. None of the terms of t h i s  
s e r i e s can, being comprehended w i t h i n i t ,  
dominate the economy of d l f f 6 r a n c e a > or  
s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y . Rousseau's dream 
c o n s i s t e d of making the supplement enter 
metaphysics by f o r c e . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 315) 
(emphasis D e r r i d a ' s and mine) 

A look a t D e r r i d a ' s 'undecidables' Is Indispensable to 

f u r t h e r c l a r i f y i n g d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' s displacement of presence. 

In attempting to account f o r an always a l r e a d y o c c u r r i n g 

process of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n which a l l o w s , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , f o r 

both the p o s s i b i l i t y of presence (as an e f f e c t ) and the 

2 1 ' D i f f ^ r a n c e ' i s an 'undecidable. ' 



42 

i m p o s s i b i l i t y of presence (as a s e l f - I d e n t i c a l e n t i t y ) , 

D e r r i d a p o s i t s a s e r i e s of terms such as t r a c e , l t e r a b l l l t y , 

d l f f F r a n c e , supplement, pharmakon, mark e t c . , which cannot be 

reduced to any s i n g l e , s e l f - i d e n t i c a l meaning. Thus, f o r 

example, t r a c e combines the senses of both the mark and the 

effacement of the mark, i t e r a b i l i t y combines the senses of 

both t h a t which i s repeated and t h a t which i s other ( i t e r 

coming from the S a n s k r i t i t a r a : o t h e r ) , d i f f F r a n c e combines 

the senses of both to d i f f e r and to d e f e r , supplement 

combines the senses of both t h a t which i s added to and t h a t 

which takes the p l a c e of, pharmakon combines the senses of 

both poison and remedy, mark combines the senses of both the 

t r a c e and the effacement of the t r a c e , and so on. These 

•undecldables, 1 as D e r r i d a r e f e r s to them, "can no longer be 

i n c l u d e d w i t h i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l ( b i n a r y ) o p p o s i t i o n but, 

r a t h e r , they i n h a b i t p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p p o s i t i o n , r e s i s t i n g and 

d i s o r g a n i z i n g i t , without ever c o n s t i t u t i n g a t h i r d term, 

without ever l e a v i n g room f o r a s o l u t i o n i n the form of 

s p e c u l a t i v e d i a l e c t i c s " ( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 43). V i n c e n t L e i t c h 

suggests a s i m i l a r i t y between Gell-Mann's and Zweig's quark 2 2 

and D e r r i d a ' s u n d e c l d a b l e s : 

L i k e the quark i n p h y s i c s , the [undecidable] 
i s a t h e o r e t i c a l u n i t . . . t h a t , though 
i m p e r c e p t i b l e — more nothing than something 

2 2 Derridean thought and quantum p h y s i c s are explored i n 
F l o y d M e r r e l l ' s D e c o n s t r u c t i o n Reframed, West L a f a y e t t e 
(Indiana: Purdue U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985). 



43 

— operates amidst the innermost reaches o£ 
[ t e x t u a l i t y ] , permeating and e n e r g i z i n g i t s 
e n t i r e a c t i v i t y , a f f e c t i n g omnipresence, yet 
remaining out of hand. J u s t as the quark, 
p o s i t e d by Gell-Mann and Zweig d u r i n g the 
e a r l y 1960's, accounted f o r the strange 
a c t i v i t i e s of p a r t i c l e s w i t h i n sub-atomic 
spheres, so D e r r i d a ' s [undecidable] e x p l a i n s 
the p e c u l i a r e f f e c t s of t e x t u a l i t y d e t e c t e d a t 
m i c r o l e v e l s of the s i g n . Neither a f r e e quark 
nor a pure [undecidable] can be d i s l o d g e d or 
i s o l a t e d because they are f u n c t i o n s of 
r e l a t i o n s — mirage ' e f f e c t s ' of p r i m o r d i a l 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n p r o c e s s . 

( L e i t c h , 1983: 28) 

And, p r e c i s e l y because they cannot be d i s l o d g e d or i s o l a t e d , 

undecldables cannot be p e r c e i v e d as concepts per se — t h a t 

i s , they cannot be reabsorbed i n t o a d i a l e c t i c a l system of 

h i e r a r c h i c a l o p p o s i t i o n s as c l e a r cut ' t h i r d terms' or, 

indeed, as s e l f - i d e n t i c a l terms a t a l l . As D e r r i d a says with 

r e s p e c t to d i f f F r a n c e , "every concept i s i n s c r i b e d i n a c h a i n 

or i n a system w i t h i n which i t r e f e r s to the o t h e r s , to other 

concepts, by means of the s y s t e m a t i c p l a y of d i f f e r e n c e s . 

Such a p l a y , d l f f F r a n c e , i s thus no longer simply a concept, 

but r a t h e r the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n c e p t u a l i t y , of a conceptual 

process and system i n g e n e r a l " ( D e r r i d a , 1982a: 11). As 

Gasch6 p o i n t s out: 

Because the [undecldables] are not 
atoms, because they have no i d e n t i t y i n 
themselves, . . . they cannot be gathered 
once and f o r a l l upon themselves i n some 
i d e a l p u r i t y . Let us not f o r g e t t h a t the 
undecldables are the c o n d i t i o n s of 
p o s s i b i l i t y (and i m p o s s i b i l i t y ) of the 
conceptual d i f f e r e n c e s as w e l l as of 



44 

d i s c u r s i v e I n e q u a l i t i e s ; thus, they are 
what makes the p r o j e c t of s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n 
p o s s i b l e , without, however, being 
s y s t e m a t i z a b l e themselves. Yet t h i s i s 
not to say t h a t a c e r t a i n s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n 
cannot a p p l y to them; i t simply means 
t h a t t h e i r system cannot be c l o s e d upon 
i t s e l f by means of some dominating 
c e n t e r . . . . The system of the 
[undecidables] cannot be f o r m a l i z e d , 
i d e a l i z e d , or systematized because i t i s 
p r e c i s e l y i t s p l a y t h a t makes those 
p r o j e c t s p o s s i b l e . 

(Gasch6, 1986 184-185) 

D e r r i d a takes care to p o i n t out t h a t , because 

undecidables "block every r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e o l o g y , " every 

r e l a t i o n s h i p to a ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i g n i f i e d ' or r e f e r e n t of 

whatever form, none of them may be e l e v a t e d to the p o s i t i o n 

of "a master-word or a master-concept" ( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 40) 

and, consequently, t h e i r number i s open -- t h e i r c r e a t i o n 

depending not on any p o s s i b i l i t y of a b s o l u t e c l o s u r e (as i s 

the case with philosophemes such as t r u t h , meaning, d i a l e c t i c 

e t c . which are grounded i n and contained by a n o t i o n of 

presence) but on the nuances and p l a y of whatever p i e c e of 

t e x t u a l i t y may be under one's c o n s i d e r a t i o n . As I w i l l now 

attempt to show, i t i s Important to understand how D e r r i d a 

views language and t e x t u a l i t y . 

In Of Grammatology D e r r i d a s t a t e s : "There i s nothing  

o u t s i d e of the t e x t [there i s no o u t s i d e - t e x t ; i _ l n'y a pas  

de hors t e x t e ] " ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 158). T h i s statement, 

almost i n v a r i a b l y taken out of context, has l e d to enormous 



c o n f u s i o n and to the b e l i e f , expressed by c r i t i c s as 

d i v e r g e n t from one another as Edward S a i d and E.D. H i r s c h , 

t h a t d e c o n s t r u c t i o n maintains t h a t nothing e x i s t s o u t s i d e of 

language. In a 1984 i n t e r v i e w with R i c h a r d Kearney D e r r i d a 

expresses h i s I r r i t a t i o n with such mlsreadings: 

I never cease to be s u r p r i s e d by c r i t i c s 
who see my work as a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t 
there i s nothing beyond language, t h a t we 
are imprisoned i n language; i t i s , i n 
f a c t , s a y i n g the exact o p p o s i t e . The 
c r i t i q u e of l o g o c e n t r i s m i s above a l l 
e l s e the search f o r the 'other' and the 
'other' of language. Every week I 
r e c e i v e c r i t i c a l commentaries and s t u d i e s 
on d e c o n s t r u c t i o n which operate on the 
assumption t h a t what they c a l l 'post-
s t r u c t u r a l i s m ' amounts to s a y i n g t h a t 
there i s nothing beyond language, t h a t we 
are submerged i n words — and other 
s t u p i d i t i e s of t h a t s o r t . C e r t a i n l y , 
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n t r i e s to show t h a t the 
q u e s t i o n of r e f e r e n c e i s much more 
complex and p r o b l e m a t i c than t r a d i t i o n a l 
t h e o r i e s supposed. I t even asks whether 
our term ' r e f e r e n c e ' i s e n t i r e l y adequate 
f o r d e s i g n a t i n g the 'other'. The other, 
which i s beyond language and which 
summons language, i s perhaps not a 
' r e f e r e n t ' i n the normal sense which 
l i n g u i s t s have a t t a c h e d to t h i s term. 
But to d i s t a n c e o n e s e l f thus from the 
h a b i t u a l s t r u c t u r e of r e f e r e n c e , to 
c h a l l e n g e or complicate our common 
assumptions about i t , does not amount to 
s a y i n g t h a t there i s nothing beyond 
language. 
( D e r r i d a i n Kearney ed., 1984: 123-124) 

When D e r r i d a says t h a t " [ t l h e r e i s nothing o u t s i d e of 

the t e x t , " t h a t there i s no * o u t s l d e - t e x t , ' no ' e x t r a - t e x t , ' 



he i s s a y i n g t h a t there i s no ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i g n i f i e d ' or 

s e l f - i d e n t i c a l presence capable of grounding and accounting 

f o r any given p i e c e of w r i t i n g or, indeed, f o r any i s o l a t e d 

or 'framed' s i t u a t i o n whatsoever. For D e r r i d a , language, as 

such, i s an e f f e c t of the t e x t taken i n i t s g e n e r a l i z e d or 

'undecidable' sense, f o r , as Gasch6 i n d i c a t e s , 

a c c o r d i n g to D e r r i d a the 
g e n e r a l i z e d concept of t e x t Is p r e c i s e l y 
t h a t which exceeds the t r a d i t i o n a l 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t e x t as a t o t a l i t y . In 
whatever terms — e m p i r i c a l , i d e a l i s t , or 
d i a l e c t i c a l — t e x t i s d e f i n e d , i t always 
i m p l i e s a c l o s u r e upon i t s e l f with a 
c l e a r i n s i d e and o u t s i d e , whether i t i s 
the e m p i r i c a l c l o s u r e of the u n i t y of a 
corpus, the i n t e l l i g i b l e u n i t y of a work, 
or the d i a l e c t i c a l t o t a l i t y of i t s formal 
or thematic meanings. Yet i f the g e n e r a l 
t e x t d e l i m i t s the t r a d i t i o n a l t o t a l i z i n g 
concepts of what has been c a l l e d t e x t , i t 
a l s o i m p l i e s t h a t the e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t 
t e x t , because i t i s no longer a t o t a l i t y , 
has no i n s i d e or o u t s i d e . The 
g e n e r a l i z e d t e x t i s not something t h a t i s 
c l o s e d upon i t s e l f i n such a manner t h a t 
i t s l i m i t s would demarcate an i n s i d e from 
an o u t s i d e . . . . The g e n e r a l t e x t i s 
r a t h e r t h a t border i t s e l f , from which the 
assignment of i n s l d e s and o u t s l d e s takes 
p l a c e , as w e l l as where t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
u l t i m a t e l y c o l l a p s e s . . . . "There i s no 
e x t r a - t e x t " means j u s t t h i s : nothing 
o u t s i d e the t e x t can, l i k e a l a s t reason, 
assume a f u l f i l l i n g f u n c t i o n . . . of the 
t e x t u a l r e f e r r a l s . I t c e r t a i n l y does not 
permit the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t there i s 
nothing e l s e but t e x t s , or f o r t h a t 
matter, t h a t a l l i s language. 

(GaschS, 1986 279-181) 



I t may, of course, be argued, and, indeed, o f t e n i s , 

t h a t D e r r i d a i s maddeningly a b s t r u s e , t h a t he uses o r d i n a r y 

words i n an e x t r a o r d i n a r y f a s h i o n and then complains because 

people take e x c e p t i o n or get confused or both. Such comments 

as: "There i s nothing o u t s i d e the t e x t " ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 

158); "I don't b e l i e v e t h a t there i s any p e r c e p t i o n " ( D e r r i d a 

i n Macksey and Donato eds., 1982: 272); "Immediacy i s 

d e r i v e d " ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 157); "Speech . . . i s a l r e a d y i n 

i t s e l f a w r i t i n g " ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 46); "Wherever i t 

operates, 1 thought' means n o t h i n g " ( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 49), and 

so on, tend to be p i c k e d up (again, almost i n v a r i a b l y out of 

context) and bandied about as though they are merely o f f the 

c u f f comments and t h a t they, i n and of themselves, preclude 

any n e c e s s i t y f o r one's t a k i n g t h e i r author s e r i o u s l y . No 

l e s s an e s t a b l i s h e d and r e s p e c t e d c r i t i c than Ren6 Wellek has 

i n c u r r e d a contemptuous response from D e r r i d a f o r engaging i n 

p r e c i s e l y t h i s s o r t of d i s m i s s i v e and embarrassingly 

u n p r o f e s s i o n a l behaviour: 

I t does not s u f f i c e , i n order to know how 
to read, simply to own a l i b r a r y and to 
know how to t a l k . In s a y i n g t h i s I am 
r e f e r r i n g to what can be i n f e r r e d about 
non-reading from an a s s e r t i o n by Wellek, 
a c c o r d i n g to which I supposedly advanced 
"the preposterous theory t h a t w r i t i n g 
precedes speaking, a c l a i m r e f u t e d by 
every c h i l d and by the thousand spoken 
languages t h a t have no w r i t t e n r e c o r d s . " 
I quote t h i s " c h i l d " argument . 
because i t demonstrates t h a t the 
condemned t e x t s have not even been 
opened. 

( D e r r i d a , 1986d: 42) 



48 

The p o i n t i s , of course, t h a t DerrIda's comments are most 

e m p h a t i c a l l y not o f f the c u f f and to p o r t r a y them as such i s 

to do a d i s s e r v i c e not o n l y to him but to s c h o l a r s h i p i n 

g e n e r a l . 

One of the s t r a t e g i e s which D e r r i d a employs i n 

attempting to d e l i m i t Western metaphysics, which, i t must 

always be remembered, i s dependent upon the n o t i o n of 

presence as a s e l f - i d e n t i c a l and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t e n t i t y , i s 

to demonstrate the unstable and v o l a t i l e nature of concepts 

such as t e x t , w r i t i n g , meaning, s i g n , and so on, which we 

commonly tend to view as d e f i n i t i v e l y c l o s e d s i g n i f i e d s . By 

I n d i c a t i n g the s l i p p a g e w i t h i n these concepts, by d i s p l a c i n g 

the s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g n o t i o n of presence, D e r r i d a i s 

attempting to open Western metaphysics to the p o s s i b i l i t y of 

i t s 'other,' to the p o s s i b i l i t y of an o r i g i n a r i l y and 

always, everywhere, a l r e a d y o c c u r r i n g process of 

d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . With r e s p e c t to D e r r i d a ' s use of n o t i o n s 

and concepts which appear to be t r a d i t i o n a l to Western 

metaphysics one i s reminded of Wallace Stevens's The Man with 

the Blue G u i t a r : 

They s a i d , "You have a blue g u i t a r , 
You do not p l a y t h i n g s as they a r e . " 

The man r e p l i e d , "Things as they are 
Are changed upon the blue g u i t a r . " 

And they s a i d then, "But p l a y , you must, 
A tune beyond us, yet o u r s e l v e s , 

A tune upon the blue g u i t a r 
Of t h i n g s e x a c t l y as they a r e . " 

(Stevens, 1982c: 165) 



In other words, although D e r r i d a uses t r a d i t i o n a l concepts 

they are not to be read as ' t r a d i t i o n a l concepts' pure and 

simple -- they are always a l r e a d y 'under e r a s u r e ' a 3 — always 

a l r e a d y changed upon the blue g u i t a r of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . As 

D e r r i d a says: 

Since these concepts are i n d i s p e n s a b l e 
f o r u n s e t t l i n g the h e r i t a g e to which they 
belong, we should [not] renounce them. 
Within the c l o s u r e , by an o b l i q u e and 
always p e r i l o u s movement, c o n s t a n t l y 
r i s k i n g f a l l i n g back w i t h i n what i s being 
d e c o n s t r u c t e d , i t i s necessary to 
surround the c r i t i c a l concepts with a 
c a r e f u l and thorough d i s c o u r s e — to mark 
the c o n d i t i o n , the medium, and the l i m i t s 
of t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s and to designate 
r i g o r o u s l y the i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p to 
the machine whose d e c o n s t r u c t i o n they 
permit; and, i n the same process, 
designate the c r e v i c e through which the 
yet unnameable glimmer beyond the c l o s u r e 
can be glimpsed. 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 14) 

T h i s 'unnameable glimmer' i s teased out of the t e x t s of 

Western metaphysics i n the formless shape of 'undecldables' 

which, i n t u r n , are teased out by the ' s p l i t w r i t i n g ' or 

'double g e s t u r e ' of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . V i n c e n t L e i t c h o f f e r s a 

c o n c i s e and u s e f u l summary of t h i s p r o c e s s : 

The p l a c e where a reader n o t i c e s a 
displacement or r e v e r s a l i n a t e x t u a l 

3 9 Concepts, which, having been d e c o n s t r u c t e d , are 
r e v e a l e d as being n o n - s e l f - i d e n t i c a l yet i n d i s p e n s a b l e , are 
sometimes w r i t t e n : t^a^h. 



50 

c h a i n or system o f t e n c o n s t i t u t e s the 
s i t e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l or thematic 
o p p o s i t i o n . D i s c l o s i n g such a c r e v i c e , 
the d e c o n s t r u c t o r s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and 
t e n a c i o u s l y i n v e r t s the o p p o s i t i o n s to 
r e v e a l the a c t u a l h i e r a r c h i c a l r e l a t i o n 
of the dichotomous terms. At t h i s p o i n t 
she s t e a d f a s t l y d i s a l l o w s any 
r e c o n s t i t u t l o n , s u b l i m a t i o n , or s y n t h e s i s 
(any Hegelian Aufhebung) of opposing 
terms. T h i s s t r a t e g i c i n v e r s i o n and 
stubborn expos6 produce an unexpected 
gap, f o r c i n g the emergence of a new 
['concept'], which nameless mark n e i t h e r 
n e u t r a l i z e s nor reforms the o l d 
o p p o s i t i o n . Rather, i t f u n c t i o n s as a 
d i s o r g a n i z i n g s t r u c t u r a l f o r c e t h a t 
I n v i s i b l y i n h a b i t s and t r a n s g r e s s e s the 
o p p o s i t i o n . . . . The purpose of the 
d e c o n s t r u c t o r i s to produce such 
undecidables and to t r a c k t h e i r i n s i s t e n t 
o p e r a t i o n throughout the t e x t . . . . 

The s p l i t w r i t i n g of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
. . . c o n s i s t s of d e l i b e r a t e l y i n v e r t i n g 
t r a d i t i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n s and marking the 
mysterious and d i s o r i e n t i n g p l a y of 
h i t h e r t o i n v i s i b l e ['concepts' i . e . 
undecidables] t h a t r e s i d e , unnamed, i n 
the gap between opposing terms. (Between 
"nature" and " c u l t u r e , " f o r example, 
dwells the supplement.) In t h i s double 
gesture, d e c o n s t r u c t i o n avoids simply 
d e f u s i n g o p p o s i t i o n s or reforming them; 
i n other words, d e c o n s t r u c t i o n a c t i v e l y 
r e s i s t s the i n c l u s i o n of the new 
['concept'] i n t o the o l d dichotomy. 

( L e i t c h , 1983: 180) 

J u s t as d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , with i t s i n s i s t e n c e on o r i g i n a r y 

d o u b l i n g , does away with the n o t i o n of a pure o r i g i n , 

b e g i n n i n g or arche, so i t a l s o does away with the c o r r e l a t i v e 

n o t i o n of a pure f i n a l i t y , ending or t e l o s . T h i s being the 

case, the western n o t i o n of l i n e a r i t y , and of h i s t o r y as a 

l i n e a r sequence, i s c a l l e d r a d i c a l l y i n t o q u e s t i o n , f o r , as 



51 

D e r r i d a p o i n t s out, " h i s t o r y has no doubt always been 

a s s o c i a t e d with a l i n e a r scheme of the u n f o l d i n g of presence, 

where the l i n e r e l a t e s the f i n a l presence to the o r i g i n a r y 

presence a c c o r d i n g to the s t r a i g h t l i n e or the c i r c l e " 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 85). Although, as Mark T a y l o r i n d i c a t e s , we 

o f t e n tend to draw a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between E a s t e r n and 

western, or, indeed, ' p r i m i t i v e ' and ' c i v i l i z e d ' n o t i o n s of 

time wherein the former i s c o n s i d e r e d to be c y c l i c a l and 

s t a t i c , with the end c o i n c i d i n g with the beginning, and the 

l a t t e r i s c o n s i d e r e d to be l i n e a r and p r o g r e s s i v e , with the 

end s u r p a s s i n g the beginning, i t i s important to r e a l i z e 

t h a t , " t b l o t h c i r c l e and l i n e are forms of c l o s u r e and 

f i g u r e s of p l e n i t u d e t h a t serve as t o t a l i z i n g metaphors" 

( T a y l o r , 1987c: 70). In other words, both the l i n e and the 

c i r c l e are dominated and determined by the n o t i o n of 

presence. A c c o r d i n g to J . H i l l i s M i l l e r , 

The model of the l i n e i s a powerful p a r t 
of the t r a d i t i o n a l language of O c c i d e n t a l 
metaphysics. . . . The end of the s t o r y 
i s the r e t r o s p e c t i v e r e v e l a t i o n of the 
law of the whole. That law i s an 
u n d e r l y i n g ' t r u t h ' which t i e s a l l 
together i n an i n e v i t a b l e sequence 
r e v e a l i n g a h i t h e r t o hidden f i g u r e i n the 
c a r p e t . The image of the l i n e tends 
always to imply the norm of a s i n g l e 
continuous u n i f i e d s t r u c t u r e determined 
by one e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e . 
T h i s p r i n c i p l e holds the l i n e t o g e t h e r , 
g i v e s i t i t s law, c o n t r o l s i t s 
p r o g r e s s i v e e x t e n s i o n , c u r v i n g or 
s t r a i g h t , with some arche, t e l o s , or 
ground. O r i g i n , g o a l , or base: a l l three 



52 

come together i n the g a t h e r i n g movement 
of [ p r e s e n c e ] . 

( M i l l e r i n T a y l o r , 1987c: 70) 

Along with t h i s , of course, goes a severe c r i t i q u e of the 

n o t i o n of the book and i t s i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t assumption of 

the l i n e a r i t y of beginning, middle and end. Again i t must be 

emphasized t h a t , o b v i o u s l y , D e r r i d a does not d i s p u t e the 

e x i s t e n c e of books as t a n g i b l e o b j e c t s — what he does 

d i s p u t e i s the e x i s t e n c e of books as comprehensive wholes 

dependent on a n o t i o n of p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d s e l f - c o n t a i n e d 

harmony or order, i . e . presence. And t h i s c r i t i q u e holds 

whether the book i n q u e s t i o n happens to be a n o v e l , a 

h i s t o r y , an ethnography, or whatever. A c c o r d i n g to D e r r i d a , 

The idea of the book i s the idea of a 
t o t a l i t y , f i n i t e or i n f i n i t e , of the 
s i g n i f i e r ; t h i s t o t a l i t y of the s i g n i f i e r 
cannot be a t o t a l i t y , u n l e s s a t o t a l i t y 
c o n s t i t u t e d by the s i g n i f i e d p r e e x i s t s 
i t , s u p e r v i s e s i t s i n s c r i p t i o n s and i t s 
s i g n s , and i s independent of i t i n i t s 
i d e a l i t y . The idea of the book, which 
always r e f e r s to a . . . t o t a l i t y , i s 
p r o f o u n d l y a l i e n to the sense of w r i t i n g . 
I t i s the e n c y c l o p e d i c p r o t e c t i o n of 
t h e o l o g y and of l o g o c e n t r l s m a g a i n s t the 
d i s r u p t i o n of w r i t i n g , a g a i n s t i t s 
a p h o r i s t i c energy, and . . . a g a i n s t 
d i f f e r e n c e i n g e n e r a l . I f I d i s t i n g u i s h 
the t e x t from the book, I s h a l l say t h a t 
the d e s t r u c t i o n of the book, as i t i s now 
underway i n a l l domains, denudes the 
s u r f a c e of the t e x t . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 18) 



53 

Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , D e r r i d a ' s n o t i o n o£ o r i g i n a r y 

d o u b l i n g , of i t e r a b i l i t y , a l s o p r o v i d e s a r a d i c a l c r i t i q u e of 

our concept of s e l f , and, by e x t e n s i o n , of our concept of the 

author as such. The Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s ' s e l f 

as: "Person's . . . own i n d i v i d u a l i t y or essence." As 

D e r r i d a has shown, the idea of essence i s o n l y made p o s s i b l e 

by t h a t which renders i t impossible as an independent and 

s e l f - i d e n t i c a l concept. And so with the n o t i o n of s e l f : i n 

order to appear as what i t portends to be -- a unique and 

independent essence -- i t must, to r e i t e r a t e , "[add] to  

i t s e l f the p o s s i b i l i t y of being repeated as such. And i t s 

i d e n t i t y i s hollowed out by t h a t a d d i t i o n , withdraws i t s e l f 

i n the supplement t h a t presents i t " ( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 168). 

Thus, as T a y l o r p o i n t s out, "[the] search f o r s e l f - p r e s e n c e 

i n s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s leads to the d i s c o v e r y of the absence 

of the s e l f " ( T a y l o r , 1987c: 50). And t h i s because, by 

d e f i n i t i o n , consciousness of s e l f i s dependent on the 

p o s s i b i l i t y of the s e p a r a t i o n of s e l f from s e l f — on an 

o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g which p r e c l u d e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f as 

a unique, impenetrable essence. As D e r r i d a says, "the s e l f 

of the l i v i n g present i s p r i m o r d i a l l y a t r a c e " ( D e r r i d a , 

1973b: 85). 

The Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s 'author' as: 

" O r i g i n a t o r . . .; w r i t e r of book, t r e a t i s e , e t c . " We t h i n k 

of an author as a person (a s e l f ) who produces a book which 

c o n t a i n s what she means to say and which stands as a 



completed m a n i f e s t a t i o n of her expressed I n t e n t i o n s . Bearing 

i n mind the Derridean c r i t i q u e of o r i g i n , book and s e l f , 

c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g : 

. . . i t e r a b i l i t y . . . excludes the 
hypothesis of i d e a l i z a t i o n , t h a t i s , the 
adequation of a meaning to i t s e l f , of a 
s a y i n g to i t s e l f , of understanding to a 
sentence, whether w r i t t e n or o r a l , or to 
a mark i n g e n e r a l . Once a g a i n , 
i t e r a b i l i t y makes p o s s i b l e i d e a l i z a t i o n 
— and thus, a c e r t a i n i d e n t i t y i n 
r e p e t i t i o n t h a t i s independent of the 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of f a c t u a l events — while 
at the same time l i m i t i n g the 
i d e a l i z a t i o n i t makes p o s s i b l e : broaching 
and breaching i t a t once t e l l e . 1'entame J. 
To put i t more simply and more 
c o n c r e t e l y : a t the v e r y moment (assuming 
t h a t t h i s moment i t s e l f might be f u l l and 
s e l f - i d e n t i c a l , i d e n t i f i a b l e -- f o r the 
problem of i d e a l i z a t i o n and i t e r a b i l i t y 
i s a l r e a d y posed here, i n the s t r u c t u r e 
of t e m p o r a l i z a t i o n 2 4 ) , a t the v e r y moment 
when someone would l i k e to say or w r i t e , 
"On the t w e n t i e t h . . . e t c . , " the v e r y 
f a c t o r t h a t w i l l permit the mark (be i t 
p s y c h i c , o r a l , g r a p h i c ) to f u n c t i o n 
beyond t h i s moment — namely the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s being repeated another 
time — breaches, d i v i d e s , e x p r o p r i a t e s 
the " i d e a l " p l e n i t u d e or s e l f - p r e s e n c e of 

2 4 Of course, f o r D e r r i d a , the 'moment' can never be ' f u l l 
and s e l f - I d e n t i c a l ' because the s t r u c t u r e of t e m p o r a l i t y , 
being premised on the e s s e n t i a l l y A r i s t o t e l i a n n o t i o n of the 
non-temporal now, of presence as non-temporal because 
Immediate and s e l f - I d e n t i c a l , i s always a l r e a d y f i s s u r e d by 
i t s own i m p o s s i b i l i t y --by i t s 'other.' To put i t another 
way, because time i s d e f i n e d as a l i n e a r (or c i r c u l a r ) number 
of past-nows and future-nows ("It i s the now t h a t measures 
time, c o n s i d e r e d as before and a f t e r " ( A r i s t o t l e , 1987: 125)) 
and because the now as such cannot be r e a l i z e d i n i t s supposed 
s e l f - p r e s e n c e (always being a l r e a d y past or a l r e a d y f u t u r e ) 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u l l and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l moment i s 
p r e c l u d e d by the v e r y t e m p o r a l i t y f o r which i t seeks to 
account. 



55 

i n t e n t i o n , of meaning (to say) and, a 
f o r t i o r i , of a l l adequation between 
meaning and s a y i n g . I t e r a b i l i t y a l t e r s , 
contaminating p a r a s l t l c a l l y what i t 
i d e n t i f i e s and enables to repeat 
" i t s e l f " ; i t leaves us no c h o i c e but to 
mean (to say) something t h a t i s ( a l r e a d y , 
always, a l s o ) other than what we say and 
would have wanted to say, to understand 
something other than . . . e t c . In 
c l a s s i c a l terms, the a c c i d e n t i s never an 
a c c i d e n t . 

( D e r r i d a , 1977b: 199-200) 

In other words, n e i t h e r the 'author' nor the 'book' i s 

p o s s i b l e i n so f a r as e i t h e r presumes to present c l o s e d 

and/or d e f i n i t i v e accounts of anything whatsoever. And there 

can be no c l o s e d d e f i n i t i v e accounts not, as with the 

hermeneutlc n o t i o n of polysemy, because the number of 

p o s s i b l e meanings exceeds the p o s s i b i l i t y of adequate 

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , but because meaning i s always a l r e a d y 

f i s s u r e d — Is always a l r e a d y marked with i t s own e s s e n t i a l 

non-essence. As D e r r i d a says, " I t i s t h i s hermeneutlc 

concept of polysemy t h a t must be r e p l a c e d by d i s s e m i n a t i o n " 

( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 262). 

In P o s i t i o n s , D e r r i d a o f f e r s one of h i s c l e a r e s t 

statements on the problem of polysemy and d i s s e m i n a t i o n : 

I f d i s s e m i n a t i o n , seminal d l f f F r a n c e , 
cannot be summarized i n t o an exact 
conceptual t e n o r , i t i s because the f o r c e 
and form of i t s d i s r u p t i o n explode the 
semantic h o r i z o n . The a t t e n t i o n brought 
to bear on polysemia or polythematism 
d o u b t l e s s r e p r e s e n t s progress i n r e l a -
t i o n s h i p to the l i n e a r i t y of the 



56 

monothematlc w r i t i n g or r e a d i n g t h a t i s 
always anxious to anchor i t s e l f to the 
t u t e l a r y meaning, the p r i n c i p a l s i g n i f i e d 
of a t e x t , t h a t i s , i t s major r e f e r e n t . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , polysemia, as such, i s 
organized w i t h i n the i m p l i c i t h o r i z o n of 
a u n i t a r y resumption of meaning, t h a t i s , 
w i t h i n the h o r i z o n of a d i a l e c t i c s . . . 
a t e l e o l o g i c a l and t o t a l i z i n g d i a l e c t i c s 
t h a t a t a g i v e n moment, however f a r o f f , 
must permit the reassemblage of the 
t o t a l i t y of a t e x t i n t o the t r u t h of i t s 
meaning, c o n s t i t u t i n g the t e x t as 
e x p r e s s i o n , as I l l u s t r a t i o n , and a n n u l -
l i n g the open and p r o d u c t i v e displacement 
of the t e x t u a l c h a i n . D i s s e m i n a t i o n , on 
the c o n t r a r y , although producing a 
n o n f i n i t e number of semantic e f f e c t s , can 
be l e d back n e i t h e r to a present of 
simple o r i g i n . . . nor t o an 
e s c h a t a l o g i c a l presence. I t marks an 
I r r e d u c i b l e and g e n e r a t i v e m u l t i p l i c i t y . 
The supplement and the t u r b u l e n c e of a 
c e r t a i n lack f r a c t u r e the l i m i t of the 
t e x t , f o r b i d d i n g an exhaustive and c l o s e d 
f o r m a l i z a t i o n of i t , or a t l e a s t a 
s a t u r a t i n g taxonomy of i t s themes, i t s 
s i g n i f i e d , i t s meaning. 

( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 45) 

D i s s e m i n a t i o n , l i k e other Derridean 'undecidables,' i n d i c a t e s 

the o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g , the o r i g i n a r y s l i p p a g e and 

displacement, t h a t accounts f o r both the p o s s i b i l i t y and 

i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a c o n c e p t u a l i t y premised upon the n o t i o n of 

presence and i t s concomitant l o g i c of i d e n t i t y ( i . e . the 

p r i n c i p l e of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) . Polysemy, i t s improvement 

over monosemic accountings n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , s t i l l remains 

dependent upon a concept of f r a y e d but u l t i m a t e l y to be fused 

u n i t y . As Gasch6 puts i t : 



57 

D i s s e m i n a t i o n i s the name by which the 
in-advance always a l r e a d y d i v i d e d u n i t y 
i s a f f i r m e d . T h i s in-advance d i v i d e d 
u n i t y of the undecldables i s not the 
polysemic d i s p e r s i o n of a once u n i t a r y 
meaning but . . . an always open ensemble 
of s t r u c t u r e s , presupposed by the p r o j e c t 
of u n i t y and t o t a l i t y and a f f i r m e d by 
r e f l e c t i o n and s p e c u l a t i o n , without t h e i r 
knowledge, as the l i m i t of t h e i r p o s s i -
b i l i t y . The g e n e r a l theory of d u p l i -
c a t i o n or r e d u p l i c a t i o n [ i t e r a b i l i t y ] 
o u t l i n e s . . . the l i m i t s of the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of the 
p h i l o s o p h y of r e f l e x i v i t y — p r e s u p p o s i -
t i o n s of an o r i g i n a l s p o n t a n e i t y , of 
p r o d u c t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n , of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
i n t u i t i o n , and so on. . . . No v i r g i n 
substance or homogeneous and o r g a n i c 
u n i t y precedes or superintends the 
o r i g i n a r y d u p l i c a t i o n and the 'system' of 
the [ u n d e c l d a b l e s ] . The myth of a u n i t y 
i s o n l y an e f f e c t made p o s s i b l e and 
i r r e v o c a b l y undercut by r e f l e c t i o n 
i t s e l f , I n s o f a r as i t must r e l y , i n order 
to take p l a c e i n the f i r s t p l a c e , on what 
i t cannot hope to r e f l e c t . What l i e s 
beyond the m i r r o r , on the other s i d e of 
the speculum, i n the beyond of the 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of the p h i l o s o p h y of 
r e f l e c t i o n -- t h a t i s to say, the 
'system' of the [undecldables] — cannot 
be understood i n terms of u n i t y , 
s y n t h e s i s , t o t a l i t y , and the l i k e . 

(GaschS, 1986: 237) 

D i s s e m i n a t i o n , the c o n s t a n t l y r e p r e s s e d 'other' of 

Western metaphysics, i s the l i m i t l e s s p l a y of o r i g i n a r y 

d i f f e r e n c e which a l l o w s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of presence not 

as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t grounding t o t a l i t y but as an e f f e c t — 

as a by-product of the d i s s e m i n a t i n g p l a y of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , 

i . e . w r i t i n g , t r a c e , d l f f 6 r a n c e , supplement e t c . And, as by 

now w i l l come as no s u r p r i s e , f o r D e r r i d a , 



58 

P l a y Is the d i s r u p t i o n o£ presence. The 
presence of an element i s always a 
s i g n i f y i n g and s u b s t i t u t i v e r e f e r e n c e 
i n s c r i b e d i n a system of d i f f e r e n c e s and 
the movement of a c h a i n . P l a y i s always 
p l a y of absence and presence, but i f i t 
i s to be thought r a d i c a l l y , p l a y must be 
conceived of before the a l t e r n a t i v e of 
presence and absence. Being must be 
conceived as presence or absence on the 
b a s i s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of p l a y and not 
the other way around. 

( D e r r i d a , 19781: 292) 

i n other words, what Is of I n t e r e s t i s not s p e c i f i c concepts, 

themes or philosophemes per se, but the p l a y of the cracks 

and f i s s u r e s w i t h i n them which p r o h i b i t them from ever being 

s e l f - I d e n t i c a l and which ensure, from the o u t s e t , t h a t they 

w i l l always a l r e a d y be i n v o l v e d with s l i p p a g e and 

displacement. As D e r r i d a says, 

From the v e r y beginnings of Greek 
p h i l o s o p h y the s e l f - i d e n t i t y of the Logos 
i s a l r e a d y f i s s u r e d and d i v i d e d . I t h i n k 
one can d i s c e r n s i g n s of such f i s s u r e s of 
' d i f f F r a n c e ' i n every great p h i l o s o p h e r : 
the 'Good beyond Being' (epekelna t e s  
ouslas) of P l a t o ' s R e p u b l i c , f o r example, 
or the c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the 'Stranger' 
i n The S o p h i s t are a l r e a d y t r a c e s of an 
a l t e r l t y which r e f u s e s to be t o t a l l y 
domesticated. Moreover, the r a p p o r t of 
s e l f - i d e n t i t y i s i t s e l f always a r a p p o r t 
of v i o l e n c e with the other; so t h a t the 
n o t i o n s of p r o p e r t y , a p p r o p r i a t i o n and 
s e l f - p r e s e n c e , so c e n t r a l to l o g o c e n t r i c 
metaphysics, are e s s e n t i a l l y dependent on 
an o p p o s i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n with otherness. 
In t h i s sense, i d e n t i t y presupposes 
a l t e r i t y . 

( D e r r i d a i n Kearney, ed., 1984: 117) 



59 

Rather than emphasizing presence and i t s concomitant 

n o t i o n s of homogeneity, the l o g i c of i d e n t i t y , non-

c o n t r a d i c t i o n , the l i n e a r t e l e o l o g y of beginning, middle and 

ending, polysemy and so on, D e r r i d a s t r e s s e s o r i g i n a r y 

d o u b l i n g , h e t e r o g e n e i t y , displacement, and the d i s s e m i n a t i n g 

p l a y of u n d e c i d a b i l l t y . The f o l l o w i n g chapters concern 

themselves with what the Derridean e x p l o r a t i o n of the 

r e p r e s s e d 'other' of Western metaphysics has to say to an 

i n t e r p r e t i v e and/or 'postmodern' anthropology rooted i n 

phenomenological/hermeneutical notions of i n t e r s u b j e c t l v i t y , 

i n t e n t i o n a l l t y , meaning e t c . , and, by e x t e n s i o n , what i t 

portends f o r the p o s s i b l e f u t u r e of the d i s c i p l i n e of 

anthropology i n g e n e r a l . 



Chapter Three 

P h i l o s o p h i c a l Background of I n t e r p r e t i v e and 'Postmodern'  

Anthropology: Phenomenology and Hermeneutlcs 

In order to adequately comprehend the s t a t u s of 

contemporary i n t e r p r e t i v e and/or 'postmodern' anthropology i t 

Is necessary to be acquainted with t h e i r rootedness i n c e r t a i n 

modes of C o n t i n e n t a l thought. Consequently, i n t h i s chapter 

I w i l l attempt to demonstrate t h a t the phenomenology of 

H u s s e r l and the hermeneutlcs of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur 

r e s p e c t i v e l y , are a l l based on such m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of the 

concept of presence as consciousness, u n i t y , t o t a l i t y , 

p l e n i t u d e , d i a l e c t i c , and so on and t h a t , as such, they (and, 

by e x t e n s i o n , t h e i r a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l i n h e r i t o r s ) are open to 

a r a d i c a l d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Obviously, I make no c l a i m to 

coming c l o s e to a d d r e s s i n g a l l the c o m p l e x i t i e s inherent 

w i t h i n the works of any of the aforementioned authors — 

c o n s t a n t l y expanding l i b r a r y s h e l v e s a t t e s t to the 

i m p o s s i b i l i t y of such an endeavour. With r e s p e c t to H u s s e r l , 

Heidegger e t a l . , my concern i s simply to show t h a t s p e c i f i c 

threads of t h e i r r e a s o n i n g , which have woven and continue to 

weave t h e i r way i n t o the f a b r i c of i n t e r p r e t i v e and/or 

'postmodern' anthropology, are prime fodder f o r a 

d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g . In t h i s chapter I w i l l not o f f e r any 

f u l l s c a l e d e c o n s t r u c t i v e readings but, r a t h e r , w i l l d e l i n e a t e 



c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of C o n t i n e n t a l thought t h a t w i l l reappear i n 

my chapter on Geertz and C l i f f o r d and w i l l there be d e a l t 

with i n d e t a i l . 

I PHENOMENOLOGY 

(1) H u s s e r l 

In h i s l a s t work, The C r i s i s of European Sciences and  

Transcendental Phenomenology, H u s s e r l makes an impassioned 

statement concerning the then c u r r e n t s t a t u s (1930's) of the 

n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s : 

The e x c l u s i v e n e s s with which the t o t a l 
world-view of modern [humanity], i n the 
second h a l f of the n i n e t e e n t h century, 
l e t i t s e l f be determined by the p o s i t i v e 
s c i e n c e s and be b l i n d e d by the 
' p r o s p e r i t y ' they produced, meant an 
I n d i f f e r e n t turning-away from the 
q u e s t i o n s which are d e c i s i v e f o r a 
genuine humanity. Merely fact-minded 
s c i e n c e s make merely fact-minded people. 
. . . In our v i t a l need — so we are 
t o l d — t h i s s c i e n c e has nothing to say 
to us. I t excludes i n p r i n c i p l e 
p r e c i s e l y the q u e s t i o n s which [humanity], 
given over i n our unhappy times to the 
most portentous upheavals, f i n d s the most 
burning: q u e s t i o n s of the meaning or 
meaninglessness of the whole of t h i s 
human e x i s t e n c e . Do not these q u e s t i o n s , 
u n i v e r s a l and necessary f o r a l l 
[humanity], demand u n i v e r s a l r e f l e c t i o n s 
and answers based on r a t i o n a l i n s i g h t ? . 
. . . What does s c i e n c e have to say about 
reason and unreason or about us [human 
beings] as s u b j e c t s of t h i s freedom? The 
mere s c i e n c e of bodies c l e a r l y has 
nothing to say; I t a b s t r a c t s from 
e v e r y t h i n g s u b j e c t i v e . As f o r the 
humanistic s c i e n c e s , on the other hand, 
a l l the s p e c i a l and g e n e r a l d i s c i p l i n e s 



62 

of which t r e a t of [humanity's] s p i r i t u a l 
e x i s t e n c e , t h a t i s , w i t h i n the h o r i z o n of 
[ i t s ] h i s t o r i c i t y ; t h e i r r i g o r o u s 
s c i e n t i f i c c h a r a c t e r r e q u i r e s , we are 
t o l d , t h a t the s c h o l a r c a r e f u l l y exclude 
a l l v a l u a t i v e p o s i t i o n s , a l l q u e s t i o n s of 
reason or unreason of t h e i r human s u b j e c t 
matter and i t s c u l t u r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . 
S c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v e t r u t h i s e x c l u s i v e l y 
a matter of e s t a b l i s h i n g what the world, 
the p h y s i c a l as w e l l as the s p i r i t u a l 
world, i s i n f a c t . But can the world, 
and human e x i s t e n c e i n i t , t r u t h f u l l y 
have a meaning i f the s c i e n c e s r e c o g n i z e 
as t r u e o n l y what i s o b j e c t i v e l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d In t h i s f a s h i o n , and i f 
h i s t o r y has nothing more to teach us than 
t h a t a l l the shapes of the s p i r i t u a l 
world, a l l the c o n d i t i o n s of l i f e , 
i d e a l s , norms upon which [humanity] 
r e l i e s , form and d i s s o l v e themselves l i k e 
f l e e t i n g waves, t h a t I t always was and 
ever w i l l be so, t h a t again and a g a i n 
reason must t u r n i n t o nonsense, and w e l l 
being i n t o misery? Can we console 
o u r s e l v e s with t h a t ? Can we l i v e i n t h i s 
world, where h i s t o r i c a l occurrence i s 
nothing but an unending c o n c a t e n a t i o n of 
i l l u s o r y p r o g r e s s and b i t t e r 
disappointment? 

( H u s s e r l , 1970: 6-7) 

H u s s e r l b e l i e v e s t h a t the s c i e n c e s have become so c a r r i e d 

away with t h e i r methodologies and t h e i r f a s c i n a t i o n with 

' f a c t s ' t h a t they have f o r g o t t e n t h e i r s u b j e c t i v e o r i g i n s . 

T h i s f o r g e t t i n g has i n t u r n l e d to the c r e a t i o n of an ever 

widening gap between t e c h n i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n and a c t u a l 

human needs. As a s o l u t i o n to t h i s ' c r i s i s ' H u s s e r l o f f e r s 

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l phenomenology. 

H u s s e r l ' s phenomenology i s meant to provide an 

a b s o l u t e l y sound, because a b s o l u t e l y i n d u b i t a b l e , o n t o l o g i c a l 



foundation f o r eplstemology. H u s s e r l b e l i e v e s t h a t what he 

terms the ' n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e , • the unexamined every-day world 

of taken f o r granted assumptions wherein o b j e c t s appear to 

e x i s t p r i o r to and to impinge upon the p e r c e i v i n g 

consciousness from without, must be s u b j e c t e d to a 

phenomenological epoch6 or r e d u c t i o n . In other words, the 

n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e must be 'bracketed' or suspended and the 

phenomenologist must d e s c r i b e o n l y what appears to her 

consciousness as, and o n l y i n so f a r as, i t appears to her 

c o n s c i o u s n e s s . The p o s s i b i l i t y of a t t a i n i n g to t h i s 'pure' 

form of d e s c r i p t i o n , a d e s c r i p t i o n which i s supposedly 

u n a d u l t e r a t e d by any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Is premised on the 

c o n v i c t i o n t h a t consciousness i s i n t e n t i o n a l — t h a t i s , t h a t 

a l l consciousness intends some o b j e c t , t h a t a l l consciousness 

i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , consciousness o|_ something. As H u s s e r l 

says, "the b a s i c c h a r a c t e r of being as consciousness, as 

consciousness of something, i s i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " ( H u s s e r l i n 

T a y l o r , 1986a: 123). Another way of p u t t i n g t h i s i s to say 

t h a t consciousness i s c o n s t i t u t i v e , i . e . , t h a t , so f a r from 

being a p a s s i v e r e c e p t a c l e (or, & l a Locke, a t a b u l a rasa) 

w a i t i n g to r e c e i v e e x t e r i o r o b j e c t i v e s e n s a t i o n s , 

consciousness a c t u a l l y produces o b j e c t i v e s e n s a t i o n s . In 

other words, o b j e c t i v i t y , as such, i s a s u b j e c t i v e c o n s t r u c t . 

T h i s being the case, the phenomenologlcally reduced 

consciousness i s immediately and unmediatedly present to i t s 



i n t e n t i o n a l phenomena, thus a l l o w i n g f o r p r i s t i n e 

d e s c r i p t i o n . 

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , f o r a l l h i s r a d i c a l i z i n g of C a r t e s i a n 

doubt (e.g. h i s emphasis on the i n t e n t i o n a l or c o n s t i t u t i v e 

nature of consciousness with the attendant c o l l a p s i n g of the 

res c o g l t a n s / r e s extensa d i s t i n c t i o n ) , H u s s e r l never attempts 

to doubt or bracket the phenomenologically reduced 

consciousness or what he a l t e r n a t e l y r e f e r s to as the 

'transcendental s u b j e c t ' and/or ' p r i m o r d i a l i n t u i t i o n ' 2 3 : 

No theory we can conceive can mislead us 
In regard to the p r i n c i p l e of a l l  
p r i n c i p l e s : t h a t every p r i m o r d i a l dator  
I n t u i t i o n i s a source of a u t h o r i t y  
( R e c h t s q u e l l e ) f o r knowledge, t h a t 
whatever p r e s e n t s I t s e l f i n ' i n t u i t i o n ' 
[consciousness] i n p r i m o r d i a l form (as i t 
were i n i t s b o d i l y r e a l i t y ) , is. simply to  
be accepted as i t g i v e s I t s e l f out to be, 
though o n l y w i t h i n the l i m i t s i n which i t  
then presents I t s e l f . 

( H u s s e r l i n D e r r i d a , 1973b: 62) 

Taking the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t as the o n l y i n d u b i t a b l e 

g i v e n , H u s s e r l proceeds to show how i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 

c o n s t i t u t i n g ' r e a l i t y ' as we know and accept i t i n the common 

sense world of the n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e . I t i s important to 

2 3 In order to a v o i d c o n f u s i o n , f o r the d u r a t i o n of t h i s 
s e c t i o n on H u s s e r l , I w i l l use the term 'transcendental 
s u b j e c t ' r a t h e r than ' p r i m o r d i a l i n t u i t i o n ' or 
'phenomenologically reduced c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ' However, the 
reader should bear i n mind t h a t these terms are 
i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e . 



understand t h a t H u s s e r l b e l i e v e s t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i v e nature 

o£ the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t r e s u l t s i n the emergence of 

' i n v a r i a n t e s s e n t i a l forms' which a l l o w f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y 

of knowledge and which i t i s the purpose of phenomenological 

r e d u c t i o n to r e v e a l : 

. . . the phenomenology of p e r c e p t i o n of 
bodies w i l l not be (simply) a r e p o r t on 
the f a c t u a l l y o c c u r r i n g ' p e r c e p t i o n s or 
those to be expected; r a t h e r i t w i l l be 
the p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n v a r i a n t s t r u c t u r a l 
systems without which p e r c e p t i o n of a 
body and a s y n t h e t i c a l l y concordant 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of p e r c e p t i o n s of one and 
the same body as such would be 
u n t h i n k a b l e . I f the phenomenological 
r e d u c t i o n c o n t r i v e d a means of access to 
the phenomenon of r e a l and a l s o p o t e n t i a l 
inner experience, the method founded i n 
i t of " e i d e t i c r e d u c t i o n " p r o v i d e s the 
means of access to the i n v a r i a n t 
e s s e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e s of the t o t a l sphere 
of pure mental p r o c e s s . 

( H u s s e r l i n T a y l o r , 1986a: 126-127) 

In other words, through b r a c k e t i n g out the taken f o r granted 

world and by r e d u c i n g supposedly c o n c r e t e l y e x i s t i n g 

s e n s a t i o n s and/or o b j e c t s to i n t e n t i o n a l phenomena — to t h a t 

which i s a product of the i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i v i t y of a 

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t , H u s s e r l i s able to p o s i t the a p r i o r i 

e x i s t e n c e of i n v a r i a n t e s s e n t i a l forms or s t r u c t u r e s which, 

as such, c o n s t i t u t e an i d e a l o b j e c t i v i t y and which a l l o w f o r 

the p o s s i b i l i t y of the everyday l i f e of the n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e . 

However, one must never f o r g e t t h a t t h i s seeming o b j e c t i v i t y 



Is f i r s t and foremost a s u b j e c t i v i t y as i t can, by 

d e f i n i t i o n , have no e x i s t e n c e a p a r t from the c o n s t i t u t i n g 

a c t i v i t y of the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t . 

H u s s e r l i s not unaware t h a t he o f t e n appears to run the 

r i s k of becoming mired i n s o l i p s i s m . I f e v e r y t h i n g i s the 

consequence of the c o n s t i t u t i n g work of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 

s u b j e c t i v i t y , i f i n order to know anything one must reduce, 

the world to the workings of one's own consciousness, how can 

one ever be c e r t a i n of the a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e of anything 

o u t s i d e of one's own mind? 2' H u s s e r l attempts to d e a l with 

t h i s problem through the n o t i o n of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y : 

The r e d u c t i v e method i s t r a n s f e r r e d from 
s e l f - e x p e r i e n c e to the experience of 
other i n s o f a r as there can be a p p l i e d to 
the envisaged . . . mental l i f e of the 
Other the corresponding b r a c k e t i n g and 
d e s c r i p t i o n a c c o r d i n g to the s u b j e c t i v e 
"How" of i t s appearance and what Is 
appearing. . . . As a f u r t h e r conse-
quence, the community t h a t i s experienced 
i n community experience i s reduced not 
o n l y to the m e n t a l l y p a r t i c u l a r i z e d 
i n t e n t i o n a l f i e l d s but a l s o to the u n i t y 
of the community l i f e t h a t connects them 
a l l t o g e t h e r , the community l i f e i n i t s 
phenomenological p u r i t y ( i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e 
r e d u c t i o n ) . . . . 

2 6 At t h i s p o i n t i t does not hurt to r e c a l l t h a t , f o r 
H u s s e r l , pure e x p r e s s i o n — pure meaning as such, can o n l y 
occur w i t h i n ' s o l i t a r y mental l i f e ' ( H u s s e r l i n M u e l l e r - V o l l m e r 
ed., 1988: 173). A c c o r d i n g to H u s s e r l , o u t s i d e of the inner 
workings of consciousness, 'expression' i s always Interwoven 
with ' I n d i c a t i o n ' and hence 'meaning' can o n l y be intimated -
- i t cannot be experienced i n i t s pure form. (In Speech and  
Phenomena D e r r i d a p r o v i d e s an extended d e c o n s t r u c t i v e reading 
of H u s s e r l ' s use of 'expression* and ' i n d i c a t i o n . ' ) 



67 

To every mind there belongs not o n l y 
the u n i t y of i t s m u l t i p l e i n t e n t i o n a l  
l i f e - p r o c e s s . . . with a l l i t s 
i n s e p a r a b l e u n i t i e s of sense d i r e c t e d 
towards the " o b j e c t . " There i s a l s o , 
i n s e p a r a b l e from t h i s l i f e - p r o c e s s , the 
e x p e r i e n c i n g I - s u b j e c t as the i d e n t i c a l 
I-pole g i v i n g a center f o r a l l s p e c i f i c 
i n t e n t i o n a l i t i e s , and as the c a r r i e r of 
a l l h a b i t u a l i t i e s growing out of t h i s 
l i f e - p r o c e s s . L i k e w i s e , then, the 
reduced i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , i n pure form 
and c o n c r e t e l y grasped, i s a community of 
pure "persons" a c t i n g i n the 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e realm of the pure l i f e of 
consciousness. 

( H u s s e r l i n T a y l o r , 1986a: 125-126) 

Yet a l l of the above must, by H u s s e r l ' s own ' p r i n c i p l e of 

p r i n c i p l e s , ' s t i l l be premised upon, and hence merely a 

p r o j e c t i o n of, the I n d i v i d u a l t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t or 

c o n s c i o u s n e s s . For H u s s e r l , the other must remain an 

e x t e n s i o n and r e f l e c t i o n of the s e l f . As a p h i l o s o p h y of 

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y , Husserlean phenomenology can no 

more bequeath o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e to other s u b j e c t i v i t i e s 

than i t can bequeath o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e to any f e a t u r e of 

the taken f o r granted world. 

A b r i e f look a t D e r r i d a ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n of H u s s e r l * s 

n o t i o n of inner time consciousness p r o v i d e s c o n s i d e r a b l e 

i n s i g h t i n t o phenomenology's i n a b i l i t y to remain t r u e to i t s 

own g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s . According to H u s s e r l , "the a c t u a l 

now i s n e c e s s a r i l y something punctual ( e i n P u n k t u e l l e s ) and 

remains so, a form t h a t p e r s i s t s through continuous change of  

matter" (Husserl i n D e r r i d a , 1973b: 62). In order to account 



68 

f o r the seeming c o n t i n u i t y of events as p e r c e i v e d by 

consciousness H u s s e r l p o s i t s the idea of r e t e n t i o n and 

p r o t e n t i o n — t h a t i s , past nows and f u t u r e nows. However, 

H u s s e r l i s a t pains to underscore the necessary and e s s e n t i a l 

p r i o r i t y of the ' a c t u a l ' or present now: "[The a c t u a l ] now-

apprehension i s , as i t were, the nucleus of a comet's t a i l of 

r e t e n t i o n s [and] a punctual phase i s a c t u a l l y present as now 

a t any g i v e n moment, while the others are connected as a 

r e t e n t i o n a l t r a i n " ( H u s s e r l i n D e r r i d a , 1973b: 62) (emphasis 

mine). Remembering t h a t the e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e of 

phenomenology r e s t s on a n o t i o n of the o r i g i n a r y and 

i n d u b i t a b l e s e l f - p r e s e n c e of the c o n s t i t u t i v e consciousness 

which, by d e f i n i t i o n , can o n l y e x i s t i n an Immediate and 

unmediated present, one can see t h a t H u s s e r l ' s concept of 

r e t e n t i o n a l and p r o t e n t i o n a l components of the now shakes h i s 

whole e d i f i c e of thought. As D e r r i d a says, 

. . . we cannot a v o i d n o t i c i n g t h a t a . 

. . concept of the "now," of the present 
as p u n c t u a l i t y of the i n s t a n t , 
d e c i s i v e l y s a n c t i o n s [ H u s s e r l ' s ] whole 
system. . . . I f the p u n c t u a l i t y of the 
i n s t a n t i s a myth, a s p a t i a l or 
mechanical metaphor, an i n h e r i t e d 
metaphysical concept, or a l l t h a t a t 
once, and i f the present of s e l f - p r e s e n c e 
i s not simple, i f i t i s c o n s t i t u t e d i n a 
p r i m o r d i a l and i r r e d u c i b l e s y n t h e s i s , 
then the whole of H u s s e r l ' s argumentation 
i s threatened i n i t s very p r i n c i p l e . 

( D e r r i d a , 1973b: 61) 



69 

l£ the present now must be supplemented by a past now In 

order to be known as such, then the present now i s not and 

cannot be a b s o l u t e — i t s p o s s i b i l i t y i s c o n s t i t u t e d by i t s 

i m p o s s i b i l i t y as a pure s e l f - i d e n t i c a l concept. I d e n t i t y , as 

such, i s always a l r e a d y contaminated by d i f f e r e n c e . As 

D e r r i d a puts i t , 

. . . d i f f e r e n c e , which c o n s t i t u t e s the 
s e l f - p r e s e n c e of the l i v i n g present, 
i n t r o d u c e s i n t o s e l f - p r e s e n c e from the 
beginning a l l the i m p u r i t y p u t a t i v e l y 
excluded from I t . The l i v i n g present 
s p r i n g s f o r t h out of i t s n o n i d e n t i t y with 
i t s e l f and from the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
r e t e n t i o n a l t r a c e . I t i s always a l r e a d y 
a t r a c e . T h i s t r a c e cannot be thought 
out on the b a s i s of a simple present 
whose l i f e would be w i t h i n i t s e l f ; the 
s e l f of the l i v i n g present i s 
p r l m o r d i a l l y a t r a c e . 

( D e r r i d a , 1973b: 85) 

In the form of a b e l i e f i n p r i m o r d i a l i n t u i t i o n / 

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y / c o n s t i t u t i v e consciousness 

H u s s e r l ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l phenomenology expresses i t s e l f as a 

p h i l o s o p h y of presence. As D e r r i d a says, 

what i s s i g n i f i e d by 
p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' s " p r i n c i p l e o f 
p r i n c i p l e s " ? What does the value of 
p r i m o r d i a l presence to i n t u i t i o n as 
source of sense and evidence, as the a 
p r i o r i of a p r l o r i s , s i g n i f y ? F i r s t of 
a l l i t s i g n i f i e s the c e r t a i n t y , I t s e l f 
i d e a l and a b s o l u t e , t h a t the u n i v e r s a l 
form of a l l experience ( E r l i b n i s ) , and 
t h e r e f o r e of a l l l i f e , has always been 
and w i l l always be the p r e s e n t . The 



70 

present alone Is and ever w i l l be. Being 
i s presence or the m o d i f i c a t i o n of 
presence. 

( D e r r i d a , 1973b: 53) 

As with a l l p h i l o s o p h i e s of presence, phenomenology cannot be 

e x t r i c a t e d from n o t i o n s of the a b s o l u t e , of a r e t u r n to a 

p r i s t i n e o r i g i n , of essence, of t e l e o l o g y and so on. As 

H u s s e r l says, 

In phenomenology a l l r a t i o n a l 
problems have t h e i r p l a c e . . . . For out 
of the a b s o l u t e sources of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
experience . . . they f i r s t [are a b l e to] 
o b t a i n t h e i r genuine f o r m u l a t i o n and 
f e a s i b l e means f o r t h e i r s o l u t i o n . . . . 
[Phenomenology] r e c o g n i z e s the a b s o l u t e 
norms which are to be p i c k e d out 
i n t u i t i v e l y . . . and a l s o i t s p r i m o r d i a l 
t e l e o l o g l c a l - t e n d e n t l a l s t r u c t u r e i n a 
d i r e c t e d n e s s towards d i s c l o s u r e of these 
norms and t h e i r conscious p r a c t i c a l 
o p e r a t i o n s . . . . The t r a c i n g back of a l l  
being to the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y  
and i t s c o n s t i t u t i v e i n t e n t i o n a l  
f u n c t i o n s leaves open . . . no other way 
of contemplating the world than the 
t e l e o l o g i c a l . 

( H u s s e r l i n T a y l o r , 1986a: 138-140) 
(emphasis H u s s e r l ' s and mine) 

And, a g a i n , as with a l l p h i l o s o p h i e s of presence, 

phenomenology n e c e s s i t a t e s and r e i n f o r c e s a whole s e r i e s of 

h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r s such as s u b j e c t / 

o b j e c t , s e l f / o t h e r , essence/contingence, i d e n t i t y / d i f f e r e n c e , 

e t c . wherein the l a t t e r term of each p a i r i s viewed as a 

c o r r u p t i o n of the former, thus e n s u r i n g the s u p p r e s s i o n of 



71 

d i f f e r e n c e and/or otherness. As T a y l o r says, 

The a b s o l u t e knowledge made p o s s i b l e by 
the phenomenological r e d u c t i o n of 
d i f f e r e n c e to i d e n t i t y i n s u b j e c t i v i t y ' s 
f u l l knowledge of i t s e l f r e a l i z e s Western 
p h i l o s o p h y ' s dream of e n j o y i n g a t o t a l 
presence t h a t i s undisturbed by absence 
or l a c k . 

( T a y l o r , 1986b: 3) 

II HERMENEUTICS 

( i ) Background 

The term 'hermeneutics' comes from the Greek words 

•hermeneuein,' u s u a l l y t r a n s l a t e d as 'to i n t e r p r e t , ' and 

'hermeneia,' u s u a l l y t r a n s l a t e d as ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . ' As 

R i c h a r d Palmer p o i n t s out, 'hermeneuein' and 'hermeneia' 

taken together with 'hermeios' (the p r i e s t at the D e l p h i c 

o r a c l e ) r e f e r s back t o , 

the wing-footed messenger-god 
Hermes, from whose name the words are 
a p p a r e n t l y d e r i v e d (or v i c e v e r s a ? ) . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Hermes i s a s s o c i a t e d with 
the f u n c t i o n of t r a n s m i t t i n g what i s 
beyond human understanding i n t o a form 
t h a t human i n t e l l i g e n c e can grasp. The 
v a r i o u s forms of t h i s word suggest the 
process of b r i n g i n g a t h i n g or s i t u a t i o n 
from u n l n t e l l i g i b i l i t y to understanding. 

(Palmer, 1969: 13) 



Hermeneutlcs, as such, Is u s u a l l y t r a c e d to the 

seventeenth century, a t which time i t was p e r c e i v e d to be a 

form of b i b l i c a l e x e g e s i s . In the l a t e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y 

and e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y hermeneutlcs was focussed upon 

the p h i l o l o g i c a l researches of Wolf and Ast and In the 

n i n e t e e n t h century Schleiermacher attempted to e l e v a t e 

hermeneutlcs to the s t a t u s of a s c i e n c e of understanding 

through p r o v i d i n g a method by which the reader could 

comprehend the meaning of a g i v e n t e x t through an empathetlc 

understanding of i t s author's I n t e n t i o n s . However, i t was 

Wilhelm D i l t h e y who f i r s t attempted to ground the human 

s c i e n c e s on a n o t i o n of hermeneutical understanding. 

D i l t h e y b e l i e v e d t h a t , whereas the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s may 

ground themselves on an e x p l a n a t i o n of f a c t , the human 

s c i e n c e s must ground themselves on an understanding of 

meaning. L i k e Schleiermacher, D i l t h e y b e l i e v e d t h a t i t was 

p o s s i b l e to r e c o n s t r u c t and hence to r e - e x p e r i e n c e another 

person's inner c o n s c i o u s n e s s . As Palmer says, " I t was 

D l l t h e y ' s aim to develop methods of g a i n i n g ' o b j e c t i v e l y 

v a l i d ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of 'expressions of inner l i f e ' " 

(Palmer, 1969: 98). For D i l t h e y , 'understanding' i s an 

e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l n o t i o n which has to do with the k n o w a b i l i t y 

of the products of one human mind through "a mysterious 

process of mental t r a n s f e r " (Palmer, 1969: 104) to another 

human mind. T h i s mental t r a n s f e r takes p l a c e through the 

p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n t u i t i v e understanding of human 



p r o d u c t i o n s , be they t e x t s or v i s u a l a r t s or whatever. Thus 

Palmer quotes D i l t h e y as f o l l o w s : "above a l l . . . the 

g r a s p i n g of the s t r u c t u r e of the inner l i f e i s based on the 

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of works, works i n which the t e x t u r e of inner 

l i f e comes f u l l y to e x p r e s s i o n " ( D i l t h e y i n Palmer, 1969: 

114). And, a c c o r d i n g to D i l t h e y , such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 

would be ' o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d ' because these 'works' are as 

o b j e c t i v e l y e x i s t i n g as i s anything e l s e — t h e r e f o r e i t i s 

j u s t as p o s s i b l e f o r a hermeneutlc i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a 

w r i t t e n t e x t to 'get i t r i g h t ' as i t i s f o r a s c i e n t i f i c 

e x p l a n a t i o n of a g e o l o g i c a l formation. The d i f f e r e n c e l i e s 

i n the o b j e c t s under study r a t h e r than i n the o b j e c t i v e 

v a l i d i t y of the r e s u l t s of the i n q u i r y . 

L i k e Wolf, Ast and Schleiermacher before him, D i l t h e y 

makes use of the 'hermeneutlc c i r c l e ' wherein the p a r t s are 

understood i n r e l a t i o n to the whole and the whole i s 

understood i n r e l a t i o n to i t s p a r t s . I t i s a t a c k i n g back 

and f o r t h between whole and p a r t s t h a t allows understanding 

to determine the s p e c i f i c meaning of any g i v e n work: 

. the sentence f u r n i s h e s a c l e a r 
example of the i n t e r a c t i o n of the whole 
and p a r t s and the need f o r both: out of 
the meaning of i n d i v i d u a l p a r t s i s 
y i e l d e d an understanding of the sense of 
the whole, which i n t u r n changes the 
indeterminateness of the words i n t o a 
f i x e d and meaningful p a t t e r n . D i l t h e y 
c i t e s t h i s example and then a s s e r t s t h a t 
the same r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between the 
p a r t s and the whole of one's l i f e . The 
meaning of the whole i s a 'sense' 



74 

d e r i v e d from the meaning of i n d i v i d u a l 
p a r t s . An event or experience can so 
a l t e r our l i v e s t h a t what was f o r m e r l y 
meaningful becomes meaningless and an 
a p p a r e n t l y unimportant past experience 
may take on meaning i n r e t r o s p e c t . The 
sense of the whole determines the 
f u n c t i o n and the meaning of the p a r t s . 
And meaning i s something h i s t o r i c a l ; i t 
i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p of whole to p a r t s seen 
by us from a g i v e n s t a n d p o i n t , at a given 
time, f o r a g i v e n combination of p a r t s . 
I t i s not something above or o u t s i d e 
h i s t o r y but a p a r t of a hermeneutlc 
c i r c l e always h i s t o r i c a l l y d e f i n e d . 

(Palmer, 1969: 118) 

D i l t h e y ' s hermeneutics i s premised on a p h i l o s o p h y of 

consciousness — on the idea t h a t the 'inner l i f e ' of the 

human mind e x i s t s as a knowable e n t i t y and i s understandable 

as such. His n o t i o n of ' o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d ' knowledge i s a 

d i r e c t r e s u l t of h i s b e l i e f t h a t human works can be 

c o n t e x t u a l i z e d i n t o c o n c r e t e l y d e f i n a b l e p a r t s and wholes 

whose r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r a c t i o n accounts f o r the a t t a i n a b i l i t y 

of h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c meanings. His concern i s 

fundamentally e p i s t e m o l o g l c a l , i . e . to provide a method 

whereby the s c i e n c e s may a s p i r e to the achievement of 

o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d knowledge. I t i s M a r t i n Heidegger who 

f i r s t attempts to provide an o n t o l o g i c a l grounding f o r the 

hermeneutlc p r o j e c t . 

( i i ) Heidegger 

Heidegger had been a student of Edmund H u s s e r l and, 

indeed, a t one time the l a t t e r e n t e r t a i n e d the hope t h a t the 



former would c a r r y on h i s work. However, as i s o f t e n the 

case, the student proved to be a major disappointment to the 

t e a c h e r . Heidegger c o u l d accept n e i t h e r H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n of 

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y with i t s r o o t s i n human 

consciousness nor h i s hope f o r the development of 

phenomenology as a 'rigorous s c i e n c e . ' A c c o r d i n g to 

Heidegger, Western metaphysics took a wrong t u r n when i t 

ceased to take the P r e s o c r a t i c q u e s t i o n i n g of 'Being' 

s e r i o u s l y . 

T h i s q u e s t i o n has today been f o r g o t t e n -
- although our time c o n s i d e r s I t s e l f 
p r o g r e s s i v e i n a g a i n a f f i r m i n g 
'metaphysics.' . . . . And what then was 
wrested from phenomena by the h i g h e s t 
e x e r t i o n of t h i n k i n g , a l b e i t i n fragments 
and f i r s t - b e g i n n i n g s , has long s i n c e been 
t r i v i a l i z e d . 

Not o n l y t h a t . On the foundation of 
the Greek p o i n t of departure f o r the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Being a dogmatic 
a t t i t u d e has taken shape which not o n l y 
d e c l a r e s the q u e s t i o n of the meaning of 
Being to be s u p e r f l u o u s but s a n c t i o n s i t s 
n e g l e c t . I t i s s a i d t h a t "Being" i s the 
most u n i v e r s a l and the emptiest concept. 
As such i t r e s i s t s every attempt a t 
d e f i n i t i o n . Nor does t h i s most u n i v e r s a l 
and thus i n d e f i n a b l e concept need any 
d e f i n i t i o n . Everybody uses I t c o n s t a n t l y 
and a l s o a l r e a d y understands what he 
means by i t . Thus what made a n c i e n t 
p h i l o s o p h i z i n g uneasy and kept I t so by 
v i r t u e of i t s o b s c u r i t y has become 
obvious, c l e a r as day; and t h i s to the 
p o i n t t h a t whoever pursues i t i s accused 
of an e r r o r of'method. 

(Heidegger, 1962: 2) 



Heidegger maintains t h a t Western metaphysics has an 

e s s e n t i a l l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l programme and t h a t , consequently, 

i t ' f o r g e t s ' to ask the fundamentally o n t o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n of 

the meaning of Being, of the d i f f e r e n c e between being and 

B e i n g . 2 7 He d i s a g r e e s with H u s s e r l ' s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of the 

e x i s t e n c e of p r i m o r d i a l i n t u i t i o n and maintains t h a t , so f a r 

from being a c o n s t i t u t i v e s u b j e c t i v i t y , Daseln ( l i t e r a l l y 

'there-being,' o f t e n l o o s e l y t r a n s l a t e d as 'human being') i s 

'thrown' i n t o a world t h a t i s always a l r e a d y t h e r e . 

Knowledge, as such, i s a secondary phenomenon — what i s 

primary i s Dasein's i n t r i n s i c involvement with 'being i n the 

world, ' an involvement which Heidegger c h a r a c t e r i z e s as 

•concern' and/or 'care.' i t i s t h i s p r i m o r d i a l Involvement 

with the world (world being d e f i n e d as the whole i n which 

Dasein i s always a l r e a d y i n v o l v e d and always a l r e a d y 

preunderstands) t h a t metaphysics, i n i t s concern with 

•Knowledge,' f o r g e t s . 

In Being and Time Heidegger attempts to get to the 

q u e s t i o n of the meaning of Being through an a n a l y s i s of 

Dasein — t h a t being whose s p e c i a l o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s i s 

c o n s t i t u t e d by i t s awareness of Being. T h i s mindfulness of 

the problem of Being i s a f e a t u r e of Dasein's temporal 

nature, i . e . i t s awareness of past, present and f u t u r e as 

2 7 Very roughly, 'being' r e f e r s to the c o n c r e t e l y e x i s t i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l whereas 'Being' r e f e r s to the mystery of the 
' i s n e s s ' of e x i s t e n c e . ( S t e i n e r , 1980: 26) 



c o i n c i d e n t a l with i t s 

Heidegger emphasizes 

examination of Dasein: 

awareness of i t s own 

the hermeneutic nature 

f i n i t u d e . 

of h i s 

In e x p l a i n i n g the tasks of ontology we 
found i t necessary t h a t there should be 
a fundamental ontology t a k i n g as i t s 
theme t h a t e n t i t y which i s o n t o l o g i c o -
o n t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t i v e , Dasein, i n order 
to c o n f r o n t the c a r d i n a l problem -- the 
q u e s t i o n of the meaning of Being i n 
g e n e r a l . Our i n v e s t i g a t i o n i t s e l f w i l l 
show t h a t the meaning of phenomenological 
d e s c r i p t i o n as a method l i e s i n 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The logos of the 
phenomenology of Dasein has the c h a r a c t e r 
of hermeneuein, through which the 
a u t h e n t i c meaning of Being, and a l s o 
those b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s of Being which 
Dasein i t s e l f possesses, are made known 
to Dasein's understanding of Being. The 
phenomenology of Dasein i s a hermeneutlc 
In the p r i m o r d i a l s i g n i f i c a t i o n of the 
word, where i t d e s i g n a t e s t h i s business 
of i n t e r p r e t i n g . 

(Heidegger, 1962: 61-62) 

Before l o o k i n g at Heidegger's v e r s i o n of the hermeneutic 

c i r c l e i t i s necessary to grasp what he has to say about 

understanding and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . For Heidegger, 

understanding i s an e q u i p r l m o r d l a l f e a t u r e of Dasein's b e i n g -

i n - t h e - w o r l d and, f u r t h e r , "understanding has i n I t s e l f the 

e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e which we c a l l ' p r o j e c t i o n ' (Heidegger, 

1962: 184-185). In other words, Dasein, by d e f i n i t i o n , 

always has a pre-understanding of any given s i t u a t i o n and, as 

p r o j e c t i o n r e f e r s to p o t e n t i a l , "Dasein always has understood 



78 

i t s e l f and always w i l l understand i t s e l f i n terms of 

p o s s i b i l i t i e s " (Heidegger, 1962: 185). I n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the 

development and a r t i c u l a t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s p r o j e c t e d 

by understanding. As Heidegger says, 

The p r o j e c t i n g of the understanding we 
c a l l " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . " In i t the 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e s 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g l y t h a t which i s understood 
by i t . In i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , understanding 
does not become something d i f f e r e n t . I t 
becomes i t s e l f . Such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
grounded e x i s t e n t l a l l y In understanding; 
the l a t t e r does not a r i s e from the 
former. Nor i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the 
a c q u i r i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n about what i s 
understood; i t i s r a t h e r the working-out 
of p o s s i b i l i t i e s p r o j e c t e d i n 
understanding. 

(Heidegger, 1962: 188-189) 

For Heidegger, an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s not a framework which we 

superimpose upon an o b j e c t i v e l y e x i s t i n g world but a 

d i s c l o s u r e or r e t r i e v a l of Dasein's pre-understanding of i t s 

always a l r e a d y o c c u r r i n g involvement with the world. As 

Heidegger puts i t , 

In i n t e r p r e t i n g , we do not, so to speak, 
throw a ' s i g n i f i c a t i o n ' over some naked 
t h i n g which i s present-at-hand, we do not 
s t i c k a value on i t ; but when something 
w i t h i n - t h e - w o r l d i s encountered as such, 
the t h i n g i n q u e s t i o n a l r e a d y has an 
involvement which i s d i s c l o s e d i n our 
understanding of the world, and t h i s 
involvement i s one which gets l a i d out by 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 

(Heidegger, 1962: 190-191) 



79 

I n t e r p r e t a t i o n enables us to view the 1 ready-to-hand' world 

o£ the understanding as. c o n s t i t u t e d by v a r i o u s o b j e c t s such 

as t a b l e s , c h a i r s e t c . Heidegger r e f e r s to t h i s as the 'as  

s t r u c t u r e ' o£ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which, as w i l l p r e s e n t l y become 

c l e a r , i s i n t i m a t e l y i n v o l v e d with the f o r e - s t r u c t u r e s of 

understanding. 

Heidegger p o s i t s three f o r e s t r u c t u r e s which belong to 

the realm of understanding and which a l l o w f o r I t s 

development i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — f o r e - h a v i n g , f o r e - s i g h t and 

f o r e - c o n c e p t i o n . As these are c r u c i a l concepts with r e s p e c t 

to Heidegger's n o t i o n of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I w i l l quote him at 

l e n g t h . 

The ready-to-hand i s always 
understood i n terms of a t o t a l i t y of 
involvements. T h i s t o t a l i t y need not be 
grasped e x p l i c i t l y by a thematic 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Even i f i t has undergone 
such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t recedes i n t o 
an understanding which does not stand out 
from the background. And t h i s i s the 
v e r y mode i n which i t i s the e s s e n t i a l 
foundation f o r everyday c i r c u m s p e c t i v e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In every case t h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s grounded i n something  
we have i n advance — i n a f o r e - h a v i n g . 
As the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of understanding, 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n operates i n Being 
towards a t o t a l i t y of Involvements which 
i s a l r e a d y understood — a Being which 
understands. When something i s 
understood but s t i l l v e i l e d , i t becomes 
u n v e i l e d by an a c t of a p p r o p r i a t i o n , and 
t h i s i s always done under the guidance of 
a p o i n t of view, which f i x e s t h a t with 
regard to which what i s understood i s 
i n t e r p r e t e d . In e v e r y c a s e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s grounded In something 



80 

ve see In advance — i n a f o r e - s i g h t . 
T h i s f o r e - s i g h t 'takes the f i r s t c u t ' out 
of what has been taken i n t o our f o r e -
having, and I t does so with a view to a 
d e f i n i t e way i n which t h i s can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d . Anything understood which 
i s held i n our f o r e - h a v i n g and towards 
which we s e t our s i g h t s ' f o r e s i g h t e d l y , ' 
becomes c o n c e p t u a l i z a b l e through the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In s u c h an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the way i n which the 
e n t i t y we are i n t e r p r e t i n g i s to be 
conceived can be drawn from the e n t i t y 
i t s e l f , or the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can f o r c e 
the e n t i t y i n t o concepts to which i t i s 
opposed In i t s manner of Being. In 
e i t h e r case, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has 
a l r e a d y decided f o r a d e f i n i t e way of 
c o n c e i v i n g i t , e i t h e r with f i n a l i t y or 
with r e s e r v a t i o n ; i t i s grounded i n 
something we grasp i n advance — i n a 
f o r e - c o n c e p t i o n . 

(Heidegger, 1962: 191) 

Thus the ' a s - s t r u c t u r e ' of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the working out 

of the p r o j e c t e d ' f o r e - s t r u c t u r e s ' of understanding which, i n 

t u r n , a l l o w f o r Heidegger's n o t i o n of meaning as "the 'upon  

which' of a p r o j e c t i o n i n terms of which something becomes  

i n t e l l i g i b l e as something; i t gets i t s s t r u c t u r e from a f o r e - 

having, and a f o r e - c o n c e p t I o n . In so f a r as understanding 

and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n make up the e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t e of Being of 

the 'there,' 'meaning' must be conceived as the f o r m a l -

e x i s t e n t i a l framework of the d i s c l o s e d n e s s which belongs to 

understanding" (Heidegger, 1962: 193). In other words, 

'meaning' i s not something which e x i s t s i n some form o u t s i d e 

of Dasein — i t i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , c o n s t i t u t e d by and 



81 

r e s t r i c t e d to the h i s t o r i c a l h o r i z o n of Daseln's p r o j e c t e d 

understanding i n the form of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 

By now i t should be c l e a r t h a t the Being of Dasein, 

along with being fundamentally temporal, i s e s s e n t i a l l y 

c i r c u l a r . As Heidegger says, 

The ' c i r c l e ' In understanding belongs to 
the s t r u c t u r e of meaning, and the l a t t e r 
phenomenon i s rooted i n the e x i s t e n t i a l 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of Dasein — t h a t i s , i n the 
understanding which i n t e r p r e t s . An 
e n t i t y f o r which, as B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , 
i t s Being i s i t s e l f an i s s u e , has, 
o n t o l o g i c a l l y , a c i r c u l a r s t r u c t u r e . 

(Heidegger, 1962: 195) 

Thus the always a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g pre-understanding of Dasein 

p r o j e c t s i t s e l f toward f u t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s which can o n l y 

be a u t h e n t i c a l l y 2 8 r e a l i z e d by d i s c l o s i n g the always a l r e a d y 

having been of p r i m o r d i a l understanding. L i k e T.s. E l i o t , we 

go forward i n order to come back p r o p e r l y : 

We s h a l l not cease from e x p l o r a t i o n 
And the end of a l l our e x p l o r i n g 
W i l l be to a r r i v e where we s t a r t e d 
And know the p l a c e f o r the f i r s t time. 

( E l i o t , 1963: 222) 

John Caputo p r o v i d e s a s u c c i n c t synopsis of the c i r c u l a r i t y 

of Dasein: 

2 8 In Heidegger ' a u t h e n t i c i t y ' has to do with Daseln's 
r e c o g n i t i o n of, and being i n harmony with, Being whereas 
' l n a u t h e n t i c l t y ' has to do with Daseln's f o r g e t t i n g of Being. 



82 

As an ' e x i s t i n g ' being ( i n the 
K l e r k e g a a r d i a n sense), the meaning of 
Dasein i s to move forward, to press ahead 
toward i t s a u t h e n t i c f u t u r e . But t h i s 
forward movement i s taken by Heidegger to 
be at one and the same time a movement 
back to the being t h a t Dasein a l l along 
has been. The movement forward i s thus 
a l s o a movement of r e c o v e r y or r e t r i e v a l . 
. . . Heidegger . . . g i v e s a s p e c i a l 
p l a y to the ' c i r c u l a r ' movement of 
Dasein's Being i n Being and Time l i n k i n g 
i n an o n t o l o g i c a l loop Dasein's forward 
and backward movement, I t s f u t u r a l 
p r o j e c t i o n and i t s a l r e a d y having been. 
Wlederholung i n Being and Time means a 
r e p e t i t i o n / r e t r i e v a l , a p r e s s i n g forward 
which r e c o v e r s something h i t h e r t o l a t e n t , 
i n p o t e n t l a , harboured i n the 
p o s s i b i l i t y - t o - b e (Seinskonnen), of 
Dasein. Dasein's own Being ' c i r c u l a t e s ' 
between I t s ' f u t u r i t y ' ( Z u k u n f t l g k e l t ) 
and I t s 'having been' (Gewesenhelt). The 
Being of Dasein i s c o n s t a n t l y p r o j e c t e d 
ahead, never i n a f r e e - f l o a t i n g and 
a b s o l u t e way, but always toward 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t o which i t has a l l along 
been i n s e r t e d . Whence Heidegger speaks 
of "the c i r c u l a r Being of Dasein." 

(Caputo, 1987b: 60) 

Heidegger's s h i f t i n g of the hermeneutic c i r c l e from 

e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l to o n t o l o g i c a l ground p o r t r a y s h i s deep 

concern with o r i g i n s ("In the [hermeneutic] c i r c l e Is hidden 

a p o s i t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y of the most p r i m o r d i a l kind of 

knowing" (Heidegger, 1962: 195)), u n i t y and t o t a l i t y — i n a 

word, with holism. As Robert Solomon comments, "Being and  

Time i s almost unique i n Western p h i l o s o p h y i n i t s 

u n r e s t r i c t e d emphasis on holism, i t s v i s i o n of our b e i n g - i n -



83 

the-world as a seamless whole even more than i n Hegel (who 

sees the whole as a r e s u l t r a t h e r than a s t a r t i n g p o i n t " ) 

(Solomon, 1988: 156). In h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g Heidegger moves 

away from attempting to determine the meaning of Being 

through an a n a l y s i s of Dasein and c o n c e n t r a t e s on 

e l u c i d a t i n g / o b f u s c a t i n g the meaning of Being as a l e t h e i a — 

as "luminous s e l f - c o n c e a l i n g " (Heidegger, 1984: 108). 

However, h i s n o s t a l g i a f o r o r i g i n s and h i s e s c h a t o - t e l e o -

l o g l c a l d e s i r e f o r the u n i f y i n g h o r i z o n of the c i r c l e never 

abates. Hence, i n commenting on the "Anaximander Fragment," 

Heidegger expresses h i m s e l f as f o l l o w s : 

But what i f t h a t which i s e a r l y 
o u t d i s t a n c e d e v e r y t h i n g l a t e ; i f the v e r y 
e a r l i e s t f a r surpassed the v e r y l a t e s t ? 
What once occurred i n the dawn of our 
d e s t i n y would then come, as what once 
occurred, a t the l a s t . . ., t h a t i s , at 
the departure of the long-hidden d e s t i n y 
of Being. The Being of beings i s 
gathered . . . i n the u l t i m a c y of i t s 
d e s t i n y . The essence of Being h i t h e r t o 
d i s a p p e a r s , i t s t r u t h s t i l l v e i l e d . The 
h i s t o r y of Being i s gathered In t h i s 
departure. The g a t h e r i n g i n t h i s 
departure, as the g a t h e r i n g . . . a t the 
outermost p o i n t . . . of i t s essence 
h i t h e r t o , i s the e s c h a t o l o g y of Being. 
As something f a t e f u l , Being i t s e l f i s 
i n h e r e n t l y e s c h a t o l o g i c a l . . . . We 
t h i n k of the e s c h a t o l o g y of Being i n a 
way c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the way the 
phenomenology of s p i r i t i s to be thought, 
i . e . from w i t h i n the h i s t o r y of Being. 
The phenomenology of s p i r i t i t s e l f 
c o n s t i t u t e s a phase i n the e s c h a t o l o g y of 
Being, when Being gathers i t s e l f In the 
u l t i m a c y of i t s essence. . . . 

I f we t h i n k the e s c h a t o l o g y of 
Being, then we must someday a n t i c i p a t e 



84 

the former dawn i n the day to come; today 
we must l e a r n to ponder t h i s former dawn 
through what i s imminent. 

(Heidegger, 1984: 18) 

( i l l ) Gadamer 

Gadamer does not f o l l o w h i s teacher, Heidegger, i n t o the 

mysticism surrounding the l a t t e r ' s concern with the meaning 

of Being as a l e t h e i a but, i n s t e a d , takes h i s mentor's 

o n t o l o g i c a l n o t i o n of understanding and attempts to develop 

i t i n t o a f u l l blown ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l hermeneutlcs, ' the 

purpose of which i s to show "not what we do or what we ought 

to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and 

d o i n g " (Gadamer i n Baynes et a l . , 1988: 339). For Gadamer, 

t h i s means working out a system which accounts f o r 

understanding as the fundamental u n i v e r s a l o n t o l o g i c a l 

process of being human: 

"How i s understanding (Verstehen) 
p o s s i b l e ? " T h i s q u e s t i o n i s p r i o r to any 
a c t i v i t y of understanding on the p a r t of 
s u b j e c t i v i t y , i n c l u d i n g the methodical 
a c t i v i t y of the verstehenden s c i e n c e s , 
t h e i r norms and r u l e s . In my view, 
Heidegger's temporal a n a l y s i s of human 
Dasein has c o n v i n c i n g l y shown t h a t 
understanding i s not one of many modes of 
a c t i o n on the p a r t of the s u b j e c t but 
r a t h e r Dasein's v e r y mode of being. I t 
i s i n t h i s sense t h a t [I employ] the 
concept of hermeneutlcs. . . . I t 
designates the fundamental movement of 
Dasein, which c o n s t i t u t e s i t s f i n l t u d e 
and h i s t o r i c i t y and thus encompasses the 
whole of i t s experience of the world. To 
say t h a t the movement of understanding i s 
comprehensive and u n i v e r s a l i s n e i t h e r 
a r b i t r a r y nor a c o n s t r u c t i v e e x a g g e r a t i o n 
of a s i n g l e aspect; i t l i e s r a t h e r i n the 



85 

v e r y nature of t h i n g s . 
(Gadamer i n Baynes et a l . , 1988: 341) 

Because Gadamer b e l i e v e s t h a t understanding i s e s s e n t i a l to 

the temporal beingness of Dasein he opposes Schleiermacher's 

and D i l t h e y ' s n o t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of s l i p p i n g out of 

one's immediate h i s t o r i c a l context i n order to comprehend the 

a u t h o r i a l i n t e n t i o n w i t h i n a t e x t w r i t t e n i n another e r a . 

A c c o r d i n g to Gadamer, t h i s r e s u l t s i n an impossible 

s e p a r a t i o n and hence r e i f i c a t i o n of both the past and the 

present whereas what i s r e q u i r e d i s a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t , on 

the Heideggerian model, past, present and f u t u r e are 

i n s e p a r a b l e ( i . e . Dasein i s 'thrown' i n t o a present which i s 

c o n s t i t u t e d by a pre-understanding of the past and i s 

p r o j e c t e d i n t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of the f u t u r e ) . 

In working out h i s ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l hermeneutics' Gadamer 

' r e h a b i l i t a t e s ' three n o t i o n s t h a t he maintains f e l l i n t o 

unwarranted d i s r e p u t e d u r i n g the Enlightenment — p r e j u d i c e , 

t r a d i t i o n and a u t h o r i t y . With r e s p e c t to p r e j u d i c e , Gadamer 

argues t h a t i t i s a c t u a l l y n e i t h e r more nor l e s s than the 

Heideggerian concept of pre-understanding, which e f f e c t i v e l y 

shows t h a t one i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , never without always 

a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . To deny these 

p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s Is to be unaware of one's own involvement 

with beingness and hence to ensure t h a t one w i l l be incapable 

of ever g r a s p i n g the a u t h e n t i c nature of understanding. As 



86 

f o r t r a d i t i o n , 

[In] our c o n t i n u a l l y manifested a t t i t u d e 
to the past, the main f e a t u r e i s not . . 
. a d i s t a n c i n g and f r e e i n g of o u r s e l v e s 
from what has been t r a n s m i t t e d . Rather, 
we stand always w i t h i n t r a d i t i o n , and 
t h i s i s no o b j e c t i f y i n g process, i . e . we 
do not conceive of what t r a d i t i o n says as 
something other, a model or exemplar, a 
r e c o g n i t i o n of o u r s e l v e s which our l a t e r 
h i s t o r i c a l judgement would h a r d l y see as 
a kind of knowledge, but as the s i m p l e s t 
p r e s e r v a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n . 

(Gadamer, 1975: 250) 

In other words, as Palmer s u c c i n c t l y expresses i t , " t r a d i t i o n 

does not stand over a g a i n s t our t h i n k i n g as an o b j e c t of 

thought but i s the f a b r i c of r e l a t i o n s , the h o r i z o n , w i t h i n 

which we do our t h i n k i n g " (Palmer, 1969: 182). The 

r e c o g n i t i o n of t r a d i t i o n as an I n t e g r a l p a r t of Dasein's 

b e l n g - l n - t h e - w o r l d leads d i r e c t l y to the acknowledgement of 

i t s a u t h o r i t y . As Gadamer says, 

That which has been s a n c t i o n e d by 
t r a d i t i o n . . . has an a u t h o r i t y t h a t i s 
nameless, and our f i n i t e h i s t o r i c a l being 
i s marked by the f a c t t h a t always the 
a u t h o r i t y of what has been t r a n s m i t t e d -
- and not o n l y what i s c l e a r l y grounded -

has power over our a t t i t u d e s and 
behaviour. 

(Gadamer, 1975: 249) 

B a s i c a l l y , Gadamer takes e x c e p t i o n to what he p e r c e i v e s 

to be the Enlightenment's s u p e r f i c i a l view t h a t p r e j u d i c e , 



87 

t r a d i t i o n and a u t h o r i t y are the enemies of c r e a t i v e thought -

- i t s n o t i o n t h a t somehow i t i s p o s s i b l e to transcend the 

muck of the world and to have recourse to a p r i s t i n e realm of 

pure reason. Such an a t t i t u d e precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of 

r e c o g n i z i n g the o n t o l o g i c a l nature of understanding and 

determines a world view premised upon unacknowledged second 

order c o n s t r u c t s . As f a r as Gadamer Is concerned, p r e j u d i c e 

and the a u t h o r i t y of t r a d i t i o n are simply p a r t of the 

nature of t h i n g s and, whether or not t h i s f a c t i s c o n s c i o u s l y 

acknowledged, i t nonetheless e x e r t s I t s e f f e c t on a l l human 

thought -- Enlightenment or no Enlightenment: "there i s one 

p r e j u d i c e of the enlightenment t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l to i t : the 

fundamental p r e j u d i c e of the enlightenment i s the p r e j u d i c e 

a g a i n s t p r e j u d i c e i t s e l f , which d e p r i v e s t r a d i t i o n of i t s 

power" (Gadamer, 1975: 239-240) 

Again emphasizing Heidegger's n o t i o n of the e s s e n t i a l 

h i s t o r i c i t y of Dasein, Gadamer p o s i t s what he terms the 

' p r i n c i p l e of e f f e c t i v e h i s t o r y . ' By t h i s he means t h a t 

Dasein must be aware t h a t i t s e x i s t e n c e as a h i s t o r i c a l being 

i s d e f i n i t i v e , i . e . i t cannot be. and be without 

p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . Thus, 

I f we are t r y i n g to understand a 
h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon from the h i s t o r i c a l 
d i s t a n c e t h a t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of our 
hermeneutical s i t u a t i o n , we are always 
s u b j e c t to the e f f e c t s of e f f e c t i v e -
h i s t o r y . I t determines i n advance both 
what seems to us worth e n q u i r i n g about 
and what w i l l appear as an o b j e c t of 



88 

i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and we more or l e s s f o r g e t 
h a l f of what i s r e a l l y there -- i n f a c t , 
we miss the whole t r u t h of the phenomenon 
when we take i t s immediate appearance as 
the whole t r u t h . 

(Gadamer, 1975: 267-268) 
Taking the h i s t o r i c i t y of Dasein as a g i v e n , Gadamer 

f u r t h e r argues t h a t i n l o o k i n g a t any p a r t i c u l a r t e x t or t e x t 

analogue one must i n i t i a l l y engage i n 'the a n t i c i p a t i o n of 

completion.' In other words, one must assume t h a t the t e x t 

presents a ' u n i t y of meaning.' In a t t e s t i n g to h i s agreement 

with Heidegger concerning the s t r u c t u r e of the understanding 

Gadamer goes on to d i s c u s s the importance of the n o t i o n of 

completion: 

The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t t h e 
hermeneutic] c i r c l e , which i s fundamental 
to a l l understanding, has a f u r t h e r 
hermeneutic consequence which I may c a l l 
the ' f o r e - c o n c e p t i o n of completion.' But 
t h i s , too, i s o b v i o u s l y a formal 
c o n d i t i o n of a l l understanding. I t 
s t a t e s t h a t o n l y what r e a l l y c o n s t i t u t e s 
a u n i t y of meaning i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . So 
when we read a t e x t we always f o l l o w t h i s 
complete p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of completion, 
and o n l y when i t proves inadequate, i . e . 
the t e x t i s not i n t e l l i g i b l e , do we s t a r t 
to doubt the t r a n s m i t t e d t e x t and seek to 
d i s c o v e r i n what way i t can be remedied. 

The a n t i c i p a t i o n of completion t h a t 
guides a l l our understanding i s , then, 
always s p e c i f i c i n content. Not o n l y i s 
an immanent u n i t y of meaning g u i d i n g the 
reader assumed, but h i s understanding Is 
l i k e w i s e guided by the constant 
transcendent e x p e c t a t i o n s of meaning 
which proceed from the r e l a t i o n to the 
t r u t h of what i s being s a i d . . . . The 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of completion, then, 
c o n t a i n s not o n l y t h i s formal element 
t h a t a t e x t should f u l l y express i t s 
meaning, but a l s o t h a t what I t says 



89 

should be the whole t r u t h . 
[ U n d e r s t a n d i n g means, p r i m a r i l y , to 
understand the content of what i s s a i d , 
and o n l y s e c o n d a r i l y to i s o l a t e and 
understand another's meaning as such. 
Hence the f i r s t of a l l hermeneutlc 
requirements remains one's own f o r e -
understanding, which proceeds from being 
concerned with the same s u b j e c t [matter 
as expressed i n the t e x t ] . I t i s t h i s 
t h a t determines what u n i f i e d meaning can 
be r e a l i s e d and hence the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the a n t i c i p a t i o n of completion. 

(Gadamer, 1975: 261-262) 
(emphasis mine) 

The l a s t paragraph of the preceding q u o t a t i o n makes i t c l e a r 

t h a t what Gadamer concerns h i m s e l f with are the o n t o l o g i c a l 

c o n d i t i o n s of understanding i t s e l f r a t h e r than the 

e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of what i s presumed to be 

understood. For Gadamer, the primary area of herraeneutical 

i n t e r e s t l i e s i n the misty f l a t s between the given h i s t o r i c a l 

p o s i t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r t e x t and the g i v e n h i s t o r i c a l 

p o s i t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r reader. I t i s the seeming p o l a r i t y 

between the strangeness of what i s d i s t a n t and the 

f a m i l i a r i t y of what i s near t h a t hermeneutics attempts to 

mediate: "The p l a c e between strangeness and f a m i l i a r i t y t h a t 

a t r a n s m i t t e d -text has f o r us i s t h a t intermediate p l a c e 

between being an h i s t o r i c a l l y intended separate o b j e c t and 

being p a r t of a t r a d i t i o n . The t r u e home of hermeneutics i s 

i n t h i s intermediate a r e a " (Gadamer, 1975: 262-262). 

In attempting to mediate between t e x t and reader Gadamer 

r e l i e s on a d i a l e c t i c t h a t i s p a r t P l a t o n i c and p a r t Hegelian 



90 

and which r e s u l t s i n what he terms a ' f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s . ' 8 8 

Gadamer*s P l a t o n i c i n f l u e n c e i s e v i d e n t i n h i s b e l i e f t h a t a 

d i a l o g i c s t r u c t u r e of understanding Is e s s e n t i a l to mediating 

between the assumed u n i f i e d meaning of any g i v e n t e x t 

( ' a n t i c i p a t i o n of completion') and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to one's 

immediate h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t e d n e s s . For Gadamer, P l a t o 

p r o v i d e s the i d e a l model of d i a l o g i c q u e s t i o n i n g : 

The a r t of q u e s t i o n i n g i s t h a t of being 
able to go on a s k i n g q u e s t i o n s , i . e . the 
a r t of t h i n k i n g . I t i s c a l l e d 
' d i a l e c t i c , • f o r i t i s the a r t of 
conducting a r e a l c o n v e r s a t i o n . . . . To 
conduct a c o n v e r s a t i o n means to a l l o w 
o n e s e l f to be conducted by the o b j e c t to 
which the p a r t n e r s i n the c o n v e r s a t i o n 
are d i r e c t e d . I t r e q u i r e s t h a t one does 
not t r y to out-argue the other person, 
but t h a t one r e a l l y c o n s i d e r s the weight 
of the other's o p i n i o n . Hence i t i s an 
a r t of t e s t i n g . But the a r t of t e s t i n g 
i s the a r t of q u e s t i o n i n g . For . . . t o 
q u e s t i o n means to l a y open, to p l a c e i n 
the open. As a g a i n s t the s o l i d i t y of 
o p i n i o n , q u e s t i o n i n g makes the o b j e c t and 
a l l i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s f l u i d . 
D i a l e c t i c c o n s i s t s not i n t r y i n g to 
d i s c o v e r the weakness of what i s s a i d , 
but i n b r i n g i n g out i t s r e a l s t r e n g t h . 

The unique and c o n t i n u i n g r e l e v a n c e 
of the P l a t o n i c d i a l o g u e s i s due to t h i s 
a r t of s t r e n g t h e n i n g , f o r i n t h i s process 
what i s s a i d i s c o n t i n u a l l y transformed 
i n t o the uttermost p o s s i b i l i t i e s of i t s 
r i g h t n e s s and t r u t h and overcomes a l l 
opposing argument which seeks to l i m i t 
i t s v a l i d i t y . . . . What emerges in_ i t s  
t r u t h [ i n the P l a t o n i c d i a l o g u e s ] is_ the  
logos, which i s n e i t h e r mine nor yours 

2 9 Gadamer d e f i n e s h o r i z o n as "the range of v i s i o n t h a t 
i n c l u d e s e v e r y t h i n g t h a t can be seen from a p a r t i c u l a r 
vantage p o i n t " (Gadamer, 1975: 269). 



91 

and hence so f a r transcends the 
s u b j e c t i v e o p i n i o n s of the p a r t n e r s to 
the d i a l o g u e t h a t even the person l e a d i n g 
the c o n v e r s a t i o n i s always i g n o r a n t . 
D i a l e c t i c as the a r t of conducting a 
c o n v e r s a t i o n i s a l s o the a r t of s e e i n g 
t h i n g s i n the u n i t y of an aspect (sunoran  
e i s hen e i d o s ) i . e . i t i s the a r t of the 
formation of concepts as the working out 
of the common meaning. 

(Gadamer, 1975: 330-331) 
(emphasis mine) 

Gadamer f o l l o w s t h i s panegyric to the P l a t o n i c d i a l o g u e by 

s t a t i n g t h a t " i t i s more than a metaphor, i t i s a memory of 

what o r i g i n a l l y was the case, to d e s c r i b e the work of 

hermeneutics as a c o n v e r s a t i o n with the t e x t " (Gadamer, 1975: 

331) (emphasis mine). T h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n with the t e x t i s 

concerned not with any p o s s i b l e a u t h o r i a l i n t e n t i o n but with 

the s u b j e c t matter of the t e x t , which transcends any 

i n d i v i d u a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y and which emerges as the f u s i o n of 

the h o r i z o n of the t e x t with the h o r i z o n of the reader. As 

Gadamer says, 

i t i s p a r t of any genuine 
c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t one submits to the 
other, a l l o w s h i s viewpoint r e a l l y to 
count and gets i n s i d e the other f a r 
enough to understand not him, to be sure, 
as t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y but r a t h e r what he 
says. That which has to be grasped i s 
the s u b s t a n t i v e v a l i d i t y of h i s o p i n i o n 
so t h a t we can be u n i t e d with one another 
on the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r . 

(Gadamer i n Warnke, 1987: 100) 



Gadamer's n o t i o n of the f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s bears a 

s t r i k i n g resemblance to Hegel's n o t i o n of Aufhebung — of the 

s y n t h e s i s of t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s which transcends both 

while yet m a i n t a i n i n g both. Gadamer's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t he 

d i f f e r s markedly from Hegel i n so f a r as he has no n o t i o n of 

Absolute S p i r i t or Knowledge i n which the d i a l e c t i c a l process 

f i n d s u l t i m a t e completion cannot b e l i e the f a c t t h a t h i s 

v e r s i o n of the f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s reads very much l i k e a 

s e c u l a r i z a t i o n of Hegel. Thus, 

. . . the h o r i z o n of the present i s being 
c o n t i n u a l l y formed, i n t h a t we have 
c o n t i n u a l l y to t e s t a l l our p r e j u d i c e s . 
An important p a r t of t h i s t e s t i n g i s the 
encounter with the past and the 
understanding of the t r a d i t i o n from which 
we come. Hence the h o r i z o n of the 
present cannot be formed without the 
past. There i s no more an i s o l a t e d 
h o r i z o n of the present than there are 
h i s t o r i c a l h o r i z o n s . Understanding, 
r a t h e r , i s always the f u s i o n of these 
h o r i z o n s which we imagine to e x i s t by 
themselves. . . . In . . . t r a d i t i o n 
t h i s process of f u s i o n i s c o n t i n u a l l y 
going on, f o r there o l d and new 
c o n t i n u a l l y grow together to make 
something of l i v i n g v a l u e , without e i t h e r 
being e x p l i c i t l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the 
other. 

(Gadamer, 1975: 273) 

John Caputo n i c e l y captures Gadamer's r e l i a n c e on P l a t o and 

Hegel: 

In the end . . . Gadamer remains a t t a c h e d 
to t r a d i t i o n as the bearer of 
e t e r n a l t r u t h s , which i n a way does 



93 

nothing more than modify P l a t o and Hegel 
from a Heideggerian s t a n d p o i n t . 
Gadamer's hermeneutics i s t r a d i t i o n a l i s m 
and the p h i l o s o p h y of e t e r n a l t r u t h 
pushed to i t s h i s t o r i c a l l i m i t s . He 
o f f e r s us the most l i b e r a l form of 
t r a d i t i o n a l i s m p o s s i b l e . He i n t r o d u c e s 
as much change as p o s s i b l e i n t o the 
p h i l o s o p h y of unchanging t r u t h , as much 
movement as p o s s i b l e i n t o immobile 
v e r i t y . 

P l a t o s a i d t h a t t r u t h i s e t e r n a l and 
t h a t we r e q u i r e a d i a l o g u e among 
o u r s e l v e s In order to make the ascent to 
the forms. Hegel put the forms i n t o time 
and r e q u i r e d t h a t they pass through 
d i a l e c t i c a l development, t h a t they prove 
t h e i r e t e r n a l worth i n time, i n the hard 
work and n e g a t i v i t y of h i s t o r i c a l 
becoming. Gadamer d e l i m i t s the Hegelian 
p r o j e c t of s e t t i n g the t r u t h Into time, 
not by denying e t e r n a l t r u t h but by 
p r o t e s t i n g t h a t there i s no one f i n a l 
f o r m u l a t i o n of i t . He i n s i s t s t h a t there 
i s always a p l u r a l i t y of a r t i c u l a t i o n of 
the same t r u t h , t h a t the selfsame i s 
capable of an i n d e f i n i t e number of 
h i s t o r i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s . But t h a t i s 
another way of r e a s s u r i n g us t h a t no 
matter how great the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of . 
. . t r a d i t i o n may be, i t s deep u n i t y i s 
always s a f e . Gadamer's whole argument 
turns on an i m p l i c i t acceptance of the 
metaphysical d i s t i n c t i o n between a more 
or l e s s s t a b l e and o b j e c t i v e meaning and 
i t s c e a s e l e s s l y changing e x p r e s s i o n . 

For Gadamer, the o n l y r e a l q u e s t i o n 
i s how meaning and t r u t h get passed along 
and handed down (trans-dare) . That i s 
why the P l a t o n i c c o n c e p t i o n of d i a l o g u e 
and the Hegelian d o c t r i n e of d i a l e c t i c a l 
mediation are so important to him. These 
are the p r i n c i p l e means of the 
t r a n s m i s s i o n of meaning and t r u t h . 

(Caputo, 1987b: 111) 

Thus Gadamer's p h i l o s o p h i c a l hermeneutics, I t s c r i t i q u e 

of the e p i s t e m o l o g l c a l bases of p r e v i o u s forms of 



hermeneutlcs n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , remains embedded i n t r a d i t i o n a l 

Western metaphysical n o t i o n s o£ u n i t y , completion, t r u t h and 

so on. In l i g h t o£ t h i s i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t he 

p r e f a c e s h i s magnum opus, T r u t h and Method, with the 

f o l l o w i n g l a u d a t o r y address to the s u p p r e s s i o n of otherness: 

Catch o n l y what you've thrown y o u r s e l f , a l l Is 
mere s k i l l and l i t t l e g a i n ; 
but when you're suddenly the catcher of a b a l l 
thrown by an e t e r n a l partner 
with accurate and measured swing 
towards you, to your c e n t r e , i n an arch 
from the g r e a t b r i d g e b u i l d i n g of God: 
Why c a t c h i n g then becomes a power — 
not yours, a world's. 

( R l l k e i n Gadamer, 1975: n.p.) 

( i v ) Rlcoeur 

L i k e Heidegger and Gadamer, Ricoeur b e l i e v e s t h a t 

hermeneutics must grasp the o n t o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of 

understanding as p r e d i c a t e d upon an awareness of human 

f i n i t u d e and h i s t o r i c i t y . However, u n l i k e Heidegger and 

Gadamer, Ricoeur concerns h i m s e l f with attempting a 

r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between ontology and epistemology through a 

study of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between understanding and 

e x p l a n a t i o n . According to Ricoeur: "Understanding precedes, 

accompanies, c l o s e s , and thus envelops e x p l a n a t i o n . In 

r e t u r n , e x p l a n a t i o n develops understanding a n a l y t i c a l l y " 

(Ricoeur i n Baynes et a l . , 1988: 354). As Ricoeur says, 



95 

I f there i s a f e a t u r e which d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
me not o n l y from the hermeneutlc 
p h i l o s o p h y of Schleiermacher and D i l t h e y , 
but a l s o from t h a t of Heidegger and even 
Gadamer ( d e s p i t e my great p r o x i m i t y to 
the work of the l a t t e r ) , i t i s indeed my 
concern to a v o i d the p i t f a l l of an 
o p p o s i t i o n between an 'understanding* 
which would be r e s e r v e d f o r the 'human 
s c i e n c e s ' and an ' e x p l a n a t i o n ' which 
would be common to the l a t t e r and to the 
nomological s c i e n c e s , p r i m a r i l y the 
p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s . [I am concerned with 
the] search f o r a f l e x i b l e a r t i c u l a t i o n 
and a c o n t i n u a l to and f r o between the 
i n v e s t i g a t o r ' s p e r s o n a l engagement with 
the matter of the t e x t , and the 
disengagement which the o b j e c t i v e 
e x p l a n a t i o n by causes, laws, f u n c t i o n s or 
s t r u c t u r e s demands. . . . 

(Ricoeur, 19821: 36) 

In attempting to mediate between e x p l a n a t i o n ( e r k l a r e n ) and 

understanding (verstehen) Ricoeur r e l i e s upon the model of 

the w r i t t e n t e x t . 

A c c o r d i n g to Ricoeur, the t e x t i s " c h a r a c t e r i z e d by (1) 

the f i x a t i o n of meaning, (2) i t s d i s s o c i a t i o n from the mental 

i n t e n t i o n of the author, (3) the d i s p l a y of non-ostensive 

r e f e r e n c e s , (4) the u n i v e r s a l range of i t s addressees" 

(Ricoeur, 1982e: 210). The combination of the preceding four 

t r a i t s c o n s t i t u t e s the t e x t as an o b j e c t s u s c e p t i b l e to 

e x p l a n a t i o n — e x p l a n a t i o n being, as Ricoeur i s a t pains to 

p o i n t out, not an import from the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s (pace 

D i l t h e y ) but a p o s s i b i l i t y which i s i n h e r e n t w i t h i n the 



96 

l i n g u i s t i c a l i t y o£ any g i v e n t e x t as such 3 0 : "There i s no 

t r a n s f e r from one r e g i o n of r e a l i t y to another — l e t us say, 

from the sphere of f a c t s to the sphere of s i g n s . I t i s 

w i t h i n the same sphere of s i g n s t h a t the process of 

o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n takes p l a c e and g i v e s r i s e to e x p l a n a t o r y 

procedures" (Ricoeur, 1982e: 210). 

Ricoeur begins h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the nature of t e x t 

I n t e r p r e t a t i o n by p o s i t i n g a movement from understanding to 

e x p l a n a t i o n . Borrowing from E.D. H i r s c h , Rlcoeur maintains 

t h a t t e x t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has to do with the d i a l e c t i c between 

guessing and v a l i d a t i n g , the former corresponding to 

understanding and the l a t t e r corresponding to e x p l a n a t i o n . 

The d i a l e c t i c of guess and v a l i d a t i o n i s n e c e s s i t a t e d by the 

h o l i s t i c nature of the t e x t . As Ricoeur says, 

Why do we need an a r t of guessing? Why 
do we have to 'construe' the meaning? . 
. . a t e x t has to be construed because i t 
i s not a mere sequence of sentences, a l l 
on an equal f o o t i n g and s e p a r a t e l y 
understandable. A t e x t i s a whole, a 
t o t a l i t y . . . . C o r r e c t l y , the whole 
appears as a h i e r a r c h y of t o p i c s , or 
primary and subordinate t o p i c s . The 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the t e x t as a whole i s 
i m p l i e d i n the r e c o g n i t i o n of the p a r t s . 
And r e c i p r o c a l l y , i t i s i n c o n s t r u i n g the 
d e t a i l s t h a t we construe the whole. 
There i s no n e c e s s i t y and no evidence 
concerning what i s important and what i s 

3 0 Ricoeur d i s t i n g u i s h e s between language-systems or 
l i n g u i s t i c codes and language-event or l i n g u i s t i c usage. The 
former i s s y n c h r o n i c and unchanging (e.g. Saussure's langue) 
and hence amenable to e x p l a n a t i o n whereas the l a t t e r i s 
d i a c h r o n i c and dynamic (e.g. Saussure's p a r o l e ) . 



97 

unimportant, what i s e s s e n t i a l and what 
i s u n e s s e n t i a l . The judgement of 
importance Is a guess. 

(Ricoeur, 1982e: 211) 

Thus, a c c o r d i n g to Ricoeur, our i n i t i a l response to the 

p l u r i v o c a l t o t a l i t y of any given t e x t i s to guess a t i t s 

meaning. Bearing i n mind t h a t "the t e x t i s a l i m i t e d f i e l d 

of p o s s i b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n s " (Ricoeur, 1982e: 213), a f t e r 

making one's 'guess' one then s u b j e c t s i t to a process of 

v a l i d a t i o n . T h i s process of v a l i d a t i o n , which manifests 

i t s e l f as a l o g i c of p r o b a b i l i t y , weighs the v a l i d i t y claims 

of any p a r t i c u l a r guess a g a i n s t what i s presumed to be known 

about the t e x t and eventuates i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the 

most probable meaning: "Such i s the balance between the 

genius of guessing and the s c i e n t i f i c c h a r a c t e r of v a l i d a t i o n 

which c o n s t i t u t e s the modern complement of the d i a l e c t i c 

between verstehen and e r k l a r e n " (Ricoeur, 1982e: 212). 

At t h i s p o i n t i n h i s a n a l y s i s of t e x t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 

Ricoeur r e v e r s e s the order of the movement from understanding 

to e x p l a n a t i o n . Working now from e x p l a n a t i o n to 

understanding, he s t r e s s e s the importance of the " r e f e r e n t i a l 

f u n c t i o n of the t e x t . " 

T h i s r e f e r e n t i a l f u n c t i o n . . . exceeds 
the mere o s t e n s i v e d e s i g n a t i o n of the 
s i t u a t i o n common to both speaker and 
hearer i n the d l a l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n . T h i s 
a b s t r a c t i o n from the surrounding world 
g i v e s r i s e to two opposite a t t i t u d e s . As 
r e a d e r s , we may e i t h e r remain i n a kind 



98 

o£ s t a t e o£ suspense as regards any kind 
o£ re£erred-to world, or we may a c t u a l i z e 
the p o t e n t i a l non-ostensive r e f e r e n c e s of 
the t e x t i n a new s i t u a t i o n , t h a t of the 
reader. In the f i r s t case, we t r e a t the 
t e x t as a w o r l d l e s s e n t i t y ; i n the 
second, we c r e a t e a new o s t e n s i v e 
r e f e r e n c e through the kind of ' e x e c u t i o n 1 
which the a r t of r e a d i n g i m p l i e s . These 
two p o s s i b i l i t i e s are e q u a l l y e n t a i l e d by 
the a c t of r e a d i n g , conceived as t h e i r 
d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p l a y . 

(Ricoeur, 1982e: 215-216) 

Looking a t the t e x t as a s e l f - e n c l o s e d , s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l 

system of s i g n s e n t a i l s the use of e x p l a n a t i o n as s t r u c t u r a l 

e x p l i c a t i o n . C o n t r a s t i n g t h i s mode of e x p l a n a t i o n to 

D i l t h e y ' s a t t i t u d e toward e x p l a n a t i o n , Ricoeur says, 

. . . a new k i n d of e x p l a n a t o r y a t t i t u d e 
may be extended to the [ t e x t ] , which, 
c o n t r a r y to the e x p e c t a t i o n of D i l t h e y , 
i s no longer borrowed from the n a t u r a l 
s c i e n c e s , i . e . from an area of knowledge 
a l i e n to language i t s e l f . The o p p o s i t i o n 
between Natur and G e l s t i s no longer 
o p e r a t i v e here. I f some model i s 
borrowed, i t comes from . . . the 
s e m i o l o g i c a l f i e l d . . . . We have learned 
from the Geneva s c h o o l , the Prague 
s c h o o l , and the Danish s c h o o l t h a t i t i s 
always p o s s i b l e to a b s t r a c t systems from 
processes and to r e l a t e these systems — 
whether p h o n o l o g i c a l , l e x i c a l , or 
s y n t a c t i c a l — to u n i t s which are merely 
d e f i n e d by t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to other 
u n i t s of the same system. T h i s i n t e r p l a y 
of merely d i s t i n c t i v e e n t i t i e s w i t h i n 
f i n i t e s e t s of such u n i t s d e f i n e s the 
n o t i o n of s t r u c t u r e i n l i n g u i s t i c s . 

(Ricoeur, 1982e: 216) 



99 

Ricoeur uses L 6 v i - S t r a u s s 1 s a n a l y s i s o£ myth as an 

example of the a p p r o p r i a t e a p p l i c a t i o n of e x p l a n a t i o n . In 

t h i s case the numerous sentences which c o n s t i t u t e the 

n a r r a t i v e of the myth are reduced to 'mythemes' or 'bundles 

of r e l a t i o n s ' the i n t e r a c t i o n of which makes up the s t r u c t u r e 

of the myth as such. S t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s a l l o w s us to "say 

t h a t we have e x p l a i n e d a myth, but not t h a t we have 

i n t e r p r e t e d i t . We can, by means of s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s , 

b r i n g out the l o g i c of i t , the o p e r a t i o n s which r e l a t e the 

•bundles of r e l a t i o n s ' among themselves. T h i s l o g i c 

c o n s t i t u t e s the s t r u c t u r a l law of the myth under 

c o n s i d e r a t i o n " (Ricoeur, 1982e: 216-217). To t h i s s t r u c t u r a l 

e x p l a n a t i o n of a myth or t e x t must be added an understanding 

of what the t e x t t a l k s about, i . e . i t s meaning. Ricoeur 

argues t h a t t h i s understanding does not do v i o l e n c e to the 

i n t e g r i t y of s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s but, r a t h e r , develops i t , 

f o r : " S t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s does not exclude, but presupposes 

. . . the . . . hypothesis [ t h a t ] the myth . . . has a 

meaning as a n a r r a t i v e of o r i g i n s . S t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s 

merely r e p r e s s e s t h i s f u n c t i o n . But i t cannot suppress i t " 

(Ricoeur, 1982e: 217). 

Ricoeur maintains t h a t the purpose of s t r u c t u r a l 

a n a l y s i s i s to go from s u r f a c e semantics (the myth or t e x t as 

n a r r a t i v e ) to depth semantics (the mediation of fundamental 

o p p o s i t i o n s ) , the l a t t e r c o n s t i t u t i n g "the u l t i m a t e 



100 

' r e f e r e n t ' of the myth" (Ricoeur, 1982e: 217). Thus Rlcoeur 

suggests t h a t , 

I f . . . we c o n s i d e r s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s 
as a stage -- and a necessary one --
between a naive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a 
c r i t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , between a 
s u r f a c e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a depth 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , then i t would be p o s s i b l e 
to l o c a t e e x p l a n a t i o n and understanding 
a t two d i f f e r e n t stages of a unique 
hermeneutlcal a r c . I t i s t h i s depth 
semantics which c o n s t i t u t e s the genuine 
o b j e c t of understanding and which 
r e q u i r e s a s p e c i f i c a f f i n i t y between the 
reader and the kind of t h i n g s the t e x t i s 
about. 

(Ricoeur, 1982e: 218) 

Thus, as opposed to being concerned with a u t h o r i a l I n t e n t i o n 

or what the t e x t o s t e n s i v e l y says, one must be concerned with 

what the t e x t i s about, i . e . with i t s 'non-ostensive 

r e f e r e n c e s . ' I t i s these non-ostensive r e f e r e n c e s which 

a l l o w the reader to blend e x p l a n a t i o n with understanding, 

and, consequently, to e x e r c i s e her 'productive i m a g i n a t i o n ' 

i n the r e a l i z a t i o n of p o s s i b l e worlds. As Ricoeur says, 

The non-ostensive r e f e r e n c e of the t e x t 
i s the kind of world opened up by the 
depth semantics of the t e x t . Therefore 
what we want to understand i s not 
something hidden behind the t e x t , but 
something d i s c l o s e d i n f r o n t of i t . What 
has to be understood i s not the i n i t i a l 
s i t u a t i o n of d i s c o u r s e , but what p o i n t s 
to a p o s s i b l e world. Understanding . . 
. wants to grasp the proposed worlds 
opened up by the r e f e r e n c e s of the t e x t . 
To understand a t e x t i s to f o l l o w i t s 



101 

movement from sense to r e f e r e n c e , from 
what i t says to what i t t a l k s about. In 
t h i s process the mediating r o l e played by 
s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s c o n s t i t u t e s both the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s o b j e c t i v e approach 
and the r e c t i f i c a t i o n of the s u b j e c t i v e 
approach. 

(Ricoeur, 1982e: 218) 

Thus, whether the movement i s from understanding to 

e x p l a n a t i o n v i s a v i s guessing and v a l i d a t i n g or from 

e x p l a n a t i o n to understanding v i s a v i s o s t e n s i v e and non-

o s t e n s i v e r e f e r e n c e s , a c c o r d i n g to Ricoeur: "Understanding i s 

e n t i r e l y mediated by the whole of e x p l a n a t o r y procedures 

which precede i t and accompany i t " (Ricoeur, 1982e: 220). 

And, not s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h i s e n t i r e d i a l e c t i c a l process always 

takes p l a c e w i t h i n the hermeneutlc c i r c l e : " U l t i m a t e l y , the 

c o r r e l a t i o n between e x p l a n a t i o n and understanding, between 

understanding and e x p l a n a t i o n , i s the 'hermeneutical c i r c l e ' " 

(Ricoeur, 1982e: 221). 

With r e s p e c t to h i s work on n a r r a t i v e , Ricoeur maintains 

t h a t " i t i s the same debate between understanding and 

e x p l a n a t i o n which i s pursued here; f o r the c a p a c i t y to f o l l o w 

a s t o r y expresses the i r r e d u c i b l e component of understanding 

i n the a c t of n a r r a t i n g , whereas the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of laws i n 

h i s t o r y , and of n a r r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s i n f o l k t a l e s , p l a y s , 

novels and f i c t i o n a l l i t e r a t u r e i n g e n e r a l , corresponds to 

the e x p l a n a t o r y phase of the nomological s c i e n c e s " (Ricoeur, 

1982h: 38). Very b r i e f l y , Ricoeur contends t h a t f i c t i o n a l 



102 

and h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e s have a common n a r r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e 

and t h a t t h i s s t r u c t u r e i s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e f e a t u r e of the 

h i s t o r i c i t y of the human s i t u a t i o n . I do not wish to get 

i n v o l v e d i n a major d i s c u s s i o n of Ricoeur's theory of 

n a r r a t i v e as much of i t would merely repeat what has a l r e a d y 

been s a i d concerning t e x t a n a l y s i s (e.g. the n e c e s s i t y of a 

s t r u c t u r a l phase of a n a l y s i s , the importance of non-ostensive 

r e f e r e n t i a l i t y and so on). S u f f i c e i t to say t h a t Ricoeur 

maintains t h a t : 

. . . any n a r r a t i v e combines, i n v a r y i n g 
p r o p o r t i o n s , two d i m e n s i o n s : a 
c h r o n o l o g i c a l dimension and a non-
c h r o n o l o g i c a l dimension. The f i r s t may 
be c a l l e d the ' e p i s o d i c dimension' of the 
n a r r a t i v e . W i t h i n the a r t of f o l l o w i n g 
a s t o r y , t h i s dimension i s expressed i n 
the e x p e c t a t i o n of c o n t i n g e n c i e s which 
a f f e c t the s t o r y ' s development; hence i t 
g i v e s r i s e to q u e s t i o n s such as: and so? 
and then? what happened next? what was 
the outcome? e t c . But the a c t i v i t y of 
n a r r a t i n g does not c o n s i s t simply i n 
a d d r e s s i n g episodes to one another; i t 
a l s o c o n s t r u c t s meaningful t o t a l i t i e s out 
of s c a t t e r e d events. T h i s aspect of the 
a r t of n a r r a t i n g i s r e f l e c t e d , on the 
s i d e of f o l l o w i n g a s t o r y , i n the attempt 
to 'grasp t o g e t h e r ' s u c c e s s i v e events. 
The a r t of n a r r a t i n g , as w e l l as the 
corresponding a r t of f o l l o w i n g a s t o r y , 
t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e t h a t we are able to  
e x t r a c t a c o n f i g u r a t i o n from a 
s u c c e s s i o n . T h i s ' c o n f i g u r a t i o n a l ' 
o p e r a t i o n . . . c o n s t i t u t e s the second 
dimension of the n a r r a t i v e a c t i v i t y . 

(Ricoeur, 1982f: 278) 



103 

In other words, a l l n a r r a t i v e i s both t e l e o l o g i c a l 

( c h r o n o l o g i c a l e p i s o d i c sequence tending to f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n ) 

and e s c h a t o l o g i c a l ( n o n - c h r o n o l o g i c a l meaningful t o t a l i t y — 

the a l l encompassing s t r u c t u r e of f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n ) the 

proper i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of which r e q u i r e s a d i a l e c t i c between 

understanding and e x p l a n a t i o n . Thus, although Ricoeur, l i k e 

Gadamer, maintains t h a t the t e x t or n a r r a t i v e d i s c l o s e s no 

a b s o l u t e meaning, t h a t the p o l y s e m i c / p l u r i v o c a l nature of 

l i n g u i s t i c a l i t y p r e c l u d e s t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , he nonetheless 

p e r s i s t s i n viewing the t e x t / n a r r a t i v e as a u n i f i e d , 

meaningful t o t a l i t y — t h a t i s , m u l t i p l i c i t y / d i f f e r e n c e i s 

always contained w i t h i n , and dominated by, u n i t y / i d e n t i t y . 

As Caputo says, i n c o n t r a s t i n g Ricoeur and Gadamer to 

D e r r i d a : 

D i s s e m i n a t i o n e f f e c t s a d i s r u p t i o n of 
semantics, even when semantics t r i e s to 
p r o t e c t i t s e l f , when i t t r i e s to make 
c o n c e s s i o n s , with a theory of polysemy, 
such as those of Ricoeur and contemporary 
hermeneutical t h e o r i s t s . The r e a d i n g of 
l i t e r a t u r e has been dominated by the r u l e 
of the semantic. I t has assumed, f o r 
fundamentally metaphysical reasons, t h a t 
there i s a r u l i n g "thematic" u n i t y to a 
t e x t , a s i n g l e , u n i f y i n g meaning by which 
the e n t i r e c h a i n of s i g n i f i e r s i s 
organized and to which i t Is 
subordinated. In the o l d e r v e r s i o n , t h i s 
semantic u n i t y was a t t r i b u t e d to the 
u n i f y i n g i n t e n t i o n of the author. In i t s 
more modern form, i n the "new c r i t i c i s m " 
and i n the hermeneutics of Gadamer and 
Ricoeur, i t i s a t t r i b u t e d to a system of 
meaning which operates i n the t e x t 
i t s e l f , which t h e r e f o r e exceeds and 
o u t l a s t s the o r i g i n a l author and h i s 
o r i g i n a l audience. For D e r r i d a , t h i s 



104 

amounts to a retrenchment of semanticism 
which has the e f f e c t of a l l o w i n g i t to 
d i g i n even deeper. In e i t h e r v e r s i o n , 
the task of semantic c r i t i c i s m i s to 
f i n g e r t h i s golden thread, to f i n d the 
animating, u n i f y i n g c e n t r e . 

(Caputo, 1987b: 149) 

To summarize, i n v a r i o u s ways a l l of the preceding modes 

of thought manifest t h e i r r e l i a n c e on a concept of presence -

- on the e x i s t e n c e of an a b s o l u t e and unquestionable ground 

capable of a c c o u n t i n g f o r a l l human e x p e r i e n c e . Thus, f o r 

example, H u s s e r l i n s i s t s upon the e x i s t e n c e of ' i n v a r i a n t 

e s s e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e s ' as the product of a c o n s t i t u t i v e 

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y , Heidegger i n s i s t s upon the 

o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y of the meaning of Being and on the 

c i r c u l a r nature of Dasein, Gadamer i n s i s t s upon the v a l i d i t y 

of understanding as a d i a l o g i c a l process r e s u l t i n g i n a 

f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s which maintains yet e l e v a t e s d i s c r e t e 

viewpoints through a d i a l e c t i c a l process of transcendence and 

Ricoeur i n s i s t s upon i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as the product of the 

d i a l e c t i c a l I n t e r p l a y of e x p l a n a t i o n and understanding w i t h i n 

the u n i t y of meaning which i s the t e x t . 

In the f o l l o w i n g chapter I w i l l attempt to show t h a t a 

number of concepts common to i n t e r p r e t i v e and/or 'postmodern' 

anthropology (e.g. i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , d i a l o g i c , meaning and so 

on) are drawn d i r e c t l y from the aforementioned phenomeno-



105 

l o g i c a l / hermeneutical t r a d i t i o n s and t h a t , t h i s being the 

case, a d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g of these concepts (and, 

Indeed, of c o n c e p t u a l i t y as such) i s e s s e n t i a l to 

anthropology's r e c o g n i t i o n of i t s e l f as an i n h e r i t o r and 

perpetuator of the v a l u e s of Western metaphysics. 



106 

Chapter Four 

C l i f f o r d Geertz and James C l i f f o r d : A D e c o n s t r u c t l v e Reading 

In t h i s chapter, I w i l l look a t c e r t a i n works by C l i f f o r d 

Geertz and by James C l i f f o r d r e s p e c t i v e l y , with the purpose 

of i s o l a t i n g a number of t h e i r key concepts ( p a r t i c u l a r l y , i n 

Geertz's case, •meaning,' 'concept,' ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , ' 

•context,' ' t r a n s l a t i o n ' and ' t e x t ' and, i n C l i f f o r d ' s case, 

' m e t a p h o r / a l l e g o r y , ' ' s u b j e c t i v i t y , ' ' d i a l o g i s m , ' 

' d i s c u r s i v i t y , ' ' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' and 'speech') and s u b j e c t i n g 

them to a d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g . In order, as much as 

p o s s i b l e , to a l l o w Geertz and C l i f f o r d to speak f o r 

themselves, I w i l l provide an extended s e r i e s of quotations 

a t the beginning of each of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s e c t i o n s . 

Although t h i s format n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l s a c e r t a i n amount of 

o v e r l a p , i t e f f e c t i v e l y i l l u s t r a t e s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of 

s p e c i f i c r e c u r r i n g concepts. 

I GEERTZ 

( i ) C u l t u r e 

B e l i e v i n g , with Max Weber, t h a t man i s an 
animal suspended i n webs of s i g n i f i c a n c e 
he h i m s e l f has spun, I take c u l t u r e to be 
those webs, and the a n a l y s i s of i t to be 
t h e r e f o r e not an experimental s c i e n c e i n 
search of law but an I n t e r p r e t i v e one i n 
search of meaning. I t i s e x p l i c a t i o n I 



am a f t e r , c o n s t r u i n g s o c i a l e x p r e s s i o n s  
on t h e i r s u r f a c e e n i g m a t i c a l . 

(Geertz, 19731: 5) 
(emphasis mine) 

[Assuming t h a t ] the aim of anthropology 
i s the enlargement of the u n i v e r s e of  
human d i s c o u r s e . . . . i t i s an aim to 
which a s e m l o t l c concept of c u l t u r e i s 
p e c u l i a r l y w e l l adapted. As interworked 
systems of c o n s t r u a b l e s i g n s (what, 
i g n o r i n g p r o v i n c i a l usages I would c a l l 
symbols), c u l t u r e i s not a power, 
something to which s o c i a l events, 
behaviours, i n s t i t u t i o n s , or processes 
can be c a u s a l l y a t t r i b u t e d ; i t i s a 
c o n t e x t , something w i t h i n which they can 
be i n t e l l i g i b l y — t h a t i s , t h i c k l y — 
d e s c r i b e d . 

(Geertz, 19731: 14) 
(emphasis mine) 

To g e n e r a l i z e w i t h i n cases i s u s u a l l y 
c a l l e d , at l e a s t i n medicine and depth 
psychology, c l i n i c a l i n f e r e n c e . Rather 
than beginning with a s e t of o b s e r v a t i o n s 
and attempting to subsume them under a 
governing law, such i n f e r e n c e begins with 
a s e t of (presumptive) s i g n i f i e r s and 
attempts to p l a c e them w i t h i n an 
i n t e l l i g i b l e frame. Measures are matched 
to t h e o r e t i c a l p r e d i c t i o n s , but symptoms 

are scanned f o r t h e o r e t i c a l 
p e c u l i a r i t i e s — t h a t i s , they are 
diagnosed. In the study of c u l t u r e the 
s i g n i f i e r s are not symptoms or c l u s t e r s 
of symptoms, but symbolic a c t s , and the 
aim i s not therapy but the a n a l y s i s of 
s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e . But the way In which 
t h e o r y i s used — to_ f e r r e t out the  
unapparent import of t h i n g s — i s the 
same. 

(Geertz, 19731: 26) 
(emphasis mine) 



c u l t u r e Is best seen not as 
complexes of concrete behaviour p a t t e r n s 
— customs, usages, t r a d i t i o n s , h a b i t 
c l u s t e r s — as has, by and l a r g e , been 
the case up to now, but as a s e t of  
c o n t r o l mechanisms — p l a n s , r e c i p e s , 
r u l e s , i n s t r u c t i o n s (what computer 
engineers c a l l "programs") -- f o r the 
governing of behaviour. 

(Geertz, 1973f: 44) 
(emphasis mine) 

. . . the c u l t u r e concept to which I 
adhere has n e i t h e r m u l t i p l e r e f e r e n t s 
nor, so f a r as I can see, any unusual 
a m b i g u i t i e s : i t denotes an h i s t o r i c a l l y  
t r a n s m i t t e d p a t t e r n of meanings embodied  
i n symbols, a system of i n h e r i t e d 
conceptions expressed i n symbolic forms 
by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate, and develop t h e i r knowledge 
about and a t t i t u d e s toward l i f e . 

(Geertz, 1973g: 89) 
(emphasis mine) 

[To view a symbolic system as a 
"metasocial commentary"1 i s to engage i n 
a b i t of metaphorical r e f o c u s s i n g of 
one's own, f o r i t s h i f t s the a n a l y s i s of 
c u l t u r a l forms from an endeavour i n 
g e n e r a l p a r a l l e l to d i s s e c t i n g an 
organism, d i a g n o s i n g a symptom, 
d e c i p h e r i n g a code, or o r d e r i n g a system 
— the dominant a n a l o g i e s i n contemporary 
anthropology — to one i n g e n e r a l 
p a r a l l e l with p e n e t r a t i n g a l i t e r a r y  
t e x t . I f one takes the [ B a l i n e s e ] 
c o c k f i g h t , or any other c o l l e c t i v e l y 
s u s t a i n e d symbolic s t r u c t u r e , as a means 
of "saying something of something" (to 
invoke a famous A r i s t o t e l i a n t a g ) , then 
one i s faced with a problem not i n s o c i a l 
mechanics but s o c i a l semantics. For the 
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , whose concern i s with 
f o r m u l a t i n g s o c i o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . . 
. the q u e s t i o n i s , what does one l e a r n 
about such p r i n c i p l e s from examining 



109 

c u l t u r e as an assemblage of t e x t s ? 
(Geertz, 1973c: 448) 

(emphasis mine) 

( i i ) I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 

. . . there are three c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
ethnographic d e s c r i p t i o n : i t i s 
i n t e r p r e t i v e ; what i t i s i n t e r p r e t i v e of 
i s the flow of s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e ; and the 
i n t e r p r e t i n g i n v o l v e d c o n s i s t s i n t r y i n g 
to rescue the " s a i d " of such d i s c o u r s e  
from i t s p e r i s h i n g occasions and f i x i t  
i n perusable terms. 

(Geertz, 19731: 20) 
(emphasis mine) 

I f a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
c o n s t r u c t i n g a r e a d i n g of what happens, 
then to d i v o r c e i t from what happens — 
from what, i n t h i s time or t h a t p l a c e , 
s p e c i f i c people say, what they do, what 
i s done to them, from the whole v a s t 
business of the world -- i s to d i v o r c e i t 
from i t s a p p l i c a t i o n and render i t 
vacant. A good i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
anything — a poem, a person, a h i s t o r y , 
a r i t u a l , an i n s t i t u t i o n , a s o c i e t y — 
takes us i n t o the heart of t h a t of which  
i t i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 

(Geertz, 19731: 18) 
(emphasis mine) 

. . . from whatever l e v e l a t which one 
operates, and however i n t r i c a t e l y , the 
g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e i s the same: s o c i e t i e s , 
l i k e l i v e s , c o n t a i n t h e i r own  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . One has o n l y to l e a r n  
how to g a i n access to them. 

(Geertz, 1973c: 453) 
(emphasis mine) 



110 

Are we, i n d e s c r i b i n g symbol uses, 
d e s c r i b i n g p e r c e p t i o n s , sentiments, 
o u t l o o k s , experiences? And i n what 
sense? What do we c l a i m when we c l a i m 
t h a t we understand the s e m i o t i c means by 
which . . . persons are d e f i n e d to one 
another? That we know words or t h a t we 
know minds? 

In answering t h i s q u e s t i o n , i t i s 
necessary, I t h i n k , f i r s t to n o t i c e the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n t e l l e c t u a l movement, the 
Inward conceptual rhythm . . . in. a l l . 
. . analyses . . . namely, a continuous 
d i a l e c t i c a l t a c k i n g between the most 
l o c a l of l o c a l d e t a i l and the most g l o b a l 
of g l o b a l s t r u c t u r e i n such a way as to 
b r i n g them i n t o simultaneous view. . . . 
Hopping back and f o r t h between the whole  
conceived through the p a r t s t h a t  
a c t u a l i z e i t and the p a r t s conceived  
through the whole t h a t motivates them, we  
seek to t u r n them, by a s o r t of  
i n t e l l e c t u a l p e r p e t u a l motion, i n t o  
e x p l i c a t i o n s of one another. 

A l l t h i s i s . . . but the now f a m i l i a r 
t r a j e c t o r y of what D i l t h e y c a l l e d the 
hermeneutlc c i r c l e , and my argument here 
i s merely t h a t i t ^ is. as c e n t r a l to  
ethnographic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and thus to  
the p e n e t r a t i o n of other peoples' modes  
of thought, as I t i s to l i t e r a r y ,  
h i s t o r i c a l , p h i l o l o g i c a l , p s y c h o a n a l y t i c ,  
or b i b l i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . . . . 

(Geertz, 1983b: 69) 
(emphasis mine) 

( i l l ) Anthropology 

a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l w r i t i n g s are 
themselves i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , and second  
and t h i r d order ones to boot. (By 
d e f i n i t i o n , o n l y a " n a t i v e " makes f i r s t  
order ones: i t s h i s c u l t u r e . ) They a r e , 
thus, f i c t i o n s ; f i c t i o n s i n the sense 
t h a t they are "something made," 
"something f a s h i o n e d " — the o r i g i n a l 
meaning of f I c t i o — not t h a t they are 



f a l s e , u n f a c t u a l , or merely "as i f " 
thought experiments. 

(Geertz, 19731: 15) 
(emphasis Geertz's and mine) 

The ethnographer " I n s c r i b e s " s o c i a l  
d i s c o u r s e : he w r i t e s i t down. In so 
doing, he turns i t from a p a s s i n g event, 
which e x i s t s o n l y i n i t s own moment of 
occurrence, i n t o an account, which e x i s t s 
i n i t s I n s c r i p t i o n s and can be 
r e c o n s u l t e d . . . . "What," Paul Ricoeur, 
from whom t h i s whole idea of i n s c r i p t i o n  
of a c t i o n i s borrowed . . . asks, "what 
does w r i t i n g f i x ? Not the event of 
speaking, but the " s a i d " of speaking, 
where we understand by the " s a i d " of 
speaking t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l e x t e r i o r i z a t i o n 
c o n s t i t u t i v e of the aim of d i s c o u r s e 
thanks to which the sagen -- the s a y i n g -

wants to become Aus-sage -- the 
e n u n c i a t i o n , the enunciated. In s h o r t , 
what we w r i t e i s the noema ["thought," 
"content," " g i s t " ] of the speaking. I t 
i s the meaning of the speech event, not 
the event as event." . . . C u l t u r a l 
a n a l y s i s i s (or should be) guessing a t 
meanings, a s s e s s i n g the guesses, and 
drawing e x p l a n a t o r y c o n c l u s i o n s from the 
b e t t e r guesses. . . . 

(Geertz, 19731: 19-20) 
(emphasis Geertz's and mine) 

We must, i n s h o r t , descend i n t o d e t a i l , 
past the m i s l e a d i n g tags, past the 
metaphysical types, past the empty 
s i m i l a r i t i e s to grasp f i r m l y the 
e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r of not o n l y the 
v a r i o u s c u l t u r e s but the v a r i o u s s o r t s of 
i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n c u l t u r e , i f we wish to 
encounter humanity face to f a c e . 

(Geertz, 1973g: 53) 
(emphasis mine) 

[The] i s s u e s are m u l t i p l e , i n v o l v i n g 
questions of d e f i n i t i o n s , v e r i f i c a t i o n s , 



c a u s a l i t y , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s , 
o b j e c t i v i t y , measurement, communication. 
But a t base they a l l b o l l down to one  
q u e s t i o n : how to frame an a n a l y s i s of  
meaning -- the conceptual s t r u c t u r e s  
I n d i v i d u a l s use to construe experience -
- which w i l l be a t once c i r c u m s t a n t i a l 
enough to c a r r y c o n v i c t i o n and a b s t r a c t 
enough to forward theory. These are 
equal n e c e s s i t i e s . . . . But they a l s o . 
. . p u l l i n opposite d i r e c t i o n s , f o r the 
more one invokes d e t a i l s the more he i s 
bound to the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the 
immediate case, the more one omits them 
the more he l o s e s touch with the ground 
on which h i s arguments r e s t . D i s c o v e r i n g 
how to escape t h i s paradox — or more 
e x a c t l y , f o r one never r e a l l y escapes I t , 
how to keep i t a t bay — i s what, 
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y , thematic a n a l y s i s i s 
a l l about. 

(Geertz, 19731: 313) 
(emphasis mine) 

What i s needed i s some s y s t e m a t i c , r a t h e r 
than merely l i t e r a r y or I m p r e s s i o n i s t i c , 
way to d i s c o v e r what is. g i v e n , what the 
conceptual s t r u c t u r e embodied i n the 
symbolic forms through which persons are 
p e r c e i v e d a c t u a l l y i s . What we want . . 
. i s a developed method of d e s c r i b i n g and 
a n a l y z i n g the meaningful s t r u c t u r e of 
experience . . . as i t i s apprehended by 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e members of a p a r t i c u l a r 
s o c i e t y a t a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n time --
i n a word, a s c i e n t i f i c phenomenology of 
c u l t u r e . 

(Geertz, 1973h: 364) 
(emphasis mine) 

. . . i t i s from the . . . d i f f i c u l t 
achievement of s e e i n g o u r s e l v e s amongst 
o t h e r s , as a l o c a l example of the forms 
human l i f e has l o c a l l y taken, a case  
among cases, a world among worlds, t h a t 
the largeness of mind, without which 
o b j e c t i v i t y i s s e l f - c o n g r a t u l a t i o n and 
t o l e r a n c e a sham, comes. I f i n t e r p r e t i v e 



113 

anthropology has any general o f f i c e i n 
the world i t i s to keep r e t e a c h i n g t h i s 
f i g u r a t i v e t r u t h . 

(Geertz, 1983f: 16) 
(emphasis mine) 

The q u e s t i o n of s i g n a t u r e , the  
establishment of an a u t h o r i a l presence 
w i t h i n a t e x t , has haunted ethnography 
from very e a r l y on, though f o r the most 
p a r t i t has done so i n a d i s g u i s e d form. 
D i s g u i s e d , because i t has been g e n e r a l l y 
c a s t not as a n a r r a t o l o g l c a l Issue, a 
matter of how best to get an honest s t o r y  
h o n e s t l y t o l d , but as an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
one, a matter of how to prevent 
s u b j e c t i v e views from c o l o r i n g o b j e c t i v e 
f a c t s . 

(Geertz, 1988b: 9) 
(emphasis mine) 

From the preceding q u o t a t i o n s , which, I b e l i e v e , 

c o n s t i t u t e a f a i r l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e sampling of G e e r t z i a n 

anthropology, i t may be seen t h a t , 'a b i t of metaphorical 

r e f o c u s s i n g ' n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , throughout h i s c a r e e r Geertz's 

views have remained q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t . Geertz o f t e n r e f e r s to 

h i m s e l f as a 'meanlngs-and-symbols' a n t h r o p o l o g i s t whose 

purpose i s to assess ever more p r e c i s e d e s c r i p t i o n s of 

v a r y i n g c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s i n order to a r r i v e a t ever more 

a c c u r a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of "what the d e v i l [the people under 

s c r u t i n y ] t h i n k they are up t o " (Geertz, 1983d: 58). 

A c c o r d i n g to Geertz, meaning can be t r a n s f e r r e d from one 

c u l t u r a l context to another through the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 

symbolic s t r u c t u r e s , thus e n a b l i n g 'the enlargement of the 



114 

u n i v e r s e o£ human d i s c o u r s e . ' In a p a r t i c u l a r l y romantic 

moment Geertz opines t h a t f o r the seeker of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 

knowledge "the road l i e s , l i k e any genuine Quest, through a 

t e r r i f y i n g complexity" (Geertz, 1973f: 54). Throughout h i s 

work, Geertz maintains t h a t an a p p l i c a t i o n of 

phenomenological ('some s y s t e m a t i c . . . way to d i s c o v e r what 

i s given') and hermeneutical ('a continuous d i a l e c t i c a l . . 

.[hJopping back and f o r t h between the whole conceived through 

the p a r t s t h a t a c t u a l i z e I t and the p a r t s conceived through 

the whole t h a t motivates them') p r i n c i p l e s to whatever 

c u l t u r a l context may be a t hand i s the method most 

a p p r o p r i a t e to those who would embark upon the 

a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 'Quest.' Time and again Geertz makes use of 

such phrases as ' f i g u r a t i v e t r u t h , ' 'the heart of the 

matter,' ' e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r , ' 'genuine Quest,' 'the 

f i x a t i o n of meaning' and so on. He i n s i s t s t h a t , 

The meanings t h a t symbols, the m a t e r i a l 
v e h i c l e s of thought, embody are o f t e n 
e l u s i v e , vague, f l u c t u a t i n g , and 
convoluted, but they are, i n p r i n c i p l e , 
as capable of being d i s c o v e r e d through 
s y s t e m a t i c e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
e s p e c i a l l y i f the people who p e r c e i v e 
them w i l l cooperate a l i t t l e — as the 
atomic weight of hydrogen or the f u n c t i o n 
of the a d r e n a l glands. 

(Geertz, 1973h: 362-363) 

For Geertz, c u l t u r e s , l i k e the l i t e r a r y t e x t s examined by 

c r i t i c s such as Leo S p i t z e r and L i o n e l T r i l l i n g , are, i n 



115 

p r i n c i p l e , s u s c e p t i b l e to thematic a n a l y s i s , i . e . t h e i r 

meaning i s d i s c o v e r a b l e i f o n l y they are p r o p e r l y approached. 

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i n s p i t e of Geertz's constant c o n t e n t i o n 

t h a t meaning i s , i n p r i n c i p l e , both d i s c o v e r a b l e and 

t r a n s f e r a b l e , and i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t "a r e c u r r i n g 

c y c l e of terms — symbol, meaning, c o n c e p t i o n , form, t e x t 

. . . c u l t u r e — Care] designed to suggest there i s system i n 

p e r s i s t e n c e , t h a t a l l [my] so v a r i o u s l y aimed i n q u i r i e s are 

d r i v e n by a s u b t l e view of how one should go about 

c o n s t r u c t i n g an account of the imaginative make-up of a 

s o c i e t y " (Geertz, 1983f: 5), h i s work i s haunted by a 

n a g g i n g l y p e r s i s t e n t uneasiness. Thus, f o r example, 

The s t u t t e r i n g q u a l i t y of . . . my own 
e f f o r t s . . . i s a r e s u l t . . . . of not 
knowing, i n so u n c e r t a i n an undertaking, 
q u i t e where to begin, or, having anyhow 
begun, which way to move. Argument grows 
o b l i q u e , and language with i t , because 
the more o r d e r l y and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d a 
p a r t i c u l a r course looks the more i t seems 
i l l a d v i s e d . 

(Geertz, 1983f: 6) 

F i n d i n g our f e e t , an unnerving business 
which never more than d i s t a n t l y succeeds, 
i s what ethnographic r e s e a r c h c o n s i s t s of 
as a p e r s o n a l experience; t r y i n g to 
formulate the b a s i s on which one 
imagines, always e x c e s s i v e l y , one has 
found them i s what a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 
w r i t i n g c o n s i s t s of as a s c i e n t i f i c 
endeavour. 

(Geertz, 19731: 13) 



116 

El have never] gotten anywhere near to 
the bottom of anything I have ever 
w r i t t e n about. . . . C u l t u r a l a n a l y s i s i s 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y incomplete. And, worse 
than t h a t , the more deeply i t goes the 
l e s s complete i t i s . I t i s a strange 
s c i e n c e whose most t e l l i n g a s s e r t i o n s are 
i t s most t r e m u l o u s l y based, i n which to 
get somewhere with the matter a t hand i s 
to i n t e n s i f y the s u s p i c i o n , both your own 
and t h a t of o t h e r s , t h a t you are not 
q u i t e g e t t i n g i t r i g h t . 

(Geertz, 19731: 29) 

Meaning, t h a t e l u s i v e and i l l - d e f i n e d 
p s e u d o - e n t i t y we were once more than 
content to leave p h i l o s o p h e r s and 
l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s to fumble with, has now 
come back i n t o the heart of our 
d i s c i p l i n e . 

(Geertz, 19731: 29) 

T h i s e f f o r t , h a l f - q u i x o t i c , h a l f -
Sisyphean . . . to render anomalous 
t h i n g s i n not too anomalous words. . . . 

(Geertz, 1983e: 225) 

I t i s not t h a t we no longer have 
conventions of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; we have 
more than ever, b u i l t — o f t e n enough 
j e r r y - b u i l t — to accommodate a s i t u a t i o n 
a t once f l u i d , p l u r a l , uncentered, and 
i n e r a d i c a b l y u n t i d y . 

(Geertz, 1983a: 21) 

These examples c o u l d be m u l t i p l i e d , but what I have quoted 

should be s u f f i c i e n t to i n d i c a t e t h a t behind Geertz's more 

s e l f - a s s u r e d pronouncements there l u r k s an uneasiness f o r 

which the t e n e t s of h i s chosen c o n c e p t u a l i t y do not a l l o w him 



117 

adequately to account. I t i s with t h i s i n mind t h a t I would 

now l i k e to show what a d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g t e l l s us about 

Geertz's use of, and r e l i a n c e upon, such n o t i o n s as 

'meaning,' 'concept,' ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , ' 'context,' 

' t r a n s l a t i o n ' and ' t e x t . ' 

As w i l l be r e c a l l e d , D e r r i d a maintains t h a t concepts are 

always a l r e a d y doubled, t h a t the e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of 

t h e i r i t e r a b i l i t y p r e c l u d e s them from ever being homogeneous 

and s e l f - I d e n t i c a l . T h i s being the case, Geertz's assumption 

(which i s the assumption of Western metaphysics i n general) 

t h a t a ' f i x a t i o n of meaning' i s both p o s s i b l e and d e s i r a b l e 

i s c a l l e d r a d i c a l l y Into q u e s t i o n . As Geertz r e f e r s to 

h i m s e l f as a 'meanings-and-symbols' a n t h r o p o l o g i s t i t i s 

u s e f u l to look at how he d e f i n e s these two terms: 

. . . s i g n i f i c a n t symbols [Include] words 
f o r the most p a r t but a l s o g e s t u r e s , 
drawings, musical sounds, mechanical 
d e v i c e s l i k e c l o c k s , or n a t u r a l o b j e c t s 
l i k e jewels — a n y t h i n g , i n f a c t , t h a t i s  
disengaged from i t s mere a c t u a l i t y and  
used to Impose meaning on e x p e r i e n c e . 

(Geertz, 1973g: 45) 
(emphasis mine) 

[A symbol] i s . any o b j e c t , a c t , 
event, q u a l i t y , or r e l a t i o n which serves  
as a v e h i c l e f o r a conception -- the  
conception i s the symbol's "meaning." 

(Geertz, 1973J: 91) 
(emphasis mine) 



118 

So f o r Geertz, symbols are 'construable s i g n s * and what they 

are s i g n i f i c a t i v e of i s meanings or concepts. Now, a c c o r d i n g 

to D e r r i d a , n o t i o n s such as •symbol,' ' s i g n , 1 'meaning' and 

'concept' are premised upon a d e d i c a t i o n to presence — to a 

b e l i e f i n the e x i s t e n c e of a " ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i g n i f i e d ' 

which i n and of i t s e l f , i n i t s essence, would r e f e r to no 

s i g n i f i e r , would exceed the c h a i n of s i g n s , and would no 

longer i t s e l f f u n c t i o n as a s i g n i f i e r " ( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 19-

20). In other words, presence i s the u l t i m a t e u n i t y which 

both exceeds and c o n t a i n s m u l t i p l i c i t y , the u l t i m a t e s e l f -

i d e n t i t y which both exceeds and c o n t a i n s d i f f e r e n c e -- i t i s 

the t h e o l o g i c a l moment par e x c e l l e n c e ("the name of God 

. . . Is the name of i n d i f f e r e n c e i t s e l f " ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 

71)), f o r , being p e r f e c t i n and of i t s e l f , i t f u n c t i o n s as an 

a b s o l u t e r e f e r e n t which, by d e f i n i t i o n , does not i t s e l f 

r e f e r . T h i s d e d i c a t i o n to presence, whether i t be i n the 

form of a b e l i e f i n God, a b e l i e f i n meaning or a b e l i e f i n 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y as such, p r e c l u d e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of 

acknowledging d i f f e r e n c e as d i f f e r e n c e or the other as_ other 

f o r d i f f e r e n c e must always be viewed as a c o r r u p t i o n of 

and/or i n f e r i o r to i d e n t i t y and the other must always be 

viewed as a c o r r u p t i o n of and/or i n f e r i o r to the s e l f . Hence 

Western metaphysics abounds with p h i l o s o p h i e s which subsume 

d i f f e r e n c e w i t h i n i d e n t i t y (e.g. the Hegelian Aufhebung and 

d i a l e c t i c s i n general) and the other w i t h i n the s e l f (e.g. 

the C a r t e s i a n c o g l t o and i t s development i n Husserlean 



119 

thought and phenomenology i n g e n e r a l ) . Thus the uneasiness 

which i s apparent i n Geertz's work may be seen to be due to 

the f a c t t h a t h i s metaphysical assumptions imprison him 

w i t h i n a t h e o r e t i c a l and methodological framework which 

f u n c t i o n s to r e p r e s s the d i f f e r e n c e / o t h e r n e s s / d i v e r s i t y t h a t 

he i s a b l e to intimate but f o r which he i s unable to account. 

Even though Geertz acknowledges t h a t ' c u l t u r a l a n a l y s i s 

i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y incomplete' t h a t meaning i s an ' e l u s i v e and 

i l l - d e f i n e d p s e u d o - e n t i t y ' he never a r r i v e s a t the p o i n t 

where he q u e s t i o n s the n o t i o n of concept or c o n c e p t u a l i t y as 

such. And, as D e r r i d a says, 

Every concept t h a t l a y s c l a i m to any 
r i g o u r whatsoever i m p l i e s the a l t e r n a t i v e 
of " a l l or n o t h i n g . " Even i f i n 
" r e a l i t y " or i n "experience" everyone 
b e l i e v e s he knows t h a t there i s never 
" a l l or n o t h i n g , " a concept determines 
i t s e l f o n l y a c c o r d i n g to " a l l or 
n o t h i n g . " Even the concept of 
" d i f f e r e n c e of degree," the concept of 
r e l a t i v i t y i s , qua concept, determined 
a c c o r d i n g to the l o g i c of a l l or nothing, 
of yes or no: d i f f e r e n c e s of degree or. 
n o n d l f f e r e n c e s of degree. I t i s 
impossible . . . to form a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
concept o u t s i d e of t h i s l o g i c of a l l or 
nothing. 

( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 116-117) 

Thus, g i v e n t h a t concepts are d e f i n e d as s e l f - i d e n t i c a l 

( e i t h e r there i s meaning or there i s not, e i t h e r there i s 

essence or there i s not e t c . ) and given t h a t Geertz does not 

q u e s t i o n the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s and/or adequacy of c o n c e p t u a l i t y 



as such, i t Is not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t he c o n s t a n t l y f i n d s 

h i m s e l f 'unnerved' by what he p e r c e i v e s to be the 

• i n e r a d i c a b l e u n t i d i n e s s ' of c u l t u r a l phenomena. C u l t u r a l 

phenomena are not e i t h e r ( t i d y ) or. (untidy) -- they are both 

( t i d y / u n t i d y ) and ( i n v o l v e d with i r r e d u c i b l e u n d e c l d a b i l i t y ) . 

And t h i s because no c u l t u r a l phenomenon, be i t a r i t u a l , a 

book or a p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept, e x i s t s i n and of i t s e l f , 

r e f e r r i n g o n l y to I t s e l f — i t i s always a l r e a d y doubled, 

always a l r e a d y p a r t of a s i g n i f y i n g c h a i n , and thus always 

a l r e a d y r i d d l e d with otherness. I t i s t h i s u n d e c l d a b i l i t y , 

t h i s p l a y of i t e r a b i l i t y , d i f f 6 r a n c e , t r a c e e t c . , which i s 

not r e d u c i b l e to e i t h e r / o r l o g i c , the l o g i c of i d e n t i t y , and 

yet which allows f o r both the p o s s i b i l i t y (as e f f e c t ) and the 

i m p o s s i b i l i t y (as s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t cause) of t h a t l o g i c , t h a t 

must be taken i n t o account. 

Geertz's n o t i o n of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r o v i d e s another 

example of the way i n which h i s t h e o r e t i c a l / p h i l o s o p h i c a l 

assumptions prevent him from r e c o g n i z i n g and d e v e l o p i n g 

c e r t a i n p o s s i b i l i t i e s which are nonetheless i n s c r i b e d w i t h i n 

h i s work. For Geertz, as f o r Western metaphysics i n g e n e r a l , 

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o n s i s t s In the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of meaning. I t 

i s important to r e a l i z e t h a t , however i t i s expressed, 

whether as a D i l t h e y a n t a c k i n g back and f o r t h between p a r t 

and whole, as a Heideggerian p r o j e c t i o n and r e t r i e v a l , as a 

Gadamerian f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s , as a R i c o e u r i a n working out of 

understanding and e x p l a n a t i o n , or as a G e e r t z i a n combination 



of D i l t h e y and Ricoeur, the d i a l e c t i c a l movement of the 

hermeneutic c i r c l e (or s p i r a l , or arc) always presupposes an 

o v e r - r i d i n g u n i t y upon which the p o s s i b i l i t y of 

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as the c o n s t r u i n g of meaning i s based. A 

d i a l e c t i c a l s t r u c t u r e , whether i t be i n the garb of P l a t o n i c 

d i a l o g u e , Hegelian s p e c u l a t i o n , Gadamerian hermeneutlcs, or 

G e e r t z l a n i n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology, i s , by d e f i n i t i o n and i n 

p r i n c i p l e , d e d i c a t e d to the t e l e o l o g i c a l r e s o l u t i o n of 

o p p o s i t l o n a l i t y . As Wallace Stevens says, "a law of inherent 

o p p o s l t e s , / Of e s s e n t i a l u n i t y , i s as p l e a s a n t as p o r t " 

(Stevens, 1982b: 215). And whether the d i a l e c t i c a l process 

Is deemed capable of completion (e.g. Hegel's Absolute 

S p i r i t ) or whether i t i s deemed endless (e.g. Ricoeur's 

polysemy) i t i s nonetheless always c a r r i e d out w i t h i n a 

n o t i o n of u n i t y . Thus even though Geertz, i n l i k e n i n g the 

a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l task of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to t h a t of the 

l i t e r a r y c r i t i c , views c u l t u r e as an 'assemblage of t e x t s ' 

which are by nature polysemous and p o l y t h e m a t i c , he s t i l l 

cannot escape the i n e v i t a b l y homogeneous s t r i c t u r e s of h i s 

t h e o r e t i c a l paradigm, f o r , as D e r r i d a says, 

Polysemy always puts out i t s 
m u l t i p l i c i t i e s and v a r i a t i o n s w i t h i n the 
hor i z o n , a t l e a s t , of some i n t e g r a l 
r e a d i n g which c o n t a i n s no a b s o l u t e r i f t , 
no s e n s e l e s s d e v i a t i o n — the h o r i z o n of 
the f i n a l p a r o u s i a of a meaning a t l a s t 
deciphered, r e v e a l e d , made present i n the 
r i c h c o l l e c t i o n of i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . 
Whatever i n t e r e s t one might f i n d i n them, 
whatever d i g n i t y one might grant them, 



122 

p l u r l v o c i t y , the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I t c a l l s 
f o r , and the h i s t o r y t h a t Is p r e c i p i t a t e d 
out around i t remain l i v e d as the 
e n r i c h i n g , temporary detours of some 
p a s s i o n , some s i g n i f y i n g martyrdom t h a t 
t e s t i f i e s to a t r u t h past or a t r u t h to 
come, to a meaning whose presence i s 
announced by enigma. A l l the moments of 
polysemy a r e , as the word i m p l i e s , 
moments of meaning. 

( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 350) 

Thus, even though Geertz attempts to defend d i v e r s i t y by 

p r o c l a i m i n g an ' a n t l - a n t i - r e l a t i v i s t ' stance a g a i n s t the 

u n i f y i n g notions of 'Human Nature' (e.g. v a r i o u s forms of 

b i o l o g i c a l determinism) on the one hand and of 'Human Mind' 

(e.g. v a r i o u s forms of p s y c h o l o g i c o - l i n g u i s t i c determinism) 

on the other, both of which d i s p l a y "the same tendency to see 

d i v e r s i t y as s u r f a c e and u n i v e r s a l i t y as depth" (Geertz, 

1984: 272), he nonetheless, i r o n i c a l l y and i n s p i t e of h i s 

own most strenuous e f f o r t s , cannot help but end up as h i m s e l f 

a promoter of u n i t y . And t h i s because he does not q u e s t i o n 

the r e p r e s s i v e , homogeneous i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s own 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y . 

Geertz's n o t i o n of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , besides e n t a i l i n g a 

d i a l e c t i c a l working out of meaning, a l s o e n t a i l s a n o t i o n of 

the e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of the t r a n s m i s s i b l l i t y of meaning 

from one c u l t u r a l context or frame to another. As Geertz 

says, he i s concerned with what he p e r c e i v e s to be a problem 

of " t r a n s l a t i o n , [of] how meaning gets moved, or does not, 

r e a s o n a b l y i n t a c t from one s o r t of d i s c o u r s e to the next" 



123 

(Geertz, 1983g: 154). And ' t r a n s l a t i o n , ' a c c o r d i n g to 

Geertz, " i s not a simple r e c a s t i n g of o t h e r s ' ways of p u t t i n g 

t h i n g s i n terms of our own ways of p u t t i n g them . . . but 

[of] d i s p l a y i n g the l o g i c of t h e i r ways of p u t t i n g them i n 

the l o c u t i o n s of ours. . . . [ i t i s a] c a t c h i n g of ' t h e i r ' 

views i n 'our' v o c a b u l a r i e s " (Geertz, 1983f: 10). In other 

words, Geertz i s concerned with the t r a n s m i s s i o n of meaning 

( i . e . t r a n s l a t i o n ) between c u l t u r e s v i a a thematic or 

i n t e r p r e t i v e r e a d i n g of symbols which a l l o w s him 

. . . to penetrate somewhat [the] t a n g l e 
of hermeneutlcal involvements, to l o c a t e 
with some p r e c i s i o n the i n s t a b i l i t i e s of 
thought and sentiment i t generates and 
s e t them i n a s o c i a l frame. Such an 
e f f o r t h a r d l y d i s s o l v e s the t a n g l e or 
removes the i n s t a b i l i t i e s . Indeed . . . 
i t r a t h e r b r i n g s them more d i s t u r b i n g l y 
to n o t i c e . But i t does at l e a s t (or can) 
p l a c e them i n an i n t e l l i g i b l e context, 
and u n t i l some c l i o m e t r i c i a n , 
s o c i o b i o l o g i s t , or deep l i n g u i s t i c i s t 
r e a l l y does c o n t r i v e to s o l v e the R i d d l e 
of the Sphinx, t h a t w i l l have to do. 

(Geertz, 1983c: 45) 
(emphasis mine) 

From the preceding q u o t a t i o n i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t , a g a i n , 

Geertz i s t r o u b l e d by the amorphous nature of h i s 'data' and 

t h a t , a g a i n , he attempts to account f o r i t through the use of 

an unexamined c o n c e p t u a l i t y . In order to begin 

d e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h i s l e t us f i r s t look a t the n o t i o n of 

• c o n t e x t . ' 



124 

The Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s 'context* as, 

" p a r t s t h a t precede or f o l l o w a passage or word and f i x i t s 

meaning (out of -, without these and hence m i s l e a d i n g ) ; 

ambient c o n d i t i o n s . " In terms of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Geertz p e r c e i v e s a context to be those 

c o n d i t i o n s which surround and determine a p a r t i c u l a r 

phenomenon ( i . e . symbol or symbolic c l u s t e r ) hence r e n d e r i n g 

i t capable of being r e c o g n i z e d as a v e h i c l e of e s s e n t i a l l y 

t r a n s l a t a b l e meaning. In other words, symbols or symbolic 

c l u s t e r s are p e r c e i v e d to be a t the c e n t r e of any given 

context (at 'the heart of the matter,' as Geertz would say) 

and thus, by usage and by d e f i n i t i o n , the n o t i o n of context 

as such, as I t f u n c t i o n s In Geertz's work, Is, i n p r i n c i p l e , 

a u n i f i c concept c o n s t i t u t e d d i a l e c t i c a l l y by the 'meaning' 

which i t surrounds and i n surrounding both d e f i n e s and i s 

d e f i n e d by and i n d e f i n i n g i t both s a t u r a t e s and i s s a t u r a t e d 

by. What Geertz ends up with i s a n o t i o n of c u l t u r a l context 

which, f o r purposes of comparison and/or c o n t r a s t , i s 

i s o l a b l e and hence t r a n s m i s s i b l e and/or t r a n s l a t a b l e as a 

d e f i n a b l e e n t i t y . With r e s p e c t to t h i s n o t i o n of context 

D e r r i d a comments, 

But are the c o n d i t i o n s . . . of a 
context ever a b s o l u t e l y determinable. . 
. . Is there a r i g o r o u s and s c i e n t i f i c 
concept of context? Or does the n o t i o n 
of context c o n c e a l , behind a c e r t a i n 
c o n f u s i o n , p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s 
of a v e r y determinate nature? . . . [I] 
t r y to demonstrate why a context i s never 
a b s o l u t e l y determinable, or r a t h e r , why 



125 

i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n can never be e n t i r e l y 
c e r t a i n or s a t u r a t e d . T h i s s t r u c t u r a l 
n o n - s a t u r a t i o n would have a double 
e f f e c t : 1) i t would mark the t h e o r e t i c a l 
inadequacy o|_ the c u r r e n t concept of  
context ( l i n g u i s t i c or n o n - l i n g u i s t i c ) , 
as i t i s accepted by numerous domains of 
r e s e a r c h , i n c l u d i n g a l l the concepts with 
which i t i s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d ; 
2) i t would n e c e s s i t a t e a c e r t a i n 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n and a c e r t a i n displacement 
of the concept of w r i t i n g . T h i s concept 
would no longer be comprehensible i n 
terms of communication, a t l e a s t i n the 
l i m i t e d sense of a t r a n s m i s s i o n of 
meaning. I n v e r s e l y , i t Is w i t h i n the 
g e n e r a l domain of w r i t i n g , d e f i n e d i n 
t h i s way, t h a t the e f f e c t s of semantic 
communication can be determined as 
e f f e c t s t h a t are p a r t i c u l a r , secondary, 
i n s c r i b e d , and supplementary. 

( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 2-3) 

As w i l l be r e c a l l e d , w r i t i n g , i n the sense by which 

D e r r i d a r e f e r s to i t above, i s an 'undecidable' -- i t i s , to 

r e i t e r a t e N o r r i s , "the endless displacement of meaning which 

both governs language and p l a c e s i t f o r e v e r beyond the reach 

of a s t a b l e , s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g knowledge" ( N o r r i s , 1986: 

29). As I argued i n Chapter Two, i t i s the p l a y of 

u n d e c i d a b i l i t y which, premised as i t i s upon a n o t i o n of 

o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g , allows f o r both the p o s s i b i l i t y of 

p h i l o s o p h i c a l concepts (as e f f e c t s ) and t h e i r i m p o s s i b i l i t y 

(as s e l f - i d e n t i c a l e n t i t i e s ) . w i t h r e s p e c t to Geertz's 

n o t i o n of context, i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s p r i m o r d i a l p l a y of 

u n d e c i d a b i l i t y which he f a i l s to take i n t o account. For 

Geertz, context f u n c t i o n s as an i s o l a b l e framework which 



126 

surrounds and determines an e q u a l l y i s o l a b l e meaning. 

However, as D e r r i d a says, "Context i s always, and always has 

been, a t work w i t h i n the p l a c e , and not o n l y around i t " 

( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 60). In other words, c o n t e x t u a l i t y as such, 

as t h a t which frames or f i x e s a meaning, i s always a l r e a d y 

i t s e l f c o n t e x t u a l i z e d , t h a t i s , i t i s always a l r e a d y i t s e l f 

an e f f e c t of the p l a y of u n d e c l d a b i l i t y — I t nowhere e x i s t s 

as an a b s o l u t e , i s o l a b l e e n t i t y . And, as D e r r i d a p o i n t s out, 

"This does not imply t h a t [a gesture, a word, an a c t i o n e t c . ] 

i s v a l i d o u t s i d e of a c o n t e x t , but on the c o n t r a r y t h a t there 

are o n l y contexts without any c e n t r e or a b s o l u t e anchorage" 

( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 12). And whether Geertz acknowledges the 

a r t i f i c i a l , imposed nature of h i s c o n t e x t u a l frames or not 

(and, q u i t e o b v i o u s l y , he does), u n l e s s and u n t i l he 

acknowledges the u n d e c l d a b i l i t y t h a t i s always a l r e a d y at 

work (or play) w i t h i n h i s chosen c o n c e p t u a l i t y he w i l l 

c o n t i n u e , c o n t r a r y to h i s r e p e a t e d l y p r o f e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s , to 

subordinate d i v e r s i t y to u n i t y , d i f f e r e n c e to i d e n t i t y , the 

other to the s e l f . 

Before d i s c u s s i n g Geertz's n o t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n or the 

t r a n s m i s s i b i l i t y of meaning, i t i s important to be c l e a r 

t h a t , f o r him, meaning i s i n t e n t i o n a l , t h a t i s , meaning, 

being t h a t which i s contained w i t h i n 'symbols or symbolic 

c l u s t e r s , ' i s t h a t which people 'think [ i t i s ] they are up 

t o ' — i . e . i t Is t h a t which they Intend. I t must be 

remembered t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , as such, i s p r e d i c a t e d upon 



127 

a phenomenological n o t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l consciousness which, 

i n t u r n , i s p r e d i c a t e d upon a n o t i o n of p r i m o r d i a l i n t u i t i o n , 

"where 'consciousness' means nothing other than the 

p o s s i b i l i t y of the s e l f - p r e s e n c e of the present i n the l i v i n g 

p r e s e n t " ( D e r r i d a , 1973b: 9 ) . In other words, i n t e n t i o n a l i t y 

i s an i n t e g r a l f e a t u r e of a p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness which 

p o s i t s the e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t u i t i o n — of an 

immediately s e l f - p r e s e n t and unmediated "source of a u t h o r i t y 

. f o r knowledge" (Husserl i n D e r r i d a , 1973b: 62). 

I n t e n t i o n a l i t y , as d e f i n e d i n the t r a d i t i o n of Husserlean 

phenomenology and as manifested i n G e e r t z i a n i n t e r p r e t i v e 

anthropology, i s fundamentally and i r r e m e d i a b l y t e l e o l o g i c a l 

— t h a t Is, i t e n t a i l s , i n p r i n c i p l e , f u l f i l m e n t i n the s e l f -

present r e a l i z a t i o n of t h a t which i t i n t e n d s . And, whether 

or not Geertz r e c o g n i z e s i t (and, a p p a r e n t l y , he does n o t ) , 

T h i s t e l o s of " f u l f i l l m e n t " Is 
c o n s t i t u t i v e of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ; i t i s 
p a r t of i t s concept. I n t e n t i o n a l 
movement tends toward t h i s f u l f i l l m e n t . 
T h i s i s the o r i g i n or the f a t a l i t y of 
t h a t " l o n g i n g f o r metaphysical p l e n i t u d e " 
which, however, can a l s o be presupposed, 
d e s c r i b e d , or l i v e d without the romantic, 
even m y s t i c a l pathos sometimes a s s o c i a t e d 
with those words. . . . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i f 
one wishes to speak r i g o r o u s l y of an 
i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e one should take 
i n t o account, with or without " l o n g i n g , " 
the t e l o s of p l e n i t u d e t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s 
i t . . . . T h i s p l e n i t u d e ( t h i s 
" f u l f i l l m e n t " ) , f o r reasons I have 
a l r e a d y s t a t e d ( i t e r a b i l i t y , s t r u c t u r e of 
the t r a c e and of the mark i n g e n e r a l 
[ i . e . the p l a y of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y ] ) , i s 
a l r e a d y i n a c c e s s i b l e i n p e r c e p t i o n or i n 



128 

I n t u i t i o n i n g e n e r a l as the experience of 
a present content. 

( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 121) 

Now a g a i n , as with the n o t i o n of context, i t i s important to 

r e a l i z e t h a t D e r r i d a i s not arguing t h a t there i s no 

i n t e n t i o n a l i t y — he i s arguing t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y as such, 

as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept premised on a t e l e o l o g i c a l n o t i o n 

of u l t i m a t e p l e n i t u d e , does not and has never e x i s t e d . As 

D e r r i d a says, "What i s l i m i t e d by i t e r a b i l i t y 

[ u n d e c l d a b i l i t y ] i s not i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i n g e n e r a l , but i t s 

c h a r a c t e r of being conscious or present to i t s e l f 

( a c t u a l i z e d , f u l f i l l e d , and adequate), the s i m p l i c i t y of i t s 

f e a t u r e s , i t s undlvldedness. . . . The i t e r a t i o n s t r u c t u r i n g  

i t a p r i o r i i n t r o d u c e s i n t o i t a dehiscence and a c l e f t 

. . . which are e s s e n t i a l " ( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 105). In other 

words, the concept of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , l i k e a l l 

undeconstructed conceptual c a t e g o r i e s , f u n c t i o n s as a 

u n i f y i n g s t r u c t u r e which r e p r e s s e s i t s own e s s e n t i a l 

u n d e c l d a b i l i t y . And t h i s u n d e c l d a b i l i t y i s e s s e n t i a l because 

i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , as such, i s p r e d i c a t e d upon the impossible 

• p o s s i b i l i t y of the s e l f - p r e s e n c e of the present In the 

l i v i n g present' — Impossible because, as s t a t e d i n Chapter 

Two but worth r e p e a t i n g here, 

. the being-present (on) i n i t s 
t r u t h , i n the presence of i t s i d e n t i t y 
and i n the i d e n t i t y of i t s presence, i s 
doubled as soon as i t appears, as soon as 



129 

i t presents i t s e l f . r t appears, i n i t s  
essence, as the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s own 
most proper non-truth, of i t s psuedo-
t r u t h r e f l e c t e d i n the i c o n , the 
phantasm, or the simulacrum. What i s i s 
not what i t i s , I d e n t i c a l and I d e n t i c a l 
to i t s e l f , unless i t adds to I t s e l f the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of being repeated as such. 
And i t s i d e n t i t y i s hollowed out by t h a t 
a d d i t i o n , withdraws i t s e l f i n the 
supplement t h a t presents i t . 

( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 168) 

Thus I n t e n t i o n a l i t y , as a concept p r e d i c a t e d upon i t s 

r e a l i z a t i o n or f u l f i l m e n t i n the p l e n i t u d e of an intended and 

s e l f - p r e s e n t meaning, i s , due to o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g and the 

e s s e n t i a l p l a y of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , i t s e l f always a l r e a d y 

f i s s u r e d with i t s own i m p o s s i b i l i t y . And a g a i n , as Geertz 

does not examine the i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s conceptual 

framework, he i s l e f t with no a l t e r a t i v e but to f o l l o w the 

d i c t a t e s of t h a t framework, thus e n s u r i n g t h a t h e t e r o g e n e i t y 

i s i n e v i t a b l y subsumed w i t h i n homogeneity. 

With r e s p e c t to Geertz's n o t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n , of the 

t r a n s m i s s i b i l i t y of meaning from one c u l t u r a l context to 

another, i t should by now be c l e a r t h a t i t i s premised upon 

a whole s t r a i n of p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought which, among other 

t h i n g s , presumes a t e l e o l o g i c a l n o t i o n of d i a l e c t i c a l process 

and of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y as w e l l as the s e l f - i d e n t i c a l nature of 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y . Thus i t should not be s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Geertz 

p o s i t s the p o s s i b i l i t y of "meaning g e t t t i n g ] moved, or . . . 

not, r e a s o n a b l y I n t a c t from one s o r t of d i s c o u r s e to the 



130 

n e x t . " I t w i l l be remembered t h a t G e e r t z contends t h a t 

meaning i s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n symbols or s y m b o l i c c l u s t e r s and 

t h a t he d e f i n e s symbols as s i g n s . And, of c o u r s e , a c c o r d i n g 

t o G e e r t z ' s c o n c e p t u a l i t y , s i g n s must be s i g n s of_ something, 

and what t h e y a r e s i g n s of i s meaning. However, as D e r r i d a 

s a y s , "But what i s a s i g n as such? There i s no s i g n as s u c h . 

E i t h e r the s i g n Is c o n s i d e r e d a t h i n g , and i t i s not a s i g n . 

Or i t i s a r e f e r e n c e , and t h u s not i t s e l f " ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 

204). F u r t h e r , 

Is i t not e v i d e n t t h a t no s i g n i f i e r , 
whatever i t s substance and form, has a 
"unique and s i n g u l a r r e a l i t y ? " A 
s i g n i f i e r i s from the very beginning the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s own r e p e t i t i o n , of i t s 
own image or resemblance. I t i s the 
c o n d i t i o n of i t s i d e a l i t y , what 
i d e n t i f i e s i t as s i g n i f i e r , and makes i t 
f u n c t i o n as such, r e l a t i n g i t to a 
s i g n i f i e d which, f o r the same reasons, 
c o u l d never be a "unique and s i n g u l a r 
r e a l i t y . " From the moment t h a t the s i g n 
appears, t h a t i s to say from the v e r y 
beginning, there i s no chance of 
encountering anywhere the p u r i t y of 
" r e a l i t y , " " u n i c i t y , " " s i n g u l a r i t y . " 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 91) 

Nonetheless, the concept of ' s i g n , ' as i t f u n c t i o n s 

w i t h i n Western metaphysics i n g e n e r a l and w i t h i n G e e r t z l a n 

anthropology i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n d i c a t e s the e x i s t e n c e of a 

meaning which i s by d e f i n i t i o n s e l f - i d e n t i c a l and which i s i n 

p r i n c i p l e i s o l a b l e and hence t r a n s p o r t a b l e ( i . e . 

t r a n s l a t a b l e ) from one c u l t u r a l context to another. As 

D e r r i d a says, 



131 

. . . the model of the s i g n . . . marks 
the " s e m i o l o g i c a l " p r o j e c t i t s e l f and the 
o r g a n i c t o t a l i t y of i t s concepts, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r t h a t of communication, which 
i n e f f e c t i m p l i e s a t r a n s m i s s i o n charged  
with making pass, from one s u b j e c t to  
another, the i d e n t i t y of a s i g n i f i e d 
o b j e c t , of a meaning or of a concept 
r i g h t f u l l y separable from the process of 
passage and from the s i g n i f y i n g 
o p e r a t i o n . Communication presupposes 
s u b j e c t s (whose i d e n t i t y and presence are 
c o n s t i t u t e d before the s i g n i f y i n g 
operation) and o b j e c t s ( s i g n i f i e d 
concepts, a thought meaning t h a t the 
passage of communication w i l l have 
n e i t h e r to c o n s t i t u t e , nor, by a l l 
r i g h t s , to t r a n s f o r m ) . A communicates B 
to C. 

( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 23) 

Thus Geertz's n o t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n may be seen to be the 

i n e v i t a b l e outcome of h i s embeddedness w i t h i n an 

undeconstructed system of c o n c e p t u a l i t y . And whether or not 

one argues t h a t Geertz i s , a f t e r a l l , by and l a r g e u s i n g 

'everyday language' and t h a t to make so much out of h i s usage 

i s to put f a r too f i n e a p o i n t on t h i n g s , I t cannot be denied 

t h a t , 

. . ."everyday language" i s not innocent 
or n e u t r a l . I t i s the language of 
Western metaphysics, and i t c a r r i e s with 
i t not o n l y a c o n s i d e r a b l e number of 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a l l types, but a l s o 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n s e p a r a b l e from 
metaphysics, which, although l i t t l e 
attended t o , are knotted i n t o a system. 

( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 19) 



132 

Thus, f o r example, the concept ' s i g n , ' which c a r r i e s with i t 

the n o t i o n of an e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between s i g n i f i e r and 

s i g n i f i e d , between the s i g n and what i t s i g n s , 

i n h e r e n t l y leaves open the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i n k i n g a concept  
s i g n i f i e d i n and of i t s e l f , a concept 
simply present f o r thought, independent 
. . . of a r e l a t i o n s h i p to a system of 
s i g n i f i e r s [ i . e . a ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
s i g n i f i e d ' ] . . . . [However] from the 
moment t h a t one q u e s t i o n s the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of . . . a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i g n i f i e d , and 
t h a t one r e c o g n i z e s t h a t every s i g n i f i e d 
i s a l s o In the p o s i t i o n of a s i g n i f i e r , 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between s i g n i f i e d and 
s i g n i f i e r becomes p r o b l e m a t i c a l a t i t s 
r o o t . . . . In e f f e c t , the theme of a 
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i g n i f i e d took shape 
w i t h i n the h o r i z o n of an a b s o l u t e l y pure, 
t r a n s p a r e n t , a n d u n e q u i v o c a l 
t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y . In the l i m i t s to which 
i t i s p o s s i b l e , or a t l e a s t appears 
p o s s i b l e , t r a n s l a t i o n p r a c t i c e s the 
d i f f e r e n c e between s i g n i f i e d and 
s i g n i f i e r . But i f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s 
never pure, no more so i s t r a n s l a t i o n , 
and f o r the n o t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n we 
would have to s u b s t i t u t e a n o t i o n of 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ; a r e g u l a t e d 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of one language by 
another, of one t e x t by another. 

( D e r r i d a , 1981g:19-20) 

In other words, the p o i n t i s n e i t h e r to n e u t r a l i z e the 

d i s t i n c t i o n between s i g n i f i e r and s i g n i f i e d nor simply to 

r e v e r s e t h e i r l e v e l s of importance, but to show t h a t t h e i r 

d i s t i n c t i o n i s not and never has been a b s o l u t e — t h a t i t i s 

an e f f e c t of an e s s e n t i a l u n d e c l d a b i l i t y which both allows 

f o r and d e l i m i t s the n o t i o n of c o n c e p t u a l i t y i n g e n e r a l . I t 



133 

i s t h i s e s s e n t i a l u n d e c l d a b i l i t y which ensures t h a t any 

n o t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n as the simple t r a n s m i s s i o n of meaning 

from one context to another i s fundamentally inadequate, and 

i t i s t h i s e s s e n t i a l u n d e c l d a b i l i t y t h a t Geertz does not take 

i n t o account. 

Before going on to the work of James C l i f f o r d , I would 

l i k e to look at Geertz's f a v o u r i t e analogue f o r c u l t u r e , 

t h a t of the t e x t : 

The key to the t r a n s i t i o n from t e x t to 
t e x t analogue, from w r i t i n g as d i s c o u r s e 
to a c t i o n as d i s c o u r s e , i s , as Paul 
Ricoeur has p o i n t e d out, the concept of 
" i n s c r i p t i o n " : the f i x a t i o n of meaning. 
When we speak, our u t t e r a n c e s f l y by as 
events l i k e any other behaviour; unless 
what we say i s i n s c r i b e d i n w r i t i n g (or 
some other e s t a b l i s h e d r e c o r d i n g 
p r o c e s s ) , i t i s as evanescent as what we 
do. I f i t i s so i n s c r i b e d , i t of course 
passes, l i k e Dorian Gray's youth, anyway; 
but a t l e a s t I t s meaning, the s a i d , not 
the s a y i n g -- to a degree and f o r a while 
remains. T h i s too i s not d i f f e r e n t f o r 
a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l : i t s meaning can 
p e r s i s t i n a way i t s a c t u a l i t y cannot. 

The g r e a t v i r t u e of the e x t e n s i o n of 
the n o t i o n of t e x t beyond t h i n g s w r i t t e n 
on paper or carved i n t o stone i s t h a t i t 
t r a i n s a t t e n t i o n on p r e c i s e l y t h i s 
phenomenon: on how the i n s c r i p t i o n of 
a c t i o n i s brought about, what i t s 
v e h i c l e s are and how they work, and on 
what the f i x a t i o n of meaning from the 
flow of events -- h i s t o r y from what 
happened, thought from t h i n k i n g , c u l t u r e 
from behaviour — i m p l i e s f o r 
s o c i o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 

(Geertz, 1983a: 31) 



134 

Geertz, l i k e Rlcoeur, views the t e x t as a p l u r l v o c a l t o t a l i t y 

which, as such and i n p r i n c i p l e , enables the i n t e r p r e t e r to 

i s o l a t e and to account f o r s p e c i f i c meanings — the process 

of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of a d i a l e c t i c between guessing 

a t and v a l i d a t i n g s a i d meanings. Whereas the meanings of 

w r i t t e n d i s c o u r s e are embodied w i t h i n given l i n g u i s t i c or 

v e r b a l s t r u c t u r e s , the meanings of s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e are 

embodied w i t h i n a c t i o n s or c l u s t e r s of a c t i o n s p e r c e i v e d as 

symbolic s t r u c t u r e s — but the p r i n c i p l e upon which 

I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Is based remains the same, i . e . the e s s e n t i a l 

p o s s i b i l i t y of the f i x a t i o n of meaning or meanings which i s 

a necessary f e a t u r e of the s e l f - c o n t a i n e d t o t a l i z i n g 

s t r u c t u r e of the t e x t or t e x t analogue. I t Is p r e c i s e l y t h i s 

assumed t o t a l i z i n g s t r u c t u r e , which i s a f e a t u r e of 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y i n g e n e r a l , which must be questioned, f o r , 

u n t i l i t I s , a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , along with 

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n g e n e r a l , w i l l remain d e d i c a t e d to a n o t i o n 

of p l e n i t u d e which d i s a l l o w s not o n l y a r i g o r o u s accounting 

o f , but, indeed, any r e c o g n i t i o n of, the r a d i c a l 

h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h i n g s . 

Geertz's penchant f o r viewing anthropology as a kind of 

t e x t u a l commentary leads him to p o s i t , i n h i s most r e c e n t 

work, t h a t the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t may be most c o n s t r u c t i v e l y 

viewed as being concerned with "a n a r r a t o l o g i c a l i s s u e , a 

matter of how best to get an honest s t o r y h o n e s t l y t o l d " 

(Geertz, 1988b: 9). Now both n a r r a t i o n and s t o r y e n t a i l , by 



135 

d e f i n i t i o n , the r e c o u n t i n g of a l i n e a r sequence of events or 

episodes which are contained w i t h i n an o v e r a r c h i n g p l o t 

s t r u c t u r e , i . e . they are both t e l e o l o g i c a l and 

e s c h a t o l o g l c a l . (See Ricoeur on n a r r a t i v e , chapter Three.) 

As such, they f u n c t i o n to c o n t a i n h e t e r o g e n e i t y ( i . e . the 

p e r c e i v e d ' i n e r a d i c a b l e u n t i d i n e s s ' of t h i n g s ) w i t h i n 

homogeneity ( i . e . the p l e n i t u d e of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d and a l l 

encompassing paradigm). The s t o r y or n a r r a t i v e as such, as 

d e f i n e d w i t h i n the conceptual l i m i t s of Western metaphysics, 

do not and have never e x i s t e d f o r they are always a l r e a d y 

f i s s u r e d by an e s s e n t i a l u n d e c i d a b i l i t y which prevents them 

from ever being, at any given moment, pure or s e l f - c o n t a i n e d . 

T h i s being the case, the unexamined use of n a r r a t i v e or s t o r y 

as an analogue or model f o r the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l e n t e r p r i s e 

ensures t h a t the l a t t e r w i l l remain premised upon and 

d e d i c a t e d to a n o t i o n of p l e n i t u d e . As one of V i r g i n i a 

Woolf's c h a r a c t e r s comments, 

I have made up thousands of s t o r i e s ; I 
have f i l l e d innumerable notebooks with 
phrases to be used when I have found the 
t r u e s t o r y , the one s t o r y to which a l l 
these phrases r e f e r . But I have never 
yet found t h a t s t o r y . And I begin to 
ask, Are there s t o r i e s ? 

(Woolf, 1968: 160) 

Geertz c o u l d do worse than to begin to ask as w e l l . 



136 

II CLIFFORD 

(1) Discourse 

Discourse . . . i s a mode o£ 
communication i n which the presence of  
the speaking s u b j e c t and of the immediate  
s i t u a t i o n of communication are i n t r i n s i c . 
. . . Discourse does not transcend the 
s p e c i f i c o c c a s i o n i n which a s u b j e c t 
a p p r o p r i a t e s the resources of language In 
order to communicate d l a l o g l c a l l y . 
Ricoeur argues t h a t d i s c o u r s e cannot be 
i n t e r p r e t e d In the open-ended p o t e n t i a l l y 
p u b l i c way i n which a t e x t i s "read." To 
understand d i s c o u r s e "you had to have 
been t h e r e , " i n the presence of the 
d i s c o u r s i n g s u b j e c t . For d i s c o u r s e to 
become a t e x t i t must become 
"autonomous," i n Ricoeur's terms, 
separated from a s p e c i f i c u t t e r a n c e and 
a u t h o r i a l i n t e n t i o n . I n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s  
not i n t e r l o c u t i o n . I t does not depend on  
being i n the presence of a speaker. 

( C l i f f o r d , 1988f: 39) 
(emphasis mine) 

An i n t e r e s t i n the d i s c u r s i v e aspects of  
c u l t u r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n draws a t t e n t i o n 
not to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c u l t u r a l 
" t e x t s " but to t h e i r r e l a t i o n s of 
p r o d u c t i o n . Divergent s t y l e s of w r i t i n g 
are, with v a r y i n g degrees of success, 
g r a p p l i n g with these new orders of 
complexity — d i f f e r e n t r u l e s and 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n the h o r i z o n of a 
h i s t o r i c a l moment. . . . [There i s a] 
general t r e n d toward a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of  
d i s c o u r s e s i n ethnography: who speaks? 
who w r i t e s ? when and where? with or to 
whom? under what i n s t i t u t i o n a l and 
h i s t o r i c a l r e s t r a i n t s ? 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 13) 
(emphasis C l i f f o r d ' s and mine) 



A d i s c u r s i v e model o£ ethnographic 
p r a c t i c e b r i n g s i n t o prominence the 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of speech, along with 
i t s immediate performative c o n t e x t . 

( C l i f f o r d , 1988f: 41) 
(emphasis mine) 

Once c u l t u r e s are no longer p r e f i g u r e d 
v i s u a l l y — as o b j e c t s , t h e a t e r s , t e x t s -
- i t becomes p o s s i b l e to t h i n k of a 
c u l t u r a l p o e t i c s t h a t i s an I n t e r p l a y of  
v o i c e s , of p o s i t i o n e d u t t e r a n c e s . In a 
d i s c u r s i v e r a t h e r than a v i s u a l paradigm, 
the dominant metaphors f o r ethnography 
s h i f t away from the observing eye and 
toward e x p r e s s i v e speech. . . . And the 
c r u c i a l p o e t i c problem f o r a d i s c u r s i v e 
ethnography becomes how "to achieve by 
w r i t t e n means what speech c r e a t e s . " 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 12) 
(emphasis mine) 

i i ) Dialogue 

. . . d i a l o g i c a l processes p r o l i f e r a t e i n 
any complexly represented d i s c u r s i v e  
space. . . . Many v o i c e s clamor f o r 
e x p r e s s i o n . P o l y v o c a l i t y was r e s t r a i n e d 
and o r c h e s t r a t e d i n t r a d i t i o n a l 
ethnographies by g i v i n g to one v o i c e a 
p e r v a s i v e a u t h o r i a l f u n c t i o n and to 
others the r o l e of sources, "informants," 
to be quoted or paraphrased. Once 
d l a l o g l s m and polyphony are r e c o g n i z e d as 
modes of t e x t u a l p r o d u c t i o n , monophonic 
a u t h o r i t y i s questioned, r e v e a l e d to be 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a s c i e n c e t h a t has 
claimed to r e p r e s e n t c u l t u r e s . 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 15) 
(emphasis C l i f f o r d ' s and mine) 

To the extent t h a t the ethnographic 
process i s seen as i n s c r i p t i o n ( r a t h e r 
than, f o r example, as t r a n s c r i p t i o n , or 
d i a l o g u e ) the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i l l 



continue to enact a potent, and 
q u e s t i o n a b l e , a l l e g o r i c a l s t r u c t u r e . 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 113) 
(emphasis mine) 

The model of d i a l o g u e b r i n g s to 
prominence p r e c i s e l y those d i s c u r s i v e — 
c i r c u m s t a n t i a l and i n t e r s u b j e c t l v e — 
elements t h a t Ricoeur had to exclude from 
h i s model of the t e x t . . . . I f i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t f o r d l a l o g l c a l p o r t r a y a l s to 
escape t y p i f y i n g procedures, they can, to 
a s i g n i f i c a n t degree, r e s i s t the p u l l 
toward a u t h o r i t a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
the other. T h i s depends on t h e i r a b i l i t y 
f i c t i o n a l l y to maintain the strangeness 
of the other v o i c e and to h o l d i n view 
the s p e c i f i c c o n t i n g e n c i e s of the 
exchange. 

( C l i f f o r d , 1988f: 43-44) 
(emphasis mine) 

The f i c t i o n a l d i a l o g u e i s i n f a c t a 
condensation, a s i m p l i f i e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
of complex m u l t i v o c a l p r o c e s s e s . An 
a l t e r n a t i v e way of r e p r e s e n t i n g t h i s 
d i s c u r s i v e complexity i s to understand 
the o v e r a l l course of the r e s e a r c h as an 
ongoing n e g o t i a t i o n . 

( C l i f f o r d , 1988f: 44) 
(emphasis mine) 

ethnography [should be] a 
d l a l o g l c a l e n t e r p r i s e i n which both 
r e s e a r c h e r s and n a t i v e s are a c t i v e 
c r e a t o r s or, to s t r e t c h a term, authors 
of c u l t u r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . 
D i a l o g i c a l , c o n s t r u c t i v i s t paradigms tend 
to d i s p e r s e or share out ethnographic 
a u t h o r i t y . 

( C l i f f o r d , 19881: 84) 
(emphasis mine) 



139 

[Fleldwork] must . . . be seen as a 
h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n t i n g e n t , u n r u l y 
d i a l o g i c a l encounter i n v o l v i n g to some 
degree both c o n f l i c t and c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n 
the p r o d u c t i o n of t e x t s . 

( C l i f f o r d , 19881: 90) 
(emphasis mine) 

( i i i ) Anthropology/Ethnography 

. . . I t r e a t ethnography I t s e l f as a 
performance emplotted by powerful  
s t o r i e s . Embodied i n w r i t t e n r e p o r t s , 
these s t o r i e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y d e s c r i b e 
r e a l c u l t u r a l events and make a d d i t i o n a l , 
moral, i d e o l o g i c a l , and even c o s m o l o g i c a l 
statements. Ethnographic w r i t i n g i s 
a l l e g o r i c a l a t the l e v e l both of i t s 
content (what i t says about c u l t u r e s and 
t h e i r h i s t o r i e s ) and of i t s form (what i s 
i m p l i e d by i t s mode of t e x t u a l l z a t i o n ) . 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 98) 
(emphasis mine) 

. . . t r a n s c e n d e n t a l meanings are not 
a b s t r a c t i o n s or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s "added" 
to the o r i g i n a l "simple" account. 
Rather, they are the c o n d i t i o n s of i t s  
meaningfulness. Ethnographic t e x t s are 
i n e s c a p a b l y a l l e g o r i c a l , and a s e r i o u s 
acceptance of t h i s f a c t changes the ways 
they can be w r i t t e n and read. . . . I 
[applaud] a r e c e n t tendency to 
d i s t i n g u i s h a l l e g o r i c a l l e v e l s as 
s p e c i f i c " v o i c e s " w i t h i n the t e x t . I 
argue . . . t h a t the very a c t i v i t y of 
ethnographic w r i t i n g — seen as 
i n s c r i p t i o n or t e x t u a l i z a t i o n -- enacts 
a redemptive Western a l l e g o r y . T h i s 
p e r v a s i v e s t r u c t u r e needs to be p e r c e i v e d 
and weighed a g a i n s t other p o s s i b l e 
emplotments f o r the performance of 
ethnography. 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 99) 
(emphasis C l i f f o r d ' s and mine) 



A r e c o g n i t i o n of a l l e g o r y complicates the 
w r i t i n g and r e a d i n g of ethnographies i n 
p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l ways. A tendency 
emerges to s p e c i f y and separate d i f f e r e n t  
a l l e g o r i c a l r e g i s t e r s w i t h i n the t e x t . 
The marking o f f of extended indigenous  
d i s c o u r s e s shows the ethnography to be a 
h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e of powerful  
s t o r i e s t h a t t r a n s l a t e , encounter, and 
r e c o n t e x t u a l i z e other powerful s t o r i e s . 
I t i s a p a l i m p s e s t . . . . Moreover, an 
awareness of a l l e g o r y heightens awareness 
of the n a r r a t i v e , and other temporal 
setups, I m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y a t work. 
Is the redemptive s t r u c t u r e of s a l v a g e -
t e x t u a l i z a t i o n being r e p l a c e d ? By what 
new a l l e g o r i e s ? Of c o n f l i c t ? Of 
emergence? Of syncretism? 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 120-121) 
(emphasis mine) 

I n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology, by viewing 
c u l t u r e s as assemblages of t e x t s , l o o s e l y 
and sometimes c o n t r a d i c t o r a l l y [ s i c ] 
u n i t e d , and by h i g h l i g h t i n g the i n v e n t i v e 
p o e i s i s a t work i n a l l c o l l e c t i v e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , has c o n t r i b u t e d 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the d e f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n of 
ethnographic a u t h o r i t y . In i t s 
mainstream r e a l i s t s t r a n d s , however, i t 
does not escape the general s t r i c t u r e s of 
t h o s e c r i t i c s of " c o l o n i a l " 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n who, s i n c e 1950, have 
r e j e c t e d d i s c o u r s e s t h a t p o r t r a y the 
c u l t u r a l r e a l i t y of other peoples without 
p l a c i n g t h e i r own r e a l i t y i n jeopardy. . 
. . Henceforth n e i t h e r the experience 
nor the i n t e r p r e t i v e a c t i v i t y of the 
s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h e r can be c o n s i d e r e d 
innocent. I t becomes necessary to 
conceive of ethnography not as the 
experience and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a 
c i r c u m s c r i b e d " o t h e r " r e a l i t y , but r a t h e r 
as a c o n s t r u c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n i n v o l v i n g 
at l e a s t two, and u s u a l l y more, 
c o n s c i o u s , p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
s u b j e c t s . Paradigms of experience and 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are y i e l d i n g to d i s c u r s i v e  
paradigms of d i a l o g u e and polyphony. 

( C l i f f o r d , 1988f: 41) 
(emphasis mine) 



Although C l i f f o r d c o n s t a n t l y r e i t e r a t e s t h a t h i s d e s i r e 

i s "to d i s p l a c e any transcendent regime of a u t h e n t i c i t y " 

( C l i f f o r d , 1988c: 10), to q u e s t i o n and c r i t i q u e a l l modes of 

t o t a l i z a t i o n ("there Is no whole p i c t u r e t h a t can be ' f i l l e d 

i n ' " ( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 18) "There i s no longer any p l a c e of 

overview . . . no Archimedean p o i n t from which to r e p r e s e n t 

the world" ( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 22)), i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t h i s 

f a i l u r e to s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n the components of h i s own 

p r e f e r r e d 'paradigm' p r e c l u d e s any p o s s i b i l i t y of the 

f u l f i l m e n t of t h i s d e s i r e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , C l i f f o r d ' s 

approach to t h e o r e t i c a l problems tends to be r a t h e r 

s u p e r f i c i a l . As Kapferer comments ( i n a review with which, 

the f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n a s i d e , I am f a r from being i n 

agreement), 

[In r e a d i n g C l i f f o r d ' s work] I c o u l d not 
escape a sense of s u p e r f i c i a l i t y . 
C l i f f o r d a l i g h t s , l i k e some gorgeous 
b u t t e r f l y , i n the great garden of human 
p o s s i b i l i t y which i s the f i e l d of 
anthropology. But he passes from flower 
to flower, seldom s t a y i n g f o r long to 
examine t h o r o u g h l y t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y . 
T h i s I found f r u s t r a t i n g . 

(Kapferer, 1989: 101) 

S i m i l a r l y , Sangren c a l l s a t t e n t i o n to " C l i f f o r d ' s (1986a: 3) 

i n v o c a t i o n of academic l u m i n a r i e s to no apparent purpose 

other than to a u t h o r i z e and l o c a t e h i s t e x t w i t h i n t h e i r 

aura" (Sangren, 1988: 409). What i s most annoying about 

C l i f f o r d i s not simply t h a t he does not do what he says he Is 

going to do, i . e . d i s p l a c e transcendent, t o t a l i z i n g regimes 



of a u t h e n t i c i t y , but t h a t he i n f a c t f u r t h e r r e i n f o r c e s those 

regimes by c o n s i s t e n t l y o v e r l o o k i n g the t o t a l i z i n g nature of 

h i s own conceptual framework. For example, he does not 

q u e s t i o n metaphor/allegory, s u b j e c t i v i t y , d l a l o g l s m , 

d i s c u r s i v i t y , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n or speech as such. A c c o r d i n g l y , 

I w i l l begin my d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g of C l i f f o r d by l o o k i n g 

a t h i s use of metaphor and a l l e g o r y . 

In an essay e n t i t l e d "On Ethnographic A l l e g o r y " C l i f f o r d 

adopts the Webster's New Twentieth Century D i c t i o n a r y 

d e f i n i t i o n s of • a l l e g o r y 1 : "1. a s t o r y i n which people, 

t h i n g s and happenings have another meaning, as i n a f a b l e or 

p a r a b l e : a l l e g o r i e s are used f o r t e a c h i n g or e x p l a i n i n g . 2. 

the p r e s e n t a t i o n of ideas by means of such s t o r i e s " ( C l i f f o r d 

1986b: 98). He argues t h a t ethnographies are I r r e m e d i a b l y 

a l l e g o r i c a l and t h a t t h i s f a c t should be accepted as the 

b a s i s upon which ethnographic l i t e r a t u r e i s approached. 

According to C l i f f o r d , 

A s c i e n t i f i c ethnography normally 
e s t a b l i s h e s a p r i v i l e g e d a l l e g o r i c a l 
r e g i s t e r i t i d e n t i f i e s as "theory," 
" I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " or " e x p l a n a t i o n . " But 
once a l l meaningful l e v e l s i n a t e x t , 
i n c l u d i n g t h e o r i e s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , 
are r e c o g n i z e d as a l l e g o r i c a l , i t becomes 
d i f f i c u l t to view one of them as 
p r i v i l e g e d , a c c o u n t i n g f o r the r e s t . 
Once t h i s anchor i s d i s l o d g e d , the 
s t a g i n g and v a l u i n g of m u l t i p l e 
a l l e g o r i c a l r e g i s t e r s , or " v o i c e s , " 
becomes an important area of concern f o r 
ethnographic w r i t e r s . R e c e n t l y t h i s has 
sometimes meant g i v i n g indigenous 
d i s c o u r s e a semi-independent s t a t u s i n 
the t e x t u a l whole, i n t e r r u p t i n g the 
p r i v i l e g e d monotone of " s c i e n t i f i c " 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Much of ethnography, 



143 

t a k i n g i t s d i s t a n c e from t o t a l i z i n g 
anthropology, seeks to evoke m u l t i p l e 
(but not l i m i t l e s s ) a l l e g o r i e s . 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 103) 

In other words, C l i f f o r d seems to t h i n k t h a t i f ethnographies 

are viewed as c o l l e c t i o n s of m u l t i p l e a l l e g o r i e s , t h i s f a c t , 

i n and of i t s e l f , prevents them from being t o t a l i z i n g 

c o n s t r u c t s c o n t r i b u t i n g to a ' t o t a l i z i n g anthropology.' 

T h i s , however, i s f a r from the case, f o r the concept of 

a l l e g o r y , i n and of i t s e l f , i s a t o t a l i z i n g concept par  

e x c e l l e n c e . And t h i s , C l i f f o r d seems not to n o t i c e . 

C l i f f o r d agrees with Q u i n t l l i a n t h a t a l l e g o r y i s , 

e s s e n t i a l l y , a form of metaphor, t h a t "any continuous or 

extended metaphor develops i n t o a l l e g o r y " ( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 

98). A r i s t o t l e p r o v i d e s the c l a s s i c d e f i n i t i o n of metaphor: 

Metaphor (metaphora) c o n s i s t s i n g i v i n g 
(epiphora) the t h i n g a name (onomatos) 
t h a t belongs to something e l s e 
( a l l o t r l o r e ) . the t r a n s f e r e n c e being 
e i t h e r from genus to s p e c i e s . . ., or 
from s p e c i e s to genus . . ., or from 
s p e c i e s to s p e c i e s . . ., or on the 
grounds of analogy. 

( A r i s t o t l e i n D e r r i d a , 1982m: 231) 

In d i s c u s s i n g the preceding d e f i n i t i o n D e r r i d a emphasizes the 

r e l a t i o n s h i p between metaphor and t h a t which i s 

n o m i n a l i z a b l e : 



I t Is under [the] heading of [the 
nominal, the noun] t h a t [ A r i s t o t l e ] 
t r e a t s metaphor (epiphora onomatos). 
Onoma c e r t a i n l y has two v a l u e s i n t h i s 
context. Sometimes i t i s opposed to the 
verb (rhema), which i m p l i e s the idea of 
time. Sometimes i t covers the f i e l d of 
verbs, s i n c e metaphor, the displacement 
of nouns, a l s o , i n the examples g i v e n i n 
the P o e t i c s , p l a y s upon verbs. T h i s 
c o n f u s i o n i s p o s s i b l e by v i r t u e of the 
profound i d e n t i t y of the noun and the 
verb: what they have i n common i s t h a t 
they are i n t e l l i g i b l e i n and of 
themselves, have an immediate r e l a t i o n to 
an o b j e c t or r a t h e r to a u n i t y of 
meaning. They c o n s t i t u t e the order of 
the phon& semantike from which are 
excluded . . . a r t i c l e s , c o n j u n c t i o n s , 
p r e p o s i t i o n s , and i n general a l l the 
elements of language which, a c c o r d i n g to 
A r i s t o t l e , have no meaning i n themselves; 
i n other words, which do not of 
themselves designate something. The 
a d j e c t i v e i s capable of becoming 
s u b s t a n t i v e and nominal. To t h i s extent 
i t may belong to the semantic order. 
Therefore i t seems t h a t the f i e l d of 
onoma -- and consequently t h a t of 
metaphor, as the t r a n s p o r t of names — i s 
l e s s t h a t of the noun i n the s t r i c t 
sense, (which i t a c q u i r e d v e r y l a t e i n 
r h e t o r i c ) , t h a n t h a t of the 
n o m i n a l i z a b l e . Every word which r e s i s t s 
t h i s n o m i n a l i z a t i o n would remain f o r e i g n 
to metaphor. Now, o n l y t h a t which 
c l a i m s , or h e n c e f o r t h claims — to have 
a complete and independent s i g n i f i c a t i o n , 
t h a t which i s i n t e l l i g i b l e by i t s e l f , 
o u t s i d e any s y n t a c t i c r e l a t i o n , can be 
nominalized. To take up a t r a d i t i o n a l 
o p p o s i t i o n t h a t s t i l l w i l l be i n use i n 
H u s s e r l , metaphor would be a t r a n s p o r t of 
categorematic and not syncategorematic 
words as. such. 

( D e r r i d a , 1982m: 233) 



In other words, metaphor, and a l l concepts which are 

t r a c e a b l e to i t (e.g. a l l e g o r y , analogy, s i m i l e e t c . ) , i s 

rooted i n a n o t i o n o£ s e l f - i d e n t i c a l essence or presence. 

Metaphor, and, by e x t e n s i o n , a l l e g o r y , has to do not with the 

displacement o£ meaning as such but with the replacement o£ 

one meaning by another, and , hence, with the r e a f f i r m a t i o n 

of meaning as an a l l - i n c l u s i v e , s e l f - i d e n t i c a l concept. As 

Gasch6 p o i n t s out, 

D e r r i d a has never l e f t the s l i g h t e s t 
doubt t h a t metaphor i s by nature a 
metaphysical concept. In s p i t e , or r a t h e r 
because of i t s n e g a t i v i t y , i t belongs to 
the v e r y order and movement of meaning: 
the p r o v i s o r y l o s s of meaning t h a t 
metaphor i m p l i e s i s subordinated to the 
t e l e o l o g y of meaning as one moment i n the 
process of the s e l f - m a n i f e s t a t i o n of 
meaning i n a l l i t s p r o p r i e t y . The 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept of metaphor (and 
there i s no other) makes metaphor depend 
on the a b s o l u t e p a r o u s l a of meaning. 

(Gasch<§, 1986: 293) 

Indeed, D e r r i d a i s v e r y c l e a r In i n d i c a t i n g the 

p h i l o s o p h i c a l nature of metaphor and the metaphoric nature of 

p h i l o s o p h y : 

metaphor remains, i n a l l i t s 
e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , a c l a s s i c a l 
philosopheme, a metaphysical concept. . 
. . Metaphor has been i s s u e d from a 
network of philosophemes which themselves 
correspond to t r o p e s or to f i g u r e s , and 
these philosophemes are contemporaneous 
to or i n s y s t e m a t i c s o l i d a r i t y with 
these t r o p e s or f i g u r e s . T h i s stratum of 
" t u t e l a r y " t r o p e s , the l a y e r of "primary" 



146 

phllosophemes (assuming t h a t the 
q u o t a t i o n marks w i l l serve as a 
s u f f i c i e n t p r e c a u t i o n h e r e ) , cannot be 
dominated. I t cannot dominate i t s e l f , 
cannot be dominated by what i t i t s e l f has 
engendered, has made to grow on i t s own 
s o i l , supported on i t s own base. 
T h e r e f o r e , i t gets " c a r r i e d away" each 
time t h a t one of i t s products — here, 
the concept of metaphor -- attempts i n 
v a i n to i n c l u d e under i t s own law the 
t o t a l i t y of the f i e l d to which the 
product belongs. I f one wished to 
conceive and to c l a s s a l l the 
metaphorical p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p h i l o s o p h y , 
one metaphor, at l e a s t , always would 
remain excluded, o u t s i d e the system: the 
metaphor, a t the v e r y l e a s t , without 
which the concept of metaphor c o u l d not 
be c o n s t r u c t e d , . . . the metaphor of 
metaphor. T h i s e x t r a metaphor, remaining 
o u t s i d e the f i e l d t h a t i t a l l o w s to be 
c i r c u m s c r i b e d , e x t r a c t s or a b s t r a c t s 
I t s e l f from t h i s f i e l d , thus s u b t r a c t i n g 
I t s e l f as a metaphor l e s s . By v i r t u e of 
[a] t r o p i c s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y , s i n c e the 
e x t r a t u r n of speech becomes the m i s s i n g 
term of speech, the taxonomy or h i s t o r y 
of p h i l o s o p h i c a l metaphors [can] never 
[be] s a t u r a t e d . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982m: 219-220) 

In other words, what i s r a d i c a l i s not the d i s c o v e r y or 

r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l works (which, of course, 

i n c l u d e s anthropology) are r e p l e t e with metaphors or 

a l l e g o r i e s -- they are so by d e f i n i t i o n (as Rabinow remarks, 

"the i n s i g h t that a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w r i t e employing l i t e r a r y 

conventions, although i n t e r e s t i n g , i s not i n h e r e n t l y c r i s i s 

provoking" (Rabinow i n C l i f f o r d and Marcus eds., 1986c: 243)) 

but the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t metaphor, as such, i s i n a symbiotic 

r e l a t i o n s h i p with p h i l o s o p h y and t h a t they must both be 



d e c o n s t r u c t e d . What has to be r e c o g n i z e d i s not the 

e x i s t e n c e o£ metaphor as such but the p o s s i b i l i t y of  

m e t a p h o r i c l t y i n g e n e r a l — which i s h a r d l y the same t h i n g . 

And t h i s comes back to the n o t i o n of o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g . I f 

p h i l o s o p h y i s always a l r e a d y i n v o l v e d with metaphor as a 

means by which to r e p r e s e n t or r e f e r to i t s e l f , and i f 

metaphor i s always a l r e a d y p r e d i c a t e d upon and r e f e r r i n g to 

p h i l o s o p h y , then we are l e f t with both a more and a l e s s f o r 

which n e i t h e r p h i l o s o p h y nor metaphor, as such, can account. 

The i d e a l of t o t a l i z a t i o n i s f i s s u r e d from the outset by the 

i m p o s s i b i l i t y of the e x i s t e n c e of an unmediated presence, an 

i m p o s s i b i l i t y which, from the o u t s e t , i n v o l v e s a ' t r o p i c 

s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y ' whereby the e x t r a metaphor ( i . e . the 

p o s s i b i l i t y of m e t a p h o r i c l t y — the metaphor of metaphor) 

becomes the m i s s i n g metaphor ( i . e . t h a t which escapes the 

t o t a l i z i n g f i e l d of p h i l o s o p h y ) . I t i s m e t a p h o r i c l t y as the 

p l a y of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , as s u p p l e m e n t a r i t y , i t e r a b i l i t y , 

d i f f 6 r a n c e , t r a c e and so on t h a t may harbour r a d i c a l 

I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r p h i l o s o p h y and, by e x t e n s i o n , f o r 

anthropology, not metaphor or a l l e g o r y as such. 

C l i f f o r d never q u e s t i o n s the n o t i o n s of a l l e g o r y or 

metaphor as p h i l o s o p h i c a l concepts. The r e c o g n i t i o n and, i n 

C l i f f o r d ' s case, the c e l e b r a t i o n of ethnographic works as 

c o n t a i n i n g m u l t i p l e a l l e g o r i c a l r e g i s t e r s does not f r e e them 

from a t o t a l i z i n g metaphysics — on the c o n t r a r y , I t binds 

them ever more t i g h t l y to n o t i o n s of essence, presence and so 



148 

on. Take, f o r example, C l i f f o r d ' s e f f u s i v e p r a i s e of one of 

the a l l e g o r i c a l s t r a n d s of M a r j o r i e Shostak's N i s a : The L i f e  

and Words of a !Kung Woman: 

The s t o r y [of Nisa's g i v i n g b i r t h ] 
has great immediacy. Nisa's v o i c e i s 
unmistakable, the experience s h a r p l y 
evoked: "She l a y t h e r e , moving her arms 
about, t r y i n g to suck her f i n g e r s . " But 
as readers we do more than r e g i s t e r a 
unique event. The s t o r y ' s u n f o l d i n g 
r e q u i r e s us, f i r s t , to imagine a 
d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l norm (JKung b i r t h , 
alone i n the bush) and then to r e c o g n i z e 
a common human experience (the q u i e t 
heroism of c h i l d b i r t h , f e e l i n g s of 
postpartum wonder and doubt). The s t o r y 
of an occurrence somewhere i n the 
K a l a h a r i d e s e r t cannot remain j u s t t h a t . 
I t i m p l i e s both l o c a l c u l t u r a l meanings 
and a g e n e r a l s t o r y of b i r t h . A 
d i f f e r e n c e i s p o s i t e d and transcended. 
Moreover, Nisa's s t o r y t e l l s us (how 
c o u l d i t not?) something b a s i c about 
woman's e x p e r i e n c e . Shostak's l i f e of a 
JKung i n d i v i d u a l i n e v i t a b l y becomes an 
a l l e g o r y of (female) humanity. 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 99) 

Not o n l y does t h i s passage s i n g the p r a i s e s of a t o t a l i z i n g , 

d i a l e c t i c a l homogeneity ('a d i f f e r e n c e i s p o s i t e d and 

transcended' 'an a l l e g o r y of (female) humanity' e t c . ) , but i t 

does so i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y o f f e n s i v e manner. Who i s James 

C l i f f o r d to d e f i n e c h i l d b i r t h as r e v e a l i n g 'something b a s i c 

about woman's experience'? What about the m i l l i o n s of women, 

myself numbered among them, to whom the experience of 

c h i l d b i r t h i s about as b a s i c as i s f l a p p i n g our arms and 



149 

f l y i n g to the moon? What about the m i l l i o n s of women to whom 

c h i l d b i r t h i s a sorrow and a burden, evoking not 'wonder and 

doubt' but d e p r e s s i o n and d e s p a i r ? Aside from the f a c t t h a t 

t h e r e are few t h i n g s q u i t e so o f f - p u t t i n g as some man gushing 

over 'the q u i e t heroism of c h i l d b i r t h ' i t seems to me t h a t 

C l i f f o r d here presents a c l a s s i c example of the way i n which 

the r e p r e s s i v e / o p p r e s s i v e nature of t o t a l i z a t i o n excludes and 

debases d i f f e r e n c e by subsuming i t w i t h i n a transcendent 

homogeneity. 

Because he never q u e s t i o n s the nature of metaphorical 

and/or a l l e g o r i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , C l i f f o r d never grasps the 

p o i n t t h a t , no matter how many a l l e g o r i c a l l e v e l s he may 

d e l i n e a t e or produce i n any given ethnography, so f a r from 

engaging i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n o n - t o t a l i z i n g work, he i s 

merely j u g g l i n g v a r i o u s s t r a t a of meaning without ever  

q u e s t i o n i n g meaning as such. C l i f f o r d leaves the 

p h i l o s o p h i c a l f i e l d u t t e r l y i n t a c t — allegory/metaphor and 

p h i l o s o p h y e n d l e s s l y r e f l e c t i n g and r e f e r r i n g to each other 

w i t h i n a c l o s e d c i r c u l a r i t y . Thus, f o r example, i n r e f e r r i n g 

to a passage of Shostak's work wherein she d e p i c t s her banter 

with a twelve year o l d !Kung g i r l whom she f i n d s admiring 

h e r s e l f i n a m i r r o r , C l i f f o r d comments ( a p p r o v i n g l y ) as 

f o l l o w s : 

A great d e a l of the book i s here: an o l d 
v o i c e , a young v o i c e , a m i r r o r . . . t a l k 
of s e l f - p o s s e s s i o n . N a r c i s s i s m , a term 
of deviance a p p l i e d to women of the West, 
i s t r a n s f i g u r e d . We n o t i c e , too, t h a t i t 



150 

Is the ethnographer, assuming a v o i c e of 
age, who has brought a m i r r o r , j u s t as 
Nisa p r o v i d e s an a l l e g o r i c a l m i r r o r when 
Shostak takes the r o l e of youth. 
Ethnography gains s u b j e c t i v e "depth" 
through the s o r t s of r o l e s , r e f l e c t i o n s , 
and r e v e r s a l s dramatized here. The 
w r i t e r , and her readers, can be both 
young ( l e a r n i n g ) and o l d (knowing). They 
can s i m u l t a n e o u s l y l i s t e n , and "give 
v o i c e t o , " the other. Nisa's readers 
f o l l o w — and prolong — the p l a y of a 
d e s i r e . They imagine, i n the m i r r o r of 
the other, a g u i l e l e s s s e l f - p o s s e s s i o n , 
an u n c o m p l i c a t e d f e e l i n g of 
" a t t r a c t i v e n e s s . " 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 108-109) 

For C l i f f o r d , the other i s a m i r r o r which r e f l e c t s the s e l f 

and v i c e v e r s a — t h i s c i r c u l a r i t y i s s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i n g and 

c o n s t i t u t e s a homogeneity wherein the other as_ other has no 

p l a c e . In order to t h i n k a r a d i c a l a l t e r i t y one must f i r s t 

p e r c e i v e the cracks w i t h i n the r e f l e x i v e c i r c u l a r i t y of 

Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y . As D e r r i d a says, 

The breakthrough toward r a d i c a l otherness 
(with r e s p e c t to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
concept — of the concept) always takes, 
w i t h i n p h i l o s o p h y , the form of an 
a p o s t e r l o r i t y or an e m p i r i c i s m . But t h i s 
i s an e f f e c t of the s p e c u l a r nature of 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , p h i l o s o p h y 
b e i n g i n c a p a b l e of i n s c r i b i n g 
(comprehending) what i s o u t s i d e i t 
otherwise than through the a p p r o p r i a t i n g 
negative image of i t , and d i s s e m i n a t i o n 
i s w r i t t e n on the back — the t a i n — of 
t h a t m i r r o r . Not on i t s i n v e r t e d 
s p e c t r e . Nor i n the t r i a d l c symbolic 
order of i t s s u b l i m a t i o n . 

( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 33) 

i 



151 

C l i f f o r d s t a t e s t h a t , "In the human s c i e n c e s the 

r e l a t i o n of f a c t to a l l e g o r y i s a domain of s t r u g g l e and 

i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e " ( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 119). And t h i s 

may, Indeed, be t r u e . However, what he c o n s i s t e n t l y f a i l s to 

comprehend i s t h a t f a c t and a l l e g o r y are both p r e d i c a t e d upon 

and d e d i c a t e d to a n o t i o n of presence, of s e l f - i d e n t i c a l and 

unquestionable essence. To emphasize a l l e g o r y r a t h e r than 

f a c t i s not, as C l i f f o r d seems to t h i n k , to d i s c o v e r "a 

t r o u b l e d , i n v e n t i v e moment i n the h i s t o r y of c r o s s - c u l t u r a l 

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " ( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 109), but merely, as the 

o l d s a y i n g goes, to rob Peter to pay P a u l . As D e r r i d a says 

concerning metaphor (and, i t w i l l be remembered, t h i s a l s o 

a p p l i e s to a l l e g o r y ) , 

Metaphor . . . i s determined by 
p h i l o s o p h y as a p r o v i s i o n a l l o s s of 
meaning, an economy of the proper without 
i r r e p a r a b l e damage, a c e r t a i n l y 
i n e v i t a b l e detour, but a l s o a h i s t o r y 
with i t s s i g h t s s e t on, and w i t h i n the 
h o r i z o n of, the c i r c u l a r r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n 
of l i t e r a l , proper meaning. T h i s i s why 
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l e v a l u a t i o n of metaphor 
always has been ambiguous: metaphor i s 
dangerous and f o r e i g n as concerns 
I n t u i t i o n ( v i s i o n or c o n t a c t ) , concept 
(the g r a s p i n g or proper presence of the 
s i g n i f i e d ) , and consciousness ( p r o x i m i t y 
or s e l f presence); but i t i s i n 
c o m p l i c i t y with what i t endangers, i s 
necessary to i t i n the extent to which 
the de-tour i s a r e - t u r n guided by the 
f u n c t i o n of resemblance (mimesis or 
h o m o i o s i s ) . under the law of the same. 
The o p p o s i t i o n of i n t u i t i o n , the concept, 
and consciousness a t t h i s p o i n t no longer 
has any p e r t i n e n c e . These three v a l u e s 



152 

belong to the order and to the movement 
of meaning. L i k e metaphor. 

Henceforth the e n t i r e t e l e o l o g y of 
meaning, which c o n s t r u c t s the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept of metaphor, 
c o o r d i n a t e s metaphor w i t h the 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n of t r u t h , with the 
p r o d u c t i o n of t r u t h as presence without 
v e i l , of the r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a f u l l 
language without syntax, with the 
v o c a t i o n of a pure nomination: without 
d i f f e r e n t i a l syntax, or i n any case 
without a p r o p e r l y unnamable a r t i c u l a t i o n 
t h a t i s i r r e d u c i b l e . . . to d i a l e c t i c a l 
i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n . [What i s needed i s a 
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n of metaphor which] i s no 
longer a [matter] of extending and 
c o n f i r m i n g a philosopheme, but r a t h e r , of 
u n f o l d i n g I t without l i m i t , and w r e s t i n g 
i t s borders of p r o p r i e t y from i t . And 
consequently [exploding] the r e a s s u r i n g 
o p p o s i t i o n of the metaphoric and the 
proper, the o p p o s i t i o n i n which the one 
and the other have never done anything 
but r e f l e c t and r e f e r to each other i n 
t h e i r r a d i a n c e . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982m: 270-271) 

I would l i k e now to look a t C l i f f o r d ' s use of d i s c o u r s e , 

d i a l o g u e , speech and v o i c e . C l i f f o r d c o n s t a n t l y urges t h a t 

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s / e t h n o g r a p h e r s u t i l i z e d i s c u r s i v e / d i a l o g i c a l 

r a t h e r than t e x t u a l / I n t e r p r e t i v e models or paradigms i n t h e i r 

accountings of other c u l t u r e s . C l i f f o r d b e l i e v e s t h a t 

f o c u s s i n g on attempting to capture the immediacy of the 

d i s c u r s i v e / d i a l o g i c a l context of speech events a l l o w s f o r the 

e v o c a t i o n of m u l t i p l e v o i c e s and hence f o r the d i s r u p t i o n and 

d i s p e r s i o n of monophonic a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l / 

ethnographic w r i t i n g s . Aside from the obvious problem of who 

f i n a l l y determines what ends up i n any given w r i t t e n account 



153 

and what i t s format w i l l be, and, indeed, who (or what) 

d e c i d e s upon what i s worth w r i t i n g up i n the f i r s t place (a 

problem which, to be sure, C l i f f o r d does appear to 

r e c o g n i z e ) , there remains a major problem which C l i f f o r d does 

not appear to r e c o g n i z e , and t h a t i s t h a t the concepts of 

d i s c o u r s e , speech, v o i c e , d i a l o g u e and so on are a l l premised 

upon and d e d i c a t e d to an unexamined n o t i o n of presence — a 

n o t i o n whose a u t h o r i t a t i v e sway i s c o n s t a n t l y r e i n f o r c e d i n 

h i s work by i t s s t a t u s as taken f o r granted assumption. 

As I argue throughout t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , the assumption 

of presence i s , by d e f i n i t i o n and i n p r i n c i p l e , r e p r e s s i v e / 

o p p r e s s i v e and, by e x t e n s i o n , so are the working concepts of 

Western thought which remain f i r m l y w i t h i n i t s aura. As has 

been s t a t e d , C l i f f o r d a s s e r t s t h a t , "a d i s c u r s i v e model of 

ethnographic p r a c t i c e b r i n g s i n t o prominence the 

i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of speech along with i t s Immediate 

p e r f o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t . " And he concurs with Stephen T y l e r 

t h a t the "problem f o r a d i s c u r s i v e ethnography i s how 'to 

achieve by w r i t t e n means what speech c r e a t e s . ' " c l e a r l y , 

C l i f f o r d ' s primary focus i s on the presumed immediacy of 

speech and how best to d e p i c t t h a t immediacy i n ethnographic 

form. At t h i s p o i n t i t i s h e l p f u l to quote D e r r i d a at 

l e n g t h : 

Within [the] logos, the o r i g i n a l and 
e s s e n t i a l l i n k to the phon& has never 
been broken. . . . [The] essence of the 
phon& [ i s p e r c e i v e d to be] immediately 
proximate to t h a t which w i t h i n "thought" 



as logos r e l a t e s to "meaning," produces 
i t , r e c e i v e s i t , speaks i t , "composes" 
i t . I f , f o r A r i s t o t l e , f o r example, 
"spoken words (ta_ en te phon&) are the 
symbols of mental experience (pathemata  
t e s psyches) and w r i t t e n words are the 
symbols of spoken words" (De  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e , 1, 16a, 3) i t i s because 
the v o i c e , producer of the f i r s t symbols, 
has a r e l a t i o n s h i p of e s s e n t i a l and 
immediate p r o x i m i t y with the mind. . . . 

The f e e l i n g s of the mind, e x p r e s s i n g 
t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y , c o n s t i t u t e s a s o r t of 
u n i v e r s a l language which can then e f f a c e 
i t s e l f . . . . In every case, the v o i c e i s 
c l o s e s t to the s i g n i f i e d , whether i t i s 
determined s t r i c t l y as sense (thought or 
l i v e d ) or more l o o s e l y as t h i n g . A l l 
s i g n i f l e r s . . . are d e r i v a t i v e with 
regard to what would wed the v o i c e 
i n d i s s o l u b l y to the mind or to the 
thought of the s i g n i f i e d sense, indeed to 
the t h i n g i t s e l f , (whether i t i s done i n 
the A r i s t o t e l i a n manner we have j u s t 
i n d i c a t e d or In the manner of medieval 
theology, determining the res as a t h i n g 
c r e a t e d from i t s e i d o s , from i t s sense 
thought In the logos or i n the i n f i n i t e 
understanding of God). The w r i t t e n 
s i g n i f i e r i s always t e c h n i c a l and 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I t has no c o n s t i t u t i v e 
meaning. T h i s d e r i v a t i o n i s the very 
o r i g i n of the n o t i o n of the " s i g n i f i e r . " 
The n o t i o n of the s i g n always i m p l i e s 
w i t h i n i t s e l f the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
s i g n i f i e r and s i g n i f i e d , even i f , as 
Saussure argues, they are d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
simply as the two faces of one and the 
same l e a f . T h i s n o t i o n remains t h e r e f o r e 
w i t h i n the h e r i t a g e of t h a t l o g o c e n t r i s m 
which i s a l s o a phonocentrism: a b s o l u t e 
p r o x i m i t y of v o i c e and being, of v o i c e 
and the meaning of being, of v o i c e and 
the i d e a l i t y of meaning. . . . What i s 
s a i d of sound i n g e n e r a l i s a f o r t i o r i 
v a l i d f o r the phond by which, by v i r t u e 
of h e a r i n g (understanding)-oneself-speak 
— an l n d i s s o c i a b l e system — the s u b j e c t 
e f f e c t s i t s e l f and i s r e l a t e d to i t s e l f 
i n the element of i d e a l i t y . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 11-12) 



155 

And, as s t a t e d at the beginning of Chapter Two and worth r e -

emphasizing here, 

phonocentrism merges with the 
h i s t o r i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the meaning 
of being i n g e n e r a l as presence, with a l l 
the sub-determinations which depend on 
t h i s g e n e r a l form and which organize 
w i t h i n i t t h e i r system and t h e i r 
h i s t o r i c a l sequence (presence of the 
t h i n g to s i g h t as e i d o s , presence as 
substance/essence/existence ( o u s l a ) , 
temporal presence as p o i n t (stigm6) of 
the now or of the moment (nun), the s e l f -
presence of the c o g l t o , consciousness, 
s u b j e c t i v i t y , the co-presence of the 
other and of the s e l f , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y 
as the i n t e n t i o n a l phenomenon of the ego, 
and so f o r t h ) . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 12) 

C l i f f o r d ' s emphasis on d i s c u r s i v i t y , the immediacy and 

i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of speech, p l a c e s him s q u a r e l y w i t h i n a 

phenomenological p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness and/or 

s u b j e c t i v i t y . L i k e H u s s e r l before him, C l i f f o r d assumes the 

e x i s t e n c e of an i n t e n t i o n a l or c o n s t i t u t i v e consciousness and 

the problem i s not t h i s supposed consciousness as such but, 

r a t h e r , how best to d e p i c t the l n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s 

between such c o n s c i o u s n e s s e s . Thus, i n e x t o l l i n g a 

d i a l o g i c a l approach to anthropology, C l i f f o r d s t a t e s , 

f i c t i o n s of d i a l o g u e have the 
e f f e c t of t r a n s f o r m i n g the " c u l t u r a l " 
t e x t (a r i t u a l , an i n s t i t u t i o n , a l i f e 
h i s t o r y , or any u n i t of t y p i c a l behavior 
to be d e s c r i b e d or i n t e r p r e t e d ) i n t o a 
speaking s u b j e c t , who sees as w e l l as i s 
seen, who evades, argues, probes back. 
In t h i s view of ethnography the proper 



156 

r e f e r e n t of any account i s not a 
represented "world"; now i t i s s p e c i f i c 
i n s t a n c e s of d i s c o u r s e . But the 
p r i n c i p l e of d l a l o g l c a l t e x t u a l 
p r o d u c t i o n goes w e l l beyond the more or 
l e s s a r t f u l p r e s e n t a t i o n of " a c t u a l " 
encounters. I t l o c a t e s c u l t u r a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n many s o r t s of 
r e c i p r o c a l c o n t e x t s , and i t o b l i g e s 
w r i t e r s to f i n d d i v e r s e ways of r e n d e r i n g 
n e g o t i a t e d r e a l i t i e s as m u l t i s u b j e c t i v e , 
power-laden, and incongruent. In t h i s 
view, " c u l t u r e " i s always r e l a t i o n a l , an 
i n s c r i p t i o n of communicative processes 
t h a t e x i s t , h i s t o r i c a l l y , between  
s u b j e c t s i n r e l a t i o n s of power. 

( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 14-15) 
(emphasis C l i f f o r d ' s and mine) 

C l i f f o r d then goes on to argue t h a t , i n order to d i s p e r s e 

monovocal a u t h o r i t y , ethnographies must be viewed and 

c o n s t r u c t e d as p o l y v o c a l . But 'voice' or 'speech' as such 

are never questioned. I t i s t h i s r e s o l u t e non-questioning of 

speech which allows C l i f f o r d ( i n agreement with Bakhtin) to 

a r r i v e a t the b i z a r r e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the works of C h a r l e s 

Dickens, no l e s s , "tend to r e s i s t t o t a l i t y " p r e c i s e l y because 

they are p l u r i v o c a l ( C l i f f o r d , 1988f: 46-47). Now i t does 

not take much more than a nodding acquaintance with Dickens's 

work to r e a l i z e t h a t there are very few n o v e l i s t s who are 

more concerned with e n s u r i n g t h a t there are no loose ends, 

t h a t e v e r y t h i n g f i t s together i n a seamless whole, which, 

although i t may indeed s t r e t c h c o i n c i d e n c e to alarming i f not 

laughable extremes, nonetheless provides an adamantine 

s t r u c t u r e c o n t a i n i n g and accounting f o r any and a l l events. 



157 

And so with ethnography — I t i s not the number of v o i c e s 

which w i l l lead to a n o n - t o t a l i z i n g product, but a re-working 

of the v e r y n o t i o n of speech or v o i c e as such. 

As D e r r i d a has shown, throughout Western metaphysics 

speech i s presumed to be i n immediate p r o x i m i t y with being or 

consciousness and thus i s p e r c e i v e d to be the p r i v i l e g e d 

v e h i c l e of meaning. However, speech, as such, as pure and 

s e l f - i d e n t i c a l , does not and cannot e x i s t f o r i t i s always 

a l r e a d y f i s s u r e d by the e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s own 

i t e r a b i l i t y — i t s own otherness. In other words, speech's 

i n t e g r i t y as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t concept i s compromised from 

the outset by i t s own other because i t cannot be what i t i s 

unless i t adds to i t s e l f the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s own 

r e p e t i t i o n — and t h i s necessary a d d i t i o n a b s o l u t e l y 

d i s a l l o w s i t s e x i s t e n c e as a unique, s e l f - i d e n t i c a l e n t i t y . 

What we have, from the o u t s e t , i s the t r a c e , d i f f 6 r a n c e , the 

supplement, i . e . u n d e c i d a b i l i t y and the concomitant e s s e n t i a l 

p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s s e m i n a t i o n . What we do not have i s a s e l f -

i d e n t i c a l concept and the concomitant I n e v i t a b i l i t y of 

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and/or d i a l o g i c a l t o t a l i z i n g as such. 

Because C l i f f o r d does not r a d i c a l l y q u e s t i o n h i s b a s i c 

concepts, i . e . speech, immediacy, d i s c o u r s e , d i a l o g u e , 

i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y and so on, even though he claims to be 

concerned with espousing a n o n - t o t a l i z i n g anthropology he i n 

e f f e c t does j u s t the o p p o s i t e . So f a r from i n v e n t i n g non-

t o t a l i z i n g c o n s t r u c t s , C l i f f o r d merely adds h i s name to the 



158 

long l i s t o£ t h i n k e r s who p r e d i c a t e t h e i r work upon a primary 

n o t i o n o£ s u b j e c t i v i t y — a n o t i o n which, i n t u r n , i s t i e d to 

a p r i v i l e g i n g of speech, d i s c o u r s e , d i a l o g u e e t c . J u s t as 

C l i f f o r d seems content to p o s i t t h a t p o l y v o c a l i t y ensures the 

n o n - p r i v i l e g i n g of the s i n g u l a r v o i c e , so he seems content to 

p o s i t t h a t i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y ensures the n o n - p r i v i l e g i n g of 

the s i n g u l a r s u b j e c t or s e l f . But t h i s i s a v e r y s u p e r f i c i a l 

view. Numerous v o i c e s s t i l l come back to p r i v i l e g i n g v o i c e 

or speech as such j u s t as numerous s u b j e c t i v i t i e s s t i l l come 

back to p r i v i l e g i n g s u b j e c t i v i t y or consciousness as such. 

The m o t i v a t i n g concepts remain untouched. 

C l i f f o r d maintains t h a t " i d e n t i t y , c o n s i d e r e d 

e t h n o g r a p h i c a l l y , must always be mixed, r e l a t i o n a l , and 

i n v e n t i v e [ i . e . i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e ] " ( C l i f f o r d , 1988c: 10) and 

t h a t , 

ethnographic t e x t s are o r c h e s t r a t i o n s of 
m u l t i v o c a l exchanges o c c u r r i n g i n 
p o l i t i c a l l y charged s i t u a t i o n s . The 
s u b j e c t i v i t i e s produced i n these o f t e n 
unequal exchanges — whether of " n a t i v e s " 
or of v i s i t i n g p a r t i c i p a n t observers, are 
c o n s t r u c t e d domains of t r u t h , s e r i o u s 
f i c t i o n s . Once t h i s i s r e c o g n i z e d , 
d i v e r s e i n v e n t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r 
p o s t c o l o n i a l ethnographic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
emerge. 

( C l i f f o r d , 1988c: 10) 

But how does t h i s ' r e c o g n i t i o n ' d i f f e r i n any s i g n i f i c a n t way 

from H u s s e r l * s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t s u b j e c t i v i t y i s c o n s t i t u t i v e ? 

R e f e r r i n g to s u b j e c t i v i t y or s u b j e c t i v i t i e s as 'constructed 



159 

domains o£ t r u t h , s e r i o u s f i c t i o n s ' i n no way addresses the 

problem of s u b j e c t i v i t y as such, i . e . as, e s s e n t i a l l y , the 

product of a c o n s t i t u t i v e consciousness. C l i f f o r d merely 

p o i n t s out t h a t any given s e l f or s u b j e c t i v i t y i s 'fashioned' 

from numerous fragments — of language, of c u l t u r e , of i n t e r -

p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s and so on, but even Tennyson (a 

c o n s e r v a t i v e , t o t a l i z i n g poet i f ever t h e r e was one) c o u l d 

acknowledge as much: "I am a p a r t of a l l t h a t I have met" 

(Tennyson, 1958: 66). I t i s the o l d Husserlean t r i c k of 

t r a n s f o r m i n g s u b j e c t i v i t y i n t o i n t e r s u b j e c t l v i t y i n a 

desperate b i d to a v o i d s o l i p s i s m , and i t works f o r C l i f f o r d 

about as w e l l as i t worked f o r H u s s e r l . As D e r r i d a says, 

a c c o r d i n g to H u s s e r l . . . the s u b j e c t 
[ i s ] designated i n terms of the c l a s s i c a l 
metaphysical schema which d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
substance (present being) from i t s 
a t t r i b u t e s . Another schema t h a t keeps 
the . . . a n a l y s i s w i t h i n the c l o s u r e of 
the metaphysics of presence i s the 
s u b j e c t - o b j e c t o p p o s i t i o n . T h i s being 
whose "absolute p r o p e r t i e s " are 
i n d e s c r i b a b l e i s present as a b s o l u t e 
s u b j e c t i v i t y , i s an a b s o l u t e l y present 
and a b s o l u t e l y s e l f - p r e s e n t being, o n l y 
i n o p p o s i t i o n to the o b j e c t . The o b j e c t 
i s r e l a t i v e ; what i s a b s o l u t e i s the 
s u b j e c t . . . . T h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
"absolute s u b j e c t i v i t y " would . . . have 
to be c r o s s e d out as soon as we conceive 
the present on the b a s i s of d i f f e r e n c e , 
and not the r e v e r s e . The concept of 
s u b j e c t i v i t y belongs a p r i o r i and i n  
g e n e r a l to the order of the c o n s t i t u t e d . 
T h i s holds a f o r t i o r i f o r the a n a l o g i c a l 
a p p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . 

( D e r r i d a , 1973b: 84-85) 



160 

In other words, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y Is as much a product of the 

n o t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i v e or i n t e n t i o n a l consciousness as i s 

s u b j e c t i v i t y per se. But i f , as we have seen, consciousness 

i s not and cannot be an a b s o l u t e l y s e l f - p r e s e n t and s e l f -

i d e n t i c a l e n t i t y , then not o n l y the n o t i o n of consciousness, 

but the n o t i o n s of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , the s e l f , s u b j e c t i v i t y , 

i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y and so on must be rethought as w e l l . T h i s 

C l i f f o r d does not r e c o g n i z e . 

J u s t as C l i f f o r d ' s n o t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y may be seen to 

have i t s r o o t s i n H u s s e r l , so h i s n o t i o n of d i a l o g u e may be 

seen to have i t s r o o t s i n Gadamer. As was shown i n Chapter 

Three, Gadamer r e l i e s on a P l a t o n i c n o t i o n of d i a l o g u e i n 

order to achieve h i s hermeneutlc ' f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s ' and the 

concomitant attainment of 'the common meaning.' In the same 

way, C l i f f o r d ' s n o t i o n of 'negotiated r e a l i t i e s ' r e l i e s on an 

e s s e n t i a l l y P l a t o n i c cum Gadamerlan n o t i o n of d i a l o g u e 

wherein the ' t r u t h * ( p a r t i a l or otherwise) of any g i v e n 

s i t u a t i o n i s determined by the ' f u s i o n ' of the views of the 

n e g o t i a t i n g p a r t i e s . Again, the f a c t t h a t C l i f f o r d i n s i s t s 

upon the non-absolute ( i . e . the ' p a r t i a l ' nature of 'truth') 

i n no way d i s c o u n t s the f a c t t h a t h i s e n t i r e conceptual 

system remains p r e d i c a t e d upon and d e d i c a t e d to an unexamined 

n o t i o n of presence which, by d e f i n i t i o n , i m p l i e s the 

e x i s t e n c e of the v e r y a b s o l u t e s he i s a t pains to deny. In 

other words, i t i s no use denying the p o s s i b i l i t y of 

a t t a i n i n g absolute t r u t h i f one's e n t i r e conceptual frame 



assumes t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y — one must f i r s t look to one's 

taken f o r granted n o t i o n s f o r , to paraphrase A r i s t o t l e , the 

unexamined concept i s not worth having. So with speech and 

d i a l o g u e , f o r , as D e r r i d a p o i n t s out, 

[The system of speech] r e q u i r e s t h a t i t 
be heard and understood immediately by 
whoever emits i t . I t produces a 
s i g n i f i e r which seems not to f a l l i n t o 
the world, o u t s i d e the i d e a l i t y of the 
s i g n i f i e d , but to remain s h e l t e r e d — 
even a t the moment t h a t i t a t t a i n s the 
audiophonic system of the other -- w i t h i n 
the pure i n t e r i o r i t y of a u t o - a f f e c t i o n . 
I t does not f a l l i n t o the e x t e r i o r i t y of 
space, i n t o what one c a l l s the world, 
which i s nothing but the o u t s i d e of 
speech. Within s o - c a l l e d " l i v i n g " 
speech, the s p a t i a l e x t e r i o r i t y of the 
s i g n i f i e r seems a b s o l u t e l y reduced. . . 

C o n v e r s a t i o n [dialogue] i s , then, a 
communication between two a b s o l u t e 
o r i g i n s t h a t , i f one may venture the 
formula, a u t o - a f f e c t r e c i p r o c a l l y , 
r e p e a t i n g as immediate echo the auto-
a f f e c t i o n produced by the other. 
Immediacy i s here the myth of 
consciousness. Speech and consciousness 
of speech — t h a t i s to say consciousness 
simply as s e l f - p r e s e n c e — are the 
phenomenon of an a u t o - a f f e c t i o n l i v e d as 
s u p p r e s s i o n of d l f f F r a n c e . That 
phenomenon, the presumed s u p p r e s s i o n of 
d i f f 6 r a n c e , t h a t l i v e d r e d u c t i o n of the 
o p a c i t y of the s i g n i f i e r , are the o r i g i n s 
of what i s c a l l e d presence. 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 166) 

And, indeed, C l i f f o r d v e r y much s u b s c r i b e s to t h i s system of 

speech and d i a l o g u e as i n d i c a t i v e of immediate and unmediated 

i n s t a n c e s of presence — "the proper r e f e r e n t of any account 



i s not a represented 'world,' . . . i t i s s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s 

of d i s c o u r s e " ( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 14). These 'Instances of 

d i s c o u r s e ' are composed of d l a l o g l c a l s i t u a t i o n s , the 

i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e nature of which i t i s the task of the 

ethnographer to n e g o t i a t e . But t h i s e n t i r e procedure takes 

p l a c e w i t h i n the unquestioned domain of speech as presence, 

of speech as Immediate and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l and, as we have 

seen, speech, being s u b j e c t to i t e r a b i l i t y , i s always a l r e a d y 

r i d d l e d with i t s own i m p o s s i b i l i t y as such — with i t s own 

I m p o s s i b i l i t y as an unmedlated, s e l f - I d e n t i c a l concept. 

Again, the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of t h i s must be c o n s i d e r e d . 

F i n a l l y , although C l i f f o r d c r i t i c i z e s an anthropology 

t h a t , monophonically, 'has claimed to r e p r e s e n t c u l t u r e s ' 

(emphasis C l i f f o r d ' s ) he has no d i f f i c u l t y i n p e r c e i v i n g 

anthropology as 'a d l a l o g l c a l e n t e r p r i s e i n which both 

r e s e a r c h e r s and n a t i v e s are . . . authors of c u l t u r a l 

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ' (emphasis mine). In other words, he never 

q u e s t i o n s the nature of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as such. The Oxford  

E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s the verb 'to r e p r e s e n t ' as 

f o l l o w s : "place l i k e n e s s of before mind or senses, serve or 

be meant as l i k e n e s s of . . .symbolize, a c t as embodiment of, 

stand f o r , correspond t o . " Thus, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n may be seen 

to be p a r t of the order of the s i g n i n g e n e r a l (n.b. the OED 

d e f i n e s ' s i g n ' as " t h i n g used as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 

something") — t h a t i s to say, i t assumes the p o s s i b i l i t y of 

r e - p r e s e n t i n g an idea or phenomenon which p r e - e x i s t s s a i d 



163 

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d p l e n i t u d e . As D e r r i d a 

p o i n t s out, 

Between the overture and the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of 
phonologism (or l o g o c e n t r i s m ) , the motif 
of presence was d e c i s i v e l y a r t i c u l a t e d . 
I t underwent an i n t e r n a l m o d i f i c a t i o n 
whose most conspicuous index was the 
moment of c e r t i t u d e i n the C a r t e s i a n 
c o g i t o . Before t h a t , the i d e n t i t y of 
presence o f f e r e d to the mastery of 
r e p e t i t i o n was c o n s t i t u t e d under the 
" o b j e c t i v e " form of the I d e a l i t y of the 
eidos or the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of o u s i a . 
T h e r e a f t e r , t h i s o b j e c t i v i t y takes the 
form of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , of the idea as 
the m o d i f i c a t i o n of a s e l f - p r e s e n t 
substance, conscious and c e r t a i n of 
i t s e l f a t the moment of i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p 
to i t s e l f . Within i t s most g e n e r a l form, 
the mastery of presence a c q u i r e s a s o r t 
of i n f i n i t e assurance. The power of 
r e p e t i t i o n t h a t the eidos and o u s i a made 
a v a i l a b l e seems to a c q u i r e an a b s o l u t e 
i n d e p e n d e n c e . I d e a l i t y and 
s u b s t a n t i a l i t y r e l a t e to themselves, i n 
the element of the res c o g l t a n s , by a 
movement of pure a u t o - a f f e c t i o n . 
Consciousness i s the experience of pure 
a u t o - a f f e c t i o n . 

( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 97-98) 

In other words, i n p o s t - C a r t e s i a n p h i l o s o p h y the concept of 

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s i n d i s s o c i a b l e from the concept of 

consciousness as pure a u t o - a f f e c t i o n — as pure s e l f -

presence. We have a l r e a d y seen how the C a r t e s i a n n o t i o n of 

consciousness i s developed and extended by H u s s e r l and how 

Husserlean phenomenology i s assumed by both ' i n t e r p r e t i v e ' 

anthropology v i s & v i s Geertz and 'postmodern* anthropology 



164 

v i s & v i s C l i f f o r d . The n o t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as such 

assumes a p h i l o s o p h y of s u b j e c t i v i t y which takes as i t s 

moment of i n d u b i t a b i l i t y the moment of consciousness as pure 

s e l f - p r e s e n c e . To repeat, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s what r e - p r e s e n t s 

an assumed o r i g i n a r y s e l f - p r e s e n c e . However, i f the concept 

of presence, i n a l l i t s v a r i e d m a n i f e s t a t i o n s (e.g. speech, 

consciousness, metaphor e t c . ) , i s c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n , so, 

too, i s the concept of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I f presence i s always 

a l r e a d y d i v i d e d , always a l r e a d y r i d d l e d with i t s own absence, 

then r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as such i s no longer a v i a b l e concept f o r 

i t can no longer r e - p r e s e n t a unique, s e l f - c o n t a i n e d 

phenomenon — which i s to say t h a t i t cannot r e - p r e s e n t , as 

such, a t a l l . 

C l i f f o r d , l i k e Geertz, and, indeed, l i k e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s 

i n g e n e r a l , must become more aware of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of 

Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y . Unless and u n t i l t h i s happens 

C l i f f o r d , and a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s i n g e n e r a l , w i l l continue, 

w i t t i n g l y or u n w i t t i n g l y , to r e i n f o r c e and to perpetuate the 

r e p r e s s i o n / o p p r e s s i o n which comes with an unexamined 

acceptance of t o t a l i z a t i o n and homogeneity. 



Chapter F i v e 

165 

Concluding Assessments 

In t h i s f i n a l chapter I w i l l begin by a s s e s s i n g what I 

have a l r e a d y s a i d about Geertz and C l i f f o r d r e s p e c t i v e l y , and, 

i n so doing, w i l l attempt to show t h a t i n t e r p r e t i v e and 

'postmodern' anthropology are two s i d e s of the same o l d c o i n . 

Having done t h a t , I w i l l then go on to suggest why a s e r i o u s 

c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Derridean d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s of c r u c i a l 

importance to the d i s c i p l i n e of anthropology. 

Both Geertz and C l i f f o r d have t h e i r r o o t s i n 

phenomenology and hermeneutlcs and both p r o f e s s to be 

concerned with r e s c u i n g c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y from an o v e r a r c h i n g 

u n i t y or t o t a l i t y . T h e i r main d i f f e r e n c e seems to be 

m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , i n t h a t Geertz p r e f e r s the R i c o e u r i a n model 

of the t e x t whereas C l i f f o r d p r e f e r s the Gadamerlan model of 

the d i a l o g u e . 3 1 Thus Geertz lauds the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 

• f i x a t i o n of meaning' through e s t a b l i s h i n g a " c o n s u l t a b l e 

r e c o r d of what man has s a i d " (Geertz, 19731: 30) while 

C l i f f o r d lauds the p o s s i b i l i t y of a ' s p e c i f i c a t i o n of 

d i s c o u r s e s ' through emphasizing "the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of 

3 1 I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Rabinow comments t h a t i n C l i f f o r d ' s 
a r t i c l e , "On Ethnographic A u t h o r i t y " (Representations 1, no. 
2, 1983: 118-146), he p r a i s e s Gadamer f o r a s p i r i n g to ' r a d i c a l 
d i a l o g i s m . 1 However, i n the 1988 r e p r i n t of t h i s a r t i c l e i n 
C l i f f o r d ' s The Predicament of C u l t u r e , a l l r e f e r e n c e to 
Gadamer has been d e l e t e d , one wonders why. 



166 

speech, along with i t s immediate p e r f o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t " 

( C l i f f o r d , 1988f: 41). In other words, Geertz a b s t r a c t s from 

the d l a l o g l c a l s i t u a t i o n ( s ) through a process of guess and 

v a l i d a t i o n whereby he a r r i v e s at the ' p a r t i a l t r u t h ' of an 

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n whereas C l i f f o r d attempts to r e p r e s e n t the 

d i a l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n ( s ) as such whereby he a r r i v e s a t the 

' p a r t i a l t r u t h ' of a n e g o t i a t e d ' r e a l i t y . ' But both authors 

p e r c e i v e the doing of anthropology to be i n v o l v e d with a 

hermeneutlc idea of process (Geertz through h i s n o t i o n of 

d i a l e c t i c and C l i f f o r d through h i s n o t i o n of d i a l o g u e ) and 

both authors p r i v i l e g e a phenomenological idea of the 

c o n s t i t u t i v e or i n t e n t i o n a l nature of consciousness (Geertz 

through h i s n o t i o n of meaning and C l i f f o r d through h i s n o t i o n 

of speech). F u r t h e r to t h i s , both authors emphasize the 

importance of n a r r a t i v e and/or s t o r i e s with r e s p e c t to 

ethnography (e.g. Geertz: "[Ethnography should be] c a s t 

. . . as a n a r r a t o l o g i c a l i s s u e , a matter of how best to get 

an honest s t o r y h o n e s t l y t o l d " (Geertz, 1988b: 9) and 

C l i f f o r d : "[A r e c o g n i t i o n of a l l e g o r y ] shows the ethnography 

t o be a h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e of powerful s t o r i e s [and] 

heightens awareness of the n a r r a t i v e . . . i m p l i c i t y or 

e x p l i c i t l y a t work" ( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 120-121)). ( I t w i l l , 

of course, be remembered t h a t n a r r a t i v i t y as such i s , by 

d e f i n i t i o n , a t e l e o l o g i c a l / t o t a l i z i n g concept.) Thus Geertz 

and C l i f f o r d , t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e emphases on t e x t and 

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on the one hand and speech and d i a l o g u e on the 



167 

other n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , may be seen to be both i n h e r i t o r s and, 

more i m p o r t a n t l y , p e r p e t u a t o r s of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y which m i t i g a t e s a g a i n s t t h e i r p r o f e s s e d d e s i r e 

to emphasize d i v e r s i t y / h e t e r o g e n e i t y over unity/homogeneity. 

At t h i s p o i n t i t i s necessary to take a b r i e f look at the 

term 'postmodern' and attempt both to s i t u a t e i t and to assess 

i t s a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s as a d e s c r i p t i v e tag f o r the work of James 

C l i f f o r d . 3 2 Mark T a y l o r p r o v i d e s the c l e a r e s t account of 

postmodernism and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to modernism t h a t I have 

yet encountered and so I w i l l quote him a t some l e n g t h : 

The search f o r I r r e d u c i b l e d i f f e r e n c e and 
r a d i c a l otherness obsesses many of our 
most i m a g i n a t i v e and c r e a t i v e a r t i s t s , 
w r i t e r s , p h i l o s o p h e r s , p s y c h o l o g i s t s , and 
t h e o l o g i a n s . Although i t r e c u r s 
throughout the century, concern with 
d i f f e r e n c e and otherness i s a 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t r a i t of t h i n k e r s who can 
be d e s c r i b e d as "postmodern." 
"Postmodernism" i s a n o t o r i o u s l y vague 
term. The o b s c u r i t y of postmodernism 
r e f l e c t s , i n p a r t , the c o n t i n u i n g 
c o n f u s i o n surrounding the n o t i o n of the 
modern. . . . While i t i s impossible to 
d e f i n e and d e l i m i t modernity with any 
degree of p r e c i s i o n , there seems to be a 
consensus t h a t modern p h i l o s o p h y begins 
with Descartes's inward t u r n to the 
s u b j e c t . Plagued by u n c e r t a i n t y and 
doubt, Descartes seeks c e r t a i n t y through 
doubt. He doubts e v e r y t h i n g u n t i l he 
reaches what he regards as i n d u b i t a b l e -
- h i s own doubting s e l f . Descartes 

3 3 For an i n t e r e s t i n g account of the v a r i o u s s t r a n d s of 
postmodernist thought, the reader may wish to c o n s u l t E. Ann 
Kaplan, ed. Postmodernism and i t s D i s c o n t e n t s : T h e o r i e s ,  
P r a c t i c e s (London: Verso, 1989). 



l a b e l s t h i s s e l f - c e r t a i n s u b j e c t res  
c o g l t a n s , which he d i s t i n g u i s h e s from a l l 
e l s e , d e s c r i b e d as res extensa. Having 
r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d res c o g l t a n s 
from res extensa, Descartes faces the 
problem of e s t a b l i s h i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between s u b j e c t i v i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y . In 
a move t h a t becomes d e c i s i v e f o r many 
l a t e r t h i n k e r s , Descartes i n s i s t s t h a t 
the s u b j e c t ' s r e l a t i o n to otherness i s 
mediated by and r e d u c i b l e to i t s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to I t s e l f . 

In the wake of Descartes's 
m e d i t a t i o n s , modern p h i l o s o p h y becomes a 
p h i l o s o p h y of the s u b j e c t . As the l o c u s 
of c e r t a i n t y and t r u t h , s u b j e c t i v i t y i s 
the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e from which e v e r y t h i n g 
a r i s e s and to which a l l must be r e t u r n e d . 
With the movement from Descartes, through 
the Enlightenment to i d e a l i s m and 
romanticism, a t t r i b u t e s t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
p r e d i c a t e d of the d i v i n e s u b j e c t are 
g r a d u a l l y d i s p l a c e d onto the human 
s u b j e c t . Through a d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l , 
the c r e a t o r God d i e s and i s r e s u r r e c t e d 
i n the c r e a t i v e s u b j e c t . As God c r e a t e d 
the world through the Logos, so man 
c r e a t e s a "world" through conscious and 
unconscious p r o j e c t i o n . In d i f f e r e n t 
terms, the modern s u b j e c t d e f i n e s i t s e l f 
by i t s c o n s t r u c t i v e a c t i v i t y . L i k e God, 
the s o v e r e i g n s u b j e c t r e l a t e s o n l y to 
what i t c o n s t r u c t s and t h e r e f o r e i s 
u n a f f e c t e d by anything other than i t s e l f . 
What appears to be a r e l a t i o n s h i p to 
otherness -- be t h a t other God, nature, 
o b j e c t s , s u b j e c t , c u l t u r e or h i s t o r y — 
always turns out to be an aspect of 
mediate s e l f - r e l a t i o n t h a t i s necessary 
f o r complete s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n i n 
t r a n s p a r e n t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Absolute 
knowledge a c t u a l i z e d i n the f u l l s e l f -
consciousness of the s u b j e c t seems to 
r e a l i z e Western philosophy's dream of 
e n j o y i n g a t o t a l presence t h a t i s n e i t h e r 
d i s t u r b e d by i r r e d u c i b l e d i f f e r e n c e nor 
i n t e r r u p t e d by the r e t u r n of an a b s o l u t e 
other. 

( T a y l o r , 1987a: x x i - x x l i ) 



169 

Thus modernism has to do with n o t i o n s o£ s e l f - i d e n t i c a l / 

s e l f - c e r t a i n knowledge and t o t a l i t y ( i . e . presence), whereas 

postmodernism has to do with i r r e d u c i b l e d i f f e r e n c e and 

r a d i c a l a l t e r i t y ( i . e . u n d e c i d a b i l i t y ) . In these terms, 

C l i f f o r d f a l l s as much i n t o the modernist camp as does Geertz 

f o r , as has been seen, both he and Geertz r e l y on a 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y t h a t i s phenomenological/hermeneutical — i . e . 

a c o n c e p t u a l i t y t h a t i s rooted i n assumptions of s u b j e c t i v i t y 

(and hence t o t a l i t y ) on the one hand and assumptions of 

d i a l e c t i c l t y (and hence t o t a l i t y ) on the other. T h i s being 

the case, the term 'postmodernism' i s a misnomer as a p p l i e d 

to C l i f f o r d and i t i s e x c e e d i n g l y unfortunate t h a t t h i s 

a p p l i c a t i o n has gained c u r r e n c y i n r e c e n t a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 

l i t e r a t u r e f o r i t can do nothing but spawn c o n f u s i o n . (In 

one r e c e n t a r t i c l e (Kapferer, 1989) even Geertz i s r e f e r r e d 

to as postmodernist!) I t does not s u f f i c e merely to s t a t e 

t h a t one i s n o n - t o t a l i z i n g i n order a c t u a l l y to be so -- i f 

one's c o n c e p t u a l i t y does not f o l l o w s u i t one ends up being 

merely c o n t r a d i c t o r y . And i f t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s not 

r e c o g n i z e d and i t s r a m i f i c a t i o n s pursued (as i t i s not and 

they are not i n C l i f f o r d ' s work) then one submits to t o t a l i t y 

by d e f a u l t , f o r one's i n t e n t i o n s w i l l always remain prey to 

the assumptions i m p l i c i t w i t h i n one's conceptual frame. As 

V i n c e n t Descombes remarks, "We must be wary of m i s t a k i n g the 

wish to reach the promised land f o r having a l r e a d y a r r i v e d 

t h e r e " (Descombes, 1985: 77). 



170 

In any case, g i v e n t h a t what holds f o r Geertz and 

C l i f f o r d a l s o holds f o r anthropology i n g e n e r a l , i . e . t h a t 

i t s conceptual frames are embedded i n an assumed n o t i o n of 

presence which always subsumes d i f f e r e n c e w i t h i n i d e n t i t y , 

d i v e r s i t y w i t h i n u n i t y , the problem becomes how to a v o i d 

doing t h i s while s t i l l remaining coherent. And i t i s c r u c i a l 

to a v o i d t h i s assumption of presence because such an 

assumption, r e q u i r i n g , as i t does, a s e r i e s of h i e r a r c h i c a l 

o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r s wherein one term i s always seen as 

s u b s e r v i e n t to and/or as a f a l l i n g away from the favoured 

term (which i s always c l o s e r to an assumed presence than i s 

i t s p a r t n e r ) , cannot h e l p but be both r e p r e s s i v e and 

o p p r e s s i v e . Indeed, the assumption of presence Is the very 

essence of r e p r e s s i v i t y and o p p r e s s i v i t y f o r i t r e q u i r e s , by 

d e f i n i t i o n and i n p r i n c i p l e , t h a t there be an a b s o l u t e , a 

' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i g n i f i e d , ' which e x i s t s as an u l t i m a t e , 

u t t e r l y dominant, s e l f - c e r t a i n p l e n i t u d e . I t f o l l o w s t h a t 

d i f f e r e n c e and otherness are given credence o n l y i n so f a r as 

they have the s t a t u s of mere v a r i a t i o n s on a theme (the 

theme, of course, being a b s o l u t e presence) -- they are not 

viewed as i n any way t h r e a t e n i n g to the fundamental 

assumption of o v e r - a r c h i n g p l e n i t u d e . T h i s being the case, 

the e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of u n d e c l d a b i l i t y , of r a d i c a l 

otherness, of r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e -- an otherness and a 

d i f f e r e n c e t h a t a c t u a l l y d i s r u p t s and d i s p l a c e s a s e l f -

c e r t a i n , s e l f - i d e n t i c a l presence — i s never s e r i o u s l y 



171 

c o n s i d e r e d because such a p o s s i b i l i t y i s presumed, from the 

o u t s e t , to be u t t e r l y i m p o s s i b l e . 

Now i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to see how the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of 

presence works I t s e l f out In p r a c t i c e — i t Is the v e r y 

c h a r t e r f o r sexism, r a c i s m and God-is-on-our-side p o l i t i c s of 

every d e s c r i p t i o n . And, indeed, how c o u l d i t not be? For 

i f e v e r y t h i n g Is presumed, i n the ' f i n a l a n a l y s i s , ' to r e f e r 

to an u l t i m a t e , s e l f - c e r t a i n and s e l f - c o n t a i n e d presence, 

then there cannot help but be corresponding n o t i o n s as to 

which e x i s t i n g phenomena most c l o s e l y approximate to t h a t 

presence. Thus those phenomena which are p e r c e i v e d to be 

nearer to presence ( i n the guise of God, the Good, T r u t h , the 

Proper or whatever) are favoured while those which are 

p e r c e i v e d to be f u r t h e r from presence are d e r i d e d . To take 

an obvious example, Western European c u l t u r e was (and, make 

no mistake, s t i l l i s ) presumed to be s u p e r i o r to non-Western 

European c u l t u r e s because the former was considered to be 

c l o s e r to God, the r l g h t n e s s and i n e v i t a b i l i t y of 'progress 

and c i v i l i z a t i o n ' and so on. Thus the 'white man's burden* 

was p e r c e i v e d to c o n s i s t of b r i n g i n g out the human essence 

of s u b j e c t peoples by t r a n s f o r m i n g them i n t o minor v e r s i o n s 

of Western Europeans. What i s t h i s but the r e p r e s s i o n / 

o p p r e s s i o n of d i f f e r e n c e i n the name of e s s e n t i a l i d e n t i t y ? 

And, of course, i t Is no s e c r e t as to who gets to d e f i n e 

what i s e s s e n t i a l and what should be developed, what 

d i s c o u r a g e d . A l l t h i s i s , of course, w e l l documented and 



172 

need not be dwelt upon here, what concerns me Is t h a t t h i s 

same d e d i c a t i o n to presence remains f u l l y o p e r a t i v e today and 

continues to foment r e p r e s s i o n and o p p r e s s i o n . The p o i n t i s , 

I b e l i e v e , with D e r r i d a , t h a t so long as our c o n c e p t u a l i t y 

remains premised upon and d e d i c a t e d to an unexamined n o t i o n 

of presence, so long w i l l r e p r e s s i o n / oppression be, by 

d e f i n i t i o n and i n p r i n c i p l e , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d and 

i n e v i t a b l e . I do not pretend to know e x a c t l y how to d e a l 

with t h i s s i t u a t i o n , but I do not t h i n k t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e 

to over-emphasize the Importance of, a t the very l e a s t , 

r e c o g n i z i n g and acknowledging i t . And along with r e c o g n i t i o n 

and acknowledgement comes the o b l i g a t i o n not to shy away from 

the e f f o r t i n v o l v e d i n t r y i n g to get out of the mire of 'the 

o l d q u e s t i o n s , the o l d answers* (as T.S, E l i o t says, i n a 

r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t context, " A f t e r such knowledge, what 

f o r g i v e n e s s ? " ( E l i o t , 1963b: 40)) but, r a t h e r , to take the 

advice of the l a t e J a n i s J o p l i n : "You know what you b e t t e r do 

baby — you b e t t e r t r y harder" ( J o p l i n , 1975). 

So, i n t h i s e f f o r t of t r y i n g , t h i s t r y i n g e f f o r t , i t i s 

time to take a c l o s e r look at u n d e c l d a b i l i t y . As w i l l be 

remembered from Chapter Two, the d i s s e m i n a t i v e p l a y of 

u n d e c l d a b i l i t y i s an always a l r e a d y o c c u r r i n g process which 

prevents any given concept from ever being c l o s e d and s e l f -

i d e n t i c a l ( i t s i m p o s s i b i l i t y ) while s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a l l o w i n g 

f o r the e x i s t e n c e of the concept as an e f f e c t ( i t s 



173 

p o s s i b i l i t y ) , 3 3 Once concepts are seen as e f f e c t s of a 

p r i m o r d i a l d i s s e m i n a t i v e u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , they are precluded 

from occupying any p o s i t i o n of absolute dominance because 

they are recognized as being always a l r e a d y f i s s u r e d by a 

p l a y which determines both t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y and t h e i r 

i m p o s s i b i l i t y -- a p l a y which prevents them from ever 

a b s o l u t e l y accounting f o r any given s i t u a t i o n whatsoever. 

Again, I must emphasize t h a t t h i s i s not to say t h a t concepts 

w i l l cease to f u n c t i o n -- o n l y t h a t they w i l l cease to 

f u n c t i o n as a l l - d e t e r m i n i n g e n t i t l e s or essences, i . e . as 

concepts as such. As Henry Staten puts i t , 

D e r r i d a . . . denies what we c o u l d c a l l 
the i m p e r m e a b i l i t y of the as-such, the 
t r a n s c e n d e n t a 1 i t y o r l o g i c a l 
superhardness of the b a r r i e r t h a t marks 
o f f the conceptual p u r i t y of X from 
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s not-X. I t i s not t h a t 
i d e n t i t y i s drowned i n otherness, but 
t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y open to i t , 
contaminated by i t . Yet the n e c e s s i t y or 
e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r of t h i s contamination 
cannot be named unless we f i r s t grasp the 
concept or essence or form as p u r i t y , as 
pure p o s i t i v e s e l f - i d e n t i t y . Otherwise 
e i t h e r there i s nothing to contaminate, 
or the f o r c e of the contamination i s not 
f e l t . Furthermore, the claims of 
p o s i t i v e s e l f - i d e n t i t y are undeniable. 

3 3 I t should be noted t h a t t h i s holds f o r the concept of 
d i f f e r e n c e every b i t as much as i t holds f o r the concept of 
i d e n t i t y . The reader must take care not to confuse 
' d i f f e r e n c e , ' a p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept which presupposes 
u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n w i t h i n a u n i f i c , s e l f - i d e n t i c a l presence, 
with d l f f F r a n c e , the always a l r e a d y o c c u r r i n g process of 
u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , which i s n e i t h e r d i f f e r e n c e nor i d e n t i t y but 
which a l l o w s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of both as an e f f e c t of i t s 
d i s s e m i n a t i v e p l a y . 



174 

The Now cannot be reduced to the not-now. 
I t s e s s e n t i a l l i n k a g e with the not-now 
compromises the p u r i t y of i t s p o s i t i v e 
I d e n t i t y without d e s t r o y i n g i t . 

The p o i n t of departure of 
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n from p h i l o s o p h y i s thus 
q u i t e s u b t l e . The value and n e c e s s i t y of 
pure concepts and c a t e g o r i e s are not 
denied, but they are no longer the l a s t 
word. We no longer simply note and then 
s e t a s i d e the f a c t u a l or e m p i r i c a l 
contamination of our u n i t i e s , but see 
t h a t they are Impure always and In 
p r i n c i p l e , and pursue the i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
t h i s e s s e n t i a l law of i m p u r i t y . 

(Staten, 1984: 18-19) 

Now i f concepts, as such, can no longer be seen to t o t a l l y 

dominate any given f i e l d , can no longer be seen to have 'the 

l a s t word,' then i t becomes necessary to r e - t h i n k 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y as such and to take account of i t s e s s e n t i a l 

openness to r a d i c a l a l t e r i t y . And t h i s r a d i c a l a l t e r i t y , 

t h i s otherness which cannot be homogenized w i t h i n the s e l f -

same of c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p t u a l i t y , i s the d i s s e m i n a t i v e p l a y of 

u n d e c l d a b i l i t y . 

I t i s important to r e a l i z e t h a t the d e c o n s t r u c t i v e 

concern with u n d e c l d a b i l i t y i s n e i t h e r negative nor 

n i h i l i s t i c . As D e r r i d a says, 

D e c o n s t r u c t i o n always presupposes 
a f f i r m a t i o n , as I have f r e q u e n t l y 
attempted to p o i n t out. . . . I do not 
mean that the d e c o n s t r u c t i n g s u b j e c t or 
s e l f a f f i r m s . I mean t h a t d e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
i s , i n i t s e l f , a p o s i t i v e response to an 
a l t e r i t y which n e c e s s a r i l y c a l l s , summons 
or motivates i t . . . . The other, as the 
other than s e l f , the other t h a t opposes 



175 

s e l f - i d e n t i t y , i s not something t h a t can 
be d e t e c t e d and d i s c l o s e d w i t h i n a 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l space and with the a i d of 
a p h i l o s o p h i c a l lamp. The other precedes 
p h i l o s o p h y and n e c e s s a r i l y invokes and 
provokes the s u b j e c t before any genuine 
q u e s t i o n i n g can begin. I t i s i n t h i s 
rapport with the other t h a t a f f i r m a t i o n 
expresses i t s e l f . 

( D e r r i d a i n Kearney, ed., 1984: 118) 

In other words, d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , u n l i k e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or 

e x p l a n a t i o n as such (which, being p r e d i c a t e d upon notions of 

presence, presuppose the e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of c l o s u r e , 

e.g. an u l t i m a t e r e f e r e n t i n the guise of an i n t e r p r e t e d 

theme(s) on the one hand or an e x p l a i n e d s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t 

r e s u l t on the other) c o n c e n t r a t e s on the p l a y of a n o n - f i n i t e 

d i s s e m i n a t i o n (which, being p r e d i c a t e d on o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g 

and u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , presupposes the e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of 

openness). T h i s d i s s e m i n a t i v e p l a y c o n s t a n t l y a f f i r m s an 

u n d e c i d a b i l i t y which, i n a l l o w i n g f o r both the p o s s i b i l i t y 

and I m p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n / e x p l a n a t i o n as such, 

i n s i s t s on a r e c o g n i t i o n of r a d i c a l openness which c a l l s i n t o 

q u e s t i o n the c l a s s i c a l n o t i o n of the concept along with the 

e n t i r e t r a d i t i o n of Western thought which presupposes i t s 

a u t h o r i t y . To put i t another way, D e r r i d a ' s concern with 

u n d e c i d a b i l i t y does not negate Western p h i l o s o p h y — . i t 

s i t u a t e s i t . That i s to say, r a t h e r than being seen as s e l f -

c o n t a i n e d and i n e v i t a b l e , Western thought i s seen as merely 

one p o s s i b l e o f f s h o o t of an o r i g i n a r y u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , and, as 



such, I t i s always a l r e a d y r i d d l e d with the p o s s i b i l i t y of 

what i t d e f i n e s i t s e l f as most p r o p e r l y not being, i . e . i t s 

other. And t h i s e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of r a d i c a l a l t e r i t y 

p r o h i b i t s Western thought from ever a t t a i n i n g a c l o s u r e and 

a dominance which i t nonetheless presumes. 

S i m i l a r l y , with r e s p e c t to u n d e c i d a b i l i t y e n t a i l i n g 

n i h i l i s m or a b s o l u t e indeterminacy, D e r r i d a comments as 

f o l l o w s : 

D l f f F r a n c e i s not indeterminacy. I t 
renders determinacy both p o s s i b l e and 
necessary. Someone might say: but i f i t 
renders determinacy p o s s i b l e , i t i s 
because i t i t s e l f i s "indeterminacy." 
P r e c i s e l y not, s i n c e f i r s t of a l l i t " i s " 
i n I t s e l f nothing o u t s i d e of d i f f e r e n t 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ; second, and consequently, 
i t never comes to a f u l l stop anywhere, 
a b s o l u t e l y t e l l e ne s ' a r r e t e n u l l e p a r t ], 
and Is n e i t h e r n e g a t i v i t y nor nothingness 
(as indeterminacy would be). 

( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 149) 

In other words, the p l a y of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , because i t 

accounts f o r both determined e f f e c t s and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of 

the a b s o l u t e nature of those e f f e c t s , cannot be p e r c e i v e d as 

a simple indeterminacy, a simple n e g a t i v i t y , or, Indeed, a 

simple ( i n the sense of c o n s i s t i n g of one pure and s e l f -

contained element or essence) anything. I t i s f o r t h i s 

reason t h a t d e c o n s t r u c t i o n and i t s i n s i s t e n c e upon the 

c r u c i a l importance of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y cannot be viewed as 

c o n s t i t u t i n g a form of r e l a t i v i s m . R e l a t i v i s m presumes a 



177 

n o t i o n o£ context or contexts as s e l f - c o n t a i n e d and s e l f -

v a l i d a t i n g . I f , however, contexts as such are seen to be 

always a l r e a d y i n s c r i b e d with what they are not, i . e . with 

the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r own o t h e r n e s s , 3 4 then the concept of 

r e l a t i v i s m , l i k e a l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l concepts, must be 

d e c o n s t r u c t e d — i t must give way to the d i s s e m i n a t i v e p l a y 

of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y . 

As w i l l be r e c a l l e d , 

Dissemination . . . although producing a 
n o n f i n i t e number of semantic e f f e c t s , can 
be l e d back n e i t h e r to a present of 
simple o r i g i n . . . nor to an 
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l presence. I t marks an 
i r r e d u c i b l e and g e n e r a t i v e m u l t i p l i c i t y . 
The supplement and the t u r b u l e n c e of a 
c e r t a i n lack f r a c t u r e the l i m i t of the 
t e x t , f o r b i d d i n g an exhaustive and c l o s e d 
f o r m a l i z a t i o n of i t , or a t l e a s t a 
s a t u r a t i n g taxonomy of i t s themes, i t s 
s i g n i f i e d , i t s meaning. 

( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 45) 

The p o i n t i s , i f we can no longer t h i n k i n terms of concepts 

which are i n p r i n c i p l e a b s o l u t e and s e l f - c o n t a i n e d , i f we 

must acknowledge an o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g , an e s s e n t i a l 

u n d e c i d a b i l i t y which p r e c l u d e s any p o s s i b i l i t y of u l t i m a t e 

u n i t y or c l o s u r e , then we must f o l l o w up on Geertz's 

i n t i m a t i o n t h a t "Something i s happening to the way we t h i n k 

about the way we t h i n k " (Geertz, 1983a: 20). And what i s 

3 4 See my d i s c u s s i o n of the concept of context i n chapter 
Four. 



178 

happening Is t h a t we can no longer 'think' as such — t h a t Is 

to say, we can no longer assume the e x i s t e n c e o£ a s i n g u l a r , 

s e l f - i d e n t i c a l consciousness or mind which intends s i n g u l a r 

and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l thoughts. (The Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y 

d e f i n e s the verb 'to t h i n k ' as: " i n t e n d , expect. . . . form 

c o n c e p t i o n o f . . . . independent mind.") Rather, we must be 

a t t e n t i v e to an e s s e n t i a l openness, a p r i m o r d i a l and 

g e n e r a t i v e h e t e r o g e n e i t y , a d i s s e m i n a t i v e p l a y of 

u n d e c i d a b i l i t y . And what might t h i s look l i k e f o r 

anthropology i n general? 

Well, to begin with, i t looks l i k e what I have attempted 

to do throughout t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . That i s , i t i n v o l v e s an 

extremely c l o s e examination and d e c o n s t r u c t i o n of what 

anthropology has done up to t h i s p o i n t — author by author 

and concept by concept. An a t t e n t i v e n e s s to u n d e c i d a b i l i t y 

i n v o l v e s a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t none of our concepts, none of our 

assumptions, are a b s o l u t e and homogeneous and t h a t we must 

c o n s t a n t l y be on guard a g a i n s t l e t t i n g n o t i o n s of p l e n i t u d e , 

t o t a l i t y and other such m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of presence i n by the 

back door. And t h i s guarding a g a i n s t c o n s c i o u s l y or 

u n c o n s c i o u s l y r e l y i n g on v a r i o u s concepts which are rooted i n 

assumptions of presence i s of fundamental Importance to 

anthropology because such concepts are, by d e f i n i t i o n and i n 

p r i n c i p l e , both r e p r e s s i v e and o p p r e s s i v e . They are 

r e p r e s s i v e because they a b s o l u t e l y deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of an 

a l t e r i t y or otherness t h a t i s not subsumed w i t h i n n o t i o n s of 



179 

u n i t y and s e l f - i d e n t i t y — and t h i s a b s t r a c t r e p r e s s i o n 

t r a n s l a t e s i n t o a v e r y concrete o p p r e s s i o n . Thus throughout 

Western ' h i s t o r y ' women have been (and are) viewed as 

i n f e r i o r to and hence p r o p e r l y s u b s e r v i e n t to men, 

' p r i m i t i v e ' c u l t u r e s have been (and are) viewed as i n f e r i o r 

to and hence p r o p e r l y s u b s e r v i e n t to ' c i v i l i z e d ' c u l t u r e s , 

people of c o l o u r have been (and are) viewed as i n f e r i o r to 

and hence p r o p e r l y s u b s e r v i e n t to white people (and here 

t r a d i t i o n a l Western notions of white s y m b o l i z i n g good and 

p u r i t y and black s y m b o l i z i n g e v i l and i m p u r i t y s u r e l y cannot 

be c o n s i d e r e d c o i n c i d e n t a l ) , non-human l i f e - f o r m s have been 

(and are) viewed as i n f e r i o r to and hence p r o p e r l y 

s u b s e r v i e n t to human l i f e - f o r m s and so on. In other words, 

the h i e r a r c h i c a l o p p o s i t i o n a l i t y which i s a product of 

v a r i o u s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of the concept of presence i s 

s t r u c t u r e d In such a way t h a t the h a l f of an o p p o s i t i o n a l 

p a i r which i s c o n s i d e r e d c l o s e s t to an o r i g i n a r y and a l l -

encompassing presence i s p r i v i l e g e d over the other h a l f . The 

n o n - p r i v i l e g e d h a l f of a h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d 

o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r i s c o n s i d e r e d to be a c o r r u p t v e r s i o n of 

the p r i v i l e g e d h a l f and, t h e r e f o r e , to have no s t a n d i n g i n 

and of i t s e l f . That Is to say, because the e s s e n t i a l 

p o s s i b i l i t y of r a d i c a l a l t e r i t y , of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , i s not 

taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the n o n - p r i v i l e g e d h a l f i s deemed 

to be o n l y an impure form of i t s partner and hence serves 

merely to underscore the e s s e n t i a l u n i t y of a dominating 



180 

presence — a dominating presence which i s always skewed In 

favour of t h a t which i s p e r c e i v e d to be c l o s e s t to i t . Thus, 

f o r example, i n C h r i s t i a n theology, Satan, the embodiment of 

e v i l , i s c o n s i d e r e d to be a f a l l e n a n g e l ; women are 

c o n s i d e r e d to be f u r t h e r from God than are men ("Hee f o r God 

only, shee f o r God i n him" ( M i l t o n , 1975: 285)); ' p r i m i t i v e ' 

peoples are c o n s i d e r e d to partake of the essence of humanity 

but i t i s ' c i v i l i z e d ' peoples who most p r o p e r l y express and 

d e f i n e t h a t essence; non-human l i f e - f o r m s are c o n s i d e r e d to 

be f u r t h e r from God than are human l i f e - f o r m s ("26. So God 

c r e a t e d man i n h i s own image, i n the image of God c r e a t e d he 

him; male and female c r e a t e d he them. 27. And God b l e s s e d 

them, and God s a i d unto them, Be f r u i t f u l and m u l t i p l y , and 

r e p l e n i s h the e a r t h , and subdue i t : and have dominion over 

the f i s h of the sea, and over the fowl of the a i r , and over 

every l i v i n g t h i n g t h a t moveth upon the e a r t h " (Genesis, 

Ch.I, v. 26-27)); and so on. The p o i n t i s , the non-

p r i v i l e g e d term i n such o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r s i s always seen as 

being an i n f e r i o r form of the p r i v i l e g e d term and, as such, 

i s s u b j e c t to abuse and s c o r n . 

I f the kinds of concrete o p p r e s s i o n t h a t I have 

mentioned can be seen to be l o g i c a l and i n e v i t a b l e extensions 

of a c o n c e p t u a l i t y t h a t i s i t s e l f d e d i c a t e d to r e p r e s s i o n , 

then the importance of d e c o n s t r u c t i n g and r e s i t u a t i n g t h a t 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y should be c o n s i d e r e d paramount not o n l y by 

a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , but by a l l those who have been brought up 



181 

w i t h i n the domain of Western thought. Again, I must 

emphasize t h a t t h i s i s not to say t h a t Western concepts must 

be destroyed a b s o l u t e l y — o n l y t h a t they must be destroyed 

i n t h e i r absolute form. And t h i s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h i s 

displacement and r e s i t u a t l n g of c o n c e p t u a l i t y as such, 

e n t a i l i n g , as i t does, the acknowledgement of a s i t u a t i o n i n 

which i t i s no longer p o s s i b l e f o r a n o t i o n of presence to 

c o n t a i n and account f o r a l l phenomena, a s i t u a t i o n i n which 

i t i s no longer l e g i t i m a t e f o r one term of an o p p o s i t i o n a l 

p a i r to be contained w i t h i n and dominated by i t s p a r t n e r , 

leads to a r e c o g n i t i o n of p r i m o r d i a l or r a d i c a l a l t e r i t y and 

a l l t h a t such a r e c o g n i t i o n i m p l i e s . 

As I hope has been s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r , r a d i c a l a l t e r i t y 

i s another name f o r u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , i . e . i t i s t h a t which 

cannot be contained and accounted f o r by the l o g i c of b i n a r y 

o p p o s i t i o n or t r i n l t a r i a n u n i t y (which i s the l o g i c of a 

Western p h i l o s o p h y rooted i n the presumption of presence) but 

which nonetheless a l l o w s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c e r t a i n 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y . I say a ' c e r t a i n ' c o n c e p t u a l i t y because a 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y which i s seen to be the product of an o r i g i n a r y 

p l a y of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , u n l i k e a c o n c e p t u a l i t y which i s seen 

to be the product of an assumption of presence, i s , by 

d e f i n i t i o n and i n p r i n c i p l e , incapable of absolute 

domination. In other words, what we are d e a l i n g with i s the 

d i f f e r e n c e between a fundamental h e t e r o g e n e i t y and a 

fundamental homogeneity -- the l a t t e r l e a d i n g to a 



182 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y which Is by d e f i n i t i o n c l o s e d and s e l f -

c o n t a i n e d and the former l e a d i n g to a c o n c e p t u a l i t y which i s 

by d e f i n i t i o n open and always a l r e a d y other than what i t i s . 

What a r e c o g n i t i o n of r a d i c a l a l t e r i t y or u n d e c i d a b i l i t y 

i m p l i e s f o r anthropology (and, indeed, f o r Western thought i n 

general) i s nothing l e s s than the f a c t t h a t r e p r e s s i o n /  

o p p r e s s i o n can never a g a i n be j u s t i f i e d on e i t h e r p u r e l y  

l o g i c a l or p u r e l y moral grounds. In other words, i f 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y i s seen to be the product of an e s s e n t i a l 

u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , then l o g i c and m o r a l i t y as such must be seen 

to be 'impure' by d e f i n i t i o n -- to be always a l r e a d y 

contaminated by t h e i r other and hence to be incapable of 

grounding and v a l i d a t i n g a s e r i e s of h i e r a r c h i c a l l y 

s t r u c t u r e d o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r s which presuppose u l t i m a t e 

r e s o l u t i o n w i t h i n a u n i f i c , all-encompassing presence. What 

t h i s means i s t h a t a r e p r e s s i o n / o p p r e s s i o n which has 

h e r e t o f o r e been the i n e v i t a b l e l o g i c a l and moral outcome of 

a c o n c e p t u a l i t y p r e d i c a t e d upon a n o t i o n of presence and i t s 

concomitant skewed b i n a r i s m i s , q u i t e simply, no longer 

a c c e p t a b l e . Obviously, I am not s a y i n g t h a t a r e a l i z a t i o n of 

the fundamentally r e p r e s s i v e / o p p r e s s i v e nature of Western 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y w i l l r e s u l t i n an end to r e p r e s s i o n and 

o p p r e s s i o n . But I am s a y i n g t h a t such a r e a l i z a t i o n c o u l d , 

or, a t l e a s t , should r e s u l t i n an end to the unconscious and 

presumptuous m a n u f a c t u r e and p e r p e t u a t i o n of 



183 

r e p r e s s i o n / o p p r e s s i o n through the mindless assumption of an 

unexamined c o n c e p t u a l i t y . 

I b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s incumbent upon a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s 

(and, of course, hot o n l y upon a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s ) to be hyper-

aware of the dangers of assuming such an unexamined 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y (and, as I hope my examination of Geertz and 

C l i f f o r d has shown, i t i s no easy task to a v o i d f a l l i n g back 

on o l d assumptions) and to work c o n s t a n t l y to tease out and 

to develop the p o s s i b i l i t i e s inherent w i t h i n i t s cracks and 

f i s s u r e s . What t h i s t e a s i n g out and d e v e l o p i n g might look 

l i k e i n concrete f i e l d s i t u a t i o n s i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r me 

to say, f o r , as D e r r i d a p o i n t s out, 

D e c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n the s i n g u l a r , i s not 
" i n h e r e n t l y " anything at a l l t h a t might 
be determinable on the b a s i s of 
[logocentrism] and of i t s c r i t e r i a . I t 
i s " i n h e r e n t l y " nothing a t a l l ; the l o g i c 
of essence (by o p p o s i t i o n to a c c i d e n t ) , 
of the proper (by o p p o s i t i o n to the 
improper), hence of the " i n h e r e n t " by 
o p p o s i t i o n to the e x t r i n s i c , i s p r e c i s e l y 
what a l l d e c o n s t r u c t i o n has from the 
s t a r t c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n . 
D e c o n s t r u c t i o n does not e x i s t somewhere, 
pure, proper, s e l f - i d e n t i c a l , o u t s i d e of 
i t s i n s c r i p t i o n s i n c o n f l i c t u a l and 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n t e x t s ; i t " i s " o n l y 
what I t does and what i s done with i t , 
there where i t takes p l a c e . I t i s [not 
p o s s i b l e ] to give a u n i v o c a l d e f i n i t i o n 
or an adequate d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s 
" t a k i n g p l a c e . " 

( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 141) 



184 

In other words, the a p p l i c a t i o n of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , what i t 

w i l l look l i k e , what t r a c e s i t w i l l f o l l o w , depends upon the 

p a r t i c u l a r context to which i t i s a p p l i e d , and t h i s not 

because of a b u i l t - i n obscurantism, but because of a 

fundamental and i n t e n s e r e s p e c t f u l n e s s f o r the r a d i c a l l y 

heterogeneous nature of any given s i t u a t i o n . Thus while i t 

i s p o s s i b l e f o r me to a p p l y a d e c o n s t r u c t l v e r e a d i n g to the 

t e x t s of C l i f f o r d Geertz and James C l i f f o r d r e s p e c t i v e l y , and 

to d e l i n e a t e the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e i r 

chosen c o n c e p t u a l i t y , I cannot say what they might have found 

i n any g i v e n f i e l d s i t u a t i o n had they u t i l i z e d a 

d e c o n s t r u c t i v e s t r a t e g y because t h a t would depend e n t i r e l y on 

the p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d s i t u a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n . And I cannot 

take t h e i r word f o r what they found because, as I have t r i e d 

to show, i t i s a l r e a d y e n t i r e l y imbued with the 

p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y . Although the 

i n a b i l i t y to p r o j e c t the r e s u l t s of a p o t e n t i a l 

d e c o n s t r u c t l v e r e a d i n g of as yet undeconstructed s i t u a t i o n s 

may indeed be i r r i t a t i n g , I b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s v e r y much a 

s t r e n g t h r a t h e r than a weakness of the d e c o n s t r u c t i v e 

approach. And t h i s because i t m i t i g a t e s a g a i n s t the a l l too 

a p p e a l i n g temptation to r e s t on assumption. I f each and 

every s i t u a t i o n i s always a l r e a d y r i d d l e d with m u l t i p l e 

p o s s i b i l i t i e s due to an e s s e n t i a l u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , an 

e s s e n t i a l h e t e r o g e n e i t y , then each and every s i t u a t i o n must 

be approached with an openness which p r e c l u d e s the 



185 

p o s s i b i l i t y , or, perhaps I should say, the v a l i d i t y of 

a b s t r a c t p r o j e c t i o n . Again, t h i s i s n e i t h e r e v a s i o n nor 

obscurantism -- i t i s the necessary and i n e v i t a b l e c o r o l l a r y 

of emphasizing an e s s e n t i a l and r a d i c a l h e t e r o g e n e i t y r a t h e r 

than an e s s e n t i a l and r a d i c a l homogeneity. 

What d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , the r e c o g n i t i o n of r a d i c a l 

a l t e r i t y , e s s e n t i a l u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , c a l l s f o r Is nothing l e s s 

than a r e - r e a d i n g and r e s i t u a t i n g of the e n t i r e 

a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l canon along with, of course, an approach to 

f i e l d w o r k which takes t h i s r e s i t u a t i n g i n t o a c c o u n t . " We 

3 5 With r e s p e c t to f i e l d w o r k , i t i s c r u c i a l to look a t the way 
i n which f i e l d w o r k e r s are now t r a i n e d . At the undergraduate l e v e l 
the Anthropology student takes a s e r i e s of courses which emphasize 
the h i s t o r y of the d i s c i p l i n e , two or three c u l t u r e areas (which 
are c o n s t i t u t e d by the w r i t i n g s of 'big name' a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s ) , 
methods and t h e o r i e s . At the graduate l e v e l the student engages 
In more of the same and then s e t s to conduct her f i e l d w o r k -- a f t e r 
which she r e t u r n s , w r i t e s up her experiences ( c a t e g o r i z i n g them 
w i t h i n the framework of any one of a number of methods and/or 
t h e o r i e s ) and Is accepted by the ' s c h o l a r l y community' ( i n the form 
of a d i s s e r t a t i o n committee) on the b a s i s of how w e l l she c a r r i e s 
out t h i s e n t e r p r i s e . Now, a l l of t h i s t r a i n i n g , and the f i n a l 
judgement of the student's work, a c c e p t s , without q u e s t i o n , the 
fundamental c o r r e c t n e s s of the Western metaphysical n o t i o n of 
presence and a l l t h a t flows therefrom. So, whether v a r i a t i o n s on 
the theme of presence come i n the form of T y l o r i a n e v o l u t i o n i s m , 
R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n i a n s t r u c t u r e - f u n c t i o n a l i s m , Malinowskinian b i o -
p s y c h o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m , L 6 v i - S t r a u s s i a n s t r u c t u r a l i s m , 
G e e r t z i a n i n t e r p r e t i s m or C l l f f o r d i a n 'postmodernism,' throughout 
her c a r e e r , the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , so f a r from being encouraged to 
examine the consequences of her p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of presence, never  
even becomes aware t h a t she has i t . As a r e s u l t of t h i s s t u d i e d 
lack of awareness, the d i s c i p l i n e of Anthropology p r o j e c t s the 
r e p r e s s i o n i n h e r e n t i n Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y onto other peoples 
and other c u l t u r e s through i t s agent, the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t . And so 
i t goes, Anthropology and the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t c o n s t a n t l y r e p l i c a t i n g 
and r e i n f o r c i n g each other through the t h o u g h t l e s s acceptance of 
a c o n c e p t u a l i t y which f u n c t i o n s to r e p r e s s the 'other.' 

In order to begin to r e d r e s s t h i s s i t u a t i o n , d e c o n s t r u c t l v e 
s t r a t e g i e s must be o f f e r e d as p a r t of the core c u r r i c u l a of a l l 
departments of Anthropology. I f t h i s were to be accomplished, 



186 

must become aware of the sometimes ever so s u b t l e (e.g. 

Geertz and C l i f f o r d ) sometimes ever so b l a t a n t (e.g. F r a z e r 

and T y l o r ) ways i n which anthropology f o i s t s an assumed 

c o n c e p t u a l i t y , with a l l of I t s r e p r e s s i v e / o p p r e s s i v e 

i m p l i c a t i o n s and consequences, onto non-Western c u l t u r e s . 

T h i s alone makes d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d i s p e n s a b l e to an 

anthropology t h a t e n t e r t a i n s any n o t i o n s of i t s e l f as 

p o t e n t i a l l y non-oppressive, l i b e r a t i n g , g e n u i n e l y concerned 

with the other and so on. What does the e s s e n t i a l 

p o s s i b i l i t y of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y t e l l us about a l l we have 

w r i t t e n concerning the s o - c a l l e d ' p r i m i t i v e ' and h e r / h i s lack 

of l o g i c and consequent i n a b i l i t y to p e r c e i v e l o g i c a l 

c o n t r a d i c t i o n ? What i f she/he simply put the emphasis on 

h e t e r o g e n e i t y as opposed to homogeneity? Is i t p o s s i b l e t h a t 

L6vy-Bruhl stumbled onto the t r a c e of something which, i n our 

d e s i r e to view other peoples as, f o r whatever reasons, 

underdeveloped v e r s i o n s of o u r s e l v e s , we too e a s i l y and too 

smugly dismissed? I f our a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l fore-mothers and 

f o r e - f a t h e r s had presumed an e s s e n t i a l h e t e r o g e n e i t y / 

u n d e c i d a b i l i t y r a t h e r than an e s s e n t i a l homogeneity/presence, 

what might they have found? What might we s t i l l f i n d ? And 

so on and so on. Is anthropology, a f t e r a l l these years of 

c r e a t i n g and d e f i n i n g i t s e l f as a d i s c i p l i n e which i s 

perhaps the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g c o u l d be a help 
r a t h e r than a hindrance with r e s p e c t to e n a b l i n g her to approach 
the f i e l d w o r k s i t u a t i o n with a s e n s i t i v i t y to otherness which has, 
h i t h e r t o , been d i s c e r n i b l e o n l y as a l a c k . 



187 

supposedly d e d i c a t e d to d e s c r i b i n g and comprehending the 

other, l e f t i n the p o s i t i o n of an aged, half-mad, once-but-

no-longer and never-again-to-be k i n g who can o n l y wander 

a i m l e s s l y amid a wretchedness of h i s own c r e a t i n g and 

p a t h e t i c a l l y intone, "0, I have ta'en too l i t t l e care of 

t h i s " (Shakespeare, 1963: 112)? The answer, a l l too 

c l e a r l y , i s yes. The q u e s t i o n remains as to whether or not 

we, as a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , w i l l recognize t h i s p o s i t i o n and, i f 

so, what we w i l l do about i t . I f we dp_ r e c o g n i z e i t , then a 

hard look a t Derridean d e c o n s t r u c t i o n may o f f e r us the 

p o t e n t i a l to begin re-working and r e s i t u a t i n g what we have 

done and provide a way to begin a p p r e c i a t i n g the otherness of 

others r a t h e r than c o n s t a n t l y r e d u c i n g them to simple 

r e f l e c t i o n s and r e p l i c a t i o n s of o u r s e l v e s . I f we do not 

r e c o g n i z e i t , then we w i l l simply go on c r e a t i n g and 

p e r p e t u a t i n g the same o l d h o r r o r s — t h i s time, a p p a r e n t l y , 

under the banner of •postmodernism.' 

v 



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