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15158	----	Proofreading Team. in time of EMERGENCY a citizen's handbook on ... NUCLEAR ATTACK ... NATURAL DISASTERS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE * * * * * THIS HANDBOOK IS THE PROPERTY OF: Name_____________________________________________ Address__________________________________________ LOCATION OF DESIGNATED FALLOUT SHELTER, OR SHELTER NEAREST TO: Home_____________________________________________ School___________________________________________ Workplace________________________________________ EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBERS:[1] Ambulance________________________________________ Civil Defense____________________________________ Doctors__________________________________________ __________________________________________ Fire_____________________________________________ Health Department________________________________ Hospitals________________________________________ ________________________________________ Police___________________________________________ Red Cross________________________________________ Utility Companies________________________________ ________________________________ Weather Bureau___________________________________ Other____________________________________________ * * * * * IN TIME OF EMERGENCY A CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK ON --NUCLEAR ATTACK --NATURAL DISASTERS The Office of Civil Defense gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by representatives of the following agencies and organizations in the preparation of material for this handbook: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission U.S. Department of Agriculture U.S. Department of Commerce; Environmental Science Services Administration; Weather Bureau U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Public Health Service Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President American Medical Association; Committee on Disaster Medical Care American National Red Cross National Geographic Society National Association of State Civil Defense Directors United States Civil Defense Council The Office of Civil Defense, however, is solely responsible for the validity and accuracy of the information in the handbook. * * * * * TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction PART I: NUCLEAR ATTACK Chapter 1--Checklist of Emergency Actions Chapter 2---Understand the Hazards of Nuclear Attack Chapter 3--Know About Warning Chapter 4--Fallout Shelters, Public and Private Chapter 5--Improvising Fallout Protection Chapter 6--Supplies for Fallout Shelters Chapter 7--Water, Food, and Sanitation in a Shelter Chapter 8--Fire Hazards Chapter 9--Emergency Care of the Sick and Injured PART II: MAJOR NATURAL DISASTERS Chapter 1--General Guidance Chapter 2--Floods and Hurricanes Chapter 3--Tornadoes Chapter 4--Winter Storms Chapter 5--Earthquakes Index * * * * * INTRODUCTION A major emergency affecting a large number of people may occur anytime and anywhere. It may be a peacetime disaster such as a flood, tornado, fire, hurricane, blizzard or earthquake. It could be an enemy nuclear attack on the United States. In any type of general disaster, lives can be saved if people are prepared for the emergency, and know what actions to take when it occurs. With the aid of Federal and State governments, cities and counties in all parts of the country are developing their local civil defense systems--the fallout shelters, supporting equipment and emergency plans needed to reduce the loss of life from an enemy attack. While these local government systems have been set up mainly as safeguards against nuclear attack, they have saved lives and relieved suffering in many major peacetime disasters. People have been warned of impending storms and similar dangers, told how to protect themselves, sheltered from the elements, fed and clothed, treated for injury and illness, and given help in resuming their normal lives. Experience has shown that as cities, counties and towns develop their systems to preserve life under nuclear attack conditions, they also become better prepared to deal effectively with peacetime disasters. In cooperation with the U.S. Office of Civil Defense and the States, many local governments are improving their civil defense systems by preparing community shelter plans. These plans include instructions to local citizens on what to do in the event of nuclear attack. This handbook, "In Time of Emergency," contains basic general information on both nuclear attack and major natural disasters. This general guidance supplements the specific instructions issued by local governments. Since special conditions may exist in some communities, the local instructions may be slightly different from this general guidance. In those cases, the local instructions should be followed. Part I (pages 3-68) is concerned with nuclear attack and basic actions to take. Part II (pages 69-86) discusses preparations and emergency actions that will help individuals cope with major natural disasters--floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, winter storms, and earthquakes. In addition to following the advice given in this handbook and the instructions of their local governments, people can prepare themselves better to meet any major disaster by taking training courses to develop their "emergency skills." Especially recommended are these courses: "PERSONAL AND FAMILY SURVIVAL" (12-hour course)--A basic orientation course in civil defense, which also tells people how to improve their protection against the effects of a nuclear attack. "MEDICAL SELF-HELP" (16-hour course)--How to care for the sick and injured if a doctor or nurse is not available. "FIRST AID" (courses of various lengths)--How to help the sick and injured until professional medical assistance is obtained. "CARE OF THE SICK AND INJURED" (12-hour course)--How to care for patients after they have received professional medical treatment. Information on these free courses, which are given in most communities, is available from local Civil Defense Offices, County Agricultural Extension Agents, local public health departments, or American Red Cross chapters. Special advice for rural families on emergency actions related to crops and livestock is available from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. * * * * * PART ONE NUCLEAR ATTACK A nuclear attack against the United States would take a high toll of lives. But our losses would be much less if people were prepared to meet the emergency, knew what actions to take, and took them. A nationwide civil defense system now exists in the United States, and is being enlarged and improved constantly. The heart of this system is fallout shelter to protect people from the radioactive fallout that would result from a nuclear attack. The system also includes warning and communications networks, preparations to measure fallout radiation, control centers to direct lifesaving and recovery operations, emergency broadcasting stations, local governments organized for emergency operations, large numbers of citizens trained in emergency skills, and U.S. military forces available to help civil authorities and the public in a time of emergency. If an enemy should threaten to attack the United States, you would not be alone. The entire Nation would be mobilizing to repulse the attack, destroy the enemy, and hold down our own loss of life. Much assistance would be available to you--from local, State and Federal governments, from the U.S. armed forces units in your area, and from your neighbors and fellow-Americans. If an attack should come, many lives would be saved through effective emergency preparations and actions. You can give yourself and your family a much better chance of surviving and recovering from a nuclear attack if you will _take time now to:_ Understand the dangers you would face in an attack. Make your own preparations for an attack. Learn what actions you should take at the time of attack. * * * * * CHAPTER 1 CHECKLIST OF EMERGENCY ACTIONS * KNOW YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN * Find out from your local government your local plan for emergency action. * Determine the specific actions you and members of your family are expected to take. * UNDERSTAND NUCLEAR ATTACK HAZARDS (See Chapter 2, page 9) On the widespread threat of fallout, remember: * The most dangerous period is the first 24 hours after fallout arrives. But you might have to use fallout shelter for up to two weeks. * Highly dangerous amounts of fallout are visible. They look like particles of sand or salt. * There is little danger that adults could inhale or swallow enough fallout particles to hurt them. Small children, however, could be injured by drinking contaminated water or milk. * A person exposed to fallout radiation does _not_ become radioactive. Radiation sickness is _not_ contagious; one person cannot "catch it" from another person. * KNOW THE ATTACK WARNING SIGNAL (See Chapter 3, page 17) * On outdoor warning devices, the Attack Warning Signal is a _3- to 5-minute_ wavering sound, or a series of short blasts on whistles or horns. * This signal means: An enemy attack against the United States has been detected. _Take protective action_. (This signal has no other meaning, and will be used for no other purpose.) * On warning, don't use the phone. Get information from radio. * KNOW THE LOCATION OF FALLOUT SHELTER (See Chapter 4, page 23) * Public shelters are marked like this. * Good shelters can be prepared in homes with basements. * IF NO SHELTER IS AVAILABLE, IMPROVISE PROTECTION (See Chapter 5, page 33) Remember: * A basement corner below ground level, or a storm cellar, is the best place to improvise fallout protection. * For the best possible protection, use heavy and dense materials for shielding. * PREPARE EMERGENCY SUPPLIES (See Chapter 6, page 39) Especially important are: * Water and other liquids. * Food requiring no cooking. * Special medicines. * CONSERVE EMERGENCY SUPPLIES; MAINTAIN SANITATION (See Chapter 7, page 45) * REDUCE FIRE HAZARDS (See Chapter 8, page 51) * KNOW THE BASICS OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE (See Chapter 9, page 55) If no doctor is available, especially important are actions to: * Restore breathing. * Stop serious bleeding. * Treat for shock. * Treat broken bones and burns. * FOLLOW OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS * * * * * CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTAND THE HAZARDS OF NUCLEAR ATTACK SUMMARY 1. The main hazards of a nuclear attack are blast, heat, fire, and fallout radiation. 2. You _may_ be able to protect yourself against blast and heat by getting inside a shelter or taking cover, before the nuclear explosions occur. You may be able to avoid fire injuries by putting out small fires or escaping from large fires that might occur in your area. 3. You _can_ protect yourself against fallout radiation by getting inside a fallout shelter--if possible, before fallout particles begin drifting down--and by staying there until you are told to come out by authorities who have the equipment to measure radiation levels. 4. After a nuclear attack, food and water would be available to most people, and it would be usable. If any fallout particles have collected, they could be removed before the food is eaten or the water is drunk. People suffering from extreme hunger or thirst should not be denied food or water, even if the available supplies are not known to be free of fallout particles or other radioactive substances. 5. Infants and small children should be fed canned or powdered milk (if available) for awhile after the attack, unless the regular milk supply is uncontaminated. They should not be given water that may contain radioactive substances, if other water known to be pure is available. 6. A person cannot "catch" radiation sickness from another person. UNDERSTAND THE HAZARDS OF NUCLEAR ATTACK When a nuclear bomb or missile explodes, the main effects produced are intense light (flash), heat, blast, and radiation. How strong these effects are depends on the size and type of the weapon; how far away the explosion is; the weather conditions (sunny or rainy, windy or still); the terrain (whether the ground is flat or hilly); and the height of the explosion (high in the air, or near the ground). All nuclear explosions cause light, heat and blast, which occur immediately. In addition, explosions that are on or close to the ground would create large quantities of dangerous radioactive fallout particles, most of which would fall to earth during the first 24 hours. Explosions high in the air would create smaller radioactive particles, which would not have any real effect on humans until many months or years later, if at all.[2] WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN AN ENEMY ATTACK If the U.S. should be attacked, the people who happened to be close to a nuclear, explosion--in the area of heavy destruction--probably would be killed or seriously injured by the blast, or by the heat of the nuclear fireball. People a few miles away--in the "fringe area" of the explosion--would be endangered by the blast and heat, and by fires that the explosion might start. However, it is likely that most of the people in the fringe area would survive these hazards. People who were _outside_ the fringe area would not be affected by the blast, heat or fire. Department of Defense studies show that in any nuclear attack an enemy might launch against us, tens of millions of Americans would be outside the fringe areas. To them--and to people in the fringe areas who survived the blast, heat and fire--radioactive fallout would be the main danger. Protective measures against this danger can be taken. WHAT IS FALLOUT? When a nuclear weapon explodes near the ground, great quantities of pulverized earth and other debris are sucked up into the nuclear cloud. There the radioactive gases produced by the explosion condense on and into this debris, producing radioactive fallout particles. Within a short time, these particles fall back to earth--the larger ones first, the smaller ones later. On the way down, and after they reach the ground, the radioactive particles give off invisible gamma rays--like X-rays--too much of which can kill or injure people. These particles give off most of their radiation quickly; therefore the first few hours or days after an attack would be the most dangerous period. In dangerously affected areas the particles themselves would look like grains of salt or sand; but the _rays_ they would give off could not be seen, tasted, smelled or felt. Special instruments would be required to detect the rays and measure their intensity. FALLOUT WOULD BE WIDESPREAD The distribution of fallout particles after a nuclear attack would depend on wind currents, weather conditions and other factors. There is no way of predicting in advance what areas of the country would be affected by fallout, or how soon the particles would fall back to earth at a particular location. Some communities might get a heavy accumulation of fallout, while others--even in the same general area--might get little or none. No area in the U.S. could be sure of _not_ getting fallout, and it is probable that some fallout particles would be deposited on most of the country. Areas close to a nuclear explosion might receive fallout within 15-30 minutes. It might take 5-10 hours or more for the particles to drift down on a community 100 or 200 miles away. Generally, the first 24 hours after fallout began to settle would be the most dangerous period to a community's residents. The heavier particles falling during that time would still be highly radioactive and give off strong rays. The lighter particles falling later would have lost much of their radiation high in the atmosphere. FALLOUT CAUSES RADIATION SICKNESS The invisible gamma rays given off by fallout particles can cause radiation sickness--that is, illness caused by physical and chemical changes in the cells of the body. If a person receives a large dose of radiation, he will die. But if he receives only a small or medium dose, his body will repair itself and he will get well. The same dose received over a short period of time is more damaging than if it is received over a longer period. Usually, the effects of a given dose of radiation are more severe in very young and very old persons, and those not in good health. No special clothing can protect people against gamma radiation, and no special drugs or chemicals can prevent large doses of radiation from causing damage to the cells of the body. However, antibiotics and other medicines are helpful in treating infections that sometimes follow excessive exposure to radiation (which weakens the body's ability to fight infections). Almost all of the radiation that people would absorb from fallout particles would come from particles _outside_ their own bodies. Only simple precautions would be necessary to avoid swallowing the particles, and because of their size (like grains of sand) it would be practically impossible to inhale them. People exposed to fallout radiation do _not_ become radioactive and thereby dangerous to other people. Radiation sickness is not contagious or infectious, and one person cannot "catch it" from another person. PROTECTION IS POSSIBLE People can protect themselves against fallout radiation, and have a good chance of surviving it, by staying inside a fallout shelter. In most cases, the fallout radiation level outside the shelter would decrease rapidly enough to permit people to leave the shelter within a few days. Even in communities that received heavy accumulations of fallout particles, people soon might be able to leave shelter for a few minutes or a few hours at a time in order to perform emergency tasks. In most places, it is unlikely that full-time shelter occupancy would be required for more than a week or two. MANY KINDS OF FALLOUT SHELTERS The farther away you are from the fallout particles outside, the less radiation you will receive. Also, the building materials (concrete, brick, lumber, etc.) that are between you and the fallout particles serve to absorb many of the gamma rays and keep them from reaching you. A fallout shelter, therefore, does not need to be a special type of building or an underground bunker. It can be _any space_, provided the walls and roof are thick or heavy enough to absorb many of the rays given off by the fallout particles outside, and thus keep dangerous amounts of radiation from reaching the people inside the structure. A shelter can be the basement or inner corridor of any large building; the basement of a private home; a subway or tunnel; or even a backyard trench with some kind of shielding material (heavy lumber, earth, bricks, etc.) serving as a roof. In addition to protecting people from fallout radiation, most fallout shelters also would provide some limited protection against the blast and heat effects of nuclear explosions that were not close by. Chapter 4 (pages 23-32) discusses the various types of fallout shelters that people can use to protect themselves in case of nuclear attack. FOOD AND WATER WOULD BE AVAILABLE AND USABLE From many studies, the Federal Government has determined that enough food and water would be available after an attack to sustain our surviving citizens. However, temporary food shortages might occur in some areas, until food was shipped there from other areas. Most of the Nation's remaining food supplies would be usable after an attack. Since radiation passing through food does not contaminate it, the only danger would be the actual swallowing of fallout particles that happened to be on the food itself (or on the can or package containing the food), and these could be wiped or washed off. Reaping, threshing, canning and other processing would prevent any dangerous quantities of fallout particles from getting into processed foods. If necessary to further protect the population, special precautions would be taken by food processors. Water systems might be affected somewhat by radioactive fallout, but the risk would be small, especially if a few simple precautions were taken. Water stored in covered containers and water in covered wells would not be contaminated after an attack, because the fallout particles could not get into the water. Even if the containers were not covered (such as buckets or bathtubs filled with emergency supplies of water), as long as they were indoors it is highly unlikely that fallout particles would get into them. Practically all of the particles that dropped into open reservoirs, lakes, and streams (or into open containers or wells) would settle to the bottom. Any that didn't would be removed when the water was filtered before being pumped to consumers. A small amount of radioactive material might dissolve in the water, but at most this would be of concern for only a few weeks. Milk contamination from fallout is not expected to be a serious problem after an attack. If cows graze on contaminated pasture and swallow fallout particles that contain some radioactive elements, their milk might be harmful to the thyroid glands of infants and small children. Therefore, if possible, they should be given canned or powdered milk for a few weeks if authorities say the regular milk supply is contaminated by radioactive elements. In summary, the danger of people receiving harmful doses of fallout radiation through food, water or milk is very small. People suffering from extreme hunger or thirst should not be denied these necessities after an attack, even if the only available supplies might contain fallout particles or other radioactive substances. * * * * * CHAPTER 3 KNOW ABOUT WARNING SUMMARY BEFORE AN EMERGENCY 1. Learn what outdoor warning signals are used in your community, what they sound like, what they mean, and what actions you should take when you hear them. 2. Make sure you know the difference between the Attack Warning Signal and the Attention or Alert Signal (if both are used in your community). DURING AN EMERGENCY 1. When you hear the warning signals, or warning information is broadcast, take prompt action. 2. If the Attack Warning Signal sounds, go to a fallout shelter immediately (unless your local government has told you to do something else). After you are in shelter, listen to a radio for more information and instructions. 3. If there is no public or private shelter you can go to, try to improvise some fallout protection. As a last resort, take cover in the best available place. 4. If there should be a nuclear flash--especially if you feel the warmth from it--take cover _instantly_, and then move to a fallout shelter later. KNOW ABOUT WARNING An enemy attack on the United States probably would be preceded by a period of international tension or crisis. This crisis period would help alert all citizens to the _possibility_ of attack. If an attack actually occurs, it is almost certain that incoming enemy planes and missiles would be detected by our networks of warning stations in time for citizens to get into shelters or at least take cover. This warning time might be as little as 5-15 minutes in some locations, or as much as an hour or more in others. How you received warning of an attack would depend on where you happened to be at that time. You might hear the warning given on radio or television, or even by word-of-mouth. Or your first notice of attack might come from the outdoor warning system in your own city, town or village. Many U.S. cities and towns have outdoor warning systems, using sirens, whistles, horns or bells. Although they have been installed mainly to warn citizens of enemy attack, some local governments also use them in connection with natural disasters and other peacetime catastrophes. Different cities and towns are using their outdoor warning systems in different ways. Most local governments, however, have decided to use a certain signal to warn people of an enemy attack, and a different signal to notify them of a peacetime disaster. THE STANDARD WARNING SIGNALS The two "standard" signals that have been adopted in _most_ communities are these: THE ATTACK WARNING SIGNAL. This will be sounded only in case of enemy attack. The signal itself is a 3- to 5-minute _wavering sound_ on the sirens, or a _series of short blasts_ on whistles, horns or other devices, repeated as deemed necessary. The Attack Warning Signal means that an actual enemy attack against the United States has been detected, and that protective action should be taken immediately. This signal has no other meaning, and will be used for no other purpose. THE ATTENTION OR ALERT SIGNAL. This is used by some local governments to get the attention of citizens in a time of threatened or impending natural disaster, or some other peacetime emergency. The signal itself is a 3-to 5-minute _steady blast_ on sirens, whistles, horns or other devices. In most places, the Attention or Alert Signal means that the local government wants to broadcast important information on radio or television concerning a peacetime disaster. (See Chapter 1 of Major Natural Disasters section of this handbook.) WHAT TO DO WHEN SIGNALS SOUND 1. _If you should hear the Attack Warning Signal_--unless your local government has instructed you otherwise--go immediately to a public fallout shelter marked like this, or to your home fallout shelter. Turn on a radio, tune it to any local station that is broadcasting, and listen for official information. Follow whatever instructions are given. If you are at home and there is no public or private shelter available, you may be able to improvise some last-minute protection for yourself and your family by following the suggestions in Chapter 5 (pages 33-38) of this handbook. As a last resort, take cover anywhere you can. 2. If you should hear the Attention or Alert Signal, turn on a radio or TV set, tune it to any local station, and follow the official instructions being broadcast. DON'T USE THE TELEPHONE Whichever signal is sounding, _don't_ use the telephone to obtain further information and advice about the emergency. Depend on the radio or television, since the government will be broadcasting all the information it has available. The telephone lines will be needed for official calls. Help keep them open. LEARN YOUR COMMUNITY'S SIGNALS NOW As mentioned before not all communities in the U.S. have outdoor warning systems, and not all communities with warning systems have adopted the two "standard" warning signals. You should therefore _find out now_ from your local Civil Defense Office what signals are being used, in _your_ community; what they sound like; what they mean; and what actions you should take when you hear them. Then memorize this information, or write it down on a card to carry with you at all times. Also, post it in your home. Check at least once each year to see if there are any changes. IF THERE IS A NUCLEAR FLASH It is possible--but extremely unlikely--that your first warning of an enemy attack might be the flash of a nuclear explosion in the sky some distance away. Or there might be a flash after warning had been given, possibly while you were on your way to shelter. * TAKE COVER INSTANTLY. If there should be a nuclear flash--especially if you are outdoors and feel warmth at the same time--take cover _instantly_ in the best place you can find. By getting inside or under something within a few _seconds_, you might avoid being seriously burned by the heat or injured by the blast wave of the nuclear explosion. If the explosion were some distance away, you might have 5 to 15 _seconds_ before being seriously injured by the heat, and perhaps 30 to 60 _seconds_ before the blast wave arrived. Getting under cover within these time limits might save your life or avoid serious injury. Also, to avoid injuring your eyes, _never look at the flash of an explosion or the nuclear fireball_. * WHERE TO TAKE COVER. You could take cover in any kind of a building, a storm cellar or fruit cellar, a subway station or tunnel--or even in a ditch or culvert alongside the road, a highway underpass, a storm sewer, a cave or outcropping of rock, a pile of heavy materials, a trench or other excavation. Even getting under a parked automobile, bus or train, or a heavy piece of furniture, would protect you to some extent. If no cover is available, simply lie down on the ground and curl up. The important thing is to avoid being burned by the heat, thrown about by the blast, or struck by flying objects. * BEST POSITION AFTER TAKING COVER. After taking cover you should lie on your side in a curled-up position, and cover your head with your arms and hands. This would give you some additional protection. * MOVE TO A FALLOUT SHELTER LATER. If you protected yourself against the blast and heat waves by instantly taking cover, you could get protection from the radioactive fallout (which would arrive later) by moving to a fallout shelter. * * * * * CHAPTER 4 FALLOUT SHELTERS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SUMMARY BEFORE AN EMERGENCY 1. Learn the locations of the public fallout shelters that your local government wants you to go to in a time of attack. If no instructions of this kind have been issued, learn the locations of the public shelters nearest to you when you are at home, work, or school. Make sure each member of the family knows these locations. 2. If there is no public fallout shelter near your home, prepare a permanent or preplanned family shelter at home. DURING AN EMERGENCY 1. When you are warned of an enemy attack, go immediately to a public fallout shelter or to your own home shelter, unless your local government has given you other instructions. 2. Stay in shelter until you receive official notice that it is safe to come out. FALLOUT SHELTERS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE After a nuclear attack, fallout particles would drift down on most areas of this country. To protect themselves from the radiation given off by these particles, people in affected areas would have to stay in fallout shelters for 2 or 3 days to as long as 2 weeks. Many people would go to public fallout shelters, while others--through choice or necessity--would take refuge in private or home fallout shelters. IDENTIFYING PUBLIC SHELTERS Most communities now have public fallout shelters that would protect many of their residents against fallout radiation. Where there are still not enough public shelters to accommodate all citizens, efforts are being made to provide more. In the meantime, local governments plan to make use of the best available shelter. Most of the existing public shelters are located in larger buildings and are marked with this standard yellow-and-black fallout shelter sign. Other public shelters are in smaller buildings, subways, tunnels, mines and other facilities. These also are marked with shelter signs, or would be marked in a time of emergency. LEARN THE LOCATIONS OF PUBLIC SHELTERS An attack might come at any hour of the day or night. Therefore you should find out _now_ the locations of those public fallout shelters designated by your local government for your use. If no designations have yet been made, learn the locations of public shelters that are nearest to you when you are at home, work, school, or any other place where you spend considerable time. This advice applies to all members of the family. Your children especially should be given clear instructions _now_ on where to find a fallout shelter at all times of the day, and told what other actions they should take in case an attack should occur. A HOME SHELTER MAY SAVE YOUR LIFE Public fallout shelters usually offer some advantages over home shelters. However, in many places--especially suburban and rural areas--there are few public shelters. If there is none near you, a home fallout shelter may save your life. The basements of some homes are usable as family fallout shelters as they now stand, without any alterations or changes--especially if the house has two or more stories, and its basement is below ground level. However, most home basements would need some improvements in order to shield their occupants adequately from the radiation given off by fallout particles. Usually, householders can make these improvements themselves, with moderate effort and at low cost. Millions of homes have been surveyed for the U.S. Office of Civil Defense by the U.S. Census Bureau, and these householders have received information on how much fallout protection their basements would provide, and how to improve this protection. SHIELDING MATERIAL IS REQUIRED In setting up any home fallout shelter, the basic aim is to place enough "shielding material" between the people in the shelter and the fallout particles outside. Shielding material is any substance that would absorb and deflect the invisible rays given off by fallout particles outside the house, and thus reduce the amount of radiation reaching the occupants of the shelter. The thicker or denser the shielding material is, the more it would protect the shelter occupants. Some radiation protection is provided by the existing, standard walls and ceiling of a basement. But if they are not thick or dense enough, other shielding material will have to be added. Concrete, bricks, earth and sand are some of the materials that are dense or heavy enough to provide fallout protection. For comparative purposes, 4 inches of concrete would provide the same shielding density as: --5 to 6 inches of bricks. --6 inches of sand or gravel . .\ May be packed into bags, cartons, boxes, --7 inches or earth. . . . . . ./ or other containers for easier handling. --8 inches of hollow concrete blocks (6 inches if filled with sand). --10 inches of water. --14 inches of books or magazines. --18 inches of wood. HOW TO PREPARE A HOME SHELTER If there is no public fallout shelter near your home, or if you would prefer to use a family-type shelter in a time of attack, you should prepare a home fallout shelter. Here is how to do it: * A PERMANENT BASEMENT SHELTER. If your home basement--or one corner of it--is below ground level, your best and easiest action would be to prepare a permanent-type family shelter there. The required shielding material would cost perhaps $100-$200, and if you have basic carpentry or masonry skills you probably could do the work yourself in a short time. Here are three methods of providing a permanent family shelter in the "best" corner of your home basement--that is, the corner which is most below ground level. If you decide to set up one of these shelters, _first get the free plan for it_ by writing to Civil Defense, Army Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Blvd. (Middle River), Baltimore, Md. 21220. In ordering a plan, use the full name shown for it. CEILING MODIFICATION PLAN A If nearly all your basement is below ground level, you can use this plan to build a fallout shelter area in one corner of it, without changing the appearance of it or interfering with its normal peacetime use. However, if 12 inches or more of the basement wall is above ground level, this plan should _not_ be used unless you add the "optional walls" shown in the sketch. Overhead protection is obtained by screwing plywood sheets securely to the joists, and then filling the spaces between the joists with bricks or concrete blocks. An extra beam and a screwjack column may be needed to support the extra weight. Building this shelter requires some basic woodworking skills and about $150-$200 for materials. It can be set up while the house is being built, or afterward. ALTERNATE CEILING MODIFICATION PLAN B This is similar to Plan A, except that new extra joists are fitted into part of the basement ceiling to support the added weight of the shielding (instead of using a beam and a screwjack column). The new wooden joists are cut to length and notched at the ends, then installed between the existing joists. After plywood panels are screwed securely to the joists, bricks or concrete blocks are then packed tightly into the spaces between the joists. The bricks or blocks, as well as the joists themselves, will reduce the amount of fallout radiation penetrating downward into the basement. Approximately one-quarter of the total basement ceiling should be reinforced with extra joists and shielding material. _Important:_ This plan (like Plan A) should _not_ be used if 12 inches or more of your basement wall is above ground level, unless you add the "optional walls" inside your basement that are shown in the Plan A sketch. PERMANENT CONCRETE BLOCK OR BRICK SHELTER PLAN C This shelter will provide excellent protection, and can be constructed easily at a cost of $150 in most parts of the country. Made of concrete blocks or bricks, the shelter should be located in the corner of your basement that is most below ground level. It can be built low, to serve as a "sitdown" shelter; or by making it higher you can have a shelter in which people can stand erect. The shelter ceiling, however, should _not_ be higher than the outside ground level of the basement corner where the shelter is located. The higher your basement is above ground level, the thicker you should make the walls and roof of this shelter, since your regular basement walls will provide only limited shielding against outside radiation. Natural ventilation is provided by the shelter entrance, and by the air vents shown in the shelter wall. This shelter can be used as a storage room or for other useful purposes in non-emergency periods. A PREPLANNED BASEMENT SHELTER. If your home has a basement but you do not wish to set up a permanent-type basement shelter, the next best thing would be to arrange to assemble a "preplanned" home shelter. This simply means gathering together, in advance, the shielding material you would need to make your basement (or one part of it) resistant to fallout radiation. This material could be stored in or around your home, ready for use whenever you decided to set up your basement shelter. Here are two kinds of preplanned basement shelters. If you want to set up one of these, be sure to _get the free plan for it first_ by writing to Civil Defense, Army Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Blvd. (Middle River), Baltimore, Md. 21220. Mention the full name of the plan you want. PREPLANNED SNACK BAR SHELTER PLAN D This is a snack bar built of bricks or concrete blocks, set in mortar, in the "best" corner of your basement (the corner that is most below ground level). It can be converted quickly into a fallout shelter by lowering a strong, hinged "false ceiling" so that it rests on the snack bar. When the false ceiling is lowered into place in a time of emergency, the hollow sections of it can be filled with bricks or concrete blocks. These can be stored conveniently nearby, or can be used as room dividers or recreation room furniture (see bench in sketch). PREPLANNED TILT-UP STORAGE UNIT PLAN E A tilt-up storage unit in the best corner of your basement is another method of setting up a "preplanned" family fallout shelter. The top of the storage unit should be hinged to the wall. In peacetime, the unit can be used as a bookcase, pantry, or storage facility. In a time of emergency, the storage unit can be tilted so that the bottom of it rests on a wall of bricks or concrete blocks that you have stored nearby. Other bricks or blocks should then be placed in the storage unit's compartments, to provide an overhead shield against fallout radiation. The fallout protection offered by your home basement also can be increased by adding shielding material to the outside, exposed portion of your basement walls, and by covering your basement windows with shielding material. You can cover the above-ground portion of the basement walls with earth, sand, bricks, concrete blocks, stones from your patio, or other material. You also can use any of these substances to block basement windows and thus prevent outside fallout radiation from entering your basement in that manner. * A PERMANENT OUTSIDE SHELTER. If your home has no basement, or if you prefer to have a permanent-type home shelter in your yard, you can obtain instructions on how to construct several different kinds of outside fallout shelters by writing to the U.S. Office of Civil Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 20310. There is no charge for these. WHEN TO LEAVE SHELTER You should not come out of shelter until you are told by authorities that it is safe to do so. Special instruments are needed to detect fallout radiation and to measure its intensity. Unless you have these instruments, you will have to depend on your local government to tell you when to leave shelter. This information probably would be given on the radio, which is one reason why you should keep on hand a battery-powered radio that works in your shelter area. If you came out of shelter too soon, while the fallout particles outside were still highly radioactive, you might receive enough radiation to make you sick or even kill you. Remember that _fallout particles_ can be seen, but the _rays_ they give off cannot be seen. If you see unusual quantities of gritty particles outside (on window ledges, sidewalks, cars, etc.) after an attack, you should assume that they are fallout particles, and therefore stay inside your shelter until you are told it is safe to come out. * * * * * CHAPTER 5 IMPROVISING FALLOUT PROTECTION SUMMARY BEFORE AN EMERGENCY 1. If there is no public fallout shelter near your home and you have decided _not_ to prepare a permanent or preplanned shelter in your basement or yard, make sure that you have on hand _now_ the materials and tools needed to improvise an emergency shelter at home. These would include shielding material (for an inside shelter), and lumber and a shovel (for an outside shelter). DURING AN EMERGENCY 1. If you have no better shelter to go to, improvise an emergency shelter at home. 2. Usually, the best place for an improvised shelter would be in your basement or storm cellar. 3. If you don't have a basement or storm cellar, you might be able to improvise a shelter in the crawl space under your house, outside in your yard, or (as a last resort) on the ground floor of your house. In some places, a boat would provide some fallout protection. IMPROVISING FALLOUT PROTECTION If an enemy attack should occur when you are at home, and you have made no advance shelter preparations, you still might be able to improvise a shelter either inside or outside your house. In a time of emergency, the radio broadcasts may tell you whether you have time to improvise a shelter or should take cover immediately. An improvised shelter probably would not give you as much protection as a permanent or a preplanned family shelter, but any protection is better than none, and might save your life. The best place to improvise a shelter would be the basement or storm cellar, if your home has one. SHIELDING MATERIAL NEEDED To improvise a shelter you would need shielding materials such as those mentioned on page 25--concrete blocks, bricks, sand, etc. Other things could also be used as shielding material, or to support shielding material, such as: --House doors that have been taken off their hinges (especially heavy outside doors). --Dressers and chests (fill the drawers with sand or earth after they are placed in position, so they won't be too heavy to carry and won't collapse while being carried). --Trunks, boxes and cartons (fill them with sand or earth after they are placed in position). --Tables and bookcases. --Large appliances (such as washers and dryers). --Books, magazines, and stacks of firewood or lumber. --Flagstones from outside walks and patios. IMPROVISING A BASEMENT SHELTER Here are two ways of improvising fallout protection in the basement of a home: Set up a large, sturdy table or workbench in the corner of your basement that is most below ground level. On the table, pile as much shielding material as it will hold without collapsing. Around the table, place as much shielding material as possible. When family members are "inside the shelter"--that is, under the table--block the opening with other shielding material. If you don't have a large table or workbench available--or if more shelter space is needed--place furniture or large appliances in the corner of the basement so they will serve as the "walls" of your shelter. As a "ceiling" for it, use doors from the house that have been taken off their hinges. On top of the doors, pile as much shielding material as they will support. Stack other shielding material around the "walls" of your shelter. When all persons are inside the shelter space, block the opening with shielding material. USING A STORM CELLAR FOR FALLOUT PROTECTION A below-ground storm cellar can be used as an improvised fallout shelter, but additional shielding material may be needed to provide adequate protection from fallout radiation. If the existing roof of the storm cellar is made of wood or other light material, it should be covered with one foot of earth or an equivalent thickness of other shielding material (see page 25) for overhead shielding from fallout. More posts or braces may be needed to support the extra weight. After the roof has been shielded, better protection can be provided by blocking the entrance way with 8-inch concrete blocks or an equivalent thickness of sandbags, bricks, earth or other shielding material, after all occupants are inside the shelter. A few inches should be left open at the top for air. After particles have stopped falling, the outside door may be left open to provide better ventilation. If shielding material is not available for the entrance way, shelter occupants should stay as far away from it as possible. They also should raise the outside door of the storm cellar now and then to knock off any fallout particles that may have collected on it. USING THE CRAWL SPACE UNDER YOUR HOUSE Some homes without basements have "crawl space" between the first floor and the ground underneath the house. If you have this space under your house--and if the house is set on foundation walls, rather than on pillars--you can improvise fallout protection for your family there. First, get access to the crawl space through the floor or through the outside foundation wall. (A trapdoor or other entry could be made now, before an emergency occurs.) As the location for your shelter, select a crawl-space area that is under the center of the house, as far away from the outside foundation walls as possible. Around the selected shelter area, place shielding material-- preferably bricks or blocks, or containers filled with sand or earth--from the ground level up to the first floor of the house, so that the shielding material forms the "walls" of your shelter area. On the floor above, place other shielding material to form a "roof" for the shelter area. If time permits, dig out more earth and make the shelter area deeper, so you can stand erect or at least sit up in it. IMPROVISING AN OUTSIDE SHELTER If your home has no basement, no storm cellar and no protected crawl space, here are two ways of improvising fallout protection in your yard: * Dig an L-shaped trench, about 4 feet deep and 3 feet wide. One side of the L, which will be the shelter area, should be long enough to accommodate all family members. The other side of the L can be shorter, since its purpose is to serve as an entrance-way and to reduce the amount of radiation getting into the shelter area. Cover the entire trench with lumber (or with house doors that have been taken off their hinges), except for about 2 feet on the short side of the L, to provide access and ventilation. On top of the lumber or doors, pile earth 1 to 2 feet high, or cover them with other shielding material. If necessary, support or "shore up" the walls of the trench, as well as the lumber or doors, so they will not collapse. * Dig a shallow ditch, 6 inches deep and 6 inches wide, parallel to and 4 feet from the outside wall of your house. Remove the heaviest doors from the house. Place the bottoms of the doors in the ditch (so they won't slip), and lean the doors against the wall of the house. On the doors, pile 12 to 18 inches of earth or sand. Stack or pile other shielding material at the sides of the doors, and also on the other side of the house wall (to protect you against radiation coming from that direction). If possible, make the shelter area deeper by digging out more earth inside it. Also dig some other shallow ditches, to allow rain water to drain away. AN IMPROVISED SHELTER ON THE GROUND FLOOR If your home has no basement or storm cellar (and no crawl space that is surrounded by foundation walls up to the first floor), you can get some limited fallout protection by improvising a fallout shelter on the first or ground floor of your house. However, this type of shelter probably would not give you nearly as much protection as the other types of improvised shelters described in this chapter. Use an inner hall, inner room or large clothes closet on the ground floor, away from outside walls and windows. With doors, furniture and appliances, plus stacks of other shielding material, you can create an enclosure large enough to live in for a short time. If possible, use boxes filled with sand or earth as shielding material, and fill drawers and trunks with sand or earth. If there is not room for the shielding material in the limited space of a closet or small room, you can place the material on the other sides of the walls, or on the floor overhead. BOATS AS IMPROVISED SHELTERS If no better fallout protection is available, a boat with an enclosed cabin could be used. However, in addition to emergency supplies such as food, drinking water and a battery-powered radio, you should have aboard the items you would need (a broom, bucket, or pump-and-hose) to sweep off or flush off any fallout particles that might collect on the boat. The boat should be anchored or cruised slowly at least 200 feet offshore, where the water is at least 5 feet deep. This distance from shore would protect you from radioactive fallout particles that had fallen on the nearby land. A 5-foot depth would absorb the radiation from particles falling into the water and settling on the bottom. If particles drift down on the boat, stay inside the cabin most of the time. Go outside now and then, and sweep or flush off any particles that have collected on the boat. * * * * * CHAPTER 6 SUPPLIES FOR FALLOUT SHELTERS SUMMARY BEFORE AN EMERGENCY 1. If you intend to go to a _public_ fallout shelter in a time of attack, find out _now_ whether it has emergency supplies in it. --If it _has_ emergency supplies, always keep on hand at home (or in your car) those few additional supplies you would need to take with you. --If it _does not have_ emergency supplies, always keep on hand at home all the supplies you would need to take with you. 2. If you intend to use a family fallout shelter at home, always keep on hand, in and around your home, all the supplies and equipment you would need for a shelter stay of two weeks. DURING AN EMERGENCY 1. If you are going to a _public_ fallout shelter, take with you the supplies you will need. 2. If you are going to your _home_ fallout shelter, gather up the supplies and equipment you want to take to the shelter area with you. SUPPLIES FOR FALLOUT SHELTERS People gathered in public and private fallout shelters to escape fallout radiation after a nuclear attack would have to stay there--at least part of the time--for a week or two. During this time they would need certain supplies and equipment in order to stay alive and well, and to cope with emergency situations that might occur in their shelters. This chapter tells you what supplies and equipment to take with you if you go to a public fallout shelter, and what items you should keep on hand if you plan to use a family fallout shelter at home. WHAT TO TAKE TO A PUBLIC FALLOUT SHELTER To augment the supply of food and liquids usually found in large buildings, most public fallout shelters are stocked--and others are being stocked--with emergency supplies. These include water containers, emergency food rations, sanitation items, basic medical supplies, and instruments to measure the radiation given off by fallout particles. If the public shelter you will use in a time of attack contains these or other emergency supplies, you should plan to take with you only these additional items: --Special medicines or foods required by members of your family, such as insulin, heart tablets, dietetic food or baby food. --A blanket for each family member. --A battery-powered radio, a flashlight, and extra batteries. If the public shelter you are going to does _not_ contain emergency supplies, you should take with you all the above items, _plus_ as much potable liquids (water, fruit and vegetable juices, etc.) and ready-to-eat food as you can carry to the shelter. STOCKS FOR A HOME SHELTER If you intend to use a home fallout shelter, you should _gather together now_ all the things you and your family would need for 2 weeks, even though you probably wouldn't have to remain inside shelter for that entire period. All these items need not be stocked in your home shelter area. They can be stored elsewhere in or around your house, as long as you could find them easily and move them to your shelter area quickly in a time of emergency. * THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITIES. There are a few things you _must_ have. They are water, food, sanitation supplies, and any special medicines or foods needed by family members such as insulin, heart tablets, dietetic food and baby food. * THE COMPLETE LIST. In addition to the absolute necessities, there are other important items. Some of them may be needed to save lives. At the least, they will be helpful to you. Here is a list of all major items--both essential and desirable. WATER. This is even more important than food. Enough water should be available to give each person at least one quart per day for 14 days. Store it in plastic containers, or in bottles or cans. All should have tight stoppers. Part of your water supply might be "trapped" water in the pipes of your home plumbing system, and part of it might be in the form of bottled or canned beverages, fruit or vegetable juices, or milk. A water-purifying agent (either water-purifying tablets, or 2 percent tincture of iodine, or a liquid chlorine household bleach) should also be stored, in case you need to purify any cloudy or "suspicious" water that may contain bacteria. FOOD. Enough food should be kept on hand to feed all shelter occupants for 14 days, including special foods needed by infants, elderly persons, and those on limited diets. Most people in shelter can get along on about half as much food as usual. If possible store canned or sealed-package foods, preferably those not requiring refrigeration or cooking. These should be replaced periodically. Here is a table showing the suggested replacement periods, in months, for some of the types of food suitable to store for emergency use.[3] Milk: _Months_ Evaporated 6 Nonfat dry or whole dry milk, in metal container 6 Canned meat, poultry, fish: Meat, poultry 18 Fish 12 Mixtures of meats, vegetables, cereal products 18 Condensed meat-and-vegetable soups 8 Fruits and vegetables: Berries and sour cherries, canned 6 Citrus fruit juices, canned 6 Other fruits and fruit juices, canned 18 Dried fruit, in metal container 6 Tomatoes, sauerkraut, canned 6 Other vegetables, canned (including dry beans and dry peas) 18 Cereals and baked goods: Ready-to-eat cereals: In metal container 12 In original paper package 1 Uncooked cereal (quick-cooking or instant): In metal container 24 In original paper package 12 Hydrogenated (or antioxidant-treated) fats, vegetable oil 12 Sugars, sweets, nuts: Sugar will keep indefinitely Hard candy, gum 18 Nuts, canned 12 Instant puddings 12 Miscellaneous: Coffee, tea, cocoa (instant) 18 Dry cream product (instant) 12 Bouillon products 12 Flavored beverage powders 24 Salt will keep indefinitely Flavoring extracts (e.g., pepper) 24 Soda, baking powder 12 SANITATION SUPPLIES. Since you may not be able to use your regular bathroom during a period of emergency, you should keep on hand these sanitation supplies: A metal container with a tight-fitting lid, to use as an emergency toilet; one or two large garbage cans with covers (for human wastes and garbage); plastic bags to line the toilet container; disinfectant; toilet paper; soap; wash cloths and towels; a pail or basin; and sanitary napkins. MEDICINES AND FIRST AID SUPPLIES. This should include any medicines being regularly taken, or likely to be needed, by family members. First aid supplies should include all those found in a good first aid kit (bandages, antiseptics, etc.), plus all the items normally kept in a well-stocked home medicine chest (aspirin, thermometer, baking soda, petroleum jelly, etc.). A good first aid handbook is also recommended. INFANT SUPPLIES. Families with babies should keep on hand a two-week stock of infant supplies such as canned milk or baby formula, disposable diapers, bottles and nipples, rubber sheeting, blankets and baby clothing. Because water for washing might be limited, baby clothing and bedding should be stored in larger-than-normal quantities. COOKING AND EATING UTENSILS. Emergency supplies should include pots, pans, knives, forks, spoons, plates, cups, napkins, paper towels, measuring cup, bottle opener, can opener, and pocket knife. If possible, disposable items should be stored. A heat source also might be helpful, such as an electric hot plate (for use if power is available), or a camp stove or canned-heat stove (in case power is shut off). However, if a stove is used indoors, adequate ventilation is needed. CLOTHING. Several changes of clean clothing--especially undergarments and socks or stockings--should be ready for shelter use, in case water for washing should be scarce. BEDDING. Blankets are the most important items of bedding that would be needed in a shelter, but occupants probably would be more comfortable if they also had available pillows, sheets, and air mattresses or sleeping bags. FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT. Simple fire fighting tools, and knowledge of how to use them, may be very useful. A hand-pumped fire extinguisher of the inexpensive, 5-gallon, water type is preferred. Carbon tetrachloride and other vaporizing-liquid type extinguishers are not recommended for use in small enclosed spaces, because of the danger of fumes. Other useful fire equipment for home use includes buckets filled with sand, a ladder, and a garden hose. GENERAL EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS. The essential items in this category are a battery-powered radio and a flashlight or lantern, with spare batteries. The radio might be your only link with the outside world, and you might have to depend on it for all your information and instructions, especially for advice on when to leave shelter. Other useful items: a shovel, broom, axe, crowbar, kerosene lantern, short rubber hose for siphoning, coil of half-inch rope at least 25 feet long, coil of wire, hammer, pliers, screwdriver, wrench, nails and screws. MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS. In addition to such practical items as matches, candles, and civil defense instructions, some personal convenience items could be brought into the home shelter if space permits. These might include books and magazines, writing materials, a clock and calendar, playing cards and hobby materials, a sewing kit, and toiletries such as toothbrushes, cosmetics, and shaving supplies. * * * * * CHAPTER 7 WATER, FOOD, AND SANITATION IN A SHELTER SUMMARY BEFORE AN EMERGENCY 1. Read this chapter fully, and learn how you would have to manage your water, food and sanitation problems if you had to spend a week or two in a fallout shelter, especially a home shelter. DURING AN EMERGENCY 1. If you are in a _public_ fallout shelter, do exactly what the shelter manager tells you to do. He will take care of you to the best of his ability. 2. If you are in a _home_ shelter, follow the advice given in this chapter concerning water, food and sanitation. Take care of your water and food supplies, keep them clean, and make them last for the period you may have to stay in shelter. If necessary, set up an emergency toilet, keep it clean, and make sure it is used properly. WATER, FOOD, AND SANITATION IN A SHELTER At all times and under all conditions, human beings must have sufficient water, adequate food and proper sanitation in order to stay alive and healthy. When people are living in a fallout shelter--even for a week or two--water and food may be scarce, and it may be difficult to maintain normal sanitary conditions. Water and food supplies may have to be "managed"--that is, taken care of, kept clean, and rationed to each person in the shelter. Sanitation also may have to be managed and controlled, perhaps by setting up emergency toilets and rules to insure that they are used properly. If you go to a _public_ fallout shelter in a time of attack, you probably would not need to know a great deal about managing water, food, and sanitation. A shelter manager and his assistants would handle these problems with the cooperation of all in the shelter. He would make the best use of whatever water and food supplies were available, provide emergency toilets if necessary, set up rules for living in the shelter, arrange for the shelter occupants to carry on various activities necessary for health and well-being, and decide when it was safe for the group to leave shelter and for how long at a time. In a _home_ fallout shelter, however, you and your family would be largely on your own. You would have to take care of yourselves, solve your own problems, make your own living arrangements, subsist on the supplies you had previously stocked, and find out for yourself (probably by listening to the radio) when it was safe to leave shelter. In this situation, one of your most important tasks would be to manage your water and food supplies, and maintain sanitation. The following guidance is intended to help you do this. CARE AND USE OF WATER SUPPLIES The average person in a shelter would need at least 1 quart of water or other liquids per day to drink, but more would be useful (to allow some for washing, etc.). Therefore a rationing plan might be required in your home shelter, so as to make your available liquids last for 14 days. (Many communities may continue to have potable water available, and families could relax their rationing plans.) In addition to water stored in containers, there is usually other water available in most homes that is drinkable, such as: --Water and other liquids normally found in the kitchen, including ice cubes, milk, soft drinks, and fruit and vegetable juices. --Water (20 to 60 gallons) in the hot water tank. --Water in the _flush tanks_ (not the bowls) of home toilets. --Water in the pipes of your home plumbing system. In a time of nuclear attack, local authorities may instruct householders to _turn off_ the main water valves in their homes to avoid having water drain away in case of a break and loss of pressure in the water mains. With the main valve in your house closed, all the pipes in the house would still be full of water. To use this water, _turn on_ the faucet that is located at the _highest_ point in your house, to let air into the system; and then draw water, as needed, from the faucet that is located at the _lowest_ point in your house. In a home shelter, occupants should drink first the water they know is uncontaminated, such as that mentioned above. Of course, if local authorities tell you the regular water is drinkable, it should be used. If necessary, "suspicious" water--such as cloudy water from regular faucets or perhaps some muddy water from a nearby stream or pond--can be used after it has been purified. This is how to purify it: 1. Strain the water through a paper towel or several thicknesses of clean cloth, to remove dirt and fallout particles, if any. Or else let the water "settle" in a container for 24 hours, by which time any solid particles would have sunk to the bottom. A handful of clay soil in each gallon of water would help this settling process. 2. After the solid particles have been removed, boil the water if possible for 3 to 5 minutes, or add a water-purifying agent to it. This could be either: (_a_) water-purifying tablets, available at drug stores, or (_b_) two percent tincture of iodine, or (_c_) liquid chlorine household bleach, provided the label says that it contains hypochlorite as its _only_ active ingredient. For each gallon of water, use 4 water-purifying tablets, or 12 drops of tincture of iodine, or 8 drops of liquid chlorine bleach. If the water is cloudy, these amounts should be doubled. There would not be much danger of drinking radioactive particles in water, as they would sink quickly to the bottom of the container or stream. Very few would dissolve in the water. Although open reservoirs might contain some radioactive iodine in the first few days after an attack, this danger is considered minor except to very young children. CARE AND USE OF FOOD SUPPLIES Food also should be rationed carefully in a home shelter, to make it last for at least a 2-week period of shelter occupancy. Usually, half the normal intake would be adequate, except for growing children or pregnant women. In a shelter, it is especially important to be sanitary in the storing, handling and eating of food, so as to avoid digestive upsets or other more serious illness, and to avoid attracting vermin. Be sure to: --Keep all food in covered containers. --Keep cooking and eating utensils clean. --Keep all garbage in a closed container, or dispose of it outside the home when it is safe to go outside. If possible, bury it. Avoid letting garbage or trash accumulate inside the shelter, both for fire and sanitation reasons. EMERGENCY TOILET FACILITIES In many home shelters, people would have to use emergency toilets until it was safe to leave shelter for brief periods of time. An emergency toilet, consisting of a watertight container with a snug-fitting cover, would be necessary. It could be a garbage container, or a pail or bucket. If the container is small, a larger container, also with a cover, should be available to empty the contents into for later disposal. If possible, both containers should be lined with plastic bags. This emergency toilet could be fitted with some kind of seat, especially for children or elderly persons. Or it may be possible to remove the seat from a wooden chair, cut a hole in it, and place the container underneath. For privacy, the toilet could be screened from view. Every time someone uses the toilet, he should pour or sprinkle into it a small amount of regular household disinfectant, such as creosol or chlorine bleach, to keep down odors and germs. After each use, the lid should be put back on. When the toilet container needs to be emptied, and outside radiation levels permit, the contents should be buried outside in a hole 1 or 2 feet deep. This would prevent the spread of disease by rats and insects. If the regular toilets inside the home--or the sewer lines--are not usable for any reason, an outside toilet should be built when it is safe to do so. If anyone has been outside and fallout particles have collected on his shoes or clothing, they should be brushed off before he enters the shelter area again. * * * * * CHAPTER 8 FIRE HAZARDS SUMMARY BEFORE AN EMERGENCY 1. Follow the normal fire prevention rules given in this chapter. 2. Keep on hand at home the basic fire fighting tools mentioned in this chapter. DURING AN EMERGENCY 1. Close doors, windows, venetian blinds, shades, and drapes in your house. 2. Unless otherwise advised, fill buckets and other containers with water, for emergency fire fighting as well as other purposes. 3. If a fire should occur, fight it promptly, following the recommended procedures. FIRE HAZARDS Fire, always a danger, could be even more of a disaster during a nuclear attack emergency when the fire department might not be available to help you. Also, the risk of fire would be greater at that time. Normal fire-prevention rules are of special importance in an emergency. They include familiar commonsense precautions such as not allowing trash to accumulate, especially near heat sources; exercising extreme caution in the use of flammable fluids such as gasoline, naphtha, etc.; storage of such fluids outdoors when possible; care in the use of electricity; repairing of faulty wiring and avoiding overloaded circuits; and repair of faulty heating systems. These special fire precautions should be taken in a time of nuclear emergency, especially if you plan to use a home shelter: (1) Keep some of the intense heat rays from nuclear explosions from entering your house by closing your doors, windows, venetian blinds, window shades and drapes. If the climate will not permit this for an extended period of time, close as many as possible, then close the rest when the Attack Warning Signal is given. (2) Unless local authorities advise otherwise, fill buckets, bathtubs and other containers with water, for use in emergency fire fighting. If a fire does occur, your home might be saved if you know how to fight fires, and have on hand some basic firefighting tools. These should include a garden hose, a ladder, buckets filled with sand, containers filled with water, and a fire extinguisher. Keep in mind that vaporizing-liquid types of fire extinguishers can produce dangerous fumes when used in small enclosed spaces. Remember the 3 basic ways to put out a fire: * Take away its fuel. * Take away its air (smother it). * Cool it with water or fire-extinguisher chemicals. _Ordinary fires_ should be fought by: --Getting the burning material out of the house (carry it out, or throw it out of a door or window if you can); or --Putting out the fire with water, sand, earth or fire-extinguisher chemicals; or --Smothering the fire with a rug or blanket, preferably wet. _Special types of fires_ require special methods: --If it is an _electrical fire_, be sure to shut off the electricity first. Then put out the flames with water or anything else available. If you can't shut off the electricity, don't use water on an electrical fire. --If it is an _oil or grease fire_, shut off the supply of whatever is burning. Then smother the flames with sand, earth, rugs, or other heavy materials. Don't use water. --If it is a _gas fire_, shut off the gas supply. Then use water, sand, or earth to put out whatever is burning. * * * * * CHAPTER 9 EMERGENCY CARE OF THE SICK AND INJURED SUMMARY BEFORE AN EMERGENCY 1. Take the Medical Self-Help course, or a First Aid course. 2. If this is not possible, obtain a good first aid manual, study it, and keep it at home; or study the emergency medical instructions given in this chapter, and keep this handbook at home. 3. Obtain a good first aid kit, and keep your home medicine chest well stocked with supplies you may need in a time of emergency. DURING AN EMERGENCY 1. Try to get a doctor or nurse (or at least a person trained in first aid) to treat anyone who is injured or sick. 2. If no one better qualified is available, take charge yourself. EMERGENCY CARE OF THE SICK AND INJURED A nuclear attack on the United States would cause great numbers of casualties, and there would be fewer doctors, nurses and hospitals available to care for them. Even in areas where no nuclear weapons exploded, radioactive fallout could prevent doctors and nurses from reaching injured or sick persons for a considerable period of time. People would have to help each other during the emergency. Those in a stocked public fallout shelter would have available the basic medical kit stored there, and perhaps one or more shelter occupants might be a doctor, nurse, or trained first-aider. But persons in a home shelter would have only the medical supplies available at home, and would have to depend on their own knowledge of first aid and emergency medical care. Both adults and teenagers can acquire these valuable skills now by taking free courses that are offered in many communities, such as the Medical Self-Help course or a First Aid course. The following information is no substitute for one of these courses. This basic guidance may save lives during a nuclear emergency, however, by helping untrained persons take care of the sick and injured when professional medical assistance may not be immediately available. GENERAL RULES FOR ANY MEDICAL EMERGENCY 1. First of all, _do no harm_. Often, well-meaning but untrained persons worsen the injury or illness in their attempts to help. Get competent medical assistance, if possible. Do not assume responsibility for a patient if you can get the help of a doctor, nurse, or experienced first-aid worker. But if no one better qualified is available, take charge yourself. 2. _Look for stoppage of breathing, and for serious bleeding._ These are the two most life-threatening conditions you can do something about. They demand _immediate_ treatment (see pages 58 and 61). 8. _Prevent shock, or treat it._ Shock, a serious condition of acute circulatory failure, usually accompanies a severe or painful injury, a serious loss of blood, or a severe emotional upset. If you _expect_ shock, and take prompt action, you can prevent it or lessen its severity. This may save the patient's life. (Treatment of shock is discussed on page 62). 4. _Don't move the patient immediately_. Unless there is real danger of the patient receiving further injury where he is, he should not be moved until breathing is restored, bleeding is stopped, and suspected broken bones are splinted. 5. _Keep calm, and reassure the patient._ Keep him lying down and comfortably warm, but do not apply heat to his body, or make him sweat. 6. _Never attempt to give liquids to an unconscious person_. If he is not able to swallow, he may choke to death or drown. Also, don't give him any liquids to drink if he has an abdominal injury. IF THE PATIENT HAS STOPPED BREATHING Quick action is required. You must get air into his lungs again immediately or he may die. The best and simplest way of doing this is to use mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration. Here is how to do it: 1. Place the patient on his back. Loosen his collar. 2. Open his mouth and use your fingers to remove any food or foreign matter. If he has false teeth or removable dental bridges, take them out. 3. Tilt the patient's head back so that his chin points upward. Lift his lower jaw from beneath and behind so that it juts out. This will move his tongue away from the back of his throat, so it does not block the air passage to his lungs. Placing a pillow or something else under his shoulders will help get his head into the right position. Some patients will start breathing as soon as you take these steps, and no further help is necessary. 4. Open your mouth as wide as possible, and place it tightly over the patient's mouth, so his mouth is completely covered by yours. With one hand, pinch his nostrils shut. With your other hand, hold his lower jaw in a thrust-forward position and keep his head tilted back. With a baby or small child, place your mouth over both his nose and mouth, making a tight seal. 5. Blow a good lungful of air into an adult patient's mouth, continuing to keep his head tilted back and his jaw jutting out so that the air passage is kept open. (Air can be blown through an unconscious person's teeth, even though they may be clenched tightly together.) Watch his chest as you blow. When you see his chest rise, you will know that you are getting air into his lungs. 6. Remove your mouth from the patient's mouth, and listen for him to breathe out the air you breathed into him. You also may feel his breath on your cheek and see his chest sink as he exhales. 7. Continue your breathing for the patient. If he is an adult, blow a good breath into his mouth every 5 seconds, or 12 times a minute, and listen for him to breathe it back out again. _Caution_: If the patient is an infant or small child, blow _small puffs_ of air into him about 20 times a minute. You may rupture his lung if you blow in too much air at one time. Watch his chest rise to make sure you are giving him the right amount of air with each puff. 8. If you are _not_ getting air into the patient's lungs, or if he is not breathing out the air you blew into him, first make sure that his head is tilted back and his jaw is jutting out in the proper position. Then use your fingers to make sure nothing in his mouth or throat is obstructing the air passage to his lungs. If this does not help, turn him on his side and strike him sharply with the palm of your hand several times between his shoulder blades. This should dislodge any obstruction in the air passage. Then place him again on his back, with his head tilted back and his jaw jutting out, and resume blowing air into his mouth. If this doesn't work, try closing his mouth and blowing air through his nose into his lungs. 9. If you wish to avoid placing your mouth directly on the patient's face, you may hold a cloth (handkerchief, gauze or other porous material) over his mouth and breathe through the cloth. But don't waste precious time looking for a cloth if you don't have one. 10. _Important_: Even if the patient does not respond, continue your efforts for 1 hour or longer, or until you are completely sure he is dead. If possible, have this confirmed by at least one other person. TO STOP SERIOUS BLEEDING 1. Apply firm, even pressure to the wound with a dressing, clean cloth, or sanitary napkin. If you don't have any of these, use your bare hand until you can get something better. Remember, you must keep blood from running out of the patient's body. Loss of 1 or 2 quarts will seriously endanger his life. 2. Hold the dressing in place with your hand until you can bandage the dressing in place. In case of an arm or leg wound, make sure the bandage is not so tight as to cut off circulation; and raise the arm or leg above the level of the patient's heart. (But if the arm or leg appears broken, be sure to splint it first.) 3. Treat the patient for shock (see page 62). 4. If blood soaks through the dressing, do _not_ remove the dressing. Apply more dressings. 5. SPECIAL ADVICE ON TOURNIQUETS: Never use a tourniquet unless you cannot stop excessive, life-threatening bleeding by any other method. Using a tourniquet increases the chances that the arm or leg will have to be amputated later. If you are _forced_ to use a tourniquet to keep the patient from bleeding to death (for example, when a hand or foot has been accidentally cut off), follow these instructions carefully: --Place the tourniquet _as close to the wound as possible_, between the wound and the patient's heart. --After the tourniquet has been applied, do not permit it to be loosened (even temporarily, or even though the bleeding has stopped) by anyone except a physician, who can control the bleeding by other methods and replace the blood that the patient has lost. --Get a physician to treat the patient as soon as possible. PREVENTING AND TREATING SHOCK Being "in shock" means that a person's circulatory system is not working properly, and not enough blood is getting to the vital centers of his brain and spinal cord. These are the symptoms of shock: The patient's pulse is weak or rapid, or he may have no pulse that you can find. His skin may be pale or blue, cold, or moist. His breathing may be shallow or irregular. He may have chills. He may be thirsty. He may get sick at his stomach and vomit. A person can be "in shock" whether he is conscious or unconscious. _Important: All seriously-injured persons should be treated for shock, even though they appear normal and alert_. Shock may cause death if not treated promptly, even though the injuries which brought on shock might not be serious enough to cause death. In fact, persons may go into shock without having any physical injuries. Here is how to treat any person who may be in shock: 1. Keep him lying down and keep him from chilling, but do _not_ apply a hot water bottle or other heat to his body. Also, loosen his clothing. 2. Keep his head a little lower than his legs and hips. But if he has a head or chest injury, or has difficulty in breathing, keep his head and shoulders slightly higher than the rest of his body. 3. Encourage him to drink fluids if he is conscious and not nauseated, and if he does not have abdominal injuries. Every 15 minutes give him a half-glass of this solution until he no longer wants it: One teaspoonful of salt and a half-teaspoonful of baking soda to one quart of water. 4. Do _not_ give him alcohol. BROKEN BONES Any break in a bone is called a fracture. If you think a person may have a fracture, treat it as though it were one. Otherwise, you may cause further injury. For example, if an arm or leg is injured and bleeding, splint it as well as bandage it. With any fracture, first look for bleeding and control it. Keep the patient comfortably warm and quiet, preferably lying down. If you have an ice bag, apply it to the fracture to ease the pain. Do not move the patient (unless his life is in danger where he is) without first applying a splint or otherwise immobilizing the bone that may be fractured. Treat the patient for shock. A FRACTURED ARM OR LEG should be straightened out as much as possible, preferably by having 2 persons gently stretch it into a normal position. Then it should be "splinted"--that is, fastened to a board or something else to prevent motion and keep the ends of the broken bone together. As a splint, use a board, a trimmed branch from a tree, a broomstick, an umbrella, a roll of newspapers, or anything else rigid enough to keep the arm or leg straight. Fasten the arm or leg to the splint with bandages, strips of cloth, handkerchiefs, neckties, or belts. After splinting, keep the injured arm or leg a little higher than the rest of the patient's body. From time to time, make sure that the splint is not too tight, since the arm or leg may swell, and the blood circulation might be shut off. If the broken bone is sticking out through the skin but the exposed part of it is clean, allow it to slip back naturally under the skin (but don't push it in) when the limb is being straightened. However, if the exposed part of the bone is dirty, cover it with a clean cloth and bandage the wound to stop the bleeding. Then splint the arm or leg without trying to straighten it out, and try to find a doctor or nurse to treat the patient. A FRACTURED COLLAR-BONE should also be prevented from moving, until the patient can get professional medical attention. It can be immobilized by placing the arm on that side in a sling and then binding the arm close to the body. A FRACTURED RIB should be suspected if the patient has received a chest injury or if he has pain when he moves his chest, breathes, or coughs. Strap the injured side of his chest with 2-inch adhesive tape if available, or with a cloth bandage or towel wrapped around and around his entire chest. Fractured bones in the NECK OR BACK are very serious, because they may injure the patient's spinal cord and paralyze him or even kill him. He should not be moved until a doctor comes (or a person trained in first aid), unless it is absolutely necessary to move him to prevent further injury. If a person with a back injury has to be moved, he should be placed gently on his back on a stiff board, door or stretcher. His head, back, and legs should be kept in a straight line at all times. A person with a neck injury should be moved gently with his head, neck, and shoulders kept in the same position they were when he was found. His neck should not be allowed to bend when he is being moved. BURNS Non-serious or superficial (first degree) burns should not be covered--in fact, nothing need be done for them. However, if a first degree burn covers a large area of the body, the patient should be given fluids to drink as mentioned in item 2 following. The most important things to do about serious (second or third degree) burns are: _(a)_ Treat the patient for shock, _(b)_ Prevent infection, and _(c)_ Relieve pain. These specific actions should be taken: 1. Keep the patient lying down, with his head a little lower than his legs and hips unless he has a head or chest wound, or has difficulty in breathing. 2. Have him drink a half-glass every 15 minutes of a salt-and-soda solution (one teaspoonful of salt and a half-teaspoonful of baking soda to a quart of water). Give him additional plain water to drink if he wants it. 3. Cover the burned area with a _dry_, sterile gauze dressing. If gauze is not available, use a clean cloth, towel or pad. 4. With soap and water, wash the area _around_ the burn (not the burn itself) for a distance of several inches, wiping _away_ from the burn. The dressing will help prevent surface washings from getting into the burned area. 5. Use a bandage to hold the dry dressing firmly in place against the burned area. This will keep moving air from reaching the burn, and will lessen the pain. Leave dressings and bandage in place as long as possible. 6. If adjoining surfaces of skin are burned, separate them with gauze or cloth to keep them from sticking together (such as between toes or fingers, ears and head, arms and chest). 7. If the burn was caused by a chemical--or by fallout particles sticking to the skin or hair--wash the chemical or the fallout particles away with generous amounts of plain water, then treat the burn as described above. _What NOT to do about burns_: --Don't pull clothing over the burned area (cut it away, if necessary). --Don't try to remove any pieces of cloth, or bits of dirt or debris, that may be sticking to the burn. --Don't try to clean the burn; don't use iodine or other antiseptics on it; and don't open any blisters that may form on it. --Don't use grease, butter, ointment, salve, petroleum jelly, or any type of medication on severe burns. Keeping them dry is best. --Don't breathe on a burn, and don't touch it with anything except a sterile or clean dressing. --Don't change the dressings that were initially applied to the burn, until absolutely necessary. Dressings may be left in place for a week, if necessary. RADIATION SICKNESS Radiation sickness is caused by the invisible rays given off by particles of radioactive fallout. If a person has received a large dose of radiation in a short period of time--generally, less than a week--he will become seriously ill and probably will die. But if he has received only a small or medium dose, his body will repair itself and he will get well. No special clothing can protect a person from gamma radiation, and no special medicines can protect him or cure him of radiation sickness. Symptoms of radiation sickness may not be noticed for several days. The early symptoms are lack of appetite, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, weakness and headache. Later, the patient may have sore mouth, loss of hair, bleeding gums, bleeding under the skin, and diarrhea. But these same symptoms can be caused by other diseases, and not everyone who has radiation sickness shows all these symptoms, or shows them all at once. If the patient has headache or general discomfort, give him one or two aspirin tablets every 3 or 4 hours (half a tablet, for a child under 12). If he is nauseous, give him "motion sickness tablets," if available. If his mouth is sore or his gums are bleeding, have him use a mouth wash made up of a half-teaspoonful of salt to 1 quart of water. If there is vomiting or diarrhea, he should drink slowly several glasses each day of a salt-and-soda solution (one teaspoonful of salt and one-half teaspoonful of baking soda to 1 quart of cool water), plus bouillon or fruit juices. If available, a mixture of kaolin and pectin should be given for diarrhea. Whatever his symptoms, the patient should be kept lying down, comfortably warm, and resting. Remember that radiation sickness is _not_ contagious or infectious, and one person cannot "catch it" from another person. * * * * * PART TWO MAJOR NATURAL DISASTERS Many of the actions recommended in Part I of this handbook to help you prepare for and live through a nuclear attack--such as learning the warning signals, stocking emergency supplies, taking a course in emergency skills, and knowing how to fight fires at home--also would help you in case a major natural disaster occurs in your area. If you are prepared for nuclear attack, you are also prepared to cope with most peacetime disasters--disasters that kill hundreds of Americans every year, injure thousands, inflict widespread suffering and hardship, and cause great economic loss. Part II of this handbook (pages 69-86) is intended to help you prepare for those natural disasters that may occur in your area, and tell you the right actions to take if they occur. Chapter 1 (pages 71-74) gives general guidance applicable to various types of natural disasters. Succeeding chapters give special advice on floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, winter storms, and earthquakes. * * * * * CHAPTER 1 GENERAL GUIDANCE There are certain things you can learn and do that will help you get ready for, and cope with, almost any type of natural disaster. Perhaps the most basic thing to remember is to _keep calm_. This may mean the difference between life and death. In many disasters, people have been killed or injured needlessly because they took thoughtless actions when they should have done something else--or done nothing at all just then. In a time of emergency, taking proper action may save your life. _Take time to think_, and then take the considered action that the situation calls for. Usually, this will be the action you have planned in advance, or the action you are instructed to take by responsible authorities. Here is other guidance that applies to most types of natural disasters. WARNING LEARN YOUR COMMUNITY'S WARNING SIGNALS. In most communities having outdoor warning systems, the Attack Warning Signal is a wavering sound on the sirens, or a series of short blasts on whistles, horns, or other devices. This signal will be used only to warn of an attack against the United States. Many communities also are using an _Attention or Alert Signal_, usually a 3- to 5-minute _steady blast_ to get the attention of their people in a time of threatened or impending peacetime emergency. In most places, the Attention or Alert Signal means that people should turn on their radio or television sets to hear important emergency information being broadcast. You should find out now, before any emergency occurs, what warning signals are being used in your community, what they sound like, what they mean, and what actions you should take when you hear them. Also, whenever a major storm or other peacetime disaster threatens, keep your radio or television set turned on to hear Weather Bureau reports and forecasts (issued by the Environmental Science Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce), as well as other information and advice that may be broadcast by your local government. When you are warned of an emergency, get your information on the radio or television. Use your telephone only to _report_ important events (such as fires, flash floods, or tornado sightings) to the local authorities. If you tie up the telephone lines simply to get information, you may prevent emergency calls from being completed. EMERGENCY SUPPLIES A major disaster of almost any kind may interfere with your normal supplies of water, food, heat, and other day-to-day necessities. You should keep on hand, in or around your home, a stock of emergency supplies sufficient to meet your needs for a few days or preferably for a week. If you stayed at home during the disaster, these supplies would help you live through the period of emergency without hardship. If you had to evacuate your home and move temporarily to another location, your emergency supplies could be taken with you and used en route or after you arrived at the new location (where regular supplies might not be available). Even if you only had to move to an emergency shelter station set up by a local agency, these supplies might be helpful to you, or make your stay easier. The most important items to keep on hand are water (preferably in plastic jugs or other stoppered containers); canned or sealed-package foods that do not require refrigeration or heat for cooking; medicines needed by family members, and a first aid kit; blankets or sleeping bags; flashlights or lanterns; a battery-powered radio; and perhaps a covered container to use as an emergency toilet. In addition, an automobile in good operating condition with an ample supply of gasoline may be necessary in case you have to leave your home. In those parts of the country subject to hurricanes or floods, it is also wise to keep on hand certain emergency materials you may need to protect your home from wind and water--such as plywood sheeting or lumber to board up your windows and doors, and plastic sheeting or tarpaulins to protect furniture and appliances. FIRE PROTECTION AND FIRE FIGHTING Fires are a special hazard in a time of disaster. They may start more readily, and the help of the fire department may not be available quickly. Therefore, it is essential that you: 1. Follow the fire prevention rules given on page 52, and be especially careful not to start fires. 2. Know how to put out small fires yourself. (See pages 52-54.) 3. Have on hand simple tools and equipment needed for fire fighting. (See page 43.) AFTER A NATURAL DISASTER _Use extreme caution in entering or working in buildings_ that may have been damaged or weakened by the disaster, as they may collapse without warning. Also, there may be gas leaks or electrical short circuits. _Don't bring lanterns, torches or lighted cigarettes_ into buildings that have been flooded or otherwise damaged by a natural disaster, since there may be leaking gas lines or flammable material present. _Stay away from fallen or damaged electric wires_, which may still be dangerous. _Check for leaking gas pipes in your home_. Do this by _smell only_-- don't use matches or candles. If you smell gas, do this: (1) Open all windows and doors, (2) Turn off the main gas valve at the meter, (3) Leave the house immediately, (4) Notify the gas company or the police or fire department, (5) Don't re-enter the house until you are told it is safe to do so. _If any of your electrical appliances are wet_, first turn off the main power switch in your house, then unplug the wet appliance, dry it out, reconnect it, and finally, turn on the main power switch. (Caution: Don't do any of these things while _you_ are wet or standing in water.) If fuses blow when the electric power is restored, turn off the main power switch again and then inspect for short circuits in your home wiring, appliances and equipment. _Check your food and water supplies before using them_. Foods that require refrigeration may be spoiled if electric power has been off for some time. Also, don't eat food that has come in contact with flood waters. Be sure to follow the instructions of local authorities concerning the use of food and water supplies. _If needed, get food, clothing, medical care or shelter_ at Red Cross stations or from local government authorities. _Stay away from disaster areas_. Sightseeing could interfere with first aid or rescue work, and may be dangerous as well. _Don't drive unless necessary_, and drive with caution. Watch for hazards to yourself and others, and report them to local authorities. _Write, telegraph or telephone your relatives_, after the emergency is over, so they will know you are safe. Otherwise local authorities may waste time locating you--or if you have evacuated to a safer location, they may not be able to find you. (However, do not tie up the phone lines if they are still needed for official emergency calls.) _Do not pass on rumors_ or exaggerated reports of damage. _Follow the advice and instructions of your local government_ on ways to help yourself and your community recover from the emergency. * * * * * CHAPTER 2 FLOODS AND HURRICANES In addition to the general guidance in Chapter 1 of this section, there are certain emergency actions particularly associated with major floods, hurricanes, and storm tides or surges. These types of disasters usually are preceded by extended periods of warning. People living in areas likely to be most severely affected often are warned to move to safer locations. EVACUATION If you are warned to evacuate your home and move to another location temporarily, there are certain things to remember and do. Here are the most important ones: * FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS AND ADVICE OF YOUR LOCAL GOVERNMENT. If you are told to evacuate, do so promptly. If you are instructed to move to a certain location, go there--don't go anywhere else. If certain travel routes are specified or recommended, use those routes rather than trying to find short cuts of your own. (It will help if you have previously become familiar with the routes likely to be used.) If you are told to shut off your water, gas or electric service before leaving home, do so. Also find out on the radio where emergency housing and mass feeding stations are located, in case you need to use them. * SECURE YOUR HOME BEFORE LEAVING. If you have time, and if you have not received other instructions from your local government, you should take the following actions before leaving your home: --Bring outside possessions inside the house, or tie them down securely. This includes outdoor furniture, garbage cans, garden tools, signs, and other movable objects that might be blown or washed away. --Board up your windows so they won't be broken by high winds, water, flying objects or debris. --If flooding is likely, move furniture and other movable objects to the upper floor of your house. Disconnect any electrical appliances or equipment that cannot be moved--but don't touch them if you are wet or are standing in water. --Do _not_ stack sandbags around the outside walls of your house to keep flood waters out of your basement. Water seeping downward through the earth (either beyond the sandbags or over them) may collect around the basement walls and under the floor, creating pressure that could damage the walls or else raise the entire basement and cause it to "float" out of the ground. In most cases it is better to permit the flood waters to flow freely into the basement (or flood the basement yourself with clean water, if you feel sure it will be flooded anyway). This will equalize the water pressure on the inside and outside of the basement walls and floor, and thus avoid structural damage to the foundation and the house. --Lock house doors and windows. Park your car in the garage or driveway, close the windows, and lock it (unless you are driving to your new temporary location). * TRAVEL WITH CARE. If your local government is arranging transportation for you, precautions will be taken for your safety. But if you are walking or driving your own car to another location, keep in mind these things: --Leave early enough so as not to be marooned by flooded roads, fallen trees, and wires. --Make sure you have enough gasoline in your car. --Follow recommended routes. --As you travel, keep listening to the radio for additional information and instructions from your local government. --Watch for washed-out or undermined roadways, earth slides, broken sewer or water mains, loose or downed electric wires, and falling or fallen objects. --Watch out for areas where rivers or streams may flood suddenly. --Don't try to cross a stream or a pool of water unless you are certain that the water will not be above your knees (or above the middle of your car's wheels) _all the way across_. Sometimes the water will hide a bridge or a part of the road that has been washed out. If you decide it is safe to drive across it, put your car in low gear and drive very slowly, to avoid splashing water into your engine and causing it to stop. Also, remember that your brakes may not work well after the wheels of your car have been in deep water. Try them out a few times when you reach the other side. DURING A HURRICANE --If your house is on high ground and you haven't been instructed to evacuate, stay indoors. Don't try to travel, since you will be in danger from flying debris, flooded roads, and downed wires. --Keep listening to your radio or television set for further information and advice. If the center or "eye" of the hurricane passes directly over you, there will be a temporary lull in the wind, lasting from a few minutes to perhaps a half-hour or more. _Stay in a safe place during this lull_. The wind will return--perhaps with even greater force--from the _opposite_ direction. SPECIAL ADVICE ON FLASH FLOODS In many areas, unusually heavy rains may cause quick or "flash" floods. Small creeks, gullies, dry streambeds, ravines, culverts or even low-lying grounds frequently flood very quickly and endanger people, sometimes before any warning can be given. In a period of heavy rains, be aware of this hazard and be prepared to protect yourself against it. If you see any possibility of a flash flood occurring where you are, move immediately to a safer location (don't wait for instructions to move), and then notify your local authorities of the danger, so other people can be warned. * * * * * CHAPTER 3 TORNADOES * _When a tornado watch (forecast) is announced_, this means that tornadoes are expected in or near your area. Keep your radio or television set tuned to a local station for information and advice from your local government or the Weather Bureau. Also, keep watching the sky, especially to the south and southwest. (When a tornado watch is announced during the approach of a hurricane, however, keep watching the sky to the east.) If you see any revolving, funnel-shaped clouds, report them by telephone immediately to your local police department, sheriff's office or Weather Bureau office. But do not use the phone to get information and advice--depend on radio or TV. * _When a tornado warning is issued, take shelter immediately_. The warning means that a tornado has actually been sighted, and this (or other tornadoes) may strike in your vicinity. You must take action to protect yourself from being blown away, struck by falling objects, or injured by flying debris. Your best protection is an underground shelter or cave, or a substantial steel-framed or reinforced-concrete building. But if none of these is available, there are other places where you can take refuge: --If you are _at home_, go to your underground storm cellar or your basement fallout shelter, if you have one. If not, go to a corner of your home basement and take cover under a sturdy workbench or table (but not underneath heavy appliances on the floor above). If your home has no basement, take cover under heavy furniture on the ground floor in the center part of the house, or in a small room on the ground floor that is away from outside walls and windows. (As a last resort, go outside to a nearby ditch, excavation, culvert or ravine.) Doors and windows on the sides of your house _away from_, the tornado may be left open to help reduce damage to the building, but stay away from them to avoid flying debris. Do not remain in a trailer or mobile home if a tornado is approaching; take cover elsewhere. --If you are _at work_ in an office building, go to the basement or to an inner hallway on a lower floor. In a factory, go to a shelter area, or to the basement if there is one. --If you are _outside in open country_, drive away from the tornado's path, at a right angle to it. If there isn't time to do this--or if you are walking--take cover and lie flat in the nearest depression, such as a ditch, culvert, excavation, or ravine. * * * * * CHAPTER 4 WINTER STORMS Here is advice that will help you protect yourself and your family against the hazards of winter storms--blizzards, heavy snows, ice storms, freezing rain, or sleet. * KEEP POSTED ON WEATHER CONDITIONS. Use your radio, television and newspapers to keep informed of current weather conditions and forecasts in your area. Even a few hours' warning of a storm may enable you to avoid being caught outside in it, or at least be better prepared to cope with it. You should also understand the terms commonly used in weather forecasts: --A _blizzard_ is the most dangerous of all winter storms. It combines cold air, heavy snow, and strong winds that blow the snow about and may reduce visibility to only a few yards. A _blizzard warning_ is issued when the Weather Bureau expects considerable snow, winds of 35 miles an hour or more, and temperatures of 20 degrees Fahrenheit or lower. A _severe blizzard warning_ means that a very heavy snowfall is expected, with winds of at least 45 miles an hour and temperatures of 10 degrees or lower. --A _heavy snow warning_ usually means an expected snowfall of 4 inches or more in a 12-hour period, or 6 inches or more in a 24-hour period. Warnings of _snow flurries, snow squalls_, or _blowing and drifting snow_ are important mainly because visibility may be reduced and roads may become slippery or blocked. --_Freezing rain or freezing drizzle_ is forecast when expected rain is likely to freeze as soon as it strikes the ground, putting a coating of ice or glaze on roads and everything else that is exposed. If a substantial layer of ice is expected to accumulate from the freezing rain, an _ice storm_ is forecast. --_Sleet_ is small particles of ice, usually mixed with rain. If enough sleet accumulates on the ground, it will make the roads slippery. * BE PREPARED FOR ISOLATION AT HOME. If you live in a rural area, make sure you could survive at home for a week or two in case a storm isolated you and made it impossible for you to leave. You should: --Keep an adequate supply of heating fuel on hand and use it sparingly, as your regular supplies may be curtailed by storm conditions. If necessary, conserve fuel by keeping the house cooler than usual, or by "closing off" some rooms temporarily. Also, have available some kind of _emergency_ heating equipment and fuel so you could keep at least one room of your house warm enough to be livable. This could be a camp stove with fuel, or a supply of wood or coal if you have a fireplace. If your furnace is controlled by a thermostat and your electricity is cut off by a storm, the furnace probably would not operate and you would need emergency heat. --Stock an emergency supply of food and water, as well as emergency cooking equipment such as a camp stove. Some of this food should be of the type that does not require refrigeration or cooking. --Make sure you have a battery-powered radio and extra batteries on hand, so that if your electric power is cut off you could still hear weather forecasts, information and advice broadcast by local authorities. Also, flashlights or lanterns would be needed. --Consult page 72 of this handbook for other supplies and equipment that you may need if isolated at home. Be sure to keep on hand the simple tools and equipment needed to fight a fire. Also, be certain that all family members know how to take precautions that would prevent fire at such a time, when the help of the fire department may not be available. * TRAVEL ONLY IF NECESSARY. Avoid all unnecessary trips. If you must travel, use public transportation if possible. However, if you are forced to use your automobile for a trip of any distance, take these precautions: --Make sure your car is in good operating condition, properly serviced, and equipped with chains or snow tires. --Take another person with you if possible. --Make sure someone knows where you are going, your approximate schedule, and your estimated time of arrival at your destination. --Have emergency "winter storm supplies" in the car, such as a container of sand, shovel, windshield scraper, tow chain or rope, extra gasoline, and a flashlight. It also is good to have with you heavy gloves or mittens, overshoes, extra woolen socks, and winter headgear to cover your head and face. --Travel by daylight and use major highways if you can. Keep the car radio turned on for weather information and advice. --Drive with all possible caution. Don't try to save time by travelling faster than road and weather conditions permit. --Don't be daring or foolhardy. Stop, turn back, or seek help if conditions threaten that may test your ability or endurance, rather than risk being stalled, lost or isolated. If you are caught in a _blizzard_, seek refuge immediately. * KEEP CALM IF YOU GET IN TROUBLE. If your car breaks down during a storm, or if you become stalled or lost, don't panic. Think the problem through, decide what's the safest and best thing to do, and then do it slowly and carefully. If you are on a well-traveled road, show a trouble signal. Set your directional lights to flashing, raise the hood of your car, or hang a cloth from the radio aerial or car window. Then stay in your car and wait for help to arrive. If you run the engine to keep warm, remember to open a window enough to provide ventilation and protect you from carbon monoxide poisoning. Wherever you are, if there is no house or other source of help in sight, do not leave your car to search for assistance, as you may become confused and get lost. * AVOID OVEREXERTION. Every winter many unnecessary deaths occur because people--especially older persons, but younger ones as well--engage in more strenuous physical activity than their bodies can stand. Cold weather itself, _without_ any physical exertion, puts an extra strain on your heart. If you add to this physical exercise, especially exercise that you are not accustomed to--such as shovelling snow, pushing an automobile, or even walking fast or far--you are risking a heart attack, a stroke, or other damage to your body. In winter weather, and especially in winter storms, be aware of this danger, and avoid overexertion. * * * * * CHAPTER 5 EARTHQUAKES If your area is one of the places in the United States where earthquakes occur, keep these points in mind: --When an earthquake happens, _keep calm_. Don't run or panic. If you take the proper precautions, the chances are you will not be hurt. --REMAIN WHERE YOU ARE. If you are outdoors, stay outdoors; if indoors, stay indoors. In earthquakes, most injuries occur as people are entering or leaving buildings (from falling walls, electric wires, etc.). --If you are indoors, sit or stand against an inside wall (preferably in the basement), or in an inside doorway; or else take cover under a desk, table or bench (in case the wall or ceiling should fall). Stay away from windows and outside doors. --If you are outdoors, stay away from overhead electric wires, poles or anything else that might shake loose and fall (such as the cornices of tall buildings). --If you are _driving an automobile_, pull off the road and stop (as soon as possible, and with caution). Remain in the car until the disturbance subsides. When you drive on, watch for hazards created by the earthquake, such as fallen or falling objects, downed electric wires, and broken or undermined roadways. AFTER AN EARTHQUAKE For your own safety and that of others, you should follow carefully the advice given in the section, "After a Natural Disaster" (page 73). * * * * * INDEX Air raid _see_ NUCLEAR ATTACK Air raid shelters _see_ FALLOUT SHELTERS ARTIFICIAL RESPIRATION 58-60 Atomic bomb attack _see_ NUCLEAR ATTACK Attack, nuclear _see_ NUCLEAR ATTACK ATTACK WARNING: 17-22 Actions to take 19-20, 21-22 Attack warning signal 19 Attack warning time 18, 21 Taking cover 21-22 ATTENTION OR ALERT SIGNAL (for natural disasters) 19-20, 71-72 Basements (for use as fallout shelters) _see_ FALLOUT SHELTERS Blast from nuclear explosions _see_ NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, Effects of BLEEDING, How to stop 61 Blizzards _see_ STORMS, Winter BOATS (use as improvised fallout shelters) 33, 38 Bomb shelters _see_ FALLOUT SHELTERS BREATHING, How to restore 58-60 BROADCASTING, Radio and television: In time of natural disaster 72, 75, 77, 81, 83 In time of nuclear attack 17-18, 32, 34 BROKEN BONES, How to treat 63-65 BURNS, How to treat 65-66 CHECKLIST OF EMERGENCY ACTIONS 6-7 CHILDREN, Special precautions for: Avoiding contaminated water and milk 6, 9, 16 Effects of radiation on children 13, 16 Finding fallout shelter at all times 24 Giving artificial respiration to children 59, 60 Infant supplies to be stored for shelter use 43 Construction of home fallout shelters _see_ PLANS FOR HOME FALLOUT SHELTERS Cover _see_ TAKING COVER CRAWL SPACE (use as improvised fallout shelter) 33, 36 DRIVING IN A TIME OF NATURAL DISASTER: Car may be needed for evacuation 72 Driving after a natural disaster has occurred 74 Driving at the time of a flood or hurricane 75, 76, 77, 78 Driving at the time of an earthquake 86 Driving during a winter storm 82-84 If you see a tornado while driving 80 EARTHQUAKES 85-86 _see also_ 71-74 (General Guidance) Effects of nuclear explosions _see_ NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, Effects of ELECTRIC SERVICE 75,82 ELECTRIC WIRES, Downed 73, 77, 78, 86 ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES 73, 76 ELECTRICITY (as related to fires) 52, 54 EMERGENCY ACTIONS CHECKLIST 6-7 EMERGENCY SKILLS: Need for 2, 5, 55, 56 Training courses in 2, 55 EVACUATION IN A TIME OF NATURAL DISASTER: 75-78 Securing your home before leaving 75-76 EXERTION, Physical: Avoiding overexertion during a storm 84 FALLOUT, Radioactive 5, 6, 10-13, 15, 16 FALLOUT SHELTERS: _General information_ 13-14, 23-25 Home shelters 24-25, how to prepare 26-32 Improvised shelters 33-38 Public shelters 23-24, how to identify 24 Some protection provided against blast and heat 14 Supplies for fallout shelters 39-44 Taking cover before going to fallout shelter 21-22 When to leave shelter 13, 24, 32 FIRE: Firefighting at home 52-54 Firefighting supplies needed at home 43, 53 Fire from nuclear explosions _see_ NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, Effects of Fire in connection with natural disasters 73 Fire prevention at home 51-54 Special fire precautions in time of attack 52-53 Fireball, nuclear _see_ NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, Effects of FIRST AID: 55-67 _General rules_ 57 Bleeding, how to stop it 61-62 Breathing, how to restore it 58-60 Broken bones 63-65 Burns 65-66 Radiation sickness 66-67 Shock, how to prevent and treat it 62-63 Supplies 42 Training courses 2, 55-56 Flash from nuclear explosions _see_ NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, Effects of FLOODS: 75-78 _see also_ 71-74 (General Guidance) Special advice on flash floods 78 Using sandbags to protect home not recommended 76 FOOD: Available and usable after an attack 14-16 Care and use of food supplies in shelter 42, 46, 48 Food supplies in time of natural disaster 72, 82 Food to take to shelter 40, 42 Use of food after a natural disaster 73 _see also_ SUPPLIES FOR FALLOUT SHELTERS Gamma radiation _see_ FALLOUT, Radioactive GAS SERVICE, Turnoff by householders 75 GAS PIPES, Leaking 73 Heat from nuclear explosions _see_ NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, Effects of HEATING, in time of winter storms 82 HOME FALLOUT SHELTERS: How to prepare a home shelter: 26-32 Outside type 32 Permanent type 26-29 Preplanned type 30-32 Importance of 24-25 Improvised home shelters 33-38 Managing water, food, and sanitation in 45-49 Supplies and equipment for 41-44 When to leave shelter 13, 24, 32 HURRICANES: 75-78 _see also_ 71-74 (General Guidance) "Eye" of a hurricane 78 Ice storm _see_ STORMS, Winter Improvised fallout shelters _see_ FALLOUT SHELTERS Infants _see_ CHILDREN, Special precautions for Injuries, treatment of _see_ FIRST AID MEDICAL CARE IN EMERGENCIES 55-67 _see also_ FIRST AID MEDICAL SELF-HELP COURSE 2, 55, 56 MEDICINES AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES: Importance of having available 55, 56 What to keep on hand for natural disasters 72 What to store for home shelter use 42 What to take to a public fallout shelter 40 MILK CONTAMINATION FROM FALLOUT 9, 16 Missiles, nuclear _see_ NUCLEAR ATTACK _and_ NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, Effects of MOUTH-TO-MOUTH RESUSCITATION 58-60 NATURAL DISASTERS: 69-86 _General guidance_ 71-74 Earthquakes 85, 86 Emergency feeding and shelter stations 75 Floods and hurricanes 75-78 Supplies for 72, 82, 83 Tornadoes 79, 80 Value of preparations 70, 71 Warning 71-72, 75, 79, 81 Winter Storms 81-84 NATURAL DISASTER WARNING 17, 18, 19, 71-72 NUCLEAR ATTACK: 3-67 Areas of damage 10-11 Assistance available in time of attack 5 Checklist of emergency actions 6-7 Deaths and injuries 5, 10-11 Hazards of an attack 9-16 Importance of following local instructions 1, 2, 6, 7 Survivors 10-11 Taking cover if there should be a nuclear flash 21-22 Warning 6, 17-22 NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, Effects of 9-13 Outside fallout shelters _see_ HOME FALLOUT SHELTERS PLANS FOR HOME FALLOUT SHELTERS: 26-32 Improvised home shelters, description of 33-38 Preparations for natural disasters _see_ NATURAL DISASTERS Preparations for nuclear attack _see_ NUCLEAR ATTACK Protective materials against fallout _see_ SHIELDING MATERIALS PUBLIC FALLOUT SHELTERS: How to identify 7, 24 Supplies to take to public shelter 40 Water, food and sanitation in public shelter 45-46 When to leave shelter 13, 24, 32 Radiation _see_ FALLOUT, Radioactive RADIATION SICKNESS: 11-13, 32 How to recognize and treat it 66-67 Radio _see_ BROADCASTING, Radio and television Radioactive fallout _see_ FALLOUT, Radioactive SANITATION 41-42, 45-49 Shelters _see_ FALLOUT SHELTERS SHIELDING MATERIALS 14, 25, 34 Comparison of various materials 25 SHOCK, How to recognize and treat 62-63 Sick and injured, care of the _see_ FIRST AID Sign, public fallout shelter _see_ PUBLIC FALLOUT SHELTERS SIGNALS, Warning: 18-20 _see also_ ATTACK WARNING _and_ NATURAL DISASTER WARNING Sirens, warning _see_ SIGNALS, Warning Snow storms _see_ STORMS, Winter STORM CELLARS: For protection from tornadoes 80 Use as fallout shelters 36 STORMS, Winter 81-84 _see also_ 71-74 (General Guidance) STORM TIDES OR SURGES 75-78 SUPPLIES FOR FALLOUT SHELTERS: 39-44 Home shelters 39, 41-44, care and use of supplies 45-49 Public shelters 40, 46 SUPPLIES NEEDED FOR NATURAL DISASTERS 72, 82-83 TAKING COVER: For protection from tornadoes 79-80 In time of nuclear attack 21-22 TELEPHONE, Restricted use in a time of emergency 6, 20, 72, 74, 79 Television _see_ BROADCASTING, Radio and television TOILETS, Emergency 42, 45-46, 48-49 TORNADOES 79-80 _see also_ 71-74 (General Guidance) TOURNIQUETS, Special advice on 61-62 Training courses _see_ EMERGENCY SKILLS WARNING: 17-22 _see also_ ATTACK WARNING _and_ NATURAL DISASTER WARNING WATER: Available and usable after an attack 14-16 Care and use of water supplies in shelter 46-48 Possible danger of contaminated water to children 6, 9, 16 Precautions on use of water after a natural disaster 73 To store for home shelter use 41 To store for use in a natural disaster 72, 82 To take to public fallout shelter 40 Water service, turnoff by householders 75 _see also_ SUPPLIES FOR FALLOUT SHELTERS Winter storms _see_ STORMS, Winter * * * * * KEEP THIS HANDBOOK WITH OTHER EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS YOU RECEIVE U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968--O-297-579 * * * * * FOOTNOTES: Footnote 1: In a time of nuclear attack or major natural disaster, don't use the telephone to get information or advice. Depend on radio or television. Footnote 2: These smaller particles would drift to earth more slowly, losing much of their radioactivity before they reached the ground, and would be spread by the upper winds over vast areas of the world. Footnote 3: This table, and other suggestions concerning emergency supplies of food and water, is contained in "Family Food Stockpile for Survival," Home and Garden Bulletin No. 77, U.S. Department of Agriculture. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402, price 10 cents. 
10629	----	BRITAIN AT BAY BY SPENSER WILKINSON New York 1909 TO MY CHILDREN CONTENTS CHAPTER I. THE NATION AND THE PARTIES II. DEFEAT III. FORCE AND RIGHT IV. ARBITRATION AND DISARMAMENT V. THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR VI. THE BALANCE OF POWER VII. THE RISE OF GERMANY VIII. NATIONHOOD NEGLECTED IX. NEW CONDITIONS X. DYNAMICS--THE QUESTION OF MIGHT XI. POLICY--THE QUESTION OF RIGHT XII. THE NATION XIII. THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR UPON LEADERSHIP XIV. THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY XV. ENGLAND'S MILITARY PROBLEM XVI. TWO SYSTEMS CONTRASTED XVII. A NATIONAL ARMY XVIII. THE COST XIX. ONE ARMY NOT TWO XX. THE TRANSITION XXI. THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ARMIES ARE RAISED XXII. THE CHAIN OF DUTY Chapters XIV. to XX. have appeared as articles in the _Morning Post_ and are by kind permission reproduced without substantial change. I. THE NATION AND THE PARTIES "I do not believe in the perfection of the British constitution as an instrument of war ... it is evident that there is something in your machinery that is wrong." These were the words of the late Marquis of Salisbury, speaking as Prime Minister in his place in the House of Lords on the 30th of January 1900. They amounted to a declaration by the British Government that it could not govern, for the first business of a Government is to be able to defend the State of which it has charge, that is, to carry on war. Strange to say, the people of England were undisturbed by so striking an admission of national failure. On the 16th of March 1909 came a new declaration from another Prime Minister. Mr. Asquith, on the introduction of the Navy Estimates, explained to the House of Commons that the Government had been surprised at the rate at which the new German navy was being constructed, and at the rapid growth of Germany's power to build battleships. But it is the first duty of a Government to provide for national security and to provide means to foresee. A Government that is surprised in a matter relating to war is already half defeated. The creation of the German navy is the creation of means that could be used to challenge Great Britain's sea power and all that depends upon it. There has been no such challenge these hundred years, no challenge so formidable as that represented by the new German fleet these three hundred years. It brings with it a crisis in the national life of England as great as has ever been known; yet this crisis finds the British nation divided, unready and uncertain what leadership it is to expect. The dominant fact, the fact that controls all others, is that from now onwards Great Britain has to face the stern reality of war, immediately by way of preparation and possibly at any moment by way of actual collision. England is drifting into a quarrel with Germany which, if it cannot be settled, involves a struggle for the mastery with the strongest nation that the world has yet seen--a nation that, under the pressure of necessity, has learnt to organise itself for war as for peace; that sets its best minds to direct its preparations for war; that has an army of four million citizens, and that is of one mind in the determination to make a navy that shall fear no antagonist. A conflict of this kind is the test of nations, not only of their strength but also of their righteousness or right to be. It has two aspects. It is first of all a quarrel and then a fight, and if we are to enter into it without fear of destruction we must fulfil two conditions: in the quarrel we must be in the right, in the fight we must win. The two conditions are inseparable. If there is a doubt about the justice of our cause we shall be divided among ourselves, and it will be impossible for us to put forth the strength of a united nation. Have we really a quarrel with Germany? Is she doing us any wrong? Some of our people seem to think so, though I find it hard to say in what the wrong consists. Are we doing her any wrong? Some Germans seem to think so, and it behoves us, if we can, to find out what the German grievance is. Suppose that there is a cause for quarrel, hidden at present but sooner or later to be revealed. What likelihood is there that we shall be able to make good our case in arms, and to satisfy the world and posterity that we deserved to win? Germany can build fleets as fast as we can, and although we have a start the race will not be easy for us; she has the finest school of war that ever existed, against which we have to set an Admiralty so much mistrusted that at this moment a committee of the Cabinet is inquiring into its efficiency. Is it not time for us to find the answer to the question raised by Lord Salisbury nine years ago, to ascertain what it is that interferes with the perfection of the British constitution as an instrument of war, and to set right what is wrong with our machinery? The truth is that we have ceased to be a nation; we have forgotten nationhood, and have become a conglomerate of classes, parties, factions, and sects. That is the disease. The remedy consists in reconstituting ourselves as a nation. What is a nation? The inhabitants of a country constituted as one body to secure their corporate being and well-being. The nation is all of us, and its government is trusteeship for us all in order to give us peace and security, and in order that in peace and security we may make each other's lives worth living by doing each the best work he can. The nature of a nation may be seen by distinguishing it from the other nations outside and from the parties within. The mark of a nation is sovereignty, which means, as regards other nations, the right and the power to make peace with them or to carry on war against them, and which means, as regards those within, the right and the power to command them. A nation is a people constituted as a State, maintaining and supporting a Government which is at once the embodiment of right and the wielder of force. If the right represented by the Government is challenged, either without or within, the Government asserts it by force, and in either case disposes, to any extent that may be required, of the property, the persons, and the lives of its subjects. A party, according to the classical theory of the British constitution, is a body of men within the State who are agreed in regarding some measure or some principle as so vital to the State that, in order to secure the adoption of the measure or the acceptance of the principle, they are willing to sink all differences of opinion on other matters, and to work together for the one purpose which they are agreed in regarding as fundamental. The theory of party government is based on the assumption that there must always be some measure or some principle in regard to which the citizens of the same country will differ so strongly as to subordinate their private convictions on other matters to their profound convictions in regard to the one great question. It is a theory of permanent civil war carried on through the forms of parliamentary debate and popular election, and, indeed, the two traditional parties are the political descendants of the two sides which in the seventeenth century were actually engaged in civil war. For the ordinary purposes of the domestic life of the country the system has its advantages, but they are coupled with grave drawbacks. The party system destroys the sincerity of our political life, and introduces a dangerous dilettantism into the administration of public business. A deliberative assembly like the House of Commons can reach a decision only by there being put from the chair a question to which the answer must be either Yes or No. It is evidently necessary to the sincerity of such decisions that the answer given by each member shall in every case be the expression of his conviction regarding the right answer to the question put. If every member in every division were to vote according to his own judgment and conscience upon the question put, there would be a perpetual circulation of members between the Ayes to the right and the Noes to the left. The party system prevents this. It obliges each member on every important occasion to vote with his leaders and to follow the instruction of the whips. In this way the division of opinion produced by some particular question or measure is, as far as possible, made permanent and dominant, and the freedom of thought and of deliberation is confined within narrow limits. Thus there creeps into the system an element of insincerity which has been enormously increased since the extension of the franchise and the consequent organisation of parties in the country. Thirty or forty years ago the caucus was established in all the constituencies, in each of which was formed a party club, association, or committee, for the purpose of securing at parliamentary elections the success of the party candidate. The association, club, or committee consists, as regards its active or working portion, of a very small percentage of the voters even of its own party, but it is affiliated to the central organisation and in practice it controls the choice of candidates. What is the result? That the affairs of the nation are entirely given over to be disputed between the two organised parties, whose leaders are compelled, in shaping their policy and in thinking about public affairs, to consider first and foremost the probable effect of what they will do and of what they will say upon the active members of the caucus of their own party in the constituencies. The frame of mind of the members of the caucus is that of men who regard the opposite caucus as the adversary. But the adversary of a nation can only be another nation. In this way the leaders of both parties, the men who fill the places which, in a well-organised nation, would be assigned to statesmen, are placed in it position in which statesmanship is almost impossible. A statesman would be devoted solely to the nation. He would think first, second, and third of the nation. Security would be his prime object, and upon that basis he would aim at the elevation of the characters and of the lives of the whole population. But our leaders cannot possibly think first, second, and third of the nation. They have to think at least as much of the next election and of the opinions of their supporters. In this way their attention is diverted from that observation of other nations which is essential for the maintenance of security. Moreover, they are obliged to dwell on subjects directly intelligible to and appreciable by the voters in the constituencies, and are thereby hindered from giving either the time or the attention which they would like to any of those problems of statesmanship which require close and arduous study for their solution. The wonder is in these conditions that they do their work so well, and maintain undiminished the reputation of English public men for integrity and ability. Yet what at the present moment is the principle about which parties are divided? Is there any measure or any principle at issue which is really vital to Great Britain? Is there anything in dispute between the parties which would not be abandoned and forgotten at the first shot fired in a war between England and a great continental nation? I am convinced that that first shot must cause the scales to fall from men's eyes; that it must make every one realise that our divisions are comparative trifles and that for years we have been wasting time over them. But if we wait for the shock of war to arouse us to a sense of reality and to estimate our party differences at their true value, it will be too late. We shall wring our hands in vain over our past blindness and the insight we shall then have obtained will avail us nothing. The party system has another consequence which will not stand scrutiny in the light of reality; it is dilettantism in the conduct of the nation's principal business. Some of the chief branches of the executive work of government are the provinces of special arts and sciences, each of which to master requires the work of a lifetime. Of such a kind are the art of carrying on war, whether by sea or land, the art of conducting foreign relations, which involves a knowledge of all the other great States and their policies, and the direction of the educational system, which cannot possibly be properly conducted except by an experienced educator. But the system gives the direction of each of these branches to one of the political leaders forming the Cabinet or governing committee, and the practice is to consider as disqualified from membership of that committee any man who has given his life either to war, to foreign policy, or to education. Yet by its efficiency in these matters the nation must stand or fall. By all means let us be chary of lightly making changes in the constitution or in the arrangements of government. But, if the security and continued existence of the nation are in question, must we not scrutinise our methods of government with a view to make sure that they accord with the necessary conditions of success in a national struggle for existence? I am well aware that the train of thought to which I have tried to give expression is unpopular, and that most people think that any modification of the traditional party system is impracticable. But the question is not whether the system is popular; it is whether it will enable the country to stand in the hour of trial. If the system is inefficient and fails to enable the nation to carry on with success the functions necessary for its preservation and if at the same time it is impracticable to change it, then nothing can avert ruin from this country. Yet I believe that a very large number of my countrymen are in fact thinking each for himself the thoughts which I am trying to express. They are perhaps not the active members of the caucus of either party, but they are men who, if they see the need, will not shrink from exertions or from sacrifices which they believe to be useful or necessary to the country. It is to them that the following pages are an appeal. I appeal with some confidence because what I shall try to show to be necessary is not so much a change of institutions as a change of spirit; not a new constitution but a return to a true way of looking at public and private life. My contention is that the future of England depends entirely upon the restoration of duty, of which the nation is the symbol, to its proper place in our lives. II. DEFEAT Great Britain is drifting unintentionally and half unconsciously into a war with the German Empire, a State which has a population of sixty millions and is better organised for war than any State has ever been in modern times. For such a conflict, which may come about to-morrow, and unless a great change takes place must come about in the near future, Great Britain is not prepared. The food of our people and the raw material of their industries come to this country by sea, and the articles here produced go by sea to their purchasers abroad. Every transaction carries with it a certain profit which makes it possible. If the exporter and the manufacturer who supplies him can make no profit they cannot continue their operations, and the men who work for them must lose their employment. Suppose Great Britain to be to-morrow at war with one or more of the Great Powers of Europe. All the sailing vessels and slow steamers will stop running lest they should be taken by hostile cruisers. The fast steamers will have to pay war rates of insurance and to charge extra freights. Steamers ready to leave foreign ports for this country will wait for instructions and for news. On the outbreak of war, therefore, this over-sea traffic must be greatly diminished in volume and carried on with enormously increased difficulties. The supply of food would be considerably reduced and the certainty of the arrival of any particular cargo would have disappeared. The price of food must therefore rapidly and greatly rise, and that alone would immediately impose very great hardships on the whole of the working class, of which a considerable part would be driven across the line which separates modern comfort from the starvation margin. The diminution in the supply of the raw materials of manufacture would be much greater and more immediate. Something like half the manufacturers of Great Britain must close their works for want of materials. But will the other half be able to carry on? Foreign orders they cannot possibly execute, because there can be no certainty of the delivery of the goods; and even if they could, the price at which they could deliver them with a profit would be much higher than it is in peace. For with a diminished supply the price of raw material must go up, the cost of marine insurance must be added, together with the extra wages necessary to enable the workmen to live with food at an enhanced price. Thus the effect of the greater difficulty of sea communication must be to destroy the margin of profit which enables the British capitalist to carry on his works, while the effect of all these causes taken together on the credit system upon which our whole domestic economy reposes will perhaps be understood by business men. Even if this state of things should last only a few months, it certainly involves the transfer to neutrals of all trade that is by possibility transferable. Foreign countries will give their orders for cotton, woollen, and iron goods to the United States, France, Switzerland, and Austro-Hungary, and at the conclusion of peace the British firms that before supplied them, if they have not in the meantime become bankrupt, will find that their customers have formed new connections. The shrinkage of credit would bring a multitude of commercial failures; the diminution of trade and the cessation of manufactures a great many more. The unemployed would be counted by the million, and would have to be kept at the public expense or starve. If in the midst of these misfortunes, caused by the mere fact of war, should come the news of defeat at sea, still more serious consequences must follow. After defeat at sea all regular and secure communication between Great Britain, her Colonies, and India comes to an end. With the terrible blow to Britain's reputation which defeat at sea must bring, what will be the position of the 100,000 British in India who for a century have governed a population of nearly 300,000,000? What can the Colonies do to help Great Britain under such conditions? For the command of the sea nothing, and even if each of them had a first-rate army, what would be the use of those armies to this country in her hour of need? They cannot be brought to Europe unless the British navy commands the sea. These are some of the material consequences of defeat. But what of its spiritual consequences? We have brought up our children in the pride of a great nation, and taught them of an Empire on which the sun never sets. What shall we say to them in the hour of defeat and after the treaty of peace imposed by the victor? They will say: "Find us work and we will earn our bread and in due time win back the greatness that has been lost." But how are they to earn their bread? In this country half the employers will have been ruined by the war. The other half will have lost heavily, and much of the wealth even of the very rich will have gone to keep alive the innumerable multitude of starving unemployed. These will be advised after the war to emigrate. To what country? Englishmen, after defeat, will everywhere be at a discount. Words will not describe, and the imagination cannot realise, the suffering of a defeated nation living on an island which for fifty years has not produced food enough for its population. The material and spiritual results of defeat can easily be recognised by any one who takes the trouble to think about the question, though only experience either at first hand or supplied by history can enable a man fully to grasp its terrible nature. But a word must be said on the social and political consequences inseparable from the wreck of a State whose Government has been unable to fulfil its prime function, that of providing security for the national life. All experience shows that in such cases men do not take their troubles calmly. They are filled with passion. Their feelings find vent in the actions to which their previous currents of thought tended. The working class, long accustomed by its leaders to regard the capitalists as a class with interests and aims opposed to its own, will hardly be able in the stress of unemployment and of famine to change its way of thinking. The mass of the workmen, following leaders whose judgment may not perhaps be of the soundest but who will undoubtedly sincerely believe that the doctrines with which they have grown up are true, may assail the existing social order and lay the blame of their misfortunes upon the class which has hitherto had the government of the country in its hands and has supplied the leaders of both political parties. The indignation which would inspire this movement would not be altogether without justification, for it cannot be denied that both political parties have for many years regarded preparation for war and all that belongs to it as a minor matter, subordinate to the really far less important questions relying upon which each side has sought to win sufficient votes to secure a party majority. Why do I discuss the hypothesis of British defeat rather than that of British victory? Because it is the invariable practice of the masters of war to consider first the disagreeable possibilities and to make provision for them. But also because, according to every one of the tests which can be applied, the probability of defeat for Great Britain in the present state of Europe is exceedingly great. Rarely has a State unready for conflict been able to stand against a nation organised for war. The last of a long series of examples was the war between Russia and Japan, in which the vast resources of a great Empire were exhausted in the struggle with a State so small as to seem a pigmy in comparison with her giant adversary. On the 10th of February 1904, the day when the news reached England that the Russo-Japanese war had begun, I gave as follows my reasons for thinking that Japan would win:-- "The hypothesis of a considerable Japanese success, at any rate at first, is considered rather than its opposite, because Japan has at present all the marks of a nation likely to do great things in war. It is not merely that she has transformed her government and her education, has introduced military institutions on the German model, especially compulsory training and that vivifying institution, a general staff. The present quarrel arises from the deliberate policy of Russia, pursuing aims that are incompatible with every Japanese tradition and every Japanese hope. The whole Japanese nation has for years been burning with the sense of wrongs inflicted by Russia, and into this war, as into the preparation for it, the whole people throws itself, mind, soul, and body. This is the condition which produces great strategical plans and extreme energy in their execution. The Japanese forces are well organised, armed, and equipped. They are intelligently led and follow with intelligence. "Of Russia there is hardly evidence to show that the cause for which she is fighting has touched the imaginations or the feelings of more than a small fraction of the population. It is the war of a bureaucracy, and Russia may easily fail to develop either great leading, though her officers are instructed, or intelligent following of the leaders by the rank and file. But the Russian troops are brave and have always needed a good deal of beating." Substitute Great Britain for Russia and Germany for Japan in this forecast, which has been proved true, and every word holds good except two. We now know that Russia's policy was not deliberate; that her Government bungled into the war without knowing what it was doing. In just the same way British Governments have drifted blindly into the present difficult relations with Germany. Those in England who would push the country into a war with Germany are indeed not a bureaucracy, they are merely a fraction of one of the parties, and do not represent the mass of our people, who have no desire for such a war, and are so little aware of its possibility that they have never even taken the trouble to find out why it may come. A larger section of the other party is steeped in the belief that force, violence, and war are wicked in themselves, and ought therefore not to be thought about. It is a prejudice which, unless removed, may ruin this country, and there is no way of dissipating it except that of patient argument based upon observation of the world we live in. That way I shall attempt to follow in the next chapter. III. FORCE AND RIGHT "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away. Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies." (Matt. v. 38-44). If there are any among us who adopt these words as the governing rule of their lives they will certainly cause no difficulty to the State in its military policy whatever that may be, and will find their natural places even in time of war to the public good. If the whole population were of their way of thinking and acting there would be no need to discuss war. An invader would not be resisted. His troops would be hospitably entertained and treated with affection. No opposition would be made to the change of Government which he would introduce, and the taxes which he imposed would be cheerfully paid. But there would be no State, except that created by the invader; and the problem of conduct for those living the life described would arise when the State so set up issued its ordinances requiring every able-bodied man to become a competent soldier. There are those who believe, or fancy they believe, that the words I have quoted involve the principle that the use of force or of violence between man and man, or between nation and nation, is wicked. To the man who thinks it right to submit to any violence or to be killed rather than to use violence in resistance, I have no reply to make. The world cannot conquer him and fear has no hold upon him. But even he can carry out his doctrine only to the extent of allowing himself to be ill-treated, as I will now convince him. Many years ago the people of South Lancashire were horrified by the facts reported in a trial for murder. In a village on the outskirts of Bolton lived a young woman, much liked and respected as a teacher in one of the Board schools. On her way home from school she was accustomed to follow a footpath through a lonely wood, and here one evening her body was found. She had been strangled by a ruffian who had thought in this lonely place to have his wicked will of her. She had resisted successfully and he had killed her in the struggle. Fortunately the murderer was caught and the facts ascertained from circumstantial evidence were confirmed by his confession. Now, the question I have to ask of the man who takes his stand on the passage I have quoted from the Gospel is: "What would have been your duty if you had been walking through that wood and come upon the girl struggling with the man who killed her?" This is a crucial instance which, I submit, utterly destroys the doctrine that the use of violence is in itself wrong. The right or wrong is not in the employment of force but simply in the purpose for which it is used. What the case establishes, I think, is that to use violence in resistance to violent wrong is not only right but necessary. The employment of force for the maintenance of right is the foundation of all civilised human life, for it is the fundamental function of the State, and apart from the State there is no civilisation, no life worth living. The first business of the State is to protect the community against violent interference from outside. This it does by requiring from its subjects whatever personal service and whatever sacrifice of property and of time may be necessary; and resistance to these demands, as well as to any injunctions whatever laid by the State upon its subjects, is unconditionally suppressed by force. The mark of the State is sovereignty, or the identification of force and right, and the measure of the perfection of the State is furnished by the completeness of this identification. In the present condition of English political thought it may be worth while to dwell for a few moments upon the beneficent nature of this dual action of the State. Within its jurisdiction the State maintains order and law and in this way makes life worth living for its subjects. Order and law are the necessary conditions of men's normal activities, of their industry, of their ownership of whatever the State allows them to possess--for outside of the State there is no ownership--of their leisure and of their freedom to enjoy it. The State is even the basis of men's characters, for it sets up and establishes a minimum standard of conduct. Certain acts are defined as unlawful and punished as crimes. Other acts, though not criminal, are yet so far subject to the disapproval of the courts that the man who does them may have to compensate those who suffer injury or damage in consequence of them. These standards have a dual origin, in legislation and precedent. Legislation is a formal expression of the agreement of the community upon the definition of crimes, and common law has been produced by the decisions of the courts in actions between man and man. Every case tried in a civil court is a conflict between two parties, a struggle for justice, the judgment being justice applied to the particular case. The growth of English law has been through an endless series of conflicts, and the law of to-day may be described as a line passing through a series of points representing an infinite number of judgments, each the decision of a conflict in court. For seven hundred years, with hardly an interruption, every judgment of a court has been sustained by the force of the State. The law thus produced, expressed in legislation and interpreted by the courts, is the foundation of all English conduct and character. Upon the basis thus laid there takes place a perpetual evolution of higher standards. In the intercourse of a settled and undisturbed community and of the many societies which it contains, arise a number of standards of behaviour which each man catches as it were by infection from the persons with whom he habitually associates and to which he is obliged to conform, because if his conduct falls below them his companions will have nothing to do with him. Every class of society has its notions of what constitutes proper conduct and constrains its members to carry on their lives, so far as they are open to inspection, according to these notions. The standards tend constantly to improve. Men form an ideal of behaviour by observing the conduct of the best of their class, and in proportion as this ideal gains acceptance, find themselves driven to adopt it for fear of the social ostracism which is the modern equivalent of excommunication. Little by little what was at first a rarely attained ideal becomes a part of good manners. It established itself as custom and finally becomes part of the law. Thus the State, in co-operation with the whole community, becomes the educator of its people. Standards of conduct are formed slowly in the best minds and exist at first merely in what Plato would have called "the intellectual sphere," or in what would have been called at a later date in Palestine the "kingdom of heaven." But the strongest impulse of mankind is to realise its ideals. Its fervent prayer, which once uttered can never cease, is "on earth as it is in heaven," and the ideals developed in man's spiritual life gradually take shape in laws and become prohibitions and injunctions backed by the forces of the State. The State, however, is not an abstraction. For English people it means the United Kingdom; and if an Englishman wants to realise what he owes to his country let him look back through its history and see how all that he values in the character of the men he most admires and all that is best in himself has gradually been created and realised through the ceaseless effort of his forefathers, carried on continuously from the time when the first Englishman crossed the North Sea until the present day. Other nations have their types of conduct, perhaps as good as our own, but Englishmen value, and rightly value, the ideals particularly associated with the life of their own country. Perhaps two of the commonest expressions convey peculiarly English views of character. We talk of "fair play" as the essence of just dealing between man and man. It is a conception we have developed from the national games. We describe ideal conduct as that of a gentleman. It is a condensation of the best part of English history, and a search for a definition of the function of Great Britain in the moral economy of the world will hardly find a better answer than that it is to stamp upon every subject of the King the character implied in these two expressions. Suppose the British State to be overthrown or to drop from its place among the great Powers of the world, these ideals of character would be discredited and their place would be taken by others. The justification of the constraint exercised by the State upon its own citizens is the necessity for security, the obligation of self-defence, which arises from the fact that outside the State there are other States, each endowed like itself with sovereignty, each of them maintaining by force its conception of right. The power of the State over its own subjects is thus in the last resort a consequence of the existence of other States. Upon the competition between them rests the order of the world. It is a competition extending to every sphere of life and in its acute form takes the shape of war, a struggle for existence, for the mastery or for right. IV. ARBITRATION AND DISARMAMENT To some people the place of war in the economy of nations appears to be unsatisfactory. They think war wicked and a world where it exists out of joint. Accordingly they devote themselves to suggestions for the abolition of war and for the discovery of some substitute for it. Two theories are common; the first, that arbitration can in every case be a substitute for war, the second that the hopes of peace would be increased by some general agreement for disarmament. The idea of those who regard arbitration as a universal substitute for war appears to be that the relations between States can be put upon a basis resembling that of the relations between citizens in a settled and civilised country like our own. In Great Britain we are accustomed to a variety of means for settling disagreements between persons. There are the law courts, there are the cases in which recourse is had, with the sanction of the law courts, to the inquiry and decision of an arbitrator, and in all our sports we are accustomed to the presence of an umpire whose duty it is impartially to see that the rules of the game are observed and immediately to decide all points that might otherwise be doubtful. The work of an umpire who sees that the rules of the game are observed is based upon the consent of the players of both sides. Without that consent there could be no game, and the consent will be found to be based upon the fact that all the players are brought up with similar traditions and with like views of the nature of the game. Where this unity does not exist, difficulties constantly arise, as is notoriously the case in international sports. The attempt has been made, with constantly increasing success, to mitigate the evils of war by the creation of institutions in some way analogous to that of the umpire in a game. The Declaration of London, recently published, is an agreement between the principal Powers to accept a series of rules concerning maritime war, to be administered by an International Prize Court. The function of an arbitrator, usually to decide questions of fact and to assess compensation for inconvenience, most commonly the inconvenience occasioned to a private person by some necessary act of the State, also rests upon the consent of the parties, though in this case the consent is usually imposed upon them by the State through some legislative enactment or through the decision of a court. The action of a court of law, on the other hand, does not rest upon the consent of the parties. In a civil action the defendant may be and very often is unwilling to take any part in the proceedings. But he has no choice, and, whether he likes it or not, is bound by the decision of the court. For the court is the State acting in its judicial capacity with a view to insure that justice shall be done. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant has done him some wrong either by breach of contract or otherwise, and the verdict or judgment determines whether or not this is the case, and, if it is, what compensation is due. The judgment once given, the whole power of the State will be used to secure its execution. The business of a criminal court is the punishment of offenders whom it is the function of the State to discover, to bring to trial, and, when convicted, to punish. The prisoner's consent is not asked, and the judgment of the court is supported by the whole power of the State. In the international sphere there is no parallel to the action either of a civil or of a criminal court. Civil and criminal jurisdiction are attributes of sovereignty, and over two independent States there is no sovereign power. If, therefore, it is desired to institute between two States a situation analogous to that by which the subjects of a single Government are amenable to judicial tribunals, the proper way is to bring the two States under one sovereignty. This can be effected, and is constantly effected, by one of two methods. Either the two States federate and form a united State, or one of them conquers and annexes the other. The former process has been seen in modern times in the formation of the United States of America: the latter formed the substance of the history of civilisation during the first three centuries before Christ, when the Roman State successively conquered, annexed, and absorbed all the other then existing States surrounding the basin of the Mediterranean. The history of no State justifies the belief that order and justice can successfully be maintained merely by the action of umpires and of arbitrators. Every State worth the name has had to rely upon civil and criminal courts and upon law enforced by its authority, that is, upon a series of principles of right expressed in legislation and upon an organisation of force for the purpose of carrying those principles into practical effect. It appears, then, that so far from the experience of States justifying the view that it is wrong to employ force, the truth is that right or law, unless supported by force, is ineffective, that the objection in principle to any use of force involves anarchy, or the cessation of the State, and that the wish to substitute judicial tribunals for war as a means of settling disputes between State and State is a wish to amalgamate under a single Government all those States which are to benefit by the substitution. The reasonable attitude with regard to arbitration is to accept it whenever the other side will accept it. But if the adversary refuses arbitration and insists upon using force, what course is open to any State but that of resisting force by force? Arbitration has from the earliest times been preferred in most of those cases to which it was applicable, that is, in cases in which there was a basis of common view or common tradition sufficient to make agreement practicable. But wherever there has been a marked divergence of ideals or a different standard of right, there has been a tendency for each side to feel that to submit its conscience or its convictions of right, its sense of what is most sacred in life, to an outside judgment would involve a kind of moral suicide. In such cases every nation repudiates arbitration and prefers to be a martyr, in case of need, to its sense of justice. It is at least an open question whether the disappearance of this feeling would be a mark of progress or of degeneration. At any rate it is practically certain that the period when it will have disappeared cannot at present be foreseen. The abolition of war, therefore, involves the abolition of independent States and their amalgamation into one. There are many who have hoped for this ideal, expressed by Tennyson when he dreamed of "The Parliament of man, the Federation of the world." That it is the ultimate destiny of mankind to be united under a single Government seems probable enough, but it is rash to assume that that result will be reached either by a process of peaceful negotiation, or by the spread of the imperfect methods of modern democratic government. The German Empire, with its population of sixty millions, educated by the State, disciplined by the State, relying on the State, and commanded by the State, is as potent in comparison with the less disciplined and less organised communities which surround it as was, in the third century before Christ, the Roman State in comparison with the disunited multitude of Greek cities, the commercial oligarchy of Carthage, and the half-civilised tribes of Gaul and Spain. Unless the other States of Europe can rouse themselves to a discipline as sound and to an organisation as subtle as those of Prussia and to the perception of a common purpose in the maintenance of their independence, the union of Europe under a single Government is more likely to be brought about by the conquering hand of Germany than by the extension of democratic institutions and of sentimental good understandings. Proposals for disarmament stand on an entirely different footing from proposals to agree to arbitration. The State that disarms renounces to the extent of its disarmament the power to protect itself. Upon what other power is it suggested that it should rely? In the last analysis the suggestion amounts to a proposal for the abolition of the State, or its abandonment of its claim to represent the right. Those who propose agreements for disarmament imagine that the suggestion if adopted would lead to the establishment of peace. Have they considered the natural history of peace as one of the phenomena of the globe which we inhabit? The only peace of any value is that between civilised nations. It rests either upon the absence of dispute between them or upon an equilibrium of forces. During the last few centuries there has usually been at the end of a great European war a great European congress which has regulated for the time being the matters which were in dispute, and the treaty thus negotiated has remained for a long time the basis of the relations between the Powers. It is always a compromise, but a compromise more or less acceptable to all parties, in which they acquiesce until some change either by growth or decay makes the conditions irksome. Then comes a moment when one or more of the States is dissatisfied and wishes for a change. When that has happened the dissatisfied State attempts to bring about the change which it desires, but if the forces with which its wish is likely to be opposed are very great it may long acquiesce in a state of things most distasteful to it. Let there be a change in the balance of forces and the discontented State will seize the opportunity, will assert itself, and if resisted will use its forces to overcome opposition. A proposal for disarmament must necessarily be based upon the assumption that there is to be no change in the system, that the _status quo_ is everywhere to be preserved. This amounts to a guarantee of the decaying and inefficient States against those which are growing and are more efficient. Such an arrangement would not tend to promote the welfare of mankind and will not be accepted by those nations that have confidence in their own future. That such a proposal should have been announced by a British Government is evidence not of the strength of Great Britain, not of a healthy condition of national life, but of inability to appreciate the changes which have been produced during the last century in the conditions of Europe and the consequent alteration in Great Britain's relative position among the great Powers. It was long ago remarked by the German historian Bernhardi that Great Britain was the first country in Europe to revive in the modern world the conception of the State. The feudal conception identified the State with the monarch. The English revolution of 1688 was an identification of the State with the Nation. But the nationalisation of the State, of which the example was set in 1688 by Great Britain, was carried out much more thoroughly by France in the period that followed the revolution of 1789; and in the great conflict which ensued between France and the European States the principal continental opponents of France were compelled to follow her example, and, in a far greater degree than has ever happened in England, to nationalise the State. It is to that struggle that we must turn if we are to understand the present condition of Europe and the relations of Great Britain to the European Powers. V. THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR The transformation of society of which the French Revolution was the most striking symptom produced a corresponding change in the character of war. By the Revolution the French people constituted itself the State, and the process was accompanied by so much passion and so much violence that it shortly involved the reconstituted nation in a quarrel with its neighbours the Germanic Empire and Prussia, which rapidly developed into a war between France and almost all the rest of Europe. The Revolution weakened and demoralised the French army and disorganised the navy, which it deprived of almost all its experienced officers. When the war began the regular army was supplemented by a great levy of volunteers. The mixed force thus formed, in spite of early successes, was unable to stand against the well-disciplined armies of Austria and Prussia, and as the war continued, while the French troops gained solidity and experience, their numbers had to be increased by a levy _en masse_ or a compulsory drafting of all the men of a certain age into the army. In this way the army and the nation were identified as they had never been in modern Europe before, and in the fifth year of the war a leader was found in the person of General Bonaparte, who had imbued himself with the principles of the art of war, as they had been expounded by the best strategists of the old French army, and who had thus thought out with unprecedented lucidity the method of conducting campaigns. His mastery of the art of generalship was revealed by his success in 1796, and as the conflict with Europe continued, he became the leader and eventually the master of France. Under his impulse and guidance the French army, superior to them in numbers, organisation, and tactical skill, crushed one after another the more old-fashioned and smaller armies of the great continental Powers, with the result that the defeated armies, under the influence of national resentment after disaster, attempted to reorganise themselves upon the French model. The new Austrian army undertook its revenge too soon and was defeated in 1809; but the Prussian endeavour continued and bore fruit, after the French disasters in Russia of 1812, in the national rising in which Prussia, supported by Russia and Austria and assisted by the British operations in the Peninsula, overthrew the French Empire in 1814. After the definitive peace, deferred by the hundred days, but finally forced upon France on the field of Waterloo, the Prussian Government continued to foster the school of war which it had founded in the period of humiliation. Prussian officers trained in that school tried to learn the lessons of the long period of war which they had passed through. What they discovered was that war between nations, as distinct from war between dynasties or royal houses, was a struggle for existence in which each adversary risked everything and in which success was to be expected only from the complete prostration of the enemy. In the long run, they said to themselves, the only defence consists in striking your adversary to the ground. That being the case, a nation must go into war, if war should become inevitable, with the maximum force which it can possibly produce, represented by its whole manhood of military age, thoroughly trained, organised, and equipped. The Prussian Government adhered to these ideas, to which full effect was given in 1866, when the Prussian army, reorganised in 1860, crushed in ten days the army of Austria, and in 1870 when, in a month from the first shot fired, it defeated one half of the French army at Gravelotte and captured the other half at Sedan. These events proved to all continental nations the necessity of adopting the system of the nation in arms and giving to their whole male population, up to the limits of possibility, the training and the organisation necessary for success in war. The principle that war is a struggle for existence, and that the only effective defence consists in the destruction of the adversary's force, received during the age of Napoleon an even more absolute demonstration at sea than was possible on land. Great Britain, whether she would or no, was drawn into the European conflict. The neglect of the army and of the art of war into which, during the eighteenth century, her Governments had for the most part fallen, made it impracticable for her to take the decisive part which she had played in the days of William III. and of Marlborough in the struggle against the French army; her contributions to the land war were for the most part misdirected and futile. Her expeditions to Dunkirk, to Holland, and to Hanover embarrassed rather than materially assisted the cause of her allies. But her navy, favourably handicapped by the breakdown, due to the Revolution, of the French navy, eventually produced in the person of Nelson a leader who, like Napoleon, had made it the business of his life to understand the art of war. His victories, like Napoleon's, were decisive, and when he fell at Trafalgar the navies of continental Europe, which one after another had been pressed into the service of France, had all been destroyed. Then were revealed the prodigious consequences of complete victory at sea, which were more immediate, more decisive, more far-reaching, more irrevocable than on land. The sea became during the continuance of the war the territory of Great Britain, the open highway along which her ships could pass, while it was closed to the ships of her adversaries. Across that secure sea a small army was sent to Spain to assist the national and heroic, though miserably organised, resistance made by the Spanish people against the French attempt at conquest. The British Government had at last found the right direction for such military force as it possessed. Sir John Moore's army brought Napoleon with a great force into the field, but it was able to retire to its own territory, the sea. The army under Wellington, handled with splendid judgment, had to wait long for its opportunity, which came when Napoleon with the Grand Army had plunged into the vast expanse of Russia. Wellington, marching from victory to victory, was then able to produce upon the general course of the war an effect out of all proportion to the strength of the force which he commanded or of that which directly opposed him. While France was engaged in her great continental struggle England was reaping, all over the world, the fruits of her naval victories. Of the colonies of her enemies she took as many as she wanted, though at the peace she returned most of them to their former owners. Of the world's trade she obtained something like a monopoly. The nineteenth century saw the British colonies grow up into so many nations and the British administration of India become a great empire. These developments are now seen to have been possible only through the security due to the fact that Great Britain, during the first half of the nineteenth century, had the only navy worth considering in the world, and that during the second half its strength greatly preponderated over that of any of the new navies which had been built or were building. No wonder that when in 1888 the American observer, Captain Mahan, published his volume "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," other nations besides the British read from that book the lesson that victory at sea carried with it a prosperity, an influence, and a greatness obtainable by no other means. It was natural for Englishmen to draw the moral which was slumbering in the national consciousness that England's independence, her empire, and her greatness depended upon her sea power. But it was equally natural that other nations should draw a different moral and should ask themselves why this tremendous prize, the primacy of nations and the first place in the world, should for ever belong to the inhabitants of a small island, a mere appendage to the continent of Europe. This question we must try to answer. But before entering upon that inquiry I will ask the reader to note the great lesson of the age of Napoleon and of Nelson. It produced a change in the character of war, which enlarged itself from a mere dispute between Governments and became a struggle between nations. The instrument used was no longer a small standing army, but the able-bodied male population in arms. Great Britain indeed still retained her standing army, but for the time she threw her resources without stint into her navy and its success was decisive. VI. THE BALANCE OF POWER We have seen what a splendid prize was the result of British victory at sea, supplemented by British assistance to other Powers on land, a century ago. We have now to ask ourselves first of all how it came about that Great Britain was able to win it, and afterwards whether it was awarded once for all or was merely a challenge cup to be held only so long as there should be no competitor. The answer to the first question is a matter of history. England was peculiarly favoured by fortune or by fate in the great struggles through which, during a period of three hundred years, she asserted and increased her superiority at sea until a century ago it became supremacy. She rarely had to fight alone. Her first adversary was Spain. In the conflict with Spain she had the assistance of the Dutch Provinces. When the Dutch were strong enough to become her maritime rivals she had for a time the co-operation of France. Then came a long period during which France was her antagonist. At the beginning of this epoch William III. accepted the British crown in order to be able to use the strength of England to defend his native country, Holland. His work was taken up by Marlborough, whose first great victory was won in co-operation with the Imperial commander, Prince Eugene. From that time on, each of the principal wars was a European war in which France was fighting both by sea and land, her armies being engaged against continental foes, while Great Britain could devote her energies almost exclusively to her navy. In the Seven Years' War it was the Prussian army which won the victories on land, while small British forces were enabled by the help of the navy to win an Empire from France in Canada, and to lay the foundations of the British Empire in India. In the war of American Independence, Great Britain for once stood alone, but this was the one conflict which contributed little or nothing towards establishing the ascendency of the British navy. Great Britain failed of her object because that ascendency was incomplete. Then came the wars of the French Revolution and Empire in which the British navy was the partner of the Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and Spanish armies. These are the facts which we have to explain. We have to find out how it was that so many continental nations, whether they liked it or not, found themselves, in fighting their own battles, helping to bring about the British predominance at sea. It must be remembered that land warfare involves much heavier sacrifices of life than warfare at sea, and that though Great Britain no doubt spent great sums of money not merely in maintaining her navy but also in subsidising her allies, she could well afford to do so because the prosperity of her over-sea trade, due to her naval success, made her the richest country in Europe. The other nations that were her allies might not unnaturally feel that they had toiled and that Great Britain had gathered the increase. What is the explanation of a co-operation of which in the long run it might seem that one partner has had the principal benefit? If two nations carry on a serious war on the same side, it may be assumed that each of them is fighting for some cause which it holds to be vital, and that some sort of common interest binds the allies together. The most vital interest of any nation is its own independence, and while that is in question it conceives of its struggle as one of self-defence. The explanation of Great Britain's having had allies in the past may therefore be that the independence of Great Britain was threatened by the same danger which threatened the independence of other Powers. This theory is made more probable by the fact that England's great struggles--that of Queen Elizabeth against Spain, that of William III. and Marlborough against Louis XIV., and of Pitt against Napoleon--were, each one of them, against an adversary whose power was so great as to overshadow the Continent and to threaten it with an ascendency which, had it not been checked, might have developed into a universal monarchy. It seems, therefore, that in the main England, in defending her own interests, was consciously or unconsciously the champion of the independence of nations against the predominance of any one of their number. The effect of Great Britain's self-defence was to facilitate the self-defence of other nations, and thus to preserve to Europe its character of a community of independent States as opposed to that which it might have acquired, if there had been no England, of a single Empire, governed from a single capital. This is, however, only half of the answer we want. It explains to some extent why England could find other nations co-operating with her, and reveals the general nature of the cause which they maintained in common. But let us remember the distinction between a quarrel in which the main thing is to be in the right, and a fight in which the main thing is to win. The explanation just sketched is a justification of England's policy, an attempt to show that in the main she had right on her side. That is only part of the reason why she had allies. The other part is that she was strong and could help them. She had three modes of action. She used her navy to destroy the hostile navy or navies and to obtain control of the seaways. Then she used that control partly to destroy the seaborne trade of her enemies, and partly to send armies across the sea to attack her enemies' armies. It was because she could employ these three modes of warfare, and because two of them were not available for other Powers, that her influence on the course of events was so great. The question of moral justification is more or less speculative. I have treated it here on a hypothesis which is not new, though since I propounded it many years ago it has met with little adverse criticism. But the question of force is one of hard fact; it is fundamental. If England had not been able to win her battles at sea and to help her allies by her war against trade and by her ubiquitous if small armies, there would have been no need for hypotheses by which to justify or explain her policy; she would have long ago lost all importance and all interest except to antiquarians. Our object is to find out how she may now justify her existence, and enough has been said to make it clear that if she is to do that she must not only have a cause good enough to gain the sympathy of other Powers, but force enough to give them confidence in what she can do to help herself and them. We are now ready to examine the second question, whether or no Great Britain's position, won a century ago, is liable to challenge. VII. THE RISE OF GERMANY The great event of the nineteenth century in the history of Europe is the union of Germany into a Federal State. The secret of Prussia's success in accomplishing that union and in leading the federation so created, has been the organisation of the national energies by a far-seeing Government, a process begun as a means of self-defence against the French domination of the period between 1806 and 1812. The Prussian statesmen of those days were not content merely to reorganise the army on the basis of universal service. They organised the whole nation. They swept away an ancient system of land tenure in order to make the peasants free and prosperous. They established a system of public education far in advance of anything possessed by any other nation. They especially devoted themselves to fostering industry, manufacture, and commerce. The result of this systematic direction of the national energies by a Government of experts, continuously supported by the patient and methodical diligence of the people, has been a constant and remarkable advance of the national prosperity, a wonderful development of the national resources, and an enormous addition to the national strength. For the last forty years it has been the settled policy of the German Government that her organised military forces should be strong enough in case of need to confront two enemies at once, one on either frontier. Feeling themselves thus stronger than any other European state, the Germans have watched with admiration the growth of the British Colonies and of British trade. It is natural that they should think that Germany too might expect to have colonies and a great maritime trade. But wherever in the world German travellers have gone, wherever German traders have settled, wherever the German Government has thought of working for a site for a colony, everywhere they have met British influence, British trade, the British flag. In this way has been brought home to them as to no other people the tremendous influence of sea-power. Their historians have recalled to them the successive attempts which have been made in past times by German States to create a navy and to obtain colonies, attempts which to our own people are quite unknown, because they never, except in the case of the Hanseatic League, attained to such importance as to figure in the general history of Europe. In the period between 1815 and 1870, when the desire for national unity was expressed by a host of German writers, there were not wanting pleas for the creation of a German navy. Several attempts were made in those days to construct either a Prussian or a German fleet; but the time was not ripe and these attempts came to nothing. The constitution of the Empire, promulgated in 1871, embodied the principle that there should be a German navy, of which the Emperor should be commander-in-chief, and to the creation of that navy the most assiduous labour has been devoted. The plan pursued was in the first instance to train a body of officers who should thoroughly understand the sea and maritime warfare, and for this purpose the few ships which were first built were sent on long voyages by way of training the crews and of giving the officers that self-reliance and initiative which were thought to be the characteristic mark of the officers of the British navy. In due time was founded the naval college of Kiel, designed on a large scale to be a great school of naval thought and of naval war. The history of maritime wars was diligently studied, _especially_ of course the history of the British navy. The professors and lecturers made it their business to explore the workings of Nelson's mind just as German military professors had made themselves pupils of Napoleon. And not until a clear and consistent theory of naval war had been elaborated and made the common property of all the officers of the navy was the attempt made to expand the fleet to a scale thought to be proportionate to the position of Germany among the nations. When it was at length determined that that constructive effort should be made, the plan was thought out and embodied in a law regulating the construction for a number of years of a fleet of predetermined size and composition to be used for a purpose defined in the law itself. The object was to have a fleet of sufficient strength and of suitable formation to be able to hold its own in case of need even against the greatest maritime Power. In other words, Germany thought that if her prosperity continued and her superiority in organisation over other continental nations continued to increase, she might find England's policy backed by England's naval power an obstacle in the way of her natural ambition. After all, no one can be surprised if the Germans think Germany as well entitled as _any other_ State to cherish the ambition of being the first nation in the world. It has for a century been the rational practice of the German Government that its chief strategist should at all times keep ready designs for operations in case of war against any reasonably possible adversary. Such a set of designs would naturally include a plan of operation for the case of a conflict with Great Britain, and no doubt, every time that plan of operations was re-examined and revised, light would be thrown upon the difficulties of a struggle with a great maritime Power and upon the means by which those difficulties might be overcome. The British navy is so strong that, unless it were mismanaged, the German navy ought to have no chance of overcoming it. Yet Germany cannot but be anxious, in case of war, to protect herself against the consequences of maritime blockade, and of the effort of a superior British navy to close the sea to German merchantmen. Accordingly, the law which regulates the naval shipbuilding of the German Empire lays down in its preamble that--"Germany must possess a battle-fleet so strong that a war with her would, even for the greatest naval Power, be accompanied with such dangers as would render that Power's position doubtful." In other words, a war with Great Britain must find the German navy too strong for the British navy to be able to confine it to its harbours, and to maintain, in spite of it, complete command of the seas which border the German coast. As German strategists continuously accept the doctrine that the first object of a fleet in war is the destruction of the enemy's fleet with a view to the consequent command of the sea, the German Navy Act is equivalent to the declaration of an intention in case of conflict to challenge the British navy for the mastery. This is the answer to the question asked at the beginning of the last chapter, whether the command of the sea is a permanent prize or a challenge cup. Germany at any rate regards it as a challenge cup, and has resolved to be qualified, if occasion should arise, to make trial of her capacity to win it. VIII. NATIONHOOD NEGLECTED What has been the effect upon Great Britain of the rise of Germany? Is there any cause of quarrel between the two peoples and the two States? That Germany has given herself a strong military organisation is no crime. On the contrary, she was obliged to do it, she could not have existed without it. The foundations of her army were laid when she was suffering all the agonies of conquest and oppression. Only by a tremendous effort, at the cost of sacrifices to which England's experience offers no analogy, was she able to free herself from the over-lordship of Napoleon. King William I. expanded and reorganised his army because he had passed through the bitter humiliation of seeing his country impotent and humbled by a combination of Austria and Russia. Whether Bismarck's diplomacy was less honourable than that of the adversaries with whom he had to deal is a question to which different answers may be given. But in a large view of history it is irrelevant, for beyond all doubt the settlements effected through the war of 1866 and 1870 were sound settlements and left the German nation and Europe in a healthier condition than that which preceded them. The unity of Germany was won by the blood of her people, who were and are rightly resolved to remain strong enough and ready to defend it, come what may. It is not for Englishmen, who have talked for twenty years of a Two-Power standard for their navy, to reproach Germany for maintaining her army at a similar standard. Had she not done so the peace of Europe would not have been preserved, nor is it possible on any ground of right or justice to cavil at Germany's purpose to be able in case of need to defend herself at sea. The German Admiral Rosendahl, discussing the British and German navies and the proposals for disarmament, wrote in the _Deutsche Revue_ for June 1909:-- "If England claims and thinks permanently necessary for her an absolute supremacy at sea that is her affair, and no sensible man will reproach her for it; but it is quite a different thing for a Great Power like the German Empire, by an international treaty supposed to be binding for all time, expressly to recognise and accept this in principle. Assuredly we do not wish to enter into a building competition with England on a footing of equality.... But a political agreement on the basis of the unconditional superiority of the British Fleet would be equivalent to an abandonment of our national dignity, and though we do not, speaking broadly, wish to dispute England's predominance at sea, yet we do mean in case of war to be or to become the masters on our own coasts." There is not a word in this passage which can give just cause of offence to England or to Englishmen. That there has been and still is a good deal of mutual ill-feeling both in Germany and in England cannot be denied. Rivalry between nations is always accompanied by feeling which is all the stronger when it is instinctive and therefore, though not unintelligible, apt to be irrational. But what in this case is really at the bottom of it? There have no doubt been a number of matters that have been discussed between the two Governments, and though they have for the most part been settled, the manner in which they have been raised and pressed by German Governments has caused them to be regarded by British Ministers, and to a less extent by the British people, as sources of annoyance, as so many diplomatic "pin-pricks." The manners of German diplomacy are not suave. Suavity is no more part of the Bismarckian tradition than exactitude. But after all, the manners of the diplomatists of any country are a matter rather for the nation whose honour they concern than for the nations to which they have given offence. They only partially account for the deep feeling which has grown up between Great Britain and Germany. The truth is that England is disturbed by the rise of Germany, which her people, in spite of abundant warnings, did not foresee and have not appreciated until the moment when they find themselves outstripped in the race by a people whom they have been accustomed to regard with something of the superiority with which the prosperous and polished dweller in a capital looks upon his country cousin from the farm. Fifty years ago Germany in English estimation did not count. The name was no more than a geographical expression. Great Britain was the one great Power. She alone had colonies and India. She as good as monopolised the world's shipping and the world's trade. As compared with other countries she was immeasurably rich and prosperous. Her population during the long peace, interrupted only by the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny, had multiplied beyond men's wildest dreams. Her manufacturers were amassing fortunes, her industry had no rival. The Victorian age was thought of as the beginning of a wonderful new era, in which, among the nations, England was first and the rest nowhere. The temporary effort of the French to create a modern navy disturbed the sense of security which existed and gave rise to the Volunteer movement, which was felt to be a marvellous display of patriotism. There were attempts to show that British self-complacency was not altogether justified. The warnings of those who looked below the surface were read and admired. Few writers were more popular than Carlyle, Ruskin, and Matthew Arnold. But all three held aloof from the current of public life which flowed in the traditional party channels. There was no effort to revive the conception of the nation as the organised state to which every citizen is bound, the source and centre of all men's duties. Accordingly every man devoted himself to his own affairs, of which the first was to make money and the second to enjoy life; those who were rich enough finding their amusement in Parliament, which was regarded as the most interesting club in London, and in its debates, of which the charm, for those who take part in them, lies in the fact that for success not knowledge of a subject, but fluency, readiness, and wit are required. The great events taking place in the world, the wars in Bohemia, in France, and in Turkey, added a certain, interest to English life because they furnished to the newspapers matter more exciting than any novelist could produce, and in this way gratified the taste for sensation which had been acquired both by rich and poor. That these events meant anything in particular to the British nation was not likely to be realised while that nation was, in fact, non-existent, and had resolved itself into forty million individuals, each of them living for his own ends, slightly enlarged to include his family, his literary or scientific society, perhaps his cricket club, and on Sunday morning his church or chapel. There was also a widespread interest in "politics," by which was meant the particular fads cherished by one's own caucus to the exclusion of the nation's affairs, it being more or less understood that the army, the navy, and foreign policy were not to be made political questions. While forty million English people have thus been spending their lives self-centred, content to make their living, to enjoy life, and to behave kindly to their fellows, there has grown up in Germany a nation, a people of sixty millions, who believe that they belong together, that their country has the first call on them, whose children go to school because the Government that represents the nation bids them, who go for two years to the army or the navy to learn war, because they know that if the nation has to fight it can do so only by their fighting for it. Their Government thinks it is its business to be always improving the organisation of its sixty millions for security, for knowledge, for instruction, for agriculture, for industry, for navigation. Thus after forty years of common effort for a common good Germany finds itself the first nation in Europe, more than holding its own in every department of life, and eagerly surveying the world in search of opportunities. The Englishman, while he has been living his own life and, as I think, improving in many respects, has at the same time been admiring the British Empire, and discovering with pride that a number of new nations have grown up in distant places, formed of people whose fathers or grandfathers emigrated from Great Britain. He remembers from his school lessons or reads in the newspapers of the greatness of England in past centuries, and naturally feels that with such a past and with so great an Empire existing to-day, his country should be a very great Power. But as he discovers what the actual performance of Germany is, and becomes acquainted with the results of her efforts in science, education, trade, and industry, and the way in which the influence of the German Government predominates in the affairs of Europe, he is puzzled and indignant, and feels that in some way Great Britain has been surpassed and outdone. The state of the world which he thought existed, in which England was the first nation and the rest nowhere, has completely changed while he has been attending to his private business, his "politics," and his cricket, and he finds the true state of the world to be that, while in industry England has hard work to hold her own against her chief rival, she has already been passed in education and in science, that her army, good as it is, is so small as scarcely to count, and that even her navy cannot keep its place without a great and unexpected effort. Yet fifty years ago England had on her side all the advantages but one. She was forgetting nationhood while Germany was reviving it. The British people, instead of organising themselves as one body, the nation, have organised themselves into two bodies, the two "political" parties. England's one chance lies in recovering the unity that has been lost, which she must do by restoring the nation to its due place in men's hearts and lives. To find out how that is to be done we must once more look at Europe and at England's relations to Europe. IX. NEW CONDITIONS It has been seen how, as a result of the struggle with Napoleon, England, from 1805 onwards, was the only sea power remaining in Europe, and indeed, with the exception of the United States, the only sea power in the world. One of the results was that she had for many years the monopoly of the whole ocean, not merely for the purposes of war, but also for the purposes of trade. The British mercantile marine continued through the greater part of the nineteenth century to increase its preponderance over all others, and this remarkable, and probably quite exceptional, growth was greatly favoured by the Civil War in America, during which the mercantile marine of the United States received from the action of the Confederate cruisers a damage from which it has never recovered. In the years immediately following 1805, Great Britain in self-defence, or as a means of continuing the war against France, in regard to which her resources for operations on land were limited, had recourse to the operations of blockade, by which the sea was closed, as far as possible, to enemy merchantmen while Great Britain prohibited neutral ships from carrying enemy goods. Napoleon replied by the attempt to exclude British goods from the Continent altogether, and indeed the pressure produced by Great Britain's blockades compelled Napoleon further to extend his domination on the Continent. Thus the other continental States found themselves between the devil and the deep sea. They had to submit to the domination of Napoleon on land and to the complete ascendency of Great Britain on the waters which surrounded their coasts. The British claims to supremacy at sea were unanimously resented by all the continental States, which all suffered from them, but in all cases the national resentment against French invasion or French occupation of territory was greater than the resentment against the invisible pressure exercised by the British navy. In the wars of liberation, though Great Britain was the welcome ally of all the States that were fighting against France, the pressure of British sea power was none the less disagreeable and, in the years of peace which followed, the British monopoly of sea power, of sea-carriage, of manufacturing industry, and of international trade were equally disliked by almost all the nations of Europe. Protective duties were regarded as the means of fostering national industries and of sheltering them against the overpowering competition of British manufactures. The British claim to the dominion of the sea was regarded as unfounded in right, and was in principle as strongly denounced as had been the territorial domination of France. The mistress of the seas was regarded as a tyrant, whom it would be desirable, if it were possible, to depose, and there were many who thought that as the result of a conflict in which the final success had been gained by the co-operation of a number of States acting together, the gains of Great Britain which, as time went on, were seen to be growing into a world-wide empire, had been out of proportion to the services she had rendered to the common cause. Meantime during the century which has elapsed since the last great war, there has been a complete change in the conditions of intercourse between nations at sea and of maritime warfare. It has come about gradually, almost imperceptibly, so that it could hardly be appreciated before the close of the nineteenth century. But it is vital to Great Britain that her people should understand the nature of the transformation. The first thing to be observed is that the British monopoly of shipping and of oversea trade has disappeared. Great Britain still has by far the largest mercantile marine and by far the greatest share in the world's sea traffic, but she no longer stands alone. Germany, the United States, France, Norway, Italy, and Japan all have great fleets of merchant ships and do an enormous, some of them a rapidly increasing, seaborne trade. A large number of the principal States import the raw material of manufacture and carry on import and export on a large scale. The railway system connects all the great manufacturing centres, even those which lie far inland, with the great ports to and from which the lines of steamers ply. The industrial life of every nation is more than ever dependent upon its communications with and by the sea, and every nation has become more sensitive than ever to any disturbance of its maritime trade. The preponderance of the British navy is therefore a subject of anxiety in every State which regards as possible a conflict of its own interests with those of Great Britain. This is one of the reasons why continental States have during the last quarter of a century been disposed to increase their fleets and their naval expenditure. In the Declaration of Paris, renewed and extended by the Declaration of London, the maritime States have agreed that in any future war enemy goods in a neutral ship are to be safe from capture unless the ship is running a blockade, which must be effective. Whether Great Britain was well or ill advised in accepting this rule is a question which it is now useless to discuss, for the decision cannot be recalled, and the rule must be regarded as established beyond controversy. Its effect is greatly to diminish the pressure which a victorious navy can bring to bear upon a hostile State. It deprives Great Britain of one of the most potent weapons which she employed in the last great war. To-day it would be impracticable even for a victorious navy to cut off a continental State from seaborne traffic. The ports of that State might be blockaded and its merchant ships would be liable to capture, but the victorious navy could not interfere with the traffic carried by neutral ships to neutral ports. Accordingly, Great Britain could not now, even in the event of naval victory being hers, exercise upon an enemy the pressure which she formerly exercised through the medium of the neutral States. Any continental State, even if its coasts were effectively blockaded, could still, with increased difficulty, obtain supplies both of raw material and of food by the land routes through the territory of its neutral neighbours. But Great Britain herself, as an insular State, would not, in case of naval defeat, have this advantage. A decisive defeat of the British navy might be followed by an attempt on the part of the enemy to blockade the coasts of Great Britain, though that would no doubt be difficult, for a very large force would be required to maintain an effective blockade of the whole coast-line. It is conceivable that an enemy might attempt in spite of the Declaration of London to treat as contraband food destined for the civil population and this course ought to be anticipated, but in the military weakness of Great Britain an enemy whose navy had gained the upper hand would almost certainly prefer to undertake the speedier process of bringing the war to an end by landing an army in Great Britain. A landing on a coast so extensive as that of this island can with difficulty be prevented by forces on land, because troops cannot be moved as quickly as ships. The war in the Far East has shown how strong such an army might be, and how great a military effort would be needed to crush it. The proper way to render an island secure, is by a navy strong enough to obtain in war the control of the surrounding sea, and a navy unable to perform that function cannot be regarded as a guarantee of security. The immediate effects of naval victory can hardly ever again be so far-reaching as they were a century ago in the epoch of masts and sails. At that time there were no foreign navies, except in European waters, and in the Atlantic waters of the United States. When, therefore, the British navy had crushed its European adversaries, its ships could act without serious opposition upon any sea and any coast in the world. To-day, the radius of action of a victorious fleet is restricted by the necessity of a supply of coal, and therefore by the secure possession of coaling-stations at suitable intervals along any route by which the fleet proposes to move, or by the goodwill of neutrals in permitting it to coal at their depots. To-day, moreover, there are navies established even in distant seas. In the Pacific, for example, are the fleets of Japan and of the United States, and these, in their home waters, will probably be too strong to be opposed by European navies acting at a vast distance from their bases. It seems likely, therefore, that neither Great Britain nor any other State will in future enjoy that monopoly of sea power which was granted to Great Britain by the circumstances of her victories in the last great war. What I have called the great prize has in fact ceased to exist, and even if an adversary were to challenge the British navy, the reward of his success would not be a naval supremacy of anything like the kind or extent which peculiar conditions made it possible for Great Britain to enjoy during the nineteenth century. It would be a supremacy limited and reduced by the existence of the new navies that have sprung up. From these considerations a very important conclusion must be drawn. In the first place, enough victory at sea is in case of war as indispensable to Great Britain as ever, for it remains the fundamental condition of her security, yet its results can hardly in future be as great as they were in the past, and in particular it may perhaps not again enable her to exert upon continental States the same effective pressure which it formerly rendered possible. In order, therefore, to bring pressure upon a continental adversary, Great Britain is more than ever in need of the co-operation of a continental ally. A navy alone cannot produce the effect which it once did upon the course of a land war, and its success will not suffice to give confidence to the ally. Nothing but an army able to take its part in a continental struggle will, in modern conditions, suffice to make Great Britain the effective ally of a continental State, and in the absence of such an army Great Britain will continue to be, as she is to-day, without continental allies. A second conclusion is that our people, while straining every nerve in peace to ensure to their navy the best chances of victory in war, must carefully avoid the conception of a dominion of the sea, although, in fact, such a dominion actually existed during a great part of the nineteenth century. The new conditions which have grown up during the past thirty years have made this ideal as much a thing of the past as the mediæval conception of a Roman Empire in Europe to whose titular head all kings were subordinate. X. DYNAMICS--THE QUESTION OF MIGHT If there is a chance of a conflict in which Great Britain is to be engaged, her people must take thought in time how they may have on their side both right and might. It is hard to see how otherwise they can expect the contest to be decided in their favour. As I have said before, in the quarrel you must be in the right and in the fight you must win. The quarrel is the domain of policy, the fight that of strategy or dynamics. Policy and strategy are in reality inextricably interwoven one with another, for right and might resemble, more than is commonly supposed, two aspects of the same thing. But it is convenient in the attempt to understand any complicated subject to examine its aspects separately. I propose, therefore, in considering the present situation of Great Britain and her relations to the rest of the world, to treat first of the question of force, to assume that a quarrel may arise, and to ascertain what are the conditions in which Great Britain can expect to win, and then to enter into the question of right, in order to find out what light can be thrown upon the necessary aims and methods of British policy by the conclusions which will have been reached as to the use of force. The nationalisation of States, which is the fundamental fact of modern history, affects both policy and strategy. If the State is a nation, the population associated as one body, then the force which it can use in case of conflict represents the sum of the energies of the whole population, and this force cannot and will not be used except as the expression of the will of the whole population. The policy of such a State means its collective will, the consciousness of its whole population of a purpose, mission, or duty which it must fulfil, with which it is identified, and which, therefore, it cannot abandon. Only in case this national purpose meets with resistance will a people organised as a State enter into a quarrel, and if such a quarrel has to be fought out the nation's resources will be expended upon it without limitation. The chief fact in regard to the present condition of Europe appears to be the very great excess in the military strength of Germany over that of any other Power. It is due in part to the large population of the German Empire, and in part to the splendid national organisation which has been given to it. It cannot be asserted either that Germany was not entitled to become united, or that she was not entitled to organise herself as efficiently as possible both for peace and for war. But the result is that Germany has a preponderance as great if not greater than that of Spain in the time of Philip II., or of France either under Louis XIV. or under Napoleon. Every nation, no doubt, has a right to make itself as strong as it can, and to exercise as much influence as it can on the affairs of the world. To do these things is the mission and business of a nation. But the question arises, what are the limits to the power of a single nation? The answer appears to be that the only limits are those set by the power of other nations. This is the theory of the balance of power of which the object is to preserve to Europe its character of a community of independent States rather than that of a single empire in which one State predominates. Without attributing to Germany any wrong purpose or any design of injustice it must be evident that her very great strength must give her in case of dispute, always possible between independent States, a corresponding advantage against any other Power whose views or whose intentions should not coincide with hers. It is the obvious possibility of such dispute that makes it incumbent upon Great Britain to prepare herself in case of disagreement to enter into a discussion with Germany upon equal terms. Only upon such preparation can Great Britain base the hope either of averting a quarrel with Germany, or in case a quarrel should arise and cannot be made up by mutual agreement, of settling it by the arbitrament of war upon terms accordant with the British conception of right. Great Britain therefore must give herself a national organisation for war and must make preparation for war the nation's first business until a reasonable security has been attained. The question is, what weapons are now available for Great Britain in case of a disagreement with Germany leading to conflict? In the old wars, as we have seen, she had three modes of action. She used her navy to obtain control of the sea-ways, and then she used that control partly to destroy the sea-borne trade of her enemies, and partly to send armies across the sea to attack her enemies' armies. By the combination of these three modes of operation she was strong enough to give valuable help to other Powers, and therefore she had allies whose assistance was as useful to her as hers to them. To-day, as we have seen, the same conditions no longer exist. The British navy may indeed hope to obtain control of the sea-ways, but the law of maritime war, as it has been settled by the Declarations of Paris and of London, makes it impracticable for Great Britain to use a naval victory, even if she wins it, in such a way as to be able commercially to throttle a hostile Power, while the British military forces available for employment on the Continent are so small as hardly to count in the balance. The result is that Great Britain's power of action against a possible enemy is greatly reduced, partly in consequence of changes in the laws of war, but perhaps still more in consequence of the fact that while other Powers are organised for war as nations, England in regard to war is still in the condition of the eighteenth century, relying upon a small standing army, a purely professional navy, and a large half-trained force, called Territorial, neither ready for war nor available outside the United Kingdom. There is a school of politicians who imagine that Great Britain's weakness can be supplemented from other parts of the British Empire. That is an idea which ought not to be received without the most careful examination and in my judgment must, except within narrow limits, be rejected. In a war between Great Britain and a continental State or combination the assistance which Great Britain could possibly receive from the King's dominions beyond the sea is necessarily limited. Such a war must in the first place be a naval contest, towards which the most that the colonies can contribute consists in such additions to Great Britain's naval strength as they may have given during the preceding period of peace. What taken together they may do in this way would no doubt make an appreciable difference in the balance of forces between the two contending navies; but in the actual struggle the colonies would be little more than spectators, except in so far as their ports would offer a certain number of secure bases for the cruisers upon which Great Britain must rely for the protection of her sea-borne trade. Even if all the colonies possessed first-rate armies, the help which those armies could give would not be equal to that obtainable from a single European ally. For a war against a European adversary Great Britain must rely upon her own resources, and upon such assistance as she might obtain if it were felt by other Powers on the Continent not only that the cause in which she was fighting was vital to them and therefore called for their co-operation, but also that in the struggle Great Britain's assistance would be likely to turn the scale in their favour. Can we expect that history will repeat itself, and that once more in case of conflict Great Britain will have the assistance of continental allies? That depends chiefly on their faith in her power to help them. One condition of such an alliance undoubtedly exists--the desire of other nations for it. The predominance of Germany on the Continent rests like a nightmare upon more than one of the other States. It is increased by the alliance of Austria, another great military empire--an empire, moreover, not without a fine naval tradition, and, as is proved by the recent announcement of the intention of the Austrian Government to build four "Dreadnoughts," resolved to revive that tradition. Against the combination of Germany and Austria, Russia, which has hardly begun to recover from the prostration of her defeat by Japan, is helpless; while France, with a population much smaller than that of Germany, can hardly look forward to a renewal single-handed of the struggle which ended for her so disastrously forty years ago. The position of Italy is more doubtful, for the sympathies of her people are not attracted by Austria; they look with anxiety upon the Austrian policy of expansion towards the Aegean and along the shore of the Adriatic. The estrangement from France which followed upon the French occupation of Tunis appears to have passed away, and it seems possible that if there were a chance of success Italy might be glad to emancipate herself from German and Austrian influence. But even if Germany's policy were such that Russia, France, and Italy were each and all of them desirous to oppose it, and to assert a will and a policy of their own distinct from that of the German Government, it is very doubtful whether their strength is sufficient to justify them in an armed conflict, especially as their hypothetical adversaries have a central position with all its advantages. From a military point of view the strength of the central position consists in the power which it gives to its holder to keep one opponent in check with a part of his forces while he throws the bulk of them into a decisive blow against another. This is the situation of to-day on the Continent of Europe. It cannot be changed unless there is thrown into the scale of the possible opponents of German policy a weight or a force that would restore the equality of the two parties. The British navy, however perfect it may be assumed to be, does not in itself constitute such a force. Nor could the British army on its present footing restore the balance. A small standing army able to give its allies assistance, officially estimated at a strength of 160,000 men, will not suffice to turn the scale in a conflict in which the troops available for each of the great Powers are counted no longer by the hundred thousand but by the million. But if Great Britain were so organised that she could utilise for the purpose of war the whole of her national resources, if she had in addition to the navy indispensable for her security an army equal in efficiency to the best that can be found in Europe and in numbers to that maintained by Italy, which though the fifth Power on the Continent is most nearly her equal in territory and population, the equilibrium could be restored, and either the peace of Europe would be maintained, or in case of fresh conflict there would be a reasonable prospect of the recurrence of what has happened in the past, the maintenance, against a threatened domination, of the independence of the European States. The position here set forth is grave enough to demand the close attention of the British nation, for it means that England might at any time be called upon to enter into a contest, likely enough to take the form of a struggle for existence, against the greatest military empire in the world, supported by another military empire which is itself in the front rank of great Powers, while the other European States would be looking on comparatively helpless. But this is by no means a full statement of the case. The other Powers might not find it possible to maintain an attitude of neutrality. It is much more probable that they would have to choose between one side and the other; and that if they do not consider Great Britain strong enough to help them they may find it their interest, and indeed may be compelled, to take the side of Great Britain's adversaries. In that case Great Britain would have to carry on a struggle for existence against the combined forces of the Continent. That even in this extreme form the contest would be hopeless, I for one am unwilling to admit. If Great Britain were organised for war and able to throw her whole energies into it, she might be so strong that her overthrow even by united Europe would by no means be a foregone conclusion. But the determined preparation which would make her ready for the extreme contingency is the best and perhaps the only means of preventing its occurrence. XI. POLICY--THE QUESTION OF RIGHT I have now given reasons for my belief that in case of conflict Great Britain, owing to her lack of organisation for war, would be in a position of some peril. She has not created for herself the means of making good by force a cause with which she may be identified but which may be disputed, and her weakness renders it improbable that she would have allies. There remains the second question whether, in the absence of might, she would at least have right on her side. That depends upon the nature of the quarrel. A good cause ought to unite her own people, and only in behalf of a good cause could she expect other nations to be on her side. From this point of view must be considered the relations between Great Britain and Germany, and in the first place the aims of German policy. A nation of which the army consists of four million able-bodied citizens does not go to war lightly. The German ideal, since the foundation of the Empire, has been rather that held up for Great Britain by Lord Rosebery in the words: "Peace secured, not by humiliation, but by preponderance." The first object after the defeat of France in 1870 was security, and this was sought not merely by strengthening the army and improving its training but also by obtaining the alliance of neighbouring Powers. In the first period the attempt was made to keep on good terms, not only with Austria, but with Russia. When in 1876 disturbances began in the Balkan Peninsula, Germany, while giving Austria her support, exerted herself to prevent a breach between Austria and Russia, and after the Russo-Turkish war acted as mediator between Russia on one side and Austria and Great Britain on the other, so that without a fresh war the European treaty of Berlin was substituted for the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano. After 1878 Russia became estranged from Germany, whereupon Germany, in 1879, made a defensive alliance with Austria, to which at a later date Italy became a party. This triple alliance served for a quarter of a century to maintain the peace against the danger of a Franco-Russian combination until the defeat of Russia in Manchuria and consequent collapse of Russia's military power removed that danger. Shortly before this event the British agreement with the French Government had been negotiated by Lord Lansdowne. The French were very anxious to bring Morocco into the sphere of French influence, and to this the British Government saw no objection, but in the preamble to the agreement, as well as in its text, by way of declaration that Great Britain had no objection to this portion of the policy of France, words were used which might seem to imply that Great Britain had some special rights in regard to Morocco. The second article of the Declaration of April 8, 1904, contains the following clause: "The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require." This clause seems to be open to the interpretation that Great Britain assumes a right to determine what nation of Europe is best entitled to exercise a protectorate over Morocco. That would involve some British superiority over other Powers, or at any rate that Great Britain had a special right over Morocco, a sort of suzerainty of which she could dispose at will. Germany disliked both this claim and the idea that France was to obtain special influence in Morocco. She was herself anxious for oversea possessions and spheres of influence, and appears to have thought that if Morocco was to become a European protectorate she ought to have a voice in any settlement. The terms in which the English consent to the French design was expressed were construed by the German's as involving, on the part of Great Britain, just that kind of supremacy in regard to oversea affairs which they had for so many years been learning to dislike. At any rate, when the moment convenient to her came, Germany put her veto upon the arrangements which had been made and required that they should be submitted to a European Conference. France was not prepared to renew the struggle for existence over Morocco, while Germany appeared not unwilling to assert her will even by force. Accordingly Germany had her way. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary again afforded an opportunity for the exercise of Germany's preponderance. In 1878 the Treaty of Berlin had authorised Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer the two provinces without limitation of time, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have since then practically been Austrian provinces, for the male population has been subject to compulsory service in the Austrian army and the soldiers have taken the oath of allegiance to the Emperor. It is not clear that any of the great Powers had other than a formal objection to the annexation, the objection, namely, that it was not consistent with the letter of the Treaty of Berlin. The British Government pointed out that, by international agreement to which Austria-Hungary is a party, a European Treaty is not to be modified without the consent of all the signatory Powers, and that this consent had not been asked by Austria-Hungary. The British view was endorsed both by France and Russia, and these three Powers were in favour of a European Conference for the purpose of revising the clause of the Treaty of Berlin, and apparently also of giving some concessions to Servia and Montenegro, the two small States which, for reasons altogether disconnected with the formal aspect of the case, resented the annexation. Neither of the Western Powers had any such interest in the matter as to make it in the least probable that they would in any case be prepared to support their view by force, while Austria, by mobilising her army, showed that she was ready to do so, and there was no doubt that she was assured, in case of need, of Germany's support. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs publicly explained to his countrymen that Russia was not in a condition to carry on a war. Accordingly in the moment of crisis the Russian Government withdrew its opposition to Austro-Hungarian policy, and thus once more was revealed the effect upon a political decision of the military strength, readiness, and determination of the two central Powers. A good deal of feeling was aroused, at any rate in Great Britain, by the disclosure in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the earlier case of Morocco, of Germany's policy, and in the later negotiation of her determination to support Austria-Hungary by force. Yet he would be a rash man who, on now looking back, would assert that in either case a British Government would have been justified in armed opposition to Germany's policy. The bearing of Germany and Austria-Hungary in these negotiations, ending as they did at the time when the debate on the Navy Estimates disclosed to the British public the serious nature of the competition in naval shipbuilding between Germany and Great Britain, was to a large class in this country a startling revelation of the too easily forgotten fact that a nation does not get its way by asking for it, but by being able and ready to assert its will by force of arms in case of need. There is no reason to believe that the German Government has any intention to enter into a war except for the maintenance of rights or interests held to be vital for Germany, but it is always possible that Germany may hold vital some right or interest which another nation may be not quite ready to admit. In that case it behoves the other nation very carefully to scrutinise the German claims and its own way of regarding them, and to be quite sure, before entering into a dispute, that its own views are right and Germany's views wrong, as well as that it has the means, in case of conflict, of carrying on with success a war against the German Empire. If then England is to enter into a quarrel with Germany or any other State, let her people take care that it arises from no obscure issue about which they may disagree among themselves, but from some palpable wrong done by the other Power, some wrong which calls upon them to resist it with all their might. The case alleged against Germany is that she is too strong, so strong in herself that no Power in Europe can stand up against her, and so sure of the assistance of her ally, Austria, to say nothing of the other ally, Italy, that there is at this moment no combination that will venture to oppose the Triple Alliance. In other words, Germany is thought to have acquired an ascendency in Europe which she may at any moment attempt to convert into supremacy. Great Britain is thought of, at any rate by her own people, as the traditional opponent of any such supremacy on the Continent, so that if she were strong enough it might be her function to be the chief antagonist of a German ascendency or supremacy, though the doubt whether she is strong enough prevents her from fulfilling this role. But there is another side to the case. The opinion has long been expressed by German writers and is very widespread in Germany that it is Great Britain that claims an ascendency or supremacy, and that Germany in opposing that supremacy is making herself the champion of the European cause of the independence of States. This German idea was plainly expressed twenty-five years ago by the German historian Wilhelm Müller, who wrote in a review of the year 1884: "England was the opponent of all the maritime Powers of Europe. She had for decades assumed at sea the same dictatorial attitude as France had maintained upon land under Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. The years 1870-1871 broke the French spell; the year 1884 has shown England that the times of her maritime imperialism also are over, and that if she does not renounce it of her own free will, an 1870 will come for the English spell too. It is true, England need not fear any single maritime Power, but only a coalition of them all; and hitherto she has done all she can to call up such a coalition." The language which Englishmen naturally use in discussing their country's naval strength might seem to lend itself to the German interpretation. For example, on the 10th March 1908, the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, expressing an opinion in which he thought both parties concurred, said: "We must maintain the unassailable supremacy of this country at sea." Here, at any rate, is the word "supremacy" at which the Germans take umbrage, and which our own people regard as objectionable if applied to the position of any Power on the Continent. I will not repeat here the analysis which I published many years ago of the dealings between the German and British Governments during the period when German colonial enterprise was beginning; nor the demonstration that in those negotiations the British Government acted with perfect fairness, but was grossly misrepresented to the German public. The important thing for the people of Great Britain to understand to-day is not the inner diplomatic history of that and subsequent periods, but the impression which is current in Germany with regard to the whole of these transactions. The Germans think that Great Britain lays claim to a special position in regard to the ocean, in the nature of a suzerainty over the waters of the globe, and over those of its coasts which are not the possessions of some strong civilised Power. What they have perceived in the last quarter of a century has been that, somehow or other, they care not how, whenever there has been a German attempt in the way of what is called colonial expansion, it has led to friction with Great Britain. Accordingly they have the impression that Great Britain is opposed to any such German expansion, and in this way, as they are anxious for dominions beyond the sea and for the spread of their trade into every quarter of the globe, they have come to regard Great Britain as the adversary. This German feeling found vent during the South African War, and the expressions at that time freely used in the German newspapers, as well as by German writers whose works were less ephemeral, could not but deeply offend the national consciousness, to any nothing of the pride of the people of this country. In this way the sympathy which used to exist between the two peoples has been lost and they have come to regard each other with suspicion, which has not been without its effect on the relations between the two Governments and upon the course of European diplomacy. This is the origin of the rivalry, and it is to the resentment which has been diligently cultivated in Germany against the supposed British claim to supremacy at sea that is attributable the great popularity among the people of Germany of the movement in favour of the expansion of the German navy. Since 1884 the people of Germany have been taught to regard with suspicion every item of British policy, and naturally enough this auspicious attitude has found its counterpart among the people of this country. The result has been that the agreements by which England has disposed of a number of disagreements with France and with Russia have been regarded in Germany as inspired by the wish to prepare a coalition against that country, and, in view of the past history of Great Britain, this interpretation can hardly be pronounced unnatural. Any cause for which Great Britain would fight ought to be intelligible to other nations, first of all to those of Europe, but also to the nations outside of Europe, at any rate to the United States and Japan, for if we were fighting for something in regard to which there was no sympathy with us, or which led other nations to sympathise with our adversary, we should be hampered by grave misgivings and might find ourselves alone in a hostile world. Accordingly it cannot be sound policy for Great Britain to assert for herself a supremacy or ascendency of the kind which is resented, not only by Germany, but by every other continental State, and indeed by every maritime State in the world. It ought to be made clear to all the world that in fact, whatever may have been the language used in English discussions, Great Britain makes no claim to suzerainty over the sea, or over territories bordering on the sea, not forming parts of the British Empire; that, while she is determined to maintain a navy that can in case of war secure the "command" of the sea against her enemies, she regards the sea, in peace, and in war except for her enemies, as the common property of all nations, the open road forming the great highway of mankind. We have but to reflect on the past to perceive that the idea of a dominion of the sea must necessarily unite other nations against us. What in the sixteenth century was the nature of the dispute between England and Spain? The British popular consciousness to-day remembers two causes, of which one was religious antagonism, and the other the claim set up by Spain and rejected by England to a monopoly of America, carrying with it an exclusive right to navigation in the Western Atlantic and to a monopoly of the trade of the Spanish dominions beyond the sea. That is a chapter of history which at the present time deserves a place in the meditations of Englishmen. I may now try to condense into a single view the general survey of the conditions of Europe which I have attempted from the two points of view of strategy and of policy, of force and of right. Germany has such a preponderance of military force that no continental State can stand up against her. There is, therefore, on the Continent no nation independent of German influence or pressure. Great Britain, so long as she maintains the superiority of her navy over that of Germany or over those of Germany and her allies, is not amenable to constraint by Germany, but her military weakness prevents her exerting any appreciable counter pressure upon Germany. The moment the German navy has become strong enough to confront that of Great Britain without risk of destruction, British influence in Europe will be at an end, and the Continent will have to follow the direction given by German policy. That is a consummation to be desired neither in the interest of the development of the European nations nor in that of Great Britain. It means the prevalence of one national ideal instead of the growth side by side of a number of types. It means also the exclusion of British ideals from European life. Great Britain has in the past been a powerful contributor to the free development of the European nations, and therefore to the preservation in Europe of variety of national growth. I believe that she is now called upon to renew that service. The method open to her lies in such action as may relieve the other European States from the overwhelming pressure which, in case of the disappearance of England from the European community, would be put upon them by Germany. It seems probable that in default of right action she will be compelled to maintain her national ideals against Europe united under German guidance. The action required consists on the one hand in the perfecting of the British navy, and on the other of the military organisation of the British people on the principle, already explained, of the nationalisation of war. XII. THE NATION The conclusion to which a review of England's position and of the state of Europe points, is that while there is no visible cause of quarrel between Great Britain and Germany, yet there is between them a rivalry such as is inevitable between a State that has long held something like the first place in the world and a State that feels entitled in virtue of the number of its people, their character and training, their work and their corporate organisation, to aspire to the first place. The German nation by the mere fact of its growth challenges England for the primacy. It could not be otherwise. But the challenge is no wrong done to England, and the idea that it ought to be resented is unworthy of British traditions. It must be cheerfully accepted. If the Germans are better men than we are they deserve to take our place. If we mean to hold our own we must set about it in the right way--by proving ourselves better than the Germans. There ought to be no question of quarrel or of war. Men can be rivals without being enemies. It is the first lesson that an English boy learns at school. Quarrels arise, as a rule, from misunderstandings or from faults of temper, and England ought to avoid the frame of mind which would render her liable to take offence at trifles, while her policy ought to be simple enough to escape being misunderstood. In a competition between two nations the qualification for success is to be the better nation. Germany's advantage is that her people have been learning for a whole century to subordinate their individual wishes and welfare to that of the nation, while the people of Great Britain have been steeped in individualism until the consciousness of national existence, of a common purpose and a common duty, has all but faded away. What has to be done is to restore the nation to its right place in men's minds, and so to organise it that, like a trained athlete, it will be capable of hard and prolonged effort. By the nation I mean the United Kingdom, the commonwealth of Great Britain and Ireland, and I distinguish it from the Empire which is a federation of several nations. The nation thus defined has work to do, duties to perform as one nation among many, and the way out of the present difficulties will be found by attending to these duties. In the first place comes Britain's work in Europe, which to describe has been the purpose of the preceding chapters. It cannot be right for Britain, after the share she has taken in securing for Europe the freedom that distinguishes a series of independent States existing side by side from a single centralised Empire, to turn her back upon the Continent and to suppose that she exists only for the sake of her own colonies and India. On the contrary it is only by playing her part in Europe that she can hope to carry through the organisation of her own Empire which she has in view. Her function as a European State is to make her voice heard in the council of the European nations, so that no one State can dictate the decisions to be reached. In order to do that she must be strong enough to be able to say Aye and No without fear, and to give effective help in case of need to those other States which may in a decision vote on the same side with her. In her attitude towards the Powers of Europe and in her dealings with them Great Britain is the representative of the daughter nations and dependencies that form her Empire, and her self-defence in Europe is the defence of the whole Empire, at any rate against possible assaults from any European Power. At the same time she is necessarily the centre and the head of her own Empire. She must take the lead in its organisation and in the direction of its policy. If she is to fulfil these duties, on the one hand to Europe and on the other to the daughter nations and India, she must herself be organised on the principle of duty. An England divided against herself, absorbed in the disputes of factions and unconscious of a purpose, can neither lead nor defend her Empire, can play her proper part neither in Europe nor in the world. The great work to be done at home, corresponding to the ultimate purpose of national life, is that she should bring up her people to a higher standard of human excellence, to a finer type than others. There are English types well recognised. Fifty years ago the standard of British workmanship was the acknowledged mark of excellence in the industrial world, while it has been pointed out in an earlier chapter that the English standards, of character displayed in conduct, described in one aspect by the word "gentleman," and in another by the expression "fair-play," form the best part of the nation's inheritance. It is the business of any British education worth thinking of to stamp these hall-marks of character upon all her people. Nothing reveals in a more amazing light the extent to which in this country the true meaning of our being a nation has been forgotten than the use that has been made in recent years of the term "national education." The leaders of both parties have discussed the subject as though any system of schools maintained at the public expense formed a system of national education. But the diffusion of instruction is not education, and the fact that it is carried on at the public expense does not make it national. Education is training the child for his life to come, and his life's value consists in the work which he will do. National education means bringing up every boy and girl to do his or her part of the nation's work. A child who is going to do nothing will be of no use to his country, and a bringing up that leaves him prepared to do nothing is not an education but a perversion. A British national education ought to make every man a good workman, every man a gentleman, every man a servant of his country. My contention, then, is that this British nation has to perform certain specific tasks, and that in order to be able to do her work she must insist that her people--every man, woman, and child--exist not for themselves but for her. This is the principle of duty. It gives a standard of personal value, for evidently a man's use to his country consists in what he does for it, not in what he gets or has for himself, which, from the national point of view, is of no account except so far as it either enables him to carry on the work for which he is best suited or can be applied for the nation's benefit. How then in practice can the principle of duty be brought into our national and our individual life? I think that the right way is that we should join in doing those things which are evidently needed, and should postpone other things about the necessity of which there may be disagreement. I shall devote the rest of this volume to considering how the nation is to prepare itself for the first duty laid upon it, that of assuring its security and so making good its position as a member of the European community. But before pursuing that inquiry I must reiterate once more the principle which it is my main purpose to set before my countrymen. The conception of the Nation is the clue to the solution of all the problems with which the people of Great Britain are confronted. They are those of foreign and imperial policy, of defence national and imperial, of education and of social life. Foreign and imperial policy include all affairs external to Great Britain, the relations of Great Britain to Europe, to India, to the Colonies, and to the Powers of Asia and America. In all these external affairs the question to be asked is, what is Britain's duty? It is by the test of duty that Great Britain's attitude towards Germany should be tried. In what event would it be necessary and right to call on every British citizen to turn out and fight, ready to shed his blood and ready to shoot down enemies? Evidently only in case of some great and manifest wrong undertaken by Germany. As I am aware of no such wrong actually attempted, I think a conflict unnecessary. It is true I began by pointing out the danger of drifting into a war with the German Empire, but I wish to do what I can to prevent it, and to show that by right action the risk will be diminished. The greatest risk is due to fear--fear in this country of what Germany may do, fear in Germany of what Great Britain may do. Fear is a bad adviser. There are Englishmen who seem to think that as Germany is strengthening her navy it would be wise to attack her while the British navy is superior in numerical force. This suggestion must be frankly discussed and dealt with. A war is a trial of strength. To begin it does not add to your force. Suppose for the sake of the argument that a war between England and Germany were "inevitable"--which is equivalent to the supposition that one of the two Governments is bound to wrong the other--one of the two Governments must take the initiative. You take the initiative when you are the Power that wants something, in which case you naturally exert yourself to obtain it, while the adversary who merely says No to your request, acts only in resistance. England wants nothing from Germany, so that she is not called upon for an initiative. But the initiative, or offensive, requires the stronger force, its object being to render the other side powerless for resistance to its will. The defensive admits of a smaller force. A conflict between England and Germany must be primarily a naval war, and Germany's naval forces are considerably weaker than those of England. England has no political reason for the initiative; Germany is debarred from it by the inferiority of her navy. If, therefore, Germany wants anything from England, she must wait to take the initiative until she has forces strong enough for the offensive. But her forces, though not strong enough for the offensive, may be strong enough for the defensive. If, therefore, England should take the initiative, she would in so doing give away the one advantage she has. It may be Germany's interest to have a prompt decision. It can hardly be her interest to attack before she is ready. But if she really wanted to pick a quarrel and get some advantage, it would exactly serve her purpose to be attacked at once, as that would give her the benefit of the defensive. The English "Jingoes," then, are false guides, bad strategists, and worse, statesmen. Not only in the affairs of Europe, but in those of India, Egypt, and the Colonies, and in all dealings with Asia, Africa, and America the line of British policy will be the line of the British nation's duty. If Britain is to follow this line two conditions must be fulfilled. She must have a leader to show the way and her people must walk in it with confidence. The mark of a leader is the single eye. But the traditional system gives the lead of the nation to the leader of one party chosen for his success in leading that party. He can never have a single eye; he serves two masters. His party requires him to keep it in office, regarding the Opposition as the enemy. But his country requires him to guide a united nation in the fulfilment of its mission in Europe and a united Empire in the fulfilment of its mission in the world. A statesman who is to lead the nation and the Empire must keep his eyes on Europe and on the world. A party leader who is to defeat the other party must keep his eyes on the other party. No man can at the same time be looking out of the window and watching an opponent inside the house, and the traditional system puts the Prime Minister in a painful dilemma. Either he never looks out of the window at all or he tries to look two ways at once. Party men seem to believe that if a Prime Minister were to look across the sea instead of across the floor of the House of Commons his Government would be upset. That may be the case so long as men ignore the nation and so long as they acquiesce in the treasonable doctrine that it is the business of the Opposition to oppose. But a statesman who would take courage to lead the nation might perhaps find the Opposition powerless against him. The counterpart of leadership is following. A Government that shows the line of Britain's duty must be able to utilise the whole energies of her people for its performance. A duty laid upon the nation implies a duty laid upon every man to do his share of the nation's work, to assist the Government by obedient service, the best of which he is capable. It means a people trained every man to his task. A nation should be like a team in which every man has his place, his work to do, his mission or duty. There is no room in it either for the idler who consumes but renders no service, or for the unskilled man who bungles a task to which he has not been trained. A nation may be compared to a living creature. Consider the way in which nature organises all things that live and grow. In the structure of a living thing every part has its function, its work to do. There are no superfluous organs, and if any fails to do its work the creature sickens and perhaps dies. Take the idea of the nation as I have tried to convey it and apply it as a measure or test to our customary way of thinking both of public affairs and of our own lives. Does it not reveal that we attach too much importance to having and to possessions--our own and other people's--and too little importance to doing, to service? When we ask what a man is worth, we think of what he owns. But the words ought to make us think of what he is fit for and of what service he renders to the nation. The only value of what a man has springs from what he does with it. The idea of the nation leads to the right way of looking at these matters, because it constrains every man to put himself and all that he has at the service of the community. Thus it is the opposite of socialism, which merely turns upside down the current worship of ownership, and which thinks "having" so supremely important that it would put "not having" in its place. The only cry I will adopt is "England for ever," which means that we are here, every one of us, with all that we have and all that we can do, as members of a nation that must either serve the world or perish. But the idea of the nation carries us a long way further than I have yet shown. It bids us all try at the peril of England's fall to get the best Government we can to lead us. We need a man to preside over the nation's counsels, to settle the line of Britain's duty in Europe and in her own Empire, and of her duty to her own people, to the millions who are growing up ill fed, ill housed and ill trained, and yet who are part of the sovereign people. We need to give him as councillors men that are masters of the tasks in which for the nation to fail means its ruin, the tasks of which I have enumerated those that are vital. Do we give him a master of the history of the other nations to guide the nation's dealings with them? Do we give him a master of war to educate admirals and generals? Do we give him a master of the sciences to direct the pursuit of knowledge, and a master of character-building to supervise the bringing up of boys and girls to be types of a noble life? It would serve the nation's turn to have such men. They are among us, and to find them we should only have to look for them. It would be no harder than to pick apples off a tree. But we never dream of looking for them. We have a wonderful plan of choosing our leaders, the plan which we call an election. Five hundred men assemble in a hall and listen to a speech from a partisan, while five hundred others in a hall in the next street are cheering a second partisan who declaims against the first. There is no test of either speaker, except that he must be rich enough to pay the expenses of an "election." The voters do not even listen to both partisans in order to judge between them. Thus we choose our members of Parliament. Our Government is a committee of some twenty of them. Its first business is to keep its authority against the other party, of which in turn the chief function is to make out that everything the Government does is wrong. This is the only recognised plan for leading the nation. You may be shocked as you read this by the plainness of my words, but you know them to be true, though you suppose that to insist on the facts is "impracticable" because you fancy that there is no way out of the marvellously absurd arrangements that exist. But there is a way out, though it is no royal road. It is this. Get the meaning of the nation into your own head and then make a present to England of your party creed. Ask yourself what is the one thing most needed now, and the one thing most needed for the future. You will answer, because you know it to be true, that the one thing most needed now is to get the navy right. The one thing most needed for the future is to put the idea of the nation and the will to help England into every man's soul. That cannot be done by writing or by talking, but only by setting every man while he is young to do something for his country. There is one way of bringing that about. It is by making every citizen a soldier in a national army. The man who has learned to serve his country has learned to love it. He is the true citizen, and of such a nation is composed. Great Britain needs a statesman to lead her and a policy at home and abroad. But such a policy must not be sought and cannot be found upon party lines. The statesman who is to expound it to his countrymen and represent it to the world must be the leader not of one party but of both. In short, a statesman must be a nation leader, and the first condition of his existence is that there should be a nation for him to lead. XIII. THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONALISATION OF WAR UPON LEADERSHIP The argument of the preceding chapters points to the conclusion that if Great Britain is to maintain her position as a great Power, probably even if she is to maintain her independence, and certainly if she is to retain the administration of India and the leadership of the nations that have grown out of her colonies, her statesmen and her people must combine to do three things:-- 1. To adopt a policy having due relation to the condition and needs of the European Continent. 2. To make the British navy the best possible instrument of naval warfare. 3. To make the British army strong enough to be able to turn the scales in a continental war. What are for the navy and for the army the essentials of victory? If there had never been any wars, no one would know what was essential to victory. People would have their notions, no doubt, but these notions would be guesses and could not be verified until the advent of a war, which might bring with it a good deal of disappointment to the people who had guessed wrong. But there have already been wars enough to afford ample material for deductions as to the causes and conditions of success. I propose to take the two best examples that can be found, one for war at sea and the other for war on land, in order to show exactly the way in which victory is attained. By victory, of course, I mean crushing the enemy. In a battle in which neither side is crippled, and after which the fleets part to renew the struggle after a short interval, one side or the other may consider that it has had the honours of the day. It may have lost fewer ships than the enemy, or have taken more. It may have been able and willing to continue the fight, though the enemy drew off, and its commander may be promoted or decorated for having maintained the credit of his country or of the service to which he belongs. But such a battle is not victory either in a political or a strategical sense. It does not lead to the accomplishment of the purpose of the war, which is to dictate conditions of peace. That result can be obtained only by crushing the enemy's force and so making him powerless to renew the contest. A general view of the wars of the eighteenth century between Great Britain and France shows that, broadly speaking, there was no decision until the end of the period. The nearest approach to it was when Hawke destroyed the French fleet in Quiberon Bay. But this was hardly a stand-up fight. The French fleet was running away, and Hawke's achievement was that, in spite of the difficulties of weather on an extremely dangerous coast, he was able to consummate its destruction. The real decision was the work of Nelson, and its principal cause was Nelson himself. The British navy had discovered in its conflicts with the Dutch during the seventeenth century that the object of naval warfare was the command of the sea, which must be won by breaking the enemy's force in battle. This was also perfectly understood by the Dutch admirals, and in those wars was begun the development of the art of fighting battles with sailing vessels. A formation, the line of battle, in which one ship sails in the track of the ship before her, was found to be appropriate to the weapon used, the broadside of artillery; and a type of ship suitable to this formation, the line-of-battle ship, established itself. These were the elements with which the British and French navies entered into their long eighteenth century struggle. The French, however, had not grasped the principle that the object of naval warfare was to obtain the command of the sea. They did not consciously and primarily aim, as did their British rivals, at the destruction of the enemy's fleet. They were more concerned with the preservation of their own fleet than with the destruction of the enemy's, and were ready rather to accept battle than to bring it about. The British admirals were eager for battle, but had a difficulty in finding out how a decisive blow could be struck. The orthodox and accepted doctrine of the British navy was that the British fleet should be brought alongside the enemy's fleet, the two lines of battleships being parallel to one another, so that each ship in the British fleet should engage a corresponding ship in the French fleet. It was a manoeuvre difficult of execution, because, in order to approach the French, the British must in the first place turn each of their ships at right angles to the line or obliquely to it, and then, when they were near enough to fire, must turn again to the left (or right) in order to restore the line formation. And during this period of approach and turning they must be exposed to the broadsides of the French without being able to make full use of their own broadsides. Moreover, it was next to impossible in this way to bring up the whole line together. Besides being difficult, the manoeuvre had no promise of success. For if two fleets of equal numbers are in this way matched ship against ship, neither side has any advantage except what may be derived from the superior skill of its gunners. So long as these conditions prevailed, no great decisive victory of the kind for which we are seeking was gained. It was during this period that Nelson received such training as the navy could give him, and added to it the necessary finishing touch by never-ceasing effort to find out for himself the way in which he could strike a decisive blow. His daring was always deliberate, never rash, and this is the right frame of mind for a commander. "You may be assured," he writes to Lord Hood, March 11, 1794, "I shall undertake nothing but what I have moral certainty of succeeding in." His fierce determination to get at the ultimate secrets of his trade led him to use every means that would help him to think out his problem, and among these means was reading. In 1780 appeared Clerk's "Essay on Naval Tactics." Clerk pointed out the weakness of the method of fighting in two parallel lines and suggested and discussed a number of plans by which one fleet with the bulk of its force could attack and destroy a portion of the other. This was the problem to which Nelson gave his mind--how to attack a part with the whole. On the 19th of August 1796 he writes to the Duke of Clarence:-- "We are now 22 sail of the line, the combined fleet will be above 35 sail of the line.... I will venture my life Sir John Jervis defeats them; I do not mean by a regular battle but by the skill of our Admiral, and the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen. This country is the most favourable possible for skill with an inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable that some one time in the 24 hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and the other will be becalmed, or have a contrary wind." His opportunity came in 1798, when in the battle of the Nile he crushed the French Mediterranean Fleet. In a letter to Lord Howe, written January 8, 1799, he described his plan in a sentence:-- "By attacking the enemy's van and centre, the wind blowing directly along their line, I was enabled to throw what force I pleased on a few ships." We know that Nelson's method of fighting had for months before the battle been his constant preoccupation, and that he had lost no opportunity of explaining his ideas to his captains. Here are the words of Captain Berry's narrative:-- "It had been his practice during the whole of the cruise, whenever the weather and circumstances would permit, to have his captains on board the Vanguard, where he would fully develop to them his own ideas of the different and best modes of attack, and such plans as he proposed to execute upon falling in with the enemy, whatever their position or situation might be, by day or by night. There was no possible position in which they might be found that he did not take into his calculation, and for the most advantageous attack on which he had not digested and arranged the best possible disposition of the force which he commanded." The great final victory of Trafalgar was prepared in the same way, and the various memoranda written in the period before the battle have revealed to recent investigation the unwearying care which Nelson devoted to finding out how best to concentrate his force upon that portion of the enemy's fleet which it would be most difficult for the enemy to support with the remainder. Nelson's great merit, his personal contribution to his country's influence, lay first and foremost in his having by intellectual effort solved the tactical problem set to commanders by the conditions of the naval weapon of his day, the fleet of line-of-battle ships; and secondly, in his being possessed and inspired by the true strategical doctrine that the prime object of naval warfare is the destruction of the enemy's fleet, and therefore that the decisive point in the theatre of war is the point where the enemy's fleet can be found. It was the conviction with which he held this principle that enabled him in circumstances of the greatest difficulty to divine where to go to find the enemy's fleet; which in 1798 led him persistently up and down the Mediterranean till he had discovered the French squadron anchored at Aboukir; which in 1805 took him from the Mediterranean to the West Indies, and from the West Indies back to the Channel. So much for Nelson's share of the work. But Nelson could neither have educated himself nor made full use of his education if the navy of his day had not been inspired with the will to fight and to conquer, with the discipline that springs from that will, and had not obtained through long experience of war the high degree of skill in seamanship and in gunnery which made it the instrument its great commander required. These conditions of the navy in turn were products of the national spirit and of the will of the Government and people of Great Britain to devote to the navy as much money, as many men, and as vigorous support as might be necessary to realise the national purpose. The efforts of this nature made by the country were neither perfect nor complete. The Governments made mistakes, the Admiralty left much to be desired both in organisation and in personnel. But the will was there. The best proof of the national determination is to be found in the best hated of all the institutions of that time, the press-gang, a brutal and narrow-minded form of asserting the principle that a citizen's duty is to fight for his country. That the principle should take such a shape is decisive evidence no doubt that society was badly organised, and that education, intellectual and moral, was on a low level, but also, and this is the vital matter, that the nation well understood the nature of the struggle in which it was engaged and was firmly resolved not only to fight but to conquer. The causes of the success of the French armies in the period between 1792 and 1809 were precisely analogous to those which have been analysed in the case of the British navy. The basis was the national will, expressed in the volunteers and the levy _en masse_. Upon this was superimposed the skill acquired by the army in several years of incessant war, and the formal cause of the victories was Napoleon's insight into the art of command. The research of recent years has revealed the origin of Napoleon's mastery of the method of directing an army. He became an officer in 1785, at the age of sixteen. In 1793, as a young captain of artillery, he directed with remarkable insight and determination the operations by which the allied fleet was driven from Toulon. In 1794 he inspired and conducted, though still a subordinate, a series of successful operations in the Maritime Alps. In 1796, as commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy, he astonished Europe by the most brilliant campaign on record. For these achievements he had prepared himself by assiduous study. As a young officer of artillery he received the best professional training then to be had in Europe, while at the same time, by wide and careful reading, he gave himself a general education. At some period before 1796, probably before 1794, he had read and thoroughly digested the remarkable treatise on the principles of mountain war which had been left in manuscript by General Bourcet, an officer who during the campaigns of half a century had assisted as Quartermaster-General a number of the best Generals of France. Napoleon's phenomenal power of concentration had enabled him to assimilate Bourcet's doctrine, which in his clear and vigorous mind took new and more perfect shape, so that from the beginning his operations are conducted on a system which may be described as that of Bourcet raised to a higher power. The "Nelson touch" was acquired by the Admiral through years of effort to think out, to its last conclusion, a problem the nature of which had never been adequately grasped by his professional predecessors and comrades, though it seems probable that he owed to Clerk the hint which led him to the solution which he found. Napoleon was more fortunate in inheriting a strategical doctrine which he had but to appreciate to expand and to apply. The success of both men is due to the habit of mind which clings tenaciously to the subject under investigation until it is completely cleared up. Each of them became, as a result of his thinking, the embodiment of a theory or system of the employment of force, the one on sea and the other on land; and such an embodiment is absolutely necessary for a nation in pursuit of victory. It seems natural to say that if England wants victory on sea or land, she must provide herself with a Nelson or a Napoleon. The statement is quite true, but it requires to be rightly interpreted. If it means that a nation must always choose a great man to command its navy or its army it is an impossible maxim, because a great man cannot be recognised until his power has been revealed in some kind of work. Moreover, to say that Nelson and Napoleon won victories because they were great men is to invert the order of nature and of truth. They are recognised as great men because of the mastery of their business which they manifested in action. That mastery was due primarily to knowledge. Wordsworth hit the mark when, in answer to the question "Who is the Happy Warrior?" he replied that it was he-- "Who with a natural instinct to discern What knowledge can perform, is diligent to learn." The quality that made them both so valuable was that they knew the best that was known and thought in regard to the art of war. This is the quality which a nation must secure in those whom it entrusts with the design and the conduct of the operations of its fleets and its armies. There is a method for securing this, not by any means a new one, and not originally, as is commonly supposed, a German invention. It consists in providing the army and the navy with a General Staff or Department for the study, design, and direction of operations. In such a department Bourcet, Napoleon's master, spent the best years of his life. In such a department Moltke was trained; over such a department he presided. Its characteristic is that it has one function, that of the study, design, and direction of the movements in fighting of a fleet or an army, and that it has nothing whatever to do with the maintenance of an army, or with its recruiting, discipline, or peace administration. Its functions in peace are intellectual and educational, and in war it becomes the channel of executive power. Bourcet described the head of such a department as "the soul of an army." The British navy is without such a department. The army has borrowed the name, but has not maintained the speciality of function which is essential. In armies other than the British, the Chief of the General Staff is occupied solely with tactics and strategy, with the work of intellectual research by which Nelson and Napoleon prepared their great achievements. His business is to be designing campaigns, to make up his mind at what point or points, in case of war, he will assemble his fleets or his armies for the first move, and what the nature of that move shall be. The second move it is impossible for him to pre-arrange because it depends upon the result of the first. He will determine the second move when the time comes. In order that his work should be as well done as possible, care is taken that the Chief of the Staff shall have nothing else to do. Not he but another officer superintends the raising, organising, and disciplining of the forces. Thus he becomes the embodiment of a theory or system of operations, and with that theory or system he inspires as far as possible all the admirals or generals and other officers who will have to carry out his designs. In the British system the Chief of the General Staff is the principal military member of the Board which administers the army. Accordingly, only a fraction of his time can be given to thinking out the problems of strategy and tactics. At the Admiralty the principal naval member of the Board is made responsible not only for the distribution and movements of ships--a definition which includes the whole domain of strategy and tactics--but also for the fighting and sea-going efficiency of the fleet, its organisation and mobilisation, a definition so wide that it includes the greater part of the administration of the navy, especially as the same officer is held responsible for advice on all large questions of naval policy and maritime warfare, as well as for the control of the naval ordnance department. Thus in each case the very constitution of the office entrusted with the design of operations prevents the officer at its head from concentrating himself upon that vital duty. The result is that the intellectual life both of the army and of the navy lags far behind that of their German rivals, and therefore that there is every chance of both of them being beaten, not for lack of courage or hard work, but by being opposed to an adversary whose thinking has been better done by reason of the greater concentration of energy devoted to it. The first reform needed, at any rate in the navy, is a definition of the functions of the First Sea Lord which will confine his sphere to the distribution and movement of ships and the strategical and tactical training of officers, so as to compel him to become the embodiment or personification of the best possible theory or system of naval warfare. That definition adopted and enforced, there is no need to lay down regulations giving the strategist control over his colleagues who administer _matériel_ and _personnel_; they will of themselves always be anxious to hear his views as to the methods of fighting, and will be only too glad to build ships with a view to their being used in accordance with his design of victory. But until there is at the Admiralty department devoted to designing victory and to nothing else, what possible guarantee can there be that ships will be built, or the navy administered and organised in accordance with any design likely to lead to victory? XIV. THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY The doubt which, since the Prime Minister's statement on the introduction of the Navy Estimates, has disturbed the public mind, is concerned almost exclusively with the number of modern battleships in the Royal Navy. The one object which the nation ought to have in view is victory in the next war, and the question never to be forgotten is, what is essential to victory? While it is probably true that if the disparity of numbers be too great a smaller fleet can hardly engage a larger one with any prospect of success, it is possible to exaggerate the importance both of numbers and of the size of ships. The most decisive victories at sea which are on record were those of Tsusima, of Trafalgar, and of the Nile. At Tsusima the numbers and size of the Japanese Fleet were not such as, before the battle, to give foreign observers grounds for expecting a decisive victory by the Japanese. It was on the superior intellectual and moral qualities of the Japanese that those who expected them to win based their hopes, and this view was justified by the event. At the battle of Trafalgar the British Fleet numbered twenty-seven, the Franco-Spanish Fleet numbered thirty-three; at the battle of the Nile the numbers were equal--thirteen on each side. These figures seem to me sufficiently to prove that superior numbers are not in battle the indispensable condition of victory. They certainly prove that the numerically inferior fleet may very well win. Writers on the art of war distinguish between tactics, the art of winning a battle, and strategy, the art of designing and conducting the whole of the operations which constitute a campaign, of bringing about battles in conditions favourable to one's own side and of making the best use of such victories as may be won for contributing to the general purpose of the war, which is dictating peace on one's own terms. The decision of the questions, how many fleets to send out, what is to be the strength and composition of each of them, and what the objectives assigned to their several commanders is a strategical decision. It is a function of the strategist at the Board of Admiralty, but the question how to handle any one of these fleets in the presence of the enemy so as either to avoid or to bring about an action and so as to win the battle, if a battle be desirable, is a question for the admiral commanding the particular fleet. Evidently the master art, because it dominates the whole war, is that of strategy, and for that reason it must have a seat at the Admiralty Board. As is well known, a large number of naval officers have for several years past been troubled with doubts as to the strategical competence displayed by the Board or Boards of Admiralty since 1904. The Board of Admiralty has also been criticised for other reasons, into some of which it is not necessary to enter, but it is desirable to state precisely the considerations which tend to show that important decisions made by the Admiralty have not been based upon sound strategical principles, and are, indeed, incompatible with them. When four or five years ago it was decided to transfer the centre of gravity of the navy, as represented by fleets in commission, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic coasts of Europe, that was a sound decision. But when the principal fleet in commission in home waters was reduced in order to facilitate the creation of a so-called Home Fleet, made up of a number of ships stationed at different ports, and manned for the most part by nucleus crews, the Admiralty announced this measure in a very remarkable circular. The change clearly involved a reduction of the number of men at sea, and also a reduction in the number of ships which would be immediately available under war conditions. It was further evident that the chief result of this measure would be a reduction of expenditure, yet the circular boldly stated that the object of the measure was to increase the power and readiness of the navy for instant war. In any case, the decision announced revealed an ignorance of one of the fundamental conditions of naval warfare, which differentiates it completely from operations on land. A ship in commission carries on board everything that is necessary for a fight. She can be made ready for battle in a few minutes on the order to clear for action. No other mobilisation is necessary for a fleet in commission, and if a war should break out suddenly, as wars normally always do break out, whichever side is able at once with its fleets already in commission to strike the first blow has the incalculable advantage of the initiative. A fleet divided between several ports and not fully manned is not a fleet in commission; it is not ready, and its assembly as a fleet depends on a contingency, which there is no means of guaranteeing, that the enemy shall not be able to prevent its assembly by moving a fleet immediately to a point at sea from which it would be able to oppose by force the union of the constituent parts of the divided and unready fleet. Later official descriptions of the Home Fleet explained that it was part of the Admiralty design that this fleet should offer the first resistance to an enemy. The most careful examination of these descriptions leaves no room for doubt that the idea of the Admiralty was that one of its fleets should, in case of war, form a sort of advance-guard to the rest of the navy. But it is a fundamental truth that in naval war an advance-guard is absurd and impossible. In the operations of armies, an advance-guard is both necessary and useful. Its function is to delay the enemy's army until such time as the commander-in-chief shall have assembled his own forces, which may be, to some extent, scattered on the march. This delay is always possible on land, because the troops can make use of the ground, that is, of the positions which it affords favourable for defence, and because by means of those positions a small force can for a long time hold in check the advance of a very much larger one. But at sea there are no positions except those formed by narrow straits, estuaries, and shoals, where land and sea are more or less mixed up. The open sea is a uniform surface offering no advantage whatever to either side. There is nothing in naval warfare resembling the defence of a position on land, and the whole difference between offence and defence at sea consists in the will of one side to bring on an action and that of the other side to avoid or postpone it. At sea a small force which endeavours by fighting to delay the movement of a large force exposes itself to destruction without any corresponding gain of time. Accordingly, at sea, there is no analogy to the action of an advance-guard, and the mere fact that such an idea should find its way into the official accounts of the Admiralty's views regarding the opening move of a possible war must discredit the strategy of the Admiralty in the judgment of all who have paid any attention to the nature of naval war. The second requisite for victory, that is, for winning a battle against a hostile fleet, is tactical superiority, or, as Nelson put it: "The skill of our admirals and the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen." The only way to obtain this is through the perpetual practice of the admirals commanding fleets. An admiral, in order to make himself a first-rate tactician, must not merely have deeply studied and pondered the subject, but must spend as much time as possible in exercising, as a whole, the fleet which he commands, in order not only by experimental manoeuvres thoroughly to satisfy himself as to the formation and mode of attack which will be best suited to any conceivable circumstance in which he may find himself, but also to inculcate his ideas into his subordinates; to inspire them with his own knowledge, and to give them that training in working together which, in all those kinds of activities which require large numbers of men to work together, whether on the cricket field, at football, in an army, or in a navy, constitutes the advantage of a practised over a scratch team. If the practice is to make the fleet ready for war, it must be carried out with the fleet in its war composition. All the different elements, battleships, cruisers, torpedo craft, and the rest, must be fully represented, otherwise the admiral would be practising in peace with a different instrument from that with which he would need to operate in war. The importance of this perpetual training ought to be self-evident. It may be well to remind the reader that it has also been historically proved. The great advantage which the British possessed over the French navy in the Wars of the Revolution and the Empire was that the British fleets were always at sea, whereas the French fleets, for years blockaded in their ports, were deficient in that practice which, in the naval as in all other professions, makes perfect. One of the complaints against the present Board of Admiralty is that it has not encouraged the training and exercise of fleets as complete units. Another point, in regard to which the recent practice of the Admiralty is regarded with very grave doubts, not only by many naval officers, but also by many of those who, without being naval officers, take a serious interest in the navy, is that of naval construction. For several years the Admiralty neglected to build torpedo craft of the quality and in the quantity necessary for the most probable contingencies of war, while, at the same time, large sums of money were spent in building armoured cruisers, vessels of a fighting power so great that an admiral would hesitate to detach them from his fleet, lest he should be needlessly weakened on the day of battle, yet not strong enough safely to replace the battleships in the fighting line. The result has been that the admirals in command of fleets have for some time been anxiously asking to be better supplied with scouts or vessels of great speed, but not of such fighting power that they could not be spared at a distance from the fleet even on the eve of an action. These two defects in the shipbuilding policy of the Admiralty make it probable that for some years past the navy has not been constructed in accord with any fully thought-out design of operations; in other words, that the great object "victory" has been forgotten by the supreme authority. The doubt whether victory has been borne in mind is confirmed by what is known of the design of the original _Dreadnought_. A battleship ought to be constructed for battle, that is, for the purpose of destroying the enemy's fleet, for which purpose it will never be used alone, but in conjunction with a number of ships like itself forming the weapon of an admiral in command. A battleship requires three qualities, in the following order of importance:-- First, offensive power. A fleet exists in order to destroy the enemy, but it has no prospect of performing that function if its power of destruction is less than its enemy's. The chief weapon to-day, as in the past, is artillery. Accordingly the first requisite of a fleet, as regards its material qualities, those produced by the constructor, is the capacity to pour on to the enemy's fleet a heavier rain of projectiles than he can return. The second quality is the power of movement. The advantage of superior speed in a fleet--for the superior speed of an individual ship is of little importance--is that so long as it is preserved it enables the admiral, within limits, to accept or decline battle according to his own judgment. This is a great strategical advantage. It may in some conditions enable an inferior fleet to postpone an action which might be disastrous until it has effected a junction with another fleet belonging to its own side. The third quality is that the ships of a fleet should be strong enough to offer to the enemy's projectiles a sufficient resistance to make it improbable that they can be sunk before having inflicted their fair share of damage on the adversary. There is always a difficulty in combining these qualities in a given ship, because as a ship weighs the quantity of water which she displaces, a ship of any given size has its weight given, and the designer cannot exceed that limit of weight. He must divide it between guns with their ammunition, engines with their coal, and armour. Every ton given to armour diminishes the tonnage possible for guns and engines, and, given a minimum for armour, every extra ton given to engines and coal reduces the possible weight of guns and ammunition. In the _Dreadnought_ a very great effort was made to obtain a considerable extra speed over that of all other battleships. This extra speed was defended on the ground that it would enable a fleet of _Dreadnoughts_ to fight a battle at long range, and with a view to such battle the _Dreadnought_ was provided only with guns of the heaviest calibre and deprived of those guns of medium calibre with which earlier battleships were well provided. The theories thus embodied in the new class of ships were both of them doubtful, and even dangerous. In the first place, it is in the highest degree injurious to the spirit and courage of the crew to have a ship which they know will be at a disadvantage if brought into close proximity with the enemy. Their great object ought to be to get as near to the enemy as possible. The hypothesis that more damage will be done by an armament exclusively of the largest guns is in the opinion of many of the best judges likely to be refuted. There is some reason to believe that a given tonnage, if devoted to guns of medium calibre, would yield a very much greater total damage to an enemy's ship than if devoted to a smaller number of guns of heavy calibre and firing much less rapidly. There is, moreover, a widespread belief among naval officers of the highest repute, among whom may be named the author of the "Influence of Sea Power upon History," than whom no one has thought more profoundly on the subject of naval war, that it is bad economy to concentrate in a few very large ships the power which might be more conveniently and effectively employed if distributed in a great number of ships of more moderate size. Surely, so long as naval opinion is divided about the tactical and strategical wisdom of a new type of battleship, it is rash to continue building battleships exclusively of that type, and it would be more reasonable to make an attempt to have naval opinion sifted and clarified, and thus to have a secure basis for a shipbuilding programme, than to hurry on an enormous expenditure upon what may after all prove to have been a series of doubtful experiments. All the questions above discussed seem to me to be more important than that of mere numbers of ships. Numbers are, however, of great importance in their proper place and for the proper reasons. The policy adopted and carried out by the British navy, at any rate during the latter half of the war against the French Empire, was based on a known superiority of force. The British fleet set out by blockading all the French fleets, that is, by taking stations near to the great French harbours and there observing those harbours, so that no French fleet should escape without being attacked. If this is to be the policy of the British navy in future it will require a preponderance of force of every kind over that of the enemy, and that preponderant force will have to be fully employed from the very first day of the war. In other words, it must be kept in commission during peace. But, in addition, it is always desirable to have a reserve of strength to meet the possibility that the opening of a war or one of its early subsequent stages may bring into action some additional unexpected adversary. There are thus two reasons that make for a fleet of great numerical strength. The first, that only great superiority renders possible the strategy known as blockade, or, as I have ventured to call it, of "shadowing" the whole of the enemy's forces. The second, that only great numerical strength renders it possible to provide a reserve against unexpected contingencies. XV. ENGLAND'S MILITARY PROBLEM After the close of the South African war, two Royal Commissions were appointed. One of them, known as the War Commission, was in a general way to inquire into and report upon the lessons of the war. This mission it could fulfil only very imperfectly, because its members felt precluded from discussing the policy in which the war had its origin and incapable of reviewing the military conduct of the operations. This was very like reviewing the play of "Hamlet" without reference to the characters and actions either of Hamlet or of the King, for the mainsprings which determine the course, character, and issue of any war are the policy out of which it arises and the conduct of the military operations. The main fact which impressed itself on the members of the War Commission was that the forces employed on the British side had been very much larger than had been expected at the beginning of the war, and the moral which they drew was contained in the one sentence of their report which has remained in the public mind, to the effect that the Government ought to make provision for the expansion of the army beyond the limit of the regular forces of the Crown. About the same time another Commission, under the chairmanship of the Duke of Norfolk, was appointed to inquire and report whether any, and, if any, what changes were required in order to secure that the Militia and Volunteer forces should be maintained in a condition of military efficiency and at an adequate strength. The Norfolk Commission recommended certain changes which it thought would lead to a great improvement in the efficiency of both forces, while permitting them to maintain the requisite numerical strength. With regard to the Volunteer force, the report said:-- "The governing condition is that the Volunteer, whether an officer, non-commissioned officer, or private, earns his own living, and that if demands are made upon him which are inconsistent with his doing so he must cease to be a Volunteer. No regulations can be carried out which are incompatible with the civil employment of the Volunteers, who are for the most part in permanent situations. Moreover, whatever may be the goodwill and patriotism of employers, they cannot allow the Volunteers they may employ more than a certain period of absence. Their power to permit their workmen to attend camp or other exercises is controlled by the competition which exists in their trade. Those who permit Volunteers in their service to take holidays longer than are customary in their trade and district, are making in the public interest a sacrifice which some of them think excessive." The report further laid stress on the cardinal principle that no Volunteer, whatever his rank, should be put to expense on account of his service. Subject to this governing condition and to this cardinal principle, the Commission made recommendations from which it expected a marked improvement and the gradual attainment of a standard much in advance of anything which until then had been reached. Most of these recommendations have been adopted, with modifications, in the arrangements which have since been made for the Volunteers under the new name "The Territorial Force." The Norfolk Commission felt no great confidence in the instructions given it by the Government on the subject of the standard of efficiency and of numerical strength. Accordingly the Commission added to its report the statement:-- "We cannot assert that, even if the measures recommended were fully carried out, these forces would be equal to the task of defeating a modern continental army in the United Kingdom." The Commission's chief doubt was whether, under the conditions inseparable at any rate from the volunteer system, any scheme of training would give to forces officered largely by men who are not professional soldiers the cohesion of armies that exact a progressive two-years' course from their soldiers and rely, except for expanding the subaltern ranks on mobilisation, upon professional leaders. The Commission then considered "Measures which may provide a Home Defence Army equal to the task of defeating an invader." They were unable to recommend the adoption of the Swiss system, partly because the initial training was not, in their judgment, sufficient for the purpose, and partly because they held that the modern method of extending the training to all classes, while shortening its duration, involves the employment of instructors of the highest possible qualifications. The Commission concluded by reporting that a Home Defence Army capable, in the absence of the whole or the greater portion of the regular forces, of protecting this country against invasion can be raised and maintained only on the principle that it is the duty of every citizen of military age and sound physique to be trained for the national defence and to take part in it should emergency arise. The Norfolk Commission gave expression to two different views without attempting to reconcile them. On the one hand it laid down the main lines along which the improvement of the militia and volunteers was to be sought, and on the other hand it pointed out the advantages of the principle that it is the citizen's duty to be trained as a soldier and to fight in case of need. To go beyond this and to attempt either to reconcile the two currents of thought or to decide between them, was impossible for a Commission appointed to deal with only a fraction of the problem of national defence. The two sets of views, however, continue to exist side by side, and the nation yet has to do what the Norfolk Commission by its nature was debarred from doing. The Government, represented in this matter by Mr. Haldane, is still in the position of relying upon an improved militia and volunteer force. The National Service League, on the other hand, advocates the principle of the citizen's duty, though it couples with it a specific programme borrowed from the Swiss system, the adoption of which was deprecated in the Commission's Report. The public is somewhat puzzled by the appearance of opposition between what are thought of as two schools, and indeed Mr. Haldane in his speech introducing the Army Estimates on March 4, 1909, described the territorial force as a safeguard against universal service. The time has perhaps come when the attempt should be made to find a point of view from which the two schools of thought can be seen in due perspective, and from which, therefore, a definite solution of the military problem may be reached. By what principle must our choice between the two systems be determined? By the purpose in hand. The sole ultimate use of an army is to win the nation's battles, and if one system promises to fulfil that purpose while the other system does not, we cannot hesitate. Great Britain requires an army as one of the instruments of success in a modern British war, and we have therefore to ascertain, in general, the nature of a modern war, and in particular the character of such wars as Great Britain may have to wage. The distinguishing feature of the conflict between two modern great States is that it is a struggle for existence, or, at any rate, a wrestle to a fall. The mark of the modern State is that it is identified with the population which it comprises, and to such a State the name "nation" properly belongs. The French Revolution nationalised the State and in consequence nationalised war, and every modern continental State has so organized itself with a view to war that its army is equivalent to the nation in arms. The peculiar character of a British war is due to the insular character of the British State. A conflict with a great continental Power must begin with a naval struggle, which will be carried on with the utmost energy until one side or the other has established its predominance on the sea. If in this struggle the British navy is successful, the effect which can be produced on a continental State by the victorious navy will not be sufficient to cause the enemy to accept peace upon British conditions. For that purpose, it will be necessary to invade the enemy's territory and to put upon him the constraint of military defeat, and Great Britain therefore requires an army strong enough either to effect this operation or to encourage continental allies to join with it in making the attempt. In any British war, therefore, which is to be waged with prospect of success, Great Britain's battles must be fought and won on the enemy's territory and against an army raised and maintained on the modern national principle. This is the decisive consideration affecting British military policy. In case of the defeat of the British navy a continental enemy would, undoubtedly, attempt the invasion and at least the temporary conquest of Great Britain. The army required to defeat him in the United Kingdom would need to have the same strength and the same qualities as would be required to defeat him in his own territory, though, if the invasion had been preceded by naval defeat, it is very doubtful whether any military success in the United Kingdom would enable Great Britain to continue her resistance with much hope of ultimate success. For these reasons I cannot believe that Great Britain's needs are met by the possession of any force the employment of which is, by the conditions of its service, limited to fighting in the United Kingdom. A British army, to be of any use, must be ready to go and win its country's battles in the theatre of war in which its country requires victories. That theatre of war will never be the United Kingdom unless and until the navy has failed to perform its task, in which case it will probably be too late to win battles in time to avert the national overthrow which must be the enemy's aim. There are, however, certain subsidiary services for which any British military system must make provision. These are:-- (1) Sufficient garrisons must be maintained during peace in India, in Egypt, for some time to come in South Africa, and in certain naval stations beyond the seas, viz., Gibraltar, Malta, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mauritius, West Africa, Bermuda, and Jamaica. It is generally agreed that the principle of compulsory service cannot be applied for the maintenance of these garrisons, which must be composed of professional paid soldiers. (2) Experience shows that a widespread Empire, like the British, requires from time to time expeditions for the maintenance of order on its borders against half civilised or savage tribes. This function was described in an essay on "Imperial Defence," published by Sir Charles Dilke and the present writer in 1892 as "Imperial Police." It would not be fair, for the purpose of one of these small expeditions, arbitrarily to call upon a fraction of a force maintained on the principle of compulsion. Accordingly any system must provide a special paid reserve for the purpose of furnishing the men required for such an expedition. An army able to strike a serious blow against a continental enemy in his own territory would evidently be equally able to defeat an invading army if the necessity should arise. Accordingly the military question for Great Britain resolves itself into the provision of an army able to carry on serious operations against a European enemy, together with the maintenance of such professional forces as are indispensable for the garrisons of India, Egypt, and the over-sea stations enumerated above and for small wars. XVI. TWO SYSTEMS CONTRASTED I proceed to describe a typical army of the national kind, and to show how the system of such an army could be applied in the case of Great Britain. The system of universal service has been established longer in Germany than in any other State, and can best be explained by an account of its working in that country. In Germany every man becomes liable to military service on his seventeenth birthday, and remains liable until he is turned forty-five. The German army, therefore, theoretically includes all German citizens between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, but the liability is not enforced before the age of twenty nor after the age of thirty-nine, except in case of some supreme emergency. Young men under twenty, and men between thirty-nine and forty-five, belong to the Landsturm. They are subjected to no training, and would not be called upon to fight except in the last extremity. Every year all the young men who have reached their twentieth birthday are mustered and classified. Those who are not found strong enough for military service are divided into three grades, of which one is dismissed as unfit; a second is excused from training and enrolled in the Landsturm; while a third, whose physical defects are minor and perhaps temporary, is told off to a supplementary reserve, of which some members receive a short training. Of those selected as fit for service a few thousand are told off to the navy, the remainder pass into the army and join the colours. The soldiers thus obtained serve in the ranks of the army for two years if assigned to the infantry, field artillery, or engineers, and for three years if assigned to the cavalry or horse artillery. At the expiration of the two or three years they pass into the reserve of the standing army, in which they remain until the age of twenty-seven, that is, for five years in the case of the infantry and engineers, and for four years in the case of the cavalry and horse artillery. At twenty-seven all alike cease to belong to the standing army, and pass into the Landwehr, to which they continue to belong to the age of thirty-nine. The necessity to serve for at least two years with the colours is modified in the case of young men who have reached a certain standard of education, and who engage to clothe, feed, equip, and in the mounted arms to mount themselves. These men are called "one year volunteers," and are allowed to pass into the reserve of the standing army at the expiration of one year with the colours. In the year 1906, 511,000 young men were mustered, and of these 275,000 were passed into the standing army, 55,000 of them being one year volunteers. The men in any year so passed into the army form an annual class, and the standing army at any time is made up, in the infantry, of two annual classes, and in the cavalry and horse artillery of three annual classes. In case of war, the army of first line would be made up by adding to the two or three annual classes already with the colours the four or five annual classes forming the reserve, that is, altogether seven annual classes. Each of these classes would number, when it first passed into the army, about 275,000; but as each class must lose every year a certain number of men by death, by diseases which cause physical incapacity from service, and by emigration, the total army of first line must fall short of the total of seven times 275,000. It may probably be taken at a million and a half. In the second line come the twelve annual classes of Landwehr, which will together furnish about the same numbers as the standing army. Behind the Landwehr comes the supplementary reserve, and behind that again the Landsturm, comprising the men who have been trained and are between the ages of thirty-nine and forty-five, the young men under twenty, and all those who, from physical weakness, have been entirely exempted from training. During their two or three years with the colours the men receive an allowance or pay of twopence halfpenny a day. Their service is not a contract but a public duty, and while performing it they are clothed, lodged, and fed by the State. When passed into the reserve they resume their normal civil occupation, except that for a year or two they are called up for a few weeks' training and manoeuvres during the autumn. In this way all German citizens, so far as they are physically fit, with a few exceptions, such as the only son and support of a widow, receive a thorough training as soldiers, and Germany relies in case of war entirely and only upon her citizens thus turned into soldiers. The training is carried out by officers and non-commissioned officers, who together are the military schoolmasters of the nation, and, like other proficient schoolmasters, are paid for their services by which they live. Broadly speaking, there are in Germany no professional soldiers except the officers and non-commissioned officers, from whom a high standard of capacity as instructors and trainers during peace and as leaders in war is demanded and obtained. The high degree of military proficiency which the German army has acquired is due to the excellence of the training given by the officers and to the thoroughness with which, during a course of two or three years, that training can be imparted. The great numbers which can be put into the field are due to the practice of passing the whole male population, so far as it is physically qualified, through this training, so that the army in war represents the whole of the best manhood of the country between the ages of twenty and forty. The total of three millions which has been given above is that which was mentioned by Prince Bismarck in a speech to the Reichstag in 1887. The increase of population since that date has considerably augmented the figures for the present time, and the corresponding total to-day slightly exceeds four millions. * * * * * The results of the British system are shown in the following table, which gives, from the Army Estimates, the numbers of the various constituents of the British army on the 1st of January 1909. There were at that date in the United Kingdom:--- Regular forces ........................ 123,250 Army reserve .......................... 134,110 Special reserves ...................... 67,780 Militia ............................... 9,158 Territorial force ..................... 209,977 Officers' training corps .............. 416 ________ Total in the United Kingdom ...... 544,691 In Egypt and the Colonies:-- Regular forces ........................ 45,002 The British troops in India are paid for by the Indian Government and do not appear in the British Army Estimates. Of the force maintained in the United Kingdom, it will be observed that it falls, roughly, into three categories. In the first place come the first-rate troops which may be presumed to have had a thorough training for war. This class embraces only the regulars and the army reserve, which together slightly exceed a quarter of a million. In the second class come the 68,000 of the special reserve, which, in so far as they have enjoyed the six months' training laid down in the recent reorganisation, could on a sanguine estimate be classified as second-class troops, though in view of the fact that their officers are not professional and are for the most part very slightly trained, that classification would be exceedingly sanguine. Next comes the territorial force with a maximum annual training of a fortnight in camp, preceded by ten to twenty lessons and officered by men whose professional training, though it far exceeds that of the rank and file, falls yet very much short of that given to the professional officers of a first-rate continental army. The territorial force, by its constitution, is not available to fight England's battles except in the United Kingdom, where they can never be fought except in the event of a defeat of the navy. This heterogeneous tripartite army is exceedingly expensive, its cost during the current year being, according to the Estimates, very little less than 29 millions, the cost of the personnel being 23-1/2 millions, that of _matériel_ being 4 millions, and that of administration 1/2 millions. The British regular army cannot multiply soldiers as does the German army. It receives about 37,000 recruits a year. But it sends away to India and the Colonies about 23,000 each year and seldom receives them back before their eight years' colour service are over, when they pass into the first-class reserve. There pass into the reserve about 24,000 men a year, and as the normal term of reserve service is four years, its normal strength is about 96,000 men. As the regular army contains only professional soldiers, who look, at any rate for a period of eight years, to soldiering as a living, and are prepared for six or seven years abroad, there is a limit to the supply of recruits, who are usually under nineteen years of age, and to whom the pay of a shilling a day is an attraction. Older men with prospects of regular work expect wages much higher than that, and therefore do not enlist except when in difficulties. XVII. A NATIONAL ARMY I propose to show that a well-trained homogeneous army of great numerical strength can be obtained on the principle of universal service at no greater cost than the present mixed force. The essentials of a scheme, based upon training the best manhood of the nation, are: first, that to be trained is a matter of duty not of pay; secondly, that every trained man is bound, as a matter of duty, to serve with the army in a national war; thirdly, that the training must be long enough to be thorough, but no longer; fourthly, that the instructors shall be the best possible, which implies that they must be paid professional officers and non-commissioned officers. I take the age at which the training should begin at the end of the twentieth year, in order that, in case of war, the men in the ranks may be the equals in strength and endurance of the men in the ranks of any opposing army. The number of men who reach the age of twenty every year in the United Kingdom exceeds 400,000. Continental experience shows that less than half of these would be rejected as not strong enough. The annual class would therefore be about 200,000. The principle of duty applies of course to the navy as well as to the army, and any man going to the navy will be exempt from army training. But it is doubtful whether the navy can be effectively manned on a system of very short service such as is inevitable for a national army. The present personnel of the navy is maintained by so small a yearly contingent of recruits that it will be covered by the excess of the annual class over the figure here assumed of 200,000. The actual number of men reaching the age of twenty is more than 400,000, and the probable number out of 400,000 who will be physically fit for service is at least 213,000. I assume that for the infantry and field artillery a year's training would, with good instruction, be sufficient, and that even better and more lasting results would be produced if the last two months of the year were replaced by a fortnight of field manoeuvres in each of the four summers following the first year. For the cavalry and horse artillery I believe that the training should be prolonged for a second year. The liability to rejoin the colours, in case of a national war, should continue to the end of the 27th year, and be followed by a period of liability in the second line, Landwehr or Territorial Army. The first thing to be observed is the numerical strength of the army thus raised and trained. If we assume that any body of men loses each year, from death, disablement, and emigration, five per cent. of its number, the annual classes would be as follows:-- 1st year, age 20-21 200,000 (At the end of the 2nd " " 21-22 170,000 first year 20,000 3rd " " 23-24 161,300 are to go abroad 4th " " 24-25 153,425 as explained below) 5th " " 25-26 145,754 6th " " 26-27 138,467 -------- Total on mobilisation 968,946 ======== This gives an army of close upon a million men in first line in addition to the British forces in India, Egypt, and the colonial stations. If from the age of 27 to that of 31 the men were in the Landwehr, that force would be composed of four annual classes as follows:-- 7th year, age 27-28 131,544 8th " " 28-29 124,967 9th " " 29-30 118,719 10th " " 30-31 112,784 -------- Total of Landwehr 488,014 ======== There is no need to consider the further strength that would be available if the liability were prolonged to the age of 39, as it is in Germany. The liability thus enforced upon all men of sound physique is to fight in a national war, a conflict involving for England a struggle for existence. But that does not and ought not to involve serving in the garrison of Egypt or of India during peace, nor being called upon to take part in one of the small wars waged for the purpose of policing the Empire or its borders. These functions must be performed by professional, i.e. paid soldiers. The British army has 76,000 men in India and 45,000 in Egypt, South Africa, and certain colonial stations. These forces are maintained by drafts from the regular army at home, the drafts amounting in 1908 to 12,000 for India and 11,000 for the Colonies. Out of every annual class of 200,000 young men there will be a number who, after a year's training, will find soldiering to their taste, and will wish to continue it. These should be given the option of engaging for a term of eight years in the British forces in India, Egypt, or the Colonies. There they would receive pay and have prospects of promotion to be non-commissioned officers, sergeants, warrant officers or commissioned officers, and of renewing their engagement if they wished either for service abroad or as instructors in the army at home. These men would leave for India, Egypt, or a colony at the end of their first year. I assume that 20,000 would be required, because eight annual classes of that strength, diminishing at the rate of five per cent. per annum, give a total of 122,545, and the eight annual classes would therefore suffice to maintain the 121,000 now in India, Egypt, and the Colonies. Provision is thus made for the maintenance of the forces in India, Egypt, and the Colonies. There must also be provision for the small wars to which the Empire is liable. This would be made by engaging every year 20,000 who had finished their first year's training to serve for pay, say 1s. a day, for a period say of six months, of the second year, and afterwards to join for five years the present first-class reserve at 6d. a day, with liability for small wars and expeditions. At the end of the five years these men would merge in the general unpaid reserve of the army. They might during their second year's training be formed into a special corps devoting most of the time to field manoeuvres, in which supplementary or reserve officers could receive special instruction. It would be necessary also to keep with the colours for some months after the first year's training a number of garrison artillery and engineers to provide for the security of fortresses during the period between the time of sending home one annual class and the preliminary lessons of the next. These men would be paid. I allow 10,000 men for this purpose, and these, with the 20,000 prolonging their training for the paid reserve, and with the mounted troops undergoing the second year's training, would give during the winter months a garrison strength at home of 50,000 men. The mobilised army of a million men would require a great number of extra officers, who should be men of the type of volunteer officers selected for good education and specially trained, after their first year's service, in order to qualify them as officers. Similar provision must be made for supplementary non-commissioned officers. XVIII. THE COST It will probably be admitted that an army raised and trained on the plan here set forth would be far superior in war to the heterogeneous body which figures in the Army Estimates at a total strength of 540,000 regulars, militia, and volunteers. Its cost would in no case be more than that of the existing forces, and would probably be considerably less. This is the point which requires to be proved. The 17th Appendix to the Army Estimates is a statement of the cost of the British army, arranged under the four headings of:-- 1. Cost of personnel of regular army and army reserve £18,279,234 2. Cost of special reserves and territorial forces 5,149,843 3. Cost of armaments, works, stores, &c. 3,949,463 4. Cost of staff and administration 1,414,360 ___________ Making a total of £28,792,900 =========== In the above table nearly a million is set down for the cost of certain labour establishments and of certain instructional establishments, which may for the present purpose be neglected. Leaving them out, the present cost of the personnel of the Regular Army, apart from staff, is, £15,942,802. For this cost are maintained officers, non-commissioned officers and men, numbering altogether 170,000. The lowest pay given is that of 1s. a day to infantry privates, the privates of the other arms receiving somewhat higher and the non-commissioned officers very much higher rates of pay. If compulsory service were introduced into Great Britain, pay would become unnecessary for the private soldier; but he ought to be and would be given a daily allowance of pocket-money, which probably ought not to exceed fourpence. The mounted troops would be paid at the rate of 1s. a day during their second year's service. Assuming then that the private soldier received fourpence a day instead of 1s. a day, and that the officers and non-commissioned officers were paid as at present, the cost of the army would be reduced by an amount corresponding to 8d. a day for 148,980 privates. That amount is £1,812,590, the deduction of which would reduce the total cost to £14,137,212. At the same rate an army of 200,000 privates and 20,000 non-commissioned officers and men would cost . . . . . . . . £18,295,215 Second year of 20,000 mounted troops at £60 a year each . . . 1,200,000 Add to this cost of first-class Reserve of 96,000 at £10 7s. 6d. each . . . . . . . 997,600 Cost of 30,000 men for six months' extra training at the rate of £60 a year each . . . . . 900,000 Cost of extra training for supplementary officers and non-commissioned officers . . . . . . 500,000 ----------- £21,892,815 Add to this the cost of the troops maintained in the Colonies and Egypt so far as charged to British Estimates . . . . £3,401,704 ----------- Total personnel . . . £25,294,519 Matériel (allowing for additional outlay due to larger numbers) . . 4,500,000 Staff and administration . . . 1,500,000 ------------ Total Cost of Army at Home and in the Colonies . . £31,294,519 This is slightly in excess of the present cost of the personnel of the Army, but, whereas the present charge only provides for the heterogeneous force already described of 589,000 men, the charges here explained provide for a short-service homogeneous army of one million and a half, as well as for the 45,000 troops permanently maintained in Egypt and the Colonies. The estimate just given is, however, extravagant. The British system has innumerable different rates of pay and extra allowances of all kinds, and is so full of anomalies that it is bound to be costly. Unfortunately, the Army Estimates are so put together that it is difficult to draw from them any exact inferences as to the actual annual cost of a private soldier beyond his pay. The average annual cost, effective and non-effective, of an officer in the cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry is £473, this sum covering all the arrangements for pensions and retiring allowances. I propose in the following calculations to assume the average cost of an officer to be £500 a year, a sum which would make it possible for the average combatant officer to be somewhat better paid than he is at present. The normal pay of a sergeant in the infantry of the line is 2s. 4d. a day, or £42, 11s. 8d. a year. The Army Estimates do not give the cost of a private soldier, but the statement is made that the average annual cost per head of 150,000 warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men is £63, 6s. 7d. The warrant officers and non-commissioned officers appear to be much more expensive than the private, and as the minimum pay of a private is £18, 5s., the balance, £45, 1s. 7d., is probably much more than the cost of housing, clothing, feeding, and equipping the private, whose food, the most expensive item, certainly does not cost a shilling a day or £18 a year. I assume that the cost of maintaining a private soldier is covered by £36 a year, while his allowance of 4d. a day amounts to £6, 1s. 4d. In order to cover the extra allowances which may be made to corporals, buglers, and trumpeters, I assume the average cost of the rank and file to be £45 a year. I also assume that the average cost of a sergeant does not exceed £100 a year, which allows from £40 to £50 for his pay and the balance for his housing, clothing, equipment, and food. I add provisions for pensions for sergeants after twenty-five years' service. These figures lead to the following estimate:-- 7000 officers at £500 £3,500,000 14,000 sergeants at £100 1,400,000 Pension after twenty-five years for sergeants, £52 a year 396,864 (An annual class of 14,000, decreasing annually by 2-1/2 per cent., would consist, after twenty-five years, of 7632) ------------ Carry forward £5,296,864 Brought forward . . . £5,296,864 200,000 privates at £45 a year . . 9,000,000 2nd year of 20,000 mounted troops (cavalry and horse artillery at £60 a year each) 1,200,000 Six months' extra training for 30,000 men with pay (total rate per man £60 a year) (20,000 for paid reserve and 10,000 fortress troops) . . . . 900,000 First-class reserve . . . . 997,600 Training supplementary officers and sergeants 500,000 ------------ £17,894,464 Colonial troops . . . . . 3,500,000 Total personnel . . . . £21,394,464 ------------ _Matériel_, allowing for additional cost due to larger numbers . . . . 4,500,000 Staff and administration . . . 1,500,000 ------------ Total cost of army at home and in the Colonies . . . . . £27,394,464 ============ The figures here given will, it is hoped, speak for themselves. They are, if anything, too high rather than too low. The number of officers is calculated on the basis of the present war establishments, which give 5625 officers for 160,500 of the other ranks. It does not include those in Egypt and the Colonies. The cost of the officers is taken at a higher average rate than that of British officers of the combatant arms under the present system, and, both for sergeants and for privates, ample allowance appears to me to be made even on the basis of their present cost. When it is considered that Germany maintains with the colours a force of 600,000 men at a cost of £29,000,000, that France maintains 550,000 for £27,000,000, and that Italy maintains 221,000 for £7,500,000, it cannot be admitted that Great Britain would be unable to maintain 220,000 officers and men at an annual cost of £17,500,000, and the probability is that with effective administration this cost could be considerably reduced. It may at first sight seem that the logical course would have been to assume two years' service in the infantry and three years' service in the mounted arms, in accord with the German practice, but there are several reasons that appear to me to make such a proposal unnecessary. In the first place, Great Britain's principal weapon must always be her navy, while Germany's principal weapon will always be her army, which guarantees the integrity of her three frontiers and also guards her against invasion from oversea. Germany's navy comes only in the second place in any scheme for a German war, while in any scheme for a British war the navy must come in the first place and the army in the second. The German practice for many years was to retain the bulk of the men for three years with the colours. It was believed by the older generation of soldiers that any reduction of this period would compromise that cohesion of the troops which is the characteristic mark of a disciplined army. But the views of the younger men prevailed and the period has been reduced by a third. The reduction of time has, however, placed a heavier responsibility upon the body of professional instructors. The actual practice of the British army proves that a recruit can be fully trained and be made fit in every way to take his place in his company by a six months' training, but in my opinion that is not sufficient preparation for war. The recruit when thoroughly taught requires a certain amount of experience in field operations or manoeuvres. This he would obtain during the summer immediately following upon the recruit training; for the three months of summer, or of summer and autumn, ought to be devoted almost entirely to field exercises and manoeuvres. If the soldier is then called out for manoeuvres for a fortnight in each of four subsequent years, or for a month in each of two subsequent years, I believe that the lessons he has learned of operations in the field will thereby be refreshed, renewed, and digested, so as to give him sufficient experience and sufficient confidence in himself, in his officers, and in the system to qualify him for war at any moment during the next five or six years. The additional three months' manoeuvre training, beyond the mere recruit training, appears to me indispensable for an army that is to be able to take the field with effect. But that this period should suffice, and that the whole training should be given in nine or ten months of one year, followed by annual periods of manoeuvre, involves the employment of the best methods by a body of officers steeped in the spirit of modern tactics and inspired by a general staff of the first order. The question what is the shortest period that will suffice to produce cohesion belongs to educational psychology. How long does it take to form habits? How many repetitions of a lesson will bring a man into the condition in which he responds automatically to certain calls upon him, as does a swimmer dropped into the water, a reporter in forming his shorthand words, or a cyclist guiding and balancing his machine? In each case two processes are necessary. There is first the series of progressive lessons in which the movements are learned and mastered until the pupil can begin practice. Then follows a period of practice more or less prolonged, without which the lessons learned do not become part of the man's nature; he retains the uncertainty of a beginner. The recruit course of the British army is of four months. A first practice period of six months followed by fresh practice periods of a month each in two subsequent years or by four practice periods of a fortnight each in four successive years are in the proposals here sketched assumed to be sufficient. If they were proved inadequate I believe the right plan of supplementing them would be rather by adding to the number and duration of the manoeuvre practices of the subsequent years than by prolonging the first period of continuous training. The following table shows the cost of two years' service calculated on the same bases as have been assumed above. Two years' service would mean an army with the colours not of 200,000 but of 390,000 men. This would require double the number of officers and sergeants, and the annual estimates for personnel would be £34,000,000, and the total Army Estimates £41,000,000. There would also be a very great extra expenditure upon barracks. Estimate of Annual Cost for Two Years' Service. 13,650 officers at £500 a year £6,825,000 27,300 sergeants at £100 2,730,000 Pension for sergeants' annual class of 27,300, decreasing by 2-1/2 per cent., gives after twenty-five years £12,403; at £52 a year pension is 644,956 390,000 privates at £45 a year 17,550,000 Third year mounted troops, 20,000 at £60 1,200,000 First-class reserve 997,000 Training supplementary officers and sergeants 500,000 ---------- Carry forward £30,446,956 Brought forward £30,446,956 Colonial troops 3,500,000 ---------- Total personnel £33,946,956 _Matériel_, allowing for extra numbers 5,000,000 Staff and administration, allowing for extra numbers 2,000,000 ----------- £40,946,956 =========== XIX. ONE ARMY NOT TWO The training provided in the scheme which I have outlined could be facilitated at comparatively small cost by the adoption of certain preparatory instruction to be given partly in the schools, and partly to young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty. It has never appeared to me desirable to add to the school curriculum any military subjects whatever, and I am convinced that no greater mistake could be made, seeing that schoolmasters are universally agreed that the curriculum is already overloaded and requires to be lightened, and that the best preparation that the school can give for making a boy likely to be a good soldier when grown up, is to develop his intelligence and physique as far as the conditions of school life admit. But if all school children were drilled in the evolutions of infantry in close order, the evolutions being always precisely the same as those practised in the army, the army would receive its men already drilled, and would not need to spend much time in recapitulating these practices, which make no appreciable demand upon the time of school children. Again, there seems to be no doubt that boys between the ages of seventeen and twenty can very well be taught to handle a rifle, and the time required for such instruction and practice is so small that it would in no way affect or interfere with the ordinary occupations of the boys, whatever their class in life. Every school of every grade ought, as a part of its ordinary geography lessons, to teach the pupils to understand, to read, and to use the ordnance maps of Great Britain, and that this should be the case has already been recognised by the Board of Education. A soldier who can read such a map has thereby acquired a knowledge and a habit which are of the greatest value to him, both in manoeuvres and in the field. The best physical preparation which the schools can give their pupils for the military life, as well as for any other life, is a well-directed course of gymnastics and the habits of activity, order, initiative, and discipline derived from the practice of the national games. A national army is a school in which the young men of a nation are educated by a body of specially trained teachers, the officers. The education given for war consists in a special training of the will and of the intelligence. In order that it should be effective, the teachers or trainers must not merely be masters of the theory and practice of war and of its operations, but also proficient in the art of education. This conception of the officers' function fixes their true place in the State. Their duties require for their proper performance the best heads as well as the best-schooled wills that can be found, and impose upon them a laborious life. There can be no good teacher who is not also a student, and a national army requires from its officers a high standard not only of character, but of intelligence and knowledge. It should offer a career to the best talent. A national army must therefore attract the picked men of the universities to become officers. The attraction, to such men consists, chiefly, in their faith in the value of the work to be done, and, to a less degree, in the prospect of an assured living. Adequate, though not necessarily high, pay must be given, and there must be a probability of advancement in the career proportionate to the devotion and talents given to the work. But their work must be relied upon by the nation, otherwise they cannot throw their energies into it with full conviction. This is the reason why, if there is to be a national army, it must be the only regular army and the nation must rely upon nothing else. To keep a voluntary paid standing army side by side with a national army raised upon the principle of universal duty is neither morally nor economically sound. Either the nation will rely upon its school or it will not. If the school is good enough to serve the nation's turn, a second school on a different basis is needless; if a second school were required, that would mean that the first could not be trusted. There can be no doubt that in a national school of war the professional officers must be the instructors, otherwise the nation will not rely upon the young men trained. The 200,000 passed through the school every year will be the nation's best. Therefore, so soon as the system has been at work long enough to produce a force as large as the present total, that is, after the third year, there will be no need to keep up the establishment of 138,000 paid privates, the special reserve, or the now existing territorial force. There will be one homogeneous army, of which a small annual contingent will, after each year's training, be enlisted for paid service in India, Egypt, and the oversea stations, and a second small contingent, with extra training, will pass into the paid reserve for service in small oversea expeditions. The professional officers and sergeants will, of course, be interchangeable between the national army at home and its professional branches in India, Egypt, and the oversea stations, and the cadres of the battalions, batteries, and squadrons stationed outside the United Kingdom can from time to time be relieved by the cadres of the battalions' from the training army at home. This relief of battalions is made practicable by the national system. One of the first consequences of the new mode of recruiting will be that all recruits will be taken on the same given date, probably the 1st of January in each year, and, as this will apply as well to the men who re-engage to serve abroad as to all others, so soon as the system is in full working order, the men of any battalion abroad will belong to annual classes, and the engagement of each class will terminate on the same day. XX. THE TRANSITION I have now explained the nature and working of a national army, and shown the kind of strength it will give and the probable maximum cost which it will involve when adopted. The chief difficulty attendant upon its adoption lies in the period of transition from the old order to the new. If Great Britain is to keep her place and do her duty in the world the change must be made; but the question arises, how is the gulf between one and the other to be bridged? War comes like a thief in the night, and it must not catch this country unready. The complete readiness which the new system, when in full swing, will produce, cannot be obtained immediately. All that can be done in the transition period is to see that the number and quality of men available for mobilisation shall be at least as high as it is under the existing system. It may be worth while to explain how this result can be secured. Let us assume that the Act authorising the new system is passed during a year, which may be called '00, and that it is to come into force on the 1st January of the year '01. The Act would probably exempt from its operations the men at the date of its passing already serving in any of the existing forces, including the territorial army, and the discussion on the Bill would, no doubt, have the effect of filling the territorial army up to the limit of its establishment, 315,000 men. On the 31st December '00 the available troops would therefore be:-- Regulars in the United Kingdom (present figure) 138,000 Special reserve 67,000 Army reserve (probably diminished from present strength) 120,000 Territorial force 315,000 -------- Total 640,000 ======== From the 1st January '01 recruiting on present conditions for all these forces would cease. The regular army of 138,000 would lose drafts to India and the Colonies 23,000 and would have lost during '00 by waste at 5 per cent 6,900 ------- 29,000 This would leave: ------- regular army under old conditions 108,100 and leave room for recruits under new conditions 91,900 ======= The total available for mobilisation during the year '01 would therefore be:-- Regulars 200,000 Paid reserves (the present first-class reserve. I assume an arbitrary figure below the actual one) 120,000 Special reserve (I assume a large waste and a loss from men whose time has expired) 50,000 Territorial force 315,000 Less 5 per cent 15,700 ------- 299,250 ------- 669,250 On the 1st January '02 the regular army would be:-- Old engagement 108,000 Less waste 5,400 Indian and Colonial reliefs 23,000 ------- 79,600 Recruits under new system 120,400 Mounted troops serving second year 20,000 -------- Total of regulars 220,000 New reserve 91,900 Less 5 per cent. 4,580 ------- 87,320 87,000 Paid reserve 120,000 Special reserve, reduced by lapse of engagements 40,000 -------- Total liable for national war 467,000 Add--Territorial force, reduced by 5 per cent waste (14,962), and lapse of (78,750) engagements 205,538 -------- 672,538 ======== In the year '03 there would be:-- Old regulars, 79,600; less 5 per cent. waste, 3,950; less drafts for abroad, 23,000-- leaves 52,050, say 50,000 Regulars, recruits under new conditions 150,000 Mounted troops serving second year 20,000 New reserve 197,331 Paid reserve 120,000 Special reserve 30,000 --------- Total liable for national war 567,334 Territorial force 116,512 --------- 683,846 ========= In the year '04 there would be:-- Old regulars 50,000 Less 5 per cent. 2,500 ------- 47,500 Less drafts 23,000 ------- 24,500 New regulars 175,500 Mounted troops, second year 20,000 --------- 220,000 New reserve 329,000 Paid reserve 120,000 Special reserve may now be dropped --------- Total liable for national war 669,000 Territorial force 116,512 Less 5 per cent. 5,825 -------- 110,687 Less 78,750 -------- 31,937 -------- 700,937 ======== At the end of '04 the territorial force would come to an end and in '05 there would be:-- (Old regulars, 24,000, after waste just enough for drafts.) New regulars 200,000 Mounted troops, second year 20,000 New reserve 478,000 Less to paid reserve 20,000 -------- 458,000 Paid reserve 120,000 -------- Total, all liable for national war 798,000 ======== In these tables I have taken the drafts for India and the Colonies from the old regulars. But they can just as well be taken from the new regulars. If need be the old regulars could, before the fourth year, be passed into the paid reserve, and the full contingent of 200,000 one year's men taken. The men of the special reserve and territorial force would on the termination of their engagements pass into the second line reserve or Landwehr until the age of thirty-one or thirty-two. It will be seen that during the years of transition additional expense must be incurred, as, until the change has been completed, some portion of the existing forces must be maintained side by side with the new national army. It is partly in order to facilitate the operations of the transition period that I have assumed a large addition to the number of officers. There will also be additional expense caused by the increase of barrack accommodation needed when the establishment is raised from 138,000 privates to 200,000, but this additional accommodation will not be so great as it might at first sight appear, because it is reasonable to suppose that those young men who wish it, and whose parents wish it, will be allowed to live at home instead of in barracks, provided they regularly attend all drills, parades, and classes. It has been necessary, in discussing the British military system, to consider the arrangements for providing the garrisons of India, Egypt, and certain oversea stations during peace, and to make provision for small wars or imperial police; but I may point out that the system by which provision is made out of the resources of the United Kingdom alone for these two military requirements of the Empire, is, in the present conditions of the Empire, an anomaly. The new nations which have grown up in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are anxious, above all things, to give reality to the bond between them and the mother country. Their desire is to render imperial service, and the proper way of giving them the opportunity to do so is to call upon them to take their part in maintaining the garrisons in India and Egypt and in the work of imperial police. How they should do it, it is for them to decide and arrange, but for Englishmen at home to doubt for a moment either their will or their capacity to take their proper share of the burden is to show an unworthy doubt of the sincerity of the daughter nations and of their attachment to the mother country and the Empire. If Great Britain should be compelled to enter upon a struggle for existence with one of the great European powers, the part which Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa could play in that struggle is limited and specific. For the conflict would, in the first instance, take the form of a naval war. To this the King's dominions beyond the seas can do little more than assist during peace by their contributions, either of ships, men, or money, in strengthening the British navy. But during the actual course of such a war, while it is doubtful whether either Canada, Australia, or New Zealand could render much material help in a European struggle, they could undoubtedly greatly contribute to the security of India and Egypt by the despatch of contingents of their own troops to reinforce the British garrisons maintained in those countries. This appears to me to be the direction to which their attention should turn, not only because it is the most effective way in which they can promote the stability of the Empire, but also because it is the way along which they will most speedily reach a full appreciation of the nature of the Empire and its purpose in the world. XXI. THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ARMIES ARE RAISED I have now sketched the outlines of a national military system applicable to the case of Great Britain. It remains to show why such a system is necessary. There are three main points in respect of each of which a choice has to be made. They are the motive which induces men to become soldiers, the time devoted to military education, and the nature of the liability to serve in war. The distinction which strikes the popular imagination is that between voluntary and compulsory service. But it covers another distinction hardly less important--that between paid and unpaid soldiers. The volunteers between 1860 and 1878, or 1880, when pay began to be introduced for attendance in camps, gave their time and their attention with no external inducement whatever. They had no pay of any kind, and there was no constraint to induce them to join, or, having, joined, to continue in their corps. The regular soldier, on the other hand, makes a contract with the State. He agrees in return for his pay, clothes, board and lodging to give his whole time for a specific number of years to the soldier's life. The principle of a contract for pay is necessary in the case of a professional force maintained abroad for purposes of imperial police; but it is not possible on that principle to raise or maintain a national army. The principle of voluntary unpaid service appears to have a deeper moral foundation than that of service by a contract of hiring. But if the time required is greater than is consistent with the men's giving a full day's work to their industrial occupations the unpaid nature of the service cannot be maintained, and the men must be paid for their time. The merit of the man's free gift of himself is thereby obscured. Wherein does that merit consist? If there is no merit in a man's making himself a soldier without other reward than that which consists in the education he receives, then the voluntary system has no special value. But if there is a merit, it must consist in the man's conferring a benefit upon, or rendering a service to, his country. In other words, the excellence of the unpaid voluntary system consists in its being an acceptance by those who serve under it of a duty towards the State. The performance of that duty raises their citizenship to a higher plane. If that is the case it must be desirable, in the interest both of the State and of its citizens, that every citizen capable of the duty should perform it. But that is the principle upon which the national system is based. The national system is therefore an extension of the spirit of the volunteer or unpaid voluntary system. The terms compulsory service and universal service are neither of them strictly accurate. There is no means of making every adult male, without exception, a soldier, because not every boy that grows up has the necessary physical qualification. Nor does the word compulsion give a true picture. It suggests that, as a rule, men would not accept the duty if they could evade it, which is not the case. The number of men who have been volunteers since 1860 shows that the duty is widely accepted. Indeed, in a country of which the government is democratic, a duty cannot be imposed by law upon all citizens except with the concurrence of the majority. But a duty recognised by the majority and prescribed by law will commend itself as necessary and right to all but a very few. If a popular vote were to be taken on the question whether or not it is every citizen's duty to be trained as a soldier and to fight in case of a national war, it is hardly conceivable that the principle would fail to be affirmed by an overwhelming majority. The points as to which opinions are divided are the time and method of training and the nature of the liability to serve in war. There are, roughly speaking, three schemes of training to be considered--first, the old volunteer plan of weekly evening drills, with an annual camp training; secondly, the militia plan of three months' recruit training followed by a month's camp training in several subsequent years; and, lastly, the continental plan of a continuous training for one or more years followed by one or more periods of annual manoeuvres. The choice between these three methods is the crucial point of the whole discussion. It must be determined by the standard of excellence rendered necessary by the needs of the State. The evidence given to the Norfolk Commission convinced that body that neither the first nor the second plan will produce troops fit to meet on equal terms those of a good modern army. Professional officers are practically unanimous in preferring the third method. The liability of the trained citizen to serve in war during his year in the ranks and his years as a first-class reservist must be determined by the military needs of the country. I have given the reasons why I believe the need to be for an army that can strike a blow in a continental war. I myself became a volunteer because I was convinced that it was a citizen's duty to train himself to bear arms in his country's cause. I have been for many years an ardent advocate of the volunteer system, because I believed, as I still believe, that a national army must be an army of citizen soldiers, and from the beginning I have looked for the efficiency of such an army mainly to the tactical skill and the educating power of its officers. But experience and observation have convinced me that a national army, such as I have so long hoped for, cannot be produced merely by the individual zeal of its members, nor even by their devoted co-operation with one another. The spirit which animates them must animate the whole nation, if the right result is to be produced. For it is evident that the effort of the volunteers, continued for half a century, to make themselves an army, has met with insuperable obstacles in the social and industrial conditions of the country. The Norfolk Commission's Report made it quite clear that the conditions of civil employment render it impossible for the training of volunteers to be extended beyond the present narrow limits of time, and it is evident that those limits do not permit of a training sufficient for the purpose, which is victory in war against the best troops that another nation can produce. Yet the officers and men of the volunteer force have not carried on their fifty years' work in vain. They have, little by little, educated the whole nation to think of war as a reality of life, they have diminished the prejudice which used to attach to the name of soldier, and they have enabled their countrymen to realise that to fight for his country's cause is a part of every citizen's duty, for which he must be prepared by training. The adoption of this principle will have further results. So soon as every able-bodied citizen is by law a soldier, the administration of both army and navy will be watched, criticised, and supported with an intelligence which will no longer tolerate dilettantism in authority. The citizen's interest in the State will begin to take a new aspect. He will discover the nature of the bond which unites him to his fellow-citizens, and from this perception will spring that regeneration of the national life from which alone is to be expected the uplifting of England. XXII. THE CHAIN OF DUTY The reader who has accompanied me to this point will perhaps be willing to give me a few minutes more in which we may trace the different threads of the argument and see if we can twine them into a rope which will be of some use to us. We began by agreeing that the people of this country have not made entirely satisfactory arrangements for a competitive struggle, at any rate in its extreme form of war with another country, although such conflict is possible at any time; and we observed that British political arrangements have been made rather with a view to the controversy between parties at home than to united action in contest with a foreign state. We then glanced at the probable consequences to the British people of any serious war, and at the much more dreadful results of failure to obtain victory. We discussed the theories which lead some of our countrymen to be unwilling to consider the nature and conditions of war, and which make many of them imagine that war can be avoided either by trusting to international arbitration or by international agreements for disarmament. We agreed that it was not safe to rely upon these theories. Examining the conditions of war as they were revealed in the great struggle which finished a hundred years ago, we saw that the only chance of carrying on war with any prospect of success in modern times lies in the nationalisation of the State, so that the Government can utilise in conflict all the resources of its land and its people. In the last war Great Britain's national weapon was her navy, which she has for centuries used as a means of maintaining the balance of power in Europe. The service she thus rendered to Europe had its reward in the monopoly of sea power which lasted through the nineteenth century. The great event of that century was the attainment by Germany of the unity that makes a nation and her consequent remarkable growth in wealth and power, resulting in a maritime ambition inconsistent with the position which England held at sea during the nineteenth century and was disposed to think eternal. Great Britain, in the security due to her victories at sea, was able to develop her colonies into nations, and her East India Company into an Empire. But that same security caused her to forget her nationalism, with the result that now her security itself is imperilled. During this period, when the conception of the nation was in abeyance, some of the conditions of sea power have been modified, with the result that the British monopoly is at an end, while the possibility of a similar monopoly has probably disappeared, so that the British navy, even if successful, could not now be used, as it was a hundred years ago, as a means of entirely destroying the trade of an adversary. Accordingly, if in a future war Britain is to find a continental ally, she must be able to offer him the assistance, not merely of naval victory, but also of a strong army. Moreover, during the epoch in which Great Britain has turned her back upon Europe the balance of power has been upset, and there is no power and no combination able to stand up against Germany as the head of the Triple Alliance. This is a position of great danger for England, because it is an open question whether in the absence of a strong British army any group of Powers, even in alliance with England, could afford to take up a quarrel against the combination of the central States. It thus appears that Great Britain, by neglecting the conditions of her existence as a nation, has lost the strength in virtue of which, at previous crises in European history, she was the successful champion of that independence of States which, in the present stage of human development, is the substance of freedom. Our consideration of the question of might showed that if Great Britain is to be strong enough to meet her responsibilities her people must nationalise themselves, while our reflections on the question of right showed that only from such nationalisation is a sound policy to be expected. In short, only in so far as her people have the unity of spirit and of will that mark a nation can Great Britain be either strong or just. The idea of the nation implies a work to be done by the British State, which has to be on the watch against challenge from a continental rival to Great Britain's right to the headship of her empire, and which at the same time has to give to that empire the direction without which it cannot remain united. Great Britain cannot do the work thus imposed upon her by her position and her history unless she has the co-operation of all her people. Thus the conception of the nation reveals itself in the twofold shape of duties laid upon England and of duties consequently laid upon every Englishman. It means that England must either decline and fall or do a certain work in the world which is impossible for her unless she constrains all her people to devote themselves to her service. It thus appears that England and her people can expect no future worth having except on the principle of duty made the mainspring both of public and of private life. We attempted to apply the principles involved in the word nation to the obvious and urgent needs of the British State at the present time. Victory at sea being indispensable for Great Britain in case of conflict, we inquired into the conditions of victory, and found in the parallel instances of Nelson and Napoleon that both by sea and land the result of the nationalisation of war is to produce a leader who is the personification of a theory or system of operations. The history of the rise of the German nation shows how the effort to make a nation produced the necessary statesman, Bismarck. Nationalisation creates the right leadership--that of the man who is master of his work. Reviewing the needs of the naval administration, we saw that what is wanted at the present time is rather proper organisation at the Admiralty than an increase in mere material strength; while turning to the army, we discovered that the only system on which can be produced the army that Great Britain requires is that which makes every able-bodied citizen a soldier. To make the citizen a soldier is to give him that sense of duty to the country and that consciousness of doing it, which, if spread through the whole population, will convert it into what is required--a nation. Therefore to reform the army according to some such plan as has been here proposed is the first step in that national revival which is the one thing needful for England, and if that step be taken the rest will follow of itself. Nationalisation will bring leadership, which in the political sphere becomes statesmanship, and the right kind of education, to give which is the highest ultimate function of national existence. I have tried in these pages to develop an idea which has haunted me for many years. I think if the reader would extend to it even for a short time the hospitality of his mind he might be willing to make it his constant companion. For it seems to me to show the way towards the solution of other problems than those which have here been directly discussed. I cannot but believe that if we could all accustom ourselves to make some sacrifices for the sake of England, if only by giving a few minutes every day to thinking about her and by trying to convince ourselves that those who are not of our party are yet perhaps animated by the same love of their country as we ourselves, we might realise that the question of duty is answered more easily by performance than by speculation. I suspect that the relations between the political parties, between capital and labour, between master and servant, between rich and poor, between class and class would become simpler and better if Englishmen were to come to see how natural it is that they should spend their lives for England. THE END 
52793	----	file was produced from images generously made available by University of California libraries; missing images from HathiTrust Digital Library) TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{x}; for example, S^t or Esq^{re}. Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. More detail can be found at the end of the book. [Illustration: BY COMMAND OF His late Majesty WILLIAM THE IV^{TH}. _and under the Patronage of_ Her Majesty the Queen. HISTORICAL RECORDS, _OF THE_ British Army _Comprising the History of every Regiment IN HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE_. _By Richard Cannon Esq^{re}._ _Adjutant Generals Office, Horse Guards._ London _Printed by Authority:_] HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE SEVENTEENTH, OR THE LEICESTERSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT; CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE FORMATION OF THE REGIMENT IN 1688, AND OF ITS SUBSEQUENT SERVICES TO 1848. COMPILED BY RICHARD CANNON, ESQ., ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, HORSE GUARDS. LONDON: PARKER, FURNIVALL, & PARKER, 30, CHARING-CROSS. MDCCCXLVIII. LONDON. PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. THE SEVENTEENTH, OR THE LEICESTERSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT, BEARS ON THE REGIMENTAL COLOUR "_THE ROYAL TIGER_;" WITH THE WORD "HINDOOSTAN," AS A LASTING TESTIMONY OF THE EXEMPLARY CONDUCT OF THE REGIMENT DURING ITS SERVICE IN INDIA FROM 1804 TO 1823; AND THE WORDS "AFFGHANISTAN," "GHUZNEE," AND "KHELAT," IN COMMEMORATION OF ITS DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT IN AFFGHANISTAN, THE STORMING OF GHUZNEE, AND THE CAPTURE OF KHELAT, IN THE YEAR 1839. SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. CONTENTS OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD. YEAR PAGE INTRODUCTION 1688 Formation of the Regiment in the vicinity of London 1 ---- Solomon Richards appointed to be Colonel 2 ---- Reported fit for duty, and marched to Windsor, Slough, Datchet, Staines, and Egham - ---- Furnished a Guard at Windsor Castle, to His Majesty King James II. - ---- Revolution took place in Great Britain - ---- King James II. proceeded to France - 1689 King William III. and Queen Mary elevated to the Throne - ---- Regiment adhered to the Protestant interest - ---- Embarked for Ireland with Ninth Foot to aid in the defence of Londonderry 3 ---- Returned to England, having failed to land at Londonderry - ---- Colonel Richards deprived of his commission by King William III. - ---- Sir George St. George appointed Colonel - 1693 Embarked for Flanders 4 1694 Quartered for the winter at Ostend 4 1695 Marched to Dixmude - ---- Colonel Courthorpe exchanged with Colonel Sir George St. George - ---- Engaged at the Fortress of Kenoque - ---- Joined in the Siege of Namur 5 ---- Engaged at the storming of St. Denis - ---- Colonel Courthorpe killed 6 ---- Lieut.-Colonel Sir Matthew Bridges promoted to the Colonelcy - ---- Surrender of the Castle of Namur - ---- Quartered for the winter in Bruges - 1696 Encamped near Ghent - ---- Served the Campaign under the Prince of Vaudemont 7 1697 Engaged in operations in Brabant - ---- Termination of Hostilities by the Treaty of Ryswick - ---- Returned to England - ---- Embarked for Ireland - 1701 Preparations for War recommenced - ---- Re-embarked from Cork for Holland - ---- Reviewed by King William III. on Breda-heath - 1702 Proceeded to Rosendael - ---- Encamped at Cranenburg - ---- Siege and Capture of Kayserswerth 8 ---- ---------------- of Venloo - ---- ---------------- of Ruremonde - ---- ---------------- of Liege - 1703 ---------------- of Huy 9 ---- ---------------- of Limburg - ---- Lieut.-Colonel Blood promoted to the Colonelcy, _vice_ Sir M. Bridges - ---- Embarked from Holland 10 1704 Proceeded to Portugal 10 1705 Siege and Capture of Valencia de Alcantara 11 ---- ---------------- of Albuquerque -- ---- Siege of Badajoz -- 1706 Siege and Capture of Alcantara -- ---- Advanced to Placencia -- ---- Siege and Capture of Ciudad Rodrigo 12 ---- Marched to Madrid -- ---- Retreated to Valencia -- 1707 Battle of Almanza -- ---- Lieut.-Colonel Wightman promoted to the Colonelcy, in succession to General Blood, deceased 14 1708 Engaged in operations in Catalonia 15 1709 Returned to England -- 1710 Stationed in Scotland -- 1714 Proceeded to Ireland -- 1715 Removed to Scotland -- ---- Engaged at Sheriff-Muir -- 1722 Promotion of Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Ferrers to the Colonelcy, in succession to General Wightman, deceased 16 ---- Appointment of Colonel James Tyrell, vice Colonel Ferrers, deceased -- 1726 Embarked for Minorca -- 1742 Colonel John Wynyard from the Marines (4th Regiment) appointed Colonel, in succession to General Tyrell, deceased -- 1748 Peace concluded at Aix la Chapelle 17 ---- Embarked for Ireland -- 1751 Royal Warrant issued on 1st July for regulating clothing, colours, &c. -- 1752 Colonel Edward Richbell appointed to the Colonelcy, in succession to General Wynyard, deceased -- 1757 Colonel John Forbes appointed Colonel, in succession to General Richbell, deceased 17 ---- Embarked for Nova Scotia -- 1758 Proceeded on an expedition against Cape Breton -- ---- Siege of Louisburg, and capture of the island of Cape Breton 18 ---- Joined the troops at Lake George -- 1759 Siege of Ticonderago 19 ---- Proceeded to Crown Point -- ---- Hon. Robert Monckton appointed Colonel, _vice_ Forbes, deceased -- 1760 Embarked from Crown Point, and formed part of the army which advanced to Montreal, and effected the conquest of the whole of Canada -- 1761 Proceeded to New York 20 ---- Encamped at Staten Island -- 1762 Embarked for the West Indies -- ---- Capture of Martinique -- ---- ------ of Grenada 21 ---- ------ of St. Lucia -- ---- ------ of St. Vincent -- ---- Formed part of the expedition against the Havannah -- ---- Siege and Capture of Moro Fort, with nine ships of war, &c. -- 1763 Treaty of Peace concluded 22 ---- Havannah restored to Spain in exchange for Florida -- ---- Re-embarked for North America -- 1767 Returned to England -- 1771 Embarked for Ireland -- 1775 Embarked for North America -- 1776 Arrived at Boston, and proceeded to Nova Scotia 23 ---- Embarked for New York, and landed at Staten Island -- 1776 Proceeded to Long Island 23 ---- Engaged with the American army at Brooklyn 24 ---- Capture of New York -- ---- Engaged at White Plains -- ---- Reduction of Fort Washington -- 1777 Engagement with the American army at Trenton 25 ---- Proceeded on an Expedition to Pennsylvania 26 ---- Attacked the American position at Brandywine -- ---- Advanced, and took possession of Philadelphia -- ---- Took a position at Germantown -- 1778 Marched with the army from Philadelphia through the Jerseys, on its return to New York 27 1779 Placed in garrison at Stoney Point -- ---- Attacked and made prisoners of war -- ---- Exchanged and united with detachments of Provincial troops and employed on various services in Virginia 28 1781 Attacked the Americans at Guildford Court House -- ---- Defended York Town, where they became prisoners of war -- 1782 Major-General George Morrison appointed Colonel, _vice_ Monckton, deceased -- ---- Authorized to assume the County Title of Leicestershire Regiment -- 1783 Removed from New York to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland 28 1786 Embarked for England -- 1792 Major-General George Garth appointed Colonel, _vice_ Morrison, removed to the Fourth Foot -- 1793 Embarked for Ireland -- 1796 Embarked for St. Domingo -- 1798 Re-embarked for England 30 1799 A Second Battalion added to the Establishment of the Regiment by volunteers from the Militia -- 1799 The two Battalions embarked for Holland under Lieut.-General Sir Ralph Abercromby 30 ---- Engaged in action with the Enemy on 19th September -- ---- Again engaged at Bergen on 2nd October 31 ---- Returned to England -- 1800 Embarked for Minorca -- 1802 Embarked for Ireland -- ---- Second Battalion reduced -- 1803 Hostilities with France resumed -- ---- Ordered suddenly from Limerick to Dublin, on account of serious riots -- 1804 Embarked from Ireland for the Isle of Wight -- ---- Proceeded to the East Indies -- 1806 Proceeded to Bundelkund 32 1807 Captured the Fort of Chumar by storm -- ---- Attack on the Fort of Comona 33 ---- Employed in pursuit of the hostile tribes -- 1808 Joined the force under Major-General St. Leger -- ---- Proceeded to the Sutlej -- 1814 War with Nepaul 34 ---- Attack on Jutgurgh -- 1816 Flank Companies joined a flank Battalion forming at Allahabad 35 1817 Battalion Companies ordered to Nagpore -- ---- Action at Jubblepore 36 1819 Lieut.-General Sir Josiah Champagné, G.C.H., appointed Colonel, _vice_ Garth, deceased -- 1823 Embarked for England 37 ---- Landed at Gravesend and marched to Chatham -- ---- Reviewed at Southsea Common by H. R. H. the Duke of Clarence 38 1825 Permitted to bear the figure of the Royal Tiger, with the word Hindoostan superscribed -- ---- Proceeded to Scotland -- 1826 Returned to England 39 ---- Embarked for Ireland -- 1829 Returned to England -- 1830 Embarked by detachments for New South Wales -- 1836 Proceeded to Bombay -- 1837 Encamped at Poona -- 1838 War with Affghanistan -- ---- Proceeded to Tatta in Lower Scinde -- 1839 Marched into Scinde 40 ---- Captured Hyderabad -- ---- Marched into Affghanistan -- ---- Fortress of Ghuznee captured by storm 41 ---- Expedition against the Khan of Khelat -- ---- Khelat captured -- ---- Medal presented for storming Ghuznee 42 ---- Permitted to bear on its colours and appointments the words "Affghanistan," "Ghuznee," and "Khelat" -- 1840 Returned to British India 43 ---- General Sir F. A. Wetherall, G.C.H., appointed Colonel, _vice_ Champagné, deceased -- 1841 Proceeded to Aden, in Arabia Felix -- 1843 Lieut.-General Sir Peregrine Maitland, K.C.B., appointed Colonel, _vice_ Wetherall, deceased 44 1845 Returned to Bombay 45 1847 Embarked for England -- ---- Arrived at Gravesend and marched to Canterbury -- 1848 Proceeded to London in consequence of Chartist riots 46 ---- The Conclusion -- PLATES. Costume of the Regiment to face 1 Colours of the Regiment " 46 SUCCESSION OF COLONELS OF THE SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. YEAR PAGE 1688 Solomon Richards 47 1689 Sir George St. George -- 1695 James Courthorpe 48 ---- Sir Matthew Bridges -- 1703 Holcroft Blood -- 1707 James Wightman 49 1722 Thomas Ferrers 50 1722 James Tyrrell -- 1742 John Wynyard 51 1752 Edward Richbell -- 1757 John Forbes -- 1759 The Honourable Robert Monckton 52 1782 George Morrison -- 1792 George Garth 53 1819 Sir Josiah Champagné, G.C.H. -- 1840 Sir Frederick Augustus Wetherall, G.C.H. 55 1843 Sir Peregrine Maitland, K.C.B. 56 GENERAL ORDERS. _HORSE-GUARDS_, 1_st January_, 1836. His Majesty has been pleased to command that, with the view of doing the fullest justice to Regiments, as well as to Individuals who have distinguished themselves by their Bravery in Action with the Enemy, an Account of the Services of every Regiment in the British Army shall be published under the superintendence and direction of the Adjutant-General; and that this Account shall contain the following particulars, viz.:-- ---- The Period and Circumstances of the Original Formation of the Regiment; The Stations at which it has been from time to time employed; The Battles, Sieges, and other Military Operations in which it has been engaged, particularly specifying any Achievement it may have performed, and the Colours, Trophies, &c., it may have captured from the Enemy. ---- The Names of the Officers, and the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates Killed or Wounded by the Enemy, specifying the place and Date of the Action. ---- The Names of those Officers who, in consideration of their Gallant Services and Meritorious Conduct in Engagements with the Enemy, have been distinguished with Titles, Medals, or other Marks of His Majesty's gracious favour. ---- The Names of all such Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates, as may have specially signalized themselves in Action. And, ---- The Badges and Devices which the Regiment may have been permitted to bear, and the Causes on account of which such Badges or Devices, or any other Marks of Distinction, have been granted. By Command of the Right Honorable GENERAL LORD HILL, _Commanding-in-Chief_. JOHN MACDONALD, _Adjutant-General_. PREFACE. The character and credit of the British Army must chiefly depend upon the zeal and ardour by which all who enter into its service are animated, and consequently it is of the highest importance that any measure calculated to excite the spirit of emulation, by which alone great and gallant actions are achieved, should be adopted. Nothing can more fully tend to the accomplishment of this desirable object than a full display of the noble deeds with which the Military History of our country abounds. To hold forth these bright examples to the imitation of the youthful soldier, and thus to incite him to emulate the meritorious conduct of those who have preceded him in their honorable career, are among the motives that have given rise to the present publication. The operations of the British Troops are, indeed, announced in the "London Gazette," from whence they are transferred into the public prints: the achievements of our armies are thus made known at the time of their occurrence, and receive the tribute of praise and admiration to which they are entitled. On extraordinary occasions, the Houses of Parliament have been in the habit of conferring on the Commanders, and the Officers and Troops acting under their orders, expressions of approbation and of thanks for their skill and bravery; and these testimonials, confirmed by the high honour of their Sovereign's approbation, constitute the reward which the soldier most highly prizes. It has not, however, until late years, been the practice (which appears to have long prevailed in some of the Continental armies) for British Regiments to keep regular records of their services and achievements. Hence some difficulty has been experienced in obtaining, particularly from the old Regiments, an authentic account of their origin and subsequent services. This defect will now be remedied, in consequence of His Majesty having been pleased to command that every Regiment shall, in future, keep a full and ample record of its services at home and abroad. From the materials thus collected, the country will henceforth derive information as to the difficulties and privations which chequer the career of those who embrace the military profession. In Great Britain, where so large a number of persons are devoted to the active concerns of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and where these pursuits have, for so long a period, being undisturbed by the _presence of war_, which few other countries have escaped, comparatively little is known of the vicissitudes of active service and of the casualties of climate, to which, even during peace, the British Troops are exposed in every part of the globe, with little or no interval of repose. In their tranquil enjoyment of the blessings which the country derives from the industry and the enterprise of the agriculturist and the trader, its happy inhabitants may be supposed not often to reflect on the perilous duties of the soldier and the sailor,--on their sufferings,--and on the sacrifice of valuable life, by which so many national benefits are obtained and preserved. The conduct of the British Troops, their valour, and endurance, have shone conspicuously under great and trying difficulties; and their character has been established in Continental warfare by the irresistible spirit with which they have effected debarkations in spite of the most formidable opposition, and by the gallantry and steadiness with which they have maintained their advantages against superior numbers. In the official Reports made by the respective Commanders, ample justice has generally been done to the gallant exertions of the Corps employed; but the details of their services and of acts of individual bravery can only be fully given in the Annals of the various Regiments. These Records are now preparing for publication, under his Majesty's special authority, by Mr. RICHARD CANNON, Principal Clerk of the Adjutant General's Office; and while the perusal of them cannot fail to be useful and interesting to military men of every rank, it is considered that they will also afford entertainment and information to the general reader, particularly to those who may have served in the Army, or who have relatives in the Service. There exists in the breasts of most of those who have served, or are serving, in the Army, an _Esprit de Corps_--an attachment to everything belonging to their Regiment; to such persons a narrative of the services of their own Corps cannot fail to prove interesting. Authentic accounts of the actions of the great, the valiant, the loyal, have always been of paramount interest with a brave and civilized people. Great Britain has produced a race of heroes who, in moments of danger and terror, have stood "firm as the rocks of their native shore:" and when half the world has been arrayed against them, they have fought the battles of their Country with unshaken fortitude. It is presumed that a record of achievements in war,--victories so complete and surprising, gained by our countrymen, our brothers, our fellow citizens in arms,--a record which revives the memory of the brave, and brings their gallant deeds before us,--will certainly prove acceptable to the public. Biographical Memoirs of the Colonels and other distinguished Officers will be introduced in the Records of their respective Regiments, and the Honorary Distinctions which have, from time to time, been conferred upon each Regiment, as testifying the value and importance of its services, will be faithfully set forth. As a convenient mode of Publication, the Record of each Regiment will be printed in a distinct number, so that when the whole shall be completed, the Parts may be bound up in numerical succession. INTRODUCTION TO THE INFANTRY. The natives of Britain have, at all periods, been celebrated for innate courage and unshaken firmness, and the national superiority of the British troops over those of other countries has been evinced in the midst of the most imminent perils. History contains so many proofs of extraordinary acts of bravery, that no doubts can be raised upon the facts which are recorded. It must therefore be admitted, that the distinguishing feature of the British soldier is INTREPIDITY. This quality was evinced by the inhabitants of England when their country was invaded by Julius Cæsar with a Roman army, on which occasion the undaunted Britons rushed into the sea to attack the Roman soldiers as they descended from their ships; and, although their discipline and arms were inferior to those of their adversaries, yet their fierce and dauntless bearing intimidated the flower of the Roman troops, including Cæsar's favourite tenth legion. Their arms consisted of spears, short swords, and other weapons of rude construction. They had chariots, to the axles of which were fastened sharp pieces of iron resembling scythe-blades, and infantry in long chariots resembling waggons, who alighted and fought on foot, and for change of ground, pursuit or retreat, sprang into the chariot and drove off with the speed of cavalry. These inventions were, however, unavailing against Cæsar's legions: in the course of time a military system, with discipline and subordination, was introduced, and British courage, being thus regulated, was exerted to the greatest advantage; a full development of the national character followed, and it shone forth in all its native brilliancy. The military force of the Anglo-Saxons consisted principally of infantry: Thanes, and other men of property, however, fought on horseback. The infantry were of two classes, heavy and light. The former carried large shields armed with spikes, long broad swords and spears; and the latter were armed with swords or spears only. They had also men armed with clubs, others with battle-axes and javelins. The feudal troops established by William the Conqueror consisted (as already stated in the Introduction to the Cavalry) almost entirely of horse; but when the warlike barons and knights, with their trains of tenants and vassals, took the field, a proportion of men appeared on foot, and, although these were of inferior degree, they proved stout-hearted Britons of stanch fidelity. When stipendiary troops were employed, infantry always constituted a considerable portion of the military force; and this _arme_ has since acquired, in every quarter of the globe, a celebrity never exceeded by the armies of any nation at any period. The weapons carried by the infantry, during the several reigns succeeding the Conquest, were bows and arrows, half-pikes, lances, halberds, various kinds of battle-axes, swords, and daggers. Armour was worn on the head and body, and in course of time the practice became general for military men to be so completely cased in steel, that it was almost impossible to slay them. The introduction of the use of gunpowder in the destructive purposes of war, in the early part of the fourteenth century, produced a change in the arms and equipment of the infantry-soldier. Bows and arrows gave place to various kinds of fire-arms, but British archers continued formidable adversaries; and, owing to the inconvenient construction and imperfect bore of the fire-arms when first introduced, a body of men, well trained in the use of the bow from their youth, was considered a valuable acquisition to every army, even as late as the sixteenth century. During a great part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth each company of infantry usually consisted of men armed five different ways; in every hundred men forty were "_men-at-arms_," and sixty "_shot_;" the "men-at-arms" were ten halberdiers, or battle-axe men, and thirty pikemen; and the "shot" were twenty archers, twenty musketeers, and twenty harquebusiers, and each man carried, besides his principal weapon, a sword and dagger. Companies of infantry varied at this period in numbers from 150 to 300 men; each company had a colour or ensign, and the mode of formation recommended by an English military writer (Sir John Smithe) in 1590 was:--the colour in the centre of the company guarded by the halberdiers; the pikemen in equal proportions, on each flank of the halberdiers: half the musketeers on each flank of the pikes; half the archers on each flank of the musketeers, and the harquebusiers (whose arms were much lighter than the muskets then in use) in equal proportions on each flank of the company for skirmishing.[1] It was customary to unite a number of companies into one body, called a REGIMENT, which frequently amounted to three thousand men: but each company continued to carry a colour. Numerous improvements were eventually introduced in the construction of fire-arms, and, it having been found impossible to make armour proof against the muskets then in use (which carried a very heavy ball) without its being too weighty for the soldier, armour was gradually laid aside by the infantry in the seventeenth century: bows and arrows also fell into disuse, and the infantry were reduced to two classes, viz.: _musketeers_, armed with matchlock muskets, swords, and daggers; and _pikemen_, armed with pikes from fourteen to eighteen feet long, and swords. In the early part of the seventeenth century Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, reduced the strength of regiments to 1000 men. He caused the gunpowder, which had heretofore been carried in flasks, or in small wooden bandoliers, each containing a charge, to be made up into cartridges, and carried in pouches; and he formed each regiment into two wings of musketeers, and a centre division of pikemen. He also adopted the practice of forming four regiments into a brigade; and the number of colours was afterwards reduced to three in each regiment. He formed his columns so compactly that his infantry could resist the charge of the celebrated Polish horsemen and Austrian cuirassiers; and his armies became the admiration of other nations. His mode of formation was copied by the English, French, and other European states; but so great was the prejudice in favour of ancient customs, that all his improvements were not adopted until near a century afterwards. In 1664 King Charles II. raised a corps for sea-service, styled the Admiral's regiment. In 1678 each company of 100 men usually consisted of 30 pikemen, 60 musketeers, and 10 men armed with light firelocks. In this year the King added a company of men armed with hand-grenades to each of the old British regiments, which was designated the "grenadier company." Daggers were so contrived as to fit in the muzzles of the muskets, and bayonets similar to those at present in use were adopted about twenty years afterwards. An Ordnance regiment was raised in 1685, by order of King James II., to guard the artillery, and was designated the Royal Fusiliers (now 7th Foot). This corps, and the companies of grenadiers, did not carry pikes. King William III. incorporated the Admiral's regiment in the second Foot Guards, and raised two Marine regiments for sea-service. During the war in this reign, each company of infantry (excepting the fusiliers and grenadiers) consisted of 14 pikemen and 46 musketeers; the captains carried pikes; lieutenants, partisans; ensigns, half-pikes; and serjeants, halberds. After the peace in 1697 the Marine regiments were disbanded, but were again formed on the breaking out of the war in 1702.[2] During the reign of Queen Anne the pikes were laid aside, and every infantry soldier was armed with a musket, bayonet, and sword; the grenadiers ceased, about the same period, to carry hand grenades; and the regiments were directed to lay aside their third colour: the corps of Royal Artillery was first added to the Army in this reign. About the year 1745, the men of the battalion companies of infantry ceased to carry swords; during the reign of George II. light companies were added to infantry regiments; and in 1764 a Board of General Officers recommended that the grenadiers should lay aside their swords, as that weapon had never been used during the Seven Years' War. Since that period the arms of the infantry soldier have been limited to the musket and bayonet. The arms and equipment of the British Troops have seldom differed materially, since the Conquest, from those of other European states; and in some respects the arming has, at certain periods, been allowed to be inferior to that of the nations with whom they have had to contend; yet, under this disadvantage, the bravery and superiority of the British infantry have been evinced on very many and most trying occasions, and splendid victories have been gained over very superior numbers. Great Britain has produced a race of lion-like champions who have dared to confront a host of foes, and have proved themselves valiant with any arms. At _Crecy_ King Edward III., at the head of about 30,000 men, defeated, on the 26th of August, 1346, Philip King of France, whose army is said to have amounted to 100,000 men; here British valour encountered veterans of renown:--the King of Bohemia, the King of Majorca, and many princes and nobles were slain, and the French army was routed and cut to pieces. Ten years afterwards, Edward Prince of Wales, who was designated the Black Prince, defeated, at _Poictiers_, with 14,000 men, a French army of 60,000 horse, besides infantry, and took John I., King of France, and his son Philip, prisoners. On the 25th of October, 1415, King Henry V., with an army of about 13,000 men, although greatly exhausted by marches, privations, and sickness, defeated, at _Agincourt_, the Constable of France, at the head of the flower of the French nobility and an army said to amount to 60,000 men, and gained a complete victory. During the seventy years' war between the United Provinces of the Netherlands and the Spanish monarchy, which commenced in 1578 and terminated in 1648, the British infantry in the service of the States-General were celebrated for their unconquerable spirit and firmness;[3] and in the thirty years' war between the Protestant Princes and the Emperor of Germany, the British Troops in the service of Sweden and other states were celebrated for deeds of heroism.[4] In the wars of Queen Anne, the fame of the British army under the great MARLBOROUGH was spread throughout the world; and if we glance at the achievements performed within the memory of persons now living, there is abundant proof that the Britons of the present age are not inferior to their ancestors in the qualities which constitute good soldiers. Witness the deeds of the brave men, of whom there are many now surviving, who fought in Egypt in 1801, under the brave Abercromby, and compelled the French army, which had been vainly styled _Invincible_, to evacuate that country; also the services of the gallant Troops during the arduous campaigns in the Peninsula, under the immortal WELLINGTON; and the determined stand made by the British Army at Waterloo, where Napoleon Bonaparte, who had long been the inveterate enemy of Great Britain, and had sought and planned her destruction by every means he could devise, was compelled to leave his vanquished legions to their fate, and to place himself at the disposal of the British Government. These achievements, with others of recent dates in the distant climes of India, prove that the same valour and constancy which glowed in the breasts of the heroes of Crecy, Poictiers, Agincourt, Blenheim, and Ramilies, continue to animate the Britons of the nineteenth century. The British Soldier is distinguished for a robust and muscular frame,--intrepidity which no danger can appal,--unconquerable spirit and resolution,--patience in fatigue and privation, and cheerful obedience to his superiors. These qualities,--united with an excellent system of order and discipline to regulate and give a skilful direction to the energies and adventurous spirit of the hero, and a wise selection of officers of superior talent to command, whose presence inspires confidence,--have been the leading causes of the splendid victories gained by the British arms.[5] The fame of the deeds of the past and present generations in the various battle-fields where the robust sons of Albion have fought and conquered, surrounds the British arms with a halo of glory; these achievements will live in the page of history to the end of time. The records of the several regiments will be found to contain a detail of facts of an interesting character, connected with the hardships, sufferings, and gallant exploits of British soldiers in the various parts of the world, where the calls of their Country and the commands of their Sovereign have required them to proceed in the execution of their duty, whether in active continental operations, or in maintaining colonial territories in distant and unfavourable climes. The superiority of the British infantry has been pre-eminently set forth in the wars of six centuries, and admitted by the greatest commanders which Europe has produced. The formations and movements of this _arme_, as at present practised, while they are adapted to every species of warfare, and to all probable situations and circumstances of service, are well suited to show forth the brilliancy of military tactics calculated upon mathematical and scientific principles. Although the movements and evolutions have been copied from the continental armies, yet various improvements have from time to time been introduced, to ensure that simplicity and celerity by which the superiority of the national military character is maintained. The rank and influence which Great Britain has attained among the nations of the world have in a great measure been purchased by the valour of the Army, and to persons who have the welfare of their country at heart the records of the several regiments cannot fail to prove interesting. FOOTNOTES: [1] A company of 200 men would appear thus:-- __| | | |__| | 20 20 20 30 2|0 30 20 20 20 Harquebuses. Muskets. Halberds. Muskets. Harquebuses. Archers. Pikes. Pikes. Archers. The musket carried a ball which weighed 1/10th of a pound; and the harquebus a ball which weighed 1/25th of a pound. [2] The 30th, 31st, and 32nd Regiments were formed as Marine corps in 1702, and were employed as such during the wars in the reign of Queen Anne. The Marine corps were embarked in the Fleet under Admiral Sir George Rooke, and were at the taking of Gibraltar, and in its subsequent defence in 1704; they were afterwards employed at the siege of Barcelona in 1705. [3] The brave Sir Roger Williams, in his Discourse on War, printed in 1590, observes:--"I persuade myself ten thousand of our nation would beat thirty thousand of theirs (the Spaniards) out of the field, let them be chosen where they list." Yet at this time the Spanish infantry was allowed to be the best disciplined in Europe. For instances of valour displayed by the British Infantry during the Seventy Years' War, see the Historical Record of the Third Foot, or Buffs. [4] _Vide_ the Historical Record of the First, or Royal Regiment of Foot. [5] "Under the blessing of Divine Providence, His Majesty ascribes the successes which have attended the exertions of his troops in Egypt to that determined bravery which is inherent in Britons; but His Majesty desires it may be most solemnly and forcibly impressed on the consideration of every part of the army, that it has been a strict observance of order, discipline, and military system, which has given the full energy to the native valour of the troops, and has enabled them proudly to assert the superiority of the national military character, in situations uncommonly arduous, and under circumstances of peculiar difficulty."--_General Orders in 1801._ In the General Orders issued by Lieut.-General Sir John Hope (afterwards Lord Hopetoun), congratulating the army upon the successful result of the Battle of Corunna, on the 16th of January, 1809, it is stated:--"On no occasion has the undaunted valour of British troops ever been more manifest. At the termination of a severe and harassing march, rendered necessary by the superiority which the enemy had acquired, and which had materially impaired the efficiency of the troops, many disadvantages were to be encountered. These have all been surmounted by the conduct of the troops themselves; and the enemy has been taught, that, whatever advantages of position or of numbers he may possess, there is inherent in the British officers and soldiers a bravery that knows not how to yield,--that no circumstances can appal,--and that will ensure victory, when it is to be obtained by the exertion of any human means." [Illustration: SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. FOR CANNON'S MILITARY RECORDS] HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE SEVENTEENTH, OR THE LEICESTERSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT. [Sidenote: 1688] In the autumn of 1688, when the adoption of pernicious counsels by the Court had given rise to the preparation of an armament in Holland to support the British people in the preservation of their religion and laws, and King James II. began to entertain apprehension for the permanence of his government, His Majesty issued commissions for adding to his regular army five regiments of cavalry and seven of infantry, including two corps formed of men who had quitted the Dutch service; and of these twelve regiments, the sixteenth and SEVENTEENTH regiments of foot in the British line are the only remaining corps.[6] The SEVENTEENTH regiment was raised in London and its immediate vicinity, and the colonelcy was conferred on Solomon Richards, by commission dated the 27th of September, 1688. Great success attended the efforts made to procure men for completing the ranks of the regiment, and in three weeks after the letter of service for its formation was issued, it was embodied, armed, and clothed. It was composed to a great extent of men who had entered the army at the augmentation in 1685, and had been discharged after the suppression of the Duke of Monmouth's rebellion. The regiment was speedily reported fit for duty, and on the 23rd of October orders were received for four companies to march to Colnbrook and Longford, four to Staines and Egham, and five to Windsor, Datchet, and Slough; at the same time two companies were directed to mount guard at the Castle at Windsor: thus were the first duties of the regiment those of a guard to the Royal person. On the 29th of October the quarters were changed to Maidenhead, Datchet, and Windsor; and on the 6th of November, when the Prince of Orange had landed in Devonshire, the regiment received orders to march to Greenwich and Deptford, to be in readiness to protect the establishments in the vicinity of those places, and to aid, if required, in the preservation of the peace of the Metropolis. [Sidenote: 1689] The events which followed in rapid succession occasioned the flight of King James to France, and the services of the regiment were transferred to the Prince and Princess of Orange, who were elevated to the throne by the title of King William and Queen Mary, in February, 1689. In Ireland, the army adhered to the interest of King James; but the Protestants of Inniskilling and Londonderry embraced the principles of the Revolution, and wrote to King William for assistance to enable them to preserve those places in his interest. The ninth and SEVENTEENTH regiments were directed to proceed to Ireland, to support the people of Londonderry; and the two corps sailed from Liverpool on the 3rd of April. Contrary winds forced the transports to anchor at Highlake; but they again put to sea on the 10th of that month, and on the 15th arrived in the vicinity of Londonderry. The governor, Colonel Lundy, had resolved to surrender the place to King James, who had arrived in Ireland with a body of troops from France, and this officer called a council of war, to which he stated, that there was not provision in the town for the garrison for more than ten days, and that it would be impossible to resist the army which was advancing against it, and a resolution was passed against the two regiments landing. The two colonels had received orders to obey the governor, and they accordingly returned with their regiments to England. It afterwards appeared that the governor's statements were not true; the town was defended, and King William, considering that the two colonels (Cunningham and Richards) had not sufficiently investigated the state of the fortress, and of its stores, deprived them of their commissions. The colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment was conferred on Sir George St. George, by commission dated the 1st of May, 1689. [Sidenote: 1690] [Sidenote: 1691] [Sidenote: 1692] [Sidenote: 1693] The regiment was employed on home service during the years 1690, 1691, and 1692. In 1693, the confederate army in the Netherlands, commanded by King William III., sustained severe loss at the battle of Landen, on the 29th of July; and after His Majesty's return to England, at the end of the campaign, the SEVENTEENTH regiment received orders to hold itself in readiness for foreign service. It embarked for Flanders, and was stationed in garrison at Ostend until the spring of 1694. [Sidenote: 1694] During the campaign of this year, the regiment served in the brigade commanded by Brigadier-General Stewart; and it took part in the operations of the army commanded by the British monarch,--performing many long and toilsome marches in Flanders and Brabant; but it had no opportunity of distinguishing itself in action, and in the autumn it returned to the port of Ostend, where it passed the winter. [Sidenote: 1695] In May, 1695, the regiment marched to Dixmude, where a body of troops was assembled under the Duke of Wirtemberg for the purpose of making a diversion in favour of the main army. At this period Colonel Sir George St. George obtained His Majesty's permission to exchange with Colonel James Courthorpe, to a newly-raised regiment, which was afterwards disbanded. The troops under the Duke of Wirtemberg encamped before the _Kenoque_, a fortress at the junction of the Loo and Dixmude canals, where the French had a garrison. The SEVENTEENTH regiment, commanded by Colonel Courthorpe, took part in the capture of several outposts belonging to the fort, and its grenadier company was engaged on the 9th of June in driving the French from the entrenchments and houses near the Loo Canal, and had several men killed and wounded. While the regiment was before the Kenoque, King William invested the strong fortress of _Namur_, and the SEVENTEENTH and several other corps marched to join the covering army, under Charles Henry of Lorraine, Prince of Vaudemont. Against this army Marshal Villeroy advanced with a French force of about seventy thousand men; and the Prince, not having above thirty-six thousand men under his orders, withdrew to the vicinity of Ghent. The regiment was subsequently employed in operations to protect the maritime and other towns of Flanders, and to cover the troops carrying on the siege of Namur; and after the surrender of the town it was selected to relieve one of the corps which had suffered severely in the siege, and to take part in the operations against the castle. The regiment arrived at Namur on the 11th of August, and took its turn of duty in the trenches, and in all services connected with this great undertaking; it had several men killed and wounded, and on the 16th of August Captain Hart was killed in the trenches. When Marshal Villeroy approached at the head of a numerous army to raise the siege, the SEVENTEENTH regiment was in position at the post of St. Denis, where it was expected that the most vigorous exertions of the enemy would be made. The French not hazarding an engagement, the regiment was selected to take part in storming the outworks of the castle on the 30th of August. About midday the signal for the assault was given, when the grenadiers rushed forward, under a heavy fire from the castle, to storm the breach of the Terra Nova, and were followed by the SEVENTEENTH regiment with drums beating and colours flying,[7] and a gallant effort was made; but the three regiments ordered to support the assault did not move forward in time, and the assailants were overpowered by superior numbers. The SEVENTEENTH advanced in gallant style; but they were assailed by a storm of bullets which nearly annihilated the regiment; Colonel Courthorpe was killed, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Matthew Bridges was severely wounded; and two hundred and fifty officers and soldiers were put _hors de combat_ in a few minutes, when the survivors received orders to withdraw from the unequal contest. Some partial advantages were gained, but the loss was very severe. The SEVENTEENTH had Colonel Courthorpe, Captain Coote, Lieutenant Evans, and one hundred and one serjeants and rank and file killed; Lieut.-Colonel Sir Matthew Bridges, Captains Wolfe and Du Bourgnay, Lieutenants Disbordes and Ashe, Ensigns Foncebrand, Eyres, and Dennis, and one hundred and forty-nine soldiers wounded. King William was pleased to confer the colonelcy of the regiment on the Lieut.-Colonel, Sir Matthew Bridges, who had evinced great gallantry on this occasion. Preparations were made for a second assault of the works, which was prevented by the surrender of the garrison. The SEVENTEENTH remained a short time near the captured fortress, and afterwards marched to the opulent city of Bruges, where they passed the winter. [Sidenote: 1696] Early in the spring of 1696, the regiment was joined by a numerous body of recruits from England, and on the 12th of May it marched from Bruges to Marykirk, and it was afterwards encamped along the canal towards Ghent. It was formed in brigade with the third, fifth, and eighteenth regiments, under Brigadier-General Selwyn, and served the campaign with the army of Flanders under the Prince of Vaudemont; but no general engagement occurred, and in the autumn the regiment marched into quarters at Bruges. [Sidenote: 1697] On the 13th of March, 1697, the regiment quitted its quarters at Bruges, and was afterwards stationed a few weeks in villages between Brussels, Vilvorde, and Malines; it was subsequently formed in brigade with a battalion of the royals, the fifth, and two regiments in the Dutch service, under Brigadier-General the Earl of Orkney, and it took part in the operations of the army of Brabant, under King William, until hostilities were terminated by the treaty of Ryswick, and the British monarch saw his efforts to preserve the liberties and balance of power in Europe attended with complete success. [Sidenote: 1699] During the winter the regiment returned to England, and it was shortly afterwards removed to Ireland, where it was stationed during the years 1699 and 1700. [Sidenote: 1700] [Sidenote: 1701] The decease of Charles II., King of Spain, on the 1st of November, 1700, was followed by the elevation of the Duke of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV., to the throne of that kingdom, in violation of existing treaties; and war being resolved upon, the SEVENTEENTH regiment embarked from Cork on the 15th of June, 1701, and sailed for Holland, where it was placed in garrison at Gorcum. In September it was reviewed by King William III. on Breda-heath. [Sidenote: 1702] On the 10th of March, 1702, the regiment quitted its quarters, and proceeded to Rosendael, where the officers and soldiers received information of the death of King William III., and of the accession of Queen Anne. They afterwards marched across the country to the Duchy of Cleves, and encamped with the army, under the Earl of Athlone, at Cranenburg, during the siege of _Kayserswerth_ by the Germans. During the night of the 10th of June the army quitted Cranenburg, to preserve its communication with _Nimeguen_, in front of which fortress the regiment skirmished with the French on the following morning. The Earl of Marlborough assembled the army, composed of the troops of several nations, and advanced against the French, who withdrew to avoid a general engagement; and the regiment was afterwards selected to take part in the siege of _Venloo_, a town in the province of Limburg, on the east side of the river Maese, with a detached fortress beyond the river, against which the British troops carried on their attacks. The SEVENTEENTH took their turn of duty in the trenches, and their grenadier company was engaged in storming the counter-scarp of _Fort St. Michael_ on the 18th of September, when the soldiers followed up their first advantage with astonishing intrepidity, and captured the fort. On this occasion, Lieut.-Colonel Holcroft Blood of the regiment, who was performing the duty of principal engineer, highly distinguished himself. In a few days after the capture of Fort St. Michael, the besieging army formed to fire a _feu-de-joie_ for the taking of Landau by the Germans, when the people and garrison of _Venloo_, supposing a general attack was about to be made on the town, induced the governor to surrender. The SEVENTEENTH were afterwards employed in the siege of _Ruremonde_, which fortress was invested towards the end of September, and was forced to surrender before the middle of October. Rejoining the main army after the surrender of Ruremonde, the regiment advanced to the city of _Liege_, and its grenadier company was engaged in the siege of the citadel, which was captured by storm on the 23rd of October. After these conquests the regiment marched back to Holland. [Sidenote: 1703] Towards the end of April, 1703, the regiment marched in the direction of Maestricht, and it was in position near that city when the French army under Marshal Villeroy and Marshal Boufflers approached, and some cannonading occurred, but the enemy did not hazard a general engagement. The Duke of Marlborough assembled the army, and the SEVENTEENTH took part in the movements which occasioned the French commanders to make a sudden retreat from their position at Tongres, and to take post behind their fortified lines; where the English general was desirous of attacking them, but he was prevented by the Dutch generals and field-deputies. The services of the SEVENTEENTH regiment were afterwards connected with the siege of _Huy_, a strong fortress on the river Maese, above the city of Liege, which was captured in ten days. Another proposal to attack the French lines having been objected to by the Dutch, the regiment was employed in covering the siege of _Limburg_, a city of the Spanish Netherlands situate on a pleasant eminence among the woods near the banks of the river Weze. The siege of this place commenced on the 10th of September, and on the 28th the garrison surrendered. On the 26th of August Lieut.-Colonel Blood was promoted to the colonelcy of the regiment, in succession to Colonel Sir Matthew Bridges. During the summer of this year, Archduke Charles of Austria was acknowledged as King of Spain, by England, Holland, and several other states of Europe; and the SEVENTEENTH regiment was one of the corps selected to proceed with him to Portugal, to endeavour to place him on the throne of Spain by force of arms. [Sidenote: 1704] The regiment embarked from Holland in October, and sailed to Portsmouth, where it was detained by contrary winds; it put to sea in January, 1704, but, encountering a severe storm, was driven back to port, and several ships of the fleet were much damaged. The voyage was afterwards resumed, the regiment arrived at Lisbon in the early part of March, and landed on the 15th of that month. The King of Portugal being afraid to intrust the protection of his frontier towns to his own troops, the British regiments were placed in garrison. Tardiness in the preparations for opening the campaign was manifested by the Portuguese authorities, and the Duke of Berwick attacked the frontiers of Portugal with the combined French and Spanish armies before the allies were prepared to take the field. The SEVENTEENTH were called from garrison to take part in attempting to arrest the progress of the enemy; they were employed in the Alemtejo, and in July they were encamped near Estremos,--a town situate in an agreeable tract on the Tarra; towards the end of July, they marched into cantonments in the town. In the autumn the allied army was enabled to act on the offensive, and the SEVENTEENTH was one of the regiments which penetrated Spain, to the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo; but the enemy was found so advantageously posted, beyond the Agueda, that the Portuguese generals objected to attempt the passage of the river, and the army returned to Portugal, where the regiment passed the winter. [Sidenote: 1705] The regiment again proceeded to Estremos, in the Alemtejo, in April, 1705, and it was afterwards engaged in the siege of _Valencia de Alcantara_, which place was captured by storm on the 8th of May. The SEVENTEENTH was also employed at the siege and capture of _Albuquerque_; and when the summer heats became too great for the troops to remain in the field, the regiment went into quarters at the ancient town of Moura, near the banks of the Guadiana river. In the autumn the army crossed the Guadiana, and the SEVENTEENTH regiment was engaged in the siege of _Badajoz_, the capital of Spanish Estremadura; but the army not being sufficiently numerous to invest the place, the garrison was relieved on the 14th of October, and the siege was afterwards raised. At this siege the British general, the Earl of Galway, lost his hand by a cannon-ball. [Sidenote: 1706] After passing the winter in cantonments on the confines of Portugal, the regiment again took the field in March, 1706, and in April it was employed in the siege of _Alcantara_, a fortified town situate on a rock near the river Tagus, in Spanish Estremadura. On the 10th of April the SEVENTEENTH and thirty-third regiments attacked the convent of St. Francis, situate near the town, and captured this post with great gallantry: the two regiments had fifty officers and men killed and wounded, Colonel Wade (afterwards Field-marshal) and Lieut.-Colonel de Harcourt being among the wounded. The garrison surrendered on the 14th of April. From Alcantara the army advanced to the vicinity of Placencia, and afterwards drove the enemy from his position on the banks of the Tietar,--sending forward a detachment to destroy the bridge of Almaraz; but, subsequently changing its route, proceeded to the province of Leon, and the SEVENTEENTH regiment was employed in the siege of _Ciudad Rodrigo_, which fortress surrendered on the 26th of May. On the 3rd of June the army commenced its march from Ciudad Rodrigo for the capital of Spain, proceeding by Salamanca, through the Guadarrama Mountains; and, arriving at Madrid on the 24th and 27th of June, encamped in the vicinity of that city, where Archduke Charles of Austria was proclaimed King of Spain with the usual solemnities. This tide of success was changed by the delay of King Charles to come to Madrid from Barcelona, which fortress had been captured by the Earl of Peterborough in the preceding year. This delay occasioned his friends to be discouraged; the partisans of King Philip took up arms; and, numerous bodies of French and Spanish troops joining the army under the Duke of Berwick, the allied army retreated from Madrid to the province of Valencia, where the SEVENTEENTH regiment was stationed during the winter. [Sidenote: 1707] Early in April, 1707, the regiment joined the allied army under the Marquis das Minas and the Earl of Galway, and, after taking part in several operations, advanced, on the 25th of April, to attack the French and Spanish troops under the Duke of Berwick at _Almanza_. Fatigued by a long and difficult march, and exposed to a burning sun, the soldiers arrived in presence of their opponents, and prepared for battle. The sixth, SEVENTEENTH, thirty-third, and Lord Montjoy's regiments, were formed in brigade under Major-General Wade, and were posted on the flanks of a brigade of cavalry in the front line of the left wing. The battle was commenced by the British dragoons, who evinced great bravery, but many squadrons of Portuguese cavalry quitted the field in a panic. Major-General Wade's brigade was engaged with nine battalions of French and Spanish infantry, when it was joined by the ninth foot; the five British regiments disputed the ground with sanguinary obstinacy; but while the contest was raging, a body of fresh French and Spanish cavalry drove back the allied squadrons on the left. The sixth, ninth, SEVENTEENTH, thirty-third, and Lord Montjoy's regiments, were bravely contending with seven French and Spanish corps in their front, when they were attacked on the flank by two other of the enemy's battalions, broken, and driven from the field with great loss. The two battalions which attacked them in flank were cut to pieces by Harvey's horse, now second dragoon guards, who were in turn overpowered by the superior numbers of the enemy. The fight still raged in the centre; but the flanks being defeated, the enemy surrounded the centre and made great slaughter. The remains of the English regiments were collected into a body, and were united to some Dutch and Portuguese troops; the whole retreating to the woody hills of Caudete. The men were so exhausted with fatigue that they were unable to proceed, and they passed the night in the wood without food. On the following morning they were surrounded by the enemy; and being without ammunition, ignorant of the country, and destitute of provisions, they surrendered prisoners of war. Such were the results of a battle in which wearied and faint soldiers were hurried forward to fight superior numbers of fresh troops, commanded by a skilful general! The SEVENTEENTH Regiment had Lieut.-Colonel Woollett, Lieut.-Colonel Withers, and Major Leech, killed; Captains Fitzgerald and Foncebrand, Lieutenants Rivesson, Ingram, and Blood, Ensigns Deaven, Callon, and Bruce, wounded and taken prisoners; Captains Dudley Cosby and Loftus Cosby, Lieutenants Martin, Brown, Brooks, and Tyrell, and Ensign Bland, prisoners. The officers and soldiers of the regiment, who escaped from the field, joined the cavalry under the Earl of Galway, at Alcira, on the river Xucar; and the approach to the town being by almost inaccessible mountains, his lordship halted there a few days to reorganize the army. The SEVENTEENTH regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Wightman, was encamped some time on the banks of the Ebro above Tortosa, and was afterwards employed in operations for the protection of the province of Catalonia: it was joined by men from command and sick absent, also by several who escaped from prisoners of war, and it mustered two hundred and sixty-six officers and soldiers. Major-General Blood died on the 19th of August, 1707, and Queen Anne conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on the Lieut.-Colonel, James Wightman, who had been promoted to the rank of brigadier-general a short time previously. [Sidenote: 1708] During the period the regiment was in winter-quarters, it received drafts from several corps which were ordered to return to England to recruit: and in the spring of 1708, when it took the field, its appearance was admired. In a letter from the army, published at the time, it was stated: "We cannot yet give any certain account of the number of our forces, but those we have are the finest in the world: such are the regiments of Southwell (sixth), commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Hunt; that of Blood (SEVENTEENTH), commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Bourguet; and that of Mordaunt (twenty-eighth), commanded by Colonel Dalziel."[8] The regiment was encamped some time on the river Francoli, between Monblanco and Tarragona, and afterwards at Constantino; and it took part in the operations of the army commanded by Marshal Count Guido de Staremberg, for the defence of Catalonia. [Sidenote: 1709] After serving the campaign in Catalonia, the regiment received orders to transfer its men fit for duty to other corps, and return to England, where it arrived in 1709, and commenced recruiting its numbers. [Sidenote: 1710] In 1710 the regiment was stationed in Scotland; the head-quarters were at Leith, and four companies were detached to Musselburgh. [Sidenote: 1714] The regiment remained in Great Britain until the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, when it was placed on the peace establishment and sent to Ireland, where it was stationed in 1714. [Sidenote: 1715] On the breaking out of the rebellion of the Earl of Mar, in favour of the Pretender, in the autumn of 1715, the regiment was withdrawn from Ireland, and it joined the troops encamped at Stirling under the Duke of Argyle, and the colonel of the SEVENTEENTH regiment, Major-General Wightman. When the rebel army advanced with the view of penetrating southwards, the King's troops quitted the camp at Stirling and proceeded to the vicinity of _Dumblain_, and on the 13th of November an engagement took place on Sheriff Muir, when both armies had one wing victorious and one wing defeated, and both commanders claimed the victory; but the rebels were prevented marching southwards, and they did not hazard another engagement, which proved the advantage gained over them. The SEVENTEENTH regiment had seven men killed and five wounded on this occasion. [Sidenote: 1716] Additional forces having joined the Royal army, the Duke of Argyle advanced, in January, 1716, over ice and through snow, towards Perth, when the Pretender retreated, and soon afterwards fled, with the leaders of the rebellion, to France. The SEVENTEENTH regiment pursued the insurgents some distance, and was afterwards stationed at Perth. From this date the regiment was stationed in Great Britain during a period of ten years. [Sidenote: 1722] On the 28th of September, 1722, Major-General Wightman died, and King George II. conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on Brigadier-General Thomas Ferrers, from the thirty-ninth regiment; and this officer dying three weeks afterwards, he was succeeded by Colonel James Tyrell, who had commanded one of the regiments of dragoons disbanded in 1718. [Sidenote: 1726] In 1726 the regiment proceeded to Minorca, the second of the Balearic Islands, situate in the Mediterranean, near the coast of Spain: this island was captured by the British in 1708, and was ceded to Great Britain at the peace in 1713. [Sidenote: 1727] In this island, which is diversified with hill and valley, and in some parts rich in vegetation and abounding with the necessaries and many of the luxuries of life, the regiment was stationed twenty-five years. In 1727 it sent a detachment to Gibraltar, to assist in the defence of that fortress against the Spaniards. When the siege was raised, the detachment returned to Minorca. [Sidenote: 1742] On the 1st of August, 1742, Lieut.-General Tyrell died; the colonelcy remained vacant three weeks, and was then conferred on Colonel John Wynyard, from the fourth marines, who had previously held the commission of lieut.-colonel in the SEVENTEENTH regiment upwards of twenty years, and performed the duties of commanding officer with good reputation. [Sidenote: 1748] At the termination of the war of the Austrian succession in 1748, the regiment was relieved from duty at the island of Minorca, and proceeded to Ireland, where it was stationed during the following six years. [Sidenote: 1751] On the 1st of July, 1751, a Royal Warrant was issued, regulating the clothing, standards, and colours of the several regiments of the British army; in which the uniform of the SEVENTEENTH regiment was directed to be scarlet, faced and lined with greyish _white_. The first, or king's colour, to be the great union; the second, or regimental colour, to be the red cross of St. George in a white field, with the union in the upper canton; in the centre of each colour the number of the rank of the regiment, in gold Roman characters, within a wreath of roses and thistles on the same stalk. [Sidenote: 1752] [Sidenote: 1757] Lieut.-General Wynyard died in 1752, and King George II. nominated Brigadier-General Edward Richbell to the colonelcy of the regiment. This officer died on the 24th of February, 1757, and was succeeded by Colonel John Forbes, from the lieut.-colonelcy of the Scots Greys. In the mean time another war had commenced with France, and in May of this year the regiment embarked from Cork, and sailed to Halifax, in Nova Scotia, where it arrived in the early part of July, in order to take part in an attack on the French possessions in Canada: but the expedition was deferred until the following year, and the regiment remained in Nova Scotia during the winter. [Sidenote: 1758] The regiment sailed from Halifax in May, 1758, with the expedition against _Cape Breton_, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, under Lieut.-General (afterwards Lord) Amherst. The regiment mustered thirty-one officers, and nine hundred and sixty-seven non-commissioned officers and soldiers, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Morris; and on the 8th of June it was in boats, with the division under Brigadier-General Wightman, proceeding towards White Point, to alarm the French at that quarter, while the troops under Brigadier-General James Wolfe effected a landing, which was accomplished in gallant style. The SEVENTEENTH were afterwards engaged in the siege of _Louisburg_, the capital of the island, which was captured on the 26th of July; and with the capital the whole island was also surrendered. On this occasion the regiment had Captain William Earl of Dundonald killed; Captain Paul Rycant and Lieutenant Francis Tew wounded; also several men killed and wounded. During the period the regiment was at Cape Breton, a body of troops under Major-General Abercromby was repulsed at Fort Ticonderago, on the west shore of Lake Champlain; and on the 30th of August the SEVENTEENTH and several other corps embarked from Louisburg, and, sailing to Boston, marched through the woods to Lake George, where they joined the troops under Major-General Abercromby. [Sidenote: 1759] In the beginning of June, 1759, the regiment joined the troops assembling on the east bank of Hudson's River, about fifty miles from Albany, and afterwards marched to Lake George, where a fort was erected, and boats were procured to convey the troops along the lake, which occupied a month. On the 21st of July the regiments embarked in boats, and, using blankets for sails, arrived at the Second Narrows on the following morning. Advancing towards _Ticonderago_, they drove a body of French regulars and native Indians from a strong post two miles from the fort, and evinced such steady resolution, that the French commander quitted his fortified lines and embarked for _Crown Point_, leaving a garrison at Ticonderago. The siege of this place was commenced; and on the 25th of July the garrison blew up the fort and sailed to Crown Point, which place the French commander also abandoned, and retired down the lake to Isle aux Noix. The SEVENTEENTH proceeded to Crown Point, where a new fort was erected, and a small naval force prepared for navigating the lake. In October the troops embarked, and sailed down the lake in four divisions; but encountering high northerly winds, and a frost having set in, they returned, and went into winter-quarters. Brigadier-General Forbes died in the spring of this year, and the colonelcy of the regiment was conferred on Brigadier-General the Honorable Robert Monckton, from colonel-commandant of the second battalion of the sixtieth regiment. [Sidenote: 1760] The French possessions in Canada were invaded by the British troops in 1760, at three different points; the whole advancing upon Montreal: the first division from Lake Ontario, the second from Lake Champlain, and the third from Quebec (which was captured in 1759) up the River St. Lawrence. The SEVENTEENTH regiment formed part of the second division, under Colonel Haviland, which embarked from Crown Point on the 11th of August, and, sailing towards _Isle aux Noix_, landed on the left bank of the river Richelieu, and captured a fort near the river: two other forts were abandoned by the enemy, and the British took possession of Isle aux Noix. The regiment afterwards advanced upon _Montreal_; and the French governor, being unable to withstand the forces opposed to him, surrendered: thus was the conquest of Canada accomplished with little loss. [Sidenote: 1761] From Montreal the regiment traversed the country to New York, during the summer of 1761, and in August encamped on Staten Island. Towards the end of October it embarked for the West Indies, and arrived at Carlisle Bay, Barbadoes, on the 24th of December. [Sidenote: 1762] An armament was assembled at Barbadoes, for the attack of the French West India Islands, and the land forces were placed under the orders of Major-General the Honorable Robert Monckton, colonel of the SEVENTEENTH; this regiment being one of the corps selected to take part in the enterprise. The armament sailed from Carlisle Bay, on the 5th of January, 1762, and proceeded against the island of _Martinique_, which was colonised by the French about the year 1635. After menacing the coast at several points, a landing was effected in the middle of January, in Cas des Navières Bay, and the SEVENTEENTH were actively engaged in the operations for the reduction of the island. Many difficulties were encountered, from the rugged surface of the country, and from the formidable heights occupied by the enemy; but these were overcome by British skill, discipline, and valour; the heights of _Morné Tortenson_ were carried on the 24th of January, and of _Morné Garnier_ on the 27th; Fort Royal surrendered early in February, and these successes were followed by the submission of the island to the British Crown. Major-General the Honorable Robert Monckton commended the conduct of the troops in his despatch, and added,--"The difficulties they had to encounter in the attack of an enemy possessed of every advantage of art and nature were great; and their perseverance in surmounting these obstacles furnishes a noble example of British spirit." The capture of Martinique was followed by the submission of Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. The loss of the SEVENTEENTH at Martinique was limited to a few private soldiers killed and wounded. War had, in the mean time, been declared against Spain, and the SEVENTEENTH, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, and mustering five hundred and thirty-five rank and file, joined the armament under General the Earl of Albemarle, for the purpose of proceeding against the wealthy Spanish settlement of the _Havannah_, in the island of Cuba. The regiment formed part of the brigade commanded by Brigadier-General Grant; and, accompanying the expedition through the Straits of Bahama, arrived within six leagues of Havannah on the 6th of June: a landing was effected on the following day, and on the 9th the troops took up a position between Coximar and the Moro fort. The regiment took part in the services connected with the siege and capture of Moro fort, which was the key position of the extensive works which covered the town. The difficulties encountered in carrying on operations were particularly great, and the artillery had to be dragged several miles over a rocky country, and under a burning sun; but every obstacle was overcome by the unanimity which existed between the land and sea forces. The Moro fort was captured by storm on the 30th of July; and on the 11th of August, a series of batteries opened so well-directed a fire on the defences of the town, that the guns of the garrison were soon silenced, and flags of truce were hung out. The capitulation was signed two days afterwards, and the British troops took possession of this valuable settlement, with nine ships of war in the harbour, and two upon the stocks; three ships of war were also found sunk at the entrance of the harbour. [Sidenote: 1763] [Sidenote: 1766] A treaty of peace was soon afterwards concluded, when the Havannah was restored to Spain in exchange for Florida. The SEVENTEENTH regiment returned to North America, where it was stationed during the years 1763, 1764, 1765, and 1766. [Sidenote: 1767] In the summer of 1767 the regiment was relieved from duty in America, and returned to England, where it arrived in September. [Sidenote: 1768] The regiment remained in England during the years 1768, 1769, and 1770. [Sidenote: 1771] [Sidenote: 1774] Embarking from Liverpool in the spring of 1771, the regiment proceeded to Ireland, where it was stationed during the three following years. [Sidenote: 1775] Serious disputes had, in the mean time, arisen between the British colonists in North America and the government, and the colonists evinced a daring spirit of resistance, in their opposition to the measures for raising a revenue in their country, which, in April 1775, was followed by open hostility, some provincial militia firing on a detachment of the king's troops, on its march from Boston to Concord, to take possession of a quantity of military stores at the latter place. This was followed by the assembling of multitudes of armed men near Boston; and when the news of these occurrences arrived in England, several regiments were ordered to embark for America. The SEVENTEENTH regiment was afterwards directed to hold itself in readiness for service abroad, and on the 23rd of September it embarked from Ireland for North America. [Sidenote: 1776] The regiment was detained some time by contrary winds; but it landed at Boston on the 1st of January, 1776. At this period the British troops at Boston were blocked up on the land side by a numerous army of provincials; much inconvenience was experienced in procuring provisions; and as this town did not appear to be a place calculated to become the base of extensive military operations for the reduction of the revolted provinces, Lieut.-General Sir William Howe resolved to vacate Boston, and proceed with the army to Nova Scotia; this resolution was carried into effect in the middle of March, when the SEVENTEENTH sailed with the army to Halifax. Reinforcements being expected from England, the army sailed from Halifax in June, and, proceeding to the vicinity of New York, landed, on the 3rd of July, on Staten Island, where the SEVENTEENTH, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Mawhood, were formed in brigade with the fortieth, forty-sixth, and fifty-fifth regiments under Major-General James Grant. On the 22nd of August a landing was effected on _Long Island_, and on the evening of the 26th the army was put in motion to pass a range of woody heights which intersect the island, and attack the American army in position beyond the hills. The SEVENTEENTH regiment formed part of the column under Major-General Grant, which was directed to advance along the coast, with ten pieces of cannon, to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter. Moving forward at the appointed hour, this column fell in with the advanced parties of the Americans about midnight, and, at daybreak on the following morning, encountered a large force, formed in an advantageous position defended by artillery. Skirmishing and cannonading ensued, and was continued, until the Americans discovered, by the firing at Brooklyn, that the left of their army had been turned and forced, when they retreated in great confusion through a morass. They were met and attacked by the second battalion of grenadiers, which was soon reinforced by the seventy-first regiment (Highlanders); and were also assailed on the left by Major-General Grant's corps, and sustained severe loss; many of the Americans being killed, and others drowned or suffocated in the morass. The American army was driven from its positions with severe loss, and made a precipitate retreat to the fortified lines at _Brooklyn_. The regiment had Captain Sir Alexander Murray and two rank and file killed; Lieutenant Marcus A. Morgan, one serjeant, and nineteen rank and file wounded. The Americans having quitted their fortified lines at Brooklyn and passed the river to New York, the conquest of Long Island by the British troops was completed; and the SEVENTEENTH regiment shared in the operations by which the capture of New York was accomplished; also in the movements by which the Americans were driven from White Plains; and in the reduction of Fort Washington. Afterwards proceeding to the Jerseys, the regiment was stationed at Brunswick, and subsequently at Princetown. During the winter, General Washington suddenly passed the Delaware river, and surprised and made prisoners a corps of Hessians at Trenton, and afterwards made a precipitate retreat. Being reinforced, he again passed the river, and took up a position at Trenton. Major-General the Earl Cornwallis advanced with a division of British troops, and, after reconnoitring the American position, sent orders for the SEVENTEENTH, fortieth, and fifty-fifth regiments to join him from Princetown. [Sidenote: 1777] Early on the morning of the 4th of January, 1777, the three regiments commenced their march. The SEVENTEENTH regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Charles Mawhood, being in advance, encountered the van of the American army, General Washington having suddenly quitted Trenton with his whole force to surprise the three regiments. The morning being foggy, Lieut.-Colonel Mawhood could not discern the numbers of the force he had met; but supposing it to be only a detachment, he instantly attacked his opponents, and the SEVENTEENTH speedily drove back a force of very superior numbers with great gallantry. The regiment was soon environed in front and on both flanks by a numerous force; and Lieut.-Colonel Mawhood, discovering that he was engaged with the American army, resolved to make a desperate effort to extricate himself: having confidence in the valour and resolution of the regiment, he directed a charge with bayonets to the front, to break through the American army. Undismayed by the multitudes of opponents which environed them, the SEVENTEENTH rushed upon the ranks of the enemy, broke through all opposition, and continued their march to Maidenhead. Their conduct excited great admiration; and the Americans acknowledged the superior gallantry of the regiment. A serious loss was, however, sustained; thirteen officers and soldiers being killed, fifty-three wounded, and thirty-five missing: among the former was Captain the Honorable William Lesley, son of the Earl of Leven, an officer of great promise, whose death was much regretted. "The bravery and abilities of Colonel Mawhood, on this occasion, deservedly gained him the highest applause;"[9] and the resolute attack of the SEVENTEENTH so occupied the American army, that the fortieth and fifty-fifth regiments effected their retreat with much less loss than could have been expected. The American army had many men killed and wounded on this occasion; among the killed was an officer of reputation, Brigadier-General Mercer, from Virginia. When the army took the field, the regiment was employed in operations in the Jerseys to bring the American army to a general engagement; but General Washington kept close in his strong position in the mountains; and the British undertook an expedition to Pennsylvania: the SEVENTEENTH were employed in this enterprise, and were formed in brigade with the fifteenth, forty-second, and forty-fourth regiments, under Major-General (afterwards Earl) Grey. A landing was effected on the northern shore of Elk River on the 25th of August; and the army of the revolted provinces took up a position at _Brandywine_ to oppose the advance; an attack was made on the position on the 11th of September, when the Americans were driven from their ground with loss. On this occasion the SEVENTEENTH formed part of the column under Major-General Earl Cornwallis. Advancing upon Philadelphia, the British troops took possession of that city, and the army took up a position at _Germantown_. The Americans attempted to surprise the British troops early on the morning of the 4th of October, and they gained some advantage at the first, but were speedily repulsed with severe loss. On this occasion several companies of the fortieth regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Musgrave, threw themselves into a building, where they were attacked by an American brigade; when Major-General Grey brought forward the SEVENTEENTH and another British regiment, and drove back the enemy with great gallantry. Ensign Nathaniel Philips and four rank and file of the regiment were killed on this occasion; and three serjeants and twenty-one rank and file were wounded. [Sidenote: 1778] The regiment passed the winter in quarters in Philadelphia, and in the spring of 1778 it furnished several detachments, which ranged the country in various directions to open communications for obtaining provisions. The regiment also took part in the fatigues and difficulties of the march of the army from Philadelphia, through the Jerseys, in order to its return to New York; and its flank companies were engaged in repulsing the attack of the enemy on the rear of the column, at _Freehold_, in New Jersey, on the 28th of June, on which occasion Captain William Brereton, commanding the grenadier company, was wounded. [Sidenote: 1779] The regiment was stationed at New York, and other posts in the vicinity of that city; and when _Stoney Point_, a fortified post on the river Hudson, had been captured by the British troops, the SEVENTEENTH, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Henry Johnson, were placed in garrison at that fort. On the night of the 15th of July, 1779, this post was suddenly beset by nearly four thousand Americans under General Wayne, who assaulted the works. The SEVENTEENTH made a gallant resistance, but were overpowered by superior numbers: Captain Tew, an officer of distinguished gallantry, and a number of soldiers were killed, and the survivors were made prisoners of war. [Sidenote: 1780] [Sidenote: 1781] The regiment remained some time in custody, and, being afterwards exchanged, the men fit for duty were formed into a small battalion, and, being united with a number of detachments of provincial troops, they were placed under the orders of Colonel Watson, of the foot-guards. They sailed from New York in October, 1780, with a detachment under Major-General the Honorable Alexander Leslie, and landed in Virginia. They were employed in various services there, and early in 1781 they were directed to join the army under Earl Cornwallis. This army attacked the Americans at _Guildford Court House_ on the 15th of March, and gained a victory. After performing much harassing service the troops under Earl Cornwallis took possession of _York Town_ and Gloucester, where they were invested by the combined French and American forces in September. They defended York Town until the works were destroyed by the enemy's batteries, and, when no possibility remained of being able to resist successfully, they surrendered, and the SEVENTEENTH again became prisoners of war, but did not remain long in custody before they were exchanged. [Sidenote: 1782] In 1782 the regiment was stationed in Virginia. On the death of Lieut.-General the Honorable Robert Monckton, King George III. conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on Major-General George Morrison, from the seventy-fifth regiment (afterwards disbanded), by commission dated the 29th of May, 1782. In August of this year orders were issued for the regiment to assume the title of the SEVENTEENTH, OR THE LEICESTERSHIRE REGIMENT, and to cultivate a connection with that county, which might, at all times, be useful towards recruiting. [Sidenote: 1783] In the early part of 1783 the regiment was stationed at New York. Peace having been concluded with the Americans, the regiment was removed to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, where it was stationed during the years 1784 and 1785. [Sidenote: 1786] Having been relieved from duty in North America, the regiment embarked for England, where it arrived in August, 1786. [Sidenote: 1789] In the year in which the regiment returned to England, a company of merchants, residing in the East Indies, formed a settlement at Nootka Sound,--a bay of the North Pacific Ocean, on the west coast of North America,--with the view of obtaining furs. This settlement was seized by the Spaniards in 1789, and two ships were detained. To chastise this violation of British enterprise and liberty, a fleet was fitted out, and the SEVENTEENTH were embarked to serve as marines, but the subject was settled without hostilities taking place. [Sidenote: 1792] Lieut.-General Morrison was removed to the fourth foot in 1792, and was succeeded in the colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment by Major-General George Garth, from lieut.-colonel in the first foot-guards. [Sidenote: 1793] [Sidenote: 1796] [Sidenote: 1798] The regiment was employed on home service during the early part of the war of the French Revolution, and was stationed in Ireland, from whence it embarked on the 25th of February, 1796, for the island of St. Domingo, where a contest was being carried on between the British troops and the republican forces on that island. The climate of St. Domingo proved particularly injurious to the health of the British troops, and the SEVENTEENTH regiment lost Lieut.-Colonel Hooke, and several other officers and a number of men, by disease; also a few men in skirmishes with the republican troops. The island was eventually evacuated, and the surviving officers and men embarked for England in 1798, and landed at Deptford in January, 1799. [Sidenote: 1799] In this year the soldiers of the militia corps were permitted to volunteer their services into regiments of the regular army, when fifteen hundred men volunteered to the SEVENTEENTH regiment, which was augmented to _two battalions_, the second battalion being placed on the establishment of the army in the beginning of August, under the orders of colonel-commandant Major-General Eyre Coote; four lieut.-colonels and four majors being placed on the establishment. A favourable opportunity appearing to present itself for rescuing Holland from the power of France, Great Britain and Russia sent a body of troops to that country, under the command of his Royal Highness the Duke of York; and the two battalions of the SEVENTEENTH formed part of the leading division of the British force under Lieut.-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, which effected a landing on the Dutch coast, near the _Helder_, on the 27th of August, and defeated a body of French and Dutch troops. The SEVENTEENTH were engaged in repulsing an attack of the enemy on the 10th of September, when the first battalion had two rank and file killed, and the second two killed and eighteen wounded. At the attack of the enemy's positions on the 19th of September, the regiment distinguished itself; but the inconsiderate valour of the Russians occasioned a failure. The first battalion had six rank and file killed; Major William Grey, Major Peter Cockbourne, Captains M. J. Grace and William Knight, Lieutenant Charles Wilson, Ensign J. Thompson, two serjeants, and thirty-four rank and file wounded; Lieutenant Wickham and three rank and file missing: the second battalion had two men killed; Major Robert Wood, Lieutenant William Saunders, and nineteen rank and file wounded. In the action at _Bergen_ on the 2nd of October, the regiment was again engaged, and had two rank and file killed; Lieutenants William Wynne and Joshua Morrison, and five men wounded. The Dutch people not seconding these gallant efforts for their deliverance, the army returned to England. [Sidenote: 1800] [Sidenote: 1802] The regiment embarked from England in May, 1800, and proceeded to Minorca to join the armament assembled to co-operate with the Austrians in Italy; and when this enterprise was abandoned, the regiment remained at Minorca, where it was stationed until the peace of Amiens in 1802, when it embarked for Ireland, and, landing at Cork in August, was reduced to one battalion. [Sidenote: 1803] Hostilities were resumed in 1803; in July of that year the regiment was suddenly ordered from Limerick to Dublin, where a serious riot had taken place on the 23rd of July, when Lord Chief Justice Kilwarden, and his nephew the Rev. Richard Wolfe, were attacked in his carriage and murdered by the rioters. [Sidenote: 1804] Embarking from Ireland in April, 1804, the regiment proceeded to the Isle of Wight; in July it sailed for the East Indies, and arrived at Fort William in December; having lost Ensign Strickland by disease on the voyage. [Sidenote: 1805] In June and July, 1805, the health of the officers and soldiers suffered severely from the effects of the climate. The casualties were replaced by a strong detachment from England, and the effective strength was augmented to twelve hundred and sixty officers and soldiers. In September the whole embarked in boats for the upper provinces; the head-quarters and three companies landed and encamped a short period at Allahabad; the other companies proceeded to Cawnpore, where they were joined by the head-quarters. [Sidenote: 1806] Two companies were detached, in October, 1806, with some artillery, under Captain Nicoll, to reduce a fort on the right bank of the Jumna; but it was evacuated by the insurgents on the approach of the detachment, and the two companies returned to their cantonments. [Sidenote: 1807] On the 20th of December two companies of the regiment marched under Captain Hawkins for the purpose of reducing several forts in the mountainous district of Bundelkund, which was resigned to the British by the Mahrattas in 1804; but several chiefs proved refractory. Little resistance was made excepting at _Chumar_, which place was captured by storm in January, 1807, on which occasion Lieutenant Peter McGregor was killed gallantly fighting in the breach. Lieutenant Despard also distinguished himself; he received a contusion in ascending the breach. In an official communication on this subject, it was stated: "In justice to the merits of two companies of His Majesty's SEVENTEENTH regiment, forming part of the army immediately employed in Coonch, Major-General Dowdesdell, divesting his mind of every ground or intention of partiality, cannot forego the expression of the sincere pleasure he has received from numerous concurrent testimonies of their excellent behaviour, which is generally allowed to have been conspicuous in the affair at Chumar, and uniformly to redound to the credit and highly appreciated character of His Majesty's SEVENTEENTH regiment." The two companies returned to Cawnpore, where the regiment remained until September, when it commenced its march for Muttra. In October five companies took the field under Lieut.-Colonel Hardyman, for the purpose of attacking the fort of _Comona_, and on the 19th of November the breach was stormed with great gallantry; but it was found impracticable, and the troops were forced to retire. The enemy was, however, so fully impressed with a sense of British valour and perseverance, that he fled from the fort during the night. Captains Radcliff and Kirk, Lieutenants Harvey and Harrison, three serjeants, and forty-four rank and file of the SEVENTEENTH were killed in the act of making a gallant effort to ascend the breach; at the same time Lieutenants Wilson, Campbell, and Dadingstone, two serjeants, ninety-three rank and file were wounded. Pay-serjeant Suttle distinguished himself, and was killed at the top of the breach. The conduct of the troops on this occasion was highly commended in General Orders by the Governor-General in Council: Lieut.-Colonel Hardyman of the regiment was particularly noticed. The other companies of the SEVENTEENTH were afterwards withdrawn from Muttra, and the regiment was employed some time in pursuit of the hostile tribes, which made a short resistance at the fort of Gonoivie, and afterwards fled. The regiment then returned to Muttra. [Sidenote: 1808] [Sidenote: 1809] In November, 1808, the regiment joined the force under Major-General St. Leger advancing against the Sikhs, and proceeded as far as the river Sutlej without meeting with serious opposition. The dispute being settled by negotiation, no action of importance took place, and in the beginning of May, 1809, the regiment returned to Muttra, where its efficiency was increased by a large detachment from England. In November the regiment marched for Meerut, Muttra being discontinued as a station for European troops. [Sidenote: 1810] [Sidenote: 1811] The regiment remained at Meerut during the years 1810 and 1811. On the 4th of June of this year Colonel R. Stovin was promoted to the rank of major-general, and was succeeded in the command by Colonel Frederick Hardyman, the second lieut.-colonel. [Sidenote: 1812] [Sidenote: 1813] From Meerut the regiment marched in November, 1812, for Ghazeepore, where nine companies arrived in January, 1813. Two companies were stationed at Chumar fourteen months, and afterwards joined the regiment. In April, 1813, four companies marched under Captain Despard, to Secrole and Mirzapore, for the purpose of watching and intercepting the bands of marauders called _Pindarees_, who infested the British territory: these companies rejoined the regiment in June. [Sidenote: 1814] The depredations of the Nepaulese having brought on a war with that kingdom, the regiment was called from its quarters at Ghazeepore, to join the army invading that mountainous country. It commenced its march on the 31st of October, and, joining the division under Major-General John Sulivan Wood, was engaged in the unsuccessful attack on _Jutgurgh_. The Major-General stated in his despatch--"His Majesty's SEVENTEENTH regiment of foot led the column, headed by its gallant commander, Colonel Hardyman, and supported by the grenadiers of the second battalion of the seventeenth and fourteenth regiments of Native infantry, and advanced upon the works; while the grenadiers and one battalion company of His Majesty's SEVENTEENTH succeeded in gaining the hill on the right of the redoubt. This party was led by a brave and cool officer, Captain William Croker, who drove the enemy up the hill, killing a chief, Sooraj Tappah: still the fire from the enemy, concealed by the trees, was kept up with great obstinacy, and the hill which rose immediately behind the works was filled with troops, rendering the post, if it had been carried, wholly untenable. I therefore determined to stop the fruitless waste of lives, by sounding the retreat." The regiment lost several men on this occasion, and had Lieutenants Matthew Pickering and Arthur Poyntz wounded. Afterwards joining the army under Major-General George Wood, the regiment took part in several operations, and subsequently returned to its cantonments. The rulers of Nepaul were brought to submission. [Sidenote: 1815] The regiment was stationed at Ghazeepore during the year 1815. [Sidenote: 1816] In 1816 a combination of Native princes against the British authority called part of the regiment into the field; in July of that year the flank companies under Captain Croker proceeded to join a flank battalion forming at Allahabad, to unite with the army proceeding against Scindia, under the Marquis of Hastings. [Sidenote: 1817] The battalion companies of the regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel Nicoll, formed, in October, 1817, part of the brigade under Brigadier-General Hardyman, which was ordered to proceed by forced marches towards Nagpore, where a body of British troops was surrounded. On the march a considerable portion of the enemy's troops were discovered in order of battle in front of _Jubblepore_, with their right to the hills. The enemy's guns were captured by a charge of the eighth Native cavalry, and the Arab infantry were attacked, overpowered, and driven from their ground with severe loss, by the SEVENTEENTH regiment. The two corps were thanked in General Orders for their distinguished conduct on this occasion. The SEVENTEENTH lost a few men, and had Lieutenants Maw and Nicholson wounded. The enemy evacuated the fortified town of Jubblepore, leaving a quantity of stores; and the regiment continued its march towards Nagpore. Being obliged to halt two or three days at Lucknadoon, for the elephants to come up with provision, information was received of the overthrow of the Nagpore Rajah's forces, and of the termination of his resistance: the regiment then returned to its cantonments at Ghazeepore: it received prize-money for the capture of Nagpore. [Sidenote: 1818] The regiment remained at Ghazeepore until December, 1818, when it proceeded by water to Fort William, where it arrived on the 24th of January following. [Sidenote: 1819] General Garth died, after commanding the regiment twenty-six years, and was succeeded by Lieut.-General Sir Josiah Champagné, G.C.H., from the forty-first regiment. In August, Colonel Hardyman was promoted to the rank of Major-General; he was universally esteemed as an officer and a gentleman, and the officers of the regiment resolved to present him with a sword, value one hundred pounds, as a token of their respect; but proceeding to Meerut, to assume the command, he died suddenly of one of the diseases prevalent in that climate, before he received the sword. He was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Wilbraham Tollemache Edwards, who, on arriving, assumed the command; Colonel Sir Thomas McMahon, the senior lieut.-colonel, being adjutant-general of His Majesty's forces in India. [Sidenote: 1820] On the 21st of December, 1820, the regiment marched for Burhampore; having lost, during the two years it was at Calcutta, eight officers and one hundred and thirty-one soldiers, the cholera being prevalent during that period. [Sidenote: 1821] [Sidenote: 1822] Arriving at Burhampore on the 8th of January, 1821, the regiment remained at that station until August, 1822, when it proceeded by water to Calcutta, in order to its embarkation for Europe. In November, Colonel Edwards exchanged with Lieut.-Colonel Archibald Maclean of the fourteenth foot. [Sidenote: 1823] Four hundred and twelve men volunteered to remain in India: and on the 20th of January, 1823, the regiment embarked at Fort William: on which occasion General Sir E. Paget, Commander-in-Chief in India, issued a General Order, in which he stated,--"The Commander-in-Chief feels it to be a just tribute to this old and distinguished corps to express the high character it has always preserved in Europe, and which his Excellency is happy to find has been maintained during a long service of eighteen years in India. "A copy of this Order will be submitted to the gracious notice of his Royal Highness the Duke of York, and the Commander-in-Chief takes this opportunity of wishing the regiment a prosperous voyage, and that it may long enjoy its justly-earned reputation." The regiment landed at Gravesend on the 27th of May, after an absence of nineteen years from Europe, and bringing back four officers and sixty-six non-commissioned officers and soldiers of those who embarked with it in 1804: it lost in India one thousand and twenty-one men by disease and killed in action; and four hundred and twelve were invalided. The regiment marched to Chatham, and subsequently to Gosport, where it was joined by the depôt. On the 24th of October it was reviewed on Southsea Common with the other troops at Portsmouth, Gosport, &c., by his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, afterwards King William IV.; and in November marched to Hull, detaching one company to Carlisle and one to Tynemouth. [Sidenote: 1824] In 1824 the regiment commenced practising the new system of drill and field movements, as established in the army at this period, agreeably to the improvements introduced by Major-General Sir Henry Torrens, K.C.B., Adjutant-General of the Forces. [Sidenote: 1825] On the 25th of June, 1825, His Majesty King George IV. was graciously pleased to approve of the regiment "bearing on its colours and appointments the figure of the 'Royal Tiger,' with the word 'Hindoostan' superscribed, as a lasting testimony of the exemplary conduct of the corps during the period of its service in India, from 1804 to 1823." From Hull the head-quarters were removed to Scotland in the summer of this year, and the regiment was stationed at Edinburgh during the winter, with detachments at out-stations. In the beginning of the following year it unanimously subscribed one day's pay of all ranks towards the relief of the distressed operatives of Paisley, where six companies were stationed a short time. [Sidenote: 1826] [Sidenote: 1827] In the summer of 1826 the regiment marched to Greenock, where it embarked for Liverpool; it was stationed three months in Lancashire, the head-quarters being at Bolton, and in October embarked at Liverpool for Ireland; it landed at Dublin, from whence it marched to Mullingar; where the head-quarters were stationed until April, 1827, when they were removed to Galway. [Sidenote: 1829] The regiment remained in Ireland until May, 1829, when it embarked at Dublin for Liverpool, and was quartered in South Britain twelve months. [Sidenote: 1830] In 1830 the regiment commenced embarking by detachments for New South Wales. [Sidenote: 1836] [Sidenote: 1837] After occupying various stations in New South Wales several years, the regiment received orders to transfer its services to India; and it embarked for Bombay in March, 1836; after landing it proceeded to Poona; near which place it was encamped during the year 1837. [Sidenote: 1838] The regiment remained at the camp near Poona until November, 1838; during which period events had transpired on the frontiers of Affghanistan, which, connected with the political measures of the chiefs who had assumed the dominion of that country, induced the British government to undertake the restoration of the former sovereign, Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, to the throne of that kingdom, as a precautionary measure to protect the frontiers of the British dominions in the East against aggression. To take part in this enterprise, the regiment quitted the camp near Poona, and embarked for the mouth of the Indus: it landed in December and proceeded to the ancient town of Tatta, situate in Lower Scinde, upon a rising ground four miles west of the river. [Sidenote: 1839] To ensure the course of the Indus, the Bombay division of the army assembling for the invasion of Affghanistan commenced its march from the mouth of that river, through the country occupied by the confederation of the Ameers of Scinde, who refused permission for the British troops to pass in peace through their territory, and a passage had to be effected by forcible means. Hyderabad, the capital, was captured; Kurrachee, the richest city of Scinde, was taken possession of; and the Ameers were brought to submission in the early part of February, 1839. The army then continued its march; passed the great river Indus on a bridge of boats near the fortress of Bukkur; traversed an arid country to Usted, and afterwards marched through the desert plains of Beloochistan to Dadur, occasionally suffering inconvenience from the want of water, and sustaining loss from the hordes of predatory natives. From Dadur the troops marched through the Bolan Pass, with gloomy crags rising perpendicularly in awful grandeur on each side, to Dusht-i-be-doulut, or the Unhappy Desert, having some camp-followers murdered and baggage plundered, in these wild regions, by the Beloochees. Afterwards continuing the march over difficult mountains and sterile plains, suffering from a deficiency of forage and provision, the army entered Affghanistan, when the Barukzye chiefs fled, and the British troops took possession of Candahar, the capital of Western Affghanistan. The SEVENTEENTH regiment encamped in the grassy meadows of Candahar nearly two months, and afterwards marched along a valley of dismal sterility to the Turnuck River; then, advancing up the right bank, entered the country of the Ghilzees, and arrived before _Ghuznee_, a fortress of great strength, garrisoned by three thousand Affghans under Prince Mahomed Hyder Khan, well provided with stores, and every gate, excepting one, blocked up with masonry. Before daylight on the morning of the 23rd of July, one of the principal gates was destroyed by an explosion of gunpowder; and the British troops rushed in at the opening and captured the strong fortress of Ghuznee by storm. The SEVENTEENTH regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Croker, had the honour to take a conspicuous share in the capture of this fortress: it led the assault of the citadel, which was captured with little loss, and at five o'clock in the morning its colours were waving triumphantly on the fortress. The loss of the regiment was limited to one private killed and six men wounded. A standard was captured by the SEVENTEENTH, but was afterwards lost by the wreck of a transport in which a part of the regiment was embarked. From Ghuznee the British army advanced upon Cabool, the capital of Eastern Affghanistan; the army of Dost Mahomed Khan refused to fight in his cause, and the British, proceeding by triumphant marches to the capital, restored Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk to the capital of his dominions in the early part of August. On the 18th of September the Bombay portion of the "Army of the Indus" left Cabool _en route_ for India. The column reached Ghuznee by the same road it had advanced, and from thence proceeded to Quetta, where it arrived on the 31st of October. The SEVENTEENTH regiment was afterwards detached, under Major-General Sir Thomas Willshire, against the Khan of Khelat, to reduce this treacherous chief to submission. On the morning of the 13th of November, after a previous march, some fighting, and the assault of the heights commanding the approach to _Khelat_, on which the enemy had six guns in position, the gate of this strong fortress was blown open, and the second and SEVENTEENTH British and thirty-first Bengal regiments charged into the town in the face of two thousand Beloochees, the _élite_ of the nation, who disputed every foot of ground to the walls of the inner citadel. British valour was, however, triumphant, and the capture of the last stronghold of Beloochistan was accomplished. In this desperate defence the Khan and many of his chiefs were slain. Here also, as at Ghuznee, a standard was taken by the regiment. The regiment had six rank and file killed; Captain L. C. Bourchier, three serjeants, and twenty-nine rank and file wounded. Lieut.-Colonel Croker caused the names of Colour-Serjeants J. Dunn and Mills to be entered in the records of the regiment, on account of their bravery at Khelat. The Chiefs, who had joined in hostile designs against the British interest, having been removed, and a friendly monarch placed on the throne of Affghanistan, a medal was given by the Government of India to the officers and soldiers present at the storming of GHUZNEE, which the Queen authorized them to accept and wear. Her Majesty Queen Victoria was graciously pleased to approve of the regiment bearing on its colours the words "AFFGHANISTAN," "GHUZNEE," and "KHELAT," to commemorate its distinguished conduct in enduring the toils and privations of the campaign in Affghanistan with patient fortitude; its gallantry at the storming of Ghuznee on the 23rd of July; and its heroic conduct at the taking of Khelat on the 13th of November, 1839. Lieut.-Colonel Croker and Major Pennycuick were nominated Companions of the Order of the Bath; and the latter obtained the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Lieut.-Colonel Croker, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Pennycuick, and Major Deshon were nominated members of the order of the "_Dooranée Empire_," newly instituted by Shah Shooja, on being restored to the throne of Affghanistan. Major Deshon received the brevet rank of Lieut.-Colonel, and Captain Darley that of Major. Soon after the capture of Khelat, the regiment continued its journey back to the British territory in India, and arrived in Scinde in December. [Sidenote: 1840] On the 6th of February, 1840, the regiment embarked in boats on the great river Indus, and sailed to Tatta, where it arrived on the 13th; eight days afterwards it marched for Kurrachee; and on the 16th of March four companies, and the head-quarters, embarked on board the Hannah transport, and were wrecked on a sand-bank off the mouth of the Indus on the following day. They re-embarked on board the Bernice steamer on the 26th of March, and arrived at Bombay on the 29th of that month. General Sir Josiah Champagné, G.C.H., died in the beginning of this year; and was succeeded in the colonelcy of the regiment by General Sir Frederick Augustus Wetherall, G.C.H., from the sixty-second regiment. The regiment embarked from Bombay in April, for Panwell, from whence it proceeded to Poona, leaving a detail on duty at Bombay. [Sidenote: 1841] On the 2nd of June, 1841, the regiment left Poona, and arrived at Bombay in ten days. On the 22nd of September the head-quarters and four companies embarked from Bombay for Arabia Felix, and on the 2nd of October arrived at Aden, the capital of a pleasant and fertile district near the mouth of the Red Sea, where a detachment of the regiment arrived from Bombay in October, and another in November. On the evening of the 5th of October, 1841, a detachment, amounting to about six hundred men, selected from the troops at Aden, proceeded, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Pennycuick, to attack an Arab force, which had caused much inconvenience by preventing supplies being received from the country. After a severe skirmish of two hours' duration, in the hottest part of the following day, the troops destroyed the Arab post of Sheik Othman, and returned to Aden on the evening of the 6th, having traversed upwards of forty miles of ground in about twenty-two hours. [Sidenote: 1842] The head-quarters of the regiment remained at Aden, in Arabia Felix, during the year 1842. In February a detachment proceeded from Bombay to Poona, and in November a detachment marched from Poona to Ahmednuggur: in December four officers and thirty-four rank and file arrived at Aden from Poona. [Sidenote: 1843] On the 18th of December, 1842, the venerable General Sir Frederick Augustus Wetherall, G.C.H., after a service of sixty-seven years, and attaining the age of eighty-eight years, died, and Her Majesty Queen Victoria was pleased to confer the colonelcy of the regiment on Lieut.-General Sir Peregrine Maitland, K.C.B., from the seventy-sixth regiment, on the 2nd of January, 1843. [Sidenote: 1844] During the years 1843 and 1844 the regiment remained at Aden. In July and August, 1844, the detached wing at Ahmednuggur was affected with cholera. In the course of fifteen days one hundred and eight cases occurred; the deaths during the period amounted to thirty-two. Amongst them was Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Deshon, an officer of the highest talents and character. During the latter part of the year 1844, and beginning of 1845, a company of the regiment was employed on field service in the southern Mahratta country, where, at the assault of the fort of Munscentosh, four privates were killed; Lieutenant Gardiner, who commanded the company, and one serjeant and five rank and file, were wounded. [Sidenote: 1845] The head-quarters of the regiment embarked at Aden on the 13th of March, 1845, and arrived at Bombay on the 7th of April. The left wing marched from Ahmednuggur on the 11th of December, and joined the head-quarters at Bombay on the 26th of the same month. [Sidenote: 1846] In the beginning of January, 1846, the regiment, having been selected for field service, embarked at Bombay for Scinde, and on the 11th of January marched from Kurrachee, _en route_ to Bhawulpore; it arrived at Sukkur on the 3rd of February, and on the 16th of that month proceeded on its march towards the Punjaub; but accounts being received of the termination of the war in that country, the troops advanced no further than Bhawulpore, on the Sutlej, where the regiment remained until the 12th of March, when it returned to Sukkur, from whence it embarked for Kurrachee on the 9th of August, 1846. [Sidenote: 1847] The regiment embarked at Bombay on the 13th of March, 1847, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pennycuick, K.H., in the freight-ships Ann and John Brewer, and arrived at Gravesend on the 6th of August, from whence it marched to Canterbury. In November the regiment was removed to Dover. [Sidenote: 1848] Apprehensions were entertained that the public peace would be disturbed by the several meetings of Chartists in the vicinity of the Metropolis on Monday, the 10th of April, 1848; and as they appeared determined to unite on Kennington Common, in order to proceed from thence in procession to the House of Commons with their petition, the Government took the usual precautionary measures to prevent tumultuous assemblages of the people. Accordingly the regiment was ordered to proceed from Dover to London on the 8th of April, but happily the meetings dispersed more quietly than was anticipated, and the regiment marched to Portsmouth on the 13th of that month, in which garrison it remained until the 26th of July, when it proceeded to Chatham, where the regiment is doing duty at the period of the termination of this record, on the 1st of November, 1848. 1848. [Illustration: SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. FOR CANNON'S MILITARY RECORDS _Madeley lith. 3 Wellington S^t. Strand_] SUCCESSION OF COLONELS OF THE SEVENTEENTH OR THE LEICESTERSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT. SOLOMON RICHARDS. _Appointed 27th September, 1688._ SOLOMON RICHARDS served on the Continent in the reign of King Charles II., and in the autumn of 1688 he was nominated by King James II. to raise a corps of pikemen and musketeers, now the SEVENTEENTH regiment of foot, of which he was appointed Colonel on the 27th of September, 1688. At the Revolution he transferred his services to the Prince of Orange, afterwards King William III., who sent him, with his regiment, to the relief of Londonderry. He returned to England, at the suggestion of the governor of Londonderry, who stated the place could not be defended against the army advancing to attack it, and King William, disapproving of his conduct, deprived him of his commission. He was not afterwards employed in the army. SIR GEORGE ST. GEORGE. _Appointed 1st May, 1689._ No record of the services of this officer, previous to his appointment to the colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment on the 1st of May, 1689, has been met with. He served the campaign of 1694 in Flanders; and in 1695 he exchanged to a newly-raised regiment, which was disbanded in 1798. JAMES COURTHORPE. _Appointed 1st May, 1695._ JAMES COURTHORPE entered the army in the time of King Charles II., and afterwards commanded a company of foot. He was appointed Colonel of one of the regiments raised for the reduction of Ireland in 1689; and in 1695 he exchanged to the SEVENTEENTH foot. He served in the Netherlands under King William III., and was killed at the head of his regiment when storming the breach of Terra Nova at the Castle of Namur, on the 30th of August, 1695. SIR MATTHEW BRIDGES. _Appointed 1st September, 1695._ After a progressive service in the subordinate commissions, this officer was appointed Lieut.-Colonel in the SEVENTEENTH regiment; he distinguished himself at the storming of the breach of Terra Nova at the Castle of Namur, on the 30th of August, 1695, when he was wounded. King William III. conferred the colonelcy of the regiment upon him, and he served under His Majesty until the treaty of Ryswick in 1697; and subsequently commanded his regiment in Ireland. The date of his decease has not been ascertained. HOLCROFT BLOOD. _Appointed 26th August, 1703._ This officer was the son of the celebrated Colonel Thomas Blood, who made a desperate effort to carry off the crown from the Tower of London in the reign of King Charles II., for which the Colonel was afterwards pardoned, in consequence of his previous services in the Royal cause. HOLCROFT BLOOD served on board the fleet, in the war with Holland, in 1672 and 1673; and he subsequently entered the French army as cadet in the guards of Louis XIV., where he made great proficiency in the study of fortifications. At the Revolution in 1688 he returned to England, and was appointed to a commission in Colonel Seymour's regiment, in which corps he rose to the rank of major. He served in Ireland, where he was employed as an engineer, and evinced ability at the sieges of Athlone and Limerick: he also distinguished himself at the siege of Namur in the Netherlands, in 1695; and was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment. He accompanied the SEVENTEENTH to Holland in 1701, and in 1702 he served as a principal engineer at the sieges of Venloo and Ruremonde, where he displayed great ability. He particularly distinguished himself at the storming of Fort St. Michael, at Venloo, where "he showed the part of a brave officer, charging with the men sword in hand, and killing an officer of the enemy's grenadiers, who made a vigorous opposition with his party."[10] The talents and bravery of Colonel Blood procured him the favour of the great Duke of Marlborough, who obtained for him the colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment and the command of the British artillery on foreign service on the Continent, with the rank of brigadier-general. At the memorable battle of Blenheim in 1704, Brigadier-General Blood highly distinguished himself; and, by bringing nine field-pieces into action at a critical moment, greatly contributed to the gaining of that splendid victory: by a General Order issued in the evening of that day, all the trophies captured were placed under his care. Towards the close of the campaign he accompanied the Duke of Marlborough to the Moselle, and was engaged in the capture of several places in that quarter. He continued in the command of the British artillery on the Continent, and his services were associated with the forcing of the French lines at Helixem and Neer Hespen in 1705, and the splendid victory at Ramilies in 1706. On the 1st of January, 1707, he was promoted to the rank of Major-general. He died at Brussels on the 20th of August, 1707. JAMES WIGHTMAN. _Appointed 20th August, 1707._ JAMES WIGHTMAN was many years an officer in the SEVENTEENTH regiment, with which corps he served in the Netherlands under King William III. He accompanied the regiment to Holland in 1701, and served the campaigns of 1702 and 1703 under John Duke of Marlborough. He was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the regiment in 1702, and to the rank of colonel in the army in August 1703. He served in Portugal and Spain under the Earl of Galway; was nominated Brigadier-general on the 1st of January 1707, and to the colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment in August following: in 1710 he was promoted to the rank of Major-general. He served in Scotland under the Duke of Argyle during the rebellion of the Earl of Mar, and commanded a division of infantry at the battle of Dumblain: he wrote an account of the battle, which was published at the time. In 1719 he commanded the King's troops at the battle of Glenshill, when he forced the Highlanders to disperse, and the Spanish troops to surrender prisoners of war. His services were rewarded with the government of Kinsale. He died suddenly at Bath, of a fit of apoplexy, in September, 1722. THOMAS FERRERS. _Appointed 28th September, 1722._ This officer served under the celebrated John Duke of Marlborough, and was promoted to Captain and Lieut.-colonel in the foot-guards; in May, 1705, he was advanced to the rank of Colonel, and in 1710 to that of Brigadier-general. Being conspicuous for loyalty at a period when Jacobin principles were prevalent in the kingdom, he was commissioned to raise a regiment of dragoons, which was disbanded in 1718; and in the following year he was appointed Colonel of the thirty-ninth foot, from which he was removed, in September, 1722, to the SEVENTEENTH regiment. He died about three weeks afterwards. JAMES TYRRELL. _Appointed 7th November, 1722._ JAMES TYRRELL was appointed Ensign in a regiment of foot on the 6th of February, 1694, and he served under King William III. in the Netherlands. He distinguished himself in the wars of Queen Anne; and was promoted to the colonelcy of a newly-raised regiment of foot in April, 1709. At the peace of Utrecht his regiment was disbanded; and in 1715 he raised a regiment of dragoons for the service of King George I., which was disbanded in November, 1718: in 1722 His Majesty gave him the colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-general in 1727; to that of Major-general in 1735; and Lieut.-general in 1739. He died in August, 1742. JOHN WYNYARD. _Appointed 31st August, 1742._ JOHN WYNYARD was many years an officer of the SEVENTEENTH regiment of foot, with which corps he served in the Peninsula in the war of the Spanish succession, and in Scotland during the Earl of Mar's rebellion. On the 10th of July, 1718, he was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the regiment; and his zealous attention to all the duties of his situation was rewarded, in November, 1739, with the colonelcy of the fourth regiment of marines, which was then newly raised, from which he was removed, in 1742, to the SEVENTEENTH regiment, which corps he had commanded many years with reputation. He died in 1752. EDWARD RICHBELL. _Appointed 14th March, 1752._ This officer entered the army in the reign of Queen Anne, and served with reputation under the celebrated John Duke of Marlborough. He evinced a constant attention to the duties of his profession, and was promoted, on the 18th of May 1722, to the lieut.-colonelcy of the thirty-seventh regiment. He distinguished himself in the war of the Austrian succession, and was promoted to the colonelcy of the thirty-ninth regiment on the 14th of June, 1743. In 1746 he commanded a brigade under Lieut.-general St. Clair, in the expedition against Port L'Orient; and in 1752 he was removed to the SEVENTEENTH regiment. He died in 1757. JOHN FORBES. _Appointed 25th February, 1757._ JOHN FORBES obtained a commission in the army on the 10th of April, 1710; after a progressive service in the subordinate commissions, and distinguishing himself in the war of the Austrian succession, he was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the Scots Greys on the 29th of November, 1750: in 1757 he was advanced to the colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment. He was nominated Adjutant-general to the expedition against Louisburg in 1757; and afterwards appointed Commander-in-chief of the troops in the southern provinces of North America, with the rank of Brigadier-general. He died on the 11th of April, 1759. THE HONORABLE ROBERT MONCKTON. _Appointed 24th October, 1759._ THE HONORABLE ROBERT MONCKTON, son of John, first Viscount Galway, served in the army in the war of the Austrian succession; and in February, 1751, he was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the forty-seventh regiment: in 1757 he was nominated Colonel-commandant of the second battalion of the sixtieth regiment. He commanded a brigade, under Major-general James Wolfe, in the expedition against Quebec, and evinced great gallantry and ability on several occasions; he was shot through the lungs at the battle on the heights of Abraham, on the 13th of September; but recovered of his wound, and was nominated Lieut.-governor of Annapolis Royal, and Colonel of the SEVENTEENTH regiment. In 1761 he was appointed Governor and Commander-in-chief of the province of New York; and promoted to the rank of Major-general. Soon afterwards he was selected to command the land-forces of an expedition against the French island of Martinique, which he captured, after overcoming numerous difficulties, early in 1762. He was nominated Governor of Berwick and Holy Island, and afterwards of Portsmouth, which place he represented in Parliament several years. He was promoted to the rank of Lieut.-general in 1770. His decease occurred on the 21st of May, 1782. GEORGE MORRISON. _Appointed 29th May, 1782._ This officer served many years on the staff of the army; he was advanced to the rank of Lieut.-colonel in 1761, at which period he held the appointment of Deputy-quartermaster-general; and in 1763 he was placed at the head of that department. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel in 1772, and to that of Major-general in 1777; in 1779 he was appointed Colonel of the seventy-fifth regiment (afterwards disbanded), from which he was removed, in 1782, to the SEVENTEENTH, and also promoted to the rank of Lieut.-general. He was appointed to the fourth regiment of foot in 1792; and promoted to the rank of General in 1796. He died in 1799. GEORGE GARTH. _Appointed 8th August, 1792._ This officer served thirty-seven years in the first regiment of foot-guards, in which corps he was appointed Ensign and Lieutenant at the commencement of hostilities with France in 1755. In 1758 he obtained the rank of Lieutenant and Captain, and he afterwards served in Germany under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick: on the 6th of February, 1772, he was promoted to the rank of Captain and Lieut.-colonel. When the American war commenced, his services were extended to that country, where the foot-guards had opportunities of distinguishing themselves. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel in 1779; was nominated Major in his regiment in March, 1782, and advanced to the rank of Major-general in November following: in 1789 he was appointed Lieut.-colonel in his regiment. King George III. was pleased to confer on Major-general Garth the colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment in 1792; also to promote him to the rank of Lieut.-general in 1796, and to that of General in 1801. General Garth was subsequently appointed Lieut.-governor of Placentia. He died in 1819. JOSIAH CHAMPAGNÉ, G.C.H. _Appointed 14th June, 1819._ On the 28th of January, 1775, JOSIAH CHAMPAGNÉ was appointed Ensign in the thirty-first foot, and embarking with his regiment, in March, 1776, for the relief of Quebec, then besieged by the Americans, he arrived in Canada in May, and took part in the operations by which the troops of the United States were forced to quit the British provinces. He remained on active service in Canada during the remainder of the American war, was promoted to a lieutenancy in his regiment in July, 1777, and, returning to England at the peace in 1782, was nominated captain in the ninety-ninth foot (afterwards disbanded) in 1783, and removed to the third foot in March, 1784. He joined the Buffs at Jamaica in May of the same year; and in 1789, when the Nootka Sound question threatened to involve Great Britain and Spain in war, he embarked with a detachment of his regiment on board the fleet: he returned to England soon afterwards. He again embarked for the West Indies, with his regiment, in 1793--the Buffs forming part of the expedition under Lieut.-general Sir Charles Grey; but their destination was afterwards changed to Ostend; and they subsequently joined the armament under Major-general the Earl of Moira, prepared to aid the French loyalists. In the same year Captain Champagné was promoted to the majority of the eightieth foot, and afterwards to a lieut.-colonelcy in the same corps. In 1794 he again proceeded to the Continent, and, after serving in the retreat through Holland, returned to England. He embarked for the coast of France in 1795, and served with the expedition under Major-general Doyle which took possession of Isle de Dieu. In 1796 he proceeded with his regiment to the Cape of Good Hope, and towards the close of the same year sailed to the East Indies. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel in 1797; and in 1800 he was nominated to command an expedition against Batavia, with the rank of Brigadier-general, but this enterprise was countermanded; and he was afterwards named second in command of the army which proceeded from India to Egypt in 1801. He returned to England in 1803; and in September of that year he was promoted to the rank of Major-general. On the 22nd of February, 1810, he was rewarded with the colonelcy of the forty-first foot; and in July following promoted to the rank of Lieut.-general. In 1819 he was removed to the SEVENTEENTH regiment. He was honored with the dignity of Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order; and was advanced to the rank of General in 1821. He died on the 31st of January, 1840. SIR FREDERICK AUGUSTUS WETHERALL, G.C.H. _Appointed 17th February, 1840._ This officer entered the service in August, 1775, as Ensign in the SEVENTEENTH foot. He embarked at Cork with the regiment in September following for Boston, North America, where he remained during the siege, and accompanied his corps at the evacuation to Halifax in March, 1776. In June following he proceeded with the army under the command of Sir William Howe to Staten Island, preparatory to the attack of New York. In August, 1776, he received a lieutenancy; in which rank he served five years, and was constantly employed in North America and Europe. He was present at the battles of Brooklyn, Whiteplains, Fort Washington, Princetown, Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth, exclusive of several affairs of posts, in North America. He was embarked and did duty as a Captain of marines on board His Majesty's ship Alfred, and was in the battles of Cape Finisterre and St. Vincent, under Sir George Rodney, previous to the relief of Gibraltar. On 17th May, 1781, he raised an independent company, which was embodied in the hundred and fourth regiment, and was employed on the island of Guernsey. On 16th April, 1783, he exchanged into the eleventh regiment, and proceeded to Gibraltar, where he did duty six years. In 1790 he attended the Duke of Kent to Quebec, and accompanied his Royal Highness as aide-de-camp to the West Indies in 1794; he was at the taking of Martinique, where he received two wounds. On 1st March, 1794, he was appointed Major in the eleventh foot, and employed as Deputy-adjutant-general to the forces in Nova Scotia, under the command of the Duke of Kent, to which situation he was appointed on 23rd August, 1794. On 20th May, 1795 he was appointed Lieut.-colonel in Keppel's regiment, and employed at St. Domingo under the command of Lieut.-general Sir Adam Williamson and Major-general Forbes; he was intrusted by the latter officer with despatches for Sir Ralph Abercromby at Barbadoes, and on the passage was taken by a French frigate, and wounded in action; he remained at Guadaloupe a prisoner of war upwards of nine months, and when exchanged was appointed Adjutant-general to the forces under the command of the Duke of Kent in North America. On 3rd August, 1796, he was removed to the lieut.-colonelcy of the eighty-second regiment, and on 29th April, 1802, received the brevet of Colonel. He afterwards raised the Nova Scotia fencible regiment in North America, of which he was appointed colonel on 9th July, 1803, and Adjutant-general and Brigadier to the forces on the Caribbee Island station in May, 1806. On the 25th of October following he was removed to the Cape of Good Hope, when he served as Brigadier to the forces in that colony until 1809; he obtained the rank of Major-general on 25th October of that year, and was appointed to the Staff in India. On his passage from the Cape to India he was again taken prisoner in the Company's ship Wyndham, after a severe action, by a French squadron, in the Mozambique Channel, and carried to the Isle of France, when, after being confined two months, he was exchanged, and sailed for Calcutta. He served there as second in command, under Sir Samuel Auchmuty, on the expedition against Java, which terminated in its conquest. For his services on that occasion he had the honour to receive a medal, and the thanks of both Houses of Parliament. His next appointment was to the command in Mysore and its dependencies, which he held until June, 1815, when he returned to England. He received the rank of Lieut.-general on 4th June, 1814. On 10th January, 1837, he was advanced to the rank of General, and His Majesty King William IV. conferred upon him the colonelcy of the sixty-second regiment. On 17th February, 1840, the Queen bestowed upon him the colonelcy of the SEVENTEENTH regiment, in which he commenced his military career. He died at Ealing, in Middlesex, on the 18th of December, 1842, having attained the advanced age of eighty-eight years. GENERAL SIR PEREGRINE MAITLAND, K.C.B. _Appointed from the seventy-sixth regiment, on 2nd January, 1843._ LONDON: Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES and SONS, Stamford Street, For Her Majesty's Stationery Office. FOOTNOTES: [6] The regiments raised in 1688, by King James II., were commanded by the following officers:--HORSE.--The Earl of Salisbury, Marquis de Miremont, Viscount Brandon, Henry Slingsby, and George Holman. FOOT.--John Hales, Roger McEligot, Archibald Douglas, Solomon Richards, the Duke of Newcastle, Colonel Gage, and Colonel Skelton. [7] D'Auvergne's History. [8] This letter was published in the State of Europe for June 1708; the writer was not aware of Brigadier-General Wightman's appointment to the SEVENTEENTH regiment. [9] Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs. [10] Boyer's Annals of Queen Anne. TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{x}; for example, S^t or Esq^{re}. Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. Pg xxxi, in the list of 'PLATES' the order of the plates has been reversed, so that 'Costume of the Regiment' comes first. Pg xvii, 'Witenss the deeds' replaced by 'Witness the deeds'. Five occurrences of 'Lieut-Colonel' have been replaced for consistency by 'Lieut.-Colonel' (missing period inserted). 
55235	----	LORD ROBERTS' MESSAGE TO THE NATION BY FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS V.C., K.G. LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1912 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION PART I PEACE AND WAR A Speech to the Citizens of Manchester Letter to the _Manchester Guardian_ PART II THE TERRITORIAL FORCE Introductory Note: The National Service League and the Territorial Force The Mansion House Speech: Lord Haldane's Scheme Examined PART III THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE AND WORKING MEN Introductory Note: Mr. Blatchford's Criticism of the Manchester Speech Letter to the _Times_ on Compulsory Service and the Social Condition of the Working Classes PART IV TERRITORIAL OFFICERS AND THE PRESENT CRISIS Address at the Annual Dinner of the Kentish Men and the Men of Kent INTRODUCTION My recent speech in Manchester has been so widely discussed, and, in certain quarters, so gravely misrepresented or misunderstood, that, in the interests of the cause which I there defended, I am impelled to place before the public a complete text of that speech with such notes and supplementary matter as seem necessary to make my meaning unmistakable except to faction or to prejudice. No one who has followed with attention the efforts of the National Service League has any right to imagine that we desire a strong army solely in order to invade the territory of European or more distant States; or that we wish to root out the Territorial Force in order to establish in its place an army system modelled on the army system of Germany; or, again, that we have the ambition of resuscitating once more medieval blood-lust, anarchic plunder, and delight in war! What, then, are our aims? We desire, in the first place, that all patriotic men within this Empire should be made to see and to feel that from one cause or another England, by neglecting her armaments, has drifted into a position which it is impossible to describe otherwise than as a position of danger. We desire further that all patriotic men should, without either insincerity or delay, put to themselves the questions: How are we to arrest that drifting, and how are we to evade or overcome that danger? And, in the third place, with regard to foreign nations or empires, our ambition is simply that States well-disposed towards us, whether near or distant, may have it in their power to mix with their friendliness respect, and with their goodwill esteem. In the following pages I have stated in brief the solutions of these problems which, after some experience of peace and war and after some deliberation not free from anxiety, I have come to look upon as the only workable solutions, as the only solutions consonant with our honour and our continuance as an Empire. And in view of the discussion and criticism which this speech has provoked, and still provokes, I may be permitted to add, that, in whatever I have said in this speech as in other speeches, I have had in sight but one purpose--the good of this nation and the safety and greatness of this Empire. It is for my fellow-countrymen to judge between me and those who, during these past few weeks, have willingly or unwillingly misinterpreted my purpose or misstated my words. It is also for my countrymen to decide upon a far mightier issue; for in this self-governed, free, and democratic State of England it is for all its citizens to assert whether, in this matter of war and preparedness for war, they shall face the facts, resolute to see things as they are, or whether they shall continue indifferent to the history of the past and obstinately blind to the warnings of the present, even to such beacons as are now aflame on every hill from the Balkans to the Dardanelles! And I appeal above all to the young men of this nation, to our young men of every rank and social status, to the young men of every trade and profession and calling of any kind; for it is they who, in victory or in disaster, will have to meet the consequences of this tremendous decision. It is they, in a word, who now are England. Young men, young men of British birth, is it possible that you can shirk the issue, that you can fail to hear, or that, hearing, you can fail to respond to your country's summons, to the memories of the past, to the hopes of the future? LORD ROBERTS' MESSAGE TO THE NATION PART I PEACE AND WAR A SPEECH TO THE CITIZENS OF MANCHESTER, OCTOBER 25, 1912. MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN, This is only the second occasion in a long life on which I have had the privilege of speaking in your city; and it is with no inadequate sense of the value of that occasion and of the responsibility attaching to the position which, for the past ten years, I have taken up towards this Empire and its armies that I come before you this afternoon. For in the upbuilding of that Empire what city in our dominions has taken a more conspicuous part than this city, made illustrious almost since its foundation by commercial enterprise and by its political sagacity and spirit in affairs? In the eighteenth century your merchants aided the designs of the elder Pitt, and of the statesmen who followed him, in founding that power in India and the East which to-day is the envy and the admiration of the nations. In the nineteenth, within my own memory, your city, under the unforgotten leadership of John Bright, Richard Cobden, and Milner Gibson, gave a great watchword[1] to a great and still living party, and by its resolute effort forced through Parliament the repeal of the Corn Laws, one of the most momentous and revolutionary measures in this nation's history. Nor, in more recent times, has Manchester abated her zeal or her vital energy in every phase of English political life. The greatest, most temperate, and statesmanlike Liberal newspaper in England is night by night printed within your walls; so that, at least in one phase of our national life and amongst one group of our fellow-citizens--the Liberal party, that is to say--it is literally true that what Manchester thinks to-night London thinks to-morrow. And a certain election the other day, and the overflow meetings which, I understand, have been held in favour of Tariff Reform within the sacred precincts of the Free Trade Hall itself, give a further proof that here in Manchester you are not petrified in your opinions, but that the stream of your political life flows fresh and from the fountain-head. Judge then, gentlemen, whether it was not with some concern that I looked forward to this occasion; judge whether it was not with some searching of the heart that I reflected upon what I have this afternoon to say to you. For does it not appear at first sight as if what I have to say is not merely antagonistic to the teaching of the two greatest names of the Manchester School, John Bright and Richard Cobden, but is in every way the contradiction of the characterizing ideas and the traditions associated with this city itself? For I come before you to-day to advocate the necessity of National Service; to affirm once more that the "Nation in Arms" is the only worthy and sure bulwark of this Empire and these islands.[2] Cobden, on the other hand, has left it on record that he considered it the glory and the exceeding great reward of all his labours that he had contributed, in however small a degree, to that universal disarmament of Europe, which, he sanguinely hoped, would be the result of Free Trade and of expanding commerce and the organization of labour. And John Bright, his great colleague, in one speech after another, added the lustre of his eloquence to that same high and flattering anticipation. I can remember easily the ardent and sympathetic reception which those anticipations met in the France of Louis Napoleon; I can remember also the added weight which France's enthusiasm gave to those happy anticipations here in England. War, indeed, seemed at an end. To-morrow, it seemed, we should be turning our barracks into granaries and our arsenals into banking houses. Gentlemen, I am, I trust, doing no wrong to the memory of these statesmen when I point out that in the very years--nay, in the very months--that they were cherishing these illusions of peace and universal disarmament, in those very months the mightiest and most disciplined force that this earth has ever contained was silently being drilled in that wide region from the Rhine to the Elbe and the Oder, and from the North Sea to the Bavarian frontier, until, the right hour having struck, that army disclosed itself in all its prodigious and crushing mass and in all its unmatched capacity for destruction and war. And, amid those auspicious dreams of peace, for what was that army being trained? Koeniggrätz, Metz, St. Privat, and Sedan are the answer. Nor did that army pause until upon the ruins of the Empire of the third Napoleon--upon the ruins, I may say, of France, unprepared in peace, and in war scattered and dismayed--it had reared a new Empire, the Empire of William I., of Frederick I., and of William II., for whose personal character, noble and imaginative patriotism, and capacities as a ruler, I yield to no man in my admiration. Such, gentlemen, was history's ironic comment upon John Bright's and Richard Cobden's eloquently-urged enthusiasm. Let me not increase by any word of mine the crushing weight of Destiny's criticism. Now, gentlemen, at the present day, now in the year 1912, our German friends, I am well aware, do not, at least in sensible circles, assert dogmatically that a war with Great Britain will take place this year or next; but in their heart of hearts they know, every man of them,[3] that, just as in 1866 and just as in 1870, war will take place the instant the German forces by land and sea are, by their superiority at every point, as certain of victory as anything in human calculation can be made certain. "Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck." That is the time-honoured policy of her Foreign Office. That was the policy relentlessly pursued by Bismarck and Moltke in 1866 and 1870; it has been her policy decade by decade since that date; it is her policy at the present hour. And, gentlemen, it is an excellent policy. It is, or should be, the policy of every nation prepared to play a great part in history. Under that policy Germany has, within the last ten years, sprung, as at a bound, from one of the weakest of naval Powers to the greatest naval Power, save one, upon this globe. But yesterday, so to speak, the British Fleets did not feel the furrow of a German war-keel on the wide seas. To-day every British warship and every British merchant vessel thrills in all her iron nerves to that mighty presence. Just as in 1866, by the massing of her armies towards this frontier or towards that frontier, Prussia controlled the action of Austria, so Germany constrains the action of England at the present day. Do you wish for proofs? I point to the gradual displacement of the British Fleet before the German menace. I point to the Mediterranean, bereft of British battleships, and to the gradual narrowing, year by year, of our once far-flung battle-line. We may stand still: Germany always advances, and the direction of her advance, the line along which she is moving, is now most manifest. It is towards that consummation which I have described--a complete supremacy by land and sea. She has built a mighty fleet; but, as if nothing were done so long as anything stands between her and her goal, still she presses on--here establishing a new Heligoland, for every available island in the North Sea has been fortified--there enclosing Holland in a network of new canals, and deepening old riverbeds for the swifter transport of the munitions of war, whether to her army or her fleet. Contrasted with our own apathy or puerile and spasmodic efforts, how impressive is this magnificent and unresting energy! It has the mark of true greatness; it extorts admiration even from those against whom it is directed! But, it is urged by the advocates of universal peace, how monstrous is this expenditure of human strength and human ingenuity, if unused, and how yet more monstrous the waste of human life if actually used in war![4] And how much more sane is the policy of Cobden and of Bright and of their imitators or followers at the present day! Gentlemen, arguments which prove the folly and criminality of war are, at the present stage of history, like the arguments which prove the folly and criminality of ambition and of the love of glory. Even those who argue most eloquently against glory do, by that very eloquence, seek to win glory; and those who argue most forcibly against war do, nevertheless, live, and for long will continue to live, under an invisible power which has made war an inseparable portion of human polity. Much, during the autumn of 1911, was said and written upon arbitration. America's action in the Panama Canal, and the impotence of diplomatists in the Balkan crisis,[5] are again history's ironic comment in the autumn of 1912! Arbitration most certainly is more humane than war; but, at the present stage of the polity of nations, arbitration again and again refuses to extend itself to some of the most vital and essential questions--questions which, to a nation or empire sensitive alike to its honour and to its abiding interests, make war unavoidable. Again, we have heard much during the current year of the power of Labour in international politics. The German Socialist, it is said, will not make war upon his French or his English comrade. Gentlemen, it is to the credit of the human race that patriotism, in the presence of such organizations, has always proved itself superior to any class or any individual. Love of country has on the actual day of battle always proved itself superior to love of profit. That law has not been abrogated, and if war broke out to-morrow the German working man would quit himself like a German, and the British working man, I hope, like a Briton. Hence, gentlemen, the mistrust with which I have always viewed the proposals of British Ministers for a limitation of armaments. Emanating from Great Britain, such proposals must always, I imagine, impress a foreign observer as either too early or too late in English history. For how was this Empire of Britain founded? War founded this Empire--war and conquest! When we, therefore, masters by war of one-third of the habitable globe, when we propose to Germany to disarm, to curtail her navy or diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses; and pointing, not without justice, to the road by which England, sword in hand, has climbed to her unmatched eminence, declares openly, or in the veiled language of diplomacy, that by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities that have ever added the lustre of their name to human annals, can accuse Germany or regard the utterance of one of her greatest Chancellors a year and a half ago,[6] or of General Bernhardi three months ago, with any feelings except those of respect? Gentlemen, other world-Powers besides Germany have arisen and are arising around us; but there is one way in which Britain can have peace, not only with Germany, but with every other Power, national or imperial, and that is, to present such a battle-front by sea and land that no Power or probable combination of Powers shall dare to attack her without the certainty of disaster. That is the only reply worthy of our past and wise for our future which we can or ought to make to those unparalleled efforts which I have described. And there is a way in which England can have war; there is a way in which she is certain to have war and its horrors and calamities: it is by persisting in her present course, her apathy, unintelligence, blindness, and in her disregard of the warnings of the most ordinary political insight, as well as of the examples of history. And what is the lesson which History enforces? Of two courses you must choose one: you must either abandon your Empire, and with it your mercantile wealth; or, in the world as it is at present, be prepared to defend it. But, you will say, are we so unprepared? Have we not a Fleet? Have we not an Army? We have a Fleet, but that Fleet is rapidly becoming unequal to the fleets by which we may be opposed, and by the inadequacy of our land forces it is maimed and hampered in its very nature as a Fleet. For the essence of a Fleet in such an Empire as ours is the utmost mobility: it must have complete freedom of action. But if, in addition to its own duties, our Fleet has to perform the role of an army of defence, what must follow? It becomes a "wooden wall" indeed, unmoving and inert, anchored around these shores. It is helpless to protect our food-supplies, without the regular arrival of which we must starve. A paramount Navy we must possess, whether of two keels to one or three keels to two. That is a self-evident truth. But if this Empire is to keep abreast of the rapid and tremendous developments amongst the world-Powers around us, something more is necessary, and the necessity increases with every year, almost with every month. It is the necessity for an Army strong enough to insure the mobility of our Navy, and strong enough also to make our strength felt on the mainland of Europe, should we ever appear there as the armed ally of another Power, as we were on the verge of doing last autumn. That also is, or ought to be, self-evident. What, then, is my plan, and what is my ultimate counsel to the nation and the message to my countrymen that at this solemn hour I would utter? It is the message burnt into my mind twelve years ago during the crisis of the South African War; it is the message which every hour of that protracted and not too glorious struggle made me feel to be more and more necessary; and, I am compelled to say frankly, it is the message which events, some quite recent and some remoter, have compelled me to regard as more pressing in 1912 than in 1900-1901. Gentlemen, that message is: "Arm and prepare to quit yourselves like men, for the time of your ordeal is at hand." A long interval has been allowed us for preparation; for in this era of rapid evolution twelve years is a big space in human affairs. Twelve years have been given to us, and in those years what have we done? We have modified and remodified the effete voluntary system; we have invented several new names and a new costume. But as regards efficiency and as regards preparedness for war, we are practically where we were in 1900.[7] For, so far as the choice between the voluntary system and some form of National Service is concerned, what have these twelve years demonstrated, except the futility and positive danger of any and every other system except some form of compulsion? There has, I say, been much juggling with words and names. The old Militia and Volunteers have disappeared, and the Special Reserve and the Territorials have taken their place; there has been much complimentary and interested or disinterested laudation by Members of Parliament, and, I regret to say, by some few officers of the army. The fact remains, that in the opinion of every impartial soldier with any experience of modern war--in the opinion, I say, of every soldier, whether British, German, or French, who has given any attention to the subject, this great Empire is wholly unprepared for war. As a European Power, as a Continental Power, we do not exist--for war. Our Army, as a belligerent factor in European politics, is almost a negligible quantity. This great Empire, indeed--and the more we exalt its greatness and its unrivalled character, the more astounding does our recklessness appear--this great Empire is at all times practically defenceless beyond its first line. Such an Empire invites war. Its assumed security amid the armaments of Europe, and now of Asia, is insolent and provocative. For remember that war does not begin, nor does it end, on the day of battle. There is a kind of war which goes on silent and unperceived amid apparent peace. That is the war which undermines commerce, which profoundly affects a city like your city. If once you permit any one State to be your undisputed superior by sea and land, that hour, even if not a shot be fired, you cease to be a free nation. You are no longer an Empire. Your commercial greatness is vanished. You hold your very lives by the sufferance of another, and would have to submit to any terms he might dictate. Such, gentlemen, is the origin, and such the considerations which have fostered in me the growth of this conviction--the conviction that in some form of National Service is the only salvation of this nation and this Empire. The Territorial Force is now an acknowledged failure--a failure in discipline, a failure in numbers, a failure in equipment, a failure in energy.[8] I have so often demonstrated this thesis; I have so often analyzed the contradictions[9] in the arguments of the supporters of the Territorial movement; I have so often exposed their vamped-up statistics, and the rewards and encouragement offered by politicians to every soldier or civilian willing to say a word in praise of that scheme--I have done all this so often that there seems nothing left for me to say. To you, as practical business men, I will merely repeat this one statement--a statement the truth of which is known to every experienced soldier--that so long as the Territorial Force is based on voluntary enlistment, it is impossible to give its members a sufficiently lengthy and continuous period of training to insure a discipline which will stand the severe test of modern war. In saying this, I am making no aspersions against the zeal or intelligence of the patriotic men who compose the Force; neither they nor their employers can afford the necessary time, so long as all men in this country are not treated alike, and all compelled to serve their apprenticeship in the National Forces.[10] And, unless I am misinformed, the majority of the Territorials are now in favour of compulsion. Gentlemen, only the other day I completed my eightieth year, and to some of you, doubtless to many of you, I am indebted for one of the moments of the deepest gratification in my life, and the words I am speaking to-day are, therefore, old words--the result of earnest thought and practical experience; but, gentlemen, my fellow-citizens and fellow-Englishmen, citizens of this great and sacred trust, this Empire, if these were my last and latest words, I still should say to you, "Arm yourselves!" And if I put to myself the question, How can I, even at this late and solemn hour, best help England?--England that to me has been so much, England that for me has done so much--again I answer, "Arm and prepare to quit yourselves like men, for the day of your ordeal is at hand." I have commanded your armies in peace and in war. In my early years, as in my middle life, and now in these my latest years, I have felt to the quick the glories accompanying the armies of the past across every battlefield. What made the valour of those armies so distinguished? One thing at least: it was that, in officers exclusively, and in the ranks mainly, they were composed of men who regarded citizenship as incomplete unless it involved soldiership. Gentlemen, you have been enfranchised, many of you, by the great Acts of 1832 and 1867. I say to you, the young men of this city and of this nation, that your enfranchisement is not complete until you have become soldiers as well as citizens, prepared to attest your manhood on the battlefield as well as at the election booths. Much has been said recently of the rights and the power of the workers of this nation. We all, I hope, belong to that class--workers--but the artisan class of the nation has been urged--and to you, the working men of Manchester, I now specially address myself--you have been urged, I say, to refuse to do your duties in war until your rights in peace are granted. Gentlemen, I say to you, that is not the policy either of Britishers or of men. I will go further: I say to you that it is not by declining or shirking duty that you will extend your rights. He who diminishes the power and vital resources of Great Britain diminishes the power and the vital resources of every Britisher. How can you most easily and most securely better yourselves as Britishers--as working men? By making England better, by making it better worth your while to be a citizen of, and a worker in that nation! If you seized by violence or by Act of Parliament all the accumulated capital of the centuries, you might have a madman's holiday for a time; but in the end you would emerge bankrupt and starving. You yourselves are the capital of the nation--the life-wealth of the nation--its manhood. Weapons, however perfect, will not make an army. Men are necessary--men of spirit, men of energy, loving their country, not merely loving their class or themselves. And on you, in turn, that discipline and those duties will confer unreckonable benefits. A tyranny imposes an exterior restraint; but you, in your free democratic constitution, should consider it as your privilege to impose upon yourselves from within that discipline and those sacred duties. I say to you, therefore, assert your rights as Britishers by demanding the greatest, the highest of all civic and of all national rights--the right to be taught to defend your country--the right, that is, to defend your own honour as Britons and your liberties as citizens of this Empire. Thus, and thus only, shall you be worthy of that Empire's great past and of the dignity which that past confers upon every man of you, whatever your position in life may be. [1] Apart from Free Trade and unrestrained competition, there are three other doctrines, or political principles, associated with the Manchester School: (1) To maintain peace at any cost; (2) strictly to avoid all interference with the internal affairs of foreign Powers; (3) to subordinate as far as possible all other interests to the interests of industry. The complete organization of industry was to have, as its immediate consequence, the abolition of war. These principles crystallized later into the familiar watchword of Liberalism: "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform." [2] Succinctly, by "the Nation in Arms" I mean that every able-bodied citizen has patriotism enough to take his place in the firing-line to repel invasion; and, secondly, that he has common sense enough to undergo the discipline to make that self-sacrifice effective. In the second part of this book I have indicated what that preparation means. Here I may only observe that when Lord Haldane speaks of "the whole nation springing to arms at the call of duty" he is once more forgetting the part which discipline plays in modern war. A nation may "spring to arms," but if it is not disciplined, and thoroughly disciplined, its very courage will only serve to hasten its destruction. Within the last few weeks tens of thousands of brave Ottomans have sprung to arms, but with what dire results! [3] It would be easy, I am informed on good authority, to illustrate this from passages in the works of German writers from Treitschke, the great exponent of Bismarckism, to writers of the present day. And I may quote a paragraph in support of my thesis from an unexpected source, that of Mr. H. M. Hyndman, in a letter to the _Morning Post_ of November 9, nearly three weeks after my Manchester speech. Mr. Hyndman, I need not remind my readers, not only enjoys a wide experience of German Socialism, but of many phases of German politics and political life. He writes: "I cannot for the life of me understand what Sir Edward Grey hopes to gain by rebuking Lord Roberts for stating that which the whole Continent knows perfectly well to be the truth. The German Fleet is being strengthened now, as it has been increased up to the present time, in order either to attack us in the North Sea, when the German Government thinks it safe to do so; or, by threats of what will occur, to force us to accept German policy, and allow the German Empire to do what it pleases with Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland, after having crushed or arranged with France. If Germany is not hostile to this country, why does the whole Pan-German party (and Press), to which the heir to the German throne openly belongs, declare that she is? Why is it that 'England is the enemy' is the common talk all through German middle-class circles? Or, on the other hand, if the relations between the two nations are so excellent as our Foreign Minister assures us they are--thus leading many sober Frenchmen to believe that our _entente_ with France only means that we shall betray the French Republic the moment it suits us to do so--why are we fortifying Rosyth as a naval base, why have we withdrawn our Fleet from the Mediterranean to concentrate it in home waters, and why was every journal in this country discussing the issues of peace and war with the German Empire when the late German Ambassador came to this country? More important still, why have we given way to a worse Government than that of Germany--the Russian Government, to wit--on matters of the first importance in Persia and elsewhere? Are the English people mere children thus to be fed on the pap of fatuous pacificism and convenient party misrepresentation at one of the most serious crises in the history of our race?" [4] It is, or ought to be, superfluous to rebut the frantic accusation brought against myself and the National Service League by a leading Liberal weekly on October 26--that of blood-lust. Can there be Englishmen--or men bearing English names--in whom all sense of personal honour is so decayed, that to resent a national affront or to defend their Fatherland from foreign aggression appears a duty from which they recoil in shuddering apprehension? [5] Since these words were spoken, with what an unparalleled rapidity has event crowded upon portentous event in the Near East! I have no wish to establish hasty analogies or to draw premature inferences; but what Englishman can consider the events of these past three weeks and remember without a pitying smile Lord Haldane's naïve assurance that with six months' training our Territorials would be ready for war! Did ever dilettantism so give itself away? [6] In March, 1911, when every pulpit and every newspaper, under the influence of President Taft's message, promised us within a brief period universal peace and disarmament, the German Chancellor, Herr Bethmann-Hollweg, had the courage and the common sense to stand apart, and, speaking for his Emperor and his nation, to lay it down as a maxim that, at the present stage of the world's history, the armed forces of any nation or empire must have a distinct relation to the material resources of that nation or empire. This position seems to me as statesmanlike as it is unanswerable; but in applying the principle to our own country, I should be inclined to modify it by saying that the armed forces of any nation or empire ought to represent, not only its material resources, but the spirit which animates that nation or empire--in a word, that its armed forces should be the measure of the nation's devotion to whatever ends it pursues. [7] For a more complete examination of this subject, I must refer the reader to the First Part of "Fallacies and Facts," published two years ago in answer to Lord Haldane's and Sir Ian Hamilton's "Compulsory Service." [8] Since these words were spoken a remarkable series of letters in the _Daily Mail_, emanating from every grade in the Territorial Army itself, has illustrated and demonstrated this position point by point. [9] See, for example, my speech at the Mansion House, which forms the second part of the present publication. [10] As an illustration, let me quote a letter which I received from an important firm of manufacturing chemists in reply to a request from the Secretary of the National Service League to be allowed to speak to their men on the subject of Universal Military Training: "We regret that our manager at Hounslow is not in favour of your going there, for fear Territorial enlistment may be encouraged. Our business is of a peculiar nature, and is already quite seriously interfered with by the training of the appreciable number of Territorials in our employ. The difficulty is that ours is very skilled labour; in many cases we have no duplicate men, and outsiders cannot temporarily take up and discharge the duties of these men. When service is compulsory we shall be on equal terms with everybody else, and willing to bear an increased burden." ADDITIONAL NOTE ENGLEMERE, ASCOT, BERKS. November 5, 1912. To THE EDITOR OF THE "MANCHESTER GUARDIAN." Sir, My attention has been drawn to the leader in your issue of the 4th instant, in which you deal with a passage in my speech in Manchester. I am too much accustomed to adverse criticism in my efforts to arouse the nation to a sense of its unpreparedness for war to resent in any way the attacks of my opponents. But when a paper of such standing as that of the _Manchester Guardian_ completely misconstrues what was certainly a salient passage in my speech, I feel bound, in justice to the cause which I have at heart, to explain my meaning more fully than was possible when I was dealing with the whole question of National Defence in relation to our position as a world-Power. It is true that I pointed out the striking process by which Germany has developed from a loose congeries of petty federated States to the united Empire which arouses the admiration of the world to-day. Before 1866 the German States, under the scarcely-established leadership of Prussia, were surrounded on every side by jealous rivals or hostile neighbours, and it seemed doubtful whether the unity which was the dream of Stein in 1806, and of the Revolutionists in 1848, could ever be attained, except by a policy of blood and iron. Certain it is that Bismarck, the architect of united Germany, saw in the policy of successful war the only means of realizing German nationality, and of constructing the edifice of national greatness so firmly that it should stand "foursquare to all the winds that blow." The three hammer strokes of 1864, 1866, and 1870, were needed to achieve this result, but the strength and precision of those hammer blows were prepared by long years of patient, self-sacrificing labour, during which the German forces were made "as certain of victory as anything in human calculation can be made certain, by their superiority at every point." Of this process and development, inspiring the whole nation to manful effort and to individual sacrifice for the common fatherland, even if it be in preparation for death or victory on the battlefield, I said that "it is an excellent policy. It is, or should be, the policy of every nation prepared to play a great part in history." And I repeat that statement to-day, when the glorious achievements of the younger Nations in Arms have lent point to its truth, while they have established their claims to nationhood and the gratitude of hundreds of thousands of their kinsmen. But to suggest that I am urging upon England that it should be her policy, first, to arm herself better than Germany, and then to make war on Germany, with or without a just cause, with or without even a quarrel, simply because England thinks herself at that moment able to win a war--this is a suggestion so strange and so repugnant to my mind that I am utterly at a loss to understand how it could be attributed to me, or elicited from my speech. A moment's reflection will show the vast difference between the position of Germany, with which I was dealing, and that of England to-day. While Germany, owing to her rapidly expanding population and vast economic development, is impelled to look for means of expansion in a world which is already for the most part parcelled out, we, on the other hand, do not require or seek another square mile of dominion. Our object must be to develop the resources of our Empire, commercially, industrially, and socially. But in order to be able to do so we must be in a position to defend ourselves successfully against aggression, and so to remove the temptation which a wealthy but ill-defended Empire must always offer to a strong and virile people, proud of its achievements and conscious of its fitness to fill a greater place amid the nations. My whole speech was directed, therefore--as are all my efforts--to impressing upon my fellow-countrymen the terrible danger which is involved in the present situation, in which we alone find ourselves, as a nation, untrained, unorganized, and unarmed, amid a Europe in which every people, not only great Powers like Russia, Germany, and France, but the smaller States--Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark--stand as armed nations, providing a balance of forces which, while it strengthens each one of them physically and industrially, makes for peace with honour--or for the triumph of the right. Yours very truly, ROBERTS, F.M. PART II THE TERRITORIAL FORCE INTRODUCTORY NOTE. The controversies raised by my Manchester speech prove that there is still much misapprehension, not always involuntary, in regard to the position of the National Service League towards the Territorial Force. I therefore insert in this place a statement of that position which I made in a speech delivered in the Mansion House in July last. As an introduction to that speech I may be permitted to quote from a statement which, as President of the League, I published in the _Times_ in January, 1912: "It is not infrequently asserted that the League is hostile to the Territorials, that we have discouraged recruiting for them, and that, were our programme adopted, the Territorial Force would disappear. Nothing is further from the truth. From the date of its formation we have constantly praised the Territorial Force as an organization; we have again and again borne willing witness to the patriotism of those who joined its ranks. Thus in 1908, Lord Milner, speaking at the annual dinner of the League on June 24, said: "Let us hold up high the standard of efficiency for the Territorial army as we have got it, and let us back up those who have originated that army and who are trying to make the best of it; let us back them up in all their efforts to make it as like a real army in training and in equipment as it is possible to make it. That, I believe, is the proper course for us to pursue." In our official statement issued in February, 1909, these words occur: "The National Service League has consistently given the warmest support to the Territorial Force from its inception, recognizing the great superiority in organization and capabilities that this Force provides as compared with the old Volunteer Force." And, during the past year (1911), in his volume, "Fallacies and Facts," the President of the League, whilst criticizing Lord Haldane's and Sir Ian Hamilton's deductions, allots the highest praise to the public spirit alike of employers and employees who support the Territorial movement. In addition to this, our members have actively helped the Territorial Force by working on the County Associations and by obtaining recruits. We are represented on the majority of the County Associations, and nearly one-fourth of the members of these Associations are also members of the National Service League. Again, many of our members are enrolled in the Territorials, and Lord Haldane himself, speaking at the headquarters of the 6th City of London Rifles on December 1, 1911, said there were numbers of the National Service League who had assisted in the work of recruiting for the Territorial Force, and he "took this opportunity of thanking them." Moreover, it is to be observed that the whole programme of the National Service League is now based on the maintenance and expansion of the Territorial Force. Our programme, far from involving the disappearance of that Force, or of any part of that Force, accepts it in its entirety. All that it does is to change the system of recruiting, and thus enable the training to be given before and not after war breaks out. Were the League's proposals adopted, not a single unit of the Territorial Force would be reduced, nor a man called upon to leave its ranks. The whole organization and personnel would be preserved, and their services would be invaluable in bridging the difficult period of transition from the old system to the new. The Territorial Force would be increased to an adequate strength, made efficient as a military machine, and would rest on the firm basis of universal military training of the manhood of the nation, instead of--as at present--on insufficient service given with difficulty by a patriotic minority. The above, we trust, will be sufficient to dispose of the idea that there is, or ever has been, any antagonism on the part of the League towards the Territorial Force as a body. We contend that all able-bodied men should be trained in it. But, whilst we have from the beginning praised the organization of this Force, whilst we have admired the patriotism and self-sacrifice of those who have joined it, and encouraged our members to support it, we do not conceal our opinion that, resting as it does on voluntary enlistment alone, it can never become a Force on which the country can rely for its protection in time of peril. Every year that passes emphasizes the correctness of this view. The Territorial Force is in the fourth year of its existence, and, despite the large measure of support given to it and the unwearied labour of one of the ablest War Ministers we have ever had, what is its condition? Its strength in round numbers should be 314,000. It is 264,000. All its members should do fifteen days' drill in camp every year. Only 155,300 have done so this year. It should have 11,300 Territorial Officers. It has only 9,500. Finally, 40 officers and 6,703 men were absent from camp this year without leave. We ask any open-minded man whether a Force thus constituted is an army at all, much less an army to which this country can entrust its existence as a great Nation? We do not bring these facts forward in order to discredit Lord Haldane's courageous efforts or to depreciate the patriotism of those now serving in the Force. We bring them forward simply in order to demonstrate the impossibility of constructing a defensive Army equal to this country's needs on a basis of voluntary enlistment. If Lord Haldane, backed by the hearty support of King and country, has failed--and by his own admission he has failed--who is likely to succeed? Not many weeks ago this country was on the verge of a gigantic war. And it was a war which, if it had come, would have come unexpectedly and suddenly. What would have been our position? All the soothing fallacies which pass current in time of peace--the belief that our Expeditionary Force can at the same time be sent abroad and yet kept at home to cover the training of the Territorial Force; the belief that this Force is sure of six months' unmolested leisure in which it can fit itself for the serious business of war--would have been shattered in twelve hours. The Expeditionary Force--to be of any use at all--must have been despatched abroad without a day's delay; and, for the defence of these islands, we should have had to rely upon a handful of Regulars left behind in the depots as "unfit"; such of the Special Reserve as may not be required for the Expeditionary Force, and the National Reserve; but mainly upon a Territorial Force,[1] nominally 264,000 strong, untrained for war, and further weakened by a shortage of 1,800 officers! Now, making every allowance for the immense resisting power which in moments of supreme peril nations and cities have occasionally derived from enthusiasm or despair, is it either fitting, we ask, or even prudent, that, in the twentieth century, Great Britain should repose her trust in so problematical and hazardous a presumption? For the transformation of the most heroic enthusiasm into an effective weapon of war demands time, exactly as the transformation of the Territorials into an efficient Army demands time. But when war comes it will come with great suddenness; the essential crisis will be on us in an instant, and for Great Britain--as Lord Salisbury in his latest utterances significantly warned us--the stake is not to be reckoned in millions of a war indemnity; the stake is our very existence as an Empire. When Lord Haldane cites the exploits of untrained or semi-trained forces, when he speaks of "a whole nation springing to arms at the call of duty," he has his eyes fastened upon other circumstances and upon other times than ours. Under the conditions of modern war, discipline alone can confront discipline on a field of battle. "We appeal to our countrymen to join us in our effort," I went on to say. "We appeal, above all, to the officers and men of the existing Territorial Force. We are working to insure that their sacrifice to patriotism should not be made futile, nor their devotion thrown away. We are working to make the Army to which they belong a reality--that is to say, a Home Army efficient and sufficient; an Army which shall always be ready to take up the defence of these islands, and leave our Regulars free and our Fleets free to fight our battles elsewhere. We ask them to assist us in our efforts to introduce a system of compulsory training, the only system under which the safety of the country can be secured and the Territorial Force made really effective." [1] On June 17, 1908, Lord (then Mr.) Haldane said: "In the event of a great war breaking out ... the Territorials would be embodied, not for immediate fighting, if it could be avoided, but for their war training." THE TERRITORIAL FORCE LORD HALDANE'S SCHEME EXAMINED _Speech delivered in the Mansion House, July_ 22, 1912. MY LORD MAYOR, MY LORDS, AND GENTLEMEN, It is seven years, almost to the day, since I had the honour of addressing a meeting of City men in this historic House on the subject of Imperial Defence. On that occasion I prefaced my remarks by saying: "I have but one object in coming before you to-day, namely, to bring home to my fellow-countrymen the vital necessity of their taking into their earnest consideration our unpreparedness for war." I then affirmed that the armed forces of this country were as absolutely unfitted and unprepared for war as they were in 1899-1900. And, my Lords and gentlemen, I grieve to have this afternoon to repeat to you that we are now scarcely better fitted or better prepared to carry on a war to-day than in 1905. The experience that we gained in the Boer War has had little effect upon our general military policy. We have neglected, except as regards the Regular Army, to profit by the lessons which that war ought to have taught us. What are the causes of this indifference and this deep-seated apathy? The causes, I think, are not far to seek. In the first place, if you will permit me as a soldier to speak with the frankness of a soldier, it is one of the most dangerous tendencies of a nation, especially a democratic and self-confident nation, devoted to commerce and industry as we are, to ignore so disturbing and apparently so remote a contingency as our being forced into war. But there is another more immediate and a more particular cause, and it is to this that I mainly wish to direct your attention this afternoon. Those who are responsible for our defences--and I must include in this category the late Minister for War--are, I maintain, either so blind to the lessons of history, or so enamoured of their own schemes, that they have deliberately lulled the nation into the belief that our present system is adequate, and that we are amply prepared to meet any dangers which come within the sphere of consideration by practical men. Thus the very men who ought to declare the facts in the plainest terms to the nation, the very men who ought to be endeavouring to rouse the nation from its fatal apathy, are the men who are fostering that spirit of indifference and self-confidence to which the nation of itself is already too prone. A democracy like ours will never take the necessary measures to safeguard itself so long as Ministers and a partisan Press proclaim that we are as a nation perfectly safe, when, as a matter of fact, our position is precarious in the extreme. This is a serious statement; but, if you will have patience with me, I hope to convince you that it is well founded, and it can be demonstrated from the principles of Imperial Defence which Lord Haldane has so frequently, and, it must be admitted, so plausibly, urged upon us. My Lords and gentlemen, I have on many occasions paid a tribute to Lord Haldane's services. He has placed the problems of National Defence upon what is, for a British Minister, a new and comprehensive basis; and he will go down to posterity as the first British statesman who, in theory, embodied in an actual scheme the idea of a National Army, "A Nation in Arms." This conception is so important to my whole subject this afternoon that it is worth while to recall some of Lord Haldane's expressed ideas with regard to it. Speaking at Newcastle-on-Tyne in September, 1906, Lord Haldane said that we must have a highly trained nucleus in time of peace, and must look for a great expansion in time of war, "and for that expansion we must go to the nation, and ask for the co-operation of the nation," adding: "A nation in arms is the only safeguard for the public interests," and that "this idea has been neglected in our military contemplation. The problem," he went on to say, "is not a problem of the Regular Forces nearly so much as the problem of the nation in arms, of the people as a whole, with all the forces of the country welded into one." Such an expression of opinion by the newly-created Secretary of State for War was to many of us an augury of great hope. It seemed that at last Great Britain might have an army adapted to modern conditions of war; that we had at last a Minister who not only understood, but had enunciated in a clear and masterly manner our own conception of a Nation in Arms. From that time forward, we imagined, the Nation in Arms would be regarded as a vigorous trunk from which the Regular Army and the personnel of the Navy would spring forth as branches, drawing their sap and the vigour of their life from the qualities--mental, moral, and physical--of the nation itself. For that, and no other, is the real meaning of the phrase "A Nation in Arms." Such, my Lords and gentlemen, was Lord Haldane's language in September, 1906--less than six years ago. Might it not be imagined that he was speaking as President of the National Service League, addressing a meeting such as I am addressing to-day? Nor can it be denied that, in his subsequent description of the functions to be fulfilled by the Forces which he has substituted for the Volunteers, Lord Haldane has correctly kept in view the relationship which ought to exist between the branches and the trunk, between the Navy and the Regular nucleus on the one hand, and the "National Army lying behind" them on the other. In his Memorandum on the Army Estimates for 1908-09, when the Territorial Force was created, Lord Haldane said that it was "designed-- "1. To compel any hostile Power which may attempt invasion to send a force so large that its transports could not evade our own fleets and flotillas. "2. To free the Regular Army from the necessity of remaining in these islands to fulfil the functions of Home Defence. "3. And," he said, "a further result will be to permit greater freedom to the Navy." Elsewhere Lord Haldane protested that the "essence of the duty of the Territorial Force is to protect us against invasion"; and he pointed out that the Territorial Force might have to be entrusted with the defence of these shores after the whole of the Regular Army had left the country. You will see, my Lords and gentlemen, that an efficient Territorial Force is thus made the fundamental condition of the effectiveness of our whole defensive system, and the question immediately arises, Can the Territorial Force perform the functions assigned to it? If it cannot perform those functions, the whole defensive system, of which it is the central pillar, must fall to the ground. What, then, is this system? It consists, for an Empire such as ours, of three parts-- 1. A supreme Navy, the standard for which has been laid down by the present Government as that of a 60 per cent. superiority over the next strongest Navy. 2. A Regular Army, to act as a garrison and police force to our Empire in time of peace, and as a striking force in time of war. 3. A Home Army of such a character as regards numbers and training as would enable it to free the Navy and the Regular Army from the primary duties of Home Defence by providing direct security against an attempted invasion of these shores, and at the same time to form a potential reserve which could supply by voluntary effort in a national emergency powers of expansion to the Regular Army when fighting for the very existence of our Empire abroad. Does our Territorial Force, as it stands to-day, provide us with a Home Army of this character? I have no hesitation in answering this question in the negative. The Territorial Force is not and, under the conditions of voluntary service, never can be fit to perform the functions allotted to it by Lord Haldane himself. My Lords and gentlemen, three conditions must be fulfilled in order that an Army may be efficient. These conditions are-- 1. Sound organization. 2. Sufficient numbers. 3. Adequate training. To the soundness of the organization established by Lord Haldane I have frequently testified. He wisely followed the advice given by the Royal Commission on the Auxiliary Forces, and there is, therefore, as regards organization, nothing to criticize. With regard to numbers, I have reminded you that, when the scheme was first put forward, Lord Haldane talked of a "Nation in Arms," and the figures he gave--"seven, or eight, or nine hundred thousand"--showed that he contemplated the training of a Home Army of a strength which would correspond in a measure to that phrase. At that time, too, he declared his intention of including in his scheme a comprehensive plan for the training of boys in Cadet Corps, which would have contributed materially to broaden the basis of the Home Army, and might have shortened the period of training for those who joined the Territorial Force, had that period in itself been adequate. But this most useful proposal he dropped at the outset at the bidding of a small section of his political supporters. And, my Lords and gentlemen, in actual numbers what do we possess? The establishment of the Territorial Army is 315,000. On April 1, 1912, the numbers obtained (a large proportion being mere boys) were 278,955--that is to say, four years after the scheme was started the force is about 25,000 short of the establishment laid down, but more than 400,000 short of the smallest number that Lord Haldane originally hoped for. Can it be pretended for a moment that such a number provides the Home Army which Mr. Asquith described as necessary, if we are to be able to guard against a successful invasion of even 70,000 men? I say nothing at this point of the danger of believing that no force larger than 70,000 may have to be dealt with; but I must point out that, in order to deal with an invasion of even 70,000 highly-trained soldiers, a field force of at least 300,000 partially-trained men are required, in addition to some 200,000 men needed for the protection of the naval bases and arsenals, and to garrison the principal places in Great Britain and Ireland. It is important that you should realize the facts: that the number asked for was quite inadequate; that even that number has not been obtained, and that the age and physique of a considerable proportion of those who have come forward are not up to a satisfactory standard; for Lord Haldane has been concentrating all his efforts and the attention of the public on securing, at almost any cost, the number of men for the Territorial Force--that is, the total of 315,000 men, to which his ideal of a Nation in Arms has shrunk. But even in this he has failed. These frantic efforts to secure a nominal success are designed to distract attention from the far more serious question of the training of the Territorial Force, and to create the impression that the scheme is a masterpiece which is beyond criticism, and which has, once for all, made it quite unnecessary to discuss the question of compulsory service for the Home Army. So much for organization and numbers; now for the third condition--namely, the _training_ of the Territorial Force. In discussing this question I must try to avoid misinterpretation by saying that, in stating plain facts, I am not criticizing the officers or men of that Force. On the contrary, I honour them for their patriotism, and for the admirable example they are setting to their apathetic fellow-countrymen. It is the voluntary system that I condemn, and the politicians who are hoodwinking this nation into the belief that that system is adequate and sufficient for our needs. And surely I need not apologize for examining the standard of training laid down for the Territorial Force. Lord Haldane himself, in 1906, declared, "It is preparedness for war which is the key to the sort of organization we ought to have in peace"; and on another occasion he said, "The contemplation of large numbers by the people of this country, who are unable to take into account questions of war efficiency and war organization, necessarily promotes dangerous national illusions." It is against such "dangerous national illusions" that I wish to warn my fellow-countrymen in the following analysis of the training of the Territorial Force. The Territorial soldier can be enlisted at seventeen years of age, and the engagement is for four years. In the first year he must do a minimum of forty drills of an hour each, and a minimum of eight days or a maximum of fifteen days, in camp. In the next year he must do ten drills of an hour each, and the same camp training. The musketry standard can hardly be described as high, seeing that each man is only provided by the State with 90 rounds per annum, and in some cases this number is disposed of on an enclosed range on one day in the year. This is simply ludicrous, considering that, in modern war and with the modern rifle, the soldier who cannot use this weapon with skill and confidence is absolutely useless.[1] Such is the minimum peace training laid down for the Territorial Force. It is less than the minimum training in any army or Militia in the world. I am aware that many officers and men do a great deal more as individuals. But what is far more important--and I ask you, my Lords and gentlemen, most earnestly to realize the fact--a large number do not reach even this minimum amount of training. The proposal to give six months' training after war breaks out is so amazing as to be unworthy of consideration, and it is difficult to believe that it was made seriously by its talented author, seeing that readiness for war is the purpose aimed at by every European nation; and now-a-days, when war breaks out with the greatest suddenness, and the stake at issue between two great nations going to war would be so gigantic, the temptation to secure the advantage of the initiative and to commence hostilities without declaration of war could hardly be resisted.[2] But it may be urged that, although the Territorial Force is evidently not fit to perform its functions without a proper course of recruit training, surely it would be possible to secure that training in time of peace, instead of postponing it until the outbreak of war, as Lord Haldane proposed. If the nation still hugs this delusion, I hope it will abandon it before it drags us down to disaster. For one hundred years the voluntary system for Home Defence has been tried and found wanting. Under it a sufficient number of men have never been forthcoming, and can never be forthcoming, to devote enough time in peace to render the Army fit for war. Discipline cannot be acquired by homeopathic doses; nothing but a considerable period of continuous training can give individual soldiers and military units that self-confidence and cohesion which are essential to success in war; and no modification of the voluntary system, no amount of lavish expenditure, no cajolery, no juggling with figures, will ever produce an adequate and efficient Home Army. This truth was clearly expressed by the Duke of Norfolk when he said, with reference to the Report of the Royal Commission on the Auxiliary Forces, of which he was the President: "The breakdown is in almost every case attributed essentially to the nature of the voluntary system itself, which makes it impossible to demand a reasonable standard of efficiency without greatly reducing the forces." Curiously enough, Lord Haldane, speaking of the Territorial Force, seems to have recognized the correctness of this conclusion, for in the House of Commons on March 9, 1908, he said: "Because it is a voluntary Army on a voluntary basis, you can only give it just so much training as volunteers are able and willing to take...." Can anything be more condemnatory of the value of a Force, which will assuredly be required the moment war breaks out? And to quote the Duke of Norfolk again: "If you trust the present organization ... you will be leaning on a prop which will fail when the day of trial comes." What would be the result is simply this--for six months the striking force could not strike. The Regular Army could not leave these shores to assist our fellow-countrymen in India and the oversea Dominions, or to reinforce our friends and allies in accordance with the obligations of honour and mutual interest which we have undertaken. For six months the Navy would be hampered and shackled in performing its traditional duties of seeking out the enemy's fleets--it would, in fact, be deprived of that "greater freedom" which the Territorial Force was intended to give it. But, my Lords and gentlemen, we have not had to wait for war to see the effects of this pernicious policy; its evil effects are already upon us, though nominally we are at peace with all the world. Year by year, during the past decade, the ocean area over which the British flag floats has been steadily narrowed, and within the past three months, the most presageful, the most ominous narrowing of all, has taken place. We have abandoned the Mediterranean Sea. But yesterday that great sea was like a British lake; to-day not a single British battleship disturbs the blue of its waters. Could any more significant, more startling warning ever be given to a Government not wilfully deaf, or to a nation not wedded to luxury and self-indulgence, indifferent alike to its past glories and its present security? What better exemplification could be imagined of the truth of Mahan's axiom that "a fleet charged with the care of its base is a fleet so far weakened for effective action"? And what does this whole process of the withdrawal of the British flag from one sea after another and its concentration in home waters indicate? It indicates just this, that while "the British Navy a hundred years ago was superior to the combined navies of all Europe," it is to-day little more than equal to the next largest European Navy, and is quite inadequate in proportion to the interests it has to guard. This revolution in our relative strength at sea is mainly owing to the want of foresight on the part of successive Lords of the Admiralty, and it is incidentally an additional condemnation of our retention of the old voluntary system of our land defence. While we are standing still, Germany is moving, and we have this year the announcement of a new and larger programme, a programme which goes much beyond the Navy Law of 1900, and will, when completed, give Germany--the greatest military Power in the world--a group of battle fleets in the North Sea calculated to make us consider whether even our concentrated naval strength will be sufficient to cope with them. My Lords and gentlemen, in mentioning Germany in this connection I want to make it perfectly clear that I do so in no spirit of hostility, with no wish to stir up any feeling of resentment or enmity against a great people bent upon working out their own salvation. I have not the slightest sympathy with the Press controversies carried on in both countries, which have done so much to embitter the feeling between what are really two branches of the same race. What I desire to point out to my fellow-countrymen is simply this: Great Britain has attained to the limits of her territorial expansion. She neither requires nor seeks another square mile of dominion. Her object should be to develop the resources of her people commercially, industrially, and socially, and to maintain the traditions of religious and political freedom which have been the main cause of her greatness. At the same time there is Germany, a great homogeneous State, with a population of 66,000,000, which is consciously aiming at becoming a world-Power with "a place in the sun," where its vigorous progeny may develop a German life, actuated by German thought and ideals. This nation has already built up, in an incredibly short space of time, the second Navy in the world, not, moreover, scattered over the seven seas, but concentrated like a clenched mailed fist in the waters of the German Ocean. Who is there with any knowledge of the history of nations, or of the trend of European politics, but must see in these plain facts a danger of collision, no one can say when, but within a limit of time indicated by the convergence of the lines of destiny of the two peoples, and which at any moment may be accelerated by some misunderstanding or some conflict with the friend or ally of either country. To one whose sole desire is to see his country safe and at peace, pursuing the path of her destiny to even greater heights than she has as yet reached, it is simply amazing that anyone can imagine that the conflict of which I have spoken can be permanently averted merely by denying that there is any danger, or by abandoning our preparations for defence as an amiable invitation to Germany to do the same. Germany--indeed the whole world--is well aware of the real feebleness underlying the proud appearance of our naval and military strength. She knows that the efficacy of armaments to-day, even more than a hundred years ago, depends essentially upon their being founded upon the nation itself, and drawing their strength of mind and muscle, of courage and inspiration, from the very heart of the whole nation. Such armaments can be attained by one means only--the training of all the able-bodied men of the State. This alone will give a basis, solid as a rock, to all machinery of war; this alone will enable the nation to bring to bear, in support of the national will, the whole might of the nation's power. But, my Lords and gentlemen, our statesmen still assert that the country will never stand compulsory training. Is that so certain? I am persuaded it is by no means certain. On the other hand, it is certain that so long as our fellow-countrymen are soothed and flattered by their leaders into believing that the Territorial Force, as at present constituted, gives all the backing that is necessary to the Navy and Regular Army, they can see no need to consider compulsory training, and are not to be blamed for their belief. But if our leaders would have the honesty and courage to tell the people the truth--the truth being that we are on the eve of a great crisis--a crisis without parallel certainly during the past hundred years, and that our national forces are unfit to meet the strain that may be put upon us with any assurance of success--then I feel confident that the present generation of Britishers would willingly adopt the first necessary reform, the substitution of universal training--compulsory upon all, high and low, rich and poor, from the son of a duke to the son of a labourer--as the foundation of our Territorial Force, instead of the present foolish and unfair method of basing it on a voluntary enlistment. The real difficulty is to move our leaders to take the people into their confidence and tell them the truth about this vital matter. My Lords and gentlemen, when I consider the certainty of the struggle in front of us, its probable nearness, and the momentous issues at stake, I am astounded that the nation should be kept in the dark as to the dangers we have to cope with, and for which we most certainly are not prepared. But if our political leaders will take no part in putting our true position before the people, all the more necessary is it for those who love their country, and who have great commercial interests at stake, to help us in our efforts to prevent Great Britain falling from her high estate, and to preserve for her the blessings of peace. With all the strength and earnestness I possess, I want to impress upon you, gentlemen of this great city, that this aim cannot be fulfilled unless we are to have a Navy strong enough to insure our supremacy at sea, and an Army strong enough to prevent invasion, and free the Navy from the necessity of being tied to these shores. [1] In the course of the controversies raised by my Manchester speech the fallacy of the superiority of the volunteer to "the unwilling conscript" has once more reappeared. I must here repeat what I said in the House of Lords in April, 1911, that much of this talk about "one volunteer being worth two pressed men" is nonsensical. The truth is that one man, whether pressed or not, if well disciplined and carefully trained, is worth at least half a dozen undisciplined, insufficiently trained volunteers. No doubt, if I had to lead a forlorn hope requiring men determined to carry out the job, no matter what the odds against them might be, I would rather have half the number of men who volunteered than double the number ordered to perform it, provided all were equally well trained; but if it were a question of soldiers versus untrained volunteers, I would infinitely prefer to have ten well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers than fifty ill-trained and ill-disciplined volunteers. I could give many instances from history in support of this view--the opinions of great commanders like Washington and Napoleon--but I will here cite only one incident from my own experience of war: During the Franco-German War of 1870-71, the French, from having an army without any means of expansion, were forced, after the first few weeks, to employ hastily-raised levies. These levies, even in greatly superior numbers, were no match for the highly-trained German soldiers. On one occasion towards the end of the war, 35,000 German soldiers found themselves engaged with a force of these recently-raised levies, numbering between 140,000 and 150,000. They had been given such training as was possible while war was going on, for four and a half months. They were brave men fighting for their own country, and in their own country, and what happened? Within a month 60,000 of them were killed, wounded, prisoners, or missing, while the remaining 80,000 were driven over the Swiss frontier and there interned. [2] And as regards the much-needed six months' training, supposing, for argument's sake, that we could calculate on being given six months' warning, can we feel absolutely certain that the few patriotic employers who have allowed their men to join the Territorial Army, and are good enough to spare them for a week's or fortnight's training yearly, would or could consent to their being taken away for six months, during which time their business would go to pieces, while their competitors in trade, who have refused to allow their men to serve their country, would be reaping great benefit from their selfishness and want of patriotism? PART III THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE AND THE WORKING CLASSES INTRODUCTORY NOTE. I here insert a letter on the political situation, which I wrote to the _Times_ a year ago. This letter, I hope, will serve to show that the National Service League has at least considered the effects which National Service in Arms would have upon the working men of this country. The assertion advanced by Mr. Blatchford in criticizing my Manchester speech, that the working men of Great Britain will never hear of compulsory service because they distrust the ruling classes, rests upon a misconception of the English Constitution almost too obvious to require exposure. This subject has already been dealt with in Part III. of "Fallacies and Facts" (pp. 208-217), and to that work I must refer the reader. I shall only observe in this place that in a democratic nation the working classes are themselves the ruling classes, and that the interests of England and of the Empire are their interests. Does Mr. Blatchford really imagine that the working men are so blind that, rather than defend those interests like men, they will prefer tamely to hand them over to Germany or to any other foreign Power? For this, and this only, is the logical consequence of his assertion, that he and his fellow-workers prefer invasion to universal compulsory service. In former times, when the ruling classes of this nation consisted in very deed of the men of birth and property, that class considered it as its sacred right and inalienable privilege to serve the nation in war. Now, in the twentieth century, when the working men of this country have by the gradual extension of the franchise succeeded to the political influence and supremacy of the old aristocratic class, is it too much to hope that, as their condition of life improves, they will seek in the same spirit to secure that right and that inalienable privilege--service in war? For such service is the only mark of the true and perfect citizenship. Surely that were a greater path and to a nobler goal than the path and the goal prescribed to the workers of this nation by the criticism in the _Clarion_, to which I have just referred. NATIONAL SERVICE AND SOCIAL REFORM. TO THE EDITOR OF THE "TIMES." SIR, The notification in the _Times_ that Lord Selborne will shortly address a meeting in London on Imperial unity has caused me to reflect very seriously on what Imperial unity means to us, and on the disastrous effects that must follow any diminution on the part of the oversea Dominions in the splendid feeling of loyalty to the Mother Country of which we have quite recently had such a convincing example. Personally, I have had sufficient proof of the strength and practical value of that loyalty to make me feel that we should do all in our power to strengthen and foster it; and to this end, and in order that we may retain undiminished the confidence of our distant fellow-subjects, we must begin to put our own house in order, and show the peoples of the oversea Dominions that we are determined to grapple with the several problems with which we are confronted and with which they are immediately concerned--that our Government, for instance, is established on a firm and constitutional basis; that our fiscal policy is sound; and that our Navy and Army are strong enough to defend our own interests, and to give the Dominions such help as they may require in time of trouble. Yet, what is the present condition of affairs in this country? We have just passed under the domination of a Single Chamber. Tariff Reform, which occupies the chief place in the Unionist programme, is supported only in a half-hearted manner by the leaders of the party, and is opposed by some of its most powerful members. Our Navy is being rapidly approached by other navies in the number, speed, and power of their warships. Our Army is quite unfitted to meet the demands that may at any moment be made upon it. How and by whom is this all to be changed? It can hardly be changed by the party now in power. That party has declared openly enough its policy, alike in regard to a Second Chamber, to Tariff Reform, to the Army and Navy, and therefore also in regard to our position as a first-rate European Power. The men to whom, on account of their high public character and culture, the nation looked for a steadying influence on the ultra-Radical and Socialistic sections of the party, have not fulfilled those expectations, and seem prepared to make any concessions that their most advanced supporters may demand. On the other hand, is the Unionist party in a condition to bring about the changes that are absolutely necessary before we can take up the question of Imperial unity in any practical manner? Has that party placed before the country a definite policy upon those primary and all-important problems to which I have referred? Is it doing anything to make clearer to the people of this country what these mean to them? Or is it endeavouring to deal with them in a business-like way? I confess I can detect no indications of such a policy, and am not surprised, therefore, that a large number of the most earnest and most thoughtful Unionists have become disheartened and discontented. It seems to me that the only way the desired end can be attained is for the prominent members of the Unionist party at once to place before the country a constructive policy; above all, as to the two problems that are the most pressing and the most vital--Social Reform and National Defence. These two problems are intimately connected, and a satisfactory solution of them must precede any real strengthening of Imperial bonds. The question of Social Reform has been very fully discussed in the public papers during the last few months, and one of the writers on this subject has happily explained it as meaning "securing for the slum-dwellers good air, good housing, good food, good clothes, and good education." The conditions amid which millions of our people are living appear to me to make it natural that they should not care a straw under what rule they may be called upon to dwell, and I can quite understand their want of patriotic feeling. Again, by Social Reform I mean a reform which includes essential changes in our primary schools. No other civilized nation leaves its young boys and girls to shift for themselves, as we leave ours when they are thirteen or fourteen years of age. Nor is the education they receive an education calculated to make them lovers of their country. They are never told anything of its history, or taught to be proud of their country and its past. They are not given any idea of what their duty is to their country or what they owe to it. In some schools, indeed, it is even forbidden to hoist the Union Jack. Much of the teaching has no bearing upon actual life, and it comes to an end at the very age at which boys are most receptive of tuition, be it good or evil, and most require to be under some kind of control. Our oversea Dominions are wiser in this respect than we are. By means of Cadet Corps the boys are looked after until they reach the age of manhood, and the ground is thus prepared for the formation of a reliable Citizen Army. The same excellent results are obtained to some small extent in this country by training-ships, homes such as the Gordon Boys' Home, schools like the Duke of York's and the Royal Hibernian Military Schools, and societies like the Church Lads' and Boys' Brigades. Why are the failures in after-life amongst the lads brought up in these institutions so remarkably few? It is simply owing to the habits of order, obedience, and discipline they have been taught in their youth. And the Scout movement has already produced remarkable results. But such organizations are too limited in scope and too few in number, and, with the exception of the two Royal schools, they depend almost entirely upon private enterprise, and to a serious Government or a serious nation they are only signposts to the true policy. They should be an integral part of our national education. Social Reform is a preliminary to any thorough system of national defence. "My country right or wrong; and right or wrong my country!" is the sentiment most treasured in the breast of anyone worthy of the name of man. Nevertheless, with how much more confidence should we be able to appeal to the young men of this nation and the Empire to do their duty as citizen soldiers if we had the certainty that they regarded England, not as a harsh stepmother, but as a true motherland, sedulously nurturing its youth, and not indifferent to their welfare in manhood or in age, and if we could further appeal to them to defend the nation and the Empire, because within its bounds they can live nobler and fuller lives than on any other spot on earth! Yet recent unimpeachable evidence makes it clear that, to tens of thousands of Englishmen engaged in daily toil, the call to "sacrifice" themselves for their country must seem an insult to their reason; for those conditions amid which they live make their lives already an unending sacrifice. Will the Unionist party realize the gravity of this state of affairs? The Liberal party, by the Act for Payment of Members, has fulfilled to the letter the trust committed to it by the rising democracies of the 'forties. That Act, the last of the five points of the Charter, ends an epoch of which I can remember the beginnings more than sixty years ago. But the Radical-Liberal party has no longer a policy of construction; it seems only to have given the democracy enfranchisement in order to lead it to the disintegration of a time-honoured Constitution and the gradual dismemberment of a great Empire. Is it too late to hope that the Unionist party will come forward to lead the millions that wait for a leader? No party can long continue in power which relies for its prestige solely upon fomenting class hatreds--that is, by dividing the State against itself. But before a great national sacrifice to patriotism can fitly be demanded, a great act of national justice must be performed. The Unionist party missed its opportunity with respect to granting old-age pensions on a contributory basis. Now in 1911 it is confronted by larger issues; by problems affecting the industrial life of the entire nation, and touching, so to speak, the very fountain-head of the Empire's life. Is it too late? I am, Sir, your obedient servant, ROBERTS, F.M. PART IV ADDRESS AT THE ANNUAL DINNER OF THE KENTISH MEN AND MEN OF KENT INTRODUCTORY NOTE. Whilst seeing the present little book through the press an opportunity unexpectedly offered itself to me of speaking to some officers of the existing Territorial Force in regard to the dilemma in which they are placed between their duty as patriotic citizens and their growing conviction of the inadequacy of the Territorial Force to perform the task imposed upon it in the event of war. I therefore subjoin the address which, on the invitation of the officers themselves, I delivered at the annual dinner of the Kentish Men and the Men of Kent, on November 27, 1912. In that address I was able to state more fully than at Manchester my reasons for criticizing the Territorial Force with regard to discipline, numbers, equipment, and energy. ADDRESS AT THE ANNUAL DINNER OF THE KENT TERRITORIAL ASSOCIATION, LONDON NOVEMBER 27, 1912. GENTLEMEN, Words fail me when I try to tell you what a great pleasure it was to me to be able to accept the invitation of the Kentish Men and the Men of Kent to their annual dinner. I was more than gratified by their invitation, for I felt that I should not have been asked to be their guest had they interpreted my comments on the Territorial Force in my Manchester speech in the way some people have done, as an attack upon the members of the Force. Indeed, I am profoundly grateful for this opportunity having been given to me to explain my views about the Force more fully than it was possible for me to do at Manchester. Well, gentlemen, if I am right in feeling that you acquit me of any desire to disparage the officers and men who compose the Territorial Force, and that you will believe me when I repeat, what I have often said before, that I am second to none in my admiration of the patriotism and self-sacrifice displayed by them in their endeavour to make Lord Haldane's scheme a success--you will not, I am sure, misunderstand me if I now express my views quite frankly to you. At the Manchester meeting I gave it as my opinion that the Territorial Force is a _failure in discipline_, a _failure in numbers_, a _failure in equipment_, and a _failure in energy_. Let me say a few words on each of these supremely important points. _Failure in Discipline_.--Gentlemen, only those who have taken part in war, or have carefully studied the history of wars, can, I am persuaded, realize to its full extent the significance of discipline as applied to war. They alone can know that it is by discipline, and discipline alone, that bodies of men can be relied upon to work together in times of great difficulty and danger, and to withstand the disintegrating effect of war; for they have learnt that it is discipline alone which prevents panic seizing upon men when unforeseen circumstances arise. They alone know that amongst untrained or ill-trained troops panic spreads with lightning rapidity, and that when there is no sense of discipline to be appealed to and to keep the men together, defeat is the inevitable result. It is discipline alone which gives the soldier confidence in himself, reliance on his comrades, and belief in his officers. It is discipline alone which gives him the courage to face vastly superior numbers; to continue marching, though worn out with fatigue and want of food, ready to fight again, and yet again. It is discipline alone that supports him under the strain of lying still for successive hours in the punishing fire zone--one of the most trying of the many exacting conditions of modern warfare. It is discipline alone which makes the soldier obey the word of command, even under such circumstances as I have described. Clear understanding of and prompt obedience to an order become an instinct to the properly trained soldier, whereas the imperfectly trained man, when he finds himself in an unfamiliar and trying position, frequently misunderstands the word of command, and, when matters become acute, he does not heed or even hear it. Gentlemen, when I tell you that discipline is the backbone of an army, I ask you whether it is possible for that essential quality to be instilled into the ranks of the Territorial Force with the amount of training that is given to them. _Failure in Numbers_.--Gentlemen, despite the untiring efforts of the Territorial Associations--a large proportion of whose members are staunch supporters of the National Service League--the Territorial Force is still far short of its established strength of 315,000 men. Possibly this is a blessing in disguise, for if men had come forward in sufficient numbers to bring the Force up to its establishment, politicians would have assured the country, even more fervently than they do now, that our Home Defence Army is in all respects what is needed. The truth is that the number 315,000 has no relation to our real requirements. It was fixed upon because the experience of fifty years had proved that a larger number could never be forthcoming under the voluntary system. As with the Regular Army, so with the Home Defence Army, the strength is governed by what is known to be the limit obtainable by voluntary effort. It has no relation to the requirements of war. It solves no known problem. Again, therefore, gentlemen, I ask you whether it is possible to regard the Territorial Force as fitted, in respect to numbers, for the defence of the United Kingdom. _Failure in Equipment_.--In common with the Regular Army the Territorial Force is armed with a rifle inferior to the rifle possessed by foreign nations, and with a less deadly bullet than is used by them. But the Territorial rifle is even inferior to the present Regular Army rifle in range, in trajectory, and in stopping power. Then the gun in use with the Territorial Artillery is a mere makeshift. It is distinctly inferior in power, range, and rapidity of fire to the gun of any first-rate State, and it is not too much to say that, if our Regular soldiers were armed as the Territorials are armed, they could not keep the field against the troops of any European nation. If this is so, how unfair, how disastrous, it would be to ask Territorial troops to undertake a task which their seasoned and disciplined comrades of the Regular Army could not face. Then as regards mobilization arrangements, supply and transport services, ammunition columns, trains, horses, vehicles, harness, even boots for the men--in none of these essentials are the Territorials, as a Force, complete. I therefore repeat that _failure in equipment_ is not an unfair statement. _Failure in Energy_.--By failure in energy, I do not for a moment mean to imply that individual members of the Territorial Force are wanting in energy. I know how earnestly many of them have striven to learn and to do their duty under adverse circumstances. My criticism applies to the Force itself--to its corporate energy--if I may use such an expression. And even those who are the firmest believers in the Force must, I think, admit that, under existing conditions, it is not practicable for it to attain that combined action, that alertness, that intensity and vitality, all of which are essential to success in war. But, gentlemen, in addition to the shortcomings of the Territorial Force which I have enumerated, there is one defect in its conception which would alone show its unfitness for what you all know is its primary duty--that is, to defend these shores from invasion. That defect lies in the strange condition which is an essential factor in this scheme--a condition unprecedented with any army in the world--namely, that the Force is to receive six months' training, after war has broken out, before it is even supposed to be capable of dealing with an invading army. Can any scheme for the defence of any nation be more madly conceived? We have been given an object lesson in the Near East as to the insanity of the idea that our Citizen Army will be given six months to prepare after war has been declared. On October 8 Montenegro declared war, and in four weeks the Turks were beaten in all directions and were making their last stand within a few miles of Constantinople. Gentlemen, I am told by my opponents that it is unpatriotic of me to express these opinions, and that by doing so I am discouraging the Territorial Force. But which is really the more unpatriotic course, to tell the truth about the Force, so that the people of this country may insist upon its terrible deficiencies being remedied, or to gloss over these deficiencies and thus to expose to certain disaster the few patriotic men who have joined it, and who are asked to be prepared with a Force untrained, under-officered, and under-manned to cope with a highly-trained enemy. I venture to think, gentlemen, that I am doing you no disservice in speaking plainly about the Territorial Force. My hope is that when its grave condition is no longer concealed from our countrymen, they will realize the folly of trusting the defence of these shores to a make-believe Army, that they will take to heart the false position in which the patriotic members of the Force are placed, and that they will insist upon a law being passed by which all able-bodied men must be prepared to take their place in the Citizen Army. The Territorial Force must either be made efficient in all respects, or it will speedily cease to be a Force even in name. I hope, gentlemen, you will understand that I am thinking and speaking of the Territorial Force as a Force that must be prepared to move and live, to march and fight as an army. I am not thinking of individual men, or companies, or batteries, or squadrons, but of a Force which, if it is ever called upon to take the field, will have to deal as a whole with highly-trained picked troops. What, then, gentlemen, is right for the Territorial officers to do? It seems to me that a tremendous responsibility rests upon those officers. If they agree with me that neither they themselves, nor the men they command, are sufficiently trained to take the field against first-class soldiers; if they agree with me that neither in discipline nor in numbers, neither in equipment nor in vital energy, can the Territorial Force be reckoned as a modern army; if they agree with me that no great improvement either in efficiency or numbers can ever be reached under the conditions necessarily imposed upon all citizens who enter a voluntary force; if they agree with me that the safety of these islands, and therefore of our Empire, is endangered by this state of affairs--then their course of action is clear. While still giving of their best to the Force to which they belong, while still setting the fine example which they have consistently done, they should make the Government and the nation distinctly understand that, in their opinion, they are unable to carry out the duties entrusted to them, and that unless they are given the trained assistance of the manhood of the country, they can never guarantee the safety of these islands and the integrity of the Empire. Such a warning, coming from such men, will awaken the country in a way that I can never hope to do. Such an announcement, coming from the men who alone in the country have obeyed the call of duty, and who, at the cost of convenience, time, and money, have tried to fit themselves for the defence of their country and the security of the Empire--such a summons, I say, will arouse the People, and they themselves will call upon the Government to enact a law which shall impose upon all citizens of a military age the noble duty of defending the country and the Empire to which they have the glory to belong. THE END BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD. 
46823	----	TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. More detail can be found at the end of the book. TEN YEARS IN INDIA, AND THREE YEARS IN SOUTH AFRICA, _IN THE_ CAPE CORPS LEVIES. TEN YEARS IN INDIA, IN THE 16TH QUEEN'S LANCERS. AND THREE YEARS IN SOUTH AFRICA, IN THE CAPE CORPS LEVIES. FIRST AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. THE MAHARATTA WAR. THE SHEIK WAR. INCLUDING BATTLES OF GHUZNEE, CABUL, MAHARAJPOOR, BUDDEWAL, ALIWAL, SOBRAON, AND KAFFIR WAR OF 1850-51. REPLETE WITH ANECDOTES--INCIDENTS INSEPARABLE FROM MILITARY LIFE--MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE SEVERAL INDIAN RACES, MAHOMEDANS, HINDOOS AND KAFFIR TRIBES--TALES OF ELEPHANT HUNTING, ETC., ETC. BY W. J. D. GOULD, _Formerly Sergt. 16th Queen's Lancers, "The Terror of India," afterwards Lieut. Cape European Levies._ Toronto: HUNTER, ROSE & COMPANY, WELLINGTON ST. MDCCCLXXX. [Illustration: (Publisher's colophone.)] ENTERED according to the Act of the Parliament in Canada, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty, by W. J. D. GOULD, in the Office of the Minister of Agriculture. TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE John Douglas Sutherland Campbell, K.T., K.C.M.G. MARQUIS OF LORNE, GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE DOMINION OF CANADA, &c., &c., &c. This Work is Dedicated BY THE AUTHOR, WHO, AS HE HAS PASSED THE MEREDIAN, AND IS NOW APPROACHING THE LIMIT OF HIS EARTHLY EXISTENCE, LOOKS BACK WITH FEELINGS OF PRIDE, ON THE HUMBLE PART HE TOOK, AS ONE OF THE OLD 16TH QUEEN'S LANCERS, IN ALL THE MEMORABLE ENGAGEMENTS IN WHICH THEY PARTICIPATED IN INDIA, AND NOT THE LEAST OF ALL DOES HE FEEL THE HONOUR CONFERRED IN THUS GRANTING LEAVE TO ISSUE THE WORK UNDER SUCH DISTINGUISHED PATRONAGE. TORONTO, Ontario, 1880. [Illustration: (Vignette)] PREFACE. The most pleasant memories of my boyhood are clustered around the old family fireplace, in our home in Brighton, England, when my father, gathering us all around him, with occasionally a few intimate friends, recounted such tales of war as often made me desire I was a man at once, in order that I might there and then enrol myself as one of my country's defenders. He had served, I believe, with distinction, in the Tenth Royal Hussars, as an officer, both under Sir John Moore, and the Iron Duke. He was present at the retreat on Corunna, and, as the old man touchingly gave that narrative, I well remember the big tears course down his cheeks, losing all control of himself, his utterances almost ceasing when he pictured the hour when his heart-broken comrades, "Buried him darkly, at dead of night." This was not all, however. Rising to a pitch of the greatest excitement, his language grew bolder and more fierce as he progressed, bringing us all through Salamanca, Talavera, Duoro, Orthes, with the Iron Duke, down to the "King-making Victory,"--Waterloo. He may have been too fond of dwelling on his own exploits--the fierce charge on squares--the hand to hand encounters--sabreing this one and then that one--for, as the night's entertainment closed, for such it was considered, his old arm chair would be many yards away from its original position, driven by force of arms and legs, depicting this cut at a trooper's head, that point at a breast, this guard from an intended cleaver, as he called it, and I have often since thought, how wise my mother was in her forethought to hide away his sword at such times, for I verily believe, so forgetful was he on those occasions, some damage would be done to arms or legs, in his enthusiasm of description. It is not to be wondered at, this early training though unintended on his part, had its effect on his son in after life. Intended for the profession of a Land Surveyor, I could brook nothing short of following in his footsteps. The scenes plainly set forth in this narrative occurred mostly in India, during the first Afghan war, in 1839, the Maharatta war, and the subsequent war in the Punjaub, from 1843 to 1846, trying times to the army in India. That country is so full of study, in its ancient buildings, mosques, temples, shrines, and manners and customs, that, I have only cursorily glanced at them, and only when positions and incidents are necessary for the full understanding of my movements, I have no doubt, however, that, by a careful perusal of the whole much interest will be created, and more sympathy excited for the men, who, careless of all else, ventured life to uphold the honour of dear old England. In some cases, war is too often employed to further ambition, or in adding some coveted spot to an already overgrown empire. With this, the soldier has nothing to do. The English soldier has been often pitted against great odds, and as there is no retreating in our army, but "to do or die," much more interest centres around him than a soldier of any other country. Kind reader, may I ask you to follow me through, while I endeavour to picture to you such battles as Ghuznee and Cabul, Maharajpoor and Buddewal, Aliwal and Sobraon; and I am sure you will be convinced, as was the old King of Delhi, that men who carried the red cross banner through such actions as these, were really, as he dubbed my old corps, the Sixteenth Queen's Royal Lancers, afterwards, "The pride of England, and the terror of India." TORONTO, Ont., 1880. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Sixteenth Queen's Lancers--Regiment in India--Gravesend--Scenes _en route_--Embark on board _Lord Exmouth_--Sprung a Leak--Plymouth Sound--Passage--Passing the line--Father Neptune--Cape de Verde Islands--Becalmed--Fishing--Cape of Good Hope--Albatrosses--Pass St. Paul and Amsterdam--Storm--Isle of Fraun--Sandhead--Hooghly--Fort William--View of Calcutta--Disembark--Chinasura Garden reach--Dutch Fort--Cholera--Orders for Cawnpore--Up Ganges in Boats--Typhoon--Swamped--Loss of a Lady--Scenery along the River--Benares, the holy city--Allahabad--Cawnpore--Night marching--Camp--Description of large Banyan Tree--Meerat--Regiment--Captain Havelock--War Rumours 17 CHAPTER II. Dost Mahomet usurps the throne of Afghanistan--Meerut division ordered to assemble five miles from Delhi--The King inspects our army--Pass through Maharajah Rimjut Sing's country--The Punjaub--Sir H. Vane--Hindoo Koosh--General John Keane--Cross the attack--Sufferings on the Sandy Plain--Valley of Shaul--Entrance to Bolam Pass--Lieut. Imvariety--Candahar--Crowning Shah-Soojah--Through the Pass--First sight of Dost's Army--Battle of Ghuznee--Storming--Col. Sale--Citadel sacked--Feelings after Battle--Natives--Orders received for Cabul--March--Cabul Camp opposite city--Enter--Supposed some of the Lost Tribes of Israel--Proof--Affecting scene at the Death of Colonel Arnold--finding of two old tombstones with date 1662--Russian ambition--Elphinstone left to protect Shah-Soojah--Back to India through the Kyber, swarming with Kyberees--Dost and his commanders prisoners with us--General Avetavela escorts us through Peshwa--Punishment of Robbers--Crossing the Boundary--Meerut--Memorial 30 CHAPTER III. Native sobriety and European drunkenness--Hindoo Mahoram feast Ceremony--Native habits--Shooting Sandgeese, Ducks, Parrots, Monkeys--Report of death of Shah-Soojah--Akbar Khan assumes the government--General Elphinstone retires--Mr. McNaughton killed--Massacre in Guddulock Pass by Akbar Khan--44th foot cut to pieces--A few escape to Jellelabad--Colonel Denny--Major Havelock--Colonel Sale attacks Akbar--Denny killed--Havelock in command--General Pollock pushes on from Bengal--Doctor Brydon--His miraculous escape through the Pass--General Nott ordered to Ghuznee--Pollock reinforces Sale--Lord Auckland succeeded by Lord Ellenborough--The Gates of the Temple of Somnuth--The Maharajah of Lahore pays his respects to Lord Ellenborough--Durbar at Delhi--Review before the King and Indian Princes--Meerut again--My comrade Jaco--The Spaniel and Jaco 49 CHAPTER IV. Rio Scinde having died, his throne usurped by the Rannie or Queen of Gwalior--Ordered to join Lord Gough's Army at Agra--The Palace of Agra--The ancient seat of the Moguls of Delhi--Lord Ellenborough rewarding Pollock and Nott--The Targ or Marble Tomb of Akbar's favourite daughter--March through the country of the Ryots--Grain-fields--Religious superstition--The white bull--Women--The Chumble river crossed--No enemy in sight--Nature of ground before Maharajpoor--Christmas morning--General Grey and his Division to arrive at Gwalior--Disposition of Troops--March to Battle--Wheat-shocks filled with Sharpshooters--Battle--Push on to within fifteen miles of Gwalior--The Raumi comes out to meet us--Unconditional surrender--Gwalior a formidable Place--The Queen and her army surrenders--Grey joins us 3rd January--Reinstatement of the young King--Grand Review--Incident on a Shooting Excursion--"Bob, don't go, Bob, don't go"--Break up Camp, 3rd February--Ordered back to Meerut--Passage of the Chumble--Frightened Game--A Chase with a Stag--Through Agra and Delhi to Meerut 61 CHAPTER V. Old companionship at Meerut--General Arbuthnot and the 16th--Grand turn out--A bet won--40th leave for home--9th Lancers for Umballa--Natives with tattoo bring in fruit and vegetables--Description of the Mango--Sedanna--The Begum or Queen, a pensioner of the Company--Something of her life--Persuades the Rajah to fly--Feigning assassination caused him to stab himself--Proclaimed Queen by her army--Marries a French Adventurer--Visit to our Camp--Her palace--Rumours of an invasion of our territory by the Shieks near Ferozepoor--Lord Gough at Umballa--News from the Punjaub--The Rannie or Queen had dethroned Dulep Sing--Ordered to Punjaub--Sketch of the Sing dynasty--Three French officers revolutionize the army and bring under the French model--They possess the whole of the Punjaub Peshwa--An eye on Bengal--Advised to become allies--Treaty with Lord Auckland--The Queen makes away with the three eldest sons--Her paramour, Lal Sing--Confines the youngest in the harem--Lord Gough at Mudkee Sir R. Sale killed--Ferusha--50th and 62nd Foot--Ignorance at Meerut of all their movements--March on the Sutledge--Sad evidences _en route_ of late havoc 78 CHAPTER VI. Hureka Gaut--Sir Harry Smith ordered to intercept Rungour Sing--Joined by 77th foot--March--View of Buddural--Opened fire--16th to hold ground while infantry push on--Too weak to fight yet--Baggage cut off--Some of 31st foot made prisoners--Treatment of their sergeant by the enemy--Push into Loodianna--News of their retreat--Ordered to intercept--Arrival at fort--Harem--Finding two bags of rupees--Reinforced and advance--Order of troops--Battle of Aliwal commenced--Sir Harry's telescope cut in two--"Lancers, three cheers for our Queen"--Charge--A square of guards--Corporal Newsom--Bravery--Killed--Green flag in his hand--"Immortalized 16th"--Fearful loss--Join another squadron--Pursuit to river--Destruction--Wounded to village--March to join Lord Gough--Two hundred cannon belching together--Sobraon 10th February--Description of battle--British flag planted--The bridge blown up--Charge the entrenchments--Victory and end of Sikh War--Losses--Labour--Chiefs bring out the young Maharajah--Reception in Lord Hardinge's marquee--Terms--Crowning the young King--Proud Sikhs--Retort on our Sepoys 90 CHAPTER VII. Sir H. Lawrence--Orders for home--Re-cross Sutledge--Jerosha--Scenes of previous engagement--Meerut--Leave for Calcutta--Down Ganges--Col. Cureton's farewell--Dum Dum--Calcutta, city, grand Ball--Sights--Embark for home--Bay of Bengal--Ascension--St. Helena--Doru Cliffs--Boats coming off--Relatives--March to Canterbury--Furlough--London--Meet Sisters and Mother--Deal--Battle--Anniversary--Buckingham Palace--Reviewed by Her Majesty--Claim Discharge--Causes--Take Ship for South Africa 108 CHAPTER VIII. The religion of the Hindoos--Castes--Brahmins--Kshatriyas--Vaisyas--Sudras--Sub-division by mixed marriages--The Triune Godhead: Brahma the centre, Vishnu the preserver or sustainer, and Siva, the destroyer--The Hindoo Pantheon--Brahmin place of worship--The Sacred Cow--Transmigration of souls--Degrees of punishment for various sins--The fate of the murderer, the adulterer, the unmerciful 124 CHAPTER IX. Delhi the ancient capital of the Mogul Empire--General description, population, &c.--The king's palace--Embattled walls and guns--Martello towers--Jumna Musjeed, or chief mosque--The tombs of the Humayoon, and of Sefjar Jung--The Shelima gardens--The ancient Patons, or Afghan conquerors of India--The celebrated Cattab Minar--The tomb of Humayoon--The aqueduct of Alikhan--College for Orientals and Europeans 133 CHAPTER X. Cape of Good Hope--First sight of--Inhabitants--Descent and other particulars--Sir Harry again--Sandicea in rebellion--War rumours--Join a Volunteer Corps--Off for frontier--East London--Army at Fort William--Join them--Gazetted Lieutenant--The Jungle--Kaffir women--73rd Regiment--Arrangements--Enter the Gaika tribe country--The huts--The kraal--43rd, 60th and 12th Lancers--General Somerset--Fort Beaufort--Colonel Fordyce shot--Buffalo Post--Capture cattle--Pursuit of Kaffirs--Sardillas' horse shot--Bridle neck bush--Time-expired men--Back to recruit--The Hottentot--East London again 145 CHAPTER XI. Transferred to Fingoe Service--Fingoe character--Ordered to Kye river--Chief Krielle--Colonel Eyre--Through the bush--The Chief's position--Battered by big guns--Cattle captured--On return march--Harassed by enemy--One month on march bring in 500 head--Sir Harry called home--Sir George Cathcart--Sandilla surrendered--Chief Moshusha--Attack his stronghold--Surrenders--Back to Fort William--Disbanded--Off on elephant hunt--Provisions for--Plan to capture--Kill four--Trading with Chiefs and their wives--Precautions against lions--Elephant's spoor--Excursion often fatal--Back to Grahamstown--Stiles' Hotel 159 CHAPTER XII. West to Clanwilliam--Mr. Shaw--Productions of farm--Back to the Cape--Open an hotel--Pleasures of Cape life--Ships put in for Australia--Imports--Market day--Arrangements--Waggons--Fish--Lobsters--Off to Port Elizabeth--Whale fishing--Sea elephants--Manner of killing--The Penguin--Habits of the bird--Back to the Cape--English Church at Newlands--The Bay--Wreck of a Baltimore vessel--Loss of two children, captain's wife, and the mate--Habits of Hottentots--Manner of living--A marriage--A present and its return--Loss in business by partner absconding--Leave the Cape--East India docks--Buckinghamshire--Relatives at home--Station master--Accident detailed--Near Rugby--Exonerated and promoted--Liverpool--Brighton--To Canada--Farewell address 175 [Illustration: (Vignette)] TEN YEARS IN INDIA. CHAPTER I. Sixteenth Queen's Lancers--Regiment in India--Gravesend--Scenes _en route_--Embark on board _Lord Exmouth_--Sprung a Leak--Plymouth Sound--Passage--Passing the line--Father Neptune--Cape de Verde Islands--Becalmed--Fishing--Cape of Good Hope--Albatrosses--Pass St. Paul and Amsterdam--Storm--Isle of Fraun--Sandhead--Hooghly--Fort William--View of Calcutta--Disembark--Chinasura Garden reach--Dutch Fort--Cholera--Orders for Cawnpore--Up Ganges in Boats--Typhoon--Swamped--Loss of a Lady--Scenery along the River--Benares, the holy city--Allahabad--Cawnpore--Night marching--Camp--Description of large Banyan Tree--Meerut--Regiment--Captain Havelock--War Rumors. Though now fast approaching the valley we all must enter, I feel a certain degree of pride when I remember the Saturday in November, eighteen hundred and thirty-seven, which made me one of Her Majesty's Sixteenth Queen's Lancers. The Regiment was then in India, and, as Maidstone in Kent was at that time the centre for all depôts whose corps were abroad, I was sent thither. I am not going to trouble the reader with all the minutiæ of drill, horse and foot, always necessary to make a man perfect for his profession, suffice, it was long and arduous, borne with pleasure, so as to get as quickly as possible ready for service abroad. For this purpose I joined, and for this I done my utmost to prepare. [Sidenote: Embark on Board "Lord Exmouth."] In February, the following year, I, with members of my own and other corps, left Maidstone for Gravesend en route for Calcutta. I need hardly detail any scenes which may have occurred in our progress to the port of embarkation. They are often witnessed in England, and once seen can never be forgotten. Preceded by a band playing patriotic airs, brings to the windows and doors all the inhabitants on the line. The soldiers answer cheer with cheer, for their spirits must have vent, and they can read goodwill and Godspeed on the faces of all the people they meet. At this time there was a rumour in England of approaching trouble in Afghanistan. The people as they looked on us, seemed to understand this, and some may have been thinking, "Poor fellows, how many of you will come back, but no matter, they are glad to go, and fight too." British soldiers always are; and in this, a draft for active service differs from those that are sent off in times of peace, when a man would be glad to skulk if he could get the chance. Arrived at Gravesend, we go aboard the _Lord Exmouth_ transport, and as the ship's bell announces the hour for weighing anchor, cheer after cheer bursts forth again from the men all along the docks, caught up by the sailors on the yards, and again by the crowd of spectators ashore, and the ship carries us out of port, away from the land which has seen thousands and thousands of heroes go forth to make Britain what she is. The confusion for the while is very great, but with willing hands all soon get righted--the golden rule on board a troop ship is rigidly adhered to, "A place for everything, and everything in its place." All now settle down to life aboard. On the fifth day out, our ship in a fog struck a rock, sprung a leak, and we were obliged to put into Plymouth Sound; in three days all was again righted, and we started on our voyage. Nearing the Cape de Verde Islands, we pass the line, and as it may be interesting I will here give a description of the customary honours paid to old Father Neptune while passing the equator. All who had not crossed this imaginary line before, which, of course, in our case were few, had to be shaved, or pay a fine to Father Neptune. The boatswain acted as the redoubtable father; over the side under the bowsprit; he first challenges, then comes on board attended by his sea-nymphs, riding on a gun rigged for him; a board is placed over a large tub of sea-water; the men who have not paid their respects before--crossed the line--are ranged along the board, lathered with a tar brush, and shaved with an old iron hoop, then soused into the tub of salt water, amid roars of laughter. [Sidenote: Cape of Good Hope--storm.] Passing Cape de Verde Islands, the first land we saw for six weeks, we were becalmed--not a breath of wind, the heat in the tropics intense. We spent some of our time in fishing; we caught several beneta--a beautiful fish--and some dolphins. We now got a good breeze, rounded the Cape of Good Hope far to the west, and entered the Pacific Ocean. Here we encountered some rough weather, when calmed we caught many albatrosses with pork; this is a splendid bird, measuring eighteen feet from tip to tip of wing, all white, and strange to say, when they are brought on deck, they get giddy, and cannot fly, though free to do so. Passing the barren, rocky islands of Saint Pauls and Amsterdam, we approach the Indian Ocean. Just before entering these waters, the sky had every appearance of a storm, and sure enough the day after we noticed the indication, we encountered a perfect hurricane, carrying away fore-mast, main and mizzen, long boat, our good cow and sheep, and seven pigs, leaving us a perfect wreck. This lasted two days and nights. We were drifted about one thousand miles away from land, but Captain Warren rigged jury masts, and the day after we sighted a French ship. After passing signals the Captain promised to keep by us till we got to the Mauritius. In five days we sighted the Isle of France, here our vessel was overhauled, everything made right to enable us to continue our voyage. All went well until our arrival at the Sandheads off the mouth of the Hooghly river. Here we signalled for a pilot, and soon made the Hooghly, one of the many branches of the Ganges. Passing Tiger island, many of the natives came off in dingies, almost naked, to see us. At first we supposed they were women, from having their hair tied up and fastened with a comb on the top of the head. Diamond harbor was also passed, until we made Fort William, where we anchored. Just five months' sail from England. [Sidenote: Disembark--Dutch fort.] When viewed from on board ship, Calcutta, in the bright morning sun, presents a beautiful picture; the city rises high from the edge of the grand old river with imposing majesty. The marvellous line of architecture in every possible variety of form--countless numbers of temples, small and great, and over-topping these, fortress-looking stone and marble palaces--certainly nothing could be more unique than such a first glimpse under a bright sun, and blue sky, of forms so fantastic--brightest lights and shadows numberless; of balconies, verandahs, towers, cupolas, projections, recesses, galleries endless and undescribable; and again, the costume of the natives who came to see us, merchants, nabobs, Chinese, Parsees, people from Bengal, Bombay, Madras, in fact from every place under the sun one would imagine. On the following day we disembarked, and proceeded to Chinsura, about twelve miles along the river. This is a large fortress, built by the Dutch. As we proceeded we saw the Governor-General's palace, built of white marble. Garden Reach must be a most beautiful place to reside, with its villas on the banks, and delightful palaces, and cocoanut trees sloping to the water's edge. It is here generally the European merchants reside. We found the Dutch fortress or barracks a most spacious building, with lofty rooms, each capable of holding one hundred men. The Twenty-sixth Cameronians, and part of the Forty-ninth Foot were here awaiting orders for China, and detachments of the Third Light Dragoons, Thirteenth and Forty-fourth Infantry, waiting orders, as we ourselves were also, to proceed up the country to join their respective regiments. [Sidenote: Scenery along the Ganges.] While waiting at the fort, before proceeding to join the Regiment, the cholera broke out among the troops, and for the time it lasted we suffered severely--as many as twenty falling victims in one day. In July we received orders to proceed up the Ganges to Cawnpore, embarking on the fifteenth in large boats with thatched roofs, looking like floating houses; each boat's crew consisting of seven sailors in charge of a Jemida, or Captain. I learned after these men were pressed from the surrounding villages, as many of them ran away, and, indeed, no wonder, for the work must have been very laborious, pulling by ropes along the bank, and at this season the current was all against them, as the river had lately overflowed its banks. Nearing Ghazapoor, we encountered one of those severe typhoons, so common, and which come on so suddenly in India. This one broke with terrific force, capsizing the boat I was in, and giving all hands a baptising in the raging river. The sergeant-major, his wife, and myself were washed to a sand bank. One young lady, going up the country to join her father, a captain in one of the Regiments, was lost--we suppose, as the river was full of alligators, she was captured by one of them. The Jamida and his crew we never could find; but suppose they ran away. The other boats had gone ahead, and as soon as I found my way clear--being a good swimmer, I shot out for the bank, ran along for more than a mile, until I reached the rest. They sent back aid and rescued the man and his wife. If this was to be my experience of the Ganges, give me before it half a dozen ocean voyages. [Sidenote: Allahabad--Cawnpore.] The beauty of the scenery along the Ganges is hard to describe--fertile valleys innumerable, indigo plantations--here and there flocks of beautiful parrots; monkeys by the hundreds, capering about, particularly in the Tarmarand trees, pulling and throwing cocoa-nuts about, and as we moored at night the trees would be swarmed, grimacing and yelling, such an unearthly noise--add to this, all around seemed spotted with fire from the innumerable fireflies, while the chorus the monkeys made, and the noise from the flocks of flying foxes, almost scares a stranger. As the face of the country alters, so the extent of the overflow can be best seen. In some places, where the land is low, five or six miles in breadth is covered with water; in others between high rocky banks, confine its course, and here the flow of water is very great, trying enough on the boats, and the unfortunate men pulling them. At Benares we stayed one day. This is the holy city of the Hindoos, as Jerusalem to the Jews, or as Mecca to the Mahommedan. This city contains from nine hundred to one thousand temples, and thousands of images of the many gods worshipped by its people. The highest ambition of the Hindoo devotee is, although he may be tottering with age or sickness, and almost crawling on the earth through deformity, to visit the shrines at Benares, and walk for fifty miles around its sacred territory. Here they come from all parts of India, as it is considered a sure passport to glory to die within it. The temples have all their gods; some of them ugly looking monsters. The people prostrate themselves and strike a bell, which is in every one of them, and then depart. At certain great festivals, thousands assemble from the city on the banks of the river--a great bell is struck--horns are blowed by the priests, then these fanatics, thousands of them, men, women and children, rush headlong into the deep water, and hundreds are drowned. From Benares we went to Allahabad. Here the waters of the Jumna unite with the Ganges. This is also considered a very sacred place; the water from here is taken to all parts of Hindostan in bottles, as holy water. It was here Lord Clive gained such a decisive victory over the Great Mogul of Delhi, as secured Bengal to the East India Company. From Allahabad, we proceeded to Cawnpore, where we arrived on the fifteenth of October. Disembarking, we went into tents, and soon after joined the camp waiting for us. I merely rambled through this city to get some things at the bazaars. The goods were all exposed to view without shop-windows, as at home. The merchant sitting, tailor-fashion, on the boards. Of money changers there was plenty; heaps of gold and silver coin on small tables. The sugar dealers, or rather confectioners, had large coppers boiling, making jillavies, a mixture of butter and sugar. There is also a goodly number of bungalos and gardens, residences of rich merchants. Early in the morning, generally at three o'clock, when the march of troops commences, one is surprised at the number of animals required for the several conveyances. Elephants and camels for tents and baggage; bullock Hackerys for women and children. Married soldiers are well provided for in India, a fund provided by Lord Clive allows every woman five, and every child three rupees per month, almost enough to keep them comfortable. The first day's march was over by eight o'clock in the morning, when tents were pitched, and breakfast prepared by black servants. After this, what time you don't want for rest may be spent as one chooses. The weather being intensely hot, we found shade under plenty of orange and mango trees, occasionally issuing from cover to shoot pigeon, or chase monkeys. Birds of all plumage filled the air with their beautiful notes; the mocking bird was particularly favourable to us soldiers, as numbers of them followed us. We were now on our march to Meerut, where the head quarters of my regiment were stationed, and I felt more than anxious till I joined them. On the fourth day from Cawnpore we halted under a famous Banyan tree, which on some previous occasion had shaded five thousand troops. This idea may seem preposterous; but when you take into consideration the length of time it has been growing and spreading, it seems simple enough, each branch on rising a certain height, drops, takes root again, rises again, and again drops, and so on for ages, until from the one parent root, branches and roots covered acres of ground. [Sidenote: Meerut--regiment--Captain Havelock.] Meerut is at last reached on the 14th of November. This is a frontier station. The military cantonments were extended on an open plain three miles in length. The most beautiful barracks, like villa residences. The English Church side by side with the Theatre, standing between cavalry and infantry lines. Here I found my regiment, and having acted as provost _en route_, I was introduced by Captain Havelock--afterwards General--who came out with us, to his brother Charles, who was adjutant of our regiment. Now commenced my service in India in earnest. What was rumoured in England proved here a fact, of an army being got ready for Afghanistan. Captain Havelock left to join his regiment; all who had known him, and experienced his kindness on board, and on the march to this station, felt the parting much, as he was invariably kind and very good to all his men. [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER II. Dost Mahomet usurps the throne of Afghanistan--Meerut division ordered to assemble five miles from Delhi--The King inspects our army--Pass through Maharajah Rimjut Sing's country--The Punjaub--Sir H. Vane--Hindoo Koosh--General John Keene--Cross the attack--Sufferings on the Sandy Plain--Valley of Shaul--Entrance to Bolam Pass--Lieut. Imvariety--Candahar--Crowning Shah-Soojah--Through the Pass--First sight of Dost's Army--Battle of Ghuznee--Storming--Col. Sale--Citadel sacked--Feelings after Battle--Natives--Orders received for Cabul--March--Cabul Camp opposite city--Enter--Supposed some of the Lost Tribes of Israel--Proof--Affecting scene at the Death of our Colonel Arnold--finding of two old tombstones with date 1662--Russian ambition--Elphinstone left to protect Shah-Soojah--Back to India through the Kyber, swarming with Kyberees--Dost and his commanders prisoners with us--General Avetavela escorts us through Peshwa--Punishment of Robbers--Crossing the Boundary--Meerut--Memorial. [Sidenote: Meerut division.] The order for marching for active service at last came, and on the 25th November, we left Meerut to join the force assembling under General Sir Henry Vane, to proceed to Afghanistan to replace Shah-Soojah on the throne usurped by Dost Mahomet. The force he was to have under him consisted of the entire Meerut division--three brigades of cavalry--three of artillery--and three regiments of infantry--the 16th Queen's Lancers were commanded by Colonel Robert Arnold, and were eight hundred strong. Our route lay through the City of Delhi, so famous in all Indian annals--the city, beautiful as we passed through, must have been almost a paradise before being sacked and plundered by Nider Shah, the Persian adventurer--he and his army are reported to have carried off one hundred and fifty camel loads of treasure, consisting of gold and silver--jewels and articles of great value. The principal street running through the city is called Chan-de-la-gore, a stream of water dividing it all through, with orange and tamarand trees on each of its banks,--the bazaars were crowded with people, and goods for sale, chiefly jewellery, silverware, and in some, costly apparel, such as the gorgeous Cashmere shawl, and elegant Persian carpet. I must reserve a full description of Delhi to another part of my experience. The army, under the Commander-in-Chief was to assemble on a plain five miles from Delhi, and was to number thirty thousand men of all arms. To this rendezvous we marched. The following day we were reviewed before the King of Delhi, he and his Court could not help but be well pleased with the dashing fellows that passed before them, we then continued our march through the protected Sikh States, until we arrived at the Sutleg river, where we halted until a formal permission to proceed was secured from the Maharaja Runjiet Sing in order to pass through his country, the Punjaub. At this time the Maharaja or king was very powerful, had a large army, with four French generals in his service--Avitavula--Ventura--La Court and Belasses. Permission was granted to pass through to upper Scinde. [Sidenote: Sufferings on the sandy plain.] At this distance of time, and looking back on the misery endured in that dreadful march. The country is very sandy--the heat is intense, and days without water. Eventually, after much suffering we reached Attack, or the upper waters of the Indus near Hyderabad. Here we halted a while and refreshed, Sir Harry Vane refusing to proceed through those sterile mountains of the Hindoo Koosh without strong reinforcements to keep his communications open with the rear. General Sir John Keene was ordered up with a force from Bombay, consisting of the 4th Light Dragoons, accompanied by artillery and infantry. Sir Harry Vane, through illness, not feeling able to continue in command, resigned, left for home, but died on the passage. Crossing the Attack river, on the 15th January, new horrors presented themselves thick and fast; the country still continued very sandy, in fact a desert, no appearance of anything around or ahead of us to instil a hope of comfort; again we had great suffering through want of water. Before we proceeded far it was deemed advisable to send back the elephants, and as for the poor camels they dropped off by scores for lack of food, the tents and a great part of the baggage and forage had to be burnt, the men were attacked with dysentery in its worst form, and many died. This may be allowed was an auspicious commencement of my military life in India. Did our men regret, or get faint-hearted?--No. Did we think of home and all its comforts, and the little thought there of the endurance of her soldiers?--we did; but there was no such thing as repining--though we did think too much was expected. Endurance has an end,--and that those who plan such designs, should be obliged to accompany the army through this country, and put up with, and be content with all we had to put up with, without a sign of discontent. [Sidenote: Candahar--crowning Shah-Soojah.] Through much suffering we reached the valley of Shaul, through Beloochistan to the entrance of the Bolan Pass. This gradually rises to an elevation of something like 12,000 feet. It appears as if some convulsion of nature--and I have no doubt of it--split the mountain completely in two. At this time no Doctor Russell or Archibald Forbes ever thought of such a mad freak as to accompany an army--they are free to do so now, because perhaps, in many particulars the army is better equipped and provided for--comforts unknown to us, are supplied now--and so it should be--for the soldiers who fought for England half a century ago, must have been hardier, and possessed of greater endurance, to do as they did on hard rations, and often half rations, with less formidable arms, no possible comfort, and discipline almost carried to extremes. In passing through the valley we were obliged to dismount, and actually pull or drive our horses along, they were so used up. While camped in the Pass, Lieutenant Inverrity strayed from his regiment, was surprised by a party of Beloochees, and cut and hacked to pieces. After losing many horses and men, and having undergone much privation and suffering, we arrived at Candahar, here we rested to somewhat recruit our health--procure fresh horses, and here we crowned Shah-Soojah. The rest we had here was very acceptable, and after all we endured on the sandy plains, and through the valley--the refreshment, plentiful here for the inner man--was in abundance--grapes and pears were very large, and vegetables without stint--the cabbage here is about the size of an ordinary wash-tub, very sweet and good. The inhabitants vied with each other to please us, as we were the first British troops they ever saw. The city, like all places of note in India, is very attractive, the houses flat-roofed--any woman you meet in the street all belong to the low caste, very heavily veiled--the High caste women are never seen out. On the 4th of June we broke up camp and started for Ghuznee, our way lying through the Bolan Pass. As we approach, its appearance is formidable, the mountains at each side seem to reach to the clouds, they have an ascent of 14,000 feet. Arriving at Ghuznee on the 21st July, we observed on the hills, Hadjie Khan the commander of Dost Mahomet's army encamped with twenty thousand men. Ghuznee is strongly fortified--cut out of solid rock, on the slopes of a hill, surrounded by a moat. As the enemy commenced firing on the 22nd with heavy shot, our commander thought better to move the camp back about two miles. [Sidenote: Battle of Ghuznee--storming.] On the morning of the 23rd, we moved up at three o'clock, and got into position. One division of cavalry opposite the gate on the Cabul road; one part of our force moved off to our left, to watch the enemy on the hills, and make a feint attack on their position on the opposite side, so as to draw their attention from us. We were occupied in placing batteries so as to command the gate; at the same time Colonel Thompson, of the Engineers, was laying a chain cable to throw a bridge across the Moat. When this was accomplished, a mine was laid under the stone buttresses, and at a quarter to six o'clock the mine was opening, and up went the gates with a terrific crash. The storming party, consisting of the 13th Light Infantry, under Colonel Robert Sale; the 2nd or Queen's, under Sir Thomas Wiltshire; when the bugle sounded, commenced their attack under a heavy fire--the 13th had the honour of leading. The enemy every where made a terrific resistance. Colonel Sale was knocked off his horse and trampled upon, still he ordered the bugler to sound a retreat, instead of which, whether intentional or not, the advance was sounded. Nothing could daunt the ardour and bravery of the men. They soon gained a footing inside, where hand to hand encounters was carried on in its most relentless form, and in half an hour, both regiments were firmly established inside the walls. By day light the British flag was mounted on the Citadel, many of the enemy having thrown themselves therefrom, rather than surrender, to the Moat below, a distance of 150 feet. We were ordered to enter and seize the horses, which were running wildly without riders, which we did after some hard work, and brought them to the prize agent outside. We were annoyed, however, very much, through having to encounter the worst of firing, as many of the Afghans popped at us from loop-holes and windows in every street of the city. When the sun rose on the hills the Infantry could plainly be seen ascending the greatest heights of the Citadel, far above the city; here they got into the bank, and loaded themselves with money. Many of the enemy were trying to escape to the valley away on our left; these, and the force on the mountains, kept our troops in that direction busy. By 2 o'clock, p.m., all was over, and Ghuznee was in possession of the British. [Sidenote: Feelings after battle.] When all opposition ceased, and one went through the city, now filled with sounds of wailings, he cannot but be struck with the dreadful havoc war brings with it. This was my first general action, and although when in the heat of it, I felt no pity for any one, at least I cannot remember feeling so, still, when the desolation is complete, and you are met everywhere with its sad effects, property destroyed, mutilation of brutes, horses, camels, &c., dead, and writhing in pain from wounds; wounded men and women every where begging for mercy or succour, the dead piled all round, the most hardened must give way to sadness. Shah-Soojah, our newly crowned king, was busy on our right, hanging and shooting traitors, some of them leading Chiefs who had fallen into his hands. The whole of the 24th was occupied in burying the dead, and on the following day Hadjee Kan came in, and gave up his sword, a beautiful one, the hilt studded with costly gems; for its possession the officers had a race, which was won by the 4th Light Dragoons. The horses captured, all of them valuable Arab or Turcoman were sold by auction, the proceeds appropriated as prize money. We halted here three weeks, sending out detachments to scour the country for Dost Mahomet's troops. During this time the inhabitants began to be much familiarized to us, and brought on all the supplies we required. We had much trouble, however, in striking bargains, as they do not speak Hindoostanee; but this we did experience, their great liking for us, over the regular Indian troops, our Sepoys. On the 2nd February we received orders to prepare for an advance on Cabul. Colonel Cureton was to proceed with two troops of the 16th Lancers and three troops of heavy artillery as an advance, my troop was one of these. On the 3rd, our way lay through high rocky passes, these we had to ascend, not without great difficulty, and on the second day's advance, we came upon four guns planted so as to command a lead in the road. They were loaded, but abandoned. The artillery unloaded them, blowing up the timbrels, one of the men through accident having his arm blown off. Our march through the gorges and passes was very tedious till we arrived at Cabul, the capital. [Sidenote: Cabul--camp opposite city--enter.] As we approached, the inhabitants gathered to greet us, and a right hearty welcome we got, as we were the body guard of the King, and the first British soldiers they ever saw. Encamping opposite the main gate, we were supplied with all the dainties of the city--milk, bread and fruit in any quantity. They were very kind, particularly to us horsemen, and would take no money in return. As we had two days before the headquarters with General Keene would arrive, I had many a stroll through the city and the bazaars; but as Cabul has come into great notoriety since I was there, and has been described over and over again, I will not enter into much detail. The inhabitants are mostly Mahomedans, some Armenians and Hindoos, who are generally merchants. They strike one on first appearance with the Jewish type of features, and it would not, perhaps, be risking too much to say they are descendants of one of the lost tribes of Israel, for we read in the 9th chapter, 1st Book of Kings, that King Solomon gave to King Hiram, in exchange for wood brought to build the Temple, twenty cities, and he called them the land of Cabul unto this day. We found at that time plenty of Russian money and goods, showing that that nation then, as lately, had an avaricious desire for possession of the country. The people are mostly of fair complexion, and the women are certainly very fine looking, of the Circassian type. After the arrival of General Keene, we commenced forming batteries and trenches. One sad occurrence overtook our regiment, which caused more profound regrets, more heart-felt sorrow, than anything else that could possibly befall us, and that was the death of our old esteemed Colonel Arnold. He was fully half a century in the army, loved his men as a father his children,--a splendid cavalry officer, six feet two inches high. Feeling he could not live much longer, he desired to see his regiment before he died. His cot was brought out, he, having all the appearance of death, propped in it. The regiment was formed on foot, three deep. We then marched slowly past him, giving one sorrowful look, and that a long one, at our poor Colonel. Tears filled all eyes. The officers, as their troops passed, fell in at the side of the cot, and when all had passed through, his lips were constantly moving, seemingly muttering some farewell, he audibly exclaimed "My poor, dear fellows," fell back and expired. His remains were interred with great military and masonic honours in the Moslem cemetery. [Sidenote: Elphinstone to protect Shah-Soojah.] While we remained at Cabul, his grave was often visited, and many a deep regret was expressed over it. While looking about the many stones marking the place of the departed, I was struck with a stone erected to the memory of two English people, dated 1662. How they came to Cabul, or anything about them, no one could inform me. It was certainly an early period--nearly two centuries ago. The object of the expedition became now a matter with which every one was acquainted. Shah-Soojah, an ally of our Government, was placed on the throne, to counteract Russian ambition to our Indian Empire, Russia at the time was engaged in war in Circassia. Towards the end of September, leaving General Elphinstone with a small force to protect the king, the remainder of the troops, under Sir John Keene, left Cabul on our march towards India, _via_ the Guddulek and Kyber Passes, taking Dost Mahomet and his commander-in-chief as prisoners of war. The 16th Lancers acting as body-guard, had also the care of the prisoners. The force now consisted of my regiment, two troops Horse Artillery, one regiment native infantry, with Skinner's Irregular Horse. Our route lay towards the Gillum river; this our horses had to swim. Colonel Curston, now commanding the 16th, nearly lost his life. As his horse rolled over in the current, one of his men ran along the bank, and, although heavily booted and spurred, jumped in, caught him by the hair, and thus pulled him out. The first week in October we entered the Kyber Pass, and although the mountains on both sides swarmed with Kyberees and Ghysaltees, they made no hostile demonstration, and allowed us to pass. Had there been any attempt at a rescue, we had previous orders to shoot the king, now captive, and his commander-in-chief. After a tedious march through the rugged pass, we reached the fort of Jumrood, which stands at the mouth of the Plains of Peshwa, and the French General Avetavela was governor of that district for the king of the Panjaub. He came to meet us and pay his respects to Sir John Keene, and escort us through the Province of Peshwa. Here we halted five days, during which time I saw thirty bodies hanging in trees, and was informed that was the punishment meted out by the French General to robbers, mostly hill tribe men. [Sidenote: Crossing the boundary--Meerut.] The Panjaub is a very fertile country, abounding in game, wild boar, deer and pea fowl. We killed no bullocks on our march, out of respect to the inhabitants, as they are mostly Brahmins and worship the bull as sacred. We crossed the Sutledge, the British boundary, and arrived at Meerut in complete rags, horses and men worn and jaded; what clothes we had, patched with sheep and goat skin. We left just sixteen months before, in all the ardour of youth, bright scarlet and gold lace, now sad-looking spectacles--brown as mahogany, and faces covered with rough hair. Our losses during that time were very great. Besides our Colonel, we left two hundred officers and men behind, almost all through hardship and fatigue. The loss during the campaign in horses alone was 3,000, in camels 1,400. On arriving at Meerut we subscribed a week's pay each, had a handsome marble monument erected to our departed comrades in the churchyard. We now required some rest, and we had it. As the recruits from England were awaiting us, they relieved us from duty for awhile, and having a large amount of pay and battier money due us, we gave ourselves up to rest--recreation such as one can have in a hot country--and general enjoyment. The area of India is about 1,558,254 square miles. From the northern extremity of the Punjaub to Cape Cormoran in the south, it measures 1830 miles; its greatest breadth is about the same; its population is about 270,000,000. [Sidenote: The prevailing religions.] The prevailing religions are Buddhism, Brahminism, and Mahommedism. The first contains many excellent moral precepts and maxims, but practically it is a religion of Atheism. The doctrines of merit teach its devotees to believe in the transmigration of souls. "If any man sin" it tells him to build a pagoda, or carve an idol, it threatens him with degradation into a soulless brute, it leaves him without hope, without a god in the world. Brahminism is idolatry in its most debasing forms. It has three hundred millions of gods, but no creed; sun, moon, and stars are deified; sticks, stones, or a lump of clay smeared with red paint, are convertible into objects of superstitious reverence. The rites which it imposes are impure, and sensual. Mahommedanism differs from the other two in that it is not idolatrous. It professes a reverence for the supreme being, but like all human systems of religion it is unsatisfactory, it recognizes no divine mediator between God and man; maintained by the sword, it exercises a cruel and despotic sway over the minds of its votaries, it is remorslessly intolerant and persecuting, deprives men of liberty, upholds slavery and polygamy, and degrades women to the level of the brutes. It is one of the most powerful anti-Christian systems in the world, holding under its iron sway one hundred and seventy-six millions of the human race. A tradition prevails that Christianity was first introduced by Saint Thomas the Apostle. However that may be, when the Portuguese arrived in India, A.D. 1500, they found a large body of professing Christians with upwards of a hundred churches, who traced their history for thirteen hundred years through a succession of bishops to the Patriarch of Antioch. The Hindoos resisted all attempts of the Portuguese priests to convert them to the Roman Catholic faith. "We are Christians," said they, "and do not worship idols." Many of them were seized and put to death as heretics. Many missionaries went to India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But the East India Company did not encourage the mission work, as they seemed to keep the natives ignorant of Christianity, and by keeping the Hindoos and Mahomedans antagonistic to each other it aided them in their conquests and growing power. But recently a great many colleges have been built in Bengal, Bombay, and Madras by rich Parsee merchants, and the Hindoo youth are deriving great benefit, and since steam has opened up the rapid passage and the voyage shortened through the Suez Canal they have more frequent intercourse with the European, his manners and customs. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER III. Native sobriety and European drunkenness--Hindoo Mahoram feast Ceremony--Native habits--Shooting Sandgeese, Ducks, Parrots, Monkeys--Report of death of Shah-Soojah--Akbar Khan assumes the government--General Elphinstone retires--Mr. McNaughton killed--Massacre in Guddulock Pass by Akbar Khan--44th foot cut to pieces--A few escape to Jellelabad--Colonel Denny--Major Havelock--Colonel Sale attacks Akbar--Denny killed--Havelock in command--General Pollock pushes on from Bengal--Doctor Brydon--His miraculous escape through the Pass--General Nott ordered to Ghuznee--Pollock reinforces Sale--Lord Auckland succeeded by Lord Ellenborough--The Gates of the Temple of Somnuth--The Maharajah of Lahore pays his respects to Lord Ellenborough--Durbar at Delhi--Review before the King and Indian Princes--Meerut again--My comrade Jaco--The Spaniel and Jaco. I have often been ashamed in India, when called a Christian, to see an officer or a man under the influence of liquor. Both Mahomedans and Hindoos are very abstemious--never touching anything that intoxicates. I had now more proof of this than at any other time, there being so many attendants allowed soldiers, indeed as many followers as men, I could well judge their aversion to drink. Of all the native cooks, belt-wallas, scyses for horses, and grass-cutters, I never knew one to drink ask them, they grimace and turn away. During the time we were recruiting our strength the Hindoos had a festival called the Mahoram. They assemble by thousands from all parts, with richly dressed elephants and camels, and gorgeously dressed Princes and Nabobs. The common folk go through a sort of sham-fight with bladders. A large image made of wicker work and filled with combustibles is elevated some seventy feet high. Two beautiful children are drawn in a car richly dressed by two sacred bulls. These children fire two arrows each at the image, and are then taken to the Temple, and, as I was informed, sacrificed in the evening amid a great display of fire-works. [Sidenote: Shooting sand-geese, ducks, etc.] All the natives sleep during the great heat of the day, and are up all night around the fires made of horse and cow manure, which keep off mosquitoes. They make a horrid din, beating a drum called tum, tum, and singing, so that with the noise all through the bazaars, the drumming and the mosquito chorus, a foreigner has little rest. Our men enjoyed plenty of shooting, sand-geese, ducks, parrots, and peacocks; although dangerous to shoot the latter, the Hindoos holding them as sacred. We had almost everything to beguile our time; drill and field-days at early morning, besides a good library, ball-alley, racket, quoits, cricket, and a theatre, named the Victoria. Returning to quarters one evening, after a shooting excursion, and the day having been intensely hot, many were enjoying a cool nap on the cot outside the door of the camp. Apart from all the rest, by himself, was an old crusty sergeant, nicknamed "Old Nick,"--a bath, there being plenty about for the use of the men, stood near him, and after a moment's consultation, as he snored away, we decided to play him a trick. Our party being all of the same rank, (four sergeants) even if we were discovered, it would not be deemed so bad as if it were done by inferiors, but this we thought nothing of. Lifting him very carefully, and so gently as not to disturb his heavy snoring, we conveyed our friend "Old Nick" to the bath, laid him evenly and gently as possible, looking round seeing each our way clear for a good run--let go, and soused he fell into the water. Splutter, splutter, occasionally as we ran, a fierce yell and a curse. We were in bed in five minutes, in fact before he had time to properly shake himself, and although enquiry and enquiry was made, and a reward for the miscreants offered by himself, no one ever learned who did it for years after. We were not to remain long at peace, war broke out again on the death of Shah-Soojah. Akbar Khan had seized the reins of government of Afghanistan, shot Mr. McNaughton, the agent, had prevailed on General Elphinstone to retire, who was weak enough to do so, instead of holding his position until aid arrived; and as soon as Akbar got him into the Guddulock Pass, commenced an indiscriminate massacre. The 44th Regiment was almost cut to pieces; some were taken prisoners with the officers' wives, including Lady Sale; some few escaped to Jellelabad, at the entrance of the Kyber Pass, where General Sale, Colonel Denny, and Major Havelock were with the 13th Light Infantry. When the winter was far enough advanced to march, Akbar wanted to attack Sale, but he, not wishing to be caught, marched out and met him in battle, and fully routed him and his army. Poor Colonel Denny being killed, Havelock then assumed the command. [Sidenote: Doctor Brydon--his miraculous escape.] In the early spring General Pollock was pushed on with a force from Bengal. Before I proceed farther I will here give the following incident which occurred at the time of the massacre in the Guddulock Pass, in 1842:-- When the slaughter was nearly complete, a Doctor Brydon endeavoured to escape; among the survivors was a native assistant, who, seeing Brydon sorely pressed, called to him, saying, "Doctor Saib, I cannot possibly escape, I am dying of cold and hunger, take my pony and do the best you can for yourself." Brydon tried to encourage him, but no, he was dying. Brydon mounted, and through the confusion, forced his way to the front. Reaching all safe, he found a group of mounted officers, who knowing they were just at the end of the Pass where it opens on the plain where Jellelabad stands, determined to make a bold push for life. Seeing Brydon on a wretched pony, they declared they could not wait for him, mounted as he was, and any delay would be sure to cause their immediate destruction. On they went, leaving Brydon slowly toiling after them. The Afghans saw the group advancing at full swing, met them and slew them every man, and thinking no one else was coming, went back to the hills; just then Brydon jogged past unobserved. News of Elphinstone's force was anxiously waited for at Jellelabad. Towards evening one man slowly riding a worn-out pony was descried at the entrance of the Pass,--cavalry were immediately sent to bring him in--it was Brydon. As he entered the gate he fell senseless from fatigue. When restoratives were applied, at least such as were at hand, he revived, and the first question he asked was about his pony, the pony that had saved his life--it was dead. Brydon was with General Sale during the gallant defence of Jellelabad, and lived to take part in the defence of Lucknow. [Sidenote: Gates of the temple of Somnuth.] Pollack pushed through the Kyber Pass to the relief of Sale. Another force under General Nott marched from Bombay towards Ghuznee, to the relief of our troops hemmed in there--the two divisions were to meet at Cabul as an avenging army. Both pushed on as rapidly as possible, and after long and arduous marches, reached Cabul, rescued the prisoners, and burnt the capital to the ground. General Elphinstone having died, completely broken down through this sad disaster, Lord Auckland was called home, and Lord Ellenborough replaced him as Governor-General of India. In January, 1843, an army of observation was formed on the banks of the Sutledge, to meet Generals Nott and Pollock on their return through the Kyber Pass, bringing with them the gates of the temple of Somnuth, from in front the Mahomedan mosque, at Ghuznee,--carried off eight hundred years before, on the conquest of India and subjugation of the Hindoos--and now restored after that lapse of time by British valour, and thereby conciliating the original possessors of Hindostan. These gates were made of sandal-wood, each one drawn on a waggon by twelve bullocks; they were also covered with crimson curtains fringed with gold. The Maharajah of Lahore came down with six thousand cavalry as an escort to pay his respects to Lord Ellenborough. We marched towards Delhi on the first of February, through the protected Sikh states. Arriving at Delhi we encamped on the race course. Lord Ellenborough had summoned all the Rajahs and petty princes to meet him and the king at a Durbar; along with the King of Delhi was the Rajah of Burtpoor, the Rajah of Jypoor, the Rajah of Puttealea. All the Indian nobility gave a grand dinner to the Governor-General, Lord Gough, and all the British officers. A large place was built of wicker-work, covered with flags, banners, streamers, and variegated lamps; and tables were laid for five hundred guests; the service was of silver and gold. The Governor-General and staff went down in three carriages, escorted by two troops 16th Lancers--my troop happened to be one of them--when the cavalcade arrived, a royal salute was fired, and salvo after salvo almost shook the air; the crowd was so dense we could almost ride over turbaned heads. After dinner there was a grand presentation to Lord Ellenborough,--a gold salver full of jewels, two elephants, richly caparisoned, and four Arab horses--then came such a display of fireworks as never has been equalled since. It was twelve p.m. before we started for camp. [Sidenote: Meerut again.] The day following all this display a grand field-day was held, in order to show these native princes the power of Britain, and what good soldiers she boasted of. In all the movements, the troops sustained their traditional name; the 16th made a dashing charge, covering the infantry, who had fallen into square; we astonished the king and the several princes by the quickness of our movements, they calling us the Lall Goral Wallas, or Bullam Wallas. We broke up in a few days afterwards, each regiment marching to their respective stations, the 16th back to Meerut, where we arrived on the 4th of March. [Sidenote: My comrade Jaco.] I might have introduced to the reader before this an inseparable companion I had while in cantonments, and one who not only shared my bed and board, but one who, during many hours of serious thought and fretfulness about all at home, mother and sisters, made me laugh and forget what I had been thinking about a few moments before; this creature was Jaco, my monkey; where he was born, or where he originally sprung from, or his race, I cannot tell. I am no Darwinian, but positively, the amount of tact and knowledge displayed by Jaco, often since has led me to consider our possible relationship well. I purchased Jaco for a small sum from a native, intending, if he remained with me, to train him well and keep him as a companion; I took him to my quarters, and as a first lesson to teach him subjection and obedience, tied him to the handle of my trunk; here, I kept him sufficiently long, that, by kind treatment, I thought I had weaned him from any bad tricks he had learned; he, of course, got quite used to a sword, a carbine, and of my dress; I made him a nice-fitting scarlet jacket, blue pants, and a cap with gold lace, and, dear me, how I laughed to see my tiny mock soldier strutting about; this pleased him well. My comrade had a spaniel dog. Jaco and the spaniel got quite friendly. This creature was also very biddable, and on both, my comrade and I commenced a series of drill, providing Jaco with a wooden sword. In a short time they got so advanced, that on the word "mount," Jaco would stride the spaniel, and away out with either of us to parade for guard mounting; this they continued to do, till mounting guard became an every-day's duty, creating a great amount of laughter, and they were never absent. If I happened to be tired, and lying down getting a little rest, Jaco would jump on the table, make faces at himself in the glass, then, to annoy me, or get me up, as he knew he was disturbing me, get pen and ink, as he had seen me do, and destroy any paper that lay about with his scrawling; if I took no notice, and he found it was no use teasing me that way, he usually licked the pen, spitting out several times, made ugly faces, all the time looking at me, I pretending to sleep. I don't know that he had one bad habit, but thieving, and this he was expert at; if I had received a paper, or was sending one home, and left it on the table, nothing pleased poor Jaco better than to make away with it. His usual plan was to leap on my table, watch me well for a time, to make sure I was asleep, he gently came on the bed, above my head, put his finger softly to my eyes and try to open them; this was done, I suppose, to see if I would stir, then with a bound away on the table, seize the package, and away to the woods, where he generally remained till night, when he quietly came back, getting into bed at my feet. Jaco was a great pet all over the cantonment. I intended, if I had been fortunate enough in keeping him, to bring him home: he, however, often got me into blame for his thieving tricks, and one day returned to my tent with a broken arm; how he got it I could never make out; I applied splints, and he seemed to recover the use of it, but I fancied the pain drove him mad, for he went to the woods one day, and never came back. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER IV. Rio Scinde having died, his throne usurped by the Rannie or Queen of Gwalior--Ordered to join Lord Gough's Army at Agra--The Palace of Agra--The ancient seat of the Moguls of Delhi--Lord Ellenborough rewarding Pollock and Nott--The Targ or Marble Tomb of Ackbar's favourite daughter--March through the country of the Ryots--Grain-fields--Religious superstition--The white bull--Women--The Chumble river crossed--No enemy in sight--Nature of ground before Maharajpoor--Christmas morning--General Grey and his Division to arrive at Gwalior--Disposition of Troops--March to Battle--Wheat-shocks filled with Sharpshooters--Battle--Push on to within fifteen miles of Gwalior--The Raumi comes out to meet us--Unconditional surrender--Gwalior a formidable Place--The Queen and her army surrender--Grey joins us 3rd January--Reinstatement of the young King--Grand Review--Incident on a Shooting Excursion--"Bob don't go, Bob don't go"--Break up Camp, 3rd February--Ordered back to Meerut--Passage of the Chumble--Frightened Game--A Chase with a Stag--Through Agra and Delhi to Meerut. Peace was not of long duration. The old King of Rio Scinde having died, the British Government, by treaty with him, were bound to see his son established on his throne. It was now usurped by the Rannie of Gwalior, who deposed the rightful heir. The 16th Lancers were ordered to join the army summoned to assemble at Agra to meet the Governor-General and Lord Gough, on the 15th November. The Cawnpore division, under General Grey, were moving up on the other side. The Meerut division consisted of ourselves--three troops horse artillery, 39th and 40th regiments, three regiments of native infantry, a battery foot artillery, three companies sappers and miners. We were received by Lord Gough, who lately arrived from England as Commander-in-Chief, with Sir Harry Smith as Adjutant-General, and Colonel Havelock, my old friend, as Persian interpreter. [Sidenote: Country of the Ryots.] Agra was at one time the summer residence of the Moghul of Delhi--it stands on the Jumna river, whose waters lave the walls of the Palace. On the marble slab in front of the throne, where in days gone by stood many a proud Mahometan, when the Rajpoots lorded over the conquered Hindoos, stood Lord Ellenborough, representative of proud England, surrounded by her warriors and heroes of many a hard-fought battle, and knighted Generals Pollock and Nott by Her Majesty's command for bravery. In Agra also is the tomb or Targ of the great and mighty Ackbar's favourite daughter, built of white marble, and looked upon as one of the wonders of the world for its unsurpassing grandeur--it was erected 700 years ago. Under the immense dome are two slabs, covering the mausoleum, inlaid with precious stones. The dome is flanked by four marble minarets 150 feet in height--the garden approaching the tomb is full of orange and lemon trees--the sacred lotus flower perfumes the air--every spot around it is sacred to the Mahometan. The order to march was issued on the 20th of November. This is the most delightful time of the year in India--not so hot during the day--mornings and evenings lovely and cool. The country of the Ryots through which we marched is certainly a beautiful one, judging at this time of the year. They are mostly Hindoos, are quiet, harmless and industrious. It looked strange to us, now so near Christmas, to see hundreds of acres of golden wheat ready for harvesting--no hedges or fencing here, but as far as the eye can reach one field of waving yellow, mixed with red poppy. The Hindoos are firm believers in transmigration, consequently never eat any animal food. The Brama or Sacred Bull, mostly white, with a hump on his shoulders, his head hung with garlands of flowers, is allowed to range where he likes, and is fed out of flour or sugar-barrels, and none dare molest him. The women are most degraded--never educated,--they are not supposed to possess souls--they never eat with men, and among the high caste they are not allowed to be seen by another man. After marriage, which is contracted when about twelve years of age, they are old and ugly when thirty is reached. When I have seen a group of these girls waiting with their lamps at the four corners of the road for the bridegroom, I have often thought of the parable of the Ten Virgins. [Sidenote: The Chumble river crossed.] Our march was generally finished by nine in the morning. After guards and pickets have been placed, I have nearly always visited the nearest village, having learned some Hindoostanee. I could make them understand. I always found them civil and kind, but afraid of soldiers, some Europeans being very insulting, and even I have heard complaints of being robbed of fruit, poultry, or anything suitable to them. The followers of an Indian army being all natives, but of course of different parts of India, are generally great thieves. Naturally an army _en route_ is very destructive, so many animals to feed--elephants, camels, horses. The Government profess to pay for everything used, especially if camped in a grain or cotton field. [Sidenote: March to battle.] We arrived at the river Chumble on 24th December, and moved as follows:--16th Lancers in front, 40th following, up to their armpits in water, next the artillery, then the 39th, and so on. We had information before crossing that the enemy would probably oppose the landing, as they were in the neighbourhood, but we saw none of them. We were ordered to gallop to the front and reconnoitre. As we advanced about five miles we saw the enemy's camp at a distance between two villages. We halted allowing the column to come up. The ground here was very rough, and interspersed by ugly ravines. Between us and them was a very deep Nulla, with only two places to ford it, five miles apart. Wet as we were from our recent fording the Chumla, I had to go on in charge of the advance guard and remain all night. Our baggage, or tents, not having come up--what was worse the Commissariat had not arrived, and we felt hungry. The enemy's cavalry were reconnoitering on our front, and during the night a very strict watch was kept up. Morning at last dawned, beautiful as weather could make it--Christmas morning and all--and a pretty plight it found us in, hungry, wet clothes, and if we wanted to drink we had plenty muddy water. About four o'clock, p.m., I was ordered to mount again, take twenty men, and strengthen the outlying pickets. We had not taken off boots or clothes for four days, nor had the saddles been off the horses during the same time. I was further directed by the officer in charge of the picket, after I had reported to him, to take six troopers to the front as an extra look-out on the ford, patrolling myself between my post and the main picket every half-hour. About twelve at night a rocket went up from a village within our lines, and was answered immediately by a light from the enemy's camp. The village was at once surrounded, and every man in it made prisoners. I suffered fearfully that night, being so long in the saddle with wet trousers; my legs were as raw as a piece of beef. Give me fighting--fair open fighting, at once--in preference to such torture. We waited here, without attacking, three days, expecting some of General Grey's division, mainly from Cawnpore, towards Gwalior. On the night of the 28th we got orders quietly to turn out at 4 o'clock in the morning, 29th December, to march without baggage or other incumbrance, with one day's cooked rations. We fell into line exactly to time, when Lord Gough with Lord Ellenborough and staff rode along the front, speaking words of encouragement to each corps. [Sidenote: Battle.] Sir Joseph Thackwell, who had only one arm, commanded the Light Division, consisting of the 16th Lancers, Body Guards, three troops Horse Artillery, Outram's Irregulars. The centre division was commanded by Colonel Vallient, comprised the 40th foot, two batteries Foot Artillery, two corps of Native Infantry, one company of Engineers. The Left Division consisting of 39th Foot, five Native Cavalry, two regiments Native Infantry, and one company of Sappers under Sir Harry Smith. Each division crossed the ravine within one mile of each other. They were in position between three villages--Maharajpoor in the centre, Juna on the right, and Chuna on the left. We marched until seven o'clock, when we halted. The enemy at once opened fire from their half-moon battery. Nothing could be more welcome; we hurrahed several times and shouted lustily, "There goes the Prize-Money," showing, without doubt, the general feeling of our army,--there was no such thing as failure. The trumpeter now sounded for us "To Horse, To Horse," and away we went at a swinging trot to the front, preceded by Quarter-Master General Churchill, as it is that officer's business to learn the position of an enemy, and the nature of the ground, we advanced in close column of troops. Our route lay through a cotton plantation, and on nearing the enemy we were received by a discharge from a six-gun battery. A six-pound shot took my horse in the heart, and we both rolled over. I was extricated by some Grenadiers of a Native regiment just passing, much bruised. I was not long without a horse, as peppering had been going on by the advanced picket, a horse, minus the rider, fully accoutred, which had belonged to the enemy, passed. I seized it, and soon came up with my troop. We formed in line, in front of us being a field of wheat standing in shocks; these we found occupied by the enemy's sharp-shooters, quite concealed. A shot from one of these picked off General Churchill; as he fell, Colonel Somerset, an aide, dismounted to assist him; he was nearly as unfortunate, as a shot from one of their batteries broke his leg, killing his horse on the spot--poor Churchill died as he was being taken to the rear. The battle now became more fierce. The centre division, led by the 40th, under Colonel Vallient, charged, and at the point of the bayonet took the Village of Maharajpoor. Just then, the enemy's cavalry were coming down like a dark cloud upon our guns, when the 16th, my regiment, and the Body Guards were ordered to charge; this we were quite prepared to do, as soldiers, at least so far as my experience teaches, do not like to be onviewers, or watchers. Charge we did, but to our astonishment, as soon as they saw our movement, retreat was their order, and we afterwards heard they never stopped until they reached Gwalior. At noon the battle was over, the enemy fled, leaving all their camp equipage, guns, and about six thousand dead on the field. Their force was estimated 24,000, while ours only numbered 10,000, in having left 4,000 to protect our camp and hospital. Our loss was 2,500 officers, rank and file. [Sidenote: The Queen surrenders.] The following day we pushed on, halting some fifteen miles from Gwalior. Here we camped for a time. The Rannie, or Queen, came down with a strong guard, four thousand cavalry, to pay her respects, and make terms of peace with Lord Ellenborough. He would not hear of any only an unconditional surrender. The day after the Rannie's visit we marched on the capital, reaching Gwalior about nine a.m. Of all the fortified places ever I had seen, this was the most formidable. A large rock in the centre of an extensive plain, the city built in the middle, and so surrounded by the rocky wall, as to leave only one ascent, and that a zigzag one. The walls all round were loop-holed and bristled with cannon. Our first thought was--We are done now. But, of course, engineering skill and brave hearts laugh at stone walls. All was got ready to storm, as if taken, it must be taken at a dash, and as is always the case, a flag of truce was despatched to warn of our intention of giving them one hour to choose between unconditional surrender or the consequence of a refusal. In half that time the Ranee and her army marched out, a battalion of our infantry entered, and hoisted the British flag on the walls. We remained in Gwalior until joined by General Grey on January 3rd. This division had marched from Cawnpore, and consisted of the 9th Lancers, 3rd Buffs, three regiments Native Infantry, 2 brigades of Artillery, and the 50th Foot, under command of Colonel Anderson. They had been engaged with other portions of the enemy at Punneah on the same day we were fighting at Maharajpoor. On the 4th, the day following, the entire army was paraded to do honour to the young king, who had been reinstated on his throne, the ceremony being performed before all the people, in front of the city--and on the following day we were reviewed by Lord Gough, in presence of His Majesty, Lord Ellenborough, and the king's ministers. In the Governor-General's address of thanks to the army, he promised us a medal in shape of a star for the capture of Gwalior, and the Ranee, though now deposed, gave one crow of rupees. This was given directly, and a squadron of the 9th and one of the 16th Lancers escorted it in bags, carried by fourteen camels, to the Commander-in-Chief's camp. In any part of India I have ever been, I have always seen plenty of game, but the territory of Gwalior can certainly boast of more than any other. The gardens were laid out beautiful. Fruit of every kind was abundant. The principal people here are half Portuguese. [Sidenote: "Bob, don't go, Bob, don't go."] The following incident occurred on one of my shooting excursions. Three of us went out looking for pea-fowl, as they make a beautiful dish. We reached a Mango grove, and sat under a tree. A stream of water ran a few yards away from us, beautiful in appearance to bathe in. Robert Prichard, a corporal in the regiment, one of us, took it into his head to bathe. I remonstrated with him, urging probably the presence of venomous snakes or serpents, very numerous in the Bengal Presidency. He would go, and go he did. My last words were: "Bob, don't you go." As he started, immediately there came the same words--"Bob, don't you go"--"Bob, don't you go," again came more rapidly. Bob did turn back rather afraid, still he persuaded himself he was no coward, away he went again, and again the same words came thick and fast, "Bob, don't you go," "Bob, don't you go." On looking up we discovered a number of brown birds, similar in appearance to thrushes, in the trees, and as we rose to leave the cry went on, "Bob, don't you go," "Bob, don't you go," but Bob did bathe, and was bitten by a venomous snake, and died that evening. I have previously stated that the Hindoos are very superstitious, and do not kill anything--not even the poisonous snake. This part of India is not much travelled over by Europeans, and all sorts of dangerous reptiles and wild beasts live on undisturbed to kill man. The 16th Lancers had by this time completed twenty-two years' service in India, and naturally enough, many looked forward for the order to bring them back to England. It was not to be yet, however, although we all thought that the 9th had come out to relieve us. On the third of February we broke up camp, and commenced and marched back to our several cantonments. On our way the time passed pleasantly enough. After camp-pitching for the day, if a village was within easy distance, I generally went thither, accompanied by some companion. Generally the villagers will shy away when they get a glimpse of a soldier, they are afraid of being plundered, but the most reasonable excuse is, I think, to be found in their religion being insulted, at least here, for almost everything is sacred. Their former rulers, the Rajahs, plundered unmercifully, and allowed their men to commit the vilest of crimes. [Sidenote: Frightened game.] So full is this country of game as we neared the river Chumble, where I had on my way up got such a severe wetting in crossing, as to fasten a severe cold on me for some days. One morning at sunrise, geese, duck, and other water-fowl rose off the water in such a large dense cloud as to darken the air, as if a thunder-storm were coming on. No one with us ever saw such a multitude. Like every other living thing, they are never disturbed, but live on and multiply. No matter what our position in life--either high or low--or whatever our tastes for a variety of food, no men feel the loss of satisfying this desire more than soldiers on a campaign, always confined to the same diet. I have heard old soldiers say they remembered they had such an abhorrence for hard biscuit, and such an appetite for fresh bread, impossible to get at the time, that if a year's pay could get one fresh loaf, they would give it. We felt now something of this feeling, and all ranks longed for a change of some sort, either in bread or meat. Here was a fine opportunity, and it was availed of to the full extent, as far as the animal food could do it. Three of our officers, Captain Meek, Lieutenant Patterson, and the Veterinary Surgeon, respectively nicknamed--Meek, The Hair Trunk; Patterson, Black Jack; and the veterinary, Hot-water Jack--were sitting together engaged in mending their jackets and pants, one occasionally rising to feed the fire over which was pinioned on the sticks a leg of a stag or of mutton, I could not say which, and no doubt, as they felt hungry, anticipating a nice feed, when all of a sudden we were startled by shouts and hurrahs and roars of laughter. A dog had stolen unawares, when they were engaged in their tailoring, and making one bounce, seized the roasting limb, and away with him. The three, with jackets pants and flannels flying from their arms, after the poor hungry brute, shouting with all their might--"Stop thief! stop thief!" It was relished after all, notwithstanding the extra handling and dog-bites it got. [Sidenote: Through Agra and Delhi to Meerut.] After passing the river and ascending the hill on the opposite bank, we came suddenly on a herd of antelopes. So astonished did they seem, on perceiving horsemen, they actually stood staring at us, until nearing them, they started at a bound, some dashing through the ranks of our squadron. One of our men gave chase to a splendid buck, as he ran towards a village, near which we knew was a pond. The stag took to it; the man followed, having jumped off his horse, and seized him by the horns. The stag was the strongest, and dashed the man away in the water; still he held on until an officer coming on the scene, stabbed him, and, amid roars of laughter, the corporal emerged, covered with green slime and chick-weed. That day we had venison for twelve, the officers taking the rest. Agra and Delhi was at last reached, then Meerut on the 4th March, having been five months on that campaign, and lost fifty men from the regiment. Here we passed the hot season, from the middle of March to the beginning of May, as what are called the hot winds blow from eight in the morning till between four and five in the evening, no one in that time can stir out of doors--not even the natives can stand the scorching heat. The torment, the mosquitoes, are busy humming all this time. I have seen men almost blinded with their swollen faces; however, there is one relief, every soldier can have a native to fan him, and keep them off. Another pest during this season is found in the numbers of jackalls who run in packs at night, and actually bold enough to get under the beds. [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER V. Old companionship at Meerut--Arbuthnot and the 16th--Grand turn out--A bet won--40th leave for home--9th Lancers for Umballa--Natives with tattoo bring in fruit, vegetables--Description of the Mango--Sedanna--The Begum or Queen, a pensioner of the Company--Something of her life--Persuades the Rajah to fly--Feigning assassination caused him to stab himself--Proclaimed Queen by her Army--Marries a French adventurer--Visit to our Camp--Her palace--Rumours of an invasion of our territory by the Shieks near Ferozepoor--Lord Gough at Umballa--News from the Punjaub--The Rannie or Queen had dethroned Dulep Sing--Ordered to Punjaub--Sketch of the Sing dynasty--Three French officers revolutionize the Army and bring it under the French model--They possess the whole of the Punjaub Peshwa--An eye on Bengal--Advised to become allies--Treaty with Lord Auckland--The Queen makes away with the three eldest sons--Her paramour, Lal Sing--Confines the youngest in the harem--Lord Gough at Mudkee--Sir R. Sale killed--Ferusha--50th and 62nd Foot--Ignorance at Meerut of all their movements--March on the Sutledge--Sad evidences _en route_ of late havoc. [Sidenote: General Arbuthnot and the 16th.] Old companionship of regiment is never forgotten in the service. We had beside us now in cantonment the Fortieth Foot, a corps that had served in times gone by with the 16th in the Peninsular wars and at Waterloo. They had now been four years in Afghanistan, were present at Kilat, Gilzie and Candahar. Having plenty of money on hand, after our late campaign, we often fraternized with them, and indeed were boon companions as far as we could in the pleasures and enjoyments of camp life at Meerut. Dinners and parties, at which I am sorry to add much intoxication prevailed, was an every-day occurrence. So much was revelling carried on that on General Arbuthnot coming to the station to assume command, and when at dinner with the Colonel, the state of the regiment was the subject of discussion. This was the question, "What would you do, Colonel, if your regiment was required to-morrow morning for immediate service; they are all drunk and wandering about anywhere." This matter was soon settled by a heavy wager--I suppose merely in name--by the Colonel, who stated the regiment would be out at daylight in the morning--it was then ten o'clock--and if any man was absent, or should fall off his horse, the bet was forfeited. The Adjutant, Lieutenant Dynon, gave orders at once to sound "boot and saddle," the regiment to turn out half-an-hour before daylight. The trumpeters did their duty, galloped all over the lines sounding the alarm; the men tumbled in from all directions. The hour named for the parade arrived--the regiment, complete, not a man absent, stood out on the plain awaiting the General and his staff. They, accompanied by a number of ladies, put in an appearance. The roll was called in front of them, and with the exception of ninety-seven men, invalids in hospital, every man of the corps was present. To test the regiment more thoroughly, twenty-four difficult movements were gone through at a gallop, then we advanced in review order, every horse covered with foam. The General, of course, could do nothing after losing his wager, and witnessing our splendid movements, but compliment us most highly. As we marched back to cantonments we were wildly cheered by native and European regiments, and as a reward we received from the Colonel a few more days' leave for enjoyment. Dinner parties and suppers commenced again, and continued well up to the time the Fortieth were ordered to Calcutta, to embark for England. [Sidenote: 9th Lancers for Umballa.] In July the rainy season commences. It falls in torrents three weeks at a time, forming deep nullas or ravines, which make it difficult, indeed dangerous, to get about, and this lasts till after the middle of August. In November, the Ninth Lancers came up from Cawnpore, and as we had not met them, or at least the two regiments had not been together since eighteen hundred and eighteen, what could be expected than that another fraternization as had taken place with the Fortieth would be repeated. This I need hardly say occurred, and continued till the 9th marched for Umballa. We now enter the months when fruit and vegetables get ripe, and many a visit we had from the natives to our camp, driving or rather leading their tattoos on poneys laden with luxurious fruit. The mango is here very plentiful, and it may be interesting to describe it, the most delicious fruit in the world. The tree is about the size of a large oak; the fruit, when ripe, is of a greenish yellow, with reddish cheeks, the skin, when removed, presents a sort of jelly; a small stone, the size of a peach stone, in the middle. We eat them out of a large pan, in which is first placed some cold water. We had also plentiful supplies of guava, custard fruit, plantain, bananna, and water-melon of the size of an English beer-barrel for three pice, or a penny. [Sidenote: Queen marries a French adventurer.] Some five miles from Meerut cantonments is a town called Sedanna, where the Begum or Queen resided, who was once the monarch of this district, subject only to the once powerful Mogul of Delhi, but at this time a pensioner of the East India Company. There is a curious story told of this extraordinary woman, and I will here give it. She was the favourite of a Rajah who reigned some years back. She was instrumental in raising a revolt, and then urged him to fly, which he did. She, of course, accompanied him, but carried in a palanquin. While in this conveyance she pretended to stab herself, and screamed wildly. When the Rajah heard it, thinking she had been assassinated--not a very uncommon thing in India--he plunged a poniard into his heart, and died on the spot. No sooner was the Rajah dead than she jumped on a horse, galloped back, surrounded by her guards, collected the army, harangued them, saying she would now lead them to victory. They cheered. She did lead them against a powerful enemy, and by her perseverance--a second Joan of Arc--conquered. She was established in the favour of her army, who confirmed her Queen. Subsequently she married a French adventurer, Sombra Dyce, and made him general. He, being a Roman Catholic, converted her, at least nominally, built a chapel, which I have been in, and in which she had a tomb erected to the memory of the old Rajah, her first husband. There is also another to that of Sombra Dyce, her second. She had two sons by her second marriage, who were always at law with the old East India Company, claiming some possessions of their mother; but I could never learn the result, as the appeals were frequent to the Home Government. She was now getting old, but frequently came to our cantonment, as she was friendly with our Colonel, and loved to see the 16th Lancers. She has even been to our theatre, and whenever, in passing, she saw any children, always threw them handfuls of silver coin. A number of her people had embraced Christianity, who were ministered to by a regular priest. Whenever we strolled out to her palace we were received very kindly, were allowed the use of her billiard tables, as all the furniture was of European make, and many a good picnic we enjoyed in the mango grove of the palace. On Sunday, the thirteenth November, 1845, as we were marching from church, news soon spread that war had again broken out, and the Meerut division were to make forced marches to join Lord Gough, who had pushed on from Umballa, as the Sikhs had crossed into our territory in large force near Ferozepoor. The Cawnpore and Delhi divisions were also to move up in haste. This was astounding news to men so long in India as most of the 16th had been, but nevertheless all felt glad--in fact rejoiced--at the prospects of another good campaign, so eager were our men for it that the sick in hospital, such as were convalescent, would persuade the surgeon they were well enough, and begged to be let go with the regiment. [Sidenote: Sketch of the Sing dynasty.] Before starting, we had learned a civil war had broken out in the Punjaub. The Rannie had dethroned Dulep Sing, the rightful heir, the army was divided--one half for her, and the other against--and this state of things had been going on for several months; we then, the army of Her Majesty, as is always the case, had to set matters right. Before entering upon any further particulars, a short history of the Sing family will not be out of place. Runjeit Sing was the founder of the dynasty; he was a powerful chief, having conquered all the smaller chiefs around him, established himself as Maha Rajah at Lahore. In time, two French officers came along from Persia, soldiers of fortune, as such men are to be found everywhere, ready for anything as long as they get good pay. These men had served under the first Napoleon. One of them offered to raise a regiment to imitate the old French Imperial Guards, and the other made similar offers to raise one of cavalry. The offer was accepted. Both regiments were risen to the satisfaction of the Rajah; he made the first a General, the second a Colonel. To one, the General, he gave one of his daughters to wife. Subsequently, another Frenchman came into the county, named La Court, and his services were accepted, so that between the three old French soldiers the Rajah raised a powerful and well-equipped force; and having defeated a powerful neighbouring chief at Rungier, or the seven-hilled city, he became master of the whole Punjaub, or country of five rivers. After these successes he attacked the Afghans, drove them out of Pesheva, and took possession of the entrance of the Kyber, where he built the fort alluded to previously in this work, called Junrood. Runjeit Sing signifies, in their language, Fierce Lion. When he succeeded thus far in his conquests it became apparent he had an eye on Bengal, and thought he could drive the British back to the sea. His French generals, however, told him different, advising him not to interfere with them, or he might lose all. Craftiness, and perhaps fear, caused him to become an ally, as he made a treaty with Lord Auckland, signing it on the banks of the Sutledge river, bringing very valuable presents to be sent to our Queen. Four sons survived him, named Currick Sing, Nunihall Sing, Sheer Sing, and Dulep Sing. The first three were easily made away with by assassination, by the favourite Queen, who had the youngest, Dulep, placed in the harem, where old Runjeit had five hundred wives and concubines. Having accomplished all this, she united the contending parties under her paramour, Lal Sing, meditating an attack upon the East India Company territories. They assembled at the fort of Umritsa seventy thousand strong, crossed the Sutledge before our Government were aware of their doings. [Sidenote: Lord Gough at Mudkee.] [Sidenote: Sad evidences of late havoc.] Their first action was with Lord Gough, at Mudkee, 19th December, 1845, where he was encamped. The men, when surprised, were preparing their morning meal; they soon, however, got in fighting trim, some in their shirt-sleeves. The 3rd Light Dragoons, assisted by the fiftieth foot and others, gained a complete victory over them. It was here General Sir R. Sale got killed. Lord Gough pushed on that night, 21st December, and came on the main body encamped at Ferusha, fought them all that day, 22nd, and but for a ruse would have been surely defeated. Ammunition falling short, a troop of Horse Artillery galloped off to Ferospoor for a supply. The enemy's cavalry, seeing them through a cloud of sand, imagined their retreat was being cut off, panic-stricken, they bolted, when the 3rd Light Dragoons and 4th Native Cavalry charged under a heavy fusilade from the infantry--50th and 62nd--completely routed them from their position. In this charge, Colonel Somerset, aide to Lord Gough, was killed. The Meerut division knew nothing of all this until we arrived at Muddkee on the 1st January, when the sights we met confirmed our suspicion. At first we came across dead camels, then, on approaching the village, several of our native regiment soldiers came out to greet us. A sad sight indeed--some bandaged almost from head to foot; arms and legs off. All left behind in the hurry to keep up with the enemy. On laying out our picket guard with the Quarter-Master General, as I was in the advanced guard, we came upon a heap of sand, out of which part of a man's hand projected; also, a little further on, part of a hand and wrist, with so much of the cuff of a coat as showed a 50th button. We, of course, performed the duty of burying all such, as the pursuing army had no time. Making a reconnaisance with my captain, we entered a kind of park-like enclosure, and here we found traces of the fearful work of Gough's engagement. Men, horses, and camels lay in heaps unburied, vultures in hundreds feasting on them; none had been touched, all lay as they fell. The Sikhs lay in heaps under their guns, the Light Dragoons as they fell from their horses, the tents of the blind half-hundred still standing, knapsacks around in all directions. The guns we secured, and fatigue parties performed the sickening duty of burying the dead. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER VI. Hureka Gaut--Sir Harry Smith ordered to intercept Rungour Sing--Joined by 77th foot--March--View of Buddural--Opened fire--16th to hold ground while infantry push on--Too weak to fight yet--Baggage cut off--Some of 31st foot made prisoners--Treatment of their sergeant by the enemy--Push into Loodianna--News of their retreat--Ordered to intercept--Arrival at fort--Harem--Finding two bags of rupees--Reinforced and advance--Order of troops--Battle of Aliwal commenced--Sir Harry's telescope cut in two--"Lancers, three cheers for our Queen"--Charge--A square of guards--Corporal Newsom--Bravery--Killed--Green flag in his hand--"Immortalized 16th"--Fearful loss--Join another squadron--Pursuit to river--Destruction--Wounded to village--March to join Lord Gough--Two hundred cannon belching together--Sobraon 10th February--Description of battle--British flag planted--The bridge blown up--Charge the entrenchments--Victory and end of Sikh War--Losses--Labour--Chiefs bring out the young Maharajah--Reception in Lord Hardinge's marquee--Terms--Crowning the young King--Proud Shieks--Retort on our Sepoys. [Sidenote: Joined by the 77th Foot.] After this melancholy duty was performed, we pushed on to the Sutledge river, to overtake Lord Gough, and on the 5th January reached Hureka Gaut, encamping on the right of his Lordship's division. We lay here till the 15th, when General Sir Harry Smith was ordered to intercept Rungour Sing, he having crossed the river higher up, and burnt Loodianna, one of our stations. On the third day's march Sir Harry sent back for reinforcements, and the 16th Lancers, with a troop of artillery, was sent to him. We made forced marches in order to overtake him, which we did at Jugram; here we were joined by the 77th, having been pushed up from Calcutta. On the evening of the 20th we received orders to leave all our tents and baggage; subsequently the order to take all was given, and we mounted at 3 o'clock next morning, stopping at eight to roll our cloaks. As we were doing so, some of the look-out descried the enemy's cavalry. We remounted, and, as usual, I was sent on the advance picket. [Sidenote: Arrival at fort.] A large body of cavalry-men were moving in front, parallel with us. Soon we made a sand-hill, and on going up it saw the Fort heavily mounted with cannon, thousands of bayonets glittering in the morning sun. This was Buddiwal, a village lying between us and it. We halted till the body of the regiment came up, when a battery opened on us. The 31st foot behind could scarcely travel up--the sand was so deep. Sir Harry rode to our colonel, telling him to keep ground with the artillery till all the infantry had passed on, as he did not intend to fight them that day, but would pass on to Loodianna. They were 20,000 strong, we only about 4,000. Here was evidently some error, or some order neglected, for the baggage was too far in rear instead of being well up behind the column. As soon as these flying columns of cavalry saw the unprotected state of the baggage, they who had been seen moving parallel with us, dashed like a thick cloud, cut off our camels with the tents, bedding, money-chests, capturing also the guard of the 31st regiment, a sergeant and twelve men. That night was one of debauch over the spoils. They cruelly treated their prisoners. The Sikh soldiers run a red-hot iron through the sergeant's body. This treatment they would all have received, but it came to the ears of their General who stopped it. We, pushing on, got to Loodianna, and found great havoc had been committed. The barracks and mess-house had been burned, after the 50th left to join the army. What few troops we found there were our native soldiers, and they were shut up in the fort. Here we remained till the 23rd, until some of our elephants with tents and baggage, who had escaped from the raid and gone a long way round, came up. On 23rd January, Sir Harry received intelligence; the enemy were in full retreat from the fort, and cavalry and horse artillery went off at a gallop to intercept them. Sir Harry was too late; when we got to the fort it was deserted--they had the start of us. Ordered to dismount and enter the fort, we found they had burnt the bedding, money-chests and tents, taking with them all of value, and it was quite apparent they hurried away, fearing we would come down on them from Loodianna. The town also bore the marks everywhere of a quick departure. On entering the palace, we found it undisturbed, profusely furnished with European furniture; and on going into one of the best rooms, my comrade and I heard some women scream. Rushing to where the sound proceeded from--an adjacent room--we saw some of our native cavalry ill-treating two women--Circassians--who had belonged to the Rajah's harem. They were forcing their jewellery off them. On seeing two white soldiers, they ran to us. By persuasion, and at times by threats, they showed us where some money was hid. Taking us into the Seraglio, they pointed out a black stone near a fire stove. The floor of this apartment was made of marble, chequered black and white. On lifting the stone pointed out, we discovered two bags containing rupees. Counting them in camp, one had three hundred, the other four hundred and fifty. The girls were beautiful Circassian slaves, and could not have cost less than one thousand rupees each. They were much obliged to us, saying, "Company Dewoy, thank you, thank you." We had great fun that night in camp, appropriating anything found of use. We killed cows and sheep, made cakes, had plenty of milk, and, besides, the two young Circassians attended on us. [Sidenote: Battle of Aliwal.] Reinforcements of infantry constantly arriving from Lord Gough, on the 26th we numbered 10,000 fighting men, and on the 28th we were to march to meet the enemy, who had re-crossed the Sutledge, and added to their number 4,000 men, making them 24,000 in all. We marched in solid square; cavalry in front, then infantry, artillery in centre, and cavalry in rear. The enemy were in sight, as reported by our advance picket, at eight o'clock. As we got near, they moved out of camp, and deployed into line. The 16th Lancers, with the 5th native cavalry and two troops of horse artillery, were ordered to the left. Two regiments of native cavalry, with horse artillery and 31st and 50th foot in centre, all flanked by four regiments of native infantry. The enemy commenced the action at half-past eight, opening a heavy cannonade from the village of Aliwal, their centre--their line reaching three miles from right to left. Very soon the 31st and 50th stormed the village. Colonel Cureton, of the 16th, Brigadier of Cavalry, turned the enemy's left by a rapid movement of cavalry and artillery. On the right a large body of choice Sikh troops were coming down through a wood to outflank us. On this being apparent, our left wing--the 16th Lancers and the 5th Native Cavalry--charged, putting them to the route. I was acting as orderly to Sir Harry, and just where we stood a shell from the enemy, as it flew above us, burst overhead, a piece falling and cutting his telescope in two, as he took it from his eye. This seemingly vexed Sir Harry, for he immediately despatched me to Major Smyth, commanding the right wing, with orders to take that battery. As I delivered the order I fell in with my troop. In front was a battalion of the Rajah's Guards in square. Major Smyth shouted, "Boys, three cheers for the Queen."--"Lancers charge." Away we went as fast as horses could gallop, right through the square, and away to the battery of guns, sabering the gunners, and captured and spiked the guns. An incident is here worthy of recording. The square was just broken by a corporal named Newsome, leaping his horse right into it. As he jumped he shouted, "Here goes, boys; death or a commission!" Unfortunately for the country, and the service, to which he was an ornament, he was killed, and when found, after the square was broken, he had nineteen bayonet stabs on his body, with the green standard of Mahomet in the grasp of his hand. My lieutenant was wounded, and the Cornet killed here, the Sergeant-Major severely wounded. We were separated from the wing. I gave the word "about," and as we came back, it was as bad as going to the front. The enemy were scattered, firing in every direction. Our Major fell from his horse wounded. Him we brought to the rear, when we met the General, who shouted: "Well done 16th, you have immortalized yourselves to-day." Missing so many officers, he added: "Where are your officers--all wounded or dead?" [Sidenote: "Immortalized 16th."] On being informed, he desired me to take the remnant of the troop and join the squadron going over the hill there, pointing them out. I had 45 men out of 87. We joined the other squadron just in time; it was commanded by Major Beer, and was just about charging another square, enfiladed by artillery; having done so, a retreat of the whole enemy was the result. We followed in pursuit to the river; our guns cut their bridge of boats; the flying enemy took to the water--and such a sight!--men, horses, camels, artillery all swamping together. Our gunners, in addition, shelling them from the shores. This was the last of glorious Aliwal. We formed on the bank, cavalry and artillery. Sir Harry passed along our front as we gave a ringing cheer, his hat in hand. "Men," said he, "it is I should cheer you, for you did the work. Your Queen and country shall know of it." Then another ringer. And now for the melancholy part of the work. [Sidenote: Wounded to the village.] We had not tasted meat or drink since six o'clock in the morning; it was now evening. We had five miles to go over to collect the wounded, and bury the dead. The carnage was fearful; horses, dead and mutilated most fearfully, as they plunge very much when wounded. Several were trying to get about on three legs; we killed these outright. Where the fighting was close, as in square, men's bodies were thickest; wounded in all conceivable ways; jaws shot away; often heads; some disemboweled. But enough--it is not pleasant to remember, particularly some who were near comrades; we lost in all seventy-six officers and men killed, seventy-seven wounded, and one hundred and sixty horses. Five thousand of the enemy had been killed, besides a number drowned in the river on the retreat. We captured fifty pieces of artillery and all their camp. It was laughable to see a man of the 31st lugging to his camp an elephant, by a piece of rope tied to his trunk, and another with three camels tied together. In the evening I was ordered to take some wounded to the hospital at the village, two miles back. On getting there, the wounded were laid out on straw down the centre street, the surgeons busy in their shirt sleeves amputating arms and legs by the light of torches. Riding back in the dark we could plainly hear the groans of the wounded and dying Sikhs; we could not help them, and even if we attempted, they have been known, even when almost dead, stretching out their hand and stabbing a Sepoy or one of our own, who may have been near them. However, all of ours were collected; when we got back the army was preparing to bivouac for the night on the field. The following day was spent in preparing lists of wounded and killed, and seeing the former as comfortable as possible under cover of tents. On the 30th the wounded and the guns captured were sent to Loodianna. During the charge of the 16th Lancers through the squares of the Imperial Guards, a sergeant of my troop received a musket shot in the left side, and his horse also was shot dead. Then he was attacked by four Sikhs; he defended himself bravely with his sword, having cut down three. The fourth was about to finish him when a little Ghoorka at a distance levelled his rifle and shot the foe, thus saving the sergeant. Yet he died a few days after. These Ghoorkas are small hill-tribe men. Under the Company there are three battalions, officered by British officers, and good soldiers they are, loyal and brave. They carry three formidable knives in the shape of a sickle, and they have been known to kill a bear or tiger single-handed. They are recruited from the tribes in the Himalaya Mountains beyond Simla and Nina Tal. The officers and merchants, who reside on the hills during the hot season, keep a number of these small hill men as servants to carry the jompam, or fetch wood and water, each family dressing them in Highland costume. They are very honest and industrious. Numbers of them come in from the valleys with walnuts and other fruits for sale. [Sidenote: March to join Lord Gough.] The scenery at the stations on the hills north of Bengal is grand. Simla and Missuri, 14,000 feet above the sea level. The air is pure and bracing, far above the mountains tower to 27,000 feet. When the sun is setting in the west the view is splendid, as you see the glaciers reflecting a thousand different colours. Then to look down into the valleys below, far below, the roads are cut around the sides of the hills, and you journey up from hill to hill, like going round so many sugar loaves. Rose trees grow here to the size of oaks. The birds are of gorgeous plumage, such as the Argus pheasant, the Mango bird. The bantam fowl are numerous in the woods. Strawberries and nectarines are in abundance, growing on the sides of the hills. The natives bring in numbers of leopard and bear skins, also bears' grease. Butterflies are beautiful also; beetles of a large size, such as the elephant and stag beetle. I have made up cases of each that went at 16 rupees or 32 shillings. The mule is the only carrying animal who can travel round these roads with any safety. The ladies are conveyed in jampanns, by four natives, a sort of palanquin, which swings on a pole. All being arranged, the following day we marched to join Lord Gough, who with the main body are at Hureka Gaut. As we marched along the villagers generally welcomed us with salaams. [Sidenote: Battle of Sobraon.] Lord Ellenborough had been succeeded as Governor-General by Lord Hardinge. He, with General Gough, come out to meet Sir Harry and his division. We halted, and both rode along our front, giving us great praise for our victory at Aliwal on the 28th. We marched into camp, and occupied a position on the right of the Army. Here we waited five days, worried with picket and guard duty, waiting for the siege guns being brought from Delhi by elephants. The enemy, we learned, were in a strong position, well fortified, a sort of half-moon, each horn resting on the Sutledge, with a bridge of boats in their rear, either to bring up supplies with, or to retreat by--under the command of Lall Sing, the Queen's favourite general. On the morning of the tenth of February we formed, an hour before daybreak, not a sound of trumpet or drum being heard. All was done silently. At daybreak our mortars opened the ball by sending shell into the enemy's position. At six we were answered, and over two hundred pieces of ordnance roared away on both sides. A thirty-two pound ball, spent, struck one of our elephants, and as it was the first we saw wounded, we could not help laughing--indeed, the entire army burst into laughter--though to laugh in such a scene seems almost incredible. He had been hit on the rump, and to see him cantering and galloping over that field, upsetting everything almost he came across was indeed a sight. On the same field a fox started between the two armies, and as the soldier's dog always follows him, one followed the fox, but from the confusion at the time I lost sight of them, though the fox stood some time confined, not knowing what way to get clear. At nine the infantry began their work by firing all along the line--the 31st ordered to charge at a break made by our guns. They did, and were repulsed by a heavy discharge of grape and canister. The 10th were then ordered to advance and take part, and in a short time both regiments, vieing with each other, made an entrance at the point of the bayonet, one of the 31st mounted on the breastwork with the British flag. It was completely perforated with shot, yet the man was charmed, for he was not touched. He afterwards got a commission. The 16th Lancers with a battery of Artillery, were ordered up to command the bridge. The battery put in red-hot shot and destroyed the bridge. The centre boat forming the bridge was filled with combustibles. It was their intention, had they to retreat, to draw us away after them, and then blow us up. Now commenced hot work. We and the Infantry got into their intrenched position. All fought like tigers, the Sikhs disputed every inch of ground down to the river bank, and into it while they could stand. They fought till about two o'clock, when the battle was ours. The river was all bloody and choked with bodies now added to those that had by this time floated down from Aliwal; and, strange, the water had risen two feet through the jamming caused by this obstruction. Thus ended the battle of Sobraon, and with it the Sikh war of 1845-46. Our loss was one hundred and fifty officers and eight hundred rank and file. General Dick was killed. The enemy left 16,000 dead and wounded on the field. [Sidenote: Reception in Lord Hardinge's marquee.] Our Engineers, on the 12th of February, constructed a bridge. We crossed over and marched towards their capital, Lahore. The country was in a deplorable state through the previous civil war. The agricultural and mercantile classes were ruined. As we neared the city, after a seven days' march, not knowing how we would be received, the principal chiefs and ministers made their appearance, bringing the young heir, Dulep, a boy, with them, and to make terms with the Governor-General they were received in his Lordship's marquee, with a troop of the 9th and one of the 16th around inside the tent. They begged hard that the British flag should not float on the walls of Lahore, when his Lordship asked what compensation was to be had for the blood of his countrymen shed, when they, without provocation, invaded the Company's territory, "Yes," he added, without reply, "the flag of England shall float over your walls," he would crown the young Maharajah and take the Doab, the territory on the banks of the Sutledge up to Loodianna, as compensation for the expense such acts had entailed. On the 21st we marched on to the plain in front of the city, and encamped opposite the gate called Delhi gate. The city is surrounded by high walls flanked by towers mounting one hundred guns of large calibre, the whole surrounded by a deep moat. The river Ravie flows through the city. The most beautiful building was the Seraglio, the residence of the Rungeets, six hundred concubines. Many a fair woman was in there at that time, mostly from Circassia, captured by the Turcoman horse, in their raids among the Circassian villages, and brought to the fairs held in India every seven years for that purpose near the source of the Ganges. [Sidenote: Departure of the French officers.] On the 26th of February the young Maharajah was crowned in the presence of the British Army and an immense throng of natives. The day following, Lall Sing came in with 10,000 of his troops and surrendered. They laid down their arms as they marched past us, our Sepoys boasting they had defeated them. They retorted, saying, "No, you black pigs, but it was the Europeans who had. The English were brave, and they had fought them well." The Sikhs are a fine body of men--tall, good looking, and very proud. They had mostly been organized and drilled by French officers in Rungeit Sing's time, but after his death and the civil war commenced, the Frenchmen left, crossing to the Company's territories, some going home to France. It is certain Avitavoolie took his wife, who was the daughter of the Rungeit, and his daughter to Paris, to have them educated. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER VII. Sir H. Lawrence--Orders for home--Re-cross Sutledge--Jerosha--Scenes of previous engagement--Meerut--Leave for Calcutta--Down Ganges--Col. Cureton's farewell--Dum Dum--Calcutta, city, grand Ball--Sights--Embark for home--Bay of Bengal--Ascension--St. Helena--Doru Cliffs--Boats coming off--Relatives--March to Canterbury--Furlough--London--Meet Sisters and Mother--Deal--Battle--Anniversary--Buckingham Palace--Reviewed by Her Majesty--Claim Discharge--Causes--Take Ship for South Africa. [Sidenote: Orders for home.] Peace was proclaimed on the 4th March, and Sir Henry Lawrence was appointed to remain as Resident, with a few of our troops, to protect the young king. On the following day Sir Harry Smith told us the Commander-in-Chief would now send us home, and volunteering would be opened for two regiments, the 3rd Light Dragoons and 9th Lancers. Any of us who chose might remain, however. Under the influence of arrick, a mad drink, the 9th got one, and the 3rd got ninety, of our men. The remnant, with the 31st Foot, left on the 8th of March for Calcutta. Before leaving, we were highly complimented by Lords Hardinge and Gough, and wished a safe voyage. Our bands struck up "Home, Sweet Home," and I remember how sweet the very sound of that air seemed so far away from home,--when one thought of the dear old land, and those dearer still who were uncertain as to whether most of us were living or dead. [Sidenote: Calcutta. Grand ball.] Pushing on now, on a different errand, we re-crossed the well-known Sutledge River, came to Ferusha, where we fought on the 22nd and 23rd December, 1845; and, after pitching tents, rambled over the field, one we had left in hot pursuit of the enemy. Words cannot be found to describe our horror on finding all around was still as death; not a living soul to be seen, the village completely deserted, heaps of men, horses and camels lying there for three months unburied; the infantry, just as they fell, clothed complete; the dragoons the same way accoutred and spurred; the horses and camels in the ditch just as they fell. We did as much as we could, and went on towards Meerut, where we arrived on the 2nd May, being met by the band of the 14th Light Dragoons, who played us to the station. We were seven weeks from Lahore. Giving up our horses, we made all preparations for home by Calcutta, 900 miles from Meerut. We now sold our library, distributing the proceeds, together with the benevolent and canteen fund, among the men. This, with our prize money, after being separately awarded, was sent to our army agents in London, to be drawn when we reached home. On the 8th of May we started on foot for Gurmatesa Gaut, on the Ganges, just three days' march, where we were to take boats for Calcutta. Before embarking on the Ganges, a despatch was received from Lord Gough appointing our Colonel, Cureton, Adjutant-General of the Army in Bengal. He bade us a sorrowful good-bye, saying he came out with the regiment in 1822, hoped to go home with them, but this promotion frustrated that. "All the honours I have," said he, "and all the promotions I have received, I attribute to the brave men of the 16th." All shook hands with him, some went so far as to embrace him, and tears were shed, for he was a father to his men. We had a strange voyage down the Ganges, the water being low at this time of the year, and our men did almost as they pleased, so joyful were they at the prospect of going home. Few officers accompanied us, as many went over land to England. Sailing at night was dangerous, our boats were therefore moored; sandbars, stumps of immense trees, and an accumulation of rubbish met us everywhere. Our time was generally passed shooting flying-foxes, monkeys, alligators. We as often shot dead bodies as living, the Hindoos consigning all the dead to the waters of their goddess, Ganga. We reached Dum Dum, twelve miles from Calcutta, on 29th July, 1846, and as the ship at Calcutta was not ready, while she was getting so we took up quarters in the Artillery barracks at this station. Here we had a grand ball given by the citizens, and at which our newly-appointed Colonel and a sergeant's wife made the only couple who came out with the regiment. We had all the grandees of Calcutta up at it. Every tree for miles was illuminated; dancing was kept up all night. At this ball I met a young friend, who had been a comrade of mine, when he was one of us, but who, fortunately, had got married to a wealthy heiress, and was now settled near Calcutta, in a most beautiful mansion. I have introduced the reader before to Calcutta, but it was only a bird's-eye view from on board ship; now, however, as I had leisure to visit it and walk through its streets, I may give a more detailed description of it. Most of the wealthy people live outside, in the suburbs, such as the Dum Dum or Barrackpoor road. The city itself covers an area of sixteen square miles, and has some fine streets; the principal ones, at each corner have stands, where you can hire a pallankeen for a rupee, or two shillings, a day, to go shopping or visiting; four waiters carry it, two in front and two behind. They are beautifully got up, lined with silk cushions and generally have a crimson blind. The old city is of bamboo structure, thatched roofs, mostly inhabited by the lower order of natives. In the city proper the buildings are large and handsome, built mostly of brick, some of stone and marble. The brick houses seem very old, as if they had been built at a very early period. It is quite common to see elephants, mostly bearing some wealthy Rajah in his howda, georgeously attired, towards the water front. They are quite commonly used drawing heavy burdens, logs, &c. It is hardly credible, but they are so sagacious as to be used in bringing messages. I mean such as going alone for water. Camels may be met in strings bringing goods from all points of India. In the evening, the mall of Calcutta is the common cool resort. Here you may see all the fashionables, and people from all parts of the earth. The bazaars are very numerous; in any of them you can purchase for a small sum any article you require. There are also some very fine hotels. [Illustration: THE MONKEY TEMPLE AT BENARES.] [Sidenote: Embark for home.] [Sidenote: March to Canterbury.] On the 14th of August we marched to Calcutta to embark, two hundred and eighty-seven men all told. This was the remnant of eight hundred who marched to the Panjaub in 1845. The hottest day ever known in India was the day we embarked. Twelve men fell dead from the excess of heat; indeed, the authorities were blamed for ordering us out on such a day, on account of having some men who had been wounded, and a number of women and children on board. The captain put to sea at once, to avoid, if possible, any further sickness. On the 19th we got clear into the Bay of Bengal. The monsoons set in, and we had a succession of storms for three weeks. We cleared in good time Point de Galle; rounded Cape of Good Hope in the beginning of October, and ran for St. Helena. Here we took in fresh water. A French man-of-war, with troops from the island of Bourbon, anchored alongside of us. Of course, we fraternized as well as we possibly could, but the associations connected with St. Helena and England were not then as well smoothed down as now. The island stands alone like a large rock in mid-ocean. Passing the island of Ascension, nothing particular occurred till our arrival in the British Channel, on 23rd December, 1846. By daylight we looked on the land we loved, and saw patches of snow here and there, and as we had seen none for fifteen years, it was a sight we enjoyed. We felt all warmed up, and hearts beat high when we saw the white cliffs of Dover. We waited off Deal for a pilot, and being surrounded by bumboats, we found a difference in the desire to cheat with exorbitant prices for bread, butter or cheese, to what we had been used to by native Indians. The Ramsgate tug came off and took us to Gravesend, where we arrived on the evening of the 28th. Hundreds of boats put off, filled with relatives--mothers, sisters, brothers and old sweethearts--to welcome the living heroes, or hear some sad talk of the absent. The sight was heart-rending in some instances. One poor mother, hearing of her son having been killed at Sobraon, threw herself into the water, frantic, and with difficulty was rescued. In the afternoon two war steamers took us aboard for Herne Bay, to save us the march, as our station was Canterbury, and it was distant from the bay only seven miles. On landing, one of the men fell out, and actually knelt and kissed the ground, a bystander in the crowd saying, "Bless his soul, how he loves the old sod;" and many came and shook hands, not only with him but with all within reach. Omnibusses and waggons were ready for the sick, and women and children. We got leave to breakfast for a short time, and what a rush for the hotels. Storming an enemy's fort was nothing to it. Assembling at nine, we marched to Canterbury. Here, the Mayor and Corporation, accompanied by two bands, came to meet us. Between laurel branches in profusion, music from two bands, crowds of ladies and gentlemen in carriages, citizens on foot shouting, huzzahing and handkerchief-waving, we got a right royal reception in the famous old city; and as the officers commanding considered it no use to close the gates, or attempt to confine us within walls, we were allowed two days' leave, to do as we pleased. [Sidenote: "Home, sweet home."] On the first of January I received my month's furlough. I started for London. The day was very cold and snowing; how pleasant for me, just home from the hottest spot on earth. A cab soon brought me to Westminster, where my parents resided; I reached home at half-past eleven a.m. My sisters, when I left, were children, in those few years had grown women. One of them opened the door in answer to my knock, and fainted on seeing one of the 16th, not perhaps that she recognized me, as I was bronzed with the sun and heavily bearded. This brought my mother; dear old mother, how one does get fond of mother, when separated from her, and away, as I was in India, from her kind care. Ah, mother, I remember you yet, though I am old now, as you fell into my arms, and almost swooned. My sisters had to remove her, till by the aid of restoratives they got her round; then, such a look, sadness and joy combined. It was me, though the many reports of the fearful suffering of my regiment, she could believe until she saw me herself, whether her eyes would ever see her son again. Yes, mother, Thy image is still--the dearest impressed on my heart, And the tablet so faithful--in death must be still Ere a trace of that image departs. My father was, of course, rejoiced to see me, and so were all my old friends and acquaintances. The charges of Aliwal and Sobraon were in every one's mouth, and as I was the only man on leave near my home, I had many an enquiry how I felt, and how this and that was done. In this way, a month, the extent of my furlough, was not long in passing, and I had to rejoin my regiment. I might have stated before, I was in full charge of my troop all the way home; we had no officers, and I was the senior sergeant. The reader will therefore be as much surprised as I was, on joining my corps, to find the vacancy of troop serjeant-major filled by the promotion of a man from the depôt, without any fault whatever to me, as I was fully competent in every respect, but merely to please the whim of some depôt officer. I was very much stung to think I was the only serjeant left alive at Aliwal, had brought my men home, and that one who had never crossed the English Channel should be promoted over me. From Canterbury we went to Deal, as a riot was feared at the election. Here we met our old comrades, the 31st Foot, just home from India. In May, 1847, we were ordered to Brighton, in Sussex. Our route lay through Battle, near Hastings, where William the Conqueror defeated Harold, paying a visit to the Abbey. Here the King (Harold) was buried; his tomb is over-grown with ivy. An ancient painting of the battle may be seen in the great hall, with two statues of Saxon warriors on each side. We reached Brighton on the seventh of May. In this fashionable watering-place we commemorated the second anniversary of Aliwal with a grand ball, at which were the Duke of Wellington, Prince Albert, the officers of all the Guards regiments, and the fashionables from the Metropolis; the pavilion was filled on the occasion--twenty of our troopers, medal-men, lining the grand stairway. One entire regiment went to the theatre, where Jenny Lind sang. [Sidenote: Reviewed by Her Majesty.] Fearing a Chartist riot in London, at a great meeting to be held on Kensington Common, we were ordered up on the 10th April. We stopped two days, and then proceeded, three troops to Ipswich, five to Norwich. Here we remained till the spring of 1849, breaking young horses, and getting ready for a grand review by Her Majesty. In May we got the route for Hounslow, one troop to Kensington, to do Royal Escort duty. I had the honour of being one of the escort of Her Majesty on the 24th May, from Nine-Elms station to Buckingham Palace. On the 26th following, before the Iron Duke, Prince Albert, Her Majesty, and a host of the aristocracy, we paraded and went through a field-day, charging as we did at Aliwal, and only stopped with the horses' heads over the carriage of Her Majesty. Here, after the review, she pinned on our breasts the Medals for the Punjaub. Not feeling exactly pleased as to the way I was treated, after many days' serious consideration, I determined to leave the regiment, as I could now claim a free discharge, having completed twelve years' service. I might have remained till my time of double service had expired, when I would be entitled to a pension. Stung by seeing a man my serjeant-major who should not be, and knowing I had earned the step well, I applied for my discharge at once. The Colonel met me with apologies and excuses, promising to recommend me for a Commission, and so on, but feeling the position, if I did get it, would be more than I could manage, on the pay which I would have to support my rank on, I declined, and in time got what I asked for, leaving the corps almost heart-broken. [Sidenote: Take ship for South Africa.] In July following I got the appointment of Steward, East India United Service Club, in London, and entered upon those duties immediately. In June, 1850, a gentleman whom I saw at the Club was going to settle in South Africa. He intended to breed horses, and had selected a large tract of land at Georgetown, on the Nysena river, for that purpose. With him I made an engagement, sailing on the good ship _Devonshire_, on the 15th July, and as I was fortunate in India to arrive on the breaking out of hostilities, so the reader will find I was equally fortunate on reaching the Cape, though a civilian, to find men were wanted to stem the insurrection and rebellious spirit of the Kaffirs, which is portrayed in the next chapter. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER VIII. The religion of the Hindoos--Castes--Brahmins--Kshatriyas--Vaisyas--Sudras--Sub-division by mixed marriages--The Triune Godhead: Brahma the centre, Vishnu the preserver or sustainer, and Siva, the destroyer--The Hindoo Pantheon--Brahmin place of worship--The Sacred Cow--Transmigration of souls--Degrees of punishment for various sins--The fate of the murderer, the adulterer, the unmerciful. Before proceeding further in this work, it will be interesting to the reader to understand something of the religion, what it springs from, and the certain peculiarities in the intermixture of the several Hindoo families, giving rise to the several castes and ranks to which each is born to, and in which they must continue, or progress by marriage in the higher scale when allowed by their code of laws. I have been to a great deal of trouble in procuring this information, as it is not found in many writings of that country, and will, therefore, be new to a great many. [Sidenote: Division of the Hindoo races.] From the earliest period of which any records are extant, the Hindoo races have been divided as a people into four distinct classes or castes, designated Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras, originating with the creation of the world. Brahmins, according to their mythological creed, proceeding from the mouth of Brahma, the creator, the chief person of their theological belief--his mission was to rule and instruct. He formed the caste distinguished by the name Kshatriyas, which means sprung from the arms--of Brahma: and this deity's duty was to protect. Vaisyas, from his thighs; and the province allotted to this emanation of the deity was to trade, and cultivate the earth. Sudra, the most abject, as produced from the feet of Brahma, was doomed to be the servant or slave of the superior caste; the four forming the yet existing classes or castes of priests--soldiers, husbandmen or traders, and labourers. The division of these four classes are, however, extended; and in the fourteenth century B.C. the number of mixed classes recognized by their laws of Menu had become very considerable. Of these we may mention the classes which have sprung from the marriage of a man of the upper caste with a woman of an inferior class. 1st, Murdhabhishicta, by a Brahmin with a woman of the Kshatriya class: his duty is to teach military exercises. 2nd, Ambastha, by a Brahmin from a woman of the Vaisya class or caste: he is a medicine man. 3rd, Nishadhu, by a Brahmin from a woman of the Sudra class: his occupation is to catch fish. 4th, Mahishya, by a Kshatriya from a woman of the Vaisya class: his profession is music, astronomy and attendance on cattle. 5th, Ugra, by a Kshatriya from a woman of the Sudra class: his duty, according to Menu, is to kill or confine such animals as live in holes: he is also a bard or poet. 6th, Carana, by a Vaisya from a woman of the Sudra class: he is an attendant on princes, or secretary. [Sidenote: Sub-division of the Hindoo races.] The classes which have sprung from a marriage of a woman of the upper caste with a man of inferior caste is again sub-divided, and the offspring of such is considered inferior than the other, and also illegitimate. 1st, we will say Sota, by a Kshatriya from a woman of Brahmin rank: his occupation is managing horses and driving carts. 2nd, Vaidscha, by a Vaisya from a woman of the Brahmin class: his occupation is a waiter on women. 3rd, Chandola, by a Sudra from a woman of the Brahmin class: he is regarded the most impure of the whole race, and his business is to handle dead bodies, execute animals, and to officiate in the most abject employment. 4th, Mahada, by a Vaisya from a Kshatriya woman: his profession is, according to Menu, travelling with merchandise; he is also an economist or bard. 5th, Asygara, by a Sudra from a woman of the Vaisya class; he is a carpenter. And there is another class, Kohatti, by a Sudra from a Kshatriya woman: his occupation is killing or confining animals who live in trees. There are also other classes descending in the scale of impurity from mixed marriages. One of those most known is that of Pariahs; they are subject to labour of agriculture and to the filthiest duty of scavengers. With these there is no intercourse allowed, nor can one show the least sympathy for them, no matter how low or depressed they may be. [Sidenote: Hindoo deities.] The faith of these several castes centres in a triune godhead, Brahma the centre, Vishnu the preserver or sustainer, and Siva the destroyer. Brahma, the superior, always remains in holy solitude in the distance of the caste profound of measureless space, and is beyond the reach of superstition to profane by even ideal similitude; Vishnu and Siva are supposed to have been many times incarnate, and hence the imagination of the Hindoo has clothed them with a variety of visible forms, and each has become a distinct deity, to whom worship is daily addressed. The Hindoo Pantheon also includes a host of inferior deities or divinities. Nothing can be done without supernatural intervention, in consequence of which the elements, and every variety of animated nature, are placed under the immediate guardianship of one of the crowd of deities that throng the Brahmanical heaven. The goodly company is further augmented by myriads of demi-gods, many of whom are of the most wretched description. Thus, a little red paint smeared over a block of wood, a shapeless stone, or a lump of clay, makes it a deity, and a number of such monstrocities collected together indicate a Brahmin place of worship, and invite to some act of worship as debasing in its nature as its object is monstrous in conception. Among the animals which are the objects of Hindoo worship or adoration, and one that I shall have to refer to often, is the cow. This is the most sacred in most parts of India. The cow is frequently termed the "Mother of the gods," and many are kept by the well-to-do Hindoo for the sole purpose of worship. Circumstances are, however, at times even stronger than superstition itself, and then the poor, who derive their chief support from the labour of this useful animal so venerated, do not hesitate to work it hard and to feed it very sparingly. Besides the peculiar notions entertained by the Hindoo relative to superior beings and the worship to be paid them, those that refer to a future state form a prominent part of their theological system. Here the doctrine of transmigration of souls is a distinguishing feature. No people appear to have formed loftier ideas of its nature independently of its connection with matter. They carry the idea to so extravagant a height as to suppose the souls of both men and brute animals to have been originally portions of the Supreme mind, and consequently as participating in its eternity. The highest destiny to which a mortal can aspire is therefore reabsorbed into the divine essence, where the Hindoo's idea of supreme felicity receives its perfection, and the mind reposes on an unruffled sea of bliss. But to such a state only the most rigid ascetics who have spent a life of self-inflicted torture can aspire, the best deeds of an ordinary life cannot excite a hope of raising their author higher than one of the various heavens over which their multiplied divinities separately preside. But few are allowed to cherish the expectation of ascending to even the lowest of these, and the great body of believers have only to anticipate the consolations that flow from the transmigration of souls. [Sidenote: Punishments for sins.] As regards punishment, a series have been devised to suit the capabilities of the people and the irregular propensities of life. The institutes of Menu affirm that he who steals grain in the husk becomes a rat--should he take water, he is to be a diver--if honey, a large gnat, and if flesh, he is transformed into a vulture. The next birth of one who steals a deer or elephant is into a wolf, and if a carriage, the thief is sure to become a camel. When once sunk from the human to the brute creation, the Parana's assert that he must pass through many millions of births before he regains the human form. Their system of punishment is not however confined to these terrestrial transgressions. The all-multiplying system of the Hindoo theology has created a hundred thousand hells for those whom inferior evils could not deter from the commission of more heinous crimes. When the fatal moment arrives which changes their present position, they are hurried away through the space of 688,000 miles among the faithful rocks and eternal snows of the Himalaya mountains to the judgment seat of Yoma, where the god messengers await to convey them to their respective places of punishment, and here, too, the state of retribution is adapted to the nature of the crime. The murderer is fed on flesh and blood; the adulterer is to be embraced by an image of red-hot iron, and the unmerciful to be unceasingly bitten by snakes. Having endured this state of "penal servitude" for a period proportionate to the magnitude of their crimes, the first step to restoration is to pass a long series of ages in the form of some degraded animal, whence they ascend to the scale of being already described. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER IX. Delhi the ancient capital of the Mogul Empire--General description, population, &c.--The king's palace--Embattled walls and guns--Martello towers--Jumna Musjeed, or chief mosque--The tombs of the Humayoon, and of Sefjar Jung--The Shelima gardens--The ancient Patons, or Afghan conquerors of India--The celebrated Cattab Minar--The tomb of Humayoon--The aqueduct of Alikhan--College for Orientals and Europeans. Delhi being the ancient capital of the Mogul Empire, I will here give a description of it, as, having a few days leave from cantonment, I found it in my visit. It is situated on the eastern bank of the Jumna, and some 950 miles from Calcutta. It is walled and fortified, and has a population of somewhere near 200,000. It is between seven and eight miles round it, and may be about two miles across. The palace inhabited by the King stands in a very commanding position. The entire city is built on a rocky range of hills, and, as said, is surrounded by embattled walls and guns, with intervening Martello towers facing along the whole extent with good masonry, moats and glacis. Its chief houses are built of brick, the streets narrow; the principal avenues all wide and handsome, and for an Asiatic city, very clean. The bazaars along the avenues look remarkably pretty; formerly the city had some noble wide streets, but these have been divided by buildings all along the centre, and now spoil their appearance. The next principal buildings to the Palace is the Jumna Musjeed, or chief mosque. The tombs of the Emperor Humayoon, and of Sefjar Jung, and Cuttub Menir; and within the new city are the remains of many palaces. These structures are nearly all of red granite inlaid and ornamented with white marble; the general style is elegant, yet simple. The Palace, as seen from a distance, is very high, with gothic towers and battlements rising above any other building. It was built by Shah Jehan, and seems some sixty feet high, with two noble gateways. It is allowed by travellers to far surpass the Kremlin, in Moscow, in magnificence, or any other kingly residence. I thought, on looking at it, of our old Windsor Castle, and asked did any of them making the comparison ever see it. To my mind old Windsor surpasses it, except in its material. [Sidenote: The Shelima gardens.] The gardens known as the Shelima, and mentioned in Lalla Rookh, were formed by the same potentate, and are said to have cost the immense sum of 1,000,000 pounds; but they are now wild and allowed to go in ruins. The Mosque-Musjeed is considered the largest and most elegant temple of worship in India, it cost sixty lakhs of rupees, and Shah Jehan was six years in building it. It stands on a rocky eminence scarped for the purpose. A flight of thirty-five steps brings you to a beautiful gateway of red stones, the doors of which are covered with wrought brass. The terrace on which it is built is about 1600 yards square, and surrounded by an arched collonade with pavilions at convenient distances. In the centre stands a large marble cistern supplied by machinery with water from the canal. On the west side of the Mosque proper, of an oblong form, say 260 feet in length, its entire front is coated with large slabs of white marble, and compartments in the corner are inlaid with Arabic inscriptions in black. The mosque is approached by another flight, and surrounded by a marble dome at the flanks, as at all mosques, are minarets about 150 feet high, each having three projecting galleries of black marble and red stone alternately, their summits crowned with light pavilions of white marble. The ascent is by winding stairs of 180 steps of red stone. It is truly a noble structure, well worth this unequal description--for it must be seen to realize its beauty. It is said this mosque is maintained by a grant from our Government. Not far from the King's palace is another of red stone, used I suppose by that personage and his princes for intermediate times of worship. This one is surmounted with three gilt domes. Altogether there is some fifty mosques in this city, of more or less grandeur, some bear marks of great antiquity. One other, however, deserves a note in passing, and that one was erected in 1710 by the daughter of the great and mighty Arungzebee, and in which she is buried. Perhaps the oldest is the one erected by the ancient Patons or Afghan conquerors of India. It is of dark coloured granite, and of a different design, but exactly like the Arab mosques. [Sidenote: Cattab Minar--the Paton.] The prospect south of the Shulnia gardens, as far as the eye can reach, is covered with the remains of extensive gardens, pavilions, sepulchres, all connecting the town of Cattab with the capital, and through their neglected appearance, exhibiting one of the most striking scenes of desolation to be witnessed. The celebrated Cattab Minar is a very handsome round tower rising from a polygon of twenty-seven sides, in five different stages, gradually diminishing in circumference to the height of 250 feet, its summit crowned with a majestic cupola rising from four arcades of red granite is reached by a spiral staircase of 384 steps, and between each stage a balcony runs round the pillar. The Paton, erected by the old conquerors is almost in ruins, it was once a solid fortress, its architecture not sinking, but there remains a high black pillar of metal of Hindoo construction, originally covered with inscriptions. I have before alluded to the tomb of Humayoon the conqueror, which was erected by his daughter. It is of gothic architecture, and stands in an immense garden with terraces and numerous fountains; everything about it bears marks of decay. The garden is surrounded by an embattled wall and cloister, and in its centre, on a platform ascended by a flight of granite steps, is the tomb itself, a square building with circular apartments, surrounded by a dome of white marble. From the top of this building the ruins all round can best be seen--where Indrapat once stood--extending almost over a range of hills seven or eight miles distant. [Sidenote: Manufactures of Delhi.] The soil in the neighbourhood of Delhi seems singularly devoid of vegetation. The Jumna annually overflows its banks during the rainy season, but its waters, in this part of its course, are so much empregnated with natron that the ground is almost barren. In order to supply water to the royal gardens, the acqueduct of Ali-Khan was constructed through the chief avenue, by which the pure and wholesome water was brought from the mountains, over one hundred and twenty miles off. This channel, during the troubles that followed the decline of the Mogul Empire was stopped by rubbish, but when the English got possession they cleared it, and it is now the sole source of supply of Delhi. This was done in 1820, and is still remembered by the inhabitants with, I trust, some degree of gratitude. It was, at least, on the opening of the channel, for the inhabitants then turned out, with drums beating, to welcome the water, throwing flowers, and ghee, and sweetmeats in the current as it flowed along; for this they called down all manner of blessings on the British. But for this dearth of water, Delhi would be a great inland mart for the interchange of commodities between India and the countries west and north. Cotton, cloth and indigo are manufactured here, and there is also a large Persian shawl factory, with weavers from Cashmere. The bazaars rival any others in wealth and beauty. At the south of the city stand the ruins of an observatory, erected by Jye Singh; it formerly contained several instruments, but, like the building, long ago partially destroyed. There is also a college in this city, with two departments--Orientals and English--and the number of pupils are 270. I have dwelt rather long on this description of the famous city, but I feel any picture I can give will be far short of the reality. It is said seven cities, at different times of the earth's history, have stood on the same site. Indraput was the first; then the Patons, or Afghans; then Sultan Balun built and fortified one, after destroying the Patons; then Mozes-ud-deem built another nearer the Jumna; this destroyed, another nearer Cattal; and lastly, Shah Jehan, towards the middle of the seventeenth century, chose the present site for his capital. I might add that the census of any place in India is hardly ever taken, for the reason of so much superstition in the inhabitants--they could not be made to believe anything else but that it was intended for their destruction. The estimate of the population I have given was then considered as nearly as possible correct. CALCUTTA. [Sidenote: The Black-hole.] Calcutta presents a remarkable instance of what may arise from small beginnings, if I might so speak. In 1640 the English obtained permission to erect a factory at the ancient town of Hooghly, on the opposite bank of the river. In 1696 the Emperor Aurungzcebee allowed them to remove to the pretty village of Govindpoor, and in the following year to secure it by erecting a fort. So slow was the progress of the new settlement that up to 1717 the site of the present City of Palaces remained an assemblage of huts, wretched indeed, with only a few hundred inhabitants. In 1756 it had not more than seventy houses in it occupied by the English. An attempt had been made in 1742 to defend the place from the invasion of the Maharattas, by surrounding it with a ditch, a precaution, however, which availed but little against the attack, in June, 1756, by Suradja-ud-douhal, or Viceroy of Bengal. In consequence of this attack, apparently a surprise, the factory was deserted by the governor, the commandant and many of the European functionaries and residents. A memorable catastrophe of a most lamentable nature ensued. Such of the English as had remained for its defence were seized and thrust into a small uninhabited dungeon called the Black-hole, and of one hundred and forty-six individuals who were thus shut up at night, one hundred and twenty three perished under the most frightful sufferings ere the arrival of morning. The black-hole was afterwards converted into a warehouse, and upon an obelisk, fifty feet high at its entrance, were inscribed the names of the unhappy victims. [Illustration: THE ASCENT TO THE TEMPLE OF PARBUTTEE, NEAR POONA.] Early in the following year a squadron of five ships brought 2,400 troops under Lord Clive up the Hooghly from Madras, they retook the town of Calcutta, from which the garrison of the Subidhar retired after an attack of only two hours duration. The population now amounts to some 600,000. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER X. Cape of Good Hope--First sight of--Inhabitants--Descent and other particulars--Sir Harry again--Sandicea in rebellion--War rumours--Join a Volunteer Corps--Off for frontier--East London--Army at Fort William--Join them--Gazetted Lieutenant--The Jungle--Kaffir women--73rd Regiment--Arrangements--Enter the Gaika tribe country--The huts--The kraal--43rd, 60th and 12th Lancers--General Somerset--Fort Beaufort--Colonel Fordyce shot--Buffalo Post--Capture cattle--Pursuit of Kaffirs--Sardillas' horse shot--Bridle neck bush--Time-expired men--Back to recruit--The Hottentot--East London again. Favoured with beautiful weather, and nothing having occurred to mar our passage, we sighted the Cape on the twentieth of October. As the high land comes first to view, it has all the appearance of a lion couchant--the flag-staff rising from the lion's tail, creeping round the point to a narrow entrance, the whale rock and Robin Island come in view, then Cape Town stretches before you, in a sort of basin. Table Mountain at the back, the town sloping up from the bay, with the Blue Berg Mountains away to the east. At this time of year summer commences in the Cape. We had, therefore, a summer Christmas before us. Landing on the twenty-sixth, we took up quarters in the Pier hotel. Steamers did not venture on such long voyages in those days, and the influx of visitors was not so great as now. Living we found very cheap; a bottle of wine, and very good at that, cost fourpence; British brandy, sixpence, it was called "Cape-smoke;" meat was twopence per pound; peaches, pomegranates and grapes, one shilling per basket--bushel. The villa residences on the outskirts are very pretty--the fences surrounding them are either rose or geranium bushes, standing as high as six feet; or cactus, or prickly pear. The inhabitants of the Colony are mostly of Dutch descent, or Malays. Originally it was a slave settlement. Hither they were brought from Batavia--but on the British Government assuming control, slavery was abolished. The descendants of these are now the most industrious, as they are the wealthiest inhabitants. Their principal occupation is, or was then, whaling and seal-fishing, with some tradesmen among them. The aborigines of the Cape, or Hottentots, are a low, degraded, idle class. [Sidenote: Sir Harry Smith again.] [Sidenote: Gazetted Lieutenant.] Our old East Indian friend and General, Sir Harry Smith, I found here as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of South Africa--and it was here, and at such a time, too, such an experienced soldier was required. Sandilla, a Gaika chief, had commenced hostilities on the frontier, and his Kaffirs had burnt over twenty farms, butchered the farmers and their families, and carried off all their cattle. Though now free from the service, it was but natural, after my previous service, I should feel interested in anything concerning military movements or threatenings of war, and I soon made myself acquainted with all the particulars. The entire British force in the Colony consisted of three infantry battalions. These were scattered in detachments all over the country, only the head-quarters of the 73rd were at Cape Town. The Governor and his staff, taking these, left for the scene of disturbance, and levies were ordered all over. Besides the atrocities mentioned, the Kaffirs had murdered all the men in the three military villages of Auckland, Wobown and Joanisburgh. I could not be expected to remain long unknown, as, having seen service in the Sixteenth Lancers in India, was surprised by a request from the Colonial Secretary to assist in raising levies, who offered me a command as lieutenant in the Second Corps of Europeans. A draft of two hundred men, with seventy-eight horses, was ordered up to East London, and having given my consent, I was sent in charge. On the first of February I went on board the war steamer _Hermies_, with that number, and left for the frontier. On reaching East London, we found we could get no nearer than about two miles. Anchoring, surf-boats were brought alongside, and in these, after immense trouble, all were safely landed. Well, I had seen many towns and forts, and I have been in towns since called after our beautiful capital, but such a place as this aspiring to the great name, surprised me. The whole place consisted of one building, called a hotel; four huts; four commissariat houses; and a small fort, with a dozen or so Kaffirs, apparently friendly, standing round-about naked, fine, manly-looking fellows, copper coloured, and all six feet high or thereabouts. We found the army was encamped at Fort William, eighteen miles from East London. I marched in charge of my detachment of men and horses, to which was added a convoy of thirty-six waggons loaded with provisions. We halted at Fort Murry, half-way. Captain McLean, of the 6th Foot, was in charge here with one company. We were now in a friendly chief's country; his name was Patto. Having been detained longer than was expected by the slow travel of the bullock waggons, it was late next afternoon when we reached the camp at King William Fort. The next day being Sunday, I was ordered to parade my men before General Sir Harry Smith--after which, and being quite satisfied with his inspection, and some conversation about old times, he ordered my rank to be confirmed as lieutenant, 2nd Corps Cape Town Levies. Having had some time to rest, I was enabled to scan about me, and see a little of the place and people. Here I had an opportunity of seeing that dreadful bush so much spoken of--Kaffir land--and it is a bush--so dense, and thick, and so full of the Momossa tree, with its long thorns, it is almost impossible to penetrate. As one moved any distance round, plenty of women and girls might be seen; they come up the valleys with immense pumpkins, corn, or milk, to exchange for beads, buttons, or, in fact, anything strange. As they don't know the use of money, an old brass ring would buy all one wanted for a day. They were quite as oblivious of dress as the men we had first seen, only a small apron of deerskin around their waste. Some had blankets. They looked horrible, so full of red clay for paint, and they were disgustingly dirty. The Hottentots or Aborigines' worth is all in cattle. The women feed them, build their own houses, sow the corn, and do all the drudgery. The men do nothing but hunt, and in war time fight. The boys are not allowed to associate with men until after circumcision, which takes place at eighteen; then they may sit round the council fire with the men. [Sidenote: Enter the Gaika tribe country.] I found our army composed of volunteers from Cape Town district, Mossel Bay and Grahamstown--in all some 20,000 Europeans, Hottentots and Fingoes, besides the British 6th and 73rd regiments. The Cape mounted riflemen had, a few days previous to our arrival, most of them at least, gone over to the enemy, taking their horses and arms. They had intended to massacre all the 73rd regiment the night previous, while they were asleep; this was frustrated through a friendly chief giving information to Sir Harry Smith, and it was thought strange that all the Hottentots of Wesleyan mission stations remained loyal, when those situated east, under missionaries of other denominations, joined the insurgents; these proved our worst foes, being such good marksmen. [Sidenote: Buffalo post--capture cattle.] All arrangements being completed, we broke camp and marched towards the river Kiskama, then crossed into the Gaika territory to hunt up Sandilla. Here we remained three weeks, engaged in skirmishing and picket duty, the Kaffirs troubling us much at night, firing from the bush. This kind of warfare is most disliked by the soldier--every bush containing an enemy, and no sooner you made one than they were off to another. In fact, they were always near us, particularly at night, and yet we could get no chance of having a good shot at them. The kraal, better known now than ever before, is a collection of huts, made in the form of large beehives, placed in a circle--the cattle in the middle--we invariably burned them. They were erected in some sheltered place, on the sides of hills or mountains. We were now on the territory of the most powerful chief, Sandilla, head of the Gaikas. Reinforcements joined us here from England--the 43rd foot, 60th Rifles and 12th Lancers; and General Sir Harry Smith, considering he had troops sufficient, ordered an advance on Fuller's-hook, and the Water-kloof where he had learned Sandilla had massed some thirty-thousand warriors. General Somerset was at this time at Fort Beaufort. At Fuller's-hook we had some terrible bush fighting, but succeeded in driving them into Water-kloof. The intricacies of this place, and the dense bush, it is almost impossible to describe. Here we remained some six weeks, and were joined by the 74th from Grahamstown, under Colonel Fordyce, who was shot on the top of the kloof. Our advancement during that time in the progress, of the war was very little, as we could get no open field-fight, they proving as able as their opponents in bushwhacking. Sir Harry, seeing little progress marched us back to King Williamstown. Here the General sent for me, and ordered a start at twelve that night with 100 men--Fingoes--and fifty of Armstrong's horse, to capture 800 head of cattle in the Buffalo. Port Sandilla was said to be with them. With my command, I made a rapid march so as to reach before daybreak the place appointed, and arrived at the foot of the mountain half-an-hour before sunrise. The Buffalo Port I found a deep basin in the hills, the ascent very difficult and dense with bush. This basin had an outlet called the Gether Goolie, or Wolf's throat. With my men, I ascended the hill as best I could, leaving some mounted men at the Pass to hold the cattle. On the word "charge," down the hill we went, amid a volley from the Kaffirs, who were almost indistinguishable. I received a cut from an assaigai, knocking me off my horse, stunning me for a time. Soon, however, I recovered sufficient to stay the wound--remounted and joined my men, who by this time had joined the men below at the Pass. Here, too, the Fingoes had the cattle. Handing them over to the mounted men, we hurried on to the Yellow-wood--pursued by the Kaffirs. On the following morning we reached King Williamstown, having lost two men killed and nine wounded. During that day's engagement we were hard pressed. It, however, nearly cost the Kaffirs their leader, Sandilla--as one of our men had shot his horse, and nearly captured himself. There was a £1,000 on his head. In July I was ordered, with fifty Europeans and Lieutenant Fielding with one hundred Hottentots Levy, to the Bridle Neck bush, on the road to East London, to protect convoys of prisoners coming by sea. The enemy, knowing this, lay in ambush to attack the waggons, and on returning we had to build stockades by cutting huge trees and sinking them four feet in the ground, leaving them four feet out, with the waggons inside for the night. This was trying work, and watching all night against a surprise. However, the duty was well done, and the convoy escorted safe through the dense bush. [Sidenote: Back to recruit.] The time of the men who had joined for six months having more than expired, I was ordered to take some five hundred of them to Cape Town, on the war steamer _Styx_. I had orders to raise and bring back as many mounted men as I could get, at a bounty of twenty-three pounds and free rations, finding their own horses, and rations were to be given them. It was chiefly expected my contingent would consist of farmers' sons, and such like, who, for their own interests, would join the army formed for the protection of their own homes. After seeing the discharged men paid, I started on my recruiting errand, and soon got together sixty men from Wooster, Swellingdam and Clanwilliam, mostly sons of Europeans. The Affricandas, as they are called, are good riders and fine shots. When at Clanwilliam, I stayed with Mr. Shaw, and while out with him one day, we came across the greatest herd of deer I ever saw. We came on the opening of an immense plain, and for miles one could see swarms of gnu, elands, heart-beasts, rye-buck, bonti-buck, blue-buck, and other common deer. It was explained to me when there is a drought and scarcity of provisions in the Karoo they are driven down to seek water and the Salt licks. They are as bad as locusts to the farmer, not leaving a blade of grass where they visit; consequently, they turn out and destroy them as best they can, take their skins off, remove the best of the beef to dry it for home use, leaving the carcase for the wild dogs and lions. The farmers in South Africa generally hold from ten to twenty thousand acres of land, with large flocks of sheep, and numbers of brood-mares; in the eastern part, and in the western, they mostly cultivate the grape for wine. There being no hotels in the country parts, and the farm-houses conseqent on their large holdings, very far apart, during the long rides the screeching of the guinea fowl, together with the cooing of the turtle-dove, constantly salute the ear. When you stop under the shade of some trees to make coffee, it is easy to have a dainty bit of some wild bird to satisfy hunger, by going a few yards and killing one. In my travels going east, I have met dozens of waggons at a time going to Cape Town with wool, hides, horns, bitter aloes, and gums. The Hottentots employed as shepherds by these farmers seem fit for nothing else, an idle, lazy, indolent race. Some are squatted on every farm for that purpose, acting as shepherds. On my journey I came across packs of wild dogs. These animals prove a great enemy to the farmer--worrying his sheep. It may not seem truth, but there are in this part of the country people of very small stature, wild, almost savage, at least bordering on the brute called Bosjesmen, living in holes in the rocks, who are adepts with bow and arrow, the latter of which they poison when at war. They live chiefly on the wild dog; snakes do not come even amiss to them. Europeans class them between the ape and the man. Darwin may have founded his theory on them--evolution. We will leave it with him, as beyond our solution. [Sidenote: East London again.] As soon as I procured all the recruits I could, I started for Cape Town, and embarked on board the war steamer _Styx_, Captain Hall, for East London. On arriving we were soon joined by one hundred horses and men from Port Elizabeth, and again left for headquarters with one hundred and twenty waggons of stores and ammunition. While _en route_ we learned of the loss of the steamer _Birkenhead_, as she was coming out of Simon's Bay with troops, drafts mostly for our army. Very few escaped that fearful wreck. Arriving at the headquarters of the army, the corps was named the "Montague Horse," in compliment to the Colonial Secretary, Sir John Montague. Many of these men were independent farmers. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER XI. Transferred to Fingoe Service--Fingoe character--Ordered to Kye river--Chief Krielle--Colonel Eyre--Through the bush--The Chief's position--Battered by big guns--Cattle captured--On return march--Harassed by enemy--One month on march bring in 500 head--Sir Harry called home--Sir George Cathcart--Sandilla surrendered--Chief Moshusha--Attack his stronghold--Surrenders--Back to Fort William--Disbanded--Off on elephant hunt--Provisions for--Plan to capture--Kill four--Trading with Chiefs and their wives--Precautions against lions--Elephant's spoor--Excursion often fatal--Back to Grahamstown--Stiles' Hotel. [Sidenote: Cattle captured.] In February, 1852, I was transferred to the Fort Peddie Fingoe Levy, under Captain Fainton. The Fingoes are a tribe formerly conquered and kept in bondage by the Amagahekas, but released by the British, and located at the Fort of that name, near Grahamstown. They are very loyal, industrious, and make fine farm servants to the Scotch settlers on the frontier. So trustworthy are they, many are employed as police. Understanding the traits of the Kaffir character, they are very useful, particularly as they hold a grudge against their old oppressors. Sir Harry Smith, having learned the enemy had sent all their cattle across the Kye river to Chief Krielle, Colonel Eyre, of the 73rd, was ordered, in conjunction with a squadron the 12th Lancers, under Major Tottenham, two troops Montague horse, with all the infantry, consisting of 73rd, 43rd, and 60th Rifles, and my company of Fingoes, to capture them, punishing the Chief Krielle for his deception, as he had given his adhesion to the British. The Montague horse, knowing the country so well, were advanced as guides and picket, and hot work we had of it. When we got to the Kye, our passage was strongly opposed, even without any opposition. It looked a fearful place. The river flowed rapidly down a deep gully, between two rugged, jagged mountains, a dense bush to the water's edge. One thousand good men could keep twenty thousand from crossing if so disposed; but as nothing ever stopped the progress of British troops, if forward was the word, we forced the passage, after some fighting, and the mounted force, under Tottenham, pushed on to intercept the cattle before they drove them to Zululand, where Pandee was chief. After seven days' hard marching, we reached the Umzuvoola river in front of them, and now, as we had the river behind, and the cattle in front coming up, we expected some severe bush fighting. This we accomplished, seizing 30,000 head, besides sheep and goats. Many of these cattle had been stolen from our settlers, comprising their entire wealth, and by capturing these we were injuring our enemy as much as in actual war, as the less they had the sooner would they make peace. On returning, they were separated into three droves, with infantry on the flanks, cavalry in rear, Fingoes driving. One drove a day behind the other, one to the left, one to the extreme right on account of the grass, and when halting at night, we lighted fires all around to prevent a stampede, the enemy following us, firing all night, to get a run. In approaching the river Kye, we had great trouble in keeping them together. They had no water two days, and naturally enough, the brutes were running over each other to get at it. Then the rush down to the water, the confusion caused by the presence of so many, the shouting of all the men in their different dialects, swimming across the river, clambering over rocks on opposite side, the barking of dogs, sheep and goats bleating, hundreds lying down dying, the chasing of others along, trampling on the fallen--such a bedlam and confusion of noises I never before experienced, and heartily wished it all over. After one month's marching, not all so bad, but nearly, as I have just described, we reached headquarters at King William's Town, short 5,000 cattle and sheep, eaten up by the lions, wolves and wild dogs following in our track. As soon as the saved were rested, and it became known to the farmers, all were sold to the farmers at a nominal sum. Shortly after this affair, Sir Harry Smith was called home, Sir George Cathcart having arrived to take his place. Sandilla, feeling the immense loss of the cattle, came in and surrendered. [Sidenote: Attack chief Moshusha's stronghold.] The relief which this movement of Sandilla occasioned lasted only a few weeks, news arriving of the uprising of another Chief, Moshusha, of the Basautees' country. No news could be more unsatisfactory, as the men hated bush fighting, never having a chance of open, man to man warfare. Pleasant or unpleasant, we marched for his territory. His stronghold we found in a high hill, standing almost alone in a plain, but so covered with prickly pears and cactus as to seem almost impossible to reach. Getting our big guns in position, we played on his fortress with such good effect, it was soon abandoned, and down they came on the plain where the 12th Lancers, after some hard fighting, intercepted their retreat to the Transvaal. Finding it was useless to continue the struggle, their chief capitulated, terms of peace were arranged, and the volunteers returned to Fort William, were disbanded, and returned to their respective homes. Many had died of dysentery, brought on chiefly through lack of flour for bread. Our living on this route was chiefly on fresh meat and roasted corn cobs--no vegetables, and bad water. One instance of the filth and dirty habits of the Kaffirs I saw on this expedition which I may mention. On the slaughter of a bullock for our use, when the paunch was exposed, filled with green food or fodder, it has invariably been seized and devoured as a luxury, just as it was, hot from the carcase. [Sidenote: Off on elephant hunt.] This last surrender of the Basantees' Chief put an end to the war. All the native and European levies were disbanded, the officers receiving six months' pay for the losses of effects. Each farmer returned to his farm, the merchant to his legitimate business, and the local magistrate, as we had many with us serving in the ranks, to his business. I, with five others, planned an excursion to the Vaal river, intending to trade with the natives for ivory, skins, gum, or anything we could obtain of value, also intending to try our hands at elephant shooting or hunting. This we found easy to commence, as the merchants of Grahamstown supply all necessary articles for an outfit to the amount of two hundred pounds, should the party pay one-half of the sum provided on the return you trade the articles you received with them. We were supplied with a waggon, fourteen oxen loaded with articles to carry on our traffic. Each man mounted a good nag, with a rifle slung across the shoulder, and a Hottentot as a driver of the waggon. We had in it a barrel of flour, a case of brandy, also quinine. Our guns would supply all the animal food required. On approaching a tribe, our policy was to show great respect to the chief, making first for his kraal, and as his wives approached, giving them presents of trinkets, such as a string of beads, or a piece of red cloth, this being understood as a friendly offering. We found they are always pleased to meet the trader, and will do all they can to protect him, in hopes of his coming again. Then, again, by acts of kindness such as these, you secure a guide from the chief to conduct you to the next. After crossing the Vaal, it became necessary to light fires at night, to protect our horses and ourselves from the great number of lions in the country. One always remained on watch, he being relieved once during the night. It is well known lions will not attack an animal tied up for fear of being trapped, nor will they approach a fire, as it dazzles their eyesight. They, however, use an expedient by roaring terrifically, scaring any cattle or horses, expecting a general stampede. This also we had to prepare against, by being always ready to hold the animal in fright. On reaching the elephant track a bushranger is procured. The best to be got are from the Macatee tribe of Kaffirs. He starts on a hunt for the spoor or footprint of the beast. We had two of these men, who now took us to the ground most likely to find the herds. On reaching their feeding ground we outspan the oxen; two men stop to guard the waggon, the remaining four start in pursuit of game. As soon as we came on the herd, browsing in a sort of park or plain, the males were on the outside, the females and young in the centre. Our first care was not to be scented; to avoid this we rode to the leeward, and then we drew lots for our separate posts. Number one goes in first; next number plants himself near a tree in sight of number one, and within reach if necessary; the next a certain distance from number two, and so with the last, near number three. [Sidenote: Elephant hunting.] When all are posted, number one moves out stealthily, as near as possible to the greatest male with large tusks--previously I should have said, dismounted--and, without any noise, delivers the shot at the most vulnerable part of his body. As soon as hit, this one blew his trumpet as an alarm and a defiance. Number one then shows himself more distinctly in front of him, he stamped his feet in wild rage and made a charge. Number one was quickly on horseback, leading on to number two, who delivers his shot, then jumps his horse and leads on to number three. The elephant each time going for the one who last fired, and is on foot, thus follows all in succession, giving the first who fired time to reload. He now, having four different enemies, gets baffled, goes for each separately, till tired, he crushes through the jungle or dense bush on his way, and is easily shot down, falling with an awful thud. Marking the spot where he lays, the herd is followed, now some miles away, and the same planning is gone through till the hunters have all they require. This is not done without a great deal of danger; coolness is indespensable, also a good horse and guides. When we had thus killed our fourth, we returned to each in succession, cut out the tusks, loaded them on our waggon, and left the carcase for the lions. Our larder, while out, was supplied with plenty of antelope and birds, which swarm in the African jungles. On our return we again visit our tribes, gathering skins, horns, or anything they have for barter, and made tracks for Grahamstown. The Hottentot holds that the lion never kills a man at once when he has struck him down, unless he is irritated. This would appear to be true, in general, as the following incidents may prove. I may add, there is nothing absolute in history on the subject. [Sidenote: Precautions against lions.] My comrade had one day wounded a lion which had been sneaking after our bullocks, and was in the act of reloading when the lion sprung on him. He stood on ground a little elevated, the animal caught him on the shoulder, and both tumbled to the ground, the lion bellowing heartily close to his head; he then shook him with as much ease as a terrier would a rat. He, remembering after, and as he related it, this shaking produced a sort of stupor, a sort of dreaminess in which he neither felt pain nor terror, though quite conscious of his position and all that was happening. Whatever was the cause of this he could never make out--no sense of horror whatever on seeing the beast, and he in his power. It led me to think if this unconscious state is produced on all animals who are killed by the carnivora, it is a wise provision of Providence for lessening pain. The animal's eye was directed towards me, as I raised my piece to shoot him at a distance of about fifteen yards. My gun missed in both barrels as he sprang on me. Leaving his fallen victim he was despatched by a spear in the hands of a Kaffir, one of our attendants. A farmer told me that while unyoking his oxen, a lion made a plunge and killed two outright by breaking their spine. Now it seems by this the lion takes quite a different course in despatching the larger animals, and I have thought what can be the reason. Man inspires him with fear, and the lion's natural prudence causes him to suspect some ambuscade, even when man is in his power. Even the Africans allow themselves, the lion's knowledge between the different colour of Europeans and themselves, they are very cautious of the whites. These excursions often prove fatal to many. Numbers have never been heard of. Whether they fell a prey to the numerous wild animals, whether they were prostrated by fevers so prevalent, or their oxen got the tongue sick from the tyse flies or other insects so numerous, I could never learn, but many leaving on this sport have never returned. Travelling in the wilds of Africa during the day the scenery all around is grand in the extreme, and so wild; the different-coloured foliage in the sunbeams, the wild craggy hills covered with thick bush, the roar of the lion occasionally as he scents some antelope or zebra near a river or stream, birds of every colour, monkeys innumerable, while the dense gloom that settles on all at night in the great solitude is indescribable. On arriving at Grahamstown, our merchant received all our articles, and we retired to Stile's hotel to talk of our adventures and enjoy ourselves as Christians should, making some arrangements as to our future movements. While here we came across many who lived in this way; they are called Winklere; some, by continuing and being lucky, have realized a considerable amount of money, while others, as I have before stated, go, but have never returned. [Sidenote: Dutch Boers of South Africa.] The Kaffir's memory is remarkable. He will not forget a bullock he has once seen, and two or three years afterwards he will identify it at once, and without difficulty; they will also remember a white man the same. During the war a man of the Macomos tribe was brought in a prisoner; two years after, when I was through that part of the country and visited Macom, that man recognized me, and spoke of the good treatment he got when a prisoner. The Dutch Boers of South Africa have become so nomadic in their instincts that even when they are permanently settled in villages they still sleep in their clothes. Moreover, they never dream of indulging in the luxury of candles, but turn in with the setting sun, as they did in their waggons, and they detest the British since the abolition of slavery. They are truly patriarchal, living in large families, and having large flocks of sheep, and herds of cattle. The minister of the Lutheran Church travels from place to place, stopping a month at each, when they have camp-meetings. Then the neighbours assemble from all the surrounding farms, bringing waggons, women and children, also Hottentot servants with them. [Sidenote: British heroes.] When my memory carries me back to the battles in the north-west of India, and I think of the bravery displayed by my comrades in arms, what need to go back to Greek History for heroes. Where is there a nation that has produced greater men than Great Britain, on the field of battle, or in the council. Go back to Poitiers and Agincourt, Blenheim and Malplaquet. Then in the Peninsula, Generals Moore, Nelson, Wellington, Picton, Ponsonby; then again, in India: Lords Clive, Gough, Hardinge, Sir Harry Smith, Havelock, Lawrence, Sir Colin Campbell--a long list of heroes whose names are handed down to future generations. Then go back to the Crimea for a Cathcart, who fell at Inkerman; the gallant charge of the 16th Lancers through three squares of infantry, at Aliwal; and the Sikhs were no mean foe; they acknowledged the prowess of the British; also the death ride of the gallant 600 at Balaclava; the Guards and Light Division, at Inkerman, against fearful odds. The British soldiers have in most critical times, been surrounded when there seemed no hope of deliverance, yet they have cut their way out, often with heavy loss. Let me remind the reader of the Indian mutiny, of the rebels that had been pampered by the East India Company, how they massacred women and children without mercy, and all hope of saving India seemed gone. Yet that noble man Lawrence went and raised a body of Sikhs and Afghans, our old foes, and with them aided the few Europeans to crush the rebellion, and at the siege of Delhi gained the crowning victory. Yet there are other heroes as brave. The pioneers in this new country, who have had to face innumerable difficulties, such as the lurking Indian, the wolf, bear and panther in the wild bush, opening up the country and making the wilderness blossom as the rose. I have often been surprised during my residence in Canada, at the little interest the people here take in our affairs in other parts of the globe. Very few seem to know the extent of the British Empire, or the geographical positions of Bengal, Australia, or the Cape Colony, and seem to forget that the settlers in those other parts of the Empire are brothers of the same flesh and blood, and all from the old sod, English, Scotch and Irish, and that the sun never sets on the British dominions, and the English language is spoken in every land. Where shall we find the land that has sent forth these heroes. Look at the map of the world and you can hardly trace the little spots called the British Isles; yet they are gems in the ocean, and how many good Christian heroes have they sent forth to every clime to battle for the Cross; and the Word of God has been printed in every language. [Illustration: (Vignette)] [Illustration: (Vignette)] CHAPTER XII. West to Clanwilliam--Mr. Shaw--Productions of farm--Back to the Cape--Open an hotel--Pleasures of Cape life--Ships put in for Australia--Imports--Market day--Arrangements--Waggons--Fish--Lobsters--Off to Port Elizabeth--Whale fishing--Sea elephants--Manner of killing--The Penguin--Habits of the bird--Back to the Cape--English Church at Newlands--The Bay--Wreck of a Baltimore vessel--Loss of two children, captain's wife, and the mate--Habits of Hottentots--Manner of living--A marriage--A present and its return--Loss in business by partner absconding--Leave the Cape--East India docks--Buckinghamshire--Relatives at home--Station master--Accident detailed--Near Rugby--Exonerated and promoted--Liverpool--Brighton--To Canada--Farewell address. I now left the East, after mature consideration, and went west to Clanwilliam, where I found Mr. Shaw, who has before been introduced in these pages. He had been engaged in the war, having three hundred Hottentots under him. He was a magistrate, lived in a fine brick house, had ten thousand acres of land, was a bachelor, and a jolly good fellow at that. On being asked how he could live alone, his answer immediately was, "Jolly times, jolly times." "I am monarch of all I survey." Visitors were constant at his place from Cape Town on shooting excursions, game being plentiful and choice on large farms. Besides the raising of cattle, his farm produced fine oranges, wheat, Indian corn, and grapes. Home-made wine and brandy were in abundance. Stopping with him three weeks I started again for the Cape, stopping at night in farm houses, where they gladly receive a visitor. Most of the farms along to the Cape are wine farms, the soil mostly sandy, and the weather being very hot, unfits it for grazing land. I found, on arriving, that I had been reported as killed in the Mackazana bush. Not having any fixed purpose as to my future movements, and meeting here with a comrade officer who, like me, had nothing to do, we, after duly weighing all matters, determined to erect and open an hotel. At this time the Australian gold-fields were drawing largely on the population of Europe, and as the Cape would be the coaling and watering place for vessels on passage, we christened it "The Australasian." Soon after opening the _Great Britain_ put into port, with seven hundred passengers for Melbourne. Of these we secured one hundred and seventy-six as boarders for the time being. Next along came the _Sarah Sands_ from London, with three hundred, after her, the _West Wind_ from New York, with six hundred. Of all these we had a good share of boarders, giving them pleasure jaunts to the wine farms of Constancia and the Pearl, and took them around the mountain to see the beautiful scenery in this land of the myrtle and the vine. [Sidenote: Imports--market day.] There is a weekly market held on Wednesday at the Cape, at which articles brought from Europe are sold. Wines and brandies from Spain and Portugal; perfumes and silks from France; linens, calicoes, and broadcloths, also, ready-made clothing from England. This market commences at six in the morning. Farmers' waggons arrive during the night before. Everything is sold after the Dutch fashion. Waggons are arranged in line according to the article for sale. Grain, first line of waggons; vegetables, second; and fruit of all kinds in the third line. The Hottentot boys are the drivers of the yoke, having for an ornament in their caps splendid ostrich feathers. Ostrich eggs or feathers can be had from these boys for sixpence each; they picking them up on the sand can afford to sell cheap. Fish at the Cape is very plentiful and good, and easily caught by line. Lobsters, by dozens, can be brought up by putting a piece of liver in a basket weighted with stones, attached to a rope--lower, in five minutes pull up. I have done this myself. [Sidenote: The penguin--habits of the bird.] Off Port Elizabeth a large business is done in whale oil. Taking a trip in a boat belonging to a firm engaged in this business, named Seawright, I saw the whole process of catching and extracting the oil. The Bird Islands are in the Mosambique Channel, and here the sea elephant, as it is called, is plentiful; the animal is amphibious. The men go out at night when it is time for these animals to quit the sea for the shore; when well up on the sand, they noiselessly creep between them and the water, then they are attacked with clubs and beaten to death; if he escapes to water again he carries with him anything in his way, but only to secure a good ducking. Thirty or forty will thus be killed in one night by eight or nine men; the blubber is boiled down into oil, and sent to the Cape. These animals are the size of a good land pig, with tusks like elephants--a species of whale, though commonly called sea elephants. The Island abounds with rabbits and goats, and a curious bird may be found here called the "Penguin." They never use their wings, but march upright in flocks like a company of soldiers. Seeing them at a distance, as they are large, and having a red spot on the breast, they might be taken for a company of soldiers. If, in walking, you meet with a thousand they never get out of the way, you may do as you please, but they only peck at you. I stayed at the Islands three days while the ship was being freighted with oil, and on returning to the Cape I mightily enjoyed the sail on the beautiful calm sea in this southern hemisphere--the whale spouting, and the golden dolphin swimming around the boat. As we neared the Cape, better known to me now, and as it was after four in the afternoon, no one could be seen on the streets, but many under the stoops of their houses, in the cool, sleeping. All outdoor work is over at ten in the morning; after five in the evening all is bustle and life again--ladies promenading the Kesingraf, or ladies' walk. The road from the town leading to Newlands through Rondebosch, is very pleasant--trees on both sides for eight or nine miles. The clergyman of the English Church at Newlands showed me a collection of animals he had for the then Lord Derby, some fine specimens of eland, giraffe, and gazelle, the smallest of the deer species; he had also a lion and a panther. The heavy rolls from the Atlantic set in early in winter, and during the season no vessels venture into the bay; if they got safely in there they should remain until spring. The weather on land is very pleasant during this time--much like an English autumn. In November, a bark from Baltimore, in the States, bound to Bombay, came ashore on Robbin Island a wreck; a number went off to assist the crew; on reaching the rocks the captain and a number of sailors had got ashore--his wife, two children, and the mate were missing. The captain was nearly out of his mind through the loss, they were found the next day--two beautiful girls--and I can never forget the man's looks as he saw them laid out for burial. The wife was found under the keel of the vessel, and the mate jammed between the casks of porter in the hold. It was a melancholy funeral. [Sidenote: Habits of Hottentots] I will now revert to my travels in Kaffraria, to mention some things interesting which I omitted then. In commencing, I may say that the meaning of Kaffir is thief, by calling men of some tribes who know this, they are very indignant. They generally have from three to six wives, who do all the laborious work, even to building the hut for herself, my lord going into which he pleases. They do all the gardening, sow corn, plant pumpkins and other vegetables, milk cows and cook, the boys helping, and are never allowed to eat with the men; these latter attend to the cattle until eighteen, when they are circumcised and allowed to sit with the warriors and hunt with them. When he has arrived at the period of manhood to marry, he selects a wife, the chief and councillors set a price on her according to her charms, say, two cows or three heifers, and if he does not possess so much he will steal from the nearest settler or from another tribe; this occurring often is the cause of much war between the several tribes. One day a fine young fellow named Magesa, a chief's son of the Patos tribe, came to me, pulling a long face. He said he wanted a girl of another tribe, but he had not her value, nor would his father give him the cow and two heifers he required, as he wanted to buy another wife for himself. This boy previously had done me a good turn, and feeling for him, as well as to prevent him from stealing, I got the required cattle which he accepted. He brought his bride afterwards to thank me. I was surprised, however, when he made a request for a row of beads to decorate her neck, and also for a plug of tobacco with which to console himself. These I gave him, and in return the high favour of kissing the newly married lady was imposed upon me. Their clothing being very scant, and all procured by hunting the deer, don't cost much, but their begging propensities are very great, for a chief with four wives and five hundred head of cattle would beg as this lad had done. [Sidenote: Leave the Cape.] There is very little emigration to the Cape, the reason is, capital is required. Labour is so cheap, no white man will engage in it for a living. Land can be purchased, worked to advantage, either in grain, or stock-farming, and this requires means. The principal export is merino wool. The native sheep are like goats, with hair. They have extraordinary large tails, all fat. I have seen a tail as large as the carcase. In consequence of the loss of my wife and child by small-pox, brought to the Cape in a slaver captured on the west coast, and the defalcations of my partner in the hotel business, through which he absconded to Australia with one thousand pounds of our money, I was compelled to resign my business and return to England. A vessel on her way from Calcutta, putting in for water, I took passage, and bid good-bye to the Cape. The voyage was a rough one, we encountered many storms, arriving safe at the East India Docks on 24th March, 1855, after a voyage of ten weeks. I immediately left for Buckinghamshire, where my family had removed during my absence, and found, to my great sorrow, my poor mother had been dead just two months, her last words were: "Oh, that I could but see my dear son before I am called away." My father, feeling this affliction deeply, having lived together some forty-six years, soon followed her, and I had had that consolation of being present when he died, and laid him beside my dear angel mother. After arranging some family matters at our old home, I left for London, expecting to get a commission in the Turkish contingent, from Lord Panmure. While waiting for this, peace was proclaimed, and the troops ordered home from the Crimea. Notwithstanding all the excitement caused by that war, my services were not forgotten, though, perhaps, in the eyes of some, the famous charge of the Six Hundred, had eclipsed Aliwal and Sobraon, still I had a good friend in the Marquis of Chandos, who gave me the appointment of station-master on the London and North-Western Railway below Rugby, where I remained till 1859. [Sidenote: Railway catastrophy.] In the month of November, 1859, a serious accident occurred on my section of this road, which might have been more serious for me, as I was only recently appointed, had I not used the caution on the moment I did, showing my training as a soldier was useful even on a railroad. About three in the afternoon, the Midland Express, twenty minutes overdue, a mineral train came along. I cautioned the driver to get clear as quickly as possible, which he did, till about three hundred yards from the station he broke down. I immediately telegraphed "line blocked." Soon the Express, late, came in sight, thundering along under two engines--twelve carriages and two guard vans. Trying all means, I could not stop it, danger signal was up, waved red flag, still on she came at a rate of seventy miles an hour. As they passed me, still waving and shouting, they screwed down to twenty miles; but on she went into the mineral train, smashing the engine and telescoping the carriages. Fortunately a down train for Aylesbury had just passed the freight train, or it would have been much worse. As it was, I felt much worse than ever I did when charging up to the mouth of a big gun at Magarajpoor, or charging square of Sikhs, at Aliwal. There were many of the passengers wounded, one, a lady's maid, was killed. The wounded were removed to a gentleman's residence near by. Lord and Lady Byron were slightly injured. The Board of Directors of course had an investigation to which I was summoned, but completely exonerated from all blame, as it was proved the station-master below me had neglected his duty, in not seeing my telegraph "line blocked." I received great praise from the London papers, and was promoted by the Board to a more responsible and lucrative post. Still I never could feel happy on my post. My wife--having married again--constantly fretted for fear of a repetition, and as it was a worry to my mind, I resigned as I have before stated, in 1859. I then went to Liverpool to fill an appointment as Drill Instructor to the Exchange corps of Volunteers, under Captain Bright, and in that city I remained, until the opening of the Great Exhibition, in 1862, when I got an appointment in the first great world's show. When it closed I went to Hampstead, where I was college drill-master until 1869, when I left for Brighton, my birthplace, as superintendent of the Grand Hotel. So many early associations connected with this place, and as I had lost all my relatives nearly, I made up my mind to remove to America along with an old friend of mine, who determined, like me, to anchor at last in the New World. [Sidenote: Farewell address.] Having now reached the point of the story of my life when I must bid farewell to my reader, I feel refreshed--life renewed almost in having gone over the history of my early connection with the army, and the subsequent perils, combats, and adventures in which I was engaged. I can scarcely credit, on looking back, that all such has occurred, and that I am the same who, so many years ago, toiled under great disadvantages through the hot sands of India, parched with thirst, and ill-provided with food fit for such a climate. I sometimes think if it is possible, or is a long-past dream--the charges on Sikh squares at Aliwal and Sobraon, the storming of huge works, the capture of citadels, the marching in triumph through many a proud eastern city, after teaching their arrogant rulers that treachery or treason could not be tolerated by the British. Did I once stand on the steps of the throne of the once powerful Moguls of Delhi, and assist at the capture, and escort, after toilsome marches, some of the turbulent princes of India; and in all these had the honour of serving under such soldiers as Hardinge, Gough, Pollock, Nott, Smith, Havelock, and a Cathcart. Apart from this, in another continent, hunting the huge elephant in the jungles, the slow, stealthy creep to the leeward of the beast--the shot--the roar--the crash into the thicket--the double shot--and eventually the heavy thud with which he falls to the earth almost lifeless. It has often been said, "Once a soldier, always a soldier," and another common saying equally as true, "It runs in the blood." These assertions are true as far as my experience has led me to judge. I am but a poor example of the truth. One has only to read over the names of our country's heroes, and, tracing them for generations back, their ancestors have mostly belonged to either branch of Her Majesty's service. I am now in the sere and yellow leaf, but would to-morrow, if not so incapacitated heartily join my old comrades--"The Pride of England--the Terror of India," ready to go over the same ground again. This cannot be, however. We all have our day; young men are coming to the front every day, animated with the same spirit, but, it seems to me, possessed with more caution. They, no doubt, when called, will emulate the example of their predecessors in deeds of bravery. The Peninsular war, ending at Waterloo, produced brave and heroic men, who have left their names on the scroll of fame. The Sikh war added another long list, in which Aliwal and Sobraon heroes figure conspicuously, as did also the Maharatta war. Again, the Crimea, with its terrible charge of the Six Hundred, and the dreadful sufferings through the severe winter of 1854 and 1855, will never be forgotten. Then the Indian Mutiny, where our countrymen's names come in with those of Sir Colin and Havelock, for a high meed of praise--all showing that in the breasts of the sons of the "Three Kingdoms" there is born a living fire, which, when kindled on the cry of the oppressed or down-trodden of earth will burn till liberty and freedom is enthroned. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN. TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. Except for those changes noted below, misspelling by the author, and inconsistent or archaic usage, has been retained. For example, body guard, body-guard; daylight, day light; everywhere, every where; headquarters, head-quarters. p. viii duplicate 'and' removed from 'this one and and'. p. xiii 'Incideut' replaced by 'Incident'. p. xiii, 61 'Wheat-shooks' replaced by 'Wheat-shocks'. p. 17 'eighteeen' replaced by 'eighteen'. p. 21 'Mauritus' replaced by 'Mauritius'. p. 23 'Governor General's' replaced by 'Governor-General's' for consistency. p. 24 'aligators' replaced by 'alligators'. p. 31 'though' replaced by 'through'. p. 33 'though' replaced by 'through'. p. 38, 66 'p. m.' replaced by 'p.m.' for consistency. p. 41 duplicate 'and' removed from 'city and and'. p. 43 'Shah Shojah' replaced by 'Shah-Soojah'. p. 43 'Elphinston' replaced by 'Elphinstone'. p. 52 'souse' replaced by 'soused'. p. 54 'couse' replaced by 'cause'. p. 55 'Khyber' replaced by 'Kyber' for consistency. p. 59 'make ugly' replaced by 'made ugly'. p. 75 '--' added after 'Jack'. p. 78 'Grand turnout' replaced by 'Grand turn out' for consistency. p. 98 'meet' replaced by 'meat'. p. 99 duplicate 'the' removed from 'squares of the the'. p. 109 'Ferosha' replaced by 'Ferusha'. p. 127 'Kshadriya' replaced by 'Kshatriya'. p. 130 'bath' replaced by 'birth'. p. 131 'baths' replaced by 'births'. p. 135 'lacks' replaced by 'lakhs'. p. 141 duplicate 'and' removed from 'and and twenty'. p. 147 'attrocities' replaced by 'atrocities'. p. 151, 152 'Gaiku' replaced by 'Gaika'. p. 172 'Poictiers' replaced by 'Poitiers'. p. 189 'Maharratta' replaced by 'Maharatta'. Many occurences of 'Sing' have been retained; probably should be 'Singh'. For consistency: several occurrences of 'Shah Soojah' replaced by 'Shah-Soojah'; several occurrences of 'Affghanistan' replaced by 'Afghanistan'; two occurrences of 'Alliwal' replaced by 'Aliwal'; two occurrences of 'Jellalabad' replaced by 'Jellelabad'. 
55087	----	TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. A superscript is denoted by ^x, for example S^t (Street). Some minor changes are noted at the end of the book. HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-SIXTH, OR THE SOUTH DEVONSHIRE, REGIMENT OF FOOT: CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE FORMATION OF THE REGIMENT IN 1741 AND OF ITS SUBSEQUENT SERVICES TO 1851. COMPILED BY RICHARD CANNON, ESQ., ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, HORSE GUARDS. ILLUSTRATED WITH PLATES. LONDON: PARKER, FURNIVALL, & PARKER, 30, CHARING CROSS. M DCCC LI. LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. GENERAL ORDERS. _HORSE-GUARDS_, _1st January, 1836._ His Majesty has been pleased to command that, with the view of doing the fullest justice to Regiments, as well as to Individuals who have distinguished themselves by their Bravery in Action with the Enemy, an Account of the Services of every Regiment in the British Army shall be published under the superintendence and direction of the Adjutant-General; and that this Account shall contain the following particulars, viz.:-- ---- The Period and Circumstances of the Original Formation of the Regiment; The Stations at which it has been from time to time employed; The Battles, Sieges, and other Military Operations in which it has been engaged, particularly specifying any Achievement it may have performed, and the Colours, Trophies, &c., it may have captured from the Enemy. ---- The Names of the Officers, and the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates Killed or Wounded by the Enemy, specifying the place and Date of the Action. ---- The Names of those Officers who, in consideration of their Gallant Services and Meritorious Conduct in Engagements with the Enemy, have been distinguished with Titles, Medals, or other Marks of His Majesty's gracious favour. ---- The Names of all such Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates, as may have specially signalized themselves in Action. And, ---- The Badges and Devices which the Regiment may have been permitted to bear, and the Causes on account of which such Badges or Devices, or any other Marks of Distinction, have been granted. By Command of the Right Honorable GENERAL LORD HILL, _Commanding-in-Chief_. JOHN MACDONALD, _Adjutant-General_. PREFACE. The character and credit of the British Army must chiefly depend upon the zeal and ardour by which all who enter into its service are animated, and consequently it is of the highest importance that any measure calculated to excite the spirit of emulation, by which alone great and gallant actions are achieved, should be adopted. Nothing can more fully tend to the accomplishment of this desirable object than a full display of the noble deeds with which the Military History of our country abounds. To hold forth these bright examples to the imitation of the youthful soldier, and thus to incite him to emulate the meritorious conduct of those who have preceded him in their honorable career, are among the motives that have given rise to the present publication. The operations of the British Troops are, indeed, announced in the "London Gazette," from whence they are transferred into the public prints: the achievements of our armies are thus made known at the time of their occurrence, and receive the tribute of praise and admiration to which they are entitled. On extraordinary occasions, the Houses of Parliament have been in the habit of conferring on the Commanders, and the Officers and Troops acting under their orders, expressions of approbation and of thanks for their skill and bravery; and these testimonials, confirmed by the high honour of their Sovereign's approbation, constitute the reward which the soldier most highly prizes. It has not, however, until late years, been the practice (which appears to have long prevailed in some of the Continental armies) for British Regiments to keep regular records of their services and achievements. Hence some difficulty has been experienced in obtaining, particularly from the old Regiments, an authentic account of their origin and subsequent services. This defect will now be remedied, in consequence of His Majesty having been pleased to command that every Regiment shall, in future, keep a full and ample record of its services at home and abroad. From the materials thus collected, the country will henceforth derive information as to the difficulties and privations which chequer the career of those who embrace the military profession. In Great Britain, where so large a number of persons are devoted to the active concerns of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and where these pursuits have, for so long a period, been undisturbed by the _presence of war_, which few other countries have escaped, comparatively little is known of the vicissitudes of active service and of the casualties of climate, to which, even during peace, the British Troops are exposed in every part of the globe, with little or no interval of repose. In their tranquil enjoyment of the blessings which the country derives from the industry and the enterprise of the agriculturist and the trader, its happy inhabitants may be supposed not often to reflect on the perilous duties of the soldier and the sailor,--on their sufferings,--and on the sacrifice of valuable life, by which so many national benefits are obtained and preserved. The conduct of the British Troops, their valour, and endurance, have shone conspicuously under great and trying difficulties; and their character has been established in Continental warfare by the irresistible spirit with which they have effected debarkations in spite of the most formidable opposition, and by the gallantry and steadiness with which they have maintained their advantages against superior numbers. In the official Reports made by the respective Commanders, ample justice has generally been done to the gallant exertions of the Corps employed; but the details of their services and of acts of individual bravery can only be fully given in the Annals of the various Regiments. These Records are now preparing for publication, under His Majesty's special authority, by Mr. RICHARD CANNON, Principal Clerk of the Adjutant General's Office; and while the perusal of them cannot fail to be useful and interesting to military men of every rank, it is considered that they will also afford entertainment and information to the general reader, particularly to those who may have served in the Army, or who have relatives in the Service. There exists in the breasts of most of those who have served, or are serving, in the Army, an _Esprit de Corps_--an attachment to everything belonging to their Regiment; to such persons a narrative of the services of their own Corps cannot fail to prove interesting. Authentic accounts of the actions of the great, the valiant, the loyal, have always been of paramount interest with a brave and civilized people. Great Britain has produced a race of heroes who, in moments of danger and terror, have stood "firm as the rocks of their native shore:" and when half the world has been arrayed against them, they have fought the battles of their Country with unshaken fortitude. It is presumed that a record of achievements in war,--victories so complete and surprising, gained by our countrymen, our brothers, our fellow-citizens in arms,--a record which revives the memory of the brave, and brings their gallant deeds before us,--will certainly prove acceptable to the public. Biographical Memoirs of the Colonels and other distinguished Officers will be introduced in the Records of their respective Regiments, and the Honorary Distinctions which have, from time to time, been conferred upon each Regiment, as testifying the value and importance of its services, will be faithfully set forth. As a convenient mode of Publication, the Record of each Regiment will be printed in a distinct number, so that when the whole shall be completed, the Parts may be bound up in numerical succession. INTRODUCTION TO THE INFANTRY. The natives of Britain have, at all periods, been celebrated for innate courage and unshaken firmness, and the national superiority of the British troops over those of other countries has been evinced in the midst of the most imminent perils. History contains so many proofs of extraordinary acts of bravery, that no doubts can be raised upon the facts which are recorded. It must therefore be admitted, that the distinguishing feature of the British soldier is INTREPIDITY. This quality was evinced by the inhabitants of England when their country was invaded by Julius Cæsar with a Roman army, on which occasion the undaunted Britons rushed into the sea to attack the Roman soldiers as they descended from their ships; and, although their discipline and arms were inferior to those of their adversaries, yet their fierce and dauntless bearing intimidated the flower of the Roman troops, including Cæsar's favourite tenth legion. Their arms consisted of spears, short swords, and other weapons of rude construction. They had chariots, to the axles of which were fastened sharp pieces of iron resembling scythe-blades, and infantry in long chariots resembling waggons, who alighted and fought on foot, and for change of ground, pursuit or retreat, sprang into the chariot and drove off with the speed of cavalry. These inventions were, however, unavailing against Cæsar's legions: in the course of time a military system, with discipline and subordination, was introduced, and British courage, being thus regulated, was exerted to the greatest advantage; a full development of the national character followed, and it shone forth in all its native brilliancy. The military force of the Anglo-Saxons consisted principally of infantry: Thanes, and other men of property, however, fought on horseback. The infantry were of two classes, heavy and light. The former carried large shields armed with spikes, long broad swords and spears; and the latter were armed with swords or spears only. They had also men armed with clubs, others with battle-axes and javelins. The feudal troops established by William the Conqueror consisted (as already stated in the Introduction to the Cavalry) almost entirely of horse; but when the warlike barons and knights, with their trains of tenants and vassals, took the field, a proportion of men appeared on foot, and, although these were of inferior degree, they proved stout-hearted Britons of stanch fidelity. When stipendiary troops were employed, infantry always constituted a considerable portion of the military force; and this _arme_ has since acquired, in every quarter of the globe, a celebrity never exceeded by the armies of any nation at any period. The weapons carried by the infantry, during the several reigns succeeding the Conquest, were bows and arrows, half-pikes, lances, halberds, various kinds of battle-axes, swords, and daggers. Armour was worn on the head and body, and in course of time the practice became general for military men to be so completely cased in steel, that it was almost impossible to slay them. The introduction of the use of gunpowder in the destructive purposes of war, in the early part of the fourteenth century, produced a change in the arms and equipment of the infantry-soldier. Bows and arrows gave place to various kinds of fire-arms, but British archers continued formidable adversaries; and, owing to the inconvenient construction and imperfect bore of the fire-arms when first introduced, a body of men, well trained in the use of the bow from their youth, was considered a valuable acquisition to every army, even as late as the sixteenth century. During a great part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth each company of infantry usually consisted of men armed five different ways; in every hundred men forty were "_men-at-arms_," and sixty "_shot_;" the "men-at-arms" were ten halberdiers, or battle-axe men, and thirty pikemen; and the "shot" were twenty archers, twenty musketeers, and twenty harquebusiers, and each man carried, besides his principal weapon, a sword and dagger. Companies of infantry varied at this period in numbers from 150 to 300 men; each company had a colour or ensign, and the mode of formation recommended by an English military writer (Sir John Smithe) in 1590 was:--the colour in the centre of the company guarded by the halberdiers; the pikemen in equal proportions, on each flank of the halberdiers: half the musketeers on each flank of the pikes; half the archers on each flank of the musketeers, and the harquebusiers (whose arms were much lighter than the muskets then in use) in equal proportions on each flank of the company for skirmishing.[1] It was customary to unite a number of companies into one body, called a REGIMENT, which frequently amounted to three thousand men: but each company continued to carry a colour. Numerous improvements were eventually introduced in the construction of fire-arms, and, it having been found impossible to make armour proof against the muskets then in use (which carried a very heavy ball) without its being too weighty for the soldier, armour was gradually laid aside by the infantry in the seventeenth century: bows and arrows also fell into disuse, and the infantry were reduced to two classes, viz.: _musketeers_, armed with matchlock muskets, swords, and daggers; and _pikemen_, armed with pikes from fourteen to eighteen feet long, and swords. In the early part of the seventeenth century Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, reduced the strength of regiments to 1000 men. He caused the gunpowder, which had heretofore been carried in flasks, or in small wooden bandoliers, each containing a charge, to be made up into cartridges, and carried in pouches; and he formed each regiment into two wings of musketeers, and a centre division of pikemen. He also adopted the practice of forming four regiments into a brigade; and the number of colours was afterwards reduced to three in each regiment. He formed his columns so compactly that his infantry could resist the charge of the celebrated Polish horsemen and Austrian cuirassiers; and his armies became the admiration of other nations. His mode of formation was copied by the English, French, and other European states; but so great was the prejudice in favour of ancient customs, that all his improvements were not adopted until near a century afterwards. In 1664 King Charles II. raised a corps for sea-service, styled the Admiral's regiment. In 1678 each company of 100 men usually consisted of 30 pikemen, 60 musketeers, and 10 men armed with light firelocks. In this year the King added a company of men armed with hand grenades to each of the old British regiments, which was designated the "grenadier company." Daggers were so contrived as to fit in the muzzles of the muskets, and bayonets, similar to those at present in use, were adopted about twenty years afterwards. An Ordnance regiment was raised in 1685, by order of King James II., to guard the artillery, and was designated the Royal Fusiliers (now 7th Foot). This corps, and the companies of grenadiers, did not carry pikes. King William III. incorporated the Admiral's regiment in the second Foot Guards, and raised two Marine regiments for sea-service. During the war in this reign, each company of infantry (excepting the fusiliers and grenadiers) consisted of 14 pikemen and 46 musketeers; the captains carried pikes; lieutenants, partisans; ensigns, half-pikes; and serjeants, halberds. After the peace in 1697 the Marine regiments were disbanded, but were again formed on the breaking out of the war in 1702.[2] During the reign of Queen Anne the pikes were laid aside, and every infantry soldier was armed with a musket, bayonet, and sword; the grenadiers ceased, about the same period, to carry hand grenades; and the regiments were directed to lay aside their third colour: the corps of Royal Artillery was first added to the Army in this reign. About the year 1745, the men of the battalion companies of infantry ceased to carry swords; during the reign of George II. light companies were added to infantry regiments; and in 1764 a Board of General Officers recommended that the grenadiers should lay aside their swords, as that weapon had never been used during the Seven Years' War. Since that period the arms of the infantry soldier have been limited to the musket and bayonet. The arms and equipment of the British Troops have seldom differed materially, since the Conquest, from those of other European states; and in some respects the arming has, at certain periods, been allowed to be inferior to that of the nations with whom they have had to contend; yet, under this disadvantage, the bravery and superiority of the British infantry have been evinced on very many and most trying occasions, and splendid victories have been gained over very superior numbers. Great Britain has produced a race of lion-like champions who have dared to confront a host of foes, and have proved themselves valiant with any arms. At _Crecy_, King Edward III., at the head of about 30,000 men, defeated, on the 26th of August, 1346, Philip King of France, whose army is said to have amounted to 100,000 men; here British valour encountered veterans of renown:--the King of Bohemia, the King of Majorca, and many princes and nobles were slain, and the French army was routed and cut to pieces. Ten years afterwards, Edward Prince of Wales, who was designated the Black Prince, defeated, at _Poictiers_, with 14,000 men, a French army of 60,000 horse, besides infantry, and took John I., King of France, and his son Philip, prisoners. On the 25th of October, 1415, King Henry V., with an army of about 13,000 men, although greatly exhausted by marches, privations, and sickness, defeated, at _Agincourt_, the Constable of France, at the head of the flower of the French nobility and an army said to amount to 60,000 men, and gained a complete victory. During the seventy years' war between the United Provinces of the Netherlands and the Spanish monarchy, which commenced in 1578 and terminated in 1648, the British infantry in the service of the States-General were celebrated for their unconquerable spirit and firmness;[3] and in the thirty years' war between the Protestant Princes and the Emperor of Germany, the British Troops in the service of Sweden and other states were celebrated for deeds of heroism.[4] In the wars of Queen Anne, the fame of the British army under the great MARLBOROUGH was spread throughout the world; and if we glance at the achievements performed within the memory of persons now living, there is abundant proof that the Britons of the present age are not inferior to their ancestors in the qualities which constitute good soldiers. Witness the deeds of the brave men, of whom there are many now surviving, who fought in Egypt in 1801, under the brave Abercromby, and compelled the French army, which had been vainly styled _Invincible_, to evacuate that country; also the services of the gallant Troops during the arduous campaigns in the Peninsula, under the immortal WELLINGTON; and the determined stand made by the British Army at Waterloo, where Napoleon Bonaparte, who had long been the inveterate enemy of Great Britain, and had sought and planned her destruction by every means he could devise, was compelled to leave his vanquished legions to their fate, and to place himself at the disposal of the British Government. These achievements, with others of recent dates, in the distant climes of India, prove that the same valour and constancy which glowed in the breasts of the heroes of Crecy, Poictiers, Agincourt, Blenheim, and Ramilies, continue to animate the Britons of the nineteenth century. The British Soldier is distinguished for a robust and muscular frame,--intrepidity which no danger can appal,--unconquerable spirit and resolution,--patience in fatigue and privation, and cheerful obedience to his superiors. These qualities, united with an excellent system of order and discipline to regulate and give a skilful direction to the energies and adventurous spirit of the hero, and a wise selection of officers of superior talent to command, whose presence inspires confidence,--have been the leading causes of the splendid victories gained by the British arms.[5] The fame of the deeds of the past and present generations in the various battle-fields where the robust sons of Albion have fought and conquered, surrounds the British arms with a halo of glory; these achievements will live in the page of history to the end of time. The records of the several regiments will be found to contain a detail of facts of an interesting character, connected with the hardships, sufferings, and gallant exploits of British soldiers in the various parts of the world where the calls of their Country and the commands of their Sovereign have required them to proceed in the execution of their duty, whether in active continental operations, or in maintaining colonial territories in distant and unfavourable climes. The superiority of the British infantry has been pre-eminently set forth in the wars of six centuries, and admitted by the greatest commanders which Europe has produced. The formations and movements of this _arme_, as at present practised, while they are adapted to every species of warfare, and to all probable situations and circumstances of service, are calculated to show forth the brilliancy of military tactics calculated upon mathematical and scientific principles. Although the movements and evolutions have been copied from the continental armies, yet various improvements have from time to time been introduced, to insure that simplicity and celerity by which the superiority of the national military character is maintained. The rank and influence which Great Britain has attained among the nations of the world, have in a great measure been purchased by the valour of the Army, and to persons who have the welfare of their country at heart, the records of the several regiments cannot fail to prove interesting. FOOTNOTES: [1] A company of 200 men would appear thus:-- __| | | |__| | 20 20 20 30 2|0 30 20 20 20 Harquebuses. Muskets. Halberds. Muskets. Harquebuses. Archers. Pikes. Pikes. Archers. The musket carried a ball which weighed 1/10th of a pound; and the harquebus a ball which weighed 1/25th of a pound. [2] The 30th, 31st, and 32nd Regiments were formed as Marine corps in 1702, and were employed as such during the wars in the reign of Queen Anne. The Marine corps were embarked in the Fleet under Admiral Sir George Rooke, and were at the taking of Gibraltar, and in its subsequent defence in 1704; they were afterwards employed at the siege of Barcelona in 1705. [3] The brave Sir Roger Williams, in his Discourse on War, printed in 1590, observes:--"I persuade myself ten thousand of our nation would beat thirty thousand of theirs (the Spaniards) out of the field, let them be chosen where they list." Yet at this time the Spanish infantry was allowed to be the best disciplined in Europe. For instances of valour displayed by the British Infantry during the Seventy Years' War, see the Historical Record of the Third Foot, or Buffs. [4] _Vide_ the Historical Record of the First, or Royal Regiment of Foot. [5] "Under the blessing of Divine Providence, His Majesty ascribes the successes which have attended the exertions of his troops in Egypt to that determined bravery which is inherent in Britons; but His Majesty desires it may be most solemnly and forcibly impressed on the consideration of every part of the army, that it has been a strict observance of order, discipline, and military system, which has given the full energy to the native valour of the troops, and has enabled them proudly to assert the superiority of the national military character, in situations uncommonly arduous, and under circumstances of peculiar difficulty."--_General Orders in 1801._ In the General Orders issued by Lieut.-General Sir John Hope (afterwards Lord Hopetoun), congratulating the army upon the successful result of the Battle of Corunna, on the 16th of January, 1809, it is stated:--"On no occasion has the undaunted valour of British troops ever been more manifest. At the termination of a severe and harassing march, rendered necessary by the superiority which the enemy had acquired, and which had materially impaired the efficiency of the troops, many disadvantages were to be encountered. These have all been surmounted by the conduct of the troops themselves: and the enemy has been taught, that whatever advantages of position or of numbers he may possess, there is inherent in the British officers and soldiers a bravery that knows not how to yield,--that no circumstances can appal,--and that will ensure victory, when it is to be obtained by the exertion of any human means." THE FORTY-SIXTH, OR THE SOUTH DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT, BEARS ON THE REGIMENTAL COLOUR AND APPOINTMENTS THE WORD "DOMINICA," AS A DISTINGUISHING MARK OF THE GOOD CONDUCT AND EXEMPLARY VALOUR DISPLAYED BY THE REGIMENT IN THE DEFENCE OF THE ISLAND OF DOMINICA, AGAINST A VERY SUPERIOR FRENCH FORCE, ON THE 22nd OF FEBRUARY, 1805. THE FORTY-SIXTH, OR, THE SOUTH DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT, ORIGINALLY THE FIFTY-SEVENTH REGIMENT. CONTENTS OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD. Year Page 1739 Introduction 1 ---- War declared against Spain - 1741 Formation of the regiment - ---- Colonel John Price appointed to the colonelcy. - ---- Numbered the 57th regiment - 1742 Stationed at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, proceeded to Berwick, and thence to Scotland 3 1743 Appointment of Colonel Hon. Thomas Murray to the colonelcy in succession to Colonel Price, removed to the 14th foot - 1744 War declared between Great Britain and France - 1745 Battle of Fontenoy - ---- Prince Charles Edward, the eldest son of the Pretender, landed in the Highlands of Scotland 4 1745 The King's forces, under Lieut.-General Sir John Cope, assembled at Stirling, and advanced to Inverness 4 ---- The rebel forces, under Prince Charles, proceeded to Perth and Dundee, and thence to Edinburgh, which surrendered to him 5 ---- The Prince, James Francis Edward, proclaimed at the High Cross, Edinburgh, as King of Great Britain and Ireland - ---- The Royal forces marched from Inverness to Aberdeen, embarked for Dunbar, advanced towards Edinburgh, and encamped near _Preston-Pans_ - ---- Regiments which composed the Royal Army 6 ---- Defeat of the Royal forces by the Highland Insurgents - ---- Loss sustained by the Royal forces, including the 57th regiment, in killed, wounded, and prisoners 7 ---- The Duke of Cumberland returned from the continent, and assumed the command of the Royal army - ---- The Prince Charles captured Carlisle, and proceeded as far as Derby, from whence he afterwards retreated to Scotland - ---- The Duke of Cumberland, after capturing the rebel garrison of Carlisle, returned to London, leaving the command of the army to Lieut.-General Hawley - 1746 The Prince Charles invested Stirling, and Lieut.-General Hawley marched to its relief - ---- Action at Falkirk - ---- The Duke of Cumberland resumed the command of the army, and entered Stirling - 1746 The Duke of Cumberland obtained a complete victory over the Rebel forces at _Culloden_, four miles from Inverness 8 ---- The 57th regiment marched from Berwick towards London - ---- Strength of the Royal army at the battle of Culloden - 1747 The rebellion suppressed, and the Prince Charles escaped to France 9 ---- The 57th regiment embarked for Jersey - ---- Several regiments, which had been brought from the continent to aid in suppressing the rebellion, returned to Flanders - ---- The Duke of Cumberland returned to Flanders and engaged the French at Laffeld, or Val - 1748 The Allies took the field in the summer, but hostilities were terminated by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in October - ---- Disbandment of the 43rd regiment, and of ten marine regiments, from the 44th to the 53rd regiment 10 ---- The numerical title of the 57th regiment changed to the FORTY-SIXTH regiment -- 1749 The FORTY-SIXTH regiment proceeded to Ireland -- 1751 Royal Warrant of 1st July issued for regulating the clothing, standards, and colours, and the numerical titles and rank of regiments -- 1756 Capture of the Island of Minorca by the French 11 ---- War declared against France -- 1757 The FORTY-SIXTH regiment embarked from Cork for Nova Scotia -- 1758 Expedition under Major-General James Abercromby against Ticonderoga -- ---- Brigadier-General the Viscount Howe (55th Regiment) killed at Ticonderoga -- 1758 Attack on Fort Ticonderoga abandoned 12 ---- Loss of officers sustained by the FORTY-SIXTH regiment -- 1759 Plan of the campaign in Canada 13 ---- Brigadier-General Prideaux (55th regiment) killed at Fort Niagara -- ---- Capture of Fort Niagara 15 ---- Operations of the troops under Lieut.-General Amherst and Major-General Wolfe -- ---- Siege of Ticonderoga -- ---- Occupation of Crown Point -- ---- Battle on the Heights of Abraham; death of Major-Gen. Wolfe; and capture of Quebec -- 1760 The French attempted to regain Quebec, and the battle of Sillery was fought 16 ---- Surrender of Fort Levi on L'Isle Royale -- ---- Attack and surrender of the garrison of Montreal 17 ---- The conquest of Canada completed -- 1761 The regiment embarked for Barbadoes -- 1762 Proceeded with an armament against the Island of Martinique, which surrendered to the British Crown -- ---- The surrender of Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent 18 ---- War declared against Spain -- ---- The regiment joined the armament against the Havannah -- ---- Capture of the Moro Fort, and town of Havannah 19 ---- Negotiations for peace signed at Fontainebleau -- 1763 The Treaty of Fontainebleau concluded at Paris, and peace proclaimed in London -- ---- Conditions of the treaty of peace between Great Britain, France, and Spain -- ---- The regiment returned to North America -- 1764 Colonel Hon. William Howe appointed to the colonelcy, in succession to Lieut.-General Hon. Thomas Murray, deceased 20 1767 Regiment returned from North America and stationed in Ireland -- ---- Disputes arose between the colonists of North America and the British Government -- 1775 Hostilities commenced with the colonists in North America by the action at Lexington -- ---- Appointment of Colonel Hon. John Vaughan to the colonelcy in succession to Major-General Hon. William Howe -- ---- The battle of Bunker's Hill -- 1776 The regiment embarked from Ireland for North America 21 ---- Joined the expedition against Charleston -- ---- Proceeded to Staten Island -- ---- The declaration of Independence by the American Congress -- ---- The regiment landed on Long Island -- ---- Action at Brooklyn 22 ---- The reduction of Long Island accomplished -- ---- The capture of New York took place -- ---- Action at White Plains -- ---- The reduction of Fort Washington -- ---- The regiment occupied winter-quarters at Amboy -- 1777 Proceeded with a body of troops from New York, and destroyed magazines, barracks, &c., at Peek's Hill, and returned to New York 23 ---- Joined an expedition against the city of Philadelphia -- ---- Battle at Brandywine -- ---- The American troops, under General Wayne surprised by the British, under Major-Gen. Grey 24 1777 The FORTY-SIXTH regiment gained the distinction of wearing _Red Feathers_ for its conduct in this action 24 ---- The British army took possession of Philadelphia, and occupied a position at Germantown 25 ---- Action at Germantown -- 1778 General Hon. Sir William Howe returned to England, and General Sir Henry Clinton assumed the command of the army -- ---- Action at Monmouth Court-House -- ---- The British army marched from Philadelphia to New York, the King of France having engaged to aid the Americans -- ---- A powerful French armament arrived off the Port of New York and proceeded against Rhode Island -- ---- Expedition against Bedford, on the Accushnet river, and against Martha's Vineyard 26 ---- Returned to New York -- ---- Proceeded with other regiments to the West Indies -- ---- Attack upon the island of St. Lucia 27 ---- Repelled several attacks made by the French -- ---- The flank companies of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment distinguished themselves at La Vigie, and received the thanks of Major-General James Grant commanding the troops 28 ---- Surrender of the Island of St. Lucia to the British troops -- 1779 The courts of Spain and Holland joined in hostilities against Great Britain -- 1782 The regiment returned to England 29 ---- County titles conferred upon the regiments of Infantry, and the FORTY-SIXTH directed to assume the designation of _South Devonshire_ regiment -- 1782 Treaty of peace signed at Paris between Great Britain and the United States of America 29 1783 Treaties of peace between England, France, Spain, and Holland -- 1784 The regiment proceeded from Plymouth to Ireland 30 1792 Embarked for Gibraltar -- 1794 Proceeded from Gibraltar to the West Indies -- 1795 Engaged in suppressing the insurrection of the Caribs in the Island of St. Vincent -- ---- Actions at Dorsetshire Hill 32 ---- Loss sustained by the regiment -- ---- Assault and capture of the post of the Caribs on the Vigie 33 ---- Major-General James Henry Craig appointed to the colonelcy of the regiment in succession to Lieut.-General Hon. Sir John Vaughan, K.B. deceased -- ---- Reinforcements arrived from England in order to assist in the suppression of the Caribs -- 1796 Further reinforcements arrived under Lieut.-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, K.B. -- ---- After a conflict of some hours the Caribs surrendered prisoners of war 34 ---- Several hundreds of Caribs escaped to the woods, but were afterwards forced to submit, and were removed from St. Vincent -- ---- The FORTY-SIXTH regiment having sustained considerable loss by their numerous engagements with the Caribs, returned to England -- 1799 The regiment embarked for Ireland -- 1802 Treaty of peace with France concluded at Amiens -- 1803 War renewed with France -- 1804 Appointment of Lieut.-General John White to the colonelcy, in succession to Lieut.-General Sir James Henry Craig 35 1804 Embarked from Cork for the West Indies, and proceeded to Dominica 35 1805 Defence of Dominica against an attack of a numerous French force -- ---- Official Reports from Lieut.-General Sir William Myers, and Brigadier-General George Prevost of the conduct of the troops engaged in the defence of Dominica -- ---- The Royal authority granted for the FORTY-SIXTH regiment to bear the word "_Dominica_" on the regimental colour and appointments. 44 1806 Detachments embarked for the capture of two French vessels 45 ---- The officers and men received the thanks of the Commander of the Forces in the West Indies, and of the Major-General commanding in the Island of Dominica -- 1809 Capture of the French island of Martinique 46 1810 Capture of the French island of Guadaloupe -- 1811 The regiment returned to England and marched into Devonshire 47 1812 The regiment proceeded from Plymouth to Jersey 48 1813 Embarked from Jersey for Portsmouth, and proceeded to the Isle of Wight -- ---- Embarked for New South Wales 49 1814 Arrived at New South Wales, and inspected by Major-General Macquarie -- 1815 Certain non-commissioned officers and privates received pecuniary rewards for having suppressed gangs of bushrangers 50 1816 Appointment of Lieut.-General Henry Wynyard to the colonelcy in succession to General Whyte, deceased -- ---- Detachments employed against the hostile black natives, and received an expression of thanks for their conduct on this duty 51 1817 Embarked at Sydney Cove for Madras 52 1818 Arrived at Vellore, and proceeded thence to Fort St. George -- ---- Received the approbation of the Commanding Officer of the Troops at Vellore for its interior arrangement and discipline -- 1820 Marched to Bellary, and thence to the Mahratta country 53 1824 Engaged in suppressing an insurrection at the Fort of Kittoor -- ---- Inspected by Major-General Hall commanding at Bellary, and received his approbation for its very efficient state 54 1825 Proceeded to Cannanore 55 1826 Marched from Cannanore to Secunderabad 56 1829 Reduction of the Establishment -- 1832 Proceeded to Masulipatam, and received orders to prepare for embarkation for England 57 1833 Received the approbation of its conduct during the period of its service in India, from the Right Hon. the Governor in Council -- ---- Embarked at Madras, arrived at Margate, and marched to Canterbury 58 ---- Received official intimation respecting the continuance of the use of the _Red ball tuft_ by the Light Company for its gallant conduct in the surprise of Gen. Wayne in America in 1777 59 1834 Embarked for Ireland -- 1837 Formed into six service, and four depôt companies; the service companies embarked for Gibraltar 60 1838 Appointment of Lieut.-General Sir John Keane, K.C.B., to the colonelcy, in succession to General Wynyard, deceased -- ---- Depôt companies embarked from Ireland for Plymouth -- 1839 Appointment of Lieut.-General John Ross to the colonelcy, in succession to Lieut.-General Sir John Keane 60 ---- Depôt companies embarked at Plymouth for Jersey -- 1841 Depôt companies proceeded to Ireland -- 1842 Service companies embarked at Gibraltar for Barbadoes -- 1843 Appointment of General the Earl of Stair to the colonelcy in succession to Lieut.-General Ross, deceased 61 1845 The service companies collected at Barbadoes, and embarked for Nova Scotia -- ---- Embarked for Canada -- 1847 Proceeded from Quebec to Nova Scotia 62 1848 Embarked for England -- ---- Arrived at Dover, and joined by the depôt companies from Guernsey -- 1850 Proceeded from Liverpool to Hull -- 1851 The Conclusion 63 SUCCESSION OF COLONELS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH, OR THE SOUTH DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT: ORIGINALLY NUMBERED THE FIFTY-SEVENTH REGIMENT. Year Page 1741 John Price 67 1743 Honorable Thomas Murray 68 1764 William Viscount Howe, K.B. -- 1775 Honorable Sir John Vaughan, K.B. 69 1795 Sir James Henry Craig, K.B. 70 1804 John Whyte 71 1816 Henry Wynyard -- 1838 Sir John (afterwards Lord) Keane, G.C.B. & G.C.H. 73 1839 John Ross, C.B. 75 1843 John, Earl of Stair, K.T. 76 PLATES. Costume of the Regiment _to face_ 1 Colours of the Regiment 66 [Illustration: FORTY-SIXTH REGIMENT. _For Cannons Military Records_ _Madeley lith 3 Wellington S^t Strand_] HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-SIXTH, OR THE SOUTH DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT; ORIGINALLY NUMBERED THE FIFTY-SEVENTH REGIMENT. [Sidenote: 1739] The claim of the Spanish Government to the right of search, and the aggressions committed by that power on the commerce of Great Britain, in the West Indies, by the _guarda-costas_, and other ships acting by authority of the King of Spain, contrary to the existing treaties, led to a convention between the two Crowns, which was concluded on the 14th of January, 1739. This convention stipulated, that compensation should be made by Spain to the English Government, in reparation for the hostilities committed on the British subjects in the American seas. The Court of Madrid, however, violated the convention, and ultimately war was proclaimed against Spain on the 23rd of October, 1739. Augmentations were accordingly made in the army and navy; ten regiments of Marines were raised in this and the following year; these corps were embarked on board the fleets under Admirals Vernon and Sir Chaloner Ogle, which proceeded against the Spanish possessions in South America. [Sidenote: 1740] While the war was being carried on between Great Britain and Spain, Charles the Sixth, Emperor of Germany, died on the 20th of October, 1740; and the succession of his daughter, the Archduchess Maria Theresa, to his hereditary dominions, being disputed by the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony, also by the Kings of Prussia and Spain, a continental war was the result, in which England and France, acting in the first instance as auxiliaries, finally became principals in the contest, which has since been known as the "_War of the Austrian Succession_." The King of France, Louis XV., supported the Elector of Bavaria, while King George II., adhering to the "_Pragmatic Sanction_,"[6] to which nearly all the powers of Europe had been parties, supported the claims of the Archduchess Maria Theresa. [Sidenote: 1741] In January, 1741, seven additional regiments[7] were raised for the regular Infantry, and were numbered in succession to the ten regiments of marines, from the _Fifty-fourth_ to the _Sixtieth_ regiment. The FIFTY-SEVENTH was one of these seven regiments, and the command of the corps was conferred by King George II. on Colonel John Price, from the First Foot Guards, whose commission was dated the 13th of January, 1741. The regiment consisted of ten companies, of three serjeants, three corporals, two drummers, and seventy privates each; and its numbers, including officers, amounted to eight hundred and fifteen. [Sidenote: 1742] In March, 1742, the FIFTY-SEVENTH regiment was stationed at Newcastle-upon-Tyne. In May, 1742, several regiments were embarked for Flanders under Field Marshal the Earl of Stair, to support Maria Theresa, the Queen of Hungary and Bohemia; but the FIFTY-SEVENTH regiment remained in Great Britain. The FIFTY-SEVENTH regiment was afterwards stationed at Berwick, and in October received orders to proceed to North Britain. [Sidenote: 1743] On the 23rd of June, 1743, Colonel the Honorable Thomas Murray, from the Third Foot Guards, was promoted Colonel of the FIFTY-SEVENTH regiment, in succession to Colonel John Price, removed to the fourteenth foot. In the meanwhile King George II. had joined the army at Aschaffenberg, and on the 27th of June gained a victory over the French army, under Marshal Noailles at _Dettingen_. [Sidenote: 1744] France and Great Britain, from auxiliaries, now became principals in the contest. On the 20th of March, 1744, France declared war against England, and on the 29th of that month a counter declaration was made by Great Britain, in which the French monarch was accused of violating the "_Pragmatic Sanction_," and of assisting the son of the Pretender in his designs on the British throne. The operations of the British army in Flanders during the year 1744 were confined to the defensive, and no general engagement occurred. [Sidenote: 1745] After the battle of _Fontenoy_, fought on the 11th of May, 1745, Louis XV. revived the claims of the Pretender[8] to the throne of Great Britain. Prince Charles Edward, eldest son of the Pretender, arrived in the Highlands of Scotland towards the end of July, where he was joined by several clans. The FIFTY-SEVENTH regiment at this period formed part of the force in Scotland, and Lieut.-General Sir John Cope, the Commander in Chief in North Britain, assembled all the troops under his orders at Stirling, which consisted of about fourteen hundred men. He afterwards advanced towards the great road called the Chain, leading through the Highlands to Inverness, and after a laborious march, arrived at Dalwhinny on the 25th of August. Here intelligence was received that the rebels were posted at Corryarrack, seventeen miles distant, upon which Lieut.-General Sir John Cope continued his march through Badenoch to Inverness, so that the south of Scotland was left unprotected, and the young Pretender improved this unexpected advantage, and accordingly entered the county of Athol, seized the Castle of Blair, proceeded afterwards to Perth and Dundee, proclaiming his Father by new magistrates of his own appointment, levying the public money, and assuming other acts of royalty. The number of the rebels had increased to four thousand men, and on the 11th of September the young Chevalier marched from Perth, passed the Forth on the 13th, and on the 16th of that month, at night, arrived in the vicinity of Edinburgh. At five o'clock on the following morning the city was unaccountably surrendered to him without resistance. He then made his public entry, attired in Highland costume, and occupied the royal palace of Holyrood House. General Guest, who commanded the garrison of Edinburgh Castle, removed the bank, and the effects of the principal inhabitants into that fortress, which greatly disappointed the young Prince, who expected to gain possession of the treasure. His Father was afterwards proclaimed with great ceremony at the High Cross, as King of Great Britain and Ireland. Lieut.-General Sir John Cope, in the meanwhile, had marched with his troops from Inverness to Aberdeen, where they took shipping, and landed at Dunbar, twenty-seven miles east of Edinburgh, on the 18th of September, when he was reinforced by Brigadier-General Fowke, with two regiments of dragoons, from Edinburgh. The next day he advanced towards that city to observe the disposition of the rebels, who were now increased to upwards of five thousand men. On the 20th of September Lieut.-General Sir John Cope encamped in the neighbourhood of _Preston-Pans_,[9] near the sea, and seven miles from Edinburgh. His army consisted of the following regiments:-- Gardiner's (13th) and Hamilton's (14th) dragoons 567 Two companies of Guise's (6th) and eight of Lascelles' (47th) foot 570 Five companies of Lee's (44th) regiment 291 Murray's (now 46th) regiment 580 Highlanders 183 ----- Total 2,191 ----- Information being received of the approach of the enemy, Sir John Cope drew up his army at _Gladsmuir Heath_, between the hamlets of _Preston-Pans_ and Cockenzie. About three o'clock on the morning of the 21st of September, large bodies of rebel Highlanders were in motion, and before daybreak a chosen band of these hardy mountaineers advanced with great celerity and intrepidity to attack the royalists. As they drew near, they raised a fearful yell, fired a volley, threw down their muskets, and rushed sword in hand upon the troops which guarded the artillery. The sudden advance of the Highlanders in the dark, their superior numbers, and peculiar mode of fighting, dismayed the two hundred soldiers appointed to guard the artillery on the right, who saw themselves assaulted by more than three times their own numbers, and as they caught the gleam of steel flashing in their faces, gave way and fled. The two hundred and fifty dragoons on the right, seeing the artillery lost, became disheartened; they advanced to charge a large mass of Highlanders, but observing the disparity of numbers, they were seized with a panic and galloped from the field. This inauspicious commencement of the action damped the spirits of the infantry, and the panic spread from rank to rank; several companies made resistance, and feats of valour were displayed by individuals and small parties; all semblance of order was, however, soon lost, and a confused rout ensued. About four hundred of the royal forces were killed or wounded, and the prisoners, who amounted to nearly twelve hundred men, were removed to Edinburgh, and afterwards to the Highlands. The FIFTY-SEVENTH regiment had the following officers taken prisoners: Lieut.-Colonel Clayton, Major Talbot, Captains Reid, John Cochran, Scot, Thomas Leslie, and Blackes; Lieutenants Thomas Hay, Cranston, Disney, Wale, Wry, and Simms; Ensigns Sutherland, Lucey, Holdane, Birnie, and L'Estrange; and Adjutant Spencer. This successful commencement of the rebellion caused numerous adherents to flock to the Prince's standard; several regiments were recalled from the continent in October, and His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland proceeded to take the command of the royal army. The young Pretender, elated with the capture of Carlisle, marched as far as Derby, from whence, however, he commenced his retreat to the north on the 6th of December, as he found but few partisans in England to join him in his expedition. The Duke of Cumberland, after capturing the rebel garrison of Carlisle, returned to London, leaving the command of the army to Lieut.-General Hawley. [Sidenote: 1746] In January 1746, Stirling was closely invested by the young Chevalier, and Lieut.-General Hawley marched to its relief. An engagement occurred at _Falkirk_ on the 17th of January, in which the Prince was again victorious. The Duke of Cumberland now proceeded to Edinburgh, reassumed the command of the army, and on the 2nd of February entered Stirling. Fortune no longer favored the young Chevalier, who fixed his head-quarters at Inverness. The inclemency of the season having abated, the Duke of Cumberland, on the 8th of April, advanced towards the enemy, and gained a complete victory over him on the 16th of April, near _Culloden House_, four miles east of Inverness.[10] By official documents it appears, that on the 22nd of March, 1746, the FIFTY-SEVENTH regiment was stationed at Berwick, and on the 16th of April following, the date of the Battle of _Culloden_, the subjoined letter was addressed to the officer commanding the first division of the regiment, then at Tuxford, in Nottinghamshire, which indicates that the corps had commenced its march towards London:-- "_War Office, 16th April, 1746._ "SIR, "I am commanded to signify to you it is His Majesty's pleasure, that you cause the regiment of Foot under your command to continue its march in two divisions, with the utmost expedition, and without halting. "I am, &c. (Signed) "W. YONGE. "_Officer Commanding in Chief the first division of Colonel Murray's regiment, at Tuxford._" Prince Charles, after enduring many hardships, succeeded in escaping to France in September. In the following month the FIFTY-SEVENTH regiment embarked at Portsmouth for Jersey. [Sidenote: 1747] The rebellion being suppressed, several regiments returned to Flanders, and on the 2nd of July, 1747, the Duke of Cumberland engaged the French at _Laffeld_, or _Val_, where the Allies suffered severely from the misconduct of the Dutch troops. [Sidenote: 1748] The Allies again took the field in the summer of 1748, but hostilities were at length terminated by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which was signed on the 7th of October, 1748. By it all the great treaties, from that of Westphalia in 1648, which first recognised the principle of a balance of power in Europe, to that of Vienna in 1738, were renewed and confirmed. Prussia retained Silesia, and the Empress-Queen Maria Theresa was guaranteed in the possession of her hereditary dominions, according to the Pragmatic Sanction. France surrendered her conquests in Flanders, and England those in the East and West Indies; all therefore Great Britain gained by the war was the glory of having supported the German sovereignty of Maria Theresa, and of having adhered to former treaties. Several regiments were disbanded in consequence of the termination of the war. On the disbandment of Colonel Spotswood's (afterwards Gooche's) American Provincial Corps, then numbered the _forty-third_ regiment, and of the ten Marine regiments from the _forty-fourth_ to the _fifty-third_, the numerical titles of six of the seven regiments raised in 1741, were changed, and the _fifty-seventh_ became the FORTY-SIXTH regiment.[11] [Sidenote: 1749] In the year 1749 the FORTY-SIXTH regiment proceeded to Ireland, where it remained for eight years. [Sidenote: 1751] In the Royal Warrant, dated the 1st of July, 1751, for ensuring uniformity in the clothing, standards, and colours of the army, and regulating the number and rank of regiments, the facings of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment were directed to be yellow. The first, or King's colour, was the Great Union; the second, or Regimental colour, was of yellow silk, with the Union in the upper canton; in the centre of the colour the number of the rank of the regiment, in gold Roman characters, within a wreath of roses and thistles on the same stalk. [Sidenote: 1756] While the regiment was stationed in Ireland, the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was interrupted by the aggressions of the French on the British territory in North America, and early in 1756 the King of France prepared a powerful armament for the capture of the island of Minorca. In consequence of this attack on Minorca, hostilities became inevitable on the part of Great Britain, and on the 18th of May war was declared against France. [Sidenote: 1757] On the 7th of May 1757, the FORTY-SIXTH, and other regiments, embarked at Cork, for Nova Scotia, being intended to form part of an expedition under Major-General the Earl of Loudoun, for the attack upon Cape Breton, an island in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. On arriving at Halifax, the seventeenth, forty-second, FORTY-SIXTH, and the second battalion of the sixtieth regiments were formed in brigade under Major-General James Abercromby; but the French at Louisburg having been reinforced, the expedition was deferred until the following year, and the regiment remained in Nova Scotia during the winter. [Sidenote: 1758] While the expedition under Lieut.-General (afterwards Lord) Amherst proceeded in May, 1758, against Cape Breton,[12] the FORTY-SIXTH regiment was ordered to join the body of troops under Major-General James Abercromby, selected to attack the fort of _Ticonderoga_. This force, which comprised the twenty-seventh, forty-second, forty-fourth, FORTY-SIXTH, and fifty-fifth regiments, embarked on Lake George on the 5th of July, and landed on the following day near the extremity of the lake, from whence the troops marched through a wild and thickly-wooded country, in four columns, upon _Ticonderoga_; the guides mistook the route through the trackless woods, and on the 6th of July, a skirmish ensued with a body of French troops, in which Brigadier-General George Augustus Viscount Howe (of the fifty-fifth regiment) was killed. With this exception the British sustained but small loss, while the enemy had three hundred killed, and one hundred and forty-eight taken prisoners. On the 8th of July, the British appeared before the fort, which was situated on a tongue of land, projecting into Lake Champlain, and was built by the French in 1756. It could only be approached on one side, which was strongly fortified; the other three sides being surrounded by water. Felled trees, with their branches outward, were spread before the works, which were defended by between four and five thousand men. The engineer having reported that the entrenchment might be forced by musketry alone, Major-General Abercromby, unfortunately, determined to attack the place without waiting for the artillery, which, on account of the badness of the ground, could not be easily brought up. A rumour also that the French were about to be reinforced with three thousand men, confirmed the General in his resolution. Although the troops behaved with the utmost gallantry in the attack on fort _Ticonderoga_, on the 8th July, it was found impossible to succeed in the undertaking, and after many unavailing efforts, during a desperate contest of upwards of four hours, Major-General Abercromby gave orders to withdraw, and the British returned to their camp on the south of Lake George, where they arrived on the following evening.[13] [Sidenote: 1759] The following officers belonging to the FORTY-SIXTH regiment were killed on this occasion: Lieut.-Colonel Samuel Beaver, Captains George Needham and Edward Wynne; Lieutenants Jacob Laulhé and Arthur Lloyd; Ensign George Crofton, and Quarter-Master Thomas Carbonell. In the year 1759, it was proposed to attack the French in all their strong posts in Canada at once, so as to fall as nearly as possible at the same time upon Crown Point, Niagara, and the forts to the south of Lake Erie, while a great naval armament, and a considerable body of land forces under Major-General James Wolfe, should attempt Quebec by the river St. Lawrence. Lieut.-General Amherst, who commanded the British forces in America, was to attack Ticonderoga and Crown Point, by Lake George; the reduction of these forts would command the Lake Champlain, where having established a sufficient naval force, he was by the river Sorel, which forms the communication between this lake and the river St. Lawrence, to proceed to Quebec, and effect a junction with Major-General Wolfe. The third of the grand operations was against _Fort Niagara_, near the celebrated falls of that name, a place of great consequence. The reduction of this place was committed to Brigadier-General John Prideaux (fifty-fifth regiment), under whom Sir William Johnson commanded the provincials of New York, and several Indians of the Five Nations, who were engaged in the British service, by the credit that gentleman had obtained among their tribes. It was to this portion of the army that the FORTY-SIXTH regiment was attached. The troops which had been appointed to proceed to Niagara, arrived at the fort in July. This was a very important post, and was situated at the entrance of a strait by which Lake Ontario is joined to Lake Erie. A little above the fort is the cataract of Niagara, the most remarkable in the world, for the quantity of water, and the greatness of the fall. The siege of the place had not been long formed, before Brigadier-General Prideaux was killed in the trenches, by the bursting of a cohorn. This occurred on the 20th of July, and the accident threatened to throw a damp on the operations; but Sir William Johnson, upon whom the command devolved, omitted nothing to continue the vigorous measures of his predecessor, and added to them everything his own genius could suggest. The French were alarmed for the safety of the fort, and collected all the troops they could draw from their posts about the lakes, and to these were joined a large body of Indians; the whole advanced to raise the siege, and they amounted in all, to seventeen hundred men. It was on the 23rd of July, that Sir William Johnson received intelligence of the approach of the enemy to relieve the fort, and instantly made a disposition to defeat their designs. The guard of the trenches was commanded by Major John Beckwith, of the forty-fourth regiment, and, lest the garrison should sally out, and either attempt to surprise or overpower that guard, by which the British would have been hemmed in between two fires, the forty-fourth regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel William Farquhar, was posted in such manner as to be able to sustain Major Beckwith. The road on the left of the line, which led from the cataract to the fort, was occupied by the light infantry, and piquets of the army, on the evening of the 23rd of July; early next morning these were reinforced by the grenadiers and part of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, the whole commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Eyre Massey, of the FORTY-SIXTH, to whose good conduct in the distribution of the troops, and the steadiness with which he received the enemy in front, while the Indians in British pay, attacked them on the flanks, the honor of the day was in a great degree attributable. The French were completely defeated, and all their officers were made prisoners, among whom were Monsieur Aubry, De Lignery, Marin, and Repentini. This action sealed the fate of _Fort Niagara_, which surrendered on the following day (25th of July), and Sir William Johnson, Bart., in his despatch to Lieut.-General Amherst, of that date, thus alluded to the conduct of the troops:-- "Permit me to assure you, in the whole progress of the siege, which was severe and painful, the officers and men behaved with the utmost cheerfulness and bravery." In the meantime the siege of _Ticonderoga_ was prosecuted with vigour by the troops under Lieut.-General Amherst, and on the 25th of July the garrison blew up the fort, and sailed to _Crown Point_, another fort on Lake Champlain, which place the French also abandoned, and retired down the lake to _Isle aux Noix_; _Crown Point_ was occupied by the British on the 4th of August following. The operations against Quebec by the troops under Major-General James Wolfe, caused the year to end in a most triumphant manner to the British Arms. The battle fought on the 13th of September, 1759, on the Heights of _Abraham_, in which the Major-General was killed, led to the surrender of Quebec, which capitulated five days afterwards. While the above operations were being performed, Lieut.-General Amherst found that the command of Lake Champlain was still an object of some difficulty, although the retreat of the French from Crown Point and Ticonderoga had left him master of Lake George. In October the troops embarked in boats, and proceeded a considerable distance along the lake, but the season became too advanced for operations, which were postponed to the following year, and the force returned to Crown Point and Ticonderoga for winter-quarters. [Sidenote: 1760] The French endeavoured to regain possession of Quebec, and after the battle of _Sillery_ fought before that place on the 28th of April, 1760, in which, from their superiority in numbers they had the advantage, trenches were immediately opened by them before the town. The arrival of the English fleet in May dissipated all fears for the safety of Quebec, and nothing now remained to cloud the prospect of the reduction of Canada, by the united efforts of three British armies, which, by different routes, were marching to attack those parts of the country that remained in the power of France. A large army was collected at Oswego by Lieut.-General Amherst, which the FORTY-SIXTH regiment joined in the afternoon of the 6th of August. The whole army embarked on the 10th of August, and the grenadiers, amounting to about six hundred men, were embodied, and placed under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Eyre Massey of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment. Dispositions were afterwards made for the attack of _Fort Levi_, on _L'Isle Royale_, and after two days' sharp firing, the fort surrendered on the 25th of August, of which Lieut.-Colonel Massey, with three companies of grenadiers, took possession. After spending some days in repairing this post, and in fitting out the vessels for passing the troops down the river St. Lawrence, the most difficult part of which was now to be encountered; notwithstanding all precautions, nearly ninety men were drowned in passing the dangerous falls, and a great number of vessels broke to pieces. After a tedious voyage the British came in sight of the Island of Montreal on the 6th of September. The troops were immediately landed, and all dispositions were made for attacking the place, and so excellently was the plan concerted, that Brigadier-General the Honorable James Murray landed from Quebec on that very day, and Colonel Haviland with his force from Isle-au-Noix on the following day. The Marquis of Vaudreuil, the French Governor-General, saw himself entirely enclosed, and was compelled to surrender the garrison of Montreal on the 8th of September; thus was completed the _Conquest of Canada_, which vast country has since continued under the dominion of Great Britain. [Sidenote: 1761] The regiment remained in North America until October 1761, when it embarked for Barbadoes, where an armament was being assembled for the attack of the French West India Islands, and the land forces were placed under the orders of Major-General the Honorable Robert Monckton. [Sidenote: 1762] The armament sailed from Carlisle Bay, in Barbadoes, on the 5th of January, 1762, and proceeded against the island of _Martinique_, which was settled by the French about the year 1635. After menacing the coast at several points, a landing was effected in the middle of January in Cas des Navières Bay; many difficulties were encountered from the rugged surface of the country, and from the formidable heights occupied by the enemy, but these were overcome by British skill, discipline, and valour; the heights of _Morne Tartenson_ were carried on the 24th of January, and of _Morne Garnier_ on the 27th; _Fort Royal_ surrendered on the 4th of February, and these successes were followed by the submission of the island to the British Crown. Major-General the Honorable Robert Monckton commended the conduct of the troops in his despatch, and added,--"The difficulties they had to encounter in the attack of an enemy, possessed of every advantage that art or nature could give them, were great. Their perseverance in surmounting these obstacles furnishes a noble example of British spirit:" and in alluding to the conduct of the three divisions of grenadiers, one division of which was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel the Honorable John Vaughan, at this period Lieut.-Colonel commandant of the ninety-fourth (since disbanded), but who was appointed to the FORTY-SIXTH regiment in November following, added, that "they had particularly distinguished themselves, the warmest part of the service having fallen to their lot." The capture of _Martinique_ was followed by the submission of _Grenada_, _St. Lucia_, and _St. Vincent_. War had in the interim been declared against Spain, and the FORTY-SIXTH joined the armament under General the Earl of Albemarle, destined to proceed against the wealthy Spanish settlement of the _Havannah_, in the Island of Cuba. On the 7th of June a landing was effected, and on the 9th the troops took up a position between Coximar and the Moro Fort. Extraordinary difficulties were encountered in making the approaches, and carrying on the siege, while a severe sickness prevailed amongst the seamen and soldiers. Every obstacle was, however, overcome by the unanimity which existed between the land and sea forces. The _Moro_ fort, which protected the harbour, and was regarded as almost impregnable, was captured by storm on the 30th of July; on the 11th of August a series of batteries opened so well-directed a fire on the defences of the town, that the guns of the garrison were soon silenced, and flags of truce were hung out. On the 13th of August the town of the Havannah, with all its dependencies, and the ships of war in the harbour, surrendered, and the British troops took possession of this valuable settlement. Negociations for peace were shortly afterwards commenced, and the preliminary articles were signed at Fontainebleau by the Duke of Bedford on the 3rd of November, 1762. [Sidenote: 1763] The treaty of Fontainebleau was concluded at Paris on the 10th of February, 1763, the ratifications were exchanged on the 10th of March, and peace was proclaimed in London on the 22nd of that month. By this treaty the whole of Canada, part of Louisiana, together with Cape Breton, and the other islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, were ceded to Great Britain. In the West Indies, the islands of Tobago, Dominica, St. Vincent, and Grenada, were retained by Great Britain; but Martinique, Guadaloupe, Marigalante, and St. Lucia, were restored to France. In the East Indies, the French obtained the restitution of their settlements, but agreed not to erect any fortifications in Bengal. Minorca was restored to England in exchange for Belle-Isle, which had been captured by the British in 1761, and it was stipulated that the fortifications of Dunkirk should be demolished. Spain ceded East and West Florida to Great Britain, in return for the restitution of the Havannah, Manilla, and all the places which Spain had lost since the commencement of the war. [Sidenote: 1764] In the meanwhile the FORTY-SIXTH regiment had returned to North America, where it remained for the four following years. Colonel the Honorable William Howe was appointed by His Majesty King George III. from the fifty-eighth to the colonelcy of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment on the 21st of November, 1764, in succession to Lieut.-General the Honorable Thomas Murray, deceased. [Sidenote: 1767] In the autumn of the year 1767 the FORTY-SIXTH regiment returned to Great Britain, and was stationed in Ireland for eight years. Serious disputes had, in the meantime, arisen, on the subject of taxation, between the colonists in North America and the British Government. The passing of the Stamp Act, in 1764, was the first cause of irritation, but the spirit of discontent was partially allayed by its repeal in 1766. This feeling was again aroused, in the following year, by the Bill for levying duties on certain articles imported from England, which was repealed in 1770, with the exception of the duty on tea, which was retained as an assertion of the right of taxation inherent in the British Legislature. After the cargoes of tea sent to Boston in 1773 had been emptied into the sea, an Act of Parliament was passed in the year 1774 for closing that port. The colonists adopted retaliatory measures, and subsequently made preparations for an appeal to arms. [Sidenote: 1775] On the 19th of April, 1775, the first hostile collision took place at _Lexington_, between His Majesty's troops and the Colonists in the unhappy contest, which was soon to assume a most formidable character. Upon Major-General the Honorable Sir William Howe, K.B., being removed to the colonelcy of the twenty-third Royal Welsh Fusiliers, on the 11th of May, 1775, Brevet Colonel the Honorable John Vaughan was appointed to the vacant colonelcy of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment. The conflict at Lexington was followed by the battle of _Bunker's Hill_, which was fought on the 17th of June, 1775. [Sidenote: 1776] These events caused several regiments to be embarked for America early in the year 1776; the FORTY-SIXTH embarked from Ireland at this period, and arrived on the coast of North Carolina early in April, when Major-General Henry Clinton, who was serving with the local rank of General in America, assumed the command. The men landed at Cape Fear to refresh themselves after the voyage, and returning on board the transports, sailed on the 1st of June with the expedition against _Charleston_. After passing Charleston bar, the troops landed on one of the islands; but the armament proved of insufficient strength for the capture of the capital of South Carolina, and the troops re-embarked and proceeded to Staten Island, where the main body of the British forces had assembled under Major-General the Honorable Sir William Howe, K.B., who was serving with the local rank of General in America. The seventeenth, fortieth, FORTY-SIXTH, and fifty-fifth regiments were here formed in brigade under Major-General James Grant. On the 4th of July, 1776, the American Congress issued their declaration of independence, abjuring their allegiance to the Crown of Great Britain, and all hope of accommodation failed. A landing was effected by the British on _Long Island_ on the 22nd of August, and in the evening of the 26th the army was put in motion to pass a range of woody heights, which intersect the island, and to attack the American force in position beyond the hills. The column under Major-General Grant, of which the FORTY-SIXTH formed part, was directed to advance along the coast, with ten pieces of cannon, to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter. Moving forward at the appointed hour, this column fell in with the advanced parties of the Americans about midnight, and at daybreak on the following morning, encountered a large body of troops formed in an advantageous position, defended by artillery. Skirmishing and cannonading ensued, and were continued until the Americans discovered by the firing at _Brooklyn_, that the left of their army had been turned and forced, when they retreated in great confusion through a morass. The American army, being driven from its positions with severe loss, made a precipitate retreat to their fortified lines at _Brooklyn_. The Americans quitted their fortified lines during the night of the 28th of August, and retired across the East River, in boats, to New York; the reduction of _Long Island_ was accomplished in a few days, with little loss. The regiment shared in the operations by which the capture of _New York_ was accomplished: also in the movements by which the Americans were driven from _White Plains_, and in the reduction of _Fort Washington_. After the reduction of Fort Washington, and of Fort Lee on the opposite side of the North, or Hudson's River, the regiment continued the pursuit of the enemy across the Jerseys, by Elizabeth Town, Raway, &c. towards Philadelphia, and remained during the following winter at Amboy. The FORTY-SIXTH regiment occupied an old transport ship as a barrack, and being actively employed during the winter in constant escorts of ammunition, was continually attacked between that place and New Brunswick, on the way to Trenton, Princetown, and Burlington, where the advance of the British army had taken up winter quarters. During the winter, General Washington suddenly passed the Delaware river, and succeeded in surprising and making prisoners a corps of Hessians at Trenton, but he afterwards made a precipitate retreat. Being reinforced, he again crossed the river, and took up a position at Trenton. [Sidenote: 1777] Information having been received that the Americans were forming magazines at _Peek's Hill_, about fifty miles up the North River, the FORTY-SIXTH regiment was detached against that post, with a body of troops, which sailed from New York on the 22nd of March, 1777, and as they approached Peek's Hill, the Americans set fire to the stores, and retreated. The British landed, completed the destruction of the magazines, barracks, &c., and subsequently returned to their former quarters at New York. Afterwards taking the field with the army in the Jerseys, the FORTY-SIXTH regiment was engaged in the operations designed to bring the enemy to a general engagement; but the Americans kept close in their fortified lines in the mountains; an expedition against the populous and wealthy city of _Philadelphia_ was next undertaken. Embarking from Sandy Hook, the army, of which the FORTY-SIXTH formed part, proceeded to the Chesapeake, and landed on the northern shore of the Elk river on the 25th of August. The American army took up a position at _Brandywine_, to oppose the advance, and on the 11th of September the Royal forces moved forward to engage their opponents. The action proved decisive; the enemy was driven from his position, and forced to make a precipitate retreat. The FORTY-SIXTH sustained but trifling loss on this occasion. In order to harass the Royal forces, General Washington posted several detachments in such a manner as to command all the roads and avenues to their encampment. He seized every opportunity of drawing detached parties into ambuscades, which was the more readily effected, as the country was in his interest, and the provincial army abounded with persons fully acquainted with all its local advantages. A very considerable detachment employed in this manner, lay concealed in the depth of a forest at a short distance behind the British camp; it consisted of fifteen hundred men, commanded by General Wayne. General Sir William Howe, upon receiving this intelligence, despatched Major-General Charles (afterwards Earl) Grey with a body of troops in the middle of the night of the 20th of September to surprise the detachment of the enemy. The light company of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment was engaged in this enterprise, which was conducted with singular address and intrepidity. The troops advanced in profound silence to the outposts of the enemy, which were surprised and secured without the least noise. It was then between twelve and one. The main body of the American army, unapprised of its danger, had retired to rest. Directed by the light of the camp fires, the party under Major-General Grey proceeded undiscovered to the enemy's encampment, and rushed upon the foe with their bayonets. Three hundred Americans were killed and wounded, and a great number taken prisoners, with most of their arms and baggage. Obscurity saved those that escaped, as it had before at Brandywine Creek. The British had only one officer, one serjeant, and one private soldier killed, and a few men wounded, in this attack. It was this affair which gave the FORTY-SIXTH regiment _Red Feathers_, which it has ever since worn. The origin of the distinction is as follows:-- The Americans having vowed vengeance for the above attack, and that they would give no quarter, the soldiers of the _light battalion_ on this declared, that to prevent any one not engaged in the action from suffering on their account, they had stained their feathers _red_, as a distinguishing mark. The British army advanced upon Philadelphia, took possession of that city, and occupied a position at _Germantown_. The Americans attempted to surprise the British troops early on the morning of the 4th of October, and at first gained some advantage, but were speedily repulsed with severe loss. [Sidenote: 1778] The regiment passed the winter in quarters at Philadelphia, and in the spring of 1778, it furnished several detachments, which ranged the country in various directions to open communications for obtaining provisions. At this period General the Honorable Sir William Howe had returned to England, and resigned the command of the army to General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. The regiment also took part in the fatigues and difficulties of the march of the army from Philadelphia, through the Jerseys, in order to return to New York, and the flank companies were engaged on the 28th of June in repulsing the attack of the enemy on the rear of the column at _Monmouth Court-House_, near _Freehold_, in New Jersey. The army had marched from Philadelphia to New York in consequence of the King of France having engaged to aid the Americans, which circumstance changed the character of the war. Shortly after the arrival of the British army at New York a powerful French armament appeared off that port. The enemy had a great superiority of numbers; but the enthusiasm in the British navy and army was unbounded, and the hour of contest was looked forward to with sanguine expectations. The enemy did not, however, venture to hazard an attack; but proceeded against Rhode Island; a numerous body of Americans co-operated in the enterprise, and besieged Newport. The British fleet put to sea, and the thirty-third, forty-second, FORTY-SIXTH, and sixty-fourth regiments embarked, under Major-General Grey, to join the fleet at the east end of Long Island. When the transports were about to sail, information was received of the departure of the French fleet from Rhode Island, and while at sea, news arrived of the Americans having raised the siege of Newport. The troops were then directed to proceed against _Bedford_, on the Accushnet river, a noted place for American privateers. On the evening of the 5th of September the troops landed,--overcame all opposition,--destroyed seventy privateers and other ships,--demolished the fort and artillery,--blew up the magazine,--destroyed an immense quantity of naval stores, &c., and returned on board the transports at noon on the following day. The troops afterwards proceeded against Martha's Vineyard,--destroyed the defences,--took three hundred and eighty-eight stand of arms from the militia,--obliged the inhabitants to deliver up three hundred oxen, ten thousand sheep, and a thousand pounds sterling collected by the Congress. After this success the regiment returned to New York. A powerful French armament menacing the British possessions in the West Indies, the FORTY-SIXTH, and other regiments, sailed from North America, early in November, for Barbadoes, under Major-General James Grant. Upon the arrival of the reinforcements at Barbadoes, the British naval and military commanders resolved to attack the French island of _St. Lucia_. On this occasion the FORTY-SIXTH regiment was formed in brigade with the fifteenth, twenty-eighth, and fifty-fifth regiments, under Major-General Prescott. The expedition sailed from Carlisle Bay on the 12th of December, a landing was effected at _St. Lucia_ on the following day, and on the 14th the French troops were driven from several important posts. In the meantime a French armament of very superior numbers approached the island, and the British took up positions to repel the enemy. The French fleet made a desperate attack on the British naval force, but was repulsed. A numerous body of the enemy landed, and, on the 18th of December, stormed the post of _La Vigie_, which was occupied by the grenadiers and light infantry (of which the flank companies of the FORTY-SIXTH formed part), and the fifth regiment, under Brigadier-General Medows. The enemy amounted to nine thousand men, commanded by Monsieur D'Estaing, the Marquis de Bouillé, and M. Lavendahl, and advanced in three columns; their first two attacks were made, to quote the words of Major-General Grant's despatch, "with the impetuosity of Frenchmen, and repulsed with the determined bravery of Britons." The French made a third attempt, but were soon broken, and were forced to re-embark, leaving the ground covered with killed and wounded.[14] The flank companies of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves on this occasion, and Lieutenant William Gomm was wounded. The loss of the French amounted to about four hundred killed and eleven hundred wounded, while the killed on the side of the British was only ten, and one hundred and thirty wounded. The sense Major-General Grant entertained of the services of Brigadier-General Medows and the detachment under his command, was expressed in the following letter, dated from _Morne Fortunée_, the 19th of December, 1778:-- "SIR, "I cannot express how much I feel obliged to you, and the troops under your command, for repulsing, with so much spirit and bravery, so great a body of the enemy, and own it was just what I expected from you and them; and I am sure, under your command, they will always behave in such a manner as to do honor to you, themselves, their King, and their country; and I must beg of you to express my gratitude. "I have, &c., (Signed) "JAMES GRANT, "_Major-General_. "_Brigadier-General Medows_, _&c., &c., &c._" Immediately after the departure of the French armament, the governor surrendered the island of _St. Lucia_ to the British troops, the capitulation being signed on the 30th of December. [Sidenote: 1779] In 1779 the Court of Spain commenced hostilities against Great Britain, and this example was followed by the Dutch. [Sidenote: 1782] The FORTY-SIXTH regiment remained in the West Indies until the year 1782, when it returned to England. A letter, dated the 31st of August, 1782, conveyed to the regiment His Majesty's pleasure, that County Titles should be conferred on the Infantry, and the FORTY-SIXTH was directed to assume the designation of the SOUTH DEVONSHIRE regiment, in order that a connexion between the regiment and that part of the county should be cultivated, which might be useful in promoting the success of the recruiting service. On the 30th of November, 1782, the preliminary Articles of Peace were signed at Paris between Great Britain and the United States of America, and the treaty was concluded in the ensuing February. [Sidenote: 1783] The preliminaries of the treaties between England, France, and Spain, were signed at Versailles on the 20th of January, 1783. _St. Lucia_ was restored to France, also the settlements on the river Senegal and the city of Pondicherry in the East Indies. France relinquished all her West India conquests, with the exception of Tobago; Spain retained Minorca (which had surrendered to the combined French and Spanish forces in the previous year), and West Florida; East Florida was ceded in exchange for the restitution of the Bahamas to Great Britain. On the 2nd of September, 1783, were signed the preliminary Articles of Peace with Holland, the treaty with that country having been postponed in consequence of the Dutch claiming an indemnification for the expenses of the war, and the restoration of Trincomalee, in Ceylon, which had been captured from the Dutch by the English in January of the previous year, and retaken by the French in August following. The place was, however, restored to Holland at the general peace. [Sidenote: 1784] The FORTY-SIXTH regiment proceeded from Plymouth to Ireland on the 21st of February, 1784, and continued in that country during the eight following years. [Sidenote: 1792] In February, 1792, the regiment proceeded from Ireland to Gibraltar. [Sidenote: 1794] While the FORTY-SIXTH regiment was stationed at Gibraltar, the French revolutionary war commenced, and in the year 1794, the islands of Martinique, St. Lucia, and Guadaloupe were captured by the British. The French republican government fitted out an expedition for the recovery of these islands, and some success attended their efforts. This occurrence occasioned an order to be given for the FORTY-SIXTH regiment to be embarked from Gibraltar to reinforce the British troops in the West Indies. The regiment accordingly embarked in November, 1794, and arrived in the following month at the island of Martinique. [Sidenote: 1795] The republican emissaries employed by France having organized an insurrection in the island of _St. Vincent_, where the native Caribs, and several of the French inhabitants were in arms against the British government, occasioned the FORTY-SIXTH regiment to be ordered to St. Vincent. At Dorsetshire Hill, the Caribs hoisted the tri-coloured flag, and burnt every plantation in their power. The loyal inhabitants of the island assembled at Kingston, and in the fort, and every means of defence which the colony afforded, were used by Governor Seton. It being determined to storm _Dorsetshire Hill_, Governor Seton selected a force for this enterprise, of which a company of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, which had arrived from Martinique, under the command of Captain Dugald Campbell, formed part. Shortly after twelve o'clock, on the night of the 14th of March, the troops mounted the steep and rugged path in regularity and silence. They ascended within eighty yards of the main post, when they were discovered by the enemy's sentry, who challenged and fired. The Caribs, undismayed by the surprise, shouted, and opened a smart fire of musketry on the British. As soon as the troops were within twenty yards of the enemy, orders were given to fire a volley and charge, which were obeyed with the greatest alacrity. While a portion of the British force mounted the bank at one place, the detachment of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, under Captain Campbell, ascended another part of the bank. The buildings which sheltered the enemy were stormed, but many escaped through the darkness of the night. Chatoye, the Carib king, was killed with several of his adherents, and the enemy's two pieces of cannon were captured. _Dorsetshire Hill_ being too extensive a position, was abandoned early on the following morning, and the British returned to Sion Hill. The remainder of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment having arrived, enabled the governor to make a second attack upon the enemy on the 10th of April, when the Caribs were driven from their positions with considerable loss on their side, but small on the part of the British. On the 7th of May, the enemy appeared on the height above _Calliaqua_, in the vicinity of which was situated the estate belonging to Sir William Young, whose buildings had been previously consumed by the Caribs, who had received reinforcements from Guadaloupe. Governor Seton, considering that some attempt would be made against Kingston, sent on the 7th of May, a party, under Captain John Hall, of the FORTY-SIXTH, consisting of a subaltern and thirty-three rank and file of that regiment, forty militia, and forty of the corps of rangers, with five of the royal artillery, and a fourteen pound field-piece, to take possession of _Dorsetshire Hill_. About one o'clock in the morning of the 8th of May, the party under Captain Hall was attacked by a force of three hundred French and Caribs, and after a vigorous resistance, was compelled to withdraw to the post on Sion Hill, in consequence of the enemy's great superiority in numbers, leaving the field-piece spiked. Kingston would inevitably have been destroyed, if the enemy had kept possession of Dorsetshire Hill, and sixty rank and file of the FORTY-SIXTH, under Captain William Cooper Forster, of that regiment, were immediately detached with other troops to attack the foe at daybreak. The Caribs, with great dexterity, found means to clear the field-piece of the spike during the short time they had it in their possession, and had been joined by upwards of a hundred French and others of their party immediately after the retreat of Captain Hall's party. The British, however, attacked them with great spirit, and, in less than half an hour, they retook the field-piece, and obtained possession of the hill, the enemy flying on all sides. The FORTY-SIXTH regiment had three rank and file killed, and nine wounded. Captain William Cooper Forster and Ensign Michael Lee, were also wounded. On the 12th of June the troops under Lieut.-Colonel Baldwin Leighton, of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, carried by assault, the enemy's post on the Vigie, on which occasion Captains John Law and William Cooper Forster, of that regiment, were wounded:--after this success the Lieut.-Colonel advanced into the Carib country, and took up a position on Mount Young. On the 1st of August, 1795, Major-General James Henry Craig was appointed Colonel of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, in succession to Lieut.-General the Honorable Sir John Vaughan, K.B., deceased. In September, 1795, reinforcements arrived from England, consisting of the fortieth, fifty-fourth, and fifty-ninth regiments, and Major-General Paulus Æmilius Irving assumed the command. The enemy, apprised of the arrival of fresh troops, retired from his position on Fairbane's Ridge, during the night of the 30th of September. At three o'clock on the morning of the 2nd of October, the troops advanced against the _Vigie_, and after a severe action, the Caribs abandoned that post, of which possession was taken by the British. [Sidenote: 1796] After this action the British remained on the defensive, but several attacks were made by the enemy. Major-General Peter Hunter, after an action fought on the 8th of January, 1796, evacuated the New Vigie, in order to provide for the safety of Fort Charlotte and Kingston. The party from Morne Ronde was also withdrawn. On the 8th of June further reinforcements arrived under Lieut.-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, K.B., and on the following day the troops marched in one column, by the right, as far as Stubbs, about eight miles from Kingston; each division halted that evening opposite to their respective points of attack. The post of _New Vigie_, an eminence on which the enemy had constructed four redoubts, stronger by the natural difficulties of the approach, than by the art displayed in their formation, was attacked on the 10th of June, and after a conflict of seven hours' duration, the Caribs surrendered prisoners of war; but about six hundred broke the capitulation, and escaped to the woods, where they joined their friends at the farther end of the island. In this attack the FORTY-SIXTH had two rank and file killed, and one wounded. Troops were also despatched to _Mounts Young_ and _William_, where a number of brass ordnance, and a quantity of ammunition, &c., were taken. A desultory warfare was carried on until September, when the Caribs were forced to submit, and they were afterwards removed from the island of St. Vincent. The FORTY-SIXTH regiment, which had been engaged with the Caribs, together, and in detachments, on _thirteen_ occasions, and in eight months had sustained a loss of four hundred men out of five hundred and twenty, afterwards returned to England, and arrived at Portsmouth in November, 1796. [Sidenote: 1797] [Sidenote: 1799] While stationed in England the regiment was successively quartered at Doncaster, York, Henley-upon-Thames, Warminster, Poole, and Plymouth, from which port it embarked for Ireland, towards the end of the year 1799. [Sidenote: 1800] In the beginning of the year 1800, the regiment arrived at Cork, and was subsequently stationed at Fermoy, Limerick, and Cork. [Sidenote: 1802] While the regiment was stationed in Ireland, a treaty of peace was signed on the 27th of March, 1802, at Amiens, but the ambitious designs of the French ruler occasioned the war to be renewed in May, 1803. [Sidenote: 1804] On the 5th of January, 1804, His Majesty King George III., appointed Lieut.-General John Whyte, from the First West India regiment, to be colonel of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, in succession to Lieut.-General Sir James Henry Craig, who was removed to the eighty-sixth regiment. The FORTY-SIXTH regiment embarked at Cork for the West Indies, and arrived at Barbadoes in April. In June following the regiment proceeded to _Dominica_.[15] [Sidenote: 1805] In February, 1805, the island of Dominica was attacked by the French, and the gallant conduct of the FORTY-SIXTH on that occasion cannot be better recorded than by the insertion of the following despatch, addressed to Earl Camden, K.G., one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, by Lieut.-General Sir William Myers, Bart., commanding the troops in the Windward and Leeward Islands:-- "_Barbadoes, March 9th, 1805._ "My LORD, "I have the honor to enclose to your Lordship, a copy of a despatch from Brigadier-General Prevost, dated Dominica, 1st of March, 1805. The details contained therein are so highly reputable to the Brigadier-General, and the small portion of troops employed against so numerous an enemy, that I have great satisfaction in recommending that their gallant exertions may be laid before His Majesty. "The zeal and talent manifested by the brigadier-general upon this occasion, it is my duty to present for the royal consideration, and at the same time I beg to be permitted to express the high sense I entertain of the distinguished bravery of His Majesty's troops, and the militia of the colony, employed on that service. "The vigorous resistance which the enemy have experienced, and the loss which they have sustained in this attack, must evince to them, that however inferior our numbers were on this occasion, British troops are not to be hostilely approached with impunity; and had not the town of Roseau been accidentally destroyed by fire, we should have little to regret, and much to exult in. "Your Lordship will perceive by the returns, that our loss in men, compared to that of the enemy, is but trifling; but I have sincerely to lament that of Major Nunn, of the First West India regiment, whose wound is reported to be of a dangerous kind; he is an excellent man, and a meritorious officer. "I have, &c., (Signed) "W. MYERS. "_Lieut.-General._" "_Head Quarters, Prince Rupert's, Dominica, March 1st, 1805._ "SIR, "About an hour before the dawn of day on the 22nd ultimo, an alarm was fired from Scots Head, and soon after a cluster of ships was discovered off Roseau. As our light increased, I made out five large ships, three frigates, two brigs, and small craft under British colours, a ship of three decks carrying a flag at the mizen. The frigates ranging too close to Fort Young, I ordered them to be fired on, and soon after nineteen large barges, full of troops, appeared coming from the lee of the other ships, attended and protected by an armed schooner, full of men, and seven other boats carrying carronades. The English flag was lowered, and that of the French hoisted. "A landing was immediately attempted on my left flank, between the town of Roseau and the post of Cachecrow. The light infantry of the First West India regiment were the first on the march to support Captain Smart's company of militia, which, throughout the day, behaved with great gallantry; it was immediately supported by the grenadiers of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment. The first boats were beat off, but the schooner and one of the brigs coming close on shore, to cover the landing, compelled our troops to occupy a better position, a defile leading to the town. At this moment I brought up the grenadiers of the St. George's regiment of militia, and soon after the remainder of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, and gave over to Major Nunn these brave troops, with orders not to yield to the enemy one inch of ground. Two field-pieces (an amuzette and a six-pounder), were brought into action for their support, under the command of Serjeant Creed of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, manned by additional gunners and sailors. These guns, and a twenty-four pounder from Melville battery, shook the French advancing column by the execution they did. "I sent two companies of St. George's militia, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Constable, and a company of the FORTY-SIXTH, to prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of the position occupied by Major Nunn. "On my return I found the "Majestueuse" of 120 guns, lying opposite to Fort Young, pouring into the town and batteries her broadsides, followed by the other seventy-fours and frigates doing the same. "Some artillery, several captains of merchantmen with their sailors, and the militia artillery, manned five twenty-four pounders, and three eighteens, at the fort, and five twenty-fours at Melville battery, and returned an uninterrupted fire; from the first post red-hot shot were thrown. At about ten o'clock, A.M., Major Nunn, most unfortunately for His Majesty's service, whilst faithfully executing the order I had given him, was wounded; I fear mortally. "This did not discourage the brave fellows. Captain O'Connell, of the First West India regiment, received the command and a wound almost at the same time; however, the last circumstance could not induce him to give up the honor of the first, and he continued on the field animating his men, and resisting the repeated charges of the enemy, until about one o'clock, when he obliged them to retire from their position with great slaughter. It is impossible for me to do justice to the merit of that officer; you will, I doubt not, favorably report his conduct to His Majesty, and at the same time that of Captain James, who commanded the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, and Captain Archibald Campbell, who commanded the grenadiers of that corps. "Foiled and beat off on the left, the right flank was attempted, and a considerable force was landed near Morne Daniel. The regulars not exceeding two hundred, employed on the left in opposing the advance of three columns, consisting of upwards of two thousand men, could afford me no reinforcement; I had only the right wing of the St. George's regiment of militia to oppose them, of about a hundred men. They attacked with spirit, but unfortunately the frigates had stood in so close to the shore to protect this disembarkation, that after receiving a destructive fire, they fell back and occupied the heights of Woodbridge estate. Then it was that a column of the enemy marched up to Morne Daniel, and stormed the redoubt defended by a small detachment, which, after an obstinate resistance they carried. On my left Captain O'Connell was gaining ground, notwithstanding a fresh supply of troops and several field-pieces, which had been brought on shore by the enemy. I now observed a large column climbing the mountains to get in his rear. "The town, which had been for some time in flames, was only protected by a light howitzer and a six-pounder to the right, supported by part of the light company of the St. George's regiment. The enemy's large ships in Woodbridge Bay, out of the reach of my guns, my right flank gained, and my retreat to Prince Rupert's almost cut off, I determined on one attempt to keep the sovereignty of the island, which the excellent troops I had warranted. I ordered the militia to remain at the posts, except such as were inclined to encounter more hardships and severe service; and Captain O'Connell, with the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, under the command of Captain James, and the light company of the First West India regiment, were directed to make a forced march to Prince Rupert's. I then allowed the President to enter into terms for the town of Roseau; and then demanded from the French General that private property should be respected, and that no wanton or disgraceful pillage should be allowed; this done, only attended by Brigade Major Prevost, and Deputy Quarter Master-General Hopley, of the militia forces, I crossed the island, and in twenty-four hours, with the aid of the inhabitants and the exertions of the Caribs, I got to this garrison on the 23rd. After four days' continued march, through the most difficult country, I might almost say existing, Captain O'Connell joined me at Prince Rupert's, himself wounded, and bringing in his wounded, with a few of the royal artillery, and the precious remainder of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, and the First West India light company. "I had no sooner got to the fort, than I ordered cattle to be driven in, and took measures for getting a store of water from the river in the bay. I found my signals to Lieut.-Colonel Charles Broughton, of the First West India Regiment, made from Roseau soon after the enemy had landed, had been received, and that, in consequence, he had made the most judicious arrangements his garrison would allow for the defence of this important post. "On the 25th I received the letter of summons I have now the honor to transmit, from General of Division La Grange, and without delay sent the reply you will find accompanying it. "On the 27th the enemy's cruisers hovered about the head, however, the "Centaur's" tender (Vigilante) came in, and was saved by our guns. I landed Mr. Henderson, her commander, and crew, to assist in the defence we were prepared to make. "As far as can be collected, the enemy had about four thousand men on board, and the whole of their force was compelled to disembark before they gained one inch of ground. "I entrust this despatch to Captain O'Connell, to whom I beg to refer you; his services entitle him to consideration. I am much indebted to the zeal and discernment of Fort Adjutant Gualy, who was very accessary to the due execution of my orders. "I cannot pass unnoticed the very soldier-like conduct of Lieutenant Wallis of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, to whom I had entrusted the post of Cachecrow, or Scots Head: on perceiving our retreat he spiked his guns, destroyed his ammunition, and immediately commenced his march to join me at Prince Rupert's with his detachment: nor that of Lieutenant Schaw of the same corps, who acted as an officer of artillery, and behaved with uncommon coolness and judgment, while on the battery, and great presence of mind in securing the retreat of the additional gunners belonging to the FORTY-SIXTH regiment. On the 27th, after levying a contribution on Roseau, the enemy reimbarked, and hovered that day and the next about this post. This morning the French fleet is seen off the south end of Guadaloupe, under easy sail. "Our loss, you will perceive by the returns I have the honor to transmit, was inconsiderable, when compared with that of the enemy, which included several officers of rank, and about three hundred others. "I have, &c., (Signed) "GEO. PREVOST. "_Lieut.-General Sir William Myers, Bart., &c. &c. &c._" "P.S. As I find I cannot spare Captain O'Connell from the duty of this garrison, I must refer you to the master of a neutral vessel, who has engaged to deliver this despatch." (TRANSLATION.) "From the General of Division La Grange, &c., to his Excellency General Prevost, &c. "_Head Quarters at Roseau, the 5th Ventôse, Year 13th, Feb. 25th, 1805._ "The General of Division La Grange, Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor, Inspector-General of the Gendarmerie, Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the expedition to the Leeward Islands: "GENERAL,-- "Before I commence any military operations against the fort, into which it appears that you have retired, I shall fulfil a preliminary duty authorised and practised by civilized nations. You are aware, no less than myself, of the nature of your position, and of the entire inutility of occasioning any further effusion of blood. You witnessed with grief the melancholy fate of the town of Roseau; my first endeavours on entering it were to issue orders for stopping the progress of the conflagration; but, unfortunately, considerable destruction had already taken place. "The want of necessaries is ever attended with the most cruel consequences, the evils of which can easily be calculated; this consideration alone is more than sufficient, without reference to the particular circumstances in which you are placed, to induce you to accept the honorable conditions that I am ready to grant you, and thus to preserve the interesting inhabitants of this colony from fresh calamities, which are inseparable from the occurrences of war. "I beg you, General, to make me an early communication of your answer, and in the meantime to receive the assurance of the high esteem which I entertain for you. "I have, &c., (Signed) "LA GRANGE." (ANSWER.) "_Head Quarters, Prince Rupert's February 25th, 1805._ "SIR, "I have the honor to say I received your letter. My duty to my King and country is so superior to every other consideration, that I have only to thank you for the observations you have been pleased to make, on the often inevitable consequences of war. Give me leave, individually, to express the greatest gratitude for your humanity and kind treatment of my wife and children; and at the same time to request a continuance thereof, not only to her and them, but towards every other object you may meet with. "I have, &c., (Signed) "GEO. PREVOST." Return of the killed and wounded in the actions of the 22nd of February, 1805, at Point Michael, Morne Daniel, and Roseau, in the Island of Dominica. Royal Artillery;--three rank and file wounded; one captain, one serjeant, and six rank and file taken by the enemy. FORTY-SIXTH regiment;--one serjeant, one drummer, and ten rank and file killed; one captain, and seven rank and file wounded. First West India regiment;--nine rank and file killed; one field officer, one captain, and eight rank and file wounded. _Total killed_;--one serjeant, one drummer, and nineteen rank and file. _Total wounded_;--one field officer, two captains, and eighteen rank and file. Taken by the enemy;--one captain, one serjeant and six rank and file. _Names of Officers Wounded._ Captain Colin Campbell, FORTY-SIXTH regiment; Major Nunn and Captain O'Connell, First West India regiment. N. B. Three sailors wounded, exclusive of the militia, from which no return has been received, but whose loss was considerable. (Signed) JAMES PREVOST. _Major of Brigade._ The Royal authority was afterwards received for the FORTY-SIXTH to bear the word "DOMINICA" on the regimental colour and appointments, "as a distinguished mark of the good conduct and exemplary valour displayed by that regiment in the defence of the Island of Dominica, against a very superior French force, on the 22nd of February, 1805." [Sidenote: 1806] In the beginning of May, 1806, the "Dominica" armed sloop was cut from her anchorage by her own crew, and taken from Dominica into Guadaloupe: early on the morning of the 6th of May, a large schooner, a row-boat full of troops, and the "Dominica" sloop, were discovered making out from the land, and Major-General Stair Park Dalrymple perceiving they were suspicious, and evidently enemy's vessels, ordered detachments from the FORTY-SIXTH regiment to be instantly embarked on board the "Duke of Montrose" packet, Captain Dynely, who had volunteered his services, and another on board a small colonial sloop. Lieutenant James Wallis, of the FORTY-SIXTH, was appointed to take command of the first detachment, and under him Lieut. Benjamin Forster and forty men; Lieutenant Andrew Hamilton commanded the second detachment on board the sloop. Both were successful; the "Duke of Montrose" chased the schooner from ten A.M. until four P.M., when she engaged within musket-shot for three-quarters of an hour. The schooner then hove up, and again endeavoured to escape. On the packet's overhauling fast, and being about to board her, she surrendered. The schooner proved to be the French national schooner _L'Impérial_, having on board General Dumareau and eighty soldiers, and carried one large gun amidships, which was well served during the action. Lieutenant Andrew Hamilton also proved successful in capturing the row-boat. For these services the officers and men received the unqualified approbation of Lieut.-General Henry Bowyer, commanding the forces in the West Indies, and of Major-General Dalrymple, for having so handsomely supported the honor of their corps by their zeal, courage, and steady discipline. [Sidenote: 1808] In 1808 an expedition was assembled at Carlisle Bay, Barbadoes, for the reduction of the French island of _Martinique_,[16] and the flank companies of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment were selected to form part of the expedition. The land forces were under Lieut.-General George Beckwith, and the navy was commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, K.B. [Sidenote: 1809] The fleet left Carlisle Bay on the 28th of January, 1809, and arrived off the island of _Martinique_ in two days. On the 30th, the troops landed in two divisions; the first division at Bay Robert under Lieut.-General Sir George Prevost, and the second division, commanded by Major-General Maitland, near St. Luce and Point Solomon. Both divisions were actively engaged in operations for the reduction of the island. St. Pierre surrendered on the 8th of February, to Lieut.-Colonel Edward Barnes of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, who commanded a brigade in the army employed in this expedition. The flank companies of the FORTY-SIXTH composed part of the flank battalion under Major Richard Payne, of the regiment, at the siege of _Fort Royal_. The reduction of _Fort Desaix_ (or Fort Bourbon) by the first division of the army, which was effected on the 24th of February, completed the reduction of _Martinique_, and the flank companies rejoined the regiment at Dominica. [Sidenote: 1810] In 1810, the flank companies of the regiment were selected to form part of an expedition under Lieut.-General Sir George Beckwith, K.B., against the island of _Guadaloupe_, which had been restored to the French at the Peace of Amiens. The expedition arrived before the island in January, 1810. The grenadiers composed part of the First Grenadier Battalion, and the light company that of the Second Light Battalion. On the 3rd of February the grenadiers were engaged in the attack on the enemy's post at _Bellair_, on the heights of Saint Louis, on which occasion the following report was made in the despatches of Brigadier-General George Harcourt to Lieut.-General Sir George Beckwith, commanding the forces in the West Indies. "_Post Bellair, Morne St. Louis, 7th February, 1810._ "Where all deserve so much praise, it is difficult to discriminate, but the good fortune of the grenadiers of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, under Captain Alexander Ogilvie, and of the First Light Infantry Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel David Stewart, brought their merits conspicuously forward. They in truth behaved most admirably. (Signed) "G. HARCOURT, "_Brigadier-General_, "_Commanding Second Division._" The regiment had three rank and file killed, and one serjeant and eight rank and file wounded. [Sidenote: 1811] The FORTY-SIXTH having been much reduced in numbers during the arduous services of the regiment in the West Indies, the head-quarters embarked on board the "Earl" transport, on the 13th of November, 1811, for England, and arrived at Liverpool on the 13th of December, from whence they marched to Kingsbridge, in Devonshire.[17] Four companies of the regiment, about two hundred strong, continued to serve in the West Indies after the departure of the head-quarters. [Sidenote: 1812] On the 18th of March 1812, the FORTY-SIXTH regiment embarked on board the "Nautilus" transport at Plymouth for Jersey, and arrived in St. Aubin's Bay on the 11th of April, when it marched to Grouville, in the eastern division of the island, the head-quarters being stationed at Mont Orgueil Castle. In June 1812, the four companies which had been left in the West Indies, arrived at Portsmouth in the "Shipley" transport, and proceeded, without landing, to Jersey. A few officers and men, who came home from the West Indies in the "John Tobin" merchantman, arrived in the same month at Liverpool, and proceeded to the regiment at Jersey. [Sidenote: 1813] On the 11th of June 1813, the regiment embarked on board the "Preston" transport for Portsmouth, and after its arrival at Spithead, received orders to proceed to Cowes, in the Isle of Wight. It disembarked at that place on the 16th of the same month, and proceeded to Sandown barracks, where the regiment remained until August following, when it received orders to proceed to New South Wales. The regiment embarked on the 23rd of August 1813, on board the "Wyndham," "Three Bees," and "General Hewitt" transports, and arrived at New South Wales in February 1814. [Sidenote: 1814] On the 31st of May 1814, the regiment was inspected by Major-General Lachlan Macquarie, who expressed his satisfaction at its appearance in General Orders, dated-- "_Head-Quarters, Sydney, 31st May, 1814._ "The Commander of the Forces having inspected His Majesty's FORTY-SIXTH regiment, commanded by Colonel Molle, this forenoon, is happy to express publicly his approbation of the clean and soldier-like appearance of that corps under arms, as well as the uniformity of dress, both of officers and men. "The advance of the corps in line was excellent, and the distances in formation were well preserved, and had the weather permitted of movements, the Major-General doubts not they would have been equally well performed. "L. MACQUARIE, "_Major-General_." The regiment was again inspected by Major-General Macquarie on the 21st of November following, when its appearance and movements elicited the Major-General's commendation. [Sidenote: 1815] In May 1815, Serjeant Robert Broadfoot and six privates were sent from the detachment of the regiment stationed at Hobart Town, Van Diemen's Land, into the interior of the colony, in order to suppress a gang of bushrangers, which infested that settlement, and had by their atrocious deeds become the terror of the inhabitants. The party succeeded in taking two of the principals, named Maguire and Burne, who were tried and executed. The serjeant and his party received the sum of one hundred pounds sterling, and the thanks of Lieut.-Governor Davy for their conduct on the occasion. In May and October 1815, the regiment was inspected by Major-General Macquarie, who again expressed his entire approval of its appearance and movements. While the regiment was stationed in New South Wales, the war, in which the European powers had been engaged, was ended by the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte on the plains of WATERLOO, and a lengthend period of peace has been the result of that victory. [Sidenote: 1816] Early in February 1816, Corporal Justin McCarthy and seven privates were sent in pursuit of bushrangers, and on the 5th of April following, they succeeded in taking two of them, both of whom were executed. Lieut.-General Henry Wynyard was appointed Colonel of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment on the 1st of April 1816, in succession to General John Whyte, deceased. In the early part of April 1816, the flank companies of the regiment were detached into the interior of New South Wales, and received in General Orders the thanks of Major-General Macquarie, Commanding the Forces, for their arduous services in pursuing into the interior, and reducing the aborigines to a state of obedience. Captain Schaw commanded the light company, and Captain Wallis the grenadiers. "_Head Quarters, Sydney, Tuesday, 7th May, 1816._ "GENERAL ORDERS. "Captains Schaw and Wallis having returned to head-quarters, with the detachments of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment under their respective commands, recently employed against the hostile black natives, and having executed the service they were thus employed on to the entire approbation of His Excellency the Governor and Commander of the Forces, he requests Captains Schaw and Wallis will accept his best thanks for their zealous exertions, and strict attention to the fulfilling of the instructions on this delicate but very important service. "The Commander of the Forces also requests that Captains Schaw and Wallis will convey to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of their respective detachments, his best thanks for their zeal and activity, and for the patience with which they endured a great deal of marching and fatigue, through a very rough and intricate country during the said service. (Signed) "L. MACQUARIE, "_Major-General_." In July 1816, Serjeant Broadfoot, and sixteen rank and file were detached from the head-quarters of the corps at Sydney into the interior of the country, to protect the inhabitants from the natives, and were employed on this service until December of the same year, during which period their conduct was such as to call forth the thanks of Major-General Macquarie, from whom Serjeant Broadfoot received a certificate approving of his "_zeal and activity during his services against the natives_." After chasing the bushrangers for six months, Corporal McCarthy and his party, in July, came up with the main body, consisting of eleven desperate characters, and headed by a deserter from the seventy-third regiment, named Geary. They were all armed, each with a musket and a brace of pistols, and well supplied with ammunition. The corporal and his men, now reduced to five, engaged them for an hour and a half, when the leader of the bushrangers being mortally wounded, his followers endeavoured to escape; two, however, were taken, tried, and executed. The corporal and his men received one hundred pounds for Geary, and twenty-five pounds for each of the other two, and were highly recommended by Lieut.-Governor Sorrell for their zeal, courage, and perseverance. On the 10th of August following, this small party again came up with the remainder of the banditti. Their leader was shot during the action, and another of his followers was wounded, and made prisoner. [Sidenote: 1817] On the 8th of September, 1817, the regiment embarked in three divisions at Sydney Cove on board the "Matilda," "Lloyd," and "Dick" transports, and arrived at Madras on the 16th of December following. On the 29th of that month the regiment marched for Vellore. [Sidenote: 1818] The regiment arrived at Vellore on the 8th of January, 1818, and on the 26th of September following proceeded from thence _en route_ to the Presidency of Madras, and arrived at Fort Saint George on the 12th of October. Previously to the FORTY-SIXTH quitting Vellore an Order was issued by Colonel Hall, commanding the troops at that garrison, in which he stated "that during the period the regiment had been in the garrison, he had not had occasion to confine or pass a censure on any rank," and then added, "that a stronger proof cannot be offered of the excellent interior arrangement and discipline of the corps." [Sidenote: 1820] On the 1st of July, 1820, the regiment commenced its march from Fort Saint George for Bellary, in the Ceded Districts, and arrived at that station on the 10th of August following. A detachment of the regiment, consisting of two captains, five lieutenants, two ensigns, one assistant surgeon, twenty serjeants, four drummers, and four hundred rank and file, marched from Bellary, for Belgaum, on field service in the Doab, on the 1st of October, 1820, and arrived at its destination on the 23rd of that month. [Sidenote: 1821] [Sidenote: 1823] During the years 1821, 1822, and 1823, the head-quarters of the regiment continued to be stationed at Bellary. [Sidenote: 1824] On the 31st of October, 1824, a detachment of the regiment, consisting of one captain, four lieutenants, eight serjeants, nine corporals, two drummers, and a hundred and forty-four privates, under the command of Captain Charles Dawe, proceeded from Bellary towards the southern Mahratta country, and was joined on the 10th of November by a second detachment of the FORTY-SIXTH from Belgaum, under the command of Captain William Nairn, consisting of one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, five serjeants and one hundred rank and file. The remainder of the detachment from Belgaum, under the command of Major (Brevet-Lieut. Colonel) Thomas Willshire, joined the above, on the 2nd of December, before the Fort of _Kittoor_, which place was in a state of insurrection. The fort being reduced, the detachment from Belgaum returned to that station on the 15th of December, leaving the detachment under Captain Dawe before Kittoor. On the 16th of December, 1824, the following Division Order was issued by Major-General Hall, commanding the ceded districts, on his inspecting the regiment:-- "_Head Quarters, Ceded Districts, Bellary, 16th December, 1824._ "The recent review and inspection of His Majesty's FORTY-SIXTH regiment has afforded Major-General Hall an opportunity of witnessing the very efficient state of that corps, and of expressing his unqualified satisfaction with the result of his enquiries, the whole of which tend greatly to the credit of the commanding officer, Major Wallis. "The Major-General will have a pleasing part of his duty to perform in reporting the present state of His Majesty's FORTY-SIXTH regiment. "By order of Major-General Hall, (Signed) "B. MCMASTER, "_Acting Brigade Major, Ceded Districts_." [Sidenote: 1825] On the 7th of February 1825, the grenadier company, and head-quarters of the regiment, marched from Bellary for Cannanore, under the command of Major James Wallis, leaving two companies at Bellary. The detachment under Captain Dawe marched on the same day from Kittoor to Belgaum, where it was joined by two other companies, and proceeded from Belgaum to Vengoolah on the 16th of February, the whole under the command of Captain Alexander Campbell, and embarked at that port for Cannanore, where they arrived on the 28th of that month. The head-quarters of the regiment arrived at Cannanore on the 17th of March, under the command of Major Wallis, Lieut.-Colonel Archibald Campbell (the senior Lieut.-Colonel), having been appointed to the command of the provinces of Malabar and Canara. The remainder of the regiment marched from Belgaum under the command of Major (Brevet Lieut.-Colonel) Willshire, for Bellary, and arrived at that station on the 18th of March, 1825. [Sidenote: 1826] The following Provincial Order was issued by Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, commanding the provinces of Malabar and Canara, on the inspection and review of the regiment at Cannanore on the 31st of May, 1826:-- "_Head Quarters, Malabar and Canara, Cannanore, 31st May, 1826._ "Lieut.-Colonel Campbell cannot permit the present half-yearly inspection and review of His Majesty's FORTY-SIXTH regiment to pass over without expressing to Major Wallis, and the officers and men under his command, the high sense he entertains of the improved state of discipline and order of the regiment, in every respect, of which he will not fail to make the most favorable report.[18] "It is with heartfelt regret the Lieut.-Colonel has learnt, that the FORTY-SIXTH regiment is likely soon to lose the valuable services of Major Wallis, who has ever been enthusiastic in doing all which could contribute to the advantage and credit of the corps, and whose ability, zeal, and talents in command of it, are evinced by the perfection to which he has brought the regiment in the revised system of discipline, and the excellent state of its interior economy. "After an intimate friendship of twenty-three years, as a brother officer, Lieut.-Colonel Campbell trusts he may be permitted thus publicly to express his sentiments of Major Wallis's merits and worth, and to lament the loss which he, individually, must sustain, when deprived of the cordial, zealous, and able support that has invariably been afforded to him by this meritorious officer. "When Major Wallis withdraws from the active duties of his profession, he will be accompanied in his retirement by the most fervent wishes of Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell for his future welfare, happiness, and prosperity. "By order, (Signed) "A. H. COLBERG, _Captain_, "_Major of Brigade_." The detached wing of the regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Willshire, marched from Bellary on the 22nd of July, 1826, and arrived at Secunderabad on the 21st of August following. The head-quarters, under the command of Captain William Mallet, marched from Cannanore on the 2nd of November, 1826, and arrived at Secunderabad on the 12th of January, 1827. [Sidenote: 1827] The regiment remained at Secunderabad during 1827, and the five following years. [Sidenote: 1829] On the 24th of June 1829, instructions were received for reducing the establishment of the regiment, from the 25th of the previous December, to the following numbers; namely, forty-five serjeants, fourteen drummers, and seven hundred and forty rank and file. [Sidenote: 1832] Arrangements having been made for the relief of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, a General Order was issued permitting the soldiers to volunteer to other corps serving in India. The volunteering was opened at Secunderabad on the 9th of November, and was finally closed on the 17th of December, 1832, when two hundred and thirty-seven men had volunteered their services to other regiments of His Majesty's service stationed in the Madras Presidency. [Sidenote: 1833] The regiment afterwards proceeded to Masulipatam, where it arrived on the 17th of January 1833, and while on the march the following General Order by the Right Honorable the Governor in Council was received: "_Fort Saint George, 4th December, 1832._ "The Right Honorable the Governor in Council cannot permit His Majesty's FORTY-SIXTH regiment to embark for England, without expressing his approbation of its conduct during the period which it has been employed on this establishment. "To Colonel Campbell, C.B., Aide-de-camp to the King, the Right Honorable the Governor in Council considers himself particularly indebted, for the temper and judgment with which he has exercised the several important commands which have been entrusted to him by Government, and he attributes, in a great measure, to the example of Colonel Campbell, and the officers of His Majesty's FORTY-SIXTH regiment, the cordiality and good feeling which has at all times prevailed between the several branches of the army at stations where the regiment has been employed. "By order of the Right Honorable "The Governor in Council, (Signed) "ROBERT CLERK, "_Secretary to Government_." Four companies of the regiment, consisting of one captain, two lieutenants, two ensigns, one assistant surgeon, thirteen serjeants, four drummers, and one hundred and sixty-seven rank and file, under the command of Captain Donald Stuart, embarked at Madras, on board the "Red Rover" on the 4th of March 1833, disembarked at Gravesend on the 25th of August 1833, and marched to Canterbury barracks, where they arrived on the 28th of August, and were consolidated with the depôt company. The head-quarters of the regiment, consisting of two captains, four lieutenants, one paymaster, one quartermaster, one assistant surgeon, twenty-three serjeants, seven drummers, and two hundred and sixteen rank and file, under the command of Captain Robert Martin, embarked at Masulipatam on the 5th of March 1833, disembarked at Margate and Whitstable on the 6th and 7th of September, from whence they marched to Canterbury. Colonel Archibald Campbell, C.B., being in command of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, was not relieved from that duty in time to proceed with the regiment, but embarked at Madras on the 18th of March 1833, and arrived at Portsmouth on the 18th of August following. One company of the regiment, consisting of two lieutenants, four serjeants, two drummers, and sixty-eight rank and file, under the command of Lieutenant James Taylor, embarked at Madras on the 27th of May 1833, disembarked at Gravesend on the 28th of September, and marched from thence to join the head-quarters of the regiment at Canterbury. On the 12th of November the following letter was addressed by the Adjutant-General to Colonel Campbell, in reference to the distinction of _Red Feathers_, conferred upon the light company for its share in the attack upon General Wayne on the 20th of September 1777, as narrated at page 24. "_Horse Guards, 12th November, 1833._ "SIR, "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, and to signify to you that, under all the circumstances stated, the General Commanding-in-Chief will undertake to recommend to His Majesty, that the distinction mentioned may be continued to the light company of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, and will, accordingly, submit that the company be allowed to wear a _Red Ball Tuft_. "I have, &c., (Signed) "JOHN MACDONALD, "_Adjutant-General_. "_Colonel Campbell_, "FORTY-SIXTH _regiment_." [Sidenote: 1834] On the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of April 1834, the regiment proceeded from Canterbury to Weedon, where it arrived in the beginning of May. In September following, the regiment marched from Weedon to Liverpool for embarkation for Ireland, and arrived at Dublin on the 3rd of October. The regiment subsequently proceeded to Newry. [Sidenote: 1835] The head-quarters marched on the 30th of January 1835, from Newry for Belfast, where they arrived on the 2nd of February. While stationed at Belfast, the regiment furnished several detachments to aid the civil power. [Sidenote: 1836] The regiment, under the command of Colonel Archibald Campbell, C.B., marched from Belfast for Enniskillen on the 16th of May 1836, and was again ordered to furnish detachments in aid of the civil power. In October following, the regiment marched from Enniskillen for Dublin. [Sidenote: 1837] Orders having been received to hold the FORTY-SIXTH regiment in readiness for foreign service, it was formed into six _service_ and four _depôt_ companies. The service companies, under the command of Colonel Archibald Campbell, C.B., proceeded to Cork in September 1837, and the head-quarters embarked at the Cove of Cork, on the 26th of that month, on board the "Prince Regent" transport. The remaining three companies, under the command of Major Robert Garrett, embarked on the 5th of October on board the "Arab" transport; the former arrived at Gibraltar on the 18th of October, and the latter in November. [Sidenote: 1838] On the 6th of April 1838, Lieut.-General Sir John Keane, K.C.B., was removed from the sixty-eighth to the Colonelcy of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, in succession to General Henry Wynyard, deceased. In June 1838, the depôt companies embarked at Kinsale for England, and arrived at Plymouth on the 27th of that month. [Sidenote: 1839] On the 1st of August 1839, Lieut.-General John Ross was appointed, from the ninety-eighth, to be Colonel of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, in succession to Lieut.-General Sir John Keane, who was removed to the forty-third regiment. [Sidenote: 1841] The depôt companies embarked at Plymouth for Jersey on the 5th of August 1839; and in June 1841 proceeded to Ireland. [Sidenote: 1842] On the 20th of January 1842, the service companies embarked at Gibraltar for Barbadoes, in the "Java" transport, and arrived at their destination on the 25th of February. They were afterwards encamped on the Savannah until the 18th of April. Upon the embarkation of the fifty-second regiment, the FORTY-SIXTH moved into the Stone Barracks, but, on the fever breaking out, encamped on the 2nd of December at the Naval Hospital. [Sidenote: 1843] On the 15th of January, 1843, the head-quarters, under the command of Captain Child, embarked on board the "Dee" steamer for St. Vincent, where they arrived on the 16th of that month, and marched to Fort Charlotte. The other companies were stationed at St. Lucia, Dominica, and Berbice. The grenadier company at Berbice suffered severely from yellow fever, and also the head-quarters, which were compelled to leave Fort Charlotte, and encamp at Townan's-pasture, about three miles distant. Her Majesty was pleased to appoint General the Earl of Stair, from the ninety-second, to be Colonel of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, on the 31st of May, 1843, in succession to Lieut.-General John Ross, C.B., deceased. [Sidenote: 1844] On the 15th of October, 1844, the head-quarters sailed from St. Vincent for Barbadoes, where the grenadier company had also arrived. The companies from Dominica and St. Lucia arrived at Barbadoes in December. [Sidenote: 1845] The regiment embarked on the 3rd of February, 1845, on board the "Resistance" for Nova Scotia, and disembarked at Halifax on the 25th of that month, when it was quartered in the South Barracks. On the 7th of July, 1845, the regiment embarked, on board the troop ship "Apollo," for Canada East, and anchored at Quebec on the 20th, when it was transhipped into the "Canada" steamer on the 22nd, and arrived at Montreal on the 23rd of July; the regiment then proceeded in the "Prince Albert" steamer for La Prairie, about nine miles from Montreal. [Sidenote: 1846] The regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Garrett, K.H., proceeded on the 9th of October, 1846, to Kingston, in Canada West, and occupied the _Tête-de-Pont_ Barracks. [Sidenote: 1847] On the 25th of September, 1847, the head-quarters of the regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Garrett, K.H., proceeded from Kingston in the "Highlander" steamer, and was followed on the next day by the second division, under the command of Major Robert Campbell, in the "Passport" steamer, for Montreal, on passage for Quebec, where, on arrival, the regiment was immediately transhipped to the "Belle-Isle," and proceeded to Nova Scotia, where it arrived on the 16th of October. [Sidenote: 1848] The service companies of the regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Garrett, K.H., embarked on board the ship "Herefordshire," for England, on the 8th of April, 1848, and arrived at Portsmouth on the 8th of May. The service companies proceeded to Dover, where they were joined by the depôt companies from Guernsey, under Major John Maclean. In July, 1848, the regiment proceeded to Liverpool, and afterwards marched into camp at Everton. On the 29th of September the head-quarters were removed to Chester, and in December proceeded to Liverpool. [Sidenote: 1850] [Sidenote: 1851] On the 16th of April, 1850, the head-quarters and four companies proceeded from Liverpool to Hull, where the regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Robert Garrett, K.H., was stationed on the 1st of April, 1851, the date to which the present record has been continued. CONCLUSION. The scene of the principal active services of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, from its formation in 1741, until the present period, has been limited to _North America_ and the _West India Islands_. After the unsuccessful attach on _Fort Ticonderago_ in July, 1758, the regiment shared in the capture of _Fort Niagara_ on the 25th of July, 1759, and of other forts in Canada, which led to the surrender of _Montreal_ on the 8th of September, 1760; and thus completed the conquest of that country,--_Quebec_ having been acquired, in September of the preceding year, by the troops detached under Major-General Wolfe. In February, 1762, the regiment shared in the capture of _Martinique_, which was followed by the reduction of _Grenada_, _St. Lucia_, and _St. Vincent_; and in August following was present at the conquest of the _Havannah_, which last acquisition was restored to Spain at the Peace of 1763. The regiment embarked in 1776, for _North America_, and shared in several actions of the war with the United States until November, 1778, when it proceeded to the _West Indies_, and participated in the capture of _St. Lucia_ in December following. During the years 1795 and 1796, the regiment was employed in the campaign against the Caribs in _St. Vincent_, a severe and harassing service. While other regiments had the opportunity of encountering the French legions in other parts of the world, the FORTY-SIXTH was employed in protecting the colonial possessions of Great Britain; how efficiently this duty was performed is testified by the word "DOMINICA," conferred by Royal authority, for the gallant defence made by the regiment against a very superior French force on the 22nd of February, 1805. The language of Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, when reporting the battle of _Corunna_, is alike applicable to the conduct of the troops at _Dominica_, for there, as at the former place,-- "The enemy has been taught, that whatever advantages of position, or of _numbers_ he may employ, there is inherent in the British officers and soldiers, a bravery that knows not how to yield,--that no circumstances can appal,--and that will ensure victory, when it is to be obtained by the exertion of any human means." The flank companies of the FORTY-SIXTH formed part of the troops which reduced _Martinique_ in February, 1809, and thus the services of the regiment were a _second_ time connected with the conquest of that island. In 1810, the flank companies of the regiment shared in the reduction of _Guadaloupe_, and were honorably mentioned in the despatches. In 1811, the regiment arrived in England from the _West Indies_, and in 1813 embarked for New South Wales, from which country it proceeded, in 1817, to the East Indies, and returned to Great Britain in 1833. The regiment embarked for Gibraltar in 1837; proceeded to the _West Indies_ in 1842, and to _North America_ in 1845, whence it returned, in 1848, to England. Services of the foregoing description, combined with excellent conduct in quarters at home and abroad, during a period of upwards of a century, have deservedly acquired for the regiment the approbation of the Sovereign, and the confidence of the Nation. ------ 1851 ------ FOOTNOTES: [6] The "_Pragmatic Sanction_" was published by the Emperor Charles the Sixth on the 17th of April, 1713, whereby, in case of his having no male issue, his daughters were to succeed to his hereditary dominions, in preference to the sons of his late brother, Joseph the First. [7] The _ten_ regiments of Marines took rank in the regular Army, and were numbered from the _Forty-fourth_ to the _Fifty-third_ regiment:--The _seven_ additional regiments of Infantry, raised in January 1741, were numbered from the _Fifty-fourth_ to the _Sixtieth_ regiment. [8] _James Francis Edward_, "_The Pretender_," son of _James II._, and of _Mary_, his second wife, daughter of the Duke of Modena, was born on the 10th June, 1688. He married, in 1719, Mary Clementina, daughter of Prince James Sobieski, and granddaughter of John Sobieski, King of Poland. He died on the 1st June, 1766, (aged 78 years), leaving issue two sons:-- 1. _Charles Edward Louis Cassimir_, termed in England "_The Young Pretender_;" born on the 30th November, 1720, who married the Princess Stohlberg of Germany, and died at Rome, without issue, on the 31st January, 1788. 2. _Henry Benedict_, called _The Cardinal York_; born on the 24th March, 1725. When the last grand effort for the restoration of his family, in 1745, proved abortive, he took holy orders, and was elevated to the purple by Pope Benedict XIV. in 1747, and died at Rome in 1807. The Cardinal was the last male branch of the House of Stuart. [9] _Preston_, contracted from _Priests' town_, the early proprietors of the soil being the monks of Holyrood and Newbattle, who erected on the sea-shore _pans_ for the manufacture of salt, from which circumstance it received the name of _Preston-Pans_. [10] _Return of the Officers and Men in each regiment of Infantry on the day of the Battle of Culloden_:-- Serjeants, Officers. Drummers, and Rank and File. Royal Scots now 1st Foot 26 455 Lieut.-General Howard's regiment " 3rd " 16 448 " Barrell's " " 4th " 20 353 Major-General Wolfe's " " 8th " 22 352 " Pulteney's " " 13th " 22 352 Brigadier-General Price's " " 14th " 23 336 " Bligh's " " 20th " 20 447 Major-General Campbell's " " 21st " 19 393 Brig.-General Lord Semple's " " 25th " 23 392 Major-General Blakeney's " " 27th " 20 336 Brig.-General Cholmondeley's " 34th " 24 435 " Fleming's " " 36th " 26 389 Colonel Battereau's " " (disbanded) 27 396 " Dejean's " " 37th regt. 23 468 " Conway's " " 48th " 24 362 --- ----- Total 335 5,914 --- ----- [11] The _seven_ regiments, raised in 1741, were numbered as shown in the following list, and the _Numerical titles_ of six of them, which have since been retained on the establishment of the army, were changed after the Peace of 1748, as specified, viz.:-- 54th regt., com. by Col. Thomas Fowke, now the 43rd regt. 55th " " James Long " 44th " 56th " " D. Houghton " 45th " 57th " " John Price " 46th " 58th " " J. Mordaunt " 47th " 59th " " J. Cholmondeley " 48th " 60th " " H. De Grangue disbanded in 1748. [12] Cape Breton was captured by the troops under Lieut.-General Amherst, on the 26th of July, 1758. [13] _Ticonderoga_, or _Ticonderago_, was the name of a fort built, in 1756, by the French in Canada, on the north side of a peninsula, for communication between Lakes George and Champlain. The fort afterwards became a heap of ruins, and formed an appendage to a farm. Its name is derived from a word in the Indian language, signifying _Noisy_. In 1759, the fort was captured by the British, and in 1775 it was surprised by the Americans, but was retaken by Major-General Burgoyne in July 1777. [14] It was in this action at St. Lucia that the fifth foot acquired the privilege of wearing a _white plume_ in the cap, instead of the red and white tuft worn by the other regiments of the line: the FORTY-SIXTH regiment had already obtained the distinction of _red feathers_, under the circumstances stated at page 25. [15] The island of Dominica was reduced by a British armament in June 1761, and was retained by Great Britain by the conditions of the Treaty of Peace which was concluded at Paris on the 10th of February, 1763. Dominica was taken by the French in September 1778, but was restored to Great Britain at the Peace of 1783. [16] Martinique was captured by the British in 1762, but was restored to France by the Peace of Fontainebleau, concluded in the following year. It was again captured in 1794, but was restored to France at the Peace of Amiens in 1802. Martinique was captured in 1809 for the third time, and was again restored to the French nation at the Peace of 1814. [17] Captain Archibald Campbell, on his return from the West Indies in 1811, obtained the permission of His Royal Highness the Duke of York to proceed to Portugal, for the purpose of offering his services to Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford, which being accepted, he served from September 1811 until 1814 with the Portuguese troops in the fifth division of the British army; and was, in 1812, promoted to the rank of major. He was present in the battles of _Salamanca_ and _Vittoria_; in the latter of which he commanded the advance of his brigade, consisting of every third file; when he, and two captains, under his command, were severely wounded; his conduct on the occasion was mentioned in the orders issued after the action by Major-General Spry, who commanded the brigade. Major Archibald Campbell commanded the 15th Portuguese infantry in the affairs of crossing the _Bidassoa_ into France, forcing the enemy's lines on the _Nive_, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of December 1813, on which occasion he was promoted for his conduct to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Portuguese service, and his name was mentioned in General Orders by Marshal Beresford; he was honored with a medal by his Sovereign, and on his return to England was promoted, on the 17th of February, 1814, to the rank of Lieut.-Colonel in the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, with which his earlier services were connected. He was subsequently appointed a Companion of the Order of the Bath, and was appointed extra aide-de-camp to His Majesty King William IV. on the 6th of May 1831, with the rank of colonel in the army. He retired from the FORTY-SIXTH regiment on the 11th of October 1839. The decease of Colonel Archibald Campbell, C.B., occurred at the Isle of Mull, on the 16th of November, 1840. [18] The remark here made by Lieut.-Colonel Campbell is in allusion to the new system of drill, prescribed by the General Order of the 10th of March, 1824, according to the improvements introduced by Major-General Sir Henry Torrens, K.C.B., Adjutant-General of the Forces. [Illustration: FORTY-SIXTH REGIMENT. _For Cannons Military Records_ _Madeley lith 3 Wellington S^t Strand_] SUCCESSION OF COLONELS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH, OR THE SOUTH DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT, ORIGINALLY NUMBERED THE FIFTY-SEVENTH REGIMENT. JOHN PRICE. _Appointed 13th January, 1741._ MR. JOHN PRICE obtained a commission of ensign in a regiment of foot in 1706; and subsequently rose to the rank of Captain and Lieut.-Colonel in the First Foot Guards. In January, 1741, he was promoted to the colonelcy of the FIFTY-SEVENTH (now FORTY-SIXTH) regiment, which was then being raised. In June, 1743, Colonel Price was removed to the fourteenth regiment of foot, and was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General on the 6th of June, 1745. During the campaign of 1747, he commanded a brigade of infantry in the Netherlands, under His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, and highly distinguished himself at the battle of Val, or Laffeld, near Maestricht, on the 2nd of July of that year. His brigade was posted in the village of Val, and his gallantry during the action was commended by the Duke of Cumberland in his public despatch. He died in November following at Breda, in Holland. THE HONORABLE THOMAS MURRAY. _Appointed 23rd June, 1743._ This Officer was promoted by His Majesty King George II. from the Third Foot Guards to be colonel of the FIFTY-SEVENTH (now FORTY-SIXTH) regiment, upon Colonel Price being removed to the fourteenth foot in June, 1743. Colonel the Honorable Thomas Murray was promoted to the rank of major-general on the 1st of April, 1754, and to that of lieut.-general on the 19th of January, 1758. His decease occurred in November, 1764. WILLIAM VISCOUNT HOWE, K.B. _Appointed 21st November, 1764._ This distinguished officer was the fifth son of Emanuel Scrope Viscount Howe, and commenced his military career as a cornet in the Duke of Cumberland's regiment of light dragoons, in which he was promoted to a lieutenancy on the 21st of September, 1747. The regiment was disbanded in 1749, shortly after the conclusion of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which was signed in October of the preceding year. He was promoted to the rank of captain in the twentieth regiment on the 1st of June, 1750, and to that of major in the sixtieth (afterwards fifty-eighth) regiment on the 4th of January, 1756. On the 17th of December, 1757, he was promoted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the fifty-eighth regiment. During the "_Seven Years' War_," he served in America under Major-General Wolfe with great reputation, and was advanced to the brevet rank of colonel on the 19th of February 1762. Colonel the Honorable William Howe was appointed by King George III. to the colonelcy of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment on the 21st of November 1764. His Majesty also advanced him to the rank of major-general on the 25th of May, 1772. Major-general the Honorable William Howe was appointed to succeed General Gage in the chief command of the British Forces in America shortly after the commencement of the War of Independence, and arrived at Boston with Major-Generals Clinton and Burgoyne in May, 1775. Major-General the Honorable Sir William Howe, K.B., was appointed by His Majesty, colonel of the twenty-third Royal Welsh Fusiliers, from the FORTY-SIXTH regiment, on the 11th of May, 1775. He commanded at the attack on Bunker's Hill on the 17th of June following, was besieged in Boston during the winter, evacuated that town in the spring of 1776, and retired to Halifax, in Nova Scotia. On the 1st of January, 1776, he received the local rank of General in North America. In June he arrived at Staten Island, where he was joined by his brother Admiral Richard Lord Howe. The brothers here informed the American Congress, that they had received full power to grant pardon to such as should return to their obedience; but the Commissioners appointed by that body declined the proposition as unworthy of attention. In August, he defeated the Americans at Long Island, and took possession of New York in September, 1776. After the campaign in the Jerseys, in 1777, Sir William Howe sailed from Sandy Hook and entered Chesapeake Bay. Having previously secured the command of the Schuylkill, he crossed it with his army, and defeated the Americans at Brandywine on the 11th of September, and at Germantown on the 4th of October, 1777. On the 29th of August, 1777, His Majesty advanced him to the rank of lieut.-general. In the spring of 1778, he returned to England, having resigned the command of the army to General Sir Henry Clinton. On the 21st of April, 1786, Sir William Howe was removed to the colonelcy of the nineteenth (late twenty-third) Light Dragoons, which he retained until his decease. On the 12th of October, 1793, Sir William Howe was promoted to the rank of general. In 1799, he succeeded to the Irish peerage held by his brother Richard Earl Howe, the celebrated Admiral; and in 1805 he was appointed Governor of Plymouth. General William Viscount Howe died on the 12th of July, 1814, in the eighty-fifth year of his age. THE HONORABLE SIR JOHN VAUGHAN, K.B. _Appointed 11th May, 1775._ LIEUT.-COLONEL Commandant the Honorable John Vaughan, who distinguished himself at the capture of Martinique in February, 1762, was appointed from the ninety-fourth, Royal Welsh Volunteers (since disbanded) to be lieut.-colonel of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment on the 25th of November, 1762, in succession to Lieut.-Colonel John Young, who retired. Lieut.-Colonel the Honorable John Vaughan was promoted to the rank of colonel in the army on the 25th of May, 1772, and His Majesty King George III. appointed him to the colonelcy of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment on the 11th of May, 1775, upon Major-General the Honorable Sir William Howe, K.B., being removed to the twenty-third, Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Colonel Vaughan embarked with his regiment for North America in the beginning of the year 1776, and, for his services during the American war, was promoted to the rank of major-general on the 29th of August, 1777, and was advanced to that of lieut.-general on the 20th of November, 1782. In 1792 His Majesty conferred upon him the dignity of a Knight of the Order of the Bath. Lieut.-General the Honorable Sir John Vaughan died on the 30th of June, 1795, at which period he was Commander in Chief of the troops stationed in the Leeward Islands. SIR JAMES HENRY CRAIG, K.B. _Appointed 1st August, 1795._ JAMES HENRY CRAIG was appointed ensign in the thirtieth foot, in 1763, and served with his regiment at Gibraltar: in 1771 he was promoted to captain in the forty-seventh regiment, with which corps he served several campaigns in America; and in 1777 he was promoted to the majority, and in 1781 to the lieut.-colonelcy, of the eighty-second regiment, from which he was removed, in 1783, to the sixteenth. He was promoted to the rank of colonel in 1790, and to that of major-general in 1794; in August, 1795, he was nominated to the colonelcy of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment; he was advanced to the rank of lieut.-general in 1801, and removed to the eighty-sixth in 1804. He commanded an expedition to the Mediterranean, in 1805, with the local rank of general, and the dignity of a Knight of the Bath; the troops under his orders landed at Naples, and subsequently took possession of the island of Sicily. In 1806 he was removed to the twenty-second regiment; and in 1807 he was appointed Governor of Upper and Lower Canada, with the local rank of General in America; in 1809 he was removed to the seventy-eighth Highlanders. He was also appointed Governor of Blackness Castle. He died on the 12th of January, 1812. JOHN WHYTE. _Appointed 5th January, 1804._ This officer commenced his military career, in 1761, as an ensign in the Thirty-eighth regiment, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in the fifty-sixth regiment on the 9th of February, 1762, and to that of captain on the 25th of March, 1771. He was promoted from the fifty-sixth to be major in the eighty-third regiment (afterwards disbanded) on the 23rd of December, 1777. Major Whyte was promoted to the rank of lieut.-colonel in the sixth regiment of foot on the 3rd of April, 1782, and received the brevet rank of colonel on the 12th of October, 1793. On the 26th of February, 1795, he was promoted to the rank of major-general, and on the 24th of April following, His Majesty King George III. appointed him to the colonelcy of the First West India regiment. Major-General Whyte was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general on the 29th of April, 1802, and on the 5th of January, 1804, he was appointed colonel of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment. On the 1st of January, 1812, he was advanced to the rank of general. The decease of General John Whyte occurred on the 30th of March, 1816. HENRY WYNYARD. _Appointed 1st April, 1816._ The early services of this officer are connected with the first regiment of foot guards, in which he was appointed ensign on the 6th of June, 1778, and in which he rose to the rank of captain on the 4th of June, 1781. In February, 1793, he embarked with the brigade of guards for Holland, and advanced with the army through Flanders. In May following he returned to England, having been promoted to a company with the rank of lieut.-colonel in the preceding month. In November, 1794, he rejoined the British army in the neighbourhood of Arnheim, and after the retreat of that winter, he embarked for England. On the 3rd of May, 1796, he received the brevet rank of colonel; and early in 1798 was appointed to the command of a flank battalion, formed from the grenadiers of the brigade of guards, and in August, 1799, landed at the Helder under General Sir Ralph Abercromby. Colonel Wynyard was present in every action during that expedition except the last; in that of the 19th of September near _Bergen_ he was wounded. On the 29th of April, 1802, he was promoted to the rank of major-general, and in May, 1803, was placed upon the staff of Great Britain, being appointed to the command of a brigade of guards in the Southern District. In September, 1806, Major-General Wynyard embarked with a brigade of guards and other troops destined for Sicily, in which Island he was placed in command upon the southern coast. In January, 1808, he arrived in England, and was again placed upon the staff in the Southern District. On the 25th of April, 1808, he was advanced to the rank of lieut.-general, and in June was appointed to the staff of Ireland, which he held until the 24th of January, 1812. On the 15th of September, 1808, His Majesty King George III. conferred upon him the colonelcy of the sixty-fourth regiment, from which he was appointed colonel of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment on the 1st of April, 1816. Lieut.-General Wynyard commanded the forces in North Britain from the 28th of July, 1812, to the 24th of April, 1816, and on the 12th of August, 1819, was advanced to the rank of general. General Wynyard was also a member of the Consolidated Board of General Officers, and a Groom of the Bedchamber to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, now King of Hanover. General Wynyard died on the 3rd of April, 1838, after a lengthened service of sixty years. SIR JOHN (afterwards LORD) KEANE, G.C.B., & G.C.H. _Appointed 6th April, 1838._ This officer entered the army at an early age, and on the 12th of November 1794, was promoted to the rank of captain in the hundred-and-twenty-fourth regiment, afterwards disbanded. Captain Keane was placed on the half-pay of the seventy-third regiment on the 11th of March 1795, and on the 7th of November 1799 he was removed to the forty-fourth regiment, which he joined at Gibraltar. During the campaign in Egypt, Captain Keane served as aide-de-camp to Major-General Lord Cavan, and was present in the actions near Alexandria, on the 13th and 21st of March 1801. On the 27th of May 1802, he was promoted to the rank of major in the sixtieth regiment; he remained in the Mediterranean on the staff until March 1803, when he returned to England. Major Keane was promoted to the rank of lieut.-colonel in the thirteenth foot on the 20th of August 1803, which regiment he joined at Gibraltar early in 1804. Lieut.-Colonel Keane afterwards served under Lieut.-General George Beckwith, in the expedition against Martinique in 1809, and was present at the siege of Fort Desaix, which surrendered on the 24th of February, of that year, and completed the capture of the island. In January 1812, he received the brevet rank of colonel, and on the 25th of June following, he was removed to the sixtieth regiment. His reputation was then such that immediately on his arrival at Madrid, he was appointed to command a brigade in the third division of the army under the Marquis of Wellington, in which he served until the end of the war with France, in 1814, and was present at the battles of Vittoria, the Pyrenees, Nivelle and Orthes; the action at Vic Bigorre, battle of Toulouse, besides other minor actions. For his services he was promoted to the rank of major-general on the 4th of June 1814, and was appointed a Knight Commander of the Bath. The honors which Major-General Keane had now acquired were the Egyptian Medal, and a cross and two clasps for Martinique, Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelle, Orthes, and Toulouse. In August 1814, he was appointed to a command ordered for particular service, and on his arrival at Jamaica, being senior officer, he assumed the command of the military force destined to co-operate with Vice-Admiral the Honorable Sir Alexander Cochrane for the attack on New Orleans and the province of Louisiana. On the morning of the 23rd of December, Major-General Keane effected a landing within nine miles of New Orleans, and the same night, with only eighteen hundred bayonets on shore, repulsed a serious attack of five thousand of the enemy, assisted by three large armed vessels on their flank. He held the command until the 25th of December, when Major-General Sir Edward Pakenham arrived, and assumed the command of the entire army. Major-General Keane was then appointed to the third brigade, and was present in the affairs of the 28th of December and 1st of January, as also at the assault made in the enemy's fortified lines on the morning of the 8th of January 1815, when he was severely wounded in two places. Sir John Keane afterwards passed eight years in Jamaica (from 1823 to 1831), as major-general commanding the forces in that island; and, during a year and a half of the time, he administered the civil government likewise. The colonelcy of the ninety-fourth regiment was conferred upon him on the 18th of April 1829, and on the 22nd of July 1830, he was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general; on the 13th of April, 1831, he was appointed colonel of the sixty-eighth regiment; and in the year 1833, he succeeded Lieut.-General Sir Colin Halkett in the command of the army at Bombay: on the 6th of April 1838, Lieut.-General Sir John Keane was appointed colonel of the FORTY-SIXTH regiment. After nearly six years' service in the Bombay presidency, on the 29th of October 1838, he received authority from the government of India to organise and lead into Scinde a force intended to co-operate with the army then on the north-west frontier of India, under the command of General Sir Henry Fane. In December following Sir Henry Fane forwarded his resignation to head-quarters, and the command of the combined forces devolved upon Sir John Keane, who was now called upon to lead a considerable army, and to conduct operations requiring much discretion, delicacy, and tact in dealing with those half-friendly powers, whose existence is one of the greatest difficulties in the government of a semi-civilized land. After penetrating the Bolan Pass, the troops arrived on the 27th of April 1839 at Candahar, from whence they proceeded to Ghuznee, which was captured by their gallant exertions on the 23rd of July following. This completed the conquest of Affghanistan; and Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, after an exile of many years, was restored to the throne of his ancestors. Lieut.-General Sir John Keane, K.C.B., was removed from the FORTY-SIXTH to the forty-third regiment on the 1st of August 1839. For his services during the expedition to Cabool, Lieut.-General Sir John Keane was appointed a Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, and on the 11th of December, was raised to the peerage as Baron Keane, of Ghuznee in Affghanistan, and of Cappoquin, county of Waterford, and obtained a pension of two thousand pounds a-year for his own life and that of his two immediate successors in the peerage, added to which he received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament, of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, and other marks of public approbation. These honors were not long enjoyed by Lieut.-General Lord Keane, who died in the sixty-fourth year of his age, at Burton Lodge, Hampshire, on the 26th of August 1844. JOHN ROSS, C.B. _Appointed 1st of August, 1839._ LIEUT.-GENERAL ROSS commenced his military career as an ensign in the thirty-sixth regiment, his commission being dated 2nd of June 1793; was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in the fifty-second regiment on the 8th of May 1796, and to that of captain on the 11th of January 1800. Captain Ross served with the expedition against Ferrol under Lieut.-General Sir James Pulteney in August following, and was engaged with the enemy. On the 15th of August 1804, he was promoted to the rank of major in the fifty-second regiment, and obtained the rank of lieut.-colonel in the army on the 28th of January 1808, and was promoted lieut.-colonel in the fifty-second regiment on the 18th of February following. Lieut.-Colonel Ross commanded the second battalion of the fifty-second regiment at the battle of Vimiera, on the 21st of August 1808, for which he received a medal; and also during the campaign in Spain under Lieut.-General Sir John Moore, which ended by the battle of Corunna on the 16th of January 1809. Lieut.-Colonel Ross in July following commanded five companies of the fifty-second regiment, which formed part of the force under Lieut.-General the Earl of Chatham, employed in the expedition to the Scheldt. Lieut.-Colonel Ross subsequently proceeded to the Peninsula, and commanded the first battalion of the fifty-second at the actions of Pombal, Redinha, Miranda de Corvo, Foz d'Arronce and Sabugal, and at the battle of Fuentes d'Onor. On the 18th of July 1811, he was removed to the sixty-sixth regiment, and in August following he was appointed Deputy Adjutant-General to the forces in Ceylon, from whence he returned to Europe in June 1814 for the benefit of his health; was promoted to the brevet rank of colonel on the 4th of that month; and was subsequently appointed Deputy Adjutant-General in Ireland. In June 1815, he was nominated a Companion of the Order of the Bath, and on the 12th of August 1819, Colonel Ross was appointed Commandant of the Depôt at the Isle of Wight. On the 27th of May 1825, he was promoted to the rank of major-general, and on the 14th of August 1828, was appointed Lieut.-Governor of Guernsey, which he held until the 31st of March 1837. His Majesty King William IV. appointed Major-General Ross to be colonel of the ninety-eighth regiment on the 30th of May 1836; on the 28th of June 1838, he was advanced to the rank of lieut.-general. In August 1839, Lieut.-General Ross was removed to the FORTY-SIXTH regiment. The decease of Lieut.-General Ross, C.B., occurred at Southampton on the 17th of May 1843. JOHN EARL OF STAIR, K.T. _Appointed from the Ninety-second regiment on the 31st of May, 1843._ London: Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES and SONS, Stamford Street, For Her Majesty's Stationery Office. APPENDIX BRITISH AND HANOVERIAN ARMY AT WATERLOO, _as formed in Divisions and Brigades on the 18th of June, 1815_. CAVALRY. Commanded by Lieut.-General the EARL OF UXBRIDGE, G.C.B. _1st Brigade._--Commanded by Major-General LORD EDWARD SOMERSET, K.C.B. 1st Life Guards Lieut.-Colonel Ferrier. 2nd " " the Hon. E. P. Lygon. Royal Horse Guards, Blue " Sir Robert Hill. 1st Dragoon Guards " Fuller (Colonel). _2nd Brigade._--Major-General SIR WILLIAM PONSONBY, K.C.B. 1st or Royal Dragoons. Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Clifton. 2nd or Royal North British " J. J. Hamilton. Dragoons 6th or Inniskilling Dragoons " J. Muter (Colonel). _3rd Brigade._--Major-General W. B. DOMBERG. 23rd Light Dragoons Lieut.-Colonel the Earl of Portarlington (Colonel). 1st " King's " J. Bulow. German Legion 2nd " " " C. de Jonquiera. _4th Brigade._--Major-General SIR JOHN O. VANDELEUR, K.C.B. 11th Light Dragoons Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Sleigh. 12th " " the Honorable F. C. Ponsonby (Colonel). 16th " " J. Hay. _5th Brigade._--Major-General SIR COLQUHOUN GRANT, K.C.B. 7th Hussars Colonel Sir Edward Kerrison. 15th " Lieut.-Colonel L. C. Dalrymple. 2nd " King's German Legion. " Linsingen. _6th Brigade._--Major-General SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN, K.C.B. 10th Royal Hussars. Lieut.-Colonel Quentin (Colonel). 18th Hussars. " _Hon._ H. Murray. 1st " King's German Legion. " A. Wissell. _7th Brigade._--Colonel SIR FREDERICK ARENSCHILDT, K.C.B. 13th Light Dragoons. Lieut.-Colonel Doherty. 3rd Hussars King's German " Meyer. Legion. Colonel ESTORFF. Prince Regent's Hussars. Lieut.-Colonel Kielmansegge. Bremen and Verden Hussars. Colonel Busche. INFANTRY. FIRST DIVISION.--Major-General G. COOKE. _1st Brigade._--Major-General P. MAITLAND. 1st Foot Guards, 2nd Batt. Major H. Askew (Colonel). " 3rd " " the Honorable W. Stewart (Colonel). _2nd Brigade._--Major-General J. BYNG. Coldstream Guards, 2nd Batt. Major A. G. Woodford (Colonel). 3rd Foot Guards, " " F. Hepburn (Colonel). SECOND DIVISION.--Lieut.-General SIR H. CLINTON, G.C.B. _3rd Brigade._--Major-General F. ADAM. 52nd Foot, 1st Batt. Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Colborne, K.C.B. (Colonel). 71st " " " T. Reynell (Col.) 95th " 2nd " } Rifles. Major J. Ross (Lieut.-Colonel). 95th " 3rd " } Major A. G. Norcott (Lieut.-Col.) _1st Brigade, King's German Legion._--Colonel DU PLAT. 1st Line Batt., King's Major W. Robertson. German Legion. 2nd " " " G. Muller. 3rd " " Lieut.-Colonel F. de Wissell 4th " " Major F. Reh. _3rd Hanoverian Brigade._--Colonel HUGH HALKETT. Militia Batt. Bremervorde. Lieut.-Colonel Schulenberg. Duke of York's 2nd Batt. Major Count Munster. " 3rd " " Baron Hunefeld. Militia Batt. Salzgitter. " Hammerstein. THIRD DIVISION.--Lieut.-General Baron ALTEN. _5th Brigade._--Major-General SIR COLIN HALKETT, K.C.B. 30th Foot, 2nd Batt. Major W. Bailey (Lieut.-Colonel). 33rd " Lieut.-Colonel W. K. Elphinstone. 69th " 2nd Batt. " C. Morice (Col.) 73rd " 2nd Batt. " W. G. Harris (Colonel). _2nd Brigade._--King's German Legion.--Colonel BARON OMPTEDA. 1st Light Batt., K.G.L. Lieut.-Colonel L. Bussche. 2nd " " Major G. Baring. 5th Line " " Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Linsingen. 8th " " " Major Schroeder (Lieut.-Colonel). _1st Hanoverian Brigade._--Major-General COUNT KIELMANSEGGE. Duke of York's 1st Batt. Major Bulow. Field Batt. Grubenhagen. Lieut.-Colonel Wurmb. " Bremen. " Langrehr. " Luneburg. " Kleucke. " Verden. Major De Senkopp. FOURTH DIVISION.--Lieut.-General SIR CHARLES COLVILLE, K.C.B. _4th Brigade._--Colonel MITCHELL. 14th Foot, 3rd Batt. Major F. S. Tidy (Lieut.-Col.) 23rd " 1st " Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry W. Ellis, K.C.B. 51st " " " H. Mitchell (Colonel). _6th Brigade._--Major-General JOHNSTONE. 35th Foot, 2nd Batt. Major C. M'Alister. 54th " Lieut.-Col. J. Earl of Waldegrave. 59th " 2nd Batt. " H. Austin. 91st " 1st " " Sir W. Douglas, K.C.B., (Colonel). _6th Hanoverian Brigade._--Major-General LYON. Field Batt., Calenberg. ------ " Lanenberg. Lieut.-Colonel Benort. Militia Batt., Hoya. " Grote. " Nieuberg. ------ " Bentheim. Major Croupp. FIFTH DIVISION.--Lieut.-General SIR THOMAS PICTON, K.C.B. _5th Brigade._--Major-General SIR JAMES KEMPT, K.C.B. 28th Foot, 1st Batt. Major R. Nixon (Lieut.-Colonel). 32nd " " " J. Hicks (Lieut.-Colonel). 79th " " Lieut.-Colonel Neil Douglas. 95th Rifles " " Sir A. F. Barnard, K.C.B., (Colonel). _9th Brigade._--Major-General SIR DENIS PACK, K.C.B. 1st Foot, 3rd Batt. Major C. Campbell. 42nd " 1st " Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robert Macara, K.C.B. 44th " 2nd " " J. M. Hamerton. 92nd " 1st " Major Donald McDonald. _5th Hanoverian Brigade._--Colonel VINCKE. Militia Batt., Hameln. Lieut.-Colonel Kleucke. " Hildesheim. Major Rheden. " Peina. Major Westphalen. " Giffhorn. Major Hammerstein. SIXTH DIVISION.--_10th Brigade._--Major-General J. LAMBERT. 4th Foot, 1st Batt. Lieut.-Colonel F. Brooke. 27th " " Captain Sir J. Reade (Major). 40th " " Major F. Browne. 81st " 2nd " " P. Waterhouse. _4th Hanoverian Brigade._--Colonel BEST. Militia Batt., Luneburg. Lieut.-Colonel De Ramdohr. " Verden. Major Decken. " Osterode. " Baron Reden. " Minden. " De Schmidt. _7th Brigade._--Major-General M'KENZIE. 25th Foot, 2nd Batt. Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Light. 37th " " " S. Hart. 78th " " " M. Lindsay. Cavalry 8,883 Infantry 29,622 Artillery 5,434 ------ Total 43,939 ====== LONDON: Printed by W. CLOWES and SONS, Stamford Street, For Her Majesty's Stationery Office. TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE In the Appendix section, all occurrences of 'Battalion' have been abbreviated to 'Batt.' to conserve space in these tables. Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. For example, favour, favored; honour, honors; head quarters, head-quarters; negociations; despatches. Pg xxxii, page number '4 ' replaced by '44'. Pg xxxv, 'Viscount Ho weK.B' replaced by 'Viscount Howe, K.B.'. Pg 9, Sidenote '1747' was moved down two paragraphs. Pg 19, 'for Belleisle' replaced by 'for Belle-Isle'. Pg 21, Sidenote '1776' was moved down two paragraphs. Pg 22, 'this columm fell' replaced by 'this column fell'. Pg 30, Sidenote '1784' was moved down one paragraph. Pg 32, 'on the Virgie' replaced by 'on the Vigie'. Pg 46, Sidenote '1809' was moved down one paragraph. Pg 51, 'approvng of his' replaced by 'approving of his'. Pg 55, 'of the regigiment' replaced by 'of the regiment'. Pg 60, 'in readines for' replaced by 'in readiness for'. Pg 64, Sidenote '1848' was removed (no other Sidenotes appear in this Conclusion section). Footnote [13], 'peninsula, or' replaced by 'peninsula, for'. Footnote [13], 'Its is derived' replaced by 'Its name is derived'. 
47437	----	East-West Trade Trends MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT OF 1951 (the Battle Act) * * * FOURTH REPORT TO CONGRESS Second Half of 1953 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL _To the Congress of the United States_: I have the honor to submit herewith the fourth semiannual report on operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), the administration of which is a part of my responsibilities. The period covered is July through December 1953. A large part of this report is an examination of what the Soviet Union has been doing in its trade relations with the free world. In order to put the Russian activities of the last half of 1953 in a more understandable framework we have ranged back over the last 30 years to show how foreign trade fits into their economy and serves their purposes. To study Soviet trends and tactics is obviously important to the economic defense of the free world. To make a report to the Congress and the public on these matters should also be useful. There has been much public interest in the subject. The selection of this theme, however, does not mean that Soviet trade activities are the only important consideration to be taken into account in the formulation of U. S. economic defense policy. They are not. Many other factors enter in, as told in Chapter V. In preparing the report my staff has drawn heavily upon the expert knowledge of the Department of State and other agencies. But of course the responsibility for the report is ours. In my last Battle Act report I said that the strategic trade control program had been hampered by lack of public knowledge. This is still true, but to a less extent, it seems to me. There is a better understanding of the Government's policies, a greater realization that the soundness of East-West trade policy is to be judged not primarily on the amount of trade, but more on what kind of goods move back and forth, and on what terms they move. <signed> HAROLD E. STASSEN, _Director, Foreign Operations Administration_. MAY 17, 1954. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION: Page NOTE ON "STRATEGIC" AND "NONSTRATEGIC" 1 CHAPTERS: I. STALIN'S LOPSIDED ECONOMY 3 Emphasis on Heavy Industry How Forced Industrialization Affects Trade How the Kremlin Controls Trade West Has Never Barred Peaceful Exports Stalin's Last Gospel II. THE NEW REGIME AND THE CONSUMER 11 Letting Off Pressure The "New Economic Courses" Malenkov's Big Announcement Khrushchev and the Livestock Lag Mikoyan Advertises the Program Has Stalin Been Overruled? III. THE KREMLIN'S RECENT TRADING ACTIVITIES 19 The New Trade Agreements More Consumer Goods Ordered A Shopping Spree for Ships Most of All, They Want Hard Goods Something Different in Soviet Exports They Have Dug Up Manganese The Emergence of Russian Oil Gold Sales Expanded Reaching Outside Europe IV. WHAT'S BEHIND IT ALL 35 The Kremlin and Peace A Mixture of Motives Their Objectives Haven't Changed Their Practices Haven't Changed The Free World Is Strong The Challenge V. U. S. POLICY ON STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS 43 The Background Basic Policy Reaffirmed The New Direction of Policy Reviewing the Control Lists East-West Trade: Road to Peace Trade Within the Free World The China Trade Falls Off They Play by Their Own Rules United States Policy on the China Trade VI. THE BATTLE ACT AND ECONOMIC DEFENSE 55 Battle Act Functions The Money and the Manpower Meshing the Gears Improving the Machinery The Termination-of-Aid Provision Miscellaneous Activities Summary of the Report APPENDICES A. TRADE CONTROLS OF FREE WORLD COUNTRIES 65 B. STATISTICAL TABLES 89 C. TEXT OF BATTLE ACT 99 CHARTS 1. VOLUME OF TRADE OF OEEC COUNTRIES WITH EUROPEAN SOVIET BLOC 6 2. FREE WORLD TRADE WITH THE SOVIET BLOC 21 3. EDAC STRUCTURE 57 _INTRODUCTION_ =Note on "Strategic" and "Nonstrategic"= To help protect the security of the free world, the United States and certain other countries have been working together for more than four years to withhold strategic goods from the Soviet bloc. But how can you tell strategic goods from nonstrategic goods? A good many people have asked that question. It is a reasonable question and it deserves a nontechnical answer. The answer is that strategic goods, as understood in the day-to-day operations of the program, are those goods which would make a significant contribution to the warmaking power of the Soviet bloc. This is a practical guide to action. There is no rigid definition that holds good for all times, places, and circumstances. All strategic goods don't have the same degree of strategicness. The free countries have embargoed some, merely limited others in quantity, and kept still other items under surveillance so that controls could be imposed if necessary. Even the same item may vary in strategic importance, depending on the destination, the changing supply situation behind the Iron Curtain, and other circumstances which may change from time to time. Whether an item includes advanced technology is an important consideration. In specific cases, two experts of equal competence may disagree on these things. Two agencies of government, differing in function, may bring different points of view to a given problem. The same is true of governments. Since there is no distinctly visible boundary between "strategic" and "nonstrategic," some people insist there is no such thing as a nonstrategic item at all. It is true that even bicycles, typewriters, or ordinary hardware may help the other fellow by strengthening his general economy. And these people argue that anything that contributes to the general economy helps in a military way, too. That is a correct concept in actual warfare but it is not an acceptable concept of "strategic" in the present situation, for trade on certain terms can help the free nations too. They carry on two-way trade with the Soviet bloc for concrete commercial benefits. The problem is to gain those benefits without permitting the Kremlin to accelerate the growth of military power or to divide the free world. In rating items as strategic or nonstrategic, it is clear that there are innumerable commodities, used entirely or mainly for civilian purposes, which would not make a clearly significant contribution to war potential. No one would have trouble drawing a line between a jet plane and a suit of clothing, to take an extreme example. Few would have difficulty putting cobalt on one side of the line and butter on the other. As for the border area where it is less clear what contribution an item would make, the allied governments put their heads together, pool their facts, and try to arrive at mutually acceptable judgments. As President Eisenhower has said, "Unity among free nations is our only hope for survival in the face of the worldwide Soviet conspiracy backed by the weight of Soviet military power." _CHAPTER I_ =Stalin's Lopsided Economy= _The weakest link of the socialist chain is merchandising and distribution; if this can be strengthened, present difficulties will be overcome. Upon it the Kremlin has wisely concentrated attention. The Kremlin's immediate objective, as recently announced by the resolutions voted at the plenary session of Bolshevik leaders, is to increase the supply of foodstuffs and consumers' goods and stimulate their mutual exchange._ That quotation is from a Moscow dispatch to the _New York Times_. The dispatch was written by Walter Duranty and printed on November 6, 1932. As long ago as that, and even before, the Russian people were wondering when something was going to be done about the supply of food and other things they needed, and the dictatorship was making motions--but not very helpful--in that direction. Goals were set and decrees were issued. But the results were disappointing, and the standards of living of the Russian people stayed low. Stalin's First Five-Year Plan called for a 50 percent rise in gross farm production during 1928-32 inclusive. But by 1932, farm production had declined by 20 percent. The difficulties have continued ever since. For example, the Third Five-Year Plan, beginning with 1938, was scheduled to bring a large increase in consumer goods--larger than the increase being promised nowadays--but instead the supply of consumer goods actually decreased, even in the three prewar years of the period. Per capita consumption in the Soviet Union is lower now than it was in the 1920's, before the 5-year plans commenced. =Emphasis on Heavy Industry= The basic cause of these continual disappointments now is widely understood: The Communist elite, while preaching continually about the "uneven development of capitalism" and the "ever-increasing decomposition of the world economic system of capitalism," created a remarkably lopsided economy of their own, in comparison with which the free economies of the West look very well-balanced indeed. Beginning in the 1920's the Bolsheviks deliberately concentrated on building a base of heavy industry. In their 5-year plans, pig iron, steel, coal, oil, electric power, factories, heavy machinery, armaments have always been given the right of way over the needs of the people for meat, fish, vegetables, vegetable oils, milk, butter, chairs, tables, beds, bicycles, watches and clocks, radio sets, decent homes, boots and shoes, fabrics of cotton, wool, and silk--and so on through the myriads of consumer items that are commonplace in most Western countries. Impressive advances have been made in heavy industry. But this was done at a staggering cost to the inhabitants. It was accomplished through a vast use of forced labor and police discipline, and through the neglect of the manufacturing of consumer articles, the growing of foodstuffs and textile fibers, and the building of homes and retail stores. The Kremlin made strenuous efforts to maintain the flow of farm products to the cities, even while drawing labor away from the farms. But heavy metalworking industry was always considered more important than food and clothing. And more important, too, was the long, bitter and as yet unsuccessful attempt to cram collectivism down the throat of the Russian farmer. Stalin considered this struggle ideologically essential. Moreover, it was the means of forcing the peasants to supply food and raw materials to the growing industrial complex without receiving consumer goods in return. All in all, the failure of Soviet farm policy was one of the most resounding failures in the brief history of the U.S.S.R.--and it still is. Bread and potatoes are the principal diet of the masses, and even the grain and potato crops are unsatisfactory. During the years of Hitler's devastating invasion, the Kremlin had to dedicate the energies of Soviet Russia to a fight for survival. But when the Grand Alliance crushed Hitler, and the western nations, hoping for a peaceful world under the United Nations, practically dismantled their military establishments and fell back into their normal roles as consumption economies, the Kremlin did not alter the lopsided war economy of the Soviet setup. The Stalin regime inaugurated a new phase of hostility toward the West. The grim drive to build up an industrial-military foundation continued. Consumer goods were still given a low priority in the scheme of things. And all this was discouraging not only to prospects of world peace but also to the prospects of happiness and dignity for the weary and heroic Soviet peoples. =How Forced Industrialization Affects Trade= Moscow laid the same pattern upon the European satellite countries and cut them to fit the pattern. Heavy industrialization was imposed on them regardless of their desires and the needs of the people. This forced industrialization absorbed large amounts of commodities that were formerly available for export to the free world. At the same time the collectivization of agriculture was imposed on the satellites, and this aggravated the difficulties of keeping pace in farm output. While these policies were reducing the total amounts of goods the satellites had available for export to the West, the U.S.S.R. was siphoning off great trainloads of what remained. The ability of these countries to trade with the West was further reduced as they were pushed into granting priorities to one another on the exchange of items they could have more profitably sold to the free world. Moscow also forced upon the satellites the characteristic Soviet trading goal of reducing and eventually eliminating all dependence on the free world. Lenin himself had emphasized that the first goal of the Soviet Union in its economic relations with the outside world was to gain "economic independence from the capitalist countries." A prominent Soviet economist, Mishustin, in a book published in 1941, spelled out this principle in greater detail: The main goal of the Soviet import (policy) is to utilize foreign products, and above all, foreign machinery ... for the technical and economic independence of the U.S.S.R.... The import (policy) of the U.S.S.R. is so organized that it aids the speediest liberation from the need to import. In 1946 the leading Soviet economist, Vosnosensky, restated the objective in the Government periodical, _Planned Economy_: The U.S.S.R. will continue in the future to maintain economic ties with foreign countries in accordance with the tested line of the Soviet government directed towards the attainment of the technical-economic independence of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin's new Eastern European empire included vast natural resources and sizeable labor reserves. Nevertheless it was--and still is--a long way from being self-sufficient, in the sense of being able to match the production levels of the free world, or even in the sense of fulfilling its own ambitious production plans, without trade with the West. Imposing an ultimate goal of self-sufficiency thus could not eliminate the Soviet bloc's dependence on the free world. Communist trade planners still found it advantageous to import from the free world many things the bloc countries needed. The new goal did, however, affect the composition of the satellites' trade. The planners placed much greater emphasis on the importation of industrial raw materials and equipment that would, in the long run, reduce the need to import. In the U.S.S.R. itself, the Government had always been disinclined to offer exports in order to import consumer goods, like meat, butter, textiles, and appliances. Now the same policy was clamped on the satellites. So the bulk of Soviet-bloc imports from the West consisted of goods that did not enter the homes of the people. [Illustration: VOLUME OF TRADE OF OEEC COUNTRIES WITH EUROPEAN SOVIET BLOC] The result of all this was a big decline in trade between Western and Eastern Europe, as compared with prewar years. Before the war, countries which now make up the Soviet bloc in Europe carried on less than 10 percent of their foreign trade with one another; now this has risen to more than 75 percent. =How the Kremlin Controls Trade= All foreign trade of the countries of the enlarged Soviet empire was placed under absolute state control. For both the U.S.S.R. and the satellites, international trade is now not only a 100-percent monopoly of the state, but also an integral part of the planned economy, officially proclaimed as such. Each country, as a part of its general economic plan, estimates its import requirements and then develops a program of exports to pay for the imports. These country plans are coordinated by Moscow. Part of the machinery of all this economic planning and trade coordination is an organization, with headquarters in Moscow, called the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. This totalitarian trading system insures that foreign trade serves the purposes of the state. Top priority in trade planning is given to the requirements of the U.S.S.R. Bloc countries are required to give one another preferential treatment in trade. With this system the export of any items to the West is easily restricted as it suits government purposes--whether or not the items could be considered as "strategic." A vast amount of commercial information is obtained by bloc governments through their dealings with free-world traders and through their intelligence services. This provides Moscow with a comprehensive picture of the bargaining strengths and weaknesses of free-world traders. Moreover the Soviet-bloc governments, as large buyers and sellers controlling the production and trade of a whole country, indeed a group of countries, enjoy certain bargaining advantages in dealing with the many smaller competing buyers and sellers in the marketplaces of the free world. Since losses on individual transactions can be absorbed in longer-term government gains on other deals, the unit profit need not be the factor that determines the advantage of a deal, as it generally does for the free-world trader. Soviet-bloc governments can--and not infrequently do--set their prices at levels which discriminate among the various buyers and sellers with whom they deal. They exercise monopoly control not only in selling their own goods abroad but also in disposing of imported goods at home. The Soviet-bloc governments get bargaining advantages from such practices, made possible by their totalitarian trading system--practices which the West would not wish to imitate but which it might as well squarely face. Foreign trade is a political as well as an economic weapon in the hands of the Soviet Communist state. By way of illustration, in 1948 it was possible for the Kremlin first to reduce and then to cut off all trade between Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia as a part of the attempt to bring Marshal Tito to his knees. The attempt failed, but the Yugoslavs suffered serious economic difficulties before they could readjust. Even earlier, the world had seen how the Kremlin refused to allow the Eastern European countries to benefit from the flow of Western goods that could have been theirs under the Marshall plan--another evidence of how the state's objectives took precedence over the people's needs. The Kremlin in its propaganda made much of Western trade restrictions. But the West's limited controls over the shipment of strategic goods did not come into existence until long after the Kremlin had begun using trade as a cold-war weapon. Even then these Western controls, far from being aggressive actions against peaceful trade or against the welfare of populations, were common-sense measures of economic _defense_, designed only to foster Western security by withholding from aggression-minded governments the important war-building materials that would make aggression easier. On the other hand, the Kremlin's long-term objectives in its economic relations with the free world are far more than defensive. They have a dual character: strengthening the bloc and weakening the free-world powers. These objectives can be summarized as follows: 1. To feed the economy, especially the industrial-military base, with imports that help the bloc become more powerful and less dependent on the free world. 2. To drive wedges among free-world nations at every opportunity. 3. To increase the reliance of free-world nations on the bloc for markets or supplies, and thus make the free world more vulnerable to bloc pressures. =West Has Never Barred Peaceful Exports= The Kremlin, while coldly managing the East-West trade of its domain in the manner described, always had its propagandists and fellow travelers out beating the drums and making a continual outcry against the security trade controls of the West. The main line of the propaganda was that trade was equivalent to peace and prosperity, and that the Soviet bloc always stood ready for unlimited trade, but that the Western "economic blockade" barred the way. In each country the businessmen were constantly handed the false but inflammatory story that they were being shamefully discriminated against by their government and that the businessmen of neighboring countries were less subject to restrictions. Western Europe as a whole was treated to an alluring picture of a vast prospect of East-West trade, beyond all factual probability in view of Soviet policies. This propaganda cannot be separated from the Soviet trading objectives. It is merely one of the instruments used in trying to achieve those objectives. It was used lavishly at a Moscow Economic Conference in April 1952, but although some Western businessmen who attended that meeting were impressed, the chief result was not an expansion of trade or elimination of Soviet discriminatory practices, but only the formation of new propaganda councils. And one of the significant facts of the present situation is that, although some new economic factors have arisen, the main propaganda line stays the same. At the Berlin four-power conference in late January 1954, Molotov used it again. The truth is that Western controls, which did not become effective until the 1950's, have never been an "economic blockade." The controls apply to a small percentage of the types of goods which made up East-West trade in the prewar years or in 1948. They leave room for the expansion of trade in many items. There are even many kinds of industrial raw materials and products which have never been embargoed by the Western Governments. Western security controls were not primarily responsible for the low levels of East-West trade. The main causes were Soviet policies, which wrenched the customary trade of the satellites away from Western Europe, tying it to the U.S.S.R., and which forced industrialization upon the whole European bloc in a manner which reduced its ability to trade with the West. In addition to these basic causes, the bloc countries were unsatisfactory trading partners in many ways. The prices were often higher than the world market; the deliveries were uncertain and sometimes deliberately withheld; the quality of their goods was often inferior; and some of the countries had a regrettable--and perhaps intentional--tendency to go into debt to the West. =Stalin's Last Gospel= Stalin himself, in the year before he died, made some illuminating statements about the reorientation of the trade of Eastern Europe. He wrote an article, The Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., which was published in October 1952, though it had been written earlier in the year. In this article Stalin said that the most important economic consequence of World War II was "the disintegration of the single, all-embracing world market." Actually there was scarcely a single world market before the war, but Stalin obviously was talking about the change in the trade of those countries that fell into the Soviet orbit during the war or shortly thereafter. He said that "now we have parallel world markets," confronting one another. He then made the customary charge that the Western countries, through an "economic blockade," had tried to "strangle" the Eastern European countries. He said the West had thereby unintentionally contributed to the formation of the new parallel world market. On this occasion, however, Stalin went on to say that "the fundamental thing, of course," is not the Western economic blockade, but the fact that since the war the Eastern European countries "have joined together economically and established economic cooperation and mutual assistance." He made it perfectly plain that, in Kremlin thinking, the breakdown of the "one world market" and the establishment of two rival markets was a tremendous boon to the Communist cause, because it shrank the markets available to the "capitalist countries" and intensified a struggle which the Communists always see as going on among those countries. And this, Stalin said, rendered more acute what he called the "general crisis of capitalism." To picture the free world as in or near a general economic crisis is of course familiar Communist mythology. But Stalin's discussion did reveal clearly the Communist indifference to the mutually fruitful and expanding international trade that the West desires. It was an admission of Communist responsibility for--or at least satisfaction with--a divided trade world. So much for Stalin's last economic gospel. Stalin's death was announced on March 5, 1953. Now let us examine what has been going on in his absence. _CHAPTER II_ =The New Regime and the Consumer= After Stalin, the Soviet leadership was taken up by a group of top party officials. Georgi M. Malenkov was the Premier and the most influential, but apparently several other men held important shares of the responsibility and the power. This elite group included, with varying degrees of personal influence, Beria (temporarily), Molotov, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, and Mikoyan. None of this new group was new to Soviet leadership. All had been close lieutenants of Stalin. All are known to have had important roles in previous policy formulation, and in directing key operations. The system that this group took over in the U. S. S. R. was their own as well as Stalin's creation. Under this system, the economy is organized along authoritarian lines and characterized by state ownership of the means of production and state planning of practically all economic activity. It is the Central Committee of the Communist party which lays down the economic and social policies which the state production plans are desired to implement. The new regime modified this system in no essential respect. In addition to inheriting the _system_, Malenkov and his associates inherited economic policies and economic conditions which they themselves had helped to create. In the U.S.S.R., as we have seen, Soviet economic policy had long been to force industrialization by every means. And this objective required such a concentration of capital investment--both civilian and military--as to deprive the growing population of advances in living standards commensurate with the overall expansion of the Soviet economy. That is another way of saying they took it out of the people's hides. Each of the European satellites, too, had undertaken, under Soviet direction, to develop an economic structure similar to that of the Soviet Union. By 1953 all foreign trade, nearly all industry, and a very substantial portion of domestic trade had been nationalized in those countries. Where collectivization of agriculture was not completed, the Government controlled agriculture by means of centralized planning and a system of compulsory deliveries. Each satellite government had drawn up a long-term comprehensive economic plan which, like that of the U.S.S.R., emphasized rapid industrialization. These developments brought the Communist leaders many serious problems--and the people many deprivations. Before the war, as independent states, most of these satellite countries had devoted a much higher percentage of resources to the consumer sectors of their economies than was customary for the U.S.S.R. When the Communists took control, belts were tightened. The standards of living of the satellite peoples began to decline toward the low levels long prevalent in the U.S.S.R. But denying the satellite peoples the fruits of their labors, in imitation of Moscow patterns, still did not bring the overambitious war-economy plans to success. Agriculture and industry both had difficulty in keeping pace. The world has heard how the transformation of satellite agriculture into the Soviet pattern was impeded by the opposition of the rural populations to collectivization and by the difficulties of mechanizing farm output; how shortages of raw materials slowed the textile program in Czechoslovakia and the electric power industry in Hungary; how the mining and metallurgical industries lagged in some areas; how the rights of labor were obliterated in the attempt to shift manpower into heavy industry; how purges furnished scapegoats for Communist failures. =Letting Off Pressure= In the summer of 1953 came the electrifying news of rioting in East Germany. Also in the summer of 1953, new economic targets were announced in the U.S.S.R. and some of the satellites. These new targets--which will be discussed further in a moment--were said to be a means of improving the lot of consumers. Some observers in the West assumed that economic difficulties in the bloc were erupting with such force that they threatened to topple the Malenkov regime. This interpretation is understandable--any democratic nation would have long since replaced a regime that in peacetime so subjugated the needs of the people--but such an interpretation of the Soviet scene must be viewed with great skepticism. At this writing there was some evidence that the problems faced by the Kremlin may in some respects have become more difficult since Stalin's death, but one could not infer that the chronic economic difficulties of the Soviet bloc were especially different in nature from previous post-war years, nor that the Communist governments with their inhuman police control were about to collapse. What the Communist rulers were facing was their perennial problem of developing lopsided economies without letting the lopsidedness become so repressive on the people as to upset the plans and timetables. Even in police states there are physical and psychological limits beyond which human beings cannot be driven without lowering their incentives, their energy, their morale to the degree that production is severely hampered. The Soviet leaders have always recognized this. At three different periods in the thirty-odd years of their control of the U.S.S.R. they have shown themselves adept at opening the valves enough to relieve accumulating pressures and then shutting them again--always without swerving very far in the basic drive to build the industrial-military machine. Many observers believe that even prior to Stalin's death the time was ripe for a slight relaxation in the postwar consumption squeeze. The Kremlin faced multiple problems in consolidating its new empire. External foreign developments had been adding to the difficulties of achieving the overambitious industrial and military goals. Western export controls on the shipment of strategic goods into the bloc had been impeding the planned development of the military sectors of the economies. In any event, a close examination of the new actions proposed by the Malenkov regime to improve the consumer's lot, insofar as they have been revealed, indicate that plans for heavy industry and for military preparation will not be materially affected. =The "New Economic Courses"= During the summer and fall of 1953, Communist governments all over Eastern Europe announced in turn so-called "new economic courses." East Germany announced its "new economic course" on June 11, just before the East Berlin riots of June 17. Then came Hungary (July 4), the U.S.S.R. (August 8), Rumania (August 22), Bulgaria (September 8) and Czechoslovakia (September 15). Smaller adjustments were announced earlier for Albania, and later for Poland. The announced programs differed according to local problems, but almost everywhere the solution of agricultural troubles was a key objective. Better collection and distribution facilities for farm products were demanded. This theme was almost invariably played to the popular tune of helping the consumer--especially in the U.S.S.R. Deplorable housing conditions came in for a share of the attention. In the satellites the programs reflected openly the inability to meet many of the exacting goals that had been set. In some countries, the emphasis was on bigger industrial investments in scarce basic materials. In others, concessions to the peasants were paramount. The initial implementation, as well as some of the program announcements, was confusing and sometimes contradictory. =Malenkov's Big Announcement= The new economic course for the U.S.S.R. itself was unfolded in three major speeches during the second half of 1953--by Malenkov in August, Khrushchev in September, and Mikoyan in October--and in a series of decrees and lesser pronouncements. Premier Malenkov, addressing the Supreme Soviet on August 8, made repeated claims of Soviet strength and progress. For example, he said the United States had no monopoly on the hydrogen bomb and added that such facts "are shattering the wagging of tongues about the weakness of the Soviet Union." But in the section on consumer goods he gave a revealing picture of weakness. He spoke at great length about lags and failures in agriculture and in the manufacture of consumer articles. He severely criticized the poor quality and appearance of goods, the "serious shortcomings" in the organization of domestic trade, the "unsatisfactory leadership of enterprises," the "high production costs" and high prices of coal and timber, the "neglected state" of agriculture in many districts, the "serious lagging" in livestock, potatoes, and vegetables. He said the Government considered it "essential to increase considerably" the investment in consumer industries. The urgent task [Malenkov said] lies in raising sharply in 2 or 3 years the population's supply of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, meat and meat produce, fish and fish produce, butter, sugar, confectionery, textiles, garments, footwear, crockery, furniture and other cultural and household goods; in raising considerably the supply to the population of all kinds of consumer goods. The program was to be accomplished in "2 or 3 years," and this was later repeated in other official statements. In other words it was to be a relatively short-term program of expansion, hardly long enough to make a major shift in industrial emphasis--nor did Malenkov claim such a shift. He said, "We shall continue to develop, by all possible means, heavy industry and transport.... We must always remember that heavy industry constitutes the basic foundation of our socialist economy, because without its development, it is impossible to insure further growth of light industry, increase productivity of agriculture, and the strengthening of the defensive power of our country." Taking up this theme, the Communist propagandists in the U.S.S.R. and the satellites have constantly assured the people that they should not interpret the "present tasks of the economic policy as a retreat from the Marxist-Leninist principles of building up socialism." The continued growth of basic industries was declared to be essential. The assertion was made, not that the consumer program would displace basic industrialization, but that both could progress simultaneously. Malenkov said that heavy industry had risen from 34 percent of the total industrial output in 1924-25 to 70 percent in 1953. And while that was going on, he said, the U.S.S.R. was unable to develop light industry (textiles, garments, shoes) and the food industry at the same rate as heavy industry. But now, he said, the Nation was at last able to develop those industries rapidly. This "now-we-are-strong-enough" theme runs all through the Communist propaganda on the subject. But it doesn't harmonize with existing facts and figures. In the first place, though the Soviet Union has made large industrial gains, it has not built its industrial base anywhere near the long-term goals that Stalin set in 1946 for the ensuing 15 years or so--goals which, even if attained, would not bring the U.S.S.R. in most respects to the production levels which the United States has already reached. In the second place, the "now-we-are-strong" theme seems to leave out of account the truly deplorable condition of Soviet agriculture. Malenkov himself said a drastic increase in consumer goods could not be achieved without "further development and upsurge" of agriculture, because agriculture "supplies the population with food and light industry with raw materials." =Khrushchev and the Livestock Lag= On the condition of agriculture, Nikita S. Khrushchev had a great deal to say at a session of the Communist Party's Central Committee on September 7. Khrushchev is the First Secretary of the Party. His speech was an even more dismal confession of the "serious lag" than Malenkov's. He revealed that the Soviet Union had 10 million fewer cattle at the beginning of 1953 than in 1928, and that the number fell by 2,200,000 during 1952 alone, instead of increasing by that same number as planned. In biting words he described the sharp decline in pork production and in wool, the unsatisfactory fodder situation, the deficiencies in potatoes and vegetables. His speech showed beyond doubt that even the production of grain, traditionally the Soviet Union's No. 1 food staple and No. 1 export commodity, was in bad shape and that a far greater acreage needed to be devoted to feed grains in order to bolster the faltering livestock industry. Khrushchev listed a number of measures to raise production. They included higher farm prices for livestock, milk, butter, and vegetables; the reduction of obligatory deliveries from the small private plots still held by collective farm members; the assignment of more tractors and more skilled workers to the collective farms; and _the tightening of Communist Party control over agriculture_. The decisions to place greater reliance on material incentives and to give slightly more recognition to what remains of private enterprise were intriguing, but the collective farm system itself remained basically unchanged. Students of the Soviet economy, surveying previous efforts to stimulate agriculture and especially mindful of the biological limitations on the reproduction of livestock, were doubtful that the new measures could bring anything like the planned increase in 1954 or 1955. =Mikoyan Advertises the Program= Anastas I. Mikoyan, the Soviet Minister of Domestic Trade, then made a speech October 17 before the All-Union Conference of Trade Workers. Mikoyan, as the man in charge of large segments of the consumer goods program, enthusiastically described the program as "gigantic". In the manner of Malenkov and Khrushchev, he also enthusiastically flayed an astonishing number of deficiencies in the production, packaging, distribution, and marketing of consumer goods. He even condemned dull advertising slogans and inconsiderate retail clerks, and said there were some things about capitalist business methods that were worthy of emulating. He stated, too, that not only the Ministry of Consumer Goods Industry but other ministries--including aircraft and defense--were getting assignments to produce such things as refrigerators, washing machines, metal beds, bicycles, and radio and television sets. Actually, small quantities of durable consumer goods have always been produced by heavy industry ministries. Mikoyan's statement was, no doubt, intended to sound as if these ministries were being transformed, but there is no evidence that the U.S.S.R. actually planned to reduce its production of aircraft and armaments to make way for household appliances. If such evidence shows up, the free world will welcome it. Mikoyan gave a few figures on the production of household appliances. They revealed plans for large percentage increases, but even if achieved, these increases would still leave the consumer many years behind. For example, he said the output of refrigerators would rise from 62,000 in 1953 to 330,000 in 1955 (for a population of more than 200 million). This, even if achieved, would still be tiny by Western standards. In August, Premier Malenkov had spoken cordially of the expansion of trade of the U.S.S.R. with Western countries but he had avoided connecting this with consumer goods. Now, however, the following brief passage appeared in the middle of Mikoyan's long and rambling speech: A few words must be said about the import of consumer goods. During recent years we have been making use of this additional source of supply for the population. Having become better off we can now allow ourselves to import such foodstuffs as rice, citrus fruits, bananas, pineapples, herrings, and such manufactured goods as high standard woolens and silk fabrics, furniture, and certain other goods supplementing our range. These goods are in demand by the population. Although we are buying 4 billion rubles' worth of consumer goods from abroad this year, two-thirds of this sum will be spent on goods from the People's Democracies. In turn, we are exporting certain consumer goods of which we have a sufficiency, and are helping the People's Democracies with certain commodities. Mikoyan, revising his figures in December, estimated the Soviet Union's imports of consumer goods from non-Communist countries in 1953 at 1 billion rubles. Rubles are not used in foreign trade and translation into dollar values may be misleading, but at the official (although artificial) rate, 1 billion rubles would be 250 million dollars. This is a slender figure in relation to the annual consumption needs of more than 200 million persons. Even so, the amount that was actually imported during the year did not equal the $250 million estimate. There is, however, some connection between the new regime's promises of more consumer goods and the recent activities of the Soviet Union in the field of East-West trade. We shall be examining those activities in the next chapter. =Has Stalin Been Overruled?= In early 1954 the situation could be summarized something like this: The Soviet-bloc rulers have put on a more affable diplomatic face and made a number of conciliatory gestures to the Western world without altering their fundamental hostile objectives, and they have made a great fanfare about supplying more consumer goods to their people without basically changing their war-oriented economy. The conciliatory diplomatic tactics of Stalin's successors have sometimes been called a "peace offensive," but the term is hardly justified. Since last June the peaceful sounds have alternated curiously with renewals of the old name-calling and intransigeance. And behind their Curtain the Communists never stopped teaching their students that capitalistic society must be overthrown. The North Atlantic Council could not avoid the conclusion at Paris on December 16 "that there had been no evidence of any change in ultimate Soviet objectives and that it remained a principal Soviet aim to bring about the disintegration of the Atlantic alliance." The evidence indicated that the Communist rulers, while making gestures to their multitudes, were trying not to interfere with industrial-military development. The evidence included the Soviet Union's own budget figures, which indicated that the state investment (there is no private investment) in consumer goods ministries is still extremely small; that the extremely large specific allocations to the military in the 1953 budget were no lower than actual expenditures in 1952; and that the budget's "unexplained" category, which almost certainly includes "sensitive" military projects, greatly increased. It seemed most unlikely that increases in domestic output of consumer goods, even supplemented by increased imports, could be large enough to make a substantial improvement in the traditionally low living standards in the Soviet Union. We must suppose that the intent of any steps to improve the lot of the Soviet-bloc consumer is to improve it just enough to rescue his productivity in the interest of the state, but not enough to give him such a taste of better living as would lead to a wider and wider opening of the valves and hinder the buildup of the totalitarian war economy. If that is a correct assumption, the world, yearning for assurance of peace, is entitled to wish that the Kremlin's calculations might be upset and the consumer might get enough to whet his appetite in a big way. _CHAPTER III_ =The Kremlin's Recent Trading Activities= In midsummer of 1953, at about the time of the Korean armistice of July 27 and just before Malenkov's major speech of August 8, the Soviet Union attracted world attention by a flurry of new trade agreements with non-Communist countries. There was another flurry around the end of the year. During the last 9 months of 1953 and the early part of 1954, the representatives of U.S.S.R. adopted a somewhat more polite and businesslike manner in their commercial dealings with the free world. They not only _said_ they wanted more trade (they had never stopped saying it) but they took more steps to bring it about. Besides trade agreements, they signed more contracts with private firms. In Moscow they warmly entertained traveling salesmen from the West. In Western capitals they staged a few cocktail parties and press conferences. They poured more funds into eye-catching exhibits at "trade fairs" from Copenhagen to Bangkok. They made grandiose offers to buy, and gave them great publicity. Some offers to buy, sell, or barter they made quietly through commercial channels. They showed signs of wanting the nonindustrial portions of the world to regard them as a helpful "big brother" bringing both trade and aid. These activities, which many writers have called a "trade offensive," carried with them important meanings for the free world. In this chapter we shall examine the activities and probe for the meanings. =The New Trade Agreements= In a period of about 3 weeks, in late July and early August, the U.S.S.R. concluded trade agreements with France, Greece, Argentina, Denmark, and Iceland. These were not mere renewals of expiring agreements. The U.S.S.R. had never before had trade agreements with France, Greece, or Argentina (or any other Latin American country). Its last trade agreement with Denmark had expired in 1950, and with Iceland in 1947. Its trade with three of the countries, Greece, Iceland, and Argentina, had been almost nonexistent in recent years. Considerable trade, however, had been carried on with France and Denmark without benefit of trade agreements. The U.S.S.R. also renewed existing trade agreements with Iran and Afghanistan and signed a "payments agreement" with Egypt. Most of these trade agreements signed during the summer of 1953 became effective as of July 1. The second group of trade agreements, clustered shortly before or after January 1, 1954, and mainly effective as of that date, was with India, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. It was the first time the U.S.S.R. had ever had a trade agreement with India. There had not been one with Belgium since 1951. The others were renewals. Barter deals were also made with some of the countries already mentioned, and with Israel and Japan. Not since 1948, when the U.S.S.R. had entered into annual or long-term trade agreements with eight countries of Western Europe, had there been a period of Soviet trade-agreement activity that could compare with the paper blitzkriegs just described. And the result was that in the early part of 1954 the U.S.S.R. had trade agreements with more free-world countries than at any other time in the postwar period. This fact and the hefty amounts of trade which were called for in some of the agreements have given many people the impression that a historic increase in the size of East-West trade was taking place. The impression seems hardly justified. In the first place, trade agreements are usually only hunting licenses. They merely authorize--but do not guarantee--the exchange of goods. The governments agree to permit the export and import of the types listed--if contracts can be arrived at between Soviet monopolies and Western business. If the goods turn out to be unavailable, or if the demand is not forthcoming, or if the price is too high or the quality too low, the publicized amounts of the trade agreements do not materialize in the export-import statistics. And this fact rarely receives as much public attention as the original announcement. To illustrate, a spokesman for the Greek Foreign Ministry told the press on January 19 that the U.S.S.R. had lagged far behind in shipments under the 1-year trade agreement of July 1953. That agreement had been publicized as calling for trade of $10 million each way, but the Greek official said few Russian deliveries had been made and "it will be a miracle" if these deliveries reached $3 million. In the second place, even a big percentage of fulfillment would not necessarily increase trade between the U.S.S.R. and the free world to the high points of 1948 and 1952. The 1948 turnover--that is, the sum of exports and imports--had been about $1 billion. It declined to $545 million in 1950. By 1952 it was back up to $943 million. The preliminary estimate for 1953 is $790 million. Thus the year which saw the Kremlin's new trading tactics was also the year that saw a slump of about 16 percent in the dollar value of its trade with the free world. The trade was rising moderately in the last part of 1953 and a further moderate rise in 1954 would not be surprising. [Illustration: FREE WORLD TRADE WITH THE SOVIET BLOC] But there is still another reason why the new Soviet trade arrangements will not necessarily mean a historic upsweep in East-West trade: The satellite countries have not been behaving in quite the same way. The U.S.S.R. is only one part of the Soviet bloc, albeit the center of power. The U.S.S.R. accounts for about 30 percent of the trade which the European Soviet bloc carries on with the free world. (The percentage would be still less if Communist China were included, but Communist China will be discussed in another chapter.) In other words, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the Soviet zone of Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, despite the long, steady decline of their trade with the free world ever since "sovietization" took hold in about 1948, still exchange about twice as much merchandise with free-world countries as does the U.S.S.R. These satellites, or some of them, have long had trade agreements with countries in Western Europe. During the last year or so they have renewed about 45 of those. In addition they renewed about a dozen agreements with non-European countries. The brand-new agreements which the satellites concluded in Europe were mainly with France and Greece, thus conforming to the Soviet pattern of increased attention to those two countries. But in other respects the satellite trade pattern was different from that of the U.S.S.R., for while recent U.S.S.R. commitments, if fulfilled, seem to indicate increased trade, there was no evidence of a reversal in the long slide of the East-West trade of the satellites. Therefore one could not ignore the possibility that the U.S.S.R., with a flourishing of fountain pens and a blare of trumpets, was merely shifting to itself a bigger percentage of all bloc trade with the rest of the world. Now let's see what kinds of goods are involved in the new trade agreements and other commitments that the U.S.S.R. has been making. =More Consumer Goods Ordered= Consumer goods, the items about which Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Mikoyan made such a fanfare in announcing the new course for the Soviet domestic economy, make up one class of commodities, though not the most important, that the U.S.S.R. has been ordering from the Western world. It appears that the U.S.S.R. has committed itself to buy consumer goods at a somewhat brisker rate than in recent years. Most of these consumer goods were food items. During the last 6 months of 1953 and the first month of 1954, the known Soviet arrangements to buy food from the free world amounted to about $90 million. Some of the deliveries were scheduled in 1953, some in 1954. Butter was the biggest item. In trade agreements and contracts, butter quotas amounted to 37,500 tons, with an estimated value of $40 million. Denmark was to provide about $18.6 million of this. The second most important source of butter was to be the Netherlands, with $13.7 million. Lesser amounts were to come from New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, and Uruguay. Meat quotas came to about $22 million, with Denmark and Argentina the leading suppliers. Smaller amounts were to come from the Netherlands, Uruguay, and other countries. Fish quotas amounted to $15 million. Nearly all of this was herring. The leading suppliers were to be Iceland and Norway, and others were the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Denmark. The U.S.S.R. during the 7-month period also arranged to buy $7 million worth of citrus fruits from Italy, Japan, and Israel (and apparently made a whopping profit selling oranges to the Russian people); $4 million worth of cheese from Argentina and the Netherlands; $2.4 million worth of lard from Denmark and Argentina; and $1.4 million worth of sugar from the United Kingdom and Cuba. Besides food, the most important consumer item ordered from the West was textiles. The amount is harder to estimate, but it was somewhat larger than the Soviet textile imports of any recent year. The principal suppliers were to be Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Italy, and the United Kingdom. In addition to contracts already made, the Soviet officials were still putting out feelers for consumer goods. Some of them reached across the Atlantic. In January much publicity was given to the efforts of an American firm to buy a large quantity of Government-owned surplus butter and sell it abroad--ultimate destination Russia. Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks announced on January 15 that he would not approve any application "which would permit an exporter to buy butter at considerably lower prices than those paid by the American housewife and then send that butter into Russia." On February 10 he announced that it had been "decided as a matter of policy to deny commercial export license applications for the export for cash of United States Government-owned surplus agricultural or vegetable fiber products to Russia or her satellites." He pointed out, however, that this ban "does not preclude study of export license applications for these nonstrategic products to the Soviet bloc if acquired by exporters in the open market and not from the Commodity Credit Corporation surplus stocks." It is difficult at this writing to compare the Soviet Union's new commitments to buy consumer goods with the actual imports of previous years. _Total_ free-world exports to the U.S.S.R. in 1953 are estimated at $410 million (compared with $481 million in 1952) but how much of this $410 million was consumer goods is not yet determined. The 1954 figure can only be speculated upon. But certain generalizations about consumer goods are possible. As evident in chapter 1, the U.S.S.R. was never very much interested in importing consumer goods from the West. The items it did import for the consumer were not the household appliances and luxury items we sometimes think of as consumer goods--but were usually food. These imports have been higher at times than others: for example they were relatively high in the late 1930's and again in 1948. Since 1950 they have been rising again, but by 1953 they were still breaking no records. They have always represented a relatively small percentage of total Soviet imports. At the same time, during the postwar years Soviet policies were forcing the consumer-goods imports of the European satellites steadily downward. These contrasting trends of rising Soviet imports and sinking satellite imports seemed likely to continue in 1954. This probability, plus Mikoyan's statement in his October speech that "we are helping the People's Democracies with certain commodities," made one wonder how much of the new Soviet imports of butter and other food were being reshipped to Eastern Germany and other satellites to alleviate the unrest there. =A Shopping Spree for Ships= The U.S.S.R., while ordering more consumer goods, seemed even more anxious to buy ships. Every trade agreement which the U.S.S.R. has signed with a shipbuilding nation of Western Europe since mid-1953--that is, with Finland, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Sweden--has included a sizeable quota for ship purchases, particularly fishing vessels and refrigerator ships. Contracts for fishing vessels were also made with firms in the United Kingdom and Western Germany. It was safe to say that Soviet activity with respect to Western European shipyards since mid-1953 surpassed the biggest previous shopping expedition for ships, which came around 1949. And it was clear that by early 1954 the U.S.S.R. had greater commitments on the books to buy ships from the West than at any other time in its history. This was true in tonnage, value, and number of vessels. Probably not all the trade agreement commitments will result in actual deliveries; on the other hand, the shopping spree is still going on and further commitments are likely. Because of Western restrictions on the export of certain types of ships, the new vessels destined for the Soviet Union were mainly of smaller types. A large number were fishing vessels, such as trawlers, fish processing craft, and refrigerator ships. Others were cargo ships, tugs and barges. The buying of fishing vessels accords with the shortage of food in the Soviet bloc. Mikoyan in his October speech admitted there had been many complaints about the fish supply and that the Soviet fishing goals had not been met. But the Soviet search for ships could not be viewed entirely in the light of a desire to produce more consumer goods. The U.S.S.R. was seeking cargo ships in addition to fishing boats, ordering other marine equipment such as component parts and floating cranes and trying to arrange for more ship repairs in free-world ports. Western shipbuilders were inclined to be receptive to orders for vessels at a time when ship orders from Western countries were declining. At the same time it was impossible to ignore the fact that Soviet-bloc orders in the West can have the effect of freeing Soviet-bloc shipyards for the building of naval vessels. The campaign to buy ships thus presented the free world not only with more orders but also with a security problem. The development of a Soviet merchant fleet is relatively recent. In 1939 the U.S.S.R. had seagoing merchant vessels totaling only 1,135,000 gross tons. It emerged from World War II with more than twice this tonnage. The main sources of the increase were lend-lease ships from the United States and war reparations. The United States in its lend-lease program leased to the U.S.S.R. 121 merchant vessels with gross tonnage of some 750,000 tons. Of these, 30 were returned to the United States and 4 were lost. The U.S.S.R. kept the others, and long exhaustive negotiations since 1946 have failed to settle this and other lend-lease claims. Through war reparations the U.S.S.R. acquired 170 more ships with gross tonnage just over one-half million tons. By 1953 the Soviet bloc--the U.S.S.R. and Poland for the most part--had a seagoing merchant fleet with a gross tonnage of 2-1/2 million tons, compared with free-world fleets totaling about 21 million tons. =Most of All, They Want Hard Goods= The new Soviet purchases of butter, meat, and other consumer items have sometimes obscured the continuing heavy demand for equipment and raw materials needed for industrialization. There has been no appreciable decline in the Soviet interest in buying industrial commodities. Such goods still dominate Soviet imports and new agreements to import--and that goes for the European satellites, too. The Soviet bloc has shifted some of its priorities. The Soviet eagerness to buy ships is an example of a raised priority. The sharp drop in Soviet buying of Malayan rubber from the United Kingdom in 1953 was an example of a lowered priority. There are some other changes, but no change in the emphasis on industrial goods in general. All the trade agreements concluded between countries of Eastern and Western Europe since mid-1953 have included quantities of such items--limited, of course, by the West's security controls which provide for the embargo of some items and quantitative restrictions on others. In the trade agreements of Czechoslovakia and Poland, we find quotas for deliveries from the free world of electrical equipment, ball bearings, steel products, pyrites, lead, zinc, aluminum, and many others. Bulgaria also has shopped for capital equipment. In exchange for their grain, vegetables, fruits, tobacco, and a small amount of manganese and chrome, the Bulgarians made trade-agreement commitments to get important amounts of cables, rods, bars, plate steel, railroad equipment, floating cranes, electrical machines and installations, mining equipment, and miscellaneous machinery. The U.S.S.R., besides its procurement program for ships, has written into its trade agreements certain kinds of machine tools, various kinds of steel, equipment for electric power plants, construction equipment, chemical products, textile machinery and machinery for the timber and food-processing industries. An analysis of one recent trade agreement showed that three-quarters of the value of the Soviet imports consisted of products of the metal working industries. Businessmen in the United Kingdom, which has concluded no recent trade agreement with the U.S.S.R., have reported that the Soviet bloc's real interest in buying British goods was confined mainly to items for production. The attempts to purchase items like those named in the foregoing paragraph are nothing new. The point is, these efforts are continuing. Many of these items have been under quantitative controls by the major free-world countries--that is, exported to the bloc in limited quantities only. Some of the most highly strategic items, such as the types of machine tools and bearings that are essential to war production, have been under embargo, and when that was true, the free countries that participate in the international control program have generally shipped them only to fulfill commitments made before controls went into effect, or in special cases where the countries felt strongly that the shipment was justified in view of the benefits to the free world that resulted from the two-way trade made possible by the shipment. In 1952 and 1953, for example, all nations receiving aid from the United States permitted the shipment to the Soviet bloc of roughly $15 million in items that were listed for embargo under the Battle Act (Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951), as compared with total free-world shipments to the bloc of about $2.7 _billion_ in the same 2 years. These highly strategic items, of course, are the ones which the countries of the Soviet empire have wanted most of all. And when not able to get them legally, they have continued their efforts to get them illegally. The third semiannual Battle Act report, _World-Wide Enforcement of Strategic Trade Controls_, contained a detailed account of the underground trade that violates Western regulations. Since all foreign trade of a Soviet-bloc country is a state monopoly, it follows that the state is an active participant in this underground traffic. With the bloc, circumvention is an official policy. The Soviet Union, despite its publicized buying of consumer goods--which have never been restricted by the free world--has definitely not slackened its efforts to obtain industrial goods whether strategic or nonstrategic in nature. =Something Different in Soviet Exports= As told in chapter I of this report, the economic planners of the Soviet empire first figure out their import requirements and then decide what they want to export in order to pay for the imports. They look upon exports primarily as a means of obtaining goods which are more advantageous to import than to produce, or which they cannot produce. In the present chapter, we have seen what sort of items they are currently interested in importing. Now we turn the coin over and look at the export side. The most noticeable feature is that the U.S.S.R. in the last half of 1953 and the early part of 1954 introduced into free-world markets a number of mineral products which they had not sold in such quantities for some years. These commodities included manganese, petroleum, and gold. All of them at one time or another have been among the major Soviet exports. Together with grain, timber, and furs, they make up the principal means that the U.S.S.R. possesses to procure the imports they want. Why have the mineral exports been revived at this time? This leads us to the grain situation. Grain has long been the Soviet Union's No. 1 export commodity, and still is. But Soviet grain shipments declined precipitately in 1953. The United Kingdom, usually the main Western customer for this commodity, stopped buying grain on a government-to-government basis and turned the purchasing over to private firms. At the same time the U.S.S.R. apparently decided to keep more of its grain stores at home. The efforts to furnish more fodder to livestock, together with below-average crops and collective-farm headaches in the U.S.S.R. and satellites, suggest the motivation for this. At any rate the private British firms were unenthusiastic about signing large contracts at the high prices set by the U.S.S.R., and grain shipments to the United Kingdom skidded from $101 million in 1952 to only $10.1 million in 1953. Although grain was far from disappearing as a Soviet export to the West, it became less potent--for the time being, at least--as a means of acquiring foreign exchange to pay for imports. This loss was only partially offset by a moderate increase in sales of Soviet timber to Britain and a big drop in the amount of Malayan rubber that the U.S.S.R. bought from the British. Meanwhile war reparations from Finland had ended in 1952, and deliveries of Swedish goods under a long-term credit agreement ended the same year. The Finnish and Swedish developments meant that about $80 million worth of goods which the U.S.S.R. had received from those countries in 1952 could not be duplicated in 1953 unless some other means of payment were created. All these events contributed to the reviving of some other export commodities. How far the shift is going and how long it will continue cannot be predicted. Abrupt alteration in Soviet exports is hardly a novel development. For a time, around 1930, when forced collectivization of agriculture and forced exports of grain had induced famine in some areas of the U.S.S.R., the Kremlin opened the pressure valves a mite, heavily slashed the exportation of grain, and even _bought_ some grain on the Baltimore exchange. That was a breathing spell in the midst of the first big Soviet push toward rapid industrialization. During the same general period, the U.S.S.R. found it expedient to force more production and more exports of furs, coal, and some of the same commodities now receiving special attention--petroleum and metallic ores--in order to get imports of capital goods needed in the ambitious industrial program. =They Have Dug Up Manganese= Manganese is a silvery-white metal used in the making of hard steels. The U.S.S.R. is one of the world's major sources of manganese. It can produce a large amount each year, depending on how much manpower it decides to throw into the effort. It consumes a lot in its own steel industry, even using manganese as a substitute for scarcer alloys like nickel and molybdenum. In addition, its plans usually provide for certain quantities of manganese ore to sell abroad. These exports have continually fluctuated. Before the war they ranged from about 400,000 metric tons a year to about 1 million. The United States, which produces very little manganese, was a major customer. In the 1930's we got about 40 percent of our manganese imports from the U.S.S.R. Other important customers were France, Germany, Belgium, and Japan. During the war, Soviet manganese vanished from world markets. The United States and other customers turned to sources in Africa, Latin America, and India. In March 1945, Soviet manganese ore reemerged. The United States was the principal buyer, receiving 1,168,000 tons in about 4 years. In February 1947 the Soviet Foreign Trade Journal pointed out the importance of the United States to future Soviet plans for the export of manganese. But late in 1948 the Kremlin suddenly reduced its shipments to the United States almost to the point of embargo. A few shipments trickled in during the next 2 years and stopped entirely in 1951. Meanwhile deliveries to Western Europe did not undergo a compensating rise; they were little more than 100,000 tons a year. Came the season of the last half of 1953 and the early part of 1954. The Kremlin's zeal for exporting manganese bloomed again. Commitments to ship over 300,000 tons of the ore were written into trade agreements with Western European countries. Offers of manganese reached the United States through various channels. Chrome is usually part of the package when manganese is sold. As could be expected, Soviet chrome commitments also climbed in late 1953. There was also a revival of activity in the export of silver, platinum, and palladium. =The Emergence of Russian Oil= But a more interesting commodity which the U.S.S.R. has begun to put on the market in bigger quantities was oil. In approximately the last half of 1953 the U.S.S.R. made agreements to ship to free-world countries about 3.5 million metric tons of crude petroleum, kerosene, diesel fuel, and other petroleum products. The countries due to receive the largest amounts--if delivered--were Finland, France, and Argentina. Other customers were Greece, Italy, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Israel, and the Netherlands. Some deliveries were made in 1953; more would be made in 1954; there was no certainty that all the commitments would be fulfilled. But even a two-thirds fulfillment apparently would be enough to hoist petroleum ahead of lumber and furs and place it second only to grain among Soviet exports to the free world. What would this mean to the free world? What problems would it raise? Again we can find clues in the past. The present situation is not the first time that the U.S.S.R. has created a stir by abruptly entering oil markets. This also happened in the late 1920's, when the U.S.S.R. began exporting large amounts of oil as a means of obtaining industrial imports. These exports grew each year and were 6.1 million metric tons in 1932. This was around 10 percent of the world's oil exports, and was almost 30 percent of Soviet oil production at the time. The United Kingdom and Italy were the major customers for this oil, but there were many others. The marketing was done through various channels. The Soviet monopoly that controlled all oil exports set up a network of sales offices abroad. Long-term contracts were made in Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The expansion of Soviet oil sales gave rise to bitter price wars with established oil groups. The bitterness was made more intense by the fact that the Bolsheviks had neglected to settle for the foreign oil properties that they had seized after the revolution. As in all exports, the U.S.S.R. was more interested in total receipts of foreign exchange than in making high per-unit profits; so it could and did use price cutting as a means of achieving a foothold. Subsidiaries of some of the world oil trusts then tried to drive the Soviet oil back home by underselling the Soviet monopoly. But the attempts failed, and Soviet oil won an important place in world markets. In the late 1930's, the oil was withdrawn. Soviet exports dropped back to 1.4 million tons in 1938, and kept fading. After the war, they came back only in a trickle--for example, 100,000 metric tons in 1951 and 250,000 in 1952, then rising to 450,000 in 1953 as some of the new commitments of 3.5 million tons began to be fulfilled. Meanwhile the war had swept additional oil into the Kremlin's hands, including the oil wells of Rumania and those which were taken over as "German assets" in the Soviet zone of Austria. And the oil exported to the West from these new Eastern European acquisitions greatly exceeded the exports of the U.S.S.R. itself, amounting to 1.2 million metric tons in 1951, 1.7 million in 1952, and 2.3 million in 1953. In recent months, while the U.S.S.R. was making agreements to ship 3.5 million tons, the new export commitments of these other properties in Eastern Europe became known only in part, at least at this writing. The Soviet bloc, though still short of certain specialized refined products, probably has the oil capacity to make considerable exports for at least some years, if the Kremlin so decides. Whether the bloc will indeed step into the world markets in an important way, as the U.S.S.R. did in the twenties, is of course not known. The West is watching closely to see whether the Kremlin will again use its monopoly control to undertake a major campaign of underselling other suppliers in world markets. It was natural for oil-importing countries in the free world to be interested in new supplies from the Soviet bloc, especially if the price was attractive or if the transaction also enabled a free country to market its own products in the East. But the West could not forget past patterns, nor ignore the problems brought by new Soviet sales. When the Russians abruptly disappear from markets, free-world importers turn to free-world sources to make up the difference. And if the importers later jump whenever the Soviet Government decides to stage another of their dramatic entrances, the free-world sources whose production has been stimulated will be the losers. And who can predict when the dictates of the Kremlin--economic or political--will override the dictates of the market place, and the oil, manganese, chrome, or whatever it may be, will suddenly be whisked out of reach? =Gold Sales Expanded= Down through the centuries, the word _gold_ has exerted a powerful effect upon the imaginations of mankind. And last December, when the news came out that airplanes laden with gold bullion were flying from Moscow to London, there was a great buzz of interest. What were the Russians up to now? The export of Russian gold was not new. The Soviet Union had been selling a sizeable amount each year in the free world. But in the last few months of 1953 a larger amount of Russian gold came out into the free world than had emerged in any recent year. Most of it, instead of entering the free market, went to the Bank of England. The total amount exported to England, Switzerland, and other countries during 1953 was not announced, but it was somewhere between $100 and $200 million. There has been much speculation on the reasons for an increase in gold sales. The best explanation seemed to be that the Kremlin, hard pressed for adequate exports, decided--as in the case of manganese and oil--to use a fraction of its gold hoard so that it could continue to import the things it wanted from the free world. It has done the same thing on past occasions. For example, in 1928 the U.S.S.R. exported $167 million worth of gold and in 1937, $212 million worth. Whether still larger amounts of Russian gold would be exported in the future was of course unknown. Concerning the size of the Soviet gold stock many guesses have been made, most of them ranging from $3 billion to $6 billion. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to its gold reserve. It has been willing to part with gold only in limited amounts or for special purposes. In any event, the gold hoard would not be big enough to use as a base for a large-scale, long-term trade relationship. Nevertheless, over the short run, and for limited purposes, the U.S.S.R. could, if it desired, export a lot more gold than it has to date. Gold therefore is an intriguing question mark of East-West trade. =Reaching Outside Europe= Moscow, while shopping for more ships, peddling more gold, and making other moves in the industrial countries of Western Europe, also reached outside Europe and tried to fasten closer economic ties with Asia and Latin America. The trade of the Soviet Union with the non-Communist areas of Asia, and with Latin America, has never amounted to more than driblets. That of Czechoslovakia and Poland has been a little bigger. The U.S.S.R. entered this field in 1953 with a good deal of propaganda effect. The effect in delivery of goods was still to be seen. The Soviet trade bosses used a number of devices. One device was to offer loans and technical assistance. Some of the loans were connected with trade. Others, related to construction activities within free-world countries, were more suggestive of investments and provided opportunity for increased Soviet or Communist Party economic penetration. There was a marked interest in assisting in the establishment of storage and supply facilities. So far, few Soviet offers have been accepted. Possibly this is because they are disturbingly reminiscent of the penetration techniques that were used to gain economic leverage inside the Eastern European countries and China prior to Soviet political domination of these regions. Or it may be that skepticism has been aroused by the experience with Communist Party use of commercial enterprises in some Western European countries to finance the local party and the Kremlin's activities. Another device has been to build lavish exhibits at "trade fairs." This activity, though carried on in Western Europe too, was especially marked in South Asia. On an increasing scale, since 1951, the Soviet Union and its satellites have been using trade fairs for a double purpose--to promote the kind of trade the bloc desires and to propagate Communist ideas. By elaborate and costly displays the Soviet-bloc governments seek to dominate the fairs; to overshadow the exhibits of the United States and other free-world countries; and to create the illusion of an industrial and commercial superiority over the Western nations, especially the United States. The U.S.S.R. makes a concerted and determined effort to discredit and minimize the industrial and technological achievements of the United States by contrasting the great size of the Communist nations' participation with the usually modest representation by United States firms. An important distinction between Soviet and U.S. exhibits is that the former are developed as a state trade promotion and propaganda undertaking, and involve the building of special pavilions, whereas U.S. participation amounts to the sum total of exhibits of individual U.S. industrial and commercial companies assembled for the single purpose of promoting the sale of individual products. The importance which the bloc attaches to these undertakings is found not only in the mountains of propaganda it issues on the subject, but in the sizeable expenditures it makes. For example, in 1952 the U.S.S.R. and its satellites dominated the Bombay International Industries Fair with four big exhibits. The Soviet exhibit was the largest; it cost more than $200,000 and was manned by a staff of 40. Communist China's exhibit was the second most pretentious, with Czechoslovakia and Hungary also participating in an impressive way. At the Thailand Constitution Fair at Bangkok in December 1953, the Soviet exhibit was again the most elaborate. The Soviet Government established a special pavilion that cost an estimated $500,000 and housed 5,000 items, including trucks, automobiles, precision equipment, glassware, rugs, and preserved foods. Yet another device was to join hands with a key nation of each continent in a brand-new impressive trade agreement which seemed to offer attractive benefits to that nation and which might stimulate neighboring countries to hanker after similar opportunities. The Kremlin chose India and Argentina. The U.S.S.R. concluded trade agreements with those two countries for the first time. So did some of the European satellites, and other satellites renewed existing agreements. The U.S.S.R. and the satellites also renewed existing agreements with certain other countries in Asia and Latin America. The two-year Russian trade agreement with Argentina, signed in August 1953, was one of the most interesting of the year. For one thing it came at a time when trading missions of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites were becoming more active throughout Latin America--and the Soviet-Argentina agreement helped those missions to gain a somewhat more receptive audience for their overtures. Latin American governments have cooperated with other Western nations in withholding highly strategic commodities from the Soviet bloc; for example, bloc proposals to buy Chilean copper and Bolivian antimony and lead were not accepted. Obviously the Kremlin hoped to bring about more resistance to the control of strategic materials and to create Western disunity over that issue. This trade agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Argentina was also interesting for its size and composition, at least on paper. It called for deliveries of $60 million in each direction, presumably during the first year, with an additional Soviet credit of $30 million. Argentine shipments were to include wool, hides, linseed oil, meat, and other goods that the Soviet Union could undoubtedly use. But the list of Soviet exports included some items for which the Soviet bloc seemed to have equal or greater need. The U.S.S.R. promised to deliver a large quantity of machinery and transportation equipment on credit, as well as petroleum, coal, and other items. Proposals to deliver certain kinds of machinery also cropped up in Soviet agreements with India and Iran. Machinery, as we know, is what the Soviet rulers go to extreme pains to _import_. If they were serious now about exporting it, and if they really intended to deliver large quantities and not mere tokens, it would be something new, although even then they would probably not be exporting the advanced types which they usually seek to obtain in the West. It remained to be seen whether the U.S.S.R. would come anywhere near to complete fulfillment of the trade agreement with Argentina, for example. But one could only suspect that the promises of big and attractive deliveries--whether fulfilled or not--were made in large part for the purpose of weakening the ties of those countries with the rest of the free world. * * * * * In this chapter we have traced various threads of the Soviet trading activities, and have suggested reasons why they engaged in each kind of activity. Now it is necessary to look more deeply into the whole complex of Soviet foreign trade policy and sum up what's behind it all. _CHAPTER IV_ =What's Behind It All= From the Kremlin comes a continual flow of propaganda, spread to the ends of the earth by the international Communist movement, to the effect that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the Champion of Peace. Stalin's death afforded the Communists a convenient opportunity to portray a new regime zealous for a peaceful, normal world. They did not say out loud that Stalin had been _less_ zealous, but they were not reluctant to play upon the world's fervent wish that the new management would turn over a bright new leaf. And they were willing, even eager, for the world to believe that one part of the pursuit of peace was the promotion of East-West trade. =The Kremlin and Peace= Can the so-called Soviet "trade offensive" of 1953-54 really be explained as an effort to establish a just and lasting peace, as the West understands the word? If we could believe that, the world might suddenly seem a more comfortable place to live in. We must always keep the door ajar for any genuine steps to abandon the Soviet brand of imperialism, to abandon the basic unfriendliness of purpose toward everything not under Moscow's control. The free world was looking for such a movement at the Berlin Conference in the early part of 1954, but it did not show up. The only way peace could be accepted as a Soviet trading motive would be to define peace as the Soviet leaders themselves have defined it in the past, not in their propaganda but in their party teachings. "The peace policy of the proletarian state," according to a Comintern Congress resolution of 1928, "certainly does not imply that the Soviet state has become reconciled with capitalism ... It is merely ... a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism, a form which the U.S.S.R. has consistently employed since the October Revolution." Lenin, in a statement which was reprinted in 1943, said that "every 'peace program' is a deception of the people and piece of hypocrisy unless its principal object is to explain to the masses the need for a revolution, and to support, aid, and develop the revolutionary struggle of the masses that is starting everywhere...." There is no evidence that the new Soviet regime has overnight embraced free-world ideas about peace and warfare. To the disciples of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, the world is always in a state of warfare. The warfare waged by them is three-fold: psychological, economic, and military. Military action is a last resort, but psychological and economic action never ceases. Stalin did not invent this concept, though he put it into action on a large scale. Nor was it exclusively Russian. The German military philosopher, Clausewitz, whose mid-19th century writings were carefully noted by Lenin and Stalin, wrote: "Disarm your enemy in peace by diplomacy and trade, if you would conquer him more readily on the field of battle." =A Mixture of Motives= Hence the question arises: Can the Soviet trade offensive be explained as a campaign of "economic warfare"? That depends on what is meant by economic warfare. Paradoxically, many people think of economic warfare as meaning economic action in which economic considerations are relatively unimportant, and the gaining of political or psychological advantage is dominant. If economic warfare is taken in this sense, the answer to our question is "no". The explanation of the Soviet trade offensive is not that simple. The Soviet Union and its satellites have economic needs. They use foreign trade to serve those needs. We have noted in this report how they determine what imports they want from the free world, and then develop a program of exports to pay for the imports. They are not in the Olympian position of being able to pick and choose these imports and exports solely on the basis of whether the choice will help them deceive, confuse, embarrass, or divide the capitalistic West. Therefore it is a grave oversimplification to assume, as some people do, that the Soviet Communist's every action in the market places of the world inevitably brings him advantages in international politics. On the other hand it would be an even greater mistake to assume that economic considerations always govern; that because the Soviet-bloc governments often use normal trading channels and devices they must be looking upon trade through the same eyes as the businessman of Indianapolis, Manchester, or Stockholm; and that politeness at the bargaining table is the undoubted mark of innocently "economic" commerce, free of ulterior motives. The truth is: Soviet-bloc trading actions are neither purely economic nor purely noneconomic. The Soviet trade offensive can be explained in terms of economic warfare, if we define economic warfare as economic action by the state that is designed to serve basic hostile objectives directed at another nation or group of nations--whether or not the immediate gains are economic. =Their Objectives Haven't Changed= In Chapter I, the Soviet bloc's long-term objectives in its economic relations with the free world were outlined. It was pointed out that these objectives have a dual character: strengthening the bloc and weakening the free-world powers. The objectives were summarized this way: 1. To feed the economy, especially the industrial-military base, with imports that help the bloc become more powerful and less dependent on the free world. 2. To drive wedges among free-world nations at every opportunity. 3. To increase the reliance of free-world nations on the bloc for markets or supplies, and thus make the free world more vulnerable to bloc pressures. Within this broad framework the Kremlin pursues more immediate and specific goals, such as: # Obtaining through normal commercial channels the ships, machinery, and other industrial goods which they can produce only at relatively high expenditure of labor and resources--or which they cannot produce at all. # Obtaining through illicit channels those strategic materials whose shipment is restricted by free-world governments in the interest of their national security. # Forcing the relaxation of free-world security controls in order to get strategic goods more cheaply and easily and to create dissension among free nations. # Fostering rivalry among free-world merchants in trading with the bloc, thus reducing the net cost to the bloc of obtaining goods it desires from the West. # Buying increased quantities of certain consumer goods, though apparently just enough to help with problems within the bloc and to rouse the interest of the West. (Of course it would not take a "trade offensive" to obtain these consumer goods, for they have never been restricted by the West.) # Selling the West an exaggerated idea of the size and reliability of markets, supplies, and general benefits that can be obtained through East-West trade. # Making their limited export commodities go as far as possible in solving their import problems without draining vital resources away from their program of forced industrialization. # Making financial and other economic arrangements in neighboring countries and nonindustrial areas in order (1) to gain more influence and more access to resources there, and (2) to diminish the influence and access to resources of free-world industrial nations. The foregoing can be recognized, as among the things being attempted in the Soviet "trade offensive" of 1953-54. They did not fall in separate compartments, but were woven together in a central plan and they contributed to one another. They were not so new as some of them might look at first glance. The long-term objectives which they served were not new at all. =Their Practices Haven't Changed= Some new tactics have been adopted, as we have seen. But even many tactics have more of an old look than a new. Soviet-bloc business practices still clash with Western concepts of normal, peaceful trade relations. Soviet-bloc representatives have access to many free-world factories, visit docks and inspect merchandise destined for the bloc, maintain offices in commercial centers, receive technical materials from libraries and business firms, and pick up voluminous statistics on free-world resources, production, exports, and imports. The governments of Soviet-bloc countries do not reciprocate. Although they entertain delegations of diplomats and businessmen and occasionally allow individuals to visit certain places when it serves their purposes, the Western business community in general is barricaded out of their cities, factories, and countrysides, and the peoples of the bloc firmly locked in. Disclosures of even the simplest facts and figures about their economies is a serious crime. They do not enter into the customary international agreements for the protection of patents. Though they claim to have invented almost everything, much of their industrial progress is based on piracy of Western inventions and technology, from the tiny Moskvich automobile to the jet engine. They have failed to settle promptly and adequately claims for confiscation of Western properties and for lend-lease assistance. Furthermore the terms on which they often seek to trade omit customary guarantees of fair dealing. For example, the U.S.S.R is still trying to insert clauses in its East-West contracts requiring that any dispute between the Soviet Government and the free-world businessman be arbitrated by the Chamber of Commerce of the Ministry of Foreign Trade--an organ of the Soviet Government. And as we have already seen, they make every effort to circumvent the export controls of other nations; they pay citizens of those nations to violate the laws of their governments. The best way to characterize the Soviet "trade offensive" is that the Soviet rulers have improvised for their trade structure a new facade of papier mache but have not reconstructed the interior. In changing circumstances the Kremlin was seeking effective ways of accomplishing the same traditional objectives of feeding its industrial-military machine and weakening the free world. In the absence of Soviet-bloc policies conducive to furnishing a long-term steady supply of exports desired by free-world countries, the West could hardly expect East-West trade to return to the prewar volume, though a short-term boost would not be surprising. The combined value of the trade in both directions between the free world and the Soviet bloc in Europe was $2.6 billion in 1951 ... $2.4 billion in 1952 ... and about $2.2 billion in 1953. By contrast, total foreign trade within the free world in 1953 was about $148 billion. It is not only the amount of trade that must be considered, however, and that is why we have devoted attention in this report to what goods were involved and what the new Soviet regime was trying to accomplish. =The Free World Is Strong= What are the implications of all this for the free world? In the face of the Soviet objectives, methods, and recent trade activities, one can recognize the inadequacy of two extreme policies that are often urged upon Western governments. Those extremes are: 1. Complete embargo on trade with the bloc. 2. Completely unrestricted commercial relations with the bloc. Complete embargo would be the conventional answer in military conflict. But to urge complete embargo in the present situation is to ignore the fact that the present trade situation offers opportunities to the free world. The free world, with its enormous production, can benefit from trade; the test is what goods are traded and on what terms. The free nations are stronger economically than they have ever been. Collectively they are far stronger than the Soviet bloc. They possess tremendous resources. On the whole they have solid and healthy competitive systems. Their businessmen have behind them centuries of experience in bargaining, merchandising, and servicing. With these factors creating for the free world a currently strong trading position, the free-world nations should be able to take advantage of the needs of the Soviet bloc and by hard bargaining gain benefits from East-West trade. Completely normal and unrestricted commercial relations with the bloc seem to be equally unsuitable as a course of action. If the free world should abandon the controls it has imposed in the interest of national security, drop its guard and permit unrestricted trade in _all_ its raw materials, industrial goods, and advanced technology--the free world would be the loser. In view of the Communist objectives and methods, unrestricted trade would permit the bloc to increase its war potential--and specifically the all-important economic base of its war potential--faster than it otherwise could. The goods received by the free world would bring no commensurate return. If such trade encouraged a general relaxation of the free world military defense, it would be that much more damaging to the free world. In any event, unrestricted trade would permit the Soviet traders to compete freely in Western markets for important strategic goods needed for Western military defense, thus making that defense more costly and difficult for many free-world nations. Employing the monopoly power of the Soviet states, individually or collectively, the bloc would be able to extract economic advantages and unwarranted concessions from the weaker individual traders and nations to the net detriment of the free world. Finally, unrestricted commercial relations, in which commercial gain is the overriding criterion, would weaken the free world insofar as they increased the economic reliance of certain free areas upon the bloc. This could be harmful by increasing the vulnerability of these areas to Soviet pressure. It could also have the effect of diverting the attention of the free world from its compelling general economic tasks such as developing bigger, better, and more accessible markets and making international financial and trade arrangements that will diminish the difficulties of sharing the free world's vast resources and production among the nations. =The Challenge= Thus, the problem and the challenge is to find and to steer a course midstream--to trade with the Soviet bloc on terms which bring to the free world a net advantage. This is no simple matter. There are two sharp dangers for the free-world nations. One is the danger of being divided in purpose, split apart on policies requiring concerted action, and forced into competing among themselves in circumstances which call for unified action. The other is the danger of being deceived about what is going on in East-West trade and what's behind it. This danger grows partly out of the complexity of economic relations and the fact that the Soviet system and approaches to economic relations and peace in general are so different from ours. It grows partly out of the fact that deception is intentionally practiced by the Soviet Communists. On the other hand, the Soviet-bloc governments have limitations in trying to accomplish their purposes. The free world, aware of its own strengths, can meet a great part of the challenge by working together not only to understand the Soviet bloc's general objectives and goals, but also to identify the specific actions which the bloc chooses at any given time to accomplish them. In this way the free world has the opportunity of segregating the harmful from the helpful. We of the free world will neither be deceived nor divided if we keep ourselves armed with facts and work as a team. _CHAPTER V_ =U. S. Policy on Strategic Trade Controls= The economic and trading activities of the Soviet empire require close and continual study by free governments, but Soviet actions alone do not determine free-world policies. Let us be perfectly clear on this point. The theme of the early chapters of this report has been the Soviet "trade offensive" and its background, just as the theme of the third semiannual Battle Act report was the enforcement of free-world strategic trade controls. The selection of the theme, however, should not be taken to mean that Soviet trading activities are the only factor that free-world nations must take into account when they consider what economic defense policies to maintain in the interest of their security. In 1953 certain other considerations were demanding the careful attention of the agencies of the United States Government that are responsible for economic defense. =The Background= One of these considerations was the probability that the world faced a long period of tension short of general war, though with the ever-present risk of war. In such a period, no matter how long it might last, it would be essential for the free nations to remain strong and alert, to move together in whatever steps were necessary for military or economic defense, and at the same time to keep open the paths that might lead to a sounder basis for peace. Another factor of historic significance was the massive upswing in the strength of the free world. Western Europe, especially, had moved into a far stronger position, both militarily and economically, than it had occupied a few years earlier. This gave the West greater bargaining power and it reduced the dangers of undue economic dependence on Soviet-bloc trading partners. As Western Europe grew stronger the need for economic assistance from the United States declined. Although military aid continued in a big way, economic aid began to taper off. Accompanying the increase in Western economic strength was a general shift in the free world from a "seller's market," in which goods were scarce and sellers had a relatively easy time finding buyers, to a "buyer's market," in which buyers generally could pick and choose. Some of the free countries had produced themselves into surpluses of some commodities--or had built up surplus capacity and needed additional markets in order to keep their industries prosperous. This change brought more and more pressure from people in free countries to carry on increased trade with the Soviet bloc. Some groups had been clamoring for this all along, and had helped spread the time-worn Communist propaganda that a friendly and peace-loving "big brother" in Moscow was ready and waiting with an unlimited paradise of peaceful trade and that the only obstacle to its attainment was the strategic trade controls of the West. But now large numbers of _anti_-Communist businessmen, even though many of them were aware that the Communist propaganda was false and that Soviet policies had always been the prime deterrent to a large and peaceful commerce, felt that some increase in East-West trade would be beneficial as a supplement to their much greater trade in the free world. They recognized the limitations of the Soviet bloc as a stable, long-term trading partner, yet saw no reason why an expansion should not be sought. This attitude was stimulated by the Korean truce of July 27, 1953. It was also stimulated by the gestures that the Soviet Union began making in the direction of livelier East-West trade. Governments in the free world tended increasingly to the view that some revisions in Western controls might be made without sacrifice of security interests. =Basic Policy Reaffirmed= The new administration in Washington, taking account of such considerations as those, and wishing to be sure that United States policy was the most effective that could be devised, began a thorough review of the economic defense policy of the United States in the spring of 1953. This policy review was completed around the beginning of August. The third semiannual Battle Act report, which was published last September 28 and which covered the first half of 1953, stated that the conclusions of the review "will be reflected in the economic defense actions of this Government during the months to come." In the present report, which covers the second half of 1953, it is possible to give more information about those conclusions. As a result of the policy review _the basic economic defense policy of the United States was reaffirmed_. There were, however, some shifts of emphasis--with respect to trade with the Soviet bloc in Europe--designed to make the basic policy more effective. We shall discuss those shifts presently, but first let's summarize the basic policy as it has existed throughout the 6 months covered by this report. This basic policy of the United States on East-West trade rested on the following principles: 1. Mutual security can best be advanced by continued increase in the political, economic and military strength and cohesion of the free nations relative to that of the Soviet bloc. 2. The free nations should not furnish a potential aggressor with goods which directly and materially aid its war industry and military buildup. 3. The free world may derive a net security advantage out of some East-West trade. 4. Security export controls should be applied on a selective basis, except in the case of military aggression, when a policy of complete embargo may be in order. In accordance with those principles the United States has long been exercising certain controls over its own trade. Here is a short description of those controls: =United States exports to Soviet bloc in Europe=: Not prohibited entirely, but limited to clearly nonstrategic goods. =United States imports from Soviet bloc in Europe=: Not prohibited, except for certain types of furs. =United States shipping to Soviet bloc in Europe=: Not prohibited, if carrying properly licensed goods. =United States exports to Communist China and North Korea=: Prohibited. =United States imports from Communist China and North Korea=: Prohibited. (Some licenses were issued, though not recently, for goods needed in United States military stockpiles and in special hardship cases.) =United States shipping to Communist China and North Korea=: Prohibited. As for the trade of the rest of the free world with the Soviet bloc, the policy of the United States was set forth in the Battle Act (the text of which is at the end of this report) and in certain executive directives. The policy was not to prevent all East-West trade but to cooperate with other free-world countries in a system of _selective_ and flexible controls. The aim was to prevent Soviet-bloc countries from obtaining items that would contribute significantly to their warmaking power, and to insure that the trade which did go on served the real economic and security interests of the West. Ever since the Communist aggression in Korea in 1950, the Far East has presented a policy problem different from the problem of controlling shipments to the bloc in Europe. The official position of the United States Government--both before and after the 1953 policy review--was that the current levels of controls by the United States and free world over shipments to Communist China and North Korea should be maintained. Later on in this chapter we shall report on what happened in the China trade during the last half of 1953. =The New Direction of Policy= So much for the basic policy. Now for the shifts in emphasis that took place in United States economic defense policy toward the Soviet bloc in Europe during the 6 months covered by this report. It was determined that the system of the free-world controls that had been developed during the last 4 years substantially satisfied the objectives of retarding the buildup of Soviet warmaking power and strengthening the free world relative to the Soviet bloc. The effort to extend the control lists appeared to be reaching the point of diminishing returns. It was decided not to pursue an extension of the lists to many other items--though items would always be added occasionally because of changed conditions or new information. On the other hand the Government recognized a need for simplifying the lists and removing or downgrading items, which, in the light of current information, were no longer deemed to be so important. The Government believed that much could be done in the months to come, if done carefully and with due regard for security, to adjust the controls to a "long-haul" basis. (Developments in the first half of 1954 will be reported in the next Battle Act report.) In general, it was decided to concentrate on seeking more effective control of those items which, if shipped, would make a significant contribution to Soviet warmaking power. The main thrust from the United States toward improvement of the control system, it was decided, would be in the field of implementation and enforcement of controls. Notable deficiencies existed in that field. To overcome them the free nations would need to keep improving their techniques, and would need closer international collaboration and pooling of information. The new direction also took into account, even more than ever, the economic and political problems of free-world countries. Free-world unity was so vital, and the economic health of free nations so important to the defense of free institutions, that problems of our allies deserved to be given great weight in determining the actions of this Government in the East-West trade field. This was not a new concept, but this Government felt that such problems needed to be discussed among the free countries more than in the past. In setting the new direction the Government recognized: (1) that maintaining commercial ties between the free world and the Soviet bloc--compatible with the security requirements of the free world--may have positive advantages during the present period of tension; (2) that there are, however, risks that trade may in some cases lead to undue reliance on the Soviet bloc as a trading partner; (3) that it is important to encourage trade within the free world, including the entry of commodities into the United States, by reducing trade barriers, especially when the effect of such action would be to decrease the reliance of the free world on the Soviet bloc. Those were among the highlights of the new direction. As explained before, the basic economic defense policy was not altered. =Reviewing the Control Lists= In the light of this basic policy, and its new direction, the Government agencies responsible for economic defense were engaged in certain projects during the period covered by this report. One of the most important of these projects was the review of the control lists. This review was a complex and time-consuming operation, which continued into 1954. It is easy for the public to become confused about control lists, not only because of their necessarily secret nature, but also because there are so many lists, serving different purposes. The United States has had three main lists for its own exports: The munitions list, compiled and administered by the Department of State; the atomic energy list, compiled and administered by the Atomic Energy Commission; and a much longer list, covering all other controlled items, which is compiled and administered by the Department of Commerce. In addition there are the Battle Act lists. They relate to potential exports from other countries to the Soviet bloc. They include those primary strategic items which we believe the other free-world countries should embargo in the interest of mutual security. Then there are lists consisting of those items--at varying levels of control--which the cooperating free-world nations have accepted as a part of their informal coordination of controls. All of these lists are subject to a continual process of review. But as a part of the new direction in United States policy, this continuing review process was broadened into an intensive reappraisal. Specialists from several Government agencies were reevaluating all our listings in terms of sharper and more meaningful criteria, and in the light of all the new relevant technical and intelligence information that could be assembled. This review would furnish the basis for appropriate adjustments and for United States discussions with other governments in 1954 concerning the coverage of export controls. =East-West Trade: Road to Peace= It is a part of the economic defense policy of the United States never to lose sight of the vital need to keep open all paths that might lead to a sounder basis for peace in the world. We not only recognize the economic benefits that free-world nations can get from an expanding East-West trade in peaceful goods; we also bear in mind the possibility that trade contacts can help to improve relations among peoples. But in hoping for and working toward that end, we are not thereby accepting the belief that international trade inevitably and automatically leads toward peace. Hitler's Germany expanded its foreign trade right up to the outbreak of World War II. We must view with skepticism the Communist propaganda line on trade and peace, for we know what their trading objectives and methods are. East-West trade as now constituted is carried on not with private individuals in the Soviet bloc but with agencies of Soviet-bloc governments. International trade in general can be a broad highway toward better living standards and more peaceful relations. It has served humanity well. There should be more of it. But it takes two to trade, and trade is not necessarily a road to peace unless both parties wish to make it so. =Trade Within the Free World= Toward the close of the 6-month period under review, the President's Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall Commission) was hard at work. There was a great amount of public discussion, continuing into 1954, concerning ways in which the United States and other free-world countries could eliminate or reduce the obstacles that hinder the international exchange of goods. The Commission, issuing its report in January, had much to say on the reduction of trade obstacles. The Commission also included a section on East-West trade, recommending that the United States not object to more trade in peaceful goods between Western Europe and the European bloc. These two subjects, trade liberalization and East-West trade, are connected with each other. When businessmen in free-world countries are hindered--either by trade barriers or other artificial causes--from selling products in other free-world countries, they are more prone to seek markets in the Soviet bloc. To a certain extent this aggravates the problem of maintaining adequate strategic trade controls and the problem that some free-world countries have of avoiding undue dependence on the Soviet bloc. It would be impractical to seek the elimination of all trade restrictions within the free world but it is important to reduce unjustifiable barriers and it is also important to take whatever other steps are possible to develop new markets and new sources of supply. To bring alternative markets and supplies into being is not an overnight task but it must be done. It means the reduction of many restrictions in the United States, thus allowing more goods to come in from our friends and allies. It means a similar loosening of restrictions by other free nations. It means more and better economic integration among the European countries. It means steady advancement in the economic development of the underdeveloped areas of the world. All those things are important for many reasons. East-West trade is one aspect of the matter. The United States Government recognizes that hindrances to the exchange of goods within the free world do have a definite relationship to the international system of strategic trade controls. =The China Trade Falls Off= This report so far has concerned itself almost entirely with trade between the free world and the Soviet bloc in Europe. Now it is time to shift our attention to the China trade. During the 6 months under review, free-world trade with Communist China fell far below the first half of the year. Free-world exports to Communist China from July through December are estimated to have been $111.1 million, as compared with $158.9 million in the first half of 1953. This meant that shipments in the report-period fell below even the extremely low level of the first half of 1952. The result of this decline in shipments to Communist China was that the estimated total for all of 1953 was $270 million, only a slight rise in value from the 1952 exports of $256.5 million.[1] A larger rise had been foreseen. The last Battle Act report to Congress, _World-Wide Enforcement of Strategic Trade Controls_, pointed out: "If free-world exports continued at the same rate as that of the first 3 or 4 months of the year--and that is not at all certain--the 1953 total would be around $375 million." It actually seems to have been about $100 million short of that. Free-world imports from Communist China also dropped in the second half of 1953, though not so sharply as exports. They amounted to $198.4 million in the second half, according to a preliminary estimate, compared with $226.6 million in the first half of the year. This brought the estimated annual total of imports to $425 million in 1953, as compared with $365.8 million in 1952. It was true that in spite of the decline in the latter part of the year, some countries were able to sell more goods to the Chinese Communists in 1953 than they had in 1952. For example, exports of Western Germany rose from $2.8 million in 1952 to $25 million in 1953, in line with the general rebirth of German foreign trade. Exports of France rose from $3.3 million to $12.4 million, and Japan from half a million dollars to $4.5 million. Exports from the United Kingdom rose from $12.8 million to $17.5 million. On the other hand exports from the British Colony of Hong Kong, the traditional gateway of commerce to and from the mainland of China, fell so drastically in the second half of 1953 that the Hong Kong total for _all_ of 1953 was only $94.6 million, or little more than the $91 million of the previous year. And the Communists slashed their buying of Pakistan cotton, which had come to about $84 million in 1952, down to about $7 million in 1953. [1] These 1952 and 1953 figures are adjusted to exclude Swiss watches, which appear in Swiss official statistics as exports to China, but which actually went to the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong and were reexported to other free-world countries. Switzerland, in reporting its "China" trade, lumps together its trade with Communist China, Nationalist China, and Hong Kong. The watches in question are believed to amount to approximately $1 million a month, on the average. =They Play by Their Own Rules= Clearly the glittering prospect of a vast and lucrative trade with the Chinese Communists which had captured the imagination of many Western traders was not materializing. The China Association, a British trade organization, said in December: "There is no doubt but that the potentialities have been greatly exaggerated in the public mind, partly as a result of the superficial successes of the various unofficial trade missions which have paid visits to Peking this year. This overeagerness has unfortunately been reflected in an increasing severity of the terms which China now demands." Information about the increasing severity of the trade requirements which Communist China was trying to impose upon the free world came from all sides in the last half of 1953. Those terms would hardly suggest a genuine interest in normal and expanding trade relations. When the Chinese Communists sell, they demand a confirmed letter of credit in the hands of their own bank before they will ship the goods. They collect payment as soon as they have loaded the goods on a ship. They present a Communist Chinese Government certificate of inspection against which the buyer has no recourse if he finds--weeks or months later--that the quality of the goods is below specification. One who sells to Communist China is asked to follow a very different set of rules. He ships his goods and waits until they have arrived in Communist China, have been inspected by Communist Chinese Government inspectors, and are in the hands of the buyers, before he can collect his money. In the meantime he extends credit without interest, immobilizing the capital he had invested in the cargo, freight, and insurance, and is forced to accept claims resulting from inspection of his goods in Communist China. No doubt exceptions to these rules are still being granted to some Western traders, for the rules are so remote from long-recognized international trading practices that many firms would naturally balk at them. But there is no doubt that the unconventional and frustrating practices of the Chinese Communists have interfered seriously with the amount of commerce and have disillusioned many who saw an almost unlimited market in China's multitudes. =United States Policy on the China Trade= As mentioned before, the policy of the United States throughout the 6 months under review was to continue its total embargo on all exports--strategic or nonstrategic--to Communist China and North Korea, which were aggressors, and labeled as such by the United Nations. Rumors heard from time to time in various countries, to the effect that the United States had decided to relax its embargo or was under irresistible pressure to do so, and that American cars were reaching the Chinese mainland by way of Japan, were completely untrue. The position of the United States throughout the review period was also that the free-world embargo on strategic goods to Communist China--an embargo much more sweeping than that applying to the European bloc--should be maintained. Other free governments took the same position, and the embargo continued in force. Such relaxations as took place in controls were changes that did not affect the multilateral embargo. One example was the change in the control of antibiotics and sulfonamides. The nations which carry on trade with Communist China had been controlling those drugs, while hostilities continued in Korea, by limiting the quantities shipped; the quotas assumed by the various nations were scheduled to expire on December 31, 1953, and were permitted to expire on schedule. Another example was the relaxation by Japan on certain items that had been under embargo by that country--but these were items that the other countries were not embargoing. The same was true of the United Kingdom's decision to permit the shipment of light passenger automobiles. Though the policies of other major free governments regarding trade with Communist China have not been identical with our own, the United States has not attempted--and will not attempt--to bring about conformity through coercion. This is true of all of our relations with other countries, not merely our relations with them on the issue of Communist China. Leaders of this Government forcefully reaffirmed that principle during the period we are reviewing. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said in a statement on December 1: "The tide of events has made our Nation more powerful but I believe that it should not make us less loyal to our great American traditions; and that it should not blur our dedication to the truths, expressed in our Declaration of Independence, that we owe a respect to the opinions of others. "Today it is to our interest to assist certain countries. But that does not give us the right to try to take them over, to dictate their trade policies and to make them our satellites. "Indeed, we do not want weak or subservient allies. Our friends and allies are dependable just because they are unwilling to be anyone's satellites. They will freely sacrifice much in a common effort. But they will no more be subservient to the United States than they will be subservient to Soviet Russia. "Let us be thankful that they are that way, and that there still survives so much rugged determination to be free." On December 2, President Eisenhower endorsed the declaration of the Secretary of State and said this: "The easiest thing to do with great power is to abuse it--to use it to excess. This most powerful of the free nations must not permit itself to grow weary of the processes of negotiation and adjustment that are fundamental to freedom. If it should turn impatiently to coercion of other free nations, our brand of coercion, so far as our friends are concerned, would be a mark of the imperialist rather than of the leader. "What America is doing abroad in the way of military and economic assistance is as much a part of our own security program as our military efforts at home. We hope to be able to maintain these overseas elements of our security program as long as our enlightened self-interest requires, even though we may, and probably we always will, have various differences of opinion with the nations receiving our aid." On that same day, Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking in general of America's leadership role in the world, said in a speech at West Point: "Relationships between members of coalitions are never simple, particularly in coalitions as large as ours of the free world. The smaller nations expect, and are entitled, to exercise their sovereignty and independence. Our leadership therefore involves self-restraint if our objectives are to be achieved by consent, rather than through the pressure techniques imposed by the Soviet on her satellites." There is one commodity that is not on any list but is more important than all others, and that is the cement that binds the free world together. _CHAPTER VI_ =The Battle Act and Economic Defense= The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, usually known as the Battle Act after Representative Battle of Alabama, established a general framework of policy within which the executive branch takes actions that meet current conditions. This law reinforced the system of international strategic trade controls that was in existence prior to its enactment. It maintains a close link between United States foreign aid and strategic trade controls. It also recognizes the necessity of international cooperation in the control effort, and it aims toward strengthening the free world as well as impeding the military ability of nations threatening our security. =Battle Act Functions= Administering the Battle Act is one of the responsibilities of the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, with the help of a Deputy Director for Mutual Defense Assistance Control (MDAC). The Director's responsibilities under the Act include the following: 1. Determining which commodities should be embargoed in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act. 2. Continually adjusting the embargo lists to current conditions. 3. Advising the President on whether or not United States aid should be continued to a country that has knowingly permitted the shipment of embargo-list items to the Soviet bloc. 4. Making a continuing study of the administration of export control measures undertaken by foreign governments and reporting to Congress at least every 6 months. 5. Making available technical advice and assistance on export control procedures to any nation desiring such cooperation. 6. Coordinating United States Government activities which are concerned with security controls over exports from other countries. =The Money and the Manpower= The budget of Mutual Defense Assistance Control (MDAC) for the present fiscal year is $1,078,000. As of December 31, 1953, the MDAC staff consisted of 29 persons, including clerical employees. In addition, there were 111 persons on other United States Government agency staffs, both in Washington and overseas, who were performing Battle Act functions and were paid out of MDAC funds. These 111 were in the following agencies: Commerce Department 32 State Department 43 Defense Department 13 FOA (other than MDAC) 23 ---- Total 111 This brought the total personnel on the MDAC payroll to 140, as compared with 115 on June 30, 1953. Besides these 140 people, the four agencies listed above had still others, paid from the agencies' own funds, who were working at least part of their time on similar functions (and generally were engaged in such activities even before the Battle Act became law). [Illustration: EDAC STRUCTURE] =Meshing the Gears= The Battle Act is a part of the economic defense program of the Government. The economic defense program involves at least 10 agencies whose activities and interests have to be coordinated. The coordination is accomplished through the Economic Defense Advisory Committee (EDAC). The chairman of EDAC is the FOA Deputy Director for MDAC. The chart opposite this page shows what agencies are members and how the EDAC structure is set up. In addition the United States Information Agency has an observer on EDAC, and economic defense matters are closely coordinated with USIA for overseas information purposes. The chart also shows that EDAC has an Executive Committee; it handles the day-to-day operating and policy problems of the economic defense program. EDAC advises the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and the Secretary of State who are charged with coordinating the implementation of the program of economic defense matters including the control of strategic shipments from the free world to the Soviet bloc. Each agency that has a part in the economic defense program brings its own particular point of view to the discussions which constantly go on in the EDAC structure. For example, the Department of State is the agency that coordinates the overall foreign policy of the Government and deals directly with other countries; hence, that Department is able to speak authoritatively about the vital problems involved in maintaining good relations and close cooperation among the free nations, and concerning the most feasible and effective means of exerting United States influence in the implementation of United States policies. The Department of Defense, being the agency primarily concerned with military defense, brings to the discussions its own expert knowledge of military matters and contributes valuable advice on the military aspects of the problems that come up. The Department of Commerce brings its specialized knowledge of commodities and its experience in the administration of controls over the exportation of goods from the United States. The Foreign Operations Administration, besides administering the Battle Act, brings the point of view of the program of foreign assistance and the economic factors which must be taken into account. The Treasury Department is the authority on foreign-assets control, the Atomic Energy Commission on the significance and control of all atomic-energy materials, and so on through the list. All these viewpoints and all these special areas of expert knowledge and experience are necessary to a well-rounded economic defense program. Each agency, while discharging its obligation to make its own special contribution to policy, is perfectly well aware that it is only one of the participants, and that the other agencies have legitimate points of view and valuable contributions to make. It is natural and inevitable that these agencies should not approach every problem of economic defense with identical views. But when the problem has been thoroughly considered, and all viewpoints taken into account, a decision is made on the basis of the overriding security interest of the country, and that decision then becomes the policy of the Government as a whole, respected by each agency regardless of the specialized views which it might have expressed in the discussions. =Improving the Machinery= Organizational changes made in the United States economic defense program during the 6 months under review included the following: 1. _Establishment of a Security Trade Controls unit within the United States Regional Organization at Paris._ This unit represents the United States in the informal international committee known as the Consultative Group (CG) and its subordinate working bodies, the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) and the China Committee (CHINCOM).[2] It also performs certain Battle Act duties in Europe. These two functions had previously been handled by separate staffs. The head of the new amalgamated office is responsible jointly to the Department of State and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration. 2. _Establishment of a Joint Operating Committee (JOC) in Washington._ This development grew out of the fact that while EDAC is advisory on Battle Act matters and on economic defense in general, another interagency structure known as the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) advises the Secretary of Commerce on controls on exports from the United States. EDAC and ACEP rely on basically similar information and upon the same general body of experts throughout the Government. Accordingly, JOC was created to analyze and recommend the strategic rating of commodities and the levels of control which might be exercised by the United States and advocated by the United States in international discussions. JOC is thus the central point of United States commodity review activities in this field, and there are no overlapping or competing activities of this nature. The chairman of JOC is a Commerce Department representative who is also a regular member of the EDAC Executive Committee. The membership of JOC is made up of the principal agencies which sit on both ACEP and EDAC. The new arrangement has proved itself in practice. [2] See Third Semiannual Battle Act Report, ch. II. =The Termination-of-Aid Provision= The Battle Act forbids United States military, economic, and financial assistance to any country that knowingly permits the shipment to the Soviet bloc of items listed for embargo under the Act, except that if the items are not munitions nor atomic energy materials the President may direct the continuance of aid "when unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States." On August 1, 1953, the President notified the Congress that he had directed the continuance of aid to France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom, because the cessation of aid would have clearly been detrimental to United States security. Even though this presidential action took place in the second half of 1953 it was covered in the last Battle Act report, entitled _World-Wide Enforcement of Strategic Trade Controls_, and the texts of the letters that went to the Congress were reprinted as appendix B of that document, pages 73-77. There were no further Battle Act determinations to continue aid during the 6 months covered by the present report. (Another group of determinations went to the Congress on March 5, 1954, and the texts of those letters will be reprinted in the next Battle Act report.) During 1952 and 1953, the first 2 years in which the Battle Act was in force, the total amount of shipments of Battle Act embargo items knowingly permitted by countries receiving United States aid was in the neighborhood of $15 million. Of this amount, 74 percent consisted of "prior commitments"--that is, commitments made before the Battle Act embargo lists went into effect on January 24, 1952. None of the shipments were arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic energy materials. Only $98 of the total went to Communist China, all the rest to the European bloc. The $15 million may be compared with a total of $2.7 _billion_ of exports of all descriptions from the entire free world to the Soviet bloc during the same 2 years. =Miscellaneous Activities= As usual, a wide range of activities relating to the Battle Act and economic defense was carried on during the last half of 1953. The intensive United States review of the control lists has been mentioned in chapter V. The United States Government continued to increase its emphasis on seeking improvements in the free-world systems for preventing illegal diversions of strategic goods. This problem involves goods of free-world origin which start out to friendly destinations but are illegally diverted en route to destinations behind the Iron Curtain. Our Government: (1) set up improved machinery in Washington for collection and coordination of information, in order to increase the effectiveness of our participation with other countries in the enforcement program, and (2) sought to work out better intergovernmental machinery to deal with diversions. Our Government also intensified its efforts to analyze current trade patterns between East and West, including the large number of trade agreements concluded between free-world nations and Soviet bloc nations. * * * * * =Summary of the Report= This leads us back to the earlier chapters of this report, which may be summarized as follows: In chapter I, Stalin's Lopsided Economy, we looked at the basic economic structure of the Soviet Union. Beginning in the 1920's, the Bolsheviks deliberately concentrated on an industrial-military buildup, at great cost to their peoples. After the war, the same pattern was forced upon the European satellite countries. Trade was reoriented away from the West. That did not mean that the bloc could do without Western goods, but the goal was to obtain those imports that would help the bloc become more powerful and less dependent on the free world. The Kremlin also sought to use trade to divide the Western powers and to increase the reliance of free-world nations on the bloc. These Soviet policies--not Western strategic controls--were the main causes of the low level of East-West trade as compared with prewar. Stalin, shortly before his death, made it clear that he welcomed the establishment of a divided trade world--he saw it as a boon to communism and a blow to the non-Communist nations. In chapter II, The New Regime and the Consumer, we described the new economic courses announced by the Soviet bloc governments after Stalin's death. They made a great fanfare about providing more consumer goods to the people and improving the neglected agricultural sectors. But their steps did not go very far, and the purpose was to benefit the state and not the people. They apparently were trying to ease internal pressures--especially in the satellites--by opening the valves a little, as they had done before. But they did not alter the basic war orientation of their economies and they pressed on with the industrial-military buildup. In chapter III, The Kremlin's Recent Trading Activities, we reviewed the so-called trade offensive--the various Soviet activities of 1953 and the early part of 1954 which seemed to show a livelier interest in East-West trade. The U.S.S.R. concluded more trade agreements, ordered consumer goods at a somewhat brisker rate, but also expanded its efforts to buy ships and showed plainly that its principal interest was still centered on the kind of materials that would foster industrial expansion. To help pay for imports, the Communist planners put manganese, oil and gold on the market in larger quantities than in recent years, though history showed that they had done the same thing in the past when it served their purposes. They also tried to increase their influence in Latin America and Asia. In chapter IV, What's Behind It All, we examined the motives and the goals of the Soviet planners in all these recent trading activities. Oversimplified explanations should be avoided. Their actions are not motivated by a pursuit of peace--at least not peace as the West knows the term. Their motives are mixed. In changing circumstances they are seeking effective ways of accomplishing the same traditional objectives of feeding the economy--especially the heavy industrial base--and of weakening the free world. The free world is strong, and if free nations refuse to be divided or deceived--if they work shoulder to shoulder to prevent the Soviet bloc from getting the advantage--they can trade with the Soviet bloc on terms that bring benefits to the free world. In chapter V, U.S. Policy on Strategic Trade Controls, we outlined the factors involved in setting policy. Not merely because of Soviet activities but also because of the vast upsurge of free-world production and other considerations, 1953 brought a thorough review of United States policy. The basic policy was reaffirmed, but shifts in emphasis were made to meet current conditions and establish controls on a long-haul basis. Policy on the China trade did not change at all during the 6 months under review. Free-world trade with Communist China dropped sharply in that period, partly because of unequal trading terms that the Chinese Communists were trying to impose upon free-world traders. Finally, the United States reaffirmed its traditional policy of treating its friends and allies with respect. In the words of President Eisenhower, "this most powerful of the free nations must not permit itself to grow weary of the processes of negotiation and adjustment that are fundamental to freedom." _APPENDIX A_ =Trade Controls of Free World Countries= This appendix summarizes, in accordance with section 302 (b) of the Battle Act, the trade control measures of most of the important mercantile countries of the free world, as well as of several others for which there is new information to report. These descriptions supplement the main text of this report and similar appendices contained in previous Battle Act reports. The main features of the trade-control systems of most free-world countries were originally established to deal with such problems as foreign-exchange control, conservation of goods in short supply, and directing foreign trade to particular currency areas. For most countries security trade controls have been inlaid in these general economic controls and are exercised through them, using the same basic techniques of export licensing and customs inspection as in export control for other purposes. Thus they are closely connected administratively with them. The details of security trade controls of almost all countries have a security classification. Thus these descriptions must, in a public report, be presented in somewhat general terms. To avoid duplication, this appendix does not include countries which were included in the appendix of previous Battle Act reports and for which there is no substantial new information on security trade controls which can be reported publicly. Summaries of export controls employed by Thailand and Yugoslavia are given on pages 64 and 69, respectively, of the third Battle Act report. The second Battle Act report contains summaries pertaining to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru on pages 64-66, and to Indo-China, The Philippines and Lebanon on pages 66, 68 and 71, respectively. Summaries concerning Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela are contained in pages 62-66 of the first Battle Act report, as well as Austria (p. 66), Iceland (p. 70), Afghanistan (p. 75), Burma (p. 76), China (Formosa) (p. 76), Federation of Malaya (p. 81), Iraq (p. 87), colonial Africa (pp. 91-97). All of the summaries mentioned above are still substantially up to date. Covered in this appendix, in alphabetical order, are the following: _Country_ _Page_ Belgium-Luxembourg 66 Canada 67 Denmark 67 Egypt 68 France 69 Germany (Federal Republic) and Western Berlin 70 Greece 71 Hong Kong 72 Iran 72 Israel 74 Italy 74 Japan 76 The Republic of Korea 77 The Netherlands 77 Norway 78 Pakistan 79 Portugal 79 Singapore 80 Turkey 80 United Kingdom 81 United States of America 83 BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG License Requirements The basic legislation from which the present import-export control system in Belgium has developed was a law of June 30, 1931, modified by the law of July 30, 1934, which authorized in broad general terms the regulation of Belgium's foreign commerce to promote the general economic well-being of the country. The convention with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on the 23d of May 1935, amending the economic union convention of 1922, established also a combined Belgo-Luxembourg Administrative Commission (the Commission Administrative Mixte Belgo-Luxembourgeoise) and in this way provided a central agency for coordinating the import and export licensing procedures of Belgium and Luxembourg. Pursuant to the 1935 convention, when the appropriate agency of either Government desires to modify or expand regulations pertaining to import and export controls, the recommendation is discussed with the appropriate agencies of the other Government; their agreement having been reached the new policies are communicated to the Mixed Commission which then transmits identical instructions to the Belgian Central Office of Licenses and Quotas and the Luxembourg Office of Licenses. This procedure insures close coordination of the import and export licensing operations of the two Governments in order that the general economic welfare of both may best be served. The control over exports effected by the requirement of export licenses is reinforced by special controls applied at the time of the actual export of the licensed merchandise. Submission to these special controls is required as a previous condition to the obtaining of certain licenses, these special additional controls being applied by reason of the special nature of the merchandise to be exported or to assure the direct delivery of the merchandise to its foreign destination. Applicants for export licenses must make a declaration that they are familiar with the conditions upon which licenses are issued and the regulations relative to exchange controls, and that they accept these conditions and regulations without reserve. The applicant also acknowledges that the licenses are not transferable and that any irregularity in his application or utilization of the license subjects him to possible refusals of any new export license applications and may expose him to prosecution for a criminal offense. Exporters of products whose final destination is controlled must sign an undertaking that their exports are not to be reexported. In such cases, the exporter renounces his right to obtain any subsequent export licenses in all cases for which nonreexport declarations are required, if the present undertaking is evaded. At the present time, licenses are not required for goods passing in transit through Belgium, with the exception of arms and implements of war and atomic energy items, as well as petroleum and its subproducts. Financial Controls Prior authorization is required for all buying and selling transactions abroad by Belgian and Luxembourg residents. The exchange control is carried out by the Belgo-Luxembourg Exchange Institute. Shipping Controls Belgium has taken action to prevent the carrying of strategic goods in Belgian ships to Communist Chinese and North Korean destinations. CANADA Permit Requirements The Canadian approach to export control is in two parts: by strategic and short supply commodities, and by areas. Under the commodity control two schedules of goods have been established: (1) goods in short supply for which permits are required for shipment to all destinations; and (2) goods of strategic importance for which permits are required for shipments to all countries other than the United States. The area control sets up a list of countries (roughly all of Europe and the Far East) to which all shipments normally require a permit. A general export permit is in effect which enables the shipment of specified nonstrategic items to all destinations except to Communist countries without individual permit. Export controls are administered by the Export Permit Section of the Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce under authority of The Export and Import Permits Act. Transit Controls An export permit is required for all goods originating outside Canada when tendered for export in the same condition as when imported, without further processing or manufacture in Canada. Goods in transit in bond on a through journey on a billing originating outside of Canada, clearly indicating the ultimate destination of the goods to be a third country, do not require a Canadian export permit. Foreign goods passing through Canada to a third country without a through bill of lading require a Canadian export permit. (If such goods represent United States shipments of controlled goods passing through Canada to third countries they must be covered by a United States export permit.) All Canadian goods having an undeclared ultimate destination require export permits. Effective from July 4, 1952, shipments of United States goods through Canada must be accompanied by a copy of the United States export declaration form. Financial Controls Canada does not exercise financial controls over the movement of any commodity. DENMARK License Requirements Export licenses are required for all commodities, except certain agricultural products, if the goods are exported to or intended for end use in countries which are not members of the European Payments Union or are within the dollar area. For the goods enumerated in the below-mentioned Commodity Lists A and B, export licenses are required, irrespective of the country of destination. List A of the Danish export regulations consists of items of strategic significance. For most of these items the licensing authority is the Board of Supply, but the Ministry of Justice controls exports of arms, munitions, and military equipment, and machinery for the production thereof. For the exportation of ships, the Board of Supply must obtain prior approval from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Navigation. List B consists of nonstrategic goods. Export licenses for these are issued by the Board of Supply, the Board of Health, the Ministry of Public Works or the National Bank of Denmark according to the nature of the commodity concerned. Denmark has instituted import certificate-delivery verification procedures. Exchange Controls The National Bank of Denmark exercises strict controls over all transactions in foreign exchange. Earnings in foreign currencies must be repatriated and sold to the bank unless special exceptions are made. Transit Controls The export controls apply to merchandise exported from the Copenhagen free port, including exports from transit or bonded warehouses and goods from free port or private warehouses. They also apply to goods in transit through Denmark, unless these are transiting on a through bill of lading and there is no change in the ultimate destination. They thus effectively prevent unauthorized diversion of goods in transit through Denmark. All transit transactions financed by Denmark are subject to control by the national bank, regardless of whether the goods in question actually pass through Denmark or are forwarded directly between the countries of origin and destination. In its administration of these provisions the bank observes the same rules as the export control authorities with which the bank cooperates closely in this field. Shipping Controls An arrangement has been made by the Danish Government with Danish shipping companies to prevent the carrying in Danish vessels of strategic goods to Communist China and North Korea. This arrangement is implemented through a licensing system operated under a voluntary agreement with Danish shipowners. EGYPT License Requirements Foreign trade and foreign exchange in Egypt are under official control. These controls were primarily designed to conserve foreign exchange but since the spring of 1951 they have been expanded to prevent the export of short supply items. Except for books, magazines and newspapers, import licenses are required for all imports. Prior to October 6, 1952, licenses were required for goods originating in hard-currency countries, while imports from other sources were in the most part exempt from restrictions. Application for imports are submitted to the Controller General of Imports, Ministry of Finance. Exports are subject to export regulations which are divided into three main categories: (a) goods that may not be exported; (b) goods that can be exported freely, through the Customs, without the need of an export license, and (c) goods that should be covered by a license. The Import and Export Committee is the main authority entrusted with the formulation of decisions governing exports and imports. This Committee is under the Secretaries for Finance, Commerce and Industry, Supplies, Agriculture, War, the Director General of Exchange Control, the Director General of Cotton Affairs of the Ministry of Finance, the Controllers General of Exports and Imports, and the Director General of Customs. Transit Controls There are no special licensing requirements or controls on goods in transit other than the ordinary customs supervision. Financial Controls Foreign exchange is under official control. The basic regulation requires all foreign exchange earnings to be repatriated to Egypt within 6 months after the shipping date of the goods. The law requires that all dollar holdings or payments received by Egyptian nationals or foreigners residing in Egypt be reported to the Egyptian Government and converted into Egyptian currency at the official rate unless they are the proceeds of cotton yarn and cloth or raw cotton exports in which cases 100 percent or 75 percent, respectively, of the dollars may be retained for up to 210 days in an "import entitlement" account usable to buy certain listed essential and semiessential commodities. FRANCE License Requirements Export licenses are required for over one-half the commodities identified in the French tariff nomenclature. Governmental authority of this control is contained in various decrees, the latest dated November 30, 1944. These decrees also permit addition to or removal from the list of controlled commodities merely by publication of a notice in the _Journal Officiel_. The most recent list of these commodities, published as a codification of all previous lists, appeared in _Journal Officiel_ No. 156 of July 5, 1953. Applications for license to export, as submitted by French exporters, are examined by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, by the Office des Changes (where monetary and financial factors are given consideration), and on occasion by appropriate technical committees and personnel in other agencies. At the time the application for export license is submitted, the exporter may be instructed by the Ministry of Industry and Energy to submit a sample, photograph, blueprint, drawing, or other detailed description of the commodity in question. These data are used in determining the advisability of issuing the export license requested. At the port of exit, random samples of actual exports are extracted by customs officials and these are compared by competent technicians with the original data submitted with the license application. This procedure is designed to assure in as many instances as practical that the commodity exported is identical with the commodity for which the export license is issued. In the event fraudulent action on the part of the exporter is found and can be legally established, the exporter is subject to confiscation of the goods in question and fines ranging upward to four times the value of the shipment plus penal servitude. The control system in operation in France makes it possible to block or encourage exports to any destination of commodities requiring export licenses. Financial Controls All transactions in foreign exchange engaged in by French residents, particularly those in which a French resident takes title to foreign merchandise, require the prior authorization of the French Government. An "exchange commitment" (guaranteeing the return to the Government of the exchange proceeds of a transaction) is required for all exports and reexports of merchandise to which a French resident holds title. Where the products concerned are subject to export license, the export license suffices for the exchange commitment. Shipping Controls In order to avoid the transport on French vessels of strategic commodities to Communist China, the French Government has reached agreement with the only French shipping firm operating on the China run that the latter will not transport commodities of any description to Communist China unless these are covered by export license or permit indicating Communist China as the destination and issued by the French Government or a friendly foreign government maintaining the same level of controls as concerns strategic items to China as is maintained in France. The French Government has also instituted controls to deny bunkering facilities to vessels transporting strategic commodities to Communist China. GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC) AND WESTERN BERLIN License Requirements No commodity can be exported from the Federal Republic of Germany or Western Berlin unless it is covered by an export-control document, which is issued by the interior customs authorities. However, certain types of exports require a special export-control document which is granted by the interior customs authorities only after a certificate of approval has been obtained, as appropriate from the Central Export Control Office of the Federal Government or the Central Licensing Agency of the Berlin Senate. A certificate of approval is required for all exports (regardless of commodity) to the Soviet bloc, Hong Kong or Macao, and for the export of all commodities in excess of DM 500 on the "restricted list," published by the Federal Government, to all other countries. This list, which corresponds to the United States "positive list," comprises commodities under control for security and short-supply reasons and includes all items covered by title I and title II of the Battle Act. Exports to numerous western countries, including peripheral countries, are subject to one form or another of end-use checks. The import certificate-delivery verification procedures have been in operation since July 1951. In conjunction with the issuance of either the export-control document or the special export-control document, the interior customs authorities observe a definite procedure for physical inspection of commodities being exported. Additional control over commodities being exported from the Federal Republic is exercised by the border customs authorities. Transit Controls Certain items are prohibited for intransit shipments on grounds of health and sanitation, but the number of items so prohibited is very small and the prohibited list has not been changed since 1939. German customs officials may inspect transit shipments at the border and remove any items prohibited under German law. They then seal the containers of all other goods and such goods are permitted to proceed, in accordance with international agreement on transit traffic, without further inspection or restriction, except to insure at the exit border that the original customs seals remained unbroken. Intransit shipments arriving in the Freeport of Hamburg are subject to a customs documentary and physical check before being allowed to enter the Freeport. When in the Freeport, such shipments are under the control of the Freeport authorities, and may be loaded, unloaded, or reloaded only with their approval. The destination of intransit shipments arriving in the Freeport of Hamburg traveling under a "through bill of lading" can only be changed upon instructions of the original shipper, while the destination of intransit goods traveling under an "ordinary bill of lading" can be determined by the responsible local forwarding agent. Intransit shipments consigned to West German firms and remaining in the Freeport of Hamburg for shipment to a consignee outside Western Germany, require an intransit trade permit (Transit Handelsgenehmigung), except when the goods are returned to country of origin. Such intransit trade permits are issued by the State Central Banks after careful scrutiny of the West German firm and in accordance with the same regulations applying to shipments of West German origin, and approval by the West German Central Export Control Office. West German firms must be listed in the official trade register in order to qualify for an intransit trade permit. The identical procedure is enforced in the Freeports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, with the exception that the functions within the Freeport are carried out by Federal Customs Authorities rather than Freeport Authorities. This procedure also applies to Cuxhaven, Emden, and Kiel, which are Freeports of very minor importance. Financial Control All financial transactions between residents of Western Germany and Western Berlin and residents of other areas are subject to either general or specific exchange-control authorizations issued by the foreign-trade banks. Before those permits are granted, the transactions in question are not only screened with respect to currency problems but also in regard to the strategic nature of the goods. The latter screening is done by export control officials, who have the power to prevent the transaction. GREECE License Requirements Export licenses are required for all strategic commodities, all minerals, and for certain nonstrategic commodities for which export quotas have been established. For nonstrategic shipments, licenses are issued by the Bank of Greece in accordance with directives from the Greek Foreign Trade Administration, Ministry of Commerce. For strategic shipments, including those to the Soviet bloc countries, licenses must be obtained from the FTA. Such FTA licenses are limited to items and quantities contemplated by trade agreements or approved private barter arrangements. Transit Shipments A transit shipment whose final destination is not indicated on the manifest or shipping documents must be licensed by the FTA prior to being reexported. If the destination be indicated, no export license is required. Financial Controls Foreign exchange proceeds must be surrendered to the Bank of Greece. Shipping Controls Effective March 17, 1953, the Greek Government prohibited Greek flag vessels from calling at Communist ports in China and North Korea. This was accomplished by the Greek Council of Ministers Act No. 204 of March 17, which was enacted into law by the Greek Parliament on May 7. Violators are punishable under the provisions of law No. 2317 of 1953, published in Greek Government Gazette No. 61, dated March 17. The Greek foreign investment law provides that foreign vessels transferred to the Greek flag may only be resold to countries named in the "letter of approval". This listing has not included Soviet bloc countries. With only minor exceptions, ships already under the Greek flag may not be resold to other countries. Current bunkering controls require licensing both by the Bank of Greece and the customs authorities. Ship repair controls require licensing by the customs authorities. In neither case is the licensing control based on the nationality of the vessel to be serviced nor, in the latter case, the type of materials used for repair or installed. HONG KONG While there has been no appreciable change in the already extensive security controls maintained by the Hong Kong Government on exports to Communist China and the Soviet bloc, there were changes in the laws and legal processes under which these controls are enforced. The Emergency (Importation and Exportation Ordinance) (amendment) Regulations, 1953, were promulgated July 10, 1953, in order to prevent evasions of export and import controls. Eighteen modifications were made by these Emergency Regulations. Among them were: 1. It was made an offence to transfer an export permit with intent to deceive or to allow any other person to use a permit with intent to deceive. 2. As court decisions in smuggling cases had thrown doubt on the legality of searches and seizures carried out by the Royal Navy in enforcing export regulations, an amendment in these Regulations specifically authorizes "any commissioned officer of H. M. Armed Forces" to carry out such duties. 3. "Any vessel not exceeding 250 gross tons and any vehicle which is made use of in the importation and exportation or attempted importation or exportation of any article contrary to the provisions of this Ordinance or any regulation made thereunder shall be liable to forfeiture whether or not any person is convicted of any offence." This article was added to discourage truck owners and particularly, junk masters, from agreeing to the use of their property for carriage of smuggled goods, even though the main purpose of their trip is quite legal. Thus, whether a conviction is obtained or not, the truck or junk is liable to forfeiture. Several other changes have also been made which were designed to protect the rights of persons tried under the basic Ordinance by bringing the Ordinance into line with usual British judicial practice. During the past 6 months Hong Kong has added a number of items to its prohibited export list and struck off a number. All of these actions were taken in conformity with the decisions of the United Kingdom Board of Trade. There were no changes in the transit controls or shipping controls in Hong Kong in the last 6 months of 1953. In the field of financial controls, since October 1953, approved gold and bullion dealers have been permitted to import nonresident-owned gold solely for reexport. While in Hong Kong such gold must be in the custody of an authorized bank. Such reexport is allowed only to nonsterling area countries and on production of a valid import license from the country of destination. IRAN The right to conduct foreign trade is vested in the Iranian Government by the foreign trade monopoly law of 1931. From time to time the Government grants by decree the right to conduct trade with respect to certain commodities to private individuals and firms. License Requirements Exports are controlled primarily through the exercise of financial controls. In general, laws and regulations governing export trade are designed so that commodities that are in short supply, or which would otherwise have to be replaced by imports, may not be exported. Thus there is a standing prohibition against the export of gold and silver in bars, sheets, or coins; cattle, sheep, raw hides, charcoal, matches, butter, sugar, and tea. Also prohibited are exports of arms and ammunition, precious stones other than turquoise and pearls, and archeological articles. Only on rare occasions has the Government authorized the export of any or these commodities. Decrees currently in effect permit the export of all other commodities without licensing procedure except those under Government monopoly, such as opium, oil and tobacco, and except wheat, flour, barley, legumes, rice, lumber and cotton. Depending on the availability of these last-named commodities, export quotas are established for them each year, and export licenses are issued by the Ministry of National Economy to private individuals or firms to the extent of the quotas established for each commodity. The issuance of export licenses for lumber and cotton is subject to the approval of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Iran Cotton Co. (an agency of the Plan Organization), respectively. The export of opium and tobacco, which are under Government monopoly, is subject to license of the Ministry of Finance. Some Iranian exports are effected under barter or clearing agreements which Iran has concluded with a number of countries since 1940, including the U.S.S.R., the Federal German Republic, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Since quota lists under these agreements specify the commodities involved, exports made thereunder are in effect licensed by the agreements themselves. Regulations promulgated on March 18, 1953, under the Law on the Encouragement of Exports and the Issuance of Licenses to Engage in Foreign Trade of December 22, 1952, require Iranian exporters to submit a preexport declaration, in which they inform the Ministry of National Economy of their intention to export stated commodities to stated destinations. One copy of this declaration is certified by the Ministry and must be returned to the exporter within 48 hours. A second copy goes to the Customs Administration for use in inspecting the goods when they actually leave the country. Transit Controls Goods having in transit through Iran may enter and leave the country only at places where customs houses have been established for that purpose. Detailed documentation is required by Iranian customs authorities for goods in transit. In practice, there are very few intransit shipments through Iran. The reexport of specified goods of foreign origin is permitted under a decree of November 11, 1953, which lists five categories of goods eligible for reexport. Reexport of such goods, however, requires the prior approval of a commission established in the Ministry of National Economy, with representatives from a number of other Government departments. Prior to this decree, reexport, of imported goods was permissible only by decree of the Council of Ministers, which rarely considered reexport cases. The new procedure represents a more workable machinery for the licensing of reexports. It should at the same time provide adequate safeguards against the reexport of strategic items. Financial Controls Exporters of Iranian goods must sign an undertaking that the exchange derived from the export will be sold to a bank authorized by the Government to deal in foreign exchange. ISRAEL License Requirements All goods to be exported from Israel (including reexports), with certain minor exceptions such as gift parcels and commercial samples under I£10,000 in value and personal effects of tourists and immigrants, require an export license. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is responsible for the control of most products. Outstanding exceptions, with the Government department or agency responsible, are as follows: Military items--Ministry of Defense. Fuel--Ministry of Finance. Citrus--Citrus Marketing Board. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry may ask for recommendations from other ministries before licensing certain products, for example foods and pharmaceuticals. Israel voted to support the United Nations Resolution of May 18, 1951, placing an embargo on shipments of arms and related material to China and North Korea. Transit Controls The value of intransit trade is small, inasmuch as Israel is bounded on three sides by Arab states with which no legal trade is conducted, but commodities may be entered in bond without becoming subject to export licensing controls. Before reshipment may take place, however, a permit must be obtained from the Office of the Collector of Customs. Financial Controls The Israel Government exercises far-reaching control over the use of foreign exchange, and it regularly uses this control to restrict the movement of commodities in international trade. Israeli importers are required to submit comprehensive justifications as to Israel's need for a commodity before they are granted an allocation of foreign exchange. Once the licenses have been granted, it has been to the interest of the Government of Israel to make certain that the commodities are in fact imported and used in the Israeli economy. This identity of interest is a strong safeguard that materials consigned to Israel are not reexported. ITALY License Requirements All commodities listed in the new export tables dated March 16, 1953, as amended, require an export license to all destinations except Somaliland, which is issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Goods not listed in the export tables are exempt from license, but must be exported in conformity with exchange regulations, which vary according to the country of destination and clearing or other financial agreements. All items require an export license for shipment to the Soviet bloc, including China. Exports to the Soviet bloc also require bank validations, as virtually all trade with the bloc is conducted under bilateral agreements which specify the commodities that may be traded and the methods by which payment is to be made. Normally, shipments to the East comprise only those commodities specified in a trade agreement with an eastern country. In order to facilitate checking of east-bound shipments, trade with the Soviet bloc is funneled through selected frontier customs points. The formulation of export-control policy and the administration of the export licensing system are the primary responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This Ministry is advised by a special interministerial committee. Italy is employing import-certificate delivery-verification procedures and carries out end-use checks for shipments to destinations outside the Soviet bloc, particularly for questionable transactions involving goods of a strategic nature. The country of origin is notified if an attempt is made to divert a shipment. Financial Controls Financial control over all export transactions is maintained through the licensing system and through implementation of existing exchange-control regulations. Strict bilateral trade agreements with almost all members of the Soviet bloc have constituted, in effect, a financial ceiling on exports to Eastern Europe. Italian exports to Communist China, with whom there is no trade agreement, must be paid for in hard currency or must be exchanged for goods acceptable to the Italian Government, an arrangement that has severely restricted Italo-Chinese trade. Italian exchange control regulations would not normally permit payment for imports from the Soviet bloc in hard currencies, although sterling is occasionally used in payment for the few items not included in the trade agreements. In certain instances ship charters are completed for sterling when circumstances warrant or it is considered convenient. Transit Controls Direct and indirect transit shipments are subject to customs check, which includes a screening of documents, physical inspection of goods in case of doubt and control of the routing of shipments to prevent the use of unnatural and unusual methods of transportation. In the case of indirect transit shipments, a check is also made on the regularity of the transaction from the foreign-currency standpoint. In doubtful or suspect cases, customs, while not empowered to stop transit shipments, is able to delay the transaction until the Ministry of Finance, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies, obtains detailed information concerning the final destination. When an investigation discloses that a transaction is not in order, the central administration orders confiscation of the goods and prefers charges against those responsible, if they are Italian nationals. New regulations published in April 1953, imposed a more strict financial control over indirect transit operations. Prior to this time, certain firms and individuals who were officially authorized to hold foreign currency accounts, were permitted to carry on transit operations without making an application for foreign exchange in each case. The new regulations withdrew this privilege, making it necessary for all transit operators to submit an application to the General Directorate for Currencies of the Ministry of Foreign Trade before purchasing abroad any item listed in part A of the export tables (which include strategic items). A later amendment to this regulation permits a certain flexibility by allowing the transit operator to purchase goods abroad and have them shipped to Italy before making application to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. An operator making use of this provision must submit to the bank which holds his currency account a written commitment that the goods will be sent directly to Italy and not diverted and must obtain the clearance of the General Directorate for Currencies before the goods can be onforwarded through Italy to another country. Shipping Controls The Ministry of Merchant Marine has drafted a bill which, when enacted into law, will give the Italian Government the power to exercise control over shipping traffic with countries of the Soviet bloc. The bill contemplates quite severe penalties to be imposed upon owners and masters of ships failing to comply with regulations established by the Ministry of Merchant Marine. Consideration of this bill by Parliament has been delayed for nearly 1 year, however, and there seems to be no immediate prospect that it will be enacted into law. Penalties Penalties that may be imposed under Italian law for violations of export-control regulations include (1) imprisonment up to 2 months, (2) fines up to 40,000 lire, and (3) confiscation of the merchandise involved. Persons and firms under investigation for illegal export transactions are denied foreign trading privileges. However, an amnesty law recently passed by the Italian Parliament has resulted in the dropping of all charges outstanding against violators of the export control regulations. Irregularities under the customs law may be punished by fines from 2,000 to 20,000 lire, while other infractions may incur the penalties contemplated by the penal code. JAPAN License Requirements Licenses from the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry are required for exports of any commodity on the Japanese export control list. No exports to North Korea have been permitted since the outbreak of the Korean War. Exports to Communist China are limited to nonstrategic items. Exports of strategic items to any other communist bloc country are strictly controlled. Strategic items embargoed by Hong Kong to Communist China are licensed for export to Hong Kong by Japan only if an essential supply certificate has been issued by the Hong Kong Government, and on exports of lesser strategic items the Japanese licensing authorities require end-use checks or reliable evidence that reexport to Communist China is unlikely. End-use checks are made also on suspicious exports of strategic items to other destinations and the import certificate-delivery verification procedure has been utilized since April 1, 1953. Transit Controls Intransit cargo is offloaded under customs supervision and is normally kept in a bonded warehouse or other area under the complete control of customs officials. All offloaded intransit cargo is subject to the same export regulations as indigenous exports. Financial Controls For balance-of-payments reasons, Japan closely controls its receipts and expenditures of foreign exchange. These controls are not related to security measures except indirectly in connection with trade with Communist China and the Soviet Union. Trade with these areas is largely confined to barter transactions which must be settled on the basis of back-to-back or escrow letters of credit approved by foreign exchange banks. Shipping and Bunkering Controls Since June 1951 it has been required that bills of lading issued by carriers for strategic items licensed for export must contain a "Notice to carrier" stating that delivery of the goods to countries other than the destination designated in the export license is prohibited without the express permission of the licensing authority. Japanese shipowners have been notified that Japanese vessels are not authorized to carry strategic goods to Communist China from Japan or from any other country unless shipment has been licensed by a COCOM country. Administrative measures also have been adopted to prevent foreigners from chartering or using Japanese vessels to carry contraband goods to Communist China or North Korea. The Ministry of Transportation has announced that applications for approval of a bare boat or time charter of a Japanese vessel to a foreigner must show that the charterer has guaranteed that during the period of the charter the vessel will not enter any port in Communist China or North Korea with strategic goods on board the vessel unless the shipment has been licensed by a COCOM country. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry furthermore has instructed Japanese oil companies not to furnish fuel bunkers to any vessels carrying strategic goods to Communist China or North Korea unless the shipment has been licensed by a COCOM country. REPUBLIC OF KOREA License Requirements Foreign trade in the Republic of Korea is governed by regulations issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Licenses are required for all exports to all destinations and are issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry only to registered foreign traders, or to manufacturers for their own products. A certificate of final destination (or pledge to submit such a certificate) must accompany all exports license applications. Registration as a foreign trader is canceled when a trader does business with individuals or juridical persons under a Communist government. Delivery of arms, ammunition and other goods for military use to enemy countries is a criminal offense. Financial Controls Foreign exchange proceeds from exports are subject to the control of the Bank of Korea. Shipping Controls Vessels engaged in foreign trade are required to submit their manifests upon entry into an open port and are prohibited from proceeding to a foreign country except by way of an open port. Transshipment from one vessel engaged in foreign trade to another is prohibited unless authorized by the Collector of Customs. Vessels engaged in domestic trade cannot load export goods unless the goods are shipped in bond. THE NETHERLANDS License Requirements All exports from the Netherlands are subject to export licenses. Export licenses for industrial commodities are issued by the Central Bureau of Imports and Exports (CDIU) at The Hague, which has delegated this authority to a number of so-called trade-control boards. For agricultural products, licenses are granted by the Ministry for Agriculture, which for a large number of commodities has delegated this function to the "agricultural-monopoly holders." The latter are state-supervised and semiofficial organizations, similar to the trade-control boards. In certain instances, the exporter may make out his own export license which must be dated and initialed by an officer of the CDIU. Transit Controls Goods passing in transit through the Netherlands, including strategic commodities, are not subject to any controls except for a customs check to insure that goods in transit leave in the same form in which they have entered. The Netherlands has adopted import certificate-delivery verification procedures. Financial Controls All transactions of a Netherlands resident involving payment of moneys to or from a party abroad are subject to a foreign-exchange license, issued by the Netherlands Bank. The export license generally includes the authorization of the banks for the proposed transaction. Shipping Controls The Netherlands instituted voyage controls in May 1953, aimed at preventing the carriage of strategic commodities by Netherlands ships to Communist China and North Korea except pursuant to special permission. NORWAY License Requirements All commodities to be exported to any destination require export licenses. The licensing authorities using existing powers can prevent the export of any item for security reasons. Transit Controls Goods which are to pass through the territory of Norway may be reexported without license only if it is clearly stated by their conveying documents that the goods are going straight to foreign destination. If the reexport does not take place within 90 days, a Norwegian export license must be secured. The destination listed on the original documents must remain the same, and the goods may not be transformed in any way during their stay in the country. The customs authority applies a control to that effect. There are no free-port areas in Norway. Norway has adopted import certificate-delivery verification procedures. Financial Controls Strict exchange controls are maintained by the Government through the Bank of Norway. The granting of an export license carries with it the obligation on the part of the exporter to relinquish the foreign exchange to the Bank of Norway as soon as received from the foreign buyer; a maximum of 60 days is allowed between export and remittance, although under certain circumstances the Government may grant the exporter an extension of time. Transfers of capital from Norway require the prior approval of the Bank of Norway. Shipping Controls The Norwegian Foreign Office announced publicly in April 1953 that the Norwegian war risk insurance group had refused to insure Norwegian vessels delivering strategic articles to Communist Chinese and North Korean ports. The foreign office also announced that Norwegian ships had not violated the United Nations resolution prohibiting the shipment of strategic material to Communist China and North Korea. Several allegations that they had done so had been investigated and found to be unjustified. PAKISTAN License Requirements Pakistan's export controls are exercised under the authority of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 (Act No. XXXIX) as amended by the Imports and Exports (Control) Amendment Act, 1953 (Act No. IX of 1953), which extends the life of the 1950 act for 3 years, until April 18, 1956. The act empowers the Central Government to prohibit, restrict, or otherwise control the import or export of goods of any specified description, or regulate generally all practices and procedures connected with the import or export of such goods. Under an export trade control notification of 1948, which is still in effect, numerous categories embracing strategic or short-supply materials have been established for which no licenses are granted. Pakistan prohibits the reexport in their original form of all imported materials regardless of origin except in specific cases, each of which is examined on its own merits. With respect to goods of domestic origin, Pakistan encourages exports to all countries of such goods as are surplus to her own requirements and encourages shipments to the dollar area by placing selected items on an open general license specifically applicable to the dollar area. Transit Controls Pakistan has issued special transit regulations to govern trade passing through that country to Afghanistan. Strict control is maintained, moreover, at the ports to insure against unauthorized transit shipments. Financial Controls Pakistan has promulgated exchange control regulations which insure the surrender to the State Bank of Pakistan or its authorized agents of all foreign exchange derived from export transactions. Shipping Controls The Control of Shipping Act, 1947 (Act XXIV), approved by the Central Government as amended by Ordinance V of June 22, 1951, provides for the control of shipping. Under this act a shipping authority appointed by the Central Government licenses vessels of both Pakistan and foreign registry which participate in coastal traffic. This act was recently extended through March 31, 1959. PORTUGAL License Requirements All exports are subject to licensing under regulations issued in 1948 except that export licenses are not generally required for shipments to Portuguese overseas provinces. Portugal's export trade with the Soviet bloc is not important and consists almost entirely of cork, which is not on any strategic or restricted list. The Portuguese colonies exert varying degrees of export control. On January 23, 1952, the Government of Macao adopted a trade-control system which requires a license for the import and the export of strategic materials. Strategic materials are shipped from Portugal to Macao only against import certificates issued by that province. Transit Controls Portuguese controls over goods in transit are not wholly effective in that no export license is required if goods in transshipment are reexported within 60 days after being placed in bond. Financial control is exercised over all exports as a part of the license control system. SINGAPORE Licensing Requirements Colonial legislative authority for control of imports and exports is exercised under the Control of Imports and Exports Ordinance of 1950, which places the issuance of all licensing, both general and special, under the absolute discretion of the Controller of Imports and Exports. Under this general authority, all exports are carefully controlled. Strategic commodities, in particular, are controlled in accordance with UK-adopted strategic trade controls with respect to exports to all Soviet bloc destinations. In addition, a special list of goods is embargoed to Communist China and North Korea, and subject to Essential Supply Certification if such goods are to be exported from Singapore to Hong Kong. Amendments to the latter embargo list adopted by the United Kingdom are promptly reflected in Singapore. Many commodities are subject to special licensing controls under exchange restrictions or emergency regulations. The only exemptions to licensing are goods transitting the colony on a through bill of lading, and those shipments customarily exempted in international trade, such as parcel post shipments under $50, etc. Transit Controls Goods which transit the port of Singapore without offloading are subject to no control. Goods which are landed in the colony for the purpose of transshipment on a through bill of lading to another destination are also subject to no local license or declaration, as long as such goods remain in the custody of the harbor board or of the agent of the ship from which landed. Transshipment goods not on through bills are treated as reexports, and are subject to full export control. Shipping Controls The United Kingdom Control of Trade by Sea Order (China and North Korea) 1953, went into effect in Singapore on March 31, 1953. Since that time, measures taken to implement the order effectively have included placing all bunkering of ships, either coal or oil, of over 500 gross registered tons, on a local licensing basis. This places bunkering under the control of the Controller of Exports and Imports. Voyage licensing of vessel is under the control of the Master Attendant. TURKEY Export Controls Under the new foreign trade regime, Turkish exports are grouped in two lists. List I contains all Turkish export commodities, the export of which is unrestricted unless they also appear on list II. A simple customs exit declaration based on the exporter's application is all which is necessary to realize list I exports. List II designates commodities requiring export licenses. The export license can be obtained from the Ministry of Economy and Commerce or agencies so designated by the said Ministry. List II items may also be exported by certain Government or semigovernmental agencies only. The list II commodities subject to such licensing procedure are as follows: cereals (barley, wheat, rye, corn, oats, and rice) and cereal products (semolina, macaroni, starch, noodles, flour); animal products (butter); dried fruits and nuts (pistachios shelled or unshelled, seedless dried raisins); minerals and mineral products (asbestos, copper, copper waste and scrap, copper plates, bars and wires); copper alloys and copper alloy products; barite; steel and iron waste and scrap; zinc ore; zinc mixed with lead; iron ore and pyrites; pig iron; iron products and waste and scrap; ferro-manganese; graphite; calco-pyrite; chrome ore; lead ore; sulphur ore; stone coal; mineral waste; coke and coke dust; manganese ore; molybdenum; tin waste; raw materials for textiles (cotton linters, greasy wool); vegetable oils (olive oil, margarines); tobacco and opium (tobacco processed and leaf, opium); creosote and xylol; sodium fluoro-silicate; toluol; mineral oils mixed with phenol and naphtha; straw; pistols and ammunition. Transit Controls There is no large amount of intransit trade in Turkey. All intransit goods arriving in Turkey, however, must carry on all shipping documents (including bill of lading and ship manifest) and outer containers the name of the Turkish port, the phrase "in transit to" and the name of the city and country of destination. Generally, goods moving intransit through Turkey may be imported only through customs warehouses. Extensive documentation, including a reexport license, is required for clearance by the Turkish Customs Administration. Financial Controls Export-control measures are designed for two purposes: (1) to keep a check on outgoing strategic or short-supply materials, and (2) they are instituted also for foreign-exchange reasons. For price-checking purposes in order that foreign-exchange losses can be prevented, exporters must register with agencies designated by the Ministry of Finance. Customs authorities do not permit exportation without a certificate of registration and destination. All foreign currency receipts are turned over to the Central Bank of Turkey. UNITED KINGDOM License Requirements The export control system in the United Kingdom is similar to but not identical with that of the United States. It is administered by the Board of Trade. Although the present system grew out of measures originally promulgated at the start of World War II, its primary purpose now is the safeguarding of the country's requirements of strategic and short-supply goods, and the restriction of the flow of such items to undesirable destinations. The United Kingdom security trade control program was instituted in 1947. The United Kingdom export control mechanism operates in the following manner: The consolidated order, which encompasses all the items subject to control, is a published document and revisions are issued in the form of statutory orders which are also published in the Board of Trade Journal (an official weekly). The list is arranged into three schedules. The first schedule lists goods which, in general, cannot be exported to any destination without a license. The second schedule lists additional goods (mostly foodstuffs) which, in general, can be exported to any destination without a license. The two schedules are, however, subject to two qualifications. Firstly, a limited number of goods included in the first schedule can be exported without license to destinations within the British Commonwealth (except Hong Kong), Ireland, and the United States. Such goods are listed in the third schedule. Secondly, no goods, even those included on the second schedule, can be exported without license to China, Hong Kong, Macao, or Tibet. The extent of the restriction on individual items is reflected in the administration of the control. Strict control is maintained over items which are prohibited exportation to certain areas, as, for instance, aircraft, firearms, ammunition, atomic materials. The exportation of a wide range of goods of strategic importance, including rubber, to Communist China is prohibited, as is the exportation to the Soviet bloc in Europe of a somewhat narrower range of commodities. The export to the Soviet bloc of many other items is subject to limitations as to quantities permitted to be shipped. In addition, there is the great bulk of items on which control is achieved through case-by-case scrutiny of individual license applications. Transit Controls The United Kingdom has had in effect since November 1951 a system whereby about 250 items of strategic importance arriving from other countries are subject to transshipment control. Individual licenses are required for all of the items on the licensing list before any of the goods, after being landed in the United Kingdom, can be transshipped to any destination other than the British Commonwealth (except Hong Kong), Ireland, and the United States. In administering the control, the British authorities normally grant licenses when they are satisfied that the goods will not be diverted to the Soviet bloc, China, etc., contrary to the wishes of the exporting country. The United Kingdom has effectively implemented import certificate-delivery verification procedures. Shipping Controls In order to restrict further the flow of strategic goods to China and as an additional measure of control, a statutory order (titled the Control of Trade by Sea (China and North Korea) Order, 1953) was made on March 13, 1953, pursuant to which the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation is empowered to control all shipping to China and North Korea. In essence, the order applies to all British ships having a gross tonnage of 500 tons, limits the type of trade in which the ships may engage and the voyages which may be undertaken, affects the class of cargo or passengers which may be carried, and imposes certain conditions on the hiring of ships. Approximately a hundred items are listed in a schedule which is an integral part of the license issued under the order in question. These items are banned from carriage to China in British flag vessels. While formal shipping controls were not adopted until March 17, 1953, British shipping circles were kept under fairly close scrutiny by the Government ever since the adoption on May 18, 1951, by the Additional Measures Committee of the United Nations of the resolution to apply economic sanctions against China as a result of her aggressive intervention in Korea. Complementary controls over the bunkering of vessels carrying strategic cargo (as defined in the Shipping Control Order) to China were adopted at the same time that the order affecting shipping became operative. These controls are administered by the Ministry of Fuel and Power on an informal basis, in cooperation with British oil companies which deny bunkers to ships carrying strategic cargo to China. UNITED STATES Export Controls in General The Department of Commerce is responsible for controls over nearly all commercial exportations from the United States under the Export Control Act of 1949, as extended. The Department of State is responsible for control over the exportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war; the Atomic Energy Commission administers controls over the export of major atomic energy items; and the Department of Treasury administers controls over the exportation of gold and narcotics. All such items required export licenses, and shipments to the Soviet bloc are not permitted. Administration of Export Controls by Commerce Department All commodities exported to any destination, except Canada, from the United States, its territories and possessions are subject to export control. There are three main techniques utilized in the administration of such controls: 1. Shipments of commodities contained in the Positive List[3] are under control to virtually all destinations; 2. For some commodities, a general license is authorized permitting exportation to virtually all friendly destinations without requiring that an export license be issued; 3. All commodities, whether or not on the Positive List and irrespective of any general license provisions, are under licensing control to subgroup A destinations (i.e., Soviet Bloc, including Communist China and North Korea), Hong Kong and Macao. The Comprehensive Export Schedule published by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce (BFC) of the Department of Commerce must be consulted in order to determine whether a validated license is required for the exportation of a given commodity to a specific destination as well as to determine other export control regulations of the Commerce Department. The Comprehensive Export Schedule is supplemented 2 or 3 times a month by BFC's Current Export Bulletin. The Secretary of Commerce's Quarterly Report to the President and the Congress reports major policy changes and activities of the Department of Commerce in carrying out its export control activities. The two main policies as indicated in the Export Control Act which is administered by the Department of Commerce are export controls for security and for short supply reasons. The objective of security controls as embodied in the Export Control Act of 1949, as extended, is to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance to the national security. The controls were designed to deny or restrict the exportation of strategic commodities to the Soviet bloc in order to impede the buildup and maintenance of the Soviet war potential. Shipments of all commodities to Communist China and North Korea are embargoed while shipments to the European Soviet bloc, Hong Kong, and Macao are either denied or restricted. In addition, all proposed shipments of strategic commodities to all destinations, except Canada, are carefully scrutinized to assure that the goods will not be transshipped or diverted to unfriendly hands. The Commerce Department has developed procedures to prevent the frustration of our own export controls which would result from shipping a strategic item to a country which (1) ships identical or closely similar items to the Soviet bloc, or (2) would use the American item directly in the manufacture of strategic items for the Soviet bloc. In order to prevent the transshipment abroad of United States commodities, the Department of Commerce also has regulations covering the unauthorized movement of United States commodities after they leave United States shores. These regulations generally referred to as the "destination control" provisions are designed to prohibit the reexportation from the country of ultimate destination except upon written authorization from BFC. These regulations also restrict ships, planes or other carriers from delivering United States origin goods to other than the destination specified on the export control documents. In addition, the United States participates in the international IC/DV (import certificate--delivery verification) system described elsewhere in this report. In addition to United States export controls for security reasons, it is necessary to administer export controls for short supply reasons in order to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the inflationary impact of abnormal demand. Such controls are usually exercised by means of export programs or quotas fixed by the Secretary of Commerce. The easing of supply programs in recent months has led to the prompt lifting of nearly all domestic controls over materials: such actions have generally been followed by the relaxation of related export controls for short supply reasons. Thus, export controls for short supply reasons do not play as important a part as before in comparison with security controls. [3] The Positive List of Commodities is a current list contained in the Comprehensive Export Schedule showing the commodities which require a validated license from the Bureau of Foreign Commerce of the Department of Commerce. Transit Controls A validated export license is required for the exportation from any seaport, land frontier, airport, or foreign trade zone in the United States of certain strategic goods in transit through the United States which originate in or are destined for a foreign country. The commodities so controlled are the ones which are identified on the United States Department of Commerce Positive List by an asterisk. Shipping Controls Department of Commerce Transportation Order T-1 denies any United States-registered vessel or aircraft authority to carry items listed on the Positive List, or arms, ammunition and implements of war or fissionable material, to any Soviet bloc destination, Hong Kong or Macao without a validated license issued by BFC or other appropriate licensing agencies or the express permission of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation. This order includes shipments from foreign ports as well as from the United States. Department of Commerce Transportation Order T-2 has the effect of preventing the transportation of any commodities directly or indirectly to Communist China, North Korea, or areas under their control, by United States-registered vessels or aircraft. It also prohibits American ships and aircraft from calling at any port or place in Communist China. A validated license is required for delivery in United States ports of specified types of petroleum and petroleum products to foreign vessels, if the foreign carrier has called at any point under Far Eastern Communist control, or at Macao, since January 1, 1953, or will carry commodities of any origin from the United States destined directly or indirectly for any such point within a period of 120 days in the case of a vessel, or 30 days in the case of any aircraft. This regulation also requires that if a carrier is registered in or under charter to a Soviet-bloc country or is under charter to a national of a Soviet-bloc country it will be necessary to apply to BFC for a validated license. American petroleum companies at certain foreign ports are prohibited without a Treasury Department authorization from bunkering any vessel bound for a Communist Far East port or Macao or which is carrying goods destined for Communist China or North Korea. Similar restrictions apply to the bunkering by these companies of vessels returning from Communist Far East ports or Macao. Financial and Transaction Controls The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, administered by the Treasury Department, block the assets here of Communist China, North Korea and their nationals and prohibit unlicensed dealings involving property in which Communist China, or North Korea, or their nationals, have any interest. The regulations prevent the use of United States financial facilities by those countries and their nationals. These regulations also prohibit the unlicensed importation of goods of Chinese Communist or North Korean origin. Treasury regulations also prohibit Americans, including foreign subsidiaries of United States firms, from participating in the purchase or sale of certain important commodities for ultimate shipment from any country outside the United States to the countries of the Soviet bloc. These transactions controls, which are complementary to the United States export control laws, are administered by the Treasury Department under Foreign Assets Control Regulations. _APPENDIX B_ =Statistical Tables= Table 1. Free-world trade with Soviet Bloc, 1948 through 1953. Table 2. Exports of principal free-world countries to Soviet Bloc, 1951, 1952, and 1953. Table 3. Imports of principal free world countries from the Soviet Bloc, 1951, 1952, and 1953. Table 4. Free-world exports to the Soviet Bloc, monthly, 1952 and 1953. Table 5. Free-world imports from the Soviet Bloc, monthly, 1952 and 1953. Table 6. Free-world exports to Communist China, semiannual 1952 and 1953. Table 7. Free-world imports from Communist China, semiannual 1952 and 1953. Table 8. United States trade with the Soviet-Bloc countries, 1937, 1948, 1952 and 1953. TABLE 1.--_Free-world trade with Soviet bloc, 1948 through 1953_ [In millions of United States dollars] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 | | | | | | |(est.) | -------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+--------| Free-World exports to: | | | | | | | Entire bloc | 1,969| 1,680| 1,545| 1,685| 1,422| 1,350| |------+------+------+------+------+--------| U.S.S.R. | 533| 437| 301| 386| 481| 410| European satellites| 902| 919| 792| 853| 672| 660| China | 534| 324| 452| 446| 268| 280| |======+======+======+======+======+========| Free-World imports from: | | | | | | | Entire bloc | 2,005| 1,788| 1,727| 1,879| 1,608|[4]1,580| |------+------+------+------+------+--------| U.S.S.R. | 492| 272| 252| 397| 462| 380| European satellites| 1,026| 1,090| 940| 960| 780| 766| China | 487| 426| 535| 522| 366| 425| -------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+--------- [4] Includes $9 million imported by United States from Outer Mongolia. NOTE.--Figures unadjusted for price changes. China data since 1949 refer, so far as possible, to Mainland (Communist) China including Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Source: Official statistics of Free-World Countries, compiled by U. S. Department of Commerce. TABLE 2.--_Exports of principal free-world countries to Soviet bloc, 1951, 1952, and 1953_ [In millions of U. S. dollars] --------------+------------------------------------+----------------------- | Exports to world | Exports to Soviet bloc Country +--------+--------+---------------+-----+------+------------ | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 | 1951| 1952 | 1953 | | | as indicated | | | as indicated ---------+--------+--------+---------------+-----+------+------------ Anglo- | | | | | | Egyp. | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Sudan | 183.5| 122.6| Dec. 127.5| 0.8| 0.7 | Dec. 0.1 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Argentina| 1,152.3| 702.3| Aug. 790.4| 34.5| 12.2 | Aug. 11.3 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Australia| 2,047.0| 1,716.2| Dec. 1,977.2| 55.5| 8.9 | Dec. 61.5 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Austria | 453.8| 505.5| Dec. 532.9| 60.5| 64.4 | Dec. 58.4 Belgium- | | | | | | Luxem- | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- bourg | 2,651.4| 2,451.0| Dec. 2,259.3| 64.4| 60.1 | Dec. 66.1 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Brazil | 1,757.4| 1,408.8| Nov. 1,363.7| 7.9| 6.5 | Nov. 10.7 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Canada | 3,608.0| 4,396.4| Dec. 4,184.8| .9| .6 | Dec. .5 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Ceylon | 399.9| 315.5| Dec. 329.3| 8.5| 28.9 | Dec. 51.5 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Chile | 376.8| 461.8| Aug. 229.2| [5] | [5] | Aug. (--) | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Denmark | 838.8| 849.1| Dec. 893.9| 40.0| 33.9 | Dec. 44.3 [6] | | | | | | | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Finland | 866.5| 717.3| Dec. 572.0|148.4|183.5 | Dec. 179.3 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- France | 4,240.6| 4,046.9| Dec. 4,019.4| 40.5| 42.1 | Dec. 63.3 French | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Morocco | 251.9| 273.8| Dec. 268.1| 3.1| 1.5 | Dec. 1.9 Germany, | | | | | | Fed. | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Repub. | 3,508.3| 4,072.4| Dec. 4,477.9|103.1| 88.2 | Dec. 139.4 Gold | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Coast | 255.5| 241.6| Sept. 192.4| 9.6| 12.0 | Sept. 8.1 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Greece | 101.8| 119.9| Dec. 132.0| .4| .4 | Dec. 8.3 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Hong Kong| 775.8| 509.8| Dec. 478.4|280.7| 91.0 | Dec. 94.6 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Iceland | 44.6| 39.3| Dec. 43.4| 3.5| 2.8 | Dec. 8.6 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- India | 1,645.8| 1,299.3| Nov. 1,001.5| 30.9| 12.7 | Nov. 9.2 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Indonesia| 1,230.7| 911.1| Dec. 819.5| 2.3| 9.8 | Dec. 4.5 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Iran | 590.6| 152.4| Dec. 125.7| 22.6| 25.6 | Dec. 16.6 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Ireland | 228.0| 284.1| Dec. 319.2| .1| [5] | Dec. .4 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Israel | 44.8| 34.2| Oct. 47.7| 2.1|[7]2.1| Oct. 1.2 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Italy | 1,629.3| 1,382.8| Dec. 1,488.1| 65.7| 58.7 | Dec. 62.7 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Japan | 1,354.5| 1,272.9| Dec. 1,273.6| 5.8| .8 | Dec. 4.6 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Malaya | 1,957.1| 1,239.7| Dec. 951.1| 92.9| 30.3 | Dec. 35.5 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Mexico | 629.7| 592.5| Sept. 386.0| .6| .5 | Sept. .2 Nether- | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- lands | 1,956.1| 2,113.4| Dec. 2,021.4| 40.0| 36.4 | Dec. 60.8 New | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Zealand | 694.8| 674.3| Dec. 659.7| 26.1| 10.0 | Dec. 14.9 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Norway | 620.0| 565.4| Dec. 508.6| 29.2| 30.0 | Dec. 32.9 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Pakistan | 749.8| 532.5| Dec. 438.8| 72.6|119.6 | Dec. 19.8 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Portugal | 262.9| 237.2| Dec. 218.8| 4.8| 7.1 | Dec. 5.7 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Spain | 477.7| 403.5| Oct. 383.9| .4| .3 | Oct. [1] | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Sweden | 1,178.5| 1,561.1| Dec. 1,477.0|126.7|119.0 | Dec. 69.7 Switzer- | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- land | 1,082.0| 1,100.1| Dec. 1,204.3| 86.0| 60.4 | Dec. 60.8 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Turkey | 314.0| 362.9| Oct. 306.5| 24.7| 20.3 | Oct. 22.8 United | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Kingdom | 7,578.3| 7,541.5| Dec. 7,524.7|119.6|155.7 | Dec. 92.7 United | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- States |16,602.3|15,176.3| Dec. 15,747.4| 2.8| 1.1 | Dec. 4.8 ---------+--------+--------+---------------+-----+------+------------ [5] Less than $50,000. [6] Includes reparations deliveries to U.S.S.R. valued at $53,899,000 in 1951 and $35,719,000 in January-September 1952 when reparation deliveries were terminated. Also includes transfers of "former German assets" to the ceded territory of Janiskoski, valued at $15,000 in 1951. [7] January-September only. (--) None. NOTE.--Soviet bloc countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Zone of Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, U.S.S.R., Outer Mongolia, and China (data as far as possible refer to Mainland China, including Manchuria and Inner Mongolia). Exports include reexports for the following countries: Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Australia, Ceylon, Gold Coast, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Japan, Malaya, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and United States. All other countries exclude reexports. Source: Official trade statistics of listed countries, compiled by U. S. Department of Commerce. TABLE 3.--_Imports of principal free-world countries from the Soviet bloc, 1951, 1952, and 1953_ [In millions of U. S. dollars] ---------+---------------------------------+------------------------- | Imports from world | Imports from Soviet bloc Country +---------------------------------+------------------------- | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 | 1951| 1952 | 1953 | | | as indicated | | |as indicated ---------+--------+--------+---------------+-----+------+------------ Anglo- | | | | | | Egyp. | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Sudan | 120.6| 175.3| Dec. 145.5| 3.5| 5.2| Dec. 3.6 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Argentina| 1,360.8| 1,178.3| Aug. 483.2| 38.6| 17.1| Aug. 9.3 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Australia| 2,112.5| 1,733.8| Dec. 1,298.5| 37.8| 14.7| Dec. 10.8 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Austria | 652.7| 653.6| Dec. 541.2| 72.0| 73.6| Dec. 60.4 Belgium- | | | | | | Luxem- | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- bourg | 2,544.0| 2,460.5| Dec. 2,422.6| 57.8| 37.4| Dec. 47.4 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Brazil | 2,010.6| 2,009.5| Nov. 1,215.8| 10.3| 5.9| Nov. 8.0 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Canada | 3,877.1| 4,120.3| Dec. 4,449.4| 8.1| 8.7| Dec. 6.0 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Ceylon | 327.3| 357.5| Dec. 337.6| 2.4| 8.0| Dec. 45.5 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Chile | 329.1| 371.0| Aug. 213.7| 1.8| .8| Aug. 1.2 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Denmark | 1,012.5| 962.1| Dec. 1,000.3| 70.7| 39.2| Dec. 40.6 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Finland | 676.0| 791.7| Dec. 529.8|108.2| 153.5| Dec. 182.3 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- France | 4,614.8| 4,547.3| Dec. 4,166.1| 71.1| 64.2| Dec. 56.9 French | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Morocco | 456.2| 515.8| Dec. 490.1| 15.8| 8.6| Dec. 13.2 Germany, | | | | | | Fed. | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Repub.| 3,532.2| 3,873.3| Dec. 3,877.4|131.8| 94.0| Dec. 168.0 Gold | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Coast | 177.3| 186.4| Sept. 143.3| 2.2| 1.6| Sept. 1.5 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Greece | 398.4| 346.3| Dec. 294.3| .6| .6| Dec. 3.8 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Hong Kong| 852.3| 661.4| Dec. 677.7|155.1| 146.6| Dec. 150.0 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Iceland | 56.7| 55.8| Dec. 68.2| 3.9| 3.7| Dec. 6.3 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- India | 1,767.8| 1,657.0| Nov. 1,100.6| 38.4| 38.8| Nov. 6.0 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Indonesia| 805.3| 924.0| Dec. 753.0| 6.7| 5.3| Dec. 6.9 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Iran | 249.1| 165.2| Dec. 152.5| 23.6| 27.4| Dec. 18.3 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Ireland | 572.6| 482.2| Dec. 513.6| 7.8| 2.3| Dec. 2.7 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Israel | 343.3|[8]280.3| Oct. 233.7| 10.5|[8]4.8| Oct. 2.1 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Italy | 2,118.7| 2,313.3| Dec. 2,395.1| 80.0| 86.4| Dec. 53.8 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Japan | 1,940.9| 2,028.2| Dec. 2,409.5| 23.1| 17.9| Dec. 37.8 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Malaya | 1,542.1| 1,256.9| Dec. 1,054.4| 46.7| 42.5| Dec. 40.3 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Mexico | 783.0| 739.2| Sept. 539.1| 2.1| 1.5| Sept. .8 Nether- | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- lands | 2,561.3| 2,257.2| Dec. 2,354.3| 66.9| 59.3| Dec. 68.6 New | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Zealand | 578.3| 644.2| Dec. 457.8| 2.9| 2.3| Dec. 1.9 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Norway | 877.3| 872.7| Dec. 912.0| 29.4| 35.3| Dec. 43.9 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Pakistan | 519.9| 609.7| Dec. 350.2| 24.6| 8.6| Dec. 4.2 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Portugal | 329.4| 346.6| Dec. 330.6| 1.8| .8| Dec. .9 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Spain | 387.0| 518.5| Oct. 481.2| .4| .2| Oct. [9] | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Sweden | 1,775.2| 1,727.2| Dec. 1,577.0|137.0| 108.4| Dec. 61.4 Switzer- | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- land | 1,364.4| 1,205.9| Dec. 1,182.8| 57.4| 45.4| Dec. 50.7 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Taiwan | 85.8| 113.0| Dec. 105.8| 6.8| 9.7| Dec. 5.8 | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Turkey | 402.0| 555.9| Oct. 428.8| 20.0| 20.6| Oct. 22.8 United | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- Kingdom |10,959.8| 9,748.2| Dec. 9,365.7|287.8| 243.3| Dec. 235.6 United | | |Jan.- | | |Jan.- States |10,967.4|10,716.8| Dec. 10,873.7|110.3| 67.3| Dec. 45.6 ---------+--------+--------+---------------+-----+------+------------ [8] January-September only. [9] Less than $50,000. NOTE.--Soviet Bloc countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Zone of Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, U.S.S.R., Outer Mongolia, and China (data as far as possible refer to Mainland China including Manchuria and Inner Mongolia). Source: Official trade statistics of listed countries, compiled by U.S. Department of Commerce. TABLE 4.--_Free-world exports to the Soviet bloc, monthly, 1952 and 1953_ [In millions of U. S. dollars] --------------+-----------+-----------+----------+---------- | | | | Month | Total | European | U.S.S.R. | China |Soviet bloc| Satellites| | --------------+-----------+-----------+----------+---------- 1952: | | | | January | 107.8 | 58.7 | 39.1 | 10.0 February | 121.4 | 51.3 | 48.9 | 21.2 March | 129.2 | 67.8 | 53.4 | 8.0 April | 114.8 | 53.1 | 40.7 | 21.0 May | 139.4 | 52.4 | 52.5 | 34.5 June | 109.4 | 56.1 | 30.7 | 22.6 July | 118.0 | 53.5 | 39.2 | 25.3 August | 125.4 | 53.2 | 39.3 | 32.9 September | 89.5 | 45.6 | 23.9 | 20.0 October | 104.6 | 50.4 | 34.6 | 19.6 November | 120.4 | 55.7 | 40.1 | 24.6 December | 139.3 | 72.5 | 38.0 | 28.8 1953: | | | | January | 119.3 | 54.9 | 25.9 | 38.5 February | 97.1 | 48.6 | 23.5 | 25.0 March | 123.9 | 61.2 | 33.3 | 29.4 April | 110.9 | 53.2 | 26.8 | 30.9 May | 88.4 | 43.4 | 25.8 | 19.2 June | 100.9 | 51.9 | 27.2 | 21.8 July | 104.4 | 55.2 | 30.7 | 18.5 August | 113.2 | 56.1 | 37.8 | 19.3 September | 90.3 | 47.7 | 30.0 | 12.6 October | 118.4 | 50.7 | 46.8 | 20.9 November | 140.3 | 67.0 | 50.6 | 22.5 December | 144.4 | 68.7 | 53.2 | 22.2 --------------+-----------+-----------+----------+---------- NOTE.--Monthly data are preliminary and unrevised. Therefore, they will not add exactly to annual world totals. China data refer, wherever possible, to Mainland (Communist) China, including Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Source: Official trade statistics of the free world, compiled by U. S. Department of Commerce. TABLE 5.--_Free world imports from the Soviet bloc, monthly, 1952 and 1953_ [In millions of U. S. dollars] --------------+-----------+-----------+----------+----------- | | | | Month | Total | European | U.S.S.R. | China |Soviet bloc| Satellites| | --------------+-----------+-----------+----------+----------- 1952: | | | | January | 153.8 | 76.0 | 43.7 | 34.1 February | 145.2 | 66.0 | 45.6 | 33.6 March | 138.5 | 68.0 | 44.5 | 26.0 April | 148.3 | 63.0 | 53.5 | 31.8 May | 133.4 | 60.6 | 47.3 | 25.5 June | 114.0 | 58.7 | 35.0 | 20.3 July | 125.0 | 66.9 | 28.7 | 29.4 August | 122.1 | 62.7 | 30.0 | 29.4 September | 120.6 | 56.7 | 31.9 | 32.0 October | 124.0 | 59.7 | 35.6 | 28.7 November | 135.3 | 65.2 | 35.7 | 34.4 December | 145.7 | 74.8 | 30.5 | 40.4 1953: | | | | January | 135.4 | 67.8 | 30.9 | 36.1 February | 103.2 | 51.3 | 16.8 | 34.3 March | 115.8 | 59.6 | 19.5 | 36.2 April | 139.9 | 74.3 | 24.2 | 40.2 May | 127.6 | 61.6 | 25.0 | 40.5 June | 132.0 | 63.3 | 29.3 | 39.2 July | 124.6 | 62.2 | 29.5 | 32.6 August | 135.3 | 58.4 | 44.9 | 30.5 September | 141.3 | 65.2 | 37.5 | 38.1 October | 147.2 | 71.5 | 40.8 | 33.7 November | 129.7 | 67.6 | 34.9 | 26.8 December | 146.2 | 63.7 | 44.3 | 37.3 --------------+-----------+-----------+----------+----------- NOTE.--Monthly data are preliminary and unrevised. Therefore, they will not add exactly to annual world totals. China data refer, wherever possible, to Mainland (Communist) China, including Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. In 1952 United States statistics included Outer Mongolia with China, where it is shown above. In 1953 United States trade with Outer Mongolia was separately available; it is therefore included in the total bloc column above, but not with China. United States monthly 1953 imports from Outer Mongolia were as follows in thousands of dollars: January, 647; February, 800; March, 517; April 1,185; May, 474; June, 228; July, 287; August, 1,492; September, 526; October, 1,243; November, 357; December, 902. Source: Official trade statistics of the free world, compiled by U. S. Department of Commerce. TABLE 6.--_Free-world exports to Communist China, semiannual, 1952 and 1953_ [In millions of U. S. dollars] --------------+-----+-----+-----+--------+------------------------------ |First|Second|First|Second | Country | half| half| half| half | Major items in 1953 | 1952| 1952| 1953| 1953 | --------------+-----+-----+-----+--------+------------------------------ Free-world | | | | [10] | exports, total|112.8|143.7|158.9| 111.1| +-----+-----+-----+--------+ Hong Kong | 29.1| 61.9| 63.7| 30.9|Medicine, dyestuffs, | | | | | fertilizers, machinery. Ceylon | 12.5| 13.5| 25.0| 25.9|Rubber, coconut oil. West Germany | .2| 2.6| 13.7| 11.3|Iron and steel, | | | | | scientific instruments, | | | | | electrical machinery. United | | | | | Kingdom | 1.9| 10.9| 8.7| 8.8|Wool tops, mechanical handling | | | | | equipment, sodium compounds, | | | | | piece goods, ammonium | | | | | sulphate, textile machinery. Egypt | 2.5| 6.4| 4.9| 5.5|Cotton. Switzerland | 2.5| 3.5| 10.0| 5.5|Watches, coal tar dyes, indigo. Finland | .1| 6.5| 1.0| 4.4|Paper, cellulose, | | | | | copper semi-manufactures. Australia | .2| .4| 1.4| 3.9|Greasy wool, wool tops. Pakistan | 54.5| 29.4| 3.6| 3.7|Cotton. France | .9| 2.4| 9.7| 2.7|Iron and steel, machine tools, | | | | | chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Japan | .3| .2| 2.3| 2.2|Textile machinery, seaweed, | | | | | superphosphates, medicines. Netherlands | [13]| [13]| 2.6| 1.3|Ammonium sulphate. Italy | 2.1| 1.5| 3.9| .8|Chemical fertilizer, artificial | | | | | yarn, woolen blankets. Sweden | .2| .4| 2.3| .4|Paper and paper manufactures. India | 5.2| 1.3| 2.2| [11] .2|Jute bags. Belgium- | | | | | Luxembourg | .3| .3| 1.3| .1|Ammonium sulphate and | | | | | sulfonitrate. Norway | [13]| 1.7| .9| [13] |Paper. Other | .3| .8| 1.7| [12] | --------------+-----+-----+-----+--------+------------------------------- [10] Estimate. [11] July-November only. [12] Not available. [13] Less than $50,000. NOTE.--Totals and Swiss data are adjusted to exclude those watches known to be destined for Hong Kong and Malaya. So far as possible, data refer to Mainland (Communist) China, including Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Source: Official trade statistics of free-world countries, compiled by U. S. Department of Commerce. TABLE 7.--_Free-world imports from Communist China, semiannual, 1952 and 1953_ [In millions of U. S. dollars] --------------+-----+------+-----+------+------------------------------- |First|Second|First|Second| Country | half| half| half | half | Major items in 1953 | 1952| 1952| 1953 | 1953 | --------------+-----+-----+------+------+------------------------------- Free world | | | | [14] | imports, total|171.2|194.6| 226.6| 198.4| |-----+-----+------+------| Hong Kong | 60.7| 84.6| 84.9| 65.1|Fruits and vegetables, | | | | | textiles,vegetable, pigs and | | | | | poultry, eggs,plants | | | | | and seeds. Ceylon | .3| 6.6| 22.1| 21.8|Rice. West Germany | 8.2| 9.4| 14.8| 18.5|Oilseeds, vegetable oils, eggs. Japan | 5.6| 9.3| 12.6| 17.1|Oilseeds, cashmere, wool, raw | | | | | silk, pulses. United Kingdom| 5.0| 3.4| 12.0| 16.8|Eggs, hair, oilseeds. Malaya | 21.0| 18.5| 20.3| 14.1|Fruits and vegetable, eggs, | | | | | plants and seeds, paper and | | | | | manufactures, animal feeding | | | | | stuffs. Switzerland | 3.5 | 6.4| 8.1| 8.0|Oilseeds, raw silk, | | | | | silk fabrics. France | 3.1| 2.5| 5.2| 5.8|Textile yarn and fibers, | | | | | grains, bristles, casings, | | | | | essential oils. Netherlands | 2.8| 2.1| 11.8| 3.4|Oilseeds. Belgium- | | | | | Luxembourg | 2.5| 2.2| 4.2| 3.1|Oilseeds, vegetable oils. Italy | .9| 1.2| 4.3| 3.1|Fats and oils, oilseeds. Taiwan | 4.5| 5.2| 2.9| 2.8|Pulses, medicinal substances, | | | | | vegetables. Norway | 1.0| 2.2| .8| 2.8|Oilseeds, copra, tung oil. French | | | | | Morocco | 4.0| 1.5| 4.7| 2.5|Green tea. Australia | 2.3| 1.2| 1.9| 2.4|Inedible animal products, oils, | | | | | peanuts. Pakistan | 1.4| 1.2| .8| 2.2|Cotton twist and yarn. Indonesia | .9| 1.0| .7| 1.5|Vegetables, plants and seeds, resin. United States | 22.6| 5.1| .2| .4|Feathers, bristles, furskins, | | | | | art works and antiques. Canada | 1.1| .2| .7| .4|Walnuts and peanuts. Philippines | 1.4| 1.8| 1.3|[15].4|Food, cotton and | | | | | manufactures, coffee. India | 10.2| 22.2| 1.4|[15].4|Rice. Denmark | [16]| [16]| 2.1|(none)|Oilseeds, feedstuffs. Indochina | 3.3| 4.0|[17]3.4| [18] |Not available. Burma | 2.2| .2| .2| [18] |Garlic, raw silk and yarn, | | | | | cotton yarn. Other | 2.7| 2.6| 5.2| [18] | --------------+-----+-----+------+------+------------------------------- [14] Estimate. [15] Figures for the second half of 1953 are incomplete as follows: Philippines, July-November: India, July-November. [16] Less than $50,000. [17] January-May only. [18] Not available. NOTE.--So far as possible, data refer to Mainland Communist China, including Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Source: Official trade statistics of free world countries, compiled by U. S. Department of commerce. TABLE 8.--_United States trade with the Soviet-bloc countries, 1937, 1948, 1952, and 1953_ [In thousands of dollars] -------------+----------------------------+------------------------------ |Exports, including reexports| General imports Country |-------+--------+-----+-----+-------+--------+------+------ | [19] | | | | | | | | 1937 | 1948 | 1952| 1953| 1937 | 1948 | 1952 | 1953 -------------+-------+--------+-----+-----+-------+--------+------+------ Total Soviet | | | | | | | | bloc |143,892| 396,641|1,097|1,776|206,506| 233,482|67,311|45,597 |=======+========+=====+=====+=======+========+======+====== Bloc in | | | | | | | | Europe |94,189 | 123,241|1,097|1,776|102,884| 113,138|39,586|36,325 |-------+--------+-----+-----+-------+--------+------+------ Albania | 147 | 344| 1| 2| 137|--------| 52| 65 Bulgaria | 490 | 2,086| 24| 5| 1,862| 831| 275| 358 Czecho- | | | | | | | | slovakia |13,233 | 21,563| 75| 40| 37,183| 22,125| 1,477| 2,262 East Germany | n.s.s.| n.s.s. | 622|1,079| n.s.s.| n.s.s.| 7,118| 6,465 Estonia | 1,244 | 7|-----| ----| 937| (X)|------|------ Hungary | 693 | 8,029| 69| 2| 5,512| 1,613| 2,913| 1,717 Latvia | 1,744 | 1|-----|-----| 767| 6|------|------ Lithuania | 511 | 115|-----|-----| 1,172| 10| 1|------ Poland and |26,297 | 55,675| 286| 622| 19,568| 1,249|10,247|14,295 Danzig | | | | | | | | Rumania | 6,938 | 7,542|-----| 7| 4,978| 480| 683| 372 U.S.S.R. |42,892 | 27,879| 20| 19| 30,768| 86,825|16,818|10,791 |=======+========+=====+=====+=======+========+======+====== BLOC IN ASIA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | China |} |} | | | | | {| | (including |} | | | | | {| [20] | [21] Manchuria) |}49,703| 273,400|-----|-----|103,622|120,343{|24,605| 614 Outer | | | | | | {| Mongolia[23]|} | | | | | {| 3,120| 8,658 North Korea | n.s.s.| n.s.s. |-----|-----| n.s.s.| n.s.s. |------|------ -------------+-------+--------+-----+-----+-------+--------+------+------ [19] Data represent direct shipments only, which in prewar years greatly understated the trade with central European countries; for a total of direct and indirect imports of United States merchandise see foreign country statistics. [20] Consisted chiefly of strategic materials specifically licensed for import. [21] Consisted chiefly of strategic materials specifically licensed for import in 1952 but not actually imported until 1953, and Chinese material located in free countries before 1950 and purchased in those countries by Americans. [22] United States does not consider Outer Mongolia as a part of Communist China; traditionally for statistical purposes Outer Mongolia has been included with China; separate figures for this area have been compiled by Census only since January 1953. The 1952 breakdown is estimated. (X) Less than $500. n.s.s. Not shown separately. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce. Rows of dashes: )----) mean nothing shipped. APPENDIX C Text of the Battle Act =Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 [H. R. 4550], Public Law 213, 82d Congress, 65 Stat. 644, Approved October 26, 1951= An ACT To provide for the control by the United States and cooperating foreign nations of exports to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, and for other purposes _Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled_, That this Act may be cited as the "Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951." TITLE I--WAR MATERIALS SEC. 101. The Congress of the United States, recognizing that in a world threatened by aggression the United States can best preserve and maintain peace by developing maximum national strength and by utilizing all of its resources in cooperation with other free nations, hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to apply an embargo on the shipment of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, in order to (1) increase the national strength of the United States and of the cooperating nations; (2) impede the ability of nations threatening the security of the United States to conduct military operations; and (3) to assist the people of the nations under the domination of foreign aggressors to reestablish their freedom. It is further declared to be the policy of the United States that no military, economic, or financial assistance shall be supplied to any nation unless it applies an embargo on such shipments to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination. This Act shall be administered in such a way as to bring about the fullest support for any resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, supported by the United States, to prevent the shipment of certain commodities to areas under the control of governments engaged in hostilities in defiance of the United Nations. SEC. 102. Responsibility for giving effect to the purposes of this Act shall be vested in the person occupying the senior position authorized by subsection (e) of section 406 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, or in any person who may hereafter be charged with principal responsibility for the administration of the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Such person is hereinafter referred to as the "Administrator". SEC. 103. (a) The Administrator is hereby authorized and directed to determine within thirty days after enactment of this Act after full and complete consideration of the views of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce; the Economic Cooperation Administration; and any other appropriate agencies, and notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, which items are, for the purpose of this Act, arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and those items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war which should be embargoed to effectuate the purposes of this Act: _Provided_, That such determinations shall be continuously adjusted to current conditions on the basis of investigation and consultation, and that all nations receiving United States military, economic, or financial assistance shall be kept informed of such determinations. (b) All military, economic, or financial assistance to any nation shall, upon the recommendation of the Administrator, be terminated forthwith if such nation after sixty days from the date of a determination under section 103 (a) knowingly permits the shipment to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, of any item which he has determined under section 103 (a) after a full and complete investigation to be included in any of the following categories: Arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war: _Provided_, That the President after receiving the advice of the Administrator and after taking into account the contribution of such country to the mutual security of the free world, the importance of such assistance to the security of the United States, the strategic importance of imports received from countries of the Soviet bloc, and the adequacy of such country's controls over the export to the Soviet bloc of items of strategic importance, may direct the continuance of such assistance to a country which permits shipments of items other than arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy materials when unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States: _Provided further_, That the President shall immediately report any determination made pursuant to the first proviso of this section with reasons therefor to the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the President shall at least once each quarter review all determinations made previously and shall report his conclusions to the foregoing committees of the House and Senate, which reports shall contain an analysis of the trade with the Soviet bloc of countries for which determinations have been made. SEC. 104. Whenever military, economic, or financial assistance has been terminated as provided in this Act, such assistance can be resumed only upon determination by the President that adequate measures have been taken by the nation concerned to assure full compliance with the provisions of this Act. SEC. 105. For the purposes of this Act the term "assistance" does not include activities carried on for the purpose of facilitating the procurement of materials in which the United States is deficient. TITLE II--OTHER MATERIALS SEC. 201. The Congress of the United States further declares it to be the policy of the United States to regulate the export of commodities other than those specified in title I of this Act to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, in order to strengthen the United States and other cooperating nations of the free world and to oppose and offset by nonmilitary action acts which threaten the security of the United States and the peace of the world. SEC. 202. The United States shall negotiate with any country receiving military, economic, or financial assistance arrangements for the recipient country to undertake a program for controlling exports of items not subject to embargo under title I of this Act, but which in the judgment of the Administrator should be controlled to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination. SEC. 203. All military, economic, and financial assistance shall be terminated when the President determines that the recipient country (1) is not effectively cooperating with the United States pursuant to this title, or (2) is failing to furnish to the United States information sufficient for the President to determine that the recipient country is effectively cooperating with the United States. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS SEC. 301. All other nations (those not receiving United States military, economic, or financial assistance) shall be invited by the President to cooperate jointly in a group or groups or on an individual basis in controlling the export of the commodities referred to in title I and title II of this Act to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination. SEC. 302. The Administrator with regard to all titles of this Act shall-- (a) coordinate those activities of the various United States departments and agencies which are concerned with security controls over exports from other countries; (b) make a continuing study of the administration of export control measures undertaken by foreign governments in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and shall report to the Congress from time to time but not less than once every six months recommending action where appropriate; and (c) make available technical advice and assistance on export control procedures to any nation desiring such cooperation. SEC. 303. The provisions of subsection (a) of section 403, of section 404, and of subsections (c) and (d) of section 406 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress) as amended, insofar as they are consistent with this Act, shall be applicable to this Act. Funds made available for the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, shall be available for carrying out this Act in such amounts as the President shall direct. SEC. 304. In every recipient country where local currency is made available for local currency expenses of the United States in connection with assistance furnished by the United States, the local currency administrative and operating expenses incurred in the administration of this Act shall be charged to such local currency funds to the extent available. SEC. 305. Subsection (d) of section 117 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 (Public Law 472, Eightieth Congress), as amended, and subsection (a) of section 1302 of the Third Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951 (Public Law 45, Eighty-second Congress), are repealed. U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954 TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Several words were changed as they were deemed to be typographic errors: p.32 esspecially changed to especially p.70 comodities changed to commodities p.71 Handelsgenchmigung changed to Handelsgenehmigung p.81 naptha changed to naphtha Otherwise, every effort has been made to remain true to the authors' words and intent. Words such as sizeable and intransigeance are unchanged on the assumption that they were the author's intent. 
54107	----	TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}. For example, iv^s (four shillings), or Esq^{re}. Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. More detail can be found at the end of the book. [Illustration: BY COMMAND OF His late Majesty WILLIAM THE IV^{TH}. _and under the Patronage of_ Her Majesty the Queen. HISTORICAL RECORDS, _OF THE_ British Army _Comprising the History of every Regiment IN HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE._ _By Richard Cannon Esq^{re}._ _Adjutant Generals Office, Horse Guards._ London _Printed by Authority_:] HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE FOURTEENTH, OR, THE BUCKINGHAMSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT: CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE FORMATION OF THE REGIMENT IN 1685, AND OF ITS SUBSEQUENT SERVICES TO 1845. _ILLUSTRATED WITH PLATES._ LONDON: PARKER, FURNIVALL, AND PARKER, _MILITARY LIBRARY, WHITEHALL_. M.DCCC.XLV. LONDON: HARRISON AND CO., PRINTERS, ST. MARTIN'S LANE. THE FOURTEENTH, OR THE BUCKINGHAMSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT, BEARS ON ITS REGIMENTAL COLOUR, "TOURNAY"--"CORUNNA"--"WATERLOO"--"JAVA"--"BHURTPORE," AND THE ROYAL TIGER SUPERSCRIBED "INDIA," IN COMMEMORATION OF ITS DISTINGUISHED SERVICES ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, AND IN THE EAST INDIES. [Illustration: (Regimental badge)] The Regiment also bears on the Caps of the Grenadiers and Drummers, THE WHITE HORSE, with the motto _Nec aspera terrent_. CONTENTS. Year Page 1685 Formation of the Regiment 9 ---- Names of the Officers 10 1689 Proceeds to Scotland 13 1692 Embarks for Flanders -- ---- Returns to England -- ---- Forms part of an expedition against the coast of France -- ---- Proceeds to Ostend 14 1693 Battle of Landen -- 1694 Forms part of the covering army during the siege of Huy 16 1695 Operations against the Fortress of Kenoque -- ---- Siege of the Fortress of Namur 17 1696 Returns to England 20 1698 Embarks for Ireland -- 1715 Proceeds to Scotland 22 ---- Battle of Sheriffmuir 23 1719 Action at Glenshiel 24 ---- Returns to England 25 1727 Defence of Gibraltar 26 1742 Returns to England -- 1745 Embarks for Flanders 27 ---- Returns to England 28 ---- Marches to Scotland -- 1746 Battle of Falkirk -- ---- -------- Culloden 29 1751 Uniform and Colours of the Regiment 31 1752 Returns to England 31 ---- Embarks for Gibraltar -- 1759 Returns to England 32 1765 Alterations in the Clothing 33 1766 Embarks for North America 34 1771 Proceeds to the West Indies -- ---- Employed against the Caribbees -- 1773 Returns to North America -- 1775 Detachment employed against the entrenchments at Great Bridge 35 1777 Returns to England 36 1782 Embarks for Jamaica -- ---- Styled the Bedfordshire Regiment 37 1791 Returns to England 38 1793 Embarks for Holland 39 ---- Engaged at Famars -- ---- Siege of Valenciennes 40 ---- Siege of Dunkirk 42 1794 Attack on the village of Prêmont 43 ---- Siege of Landrécies 44 ---- Battle of Tournay 47 ---- Forms part of the garrison of Nimeguen 50 1795 Action at Gueldermalsen 51 ---- Returns to England 53 ---- Embarks for the West Indies, but returns to port 54 1796 Resumes the voyage to the West Indies -- ---- Capture of the Islands of St. Lucia and St. Vincent 55 & 57 1797 Capture of Trinidad -- ---- Forms part of the Force destined to act against Porto Rico -- 1803 Returns to England 60 1804 A Second Battalion added 61 1805 The First Battalion embarks for Hanover -- 1806 Returns to England -- 1806 Proceeds to Ireland 62 1807 The First Battalion embarks for India -- 1808 Expedition against Tranquebar -- ---- The Second Battalion embarks for Spain 63 1809 Battle of Corunna 64 ---- The Second Battalion returns to England 65 ---- County Title changed from "Bedfordshire" to "Buckinghamshire" -- ---- The Second Battalion proceeds to Walcheren -- ---- Siege of Flushing -- ---- Battalion returns to England 66 1810 The Second Battalion embarks for Malta -- ---- Capture of the Isle of France 67 1811 Capture of Java 70 1813 Attack on the piratical state of Sambas on the western coast of Borneo 72 ---- A Third Battalion added -- 1814 The Second Battalion forms part of an expedition against the north-west coast of Italy 73 ---- The Second Battalion stationed at Genoa -- 1815 The Third Battalion embarks for Flanders 74 ---- Battle of Waterloo -- ---- Attack on the Citadel of Cambray 77 ---- The Second Battalion leaves Genoa and proceeds to France -- ---- The Second Battalion proceeds to Malta 78 ---- The Third Battalion returns to England -- 1816 The Third Battalion disbanded -- ---- The Second Battalion embarks from Malta for the Ionian Islands -- 1817 Capture of the fortified town of Hatrass 79 ---- The Second Battalion proceeds to Malta 80 ---- -------------------- returns to England -- ---- -------------------- disbanded -- ---- Employed against the Pindarees -- 1825 Capture of Bhurtpore 83 1830 Returns to England 87 1832 Proceeds to Ireland 88 1836 Embarks for the West Indies -- 1841 Proceeds to Canada 89 1845 The Conclusion 90 SUCCESSION OF COLONELS. 1685 Sir Edward Hales, Bart. 91 1688 William Beveridge 93 1692 John Tidcomb -- 1713 Jasper Clayton -- 1743 Joseph Price 95 1747 The Honorable William Herbert -- 1753 Edward Braddock 96 1755 Thomas Fowke -- 1756 Charles Jefferies 97 1765 The Honorable William Keppel 98 1775 Robert Cunninghame -- 1787 John Douglas 99 1789 George Earl Waldegrave -- ---- George Hotham 100 1806 Sir Harry Calvert, Bart., G.C.B. -- 1826 Thomas Lord Lynedoch 105 1834 The Honorable Sir Charles Colville, G.C.B. -- 1835 The Honorable Sir Alexander Hope, G.C.B. -- 1837 Sir James Watson, K.C.B. 106 PLATES. Colours of the Regiment _to face_ 9 Uniform of the Regiment " 90 HISTORICAL RECORDS OF THE BRITISH ARMY. GENERAL ORDERS. _HORSE-GUARDS_, _1st January, 1836_. His Majesty has been pleased to command, that, with a view of doing the fullest justice to Regiments, as well as to Individuals who have distinguished themselves by their Bravery in Action with the Enemy, an Account of the Services of every Regiment in the British Army shall be published under the superintendence and direction of the Adjutant-General; and that this Account shall contain the following particulars, viz., ---- The Period and Circumstances of the Original Formation of the Regiment; The Stations at which it has been from time to time employed; The Battles, Sieges, and other Military Operations, in which it has been engaged, particularly specifying any Achievement it may have performed, and the Colours, Trophies, &c., it may have captured from the Enemy. ---- The Names of the Officers and the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, Killed or Wounded by the Enemy, specifying the Place and Date of the Action. ---- The Names of those Officers, who, in consideration of their Gallant Services and Meritorious Conduct in Engagements with the Enemy, have been distinguished with Titles, Medals, or other Marks of His Majesty's gracious favour. ---- The Names of all such Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates as may have specially signalized themselves in Action. And, ---- The Badges and Devices which the Regiment may have been permitted to bear, and the Causes on account of which such Badges or Devices, or any other Marks of Distinction, have been granted. By Command of the Right Honourable GENERAL LORD HILL, _Commanding-in-Chief_. JOHN MACDONALD, _Adjutant-General_. PREFACE. The character and credit of the British Army must chiefly depend upon the zeal and ardour, by which all who enter into its service are animated, and consequently it is of the highest importance that any measure calculated to excite the spirit of emulation, by which alone great and gallant actions are achieved, should be adopted. Nothing can more fully tend to the accomplishment of this desirable object, than a full display of the noble deeds with which the Military History of our country abounds. To hold forth these bright examples to the imitation of the youthful soldier, and thus to incite him to emulate the meritorious conduct of those who have preceded him in their honourable career, are among the motives that have given rise to the present publication. The operations of the British Troops are, indeed, announced in the "London Gazette," from whence they are transferred into the public prints: the achievements of our armies are thus made known at the time of their occurrence, and receive the tribute of praise and admiration to which they are entitled. On extraordinary occasions, the Houses of Parliament have been in the habit of conferring on the Commanders, and the Officers and Troops acting under their orders, expressions of approbation and of thanks for their skill and bravery, and these testimonials, confirmed by the high honour of their Sovereign's Approbation, constitute the reward which the soldier most highly prizes. It has not, however, until late years, been the practice (which appears to have long prevailed in some of the Continental armies) for British Regiments to keep regular records of their services and achievements. Hence some difficulty has been experienced in obtaining, particularly from the old Regiments, an authentic account of their origin and subsequent services. This defect will now be remedied, in consequence of His Majesty having been pleased to command, that every Regiment shall in future keep a full and ample record of its services at home and abroad. From the materials thus collected, the country will henceforth derive information as to the difficulties and privations which chequer the career of those who embrace the military profession. In Great Britain, where so large a number of persons are devoted to the active concerns of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and where these pursuits have, for so long a period, been undisturbed by the _presence of war_, which few other countries have escaped, comparatively little is known of the vicissitudes of active service, and of the casualties of climate, to which, even during peace, the British Troops are exposed in every part of the globe, with little or no interval of repose. In their tranquil enjoyment of the blessings which the country derives from the industry and the enterprise of the agriculturist and the trader, its happy inhabitants may be supposed not often to reflect on the perilous duties of the soldier and the sailor,--on their sufferings,--and on the sacrifice of valuable life, by which so many national benefits are obtained and preserved. The conduct of the British Troops, their valour, and endurance, have shone conspicuously under great and trying difficulties; and their character has been established in Continental warfare by the irresistible spirit with which they have effected debarkations in spite of the most formidable opposition, and by the gallantry and steadiness with which they have maintained their advantages against superior numbers. In the official Reports made by the respective Commanders, ample justice has generally been done to the gallant exertions of the Corps employed; but the details of their services, and of acts of individual bravery, can only be fully given in the Annals of the various Regiments. These Records are now preparing for publication, under His Majesty's special authority, by Mr. RICHARD CANNON, Principal Clerk of the Adjutant-General's Office; and while the perusal of them cannot fail to be useful and interesting to military men of every rank, it is considered that they will also afford entertainment and information to the general reader, particularly to those who may have served in the Army, or who have relatives in the Service. There exists in the breasts of most of those who have served, or are serving, in the Army, an _Esprit de Corps_--an attachment to every thing belonging to their Regiment; to such persons a narrative of the services of their own Corps cannot fail to prove interesting. Authentic accounts of the actions of the great,--the valiant,--the loyal, have always been of paramount interest with a brave and civilized people. Great Britain has produced a race of heroes who, in moments of danger and terror, have stood, "firm as the rocks of their native shore;" and when half the World has been arrayed against them, they have fought the battles of their Country with unshaken fortitude. It is presumed that a record of achievements in war,--victories so complete and surprising, gained by our countrymen,--our brothers,--our fellow-citizens in arms,--a record which revives the memory of the brave, and brings their gallant deeds before us, will certainly prove acceptable to the public. Biographical memoirs of the Colonels and other distinguished Officers, will be introduced in the Records of their respective Regiments, and the Honorary Distinctions which have, from time to time, been conferred upon each Regiment, as testifying the value and importance of its services, will be faithfully set forth. As a convenient mode of Publication, the Record of each Regiment will be printed in a distinct number, so that when the whole shall be completed, the Parts may be bound up in numerical succession. [Illustration: 14th Regiment.] HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE FOURTEENTH, OR THE BUCKINGHAMSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT. [Sidenote: 1685] In the summer of 1685 England was in a state of tranquillity; the minds of men were not, however, at ease respecting the religion of their king, James II., but they put the best construction on his conduct, and manufactures and commerce were flourishing; when suddenly James Duke of Monmouth invaded the western shores with a few followers, and asserted his claim to the sovereignty of the realm. The din of hostile preparation instantly resounded throughout the kingdom, and thousands of His Majesty's subjects laid aside the pursuits of industry, and arrayed themselves under the royal standard, to oppose the invader and his adherents. At this juncture SIR EDWARD HALES, Baronet, of Woodchurch, in the county of Kent, stood forward in the support of the Crown, and raised a company of one hundred musketeers and pikemen, for the king's service, at Canterbury and in its vicinity. Companies were also raised by the following loyal gentlemen:-- ---- Boynton, Esq., Robert Middleton, Henry Vaughan, Richard Brewer[1], William Broom, John Gifford, Thomas Gifford, Mark Talbot, John Chappell, and Rowland Watson, and these companies were constituted a regiment, of which SIR EDWARD HALES was appointed colonel, ---- Boynton lieutenant-colonel, and Robert Middleton major, by commissions dated the 22nd of June, 1685; and the corps thus formed now bears the title of the FOURTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. The general rendezvous of the regiment was at Canterbury; two companies had their rendezvous at Rochester and Chatham, and others at Sittingbourne and Feversham. While the formation of the regiment was in progress, the rebel army was defeated at Sedgemoor, and the Duke of Monmouth was captured and beheaded. SIR EDWARD HALES'S regiment was, however, one of the corps which the King resolved to retain in his service; the establishment was fixed at ten companies of sixty men each, and in the middle of August the regiment was encamped on Hounslow-heath, where it was reviewed by His Majesty; it afterwards marched to Gravesend and Tilbury, detaching two companies to Jersey, one to Guernsey, and two to Windsor. [Sidenote: 1686] On the 1st of January, 1686, the establishment was estimated at the following numbers and rates of pay, viz.:-- SIR EDWARD HALES'S REGIMENT. Pay per Day. STAFF. £ _s_ _d._ The Colonel, _as Colonel_ 0 12 0 Lieut.-Colonel, _as Lieut.-Colonel_ 0 7 0 Major, _as Major_ 0 5 0 Chaplain 0 6 8 Chirurgeon, iv^s., one mate ii^s. vi^d. 0 6 6 Adjutant 0 4 0 Quarter Master and Marshal 0 4 0 ------------ 2 5 2 ------------ THE COLONEL'S COMPANY. Pay per Day. £ _s_ _d._ The Colonel, as Captain 0 8 0 Lieutenant 0 4 0 Ensign 0 3 0 2 Serjeants, xviii^d. each 0 3 0 3 Corporals, xii^d. each 0 3 0 1 Drummer 0 1 0 50 Soldiers, at viii^d. each 1 13 4 ------------ Total for 1 Company 2 15 4 ------------ Nine Companies more at the same rate 24 18 0 ------------ Total per day 29 18 6 ------------ Per annum £10,922 12_s._ 6_d._ [Sidenote: 1687] The regiment was again encamped on Hounslow-heath in the summer of 1687, and a grenadier company was added to its establishment. At this period the following officers were holding commissions in the regiment, viz.:-- _Captains._ _Lieutenants._ _Ensigns._ Sir Edw. Hales, (_Col._) Thomas Butler Dudley Van Burgh G. Barclay, (_Lt.-Col._) Robert Seaton Austin Belson John Gifford, (_Major_) Richard Boucher Thomas Heyward John Chappell Gaven Talbot Philip Overton Rowland Watson James Nicholson Dudley Van Colster Thomas Weld Bryce Blair Clifford Brexton George Latton William Carew George Blathwayt Richard Brewer Nicholas Morgan Edward Hales Thomas Gifford Edward Gifford Edward Pope George Aylmer Augustin Gifford Cæsar Gage {William Fielding } Peter Shackerly {Francis Sanderson } Grenadier Company _Chaplain_, Nicholas Trapps.--_Adjutant_, James Nicholson. _Chirurgeon_, John Ridley.--_Quarter-Master_, Edward Syng. After passing in review before the King and Queen, and other members of the royal family, the regiment struck its tents and marched to Plymouth, where it was stationed during the winter. [Sidenote: 1688] From Plymouth the regiment marched to London in June, 1688, and took the duty at the Tower until the middle of August, when it was relieved by the Royal Fusiliers, and marched to Canterbury, and in September to Salisbury. In the mean time the measures adopted by King James II. to establish Papacy and arbitrary government had filled the country with alarm. Among other proceedings the King claimed the power of dispensing with the oaths, required by law, on appointment to office; the colonel of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, SIR EDWARD HALES, had espoused the Roman Catholic religion; he, therefore, could not take the oaths, and was not eligible for his commission; he was prosecuted and convicted at Rochester assizes; but he moved the case into the Court of the King's Bench, and had judgment in his behalf; eleven of the twelve judges taking part with the King against the law. Many of the nobility solicited the Prince of Orange to aid them in opposing the measures of the court, and when the Prince arrived with a Dutch army, the King assembled his forces at Salisbury. The result may be told in a few words:--the English army refused to fight in the cause of Papacy and arbitrary government; the King, accompanied by Colonel Sir Edward Hales, and Quarter-Master Edward Syng, of this regiment, attempted to escape to France in disguise; but they were apprehended on board of a Custom-house vessel at Feversham, and Sir Edward Hales was afterwards confined in the Tower of London. The King made a second attempt, and arrived in France in safety. The Prince of Orange issued orders for the regiment to occupy quarters at Waltham, in Hampshire, and conferred the colonelcy on William Beveridge, an officer of the English brigade in the Dutch service, by commission dated the 31st of December, 1688. [Sidenote: 1689] The accession of William Prince of Orange and his consort to the throne was opposed in Scotland, and in the spring of 1689 the regiment was ordered to march towards the north; it was stationed a short time at Berwick, where it was inspected on the 14th of June by the commissioners for re-modelling the army: in August it received orders to march to Edinburgh. [Sidenote: 1690] [Sidenote: 1691] The regiment was employed in various services in Scotland and the north of England until the insurgent clans had lost all hope of success, and in 1691 they tendered their submission to the government of King William III. [Sidenote: 1692] In the spring of 1692, the regiment embarked for Flanders, to take part in the war in which the British monarch was engaged, to preserve the liberties of Europe against the ambitious projects of the court of France. Scarcely had it arrived at the seat of war, and taken post in one of the fortified towns of West Flanders, when the French monarch assembled his army near La Hogue, and prepared a fleet to convey the troops to England, for the purpose of replacing King James on the throne. The regiment was immediately ordered to return, and having landed at Greenwich in the early part of May, it was held in readiness to repel the invaders, should they venture to land on the British shores; but while the menace of invasion was producing considerable alarm in England, the French fleet sustained a decisive defeat off La Hogue, and the danger instantly vanished: the hopes of the Jacobites were frustrated, and the ascendancy of Protestant principles insured. The regiment was afterwards encamped near Portsmouth, and it formed part of an expedition under the Duke of Leinster, afterwards Duke Schomberg, against the coast of France; but the French naval force having been nearly annihilated at the sea-fight off La Hogue, Louis XIV. expected a descent, and had drawn so many troops from the interior to the coast, that the Duke of Leinster did not venture to land. After menacing the French shores at several points, to produce a diversion in favour of the confederate army in the Netherlands, the fleet sailed to the Downs, from whence it proceeded to Ostend, where the troops landed: they took possession of and fortified the towns of Furnes and Dixmude, and several regiments afterwards returned to England. On the 14th of November Colonel William Beveridge was killed in a duel with one of the captains; and King William afterwards conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on Lieutenant-Colonel John Tidcomb, from the Thirteenth Foot. [Sidenote: 1693] The FOURTEENTH was one of the regiments which remained in Flanders, and it took the field in May, 1693, to serve the campaign of that year with the confederate army, commanded by King William in person, who took possession of the camp at Parck, near Louvain, to prevent the designs of Louis XIV. on Brabant. After taking part in several movements, the regiment was in position at _Landen_, on the morning of the 19th of July, when the French army, of very superior numbers, commanded by Marshal Luxembourg, advanced to attack the forces under King William. On this occasion the FOURTEENTH Regiment had its first opportunity of proving its prowess in action with the enemy, and it gave presage of that gallantry for which it afterwards became distinguished. The French commenced the action with great spirit, but were repulsed several times; their superior numbers enabled them to bring forward fresh troops, and they eventually carried the village of Neer-Winden. The King ordered a retreat, which was executed with difficulty, and was attended with serious loss. The FOURTEENTH Regiment had Captains Van Burgh, Cassin, and Henriosa, and Lieutenant Worley, killed; Lieutenant Nicholson died of his wounds; Captains Devaux and Stanwix, Lieutenants Campbell, Forbes, and Pettitpiere, Ensigns Revison and Perrott, wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel Graham taken prisoner: the number of non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the regiment, killed and wounded, has not been ascertained. In the autumn, when the army separated for winter quarters, the regiment marched into garrison at Bruges; at the same time parties were sent to England to procure recruits, to replace the losses sustained during this campaign. [Sidenote: 1694] When the army took the field in the spring of 1694, the regiment was left, with several other corps, under Brigadier-General Sir David Collier, encamped near Ghent, to form a guard for the artillery, which was conveyed by water to Malines. The regiment joined the army at the camp near Louvain, on the 4th of June, and on the 6th it was reviewed by His Majesty, who was pleased to express to Colonel Tidcomb his high approbation of its appearance. The regiment was afterwards employed in several movements, and it formed part of the splendid body of troops encamped at Mont St. André, near the village of Ramilies, where the forces of the confederate states were assembled under King William III., and presented a magnificent spectacle of war. The FOURTEENTH was one of the corps which attempted, by a forced march, to pass the enemy's fortified lines, and penetrate French Flanders; but by extraordinary exertions the French gained the pass first, and thus preserved their country from an invasion. The regiment was subsequently encamped near _Rousselaer_, forming part of the covering army during the siege of _Huy_. The vicinity of the camp was infested by detachments of the enemy, and on one occasion the waggons conveying the bread to the army were attacked, when a detachment of the FOURTEENTH, forming part of the guard, was engaged, and the regiment had Captain Sacheverel mortally wounded, who was the only British officer killed by the enemy during this campaign. Having to remain in the field during cold and wet weather, the soldiers erected huts of wood and straw, and on the 1st of October the huts of the FOURTEENTH Regiment were accidentally set on fire, and destroyed: the Second Foot Guards had experienced the same misfortune a few days previously. The fortress of Huy having surrendered, the army separated for winter quarters, and the regiment returned to Bruges in the second week in October. [Sidenote: 1695] From Bruges, the regiment marched, in May, 1695, to Dixmude, where it pitched its tents, and remained several days. The Duke of Wirtemberg took the command of the troops assembled at this point, and advancing to the junction of the Loo and Dixmude canals, encamped before the fortress of _Kenoque_, upon which an attack was made for the purpose of drawing the French army that way, for the protection of their lines in West Flanders. The FOURTEENTH Regiment took part in this service; its grenadier company was engaged in driving the French from the intrenchments and houses near the Loo canal, and in repulsing the attempts of the enemy to regain possession of them. A redoubt was afterwards taken, and a lodgment effected in the works at the bridge, in which services the regiment had several men killed and wounded. This demonstration having produced the desired effect, the strong fortress of _Namur_ was exposed to an attack from the main army, and it was accordingly invested, and the siege commenced. The attack on Kenoque was then desisted in; the FOURTEENTH Regiment was one of the corps withdrawn from West Flanders, and joined the covering army, under the Prince of Vaudemont, at Wouterghem. From Wouterghem, the regiment marched towards Namur, to take part in the siege of that important fortress, which was deemed nearly impregnable, and was defended by a numerous garrison, under the celebrated Marshal Boufflers. On arriving before Namur the regiment pitched its tents at Templeux, from whence it advanced and took its turn of duty in the trenches. On the 8th of July, the regiment was on duty before Namur, and it was ordered to support the attacks to be made that evening on the covered-way near the hill of _Bouge_: the storming party was commanded by Major-General Ramsay. About seven o'clock in the evening, the signal for the attack was given, and the storming party rushed forward with the most distinguished heroism. The FOURTEENTH moved forward to support the attack, and mingling with the combatants evinced signal intrepidity. The soldiers rushed up to the enemy's palisades, and placing the muzzles of their muskets between the staves, fired a volley, which put the French into some confusion. The palisades were afterwards broken;--the supporting corps joined in the assault,--the second covered-way was carried, and the French overpowered, driven from their works, pursued among the batteries on the brow of the hill, and many of them were killed in the stone pits in which they took refuge. This post having been thus captured, the FOURTEENTH Regiment retired, and being relieved from duty in the trenches, it returned to its camp at Templeux, a league and a half from Namur. Its loss was severe:--Lieutenant Ravisson was killed; Captain Carew and Ensign Perott died of their wounds; Captains Pope, Jackson, and Forbes, and Ensign Cormach, were wounded, but afterwards recovered. The regiment quitted its post at Templeux, took its station in the lines of circumvallation, and mounted guard in the trenches, on the 10th of July; it was again on duty in the trenches on the 16th of July, when it had Captain Forbes and several private soldiers killed. A detachment of the grenadiers of the regiment was engaged, on the 17th of July, in an attack upon the counterscarp; the assault was made about five o'clock in the evening; the French disputed the post with great bravery, defending the glacis for some time; but they could not withstand the prowess of the British grenadiers, who effected a lodgment, and obliged the enemy to abandon the counterscarp. Lieutenant Williams of the grenadier company of the regiment was killed, and Captain Devaux was wounded with the working party. The regiment was again on duty in the trenches on the 19th and 24th of July. On the following day the town surrendered, the garrison retiring to the castle. After the surrender of the town of Namur, the regiment quitted the lines of circumvallation, and joined the covering army under the Prince of Vaudemont, which encamped, on the 8th of August, near the village of Waterloo, and afterwards took up a position near _Namur_. A numerous French army commanded by Marshal Villeroy advanced to raise the siege of the castle, but the covering army occupied a position which was deemed too formidable to be attacked, and the French Marshal withdrew without hazarding an engagement. A detachment from the grenadier company of the regiment quitted the covering army, and was engaged, on the 20th of August, in assaulting the breaches of the Terra Nova and Coharne, under the command of Lord Cutts. This proved a desperate service, particularly the assault of the Terra Nova, where the British grenadiers were engaged, and a serious loss was sustained in consequence of the regiments ordered to support the attack not advancing in time. The FOURTEENTH Foot had several men killed and wounded, and Lieutenant Sewell, who commanded the detachment from the grenadier company, was also wounded. Preparations were made for a second assault, when Marshal Boufflers agreed to surrender on honorable terms, which were granted. Thus was captured this important fortress, which the French had boasted might be restored, but could not be taken; and the achievement reflected great credit on the confederate arms; it was the most important event of the war. After the surrender of the castle of _Namur_, the regiment remained a short time in the field, and subsequently marched into cantonments in the villages near the Bruges canal. [Sidenote: 1696] The French monarch not only found his career of conquest arrested, by the efforts of the sovereign of Great Britain, but the towns he had captured were also being re-taken, and it became a point of great importance to him to detach England from the confederacy, which could only be accomplished by re-placing King James on the throne. For this purpose measures were privately concerted for exciting a rebellion in England; the Duke of Berwick, and several other English officers in the French service, were sent across the Channel in disguise, and through their persuasions a number of men were prepared to rise at a moment's notice; at the same time a conspiracy was formed in London to assassinate King William, and fifty men were engaged and prepared with arms to commit the diabolical act: a French naval and land force was also held in readiness for a descent on the English coast, and King James was at Calais prepared to embark. At this juncture, the FOURTEENTH, and a number of other regiments, received orders to return to England, and they arrived at Gravesend in March, 1696. The conspiracy was, however, discovered; a British fleet was sent to blockade the French ports, and the designs of the King of France being thus defeated, King William was left at liberty to prosecute the war for the security of the civil and religious liberties of the nations of Europe. Several of the corps which had arrived from Flanders returned to the seat of war immediately; but the FOURTEENTH was one of the regiments selected to remain on home service; it landed at Gravesend on the 22nd of March, and proceeded to Canterbury and Feversham, from whence it was removed to London in November, and took the duty at the Tower. [Sidenote: 1697] In 1697, King William saw his efforts for the preservation of national independence attended with success; the French monarch was humbled, and the treaty of Ryswick fixed the balance of power in Europe. [Sidenote: 1698] Soon after the restoration of peace, the regiment received orders to proceed to Ireland, and it landed at Belfast and Cork in March, 1698; at the same time it was placed upon a peace establishment. [Sidenote: 1701] [Sidenote: 1702] King James died in France in 1701, when Louis XIV. proclaimed the Pretender King of Great Britain by the title of James III.; this event, with the elevation of the Duke of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV., to the throne of Spain, in violation of solemn engagements, was followed by a sanguinary war with France and Spain, during which the continent of Europe, and the peninsula of Portugal and Spain, became theatres for the display of British valour, but the FOURTEENTH Regiment was selected to remain in Ireland. The proclamation of the Pretender, and the death of King William III., in March, 1702, revived the hopes of the partisans of the Stuart family, who were conspiring to elevate the Pretender to the throne, and Queen Anne deemed it expedient to detain a few trusty corps, of approved devotion to the Protestant interest, in Ireland. [Sidenote: 1703] Although the honorable distinction of being selected to remain in Ireland, prevented the regiment acquiring laurels in the field, yet it sent several drafts of men on foreign service, who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves. In the autumn of 1703 it furnished a draft of fifty men to complete Lord Montjoy's, and another draft of the same strength for Colonel Brudenel's regiments, (afterwards disbanded,) on their embarkation to accompany the Archduke Charles of Austria to Portugal. The regiment was in garrison at Dublin from the 7th of August to the 31st of December, 1703. [Sidenote: 1705] In the autumn of 1704, and the spring of 1705, additional detachments were sent to Portugal, to serve under General the Earl of Galway; they were conducted thither by Captain Laffit, Ensigns Schackford and Blount, and three serjeants, whose expenses, amounting to 70_l._ 19_s._ 4½_d._, were directed to be paid by a warrant dated the 5th of July, 1705. In August of the same year the regiment furnished a captain, lieutenant, ensign, two serjeants, and fifty rank and file towards completing the regiments of Charlemont, George, and Caulfield, (afterwards disbanded,) on their embarkation with the expedition under General the Earl of Peterborough, who captured Barcelona, and had astonishing success in Catalonia and Valentia. [Sidenote: 1706] The regiment was quartered at Dublin from March to November, 1706, and the private soldiers received a penny a day in addition to their pay, granted by King William III. in 1699, to all regiments employed on duty at Dublin. The FOURTEENTH had, however performed the duty of two regiments for some time, and the allowance was extended to all detachments, in consideration of the good conduct of the corps. [Sidenote: 1707] [Sidenote: 1712] The FOURTEENTH Regiment remained in Ireland during the whole of the war, continuing to send detachments abroad from time to time, particularly to Portugal and Spain, and its excellent conduct on home service occasioned it to be held in high estimation by the Government. [Sidenote: 1713] On the 14th of June, 1713, Lieutenant-General Tidcomb died at Bath; and Queen Anne conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on Colonel Jasper Clayton, from the half-pay of a newly-raised corps which was disbanded a short time previously. [Sidenote: 1714] [Sidenote: 1715] The decease of Queen Anne, and the accession of King George I., in 1714, was followed by renewed efforts on the part of the partisans of the Pretender to procure his elevation to the throne; these exertions began to assume an alarming appearance in the summer of 1715, when the well-known attachment of the FOURTEENTH Regiment to the Protestant succession, occasioned it to be recalled from Ireland, and ordered to Scotland, where the Jacobites were numerous, and it landed at Saltcoats in Ayrshire early in the summer. In the autumn the Earl of Mar assembled his vassals, erected the standard of the Pretender in the Highlands, and summoned the clans to take arms. The royal forces in Scotland were encamped at Stirling under Major-General Wightman; the FOURTEENTH Regiment joined the camp in October, and the Duke of Argyle assumed the command; but his Grace had not four thousand men to confront ten thousand under the Earl of Mar. When the rebel army advanced towards the Firth, the King's troops quitted the camp at Stirling and proceeded towards _Dumblain_; and on the morning of the 13th of November the hostile forces confronted each other on Sheriffmuir: the FOURTEENTH foot were posted in the left wing of the royal army. The rebels advanced to commence the engagement, and at that moment it was deemed necessary to make some alteration in the position of the royal forces; as the left wing was taking up the new alignment, it was attacked by a body of the clans of very superior numbers, and put into some confusion: at the same time the right wing of the royal army overpowered the left wing of the rebel host, and drove it from the field; each commander having one wing triumphant and one wing defeated. The FOURTEENTH, and several other corps on the left, resisted the charge of the clans a short time, but being attacked in the act of forming, and engaged by very superior numbers, they fell back a short distance; they thus became separated from the remainder of the army, and retiring beyond Dumblain, took possession of the passes to prevent the clans penetrating towards Stirling. Both armies retained their position during the day, and the rebels, being defeated in their design of penetrating southward, afterwards retired; when the King's troops returned to their camp at Stirling. The FOURTEENTH Foot had one lieutenant and six rank and file killed; fourteen rank and file wounded; Captain Barlow, Lieutenant Griffin, and several private soldiers were made prisoners. The Pretender arrived in Scotland soon afterwards, and his presence appeared to give new life to his adherents. [Sidenote: 1716] Additional forces joined the army under the Duke of Argyle: the FOURTEENTH was formed in brigade with the Third, Twenty-first, and Thirty-sixth regiments, under Brigadier-General Morrison; and in January, 1716, the royal troops advanced, marching through snow, over ice, and exposed to severe weather, when the Pretender retreated, and losing all hope of success he escaped, with the leaders of the rebellion, to France: the Highlanders, finding themselves deserted by their commanders, dispersed. After pursuing the insurgents some distance, the FOURTEENTH was quartered a short time at Dunkeld. [Sidenote: 1717] [Sidenote: 1718] The rebellion being suppressed, the regiment was stationed in garrison at Fort William, which was built in the reign of King William III., in a plain, on a navigable arm of the sea called Loch Eil, near the influx of the Lochy and Nevis, in the shire of Inverness. At this place the regiment was stationed during the year 1717, and in 1718 it marched from thence to Perth, and afterwards to Inverness, where it remained until June of the following year. [Sidenote: 1719] In the mean time Scotland had not enjoyed a state of tranquillity; but the minds of the people had been constantly agitated by the projects of the friends of the Pretender. When the Earl of Mar's rebellion was suppressed, the King of Sweden made preparations for a descent in favour of the Pretender; and when that project failed, the King of Spain fitted out an armament to place the Pretender on the throne. The Spanish fleet was dispersed by a storm; but two ships arrived on the coast of Scotland, in April, 1719, and four hundred Spaniards, with about a hundred Scots and English gentlemen, landed at Kintail, on the main within Skye, and encamped opposite the castle of Donan, where they were joined by about fifteen hundred men of the clans. To oppose this force the FOURTEENTH left Inverness on the 5th of June, and being united with three troops of the Scots Greys, the Eleventh and Fifteenth Regiments, under Major-General Wightman, arrived about four o'clock on the afternoon of the 10th of June at _Glenshiel_, when the Spaniards and Highlanders retreated and formed for battle on the romantic mountain scenery of the pass of Straichell. The King's troops advanced, and at five o'clock the signal for battle was given, when the infantry climbed the rocky crags and opened a sharp fire of musketry, which was re-echoed in the hollows beneath; at the same time the Greys charged along the road to force the pass. The enemy returned the fire, but soon gave way, and were chased from rock to rock for some time; on gaining the top of the hill they made a momentary stand, but the King's infantry sent forward a shower of bullets and advanced at a running pace to charge with bayonets, when the Spaniards and Highlanders fled in every direction. The soldiers passed the night in the hills; the Spaniards surrendered on the following day; the Highlanders dispersed; and the Marquis of Tullibardine, the Earl of Seaforth, and other rebel leaders, fled to the continent. [Sidenote: 1721] After this service the regiment marched to the castle of Bran, near Kainloch-Benchven, Inverness-shire; and in 1721 it proceeded to Edinburgh. [Sidenote: 1722] The regiment quitted Scotland in May, 1722, and marched to Hungerford: in the summer it was encamped, with several other corps, on Salisbury-plain, where it was reviewed by King George I. on the 30th of August, and afterwards returned to Hungerford. [Sidenote: 1723] Early in 1723 the regiment marched to Reading and Windsor; it was subsequently encamped in Hyde-park, and in the autumn marched to Bristol. [Sidenote: 1725] [Sidenote: 1726] [Sidenote: 1727] In May, 1725, the regiment commenced its march for Berwick; in July, 1726, it was removed to Lancashire; and in January, 1727, it marched to Canterbury, from whence four companies were detached to Dover, Ashford, Sandwich, and Feversham. At this period the Spaniards had commenced the siege of _Gibraltar_, which fortress had been captured by a British and Dutch armament in 1704, and had been ceded to Great Britain at the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713. The colonel of the FOURTEENTH, Jasper Clayton, was Lieutenant-Governor of Gibraltar; he proceeded thither in January, 1727, and took the command of the garrison, which opened its fire on the Spanish troops on the 21st of February; and in March the regiment embarked to take part in the defence of that important fortress, where it arrived on the 21st of April, together with a battalion of Foot Guards, and the Governor, General the Earl of Portmore. The regiment landed immediately, and it had the honor to take an active share in the successful defence of this valuable entrepôt to the Mediterranean. The Spaniards continued the siege until many men had perished in the attempt, and the tremendous fire of their artillery had produced little effect besides the bursting and damaging of their own cannon. In the early part of June the fire slackened, and on the 18th of that month hostilities ceased. [Sidenote: 1729] The regiment was afterwards selected to form part of the garrison of Gibraltar, where it was stationed during the following fifteen years. Previously to quitting England, two companies were added to its establishment; these companies remained on home service; they were stationed in the south of England until 1729, when they were disbanded. [Sidenote: 1739] [Sidenote: 1740] [Sidenote: 1742] War between Great Britain and Spain was resumed in 1739; and the claims of the Elector of Bavaria on the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, which were attempted to be enforced after the death of the Emperor, Charles VI., in 1740, involved Great Britain in hostilities with France and Bavaria. King George II. resolved to support the House of Austria; the garrison of Gibraltar was reinforced, and the FOURTEENTH Regiment, having been relieved from duty at that fortress, arrived at Portsmouth in September, 1742. After reposing a few days in barracks at Portsmouth, the regiment marched into quarters in Yorkshire, the head-quarters being at York. [Sidenote: 1743] In the summer of this year, His Majesty sent an army to Flanders to support the House of Austria, and on the 16th of June, 1743, the colonel of the FOURTEENTH Foot, Lieutenant-General JASPER CLAYTON, who was employed on the staff of the British army in Flanders, was killed at the battle of Dettingen; he was an officer of distinguished merit; his fall was regretted by the King and the whole army, and his remains were interred, with great solemnity, in the Chapel of Prince George of Hesse. The King conferred the command of the regiment on Colonel JOSEPH PRICE, from the Fifty-seventh, now Forty-sixth Foot, by commission dated the 22nd of June, 1743. [Sidenote: 1744] From Yorkshire the regiment marched into Northumberland, and was stationed at Berwick; in 1744, it marched to Dunstable and afterwards to Colchester. [Sidenote: 1745] Immediately on the receipt of the news of the loss of the battle of Fontenoy, on the 30th of April, 1745, the regiment received orders to proceed to Flanders, to join the allied army commanded by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland; it embarked at Tilbury, on the 15th of May, landed in West Flanders, and joined the camp on the plain of Lessines, before the end of the month. The regiment took part in several operations; it was encamped at Grammont, and afterwards on the Brussels' canal, in order to cover Dutch Brabant; but the French had so great a superiority of numbers, that it was found impossible to prevent their capturing several fortified towns. In the mean time, Charles Edward, eldest son of the Pretender, had arrived in Scotland, and being guided by desperate and designing men, and joined by a number of the clans, he resolved on the romantic enterprise of attempting to dethrone a beloved monarch, to overturn the constitution of a brave and free people, and to establish the authority of a dynasty which had been removed for arbitrary attacks on the established religion and laws. The FOURTEENTH was one of the regiments ordered home on this occasion; it arrived in the north of England, and formed part of the army assembled by Field-Marshal Wade, at Newcastle, to prevent the rebels penetrating into South Britain; and, in the second week of November, it was detached to Berwick, where it arrived in time to prevent the rebels capturing that town. The regiment afterwards marched to Scotland, and when the clans made a precipitate retreat from Derby, back to Scotland, it took up its quarters in the city of Edinburgh. [Sidenote: 1746] The young Pretender was joined by some new levies, and he procured a supply of artillery and ammunition, which enabled him to commence the siege of Stirling Castle: and Lieutenant-General Hawley, who commanded the King's troops at Edinburgh, resolved to attempt to raise the siege. For this purpose, the FOURTEENTH, and several other corps, advanced from Edinburgh on the 13th of January, 1746, under Major-General Huske, and drove a body of the rebels out of Linlithgow; on the following day another division marched to Borrowstounness; and on the 16th of January, the army encamped near _Falkirk_. About mid-day on the 17th of January, the rebel army was seen moving towards some high ground on Falkirk-moor, and the King's troops quitted their camp-ground to engage the clans. Passing some rugged grounds, the soldiers diverged on the moor, and formed two lines; the Fourth and FOURTEENTH Regiments constituted Brigadier-General Cholmondeley's brigade, and were posted in the first line. As the King's troops advanced to battle a tremendous hurricane, with a heavy shower of rain, beat violently in their faces, and nearly blinded them; at the same time it beat on the backs of the clans, and caused them little annoyance; the soldiers could not see to take aim, very few muskets would give fire, and, under these circumstances, some confusion took place, and several regiments quitted the field; but the Fourth and FOURTEENTH Regiments under Brigadier-General Cholmondeley made a determined stand, and they withstood the fury of the charging Highland host with astonishing firmness, evincing the most heroic valour under circumstances of peculiar danger and difficulty. They were joined by the second battalion of the Royals, the Third and Forty-eighth Regiments; Major-General Huske assumed the command; and these five corps repulsed one wing of the rebel army, and maintained their post, on the field of battle, until night, when no enemy could be seen, and the soldiers being wet, and the night cold and stormy, they retired. The King's troops retreated to Edinburgh, where His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland arrived, and assumed the command, and on the 31st of January the army again advanced, when the rebels raised the siege of Stirling Castle, and made a precipitate retreat towards Inverness. The royal army pursued the rebels as far as Perth, where it halted in consequence of severe weather; the march was resumed on the 20th of February; but heavy rains occasioned the army to make another halt at Aberdeen. The troops were again in motion in the early part of April, and on the 16th of that month, as they advanced in three columns towards Inverness, the rebel army was discovered in order of battle on _Culloden_-moor, when the royal forces formed three lines, the FOURTEENTH Foot taking post in the centre of the first line, under Lieut.-General the Earl of Albemarle. After a sharp cannonade, several clans rushed forward, with loud shouts, to attack the King's troops sword in hand; but they were assailed by a destructive fire of musketry, received on the point of the bayonet, and driven back with severe loss. The royal cavalry galloped forward, completed the rout and discomfiture of the clans, and pursued them with great slaughter several miles. This victory transformed the young Pretender from an imaginary monarch to an humble fugitive, and after wandering for some time in disguise in the isles, and among the mountains, he escaped to the continent. The loss of the regiment at the battle of _Culloden_ was limited to Captain Grosette, and one private soldier killed; Captain Simpson and nine rank and file wounded[2]. After returning from the pursuit of the rebels, the troops encamped near Inverness, from whence they advanced in May, and pitched their tents in a valley, surrounded by lofty mountains, near Fort Augustus. The FOURTEENTH Regiment was employed in guarding prisoners taken after the battle, and was afterwards stationed at Stirling, from whence it was removed to Glasgow. [Sidenote: 1747] In June, 1747 the regiment marched from Glasgow to Perth, and in September to Inverness. The colonel of the regiment, Brigadier-General Price, commanded a brigade in the Netherlands, and highly distinguished himself at the battle of Val, on the 2nd of July, 1747; he died at Breda in November of the same year; when King George II. conferred the colonelcy on the Honourable William Herbert, fifth son of Thomas, eighth Earl of Pembroke, from captain and lieutenant-colonel in the Second Foot Guards. [Sidenote: 1749] [Sidenote: 1750] The regiment remained in Scotland; in 1749 it was stationed at Fort William; and in 1750 at Glasgow, from whence it marched to Carlisle and Newcastle. [Sidenote: 1751] In 1751 a royal warrant was issued regulating the clothing, colours, and standards of the several regiments of the army. In this warrant the first, or King's colour, of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, is directed to be the great union: the second, or regimental colour, to be of _buff_ silk, with the union in the upper canton; in the centre of the colours XIV. in gold Roman characters, within a wreath of roses and thistles on the same stalk. The uniform of the regiment at this period, was black three-cornered cocked hats, bound with white lace; scarlet coats faced with yellow, yellow cuffs and white lace; scarlet waistcoats and breeches; white gaiters, and white cravats; buff belts, and buff pouches. The drummers wore buff coats faced with scarlet. The grenadiers wore cloth caps with the king's cipher and crown in front; the "_white horse_," with the motto "_Nec aspera terrent_," on the flap; and the number of the regiment behind. In August of this year orders were issued for the regiment to march to the south of England, and to furnish detachments on the coast of Sussex, to assist the officers of the revenue in the prevention of smuggling. [Sidenote: 1752] The regiment called in its detachments in the beginning of April, 1752, and marching to Portsmouth, embarked for Gibraltar, where it was stationed during the following seven years. [Sidenote: 1753] Colonel the Honorable William Herbert was removed to the Second Dragoon Guards in 1753, and was succeeded in the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Regiment by Colonel Edward Braddock, from lieutenant-colonel in the Second Foot Guards. [Sidenote: 1755] In 1755, some disputes occurred between England and France, respecting the extent of the British dominions in America, and Major-General Braddock was mortally wounded at Fort du Quesne: he was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Fowke, governor of Gibraltar, from the Second Foot, by commission dated the 12th of November, 1755. [Sidenote: 1756] War commenced between Great Britain and France in 1756, when a French armament attacked the island of Minorca, which was captured in 1708, and ceded to the British crown at the peace of Utrecht in 1713. Lieutenant-General Fowke received orders to send a detachment from Gibraltar, to reinforce the garrison of Port Mahon; but he called a council of war, which passed a resolution against sending the detachment. He was sentenced to be suspended for nine months, for disobeying the order, and King George II. dismissed him from the service. His Majesty afterwards conferred the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Regiment on Colonel Charles Jefferies, from colonel-commandant of the third battalion of the Sixtieth Regiment, who had distinguished himself in the defence of Port Mahon. [Sidenote: 1759] [Sidenote: 1760] [Sidenote: 1761] In December, 1759, the regiment was relieved from garrison duty at Gibraltar, and embarking for England, arrived, in January, 1760, at Plymouth, from whence it marched to Canterbury, and in the summer it was encamped, with the Nineteenth and Twenty-first Regiments, on Barham Downs under Lieutenant-General Campbell. In October the FOURTEENTH struck their tents, and marched to Dover Castle, where they remained during the following year. [Sidenote: 1762] [Sidenote: 1763] The regiment marched to Maidstone, and furnished a guard over French prisoners of war at Sissinghurst in October, 1762; in December it proceeded to Exeter; from whence it was removed in March, 1763, to Plymouth. [Sidenote: 1764] Leaving Plymouth in March, 1764, the regiment proceeded to the vicinity of London, and was reviewed on Wimbledon Common: on the 7th of May it was reviewed in Hyde Park by King George III., who was pleased to express his high approbation of its appearance and discipline; after the review it marched to Chatham and Dover. [Sidenote: 1765] Major-General Jefferies died in May, 1765, and the King conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on Major-General the Honorable William Keppel, fourth son of William Anne, second Earl of Albemarle, from the Fifty-sixth Foot. At this period, three companies of the regiment were employed on duty at Windsor and Hampton Court, and their good conduct attracted the attention of the King, George III., who was always ready to confer marks of his royal approbation on corps and individuals. His Majesty made some alterations in the clothing, and directed the "_white horse_," with the motto "_Nec aspera terrent_," to be placed on the black bear-skin caps to be worn by the grenadiers, and on the white caps to be worn by the drummers[3]. [Sidenote: 1766] Towards the end of May, 1766, the regiment marched into village quarters near Hounslow Heath, where it was reviewed on the 4th of June by the King, who was graciously pleased to express his royal approbation of its appearance and movements in the field. After the review the regiment marched to Salisbury and adjacents. [Sidenote: 1771] In June the regiment embarked at Portsmouth for North America, and was stationed in Nova Scotia and Canada until 1771, when it embarked from Halifax for the West Indies, to take part in reducing to submission to the British government, the refractory Caribbees in _St. Vincent's_. [Sidenote: 1772] [Sidenote: 1773] The island of St. Vincent's was captured from the French in 1762, and was ceded to Great Britain at the peace in 1763; it was found to contain two tribes of natives called the _red_ and _black_ Caribs, the former being the Aborigines, and the latter having sprung from a cargo of African slaves, who escaped from a vessel which was wrecked on the island. The Caribbees were devoted to the French interest; they were dangerous and troublesome neighbours to the English planters, and it was found necessary to restrain their conduct, and enforce obedience to a few salutary regulations. They were, however, of a determined spirit, possessed many thickly-wooded fastnesses, and so resolutely resisted all attempts to restrain their roving propensities and mode of life, that it was found necessary to augment the military force on the island. The FOURTEENTH Foot were employed against the refractory Caribbees in 1772 and 1773; numerous skirmishes occurred among the thickly-wooded parts of the country, and several soldiers were killed and wounded, in the bush fighting, which took place daily for some time. At length the Caribbees were reduced to submission: and the regiment returned to North America, leaving a number of sick men and others in the West Indies. [Sidenote: 1774] [Sidenote: 1775] The regiment was stationed at Virginia in North America, when the misunderstanding between Great Britain and these prosperous and wealthy colonies, produced open hostilities. The spirit which the colonists evinced in resisting the acts of the British parliament, for raising a revenue in their country, assumed a serious aspect in the years 1773 and 1774, and in 1775 hostilities commenced in the state of Massachusetts. The FOURTEENTH Regiment remained in the state of Virginia for some time afterwards; it was, consequently, not at Bunker's Hill; but it lost two promising officers at that battle, on the 17th of June, 1775, who were attending Major-General Howe during the engagement: viz., Lieutenant and Adjutant Bruce, who was killed, and Ensign Hesketh mortally wounded. On the 18th of October, 1775, the colonelcy of the regiment was conferred on Major-General Robert Cunninghame, from the Fifty-eighth Foot, in succession to Lieutenant-General the Honorable William Keppel, removed to the Twelfth Dragoons. The regiment was stationed at Norfolk, in Virginia, from whence a detachment of one hundred and twenty men, under Captain Fordyce, advanced at midnight on the 8th of December, against the American entrenchments at _Great Bridge_. At day-break the detachment crossed the bridge, and the grenadiers moved forward with great gallantry to storm the works, Lieutenant Batut being at the head of the leading section; but as they approached the entrenchments, a body of Americans, of very superior numbers, assailed them with a destructive fire of musketry: Captain Fordyce and twelve men were killed within a few yards of the breast-work; Lieutenant Batut and sixteen soldiers were wounded and taken prisoners, and the remainder of the detachment retreated across the bridge to a British fort, garrisoned by a detachment under Captain Leslie. The Americans buried Captain Fordyce with military honors. [Sidenote: 1776] The American troops afterwards increased in numbers so fast, that the royal forces were withdrawn from Virginia, and the FOURTEENTH Foot proceeded to the army under General Sir William Howe, at New York, where they were joined by a detachment which had been left at Nova Scotia on the embarkation of the regiment for the West Indies. After arriving at New York, part of the regiment was stationed on Staten Island, and the remainder was employed in the general operations of the army. [Sidenote: 1777] The regiment had sustained a serious loss at St. Vincent's, and being weak in numbers, it was directed to draft the private soldiers fit for duty to other corps, and return to England, where it arrived in the summer of 1777, and active measures were adopted to recruit its ranks. [Sidenote: 1778] [Sidenote: 1779] During the year 1778 the regiment was stationed in the south of England; and in the summer of 1779 it pitched its tents on Coxheath, where a camp was formed of the Sixth, FOURTEENTH, Fiftieth, Sixty-fifth, and Sixty-ninth Regiments, with sixteen battalions of militia, under Lieutenant-General Pierson. [Sidenote: 1780] [Sidenote: 1781] The regiment marched to Gosport in 1780, and pitched its tents at Stokes-bay, furnishing working parties at Fort Monkton, and a guard over the French, Spanish, and American prisoners of war, at Forton prison. In July the regiment embarked as marines on board the Channel fleet commanded by Admiral Darby, who, in 1781, relieved Gibraltar, which fortress was besieged by a combined French and Spanish force. [Sidenote: 1782] Having completed its recruiting, and attained a state of efficiency, the regiment embarked from Portsmouth, in January, 1782, for Jamaica; it was on board of transports in the harbour of St. Lucia, during Admiral Rodney's engagement with the French fleet under Count de Grasse, on the 12th of April, and afterwards mounted guard over the Count, when a prisoner on that island. The regiment proceeded to Jamaica, and was formed to receive Prince William Henry, (afterwards King William IV.,) then a midshipman, on his landing at Spanish Town, and mounted guard at his quarters during his stay on the island. Soon after its arrival at Jamaica, the regiment received orders, dated the 31st of August, 1782, to assume the title of the "FOURTEENTH, OR BEDFORDSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT," and to cultivate a connection with that county, so as to create a mutual attachment between the inhabitants of Bedfordshire and the regiment, which might, at all times, be useful towards recruiting the corps. [Sidenote: 1787] On the 4th of April, 1787, Lieutenant-General Robert Cunninghame was removed to the Fifth Royal Irish Dragoons, and was succeeded in the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Foot, by Lieutenant-General John Douglas, who had commanded the Twenty-first Light Dragoons, which corps was disbanded in 1783. [Sidenote: 1788] The FOURTEENTH Regiment attended the funeral of the Honorable Captain Chetwynd, of His Majesty's ship "Europa," in November, 1788, at which the Governor of Jamaica,--His Royal Highness Prince William Henry (then a captain of the Royal Navy),--the officers of the squadron, and a number of gentlemen in carriages, were present. The regiment marched at the head of the procession in funeral order, the band playing the Dead March; and the remains of this distinguished officer were interred in the chancel of the church at Spanish Town. [Sidenote: 1789] Lieutenant-General Douglas having been removed to the Fifth Dragoon Guards, His Majesty conferred the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Foot on Colonel George Earl Waldegrave, by commission, dated the 27th of August, 1789. Earl Waldegrave died about six weeks after his appointment, and was succeeded by Colonel George Hotham, from captain and lieutenant-colonel of the First Foot Guards. [Sidenote: 1791] [Sidenote: 1792] Having been relieved from duty at Jamaica, the regiment embarked on board of His Majesty's ship Dover, of forty-four guns, on the 9th of April, 1791, and landed at Portsmouth on the 10th of June. In the autumn it marched to Chatham, and afterwards to Canterbury; and on Friday, the 21st of November, it received their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess of York, at Dover, on their arrival from the Continent; the Duke of York having married, a few weeks previously, Frederica Charlotte Ulrica, Princess Royal of Prussia. [Sidenote: 1793] Early in 1792 the regiment returned to Chatham, and was brigaded with the Third Foot (the Buffs) under the command of Colonel Fox; in June the two regiments encamped on Bagshot-heath, with several other corps, under the command of the Duke of Richmond: at this camp the regiment remained three weeks; it was reviewed several times by His Majesty, and afterwards returned to Chatham, where it remained several months. In the meantime a revolution had taken place in France, where a republican party had seized the reins of government, beheaded their sovereign, and involved the country in anarchy and bloodshed. Not content with carrying the horrors of democracy into every part of France, the republicans endeavoured to propagate their doctrines in all countries, and to overturn the constitution of every monarchy in Europe. Under these circumstances, the British people became involved in war for the defence of the fixed rights of their sovereign, the preservation of their own civil and religious liberties, and of their honor as a nation. The FOURTEENTH Regiment was one of the first corps completed to a war establishment, under the zealous and judicious arrangements of its excellent commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel WELBORE ELLIS DOYLE, who assumed the command on the arrival of the regiment from Jamaica in 1791; it was also one of the corps selected for foreign service at the commencement of the war; and embarking at Dover, on the 19th March, 1793, for Holland, to aid the Dutch in repelling an attack of the French, it landed at Helvoetsluys, in the island of Voorn, on the 25th of March, being the first regiment of the line which arrived at the scene of war. The success of the allied arms had removed the theatre of war from Holland to the confines of French Flanders; and the FOURTEENTH Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle, proceeded to Briel, where it embarked for Antwerp, whence it marched to Ghent, and was removed in canal boats to Bruges, where it halted a few days. From Bruges it marched to Tournay, where it arrived towards the end of April; and the flank companies, with those of the Thirty-seventh and Fifty-third Regiments, were placed under the orders of Major Mathews, of the Fifty-third, and detached to Marquain, to watch the motions of the enemy, in which service they were employed until the 20th of May. The Duke of York assumed the command of the British and Hanoverian troops in Flanders, and co-operated with the Austrians under the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg. On the 23rd of May the FOURTEENTH Regiment was engaged in the attack of the enemy's fortified camp at _Famars_, and evinced great gallantry. Being composed principally of young soldiers, they rushed up the heights with great impetuosity to attack the enemy, but did not preserve sufficient order; Lieut.-Colonel Doyle galloped to the front, halted, and reformed the ranks, then bid the band play the tune "_ça ira_," and using a few encouraging expressions to the men, led them to the attack, when they rushed in compact order upon their opponents, and overpowered all opposition[4]. The French retreated across the Scheldt, and the allied army invested the fortress of Valenciennes. Lieutenant Charles W. Doyle, who performed the duty of brigade-major, was thanked for his conduct. The loss of the regiment was limited to two serjeants and seven rank and file wounded; the Duke of York expressed his approbation of its conduct in orders. The FOURTEENTH Regiment was employed at the siege of _Valenciennes_, under the Duke of York, and on the 25th of July, it furnished a detachment to take part in storming the horn-work. Lieut.-Colonel Doyle being appointed to the command of one of the attacking columns, obtained permission to place at the head of his party, one hundred volunteers of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, and having assembled the corps, he said, "Soldiers, one hundred volunteers from among you are to lead the column that I am to command _upon a service of the greatest danger_; I have thought it right to state this before I call upon you; such of you as volunteer this dangerous enterprise, recover arms:" when every man brought his musket to the "_recover_." The colonel was much affected by this display of devotion, and said, "Soldiers, I thank you from my heart; where all are equally desirous of facing the greatest danger, I cannot look, or wish, for volunteers. Officers, call out the first ten men for duty in each company." On the 26th of July the following general order was issued.-- "His Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief returns his thanks to Major-General Abercrombie, Colonel Leigh, and Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle, for the gallantry they showed on the attack last night." Haying been constantly exposed to the cannon of the town for seven weeks, the men had acquired great steadiness under fire, the attack was made with signal intrepidity and resolution, and the out-works were carried in gallant style. The regiment had one serjeant and three rank and file killed; one officer, one serjeant, and fourteen rank and file wounded; the flank companies also lost seven men. Three days afterwards the garrison capitulated, and this important fortress was delivered up to the Duke of York. After the surrender of Valenciennes the British troops marched towards Cambray, and they subsequently separated from the Austrians, taking with them a few Imperial regiments, for the purpose of undertaking the siege of Dunkirk. On arriving at Menin, it was ascertained that the French had driven the Dutch from _Lincelles_; that post was recaptured by the British Foot Guards under Major-General Lake, on the 18th of August. The FOURTEENTH Regiment was one of the corps ordered to support the Foot Guards, and was left in possession of the village, after its capture, until that post was restored to the Dutch. The army resumed its march towards _Dunkirk_ on the following day, and on the 24th of August, the FOURTEENTH Foot took part in driving the French out-posts, between the canal of Furnes and the sea, into the town, on which occasion the soldiers had to force their way through strong double hedges, and across deep ditches full of water. A deep ditch, surrounding the garden of a chateau, obstructed the progress of the grenadier company of the FOURTEENTH, when Lieutenant THOMAS GREEN CLAPHAM leaped into the ditch, where he stood up to his breast in water, that the grenadiers might pass swiftly over it, by stepping upon his shoulders, and pursue the French, which they did with great alacrity. The light infantry company also displayed distinguished ardour, and captured three pieces of artillery. Finally the French were driven into the town, and the siege was commenced. The loss of the regiment was limited to a few private soldiers killed and wounded. On the 6th of September, the French made a sortie from Dunkirk, in great strength, directing their attack principally against the right of the besieging army, when the FOURTEENTH Foot, commanded by Major Alexander Ross, (Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle being ill) was ordered forward to support that part of the position. As they passed the flank of the regiment of Esterhazy, the Germans cheered the FOURTEENTH, and the gallant soldiers rushed into the fight with great energy, overthrowing all opposition, and chasing the French up the covered way. The regiment had one serjeant, one corporal, and eight private soldiers killed; Captains Cochrane and Garnier, Lieutenants Mackenzie, Powell, and Elrington[5], Ensigns Smith and Williams, Volunteer McGrath, one serjeant, one corporal, and thirty-six private soldiers, wounded. The arrival of the heavy artillery for the siege, and the naval force intended to co-operate with the army, in the reduction of Dunkirk, was so long delayed, that the French had time to convey from every part of France, by coaches, waggons, and other vehicles, such an immense body of troops, to the vicinity of Dunkirk, that the Duke of York had little chance of success. Another sortie was made by the garrison on the 8th of September, when the FOURTEENTH and Thirty-seventh Regiments advanced to attack the French; as the two corps passed the regiment of Joseph Colloredo, they were cheered by the Austrians, and they succeeded in repulsing the enemy: but no chance of final success remained, and the siege was raised, the FOURTEENTH Regiment marching by Furnes and Ypres, to Menin. The regiment marched, in October, to Oudenarde, where it furnished a guard over two thousand French prisoners; it was sent forward, several times, to take the out-post duty, and upon a movement in advance, by the enemy, upon Menin and Wevelghem, it repulsed an attack upon the out-post at Vervicke. [Sidenote: 1794] Early in 1794 the regiment left Oudenarde for Wevelghem, and remained on outpost duty until April, when the army assembled, and was reviewed by the Emperor of Germany, on the heights of Cateau, where His Royal Highness William Frederick, Duke of Gloucester, was nominated to the command of the brigade composed of the FOURTEENTH, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third Regiments. In the general attack on the enemy's positions, on the 17th of April, the regiment formed part of the column under Lieutenant-General Sir William Erskine, and took part in the attack on the village of _Prêmont_, and the wood on its left. The French having been driven from their positions, the siege of _Landrécies_ was commenced, and the FOURTEENTH Regiment formed part of the covering army encamped on the heights of _Cateau_; this post was attacked on the 26th of April, by the French under General Chapuy, who were repulsed, with great slaughter, by the British cavalry, with the loss of many guns. On this occasion the light company of the regiment behaved with much gallantry, and, having advanced to a wood on the left, kept in check a considerable body of the enemy, who meditated an attack on the batteries. On the fall of Landrécies, the British troops moved to the vicinity of _Tournay_, where they were attacked on the 10th of May by a numerous body of French, who were defeated with severe loss. The FOURTEENTH Foot lost only one man on this occasion. At length a combined attack was made on the French positions, with the view of forcing them to evacuate Flanders, in which the FOURTEENTH Regiment had another opportunity of distinguishing itself; it left Tournay on the evening of the 16th of May,--took part in forcing the points of the French position it was destined to attack in the direction of Lisle, on the 17th of May, and was successful; but several Austrian columns failed to accomplish their part in the combined movements. The British troops, having penetrated the French position, and being left unsupported, became exposed to the attack of the enemy's very superior numbers. Early on the 18th of May the FOURTEENTH Regiment was environed and attacked by an overwhelming force, but it stood its ground, and by firing by wings and platoons with as much steadiness and regularity as on parade, held its assailants in check. Its veteran commanding officer, Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel BROWNE, became quite exhausted, and sat for some time on a chair behind the colours. At length an aide-de-camp arrived from Major-General Fox, commanding the brigade, with orders for the FOURTEENTH to retreat; and while performing this retrograde movement, they preserved an unbroken formation. Surrounded by enemies, fired upon by infantry and artillery, and menaced by cavalry, the regiment preserved its order with astonishing firmness, forming divisions in the rear against cavalry, and marching over ground covered with dead bodies. The road to Lannoy, by which the regiment had advanced on the preceding day, was found in possession of the enemy, with an abbatis and cannon formed across it, and the first discharge killed several grenadiers, when Major-General Fox said to Captain Clapham, "I fear we must lay down our arms." "No, sir," replied the captain, "the FOURTEENTH can cut through them." At this moment Corporal GILBERT CIMITIERE[6], of the grenadiers, a French emigrant, well acquainted with the country, stepped forward, and undertook to conduct the brigade through the inclosures, and the troops quitted the main road under his guidance, being followed and assailed by the French. Lieutenant-Colonel Browne was shot through the body, and was carried in a blanket by four grenadiers, but he suffered so much pain that he requested them to stop, and he and they were made prisoners. The command of the regiment devolved on Captain Perry, of the light company, which was afterwards commanded by Lieutenant Graves. This officer, and Lieutenant Elrington, commanded the two rear companies of the column, and formed alternately to repulse the French cavalry. Although every road was fortified, and the hedges lined with troops, the brigade fought its way through the inclosures with astonishing gallantry and resolution, and gained the position at Templeuve, having, however, lost every piece of artillery with the column, excepting one of the battalion guns of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, under Lieutenant Phillott. The guide of the column, Corporal Gilbert Cimitiere, was rewarded with a commission. The loss of the regiment, on this trying occasion, was one serjeant and thirteen rank and file, killed; twenty-two rank and file wounded: Lieutenant-Colonel Browne wounded and taken prisoner; three serjeants, two drummers, and sixty-eight rank and file, prisoners of war and missing, many of whom were taken in consequence of being wounded and unable to continue the retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Browne died at Lisle on the following day, and was much regretted by the officers and soldiers he had commanded with distinguished bravery on many trying occasions. The conduct of the brigade was commended by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, and its gallantry is recorded in the histories of the war[7]. The regiment resumed its post in front of _Tournay_, and was in position on the 22nd of May, when General Pichegru attacked the allied army with an immense body of troops, first assailing the right and afterwards the centre of the line. The FOURTEENTH being on the left, were not engaged during the early part of the day; but in the afternoon, the enemy carried the post of Pontechin, on the high road from Courtray to Tournay, and the fortune of the day was evidently flowing in favour of the French, when the brigade, formed of the FOURTEENTH, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third Regiments, was ordered to the post of honor and danger. As the FOURTEENTH quitted their post on the left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, the Duke of York addressed them in the most flattering manner, declaring his perfect reliance on their gallantry. The three regiments moved at a running pace; though weak in numbers, they were strong in valour and resolution, and being conscious of their own prowess, they rushed upon their numerous opponents fully determined to conquer or perish in the attempt. The FOURTEENTH charged along the chaussée,--overpowered all resistance,--carried the village,--re-formed beyond the houses under a heavy fire[8],--raised a loud shout, and rushed forward to storm a battery on a rising ground near a windmill, which the French defended a short time, but afterwards abandoned it, leaving the regiment in possession of several pieces of cannon. This sudden burst of British valour, coming like an explosion of thunder, amazed and confounded the French, who gave way before the superior prowess of the British soldiers, and the current of the battle flowed in favour of the allies. There was, however, a protracted resistance in an orchard, where the grenadiers and light infantry of the FOURTEENTH Foot were engaged, and several instances of individual contempt of danger occurred. A grenadier named RYAN refused to avail himself of the advantage of standing behind a tree, saying "They cannot touch me;" but the next moment he fell forward apparently dead, when Captain Clapham turned him over, and said, "Ryan, you are only shot through the face, you will do well yet;" "Is that all?" replied the grenadier, and jumping up and commencing loading his firelock, he added, "Then I will have another rap at them," and he was with difficulty prevailed upon to go to the rear[9]. The French were eventually driven out of the orchard; the British pressed upon their opponents, and a victory was gained over the Republican troops, who were forced to quit the field of battle with severe loss. The FOURTEENTH Regiment gained great honor on this occasion; its loss was one serjeant and four rank and file killed; Captain Cochrane, Major of brigade, died of his wounds; one serjeant and twenty-eight rank and file wounded; five men missing. Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay's horse was killed, and the Lieutenant-Colonel received four musket balls through his hat. The following general order, dated Tournay, 23rd of May, 1794, was published.-- "His Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief desires to express his most particular thanks to Major-General Fox; to the FOURTEENTH Regiment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay; to the Thirty-seventh Regiment commanded by Captain Lightburne; to the Fifty-third Regiment commanded by Major Wiseman, and to the detachment of artillery attached to them under the command of Captain Trotter, for _that display of intrepidity and good conduct, which reflects the greatest honor upon themselves, at the same time that it was highly instrumental in deciding the important victory of the 22nd instant_. "His Royal Highness much laments the loss they have sustained; but flatters himself they feel it, in some measure, compensated by the credit they have gained." In his public despatch the Duke of York, speaking of the FOURTEENTH, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third Regiments, stated,--"_Nothing could exceed the spirit and gallantry with which they conducted themselves_, particularly in the storm of the village of Pontechin, which they forced with the bayonet." Historians have recorded the gallant conduct of the regiment[10]; and the royal authority was afterwards given for it to bear the word "_Tournay_" on its colours, to commemorate its distinguished conduct on this memorable occasion. Notwithstanding these displays of valour, the enemy brought forward so great a superiority of numbers that it was found necessary to retreat, and a series of retrograde movements followed, during which little fighting occurred, and few corps had opportunities of distinguishing themselves. Various positions were occupied for short periods, and after quitting the Austrian Netherlands, attempts were made to defend Holland; but the people of that country had imbibed the doctrines of republicanism, and they made little effort to preserve the United Provinces from the French. In August the FOURTEENTH regiment was encamped near Antwerp; it was afterwards in position in the vicinity of Breda, from whence it retired to a post beyond Bois-le-duc, and, subsequently, to Nimeguen: it formed part of the garrison of Nimeguen for a short period, and when that town was evacuated, the regiment proceeded to Linden Castle; the army occupying a position beyond the Waal, for the defence of the passage of that river. Towards the end of December the river became frozen, and a body of the enemy crossed on the ice; but was driven back on the 30th of that month. [Sidenote: 1795] The frost afterwards became more severe, and on the 4th of January, 1795, another body of French troops passed the river on the ice. At this period, the FOURTEENTH Regiment was at Linden Castle, from whence it advanced to take part in a combined attack on the enemy, under Major-General David Dundas. On the 7th of January it traversed the Rhine on the ice at Rhenen, and proceeded to Bueren Castle. On the following morning Major-General Lord Cathcart advanced with the light companies, thirty hulans, and a detachment of the Twenty-seventh Regiment, to reconnoitre; and the FOURTEENTH and Twenty-seventh regiments were afterwards brought up to attack the enemy at _Gueldermalsen_. The FOURTEENTH formed on the ice, on the left of the dyke, and the Twenty-seventh across the inclosure on the right, supported by the piquets, hulans, and afterwards by a squadron of light dragoons; and the field pieces were protected by the grenadiers of the FOURTEENTH under Lieutenant Elrington, who marched before the guns. Advancing in this order, the troops drove the French before them, until they arrived at Gueldermalsen, where a protracted resistance was made. Lieutenant Elrington, with the grenadiers of the FOURTEENTH, charged the French artillery at the bridge, and bayonetted the enemy at the gun, carrying the post with great gallantry. The British battalion guns cleared the street; the soldiers rushed forward, and were engaged from house to house, until they had passed the village, when they were assailed by the enemy in force. The FOURTEENTH defended the streets; the Twenty-seventh, the church-yard; and the Twenty-eighth coming up most opportunely on the right, threw in a flanking fire, which compelled the enemy to retire[11]. The brigade remained in the village during the night; it was ordered to retire on the following morning, and the three regiments were thanked in orders for their distinguished conduct: Lieutenant ELRINGTON, of the FOURTEENTH, was thanked by name for his gallantry at the attack of the bridge defended by a gun. The regiment had twelve rank and file killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Hope (afterwards General Sir Alexander Hope, G.C.B.), Captain Perry, one serjeant, and twenty rank and file, wounded: Lieutenant-Colonel Hope lost the use of his right arm from a wound in the shoulder[12]. Captain Perry died of his wounds. After this action the regiment marched to Cullenburg, and was on duty about a week, on the banks of the Leek, without house, tent, or any other cover from the weather, which was particularly severe. Numerical superiority gave the enemy so decided an advantage, that a retreat through Holland to Germany became necessary, which took place in the depth of winter, and was attended with severe privation and suffering. On one occasion, after a long march, the FOURTEENTH Foot found themselves on a dreary heath, on a dark night, exposed to severe frost, and a snowstorm; the men's limbs were so benumbed with cold, that the most fatal results were apprehended; but the discovery of a large farm-house, and a barn upon the heath, proved particularly fortunate to the soldiers. These hardships were aggravated by the mortifying reflection, that the regiment was retiring before an enemy, whom it had never encountered without proving victorious. At length the regiment arrived in Germany, where it obtained repose in comfortable quarters; it embarked at Bremen-lee on the 9th of April, and landed at Harwich on the 7th of May. From Harwich the regiment marched to Hitchin and its neighbourhood; and when passing through the several towns on its route it was hailed with acclamations by the inhabitants; almost every officer and soldier bore marks of bullets having passed through his accoutrements or clothing; the colours were perforated in many places, and were borne by Lieutenants Stuart and Graves, the two senior subalterns,--so many casualties had occurred among the officers. The achievements of the regiment had been made known, and it was everywhere congratulated on its gallant exploits. In June the regiment pitched its tents at Warley, in Essex, and in July received orders to march to Nusthaling, near Southampton. On passing through Dartford, the band played the republican tune _ça ira_ (which it played when the regiment charged the position at Famars, in 1793), when the inhabitants evinced their aversion to democracy by throwing stones at the musicians for playing so offensive a tune; but upon an explanation being given, the people responded with three cheers to the honour of the brave soldiers of the FOURTEENTH who fought at Famars. The regiment afterwards embarked for Quiberon-bay, to support the French emigrants under M. Sombreuil, but being detained by contrary winds, it was directed to disembark and return to Southampton. At this period an armament was fitting out to complete the deliverance of the French West India islands from the power of republicanism, and to reduce to obedience the insurgents of St. Vincent and Grenada. The FOURTEENTH Regiment joined the expedition, and sailed with the immense fleet of Indiamen, transports, and merchant-vessels, under the convoy of a squadron of the royal navy commanded by Admiral Christian, which, on quitting the British shores, presented a magnificent spectacle calculated to impress the mind with a just idea of British power; but the voyage had been delayed until a very late period of the year, and the fleet encountered so severe a storm that several ships foundered at sea, others were wrecked on the western coast of England, and the greater part returned to port. The fleet was re-fitted and again put to sea, but, after encountering severe gales, it returned to Portsmouth a second time. The "Calypso" transport, having part of the FOURTEENTH Regiment on board, was nearly run down during a heavy gale, by the "Charon" of forty-four guns, and lost the main yard; but this transport continued the voyage and arrived at Barbadoes in eleven weeks. [Sidenote: 1796] Several of the regiments, which returned to port, had their destination changed; but the portion of the FOURTEENTH, which had put back, re-embarked in February, 1796, and arrived in April at Barbadoes, where four companies of the Twenty-eighth Foot were attached to the regiment. The FOURTEENTH Foot constituted part of the expedition against _St. Lucia_, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby; and sailed from Carlisle-bay, Barbadoes, on the 22nd of April, for the rendezvous of the troops to be employed in the enterprise, at Martinique, from whence the expedition sailed, on the morning of the 26th of April, for St. Lucia, where the head quarters landed on the 27th, near Pigeon Island, and marched to Choque Bay, to cover the landing of the remainder of the troops. They continued in position there a short time, till the batteries against Morne Fortuné were completed, when they were ordered up to take part in the ulterior operations. Prior to landing, three companies were detached, with a force under Brigadier-General Perryn, on the side of the Grand Cul de Sac, to facilitate the investment of _Morne Fortuné_, and an attempt was made to drive the enemy from the batteries on the base of the mountain, on that side; and Major Donkin's battalion, consisting of three companies of the FOURTEENTH and four of the Twenty-eighth, formed part of the force employed on this service. This battalion supported the Forty-fourth Regiment, in the column commanded by Colonel Riddell. On advancing to the attack, the battalion was checked, at a sudden turn in a winding road cut on the side of a steep hill, by an _abattis_ occupied by French troops, when Captain James Graves sprang up the bank by the aid of a branch, and being assisted by Captain Henry Cox, and Lieutenant George Morris, he helped a few soldiers to climb up the side of the hill, who fired down upon the flank of the troops in the _abattis_, who instantly abandoned it, and the FOURTEENTH continued their advance. On arriving on more open ground, the fire of the enemy's batteries was heavy; when Captain James Graves, of the FOURTEENTH, and Captain John Frederic Brown, of the Twenty-eighth, stormed the lower battery, called _Chapuis_, with a few men of the two regiments. Captain Brown, Lieutenants William F. Dalton and John Grady, with several private soldiers, fell wounded in the advance, but the battery was captured, and was held by Captain Graves, Lieutenant John Hutchinson, and about forty rank and file. The soldiers being fired upon from a house, it was forced by a few men under Lieutenant Owen, and all the defenders bayonetted. The firing on the right indicating a retrograde movement on the part of the British troops at that point, Serjeant Shaw of the FOURTEENTH was detached to reconnoitre; he returned wounded, and reported the retreat of the British, and the advance of a fresh column of the enemy. Under these circumstances the guns in the battery were spiked, and the soldiers retired, fighting their way through a woody country, until they joined the column under Brigadier-General Perryn. From the failure of part of the attacking force the operations were not successful. The loss of the FOURTEENTH was limited to five men killed; Captain Cox, and one serjeant wounded. On sending a flag of truce, on the following day, to inquire for prisoners, the answer received was, "The republicans have made no prisoners." An attack was afterwards made on the north side of Morne Fortuné; a battery opened its fire against the enemy's works on the 16th of May, and on the 24th the French desired a suspension of arms, which was followed by the surrender of the island. After the surrender of St. Lucia, the FOURTEENTH formed part of the expedition against the island of _St. Vincent_, and a landing was effected on the 8th of June: the Caribs having surrendered, the French troops retired, in a body, to the strong fort of La Vigie. It having been ascertained that the fort was badly provisioned, and worse provided with water, it was clear that the garrison could not hold out many days; and the Commander-in-Chief shortly received information that they intended to effect an escape, by night, by descending along the course of a deep ravine, which led from the town through high and inaccessible rocks. A party of the FOURTEENTH, consisting of three officers, and one hundred men, was ordered out to occupy the pass:--they took up a position in the bed of the river, behind some large stones, over which the men rested their bayonets. The darkness of the night, and the position between the woods, precluded the possibility of seeing anything, and the rushing of the water prevented anything from being heard. The first intimation that the party in ambuscade received of the enemy's approach, was the fact of their actually pressing upon their bayonets. Immediately a desultory firing took place, which ceased only when the enemy were supposed to have retreated. When daylight broke, a horrid spectacle of killed and wounded presented itself. Such of the garrison as succeeded in returning to La Vigie surrendered the next day. Captain Powell, who commanded, Lieutenants Gibson and Beavan, and the whole party, received the thanks of Sir Ralph Abercromby. These captures having been accomplished, the FOURTEENTH Regiment returned to Barbadoes, where it was stationed during the remainder of the year. [Sidenote: 1797] Spain having united with France in the war against Great Britain, orders were issued to attack the Spanish possessions in the West Indies, and in the early part of February, 1797, the FOURTEENTH Regiment proceeded to Cariacou, where an expedition was assembled to attack the island of _Trinidad_. On the morning of the 15th of February the fleet sailed on the enterprise, and as it anchored near the shores of Trinidad, the Spaniards became conscious of their inability to resist, and set fire to their naval force in the harbour. The troops landed on the 17th of February, and the Spaniards immediately surrendered, delivering up the island. From Trinidad the regiment proceed to Martinique, where it was stationed several weeks. Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby assembled a small force, in the beginning of April, for the attack of the Spanish island of _Porto Rico_, and the FOURTEENTH were withdrawn from Martinique to take part in the enterprise. The fleet entered a narrow channel three leagues eastward of the town, and the troops landed on the 18th of April; but met with great opposition by a heavy fire of musketry from the Spaniards, who were lodged behind a breastwork on the beach. The FOURTEENTH were in flat-bottomed boats, pulled by the Lascars of the Indiamen in which they had been conveyed. The impetuosity of the men could not bear delay; but, leaping out of the boats, and wading ashore, they soon drove the enemy from their position, at the point of the bayonet. Lieutenant-Colonel Burnett was ordered to pursue, with all possible speed, to endeavour to get possession of the bridge which led over the river between the town and the beach. So closely were the enemy pursued by the FOURTEENTH, and particularly by the _Light Company_, that many threw away their arms and accoutrements, and fairly ran for it: they succeeded in gaining the bridge; and, as soon as the men of the FOURTEENTH approached the tête-de-pont, the Spaniards blew up the bridge at the moment when many of their own people were crossing it. The destruction of the bridge obliged the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Ralph Abercromby, to change his plan, which had, originally, been to take the town by a coup-de-main. The next day, therefore, the army began to erect batteries. The second day after their completion, the enemy kept up such an incessant fire, that they succeeded in dismounting two of the guns of one of the batteries, and otherwise seriously injuring the works. A strong party was, therefore, ordered out at night to repair the damage: this party consisted of three hundred and fifty men, under the command of Captain Powell, afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel and Major of the regiment, of which number one hundred and fifty were to be employed in the trenches, and two hundred were placed at some distance from the battery to act as a covering party. The same night Major Ronald Hamilton, of the FOURTEENTH, made an attempt to ford the river, with a view of ascertaining if it were fordable for infantry; but, being discovered, he was fired upon by an advanced sentry. This creating some alarm, caused an irregular fire of musketry to be carried on all night. Under cover of this, and of the darkness, a party of five hundred Spaniards contrived to cross the river higher up, and then descending along its edge, secreted themselves among the brushwood between the river and the battery. At dawn of day a serjeant and twelve men of the FOURTEENTH, who had been on piquet in the bushes, were called in, and, at the very same moment, as if by magic, the whole party of Spaniards rushed, in one dense mass, into the battery. Sir Ralph Abercromby, Colonel Hope, the Adjutant-General, (afterwards Lord Niddry) Colonel Maitland, with the whole staff of the Commander-in-Chief, had arrived, about an hour before, to inspect the work, and were at the moment in the battery. The sudden inrush of the Spaniards created surprise; and the increased number of persons thus in the battery produced great confusion. The only British who had arms were the twelve men from the piquet; but all the Spaniards were provided with bayonets, or short swords, evidently intended for the butchery of the whole working party. For a short time it seemed as if they were to be utterly at the mercy of the enemy; but, soon recovering themselves, they fell to work with good will with shovels, pickaxes, and other implements of labour, and that with such terrible effect, that every Spaniard was either killed, or taken prisoner, before the covering party could arrive to assist their comrades. The working party had five men killed, and seventeen wounded. Captain Powell, and Lieutenants Gibson and Wren, received thanks in general orders[13]. From Porto Rico the regiment again proceeded to Martinique, where it was stationed upwards of three years. [Sidenote: 1800] Towards the end of the year 1800, the regiment relieved the Seventieth Foot at Trinidad. [Sidenote: 1802] [Sidenote: 1803] On the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens in 1802, Great Britain gave up the captured possessions of France, Spain, and Holland. The FOURTEENTH were relieved from duty in the West Indies in April, 1803, and returning to England, landed at Gosport, from whence they marched to Winchester, under Captain Graves, who had performed the duty of commanding officer nearly twelve months. Previously to the arrival of the regiment in England, the short respite from the horrors of war, granted by the treaty of Amiens, had terminated; the ambitious designs of Bonaparte, First Consul of France, had involved Great Britain in another contest, and orders had been issued for augmenting the regular army. Every effort was made to complete the establishment of the FOURTEENTH Foot, which was attended with great success, and when Bonaparte assembled an army for the invasion of England, the regiment marched to Silver Hill Barracks, and afterwards to Winchelsea, where it was held in readiness to repel the legions of France, had they ventured to land on the British coast. At this momentous period the measures of the government were nobly seconded by the people; a patriotic enthusiasm pervaded the country; and the attitude the nation assumed, with the strength and energy it evinced, while breathing defiance to the gigantic military power by which it was menaced, left no room for doubt respecting the result of the contest had the French army attempted to carry into effect the threats of its leader. [Sidenote: 1804] In 1804 the French army remained inactive at Boulogne, and Great Britain preserved an attitude of defence. In the autumn of this year a _second battalion_ was added to the FOURTEENTH Regiment. [Sidenote: 1805] The first battalion remained on the Sussex coast in readiness for active service whenever it might be required. In the mean time the French nation had conferred on its First Consul, Bonaparte, the dignity of Emperor, and he was also crowned King of Italy. In the autumn Napoleon reviewed his army at Boulogne, and afterwards marched against the forces of Russia and Austria, to crush the coalition forming against his interests in Germany. At this period the French troops were withdrawn from Hanover, which country they seized on resuming hostilities in 1803. Towards the end of October, the first battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment embarked for Hanover, where a body of British troops was assembled under Lieutenant-General Lord Cathcart. The defeat of the Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz, established the preponderance of the French power on the continent for a short period, and in the treaty concluded at Vienna soon afterwards, it was stipulated that Hanover should be occupied by the Prussians. Under these circumstances the troops under Lord Cathcart returned to England. [Sidenote: 1806] The first battalion landed from Hanover in February, 1806, and was quartered in Kent. On the decease of General Hotham, King George III. conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on Major-General Sir Harry Calvert, from the Fifth West India Regiment, by commission dated the 8th of February, 1806. In this year the second battalion proceeded to Ireland. The first battalion was encamped at Shorncliffe, where it was formed in brigade with the Ninth and Ninety-first Foot, under Major-General Rowland Hill, (afterwards General Lord Hill); this brigade was reviewed with the Forty-third Regiment by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, who expressed his high approbation of the appearance and discipline of the several corps. In December the first battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment proceeded to Ireland. [Sidenote: 1807] After remaining in Ireland five months the first battalion returned to England, and in June, 1807, it embarked under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel James Watson, for the East Indies, where it arrived in November of the same year, and landed at Fort St. George, Madras. [Sidenote: 1808] The influence of French councils at the court of Denmark, had involved that country in hostilities with Great Britain, and in the beginning of 1808 the first battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment sailed from Madras with the expedition against the Danish settlement of _Tranquebar_, situate at one of the mouths of the Caveri river, in the Carnatic, which surrendered to the British arms on the 8th of February, when Lieutenant Colonel Watson, with the head quarters, returned to Madras, and shortly afterwards to Bengal. [Sidenote: 1809] In the mean time important events had occurred in Europe, which called the second battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment into active service. After reducing Germany to submission to his will, and forcing Russia to accede to his decrees, Napoleon was prompted by his restless ambition to attempt the subjugation of Spain and Portugal. The Spaniards and Portuguese rose in arms to assert their national rights, and in the summer of 1808 Portugal was delivered by a British army under Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley. In the autumn Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore received orders to advance with a body of British troops from Portugal, into the heart of Spain, at the same time several regiments were sent from the United Kingdom to co-operate in this enterprise. The second battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Jasper Nicolls, embarked from Cork for Spain, and landed at Corunna, forming part of the force under Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird. Advancing up the country, the British troops encountered many difficulties and privations, and the Spanish armies, with which they were directed to co-operate, were defeated and dispersed by the legions of Napoleon, who had three hundred thousand men in Spain. To confront this host of veterans, the British general had not twenty-five thousand men; yet, with that intrepidity for which he was always distinguished, he advanced and menaced the enemy's lines. Sir David Baird's division joined the troops under Sir John Moore on the 20th of December, at Majorga, from whence the army advanced to Sahagun, and preparations were made for attacking the French troops under Marshal Soult; but information being received that Napoleon was advancing at the head of an overwhelming force, the army retreated towards the coast. In this retrograde movement of two hundred and fifty miles, along roads covered with snow, over rivers and mountains, and along narrow defiles, the troops endured privation and suffering of various kinds; but the ability of their commander was conspicuous, and the army arrived, unbroken, at _Corunna_, in January, 1809. The soldiers obtained shelter, food, and repose in the town and neighbouring villages, and their wasted strength was recruited while they waited the arrival of shipping to transport them to England. The French army under Marshal Soult approaching, the British troops formed for battle on a range of heights in front of Corunna; the FOURTEENTH were formed in brigade with the Second, Fifth, and Thirty-second Regiments, under Major-General (afterwards Lord) Hill, and were posted towards the left of the position. On the 16th of January the French troops descended the mountains and attacked the British position in three columns; the first column carried the village of Elvina; then dividing, attempted to turn the right of Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird's division by the valley, and to break its front; the second column advanced against the British centre, and the third attacked the left at the village of Palavia Abaxo. The furious onsets of the enemy were met and repulsed with a firmness and determination which proved the unconquerable spirit and excellent discipline of the British troops. The enemy finding his efforts unavailing on the right and centre, determined to render the attack on the left more serious, and succeeded in obtaining possession of Palavia Abaxo, the village through which the great road to Madrid passes, and which was situate in front of that part of the line; from this post the French were, however, soon expelled, by a very gallant attack of some companies of the second battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolls[14]. The enemy was repulsed at all points, and the lustre of the British arms shone with peculiar brilliance amidst the most disadvantageous circumstances; but the army sustained the loss of its gallant commander, Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, who was mortally wounded during the engagement. Having defeated a French army of superior numbers, the British troops withdrew on board the fleet. Major-General Hill's brigade took up a position near the ramparts, leaving the piquets to keep up the bivouac fires, to cover the embarkation, which was completed with little loss, and the army returned to England. The distinguished conduct of the FOURTEENTH Foot was afterwards rewarded with the royal authority to bear the word "CORUNNA" on the colours of the regiment. The second battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment landed at Portsmouth and Plymouth, from whence it proceeded to Buckingham; and while stationed at that place, the county title of the regiment was changed from "BEDFORDSHIRE" to "BUCKINGHAMSHIRE." In the summer of this year a very powerful armament was fitted out and placed under the orders of General the Earl of Chatham, for an attack on Holland, and the second battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment marched from Buckingham to Portsmouth, where it embarked on this enterprise under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolls. In the beginning of August it landed on the island of _Walcheren_, situate in the German Ocean, near the mouth of the Scheldt, and was employed in the siege of _Flushing_, the principal port on the island. During the progress of the siege, the FOURTEENTH evinced the same ardour and contempt of danger for which they were distinguished at the battle of Corunna. On the evening of the 12th of August they were directed to storm one of the Dutch entrenchments in front of the position occupied by the troops under Major-General Graham, and a detachment of the King's German Legion co-operated in the attack. Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolls led the FOURTEENTH to the assault with great gallantry, and the soldiers rushed forward with so much spirit and resolution that they carried the entrenchments in a few minutes, capturing one gun and thirteen prisoners, and establishing a lodgment within musket-shot of the walls of the town. This was accomplished with the loss of Ensign C. Harold, and one private soldier, killed; four rank and file wounded. On the following day the line of battle ships cannonaded the town, which was soon in flames, presenting an awful scene of destruction; in the evening one of the batteries was stormed by the Thirty-sixth, Seventy-first, and light battalion of the King's German Legion, and on the morning of the 15th of August the garrison surrendered. The FOURTEENTH were thanked in general orders for their distinguished conduct. Embarking from Flushing, the battalion was prepared to sail up the river Scheldt for an attack on Antwerp; but the delays which took place, gave the enemy time to prepare additional means of defence, and an epidemic disease of a fatal character breaking out among the troops, the enterprise was abandoned, and the FOURTEENTH returned to England, and were quartered at Steyning. The unhealthy climate of Walcheren produced a serious loss of life among the troops left on that island, and the soldiers of the FOURTEENTH having recovered from the effects of the epidemic, embarked a second time for that station; they formed part of the covering brigade when the stores, sick soldiers, &c., were removed, on the final evacuation of that island. [Sidenote: 1810] In March, 1810, the second battalion embarked for Malta, but on arriving at Gibraltar, it was ordered to land at that fortress, and two companies, under Captain Everard and Captain Ramsay, were detached to _Tariffa_, for the defence of that town against the French: the two companies returned to Gibraltar in June, and the battalion continued its voyage to Malta, where it arrived on the 23rd of that month. In the autumn of this year the first battalion was withdrawn from Bengal, to take part in the reduction of the _Isle of France_, or the _Mauritius_, an important island belonging to France, and situate in the Indian sea. The battalion sailed to Rodriguez, which was the appointed rendezvous of the expedition, and on the 28th of November the fleet came in sight of the Isle of France. The troops landed in the bay of Mapou, and advanced through a thick wood, skirmishing occasionally with the French. On diverging into the open country, the British marched direct upon Port Louis, but the soldiers suffering much from the want of water, the army halted at the streams at the powder mills, five miles from the town. Resuming the march on the following day, the troops were opposed by the enemy in force, when some sharp fighting occurred, in which the British soldiers were triumphant. The FOURTEENTH had one man killed, and two wounded, on this occasion. Having overcome all opposition, the British continued their march, and took post in front of the enemy's lines before the town. On the following morning the governor, General de Caen, agreed to surrender the place to the British troops, under Major-General John Abercromby. This valuable island was thus added to the possessions of the British crown, and the FOURTEENTH were thanked in orders for their conduct on this service. After the capture of the Isle of France, the first battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment proceeded to Madras, where it was stationed several weeks. [Sidenote: 1811] In January, 1811, the flank companies of the second battalion proceeded from Malta, to the island of Sicily, under the orders of Captain Ramsay and Captain Light, to serve under Major-General Lord William Bentinck. After the capture of the Isle of France, the British government resolved to complete its dominion in the East, by the conquest of the island of _Java_, of which the Dutch had held undisturbed possession for more than one hundred years. The extent of the island,--six hundred and forty miles long, and about a hundred broad; the luxuriant and fertile character of the soil, the mountain districts yielding the vegetables and grain of Europe, and the plains the delicious fruits and other valuable productions of the East in abundance, without the necessity of laborious tillage, and to so great an extent as to occasion it to be sometimes called the granary of the East; rendered the island of Java a valuable acquisition to the United Provinces, and its principal city, Batavia, was the capital of the Dutch settlements in the East Indies. Holland having become a part of that empire which Napoleon was forming to prepare the way for universal dominion, it became necessary to deprive the Dutch of the large and fertile island of Java, and a body of troops was placed under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty for that purpose. In this enterprise the first battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment was employed, and the greater part of the officers and men were re-embarked in March on board of the men-of-war ordered to cruise off the island, in which service they had various opportunities of distinguishing themselves, in destroying gun-boats, and in other enterprises on the coast. On one occasion Lieutenant Gillman, who commanded a party on board the boats of His Majesty's ship "Sir Francis Drake," was killed. The conduct of a detachment under Lieutenant J. H. Heyland, embarked in the sloop "Procris," engaged in the boarding of some of the enemy's gun-boats, was highly commended in the public despatch of Captain Maunsell, R.N. Detachments consisting of the FOURTEENTH and Eighty-ninth Regiments, Royal Marines, and seamen, were landed from His Majesty's ship "Minden," near Bantam, on the coast of Java, and, in two contests, defeated five hundred of the enemy's chosen troops, which had been sent to Batavia to attack them. Captain Watson, Lieutenants Rochfort, McLean, and L'Estrange, and Ensign Jennings, of the FOURTEENTH, and Lieutenant Dunscombe of the Eighty-ninth, particularly distinguished themselves on these occasions. The head-quarters sailed from Madras on the 18th of April, 1811, and landed on the 4th of August, at the village of Chillingching, about twelve miles east of _Batavia_, towards which city the army directed its march. The French and Dutch troops set fire to the magazines in Batavia, and abandoned the city, which was taken possession of by the British. On the 10th of August the British advanced from Batavia, and found three thousand select men of the Gallo-Batavian troops in a strong position, defended by _abattis_ behind _Weltefreden_; and this post was stormed and carried at the point of the bayonet, many of the enemy being killed, and the remainder retreating to the entrenched position at _Cornelis_, between the great river Jacatra, and the deep aqueduct of Slaken. The conduct of Captain Stannus commanding the light infantry company of the FOURTEENTH, and of Lieutenant Coghlan, commanding the rifle company, was highly commended in Colonel Gillespie's report of this action. The regiment had Ensign Nickisson and three rank and file wounded. In the strong position of _Cornelis_ more than ten thousand Gallo-Batavian troops were assembled, and they were greatly superior in numbers to the British force. This formidable position was, however, stormed on the 26th of August, and the invincible prowess of the assailants overcame all opposition; the British were triumphant at every point; nearly two thousand of the enemy were killed, and about five thousand prisoners were taken, including three general officers. The remainder of the enemy dispersed, excepting a few men, who accompanied the Gallo-Batavian commander, General Jansens, in his flight. The FOURTEENTH distinguished themselves on this occasion, and the conduct of their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, was commended in the official account of the action given by Colonel Gillespie. The victory of Cornelis terminated the Dutch sovereignty of Java; General Jansens was pursued up the country; and on the 16th of September, the FOURTEENTH were engaged in storming the fortified position at _Jattoo_, when the remainder of the Gallo-Batavian force was routed; General Jansens was afterwards forced to surrender, and this valuable island was annexed to the dominions of the British Crown. It was restored to Holland, at the termination of the war, by the Treaty of Vienna in 1814. The loss of the FOURTEENTH Foot at the storming of Fort Cornelis was Captain Marinus Kennedy, two serjeants, and nine rank and file, killed; Major George Miller, Captain Trevor Stannus, Lieutenants W. H. Coghlan and Kenneth McKenzie, seven serjeants, and eighty-three rank and file, wounded; one rank and file missing. Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty stated in his public despatch, "The superior discipline and invincible courage which have so highly distinguished the British army, were never more fully displayed, and I have the heartfelt pleasure to add, that they have not been clouded by any acts of insubordination." The commanding officer of the FOURTEENTH, Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, (now Lieutenant-General SIR JAMES WATSON, K.C.B., colonel of the regiment,) was rewarded with a gold medal; and the word "JAVA" was placed, by royal authority, on the colours of the regiment to commemorate its distinguished services at the capture of that island, which was the most splendid acquisition made by the British arms in 1811. The strength of the first battalion at the capture of Java was forty-eight officers, and one thousand one hundred and forty-five non-commissioned officers and soldiers. [Sidenote: 1812] After the capture of Java the FOURTEENTH remained on the island for some time. The Sultan of Mataram, who governed a portion of the interior, trusting to his power, and the strength of his fortified palace, at _Djoojocarta_, meditated the expulsion of all Europeans from the island, and committed aggressions of which it became necessary to stop the progress. To effect this, his palace was captured by storm on the morning of the 20th of June, 1812; on which occasion the FOURTEENTH had another occasion of distinguishing themselves. Lieutenant-Colonel Watson commanded the main attack, and the grenadiers of the regiment headed the assault in their usual gallant style[15]. Colonel Gillespie, commanding the forces in Java, stated in orders, "To Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, who commanded the leading column, the commander of the forces cannot convey the sense he entertains of his distinguished bravery, and of the quickness and celerity with which he conceived and executed the attack. "The animated style in which Captain Johnstone and Lieutenant Hunter crossed the ditch, at the head of the FOURTEENTH grenadiers, and escaladed the ramparts, under the fire of the east bastion, could only be equalled by the order and zeal of their followers." The conduct of Lieutenant Hill, and of Lieutenant McLean, of the regiment was also commended. Eight rank and file of the regiment were killed. Lieutenant McLean died of his wounds, and thirty rank and file were wounded. [Sidenote: 1813] An expedition was fitted out, in 1813, consisting of a detachment of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, and of the troops in the service of the Honourable the East India Company; and placed under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Watson of the FOURTEENTH, for the attack of the piratical state of _Sambas_, on the western coast of the island of Borneo, which terminated in the surrender of the town, after a sharp conflict in which Captain Watson and Lieutenant Jennings were wounded; the capture of all the batteries, fortified posts, and defences of the Sultan, and the complete discomfiture of Pangerang Anom and his adherents. The first battalion proceeded to Bengal in October, 1813. In the mean time the war in Europe was prosecuted with great vigour; the British troops were victorious in the Peninsula, and every effort was made to bring a powerful army into the field. At this period a _third battalion_ was added to the FOURTEENTH Regiment of Foot; it was raised by volunteers from the Militia and assembled at Weedon under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel the Honorable James Stewart, and was soon in a condition fit for active service. [Sidenote: 1814] After a contest of twenty years, the period of the downfall of that gigantic power, which had sprung out of the French revolution, arrived; the snow storms of the winter of 1812-13, had annihilated the French army in Russia; the British army, which had delivered Portugal and Spain from the tyrannical rule of Napoleon, was following up its career of victory in the heart of France; at the same time the forces of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and other continental states, were invading France. Thus a favourable opportunity presented itself; one powerful effort appeared likely to overthrow Napoleon and his adherents, and at this important juncture, (the spring of 1814,) the third battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment received orders to hold itself in readiness for foreign service, and commenced its march for the coast; at the same time the second battalion was withdrawn from the island of Malta, to join the expedition, under Lieutenant-General Lord William Bentinck, against the north-west coast of Italy. This expedition captured several places, including the maritime city of _Genoa_, once a celebrated republic, now the capital of a province in the Sardinian States. The progress of the British arms in Italy was suddenly arrested by the termination of the war: Napoleon Bonaparte abdicated; Louis XVIII. ascended the throne of France; and the nations of Europe hailed the event as the great jubilee of Christendom. The embarkation of the third battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment was countermanded, and after some delay, the second battalion was placed in quarters at the city of Genoa, where it remained twelve months. Towards the end of the year the third battalion was held in readiness to embark for North America; circumstances connected with the trade of neutral nations, during the war with France, having involved Great Britain in hostilities with the United States. Before the battalion quitted England, peace was concluded with the United States, when the order for its proceeding abroad was countermanded, and directions were given for its being disbanded on the 24th of March, 1815. [Sidenote: 1815] In the spring of 1815, while the Congress at Vienna was deciding on the boundaries of kingdoms, and the people of all countries were looking forward to a period of peace, Bonaparte suddenly violated his engagements, re-appeared in France, and the French army declaring in his favour, he reascended the throne he had abdicated. War was immediately declared against the usurper; the order for disbanding the third battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment was consequently rescinded, and on the 21st of March, (three days before the date fixed upon for its being disbanded,) the battalion received directions to embark for Flanders: it landed at Ostend on the 31st of March, and formed part of the army commanded by His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange. Additional forces were sent to Flanders, Field Marshal his Grace the Duke of Wellington assumed the command, and the third battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel FRANCIS S. TIDY, (Major of the regiment,) was formed in brigade with the Twenty-third Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and Fifty-first Light Infantry under Colonel Mitchel, and constituted part of the fourth division, commanded by Lieutenant-General the Honorable Sir Charles Colville, K.C.B. Bonaparte attempted, by one of those rapid advances for which he had always been celebrated, to interpose between the British and Prussian armies, and on the 16th of June the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras were fought: the British were victorious; but the Prussians were defeated; and the Duke of Wellington retreated, on the 17th of June, to the position in front of the village of Waterloo, to preserve his communication with Prince Blucher. On the 18th of June the third battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment had the honour to take part in the memorable battle of _Waterloo_, the character and importance of which engagement, distinguish it as the greatest event of the age, and mark it as the brightest era in the history of the British army. The battalion was composed of young soldiers, who had never before been under fire, but their bearing reflected honour on the corps to which they belonged. During the heat of the conflict, when the thunder of cannon and musketry, the occasional explosion of caissons, the hissing of balls, shells, and grape shot, the clash of arms, the impetuous noise and shouts of the soldiery, produced a scene of carnage and confusion impossible to describe, a staff officer rode up to Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy, and directed him to form square; this was scarcely completed when the glittering arms of a regiment of cuirassiers were seen issuing from the smoke. The French horsemen paused for a moment at the sight of the scarlet uniforms of the FOURTEENTH, and then turned to the right to attack a regiment of Brunswickers; but a volley from the Brunswick square repulsed the enemy, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy, with the view of giving confidence to the young soldiers of the FOURTEENTH, drew their attention to the facility with which infantry could repulse cavalry. The French cuirassiers rallied, and appeared inclined to charge the FOURTEENTH, but were intimidated by the steady and determined bearing of the battalion. The cavalry attacks on the British line were particularly severe, and were supported by large bodies of troops of all arms; the infantry pressing forward, while dragoons, lancers, carabineers, and cuirassiers advanced in overwhelming numbers, threatening to bear down all opposition; masking at times the advance of infantry; charging the British squares, and when repulsed, quickly re-forming; while individuals, spurred on by an ardent but unavailing intrepidity, were observed searching for an opening in the British battalions by which to penetrate, and usually perishing in the vain attempt. Repulsed at all points, Bonaparte resolved to make a last desperate effort, and brought forward his reserve, consisting of the old imperial guards; but these chosen bands were overthrown and annihilated; and the whole British army rushing forward upon the enemy, completed the overthrow of the legions of Bonaparte, which were driven from the field of battle with the loss of all their cannon, baggage, and the _materiel_ of their army. Thus was a victory, the most complete and decisive, achieved by the army under the Duke of Wellington: the British soldiers halted on the field of battle surrounded by their ensanguined trophies: they had decided the political destiny of the world, and ensured national independence to the kingdoms of Europe! In congratulating the regiments of the fourth brigade, in the share they had in achieving the glorious victory at Waterloo, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Colville observed,--"the Twenty-third and Fifty-first Regiments fully maintained their former high character, whilst the very young THIRD BATTALION OF THE FOURTEENTH, in this its first trial, displayed a steadiness and gallantry becoming of veteran troops." The loss of the battalion was seven rank and file killed; Ensign Alfred Cooper, four serjeants, and sixteen rank and file, wounded. The royal authority was afterwards given for the regiment to bear the word "WATERLOO" on its colors, to commemorate the share it had in gaining this splendid victory. Lieutenant-Colonel Tidy was rewarded with the dignity of Companion of the Bath; and every officer and soldier received a silver medal, with the privilege of reckoning two years' service for that day. The names of the officers of the FOURTEENTH Regiment of Foot, who received medals, for the battle of Waterloo, on the 18th of June, 1815, are contained in the following list: Major FRANCIS S. TIDY, (_Lieut.-Colonel_,) commanding the battalion. Major KEIGHTLEY. _Captains._ Wm. Turnor. George Marlay. Richard Adams. Wm. Ross. Thomas Ramsay. J. L. White. Christian Wilson. _Lieutenants._ Wm. Akenside. Wm. Buckle. L. Westwood. Ch. M. Brannan. Geo. Baldwin. Jas. C. Hartley. Samuel Beachcroft. John Nicholson. _Ensigns._ Geo. Mackenzie. Jas. Ramsay Smith. Richard J. Stacpoole. Robert B. Newenham. Alfred Cooper. Richard B. Holmes. Wm. Keowen. Joseph Bowlby. Hon. G. T. Keppel. John Manley Wood. John P. Matthews. Montague Burrows. Arthur Ormsby. _Adjutant._--William Buckle. _Assistant-Surgeons._--Alexander Shannon; Henry Terry. On the morning of the 19th of June, the British troops advanced in pursuit of the wreck of the French army; and on entering France, the Duke of Wellington invited Louis XVIII. to repair to Cateau Cambresis. Being desirous of not exposing the King's person, the British commander directed _Cambray_ to be summoned; but this fortress refused to surrender, and repulsed the troops which approached the town on the 23rd of June. On the following day orders for attacking the place by escalade were issued, and the third battalion of the FOURTEENTH, with the Twenty-third and Fifty-first Regiments, were directed to make a feint attack on the Paris gate; but the gallantry of the officers and soldiers turned the feint into a real attack, and they were in possession of the town before the other brigades of the fourth division could force an entrance. The citadel of Cambray surrendered on the 25th of June. The army continued its advance upon Paris, which city surrendered in the early part of July, and the war was terminated with the restoration of Louis XVIII. to the throne of France. During this period, the second battalion had remained at the city of Genoa, on the north-west coast of Italy, from whence it was ordered to Marseilles, in France, under the command of Major-General Lowe, and it landed at that port on the 12th of July. At this period Bonaparte was at Rochefort, endeavouring to effect his escape to North America; but being prevented by the British cruizers, he surrendered to Captain Maitland, commanding the "Bellerophon" man of war, thus closing his political career. On the conclusion of the treaties of peace which followed these events, the battalion embarked from Marseilles for the island of Malta, where it arrived in January, 1816. The third battalion remained in the vicinity of Paris several months; it was present at the reviews of the army, in the plain of St. Denis and Champs Elysees, by the Emperors of Russia and Austria, and the Kings of Prussia and France, and on the formation of the army of occupation, it returned to England: it was disbanded at Deal, on the 17th of February, 1816; the non-commissioned officers and soldiers fit for duty being transferred to the first and second battalions. The first battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment was stationed at the military cantonment of Berhampore, from whence it marched, in the beginning of 1815, and joined the army assembled under Major-General George Wood, in consequence of the war with the kingdom of _Nepaul_. The Nepaulese were soon reduced to submission, and in April, the FOURTEENTH proceeded to the military cantonment of Dinapore, situated on the south bank of the river Ganges, in the province of Bahar, where they remained until October, when they embarked in boats, and proceeded to the cantonments near the ancient Hindoo town of Cawnpore, on the west bank of the Ganges, in the province of Allahabad. [Sidenote: 1816] On the 26th of April, 1816, the second battalion embarked from Malta, for the Ionian Islands, where it was stationed during the following seventeen months. The first battalion remained at Cawnpore during the whole of this year. [Sidenote: 1817] In the mean time the resistance made by a powerful Hindoo Zemindar, or landholder, who possessed the town and fort of _Hatrass_, in the province of Agra, occasioned the regiment once more to take the field in India, in the beginning of 1817. This Zemindar was named Dyaram; during the troubles in the province of Agra, he only paid his rents when threatened with a large military force, and in the year 1803, when the country between the rivers Jumna and Ganges, called the Dooab, was taken possession of by the British, he expressed himself willing to pay his assessment, but objected to any interference in what he called his territory. This was not agreed to, but he was not then molested. His refusing to acknowledge the authority of the civil law, afterwards rendered it necessary to bring him to obedience by force of arms, and he had the presumption to defy the British power. To reduce this refractory Zemindar, a body of troops was placed under Major-General Sir Dyson Marshall, and the first battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment took part in the enterprise. The fortified town of Hatrass was reputed of great strength, and when the troops arrived before it, in February, 1817, some inquiry was made respecting the depth of the ditch, which a soldier of the FOURTEENTH, volunteered to ascertain, and fastening a large stone to the end of a cord, he proceeded alone after dark, and gained the necessary information, with a cool intrepidity, exposed to such great danger, as created great surprise. The fire of the batteries soon forced the town to submit, when it was taken possession of by Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, and the FOURTEENTH; but the castle held out several days; at length the principal magazine exploded, and during the following night the refractory Dyaram escaped at the head of a hundred horsemen all in complete armour. The castle was afterwards taken possession of without opposition; and this was followed by the submission of all the zemindars of the Dooab. After the performance of this service the FOURTEENTH returned to Cawnpore, where they remained several months. The second battalion embarked from Cephalonia in the autumn of this year, and proceeded to Malta, where it remained a few days. The peace of Europe appearing to be established upon a firm basis, a reduction in the army took place, which occasioned the second battalion to receive orders to return to England for the purpose of being disbanded; it landed at Portsmouth on the 24th and 25th of November, and was reduced at Chichester on the 23rd of December, transferring four hundred and twenty rank and file to the first battalion. [Sidenote: 1818] The aggressions of the bands of _Pindarees_, who made incursions into the territory subject to Great Britain, and committed great depredations, occasioned the regiment to be again called into the field in October of this year. Colonel Watson having received the appointment of Brigadier-General, and been nominated to a command under Major-General Sir Dyson Marshall, the command of the regiment devolved on Major Johnstone. The Pindarees were a community of professed marauders, and they were encouraged to make ravages in the British dominions in India, by the Mahratta states. Being all horsemen subsisting by plunder, the services of the corps employed against them were of an arduous and trying character:--traversing extensive districts by forced marches, passing rivers and thickets, and attempting to surprise these bands of plunderers, were duties calculated to exhaust the strength of European soldiers, when performed under an Indian sun. The regiment continued actively employed on these services until April, 1818, when it proceeded to the military cantonment of Meerut. [Sidenote: 1819] [Sidenote: 1825] At the pleasant quarters of Meerut, situated on an extensive grass plain, the regiment was stationed during the seven following years, and it preserved a high reputation for good conduct in quarters, while employed in this part of India. Events, however, occurred in 1825, which occasioned it to take the field, when it had another opportunity of gaining laurels in combat with the enemies of Great Britain, under the following circumstances: The Rajah of _Bhurtpore_, Baldeo Singh, had become attached to the English government, with which he formed an alliance, offensive and defensive, and procured a guarantee for the succession of his youthful son, Bhulwunt Singh, to the throne; but amongst many of the rajah's subjects, a strong feeling of hostility to the British existed, particularly in the army, and his nephew, Doorjun Sal, was at the head of the party opposed to the British alliance. After the rajah's decease his nephew excited a rebellion, gained possession of the capital, and assumed the sovereign power. To fulfil the engagements made with the deceased rajah, by removing the usurper, and placing the youthful prince on the throne, a British army was assembled under General Viscount Combermere, and in November, 1825, the FOURTEENTH Foot, mustering upwards of nine hundred officers and soldiers, were withdrawn from Meerut, to join the division assembling at Muttra, for the purpose of engaging in this enterprise. The most important part of this war, it was well known, would consist in the siege of the capital, the fortified city of Bhurtpore; and great confidence being placed by the natives in the strength of this place, from which a British army under Lord Lake had been forced to retire in 1805, after a short siege, a body of troops was assembled, and a train of artillery brought forward, such as have seldom taken the field in Indian warfare. The FOURTEENTH, commanded by Major Matthias Everard, were formed in brigade with the Twenty-third and Sixty-third Regiments of Native Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel John M'Combe, of the FOURTEENTH, who had the rank of brigadier-general; Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Edwards, of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, also commanded a brigade, with the rank of brigadier-general. On the 10th and 11th of December the British army appeared before the celebrated city and fortress of BHURTPORE, which contained a garrison nearly equal in numbers to the besieging force. The Bhurtporees had cut a sluice into the embankment of a lake near the town, to fill the ditch round the works with water, but they were speedily driven from the spot; the sluice was stopped, the embankment was turned into a military post, which was intrusted to a company of the FOURTEENTH Foot, and some Sepoys: about eighteen inches of water, only, had flowed into the ditch, and this sudden seizure of the embankment facilitated the progress of the siege by keeping the ditch nearly empty. The several corps took up their ground; the investment became complete, several reconnoisances were made, and working parties cut down orange and date trees from the groves, and converted them into fascines and gabions. At an early hour on the morning of the 24th of December the fires of two batteries were opened on the town; additional works were constructed, the batteries became more numerous, and the siege was prosecuted with vigour; each successive day giving birth to fresh undertakings, and the progress, though tardy, becoming hourly more and more perceptible. It was, however, found particularly difficult to effect practicable breaches in the singularly constructed walls of Bhurtpore, which were thickly studded, in many places, with large trees of a peculiarly tough description of timber, which resisted shot with remarkable pertinacity. The process of mining was adopted, several explosions took place, and the result soon rendered it evident to every one present that the horrors of an assault were drawing near. The Bhurtporees, however, evinced great bravery and perseverance, exposing themselves to the fire of the besieging force with singular resolution; they built up in the night the works which were knocked down during the day, labouring under a ceaseless fire, and evincing a firm determination to persevere in the defence. The roar of cannon and musketry continued day and night like a ceaseless peal of thunder; and the explosions of the mines deafened, for an instant, all who were near the place. [Sidenote: 1826] Considerable progress having been made towards effecting practicable breaches, the FOURTEENTH Regiment received orders to prepare to lead one of the attacks at the storming of this celebrated fortress, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 18th of January, 1826, it marched to the front opposite the left bastion, to await the explosion of a mine. The FOURTEENTH and FIFTY-NINTH Regiments had the honour of being selected to head the two attacks, and they were directed to wheel as soon as they had entered the breaches, one to the right and the other to the left, and, continuing their career round the ramparts, to drive the enemy before them till they met. Some delay occurred in the mine, and the soldiers stood seven hours anxiously waiting for the moment to commence the assault, during which time the thunder of the artillery was tremendous. General Lord Combermere arrived at the spot where the FOURTEENTH were formed, and seeing the mouth of the mine near, he anxiously enquired if all was safe, to which the engineer replied in the affirmative. His lordship returned soon afterwards, and repeated the question, when he was again assured that all was safe. In a few minutes afterwards the bastion, beneath which the mine had been formed, heaved, as if by the power of an earthquake; the ponderous wall rocked to and fro, and then sunk down again, when, with a sound far exceeding the loudest thunder, the exploding mine rent the massive bastion into fragments, forcing stones, logs of wood, guns, men, and earth, into the air, with a violence which it is impossible to describe, and filling the atmosphere for a considerable distance with so dense a cloud of smoke, dust, and fragments of the ruined bastion, that it was difficult to breathe. Brigadier M'Combe was stunned, and several soldiers of the FOURTEENTH were injured by the falling fragments and bursting mine. As soon as the tremendous crash was over, the soldiers rushed through the cloud of smoke and dust, and began to ascend the breach, led by Majors Everard and Bisshopp; they encountered some opposition, but nothing could withstand the bayonets of the Grenadiers of the FOURTEENTH,--their valour soon overpowered all resistance, and the regiment gained the summit with little loss. The native corps appointed to support the regiment not being near, a short pause ensued, when the enemy opened a heavy fire from the buildings near the breach. Undaunted by this, the FOURTEENTH dashed forward, cleared the walls as they went, and, turning to the right, they drove the enemy from bastion to bastion, and from tower to tower, with astonishing intrepidity and success, capturing a colour which was on one of the bastions. The enemy sprang a mine, which killed several soldiers of the regiment; the Bhurtpore artillerymen fought with great desperation, and the defenders of the walls evinced much personal bravery, but they could not withstand the superior prowess and discipline of the British troops. As the FOURTEENTH were scouring the ramparts, and overcoming all opposition in gallant style, they arrived at the Anah gate, where they met the soldiers of the FIFTY-NINTH, who had turned to the left at the breach, and proved victorious over every opponent; it was a moment of intense interest, and a scene of glorious emotions: BHURTPORE was won! the stain of a former repulse was wiped from the British arms, and they hailed each other with a hearty and cordial cheer. The light company of the FOURTEENTH, which mounted the breach with the grenadiers, pursued, with other troops, a body of the enemy towards the citadel, which they nearly entered with the fugitives; four hundred Bhurtporees were shut out, and bayonetted at the gate. The citadel surrendered a few hours afterwards; the commander-in-chief entered it at the head of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, which he placed in garrison, as a compliment to the corps for its extraordinary gallantry: thus was accomplished the capture of this celebrated city, which was regarded throughout the East as impregnable, the natives being accustomed to remark that India was not subdued, because Bhurtpore had not fallen. That boast was rendered futile, and every native prince had a clear evidence that neither the number of his troops, nor the strength of his fortresses, would avail against the superior valour and discipline of the British forces. The usurper, Doorjun Sal, was captured while attempting to escape, and was sent prisoner to Allahabad; the young Rajah, Bhulwunt Singh, was taken to the palace of his ancestors, and seated on the throne, in the presence of the FOURTEENTH REGIMENT; and the other towns of his dominions submitted. Thus was the cloud which darkened the horizon of British India dispersed, and the splendour of the British arms received additional lustre in the East. Lord Combermere stated in his public despatch,--"I have the pleasure to acquaint your lordship, that the conduct of every one engaged was marked by a degree of zeal which calls for my unqualified approbation; but I must particularly remark the behaviour of His Majesty's FOURTEENTH Regiment, commanded by Major EVERARD, and FIFTY-NINTH, commanded by Major FULLER; these corps having led the columns of assault, by their steadiness and determination decided the fate of the day." In division orders it was stated,--"Major-General Reynell congratulates the troops of his division, European and Native, engaged in the storming of Bhurtpore this morning, upon the brilliant success which attended their gallant exertions. It is impossible for him to convey half what he feels in appreciating the conduct of His Majesty's FOURTEENTH Regiment, that led the principal storming column. It has impressed his mind with stronger notions of what a British Regiment is capable of, when led by such officers as Major Everard, Major Bisshopp, and Captain Mackenzie, than he ever before possessed. The Major-General requests that Major Everard will assure the officers and soldiers of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, that they more than realized his expectations." Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Edwards, of the FOURTEENTH, an officer of high character and lofty promise, fell at the head of the second brigade, pierced by many wounds; Captain Henry B. Armstrong was also mortally wounded while leading his men to victory on the ramparts. The regiment had likewise two serjeants, twenty-nine rank and file, and three Lascars, killed; Lieutenant-Colonel John M'Combe, Lieutenants Richard Stack, Robert Daly, and Edward C. Lynch, Volunteer W. Tulloh, two serjeants, ninety-eight rank and file, and three Lascars, wounded. Colonel John M'Combe[16], who commanded the first brigade, and Major Matthias Everard, who commanded the regiment, were rewarded with the dignity of Companion of the Bath; and the Royal authority was afterwards given for the word "BHURTPORE" to be borne on the regimental colour, to commemorate its gallantry on this occasion. The war having terminated, the regiment returned to the cantonment of Meerut, where it was stationed upwards of six months. General Sir Harry Calvert, Baronet, G.C.B., died in September, 1826, when King George IV. conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on General Thomas Lord Lynedoch, G.C.B. [Sidenote: 1827] The regiment left Meerut in October; it subsequently embarked in boats, and, after a tedious passage down the river Ganges, arrived at Fort William in the beginning of 1827; and was stationed at that fortress twelve months. [Sidenote: 1828] [Sidenote: 1829] Early in 1828 the regiment quitted Fort William, and proceeded to the cantonment at Berhampore, where it was stationed during the year 1829. [Sidenote: 1830] [Sidenote: 1831] After performing the important duty of guarding the colonial possessions of Great Britain in India twenty-three years, the FOURTEENTH Regiment received orders to prepare to return to England; it left Berhampore in November, and proceeded to Fort William; the men who volunteered to remain in India were transferred to other corps; and in December, 1830, and January, 1831, it embarked from Calcutta for England. It landed at Gravesend in May and July,--was stationed at Chatham until September,--and at Albany Barracks during the remainder of the year. [Sidenote: 1832] In the early part of 1832, the regiment was stationed at Haslar Barracks, from whence it proceeded to Portsmouth, where it remained five months. In the middle of July it embarked for Ireland, and after landing at Cork, marched from thence to Buttevant. [Sidenote: 1833] [Sidenote: 1834] In 1833 the head-quarters were removed to Athlone; in 1834 to Dublin, and afterwards to Mullingar. [Sidenote: 1835] General Lord Lynedoch having been removed to the First, the Royal, Regiment of Foot, King William IV. conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on Lieutenant-General the Honorable Sir Charles Colville, G.C.B., G.C.H., by commission, dated the 12th of December, 1834. This officer was removed to the Fifth Fusiliers in March, 1835, and was succeeded in the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Regiment by Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Hope, G.C.B., who, as lieutenant-colonel, commanded the regiment in 1795. The head-quarters were removed to Dundalk in the summer of 1835. [Sidenote: 1836] Five years had not elapsed from the period of the return of the regiment from India, when it received orders to prepare for embarkation for the West Indies. It was divided into six service and four depôt companies; the service companies embarked from Cork in February, 1836, arrived, in March, at Barbadoes, and were removed, in April, to the island of St Kitt's. [Sidenote: 1837] In February, 1837, the service companies were removed to Antigua. On the 19th of May, General the Honorable Sir Alexander Hope, G.C.B., Lieutenant Governor of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea, died, and was succeeded in the colonelcy by Lieutenant-General Sir James Watson, K.C.B., who had commanded the regiment in India, as lieutenant-colonel, from the year 1807 to 1821, when he was promoted to the rank of major-general. In June the depôt companies embarked from Waterford for England, and, landing at Bristol, proceeded from thence to Brecon. [Sidenote: 1838] During the year 1838, the service companies remained at Antigua. The distinguished services of the FOURTEENTH Regiment in India, from 1807 to 1831, having been, at the special request of Lieutenant-General Sir James Watson, brought before Her Majesty by the Commander-in-Chief, the Royal authority was given for the badge of the "ROYAL TIGER," superscribed "INDIA," to be borne upon the regimental colour and appointments, to commemorate its services in that part of Her Majesty's dominions. [Sidenote: 1839] [Sidenote: 1840] In December[17] orders were received for the removal of the service companies from Antigua to St. Lucia, where they arrived in the beginning of January, 1839: in April, 1840, they proceeded to Barbadoes, and in June to Trinidad. They suffered severely on these stations from yellow fever and other effects of a tropical climate. The depôt companies proceeded from England to Ireland in June, 1840. [Sidenote: 1841] The regiment remained at Trinidad until the early part of 1841, when it was removed to Barbadoes. On the 27th of April it embarked from Barbadoes for Lower Canada, and landed at Quebec on the 2nd of June following. [Sidenote: 1845] The depôt companies were removed from Ireland to England, in December, 1844; and the service companies have remained in Canada until the year 1845, the period of the completion of this Record. Among the splendid achievements of valour with which the annals of the British army abound, the gallant behaviour of the FOURTEENTH FOOT, on several occasions, appears conspicuous for those bright qualities of intrepidity and heroism which distinguish the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland when arrayed under the standard of their Sovereign; and the conduct of this corps in quarters has been marked by those excellent features of order, subordination, and discipline, which adorn the character of the British soldier, procuring for him the admiration of the inhabitants of all countries. The inscriptions on the colour of the regiment bear testimony of the estimation in which its services have been held by its Sovereign; and the reports of the general officers, under whom it has served, have procured for it the confidence of the Government and the Country. [Illustration: 14th Regiment of Foot.] FOOTNOTES: [1] Afterwards Colonel of the Twelfth Foot. [2] The strength of the regiment at the battle of Culloden was, 2 field officers, 7 captains, 14 subalterns, 21 serjeants, 11 drummers, and 304 rank and file. [3] "_14th October, 1765._ "Alterations in the clothing which is to be delivered in the year 1766 to the FOURTEENTH Regiment of Foot, commanded by the Honorable Major-General Keppel, and which are approved of by His Majesty. "The breeches to be buff. "The Grenadiers to have black bear-skin caps, fronted with red, the motto and horse white metal. "The drummers to have white bear-skin caps, with a red front, motto and horse white metal. "By order of the King. "EDWARD HARVEY "_Adjutant-General_." [4] "The British troops who had this opportunity of distinguishing themselves were the brigade of the line, viz., the FOURTEENTH, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third Regiments, with the battalion formed from the Light Infantry and Grenadier companies, under the command of Major-General Abercromby; seven pieces of cannon and two hundred prisoners were taken in the redoubts."--_London Gazette._ [5] Lieutenant Richard Goodall Elrington received a musket-ball in the right thigh: after the wound was healed, he returned to his duty, when an abscess formed in the left thigh from which the ball was extracted; it having passed, in the flesh, from the right to the left side of his body, and sunk down the thigh to the spot where the abscess formed. This officer entered the army as an ensign in 1790; was promoted from a lieutenantcy in the FOURTEENTH to be captain in the First West India Regiment in 1795: was removed to the Forty-seventh Regiment in 1803, and was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy in June, 1813: he continued in command of the Forty-seventh Regiment until November, 1841, when he attained the rank of major-general. He died in London on 2nd August, 1845. [6] Afterwards lieutenant-colonel of the Forty-eighth Regiment. Mr. Gilbert Cimitiere was appointed to an ensigncy in the Sixth West India Regiment on 1st July, 1795; promoted to a lieutenantcy in the Forty-eighth Regiment on the 15th June, 1796; in which he attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel, in 1824. He retired from the service in 1827. [7] "Major-General Fox, with the FOURTEENTH, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third Regiments, was engaged with the whole of the French column which had marched from Lisle, and the different corps which had driven the rest of the army back fell upon his flanks and rear; perhaps there is _not on record a single instance of greater gallantry_ or more soldier-like conduct than was exhibited on that day, by these three regiments. At length General Fox, finding that the whole army had left him, began to think of retreating, to effect which it was necessary to get possession of the causeway leading to Leers; but before that could be accomplished he was obliged to charge several battalions of the enemy, who were astonished that such a handful of men should presume to give them battle, and expected every moment that they would lay down their arms; but with _a degree of intrepidity that words cannot describe_, and is, indeed, scarcely conceivable, they gained the wished-for point, and then formed with such regularity that the enemy could not assail them: they secured their retreat towards Leers, and the next morning joined General Otto's column."--CAPTAIN JONES' _Journal_. [8] While the troops were forming outside the village, a hare ran across the line, a man named Tovey knocked it down with his musket, and placed it in his haversack, with surprising coolness, although under so heavy a fire that it was difficult to form the men, from the frequent and numerous casualties which occurred; thus exemplifying that distinguished feature in the character of the British soldier, "cool and collected in the midst of danger." [9] Private Ryan served many years afterwards with deep marks in his cheeks. [10] "The Duke of York detached seven Austrian battalions, and the second brigade of British infantry, (FOURTEENTH, _Thirty-seventh_, and _Fifty-third_,) under Major-General Fox, who, though they had lost so many men only four days before, anxiously wished to get into action. Nothing could exceed their spirit and perseverance; they stormed the village of Pontechin, and after firing a few shot rushed with fixed bayonets into the heart of the enemy, and turned the fate of the day once more in favour of the allies. The charge was conducted with such skill and activity that it immediately threw the enemy into confusion, and forced them to give way. At this time the artillery came into action and directed their fire so well, and followed it up with such activity, the enemy could never be rallied so as to renew the attack, although they had fresh troops constantly coming up, but continued to lose ground till dark. Such a battle has seldom been fought; the enemy was in action, under an incessant fire of cannon and musketry, upwards of twelve hours, and left twelve thousand dead in the field, five hundred taken, and seven pieces of cannon. "The loss of the allies, in this memorable action, amounted to four thousand men; one hundred and ninety-six were British, and all, except three, from General Fox's brigade. It is a fact, although it appears almost impossible, that _a single British brigade, and that brigade less than six hundred men, on that great day, absolutely won the battle_; for had it not come up, the allies would have been beaten."--CAPTAIN JONES' _Journal_. [11] Every man of the FOURTEENTH was proud of the reputation which the regiment had acquired, with which he identified himself; even the recruits possessed the same _esprit de corps_. After the capture of Gueldermalsen a young soldier, named Sullivan, struck the butt-end of his musket against a cask, when the musket went off, and the ball passed through the soldier's body. He instantly called to Lieutenant Graves, and said, "I hope, Sir, you will let my friends know that I always behaved as became a good soldier," and immediately expired. [12] Captain Jones, speaking of the conduct of the FOURTEENTH, Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth Regiments, at Gueldermalsen, states in his _Journal_, "These regiments behaved with their usual gallantry, and faced every danger with that cheerfulness and perseverance which has peculiarly distinguished them." [13] Sir Ralph Abercromby entertained a high opinion of the FOURTEENTH; in the West Indies he always landed with the flank companies, and the regiment furnished a corporal's guard at his quarters. When he was appointed to the command of the troops in the Mediterranean, with whom he proceeded to Egypt, he wrote to Captain Graves, stating, "I regret extremely that I cannot take you with me, as I intended, having found all my staff appointed when I got to London." He afterwards added, with great pleasantry, "I also greatly regret that the FOURTEENTH are not on the expedition, as I do not think any service can go on well without them." [14] "It is peculiarly incumbent upon the Lieutenant-General to notice the vigorous attack made by the second battalion of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel Nicolls, which drove the enemy out of the village on the left, of which he had possessed himself."--_General Orders._ [15] "The gallant FOURTEENTH proceeded to scour the ramparts, and the capture of the Sultan rendered the victory complete."--_London Gazette._ [16] Colonel John M'Combe died at Calcutta on the 12th October, 1828. [17] A brigantine, having on board the head-quarters of the regiment, with six officers, one hundred and eight soldiers, and thirty women, under Lieut.-Colonel Everard, C.B., K.H., was wrecked on the rocks off Guadaloupe, before daylight on Christmas day; but the inhabitants came to their aid in boats, and no lives were lost. SUCCESSION OF COLONELS OF THE FOURTEENTH, OR BUCKINGHAM REGIMENT OF FOOT. SIR EDWARD HALES, BARONET. _Appointed 22nd June, 1685._ This officer was the son of Sir Edward Hales, of Woodchurch, in the county of Kent, who was a distinguished loyalist in the reigns of Charles I. and Charles II., and being forced to flee from England for his loyal attempts during the rebellion, he died in France a few years after the restoration in 1660. EDWARD HALES succeeded, on the decease of his father, to the family estate at Woodchurch, and to the dignity of a Baronet; and when the Court began to evince a disposition to favour Papacy, he changed his religion from Protestant to Roman Catholic. He was in great favour with King James II., and having raised a company of foot for the service of that monarch, in June, 1685, he was appointed colonel of a regiment, which is now the FOURTEENTH FOOT. He was also constituted a member of the privy council, one of the lords of the Admiralty, deputy governor of the cinque ports, and lieutenant-governor of the Tower of London. Being unable, from his religion, to take the required oaths on appointment to the colonelcy of his regiment, he was prosecuted and convicted at Rochester assizes; but he moved the case to the Court of King's Bench, pleaded the King's dispensation and had judgment in his behalf:--eleven out of the twelve judges being of opinion that the King might dispense in that case. SIR EDWARD HALES was in the King's confidence; and at the Revolution, in 1688, he was employed to make arrangements for His Majesty's flight to France. On the night of the 10th of December, Sir Edward, with the quarter-master of his regiment, Edward Syng[18], quitted Whitehall Palace with the King--proceeded in a hackney coach to Horse-ferry, crossed the Thames in a boat, and continued their flight in disguise to Feversham, where they went on board of the Custom-House hoy, designing to cross the channel to France; but they were suspected of being Popish priests, and were apprehended on board the vessel by the country people. The King being afterwards recognised, he was induced to return to London; but he subsequently escaped from Rochester and proceeded to France. Sir Edward Hales attempted to conceal himself, to escape the fury of the populace, who were enraged against him for changing his religion, and at the time he was apprehended at Feversham the country people were plundering his house, killing his deer, and wantonly destroying his property in Kent. He was detained in custody, and afterwards confined in the Tower of London for eighteen months; on his release he proceeded to France, and he was at La Hogue ready to embark for England when Admiral Russel defeated the French fleet. His eldest son served in King James's army in Ireland, and was killed at the battle of the Boyne. While in France, Sir Edward Hales was created by King James, EARL OF TENTERDEN, in Kent. He died in France in 1695, and was buried in the church of St. Sulpice in Paris. WILLIAM BEVERIDGE. _Appointed 31st December, 1688._ WILLIAM BEVERIDGE served under the Prince of Orange in the Netherlands, in one of the British regiments in the service of the States-General of Holland; and at the Revolution, in 1688, His Highness promoted him to the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Regiment of Foot. He commanded the regiment nearly four years; and was killed in a duel with one of his captains, on the 14th of November, 1692. JOHN TIDCOMB. _Appointed 14th November, 1692._ This officer entered the army in the reign of King James II., and was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Thirteenth Foot, on the 31st of December, 1688. He served under Major-General Mackay in Scotland, and displayed great gallantry at the battle of Killicrankie: he also served under King William III., in Ireland, and was at the battle of the Boyne. He returned to England soon afterwards; but accompanied the expedition to Ireland, under Lieutenant-General the Earl of Marlborough, (afterwards the celebrated John Duke of Marlborough,) and was at the capture of Cork and Kinsale, and also in several skirmishes. His excellent conduct on all occasions was rewarded with the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Foot, in 1692: he afterwards served in the Netherlands, was at the battle of Landen, and was engaged in the siege of Namur. He was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, in 1703; to that of major-general, on the 1st of January, 1704; and to lieutenant-general, on the 1st of January, 1707. He died at Bath, in June, 1713. JASPER CLAYTON. _Appointed 15th June, 1713._ JASPER CLAYTON obtained a commission in the army on the 24th of June, 1695, and afterwards acquired great celebrity as a gallant and meritorious officer. He served under King William until the peace of Ryswick, in 1697. He also served under the great Duke of Marlborough, in the reign of Queen Anne; and was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Eleventh Foot, with which he served in Spain. His regiment suffered severely at the battle of Almanza, in 1707, and he returned with it to England in 1708, to recruit. In 1709, he served in Flanders, and distinguished himself at the siege of Mons, where he was wounded[19]. He also served at the forcing of the French lines, in 1710, and was rewarded with the colonelcy of a newly-raised regiment of foot, on the 8th of December of that year. In 1711 he served in the disastrous expedition against Quebec, and his regiment had three officers and seventy-one soldiers drowned in the river St. Lawrence, then called the river of Canada. At the peace of Utrecht, in 1713, his regiment was disbanded; and in June of the same year, he was appointed colonel of the FOURTEENTH Foot. He served in Scotland under the Duke of Argyle, during the rebellion of the Earl of Mar, and commanded a brigade at the battle of Dumblain, on the 13th of November, 1715. He was subsequently appointed lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar; he commanded the troops in that fortress when it was besieged by the Spaniards, in 1727, and his conduct in the successful defence of that important place, called forth the approbation of his sovereign and country. The rank of major-general was conferred on this excellent officer, on the 2nd of November, 1735; and that of lieutenant-general, on the 2nd of July, 1739. In 1743, he served under King George II. in Germany; and highly distinguished himself at the battle of Dettingen, on the 16th of June in that year. He was killed as he was giving orders for the artillery to play upon the bridge as the French retreated, and his fall was equally regretted by his sovereign, the officers, and soldiers of the army. He was interred with military honors in the chapel of Prince George of Hesse, at Hanau. JOSEPH PRICE. _Appointed 22nd June, 1743._ JOSEPH PRICE obtained a commission of ensign in a regiment of foot in 1706; and subsequently rose to the rank of captain and lieutenant-colonel in the First Foot Guards. In January, 1741, he was promoted to the colonelcy of the Fifty-seventh (now Forty-sixth) regiment, which was then first raised; and in 1743 he was removed to the FOURTEENTH Foot. He was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general on the 6th of June, 1745. During the campaign of 1747, he commanded a brigade of infantry in the Netherlands, under His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland. At the battle of Val, on the 2nd of July of that year, he highly distinguished himself. His brigade was posted in the village of Val, and his gallantry during the action was commended by the Duke of Cumberland in his public despatch. He died in November of the same year, at Breda, in Holland. THE HONORABLE WILLIAM HERBERT. _Appointed 1st December, 1747._ THE HONORABLE WILLIAM HERBERT, fifth son of Thomas, eighth Earl of Pembroke, and father of Henry, first Earl of Caernarvon, was appointed to a commission in the army on the 1st of May, 1722. He was promoted on the 15th December, 1738, to the commission of captain and lieutenant-colonel in the First Foot Guards; and in December, 1747, to the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Foot. In January, 1753, he was removed to the Second Dragoon Guards. He was subsequently advanced to the rank of major-general: he was groom of the bedchamber to King George II., and a member of parliament for Wilton, in Wiltshire. He died on the 31st of March, 1757. EDWARD BRADDOCK. _Appointed 17th February, 1753._ EDWARD BRADDOCK was appointed ensign in the Second Foot Guards on the 11th October, 1710; lieutenant of the grenadier company in 1716[20]; captain and lieutenant-colonel in 1736; major in 1743; and was promoted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the same regiment on the 21st of November, 1745. In 1753 he was appointed to the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Foot; in the following year he was promoted major-general, and sent with a body of troops to North America; and in 1755 he was commander-in-chief in that country. Having completed arrangements for opening the campaign against the French, who had made aggressions on the British territory, he took the field with a body of regular troops, provincials, and Indians; and on the 9th of July, while marching with twelve hundred men through the woods towards Fort du Quesne, he was suddenly attacked by a body of French and Indians, who had concealed themselves behind the trees and bushes, and his men were put into some confusion. "He exerted himself to remedy this disaster as much as man could do, and, after having had five horses killed under him, he was shot through the arm and through the lungs, of which he died four days afterwards[21]." THOMAS FOWKE. _Appointed 12th November, 1755._ This officer had been upwards of fifty years in the army when he was appointed to the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Foot, his first commission being dated the 25th of May, 1705. After serving the Crown fifteen years, he was promoted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the Seventh Dragoons, by commission dated the 25th of June, 1720. In January, 1741, he was promoted to the colonelcy of the Fifty-fourth (now Forty-third) regiment, which was then first raised; and in August of the same year he was removed to the Second, or Queen's Royal regiment. His commissions of general officer were dated,--brigadier-general, 1st June, 1745; major-general, 18th of September, 1747; and lieutenant-general, 30th of April, 1754. He was governor of Gibraltar in 1756, when the island of Minorca, which was then subject to the British Crown, was attacked by the French; and having disobeyed the directions, which he received from the Secretary at War, to send a reinforcement to that island, he was tried by a general court-martial, and sentenced to be suspended for nine months; but the King, George II., directed that he should be dismissed from the service. CHARLES JEFFERIES. _Appointed 7th September, 1756._ After a progressive service in the subordinate commissions, this officer was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the FOURTEENTH Foot on the 12th of September, 1745, and in February following he was removed to the Thirty-fourth regiment. In January, 1756, he was promoted to colonel-commandant of a battalion of the Sixty-second Royal American regiment, now the Sixtieth, or King's Royal Rifle Corps. At this period he was with the Thirty-fourth regiment at the island of Minorca, which was soon afterwards attacked by the French, and he signalized himself in the defence of Port Mahon, particularly in repulsing an attack on the place by storm, on which occasion he was taken prisoner. His gallantry was shortly afterwards rewarded with the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH regiment. He was promoted to the rank of major-general on the 27th of June, 1759. He died in 1765. THE HONORABLE WILLIAM KEPPEL. _Appointed 31st May, 1765._ THE HONORABLE WILLIAM KEPPEL, fourth son of William-Anne, second Earl of Albemarle, was appointed captain and lieutenant-colonel in the First Foot Guards on the 28th of April, 1750; and gentleman of the horse to His Majesty King George II. in December, 1752. On the 21st of July, 1760, he was promoted to second major, with the rank of colonel, in the First Foot Guards; and in December of the following year, to the colonelcy of the Fifty-sixth Foot. In the succeeding spring he proceeded with his regiment on an expedition against the Havannah, with the local rank of major-general. In August the Havannah capitulated, when he took possession of the fort La Punta; and being afterwards left commander-in-chief at that station, he re-delivered the city to the Spaniards according to the conditions of the Treaty of Peace in 1763. He was promoted to the rank of major-general on the 10th of July, 1762; was removed from the colonelcy of the Fifty-sixth to the FOURTEENTH Foot in 1765; and was advanced to the rank of lieutenant-general in May, 1772. In 1773 he was appointed commander-in-chief in Ireland. In 1775 he was removed to the colonelcy of the Twelfth Dragoons. He was several years a representative in parliament for the borough of Windsor. His decease occurred on the 1st of March, 1782. ROBERT CUNNINGHAME. _Appointed 18th October, 1775._ This officer served several years in the Thirty-fifth Foot, in which regiment he rose to the rank of captain in December, 1752. He was soon afterwards appointed adjutant-general in Ireland, which office he held for many years. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in 1757;--to that of colonel in 1762;--and to the colonelcy of the Fifty-eighth Regiment in 1767. In 1772 he was advanced to the rank of major-general; three years afterwards he was removed to the command of the FOURTEENTH Foot; and in August, 1777, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general. On the 4th of April, 1787, he was removed to the colonelcy of the Fifth, Royal Irish, Dragoons, and he was advanced to the rank of general in 1793. He died in 1797. JOHN DOUGLAS. _Appointed April 4th, 1787._ JOHN DOUGLAS was many years an officer in the Scots' Greys, with which corps he served several campaigns in the Netherlands previously to the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748-9. He also served with his regiment in Germany, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, from 1759 to 1762, distinguishing himself on several occasions; and on the 14th of November, 1770, he was promoted to the lieutenant colonelcy of the regiment (the Greys). In 1775 he was appointed Aide-de-Camp to the King, with the rank of colonel in the army;--in February, 1779, he was promoted to the rank of major-general; and in April of the same year he obtained the colonelcy of the Twenty-first Light Dragoons, which corps was then first embodied. His regiment was disbanded at the conclusion of the American war in 1783; and in 1787 he obtained the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Foot; he was also promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general in the same year. In 1789 he was removed to the colonelcy of the Fifth Dragoon Guards, which he retained until his decease in 1790. GEORGE EARL WALDEGRAVE. _Appointed 27th August, 1789._ VISCOUNT CHEWTON was appointed ensign in the Third Foot Guards on the 10th of May, 1768; lieutenant and captain on the 12th of August, 1773; and captain-lieutenant and lieutenant-colonel in the Second Foot Guards in 1778. In the following year he was appointed lieutenant-colonel commanding the Eighty-seventh Foot, then first raised; and in 1782 he was promoted to the rank of colonel. He succeeded, on the decease of his father, in 1784, to the dignity of EARL WALDEGRAVE; and was also appointed master of the horse to the Queen, and aide-de-camp to the King. In August, 1789, he was appointed colonel of the FOURTEENTH Foot. He died about six weeks afterwards. GEORGE HOTHAM. _Appointed 18th November, 1789._ GEORGE HOTHAM procured the appointment of ensign in the First Foot Guards on the 14th of May, 1759; he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and captain in 1765; and to that of captain and lieutenant-colonel in 1775. In 1781 he was appointed aide-de-camp to the King, with the rank of colonel in the army; and in 1789 he obtained the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Foot. His commissions of general officer were dated,--major-general, 28th of April, 1790, lieutenant-general, 26th of January, 1797, and general, 29th of April, 1802. He died in 1806. SIR HARRY CALVERT, BARONET, G.C.B. _Appointed 8th February, 1806._ SIR HARRY CALVERT, Baronet, was appointed second lieutenant in the Twenty-third, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, in April, 1778; he was several months at the Royal Military College at Woolwich, and proceeding to North America in the following year, he joined his regiment, which was then employed on the outpost duty of the army. In December, 1779, he served with his regiment in the expedition, under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, to South Carolina, and was at the siege and capture of Charlestown. He afterwards served under the Marquis Cornwallis, and shared in all the difficulties, dangers, and privations, in the campaigns of the southern provinces, until the siege of York Town, when the Marquis Cornwallis was forced to surrender, with the troops under his command, to General Washington. He remained a prisoner of war from October, 1781, until the peace in 1783, when he proceeded with his regiment to New York. In the early part of 1784 he returned to England, when he procured permission to pass the remainder of the year on the Continent. In October, 1786, he purchased the command of a company in his regiment, with which he did duty until the spring of 1790, when he exchanged into the Coldstream Guards. On the breaking out of the war of the French revolution, in 1793, he proceeded with the brigade of Foot Guards, commanded by Major-General (afterwards Lord) Lake, to Holland, and when the Duke of York assumed the command of the British and Hanoverian troops in Flanders, Captain Calvert was nominated one of His Royal Highness's aides-de-camp. After serving in this capacity until the surrender of Valenciennes, he was sent to England with the account of that event, on which occasion King George III. was pleased to confer on him the rank of major. He obtained the rank of lieutenant-colonel in December, 1793, by the purchase of a company in the Coldstream Guards. He served with the allied army during the year 1794, and returned to England on the recall of the British troops early in 1795. In May of that year he was employed on a confidential mission to the court of Berlin; and in 1796 he was appointed Deputy Adjutant-General to the Forces: he obtained the rank of colonel in June 1797, and in 1799 he was appointed to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the Sixty-third Regiment. On the 9th of January, 1799, His Majesty was pleased to appoint Colonel CALVERT to the important situation of ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO THE FORCES, in which capacity he was enabled to perform important and valuable services to the crown and to the country, during one of the most eventful periods in the history of Great Britain. In August, 1800 he was nominated to the colonelcy of the Fifth West India regiment; in 1803 he was promoted to the rank of major-general; in 1806 he was removed to the FOURTEENTH Foot, and in 1810 he was advanced to the rank of lieutenant-general. At the period of his appointment to the high and important station of Adjutant-General of the Forces, the want of efficient regulations, and of an adherence to a system founded on principles calculated to promote the advantage of every branch of service, was felt by all persons called upon to take a part in the concerns of the army, and serious inconvenience was experienced from the absence of such a system by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, who, at two different periods, had to contend against powerful continental armies, with troops, though eminently brave, and endued with the true spirit of their profession, yet not formed upon sound general principles of discipline. His Royal Highness, being appointed Commander-in-Chief, applied himself with great diligence to the correction of abuses, and to the improvement of the condition of the army in every particular: and his efforts, which were honoured with the encouragement and approbation of His Majesty, were ably seconded by his staff officers, who were judiciously selected to carry his views into effect; the ultimate accomplishment of these objects reflected the highest credit on those who planned, and on those who executed measures which have conduced to the safety and glory of the United Kingdom and of its numerous colonial possessions. Among these officers, SIR HARRY CALVERT held a distinguished station. As Adjutant-General, the discipline, equipment, and efficiency of the army came under his superintendence, and to improve and perfect these, he devoted his best energies and unwearied attention. The general orders of the army, in the successive editions which were brought forward from the year 1799, afford abundant proofs of the value of his labours, in the numerous and excellent regulations made from time to time for the better government of the army. In the _clothing_, _messing_, _equipment_, and every other branch of the interior economy, improvements were introduced to promote the health and comfort of the soldier, and the efficiency of corps; and the establishment of _confidential inspection reports_ facilitated the accomplishment of these objects, by furnishing the Commander-in-Chief, and the authorities under him, with the means of forming a correct judgment of the state of each corps in all its details,--of correcting what was wrong,--of supplying what was deficient, and of ascertaining the merits and capabilities of the officers. The energies of his mind were also directed to the improvement of the _morale_, as well as to ameliorate the _materiel_ of the army. Being a man of high and sensitive honor himself, he wished to inspire all his brother officers with the same sentiments, by impressing them with a just idea of what they owed to themselves, both as individuals, and as members of the profession of arms. Conscious that no man can be truly respectable who does not respect himself, he was always anxious to uphold and encourage this principle; in accordance with which, he was particularly careful to afford every officer charged with misconduct the fullest opportunity of explanation, and, in conveying disapprobation or censure, he avoided the use of terms calculated to affect the officer's personal feelings, or to degrade him in his own estimation: his verbal intercourse was conducted on the same principle. Such was the kindness of his look and demeanour, and the courtesy of his language, that it was impossible to offer him any personal disrespect; and with whatever sentiments a gentleman might have approached him in his official capacity, he could retire with those only of respect and esteem. To the officers of his own department, who were in daily intercourse with him, his orders were conveyed in the form of requests; and the urbanity of his manners, tempered with self-respect, ensured prompt and cheerful co-operation. In so extensive a branch of the service, the preparation of many documents was necessarily confided to assistants, and the alterations which suggested themselves to his refined discrimination, were proposed with delicacy,--a trait of character grateful to the feelings of his subordinates, and remembered with emotions of respect constantly increased by continued intercourse. In 1807, when the _recruiting_ of the army was placed under his superintendence, he applied himself successfully to the improvement of that branch of the service. He interested himself in the _Royal Military Asylum_, and in the establishment of _regimental schools_; the condition of _general hospitals_ also engaged his attention,--he visited them all in 1814, and suggested many improvements in their conduct and management. The _invalid_ and the _pensioner_ found a friend and protector in him, and the representations of a discharged private soldier were received and considered with the same care as those of the higher grades of the service. In this, and in every other respect, he acted in accordance with the desires of the DUKE OF YORK, whose innate goodness of heart, and natural generosity and condescension, led him to promote and encourage every species of kindness to the humblest members of the profession to which he was so devotedly attached; and SIR HARRY CALVERT was the faithful organ of His Royal Highness's benevolent intentions, delighting in the good he was thus enabled to effect. Having conducted, in conjunction with the able officers associated with him in the other military departments, the details of the British army, when it was on a scale of magnitude surpassing anything previously known, and through the whole course of the most tremendous contest in which the nation ever was engaged, and having witnessed victory achieved, by the valour and discipline of the troops under their matchless chief, with the glorious termination of the war, he was rewarded with the dignity of BARONET, in October, 1818; and in the beginning of the year 1820, he retired from that high situation which he had so long and so ably filled, carrying with him the cordial good wishes of every rank. He had previously been appointed lieutenant-governor of Chelsea Hospital; honored with the dignity of Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, and Grand Cross of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order; and in 1826, he was promoted to the rank of general. He died suddenly of a fit of apoplexy, while on a visit with his family at Claydon Hall, in Buckinghamshire, on the 3rd of September, 1826. THOMAS LORD LYNEDOCH. _Appointed 6th September, 1826._ This nobleman, whose services, when General Graham, were of a most distinguished character, was removed to the First, or Royal, Regiment of Foot, on the 12th of December, 1834, the colonelcy of which corps he retained to the period of his decease, which took place on the 18th December, 1843. THE HONORABLE SIR CHARLES COLVILLE, G.C.B. and G.C.H. _Appointed 12th December, 1834._ SIR CHARLES COLVILLE, whose distinguished services during the late war are recorded in the history of Europe, was removed to the colonelcy of the Fifth Regiment of Foot, or Northumberland Fusiliers, on the 25th of March, 1835, in succession to General Sir Henry Johnson, deceased. He died on the 27th March, 1843. THE HONORABLE SIR ALEXANDER HOPE, G.C.B. _Appointed 25th March, 1835._ THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER HOPE entered the army as ensign in the Sixty-third Regiment, on the 6th of March, 1786, and after a service of upwards of thirteen years he was promoted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Foot, on the 27th of August, 1794. He commanded the regiment during its retreat through Holland, and in the attack of the French post at Gueldermalsen, on the 8th of January, 1795, he received a wound in the shoulder which deprived him of the use of his right arm. He was appointed governor of Tynemouth and Clifford's fort, in 1797; lieutenant-governor of Edinburgh Castle, in 1798; and deputy adjutant-general to the expedition to Holland, in 1799. He was promoted to the rank of colonel in the army, on the 1st of January, 1800; and to the colonelcy of the Fifth West India Regiment, on the 30th of October, 1806. In April, 1808, he was further promoted to the rank of major-general. In April, 1813, he was removed to the colonelcy of the Forty-seventh Regiment; and in June of the same year, he was advanced to the rank of lieutenant-general. He obtained the rank of general, on the 22nd of July, 1830; and the colonelcy of the FOURTEENTH Regiment, in 1835. He was constituted a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath: he was lieutenant-governor of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea: he died on the 19th of May, 1837. SIR JAMES WATSON, K.C.B. _Appointed 24th May, 1837._ LONDON: HARRISON AND CO., PRINTERS, ST. MARTIN'S LANE. FOOTNOTES: [18] Vide King James's own account of this circumstance, in Doctor Clarke's life of that monarch. [19] Vide the Record of the Eleventh Foot. [20] On the 26th of May, 1718, he fought a duel in Hyde Park with sword and pistol, with Colonel Waller. [21] _London Gazette._ By Royal Authority. Historical Records of the British Army; A SERIES OF Narratives of the Services of Regiments from their Formation to the present Time. PREPARED BY Richard Cannon, Esq., ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE. Authentic accounts of the actions of the great, the valiant, the loyal, have always been of paramount interest with a brave and civilized people. Great Britain has produced a race of heroes, who, in moments of danger and terror, have stood "firm as the rocks of their native shore;" and when half the world has been arrayed against them, they have fought the battles of their country with unshaken fortitude. It is presumed that a record of achievements in war,--victories so complete and surprising, gained by our countrymen, our brothers, our fellow-citizens in arms,--a record which revives the memory of the brave, and brings their gallant deeds before us, will certainly prove acceptable to the public.--_Extract from the General Preface._ THE HISTORIES OF THE FOLLOWING REGIMENTS ARE ALREADY PUBLISHED: CAVALRY. Life Guards 12_s._ Royal Horse Guards (_Blues_) 10_s._ First, or King's Dragoon Guards 8_s._ Second, or Queen's Ditto (_Bays_) 8_s._ Third, or Prince of Wales's Ditto 8_s._ Fourth (Royal Irish) Ditto 8_s._ Fifth, or Princess Charlotte of Wales' Ditto 8_s._ Sixth Ditto (_Carabineers_) 8_s._ Seventh, or The Princess Royal's 8_s._ First, or Royal Dragoons 8_s._ Second (_Scots Greys_) 8_s._ Fourth (The Queen's Own) Ditto 8_s._ Sixth Dragoons (_Inniskilling_) 8_s._ Seventh, Queen's Own Hussars 8_s._ Eighth, The King's Royal Irish 8_s._ Ninth, Queen's Royal Lancers 6_s._ Eleventh (Prince Albert's Own) Hussars 6_s._ Twelfth (The Prince of Wales's) Royal Lancers 6_s._ Thirteenth Light Dragoons 6_s._ Fifteenth, The King's Hussars 8_s._ Sixteenth, The Queen's Lancers 8_s._ Seventeenth Lancers 10_s._ Cape Mounted Riflemen 4_s._ INFANTRY. First, The Royal Regiment 12_s._ Second, The Queen's Royal 8_s._ Third, The Buffs 12_s._ Fourth, The King's Own 8_s._ Fifth, Northumberland Fusiliers 8_s._ Sixth, Royal First Warwick 8_s._ Eighth, The King's 8_s._ Thirty-fourth Foot 8_s._ Forty-Second, The Royal Highland 12_s._ Fifty-Sixth Foot (_Pompadours_) 6_s._ Sixty-First Ditto 6_s._ Eighty-Sixth, Royal County Down 8_s._ Eighty-Eighth, Connaught Rangers 6_s._ * * * The Records of other Regiments are in course of preparation. PUBLISHED AT THE MILITARY LIBRARY, WHITEHALL. TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}. For example, iv^s (four shillings), or Esq^{re}. Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. Page numbering of the original text has been retained. Front matter has numbering v to viii, then i to viii again, then 9 to 106 for the main text. Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. For example, head quarters, head-quarters; outpost, out-post; situate; inclosure. Pg 11, 'James Nicholnson' replaced by 'James Nicholson'. Pg 61, 'remainded inactive' replaced by 'remained inactive'. Pg 70, 'eighty-three three' replaced by 'eighty-three'. Pg 72, 'the downfal' replaced by 'the downfall'. 
56294	----	book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.) TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. Some minor changes are noted at the end of the book. HISTORICAL RECORDS OF THE BRITISH ARMY. GENERAL ORDERS. _HORSE-GUARDS_, _1st January, 1836_. His Majesty has been pleased to command, that, with a view of doing the fullest justice to Regiments, as well as to Individuals who have distinguished themselves by their Bravery in Action with the Enemy, an Account of the Services of every Regiment in the British Army shall be published under the superintendence and direction of the Adjutant-General; and that this Account shall contain the following particulars, viz., ---- The Period and Circumstances of the Original Formation of the Regiment; The Stations at which it has been from time to time employed; The Battles, Sieges, and other Military Operations, in which it has been engaged, particularly specifying any Achievement it may have performed, and the Colours, Trophies, &c., it may have captured from the Enemy. ---- The Names of the Officers and the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, Killed or Wounded by the Enemy, specifying the Place and Date of the Action. ---- The Names of those Officers, who, in consideration of their Gallant Services and Meritorious Conduct in Engagements with the Enemy, have been distinguished with Titles, Medals, or other Marks of His Majesty's gracious favour. ---- The Names of all such Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates as may have specially signalized themselves in Action. And, ---- The Badges and Devices which the Regiment may have been permitted to bear, and the Causes on account of which such Badges or Devices, or any other Marks of Distinction, have been granted. By Command of the Right Honourable GENERAL LORD HILL, _Commanding-in-Chief_. JOHN MACDONALD, _Adjutant-General_. PREFACE. The character and credit of the British Army must chiefly depend upon the zeal and ardour, by which all who enter into its service are animated, and consequently it is of the highest importance that any measure calculated to excite the spirit of emulation, by which alone great and gallant actions are achieved, should be adopted. Nothing can more fully tend to the accomplishment of this desirable object, than a full display of the noble deeds with which the Military History of our country abounds. To hold forth these bright examples to the imitation of the youthful soldier, and thus to incite him to emulate the meritorious conduct of those who have preceded him in their honourable career, are among the motives that have given rise to the present publication. The operations of the British Troops are, indeed, announced in the "London Gazette," from whence they are transferred into the public prints: the achievements of our armies are thus made known at the time of their occurrence, and receive the tribute of praise and admiration to which they are entitled. On extraordinary occasions, the Houses of Parliament have been in the habit of conferring on the Commanders, and the Officers and Troops acting under their orders, expressions of approbation and of thanks for their skill and bravery, and these testimonials, confirmed by the high honour of their Sovereign's Approbation, constitute the reward which the soldier most highly prizes. It has not, however, until late years, been the practice (which appears to have long prevailed in some of the Continental armies) for British Regiments to keep regular records of their services and achievements. Hence some difficulty has been experienced in obtaining, particularly from the old Regiments, an authentic account of their origin and subsequent services. This defect will now be remedied, in consequence of His Majesty having been pleased to command, that every Regiment shall in future keep a full and ample record of its services at home and abroad. From the materials thus collected, the country will henceforth derive information as to the difficulties and privations which chequer the career of those who embrace the military profession. In Great Britain, where so large a number of persons are devoted to the active concerns of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and where these pursuits have, for so long a period, been undisturbed by the _presence of war_, which few other countries have escaped, comparatively little is known of the vicissitudes of active service, and of the casualties of climate, to which, even during peace, the British Troops are exposed in every part of the globe, with little or no interval of repose. In their tranquil enjoyment of the blessings which the country derives from the industry and the enterprise of the agriculturist and the trader, its happy inhabitants may be supposed not often to reflect on the perilous duties of the soldier and the sailor,--on their sufferings,--and on the sacrifice of valuable life, by which so many national benefits are obtained and preserved. The conduct of the British Troops, their valour, and endurance, have shone conspicuously under great and trying difficulties; and their character has been established in Continental warfare by the irresistible spirit with which they have effected debarkations in spite of the most formidable opposition, and by the gallantry and steadiness with which they have maintained their advantages against superior numbers. In the official Reports made by the respective Commanders, ample justice has generally been done to the gallant exertions of the Corps employed; but the details of their services, and of acts of individual bravery, can only be fully given in the Annals of the various Regiments. These Records are now preparing for publication, under His Majesty's special authority, by Mr. RICHARD CANNON, Principal Clerk of the Adjutant-General's Office; and while the perusal of them cannot fail to be useful and interesting to military men of every rank, it is considered that they will also afford entertainment and information to the general reader, particularly to those who may have served in the Army, or who have relatives in the Service. There exists in the breasts of most of those who have served, or are serving, in the Army, an _Esprit de Corps_--an attachment to every thing belonging to their Regiment; to such persons a narrative of the services of their own Corps cannot fail to prove interesting. Authentic accounts of the actions of the great,--the valiant,--the loyal, have always been of paramount interest with a brave and civilized people. Great Britain has produced a race of heroes who, in moments of danger and terror, have stood, "firm as the rocks of their native shore;" and when half the World has been arrayed against them, they have fought the battles of their Country with unshaken fortitude. It is presumed that a record of achievements in war,--victories so complete and surprising, gained by our countrymen,--our brothers,--our fellow-citizens in arms,--a record which revives the memory of the brave, and brings their gallant deeds before us, will certainly prove acceptable to the public. Biographical memoirs of the Colonels and other distinguished Officers, will be introduced in the Records of their respective Regiments, and the Honorary Distinctions which have, from time to time, been conferred upon each Regiment, as testifying the value and importance of its services, will be faithfully set forth. As a convenient mode of Publication, the Record of each Regiment will be printed in a distinct number, so that when the whole shall be completed, the Parts may be bound up in numerical succession. HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE TWELFTH, OR THE PRINCE OF WALES'S ROYAL REGIMENT OF LANCERS: CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE FORMATION OF THE REGIMENT IN 1715, AND OF ITS SUBSEQUENT SERVICES TO 1842. _ILLUSTRATED WITH A PLATE OF THE UNIFORM._ LONDON: JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND. M.DCCC.XLII. LONDON: HARRISON AND CO., PRINTERS, ST. MARTIN'S LANE. THE TWELFTH, OR THE PRINCE OF WALES'S ROYAL LANCERS, BEAR ON THEIR GUIDONS AND APPOINTMENTS THE "SPHINX," WITH THE WORD "EGYPT;" "PENINSULA;" AND "WATERLOO;" TO COMMEMORATE THEIR DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT IN EGYPT IN 1801; UNDER FIELD MARSHAL HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, IN SPAIN AND THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, FROM 1811 TO 1814; AND AT THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO, ON THE 18TH OF JUNE, 1815. CONTENTS. Year Page 1715 Formation of the Regiment 9 ---- Names of Officer 10 ---- Rebellion of the Earl of Mar 11 1718 The Regiment embarks for Ireland -- 1751 Description of the Uniform and Guidons 13 1768 Styled the _Prince of Wales's Regiment_ 15 ---- Constituted a corps of _Light Dragoons_ 16 1784 Uniform changed from Scarlet to _Blue_ -- 1793 Embarks for the Mediterranean 17 ---- Capture of the Island of Corsica 18 1794 Stationed in Italy--Approbation of Pope Pius VI. -- 1795 Embarks for England 20 1796 Proceeds to Portugal -- 1800 Embarks for the Mediterranean 21 1801 Lands in Egypt 22 ---- Battle of Alexandria -- ---- Capture of a French Convoy in the Lybian Desert 25 ---- ---------- Cairo and Alexandria 27 1802 Returns to England 28 ---- Embarks for Ireland 29 1805 Returns to England -- 1809 Expedition to Walcheren -- ---- Returns to England 30 1811 Embarks for Portugal -- ---- Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo -- 1812 Covering the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo 31 ---- --------------------- Badajoz -- ---- Skirmish at Usagre--Action at Llerena 32 ---- Action at Castrejon 34 ---- Battle of Salamanca 35 ---- Covering the Siege of Burgos-Castle 37 ---- Skirmishes at Monasterio -- ---- Covering the Retreat at Burgos -- 1813 Battle of Vittoria 39 ---- Skirmishes at Villa Franca and Tolosa 40 ---- Covering the Siege of St. Sebastian 41 ---- Passage of the Bidassoa 42 ---- Battle of the Nivelle -- 1814 Passage of the Adour--Blockade of Bayonne 43 ---- Marches to Bordeaux--Skirmish at Etoliers 44 ---- Returns to England -- 1815 Embarks for Flanders 46 ---- Battle of Quatre Bras 47 ---- Battle of Waterloo 48 ---- Names of the Officers who received Medals 58 ---- Advances to Paris -- ---- Forms part of the Army of Occupation in France 59 ---- Constituted a corps of "_Lancers_" -- 1817 Rewarded with the title of the _Twelfth, or Prince of Wales's, Royal Lancers_ -- 1818 Returns to England 60 1820 Embarks for Ireland 61 1824 Returns to England -- 1826 Embarks for Portugal 63 1828 Returns to England 64 1829 Proceeds to Scotland -- 1830 Embarks for Ireland -- ---- Resumes wearing _Scarlet_ Clothing -- 1833 Returns to England -- 1837 Reviewed by the Queen, Victoria 65 1838 Her Majesty's Coronation 66 1839 His Royal Highness the Prince George of Cambridge attached to the Regiment -- 1840 Embarks for Ireland 67 1842 Resumes wearing _Blue_ Clothing -- ---- The Conclusion 68 SUCCESSION OF COLONELS. 1715 Phineas Bowles 69 1719 Phineas Bowles 70 1740 Alexander Rose -- 1743 Samuel Walter Whitshed -- 1746 Thomas Bligh 71 1747 Sir John Mordaunt, K.B. 72 1749 Honorable James Cholmondeley 73 1749 Lord George Sackville 74 1750 Sir John Whitefoord, Baronet 75 1763 Edward Harvey 76 1764 Benjamin Carpenter 77 1770 William Augustus Pitt -- 1775 Honorable William Keppel 78 1782 Honorable George Lane Parker 79 1791 Sir James Steuart, Baronet 79 1815 Sir William Payne, Baronet 81 1825 Sir Colquhoun Grant, K.C.B., K.C.H. 82 1827 Sir R. H. Vivian, Baronet, now Lord Vivian, K.C.B., G.C.H. 84 1837 Sir H. J. Cumming, K.C.H. -- [Illustration: Twelfth, The Prince of Wales's Royal Lancers.] HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE TWELFTH, OR, THE PRINCE OF WALES'S, ROYAL REGIMENT OF LANCERS. [Sidenote: 1715] On the 20th of January, 1715, King George I. proceeded in state to St. Paul's Cathedral, to return thanks for his peaceful accession to the throne of Great Britain and Ireland; but in a short time afterwards the tranquillity of the kingdom was disturbed by the rash proceedings of the adherents of the Stuart dynasty, who were conspiring to elevate the Pretender to the throne, in which they were abetted by the courts of Louis XIV. of France and of other foreign potentates. These proceedings occasioned the army to be augmented, and in July, 1715, Brigadier-General PHINEAS BOWLES,--a warm-hearted loyalist, distinguished for his attachment to the house of Hanover,--who had acquired a reputation at the head of a regiment in the war of the Spanish succession, was commissioned to raise a corps of cavalry in the counties of Berks, Bucks, and Hants, having his general rendezvous at Reading. His Majesty's appeal to his subjects was cheerfully responded to, and a number of loyalists coming forward to hazard their lives in defence of their King and constitution, Brigadier-General Bowles was soon at the head of a regiment of six troops, which, having been continued in the service to the present time, now bears the title of THE TWELFTH, OR THE PRINCE OF WALES'S, ROYAL REGIMENT OF LANCERS. The following officers were appointed to commissions in the regiment:-- _Captains._ Phineas Bowles, _Col._ T. Strickland, _Lt.Col._ J. Orfeur, _Major_ John Pierson Giles Stevens John Prideaux _Lieutenants._ W. Wills, _Capt.Lt._ William Bourden Christopher Bland James Baker John Johnson Hugh Hilton _Cornets._ William Pomfret Thomas Johnson Richard Hull William Pierce Bret. Norton ---- Forfar. While the regiment was in quarters in Berkshire, the Pretender's standard was raised in Scotland by the Earl of Mar; but this rebellion was suppressed without Brigadier-General BOWLES's dragoons being required to proceed to the north; in October they escorted a number of state prisoners to London, who were tried, and several of them executed for endeavouring to excite the people to rebellion, and for enlisting men for the Pretender's service. [Sidenote: 1716] [Sidenote: 1717] [Sidenote: 1718] In 1716 the regiment was stationed in Gloucestershire; in 1717 in Wiltshire; and in October, 1718, it marched to Bristol, where it embarked for Ireland, to replace a regiment of dragoons ordered to be disbanded in that country. The TWELFTH Dragoons were placed upon the Irish establishment, and they remained in that part of the United Kingdom during the following seventy-five years. [Sidenote: 1719] [Sidenote: 1735] [Sidenote: 1739] [Sidenote: 1740] Brigadier-General Bowles was removed in March, 1719, to the Eighth Dragoons, and was succeeded in the colonelcy of the TWELFTH, by Lieut.-Colonel Phineas Bowles. This officer was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general in 1735; to that of major-general in 1739, and was removed, in 1740, to the Seventh Horse, now Sixth Dragoon Guards, when King George II. conferred the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Dragoons on Colonel Alexander Rose, from the Twentieth Foot. [Sidenote: 1743] [Sidenote: 1746] Colonel Rose commanded the regiment until the summer of 1743, when he was succeeded by Colonel Samuel Walter Whitshed, from the Thirty-ninth Foot; and in April, 1746, Brigadier-General Thomas Bligh was appointed to the colonelcy of the regiment, from the Twentieth Foot. [Sidenote: 1747] [Sidenote: 1749] Brigadier-General Bligh was promoted to the rank of major-general in 1747, and removed to the Second Irish Horse, now Fifth Dragoon Guards; and the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Dragoons was conferred on Major-General Sir John Mordaunt, from the Eighteenth regiment of Foot. This distinguished officer was promoted to the Tenth Dragoons, in 1749, and was succeeded by Major-General Lord George Sackville, afterwards Viscount Sackville, from the Twentieth regiment of Foot. [Sidenote: 1750] On the 18th of January, 1750, Lord George Sackville was promoted to the Third Irish Horse, now Sixth Dragoon Guards; and the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Dragoons was conferred on Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Whitefoord, Baronet, from the Thirty-fifth Foot. [Sidenote: 1751] King George II. issued, on the 1st of July, 1751, a warrant regulating the clothing, standards and colours of the several regiments, from which the following particulars have been extracted respecting the TWELFTH DRAGOONS:-- COATS,--_scarlet_, double-breasted, without lapels, lined with _white_; slit sleeves, turned up with white; the button-holes ornamented with narrow white lace; the buttons flat, of white metal, set on two and two; a long slash pocket in each skirt; and a white worsted aiguillette on the right shoulder. WAISTCOATS AND BREECHES,--white. HATS,--bound with silver lace, and ornamented with a white metal loop and a black cockade; the forage cap red, turned up with white, and XII.D. on the little flap. BOOTS,--of jacked leather. CLOAKS,--of scarlet cloth, with a white collar, and lined with white shalloon; the buttons set on two and two, on yellow frogs or loops, with a green stripe down the centre. HORSE FURNITURE,--of white cloth; the holster-caps and housings having a border of yellow lace, with a green stripe down the centre; XII.D. embroidered upon the housings, on a red ground, within a wreath of roses and thistles; the King's cipher, with the crown over it, and XII.D. underneath, embroidered upon the holster-caps. OFFICERS,--distinguished by silver lace and embroidery, and a crimson silk sash across the left shoulder. SERJEANTS,--to have narrow silver lace on their cuffs, pockets, and shoulder-straps; silver aiguillettes, with green and yellow worsted sashes tied round their waists. DRUMMERS AND HAUTBOYS,--white coats, lined with scarlet, and ornamented with yellow lace with a green stripe down the centre; scarlet waistcoats and breeches. GUIDONS,--the first, or King's guidon, to be of crimson silk, with a silver and green fringe; in the centre the rose and thistle conjoined, and crown over them, with the motto--_Dieu et mon Droit_, underneath; the white horse in a compartment in the first and fourth corners, and XII.D. in silver characters on a white ground, in the second and third corners: the second and third guidons to be of white silk; in the centre, XII.D. in silver characters, on a crimson ground, within a wreath of roses and thistles on the same stalk; the white horse on a red ground, in the first and fourth compartments; and the rose and thistle conjoined, upon a red ground, in the second and third compartments; on the third standard, a figure 3, on a circular red ground underneath the wreath. [Sidenote: 1763] [Sidenote: 1764] Lieut.-General Sir John Whitefoord died in 1763; and was succeeded in the colonelcy by Colonel Edward Harvey, from the lieut.-colonelcy of the Sixth Dragoons. In the following year, this officer was removed to the Third Irish Horse, now Sixth Dragoon Guards, and the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Dragoons was conferred on Major-General Benjamin Carpenter, from lieut.-colonel of the second troop, now second regiment, of Life Guards. [Sidenote: 1768] Although the necessity for maintaining an efficient military force in Ireland, had prevented the regiment sharing in the perils and conflicts of the war from 1741 to 1748, and from 1755 to 1762, during which periods several corps had acquired never-fading laurels, yet its excellent conduct during its service in Ireland had been noticed and appreciated; it was held in high estimation, and in 1768, King George III. conferred upon it the distinguished title of "THE PRINCE OF WALES'S REGIMENT," in honor of the heir-apparent to the throne, afterwards King George IV., who was then in the seventh year of his age. At the same time the arms, clothing, and equipment were changed, and it was constituted a corps of "LIGHT Cavalry," and was designated "THE TWELFTH, OR THE PRINCE OF WALES'S REGIMENT OF LIGHT DRAGOONS." The regiment was also permitted to assume as a regimental badge, a coronet, with three feathers, and the motto "ICH DIEN;" also a rising sun, and a red dragon. [Sidenote: 1770] Major-General Carpenter was removed to the Fourth Dragoons in 1770, and was succeeded by Major-General William Augustus Pitt, from the lieut.-colonelcy of the Tenth Dragoons. [Sidenote: 1775] [Sidenote: 1782] After commanding the regiment five years, Major-General Pitt was removed to the Third Irish Horse, now Sixth Dragoon Guards, and was succeeded by Lieut.-General the Honorable William Keppel, from the Fourteenth Foot, who died in 1782, when His Majesty appointed Lieut.-General the Honorable George Lane Parker, from the Twentieth Foot, to the colonelcy of the PRINCE OF WALES'S Light Dragoons. [Sidenote: 1784] [Sidenote: 1785] In 1784 the uniform was changed from scarlet to _blue_, and in 1785 blue cloaks were adopted. [Sidenote: 1789] On the 25th June, 1789, Lieutenant the _Honorable Arthur Wellesley_, now Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, was removed to the TWELFTH Light Dragoons from the Forty-first Foot, and continued to belong to this regiment until the 30th June, 1791. [Sidenote: 1791] Lieut.-General Parker commanded the regiment nine years, and dying in the autumn of 1791, was succeeded by Colonel Sir James Steuart, Baronet, from the lieut.-colonelcy of the Fifth Dragoons. [Sidenote: 1793] [Sidenote: 1794] The French revolution, which occurred at this period, occasioned the regiment to be withdrawn from Ireland, where it had been stationed seventy-five years, and to be employed in more active services. Although the King of France was beheaded, and the republicans maintained their authority by the terrors of the guillotine, yet many patriots stood forward in the cause of royalty, and the inhabitants of the celebrated port of Toulon,--the principal station of the French navy, delivered up their port and city to Admiral Lord Hood, who took possession in August, 1793, in the name of Louis XVII. A French army advanced against Toulon, which was defended by a few British, Spanish, Neapolitan, and Sardinian troops; succours were sent out, and the TWELFTH Light Dragoons embarked for the Mediterranean. Toulon was, however, abandoned, and arrangements were made for attacking the island of _Corsica_; part of the regiment landed and was at the taking of _Bastia_, which surrendered on the 22nd of May, 1794; and an assembly of the deputies afterwards agreed to unite the island to Great Britain. The remainder of the regiment sailed to Italy, and landed at Civita Vecchia,--a fortified sea-port in the bay of the Tuscan sea,--and the conduct of the officers and soldiers attracted the notice of Pope Pius VI., whose thanks were communicated by Cardinal de Zelada, Secretary of State to His Holiness, in the following letter:-- "_From the Vatican, May 30th, 1794._ "The marked consideration which the Holy Father has always entertained, and never will cease to entertain, for the generous and illustrious English nation, induces him not to neglect the opportunity of giving a proof of it, which is now afforded by the stay of a British regiment at Civita Vecchia. As his holiness cannot but applaud the regular and praiseworthy conduct of the troops in question, he has determined to evince his entire satisfaction by presenting a gold medal to each of the officers, including General Sir James Steuart, Baronet, and Colonel Erskine[1], though absent; and since these medals, twelve in number, are not, at the present moment, in readiness, nor can be provided before the departure of the regiment from Civita Vecchia, the Holy Father will be careful that they shall be sent, as soon as possible, to Sir John Cox Hippesly, who will be pleased to transmit them to the respective officers, making them acquainted, at the same time, with the feelings by which His Holiness is animated, and with the lively desire which he entertains of manifesting, on all occasions, his unalterable regard, whether it be towards the nation in general, or towards every individual Englishman. In thus making known to Sir John Cox Hippesly, member of the British parliament, the dispositions of the Supreme Pontiff, the Cardinal de Zelada, Secretary of State, begs leave to add an offer of his own services, and the assurances of his distinguished esteem[2]." [Sidenote: 1795] The TWELFTH Light Dragoons were withdrawn from Italy and Corsica, and, sailing to England, landed at Plymouth in January, 1795; they were stationed, during the summer, at Tavistock, and passed the winter at Nottingham. [Sidenote: 1796] In the summer of 1796 the regiment was removed to Croydon, and in October to York. The French republic was, in the mean time, conspiring the destruction of British commerce, and having concluded a treaty of peace with Spain, had entered into negociations with the Portuguese; but the Queen of Portugal refused to ratify the treaty, and agreed to receive British troops into several ports of Portugal. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons were selected to proceed to Portugal, to assist in the defence of that kingdom, in the event of its being attacked by France or her allies. [Sidenote: 1797] The regiment left England during the winter, arrived at Portugal in the beginning of 1797, and was followed by the Twenty-sixth Dragoons, the second battalion of the First (Royals), and the Eighteenth, Fiftieth, and Fifty-first regiments of foot. [Sidenote: 1800] [Sidenote: 1801] The TWELFTH Light Dragoons were stationed at Lisbon, where they remained until the winter of 1800, when they embarked to join the expedition under General Sir Ralph Abercromby, destined to undertake the expulsion of the French "Army of the East" from Egypt. The regiment sailed under the convoy of the Braakel, armed _en flûte_, and arrived on the 11th of January, 1801, at the Bay of Marmorice, in Asiatic Turkey, where the fleet was anchored in a splendid basin of water, surrounded by mountains covered with trees. The regiment landed, and received a supply of Turkish horses, which proved of so very inferior a description, that the commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Mervyn Archdall, solicited to serve with the regiment as infantry; the necessity of having a body of mounted cavalry was, however, urgent, and three hundred of the best of the horses were trained[3]; a number of men, however, remained dismounted. The TWELFTH and Twenty-sixth Light Dragoons were formed in brigade under Brigadier-General Finch. From the Bay of Marmorice the fleet sailed on the 23rd of February, and the greatness of the armament, with the gaiety of the brave men on board, was calculated to excite a deep feeling of interest respecting the destiny of the expedition, which involved the dearest interests of Great Britain. The gallant troops employed on this enterprise proved worthy of the confidence reposed in them, and they more than realized the expectations of their king and country. Arriving off the celebrated city of Alexandria in the beginning of March, the fleet bore down into the Bay of Aboukir, and on the 8th of that month, the troops landed, and defeated a numerous body of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, formed to oppose them. Advancing towards _Alexandria_, the army encamped, on the 12th of March, near Mandora Tower, and on the following day marched through a grove of date-trees, and drove the enemy from a position he occupied. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons had one man and four horses killed; one serjeant, and one private soldier wounded. After this success the army encamped, and the Egyptian peasantry brought a supply of sheep, goats, poultry, and eggs. On the 18th of March, when a great part of the regiment had left the camp to water the horses, information arrived of the approach of a reconnoitring party, and Lieut.-Colonel Archdall collected sixty men, with whom he advanced to meet the enemy, taking also a piquet of twenty men. After proceeding about three miles, he met one hundred and fifty French hussars and infantry, under General D'Estin, and, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, he instantly detached Lieutenant Levingston with twelve men to attack the left flank of the French hussars, while he charged the front with the main body. Dashing furiously upon his opponents, Colonel Archdall broke the French infantry at the first onset; their cavalry instantly fled, and the British troopers pursued, killing and wounding several, but the main body of the French hussars, being better mounted than the British, escaped. The precaution of securing the French infantry had been, inconsiderately, omitted, and when the troopers returned from the pursuit, they were fired upon by the foot from behind a sandhill, which occasioned some loss, and, finally, the French infantry effected their retreat. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons had five horses killed; Lieut.-Colonel Archdall, and one serjeant wounded; Captain the Honorable Pierce Butler, Cornet Earle Lindsay Daniel, and seven men, who had been most eager in the pursuit, were intercepted in their return, and made prisoners. Lieut.-Colonel Archdall lost his arm, and the command of the TWELFTH Dragoons devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Robert Browne. On the 21st of March the British repulsed an attack of the French on their position; but they had to lament the loss of Sir Ralph Abercromby, who was mortally wounded. The loss of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons was limited to seven men wounded. From the vicinity of Alexandria the regiment afterwards traversed the country to Rosetta, and advanced from thence along the banks of the Nile, taking part in the operations by which the French were forced to quit their fortified post at _Rahmanie_, where the TWELFTH lost several men and horses. While possession was being taken of the fort of Rahmanie, Lieutenant Drake and thirty men of the regiment went out to water their horses, and hearing a firing at a distance, they proceeded to the spot, and found fifty men of the Twenty-second French Dragoons skirmishing with a party of Arabs. The TWELFTH advanced with the most determined gallantry, but at the moment when they were about to charge, the French captain held up a white handkerchief, and agreed to surrender. An aide-de-camp, with despatches, was also made prisoner on this occasion. From Rahmanie, the army advanced along the banks of the Nile towards Cairo, and arrived on the 16th of May at _Algam_ and Nadir. On the following morning some Bedouin Arabs arrived at Colonel Browne's tent with information that a body of French were in the Lybian Desert; the colonel sent them to head-quarters, and immediately despatched Lieutenant Francis Raynes with a small detachment into the desert; also ordered the light artillery and cavalry to feed and water their horses, and be ready to move at a moment's notice: Lieutenant Catson was afterwards sent out with another small detachment to keep up the communication with the first. Soon afterwards Brigadier-General Doyle was directed to enter the desert with his brigade of infantry,--the TWELFTH and Twenty-sixth Light Dragoons (two hundred and fifty men) and some artillery. At the same time Colonel Abercromby and Major Wilson galloped forward to find the enemy. After proceeding some distance at a brisk trot the Light Dragoons came in sight of the French column, which had been skirmishing with the Arabs. The enemy was very superior in numbers; the British artillery was some distance in the rear, and the infantry was not in sight; but Major Wilson advanced with a white handkerchief on the point of his sword, and proposed to the French commander, Colonel Cavalier, to surrender on condition of being sent to France, and the officers to retain their private property. This was at first refused, but Colonel Browne forming the TWELFTH and Twenty-sixth Light Dragoons rank-entire, with extended files, they presented a formidable appearance; and the French officers and soldiers, being weary of Egypt, and desirous of returning to France, surrendered. This proved to be a valuable French convoy of 28 officers. 570 rank and file, 1 stand of colours, 1 light four-pounder, 300 horses and dromedaries, and 500 camels. One hundred and twenty men of Bonaparte's famous dromedary corps were among the prisoners, and presented a grand and novel appearance; and the horses and camels formed a valuable acquisition to the British army. Brigadier-General (afterwards Sir John) Doyle expressed, in a letter to Colonel Browne, his approbation of the excellent conduct of the TWELFTH and Twenty-sixth Light Dragoons, adding,--"With such troops I shall always feel a pride to serve; and at their head, be content to fall, being convinced it must be with honor." When this officer received supporters to his arms, he chose, as one of them, a light dragoon of the TWELFTH, holding the French color taken with the convoy. The army, continuing to advance, arrived, on the 8th of June, near the Pyramids, where it halted several days, and subsequently advanced to _Cairo_, and invested the city; the TWELFTH Light Dragoons being posted on the left of the river. In a few days the French surrendered the capital of Egypt, which added additional lustre to the British arms, and the brave soldiers, whose skill and valor gained these honors, were rewarded with the approbation of their Sovereign, and the thanks of Parliament. From Cairo the army retired down the Nile, and commenced the siege of _Alexandria_, which city was surrendered in September, and the deliverance of Egypt from the power of France was thus completed. [Sidenote: 1802] On the evacuation of Egypt, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons returned to England, where they arrived in 1802. The officers received each a gold medal from the Grand Seignior, and the regiment was subsequently honored with the royal authority to bear on its guidons and appointments, a "SPHYNX," with the word "EGYPT," as a mark of His Majesty's approbation of their gallant services in the Egyptian campaign[4]. [Sidenote: 1803] [Sidenote: 1804] After their return from Egypt, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were stationed at Weymouth until the end of the year, when they proceeded to Ireland, and the head-quarters were established at Clonmel, from whence they were removed, in 1803, to Limerick, and in 1804, to Dublin. [Sidenote: 1805] [Sidenote: 1806] [Sidenote: 1807] [Sidenote: 1808] Returning to England in 1805, the regiment was stationed at Guildford and Romford; in 1806 the head-quarters were at Blatchington, with numerous detachments on the Sussex coast. In 1807 they were removed to Hythe, with detachments on the coast of Kent. In 1808 the regiment marched to Hounslow and Hampton Court, and took the escort duty for the royal family. [Sidenote: 1809] [Sidenote: 1810] The regiment was relieved from the escort duty, in 1809, and embarked with the expedition to Holland under General the Earl of Chatham. It was on board the fleet during the siege and capture of Flushing on the island of _Walcheren_; and when the object of the expedition was relinquished, the regiment returned to England; the head-quarters were established at Deal, with detached troops along the coast of Kent, where they were stationed in 1810. [Sidenote: 1811] In the spring of 1811 the TWELFTH Light Dragoons received orders to hold themselves in readiness to join the allied army commanded by Lord Wellington, engaged in the glorious struggle to effect the expulsion of the legions of Bonaparte from Spain and Portugal; and six troops of the regiment embarked at Portsmouth in May and June. On the 11th of June Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. C. Ponsonby was appointed lieut.-colonel in the regiment in succession to Major-General Robert Browne. The regiment landed at Lisbon on the 25th of June, and, after a halt of ten days, advanced up the country. The allied army retired, soon afterwards, from its position on the Caya in the Alentejo, and moved towards Ciudad Rodrigo; and the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were formed in brigade with the First (Royal) Dragoons under the command of Major-General Slade. This brigade was employed in the operations connected with the blockade of _Ciudad Rodrigo_, and with the action at El Bodon, which took place when the armies of Marshal Marmont and General Dorsenne advanced to relieve the blockaded fortress. A series of movements followed, in which the TWELFTH took part, and after the retrograde of the French army, the brigade went into cantonments in the valley of the Mondego, the TWELFTH occupying Celerico. [Sidenote: 1812] In the winter, when the siege of _Ciudad Rodrigo_ was undertaken, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons advanced to take part in covering the operation, and were posted at Regarda, and on the capture of fortress in January, 1812, they fell back to Seixo, in the valley of Mondego, where they were formed in brigade with the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Light Dragoons, under the orders of Major-General Anson. In February the TWELFTH Light Dragoons marched to Thomar, where they remained until the siege of _Badajoz_ was undertaken, when they proceeded to the Alentejo. On the approach of the French army, they crossed the Guadiana and advanced to Los Santos, where they took the outpost duty, and Badajoz was captured by storm on the 6th of April. The covering army afterwards advanced towards the enemy, who fell back, and on the 10th of April the TWELFTH Light Dragoons drove the enemy's posts from the vicinity of _Usagre_, and occupied the town. On the following day the brigade, commanded on this occasion by Lieut.-Colonel the Honorable Frederick Ponsonby of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons, moved towards _Llerena_, and kept the attention of a large body of French cavalry engaged by skirmishing, while the Fifth Dragoon Guards, and Third and Fourth Dragoons, commanded by Major-General Le Marchant, passed secretly at the back of some heights, and gained the enemy's flank. Everything succeeded according to expectation; as three squadrons under Lieut.-Colonel Ponsonby skirmished, the Fifth Dragoon Guards issued from a grove of olive-trees and charged the enemy's flank; and in the next moment the light brigade charged the front of the French line, which was instantly broken and pursued for several miles. A hundred Frenchmen were killed and wounded in the field, and a much greater number, including one lieut.-colonel, two captains, and a lieutenant, were made prisoners. The loss of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons was limited to one serjeant, two private soldiers, and one horse killed; one serjeant, four private soldiers, and three horses wounded. A cavalry order was issued on the following day, from which the following is an extract:-- "Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton begs Major-General Le Marchant and the Honorable Lieut.-Colonel Ponsonby will accept his best thanks for the gallant and judicious manner in which they commanded their brigades yesterday, and he requests they will make known to the officers commanding regiments the lieut.-general's high approbation of their conduct, as well as of the zeal and attention displayed by all ranks. The order which was observed by the troops in pursuing the enemy, and the quickness with which they formed after every attack, does infinite credit to the commanding officers, and is a convincing proof of the good discipline of the several regiments." The French army under Marshal Soult retired; but another army under Marshal Marmont had entered Portugal, and Major-General Anson's brigade left Spanish Estremadura, and marched for the province of Beira. Marshal Marmont retired; and the TWELFTH Light Dragoons, having halted a short period at Castello-Branco, were afterwards removed to Cano. In June, when the army took the field, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons proceeded to the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo, and subsequently advanced upon _Salamanca_, from whence the French were driven; the regiment, having crossed the Tormes below that city, with the column under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, advanced, by St. Christoval, along the road to Toro, and after skirmishing with the French rear-guard, took the outposts in front of St. Christoval, where the army was placed in position during the siege of the forts. After the capture of the forts at Salamanca, the army advanced to the bank of the Douro, and the French under Marshal Marmont were posted on the opposite side of the river. In the middle of July the French passed the Douro, when Lord Wellington united his centre and left on the Guarena; but caused two divisions, and Major-General Anson's brigade of cavalry, to halt at _Castrejon_, on the Trabancos, under Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons arrived at Castrejon on the 17th of July, and in the evening the piquet under Captain Dickens was attacked. On the following morning at day-break, the out-posts were driven in, and the French appeared in great force; the cavalry formed in front of the infantry, but afterwards advanced towards the river and some sharp skirmishing occurred. Lord Wellington arriving, the whole were directed to retire behind the Guarena, which was executed with little loss. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons had five rank and file, and eight horses killed; Adjutant Getterick, twelve rank and file, and four horses wounded; one rank and file and three horses missing. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons were actively employed during the operations which followed the retreat behind the Guarena, and on the 20th of July, when the opposing armies were moving parallel to each other, Captain Barton's squadron suffered from a cannonade; this squadron furnished the out-posts at night. The army subsequently withdrew to the vicinity of _Salamanca_, where a general action was fought on the 22nd of July. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons were stationed on the left, and not far from the rocky Arapiles, and they had the honor of taking part in the overthrow of the French army. The regiment charged twice in the evening, and broke some French infantry, after which a squadron under Captain Andrews moved to Huarte. Its loss was Captain Dickens, one serjeant, one rank and file and one horse killed; two rank and file and three horses wounded. On the day after the battle, the TWELFTH joined the other regiments of the brigade, which had been in pursuit of the enemy's rear-guard, and following the French army in its retrograde movement, arrived at the ancient city of Valladolid, in Leon, on the 30th of July. The pursuit was not continued; but the Marquis of Wellington left a small force in the neighbourhood of Valladolid, including the TWELFTH Light Dragoons, and marched with the army to Madrid, a distance of about one hundred miles. When the allied army had left the vicinity of the Douro, General Clauzel advanced with the French troops which had been defeated at Salamanca, and occupied Valladolid, and Major-General Anson's brigade was withdrawn across the Douro at Tudela in the middle of August, when the TWELFTH had one man killed in a skirmish with the French. On the return of the army from Madrid, the French retreated; the British moved forward, and on the 7th of September the TWELFTH Light Dragoons entered Valladolid, and skirmished with the enemy's rear-guard when the bridge was blown up. Leaving Valladolid the French army retired down the beautiful Pisuerga and Arlanzan valleys; the allies followed, and the ground being favorable for a retiring army, repeated skirmishes took place, in which the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were engaged. Arriving at _Burgos_, the capital of Old Castille, the army halted, and commenced the siege of the castle; the cavalry being pushed forward to _Monasterio_, where the TWELFTH Light Dragoons had frequent skirmishes with parties of the enemy. The French army having been reinforced and placed under the orders of General Souham, advanced upon Burgos; and this circumstance, with the movements of the forces under Joseph Buonaparte and Marshal Soult, induced the British commander to raise the siege of Burgos castle, and to retire. During the retreat from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were actively employed in covering the rear, and they had frequent rencontres with the French advance-guards, on one of which occasions their commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel the Honorable Frederick Ponsonby, was wounded; Lieutenant Taylor was also wounded; and the regiment had several private soldiers and horses killed and wounded. After passing the Agueda the army went into quarters; the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were stationed at Oliveira de Condé; and from the period they had taken the field in June, they reckoned thirty-three skirmishes and one general engagement, in which the regiment, or a portion of it, had taken part. [Sidenote: 1813] In February, 1813, the regiment was removed to St. Pedro de Sul, on the Vouga, and in April to Agueda, between Coimbro and Oporto. In the mean time arrangements were made for opening the compaign, and in May, the British cavalry of the left wing crossed the Douro, some at Oporto, some at Lamega and other places, and entered the mountainous district of the Tras-os-Montes; they were followed by several divisions of infantry, and by the pontoon train; the whole under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons formed a part of this force; they passed the Douro at Oporto, accompanied this portion of the army in its difficult march through mountainous regions held to be nearly impracticable even for small corps, and forded the Esla at the end of May. The French, finding their position turned, fell back without hazarding a battle, and a series of retrograde movements brought them behind the Ebro. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons followed close on the rear of the retiring enemy, and moving towards the sources of the Ebro, traversed those wild, but beautiful, mountain-regions, through which the Marquis of Wellington moved his numerous columns to turn the position occupied by the French, who fell back upon Vittoria. On the 18th of June, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons overtook a French division, with which they skirmished until a British column came up, when the enemy retired. The skilful and brilliant movements of the British commander had forced the enemy back in confusion from the banks of the Tormes to the confines of the Pyrenees, in three weeks; and this splendid success was followed by a great victory in the valley of _Vittoria_ on the 21st of June, in the gaining of which the TWELFTH Light Dragoons had the honor to take part. They formed part of the left column under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, and supported the attacks of the infantry and artillery on the right of the enemy's positions at Abechuco and Gamarra Major, and towards the close of the action they crossed the little river Zadora, turned the enemy's right, and cut off his retreat by the Bayonne road. The loss of the regiment was small, viz.:--Cornet Hammond and one man killed, and three men wounded: its gallant bearing throughout the action, and the zeal, spirit, and activity evinced by the officers and men, were, however, conspicuous, particularly in its movements in the evening of that eventful day. On the 23rd of June, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were detached, with other forces under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, by the pass of Adrian to the district of Guipuscoa, in the province of Biscay, and in the evening the head of the column, having crossed the Mutiol mountain, descended upon Segura. The TWELFTH passed the night in the mountain, resumed the march on the following day, and arrived in the evening in the neighbourhood of _Villa Franca_, at the moment when the rear-guard of General Foy's division, which was escorting a valuable convoy towards France, was entering the town. The French took up a strong position, some sharp fighting occurred, and eventually General Foy fell back to _Tolosa_, from whence he was driven with the loss of four hundred men killed and wounded; but the convoy entered France in safety. In the beginning of July, _St. Sebastian_ was besieged, and the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were employed in covering the siege of that important fortress. Towards the end of July, when Marshal Soult advanced with a powerful army to drive the allies from the Pyrenees and relieve the invested fortresses, the siege of St. Sebastian was turned into a blockade, and Major-General Anson's brigade of cavalry was employed in keeping up the communication through the mountains, between the left and centre of the allied army. The communication was interrupted on the 27th and 28th of July; but was renewed on the 29th, and after much hard fighting in the mountains, the French were driven back with loss. The siege of St. Sebastian was then renewed, and the TWELFTH Light Dragoons took post at Usurbil, from whence a squadron was subsequently detached to Renterio to furnish the out-posts in that direction. St. Sebastian was taken by storm on the 31st of August, and on the 9th of September the citadel surrendered. About this period Major-General Vandeleur was appointed to the command of the brigade of which the TWELFTH Light Dragoons formed part. After the fall of St. Sebastian, the troops which had been employed in the siege advanced to the frontiers, and on the 7th of October the passage of the _Bidassoa_ was forced, and the army entered France. Unprincipled aggression was thus overtaken by retributive justice, and the kingdom which had sent its legions to other countries to ravage and devastate, became the theatre of war. After the passage of the river, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons bivouacked on the great road, with posts at Urogne. Pampeluna having surrendered, a forward movement was made on the 10th of November, when the enemy's works on the river _Nivelle_ were attacked and forced. The TWELFTH supported the infantry, and lost several men and horses from a cannonade to which they were exposed. The river Nive was passed in the early part of December; but the weather became so severe as to confine the troops to their quarters, and the TWELFTH Light Dragoons returned to Urogne, and took the out-post duty in front of St. Jean-de-Luz. The French army occupied a strong camp at Bayonne. [Sidenote: 1814] When the severity of the weather abated, the army was again put in motion; and in the second week of February, 1814, the British commander advanced against the enemy's left to draw Marshal Soult's attention to that quarter, while the passage of the _Adour_ was effected, by the division under Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, below Bayonne. By a difficult night-march a body of troops approached the river on the morning of the 23rd of February; the artillery forced the French flotilla to retire, and sixty men of the foot-guards were rowed across in a pontoon; a raft was formed, a hawser was stretched across, and six hundred of the foot-guards, the fifth battalion of the sixtieth regiment, and part of the rocket-battery crossed, and repulsed the attack of a French column from Bayonne. On the 24th a squadron of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons crossed the Adour, the men in boats, and the horses swam across the river. A British flotilla afterwards arrived, a bridge of boats was thrown across, and Bayonne was blockaded. In the mean time important events had transpired in various parts of Europe, and the gigantic power of Bonaparte was reduced. A party favorable to the Bourbon dynasty was known to exist at _Bordeaux_, towards which city a body of troops was detached under Sir William, now Lord, Beresford. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons moved by the old road across the Landes towards Bordeaux, where they arrived on the 12th of March, and the magistrates and city-guards displayed the white cockade. The regiment was left at Bordeaux under Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie; it furnished posts and patroles between the Garonne and Dordogne. Two squadrons were subsequently attached to part of the seventh division which occupied La Réolles; and on the 7th of April, a squadron commanded by Major Bridger, crossed the Dordogne, with Lord Dalhousie, and made a successful charge upon a body of French infantry at _Etoliers_. Hostilities were soon afterwards terminated by the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne of France. After reposing a short time in quarters, the regiment commenced its march through France to Calais, which was performed in a month, and in the second week of July it embarked for Dover, from whence it proceeded to Hounslow, where it was reviewed by His Royal Highness the Duke of York; it was afterwards removed to Dorchester. In closing the account of the services of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons in the Peninsula, it is worthy of being recorded, that the regiment never had a piquet surprised, nor a patrole taken; neither did any instance of desertion occur. [Sidenote: 1815] In February, 1815, the regiment marched to Reading, in consequence of some disturbances in Berkshire. After commanding the regiment for twenty-three years, General Sir James Steuart Denham, Baronet, was removed to the Scots Greys, and was succeeded by Lieut.-General Sir William Payne, Baronet, from the Nineteenth Light Dragoons, by commission dated the 12th of January, 1815. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, appreciating the important services rendered by the army during the war, conferred rewards for gallant conduct on officers and corps; and the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were authorized to bear on their guidons and appointments the word "PENINSULA," to commemorate their services in Portugal, Spain, and the south of France, under Field-Marshal His Grace the Duke of Wellington. Their commanding officer, Colonel the Honorable F. C. Ponsonby, was rewarded with a medal and two clasps for the battles of Barrosa, Salamanca, and Vittoria. Before these distinctions were all conferred, the reappearance of Bonaparte in France,--his re-assumption of the imperial dignity,--and the flight of Louis XVIII. from Paris to the Netherlands, occasioned a British army once more to take the field against the legions of the usurper. Six troops of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons, commanded by Colonel the Honorable F. C. Ponsonby, embarked at Ramsgate, in the beginning of April, 1815, leaving a depôt of two troops in England, (which was subsequently augmented to four,) and landing at Ostend, on the 3rd of that month, advanced up the country; they were formed in brigade with the Eleventh and Sixteenth Light Dragoons, under Major-General Sir John Ormsby Vandeleur. Soon after their arrival in Flanders, they were reviewed by the Duke of Wellington, who was pleased to express his "approbation of their appearance; that he was happy at having again under his orders, a corps which had always been distinguished for its gallantry and discipline, and he did not doubt, should occasion offer, but it would continue to deserve his good opinion; and he hoped every man would feel a pride in endeavouring to maintain the reputation of the regiment." When Bonaparte endeavoured, by a sudden advance of his numerous legions, to interpose between the British and Prussian armies, and beat them in detail, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were suddenly ordered to march, on the morning of the 16th of June, to Enghien, from whence they continued their route, a great part of the way at a trot, to _Quatre Bras_, where they arrived at sunset, at the moment when the French troops, under Marshal Ney, were withdrawing from the contest. The regiment bivouacked on the ground behind the field of battle, and furnished small piquets along the front, in communication with the infantry. On the following day, when the army made a retrograde movement, to keep up the communication with the Prussians, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons withdrew by the lower road, through the woods and open grounds, passed the river Dyle, at a deep ford, below Genappe, and took post on the left of the position, in front of the village of _Waterloo_, where they bivouacked in the open fields, and were exposed to a heavy rain during the night. On the following morning (18th June) two powerful armies confronted each other; each occupied a range of heights of easy access, and a narrow valley was between them. Both armies were confident in their leader, and, as daylight appeared, they prepared to engage in deadly conflict. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons were formed in column of squadrons, and posted in a pea-field, above Papilot, a short distance from the left of the fifth division, which formed the left of the British infantry. Soon after mid-day Count D'Erlon's corps attacked the British left, but was repulsed, on which occasion a brilliant charge was made by the Royals, Greys, and Inniskilling Dragoons. One column of the enemy, on the extreme right of the attacking force, had not been engaged, and it continued to advance. Major-General Vandeleur had proceeded, with part of his brigade, to support the Royals, Greys, and Inniskilling Dragoons, whilst re-forming after their charge; but the TWELFTH remained on the left, and Colonel Ponsonby, having authority to act discretionally, resolved, notwithstanding the inferiority of his numbers, to attack the French column with the regiment. He formed the TWELFTH in open column, cautioned the men "to be steady, and do their duty," and led them forward over ploughed ground, saturated with rain, to attack this formidable column of infantry, which was supported on the flank by lancers, and covered by the fire of artillery from a rising ground in its rear. As the French column crossed the valley between the two armies, the TWELFTH passed the hedge-row occupied by the Highlanders, and descended the rising ground on which the British line was formed, exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, and receiving a volley from the column of infantry, to which the slope, the regiment was descending, rendered it a conspicuous mark. As the regiment moved forward, it gradually increased its pace; the men were anxious to charge; but Colonel Ponsonby, whose courage they admired, and in whose talents they placed unlimited confidence, restrained their ardour, that he might maintain their compact formation, and reserve the power of the horses for the critical moment. When that moment arrived, he gave the word "Charge." The French, dismayed by the heroic bearing of the regiment, gave way, and the TWELFTH plunged at speed into the column, broke its formation, and cut down the French soldiers with a terrible carnage. The moment the regiment had cut through the infantry, it was stopped by the columns of reserve, and charged by the lancers. Having succeeded in the object of the charge, Colonel Ponsonby was anxious to withdraw the regiment, and spare his men, who were fighting against fearful odds; but friends and foes were mixed in a confused mêlée; the colonel fell, dangerously wounded, and the regiment withdrew from the unequal contest. After returning from the charge, the regiment was re-formed under Captain (now Colonel) Stawell; its loss had been severe; of the three squadrons, which ten minutes before had gone into action, one-third had fallen; it was found necessary to tell off the regiment into two squadrons, and the grief of the soldiers was great at the absence of their colonel, of whose fate they were ignorant[5]. Major James Paul Bridger, whose charger was killed in the attack, procured another horse, and assumed the command of the regiment. The following account of the charge of the TWELFTH, and of his own sufferings, was afterwards written by Colonel Ponsonby to satisfy the inquiries of numerous friends:-- "I was stationed with my regiment (about 300 strong) at the extreme of the left wing, and directed to act discretionally:--each of the armies was drawn up on a gentle declivity, a small valley lying between them. "At one o'clock, observing, as I thought, unsteadiness in a column of French infantry, which was advancing _with an irregular fire_, I resolved to charge them. As we were descending in a gallop, we received from our own troops on the right, a fire much more destructive than theirs, they having begun long before it could take effect, and slackening as we drew nearer; when we were within fifty paces of them, they turned, and much execution was done among them, as we were followed by some Belgians, who had remarked our success. But we had no sooner passed through them, than we were attacked in our turn, before we could form, by about 300 Polish lancers, who had come down to their relief. The French artillery pouring in among us a heavy fire of grape-shot, which, however, killed three of their own for one of our men: in the mêlée, I was disabled almost instantly in both of my arms, and followed by a few of my men, who were presently cut down (no quarter being asked or given), I was carried on by my horse, till receiving a blow on my head from a sabre, I was thrown senseless on my face to the ground. Recovering, I raised myself a little to look round, when a lancer, passing by, exclaimed '_Tu n'es pas mort, coquin_,' and struck his lance through my back; my head dropped, the blood gushed into my mouth, a difficulty of breathing came on, and I thought all was over. "Not long afterwards a tirailleur came up to plunder me, threatening to take my life. I told him that he might search me, directing him to a small side-pocket, in which he found three dollars, being all I had; he unloosed my stock and tore open my waistcoat, then leaving me in a very uneasy posture; and was no sooner gone, than another came up for the same purpose; but assuring him I had been plundered already, he left me; when an officer, bringing on some troops, (to which probably the tirailleurs belonged,) and halting where I lay, stooped down and addressed me saying, he feared I was badly wounded: I replied that I was, and expressed a wish to be removed into the rear: he said it was against the order to remove even their own men, but that if they gained the day, as they probably would, (for he understood the Duke of Wellington was killed, and that six of our battalions had surrendered,) every attention in his power should be shown me. I complained of thirst, and he held his brandy-bottle to my lips, directing one of his men to lay me straight on my side, and place a knapsack under my head: he then passed on into the action,--and I shall never know to whose generosity I was indebted, as I conceive, for my life,--of what rank he was I cannot say; he wore a blue greatcoat. By and by another tirailleur came and knelt and fired over me, loading and firing many times, and conversing with great gaiety all the while; at last he ran off, saying, '_Vous serez bien aise d'entendre que nous allons nous retirer; bon jour, mon ami._' "While the battle continued in that part, several of the wounded men and dead bodies near me, were hit with the balls, which came very thick in that place. Towards evening, when the Prussians came, the continued roar of the cannon along theirs and the British line, growing louder and louder as they drew near, was the finest thing I ever heard. It was dusk when two squadrons of Prussian cavalry, both of them two deep, passed over me in full trot, lifting me from the ground, and tumbling me about cruelly; the clatter of their approach, and the apprehensions it excited, maybe easily conceived; had a gun come that way, it would have done for me. The battle was then nearly over, or removed to a distance--the cries and groans of the wounded all around me, became every instant more and more audible, succeeding to the shouts, imprecations, outcries of '_Vive l'Empereur!_' the discharges of musquetry and cannon; now and then intervals of perfect silence, which were worse than the noise;--I thought the night would never end. Much about this time, I found a soldier of the Royals lying across my legs, who had probably crawled thither in his agony; his weight, convulsive motions, his noises, and the air issuing through a wound in his side, distressed me greatly; the latter circumstance most of all, as the case was my own. It was not a dark night, and the Prussians were wandering about to plunder; (and the scene in Ferdinand, Count Fathom, came into my mind, though no women, I believe, were there,) several of them came and looked at me, and passed on: at length, one stopped to examine me. I told him, as well as I could (for I could say but little in German), that I was a British officer, and had been plundered already; he did not desist, however, and pulled me about roughly, before he left me. About an hour before midnight, I saw a soldier in an English uniform coming towards me; he was, I suspect, on the same errand. He came and looked in my face; I spoke instantly, telling him who I was, and assuring him of a reward, if he would remain by me. He said that he belonged to the 40th regiment, but had missed it. He released me from the dying man; being unarmed, he took up a sword from the ground, and stood over me, pacing backwards and forwards.--At eight o'clock in the morning, some English were seen at a distance; he ran to them, and a messenger was sent off to Hervey. A cart came for me. I was placed in it, and carried to a farm-house, about a mile and a half distant, and laid in the bed from which poor Gordon, (as I understood afterwards,) had been just carried out; the jolting of the cart, and the difficulty of breathing, were very painful. I had received seven wounds; a surgeon slept in my room, and I was saved by continual bleeding, 120 ounces in two days, besides the great loss of blood on the field[6]." The regiment remained at its post on the left until towards the close of the action, when the head of a Prussian column had arrived at the field of battle, the TWELFTH Light Dragoons were then removed from the left to the right of the allied army; and, in the general charge, made in the evening of this memorable day, they had the honor of being one of the corps which led the attack of the right wing; they passed over the ground on which the struggle had taken place between the French and English foot-guards, which was covered with killed and wounded; rushed upon the flanks of the enemy's broken columns with distinguished gallantry, and completed their rout and discomfiture. When the French army was overthrown and driven from the field, the regiment halted for the night. Its loss was Captain Sandys, Lieutenant Bertie, Cornet Lockhart, six serjeants, and thirty-seven rank and file, killed; Colonel Ponsonby, Lieutenant Dowbiggen, three serjeants, and fifty-five rank and file, wounded. The honor of bearing the word "WATERLOO" on their guidons and appointments was afterwards conferred on the TWELFTH Light Dragoons by royal authority. Colonel the Honorable F. C. Ponsonby and Major James Paul Bridger were constituted companions of the Bath; Major Bridger was promoted to the rank of lieut.-colonel, and Captain Sampson Stawell to that of major; and Serjeant-Major Carruthers was appointed to a cornetcy. The following officers received silver medals:-- Col. Hon. F. C. Ponsonby Major J. P. Bridger Capt. Sampson Stawell " G. F. Erskine " H. Wallace " Alexander Barton " Henry Andrews Lieut. William Heydon " James Chatterton " John Vandeleur " William Hay " W. H. Dowbiggin " Albert Goldsmith " Abraham Lane " J. H. Slade " Thomas Reed Paymaster W. L. Otway Adjutant John Griffith Surgeon B. Robinson Assist.-Surg. J. G. Smith Vet.-Surg. James Castley Every non-commissioned officer and soldier also received a silver medal, with the privilege of reckoning two years' service for having been present at this battle,--the greatest of past or present times, and one which has increased the reputation of the British arms. Following the shattered remnant of the French army in its flight, the regiment arrived in the vicinity of Paris, and the submission of the capital was followed by the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne of France. The TWELFTH Light Dragoons bivouacked in the Champs Elysées, and, having been reviewed by the Emperor of Russia, King of Prussia, and other distinguished personages, marched into cantonments in Normandy. [Sidenote: 1816] The regiment, having been selected to form part of the army of occupation, was placed in brigade with the Eighteenth Hussars under Major-General Sir Hussey Vivian, and while stationed at Fruges, it assembled on the memorable field of Agincourt, where the Waterloo medals were presented to the officers and soldiers. In May, 1816, the regiment marched to Desvres, (Pas-de-Calais,) where the depôt squadron joined from England, and information was received, that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent had approved of the regiment being armed and equipped as a corps of "LANCERS;" a detachment was, consequently, sent to England to learn the use of the LANCE. In October the regiment was reviewed, with the British, Saxon, and Danish contingents of the army of occupation, by their Royal Highnesses the Dukes of Kent and Cambridge. [Sidenote: 1817] As a further reward for its conduct on all occasions, the royal authority was granted, in March, 1817, for the regiment being styled the "TWELFTH, OR PRINCE OF WALES'S, ROYAL LANCERS." At the same time the color of the facings was changed from yellow to scarlet, and the lace from silver to gold. [Sidenote: 1818] In the autumn of this year the regiment was reviewed, with the army of occupation, near Valenciennes, by the King of Prussia and several princes and nobles; and in the autumn of 1818 the Russian, British, Danish, Saxon, and Hanoverian contingents, were reviewed by the Emperor of Russia, King of Prussia, Prince of Orange, and the Grand Dukes Constantine and Michael. After this review, the army of occupation was withdrawn from France; the TWELFTH Royal Lancers embarked at Calais on the 10th of November, landed at Dover on the following day, and proceeded from thence to Chichester and Arundel. At the end of November they marched to Staines, and were on duty at the funeral of Her Majesty Queen Charlotte. They subsequently proceeded to Canterbury, and furnished detachments to Hythe and Deal. [Sidenote: 1819] On the 21st January, 1819, Captain Alexander Barton was promoted, with other officers, to the rank of major in the army, for distinguished conduct in the field, while on service in the Peninsula, upon the recommendation of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington. [Sidenote: 1820] In the summer of 1819, the regiment was removed to Hounslow and Hampton-court, and was reviewed by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. In August, 1820, it embarked at Bristol for Ireland, and after landing at Waterford, the head-quarters were stationed at Cahir. Colonel the Honorable F. C. Ponsonby exchanged to the half-pay, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel T. W. Brotherton, who had served with distinguished gallantry in the Fourteenth Light Dragoons during the Peninsular war, and who assumed the command of the regiment in October of this year. [Sidenote: 1821] From Cahir the regiment marched, in the spring of 1821, to Dublin, where it was stationed when King George IV. visited Ireland, and took part in the duties required on that occasion. [Sidenote: 1822] [Sidenote: 1823] [Sidenote: 1824] After remaining at Dublin a year, the TWELFTH Royal Lancers marched into the Connaught district, with their head-quarters at Ballinrobe, from whence they were removed, in May, 1823, to Cork; and in July, 1824, the regiment embarked at Waterford for England, landed at Bristol, and marched from thence to Brighton and Chichester. [Sidenote: 1825] General Sir William Payne, Baronet, was removed to the Third Dragoon Guards, and was succeeded in the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Royal Lancers by Major-General Sir Colquhoun Grant, K.C.B., K.C.H., by commission dated the 2nd of June, 1825. In the summer of this year the regiment marched to the vicinity of London, and was reviewed, with the Household Brigade, First and Second Dragoon Guards, Scots Greys, Seventh Hussars, and a brigade of artillery, on Hounslow-heath, on the 28th of June, by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, who was accompanied by the Dukes of Cambridge and Sussex. [Sidenote: 1826] From London the regiment marched to Coventry, Birmingham, and Abergavenny; and in April, 1826, it was removed to Hounslow and Hampton-court. While the regiment was employed in the escort duty, commotions took place in Portugal, where a constitution had been conferred on the people, which gave them privileges previously unknown in that country; at the same time they were menaced by an invasion from Spain. In consequence of an application from the Portuguese government, a body of British troops was sent to Lisbon, and four troops of the TWELFTH Royal Lancers, commanded by Major Barton, (Colonel Brotherton being on leave of absence,) embarked at Portsmouth in December, and landed at Lisbon in January, 1827. [Sidenote: 1827] On the 22nd of January Major-General Sir Colquhoun Grant was removed to the Fifteenth Hussars, and the colonelcy of the regiment was conferred on Major-General Sir Hussey Vivian, K.C.B., G.C.H. The two squadrons in Portugal were stationed for several weeks at Belem, from whence they marched to Alhandra, and Alverca, and one troop was attached to the brigade of Foot Guards at Cartaxo. They proceeded to Torres Novas in March, retired to the vicinity of Lisbon in July, and subsequently occupied the barracks at Luz. Lieut.-Colonel Brotherton exchanged to the half-pay, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Stawell, who joined the service troops in Portugal, and assumed the command of the regiment in September of this year at Luz. [Sidenote: 1828] In these quarters the TWELFTH Royal Lancers remained until the spring of 1828, when the British troops were withdrawn from Portugal; the regiment embarked from Lisbon on the 12th of March, landed at Ramsgate on the 26th, and joined the depôt troops at Canterbury on the following day. [Sidenote: 1829] Leaving Canterbury in April, 1829, the regiment commenced its march for Scotland, and after short halts at London and York, arrived at Piershill-barracks, Edinburgh, on the 12th of May; one squadron being stationed at Glasgow. [Sidenote: 1830] In April, 1830, the regiment embarked at Port Patrick for Ireland, landed at Donaghadee, and marched from thence to Dublin. In this year orders were received to resume wearing scarlet clothing. [Sidenote: 1831] [Sidenote: 1832] [Sidenote: 1833] The head-quarters were removed to Newbridge in June, 1831, to Cork in April, 1832, and in the spring of 1833 the regiment marched to Dublin, where it embarked for England; it landed at Liverpool in the middle of April, and proceeded from thence to Manchester. Previous to the embarkation of the regiment from Dublin, a dinner was given, at the Royal Hospital, to the whole of the non-commissioned officers and privates, and to their wives and children, by their colonel, Lieut.-General SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN, Baronet, who was then commander of the forces in Ireland, as a testimony of his approbation of the good conduct and efficient services of the regiment. On his advancement to the dignity of LORD VIVIAN, in 1841, he chose for one of his supporters "A bay horse, guardant, caparisoned, thereon mounted a Lancer of the TWELFTH, or Prince of Wales's, Royal Regiment of Lancers, habited, armed, and accoutred, supporting his lance, proper." [Sidenote: 1834] [Sidenote: 1835] [Sidenote: 1836] From Manchester, the regiment marched in May, 1834, to Birmingham; leaving this station in April, 1835, it proceeded to Dorchester, and in the spring of 1836, to Coventry. [Sidenote: 1837] On the removal of Lieut.-General Sir Hussey Vivian to the Royal Dragoons, he was succeeded in the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Royal Lancers by Lieut.-General Sir Henry John Cumming, K.C.H., by commission dated the 20th of January, 1837. From Coventry the regiment marched, in May, 1837, to Hounslow. On the 28th September the Twelfth Royal Lancers, with the First Life Guards, and Grenadier Guards, were reviewed by the Queen in the Home Park, Windsor, being the first troops reviewed by Her Majesty after her accession to the throne; and on the 9th November the regiment had the honor of escorting Her Majesty on her visit to the City of London. [Sidenote: 1838] On the 28th of June, 1838, the regiment was on duty at the coronation of Her Majesty the Queen Victoria. It is a singular coincidence, that three of the cavalry regiments, which attended the coronation of Her Majesty, were commanded by lieutenant-colonels who served together in the TWELFTH Light Dragoons at the battle of Waterloo, viz.:-- Lieut.-Colonel Stawell Twelfth Royal Lancers, Lieut.-Colonel Chatterton Fourth Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, and Lieut.-Colonel Vandeleur Tenth Royal Hussars. Colonel Stawell, and the officers commanding the other regiments, which attended this august ceremony, had the honor of having a gold medal presented to them by command of Her Majesty. On the 9th of July the TWELFTH Royal Lancers were reviewed, with a number of other corps, in Hyde Park by Her Majesty; they subsequently marched to Brighton, where they were stationed in 1839. [Sidenote: 1839] On the 28th December of this year, Colonel His Royal Highness The Prince George of Cambridge, was, by authority of Her Majesty, attached to the TWELFTH Royal Lancers, and authorised to wear the uniform of the regiment. The Prince joined in February, 1840, and continued to do duty with the regiment for two years[7]. [Sidenote: 1840] Leaving Brighton in June, 1840, the regiment proceeded to Liverpool, where it embarked for Ireland. [Sidenote: 1841] The regiment has since continued in the garrison of Dublin, and remains on that duty at the period of the termination of this record. [Sidenote: 1842] In 1842 the regiment was again clothed in _blue_. The Historical Record of THE TWELFTH ROYAL LANCERS, as given in the preceding pages, which is confirmed by the testimony of the highest military commanders, under whom the regiment has served, sufficiently proves the value of this corps to the crown, and that it has, on all occasions, either in conflict with a foreign enemy, or in patient endurance, when domestic disturbances have required its services, fulfilled its duties with honor, and with advantage to the country. The distinguished conduct of the regiment in EGYPT; its gallant bearing and _esprit de corps_ during the PENINSULAR WAR; the noble and daring charge made by the corps, on a column of French infantry, at the battle of WATERLOO, on the 18th of June, 1815, with the heroic manner in which it led the attack of the right wing, at the close of the action, have established the character of the regiment, and proved its merit of the honors which have been conferred on it by royal authority. FOOTNOTES: [1] The colonel and lieut.-colonel of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons. [2] Some of the officers proceeded to Rome, and had the honor of being introduced to the Pope, who received them in a very gracious manner, and taking a helmet into his hand, ejaculated a wish "that Heaven would enable the cause of truth and religion to triumph over injustice and infidelity," and he then placed it on Captain Browne's head. [3] About three hundred men were mounted in the first instance, and three hundred more at a subsequent period. [4] The following is a description of the Column erected by General R. Browne Clayton, K.C., D.C.L. and F.S.A. on the Rick of Carrig-a-Dagon, county of Wexford, Ireland, the estate of 3,000 statute acres, bestowed on him by his father in 1801. _Height of Column, 94 feet, 3 inches._ "This Column is to commemorate the conquest of Egypt, and the events of the Campaign under the command of General Sir Ralph Abercromby, K.B., in the year 1801, when General Browne Clayton (then Lieut.-Colonel) commanded the 12th Light Dragoons, and afterwards commanded the Cavalry in pursuit of the Enemy to Grand Cairo, taking, besides other Detachments, a Convoy in the Lybian Desert, composed of 600 French Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery, commanded by Colonel Cavalier, together with Bonaparte's celebrated Dromedary Corps, one four-pounder, and one stand of colors, and capturing 300 horses and dromedaries, and 500 camels. The events of this Campaign are further to be commemorated by the appointment of Trustees, under the will of General B. Clayton, who shall annually at sun-rise on the morning of the 21st of March (when the French, under the command of General Menou, attacked the British Encampment, before Alexandria) raise the Standard on the Column, and hoist the tricolor French flag, which shall remain until the hour of ten o'clock, when the British Flag shall be hoisted and kept up until sunset, as a Memorial of the Defeat of the French, which event forms the prelude of Britannia's Triumphs, through a regular and unbroken series of Glory and Prosperity down to the Battle of Waterloo in 1815; and on the 28th March, annually, the British Flag shall be hoisted half-standard high, as a Memorial of the Death of the brave Commander-in-Chief Sir Ralph Abercromby, who died of the wounds which he received before Alexandria, on the 21st March, 1801." [5] Colonel Ponsonby's groom, an old soldier, who was in the rear with a led horse, rushed forward, with tears in his eyes, and continued to search for his master, regardless of his own danger, until he was driven away by the French skirmishers. [6] HON. FREDERICK CAVENDISH PONSONBY, second son of Frederick third earl of Besborough, was appointed cornet in the Tenth Light Dragoons in 1800, and rose in 1803 to the rank of captain in the same corps, from which he exchanged to the Sixteenth Light Dragoons in 1806. In 1807 he was appointed major in the Twenty-third Light Dragoons, at the head of which corps he distinguished himself at the battle of Talavera in 1809; and in 1810 he was promoted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the regiment. In 1811 he served under Lieutenant-General Graham, at Cadiz: and at the battle of Barossa, in March of that year, he attacked, with a squadron of German dragoons, the French cavalry covering the retreat, overthrew them, took two guns, and even attempted, though vainly, to sabre Rousseau's battalions. On the 11th of June, 1811, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Twelfth Light Dragoons, at the head of which corps he served under Lord Wellington, and distinguished himself, in April, 1812, at Llerena, in one of the most brilliant cavalry actions during the war. At the battle of Salamanca he charged the French infantry, broke his sword in the fight, and his horse received several bayonet wounds. He repeatedly evinced great judgment, penetration, and resolution in out-post duty, and was wounded, in the retreat from Burgos, on the 13th of October, 1812. At the battle of Vittoria he again distinguished himself: his services at Tolosa, St. Sebastian, and Nive were also conspicuous; and, on the King's birth-day, in 1814, he was promoted to the rank of colonel in the army. He commanded the Twelfth Light Dragoons at the battle of Waterloo, where he led his regiment to the charge with signal intrepidity. His services were rewarded with the following marks of royal favour:--Knight companion of the order of the Bath,--Knight grand cross of the order of St. Michael and St. George,--Knight commander of the Hanoverian Guelphic order,--a cross,--a Waterloo medal,--Knight of the Tower and Sword of Portugal,--and Knight of Maria Theresa of Austria. In 1824 he was appointed inspecting field-officer in the Ionian islands; in 1825 he was promoted to the rank of major-general; he was removed to the staff at Malta, and retained the command of the troops in that island until May, 1835, in which year he obtained the colonelcy of the Eighty-sixth Regiment, from which he was removed to the Royal Dragoons, in 1836. He was an ornament to his profession. In him, great military talent was united with the most chivalrous bravery,--calm judgment,--cool decision,--resolute action,--and modest deportment. He died on the 11th of January, 1837. [7] (Copy.) _Horse Guards, 28th December, 1839._ SIR, I have the honor, by direction of the General Commanding-in-Chief, to acquaint you, that Her Majesty has been pleased to approve of Colonel His Royal Highness Prince George of Cambridge being attached to the TWELFTH Royal Lancers, and permitted to wear the uniform of that regiment without holding a commission in it. I have, &c., (Signed) JOHN MACDONALD, _Adjutant-General_. _Officer Commanding Twelfth Royal Lancers, Brighton._ SUCCESSIONS OF COLONELS OF THE TWELFTH, THE PRINCE OF WALES'S ROYAL REGIMENT OF LANCERS. PHINEAS BOWLES, _Appointed 22nd July, 1715_. PHINEAS BOWLES served in the wars of Queen Anne, and succeeded, in July, 1705, Colonel Caulfield, in the command of a regiment of foot, with which he proceeded from Ireland to the relief of Barcelona, when that fortress was besieged by the French and Spanish forces under Philip, Duke of Anjou. He subsequently served in Spain under Archduke Charles, afterwards emperor of Germany; and his regiment distinguished itself at the battle of Saragossa in 1710, but was surrounded, and made prisoners in the mountains of Castille in December following. At the peace of Utrecht this regiment was disbanded, and he remained unemployed until the summer of 1715, when he was commissioned to raise a regiment of dragoons, now the TWELFTH ROYAL LANCERS. He was removed in 1719 to the Eighth Dragoons, which he retained until his decease in 1722. PHINEAS BOWLES, _Appointed 23rd March, 1719_. This officer entered the army in the reign of Queen Anne, and served the campaigns of 1710 and 1711, under the celebrated John Duke of Marlborough. He was also employed in suppressing the rebellion of the Earl of Mar in 1715 and 1716, and was promoted in 1719 to the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Dragoons. He was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general in 1735, to that of major-general in 1739, and was removed to the Seventh Horse, now Sixth Dragoon Guards, in 1740. He died in 1749. ALEXANDER ROSE, _Appointed 20th December, 1740_. ALEXANDER ROSE obtained a commission in the army on the 5th of May, 1704; he served several campaigns under the great Duke of Marlborough, and afterwards rose to the lieut.-colonelcy of the Fifth, the Royal Irish, Dragoons, from which he was promoted, in May, 1740, to the colonelcy of the Twentieth regiment of Foot. In December following he was removed to the TWELFTH Dragoons. His decease occurred in 1743, before he had attained any higher rank than that of colonel. SAMUEL WALTER WHITSHED, _Appointed 14th June, 1743_. SAMUEL WALTER WHITSHED entered the army in August, 1704, and served in the war of the Spanish succession under the Earl of Galway and Archduke Charles of Austria. King George II. promoted him to the lieut.-colonelcy of the Eighth Dragoons, and in December, 1740, to the colonelcy of the Thirty-ninth regiment of Foot. In 1743 he was removed to the TWELFTH Dragoons, the command of which corps he retained until the spring of 1746, when he was succeeded by Brigadier-General Thomas Bligh. THOMAS BLIGH, _Appointed 6th April, 1746_. This officer entered the army in the reign of King George I.; rose to the rank of lieutenant-colonel of the Sixth Horse, now Fifth Dragoon Guards, and in December, 1740, he was appointed colonel of the Twentieth regiment of Foot. On the 27th of May, 1745, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general; was removed to the TWELFTH Dragoons in the following year, and promoted to the rank of major-general in 1747. He was removed to the colonelcy of the Second Irish Horse in December of the same year, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general in 1754. War having commenced between Great Britain and France in 1756, Lieutenant-General Bligh was appointed, in 1758, to the command of an expedition designed to make a descent on the coast of France, with the view of causing a diversion in favour of the army commanded by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick in Germany. The fleet sailed in the beginning of August, and in seven days arrived in Cherbourg roads. The troops were landed, the town of Cherbourg was captured, the harbour, pier, and forts were destroyed, and the brass ordnance brought away as trophies of this success. In September a landing was effected on the coast of Brittany with the view of besieging St. Maloes, but this being found impracticable, the troops, after marching a short distance up the country, retired, and re-embarked at the bay of St. Cas. The enemy advanced in great numbers under the command of the Duke of Aguillon, and attacking the rear of the British army, occasioned great loss. Lieutenant-General Bligh was much censured for his conduct on this occasion, and soon after the return of the expedition, he retired from the service. SIR JOHN MORDAUNT, K.B., _Appointed 22nd December, 1747_. JOHN MORDAUNT entered the army in August, 1721, and after a progressive service of several years he was appointed captain and lieut.-colonel in the Third Foot Guards. In January, 1741, he was promoted to the colonelcy of the Fifty-eighth (now Forty-seventh) Foot, and in June, 1745, he obtained the rank of brigadier-general. He commanded a brigade of infantry at the disastrous battle of Falkirk, fought on the 17th of January, 1746, and his distinguished conduct was commended by Lieut.-General Hawley, in his public despatches. He also held an appointment in the army commanded by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, and was sent in pursuit of the rebels from Stirling, with two regiments of dragoons and the Campbell Highlanders. At the battle of Culloden he commanded a brigade of infantry, and gained additional reputation; and he also signalized himself at the battle of Val in 1747. His meritorious conduct was rewarded, in the autumn of the same year, with the rank of major-general; he was also appointed colonel of the TWELFTH Dragoons in December; and was removed in July, 1749, to the Fourth Irish Horse (now Seventh Dragoon Guards), and in November following to the Tenth Dragoons. He was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general in 1754, and to that of general in 1770. He was also rewarded with the dignity of a knight companion of the most honorable military order of the Bath, and the government of Berwick. He died at Bevis-mount, near Southampton, on the 23rd of October, 1780, at the age of eighty-three years. THE HONORABLE JAMES CHOLMONDELEY., _Appointed 24th July, 1749_. THE HONORABLE JAMES CHOLMONDELEY, third son of George, second Earl of Cholmondeley, was appointed guidon and major in the first troop, now first regiment, of Life Guards, in 1725; in 1731 he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and lieut.-colonel in the third troop of Life Guards; and in 1741 he obtained the colonelcy of a newly-raised regiment, which was numbered the Forty-ninth, now Forty-eighth, Foot, from which he was removed in 1742, to the Thirty-fourth regiment. Accompanying his regiment to Flanders, in 1744, he served the campaign of that year under Field-Marshal Wade. He was at the battle of Fontenoy in 1745, and was afterwards promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. On the breaking out of the rebellion in Scotland, he returned to England with a brigade of infantry, and afterwards took the charge of two battalions recently arrived from Ireland, with which he joined the army in Yorkshire under Field-Marshal Wade. On the flight of the rebels from Derby, he was detached to Scotland, and signalised himself in a most conspicuous manner at the battle of Falkirk on the 17th of January, 1746; but the excessive fatigue he underwent, with continued exposure to severe weather, deprived him of the use of his limbs for some time. In 1747 he was promoted to the rank of major-general, and was removed in 1749 to the TWELFTH Dragoons. In November of the same year he was removed to the third Irish Horse, now Sixth Dragoon Guards, and in 1750, to the Sixth Dragoons. In 1754 he was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general, and he was many years lieut.-governor of Chester. He died in 1775. LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE, _Appointed 1st November, 1749_. LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE, youngest son of his Grace the Duke of Dorset, choosing a military life, entered the army in 1737, and was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the Twenty-eighth Foot in 1740. His distinguished behaviour at the head of his regiment at the battle of Dettingen, recommended him to the notice of King George II., and his lordship was shortly afterwards rewarded with the rank of colonel, and appointed one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp. Continuing to serve on the continent, he distinguished himself at the battle of Fontenoy, where he was shot in the breast. His lordship was also employed under the Duke of Cumberland, in suppressing the rebellion in Scotland, and was promoted, in 1746, to the colonelcy of the Twentieth Foot. He served the campaigns of 1747 and 1748, on the continent; and was removed, in 1749, to the TWELFTH Dragoons, from which he was removed, in 1750, to the Third Irish Horse, or Carabineers; he was also appointed secretary of state for Ireland. In 1757 he was removed to the Second Dragoon Guards, and appointed lieut.-general of ordnance, and in 1758 he was sworn a member of the privy council. He was second in command of the expedition to the coast of France, under Charles Duke of Marlborough; also, second in command of the troops sent to Germany; and, after the Duke of Marlborough's decease, his lordship was appointed commander-in-chief of the British troops in Germany, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. Owing to some misunderstanding with his serene highness at the battle of Minden, his lordship returned to England, and was, shortly afterwards, deprived of his military employments. He was endowed with extraordinary talents as a statesman, and he filled, subsequently to this unpleasant affair, some of the highest offices in the administration. He assumed, by act of parliament, the surname of Germaine; and, in February, 1782, he was elevated to the peerage by the titles of Baron Bolebrook, and VISCOUNT SACKVILLE. He died in 1785. SIR JOHN WHITEFOORD, BART., _Appointed 18th January, 1750_. SIR JOHN WHITEFOORD, of Blairquan, a Baronet of Nova Scotia, having served in the subordinate commissions several years, was promoted to the majority of the Sixth Dragoons in 1743, and served with his regiment in the Netherlands. He was subsequently promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the Thirty-fifth Foot, and in January, 1750, he was appointed colonel of the TWELFTH Dragoons. He was promoted to the rank of major-general in 1758, and to that of lieut.-general in 1760. He died at Edinburgh on the 1st of March, 1763. EDWARD HARVEY, _Appointed 17th March, 1763_. This officer held a commission many years in the Sixth Dragoons, with which corps he served at the battles of Dettingen, Fontenoy, and Val. In 1754 he was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the regiment, and proceeding to Germany in the summer of 1758, he was present at nearly every general engagement and skirmish in which British cavalry were employed, during the remainder of the seven years' war, and on several occasions he commanded a brigade of heavy dragoons: he was twice wounded, viz.: at Wetter, in August, 1759, where he surprised a French corps, and took many prisoners, and at Campen, in October, 1760. In 1763 he was rewarded with the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Dragoons, and was removed, in the following year, to the Third Irish Horse, or Carabineers. He was promoted to the rank of major-general in 1762; to that of lieut.-general in 1772; and in 1775 he was removed to the colonelcy of the Sixth Dragoons, which he retained until his decease in 1778. BENJAMIN CARPENTER, _Appointed 20th September, 1764_. BENJAMIN CARPENTER was many years an officer in the second troop, now second regiment, of Life Guards, in which corps he was appointed major in 1749, and lieut.-colonel in 1757. He did not serve abroad, but he was celebrated for a punctilious attention to all his duties, and being repeatedly employed in attendance on the court as ivory stick and silver stick in waiting, he obtained the favour and approbation of King George II., and also of King George III., who promoted him to the rank of colonel, and appointed him aide-de-camp to the King, in a few days after His Majesty's accession to the throne. He was promoted to the rank of major-general in July, 1762, and two years after the King gave him the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Dragoons, from which he was removed in 1770, to the Fourth, the King's Own, Dragoons. He was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general in 1772, and to that of general in 1783. He died in 1788. WILLIAM AUGUSTUS PITT, _Appointed 24th October, 1770_. WILLIAM AUGUSTUS PITT was appointed in February, 1744, cornet in the Tenth Dragoons, in which corps he rose to the rank of lieut.-colonel; he commanded the regiment in Germany, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, and distinguished himself on several occasions, particularly at the battle of Campen, on the 15th of October, 1760, where he was wounded and taken prisoner. He was promoted to the rank of colonel in 1762, and to that of major-general in August, 1770; in October following he was rewarded with the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons; and in 1775 he was removed to the Third Irish Horse, or Carabineers. In 1777 he was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general, and in 1780 he was removed to the Tenth Dragoons. He was created a knight of the most honorable order of the Bath in 1792; promoted to the rank of general in 1793; appointed governor of Portsmouth in 1794; and removed to the First Dragoon Guards in 1796. He died in 1810. THE HONORABLE WILLIAM KEPPEL, _Appointed 18th October, 1775_. THE HONORABLE WILLIAM KEPPEL, fourth son of William-Anne, second Earl of Albemarle, was gentleman of the horse to King George II., and an officer of the first foot guards, in which corps he attained the rank of captain and lieut.-colonel on the 28th of April, 1751. In 1760 he was nominated second major of that regiment with the rank of colonel; and in 1761 he succeeded Lord Charles Manners in the colonelcy of the Fifty-sixth foot, with which he embarked with the armament fitted out against the Havannah, in the island of Cuba, having the rank of major-general in the expedition. On the surrender of the Havannah he took possession of fort La Punta, and when his eldest brother, George, third Earl of Albemarle, sailed for Europe, he was left in command at the Havannah, which city he delivered to the Spaniards after the conclusion of a treaty of peace in 1763. In 1765 he was removed to the Fourteenth Foot; in 1772 he was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general; in 1773 he was commander-in-chief in Ireland; and was removed in 1775, to the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons, which he retained until his decease in 1782. THE HONORABLE GEORGE LANE PARKER, _Appointed 18th March, 1782_. THE HONORABLE LANE PARKER, second son of George, second Earl of Macclesfield, served many years in the first foot guards, in which corps he attained the rank of lieutenant and captain in 1749; captain and lieut.-colonel in 1755; he was promoted to the rank of colonel in 1762, and to that of major-general in 1770; in which year he was appointed second major of the regiment. In 1773 King George III. gave him the colonelcy of the twentieth regiment, and promoted him to the rank of lieut.-general in 1777. In 1782 he was removed to the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons, and he retained this appointment until his decease in 1791. SIR JAMES STEUART, BARONET, _Appointed 9th November, 1791_. JAMES STEUART received a military education in Germany, and at sixteen years of age King George III. presented him with a cornetcy in the royal dragoons, his commission bearing the date the 17th of March, 1761. He served the campaign of that and the following year with the regiment in Germany; was at the battles of Kirch, Denkern and Groebenstein, and took part in several skirmishes. In 1763 he purchased a company in the Queen's royal highlanders, and that corps being disbanded soon afterwards, he improved his knowledge of the military profession by travelling in France and Germany. In 1766 he purchased a troop in the second Irish horse, now fifth dragoon guards; in 1769 he was appointed aide-de-camp to the lord-lieutenant of Ireland (Lord Townshend): and in 1772 he obtained the majority of the thirteenth dragoons, from which he was removed, in 1775, to the first Irish horse, now fourth dragoon guards. In 1776, he was nominated to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the thirteenth dragoons, and having brought that regiment into an excellent state of discipline and efficiency, he was rewarded with the rank of colonel in 1782; in 1783 his regiment was constituted a corps of light cavalry. In 1788 detachments from the cavalry regiments in Ireland were assembled at Dublin, and placed under his command, for the purpose of forming an improved system of interior economy, discipline, and field movements for the cavalry; his labours were honored with the approbation of his sovereign, and his systems, particularly his field movements, having been more completely defined and arranged by Sir David Dundas, were adopted for the cavalry. His services were rewarded in 1791 with the colonelcy of the TWELFTH Light Dragoons; and having been promoted to the rank of major-general in 1793, he was placed on the staff of Scotland, and appointed to superintend the formation and discipline of the fencible cavalry in that country, which was encamped under his orders in the summers of 1795, 1796, and 1797. In the autumn of 1797 he was promoted to the local rank of lieut.-general in Ireland, and appointed to the command of the southern district of that kingdom, which district was, by his excellent arrangements, preserved during the rebellion of 1798, in a state of tranquillity not known in any other part of Ireland. He was rewarded with the rank of lieut.-general, in June, 1798; and after the suppression of the rebellion, he resigned his appointment on the Irish staff. In 1803 he was promoted to the rank of general; and in 1815 he obtained the colonelcy of the Scots greys; he was also honored with the dignity of knight grand cross of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order. His rank and age prevented him from participating in the active measures which led to the wonderful military successes from the recommencement of the war in 1803 to its termination in 1815. He represented in parliament his native county (Lanark) for many years; his mansion at Coltness was proverbial as the seat of kindness and hospitality; and his time, his talents, and his property, were dedicated to the improvement of the district around him. For several years he bore the sirname of Denham; but afterwards discontinued it. He lived to be the eldest general and the oldest soldier in the British army; and died at Cheltenham, on the 5th of August, 1839, at the advanced age of ninety-five. SIR WILLIAM PAYNE, BARONET, _Appointed 12th January, 1815_. SIR WILLIAM PAYNE first entered the army, as cornet in the royal dragoons, on the 25th of January, 1776; and having served in the subordinate commissions, was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the regiment in 1794. He served in the Netherlands under his Royal Highness the Duke of York, and was present at the principal actions during the campaign of 1794. In 1796 he was removed from the lieutenant-colonelcy of the royal dragoons to the third dragoon guards; in 1798 he was promoted to the rank of colonel in the army; and in 1805 he was removed to the tenth light dragoons. He was promoted to the rank of major-general in the same year, and served four years on the staff in Ireland. In November, 1807, he obtained the colonelcy of the twenty-third light dragoons; and in 1809, he proceeded to Portugal with the local rank of lieutenant-general, and served the campaign of that year under Sir Arthur Wellesley. He took an active part in the operations by which the French were driven from Oporto; and commanded the British cavalry at the memorable battle of Talavera, fought on the 27th and 28th of July, 1809, for which he received a medal. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general on the 4th of June, 1811; was removed from the twenty-third to the nineteenth light dragoons in July, 1814, and to the TWELFTH Light Dragoons in January, 1815. He was further advanced to the rank of general on the 27th of May, 1825, and, in the following month, he obtained the colonelcy of the third dragoon guards. He died in April, 1831. SIR COLQUHOUN GRANT, K.C.B., K.C.H., _Appointed 2nd June, 1825_. This officer was appointed ensign of the thirty-sixth foot in 1793, and joined his regiment at Trichinopoly immediately after his appointment. In 1797 he exchanged to the twenty-fifth light dragoons, with which corps he served the Mysore campaign, and was at the taking of Seringapatam. In 1800 he was appointed captain in the ninth dragoons; and he was promoted to the majority of the twenty-eighth light dragoons in the following year. In 1802 he obtained the lieut.-colonelcy of the seventy-second foot, which regiment he commanded at the capture of the Cape of Good Hope in 1806, and was wounded; "but the heroic spirit of this officer was not subdued by his misfortune, and he continued to lead his men to glory, as long as an enemy was opposed to his Majesty's seventy-second regiment[8]." In 1808 he exchanged to the fifteenth, the King's Hussars. He commanded the fifteenth in Spain in 1808, and highly distinguished himself at Sahagun, where he was wounded, and he was rewarded with a gold medal. In 1811 he was appointed aide-de-camp to the Prince Regent, and promoted to the rank of colonel. He embarked with his regiment for the Peninsula in 1813; and commanded the hussar brigade at the action at Morales, where he was wounded; he also commanded the hussar brigade at the battle of Vittoria, and was rewarded with an additional honorary distinction. He subsequently commanded a brigade composed of the thirteenth and fourteenth light dragoons. On the 4th of June, 1814, he was promoted to the rank of major-general; he was also honored with the dignity of a knight commander of the order of the Bath, and in May, 1815, he was appointed groom of the bedchamber to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland. At the battle of Waterloo he commanded a brigade of hussars (seventh and fifteenth British., and second hussars King's German Legion), and had several horses killed under him. His services were further recompensed with the grand cross of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order; and he obtained permission to accept the Orders of Wladimir of Russia, and Wilhelm of the Netherlands. In 1825 he was appointed colonel of the Twelfth Royal Lancers, and was removed in 1827, to the Fifteenth King's Hussars; in July, 1830, he was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general. He died in December, 1835. THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR R. H. VIVIAN, BARONET, _now_ LORD VIVIAN, K.C.B., G.C.H., _Appointed 22nd January, 1827_. Removed to the First (Royal) regiment of dragoons, 20th January, 1837. SIR H. J. CUMMING, K.C.H., _Appointed 20th January, 1837_. FOOTNOTE: [8] Major-General Sir David Baird's despatch. LONDON: PRINTED BY HARRISON & CO., ST. MARTIN'S-LANE. TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. For example, out-post, outpost; foot-guards, foot guards; sirname; shalloon; accoutred. Pg 13, 'without lappels' replaced by 'without lapels'. Pg 31, 'and and advanced to' replaced by 'and advanced to'. Pg 79, 'colonelcy of the TWELTFH' replaced by 'colonelcy of the TWELFTH'. 
61125	----	book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.) TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been placed at the end of the book. Footnote [6] is referenced seven times from page 2. A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example S^t. Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. Misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE NINETEENTH, OR THE FIRST YORKSHIRE NORTH RIDING REGIMENT OF FOOT; CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE FORMATION OF THE REGIMENT IN 1688, AND OF ITS SUBSEQUENT SERVICES TO 1848. COMPILED BY RICHARD CANNON, ESQ., ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, HORSE GUARDS. ILLUSTRATED WITH PLATES. LONDON: PARKER, FURNIVALL, & PARKER, 30, CHARING-CROSS. MDCCCXLVIII. LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. GENERAL ORDERS. _HORSE-GUARDS_, _1st January, 1836_. His Majesty has been pleased to command that, with the view of doing the fullest justice to Regiments, as well as to Individuals who have distinguished themselves by their Bravery in Action with the Enemy, an Account of the Services of every Regiment in the British Army shall be published under the superintendence and direction of the Adjutant-General; and that this Account shall contain the following particulars, viz.:-- ---- The Period and Circumstances of the Original Formation of the Regiment; The Stations at which it has been from time to time employed; The Battles, Sieges, and other Military Operations in which it has been engaged, particularly specifying any Achievement it may have performed, and the Colours, Trophies, &c., it may have captured from the Enemy. ---- The Names of the Officers, and the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates Killed or Wounded by the Enemy, specifying the place and Date of the Action. ---- The Names of those Officers who, in consideration of their Gallant Services and Meritorious Conduct in Engagements with the Enemy, have been distinguished with Titles, Medals, or other Marks of His Majesty's gracious favour. ---- The Names of all such Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates, as may have specially signalized themselves in Action. And, ---- The Badges and Devices which the Regiment may have been permitted to bear, and the Causes on account of which such Badges or Devices, or any other Marks of Distinction, have been granted. By Command of the Right Honorable GENERAL LORD HILL, _Commanding-in-Chief_. JOHN MACDONALD, _Adjutant-General_. PREFACE. The character and credit of the British Army must chiefly depend upon the zeal and ardour by which all who enter into its service are animated, and consequently it is of the highest importance that any measure calculated to excite the spirit of emulation, by which alone great and gallant actions are achieved, should be adopted. Nothing can more fully tend to the accomplishment of this desirable object than a full display of the noble deeds with which the Military History of our country abounds. To hold forth these bright examples to the imitation of the youthful soldier, and thus to incite him to emulate the meritorious conduct of those who have preceded him in their honorable career, are among the motives that have given rise to the present publication. The operations of the British Troops are, indeed, announced in the "London Gazette," from whence they are transferred into the public prints: the achievements of our armies are thus made known at the time of their occurrence, and receive the tribute of praise and admiration to which they are entitled. On extraordinary occasions, the Houses of Parliament have been in the habit of conferring on the Commanders, and the Officers and Troops acting under their orders, expressions of approbation and of thanks for their skill and bravery; and these testimonials, confirmed by the high honour of their Sovereign's approbation, constitute the reward which the soldier most highly prizes. It has not, however, until late years, been the practice (which appears to have long prevailed in some of the Continental armies) for British Regiments to keep regular records of their services and achievements. Hence some difficulty has been experienced in obtaining, particularly from the old Regiments, an authentic account of their origin and subsequent services. This defect will now be remedied, in consequence of His Majesty having been pleased to command that every Regiment shall, in future, keep a full and ample record of its services at home and abroad. From the materials thus collected, the country will henceforth derive information as to the difficulties and privations which chequer the career of those who embrace the military profession. In Great Britain, where so large a number of persons are devoted to the active concerns of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and where these pursuits have, for so long a period, being undisturbed by the _presence of war_, which few other countries have escaped, comparatively little is known of the vicissitudes of active service and of the casualties of climate, to which, even during peace, the British Troops are exposed in every part of the globe, with little or no interval of repose. In their tranquil enjoyment of the blessings which the country derives from the industry and the enterprise of the agriculturist and the trader, its happy inhabitants may be supposed not often to reflect on the perilous duties of the soldier and the sailor,--on their sufferings,--and on the sacrifice of valuable life, by which so many national benefits are obtained and preserved. The conduct of the British Troops, their valour, and endurance, have shone conspicuously under great and trying difficulties; and their character has been established in Continental warfare by the irresistible spirit with which they have effected debarkations in spite of the most formidable opposition, and by the gallantry and steadiness with which they have maintained their advantages against superior numbers. In the official Reports made by the respective Commanders, ample justice has generally been done to the gallant exertions of the Corps employed; but the details of their services and of acts of individual bravery can only be fully given in the Annals of the various Regiments. These Records are now preparing for publication, under his Majesty's special authority, by Mr. RICHARD CANNON, Principal Clerk of the Adjutant General's Office; and while the perusal of them cannot fail to be useful and interesting to military men of every rank, it is considered that they will also afford entertainment and information to the general reader, particularly to those who may have served in the Army, or who have relatives in the Service. There exists in the breasts of most of those who have served, or are serving, in the Army, an _Esprit de Corps_--an attachment to everything belonging to their Regiment; to such persons a narrative of the services of their own Corps cannot fail to prove interesting. Authentic accounts of the actions of the great, the valiant, the loyal, have always been of paramount interest with a brave and civilized people. Great Britain has produced a race of heroes who, in moments of danger and terror, have stood "firm as the rocks of their native shore:" and when half the world has been arrayed against them, they have fought the battles of their Country with unshaken fortitude. It is presumed that a record of achievements in war,--victories so complete and surprising, gained by our countrymen, our brothers, our fellow citizens in arms,--a record which revives the memory of the brave, and brings their gallant deeds before us,--will certainly prove acceptable to the public. Biographical Memoirs of the Colonels and other distinguished Officers will be introduced in the Records of their respective Regiments, and the Honorary Distinctions which have, from time to time, been conferred upon each Regiment, as testifying the value and importance of its services, will be faithfully set forth. As a convenient mode of Publication, the Record of each Regiment will be printed in a distinct number, so that when the whole shall be completed, the Parts may be bound up in numerical succession. INTRODUCTION TO THE INFANTRY. The natives of Britain have, at all periods, been celebrated for innate courage and unshaken firmness, and the national superiority of the British troops over those of other countries has been evinced in the midst of the most imminent perils. History contains so many proofs of extraordinary acts of bravery, that no doubts can be raised upon the facts which are recorded. It must therefore be admitted, that the distinguishing feature of the British soldier is INTREPIDITY. This quality was evinced by the inhabitants of England when their country was invaded by Julius Cæsar with a Roman army, on which occasion the undaunted Britons rushed into the sea to attack the Roman soldiers as they descended from their ships; and, although their discipline and arms were inferior to those of their adversaries, yet their fierce and dauntless bearing intimidated the flower of the Roman troops, including Cæsar's favourite tenth legion. Their arms consisted of spears, short swords, and other weapons of rude construction. They had chariots, to the axles of which were fastened sharp pieces of iron resembling scythe-blades, and infantry in long chariots resembling waggons, who alighted and fought on foot, and for change of ground, pursuit or retreat, sprang into the chariot and drove off with the speed of cavalry. These inventions were, however, unavailing against Cæsar's legions: in the course of time a military system, with discipline and subordination, was introduced, and British courage, being thus regulated, was exerted to the greatest advantage; a full development of the national character followed, and it shone forth in all its native brilliancy. The military force of the Anglo-Saxons consisted principally of infantry: Thanes, and other men of property, however, fought on horseback. The infantry were of two classes, heavy and light. The former carried large shields armed with spikes, long broad swords and spears; and the latter were armed with swords or spears only. They had also men armed with clubs, others with battle-axes and javelins. The feudal troops established by William the Conqueror consisted (as already stated in the Introduction to the Cavalry) almost entirely of horse; but when the warlike barons and knights, with their trains of tenants and vassals, took the field, a proportion of men appeared on foot, and, although these were of inferior degree, they proved stout-hearted Britons of stanch fidelity. When stipendiary troops were employed, infantry always constituted a considerable portion of the military force; and this _arme_ has since acquired, in every quarter of the globe, a celebrity never exceeded by the armies of any nation at any period. The weapons carried by the infantry, during the several reigns succeeding the Conquest, were bows and arrows, half-pikes, lances, halberds, various kinds of battle-axes, swords, and daggers. Armour was worn on the head and body, and in course of time the practice became general for military men to be so completely cased in steel, that it was almost impossible to slay them. The introduction of the use of gunpowder in the destructive purposes of war, in the early part of the fourteenth century, produced a change in the arms and equipment of the infantry-soldier. Bows and arrows gave place to various kinds of fire-arms, but British archers continued formidable adversaries; and, owing to the inconvenient construction and imperfect bore of the fire-arms when first introduced, a body of men, well trained in the use of the bow from their youth, was considered a valuable acquisition to every army, even as late as the sixteenth century. During a great part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth each company of infantry usually consisted of men armed five different ways; in every hundred men forty were "_men-at-arms_," and sixty "_shot_;" the "men-at-arms" were ten halberdiers, or battle-axe men, and thirty pikemen; and the "shot" were twenty archers, twenty musketeers, and twenty harquebusiers, and each man carried, besides his principal weapon, a sword and dagger. Companies of infantry varied at this period in numbers from 150 to 300 men; each company had a colour or ensign, and the mode of formation recommended by an English military writer (Sir John Smithe) in 1590 was:--the colour in the centre of the company guarded by the halberdiers; the pikemen in equal proportions, on each flank of the halberdiers: half the musketeers on each flank of the pikes; half the archers on each flank of the musketeers, and the harquebusiers (whose arms were much lighter than the muskets then in use) in equal proportions on each flank of the company for skirmishing.[1] It was customary to unite a number of companies into one body, called a REGIMENT, which frequently amounted to three thousand men: but each company continued to carry a colour. Numerous improvements were eventually introduced in the construction of fire-arms, and, it having been found impossible to make armour proof against the muskets then in use (which carried a very heavy ball) without its being too weighty for the soldier, armour was gradually laid aside by the infantry in the seventeenth century: bows and arrows also fell into disuse, and the infantry were reduced to two classes, viz.: _musketeers_, armed with matchlock muskets, swords, and daggers; and _pikemen_, armed with pikes from fourteen to eighteen feet long, and swords. In the early part of the seventeenth century Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, reduced the strength of regiments to 1000 men. He caused the gunpowder, which had heretofore been carried in flasks, or in small wooden bandoliers, each containing a charge, to be made up into cartridges, and carried in pouches; and he formed each regiment into two wings of musketeers, and a centre division of pikemen. He also adopted the practice of forming four regiments into a brigade; and the number of colours was afterwards reduced to three in each regiment. He formed his columns so compactly that his infantry could resist the charge of the celebrated Polish horsemen and Austrian cuirassiers; and his armies became the admiration of other nations. His mode of formation was copied by the English, French, and other European states; but so great was the prejudice in favour of ancient customs, that all his improvements were not adopted until near a century afterwards. In 1664 King Charles II. raised a corps for sea-service, styled the Admiral's regiment. In 1678 each company of 100 men usually consisted of 30 pikemen, 60 musketeers, and 10 men armed with light firelocks. In this year the King added a company of men armed with hand-grenades to each of the old British regiments, which was designated the "grenadier company." Daggers were so contrived as to fit in the muzzles of the muskets, and bayonets similar to those at present in use were adopted about twenty years afterwards. An Ordnance regiment was raised in 1685, by order of King James II., to guard the artillery, and was designated the Royal Fusiliers (now 7th Foot). This corps, and the companies of grenadiers, did not carry pikes. King William III. incorporated the Admiral's regiment in the second Foot Guards, and raised two Marine regiments for sea-service. During the war in this reign, each company of infantry (excepting the fusiliers and grenadiers) consisted of 14 pikemen and 46 musketeers; the captains carried pikes; lieutenants, partisans; ensigns, half-pikes; and serjeants, halberds. After the peace in 1697 the Marine regiments were disbanded, but were again formed on the breaking out of the war in 1702.[2] During the reign of Queen Anne the pikes were laid aside, and every infantry soldier was armed with a musket, bayonet, and sword; the grenadiers ceased, about the same period, to carry hand grenades; and the regiments were directed to lay aside their third colour: the corps of Royal Artillery was first added to the Army in this reign. About the year 1745, the men of the battalion companies of infantry ceased to carry swords; during the reign of George II. light companies were added to infantry regiments; and in 1764 a Board of General Officers recommended that the grenadiers should lay aside their swords, as that weapon had never been used during the Seven Years' War. Since that period the arms of the infantry soldier have been limited to the musket and bayonet. The arms and equipment of the British Troops have seldom differed materially, since the Conquest, from those of other European states; and in some respects the arming has, at certain periods, been allowed to be inferior to that of the nations with whom they have had to contend; yet, under this disadvantage, the bravery and superiority of the British infantry have been evinced on very many and most trying occasions, and splendid victories have been gained over very superior numbers. Great Britain has produced a race of lion-like champions who have dared to confront a host of foes, and have proved themselves valiant with any arms. At _Crecy_ King Edward III., at the head of about 30,000 men, defeated, on the 26th of August, 1346, Philip King of France, whose army is said to have amounted to 100,000 men; here British valour encountered veterans of renown:--the King of Bohemia, the King of Majorca, and many princes and nobles were slain, and the French army was routed and cut to pieces. Ten years afterwards, Edward Prince of Wales, who was designated the Black Prince, defeated, at _Poictiers_, with 14,000 men, a French army of 60,000 horse, besides infantry, and took John I., King of France, and his son Philip, prisoners. On the 25th of October, 1415, King Henry V., with an army of about 13,000 men, although greatly exhausted by marches, privations, and sickness, defeated, at _Agincourt_, the Constable of France, at the head of the flower of the French nobility and an army said to amount to 60,000 men, and gained a complete victory. During the seventy years' war between the United Provinces of the Netherlands and the Spanish monarchy, which commenced in 1578 and terminated in 1648, the British infantry in the service of the States-General were celebrated for their unconquerable spirit and firmness;[3] and in the thirty years' war between the Protestant Princes and the Emperor of Germany, the British Troops in the service of Sweden and other states were celebrated for deeds of heroism.[4] In the wars of Queen Anne, the fame of the British army under the great MARLBOROUGH was spread throughout the world; and if we glance at the achievements performed within the memory of persons now living, there is abundant proof that the Britons of the present age are not inferior to their ancestors in the qualities which constitute good soldiers. Witness the deeds of the brave men, of whom there are many now surviving, who fought in Egypt in 1801, under the brave Abercromby, and compelled the French army, which had been vainly styled _Invincible_, to evacuate that country; also the services of the gallant Troops during the arduous campaigns in the Peninsula, under the immortal WELLINGTON; and the determined stand made by the British Army at Waterloo, where Napoleon Bonaparte, who had long been the inveterate enemy of Great Britain, and had sought and planned her destruction by every means he could devise, was compelled to leave his vanquished legions to their fate, and to place himself at the disposal of the British Government. These achievements, with others of recent dates in the distant climes of India, prove that the same valour and constancy which glowed in the breasts of the heroes of Crecy, Poictiers, Agincourt, Blenheim, and Ramilies, continue to animate the Britons of the nineteenth century. The British Soldier is distinguished for a robust and muscular frame,--intrepidity which no danger can appal,--unconquerable spirit and resolution,--patience in fatigue and privation, and cheerful obedience to his superiors. These qualities,--united with an excellent system of order and discipline to regulate and give a skilful direction to the energies and adventurous spirit of the hero, and a wise selection of officers of superior talent to command, whose presence inspires confidence,--have been the leading causes of the splendid victories gained by the British arms.[5] The fame of the deeds of the past and present generations in the various battle-fields where the robust sons of Albion have fought and conquered, surrounds the British arms with a halo of glory; these achievements will live in the page of history to the end of time. The records of the several regiments will be found to contain a detail of facts of an interesting character, connected with the hardships, sufferings, and gallant exploits of British soldiers in the various parts of the world, where the calls of their Country and the commands of their Sovereign have required them to proceed in the execution of their duty, whether in active continental operations, or in maintaining colonial territories in distant and unfavourable climes. The superiority of the British infantry has been pre-eminently set forth in the wars of six centuries, and admitted by the greatest commanders which Europe has produced. The formations and movements of this _arme_, as at present practised, while they are adapted to every species of warfare, and to all probable situations and circumstances of service, are well suited to show forth the brilliancy of military tactics calculated upon mathematical and scientific principles. Although the movements and evolutions have been copied from the continental armies, yet various improvements have from time to time been introduced, to ensure that simplicity and celerity by which the superiority of the national military character is maintained. The rank and influence which Great Britain has attained among the nations of the world have in a great measure been purchased by the valour of the Army, and to persons who have the welfare of their country at heart the records of the several regiments cannot fail to prove interesting. THE NINETEENTH, OR THE FIRST YORKSHIRE NORTH RIDING REGIMENT OF FOOT. NINETEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. CONTENTS OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD. PAGE YEAR INTRODUCTION 1688 Formation of the regiment 1 1689 Francis Lutterell appointed to be Colonel 2 ---- Names of Officers appointed to Commissions -- ---- Regiment marched to Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight -- ---- Embarked as Marines -- ---- Returned to Plymouth -- 1690 Embarked for Ireland 3 ---- Detachment sent to the West Indies -- 1691 Returned to England -- ---- Appointment of Thomas Erle to be Colonel, in succession to Colonel F. Lutterell, deceased -- 1692 Embarked for Flanders -- ---- Engaged at the battle of Steenkirk -- 1693 ---------- the battle of Landen 4 ---- Entered winter quarters at Malines -- 1694 Engaged in operations in Flanders and Brabant -- ---- Returned to Malines -- 1695 Engaged in the siege of Namur -- ---- Occupied winter quarters at Dendermond 5 1696 Returned to England in consequence of the expectation of invasion by France, and of the plan for assassinating King William 5 1697 Re-embarked for Flanders and encamped near Brussels -- ---- Treaty of Peace concluded at Ryswick -- ---- Returned to England -- 1698 Embarked for Ireland -- 1702 War recommenced with France -- ---- Embarked from Ireland for the Isle of Wight 6 ---- Proceeded on an expedition to Cadiz -- ---- --------- to the West Indies -- 1704 Returned to Ireland 7 1705 Embarked for England -- 1709 Promotion of Lieut.-Colonel Freke to be Colonel, in succession to Lieut.-General Erle, retired -- 1710 Embarked for Flanders -- ---- Engaged in forcing the French lines at Pont-à-Vendin -- ---- Siege and surrender of Douay -- ---- ---------------------- Bethune -- ---- ---------------------- Aire and St.-Venant -- ---- Entered winter quarters at Ghent -- 1711 Encamped at Warde 8 ---- Engaged in forcing the French lines at Arleux -- ---- Siege and surrender of Bouchain -- 1712 Appointment of Richard Sutton to be Colonel, in succession to Colonel G. Freke, deceased -- ---- The Duke of Ormond assumed the command of the army in Flanders -- ---- Suspension of hostilities -- ---- British troops retired to Ghent -- 1713 Regiment stationed in Flanders -- 1714 Returned to England -- 1715 Promotion of Lieut.-Colonel Grove to be Colonel, in place of Major-General Sutton, retired -- 1722 Encamped on Salisbury Plain 9 1723 Marched to Scotland -- 1729 Re-appointment of Major-General Sutton to be Colonel in succession to Colonel Grove, deceased -- ---- Embarked for Ireland -- 1738 Appointment of Colonel Honorable Charles Howard to be Colonel, in succession to Lieut.-General Sutton, deceased -- 1739 War declared against Spain -- ---- Removed from Ireland to North Britain -- 1742 War declared against France and Bavaria -- 1744 Embarked for Flanders -- ---- Quartered during the winter at Ghent -- 1745 Advanced to the relief of Tournay -- ---- Engaged at the battle of Fontenoy 10 ---- Retreated to Aeth -- 1746 Engaged at Roucoux 11 ---- Retreated to Maestricht -- 1747 Engaged at Val -- 1748 Treaty of Peace concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle 12 ---- Appointment of Colonel Lord George Beauclerk to be Colonel, in succession to Major-General Honorable Charles Howard, removed to the 3rd Dragoon Guards -- 1749 Regiment returned to England 13 ---- Embarked for Gibraltar -- 1751 The colours, clothing, &c., regulated by royal warrant of King George II. -- 1753 Returned to England -- 1755 Proceeded to Scotland -- 1756 Returned to England -- ---- War commenced with France -- ---- Regiment augmented to two battalions -- 1758 The second battalion formed into a distinct regiment, and numbered the 66th regiment. -- 1759 Encamped at Brentwood 14 1760 Encamped at Barham Down 14 1761 Formed part of an expedition against Belle-Isle on the coast of Bretagne -- ---- Capture of Belle-Isle 15 1762 Returned to England -- ---- Treaty of Peace concluded at Fontainebleau -- ---- Regiment embarked for Gibraltar -- 1768 Appointment of General David Graeme to be Colonel, in succession to Lord George Beauclerk, deceased -- 1771 Regiment returned to England 16 1773 Stationed in Scotland -- 1775 Embarked for Ireland -- 1781 ------------ America -- 1782 Designated the NINETEENTH, or the First Yorkshire North Riding Regiment -- ---- Peace concluded with America -- ---- Proceeded to the West Indies -- 1783 Removed to Jamaica -- 1791 Returned to England -- 1793 War commenced with France -- ---- Embarked under General the Earl of Moira to aid the French Royalists in La Vendée and La Loire 17 1794 Returned to England, and landed in Devonshire -- ---- Embarked for Ostend -- ---- Joined the army under the Duke of York at Malines -- ---- Retreated through Holland to Germany 18 ---- Engaged with the enemy at Tuyl -- 1795 Embarked from Bremen for England -- 1796 -------- for the East Indies and landed at Madras -- ---- Embarked for Ceylon, and landed at Columbo -- 1797 Appointment of General Samuel Hulse in succession to General Graeme, deceased 18 1799 Five companies embarked for India, and engaged in the storming and capture of Seringapatam, on the 4th of May, when Tippoo Saib was mortally wounded 19 ---- The five companies returned to Ceylon -- 1800 Marched from Columbo to Point de Galle -- 1801 Embarked for Trincomalee 20 1802 The Island of Ceylon retained by Great Britain on the conclusion of Peace between France and Holland -- 1803 War recommenced with France and Holland -- ---- Marched to Candy -- ---- Engaged on arduous service against the perfidious Candians 21 1804 Further engagement with the Candians 22 1805 The Candians again defeated -- ---- Embarked for Columbo -- 1806 Proceeded to Trincomalee -- ---- Marched back to Columbo -- 1809 Proceeded to Madras and joined a division of troops employed against the Rajah of Travancore -- ---- Returned to Ceylon, after compelling the Rajah of Travancore to submit 23 1810 Appointment of General Sir Hew Dalrymple, from 37th regiment, to the colonelcy, in succession to General Sir Samuel Hulse, removed to 62nd regiment -- ---- Four companies embarked with an expedition against the Isle of France -- ---- Capture of the Isle of France -- ---- The four companies returned to Ceylon -- 1811 Appointment of General Sir Hilgrove Turner to the colonelcy, in succession to Sir Hew Dalrymple, removed to 57th regiment 24 1814 Embarked for Trincomalee 24 1815 The British troops advanced against the King of Candy -- ---- The King of Candy brought prisoner to the British camp 25 ---- The Malbar dynasty deposed, and the provinces of Candy united to the dominions of the British Crown -- 1816 Remained at Trincomalee -- 1818 Returned to Columbo -- ---- Marched to Candy to suppress a rebellion of several native chiefs 26 ---- Returned to Columbo, and marched to Point de Galle -- 1820 Embarked for England -- 1821 ------------ Ireland -- 1826 Formed into six service and four depôt companies -- ---- Embarked for the West Indies -- 1830 Depôt companies embarked from Cork for England -- 1836 Service companies returned from the West Indies to Ireland 27 ---- Joined by the depôt companies from England -- 1839 Embarked from Dublin for Bristol -- 1840 Returned to Ireland -- ---- Formed into six service and four depôt companies -- ---- Service companies embarked for Malta -- 1841 Depôt companies embarked from Ireland for England -- 1843 Appointment of General Sir W. M. Peacocke to be Colonel, in succession to General Sir Hilgrove Turner, deceased -- ---- Service companies embarked for the Ionian Islands -- 1843 Depôt companies embarked for Jersey 27 1845 Depôt companies embarked for Ireland 28 ---- Service companies embarked from Corfu for the West Indies -- 1848 Service companies embarked from Barbadoes for Canada -- The Conclusion 29 APPENDIX. List of Battles, Sieges, &c. in the Netherlands from 1689 to 1697 31 List of Battles, Sieges, &c. in the Netherlands and Germany from 1702 to 1712 32 SUCCESSION OF COLONELS OF THE NINETEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. YEAR PAGE 1689 Francis Lutterell 33 1691 Thomas Erle -- 1709 George Freke 34 1712 Richard Sutton 35 1715 George Grove -- 1729 Richard Sutton _re-appointed_ 36 1738 _Hon._ Charles Howard -- 1748 Lord George Beauclerk -- 1768 David Graeme 37 1797 Sir Samuel Hulse, G.C.H. -- 1810 Sir Hew Dalrymple, Bart. 39 1811 Sir T. Hilgrove Turner -- 1843 Sir Warren M. Peacocke 40 PLATES. Colours of the Regiment to face 1 Costume of the Regiment " 30 [Illustration: NINETEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. QUEEN'S COLOR.] [Illustration: REGIMENTAL COLOR. FOR CANNON'S MILITARY RECORDS _Madeley lith. 3 Wellington S^t. Strand_] HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE NINETEENTH, OR THE FIRST YORKSHIRE NORTH RIDING REGIMENT OF FOOT. [Sidenote: 1688] The advances made by King James II. towards the subversion of the laws, and the established religion of the kingdom, occasioned the Prince of Orange to be invited to come to England with an army, to enable the nobility and other persons of property and influence to assert the inviolable character of the Constitution in parliament. The Prince landed in Devonshire on the 5th of November, 1688, and a number of persons afterwards joining his standard, they were formed into companies of musketeers and pikemen, and three regiments were embodied under Colonels Lord Mordaunt, Sir John Guise, and Sir Robert Peyton: troops of cavalry and companies of infantry were also raised, in the interest of the Prince of Orange, in various parts of England. [Sidenote: 1689] The flight of King James to France was followed by the elevation of the Prince and Princess of Orange to the throne, in February, 1689. At this period several of the companies of pikemen and musketeers raised when the Prince of Orange landed, were incorporated into a regiment under Colonel Francis Lutterell, whose commission, as colonel of this regiment, was dated the 28th of February, 1689; but the regiment, being formed of companies raised about the middle of November, 1688, was permitted to take rank from that date, and now bears the title of the "NINETEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT." The following officers were appointed to commissions in the regiment:-- _Colonel_, Francis Lutterell. _Lieutenant-Colonel_, William Norcott. _Major_, Henry Hawley. _Captains._ _Lieutenants._ _Ensigns._ Baldwin Mallett. R. Williams (_Capt._). Joseph Lewis. Alexander Lutterell. John Dodington. Abraham Hancock. Edmund Bowyer.[6] N. Simmons. Capell Stocker. William Coward.[6] John Redmore. Thomas Adams. Joseph Pigman.[6] William Willoughby. -- Sidenham. Hopton Wynham. R. Wyndham. -- Ensate. Robert Carey.[6] George Prater. Robert Norcott. Walter Vincent.[6] William Webb. Thomas Robinson. Charles Burlington.[6] John Calmady. Thomas Freke. -- Simmons.[6] John West. Thomas Resdin. Hugh Mallett. -- Gregor. Lawrence Coward. _Adjutant_, John West. _Surgeon_, T. Allen. _Quarter-Master_, Arthur Balsam. In the summer of this year the regiment marched to Portsmouth; it was afterwards stationed in the Isle of Wight, and in September embarked on board the fleet to serve as marines; but landed at Plymouth in the winter. [Sidenote: 1690] The authority of King William being resisted in Ireland, an army was sent to that country under Marshal Duke Schomberg, and in March, 1690, the NINETEENTH received orders to send five hundred and twenty men to Ireland, to replace the losses sustained by many regiments at the unhealthy camp of Dundalk. The regiment afterwards sent a detachment to the West Indies, where nearly all the men died. The regiment also sustained the loss of its colonel, who died this year. [Sidenote: 1691] In 1691 the regiment was stationed in England recruiting, and the colonelcy was conferred on Colonel Thomas Erle, from a regiment which was raised in March, 1689, and disbanded after the treaty of Ryswick in 1697. [Sidenote: 1692] Having recruited its ranks and attained a state of efficiency, the regiment embarked for Flanders in the spring of 1692, and joined the confederate army, commanded by the British monarch in person, whose efforts were directed to arrest the progress of aggression pursued by Louis XIV.;--it served the campaign of this year against the French under Marshal Luxemburg. At the battle of _Steenkirk_, on the 3rd of August, the regiment was in the main body of the allied army, and the advance-guard being repulsed before the supporting columns arrived at the field of battle, King William ordered a retreat. Colonel ERLE's regiment was one of the corps which did not sustain any loss. [Sidenote: 1693] The NINETEENTH regiment was one of the corps assembled at Parck-camp, near Louvain, in May, 1693; and by taking possession of this post, King William defeated the designs of the French monarch on Brabant. The fourteenth, sixteenth, NINETEENTH, and two newly-raised regiments were formed in brigade under Brigadier-General Erle. This brigade was in position at _Landen_, on the 29th of July, when the confederate army was attacked by the superior numbers of the enemy. Brigadier-General Erle was ill of a fever, but hearing that an action was likely to take place, he quitted his bed, and was wounded at the head of his brigade. The French having, by their numerical strength, forced the position, the confederate army retreated. Both armies sustained severe loss, and the enemy derived little advantage from the victory, beyond an opportunity to besiege Charleroi, which was captured in the autumn. The NINETEENTH regiment passed the winter in quarters at Malines. [Sidenote: 1694] In the beginning of May, 1694, the regiment quitted its quarters, and pitched its tents near the cloister of Terbanck; it took part in the operations of the campaign, and performed many long marches in Flanders and Brabant, and in the autumn returned to the pleasant town of Malines, where it passed another winter in garrison, with the third and fourth regiments of foot. [Sidenote: 1695] Early in the spring of 1695 the regiment marched to the vicinity of Ghent, and was encamped near Marykirk until the army took the field. King William undertook the siege of the strong fortress of _Namur_, and the NINETEENTH formed part of the covering army under the Prince of Vaudemont, who acquired great reputation for the skilful retreat he effected in the presence of a French army, of very superior numbers, under Marshal Villeroy. After taking part in covering this retreat, the regiment was employed in several operations for the protection of the maritime and other towns of Flanders, and to cover the troops carrying on the siege of Namur, which fortress was captured by the troops under King William, and that event terminated the campaign. The NINETEENTH regiment passed the winter at Dendermond. [Sidenote: 1696] Finding the progress of his arms arrested, and the fortune of war in favour of the confederates, the French monarch contemplated detaching England from the alliance against his interests, by replacing King James on the throne, for which purpose preparations were made for invading England, and a conspiracy was formed in London for assassinating King William. In consequence of the preparations in France, the NINETEENTH, and a number of other regiments, were ordered to return to England. The regiment embarked from Sas-van-Ghent in March, 1696, and sailed to Gravesend, where it landed. The assassination plot was discovered, and the designs of the French monarch frustrated. [Sidenote: 1697] The regiment remained in England until the summer of 1697, when it again proceeded to Flanders, and joined the army encamped near Brussels on the 14th of July; two days afterwards it was reviewed by King William. The treaty of Ryswick was signed in September, and the British monarch saw his efforts for the preservation of liberty, and the balance of power in Europe, attended with success. The regiment returned to England in November. [Sidenote: 1698] [Sidenote: 1702] In 1698 the NINETEENTH regiment was stationed in Ireland, where it remained until 1702, when the succession of the Duke of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV., to the throne of Spain had produced another war. Early in 1702 an expedition against the port and city of _Cadiz_ was resolved upon by the British government, and the NINETEENTH regiment was withdrawn from Ireland to take part in the enterprise; the fleet was commanded by Admiral Sir George Rooke, and the land forces were placed under the orders of the Duke of Ormond. The regiment proceeded to the Isle of Wight, where it embarked on board the fleet,[7] which sailed for Cadiz, and a landing was effected between Rota and Fort St. Catherine in the middle of August. Fort St. Mary's was taken possession of, and some advantages were gained; but the expedition proved of insufficient force for the reduction of Cadiz, and the troops re-embarked. The NINETEENTH regiment was detached from Cadiz to the West Indies with the squadron of the royal navy under Commander Walker. [Sidenote: 1703] A powerful armament was prepared for the attack of the French and Spanish settlements in the West Indies in 1703, but this enterprise was afterwards laid aside. An unsuccessful attempt was made on Guadaloupe in March of this year, by a few men under Colonel Codrington. [Sidenote: 1704] [Sidenote: 1705] Having lost a number of men from the effects of the climate, the regiment was withdrawn from the West Indies, and was stationed in Ireland in 1704; in 1705 it embarked for England, and landed near Chester in October. [Sidenote: 1706] The regiment was employed on home service during the years 1706, 1707, 1708, and 1709. [Sidenote: 1709] In May, 1709, Lieut.-General Erle disposed of the colonelcy of the regiment to the lieut.-colonel, George Freke. [Sidenote: 1710] Early in the spring of 1710 the regiment embarked for Flanders, to join the allied army in that country under the celebrated JOHN, DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH; it advanced up the country to the vicinity of Tournay, and afterwards took part in the movements by which the French lines were forced at _Pont-à-Vendin_. When the siege of _Douay_ was undertaken, the NINETEENTH regiment was one of the corps selected to take part in this service. Some severe fighting took place in carrying on the attacks, and in storming the outworks, in which the regiment was engaged, and sustained severe loss. On the 25th of June the garrison beat a parley, and afterwards surrendered the fortress. The NINETEENTH regiment had three serjeants and ninety-one rank and file killed at the siege of Douay; and one major, two captains, eight subalterns, ten serjeants, and one hundred and ninety-seven rank and file wounded. The regiment formed part of the covering army during the siege of _Bethune_, which fortress surrendered on the 29th of August. _Aire_ and _St.-Venant_ were afterwards invested and taken, and the regiment marched to Ghent, where it passed the winter. [Sidenote: 1711] Advancing up the country in the spring of 1711, the regiment encamped a short time at Warde, where it was joined by a fine body of recruits from England. It took part in the operations by which the enemy's fortified lines were passed at _Arleux_ on the 5th of August, and it was afterwards engaged in the siege of _Bouchain_, which proved a difficult service; but every obstacle was overcome by the skill and perseverance of the generals and engineers, and the innate bravery of the soldiers, who, on more than one occasion, fought up to their waists in water. This fortress was surrendered on the 13th of September. [Sidenote: 1712] In the spring of 1712 the regiment quitted its winter quarters. Before the army was assembled, Colonel Freke was succeeded in the colonelcy of the regiment by Major-General Richard Sutton, from a newly-raised corps, which was afterwards disbanded. The army in Flanders was this year commanded by the Duke of Ormond, and advanced to the frontiers of France; but negotiations for a treaty of peace having commenced, a suspension of hostilities was proclaimed, and the British troops retired to the vicinity of Ghent. [Sidenote: 1713] During the year 1713 the regiment was stationed in Flanders. [Sidenote: 1714] The decease of Queen Anne took place on the 1st of August, 1714, when the regiment was ordered to return to England, and it was placed in garrison at Tilbury fort, Landguard fort, and Hull, with a detachment at Sheerness. [Sidenote: 1715] In August, 1715, the colonelcy of the regiment was conferred on Lieut.-Colonel Grove, from the foot guards, in succession to Major-General Sutton, who withdrew from active service. [Sidenote: 1716] [Sidenote: 1722] [Sidenote: 1723] The regiment was employed on home service many years; in 1722 it was encamped on Salisbury Plain, where it was reviewed by King George I.; and in the following year it marched to Scotland. [Sidenote: 1727] In 1727 the regiment was held in readiness to assist the Dutch in the expected war with the Emperor of Germany; but no embarkation took place. [Sidenote: 1729] Colonel Grove died on the 13th of October, 1729, and King George II. restored Major-General Sutton to the colonelcy of the regiment. At this period the regiment was removed to Ireland. [Sidenote: 1735] [Sidenote: 1738] Major-General Sutton was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general in 1735, and died in 1738, when the colonelcy of the regiment was conferred on Colonel the Honorable Charles Howard, from captain and lieut.-colonel in the foot guards. [Sidenote: 1739] In 1739 war was proclaimed against Spain, and the NINETEENTH regiment was withdrawn from Ireland, and stationed in North Britain. [Sidenote: 1742] [Sidenote: 1744] A British army proceeded to Flanders in 1742, to support the interests of the House of Austria against France and Bavaria; but the NINETEENTH were employed on home service until 1744, when they proceeded to Flanders, and served the campaign of that year with the army under Field-Marshal Wade. The regiment was encamped some time on the banks of the Scheldt, and afterwards advanced into the territory subject to France, as far as Lisle; but no serious fighting took place, and it passed the winter in quarters at Ghent. [Sidenote: 1745] The regiment was called from its winter quarters in April, 1745, and advanced with the army commanded by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, to the relief of Tournay, which fortress was besieged by a numerous French force, and on the approach of the allied army the enemy took up a formidable position near the village of _Fontenoy_. This position was attacked on the 11th of May, and the gallant bearing of the British infantry was conspicuous; by a determined charge they broke the French lines and overthrew all opposition at their point of attack; but the Dutch failed in their attempts to capture the village of Fontenoy, and the English were exposed to a destructive flank fire which forced them to retreat. The attack was repeated, and British valour and intrepidity triumphed once more; but the Dutch again failed, and the English battalions, which had broken the enemy's lines, were exposed to so destructive a fire from batteries on both flanks, that a retreat was ordered, and the army withdrew from the field of battle to Aeth. The regiment had Lieutenant Le Grand, Ensign Gibson, and seventeen private soldiers killed; Major Petitot, Captains Cochran and Douglas, Lieutenant Coote, Ensigns Cheape, Martin, and Potterfield, one serjeant, and sixty-nine rank and file wounded; thirteen men missing. The subsequent operations of the campaign were of a defensive character, and the allied army was so much inferior in numbers to the enemy, that it was unable to prevent the capture of several fortified towns in the Austrian Netherlands. This year a rebellion broke out in Scotland, and Charles Edward, eldest son of the Pretender, gained some advantages at the head of the Highland clans, when several corps were ordered to return to England, but the NINETEENTH remained in the Netherlands. [Sidenote: 1746] Taking the field in the spring of 1746, the regiment was employed in various services; but the allied army, being very inferior in numbers to the force which the French monarch employed in the Netherlands, was necessarily restricted in its operations. On the 11th of October the allied army was formed on the beautiful plain of Liege, and the NINETEENTH regiment was stationed, with two other corps, in the village of _Roucoux_. About noon the superior numbers of the enemy under Marshal Saxe were seen advancing, and about three in the afternoon a numerous body of infantry and artillery attacked three villages, which were occupied by eight battalions of British, Dutch, and Hessians. The disparity of numbers was about one to six, yet the allies stood their ground gallantly, and repulsed the leading brigades of the enemy. New combatants rushed forward, and the allies were again victorious; but they were eventually forced to quit the villages. After defending their post with great bravery for some time, the NINETEENTH, and other corps in Roucoux, quitted the village, and took post in a hollow way, where they defended themselves until a retreat was ordered, when the army withdrew to the vicinity of Maestricht. One serjeant, one drummer, and thirty-three rank and file of the regiment were killed on this occasion; Lieutenant Cuthbert, Ensign M'Farlane, three serjeants, and nineteen rank and file wounded; Captain Leake, Lieutenant Campbell, and several private soldiers taken prisoners. [Sidenote: 1747] After passing the winter in cantonments in Holland, the regiment took the field with the army commanded by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, and distinguished itself at the battle of _Val_, on the 2nd of July in that year. The enemy attacked the village of Val, which was occupied by the thirteenth, twenty-fifth, and thirty-seventh regiments, and a battalion of Hanoverians, who repulsed the attacks of their numerous opponents some time, but were eventually forced to give way. They were reinforced by the eighth, NINETEENTH, and forty-eighth regiments, and a foreign corps, and returning to the charge, recovered the village. The fighting at this point was very severe; several French brigades were nearly annihilated, and the village was lost and won several times. During this protracted contest the innate valour of the British troops was very conspicuous; but the enemy at length succeeded in breaking the line, and the army was ordered to retreat to Maestricht, where it arrived on the same evening. Lieut.-Colonel Williams, two serjeants, one drummer, and thirty-two rank and file of the regiment were killed; Major Petitot, Captain Masters, Lieutenants Goddard, Brown, Martin, and Phillips, Ensigns Dobson and Fuller, three serjeants, and one hundred and three rank and file wounded; fifteen rank and file missing.[8] [Sidenote: 1748] The regiment again took the field in 1748. Preliminary articles for a treaty of peace were signed at Aix-la-Chapelle, and a suspension of hostilities took place. In this year Major-General the Honorable Charles Howard was removed to the third dragoon guards, and was succeeded in the colonelcy of the NINETEENTH regiment by Colonel Lord George Beauclerk, from the eighth marines. [Sidenote: 1749] The regiment returned to England during the winter of 1748-9, and immediately proceeded to Gibraltar, where it was stationed four years. [Sidenote: 1751] On the 1st of July, 1751, a warrant was issued by authority of King George II., for establishing uniformity in the clothing, standards, and colours of the several regiments, by which the facing of the NINETEENTH was directed to be _green_. The First, or the King's colour, was directed to be the Great Union; the Second, or Regimental colour, to be the colour of the facings of the regiment, with the Union in the upper canton; in the centre of the colour, the Rank of the regiment, in gold Roman characters, within a wreath of roses and thistles on the same stalk, surmounted by the Crown.[9] [Sidenote: 1753] [Sidenote: 1755] [Sidenote: 1756] Having been relieved from garrison duty at Gibraltar, in 1753, the regiment returned to England; in 1755 it was stationed in Scotland; in 1756 it was again stationed in England. A dispute respecting the extent of the British dominions in North America having occasioned another war with France, the regiment was augmented to _two battalions_. [Sidenote: 1758] In 1758 the Second battalion was formed into the SIXTY-SIXTH regiment, under the command of Colonel Edward Sandford. [Sidenote: 1759] [Sidenote: 1760] During the summer of 1759 the regiment was encamped at Brentwood, and in 1760 at Barham Downs. [Sidenote: 1761] In 1761 the regiment was placed under the orders of Major-General Hodgson, for the attack of one of the French islands off the coast of Brittany, called _Belle-Isle_. The expedition appeared before this place on the 7th of April; but the whole island was found like one vast fortress, the little which nature had left undone by rocks and crags having been supplied by art; and the first attempt on the 8th of April, to establish a post on the island, failed. The NINETEENTH, mustering eight hundred men, under Lieut.-Colonel Robert Douglas, evinced great gallantry on this occasion in the assault of the enemy's entrenchments on the shore; the officers and soldiers rushed to the attack with heroic bravery, but were unable to ascend the steep acclivity; they attempted to help one another up, under a heavy fire, but failed, and were ordered to re-embark. The regiment lost Lieutenant Dougal Stuart, three serjeants, one drummer, and forty-seven rank and file killed; Major Lumisden, one serjeant, one drummer, and thirty-eight rank and file wounded; Lieutenants Scrymsour, Forbes, and Nugent, one serjeant, and eighty-nine rank and file prisoners, thirty of whom were wounded. Another attempt was made on the 22nd of April, when Brigadier-General Lambert effected a landing on the rocks near Point Lomaria: the difficulty of mounting the precipice had made the enemy least attentive to that part. Beauclerk's grenadiers (NINETEENTH), with Captain Patterson of the regiment, gained the summit before the enemy saw what was intended, who immediately marched a body of three hundred men to attack them; the grenadiers maintained their ground till the remainder of Brigadier Lambert's troops got up. Three brass field-pieces were taken, and some wounded prisoners. Captain Patterson lost his arm, and the other casualties were about thirty men killed. The cannon was afterwards landed from the ships and dragged up the rocks; the lines which covered the town of Palais were captured; the siege of the citadel was carried on with vigour, and the garrison surrendered on the 7th of June. The conquest of the island was thus achieved, and the officers and soldiers taken prisoners re-joined their regiments. [Sidenote: 1762] Returning from Belle-Isle when the capture of that island was completed, the regiment was stationed in England in 1762. The war was terminated in 1762 by the peace of Fontainebleau, and the regiment again proceeded to Gibraltar, at which fortress it was stationed during the following eight years. [Sidenote: 1768] On the decease of Lieut.-General Lord George Beauclerk, the colonelcy of the regiment was conferred on Major-General David Graeme, from the forty-ninth regiment, by commission dated the 25th of May, 1768. On the 19th of December, 1768, a warrant was issued by command of King George III. for regulating the standards, colours, clothing, &c., of the regiments of cavalry and infantry, by which it was directed, that the _facing_ of the NINETEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT should be _deep green_. [Sidenote: 1771] Early in the spring of 1771 the regiment was relieved from duty at Gibraltar, and arrived in England in May. [Sidenote: 1773] [Sidenote: 1775] In 1773 the regiment was stationed in Scotland; and in 1775 it embarked for Ireland, where it was quartered upwards of five years. [Sidenote: 1781] The American war commenced in the same year in which the regiment embarked for Ireland, and was continued with varied success. In 1781 the regiment was ordered to proceed to South Carolina and Georgia, to reinforce the British troops in those provinces; it embarked from Ireland on the 17th of March, and arrived in America in May; but the peculiar turn which the circumstances of the war took shortly afterwards, prevented the regiment having an opportunity of distinguishing itself. [Sidenote: 1782] A letter, dated the 31st of August, 1782, conveyed to the regiment His Majesty's pleasure that it should be designated the NINETEENTH, or the FIRST YORKSHIRE NORTH RIDING REGIMENT, in order that a connexion between the corps and that part of the county of York should be cultivated, with the view of promoting the success of the recruiting service. [Sidenote: 1783] [Sidenote: 1791] Hostilities terminated in 1782, and the regiment proceeded to the Leeward Islands; in 1783 it was removed to Jamaica, where it was stationed until 1791, when it returned to England, and landed at Portsmouth in June. [Sidenote: 1793] The French revolution had commenced while the regiment was at Jamaica, and in 1793 the King of France was beheaded, and a republican government was established, which was followed by war between England and France. The French Royalists of _La Vendée_ and _La Loire_ took arms against the regicide government, and solicited aid from England; the NINETEENTH regiment embarked with the expedition under Major-General the Earl of Moira, to aid the French Royalists, who expected to be able to gain possession of a sufficient portion of the coast for the English troops to land; the expedition was held in suspense, the fleet being driven about the Channel in stormy weather in the winter of 1793-4. [Sidenote: 1794] No opportunity of landing in France, and of joining the Vendéeans, having occurred, the regiment disembarked on the coast of Devonshire in January, 1794, and went into quarters: the health of the men having suffered from being long detained on board of the fleet. After a few months' repose in quarters, the regiment again embarked, and sailed with the troops under the Earl of Moira for Ostend, which fortress was menaced by a numerous French force. The regiment landed at Ostend on the 26th of June. The Earl of Moira resolved not to limit his services to the defence of Ostend, but to attempt to effect a junction with the army commanded by His Royal Highness the Duke of York; and after a tedious and difficult march in the face of a victorious enemy of superior numbers, whose troops were overrunning the country in all directions, the British arrived at Alost, where they repulsed the attack of a body of the enemy on the 6th of July, and joined the Duke of York's army at Malines three days afterwards. The allies did not bring into the field a force sufficiently numerous to contend with the immense armies of France, and the consequence was a disastrous campaign, and a retreat through Holland to Germany during the frosts and snow-storms of an unusually severe winter; and the NINETEENTH shared, with other regiments, in the sufferings occasioned by these operations. The regiment was engaged under Major-General Lord Cathcart in the attack of the enemy's post at _Tuyl_ on the 30th of December, when it had five men killed and wounded; it also took part in several skirmishes, frequently crossing rivers on the ice to engage the numerous forces of the enemy. [Sidenote: 1795] In the early part of January, 1795, it was found necessary to resume the retreat, and a series of retrograde movements, through a country covered with snow and ice, brought the army into Germany, where the soldiers obtained a short repose, and afterwards embarked from Bremen for England. The NINETEENTH landed from Germany in May, 1795, and were stationed in England eleven months. [Sidenote: 1796] On the 28th of April, 1796, the regiment embarked for the East Indies, and landed at Madras in the middle of November following. A short time previously to the arrival of the regiment in India, the large and mountainous island of Ceylon, situate in the Indian Sea, had been captured from the Dutch, who had become united with France in hostility to Great Britain. After reposing a few weeks at Madras, the regiment received orders to transfer its services to Ceylon, and it landed at Columbo, the capital of the island, in December, 1796. [Sidenote: 1797] General David Graeme died in January, 1797, and King George III. conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on Major-General Samuel Hulse, from the fifty-sixth regiment of foot. In the island of Ceylon, which produces a great diversity of vegetables, the finest fruits, and spices of good quality, particularly cinnamon, the regiment was stationed twenty-four years. [Sidenote: 1798] About this period the officers and soldiers of the NINETEENTH regiment subscribed one day's pay, amounting to £84, for the relief of the widows and children of the men killed in the victory obtained by Admiral Lord Nelson over the French fleet at the battle of the Nile, on the 1st of August, 1798. The regiment subscribed also 2500 pagodas (8_s._ 9_d._ each) towards carrying on the war in Europe. [Sidenote: 1799] Five companies embarked in February, 1799, for the continent of India, to take part in the war with the ruler of the province of _Mysore_, the celebrated Tippoo Saib, whose adoption of French counsels, and hostility to the British interests, proved his ruin. The Mysore was invaded by the British troops, under Lieut.-General (afterwards Lord) Harris, in March, 1799, and the army advanced by triumphant marches to the capital, the strong and splendid city and fortress of _Seringapatam_, which was captured by storm on the 4th of May, when Tippoo fell, mortally wounded, in the defence of the place. The capture of the capital having terminated the war in the Mysore, the five companies of the regiment afterwards returned to Ceylon. [Sidenote: 1800] From Columbo, the regiment marched, in October, 1800, to Point de Galle, where the head-quarters were stationed several months. [Sidenote: 1801] In April, 1801, the regiment embarked for the harbour, town, and fortress of Trincomalee, situate in a barren tract of country on the north-east side of the island of Ceylon, from whence detachments were sent to various posts in the interior. The centre of the island appeared to be defended against the approach of Europeans by the unhealthy climate of the district, through which it was necessary to pass to enter the inland provinces, which were governed by a native chief called the King of Candy. [Sidenote: 1802] In 1802 a treaty of peace was concluded between England and France and Holland; but the island of Ceylon was retained by the British. [Sidenote: 1803] War with France and Holland was resumed in 1803, and, at the same time, it was found necessary to commence hostilities with the Candians, inhabiting the interior of the island of Ceylon, with whom attempts had been made to establish a treaty of amity and commerce, but without success. Some outrages having been committed by the Candians on British subjects, demand was made for reparation, which was evaded on various pretences, and a body of troops, of which a detachment of the NINETEENTH regiment formed part, penetrated through the unhealthy districts into the interior, to demand redress, and to exact security against the repetition of outrage. The troops experienced little opposition, and advanced to _Candy_, the capital, which was found abandoned by the inhabitants. A treaty was framed, and everything appeared in a train for a satisfactory arrangement; but after evincing unparalleled duplicity and treachery, the population of the surrounding districts suddenly attacked the town after hostilities had ceased, and the British troops, under Major Davey, being overpowered by numbers, agreed to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to march with their arms to the British settlements on the coast. These conditions were violated; the British soldiers were barbarously massacred, at Candy, on the 24th of June, excepting a few men who escaped, or were spared by the assassins; the Malays in the English service were required to enter the Candian service, and all who refused were destroyed. The NINETEENTH regiment had the following officers and soldiers massacred on this occasion,--Lieutenants M. H. Bynn, Peter Plenderleath, and Hector M'Lean, Ensign Robert Smith, Quarter-Master John Brown, Assistant-Surgeon William Hope, and one hundred and seventy-two non-commissioned officers and privates. After this act of perfidy and cruelty the Candians attacked the British settlements, and gained some temporary advantages; but were eventually driven back with loss. The surviving officers and soldiers of the NINETEENTH regiment were employed in much harassing and perilous service, and many casualties were occasioned by the climate. Captain Beaver particularly distinguished himself, and the governor, Major-General M^cDowall, expressed his sense of the captain's services, in general orders dated Columbo, 2nd September, 1803, in the following terms: "The Governor has observed, with peculiar satisfaction, the rapid series of well-judged and well-executed operations, by which Captain HERBERT BEAVER, of the NINETEENTH regiment, has hitherto proceeded, in recovering the important province of Matura from the Candians, and in bringing back its deluded inhabitants to their duty. The indefatigable activity, zeal, and ability, which that officer has displayed, since his assumption of the command in that district, has fully justified the high opinion which his Excellency had formed of him from his former services, and which induced the Governor to appoint him to that arduous station, in a time of such extreme difficulty and discouragement." The governor also expressed his approbation of the conduct of the officers and soldiers serving under Captain Beaver. [Sidenote: 1804] In 1804 the Candians again made preparations for an attack on the British settlements; and the English troops penetrated the provinces of Candy. Some sharp fighting occurred; and on the 14th of October Lieutenants B. Vincent and H. L. Smith were killed at Fort M^cDowall. [Sidenote: 1805] Another attack on the British territory was made in the early part of 1805; but the Candians were completely routed in every quarter. In October of this year the NINETEENTH regiment embarked for Columbo. [Sidenote: 1806] The regiment proceeded by sea to Trincomalee in September, 1806; but marched back to Columbo two months afterwards. [Sidenote: 1807] [Sidenote: 1808] During the years 1807 and 1808, the regiment was stationed at the capital of the island of Ceylon. [Sidenote: 1809] Disputes of a tedious and complicated character between the British government and the Rajah of _Travancore_, a province situated at the south-west extremity of Hindoostan, occasioned the NINETEENTH regiment to be withdrawn from Ceylon in February, 1809, and to proceed to Madras to join the troops designed for the reduction of the hostile Rajah. The country of Travancore was taken possession of without much serious opposition, when a force of sufficient strength was assembled for that purpose, and the Rajah was forced to submit. In December the regiment returned to Ceylon. [Sidenote: 1810] General Sir Samuel Hulse having been removed to the sixty-second regiment, the colonelcy of the NINETEENTH was conferred on Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple from the thirty-seventh, by commission dated the 25th of June, 1810. The war with France was continued, a British army was fighting for the liberties of Europe in Portugal and Spain, and in 1810 the English government resolved to deprive Napoleon of the Isle of France, now called the _Mauritius_, the only remaining territory in the possession of France, in the East. To take part in this enterprise, four companies of the NINETEENTH regiment embarked from Ceylon on the 6th of September, 1810. The expedition rendezvoused at the island of Rodriguez, from whence it sailed to the Isle of France, and a landing was effected on the 29th of November. The troops suffered much from the want of water in their advance upon Port Louis, the capital, and finding a plentiful supply at the powder-mills on the road, they halted there during the night of the 30th of November. Some sharp skirmishing occurred, and several men were killed and wounded. On the following day the troops resumed their march; drove the French from their positions with great gallantry; and forced the governor to surrender this valuable colony in three days. The four companies afterwards returned to Ceylon. [Sidenote: 1811] Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple was removed, in April, 1811, to the fifty-seventh regiment, and was succeeded in the colonelcy of the NINETEENTH by Major-General Hilgrove Turner, from the Cape regiment. [Sidenote: 1812] [Sidenote: 1813] [Sidenote: 1814] The reigning sovereign of Candy evinced so cruel and tyrannical a disposition, that he became odious to his subjects, who experienced a total insecurity of life and property under his rule, individuals being frequently deprived of both at the caprice of the king. The governor of one of his provinces was summoned to appear at the capital; but this chief, expecting that the sacrifice of his life, and the seizure of his property, were intended, did not obey the mandate. The king assembled an army, overpowered the forces of the disobedient chief, and forced him to fly for protection to the British settlements. About the period when these events agitated the interior of the island of Ceylon, the NINETEENTH regiment embarked for Trincomalee, where it arrived in the beginning of March, 1814. [Sidenote: 1815] Elated with his success against the disobedient chief, the King of Candy prepared to invade the British territory; and the governor, Major-General Brownrigg, resolved to preserve the English provinces from aggression by invading the kingdom of Candy. The British troops advanced into the kingdom of Candy, in seven divisions, in the beginning of February, 1815, and the NINETEENTH regiment marched from Trincomalee to take part in this service. The soldiers underwent great fatigue in crossing mountains, passing morasses and rivers, and traversing regions inhabited only by the wild beasts of the forest; they succeeded in overcoming all opposition, and arrived at the capital in the middle of February. The king fled; but he was seized by his own subjects, ill-treated, and brought a prisoner to the British camp. An assembly of Candian chiefs declared the Malbar dynasty deposed, and the provinces of Candy united to the dominions of the British crown. Thus was an extensive tract of country, bountifully endowed with natural gifts, and producing the necessaries and luxuries of life, including spices, metals, and precious stones, added to the British dominions; a numerous race of human beings, of a peculiarly interesting character, was delivered from the power of despotism, and brought under the advantages of the just government and equitable laws of Great Britain. Every species of torture was immediately abolished; but the ancient religion of the inhabitants, and the former mode of administering justice, were preserved. The conduct of the British troops was highly meritorious, and reflected credit on the several corps employed on this enterprise: the soldiers abstained from plunder and violence, and behaved with such order and regularity as to conciliate the inhabitants, whose condition, improved by a policy founded on liberal ideas, and exhibiting enlarged views, prepared the way for their emancipation from the errors of superstition, and their introduction to the advantages of Christianity, and of European arts, sciences, and commerce. The British troops occupied posts in the newly-acquired territory, and the corps not required for this duty returned to their former quarters. [Sidenote: 1816] The NINETEENTH regiment remained at Trincomalee, and other stations in that quarter of the island, until February, 1818, when it returned to Columbo. [Sidenote: 1818] Soon afterwards a new claimant to the throne of Candy arrived in that country, from the continent of India, and being supported by several native chiefs, who were hostile to the British interests, a rebellion took place. This event called the NINETEENTH again into the field; they marched for Candy in April, 1818, and again traversed mountainous districts and wild and beautiful regions; some desultory fighting occurred; but a greater loss of life was occasioned by the climate, than by the swords of the insurgents. The rebellion was suppressed; the regiment returned to Columbo in September; and in October it marched to Point de Galle. [Sidenote: 1819] [Sidenote: 1820] After serving twenty-three years at Ceylon, and taking a distinguished part in the important events which had occurred in that island, the regiment was relieved from duty there, and embarked for England in January, 1820; it landed at Gravesend on the 19th of May, and was stationed in the south of England during the remainder of the year. [Sidenote: 1821] In February, 1821, the regiment marched to Weedon Barracks; and in November embarked from Liverpool for Ireland, and, after landing at Dublin, marched to Mullingar, Longford, Tullamore, Philipstown, and Maryborough. [Sidenote: 1822] [Sidenote: 1823] [Sidenote: 1824] [Sidenote: 1825] [Sidenote: 1826] The regiment remained in Ireland during the years 1822, 1823, 1824, and 1825; in the autumn of 1826 it was divided into six service and four depôt companies: the service companies embarked from Cork in October, for the island of Demerara, where they arrived in December. [Sidenote: 1830] The depôt companies were stationed in Ireland until June, 1830, when they embarked from Cork for Portsmouth, where they arrived in two days. [Sidenote: 1836] After occupying various stations in the British West India Islands, during the period of nearly ten years, the service companies embarked from Barbadoes in July, 1836, and landed at Cork in August: they were afterwards joined by the depôt companies from England. [Sidenote: 1837] [Sidenote: 1838] During the years 1837 and 1838, the regiment was stationed in Ireland; in December, 1839, it embarked from Dublin for Bristol; but returned to Ireland in March following. [Sidenote: 1840] In the summer of 1840 the regiment was again divided into six service, and four depôt companies, and in September the service companies embarked from Cork for the island of Malta, where they landed on the 3rd and 13th of October. [Sidenote: 1841] [Sidenote: 1842] The depôt companies left Ireland in 1841, and were stationed a short time at Gosport; they proceeded to Brighton in March, 1842, and to Dover Castle in October. [Sidenote: 1843] General Sir Hilgrove Turner, G.C.H., K.C., died at Jersey, in May, 1843, and General Sir Warren Marmaduke Peacocke, K.C.H. and K.C., was appointed by Her Majesty Colonel of the NINETEENTH regiment. The service companies proceeded in the Resistance troop-ship from Malta to the Ionian Islands on the 9th of January, 1843, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hay, and arrived at Corfu on the 20th of the same month; five days afterwards the head-quarters and three companies embarked in the Boyne transport for Cephalonia. In October, 1843, the depôt companies marched from Dover to Winchester, and from thence to Portsmouth, where they embarked for Jersey. [Sidenote: 1845] On the 18th of June, 1845, the depôt companies embarked at Jersey for Ireland, and disembarked at Waterford. On the 5th of December, 1845, the service companies of the NINETEENTH regiment embarked at Corfu for the West Indies, in the Java freight-ship, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hay. [Sidenote: 1846] The regiment arrived at Barbadoes on the 19th of January, 1846. [Sidenote: 1847] In February, 1847, the regiment embarked at Barbadoes for St. Vincent. [Sidenote: 1848] The regiment returned to Barbadoes in April, 1848, and was transhipped on board the Bombay transport on the 12th of that month, and sailed in a few days for North America. On the 1st of July, the date to which the record has been continued, the service companies were stationed at Montreal, under the command of Major Sanders, and the depôt companies, under Major Calley, remained in Ireland, the head-quarters occupying the barracks at Castlebar. [Sidenote: 1848] The details narrated in the foregoing pages, contain accounts of the services of the NINETEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT, for a period of one hundred and sixty years, and although the Regimental colour does not display any mark of distinction for services performed, yet the record of the regiment proves, that when opportunity has offered, the regiment has evinced that zeal and devotion to its country's cause, and that patient endurance and bravery in the field, for which every British corps has been distinguished; these qualities were shown in the war in Flanders under King William III., particularly at the battles of _Steenkirk_ and _Landen_, and at the siege of _Namur_, from 1692 to 1695; again in Flanders in 1710 and 1711, with the army under the command of the Duke of Marlborough. The regiment again distinguished itself in the war in Flanders, particularly at the battles of Fontenoy, Roucoux, and Val, in 1745, 1746, and 1747. In 1761, in the attack and capture of _Belle Isle_, where nature as well as art had combined to render the place impregnable, the regiment evinced an extraordinary degree of bravery. Its services were again evinced in Flanders, with the army under His Royal Highness the Duke of York, in 1794 and 1795. The regiment has also been distinguished by long and arduous services in the eastern parts of the world from 1796 to 1820; it was engaged in the storming of Seringapatam on the 4th of May, 1799, where the celebrated Tippoo Saib was mortally wounded, and the city captured. Its services in the conquest of the Island of Ceylon and the deposition of the King of Candy, in 1815, likewise form an important and honorable era in the records of the regiment; the gallantry of the troops on this occasion caused the annexation of the colony of Ceylon to the British dominions, and the conduct of the NINETEENTH regiment in suppressing the rebellion in that island, in 1818, secured the possession of this valuable appendage to the territories of Great Britain. The services of the NINETEENTH regiment in the Field, as well as in arduous Colonial duties, have been such as to show in the foregoing pages, that the officers and men have ample cause for feelings of pride in the honor acquired by the corps in whatever duty it has been employed, and this tribute of commendation is considered to be justly due to a regiment, the services of which have been so highly meritorious during a period of one hundred and sixty years. 1848. [Illustration: NINETEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. _Madeley lith. 3 Wellington S^t. Strand_ FOR CANNON'S MILITARY RECORDS] APPENDIX. _Battles, Sieges, &c., in the Netherlands, during the reign of_ KING WILLIAM III., _from 1689 to the Peace of Ryswick in 1697_. Battle of Walcourt 25 August, 1689 ---- ---- Fleurus 4 July, 1690 Mons surrendered to the French 10 April, 1691 Namur ditto ditto 20 June, 1692 Battle of Steenkirk 3 August, ---- Furnes and Dixmude captured -- Sept., ---- The French lines at D'Otignies forced 10 July, 1693 Battle of Landen 29 July, ---- Surrender of Huy 17 Sept., 1694 Attack on Port Kenoque 9 June, 1695 Dixmude surrendered to the French 16 July, ---- Namur retaken by King William III. 25 July, ---- Citadel of Namur surrendered 5 Sept., ---- Treaty of Ryswick signed 11 Sept., 1697 _List of Sieges, Battles, &c., in the Netherlands and Germany, during the Campaigns under the_ DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH, _from 1702 to 1712_. Invested. Surrendered. Siege of Kayserswerth 16 April, 17 June, 1702 Skirmish near Nimeguen 11 June, ---- Siege of Venloo 29 Aug., 25 Sept., ---- Capture of Fort St. Michael 18 Sept., ---- Siege of Stevenswaert 3 Oct., ---- ---- Ruremonde 6 Oct., ---- Capture of Liege Citadel 23 Oct., ---- Siege of Bonn 24 April, 15 May, 1703 ---- Huy 16 Aug., 25 Aug., ---- ---- Limburg 10 Sept., 28 Sept., ---- Battle of Schellenberg 2 July, 1704 ---- Blenheim 13 Aug., ---- Siege of Landau 12 Sept., 24 Nov., ---- Huy captured by the French May, 1705 Re-capture of Huy 11 July, ---- Forcing the French Lines at Helixem, near Tirlemont 18 July, ---- Skirmish near the Dyle 21 July, ---- Siege of Sandvliet 26 Oct., 29 Oct., ---- Battle of Ramilies 23 May, 1706 Siege of Ostend 28 June, 8 July, ---- ---- Menin 25 July, 25 Aug., ---- ---- Dendermond 29 Aug., 5 Sept., ---- ---- Aeth 16 Sept., 3 Oct., ---- Battle of Oudenarde 11 July, 1708 Siege of Lisle 13 Aug., 23 Oct., ---- Capture of the Citadel 9 Dec., ---- Battle of Wynendale 28 Sept., ---- Passage of the Scheldt 27 Nov., ---- Siege of Ghent 18 Dec., 30 Dec., ---- ---- Tournay 27 June, 29 July, 1709 Capture of the Citadel 3 Sept., ---- Battle of Malplaquet 11 Sept., ---- Siege of Mons 21 Sept., 20 Oct., ---- Passage of the French lines at Pont-à-Vendin 21 April, 1710 Siege of Douay 25 April, 27 June, ---- ---- Bethune 15 July, 29 Aug., ---- ---- Aire 6 Sept., 9 Nov., ---- ---- St. Venant 6 Sept., 30 Sept., ---- Passage of the French lines at Arleux 5 Aug., 1711 Siege of Bouchain 10 Aug., 13 Sept., ---- Treaty of Utrecht signed 30 March, 1713 SUCCESSION OF COLONELS OF THE NINETEENTH, OR THE FIRST YORKSHIRE NORTH RIDING REGIMENT OF FOOT. FRANCIS LUTTERELL. _Appointed 28th February, 1689._ FRANCIS LUTTERELL, was one of the zealous Protestant gentlemen who joined the standard of the Prince of Orange, at the Revolution in 1688, and on the elevation of the Prince to the throne, in February, 1689, he was nominated Colonel of a regiment of foot, now the NINETEENTH, which was formed of companies raised in November, 1688. He died before he attained any higher rank. THOMAS ERLE. _Appointed 1st January, 1691._ THOMAS ERLE evinced attachment to the principles of the Revolution of 1688, and on the 8th of March, 1689, he was commissioned to raise a regiment of foot for the service of King William III., which was afterwards disbanded. He proceeded with his regiment to Ireland in 1689, and proved an officer of great merit and personal bravery. He served under King William at the battle of the Boyne, and at the siege of Limerick in 1690; and greatly distinguished himself at the battle of Aghrim in 1691, where he was taken prisoner at the head of his regiment, in attempting to force the passage of a bog. He was rescued by his men, and headed another attack, when he was wounded and again taken prisoner; but was rescued a second time by his men. He afterwards served at the siege of Limerick, and being sent to England with despatches, he was removed by King William to the NINETEENTH regiment, his commission being dated the 1st of January, 1691. He was nominated Brigadier-General in 1793, and served under King William in Flanders; but was obliged to quit the field from ill health. While confined to his bed with a fever, at Malines, he heard that a general engagement was likely to take place, when he rejoined the army, behaved with great gallantry at the battle of Landen, and was dangerously wounded. He recovered of his wound, and commanded a brigade during the campaigns of 1694 and 1695; on the 1st of June, 1696, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General; and in February, 1703, to that of Lieut.-General. He was employed on the staff of South Britain, and raised a regiment of dragoons, the colonelcy of which was afterwards conferred on Lord Cutts. In 1708, he commanded an expedition to the coast of France, but nothing of importance was accomplished; he afterwards proceeded with the infantry to Ostend, and performed great service in forwarding supplies to the allied army during the siege of Lisle. In 1709, he disposed of the colonelcy of his regiment. He was afterwards nominated Lieut.-General of the Ordnance, and also Commander of the land forces in South Britain; and in January, 1711, he was promoted to the rank of General. Political events occasioned his removal from the appointments of Lieut.-General of the Ordnance, and Commander in South Britain, in 1712. He died on the 23rd of July, 1720. GEORGE FREKE. _Appointed 23rd May, 1709._ This officer was appointed Ensign in the NINETEENTH regiment on the 19th of April, 1693, and he served in Flanders under King William III. In 1702, he served in the expedition to Cadiz, from whence he proceeded to the West Indies, and was afterwards rewarded with the lieut.-colonelcy of the NINETEENTH regiment, the colonelcy of which corps he obtained by purchase in 1709. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General on the 12th of February, 1711. His decease occurred before he attained any higher rank. RICHARD SUTTON. _Appointed 3rd April, 1712._ RICHARD SUTTON was appointed Ensign in a regiment of foot, on the 1st of April, 1690, and he served in Ireland, and also in Flanders, under King William III. He was afterwards promoted to the majority of the Eighth regiment, with which he served at the battles of Schellenberg and Blenheim in 1704; at the forcing of the French lines at Helixem in 1705; and at the battle of Ramilies, in 1706. Being afterwards promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy, he commanded the regiment at the battle of Oudenarde in 1708. On the 23rd of March, 1709, he was promoted to the colonelcy of a newly-raised regiment, and in 1710 he was nominated a Brigadier-General. He commanded a brigade in Flanders during the campaign of 1711; served at the forcing of the French lines at Arleux, and at the siege and capture of Bouchain. In 1712, he was removed to the NINETEENTH regiment, was nominated Governor of Hull, and commanded a brigade in Flanders under the Duke of Ormond: he was afterwards promoted to the rank of Major-General; but in 1715, he retired from active service. He was restored to the colonelcy of the NINETEENTH regiment in 1729, and promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General in 1735. He died in 1738. GEORGE GROVE. _Appointed 5th August, 1715._ GEORGE GROVE served in the foot guards, in which corps he rose to the rank of Captain and Lieut.-Colonel. Being a very zealous and loyal officer, at a period when Jacobite principles had become prevalent in the kingdom, he was nominated Colonel of the NINETEENTH regiment, his commission being dated the 5th of August, 1715: he did not attain any higher rank than that of Colonel. His death occurred on the 13th of October, 1729. RICHARD SUTTON. _Re-appointed 27th October, 1729._ _Died in 1738._ THE HONORABLE CHARLES HOWARD. _Appointed 1st November, 1738._ THE HONORABLE CHARLES HOWARD, second son of Charles third Earl of Carlisle, was appointed Ensign and Lieutenant in the Second foot guards on the 10th of August, 1715; in 1717 he was promoted to Captain in the sixteenth foot, from which he exchanged to the ninth dragoons; and in April, 1719, he was nominated Captain and Lieut.-Colonel in the Second foot guards. He was appointed deputy governor of Carlisle in 1725, Aide-de-camp to the King with the rank of Colonel in 1734, and Colonel of the NINETEENTH regiment in 1738. He proceeded with the army to Flanders, in 1742, with the rank of Brigadier-General; in 1743 he obtained the rank of Major-General, and in 1747 that of Lieut.-General; in 1748 he was removed to the third dragoon guards. He was advanced to the dignity of a Knight of the Bath in 1749, and promoted to the rank of General in 1765. He was governor of Forts George and Augustus in Scotland; one of the grooms of the bed-chamber to King George II.; and many years member of parliament for Carlisle. He died in 1765. LORD GEORGE BEAUCLERK. _Appointed 15th March, 1748._ LORD GEORGE BEAUCLERK, sixth son of Charles first Duke of St. Albans, served in the first regiment of foot guards, and was promoted to Captain and Lieut.-Colonel in September, 1736. In 1745 he was nominated Aide-de-camp to King George II. with the rank of Colonel, and in 1747 he obtained the colonelcy of the eighth Marines (afterwards disbanded), from which he was removed, in 1748, to the NINETEENTH regiment: in 1753 he was appointed governor of Landguard Fort. He was promoted to the rank of Major-General in 1755, and to that of Lieut.-General in 1758. He performed the duties of Commander-in-chief in Scotland some time; and was Member of Parliament for Windsor. He died on the 11th of May, 1768. DAVID GRAEME. _Appointed 25th May, 1768._ DAVID GRAEME evinced loyalty and zeal for the interests of the Crown and Kingdom, during the Seven Years' War, by raising a corps of Highlanders, which was honored with the title of the 105th, or Queen's Own Royal regiment of Highlanders, of which he was appointed Colonel in 1761. This corps was disbanded after the peace in 1763; and in 1764 he was nominated Colonel of the forty-ninth regiment, from which he was removed, in 1768, to the NINETEENTH. He was promoted to the rank of Major-General in 1762; to that of Lieut.-General in 1772; and to that of General in 1783. He died in 1797. SAMUEL HULSE. _Appointed 24th January, 1797._ SAMUEL HULSE entered the army in 1761, as ensign in the first foot guards, and was promoted to Captain and Lieut.-Colonel in 1776; in 1780 he was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of his regiment, with the rank of Colonel, and was employed in suppressing the riots in London in the same year. At the commencement of the French revolutionary war, he was called into active service, and commanded the first battalion of his regiment, in Flanders, in 1793. He served at the siege of Valenciennes; and distinguished himself at the action of Lincelles, on the 18th of August, for which he was thanked in orders by His Royal Highness the Duke of York. He was engaged in the operations before Dunkirk, and in the subsequent movements until October, when he was promoted to the rank of Major-General, and returned to England. In May of the following year he again proceeded to Flanders, and commanded a brigade before Tournay, where several partial actions occurred, and in the retreat to Holland. Returning to England early in 1795, he was appointed Colonel of the fifty-sixth regiment, and placed on the home staff, where he continued three years: in 1797 he was removed to the NINETEENTH regiment. On the 1st of January, 1798, he was promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General, and during the troubles in Ireland, in the summer of that year, his services were extended to that part of the kingdom, but he returned to England in November, and resumed his command on the staff. He served in Holland under His Royal Highness the Duke of York, in 1799, and was at the several engagements from the 19th of September to the 6th of October. On returning to England he was appointed to the command of the southern district, in which he continued until the peace in 1802. He was advanced to the rank of General in 1803; appointed Lieut.-Governor of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea in 1806; and removed to the sixty-second regiment in 1810. He was one of the earliest servants placed by King George III. on the household establishment of the Prince of Wales, and was many years his Royal Highness's treasurer and receiver-general; on the accession of the Prince to the throne, General Hulse was nominated treasurer of the household. On the 19th of February, 1820, on the decease of General the Right Honorable Sir David Dundas, he was appointed Governor of Chelsea Hospital. In 1821 he was Knighted. He was also appointed ranger of Windsor home park; a privy councillor; and Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order. On the accession of King William III., General Sir Samuel Hulse, G.C.H., was promoted to the rank of Field-Marshal. He died in 1837, at the advanced age of ninety years. SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, BART. _Appointed 25th June, 1810._ SIR HEW DALRYMPLE was appointed Ensign in the thirty-first regiment in 1763; Captain in the second battalion of the Royals in 1768, Major in the same corps in 1777, and was Knighted in 1779. He was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the sixty-eighth regiment in 1781, and obtained the rank of Colonel in 1790; he afterwards exchanged into the First foot guards. He served the campaign of 1793 in the grenadier battalion of the foot guards, and was at the battle of Famars, at the siege of Valenciennes, and in the action before Dunkirk. At the conclusion of the campaign he returned to England; and was promoted to the rank of Major-General in 1794; in 1795 he was placed on the staff of the northern district; and in 1796 appointed Lieut.-Governor of Guernsey, where he held the local rank of Lieut.-General from 1799. In 1801 he was promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General, and was placed on the staff in the command of the northern district in 1802; in 1806 he was removed to the staff of Gibraltar. Receiving orders to take the command of the British army in Portugal, in 1808, he arrived in that kingdom in time to become responsible for the Convention of Cintra, by which treaty the French army evacuated that country. Sir Hew Dalrymple was promoted to the rank of General in 1812; and was advanced to the dignity of a BARONET in 1815. He obtained the colonelcy of the thirty-seventh regiment in 1798, was removed to the NINETEENTH in 1810, and to the fifty-seventh in 1811. He died in 1830. SIR TOMKYNS HILGROVE TURNER. _Appointed 27th April, 1811._ This officer was appointed Ensign in the third foot guards in 1782, and serving in Flanders in 1793, was at the battles of St. Amand and Famars, at the siege of Valenciennes, the action at Lincelles, and also before Dunkirk. In 1794 he was repeatedly engaged, commencing with the attack on Vaux, afterwards in several affairs during the siege of Landrecies, including the battle of Cateau; he served at the battle of Tournay; the actions at Roulaix, Monveaux, and Templeuve. In November, 1794, he was promoted to Captain and Lieut.-Colonel, and in 1801 to the rank of Colonel. He served in the expedition to Egypt; was at the battles of the 8th, 13th, and 21st of March, and the action on the west side of Alexandria. He received a medal from the Grand Seignior: and returned to England in charge of the Egyptian antiquities, now in the British Museum. In 1804 he was nominated to the rank of Brigadier-General; and he served in South America in 1807 and 1808. Returning to England in the latter year, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General, and placed on the staff of the home district: he was subsequently appointed deputy secretary at Carlton House, under the Right Honorable Colonel M'Mahon. His services were rewarded with the colonelcy of the Cape regiment, and in 1811 he was removed to the NINETEENTH regiment. He was promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General in 1813, and appointed Lieut.-Governor of Jersey in 1814. He received the Grand Cross of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order; and the dignity of Knight of the Crescent of Turkey, and of St. Anne of Russia. He was promoted to the rank of General on 22nd of July, 1830. His decease occurred at Jersey, in May, 1843. GENERAL SIR WARREN MARMADUKE PEACOCKE, K.C.H. and K.C. _Appointed 31st May, 1843._ London: Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES and SONS, Stamford Street, For Her Majesty's Stationery Office. FOOTNOTES: [1] A company of 200 men would appear thus:-- __| | | |__| | 20 20 20 30 2|0 30 20 20 20 | Harquebuses. Muskets. Halberds. Muskets. Harquebuses. Archers. Pikes. Pikes. Archers. The musket carried a ball which weighed 1/10th of a pound; and the harquebus a ball which weighed 1/25th of a pound. [2] The 30th, 31st, and 32nd Regiments were formed as Marine corps in 1702, and were employed as such during the wars in the reign of Queen Anne. The Marine corps were embarked in the Fleet under Admiral Sir George Rooke, and were at the taking of Gibraltar, and in its subsequent defence in 1704; they were afterwards employed at the siege of Barcelona in 1705. [3] The brave Sir Roger Williams, in his Discourse on War, printed in 1590, observes:--"I persuade myself ten thousand of our nation would beat thirty thousand of theirs (the Spaniards) out of the field, let them be chosen where they list." Yet at this time the Spanish infantry was allowed to be the best disciplined in Europe. For instances of valour displayed by the British Infantry during the Seventy Years' War, see the Historical Record of the Third Foot, or Buffs. [4] _Vide_ the Historical Record of the First, or Royal Regiment of Foot. [5] "Under the blessing of Divine Providence, His Majesty ascribes the successes which have attended the exertions of his troops in Egypt to that determined bravery which is inherent in Britons; but His Majesty desires it may be most solemnly and forcibly impressed on the consideration of every part of the army, that it has been a strict observance of order, discipline, and military system, which has given the full energy to the native valour of the troops, and has enabled them proudly to assert the superiority of the national military character, in situations uncommonly arduous, and under circumstances of peculiar difficulty."--_General Orders in 1801._ In the General Orders issued by Lieut.-General Sir John Hope (afterwards Lord Hopetoun), congratulating the army upon the successful result of the Battle of Corunna, on the 16th of January, 1809, it is stated:--"On no occasion has the undaunted valour of British troops ever been more manifest. At the termination of a severe and harassing march, rendered necessary by the superiority which the enemy had acquired, and which had materially impaired the efficiency of the troops, many disadvantages were to be encountered. These have all been surmounted by the conduct of the troops themselves; and the enemy has been taught, that, whatever advantages of position or of numbers he may possess, there is inherent in the British officers and soldiers a bravery that knows not how to yield,--that no circumstances can appal,--and that will ensure victory, when it is to be obtained by the exertion of any human means." [6] These officers are marked "Reinstated," in the Registry of Commissions. [7] Embarkation Return of Major-General Erle's Regiment, 15th June, 1702:-- _Companies._ _Men._ _Ships._ The Grenadiers 51 The Bedford. Major-General Erle's 51 } Colonel Freke's 50 } The Expedition. Lieut.-Colonel Hawley's 50 } Captain Dejocophan's 52 } The Burford. Captain Morgan's 50 } Captain Edgworth's 51 } Captain Craddock's 51 } The Eagle. Captain Symmons' 48 } Captain Prater's 51 } The Plymouth. Captain Carey 52 } Captain Norman 51 } The Kent. (Signed) HARRY FREKE, Lieut.-Colonel. [8] _In the year 1747_ FIFES _were introduced in the regiments of infantry_. [9] Previously to the issue of the royal warrant of 1751, which directed the _Number_ to be painted, or embroidered, on each colour of every regiment, it had been the practice to designate regiments by the names of their _Colonels_, adding, in some instances, the colour of their _Facings_, particularly when two regiments were commanded by colonels of the same name:--for example, the _Nineteenth_ was commonly called "_the Green Howards_" between 1738 and 1748, in order to distinguish it from the Third regiment, or Buffs, of which Lieut.-General Thomas Howard was the colonel during that period. 
53417	----	book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.) THE FRENCH ARMY FROM WITHIN THE FRENCH ARMY FROM WITHIN BY "EX-TROOPER" NEW YORK GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY COPYRIGHT, 1914 By GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY CONTENTS CHAPTER I PAGE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY 7 CHAPTER II THE FRENCH SOLDIER AT HOME 18 CHAPTER III THE HIGHER RANKS 27 CHAPTER IV INFANTRY 44 CHAPTER V OFF DUTY 51 CHAPTER VI CAVALRY 60 CHAPTER VII ARTILLERY 74 CHAPTER VIII IN CAMP AND ON THE MARCH 85 CHAPTER IX MANOEUVRES 104 CHAPTER X WITH THE CAVALRY SCOUTS 119 CHAPTER XI INTERNAL ECONOMY 133 CHAPTER XII SOME INCIDENTALS 144 CHAPTER XIII THE GREAT GARRISON TOWNS OF FRANCE 156 CHAPTER XIV SOME EFFECTS. ACTIVE SERVICE 171 CHAPTER I THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY Before proceeding to the consideration of life as lived in the French Army, it would be well to have a clear understanding of the constitution of the Army of France, the parts of which it is composed, and the conditions under which it is organised and controlled. The British Army is a growth of years, and even of centuries, but with the changes of government that France has undergone since 1815 the constitution of the Army has undergone radical changes, and the French Army of to-day dates back only to 1871--that is, as far as form and composition are in question. One of the principles under which the present Republic of France is constituted is that "every citizen is a soldier." This principle has been more and more enforced with the growth and consolidation of the Republic since 1870, and successive laws passed with reference to the Army have been framed with ever-increasing recognition of the need for military efficiency. By the first law with regard to the constitution of the Army, that of July 27th, 1872, every young man, at the age of twenty, so long as he was physically fit, owed to his country five years of active service, five years in the Territorial Army of France, and six years in what was known as the Territorial reserve. On this law the constitution and organisation of the Army were first based. The law of July 15th, 1889, reduced the period of service to three years in the active Army, but the principle remained the same. A further modification in the length of service was brought about by the law of 1905, which reduced the period of service with the active Army to two years, and abolished certain classes of citizens who were excused from military service for various reasons. Up to the passing of this law, bread-winners of a family had been exempt, but by it they were called on to serve, while the state pensioned their dependents during their period of service; the "voluntariat," consisting of men who paid a certain amount to the state in order to serve for a period of one year only, was abolished--"every citizen a soldier" was made more of a reality than ever, for the nation realised that it must keep pace with the neighbour on the east, who was steadily increasing its military resources. From the age of twenty to that of forty-five, every Frenchman physically capable of military service is a soldier. Each commune complies yearly a list of its young men who have attained the age of twenty during the preceding twelve months. All these young men are examined by the _conseil de révision cantonale_, a revising body of military and civilian officials, by whom the men not physically fit are at once rejected, and men who may possibly attain to the standard of fitness required are put back for examination after a sufficient interval has elapsed to admit of their development in height, weight, or other requirement in which they are deficient. Five feet and half an inch is the minimum standard of height, though men of exceptional physical quality are passed into the infantry below this height. The _loi des cadres_ of 1907 supplemented the law of 1905 without materially changing it. At the present time about 200,000 men are enrolled every year, this number including the men who have been put back from previous examination by the revising council. The active Army of France thus consists of about 535,000 men, together with an approximate total of 55,000 men serving in Algeria and 20,000 men serving in Tunis. The gendarmerie and Republican guard add on another 25,000, and the colonial troops serving in the French colonies amount to a total of about 60,000. This last number is steadily increasing by means of the enrolment of natives of the French colonies in Africa. These numbers concern the Army on a peace footing. In case of a national emergency the total war strength of the French Army is calculated at 4,800,000. Of these 1,350,000 comprise the first line troops made up of the active Army and younger classes of the reserve, who would constitute the first field armies to engage the enemy on an outbreak of war. The remainder of the total of nearly 5 millions would be called up as required for garrison purposes and to strengthen the ranks of the field army. The citizen is still expected to give twenty-five years of service to his country; of these, two--or rather three, under the law passed by the action of the war ministry of M. Viviani just before the outbreak of the present continental war--years are expected to be spent in the active Army, and another eleven in the reserve of the active Army. During this second period of eleven years men are recalled to the colours--that is, to service with the active Army--for periods of a month at a time. At the conclusion of this first thirteen years of service, men pass automatically to the Territorial Army, which is supposed to serve for the purposes of home defence only. Service in the Territorial Army lasts six years, after which the soldier passes to six years in the reserve of the Territorial Army. After this the French citizen is exempt from any further military obligation. Registered at the age of twenty, the French citizen is called to the colours on the first of October following his registration, and passes from the active Army two years later on September 30th. In old days, when the period of service in the active Army was for five years, the French Army was an unpopular institution, but the shortening of service together with the knowledge, possessed by the nation as a whole, that the need for every citizen soldier would eventually rise through the action of Germany, have combined to render the Army not only an important item in national life, but a popular one. There used to be grousers and bad characters by the score, but now they are rarely found. In time of peace the active Army of France is so organised as to form the skeleton on which to build the war forces of the Republic. The system is one of twenty permanent Army Corps based as follows: the first at Lille, the second at Amiens, the third at Rouen, the fourth at Le Mans, the fifth at Orleans, the sixth at Châlons-sur-Marne, the seventh at Besançon, the eighth at Bourges, the ninth at Tours, the tenth at Rennes, the eleventh at Nantes, the twelfth at Limoges, the thirteenth at Clermont-Ferrand, the fourteenth at Lyons, the fifteenth at Marseilles, the sixteenth at Montpellier, the seventeenth at Toulouse, the eighteenth at Bordeaux, the nineteenth at Algiers, and the twentieth at Nancy. The strength of an Army Corps is made up of two divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, a brigade of horse and field artillery, and one "squadron of train," the last named including the non-combatants of the Army Corps. Exceptions are the Sixth Army Corps with head-quarters at Châlons, the seventh at Besançon, and the nineteenth at Algiers; of these the first mentioned two contain three divisions of infantry instead of two, while the Algerian Corps has four divisions, one of which is detached for duty in Tunis. In addition to the twenty stations of the Army Corps, eight independent cavalry divisions have head-quarters respectively at Paris, Luneville, Meaux, Sedan, Melun, Lyons, Rheims, and Dôle. There is also the military government of Paris, which, acting independently of the rest, contains detachments from four Army Corps and two cavalry divisions. A cavalry division is made up of two brigades, each consisting of two regiments which in turn contain four squadrons and a reserve squadron of peace. The infantry of the French Army consists of 163 regiments of infantry of the line, 31 battalions of Chasseurs à Pied, mainly stationed in mountain districts, 4 regiments of Zouaves, 4 regiments of Turcos or native Algerian tirailleurs, 2 regiments of the Foreign Legion, 5 disciplinary battalions known as African Light Infantry. The cavalry organisation is 12 regiments of Cuirassiers, 32 regiments of Dragoons, 21 regiments of Chasseurs--corresponding to the British Lancers--14 regiments of Hussars, 6 regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique, and 4 regiments of native Algerian Cavalry known as Spahis. The French Army is rather weak in artillery, its total strength consisting of 445 field batteries organised into 40 regiments of field artillery; 52 batteries of horse artillery, the greater part of which, however, have been transformed or are in process of transformation to field batteries; 14 mountain batteries; 18 battalions of garrison artillery, together with artificers to a total of 13 companies. Six regiments of engineers are divided into 22 battalions, and there is also a department of engineers known as the railway regiment. The non-combatant branches of the Army are formed into 20 squadrons of train, which contain the equivalents to the British Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, and the _personnel_ of units connected with the upkeep and maintenance of the Army in the field. In addition, there is an Army Corps of colonial infantry, service in which is a voluntary matter. Its strength is about 30,000 troops in France and over 60,000 distributed throughout the various colonies. The officers of the French Army receive their training at military schools established in various parts of the Republic, or else are recruited from among non-commissioned officers. Not less than one-third of the total number of French officers rise to commissions by the latter method--Napoleon's remark about the marshal's bâton in the private soldier's knapsack still holds good in the French Army. The principal training schools are those of St. Cyr for infantry and cavalry officers, the École Polytechnique for artillery and engineer officers, and the musketry school at Châlons. The schools of St. Maixent, Saumur, Versailles, and the gymnastic school at Joinville-le-Pont are intended for the training of non-commissioned officers selected for commissions. The rate of pay for men in the first period of service is very low, ranging from the equivalent of a halfpenny a day upwards; but the law under which the Army is constituted provides for the re-enlistment of such men as wish to make a career of the Army, and on re-enlistment the rate of pay is materially increased, while a bounty is given on re-engagement, and at the conclusion of a certain amount of service re-engaged men are granted pensions. It is only reasonable that, with the adoption of the principle of universal service, the rate of pay should be low; voluntary re-enlistment, however, is a different matter, so the Republic rewards the men who re-engage at the conclusion of their first term. From among them are selected practically all the non-commissioned officers, while, considering that all necessaries of life are provided for them in addition to their pay, even the rank and file are not badly off. The armament of the French infantry is the Lebel rifle with bayonet, this pattern of rifle having been adopted in 1886. It is understood that an automatic rifle is under consideration, but a serious drawback to the use of such a weapon is the fact that, with a rate of fire three or four times as great as that of the ordinary magazine rifle with bolt action, the automatic rifle would require more ammunition than its user could carry. The weapon of the Field Artillery is a shielded quick-firing gun of Creusot pattern, with a bore of 75 millimetres. On this gun the field-guns of all nations have been modelled, but, although it was the first of its kind to be put into use, it still gives the artillery of the French Army a decided advantage over that of other Continental nations, when reckoned gun for gun. The French cavalry is armed with a straight sword, in place of the old-fashioned curved blade which the French discarded some time ago, but which remained in use in the British Army up to the end of 1907. A carbine and bamboo lance are also carried. In all matters of military equipment and armament the French Republic has led the world since its reconstitution after 1870. The Lebel rifle and its adoption inaugurated a new era in the armament of infantry; the 75-millimetre gun, as already noted, was the first of its kind to come into use. The Lebel carbine which the cavalry carry is still unsurpassed as a cavalry weapon. Further, France led the world in the development of air craft; the lighter-than-air machine, certainly, has developed into a German specialty, but the heavier-than-air machine, or aeroplane, owes its development to French enterprise, and very largely to French military enterprise. In all branches of the service, and in all matters affecting the service, the French Army is the home of experiment, and to this fact is due the greater part of French military efficiency to-day. The bravery of French troops is unquestioned, and, in addition to this, the French Army has nothing to learn from the armies of other nations as regards _matériel_ and equipment. CHAPTER II THE FRENCH SOLDIER AT HOME British soldiers, serving under a voluntary system, have little to say for the conscript system, but a glance round Paris in time of peace might persuade them that there are various compensations and advantages in a conscript army which they, serving voluntarily, do not enjoy. It is a surprise to one who has served in the British Army to see the French Republican Guards stationed on the grand staircase of the Opéra, and also at all entrances and exits of this famous building. In practically every theatrical establishment in Paris the Guards may be seen on this class of duty, for which they get specially paid. There are military attendants at the Folies Bergères, at the Nouveau Cirque, at the Moulin Rouge, and even at such an irresponsible home of laughter as the Bal Tabarin. As the darkey said of Daniel in the lions' den, these men get a free show. But it is not only when on duty that the French soldier is to be seen in such places of amusement as these, for the non-commissioned officer is to be found in company with his wife or _fiancée_ in every class of seat. It is no uncommon thing to find among the most attentive listeners at the Opéra a number of _piou-pioux_, in full uniform, among the fashionable people in the stalls. The Republican rule, which makes of every man a citizen and an equal of all the rest, leads to what, in such a country as England, would be considered curious anomalies. Beside the newspaper critic in full evening-dress may be seen the private soldier, in uniform, taking notes with probably greater intelligence than the newspaper man; for the soldier may be anything in civilian life: the son of the rich banker occupies the next bed in the barrack-room to the son of the Breton peasant, and the Cabinet Minister's lad, when in uniform, is on a level with the gamin of Paris. It must be confessed that the average French soldier, when off parade, looks rather slovenly. The baggy trousers go a long way toward the creation of this impression. Then, again, the way in which the French soldier is trained to march is far different from British principles. The "pas-deflexion" does not look so smart as the stately march of the British Guards, but it is more effective. This bent-knee, slouching method carries men along with a swing; the step is shorter than that of British troops, but the rate is more to the minute than that of the British Army, and the men swing along, to all appearances tireless, at such a pace that they cover about thirty miles a day on manoeuvres. This, too, with a pack at which a British infantryman would look aghast, for the French pack is proverbial for its size and weight. It confers a great advantage, however, with regard to marching, in that it lessens the amount of transport which must follow on the track of infantry, and is necessary to the well-being of the men. A British infantry regiment on the march, and marching at ease, still looks imposing; a French infantry battalion, on the other hand, is the reverse of spectacular when marching at ease. The band comes first, with its instruments carried anyhow so long as they are comfortable; the rank and file, following, carry their rifles as the band carries its instruments, in any fantastic position that makes for ease; step is not maintained; the set "fours" which British troops maintain at ease as well as at attention are not to be seen, for a man drops back to the rank in his rear to talk to a comrade, or goes forward to the rank in front to light his cigarette. They smoke and sing and joke; they eat bread and drink wine by way of refreshment, since the evening meal is yet a long way off; alongside the troops as they march may be seen pedlars and hawkers offering their wares, and it is all quite the usual thing, quite legitimate. The fetish of smartness is non-existent here; comfort and use are the main points. But, at the given occasion, comes the word from the colonel; correct formations appear out of the threes and fives of men as if by magic. The band is a corporate body, marching to attention, and playing the regiment on with every bit as fine a military appearance as any British band. The men resume step, and, with their peculiar swinging march, follow on, a regiment at attention, and as fine a regiment, in appearance as well as in fact, as one would wish to see. Work is work, and play is play, and the French soldier does both thoroughly. This attitude of the French soldier toward his work, and the fact that he is permitted to maintain that attitude, are due to so large a proportion of the officers having themselves served in the ranks. There is a sufficient leavening of "ranker" officers to enable all commissioned men to understand, when on a route march, what it feels like to the rank and file. Unlike the British Army, that of France is a Republican business. The very circumstance that discipline is more severe arises from the fact that all men are equal, and both soldier and officer know it. And, if ever the French soldier becomes conscious that he is really suffering from the severity of discipline, he knows that he is suffering in good company: under conscription there is no escape. The training of the French _piou-piou_ in marching is a scientific business. At first he is required to execute 160 steps to the minute--very short steps taken very quickly. In this way the recruit is made to cover 3000 yards at first, and then the distance is increased to 12,000 yards, the increases being made a thousand yards at a time. As the distance increases, the length of the step is increased, and the number of steps to the minute decreased. The full course of training is reckoned at three practices a week for three months, and the infantry recruit, before being dismissed from training, is required to cover twelve miles at the rate of seven miles an hour. There is no doubt that this scientific training in marching, and the teaching of the half-shuffling trot, characteristic of French infantry, add enormously to the marching value of the men. One battalion of Chasseurs-à-Pied set up a record in marching while on manoeuvres by covering no less than 68 kilometres (equivalent to nearly 40 English miles) in the course of a day. This constitutes a definite record in marching, for any considerable body of men. In the matter of smartness, it is hardly fair to compare a British infantry battalion with a French one, for the point arises yet once more with regard to the difference between a voluntary and a conscript system. The English battalion is made up of picked men, while in the French service all citizens are included; the fact of choice in the case of the British battalion makes for uniformity. The recruits of the French battalion include every man who has been passed by the revising board, and there is not the same chance of maintaining that uniformity which alone is responsible for smartness. And smartness itself is but a survival from the days when a soldier was trained to no more than unquestioning obedience, the old days before warfare became so scientific as it is at present, when initiative was not required of the rank and file. The only purpose served by smartness at the present day is that of recruiting, and, obviously, a conscript army has no need of this. Hence use rather than appearance comes first. An island people may well wonder that a conscript army could be so popular as is the French, but then an island people could never realise, although they might vaguely understand, what it must be like to know that some day the army of a hostile nation may march across the frontier. The absence of sea bulwarks makes a difference in the temper of a people; an ever-present threat colours and modifies their life, and, no matter how set for peace the conditions may appear, the threat is present just the same. Since 1872 France as a whole has known that the day of reckoning with Germany would come, and the knowledge has grown more complete and more insistent with the passing of each year and the increase in German military preparations, which could be destined to fulfil but one end. France realised its duty to combat the fulfilment of that end, and the nation as a whole set itself to prepare against "The Day." By reason of this the French Army is popular; the discipline is severe, far too much so for any English soldier to endure as a Frenchman endures it; punishments are frequent, it is true, but they are undergone in the right spirit by the great majority, who know that the Army must be trained and kept in ultimate efficiency. The conscript knows that his training is a part of the price that the nation must pay for having a land frontier and a grasping neighbour, and he pays his part of the price cheerfully and well. It may be said that no conscript army in Europe is so popular as that of France; in none is there a better spirit than that displayed by Frenchmen. The mercurial temperament of the nation is yet another cause for severe disciplinary measures, for in order to shape a Frenchman to military requirements his extreme elasticity must be controlled, and this would be impossible under such conditions as are sufficient for the maintenance of, say, the British Army. Moreover, Republican rule and French military methods have forged bonds between officers and men which never have existed and never will exist in the army of their great opponent, for instance. I have devoted a considerable section of a chapter to punishment, and possibly at first sight this list may appear severe. It is, however, only necessary to recall the fact that while Germany takes only a percentage of its men for military training, and France takes the whole for the same purpose, German methods are twice as severe. Yet again, it is not the quality of the punishment inflicted, but the spirit in which it is inflicted that counts most. The French soldier admires, respects, and will gladly obey the colonel or captain who writes him down so many days _salle de police_ when he deserves it. But the German soldier is hardly likely to respect the officer who not only inflicts punishments according to scale, but will lash him across the face with a whip until the blood flows. Between French officers and their men is the spirit of comradeship, and in this is evidence of the value of the French method of training. Between the German officer and the man whom he commands are hate and despite in the great majority of cases, and this also attests the value of a system. CHAPTER III THE HIGHER RANKS So far as the rank and file of the French Army are concerned, no officer above the rank of colonel is of consequence, for the man in the ranks is not likely to come in contact with a general officer once in a twelvemonth. The colonel is the head of the regiment, whether of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, and his authority extends in every direction over the men he commands. With the help of the Conseil d'Administration he directs the administration of his regiment, and he is responsible for discipline and instruction, all forms of military education, sanitation, and police control, while, needless to say, he is held responsible for the efficiency of the regiment and the appearance of its men. He has absolute power as regards the appointment of all non-commissioned officers and corporals, who, in the French Army, do not rank as non-commissioned officers. Corresponding very nearly with the "second-in-command" common to British units, the lieutenant-colonel of a French regiment acts on behalf of the colonel, and is the intermediary of the latter in every branch of the service. In the absence of the colonel the lieutenant-colonel is empowered to issue orders in his name, and he is also especially charged with the discipline and conduct of the officers of the regiment. He keeps the report books concerning the officers, and is responsible for the entering up of reports as regards their military and private conduct and their efficiency. The colonel, however, countersigns the reports, adding whatever notes he may think desirable. The French equivalent of the major of English cavalry is the Chef d'Escadron, of whom there are two to each regiment, each in command of two service squadrons. One is specially appointed to presidency over the Commission des Ordinaires or arrangements for the food supply of the regiment, while the other presides over the Commission d'Abattage, which, in addition to the actual killing of horses, when such a step is necessary, is concerned with arrangements for forage and all matters connected with equine supplies. Each of the Chefs d'Escadron is responsible for the culinary arrangements of his two squadrons, and the management of canteens is also under his supervision. The two chefs are in charge of the barrack police and transmit their orders with regard to this duty through a captain and an adjutant. The officer known in the British service as quartermaster is termed major in the French Army, but the French major has more definite authority than the British quartermaster. Under his charge are placed the regulation of pay and accounts, the making of purchases, the supervision of equipment and barrack furniture, etc. The French major, in addition to these head-quarters duties which concern the well-being of the whole regiment, has definite command of the fifth squadron, which forms the depot for the regiment in case of war. From the major the Capitaine Trésorier receives the pay and monies which have to be distributed to the regiment. He is a member of the Conseil d'Administration, from which he receives his authorisation to make payment. The pay of the men is handed to them every fifth day, when the Capitaine Trésorier or paymaster hands over to the sergeant-major of each squadron, or to the captain commanding, the pay of the squadron for distribution among the men. He also makes all payments and issues demands for supplies for the horses of the regiment, and a lieutenant or sub-lieutenant is appointed to assist the paymaster in his duties. The Capitaine d'Habillement is the head of the regimental workshops of every description; he is held responsible for the well-being of the armoury, clothing stores, and barrack furniture, of which establishments he keeps the accounts. He has in addition to superintend all the regimental workshops, including those of the tailor, boot-maker, saddler, etc. His assistant is a lieutenant known as the Porte Étendard, who carries the colours of the regiment on parade--for in French armies the colours are still carried on parade and into action, unlike the rule of the British Army, which has abandoned the carrying of colours into action for many years. The Capitaine-Instructeur is deputed to attend to the instruction of the non-commissioned officers of the regiment, and is held responsible for their efficiency in matters of drill and discipline. He also lectures junior officers on their duties with regard to drill, shooting, veterinary matters, topography, etc., and he is specially responsible that the adjutants of the regiment perform their duties properly. Of officers of the rank of captain, two are appointed to each squadron, the senior being the Capitaine Commandant and the junior the Capitaine en second, or junior captain. The senior captain is in charge of the squadron, which in peace time has a strength of about 120 officers and men, but for active service has its strength raised considerably. He is responsible for the military education of his squadron, for the discipline of the rank and file, and the condition of the horses and stables, and he is also responsible for the pay and supplies of the squadron handed over to him by the paymaster and others. He has control of the promotion of non-commissioned officers and the leave granted to non-commissioned officers and men. He is responsible to the Chef d'Escadron for the efficient performance of his duties. The second captain of each squadron is, as regards squadron duties, under the orders of the captain commanding, and is especially concerned with all matters affecting food supplies. In addition to his squadron duties, he has to take his turn every fifth week as "captain of the week," when he has to supervise roll calls and assemblies, and the mounting and dismounting of guards. As captain of the week he supervises the cleanliness and security of the barracks and the work of the police. Of lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, four are appointed to each squadron, each being responsible for a _peloton_ or troop of men. Responsible to the senior captain of the squadron for the performance of his duties, the lieutenant is expected to instruct his men at drill, supervise their work in stables, and see that their barrack rooms are properly kept. The lieutenant is empowered to hold such inspections of kit and clothes as he may think necessary. To every regiment two doctors are appointed, holding the ranks of captain and lieutenant respectively. Each regiment of cavalry and artillery is also provided with two veterinary surgeons. As the duties of these officers are of a non-combatant nature, they are not materially concerned with the discipline or military efficiency of the regiment to which they are attached. Corresponding to the warrant-officer of the British Army and standing as intermediary between officers and non-commissioned officers of the French Army, the adjudants are appointed in the number of three to a regiment. Two of these known simply as adjudants have different duties from the third, to whom is given the title of Adjudant Vaguemestre. The two adjudants assist the work of the captain-instructor in immediately superintending the efficiency of non-commissioned officers. All sergeants and corporals are subject to their authority, and, in alternate weeks, each takes turn as "adjudant of the week" under the captain of the week. In this orderly duty the adjudant of the week keeps the rolls of sergeants and corporals, and arranges their turns of duty. He keeps the register of punishments of non-commissioned officers and the rank and file, and is responsible for the sounding of all regimental calls; he transmits the orders of the colonel to the sergeant-majors of the squadrons, and inspects the morning roll-call of each squadron. He attends to the closing of canteens and sees that "lights out" is obeyed in the barrack rooms. The position of adjudant in the French Army is one of considerable authority, which, to the credit of the service be it said, is seldom abused. The Adjudant Vaguemestre is but a minor official by comparison with the other two. He is generally a non-commissioned officer who has nearly finished his period of service, and he acts as regimental postman and postmaster, being, on the whole, a sort of handy man for all matters of business in which responsibility is incurred. The sergeant-major of each squadron has almost as much authority as the adjudant. He is, among the non-commissioned officers, what the senior captain is among commissioned officers; he stands as right-hand man to the senior captain, and, in constant contact with the non-commissioned officers and men of the squadron, is able very largely to influence the judgment of the captain with regard to the rank and file. He gives all the captain's orders to the squadron with regard to instruction, discipline, dress, etc. He is responsible for the keeping of books and registers, and for this work has appointed to him as assistants a sergeant _fourrier_ and corporal _fourrier_. He is in charge of the squadron stores and of all the _matériel_ of the squadron. The sergeants are appointed in the number of one to a troop, and are held responsible for the efficiency of the corporals and troopers. They take turns as "sergeant of the week" for their squadrons, a duty corresponding to that of the orderly-sergeant in the British Army. Nominally, the sergeant of each troop is responsible to the lieutenant or sub-lieutenant of the troop, but in reality the sergeant is more under control of the squadron sergeant-major, and, through him, of the captain. The sergeant drills the men of his troop; he is responsible that the troop barrack room is properly kept; that kits and clothing are kept clean and complete; that arms and saddlery, also, are kept in order. As sergeant of the week, the sergeant inspects and reports to the sergeant-major the correctness of morning and evening roll-call; he keeps the roll of fatigue men, and also of men in the squadron for guard; he parades the sick for inspection by the doctor and also parades all men for fatigues and guards. The sergeant _fourrier_ holding the rank of sergeant is more of the nature of squadron clerk, as his duties, with the exception of escorting men sent to hospital, consist mainly in keeping books and accounts, in which he has the corporal _fourrier_ to help him. The corporal of the French Army is placed in charge of a squad of about ten men; he sleeps in the same room with them, is responsible for their personal cleanliness and the arrangement of their kits, and sees that any men of his squad for guard or special duty turn out correctly. He superintends the general cleaning of kit which the captain orders weekly, and a rather curious duty which falls to his lot is to see that the troopers of his squad change their linen once a week. This, however, is not so curious as may appear at first sight, for it must be borne in mind that the French Army sweeps up every class of citizen into its net, and with some of the men personal cleanliness is so little a habit that insistence on the point by one in authority is a necessity. In addition to these intimate matters the French corporal has to superintend the drill of recruits, teach them to arrange their kit and packs, and show them methods of cleaning arms and kit, and grooming horses. He is empowered to inflict minor punishments which he must report to the sergeant in charge of the troop. The corporal is responsible for the maintenance of order in the barrack room, for the proper serving of meals, and the compliance with the order for "lights out"; he takes turn as corporal of the week with his fellows, and in that capacity is deputy for and assistant to the sergeant of the week. Altogether, the corporal of the French Army has a very busy time, and in addition to this his position is not so secure as that of the British corporal; the latter's rank counts as a definite promotion, while the rank of the French corporal is only an appointment, and he may find himself "reduced" much more quickly than the British man in an equivalent position. The conscript system, leading to a number of unwilling soldiers, is much more provocative of punishments than the voluntary system. In the latter, all men who enlist get the habit of making the best of their service; they have joined the army of their own free will, and have only themselves to blame if they do not like it. In a conscript army, however, there are many who hate the limitations imposed on them by service in time of peace, and enter only with a view to getting the business over and getting back to their former positions in life; it is a disagreeable necessity, the period of military service, and they are there to do as little as possible, without any regard to the welfare of the country, though a national emergency like the present finds every man willing to do his part. Not that such an attitude is the rule in time of peace, but, especially among the very lowest classes, it is not unusual. Since it is impossible to make sheep and goats of the men, but all must be treated alike, discipline is much more rigid and severe than in the British Army--which is the only voluntary European army from which comparisons can be drawn. The view is taken--necessarily taken--that men must be compelled to do their work and learn their lessons of drill and shooting; for those who give trouble in any way, there is the _salle de police_, or guard-room, the prison for worse offences, and, for hardened offenders, there is service in the dreaded disciplinary battalions of Algeria. This last form of punishment is resorted to only in the case of men who have "committed one or several faults, the gravity of which makes any other mode of repression inadequate." Contrary to the rule of the British Army, in which only commanding and company or squadron officers are empowered to inflict punishment, in the French Army any man can be punished by any other man holding a rank superior to his own, under all circumstances that may arise. As an instance: if a private of a British regiment insulted a corporal of another regiment, the case would be reported to the man's own commanding officer, who in due time would investigate the case and inflict the requisite punishment for the offence; in the French Army, if a private were guilty of a similar offence, the injured corporal would be at liberty to inflict the punishment on his own account; his action would have to be confirmed by a superior officer, but, under the rules governing the administration of punishment, there would be no difficulty about that. The officer in command of a regiment has power to increase, diminish, or even cancel punishments inflicted by inferior officers, and the captain in charge of a squadron has a like power over the subordinate officers directly under his command and over the punishments they may inflict. This system of giving so much power to all has more against it than in its favour. Certainly, given a just junior officer or non-commissioned officer, he is more likely to inflict a punishment that fits the crime than the commanding officer to whom he may report the case--he knows all the circumstances better than the man to whom he may tell them, and, in direct contact with the offender at the time the offence was committed, is not so likely to err on the side of undue severity or that of undue leniency--and that is about all that can be said in favour of the system. Against it must be said that it places in the hands of very many men, of all ranks and grades, a tremendous power which may easily be abused; under such a system a sergeant or corporal who has a grudge against a particular man can make that man's life a perfect misery to him, and, since in a conscript army authority must be upheld at all costs, even more than in a volunteer army, the right of complaint which belongs to the man is not often of much use to them--discipline would be impaired if officers upheld their men against their non-commissioned officers. Further, officers are more liable to punishment in the French Army than in the British. In the latter force, a court-martial on an officer is a very rare thing, but in the French service the equivalent to a court-martial is not an infrequent occurrence, and a certain percentage of officers get "confined to room," "confined to fortress," suspended from duty for varying periods, and cashiered (dismissed from the service),--these things happening with considerably greater frequency than in the British Army. It must be said, on the other hand, that the French officer has more required of him in time of peace than the British officer; he is required to be in closer contact with his men, and to undertake more arduous duties, and, on the whole, French officers are keen soldiers, intent on the performance of their duties, taking themselves and their work very seriously. The lesson of Metz in 1870 has not been wasted on the modern French Army, and the knowledge that some day the nation would again take up arms against its eastern neighbour has led to a strict maintenance of efficiency on the part of the officers of the Army, and to a keenness quite equal to that shown in a voluntary force. Non-commissioned officers are subject to punishments of a more severe nature than those inflicted on their fellows in the British Army--the constant comparison between the two, in matters of discipline, is necessary in order to give a clear idea of conditions of service for all ranks of the French Army. The British non-commissioned officer is either reprimanded or reduced to the ranks; the French non-commissioned officer may be confined to barracks after evening roll-call, confined to his room for slight breaches of discipline, or sent to prison and still retain his rank on his release, a thing impossible in the British service. Only for repeated misdemeanours are non-commissioned officers reduced to the ranks, while one offence is sufficient to ensure this punishment in the British service. Privates are punished in various ways according to the nature of the offence committed. The lightest punishment of all consists of extra fatigue duty; next in order comes inspection on guard parade, the man in question being compelled to parade with the guard in full marching order for a definite number of times; confinement to barracks for a stated period is inflicted for still more serious but still light offences; being sent to the _salle de police_ is a considerably severer form of punishment, and consists in the offenders being kept at night in the guard-room, doing ordinary duty during the day, and, in addition, doing all sorts of fatigues and making themselves scavengers for the regiment. Prison and solitary confinement in cells are two forms of punishment allotted to really bad characters, on whom the previously named forms of punishment have not sufficient effect. Finally, there are the Algerian disciplinary battalions, and the man who is sent to one of these may be reckoned as a criminal, as a rule. It is a curious fact that reading a newspaper constitutes an offence against discipline in the French Army, and no newspapers are permitted to be brought into barracks. The list of officers given in this chapter has been taken from the staff of a French cavalry regiment, but it applies almost identically to artillery units, while, in the case of infantry units, it is necessary only to delete all that refers to the care of horses, and the staff of officers and non-commissioned officers is practically the same as in the cavalry. The French "regiment" of artillery is a similar unit of strength to that of most great continental armies, though it has no equivalent in the British service, where the artillery is grouped in units known as brigades, of not much more than half the strength of the continental regiment. The French cavalry regiment also is considerably stronger than the British cavalry unit, containing five squadrons to the latter's four. This brings the cavalry regiment of the French Army nearly up to the strength of the infantry unit. The matter of punishments has been dwelt on at some length, owing to the prominence given to punishment in the French Army. Made up as it is of every class, the members of which are compelled to serve whether they like it or no, punishment is a necessity, and a frequent one at that, in the case of all ranks. It does not, however, alter the fact that the great majority of French conscripts are keen and willing soldiers, who make the best of their service and give a good account of themselves. CHAPTER IV INFANTRY Since the training of the French soldier lasts but two years, it is of little use making a distinction between recruits and others, for two years is a very brief period into which to compress all that a soldier must learn in order to become efficient. It may be noted that, in the British service, three years is considered the shortest period in which an infantry soldier can be turned out as fully efficient. Again, it must always be borne in mind, in considering the French Army, that _all_ must be taught their work. There is as great a percentage of stupid people in France as in any other country; a voluntary army is at liberty to reject fools as undesirable, but the nation with a conscript system must train the fools as well as the wise ones, for, admitting the principle that strength consists in numbers of trained men, then every rifle counts so long as its holder is capable of firing. The conscript, coming to the colours on the first of October, is usually given the choice of the arm of service in which he will do his two years' training. The subject of this chapter has elected to serve in the infantry of the line. He may have just completed an expensive education, or he may have come from Montmartre, the slums of a provincial town, the _landes_ of Brittany, or a village of French Lorraine; in civilian life he may have been a peasant, a street arab, a student of philosophy, a future president of the Republic--it is all the same on that first of October, for now he is simply a conscript with two years' military training before him, and a halfpenny a day for his pay, together with a periodical allowance of tobacco, which is one of the luxuries that the French Army allows to its soldiers. Arrived at his station the conscript finds his room, and is allotted a bed therein. He finds himself placed under a corporal who will teach him all about his rifle, manifest an interest in the cleanliness of his linen, see that he gets his hair cut, instruct him in drill, turn him out of bed in the morning, and see that he is in, or accounted for, when the roll is called at night. The first business of the conscript is to get fitted out from the store in which the battalion keeps clothes for its men. Here he gets his boots, his parade uniform, and his fatigue outfit. His captain, with the assistance of the master tailor, passes the outfit as complete and correct, and the conscript says good-bye to civilian attire for a period of two years. There was one youngster, a Breton youth, who mourned for a week or two after coming to the colours, because the cow at home would not take its food from other people as it would from him; there are many who remember how they used to milk the goats, and these make humorous little tragedies for a time, for their fellow conscripts. Like the British infantryman, the conscript is concerned principally in learning to march and shoot, and use his bayonet. In the matter of marching, to which reference has already been made, the training of the conscript is a complicated business. No walking that he has ever done as a civilian bears any relation to this curious half-shuffling trot, unless by chance he is a native of the Vosges country, and in that case he may recall a rapid climb up some steep hill, to which this business of the march is more nearly akin than to anything else. Perhaps he does not take kindly to his work at first, but, in addition to the corporal under whose charge he is placed, there are the men who sleep on either side of him to inculcate in him the first principles of discipline, for there is nothing on earth half so comforting to the man placed under a system as to be able to give advice to a new-comer to the system and its disabilities. Thus, with the assistance of the corporal and of his comrades, the new conscript settles to his work. Within a couple of months he has begun to understand the principle of this marching business, and, in common with all youngsters, he takes a pride in his new accomplishment. It is a tiring business, _certainement_, but then, what would you? A man must be taught, and, after all, it is only for two years, at the end of which one may go back to the cow or the goats, or the kerbstone, or the life of one who sits above these things--and Pierre, who occupies the corner bed, is an amusing rascal; it is not so bad, this military life, after all, but one would there were a little more money and a little more time. However.... The conscript must be taught to shoot. First of all, and not infrequently as a matter of necessity, he is taught the difference between the butt and the muzzle of a rifle. He is taught how to hold the thing, how to clean it, how to press its trigger, how to load it, and how to adjust its sights. He is made familiar with the weapon in the fullest sense of the word "familiar," for shooting is not altogether a matter of blazing away ammunition; the good shot is the man who has a thorough knowledge of the various parts of his weapon, and who has been taught to nurse it and care for it just as the Breton lad nursed and cared for his cow. The equivalent of the British Morris tube is requisitioned to instruct the conscript in the first elements of firing a rifle. Across a large white target a thin black line is drawn horizontally, and the conscript is set to firing at this target until he can make reasonably consistent practice on the black line. His corporal is at hand to correct defects, and his sergeant is there too, to instruct and ever to instruct. By and by the conscript begins to feel with regard to his shooting as he feels about the marching. One must learn, and rifle shooting is not an unpleasant business, though the cleaning of the rifle is another matter, and they are wonderfully particular about the way in which it is done. That corporal and that sergeant must have eyes behind them. Instruction in the use of the bayonet is very largely a similar sort of business, a matter of perpetual care on the part of the instructors and of gradually increasing efficiency on the part of the conscript. Then there is the gymnastic class, by means of which limbs are made supple, and muscles strengthened--it is only by continuous training that the marvellous efficiency to which the French conscript attains in the short space of two years is compassed. There is no "furlough season" as British troops know it; the conscript goes up to work all the time, and in that period of work he is transformed from hobbledehoy to man. Marching, the use of rifle and bayonet, and gymnastic classes, do not by any means exhaust the schedule of conscript training. There is all the business of barrack room life, the cleaning of equipment in which the corporal is ever at hand to instruct, and men in their second year are also at hand to advise and give hints; there are fatigues, white-washing, trench-digging, and all sorts of things of which in pre-military days, probably, the conscript never dreamed. There are route marches with the battalion, the commanding officer and band at the head. There is always something to do, always something waiting to be done, and in looking forward there is an endless succession of very busy days to contemplate. One goes to bed tired--very healthily tired--and one wakens to work. The work is not always pleasant, but it has the charm--if such it can be called--of never-ending variety. A monotonous variety it may be, but then, one has little time to think, and then there is always the canteen, and Jean, who sleeps in the corner opposite Pierre, has just received his allowance from home. There is yet ten minutes before parade--we will go with Jean to the canteen.... CHAPTER V OFF DUTY There is a strict but unwritten law of the French Army as regards the canteen: no man may take a drink by himself. _Faire suisse_ is the term applied, if one goes to the canteen alone, and the rest of the men in the conscript's room look on him as something of a mean fellow if he does such a thing as this. Of course, it works out at the same thing in the end, and share and share alike is not a bad principle, while it is eminently good Republicanism. Jean must share his remittance from home with somebody; he can pick the men whom he desires to treat, but he must not lay himself open to the accusation of _faire suisse_, no matter what arm of the service he represents. It is bad comradeship, for his fellows, when they have a slice of luck, would not think of doing it. Why should he? Thus, and with justice, they reason, and out of such reasoning comes the sharing of the last drops of water with a comrade on the field, the acts of self-denial and courageous self-sacrifice for which men of the French Army have always been famed. It is a little thing in itself, this compulsory sharing of one's luck, but it leads to great things, at times. Should Jean go to the canteen alone, punishment awaits him from his comrades. If he is well liked, he will get off with having his bed tipped up after he has got to sleep at night. If he is a surly fellow, he may reckon on what British troops know as a "blanket court-martial," which means that his comrades of the room will catch him and place him in a blanket, the edges of which are held all round by his fellow soldiers. At a given signal the blanket will be given a mighty heave upward by all who are holding it, and Jean will fly ceiling-ward, to alight again in the blanket and again be heaved up. This process, repeated a dozen times or so, leaves Jean with not a sufficiency of breath to beg for mercy, while at the same time he is quite undamaged, and, if he is wise, he will not incur the accusation of _faire suisse_ again. He may be fool enough to report the matter to his sergeant, as, by the rules of the service, he is entitled to do. In that case the sergeant will threaten Jean's comrades with punishment for causing annoyance to a man, but the threat, as the men well know, is all that will happen to them--but not all that will transpire as regards Jean. The French soldier abhors a sneak, and treats him as he deserves. Jean will get a rough time for many days to come, and will not dare to complain to the sergeant again. It is rough justice, but effective; so long as a man plays the game properly with his fellows, he is all right, and the sergeant knows it. Hence Jean may make complaints till he is black in the face about the conduct of his fellows, but by so doing he will only make himself unpopular, and before he has got far into his first year of service he learns to take his own part, and not to go running to the sergeant with his little troubles. It does not pay--and, if it did, the French Army would not be what it is in the matter of comradeship and good feeling. One good thing about the canteen is its cheapness. One can get coffee and a roll--which amounts to a French conscript's breakfast--for the equivalent of three halfpence, and this charge is a fair sample of the prices of all things. Whatever one may ask for, too, it is served in good quality, for the canteen is under strict supervision of the officers, who are quick to note and remedy any cause for complaint on the part of the men. Early morning breakfast, as it is served in the British Army, is unknown in French units. On turning out in the morning, coffee is brought round to the barrack rooms, but the first real meal of the day is "soup" at ten o'clock. The food is properly served in dishes, and a corporal or a man told off for the duty is at the head of each table to help each man to his allowance, for which an enamelled plate is provided. Crockery is unsafe in a barrack room, and the fact is wisely recognised. The canteen of the British Army, so far as drinks are concerned, provides beer only for its men, but beer is scarcely ever seen in a French canteen. Various brands of wine are at the disposal of the conscript, and it is possible to get a bottle of drinkable stuff for fivepence, though in order to obtain a really good brand one must pay at least a franc, for which the wine obtained is equal to that for which many a London restaurant will charge half a crown. Wine is the staple drink of the Army, though brandy finds favour among the hardened drinkers. The man who goes to the canteen for a bottle of wine to share with a comrade must not be regarded as a tippler, for the clarets which the canteen provides are not very alcoholic beverages, containing as they do but little more alcohol to the pint than supposedly "teetotal" ginger beer of some brands. To each company of infantry, as to each squadron of cavalry and battery of artillery, is allotted a barber, whose business is to shave every conscript of his company at least twice a week free of cost, the barber being remunerated by the authorities. Since most men need to shave every day in order to fulfil the requirements of parade appearance, it is obvious that the efforts of the barber in this direction must be supplemented by the men themselves, and on the whole the barber gets an easy time as a rule, for the man who shaves himself three times a week will usually get the business done without troubling the barber at any time. Complaints used to be made, especially in infantry stations, about the sanitation and lack of washing accommodation in French barracks, but modern custom has remedied all this. Chief cause of reformation was the Russo-Japanese War, which showed that an army is twice as effective if matters of sanitation are properly attended to--it does not pay to have men falling sick from the presence of nursery beds for infectious diseases. The French Army, ever first in experiment for the efficiency of its men and in search of ways to increase the fighting value of the forces available, has taken the lessons of modern sanitation to heart. In practically all barracks, now, the soldier can enjoy a hot bath or a cold one when he wishes; all that is still to be desired is a greater regard for necessary sanitary measures, and a greater regard for personal cleanliness among the men themselves. The peasant lad, who has lived a comparatively lonely life in absolutely healthy surroundings, does not understand at first that barrack life exposes him to fresh dangers, and he has to be taught what, to a town dweller, are elementary facts as regards infection. For this reason, tubercular and allied complaints still rank rather high in the medical statistics of the French Army, though every year sees an improvement in this respect. But a dissertation of this kind has taken us far from the canteen, and the methods employed by the conscript in spending his spare time. Not that the canteen is the only place of amusement, but in stated hours, as in the British Army, the canteen is the rallying point of men off duty. It is closed to men undergoing _salle de police_ at all times, and this forms a not inconsiderable part of their punishment; for to a soldier the canteen is not merely a place where he may obtain refreshments, alcoholic and otherwise, but also a place to meet his friends, hear a good song, discuss the doings of various companies, and of various friends, whom he meets here and with whom he can compare notes. The barrack room may not contain more than one close friend--if that--and the other men in the squad to which the conscript belongs may be of different provinces, of totally different ideals and ways of thought--as if a Highland Scot were planted down in a squad of Londoners. In the canteen, however, a man can be certain of meeting and sitting down for a confab with his own chums, men not only of his year--that is, joining on the same first of October as himself--but also hailing, perhaps, from the same town or village as himself, glad to share a bottle of claret at a franc the bottle and to talk over the things left behind with civilian clothing. As for canteen songs, one may guess that in the French Army there is always plenty of real talent, for the nation as a whole, like all Latin nationalities, is a very musical one, and since all come to the Army, the singers come with the rest. The songs, perhaps, are not of the highest drawing-room order, even for French drawing-rooms, but the musical and vocal abilities of the singers are beyond question; for in a gathering of men where the best can be obtained, little short of the best ventures to bring itself to notice. This mention of canteen songs recalls the fact that the French infantryman beguiles the tedium of route-marching by songs, interminably long songs which go on and on for miles; in recalling what the next verse will be, a man forgets the number of miles between him and the end of the march, or he thinks he may be able to, which amounts to very nearly the same thing. They still sing songs that were in vogue at the time of Fontenoy, as they march at ease along the endless straight roads of the country, with their rifles slung anyhow and their formations broken up that friend may march with friend. This is when marching "at ease" only, for let a column of marching infantrymen come to the streets of a town, and they immediately stiffen up to show themselves at their best before the girls at the windows. The Army of the Republic is a part of the nation, but the women of the nation manifest no less interest in it for the fact that their fathers and brothers have served. There is something in the sound of a military band and the sight of a column of uniformed men that will always bring faces to the windows of a French house. "So our Jacques is perhaps marching somewhere," they say, or--"Thus we marched to relieve Bazaine," will remark a veteran of the '70 campaign, feeling the while that these men may yet make of "'70" a thing no longer to remember in connection with lost provinces. And, once the town or village street is left behind, and the road stretches unbroken before the column, the men begin to sing again, and their officers smile at the song--they are too wise, in the French Army, to suppress the singing and the cigarette smoking, and thus the men march well. As well, certainly, as any infantry in the world, and probably better than most. Although it is a conscript army, there are regimental traditions, as in the British or in any other service. Your conscript in his second year of service will tell how his regiment captured the colours here, or saved the position there, in the way-back days, and is nearly as proud of it as if he, instead of the fellow soldiers of his great-grandfather, were concerned in the business. _Esprit de corps_, though now a common phrase in connection with the British Army, was first of all a French idiom--and is yet, and an untranslatable one too--designed to express the French soldier's pride in his own unit of the service, or in his own branch of the service. At the present time, it has as much application to the French Army as in the day when the phrase was coined; pride in his own powers of endurance, and pride in the unit in which he serves, still characterise the French conscript, and in the last ten years or so this feeling has grown to such an extent as to place the French Army, although a conscript organisation, on a level with a voluntary force. CHAPTER VI CAVALRY As in all armies, the French cavalryman considers himself as good as two infantrymen; the origin of this may probably be traced back through time to feudal days, when only the better classes of vassals were able to provide horses with which to come to the standard of the feudal chief. Certain it is that even in these present days of scientific warfare, when the guns and rifles count equally with the swords of an Army Corps, the cavalryman still looks on himself as a superior person, more efficient and more to be admired than a mere gunner or a mere man in a line regiment of infantry. Certainly, he rides, and this fact he is always ready to impress on the infantryman; what he keeps quiet about is that he has to groom the horse he rides, and to attend to its needs when the infantryman, having finished his march at practically the same time the cavalryman finished his, has his meal cooked and eaten before his fellow of the mounted unit has got away from stables. Considering that the time of the infantry conscript is fully occupied in the compression of all his tuition into his two years of service, it may be imagined that the way of the cavalryman is not an easy one, for he has far more to learn than the infantryman. He has not only to learn to use the carbine which corresponds in his case to the infantry rifle, and to execute movements on foot, but he has to groom his horse, clean his saddle, keep the stables in order, and do all the things that are absolute necessities where horses are concerned, as well as having nearly twice as much personal kit to look after as the infantryman--and then he has to be trained in the use of the sword, that of the lance in some regiments, and to add to his other drills the business of riding school. The horses of French cavalry, as a whole, are not so well cared for as those of the English cavalry regiment; methods used in connection with the care of horses are not so complete and perfect, and the stock itself is not such well-bred stuff, as a whole, as the horseflesh that goes to the British Army from Irish and other breeding establishments. At the same time, the cavalry trooper is taught how to care for his mount in his own way, and, trained in a harder school, French horses of the cavalry are tougher than those of English regiments. If a unit from each army were placed side by side in a position in which there was no chance of feeding horses on full rations of forage, but all had to live on the country and make the best of it for a time, the French animals would probably come out better of the two from the ordeal, since they are more used to hardships in time of peace. The British trooper is taught to treat his horse as he would a baby, while the French soldier, inured to rigorous discipline himself, has a horse that shares his own circumstances. The cavalry conscript elects to serve in a mounted unit, for, on the 1st of October on which a man comes up for his training, he is given choice between cavalry, artillery and infantry service, as far as the exigencies of the service will permit. Like the infantry recruit, he begins his service by drawing kit and clothing and fitting the latter to the satisfaction of his superior officers; in addition to the equivalent of the kit drawn from store by the infantryman, however, the cavalry conscript must draw stable kit and cleaning materials, spurs and all that goes to make the difference between the mounted and the dismounted soldier. Unlike modern practice in the British cavalry, the way with the French conscript is to get on teaching him at once as much as possible; riding school, foot drill, gymnastic exercises, and stable work are all crowded into his day, for there are but two years available before he will go back to civilian attire and ways. And there is much to teach him; more, really, than two years can be made to serve for. It may be said that, except in the case of men who were skilled riders before they came up for training, the French cavalry conscript is not a complete soldier by the time he has finished his two years, for it is impossible that he should be. All that can be done to make him efficient is done, though, and the difference between the finished article, going back to civilian avocations, and the conscript from which he is formed, is little short of marvellous. Detractors from the merits of a conscript system overlook the effect on the conscript as regards physique and moral stamina; out of the rough schooling men emerge far more fitted for the battle of life than they entered, and the net effect of military training in a cavalry regiment--two years of it, taken as the French soldier is made to take his training--is in nineteen cases out of twenty all to the good. Riding-school is a serious business; when a man first leads his horse through the riding-school entrance and mounts, he learns what a perfect brute--from his point of view--an instructor can be, and it is not until he is nearing the end of his period of riding-school instruction that he learns to look on the instructor as not a bad fellow, a bit strict at his work, but responsible for the turning out of some of the finest riders in the world. For in horsemanship the French soldier is no whit behind his English confrère, and it is only in recent years that the British Army has taken up the circus tricks which for many years have been practised in the French Army in order to make men thoroughly familiar with their mounts. A conscript is taught not only to ride a saddled horse, but also to vault on to the back of a cantering horse, to make his horse lie down, and various other tricks--they are nothing more in themselves--which give him thorough confidence in himself and thorough knowledge of the capabilities, intelligence, and nature of his horse. Recognising the wisdom of this form of teaching, the British Army has of late adopted it, to the betterment of cavalry riding as a whole. The new _loi de trois ans_, introduced in the war ministry of M. Viviani, will be to the advantage of the French cavalry, when it has had chance of a fair trial--it had hardly become a definite law before the outbreak of war put a stop to peace training and peace organisation. But, when things become normal again, it is certain that the cavalry will benefit by the extension of the period of service, and although they were perfectly capable of taking the field when need arose, French cavalry will be improved in quality by the additional training. This applies not so much to the main points of drill and discipline as to little things; veterinary tricks and ways, capacity for individual service, and self-dependence in the fullest sense, especially to the extent demanded of the man who goes out on patrol work and scouting duty, are not to be learned as thoroughly as could be wished in two years, but must be ingrained by experience as well as by tuition. Before his first year of training is concluded the cavalry conscript is expected to have learned all that the riding-school can teach him. In addition to the class of riding which may be termed circus work, and is taught on horses with handled pads instead of saddles, the recruit is initiated into bending lessons, by which his horse is rendered flexuous and easily amenable to pressure of leg and rein. It is worthy of note, by the way, that the principle on which the modern training of horses is based is due to a Frenchman, who brought to England what were at the time considered revolutionary principles with regard to riding. The method by which the French conscript is trained at riding school is of such a nature that it trains horse and man at the same time. At the beginning of training with saddles the ride is formed of about sixteen men who walk, trot, and canter their mounts along sides of a square in single file. The man is made to ride his horse well into the corners of the square and to make three turns sharply, and, when men have acquired full control of their horses so as to be able to perform this simple movement properly, they are taken on to more complex matters. While strung out along one side of the square, at the word of command each man turns his horse at a direct right angle, proceeds across the square, and, turning again at a right angle on the far side, the ride forms single file again and proceeds. A diagonal movement of the same nature is then taught; men are taught to halt their horses suddenly and rein them back a length or two; they are taught when at the canter to cause their horses to passage sideways across the square, and, in fact, are instructed to make every movement of which a horse is capable. At first, as may be assumed, the tuition is carried out with trained horses, but, as men become advanced in the art and practice of riding, they are put on to younger horses, and it will be easily understood that, in learning himself to make the horse execute the movements, the cavalryman trains the horse to its work as well as increasing his own knowledge. In the matter of foot drill there is not so much to learn in the cavalry as in the infantry. Cavalry foot drill, as a matter of fact, is practically a replica of the drill to which troops and squadrons of men are subjected when mounted. The principle governing cavalry foot drill in practically all armies consists in assuming that a man shall not be called on to execute a movement which he cannot execute on horseback, as, otherwise, confusion might arise in the course of mounted drill. It would be interesting, for instance, if cavalry were taught infantry drill, to see what would happen if a squadron of mounted men were ordered to form fours in the infantry style. Actual foot movements do not by any means comprise the total of drill that the cavalry conscript must learn on foot before applying it to mounted work. The use of the sword and also that of the lance are first thoroughly taught to squads of dismounted men, and a recruit must be fully conversant with sword and lance exercise before he ventures to perform either offensive or defensive movements with either of these weapons on horseback. The unskilled man waving a sword about when mounted would probably do more damage to his horse's eyes and ears than to anything else, and the man with the lance, if unskilled, would probably find himself dismounting involuntarily if he tried to use the lance on a spirited horse. Thus men are taken out, dismounted, in squads; each man assumes the position which he would occupy on horseback with feet well apart, knees bent and toes turned to the front--an exhausting posture to maintain for any length of time. In this attitude the recruit is taught such movements as are requisite to full control of sword and lance. For final training in the use of these weapons men are given fencing outfits and set in pairs to oppose each other. When they have attained to proficiency, the whole business is repeated on horseback, and by that time their training for actual field work in the ranks is practically complete. The part of his work that the cavalry conscript likes least is the grooming and sweeping up and cleaning of saddlery in the stables. There is a morning stable hour with which the day begins; there are about two hours before midday which must be devoted to grooming, cleaning saddlery, sweeping up, etc., and there is another hour or so to be spent at stables in the afternoon, when the "orders of the day" are read out to the men by the sergeant-major of the squadron or his representative. As is the case in the infantry, each conscript, on arriving at the regiment in which he is to serve, is allotted to the charge of a corporal, who instructs him in all things pertaining to his work, and takes charge of him on _corvées_, the equivalent to the "fatigues" of the British Army. _Corvées_ include the carrying of forage from the stores to stable, fetching coal for the cooks, white-washing where and when necessary, building riding-school jumps, and, in fact, all and every class of work which men are unable to perform individually for themselves. Much of this work is undergone by the men sentenced to _salle de police_, which is the equivalent of the British Army's punishment known as "days to barracks," with the addition that the offenders sleep in the guard room at night instead of in the barrack room. This of course involves entire confinement to barracks, which no offender is allowed to quit unless he is on duty; it also involves no possibility of attendance at the canteen at any time of the day, and, further, the man sentenced to _salle de police_ devotes practically all the spare time that is his under normal circumstances to some form of _corvée_. On the whole, however, the punishment is not so severe as it appears, for, with the exception of sleeping in the guard room at night, and rising exceptionally early in the morning, a man undergoing _salle de police_ is not debarred from the society of his comrades, and there is usually some good-natured chum willing to fetch canteen produce, and thus make up for at least one of the deficiencies involved. This last, however, must be done when the corporal is not looking, or else both men are likely to get into trouble. Strict discipline is the rule and the conscript is expected to take his punishment--when he incurs it--as part of his training. It must be added as a mark of the quality of the material of which the French Army is composed that punishments and rewards alike are usually accepted in equally good part. The corporal, who is the superior officer with whom the conscript is brought most frequently in contact, sleeps in the same room as his squad; he is thus able to give men hints with regard to riding school work; he trains his squad at elementary drill, both mounted and dismounted; he instructs men in the way in which clothing should be folded for placing on the shelf, and the way in which to clean kit and equipment. In the matter of troop drill the conscript is taught his work by the sergeant of the _peloton_ or troop, and the sergeant in turn is responsible to the lieutenant or sub-lieutenant over him. He is also responsible to the sergeant-major of the squadron, and through him to the senior captain of the squadron. To follow the matter through, the senior captain is responsible to the _Chef d'Escadrons_, who again is responsible to the commanding officer of the regiment. Decentralisation of command has been an important factor in French military training for many years, and although the responsibilities of the corporal and sergeant pass through so many grades before they reach the ultimate head of affairs, both these lower ranks are extremely important items in the discipline and training of the French cavalry regiments. There is one system pursued both in the cavalry and in the artillery of the French Army which leads to pleasant expeditions for a certain number of men in each of these branches of the service. The system referred to is that of boarding out a certain number of horses away from regimental control for that portion of the year which the regiment spends in barracks. When the time approaches for the regiment to go on manoeuvres, a party usually made up of a sergeant, possibly a corporal, and two or three troopers, goes round to the farms where these horses are at grass, and inspects them with a view to reporting on their condition and fitness for use. As may be imagined, the men selected for these expeditions are envied their appointments, for it is a pleasant matter to get away from the discipline and strict routine of service with the regiment for a time, and, if the sergeant in charge is a companionable man, the whole affair becomes a perfect picnic for the men concerned. On expeditions of this kind men are perfectly certain of receiving full hospitality at such places as they may visit, and altogether the trip is as good as the furlough which the conscript, unlike his British _confrère_, does not get, save in exceptional circumstances. The two years in which a man must become fully conversant with his work is too short a period, in view of the number of duties he has to learn, to admit of holidays. Altogether, the life of the cavalry conscript in barracks is not by any means an unpleasant business. A comparatively large number of men, when given the choice of the arm of the service in which to serve, request to be sent to the cavalry. The majority of those joining cavalry regiments are used to horses in some way--and by this is implied very many ways indeed, and very many kinds of horse. French cavalry as a whole is built up out of good material; the spirit of the men is good; the reputation of the French cavalry for horse-mastership is as wide as it is deserved, and, bearing in mind the period of active service for which men are required to serve, it may safely be said that there is no better body of cavalry troops in the world than the French. This remark, however, cannot be reckoned as a wise one if the speaker is addressing a British cavalryman, who always regards himself as a member of the premier squadron in the best regiment of the very finest cavalry force existent. But then, the French cavalryman will tell the same story. CHAPTER VII ARTILLERY In the matter of armament and the quality thereof, French artillery is second to none; but in the matter of numbers the Field Artillery might have been stronger when considered relatively with the total strength of the French Army. If the conscript electing to join either infantry or cavalry considers himself in for a hard time, then it would be difficult to say what are the anticipations of the conscript who goes to service with the guns, for his work is practically twice as hard as that of the average infantryman. Still, he makes up for increase of work by a relaxation of discipline, and, after all, the conscript's two years comes to about the same thing in the end, no matter what branch of the service he may choose. For, just as there is a limit to a man's endurance or efficiency, so there is a limit to the amount of knowledge that a man can absorb in a given period. The infantry conscript absorbs all the knowledge possible in the allotted time: the artillery conscript can do no more. It may be said, in fact, that the artillery conscript has a better time of it than his fellows in either infantry or cavalry, for his work is rendered more interesting than theirs by reason of its being more varied. The artillery driver, certainly, is in much the same position as the cavalryman, for his life is made up of horses and stables, riding, driving, grooming, and care for the fitness and cleanliness of harness and saddlery. He has a very busy life, this artillery driver, and his remarks, on coming in on a wet day after two or three hours' parade with the guns, might cause a little consternation in what is known as polite society, for two muddy horses with their saddlery and fittings, all to be dried and cleaned for the battery officer's inspection within a given time, are not conducive to elegance of expression or to restraint. But compensation comes in the relaxation of the rigid discipline which the infantryman, and to a certain extent the cavalryman, have to undergo. This will appear more clearly when one understands that infantrymen and cavalrymen alike need supervision throughout the whole of their day's work. Their tasks are mainly of drill and routine: made work, a good bit of it, in order to render them thoroughly efficient soldiers. The made work of the artillery driver consists in rendering him efficient in the art of controlling two of the horses which draw the gun, under all possible and many impossible conditions. By the time his training is completed, he has learned to harness up and turn out quickly, and is capable of obeying without hesitation any word of command the battery officer may give with regard to the evolutions of the battery as a whole. He is trained in the matter of casualties; that is to say, he is taught to regard one of his horses as suddenly injured or dead, and knows exactly what to do to make the best of the loss, in case such a casualty may occur. "Unlimber" and "limber up," as words of command, find him equally unmoved and equally alert; he is, at his best, a confident, self-reliant man, a far different being from the raw youth who, on a certain first of October, came to be initiated into the mysteries of artillery driving. These things comprise very nearly all of what may be termed the made work of the artillery driver, the work that is arranged with a special view to making him an efficient soldier in time of war. The rest of his work is absolutely necessary to the well-being of himself and the two horses under his charge. As a matter of course, he must keep himself and his kit smart and clean--as smartness is known in the French Army. He must groom his horses, and keep their equipment in good order; he must keep the stables clean; he must assist the gunners in the _corvées_ necessary to the maintenance of health, good order, and efficiency in the battery. Bearing in mind the fact that this one man is responsible not only for himself, in the way that an infantryman is, but is also responsible for his two horses and all their outfit, it will be seen that there is not much time for the discipline which, in the case of the infantryman, is practically indispensable to the thorough control of the man and the full efficiency of the regiment. The artillery driver is a busy man, who considers himself, by reason of the amount of work that he gets through, a far more capable man than either an infantryman or a cavalryman; in the driver's estimation, the only class of man who comes anywhere near him as regards efficiency and soldierly qualities is the gunner, and, the driver will say, the gunner is not quite so good a man as the driver. This spirit, common to each branch of the French Army, augurs well for the efficiency and fighting value of all arms of the service. Gunners in the French Army, as far as Field Artillery is concerned, differ from English gunners in that they only ride on the limber and on the gun when there is actual need that they should accompany the gun. English gunners always ride, but in the French Army it is considered better to save the horses by reducing the weight that they have to draw to the lowest possible amount. On long marches the gunners turn out two or three hours earlier than the drivers, and march like infantry to the appointed destination for the day. Although turning out later with horses and guns, the drivers usually reach camp at the end of the day quite as soon as the gunners, for the trot is maintained where possible, and, with a light load to draw, artillery horses are able to get over ground quickly. This system has much to commend it; it hardens the gunners, and is far better for their general health than sitting on a gun or limber which jolts, springless, along a country road; at the same time, it increases the mobility of the artillery, and renders horses more fresh and fit for their work in case of several days in succession, devoted to marching to a distant destination. The only drawback to the practice consists in its being useless in time of war, when the gunners must at all times accompany the guns and be ready for instant action. The work of the gunners is quite as hard as that of the drivers of Field Artillery, and quite as varied. Coming to the battery with absolutely no knowledge of the ways of using a gun, the raw conscript is taught the work of half a dozen men, for, as in the case of the drivers, each man has to be able to replace casualties in the ranks. The actual drill to which a gunner is subjected is a complicated business; there is a good deal of hopping and jumping about and aside, for each man must learn to perform his part in loading, sighting, and firing his gun, and at the same time each man must keep out of the way of the rest. A gun crew amounts to a dozen or so of men: there are the men concerned in the getting out of ammunition, others busied over the actual loading, and yet others engaged in sighting the gun and firing at the word of command; each of these men must be taught the duties of all the rest, for, when a battery is actually in action, casualties must be anticipated, and the men who are loading must be prepared to get out ammunition if required, must be able to set the time fuse of a shell for a given range, able to load, sight, and fire the gun. Thus one man has to learn the various tasks which a dozen perform, though to each is allotted a definite place, and each is specially trained for the performance of a definite part. Naturally, this training fully occupies all the two years of the gunner conscript's service, and there is little time to spare. The fuss and fret of discipline is correspondingly reduced; when a man is thoroughly busy, and interested in his work as any man must be over a gun, if he is in the least mechanically inclined, he needs no undue pressure to keep him up to his work; the gunner, if he has any sense of the responsibility and nature of his work, gets sufficiently interested in it, and sufficiently keen over the points that he has to master, to render him independent of more than actual tuition. The pleasure that comes to the sportsman over a remarkably successful shot, or to the cricketer over a good boundary hit, is akin to the feeling experienced by the gunner as he learns part after part of his gun, and finds himself well on the way to gaining complete control over the tremendous power that the gun represents. But this comes late in the training period, and is not attained easily. There is so much to learn; the way in which a shell is timed, for instance, is a complex piece of work that must be understood, to a certain extent, by the gunner who has to do the timing; that is to say, the mechanism of the shell, and the nature of the timing apparatus, have to be taught the man as well as the mere action of turning the ring to the required point and "setting the fuse." Traversing and sighting the gun, elevation and depression, are movements that explain themselves as they are taught; sighting to a given range seems easy, but is not so easy in practice, for the sighting of a gun has to be done swiftly and accurately--there must be no mistake in the range, for a shell costs more money than the total pay of the conscript during his two years of service, and to throw those costly projectiles to points at which they explode without effect is a silly business. To each man his part in the whole, and absolute efficiency in the part--that is the ideal to which the training of the gunner is directed; the quality of the French field artillery in action in this, their latest real experience of war, attests how well the ideal has been realised. Outnumbered by their opponents in batteries and regiments, often confronted with guns of far heavier calibre than their own, they have given good account of themselves, and shown that the crews of the 75-millimetre gun are capable of holding their own as far as lies within the bounds of human possibility. With regard to the custom of sending forward gunners on foot, this practice is also followed in the case of reserve drivers, or drivers who are not needed for the actual transport of the guns and limbers on the march. They are formed up in rear of the gunners, and are marched off on foot with the latter instead of adding to the weight that the horses have to pull, leaving only such officers and men as are actually necessary to travel with the guns. The artillery officer's training course is more severe than that undergone by any other branch of the service, as, in view of the complicated and responsible nature of his duties, it needs to be. An artillery officer, gaining his commission after the fashion of a British officer who elects to join the Army by way of Sandhurst or Woolwich, goes first to the École Polytechnique, the highest engineering school of France; after completing the course here, the officer of artillery is sent on to the artillery school at Fontainebleau, where a year is spent in further training, and then the youngster is considered competent to take his place as lieutenant in an artillery battery. The percentage of artillery officers gaining their commissions from the ranks is smaller than that of other branches of the service, and it is seldom that such officers reach higher than the rank of captain, for, in order to learn all that is required of the higher ranks of commissioned officer in the artillery, an officer needs to start young, and a course at the École Polytechnique is almost an essential. By the time a man has worked his way through the various grades of non-commissioned officer and is thus eligible for such a course, he is usually too old to take kindly to school work. Altogether, artillery service is not a light business in the French Army--it is not in any army, for that matter. Both gunners and drivers must take themselves seriously, and officers of the artillery must take themselves most seriously of all, with the possible exception of engineer officers. The modern rifle is a complicated weapon when compared with the musket of a hundred years ago; but in comparison with the rifle, the big gun of the Army of to-day has advanced in construction and power to an enormously greater extent. The character of the projectile has changed altogether from the old-fashioned round shot to a missile which is in itself a gun, carrying its own exploding charge and small projectiles within itself. The range of the modern gun is limited only by the necessity to make the gun mobile in the field, and by the range of human sight or power to judge the position of the target. The gunners of to-day, and the officers who command them, must be skilled workmen, possessed of no little mechanical ability in addition to their military qualities. They must be not only soldiers, but artificers, mechanics, engineers, mathematicians--skilled men in every way. The efficiency of the French artillery to-day is largely due to the French turn of mind, which is eminently suited to the solving of those mathematical problems with which the work of those who control the big guns abounds. CHAPTER VIII IN CAMP AND ON THE MARCH Manoeuvres fall at the end of the military year in the French Army, being so arranged in order that the second-year conscripts shall pass out from the Army and back to their ordinary civilian avocations as soon as they return to barracks and have time to hand in their equipment and arms. For the majority of these men, it is two years since they have had time to see their friends, save for a stray day or two of leave here and there for the man whose people live within a short distance of the training-place to which he has been drafted, or a stray visitor who brings news from home to one or other at infrequent intervals. Thus manoeuvres mean a good deal to the conscript; even the first-year men catch the infection from their fellows with regard to the approaching time for going away, and there is as well the sense for these juniors that, when they return to barracks, they will no longer be first-year men, but able to advise and instruct such raw recruits as they themselves were just a year ago. Added to this, again, is the sense of freedom that comes from knowing of the days of marching, billeting, and sight of fresh places and people from day to day, and it will be seen that the change from barrack life with its perpetual round of work to the constantly varying scenes of manoeuvres is one which is anticipated with pleasure by all. About a week, or perhaps more, before the time has come for the army corps concerned--or the cavalry or other divisions concerned--to set out on its march to the manoeuvre area, the cavalry and artillery send out their patrols to gather up the horses which have been boarded out at farms for the summer, and the men of these patrols are almost invariably billeted on the inhabitants of the districts round which they have to ride on their errand. It is a pleasant task, this; the year is at its best, and summer just so far advanced that the early rising, the riding through the day, and the evening tasks are alike easy. The weather is good, the life is not too hard, and the party too small to admit of strict discipline being maintained; the men know that their picnic-time is due to their having been specially chosen as reliable for such work, and consequently they do not abuse their freedom. And the horses come in from grass to train for what a horse can never understand, though it is in the knowledge of all that a horse comes to know his place in the ranks of the cavalry or in the traces of the gun team, and would gladly go back to that place after he has been cast out from the service to drudgery between the two shafts of a cart or cab. Perhaps the horses have their own thoughts about going on manoeuvres, and the change from stable life--such of them as have been kept in stables while the troops are in barracks--to the open air existence which is theirs in camp. It is a great day for the conscript when the regiment marches out from barracks. Farewell for a time, and in the case of the second-year men farewell for good, to the barrack routine. They leave in barracks the things they will not require on field service, the materials for what the British soldier knows as "spit and polish soldiering," and the conscript starts out with his field kit and equipment, prepared to have a good time. The infantry swing out through the barrack gates, a long column of marching men; they talk among themselves of what they will do when manoeuvres are over; the second-year men talk of going away, back to their homes, and of turning their backs on military service; they have done the duty their country asked of them, and now are at liberty to think of a good time--almost a holiday, in spite of the hard work and marching involved, with which they will end their service--to last them through the coming weeks, after which they will resume civilian attire and work. It has been a hard business, this conscript period, but France asked it, and _ma foi_, but we are men now! The stern strictness of the instructors, the unending discipline imposed by sergeants and corporals, the everlasting watchfulness of the adjutant over buttons and boots and the correct method of saluting--proper perspective, rapidly growing in the mind of the man nearing the end of his second year, assures him that these things are needs of a good army. And then, he is going out on manoeuvres, among the apple orchards or the hill villages; he is going to show the country what its soldiers are like, and almost, but not quite, he regrets that the end of his period of military service is nearly in sight. The time to which he looks forward colours his view of all things; the barracks are behind, and before him is the open road--that long, straight road which, in so many districts of France, goes on and on across bare plains, to human sight a thread laid right across the fabric of the world without bend or divergence. A road of white dust which, as soon as the barracks are left behind, rises from the many footsteps of the marching men and envelops the column. The band in front goes free of the dust, and well it is that the throats of the bandsmen are not choked and dried with the insidious stuff, for one marches better, far better, with the music. Somebody starts a song, for the regiment is marching at ease. A squad takes it up, and it spreads through the company--the company in rear has already started its own song, a different one. Interminably that song goes on, and the miles slip behind. At the end of every hour the column halts, and its men fall out for five minutes' rest--a good custom, this, for one can get rid of some of the dust, and often get a drink of water from a wayside spring--or Jean, who always gets enough money from home to satisfy the desires of his heart, has brought a bottle. It would be in the last degree injudicious to incur the accusation of _faire suisse_ on this first day of the march, and Jean has long since learned wisdom over such points of etiquette. Jean wants to keep the bottle till the next halt, but it is pointed out to him that the morning is already warm, and to carry a bottle for another hour when one might empty it--with assistance--and be saved the labour of transporting it further, is very bad judgment. Jean needs little persuasion--but it is time to fall in and resume the march: the bottle gets emptied while the column is marching, and Jean is voted _un brave garçon_--as undoubtedly he is, in other things beside this. Shrouded in dust the column goes on. The grey-headed colonel is at the head, then comes the band, and then the men of the regiment follow, at ease, singing, smoking, chatting together. They pass through a village street in which is a simple monument to the men who fell in '70, and the colonel pulls his men up to attention while they pass through the street. Quietly, and with something ominous in the manner of their march, the men pass out to the open road again, where "at ease" is the order once more. But, when they march steadily at attention, these French infantrymen seem the embodiment of military strength and efficiency. The Army has taken them and made of them what it meant to make, and, Breton lad or Paris gamin, they are stamped with the mark of the Army--they are soldiers of the Republic, marching items which, apart from their personal characteristics, mean each a rifle and a bayonet for France when the hour shall strike. Over successive horizons they go, stopping every hour for their five minutes; they grow heedless of the band at the head of the column, and scarcely know whether it is playing or no; one or two fall out, perhaps, for the first days of the march throw out from the ranks all the unfit; there is a doctor at hand to see to those who fall out, and the column swings on. Some time, after what seems to the men very many hours, the band strikes up definitely and with an indefinable new note--and the men know they are marching into camp. Food and sleep are not far ahead; the column stiffens at the call from the grey-haired colonel, and swings on to the camping-ground apparently as fresh as when the men passed out from the barrack gate. It is a part of their pride that they should come in well, should end their march like soldiers and men, not like weaklings. The cavalry also go out from the barracks with anticipations of good times ahead. Unlike the infantry, they have to keep formation when marching at ease as when marching at attention, for you cannot get a horse to rein back into the rank behind you or come up to the rank in front of you as easily as you yourself can drop back or go up, and, moreover, you cannot regain your place in the ranks at the call of "attention" as an infantryman can. But there are compensations. The "fours" of men divide into twos, of which each takes one side of the road; there is room in between the two inner men for the clouds of dust to roll about, and, although some of the stuff comes up, especially as regards the rear of the squadron, one is not so much down in it as the soldier on foot. One sees the country, too; the infantryman, keeping his place in his company, is just one of a crowd, and, in marching along and getting very tired--so the cavalryman says--he has no chance of looking about him and seeing what the country that he is marching through is like. One's horse does all the work, in the cavalry march, and one is merely a spectator, enjoying the fine day and the new scenery. It is good to be in the cavalry, and who would be an infantryman, when manoeuvres start? Patrol duty, for instance, and the isolated tasks that take patrols of three and four men to farmhouses where the milk is good and one is invited--yes, invited!--to pick fruit from the trees--what infantryman knows anything of joys like these? Assuredly it is a good thing that one chose to serve in the cavalry. Supposing it is the first time one has gone out on manoeuvres, there are all sorts of pleasant speculations in which one can indulge. Guillaumette, the surly fellow, who when in barracks always occupies the next bed and snores so atrociously--he who is not always perfectly innocent of _faire suisse_, though he has the luck of a pig, and never gets caught at any of his mean tricks--Guillaumette will be going away when one returns to barracks at the end of the manoeuvres, and who shall say what pleasant kind of a comrade may not come from among the new recruits to take his place? Jacques, for instance, who belongs to the third _peloton_ has a first-year man in the next bed to him, one who is the son of a deputy, and has always plenty of money. When the deputy's son was for guard and was warned for duty so late that he could not possibly get ready in time, Jacques lent him kit and helped him to turn out, with the result that Jacques had five francs--five francs, think of it!--with which to go to the canteen. And, soon after one has got back off manoeuvres, the new recruits will be coming in; one will be a second-year man, then, with perhaps a deputy's son to sleep in the next bed and dispense five francs at a time to one who knows all the little ways of soldiering and can be of use. The possibilities, both of the manoeuvres themselves and of what comes after, are endless, and speculation on them is a pleasant business. Surly old Sergeant Lemaire, too, is almost sure to get promotion this year, and the _peloton_ will get another sergeant to take charge of it--certainly not one with a worse temper, for that would be impossible. And the long road slips behind, while the troopers conjecture with regard to their future, talk together of horses bad and good, sergeants and corporals bad and good, comrades also bad and good; they smoke as they ride, and talk yet more of horses, for any army of the world the cavalrymen never tire of talking of horses and their own riding abilities, while in the French Army boasting of one's own horsemanship, and all the rest of one's own good qualities, is even more common than it is among English soldiers. Not that the boasting among either is carried to a nauseous extent, but the soldier is so subject to discipline, so used to doing good work with only the official recognition by way of return, that, knowing the work is good, he talks about it himself since nobody is there to do the talking for him--and this is especially true of the cavalry. Some time ago Conan Doyle created in "Brigadier Gerard" an excellent picture of a French cavalry officer of the old type, and to some extent the picture of Gerard--the most human and realistic figure Conan Doyle has ever penned, by the way--still holds good as regards both officers and men. One may find in both officers and men of the French cavalry to-day much of the absolute disregard of risks, rather than bravery as that is understood among the English, which characterises the brigadier. There is, too, much of Gerard's vanity in modern French cavalry officers and men, much of his susceptibility to influence, and all of his absolute loyalty to a superior. The French cavalryman will tell his comrades how he dislikes his squadron officer, but he will follow that squadron officer anywhere and into any danger--his loyalty is sufficient for any test that may be imposed on him. Like Gerard, he will brag of the things he has done, will devote much time to explaining exactly how he did them and how no other man could have done them just as well, until a British cavalryman, if he were listening, would tell the speaker to pass the salt and hire a trumpeter to blow for him. But, though the French cavalryman is true to the Gerard picture in that he boasts inordinately, it will be found, when one has got to close acquaintance with him, that he does not boast without reason. He has done a good thing--why not talk about it, for if he does not nobody else will? The British attitude toward a boaster is one of contempt, since the man who boasts generally does little, and exaggerates that little out of recognition. But the French cavalryman boasts--and acts too; like the Englishman, he does his work, and, unlike the Englishman, he talks about it. But it must always be remembered that he acts as well as talks. The picture of Gerard, however, is not a faithful portrait of the French cavalry officer of to-day, for the modern French officer takes his work far more seriously than Gerard took his, and understands it more fully. For forty years or more French officers, in common with the rest of the nation, have known that there would come a life and death struggle with Germany; they have set themselves to the task of mastering the difficulties attendant on the crushing of the invaders and the avenging of Sedan--no matter to what arm of the service the French officer may belong, he is first a soldier, and after that a man. Gerard, on the other hand, was man first and officer afterwards. The difference has been brought about by the training which the Army of the Third Republic imposes on its officers, and since that Army is a conscript force, the difference is of itself a necessity. And it should always be borne in mind, especially by those who deplore the training of the citizens of France into so huge an army, that the step has been vital to the life of the nation. With a far smaller population than Germany, France has been compelled, as a matter of self-preservation, to keep pace with Germany in the means adopted with regard to military training, has had to train and arm man for man, produce gun for gun--and when the hour of trial came it was found that the preparation had been none too great--there was not one trained man but was needed to cope with the national enemy, with Prussian militarism and Prussian greed of conquest. The conscript Army of the Third Republic, unlike that of its eastern neighbour and unlike the huge levies that Napoleon the First raised, has been intended as a means of defence only; the worst enemy of the Republic cannot accuse it of having maintained all its effective citizens as soldiers with a view to aggression in any direction. The Army is, because it must be for the safety of the nation, not because the nation desires territory or conquest. And all this time the squadrons are marching along the straight roads that led over far horizons and to things unguessed, unseen by the first-year men. They stop, at intervals along their marching line, to water their horses, loosen girths, and stretch themselves; they walk about the roads and look at each other's mounts; they share packets of cigarettes--those cigarettes made of black French tobacco that wither the back of the throat when first one inhales smoke from them. The lieutenant or sub-lieutenant comes round the troop to inspect the horses and see that all are fit, and the sergeant comes round too, probably to point out to the lieutenant some loose shoe or rubbing girth that the less experienced eye of the commissioned youngster has failed to detect. Then girths are tightened, the men mount again, and go on, dividing the road between them as before. As camp draws near, the line of men grows silent, or at least more silent than at the setting out, and the horses take their work steadily rather than eagerly, for this is their first day out, and they are not yet hardened to long marches. Then camp. The putting down of the lines, grooming, blanketing up for the night, feeding--one casts a glance over toward where the infantry have come in and got to their own meals, for this is the time when a cavalryman may have doubts as to whether it would not have been better, after all, to have joined the infantry. Unworthy thoughts, these--is there anything in the world like a cavalryman, for real soldierly merit? This business of believing one's own branch of the service to be infinitely superior to any other is carried into the different branches of the same arm, as well as existing between the three arms as a whole. The cavalryman knows that service in the cavalry is infinitely to be preferred to service in infantry or artillery, but further, if he is a Dragoon, he knows that neither Cuirassier nor Chasseur nor Hussar is nearly as good as himself, and the Cuirassier, the Chasseur, and the Hussar have equally strong beliefs about the unquestionable superiority of their own branches of the cavalry. Each branch, in the opinion of its members, can produce the best riders, the best shots, the best all-round soldiers, and the best officers. It is a harmless belief, maintained quite impersonally. Evening stables finished, the night guards are warned for their duty, the men settle down to the chief meal of the day, and later they sleep, the sound, healthy sleep induced by a long day in the open air. They waken or are wakened early in the morning, and again they saddle up and go on, for often the manoeuvre area is many miles from the barracks, and days may be devoted to straightforward marching before the mimic warfare begins. One comes back to the guns, the long, murderous tubes that trail, each behind six horses, just above the dust of the roads. The drivers are there and the battery officers, but the seats on the guns are empty, for the most part, for the gunners have marched out from camp very early in the morning. The drivers are at a disadvantage, compared with the men of cavalry or infantry--and even compared with their own gunners; for if a cavalryman has to keep his place in the ranks when mounted, then the gunner is absolutely a fixture in the battery. There can be no dropping back to talk to a comrade, whatever the pretext may be, for no man could take back with him the horse he is riding and the one he is leading, when both are in the gun team. The driver rides sombrely alone; the lead driver keeps his interval from the gun ahead, the centre driver looks to it that his lead horse does its share of work on the hills, and the wheel driver takes special care of the direction of his team when an infrequent corner has to be turned, for on him depends the track the wheels will make, and where they will run with relation to the middle of the road. Were there only a lead driver, the sweep taken on corners would not be wide enough, and it takes some time to get such a ponderous engine as a 75-millimetre gun out of a ditch. The regiment of artillery comes out from barracks in one long column, perhaps--unless one battery or a greater proportion of the whole has further to travel than the batteries which take the straightest road. For, if there are two or more parallel roads leading from the point of departure to the destination, if it is possible for any considerable part of the journey to divide up an artillery regiment into separate batteries, this is done. The civilian has no conception of the length of line on the road which an artillery regiment of ten batteries would take up, nor can one who has not experienced the dust of a military march understand what sort of cloud the last battery of ten would have to march in. The column goes out as a whole, but as soon as possible first one battery and then another turns off from the main route. If there are only two alternate routes, then each alternate battery turns off, leaving sufficient interval between the rest for the dust of one to settle before the next shall come along. If there are more than two roads, all are used, for the more a long column can be broken up into separate units for a day's march, the sooner will the units of the column reach their destination. The fact that the larger a body of men is, the slower it moves, is one well known to military authorities, though civilians and even many military men would be prepared to dispute it. It will be seen to be incontrovertible, though, if one realises that the pace of any body of men which keeps together as one whole is the pace of the slowest unit, and, moreover, that when a long column is in progress, not all its units can keep exactly the same pace as the head of the column. Consequently there occur a series of checks in the body of the column; here and there crowding forward occurs, and then the units of the column concerned in the crowding have to halve in order to rectify this--or at least have to check their pace for the time. The check may travel from the centre of the column right down to its rear, and then there are gaps which have to be corrected, for when a check occurs it is always prolonged just a little too long a time--and then the head of the column has to check in order for the rear to catch up. And, the longer the column, the more of these irritating little checks there will be, with a net consequence that the column will take relatively longer to pass a given point or to arrive at a given spot. Because of these checks, as well as to give more air and comfort to the men, in all arms of the service intervals are maintained on the march, and a column is divided up into as many separate units as possible. Infantry maintain intervals between companies, cavalry maintain intervals between squadrons, and artillery maintain intervals between batteries, while the two mounted arms split up their columns if parallel roads are available, for the intervals do not quite compensate for the checks described, and, the smaller the units of the force can be made by means of separate roads, the shorter will be the march between two points. CHAPTER IX MANOEUVRES Manoeuvres form an expensive portion of the conscript's training, and it will be understood, when it is remembered that under ordinary peace conditions France maintains twenty military stations, each forming the skeleton of an army corps, that the annual cost to the state runs into a considerable fraction of the total military expenditure, this including the cost of food for men, forage for horses, the running of transports and stores, and all the expenses incidental to the maintenance of troops in the field. One item alone, the cost of shells fired by artillery during their annual practice, represent a large expenditure, for each shell is in itself a complicated piece of machinery, which must be perfectly accurate in all its parts, and is a costly thing to produce. Not that the soldier on manoeuvres ever counts cost; the majority of the troops do not even think of such a thing. They are out roughing it, a business which gratifies the instincts of most healthy minded and bodied men, and one which is conducive to health and high spirits. Your conscript on manoeuvres is a different being from the one who came to the colours in the previous October. He has acquired a self-confidence and self-reliance of which he was innocent at the beginning of his training; he came as a boy, but now there are about him the signs of a man, and the first camp more than anything else gives him a realisation of the value of military training from a man's own point of view, and quite apart from its value to the state. By the time the season of manoeuvres is over he is a second-year man, and has begun to feel his feet. If one takes a map of France and picks out the twenty stations of the various army corps scattered throughout the country, and then if one realises the numbers of men actually serving that these stations represent, one will see that it is quite impossible that all the army corps of the country should make a point of undergoing their manoeuvres as one united body. The disturbance inflicted from a civilian point of view on the area chosen would be enormous, and the result of no more value as regards the training of officers and men than when two or three army corps conduct their mimic warfare together. Certainly more than one army corps should be engaged in an annual set of manoeuvres. For instance, if one took Lyons as the station concerned, and assumed that the army corps stationed at Lyons conducted its manoeuvres year after year independently of those army corps which have their head-quarters at other centres, it would be easily understood that the army corps with head-quarters at Lyons would, to a certain extent, get into a rule-of-thumb way of working, and would fail to keep itself abreast of the various discoveries that are constantly being made by all sorts and conditions of commanders in the art of war. It is essential that units should as far as possible be able to interchange ideas, and learn new ways from each other, for war is a business in which, given forces of equal strength, the most intelligently controlled army wins. The manoeuvre areas of France are many. There are stretches of hill country like the district of the Vosges; forest stretches like the Ardennes in which the French Army has recently conducted some of its stiffest fights; great open plains like that which lies about Châlons, or like the Breton _Landes_; and river basins of diversified country, giving reaches of hill, valley and woodland, and most useful of all from a military educational point of view, since they afford training in practically all branches of the soldier's work. In average manoeuvres, two forces, designated respectively as a blue and a red force, or in some way distinguished from each other by marks which enable men to tell "friend" from "enemy," are set to face each other in a certain limited area. Each force is expected to do its best to render the other ineffective as a fighting force, and the conditions are made to resemble those of real warfare as nearly as possible. It must be said, however, that up to the present, no nation in its military manoeuvres has ever allowed sufficiently for casualties; as an instance may be cited the case of a regiment which, on a certain set of manoeuvres in France, was surrounded and entirely put out of action early in the course of the operations. Had the business been real, the men of that particular regiment would all have been either dead or prisoners, but they were allowed to continue to count in the force to which they belonged, and the commander of the opposing force simply scored up so much credit for having achieved a brilliant military operation. Of course, from the point of view of training officers and men, for which manoeuvres are specially designed, it was quite right that the officers and men of this unit should take part in the operations up to the last day, but, since men do not resurrect in this fashion after a real battle, it may be said, viewing the matter disinterestedly, that there was no further tactical value in the scheme carried out. The opposing forces were so constituted for the operation as to be of about equal strength, and the presence or absence of the regiment referred to would have been quite sufficient to turn the scale one way or the other--and yet they were allowed to take part after having been theoretically wiped out of existence! This anomalous method of procedure is not peculiar to the French Army, however, but is practically common to the armies of all nations. The nature of the work which the conscript has to perform on manoeuvres is purely a matter of luck. For instance, the force in which one is serving may be compelled, in order to carry out the scheme of its commander, to execute a wheeling or turning movement to either flank, and, supposing a wheel to the right flank is required, then the men on the right flank have very little marching to do, and very little work, since their part in the scheme is to wait for the wheeling flank to come round. An amusing old scamp whose service began when the five years' law was still in force, and who served in a French infantry battalion up to a short time ago, used to allege that he was once right-hand man of an army corps which wheeled in this fashion with the right flank for a pivot. "I stood for three weeks," he alleged, "on that flank, waiting for the outer flank to come round, and looking up the line to see that the men kept their dressing." The "dressing," it should be explained, is a term used in both the French and British Army for the keeping of line by the men. But, speaking seriously, these wheeling movements occur frequently during a term of manoeuvres; when the business is over, and the men of the various units come to compare notes, they are often puzzled at the enormous amount of work and marching imposed on one unit, while another had practically nothing to do, and stayed very nearly in the same place throughout the whole time. For, though the part that his own regiment has to play in a scheme is usually explained to the conscript, the strategical nature of the scheme as a whole is generally beyond his comprehension. This is not to be wondered at, since a strategical scheme is planned out by the best brains of the army corps--at least, the staff officers are supposed to possess the best brains, and are given their posts mainly on account of greater fitness for the planning of military operations. Manoeuvres as a whole approximate as nearly as is possible, in view of the difference in circumstances, to active service, but "nearly as possible" is not "quite," and the lessons learned on manoeuvres, valuable though they are, cannot be unreservedly applied to active service. Reference has already been made to the way in which the soldier enjoys his period of manoeuvres, but no man enjoys active service in a similar fashion, and _moral_, one of the greatest deciding factors in war, is entirely absent from the mimic warfare in which armies engage in time of peace. At the same time the lessons learned from manoeuvres are as valuable as they are varied. Commanding officers learn the amount of strain which they can impose on their men; the conditions under which transport can and must be brought up for the use of the troops can be studied with almost as much accuracy as in warfare; the cavalry commander learns the value, from a war point of view, of his men as scouts and on detached duties, while the artillery officer finds out, as he never could without manoeuvre experience, the possibilities of gun transport, and the business of ranging positions with a view to rendering them untenable by shellfire. Where the manoeuvre period fails as regards war lies mainly in the absence of disadvantages. As already remarked, the conditions under which transport can be brought up for the use of troops can be studied, but sometimes in war transport goes wrong, or gets captured, and an army has to do its best to keep the field until supplementary supplies can be obtained; manoeuvres never impose this form of disability on the troops. The cavalry commander is unable to ascertain what his men would do when actually under fire, and though artillery officers learn to range a position, they are unable to judge what the troops occupying that position will be like after shelling has been carried out. Manoeuvres teach up to a point, but from that point the art of war can be learned only from the grim business itself, and, since no two bodies of troops are ever in the same frame of mind, and no two battles are fought under identical conditions, the art of war is never learned, simple though its principles are. The average conscript is troubled little about such matters as these. As an infantryman, his business is to entrench himself when ordered to do so; to advance by short rushes, squad alternating with squad, during the work of getting nearer the enemy; to charge if bidden, or to retreat as he advanced, in the way that would produce least damage to the force of which he is a member if that force were exposed to actual fire. Both in infantry and cavalry there exists a prejudice against firing the first blank cartridge of a manoeuvre day, though, once that first cartridge has been fired, a man does not care how many more he fires, and often men have been known to beg blank cartridges from others, after firing their own. The reason for the prejudice consists in the fact that the firing of the first cartridge fouls the barrel of the rifle and renders necessary far more thorough cleaning at the end of the day than would be required if the rifle had not been fired. But, no matter how many more cartridges may be fired through the same rifle, they cannot make the fouling of the barrel any worse, and once the fouling has been incurred, there is a certain amount of fun in blazing off blank cartridges at the "enemy." The work of the cavalry is considerably more varied than that of the infantry. Charges, which form the culminating point of cavalry training at drill, are infrequently indulged in on manoeuvres, for even in actual warfare, apart from the fact that the quick fire of modern rifles has rendered the charge a rare thing, the conditions imposed by the selection of infantry and artillery posts do not often admit of a definite cavalry charge, owing to the nature of the ground to be covered. During manoeuvres the chief value of cavalry lies in their ability to act as mounted infantry; that is, they are able to concentrate fire rapidly on a given point, and to get near that point more quickly than infantry, thus rendering their fire decisive. Further, small bodies of cavalry are employed in reconnaissance and detached duties of various kinds; the modern army in movement always throws out well to the front a screen of cavalry, whose object is to find and report on the presence of the enemy, to maintain contact with him, but not to engage in decisive action, which is as a rule, and practically always when the opposing forces are of equal strength, left mainly to the artillery and infantry following on behind the cavalry screen. During a period of manoeuvres cavalry patrols theoretically cut telegraph wires, destroy bridges, and do all they can to impede the progress of the advancing enemy. Sometimes small parties of scouts are sent out to get on to the enemy's lines of communication, and, if possible, cut them. An army with its line of communication cut is in practice like a man with his windpipe severed, and thus it will be understood that if cavalry perform this business effectively, their value to the force to which they belong is enormous. This, however, is more true of manoeuvres than of war, for in the latter communications are so well guarded that as a rule it takes a stronger force than a body of cavalry unsupported by artillery to get on to a line of communication with a view to damaging it. Mention has already been made of the prejudice which the infantryman has against firing the first blank cartridge of the day. Since this is the case where the rifle is concerned, one may guess what the artilleryman's feelings are like when his gun has to fire the first shot, for the cleaning of a field-gun, even after firing blank ammunition, is no light matter. The bore of the gun has literally to be scrubbed out in order to remove the fouling, and the gunner's task is not an enviable one; the clothing of the first-year conscript, when the gun has been cleaned after firing, looks as if the man had been hauled up a chimney by his heels, and though men keep a special suit of fatigue clothes for use on this task, they like it none the more for that. In addition to the ordinary manoeuvre period in which cavalry and infantry participate, artillery units go every year to a practice camp which is a special area set apart for the firing of live shells, with a view to giving officers and men alike training in the realities of their work. The so-called smokeless powder--which in reality is not smokeless--used on these occasions, together with the passage of a shell through the rifling of the gun, renders the cleaning of the bore an even more messy business than that incurred in firing blank ammunition during tactical exercises. Drivers and gunners alike generally enjoy their time at practice camp, but the gunners use language over cleaning the guns, and with good cause too, when one considers the nature and difficulty of the task. But, whether the occasion be that of practice camp for the artillery, or tactical exercise for the three arms, there is more to enjoy than to cavil at. Manoeuvres come at the best period of the year, from the weather point of view; the days are warm, but not too warm, and the cool nights induce healthy sleep. There is plenty of food, generally a sufficiency of tobacco and cigarettes, and the canteen travels with the men. There is a pleasant uncertainty about the nature of the day's work and the length of time it will take; one may be out until late in the evening, or one may finish in the afternoon, and, after an inspection of arms, be at liberty to go to the canteen and discuss things in general with one's comrades, or with the men who, coming from other stations, have new stories to tell and new matters to discuss. One may, granted the necessary leave, walk over to a near-by town, where is certain to be at least a cinema hall, and restaurants outside which one may sit by a table at the pavement edge and view civilian life. Or there may be a night march to be accomplished, and, though this is a tiring business, it has a certain amount of interest as long as the weather holds good. The chief drawback to manoeuvres is a rainy season, when the soldier has a particularly unenviable time of it. There are seldom sufficient fires at which to dry one's clothes; there is, perhaps, the business of pitching tents in the rain, and then the crowding of self, arms, and equipment into the canvas shelter, while outside the rain keeps on in a way which suggests that fine days are things of the past, never to be experienced again. The infantry go squelching out from camp in the morning; the cavalry pull up their wet lines and, getting mounted, splash out through mud puddles, while the artillery drivers harness up their horses with a knowledge that a hard day is in store for them, both on the road, where their horses will be overtaxed by the heavy going, and in camp, where the cleaning of wet saddlery and equipment and the grooming of muddy horses is enough to spoil temper at the end of the day's work. And the transport waggons, standing parked in the rain, look as if they were used for the carriage of materialised despair, and had been abandoned because the loads were too heavy. A wet town or village is a dreary sight, but a wet camp is the most depressing thing on earth. Even in wet weather, however, the spirit of the conscript is usually proof against depression. There are compensations: for one thing, work is lightened as far as possible, and usually the operations of the manoeuvres are modified in case of a continual spell of wet weather, for it is not only the men who suffer from adverse climatic conditions, and it is not the business of a period of manoeuvres to impose too great a strain on the forces taking part therein. When the men are in their tents and the rain is driving down outside, the interminable songs of the army may be heard from the interiors of the tents. Even in a standing camp--that is to say, a camp located in one position for a period of several days--the men are made to undergo a certain number of parades in order to keep them in health, for continued idleness in camp almost certainly means disease, and, as has already been remarked, the authorities of the French Army are fully alive to the necessity for preserving the health of the men. On the average, manoeuvre days are fine days; a spell of wet weather is exceptional, for the season of the year is chosen, in some degree, with a view to imparting as much instruction to officers and men alike as is possible in the allotted period. Given fine weather, one has to work--but then, one has to work in barracks, and not in such congenial fashion as in this life of open air and comparative freedom. As the end of the manoeuvre period approaches, the second-year men get more and more excited, for your Frenchman, whether as conscript or civilian, is an excitable person, and not ashamed of showing his feelings as is the man west of the Channel. For these second-year men civilian life is getting very near. Pierre will go back to the farm, and Jacques will return to his place behind the counter, while Jean will once more polish the seat of the office stool for a stated period each day. But Jacques and Pierre and Jean will at times look back to the good days and the cheery comrades of the last manoeuvres, and perhaps, although this is a conscript army, they will know a transient regret in that they will never again go out from the barrack gate as units of a column setting out on the long march. CHAPTER X WITH THE CAVALRY SCOUTS The incidents related in this chapter took place a few years back during a certain manoeuvre season, and for obvious reasons it is impossible to indicate the men, forces concerned, or locality more closely than that. The forces concerned were an army corps advancing from the south, and one advancing from the north, toward each other, with a view to trying conclusions under manoeuvre conditions. The story concerns scouts of the blue force, advancing from the north--it was one of these scouts of the blue force who told the story. It must not be taken as a typical story of army life, for the circumstances under which these men were placed were exceptional, agreeably so; it is, however, sufficiently typical for relation, in that it embodies things actually accomplished by soldiers of the Army of the Republic. Like most things that happen both in manoeuvres and in war, it could never happen again. The blue force, with at least fifty miles to go after leaving barracks, knew that the red force would have further to travel, since the limits of the manoeuvre area were clearly marked out on maps supplied to the officers taking part, and each force knew from what garrison the force opposing it was coming. Beyond this, though, neither officers nor men of the blue force knew from what direction the "reds" would attack, and the composition and strength of each arm of the "reds" was for the "blues" to find out; that is what cavalry patrols and scouting parties are for: to ascertain the strength and disposition of the enemy; and, in order to make the manoeuvres as much like real war as possible, each side was kept in ignorance, as far as might be, of the movements of the other. There were two days of steady marching, through days that were not too warm and nights that were decidedly cold. Marching in column, this business, with plenty of dust along the roads and the squadrons closed up so that one's horse's nose was not far from the tail of the horse in the next rank. In the cool weather the horses travelled well, and the cavalry got into camp fairly early in the afternoon, when the bivouacs were made and the men rested and ate, after seeing to the needs of their horses. Late in the afternoon of the second day a canvas town came into view after the troops had passed over a small river, and here the regiments went into camp. At twelve o'clock that night the manoeuvre period was to start, and no action of any kind bearing on the actual manoeuvres might be undertaken until midnight had passed, though commanders might make their plans and allot their units and men to the various parts they intended the latter to play in the struggle for points in the game. The troops themselves looked forward to an exciting time: in the blue army, every man knew that he was to capture a "red" if the chance came his way; he must act as in real war, except that the cartridges would be blank and the business would be one of sport with the grimness of war left out. In a certain regiment of chasseurs which formed part of the blue army, Lieutenant Lenoir received his orders with regard to special reconnaissance duty, and, acting on these orders, he gathered together Corporal Jean and Trooper Jacques, both qualified as signallers, whose first names will serve for the purposes of this narrative. He also collected from their respective troops certain men more than usually efficient in scouting duty, known respectively as Pierre and Guillaumette--or little Billy--from one _peloton_, Henri and l'Anglais (the latter from his English way of drinking beer when he could get it, a trick acquired in his native Lorraine, though his fellows gave him his nickname because of it, and from another _peloton_ more good men to the number of four). Lenoir would have liked to take more, but he knew that for the success of the plan with which he was entrusted a small body of men would get through with less chance of being seen--the smaller the better, down to a certain point. So he took the minimum possible. They obeyed the rules of the game thoroughly, for it was not until the stroke of twelve that the men were given permission to saddle up; all they knew at that time was that they were going out on detachment duty of some kind, away from the army itself, and that was enough for them. Detachment duty is always welcome, and Lenoir had a reputation among the men of being one of the best officers in the regiment, although a very quiet man, comparatively speaking. The men were a good crowd, too. The signallers knew their work thoroughly and were keen soldiers; the scouts chosen were men who took actual pleasure in solving problems of country, second-year and re-engaged men, who took soldiering seriously and enjoyed work like this. Altogether it was a very contented and very keen little party that set out from the camp a quarter of an hour after midnight, with Lenoir leading into the black and rainy night that came on them as they rode. They went steadily on for some time--it was three in the morning when Lenoir halted his men under shelter of a tree that branched out over their road and told them the object of their journey. He explained, by the aid of the map, what they were expected to do. The line of country that would be chosen by the "reds" had been carefully calculated: the commander of the "blues" had estimated that, with a view to avoiding rivers and hills, and keeping to open ground, the commander of the red army would bring up his men--or, at least, most of them--by the western side of the manoeuvre area, leaving a large stretch of country unoccupied to the east. It was the business of this patrol to go down by way of the eastern boundary of the manoeuvre area, get on to the "reds" line of communication, and cut it, thus preventing (in theory) the sending up of stores, and (also in theory) reducing the red force to such a state as regards stores and ammunition that it would be forced (once more in theory) to surrender. The scheme bespeaks the way in which modern military plans are thought out, and how one calculates on probabilities. The "blue" commander assumed that such a course as bringing the men up the western side would be adopted by the commander of the "reds": he was not certain of it, but assumed it to such an extent that he considered it worth while to waste a cavalry patrol on it; supposing he were wrong, then he only lost half a dozen men or so and one officer from his effectives; supposing, on the other hand, that he were right, he would have accomplished a movement that would render ineffective anything his "enemy" might do. It was their business, Lenoir explained, to get quite down to the southern limit of the manoeuvre area, so as to cut the line as nearly as possible to neutral ground, for the further back they got the less likelihood there would be of encountering any strong force left for the purpose of protecting the line. They were to ride warily, avoid hills, and keep in hollows, and at the same time they were to keep an eye out for any bodies of troops that they might see. Their business was to run from everybody whom they might see during the following day, for it would not do to risk the capture or loss of a man while on the journey; every man would be needed at the journey's end. All this was explained by the aid of the map, and, realising the importance of their mission, the men were more keen than ever over its fulfilment. They mounted again and rode on, Lenoir always leading; at times he halted them that he might consult his map with the help of an electric torch where two roads branched, or where there was any uncertainty about their direction. The rain passed off; the stars came out and paled as dawn grew; they halted in the grey of early daybreak down under the shelter of a hill. Before them was a tiny valley through which a stream flowed, and beyond an unbroken range of other hills of which the crests showed no signs of human occupation. A short distance along the way they had come was a farm-house built into a nook of the hills, while open country marked the way ahead, beyond the base of the hill under which they had camped. They gave their horses water at the stream, and, since Lenoir said they would halt there for nearly two hours to rest the horses, they got out their own food, after feeding their mounts, but did not off-saddle or remove any equipment, for the men as well as their officer knew that they were parallel now with the enemy's force. Jacques and l'Anglais went out to collect firewood, for they thought it worth while to make coffee during their halt. These two passed well out of sight of the rest round the base of the hill, and walked suddenly and unsuspectingly on to two of the scouts of the enemy's force, who, being a little more quick than either Jacques or l'Anglais, informed them that they were prisoners and must come with them. Jacques, however, temporised; he pointed out to these scouts of the "reds" that he and his companion were, like their captors, mounted men, and they certainly could not walk and leave their horses to break loose and perhaps damage themselves. They had tied their horses up round the corner, said Jacques, and if their captors would only come with them they would get the animals and follow as prisoners without trouble. The two "reds" hesitated a bit, but finally saw reason in this, and, thinking that their two prisoners were quite alone, followed without dismounting round to where the horses were supposed to be tied. So well was Lenoir's little camp located that the two "reds" followed Jacques and l'Anglais almost into it before they perceived that they were in the vicinity of a force far stronger than their two selves. When they grasped the situation fully, they put spurs to their mounts, turned, and fled. Jacques grabbed at the bridle rein of one, but missed, and l'Anglais was so lucky as to secure the helmet of the other man, which he tied to his saddle by way of a trophy. The two "reds," who were well mounted, went off round the base of the hill and vanished; apparently they formed a patrol on the extreme flank of the red force, for no other men appeared to reinforce or replace them while the little party of "blues" remained halted. The men of the blue patrol got their firewood and made coffee, which at that hour of the morning was more to them than food. More quickly than he had at first intended Lenoir bade them tighten girths and mount, for he feared lest the patrol which they had encountered would carry news of their presence, and bring down on them a greater force from which it might be impossible to escape. Through the early hours of the day they rode, sometimes on roads, sometimes across country. The average of their course took them over two miniature mountain ranges, and on the second of these little hill ranges they saw, very far off, a body of cavalry advancing across country. Corporal Jean, together with Jacques, got down from their horses and set up a heliograph, with which they tried to "call up" the troops away on the plain. They could get only fragmentary answers from the other people's heliographs; Lenoir sat on his horse beside them and waited for a coherent message, but evidently the cavalry force would not trust them, nor reveal its own identity, for all Jean could get out of it, after persistent calling up, was the query, "Who are you?" "Don't tell them," said Lenoir, "but ask them that yourself." This Jean had already done, but he tried it again with no better result than before. By this time they could see that the cavalry signallers who had stopped to answer them were getting left far behind by their main body, and Jean, finding that he could get no satisfaction out of them, packed up his own heliograph and mounted again. They went on down the hill into a shallow valley through which flowed another little river. At the foot of the hills they halted, and Guillaumette went back on foot to the top of the hill to keep guard while the others rested. After half an hour one of the others relieved him from this duty, and both men reported that the country all round was clear of enemies, or friends. This was as Lenoir had anticipated, for he had judged by this time they would be well behind the main body of the advancing red force. They made of this a long halt for the sake of their horses, which had already done the equivalent of a day's work. It was late in the afternoon, and the power of the sun had almost gone, when they slung their saddles on their horses again, and girthed up. The valley through which the little river flowed lay level before them for miles, and they rode down it toward where a curve of the hills on either side prevented sight of their destination. That curve seemed ever to recede as they rode, and the sun dropped over the crests of the western hills, leaving the men chilled and tired. By order of Lenoir, who set the example, they dismounted and trudged on, leading their horses--all save l'Anglais, who left his reins on his horse's neck and trusted to the animal to follow him. L'Anglais and his horse were good friends. Dusk fell on them as they mounted again; on their left the little river had been companion of their journey since leaving the last range of hills, but now they turned away to the right and ascended slightly from the valley. Suddenly the ground fell away from before them, and they went down past three houses to a railway station and goods yard, in which stacks of forage and other stores, covered by waterproof sheets, lay with only one man to guard them, one who was unsuspecting of surprise and easily captured. Lenoir left here all his men with the exception of Pierre and l'Anglais, and these he took with him away out to the other side of the village. Beyond the houses the officer and his two men sat down on the ground, waiting. At last the moon rose, and they espied a tent almost concealed among trees. Within the tent they found a corporal and a squad of men belonging to a squadron of train, all asleep. Lenoir wakened the corporal and informed him that he and all his party were captured, and that the stores under their charge were subject to the orders of the officer commanding the blue army. That was the end of the task. With his little squad of scouts Lenoir had captured the unguarded stores of the red force, and had thus rendered ineffective anything that they might accomplish in the matter of field operations. Theoretically the red force was beaten on its first day in the field, but in actual fact the stores went up from the captured base to the red army, as if no capture had been accomplished, for it would not do to go to the expense of moving out two army corps from barracks for the purpose of manoeuvres, and then cancelling the manoeuvres because a cavalry patrol had, by means of hard riding and good cross-country judgment, achieved a theoretical victory. Practice has shown that in real war a chance for such an achievement as that of Lenoir's patrol does not occur in one out of a thousand situations, and in actual war, also, no commander would be so foolish as to leave his chief supplies in charge of a corporal and squad of men of a squadron of train. Adequate protection is always afforded to lines of communication by an attacking force in war. The incident is noteworthy, however, in that it affords an example of the way in which military plans are thought out. The commander responsible for the conception of Lenoir's mission judged exactly what line of country would be clear for such an advance. He could not know whether or no his judgment would be at fault, but he saw that the plan was worth the risk of an officer and a dozen or so of men, whose absence would not materially weaken his force. Some slight psychological knowledge must have been his as well, for even on manoeuvres a commanding officer usually protects his lines of communication, and the base from which his stores are sent, more effectually than did this red commander. Again, the way in which Lenoir chose his men is noteworthy. He picked the best scouts from the squadron to which he belonged; possibly, had he chosen to look throughout the whole regiment, he might have obtained even better men to accompany him, but he chose men whom he knew to be good riders, careful of their horses, and able to undergo a long march. The two signallers represented a minimum that he must take if he wished to send or receive messages to or from any other force. As a matter of fact nothing occurred to render it necessary that any individual scout should be placed in a position where the exercise of initiative would be an essential; neither were the signallers called on for special exertions, or for the full exercise of their special department of knowledge, but they might have been. Lenoir chose his men with a view to compressing the greatest possible effectiveness into the smallest number compatible with the accomplishment of his mission. He chose them also with a view, not to what they actually did as individuals, but with a view of the demands that might have been made on them. As the affair turned out, they simply had a quietly good time in this "base" village until the manoeuvres concluded; Lenoir saw to it that the horses received all necessary attention, and for the rest he left his men to their own devices. And one may trust a soldier, either conscript or volunteer, to make life worth living when given such a chance as this. It was a week or more before the scout of the red force got his helmet back. He met l'Anglais by appointment in the canteen devoted to the use of the blue cavalry, and received back the headgear undamaged. It may be said in conclusion that he compensated l'Anglais in the usual fashion--and any soldier will know what that means. CHAPTER XI INTERNAL ECONOMY If one should take the trouble to enquire of the chef at any leading hotel as to whether he had undergone military service as a conscript, the answer would in nineteen cases out of twenty be in the affirmative, and probably the full nineteen out of every twenty would also reply in the affirmative if asked whether they were Frenchmen. It would be enlightening for the average Englishman to make such enquiries, for by that means he would realise to a far greater extent than in any other way, the universality of the French Army. Comprehension of the fact that virtually every man of the French nation is capable of taking his place in the ranks of some regiment without undergoing some form of preliminary training, is impossible to the English mind until concrete examples of the effect of this are confronted. The point with regard to the chefs is in connection with the way in which the French Army has its food cooked and served. The _pantalon rouge_ lives well, for cooking is an art indigenous to France, and the very best cooks of France practise their art on their comrades of the barrack-room, while there are few companies or squadrons in the French Army that do not contain at least one professional chef. The British Army suffers at times from monotonous menus, "stews" alternating with "roast" until a meat-pie would be a joy, and any variety of diet would be welcome. But in the French Army, given materials corresponding in any way to the needs of the soldier, there is no lack of variety in the food. There are two ways of cooking a potato in the British Army to twenty in the French service; the British soldiers get eggs served in two or three ways, but the conscript cook of the French Army can cook an egg in a way that disguises it to such an extent that a hen would disown it--and there are many ways of doing this. Soup precedes the more solid course of the French soldier's meal, and there are savoury dishes and concoctions which to the British soldier would be but mystery. The French cook is an artist at all times, and his art is no less evident during his conscript days than before and after. Sweet dishes are rare, and the taste of the soldier lies more in the matter of savouries. In addition to the regular provisions made for the troops, there are many men, who, in their spare time, cook dishes to suit their own fancies. The "messing allowance" of the British service is a thing unknown, for the French soldier's limited pay is pay pure and simple, and is not sufficient in amount to admit of deductions of this nature. Much is often made of the fact that the rate of pay in the British Army is far higher than that of any conscript force, but against this it must be said that, so far as the French conscript is concerned, the Government provides in kind for practically all his necessities, leaving the total of his pay--small as that is--as his own pocket money. The bread ration, for instance, is larger in the French than in the British Army, and the French Government provides, free of cost, all necessary articles for a varied and nutrient diet. The sergeants in the French Army contribute to a slight extent toward the cost of their messing, but then it must be borne in mind that all non-commissioned officers of the French Army are re-engaged men on a considerably higher rate of pay than that allowed to a conscript during his first two years. Among the rank and file, mess books are kept for the companies or squadrons of each unit, and usually these mess books are placed in the hands of corporals, who eat with the men, and thus benefit from their own good judgment in the matter of choosing provisions to the value allowed by the mess book, and equally they suffer for their own mistakes. With a view to the possible disorganisation under war conditions of arrangements for cooking food by the company or squadron, the French soldier is taught and encouraged to cook and prepare his own food on the field. During the manoeuvre period, the arrival of French troops in camp is marked by the lighting of fires, at which men cook their own food, and officers supervise this business in order to make certain that no man goes to sleep for the night without having first had a sufficiently sustaining meal. Within a quarter of an hour of the arrival of an infantry regiment in camp, the kettles are boiling and the coffee is made; the slabs of compressed soup, which form a feature of the culinary service of the army, are broken up and dissolved, and bread and meat are issued to form the solid part of the day's meal. Motor-driven vans travel with the army, filled with quarters of fresh meat hung in dust-proof compartments; these travelling meat safes form a recent innovation, and have been found thoroughly satisfactory in that they increase the fresh food supplies of the troops. A point worthy of note in connection with the arrangements for the supply of food is that in the French Army the principal meal of the day falls at the end of the day's work, both in barracks and in camp. In the British service the principal meal is taken at midday, with the result that, so far as official meals are concerned, the soldier gets nothing but a light tea between the dinner of one day and the breakfast of the next, and he has to buy his own supper to compensate for this. In the French Army men are provided with coffee before turning out for the first parade in the morning; at ten o'clock soup is served; at two o'clock or thereabouts, according to the nature of work on which men are engaged, another light meal is provided, and then with the end of the day comes a two or three course meal which corresponds in quantity and nutrient value--though not in the manner of its cooking--to the midday dinner of the British soldier. By this means the French soldier is relieved of the necessity of buying any supper, and his official rations of food are, in the majority of cases, amply sufficient for his needs without his having recourse to his own pocket. Although, as has been stated, the mess books are controlled by corporals, this by no means forms the total of the supervision entailed on French military cooking and provisions. The senior officers of the regiment are especially charged with the supervision of these details of internal economy; the officer of the week is a frequent visitor of the cook-houses of his regiment, and surprise visits are made to the dining-tables of the men in order to make sure that no cause for complaint exists with regard to the quantity or quality of provisions supplied. The adjudants also are concerned in the efficiency of the cooks, and the provision of proper meals for the non-commissioned officers, while, since these latter have a share in paying for the goods supplied, they have also a voice in matters of choice and cookery. On the whole, bearing in mind the quality of French cookery and the fact that that cookery is as much in evidence in the French Army as out of it, it may be said that the French soldier fares rather better than the man serving in the British Army in this all-important matter of food and its preparation. In other matters of internal economy, officers manifest an unceasing interest in the well-being and comfort of their men. The canteens of the French Army are under the direct supervision of senior officers, and thus such supplies as men may purchase individually in the way of food, drink, or cleaning materials, are always up to the required standard of quality. The matter of laundrywork is also in the care of officers of the various regiments, and altogether the comfort and well-being of the men are matters for which officers are held responsible to a greater extent than in the British service, where, with regards to some things, departments rather than men are made responsible. The conduct of drill and routine, directly under the supervision of the commanding officer of each regiment, are managed differently from drill and routine in the British service. For instance, British soldiers go out to drill for an hour, and at the conclusion of that hour, whatever has happened, the parade is dismissed; the French squad turns out for drill nominally for an hour--assuming that as the period taken for illustration--but in reality the drill lasts until the superiors are satisfied that the men have done what they set out to do. Stereotype is not compatible with the methods of the French Army, but efficiency counts before set rules, and the object of training is always efficiency, without regard to former practices. Slaves to custom do not exist; custom itself does not exist, except in so far as it is essential to the performance of duties, and the maintenance of efficiency. It should be borne in mind that this difference in the ways of two armies, French and English, is rendered necessary by the basis on which the armies are founded. The British Army is based on a voluntary system, and the lowest stated period of service is three years. The French Army is based on conscription, which does away with all idea of selection, and the stated period during which men can be compelled to train is two years only--or rather it was two years only up to a short time before the army changed from peace strength and conditions to a war footing. Under the two years' system, men must be kept at work all the time in order to teach them the whole of their work; drill and fatigues alternate, and there are but short intervals between; one of the rules of the French Army is that the conscript shall be made to work all the time, and another rule that must be borne in mind in connection with this is that each man shall be provided with sufficient food of a suitable nature to enable him to do his work, at no cost to himself. The rules of the army provide that during all manoeuvre periods conscripts shall endure active service conditions. Pipeclay and polish disappear, and no "parade movements" are indulged in. There are no stage effects, and a cavalry leader who on manoeuvres indulged his men in a charge that would not be really useful under war conditions would get a severe reprimand, if not a more substantial punishment. All unnecessary show is condemned, and the French Army on manoeuvres is made to understand that its work is genuine preparation for the rough business of active service. Another point worthy of note is that, during manoeuvre periods, full use is made of all available buildings for purposes of sleep and shelter, just as would be done in time of war, and straw is used to supplement the coverings carried, when the nights are cold. The bulky and ungainly-looking great-coat of the French soldier is practically sufficient for covering when in camp, since it is extremely warm, and is manufactured from a porous class of material which swells and becomes waterproof in even a slight shower. It has been long since realised in the French Army that individual comfort makes for collective efficiency, and, though discipline is exceedingly strict, yet this is counterbalanced by the way in which the well-being of the men is studied. To each regiment two doctors are allotted, and the medical service of the French Army as a whole, though only a modern growth, is equal to that of any other continental nation. The French Red Cross Society is but little more than forty years old, but the facility with which the nation as a whole, adopts and adapts all things to its use, has been well manifested here, for the Red Cross service of the French Army gives place to none in the matter of efficiency. In such a time as the present, when every resource of the nation is strained in coping with a ruthless invader, it is only to be expected that medical provision will at times be found hardly or only just adequate for unprecedented demands, but the medical service for the army has risen to the occasion in just as heroic fashion as has the nation as a whole. In the matter of making each regiment as self-contained as possible, the French Army is about equal with the British. In a French regiment, signallers, scouts, and others are trained from the ranks of the regiment itself to undertake the special duties imposed on each of these branches of military activity. In the matter of scouting, and in such things as taking cover, trench-digging, the use of extended formations, etc., the French Army has benefited largely by the British war in South Africa, of which the lessons were studied quite as keenly as in the British Army itself, and the training of men was modified on experience thus gained by others. Again, French officers attached to the Russian and Japanese staff in the Russo-Japanese war brought back much practical knowledge which was applied in their own army, more especially with regard to fortifications, defensive positions, siege warfare, and the work of armies in close contact and in large masses. It may be said as a whole, with regard to the working of the army, that France has never hesitated to adapt the lessons taught by others to her own use, while there can be no doubt that the lessons learned from the failure of such armies as Napoleon the futile forced into action in 1870 have been taken to heart and applied, with a view to fitness for the struggle that is not yet ended. CHAPTER XII SOME INCIDENTALS The subject of disciplinary battalions is not a pleasant one in the opinion of the French soldier, but the formation of such battalions is a necessity in the conscript army of a nation which demands military service of all its citizens. For in such an army the criminal classes and bad characters are included with the rest, and, if they do not conform to military rules in a better way than they submit to the ordinary restrictions imposed on any law-abiding civil community, then some form of discipline must be adopted in order to coerce them. When the regimental authorities of any unit in the French Army have ascertained, by the repeated application of ordinary corrective methods, that it is impossible to make an efficient soldier of any man in the unit in question, the man concerned is taken before the _conseil de discipline_, which has power to recommend that he should be sent to service in the disciplinary battalion stationed in Algeria. The _conseil_ consists of a major as president, together with the two senior captains and two senior lieutenants of the regiment to which the man belongs, exclusive of his own squadron or company officer. The case against the man is presented by the senior officer of the squadron or company to which the man belongs; this evidence for the prosecution having been taken, the prosecuting officer retires, and the accused man is brought in to make his defence. Then the court, after due deliberation, makes its report, recommending either that the man shall be given another chance in the regiment, or sent to a disciplinary battalion. The report is then sent to the colonel of the regiment, who either endorses or rejects the decision of the court. Should his decision be favourable to the accused, the man is given another chance, but if, on the other hand, he endorses the recommendation of the court, the sanction of the general commanding the station is required in order to complete the proceedings. With this sanction the offender is sent to Algeria, where the disciplinary battalions are known as "Biribi" and are stationed on the most advanced posts of this French colony. Owing to their shaven heads, the men in these battalions are known as _têtes des veaux_, and their release from this form of service is entirely dependent on their own conduct. In one historic case, the son of a general served four years as a private in one of these battalions, which include, in addition to men of a distinctively criminal type, a number of social wrecks. A disciplinary battalion is a veritable lost legion. Some years ago one of these battalions was on the march from Biskra in Southern Algeria, and on the march one unscrupulous ruffian, who cherished a grudge against the major commanding, fell back to the rear of the column, pretending to be ill. He feigned greater and yet greater exhaustion, and at last sat down as if unable to march further. The major came up and inquired kindly what was the matter, and on the soldier stating that he felt too exhausted to march, the major handed him a brandy flask, from which the man took a drink. As the major was occupied in returning the flask to his saddle wallet, the soldier fired his rifle at him, but fortunately missed, owing to the swerving of the officer's horse. At this the major realised with what a dangerous class of man he had to deal, and, drawing his revolver, he blew the man's brains out. Some time later another officer of the same battalion found a stone placed on the spot commemorating the memory of the soldier criminal; the stone was removed, but was replaced; six times in succession this was done, and yet it was never ascertained who was responsible for cutting inscriptions on the stones, or placing them there. A very common mistake is made in confusing the disciplinary battalions of the Algerian frontier with the world-famous Foreign Legion of the French Army, and consequently the Foreign Legion has gained an undeserved reputation for iron discipline and unduly harsh treatment of its men. The chief disabilities attendant on service in the Foreign Legion consist in periods of service in some of the peculiarly unhealthy localities included in French colonial possessions. The Foreign Legion suffered more than any other unit of the French service during its period of active service in French Cochin-China, while inland in Algeria its members are subjected to a peculiarly trying climate, and in other parts of French Africa the Foreign Legion does duty in company with a considerable amount of epidemic disease. Service in the Foreign Legion is, of course, a voluntary matter, and the fact that the Legion is always up to strength is sufficient evidence of methods adopted with regard to the discipline of the men and the treatment accorded to them. For, although the Legion itself is famous, its individual members are not, and it cannot be said to offer any conspicuous attractions to intending candidates for admission. It is probably the most cosmopolitan body of men in any part of the world, and the formation of such a body, in which the distinctions of nationality are abolished, is peculiar to the French nation. The Legion includes natives of every country populated by the Caucasian races, and especially of Italian, German, English, and French citizens. It is an agglomeration of adventurers, of whom the largest proportion desire only obscurity; it may be said that the Legion is made up of the bad bargains of half a world, but it is good fighting material, for all that. Ouida has drawn a highly coloured picture of service in the Foreign Legion in the book "Under Two Flags," but this picture consists mainly of romance with the soldiering left out, while actual service with the Legion involves soldiering with the romance left out. Hard soldiering, in various climates and under many conditions; in company with various kinds of men, of whom one never asks details of past history; one is accepted in the Legion for present soldierly qualities, and by tacit agreement the past is given the place allotted to most sleeping dogs. The period of service in the Legion has the merit of being intensely interesting to any man who, consciously or unconsciously, is a student of the psychology of his fellows. The Legion itself affords instances of devotion and self-denial as heroic as any that Ouida has penned, but it may be said here with regard not only to the Foreign Legion, but to all the armies of all the world, that such systematic persecution on the part of an individual officer toward any individual man as Ouida has pictured in "Under Two Flags" is a rank impossibility. The system of decentralisation of command, of interlinking authority and supervision, and of central control by heads of units, renders impossible the persistent gratification of spite by an individual officer against an individual soldier. In this connection, stories of persecution of individuals who have done nothing to merit the punishment inflicted on them, especially in military service, should always be accepted with the proverbial grain of salt. For there is never smoke without fire, and the man who is unpopular with all his officers and non-commissioned officers to such an extent as to incur a succession of punishments is usually deserving of all that he gets. Humanity is so constituted that sympathy almost invariably goes to the individual who is at variance with the mass, and in the exercise of sympathy one is apt to overlook the qualities and characteristics of the object on which it is bestowed. We hear, usually, the story of the man who considers himself aggrieved or unjustly punished, and, without listening to the other side of the case, we immediately conclude that his statements are correct in all their details. As a rule, the man who thus attempts to secure a reversal of the decision against him has some inherent quality which makes for unpopularity. He is inclined to curry favour, which renders him a marked man among his comrades, or he commits acts against discipline in such a way that, although it is practically certain that he is the offender, the evidence against him is insufficient to warrant punishment. These and other characteristics of the man concerned bring heavy punishment on him when is finally caught, and, although the punishment is perfectly just, the offender immediately whines over it in such a clever way that sympathising outsiders accord him far more consideration than he deserves, and consider that his just judges have been inhuman brutes, though they merely fulfilled their duty. The offender makes sufficient fuss to be heard, but the individual or body of individuals who ordered his punishment are not able to advertise themselves in similar fashion, and thus a one-sided view is taken. To return to the Foreign Legion, it may be said that any attempt to quote incidents typical of its members and their ways would be quite useless, for there is in the Legion sufficient material to furnish all the novelists of this and the next century with plots to keep them busy. To outward seeming the soldiers of the Foreign Legion are average men, engaged in average military duties, and it is not until definite contact with them has been established that any realisation of their exceptional qualities and curious defects can be obtained. As is well known, the Legion includes every class of adventurers from men of royal blood and noblemen of the highest rank downward, and many an assumed name conceals a story which would be worth untold gold in Fleet Street, or in the journalistic equivalent of Fleet Street in some other European capital. It is not generally realised in this country that the extent of the French colonies is such as to necessitate the maintenance of a considerable body of colonial troops. With the exception of the troops stationed in Algeria and Tunis, service in the French colonies is a voluntary matter; the natives of the various French dependencies have been induced to accept military service on a voluntary basis to a considerable extent. In addition to the famous Algerian Turcos, battalions of Senegalese troops have been formed with excellent results; it has been found that the natives of this dependency make good soldiers, particularly suited to service in the interior of Africa, owing to their immunity from diseases which render tracts of country almost impenetrable to white troops. The numbers of native colonial troops given in Chapter I are constantly and steadily increasing, for, in addition to making good soldiers, the natives of French dependencies come forward readily and in increasing numbers to recruiting centres. As regards the regular army, matters have been much better with reference to discipline and punishment since the system which permitted of _volontaires_ was abolished. The _volontaires_ were men who, on payment of a certain sum to the State, were permitted to compress their military training into the space of one year. The payment of this sum was supposed to guarantee a certain amount of social standing in civil life, and the _volontaires_ were always regarded theoretically as a possible source from which to promote officers in case of need. In practice, however, the experiment worked out quite differently. The _volontaires_ were found to be men of varying grades in life, with varying degrees of education, and equally varying mental qualities. They were extremely unpopular among the ordinary conscript rank and file, on whom many of them affected to look down as inferior beings. The more unscrupulous of them would attempt to evade duty by bribing non-commissioned officers, while those who were unable to compass bribery railed against the unequal treatment meted out to them in comparison with that enjoyed by their comrades. Their one year of training was insufficient to make practical soldiers out of the raw material submitted, and altogether it was a good thing for France when the whole system was swept away, and, consistently with the Republican principle, all citizens were regarded as equal under the drill instructor. The _volontaire_ system was no more and no less than favouritism on the part of the State. It must not be overlooked that, although the initial period of service in the French Army is compulsory, quite a large percentage of the men remain in the Army of their own free will at the end of the two compulsory years. For such as elect to make a career of the Army in this fashion, there is a materially increased rate of pay, ranging from an approximate equivalent of 8d. a day upwards, with a pension, and usually with Government employment if desired, after only fifteen years of service. These _re-engagés_ very seldom stay down in the ranks, but form the chief source from which non-commissioned officers are obtained. Kipling's phrase with regard to British non-commissioned officers is equally applicable to the Army of the Republic, for the non-commissioned officer is the backbone of the French Army just as surely as the officer is its brains. The sergeant-major of a squadron, or the French equivalent of a British infantry colour-sergeant in a company, is the right hand of the captain commanding, adviser as well as intermediary between officers and men. The sergeant in charge of a _peloton_ or troop is not only the principal instructor with whom the men of the troop have to deal, but is also counsellor and guide to the young lieutenant who comes straight from a military school to take up his commission, and needs experience of the ways of men in addition to the theoretical knowledge he has already gained. The corporal, who does not hold non-commissioned rank as in the British Army, and counts his position as an appointment rather than a definite promotion, forms a sort of go-between for men and sergeants, imparting individual instruction to the men, and supervising their welfare in the barrack room, while himself qualifying for the rank of sergeant. The revolutionary proposal to abolish corporals in the French Army rose out of an idea that men resented being governed by one who had formerly been a comrade with them, but could no longer be so regarded after he had assumed authority over them. It is to be hoped that the proposal will never be acted on, for the principle of entrusting matters of individual tuition and supervision to the old soldiers takes no account of personal worth or fitness for command. The life which the conscript must lead during his two years of service is determined largely by the garrison to which he is drafted. Life in a sunny and sleepy garrison town in the wine-growing district of the south is--granted reasonable military conditions--quite ideal; the monotony of the life spent in drill in a frontier fort tends to make the conscript bad-tempered, while men stationed among the French hills of the south and eastern frontiers gain most in the way of physical fitness, and also, in their work of making new roads, clearing passes, constructing frontier obstructions, ascertaining distances, and carrying the heavy loads incidental to their work from point to point, acquire a certain quality of mental celerity of which men stationed in the sunny garrison towns of the south go free. But the various attractions and drawbacks of the twenty great garrison towns, together with their situation and special characteristics, are sufficient to merit separate consideration. CHAPTER XIII THE GREAT GARRISON TOWNS OF FRANCE Paris, as capital of the Republic, first merits consideration among the great garrison towns of France. It has the most extensive system of fortifications in the world, and has had the doubtful privilege of having undergone more sieges, burnings, and other military experiments than most large cities can boast or mourn. The inner line of fortifications was planned as far back as 1840, with a total measurement of 22-1/2 miles, but after the war of 1870 two main lines of detached forts were erected in addition to those already in existence, which formed the skeleton on which the more modern plan is built. The older forts are those of St. Denis, Aubervilliers, Romainville, Noisy, Resny, Nogent, Vincennes, Ivry, Bicêtre, Montrouge, Vanves, Issy, and Mont Valérien; the new forts which completed the scheme are those of Palaiseau, Villeras, Buc, and St. Cyr, which form the Versailles portion of the scheme, and Marly, St. Jamme, and Aidremont, round St. Germain. On the opposite side of the Seine are situated forts Cormeillers, Domont, Montlignon, Montmorency, Écouen, Stains, Vaujours, Villiers, and Villeneuve St. Georges. The Chatillon fort occupies a position between the two lines, and is placed on the site whence German batteries bombarded Paris during the siege of 1871, forming a proof of the wisdom displayed in the German choice of position. The double line of forts thus disposed renders Paris as nearly impregnable to the attack of an enemy as is possible under modern military conditions. The total number of troops garrisoned in Paris in normal times is about 25,000, and there are also about 4500 _gendarmerie_. Paris in itself ranks as a separate military district of the Republic, and is noteworthy as being the head-quarters of the Republican Guard, practically the only body of picked men in the French military system, and analogous with the Guards' Brigade of the British Army. Amiens, the head-quarters of the 2nd Army Corps, is a city of nearly 100,000 inhabitants, containing a cathedral which is generally considered the finest existing example of Gothic architecture. Situated eighty-one miles north of Paris, it is one of the principal points of concentration for troops in the vicinity of the northern frontier, and forms head-quarters for the departments of Aisne, Oise, Somme, and parts of Seine-et-Oise and Seine. Although head-quarters of an Army Corps, Amiens does not rank among the principal fortified posts of France. Besançon, situated 243 miles south-east of Paris, ranks as a first-class fortress, and is the head-quarters of the 7th Army Corps. It is the centre of military administration for the departments of Ain, Doubs, Haute-Marne, Haute-Saône, Jura, Belfort, and part of Rhône. It is an ancient town containing Roman remains dating from the second century of the Christian era, including an amphitheatre and triumphal arch. Situated on the main line of rail from Dijon to Belfort, Besançon is one of the centres of mobilisation for the defence of the eastern frontier, and it is from this point that a good many of the first line of troops were drafted to the area of recent conflict in Alsace and Lorraine. In itself Besançon is a quiet and pleasant city on a peninsula stretching out from the left bank of the river Doubs, and it has a reputation as the principal watch-making centre of France. Bordeaux, the metropolis of south-western France, is 360 miles distant from Paris by rail, and forms the head-quarters of the 18th Army Corps. As one of the finest cities of France, and a coastal town, it is a popular station among the troops, and serves as head-quarters for the departments of Charente-Inférieure, Gironde, Landes, Basses-Pyrénées, and Hautes-Pyrénées. The military history of Bordeaux dates back to very ancient times, for it was sacked successively by Vandals, Visigoths, Franks, and Norsemen, and attained to a period of peace only at the middle of the twelfth century. As centre of one of the principal wine-growing districts of France, it is as near climatic perfection as the conscript can expect to get, though those who serve in the department of Hautes-Pyrénées undergo more rigorous conditions of weather. In addition to being a port of departure for trans-Atlantic traffic, Bordeaux is a popular pleasure resort, and thus plenty of amusements are within reach of the troops serving at head-quarters. Bourges, the head-quarters of the 8th Army Corps, is one of the principal military stations of France, although not in itself a town of very great importance. Its training establishments rank very highly in the military life of the nation, including as they do a national cannon foundry, very extensive engineering works, and schools of artillery and pyrotechnics for the training of officers. Bourges is head-quarters for the departments of Cher, Côte-d'Or, Nièvre, Saône-et-Loire, and part of the department of Rhône. It is one of the chief arsenals of the Republic, and occupies a position near the geographical centre of France. The town dates back to Roman time, and had the doubtful distinction of being destroyed by Julius Cæsar, at about the time of his invasion of Britain. Châlons-sur-Marne has been a centre of conflict in most of the wars in which France has been engaged from very early times. It was destroyed by the Vandals, by Attila and his ruthless Huns, and by the Burgundians in mediæval times, and is situated on a plain which has always been considered an ideal battlefield, and has served that purpose throughout the centuries up to the present day. It is the head-quarters of the 6th Army Corps, and is the military centre for the departments of Ardennes, Aubes, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Marne, Meuse, and Vosges. It is 107 miles east of Paris by rail, and is one of the principal brewing centres of France, the wine trade in which it used to be engaged having gone northward to Rheims. In the scheme under which the French Army is constituted, Châlons is one of the centres for early mobilisation of troops of the first line with a view to the defence of the north-eastern frontier. Clermont-Ferrand is head-quarters for the departments of Loire, Haute-Loire, Allier, Cantal, Puy-de-Dôme, and part of the department of Rhône. It is the head-quarters of the 13th Army Corps, and is a town of about 55,000 inhabitants, situated 260 miles directly south of Paris by rail. It may be regarded as one of the first centres of systematic mobilisation of which France affords historical record, for at the end of the eleventh century Peter the Hermit preached the first Crusade in the church of Notre Dame at Clermont-Ferrand. Grenoble, dominated by Mont Rachais, a hill rising nearly 3500 feet above sea-level, ranks as a first-class fortress, and is the military centre for the departments of Hautes-Alpes, Drôme, Isère, Savoie, Haute-Savoie, and part of the department of Rhône. It is the head-quarters of the 14th Army Corps, and is one of the most beautiful of French cities. In consequence of this it is a well patronised tourist centre, and as such is a popular station among the conscripts. Le Mans, the military centre for the departments of Eure-et-Loire, Orne, Mayenne, Sarthe, and parts of the departments of Seine-et-Rise and Seine, is situated 131 miles W.S.W. from Paris by rail, and has historical associations with Richard Coeur de Lion and Henry II of England, having been the birthplace of the latter. It is the head-quarters of the 4th Array Corps, and has a population of about 65,000, including the garrison of about 5500. It was a walled city of the Roman Empire in the third century, and has undergone sieges by the dozen from mediæval times onward. It was one of the centres of conflict in the internecine strife between Bendean and Republican troops at the time of the Revolution, while in 1870 it was the scene of a French defeat. Its cathedral contains the tomb of an English queen, Lion-hearted Richard's consort, and the town is one of great historic interest. Lille, the military centre for the departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais, is the head-quarters of the 1st Army Corps, and is in the centre of one of the most thickly populated manufacturing districts of France. It is situated 153 miles north of Paris, and up to a few years ago ranked as a first-class fortress town, but, on account of its great commercial importance, and the manufacturing character of the district in which it is situated, it was decided that Lille should be regarded as an open town, and not subject to bombardment. The nature of the country in which Lille is situated and the density of population may be judged from the fact that it forms a military centre for two departments only, instead of for four or five, as in the case of other head-quarters garrison towns. The old fortifications of Lille have been converted into boulevards; under the old scheme of defence the works were so constructed that large areas in the vicinity of the citadel could be placed under water, in case of attack. As French cities go, Lille is comparatively modern, dating back only to A.D. 1030, when Count Baldwin IV walled in the village from which the present prosperous town of nearly 200,000 inhabitants has sprung. Limoges, the military centre for the departments of Charente, Corrèze, Creuse, Dordogne, and Haute-Vienne, is situated about 250 miles S.S.W. of Paris by rail. It is the head-quarters of the 12th Army Corps, and even at the time of the Roman conquest was a place of importance, having contributed 10,000 men to the defence of Alesia against the Roman invasion. During the Hundred Years' War it sustained alternate sieges by French and English, and from the time of John of England to that of the Black Prince it was under threat to fire and sword, to which the Black Prince gave it up after taking the town by assault. Remains of a Roman fountain and amphitheatre still exist in the town, of which the present population is about 85,000. Marseilles is the military centre for the departments of Basses-Alpes, Alpes-Maritimes, Corse, Vaucluse, Bouches-du-Rhône, Gard, Var, and Ardèche. It is the head-quarters of the 15th Army Corps, and is a naval station as well. It has been a place of commercial importance from the earliest days, and, situated as it is in one of the healthiest districts of France, as well as being on the coast, it forms an ideal military station. In former times it was subject to epidemic diseases on account of the sub-tropical nature of the climate, but modern methods of sanitation have neutralised this drawback, and Marseilles is now as pleasant a place as any that a conscript can hope for in order to undergo his term of service. It is the principal port of France, and as such is strongly fortified, but its fortifications belong to the naval administration of the Republic. Historically, Marseilles dates back to the year 600 B.C., when the Greeks established a colony here. It passed to Roman rule at the time of the invasion of Gaul and became connected with, among other notable Romans, Petronius, the arbiter of elegance at Nero's court. Throughout the Middle Ages Marseilles enjoyed a semi-independence, and it has always played a prominent part in the history of the Mediterranean sea-board. Montpellier, the head-quarters of the 16th Army Corps, is the military centre for the departments of Aude, Aveyron, Hérault, Lozère, Tarn, and Pyrénées-Orientales. It is about 480 miles south of Paris, and about seven miles distant from the Mediterranean, from which it is divided by the lagoons of Perols and l'Arnel. The town is of comparatively late formation as towns go in France, having become a place of note only in the eighth century. It is a wine and brandy centre, and is also engaged in silk works, and, owing to its situation, enjoys a congenial climate. The population is upwards of 80,000. Nantes, the head-quarters of the 11th Army Corps, is known as the most populous town of Brittany, and is the military centre for the departments of Finistère, Loire-Inférieure, Morbihan, and Vendée. It is situated about 27 miles from the sea and about 250 miles from Paris by rail. The population is about 140,000, and from an historical point of view Nantes is one of the most interesting of French cities. Its name is derived from its having been the chief city of the Nannetes, an ancient Gallic tribe, and under the Romans the city became one of the principal centres of Western Gaul, having retained its prominence up to the present day. It has seen many sieges and assaults, and was the last city of France to surrender to Henry IV of France, who signed here the famous edict that gave Protestants equal rights with Catholics for nearly a hundred years. Many notable Frenchmen owned Nantes as their birthplace, among them Jules Verne and several famous French generals. Unto the present day the Bretons of Nantes and the surrounding district retain their distinct peculiarities of character, forming for France what East Anglia forms for England, and Norman influence, combined with Celtic origin, is evident in the people of the country. The Breton, by the way, makes a fine soldier, having more of doggedness than the usual Frenchman to combine with the dash and agility of body and mind characteristic of the Latin races. Orleans, the head-quarters of the 5th Army Corps, is the military centre for the departments of Loiret, Loire-et-Cher, Seine-et-Marne, Yonne, part of Seine-et-Oise and part of Seine. It is situated 75 miles south-west of Paris by rail, and has a population of about 60,000, including its garrison. As the capital of a separate kingdom, Orleans enjoyed great prominence throughout the Middle Ages, and it is always remembered for its associations with the soldier-maid of France, Jeanne d'Arc. One of the principal artillery schools of the Army is situated here. An ancient Celtic centre, the town was renamed in the period of Roman occupation, and was a flourishing city as early as the fifth century. It was vainly besieged by Attila and the Huns, taken by Clovis, and held against the English at the time when Jeanne brought reinforcements to the garrison and compelled the raising of the siege. The long wars between Huguenots and Catholics brought more strife to Orleans, and in the revolutionary period it suffered severely, while it was occupied by the Prussians both in 1815 and in 1870, numerous battles being fought in its vicinity during the last-mentioned war. It is worthy of note that a Duke of Orleans, a member of the old royal family of France, served in the British Army in the reign of Victoria. Rennes, the ancient capital of Brittany, is the head-quarters of the 10th Army Corps, and the site of a large arsenal in addition to the barracks, while it is the military centre for the departments of Côtes-du-Nord, Manche, and Ille-et-Vilaine. In the early part of the eighteenth century the town was almost destroyed by fire, a catastrophe that is not even yet forgotten; while as the birthplace of Boulanger, who introduced many reforms into the French Army and was largely responsible for its efficiency in recent years, Rennes is peculiarly connected with military matters. It may be remembered, by the way, that the second Dreyfus trial was held here in 1899. The population of the town is about 75,000, and it is 51 miles south-east of St. Malo and 232 miles west-south-west of Paris. Historically, Rennes was the centre of several Roman roads which are still recognisable, and in mediæval times it suffered greatly from the wars between French and English. In the revolutionary period the Republican Army made Rennes their centre for the operations against the Vendeans, but it has no later prominence in connection with military history. Rouen, 87 miles north-west of Paris by rail, is the head-quarters of the 3rd Army Corps, is the ancient capital of Normandy, and military centre for the departments of Calvados, Eure, Seine-Inférieure, and parts of Seine-et-Oise and of Seine. It has a population of about 120,000, including the garrison, and is a town of narrow, picturesque streets and of old-world dignity and interest. Here William the Conqueror died and Jeanne d'Arc was burned--a statue commemorates the latter event in the town. Although 78 miles from the sea, Rouen is one of the principal French ports, the bed of the Seine having been deepened from the sea to the city by an ingenious system of embankments, which forced the river to deepen its own bed rather than extend its width--and military labour went far toward the construction of the embankments. Toulouse, the head-quarters of the 17th Army Corps, is the military centre for the departments of Ariege, Haute-Garonne, Gers, Lot, Lot-et-Garonne, and Tarn-et-Garonne. The town is peculiarly liable to great floods, and those of 1855, which swept away the suspension bridge of St. Pierre, and of 1875, which destroyed 7000 houses and drowned 300 people, are still remembered in the city. It is situated 478 miles south of Paris and 160 miles south-east from Bordeaux, and, with a population of about 150,000, ranks as the metropolis of Southern France. Tours, the head-quarters of the 9th Army Corps, is situated 145 miles south-west from Paris by rail, and is the military centre for the departments of Maine-et-Loire, Indre-et-Loire, Deux-Sèvres, and Vienne. Under the Gauls it was the capital of the Turones, from whom it derived the name which it still bears, and traces of Roman occupation still remain in the form of the ancient amphitheatre. After the fall of Roman power, Tours was fortified against barbarian invasion, and subsequently it was closely connected with the great names of French history, notably those of Clovis, who presented rich gifts to the church at Tours out of the spoils won from Alaric and the Goths, and with Charlemagne, who disciplined its monasteries. Few towns surpass Tours in historic interest, and it is noteworthy in modern times, as the birthplace of Balzac and the two Marshals Boucicaut. In 1870 the government of the national defence was established at Tours, and the Third Republic may thus be said to have had its birth here. No list of the great garrisons of France would be complete without a reference to Verdun and Toul, the ends of the great chain of fortresses which defend the eastern frontier. Toul, 14 miles to the west of Nancy, is the centre of a vast network of entrenchments and defences, and the hills surrounding the town are crowned with forts which command all the country within range to the east. A series of forts, echeloning along the ridge of the Meuse, connect Toul with Verdun, and forms a defensive line which is only equalled in strength by the defences of Paris, as far as the French military defensive system is concerned. Verdun, at the northern end of the line of frontier defences, is surrounded by a ring of detached forts, eleven in number, and occupying a circumference of 25 miles. Since the loss of Metz to Germany, Verdun has been so strengthened as to form the most formidable fortress in France. CHAPTER XIV SOME EFFECTS. ACTIVE SERVICE One of the principal effects of a conscript system such as that of France is that the great majority of the population of the country is characterised by fixed habits and ideas with regard to the way in which work should be done. The Latin races are all marked by a certain flexibility and dexterity of mind, a quickness of apprehension which is absent, for the most part, from other Caucasian stock, and military training increases this and applies it to physical use as well as to mental qualities. The conscript, back in civilian life at the end of his training, is to be compared to the sailor of the British Navy in many respects; he has learned a certain handiness, a dexterity in connection with his daily work, and it is a lesson that stays with him, as a rule, to the end of his life. While military service alters, it does not create; the stolid Breton--stolid by comparison with the men of central and Southern France, remains stolid as before he went up for training, for the Army has grafted on him nothing that is new--it has merely added to his knowledge and developed, in the way of characteristics, what was already there. But the Breton is the better for his two years--without them he would be a very stolid and unimaginative person indeed, and he has learned to stir himself, to make the best of himself and the work that is his to perform. Similarly the traditional Frenchman, coming from the wine-growing districts of the south, and a hot-headed and impetuous individual, has his eccentricities modified, for hot-headedness does not pay in military service, and this man has learned to control himself just as the Breton has acquired a little more rapidity of movement. Yet the individual characteristics of the two types remain; personal traits have been modified by discipline, but not destroyed, for while the Army of the Republic creates nothing, it also annihilates nothing. The men have been moulded to a pattern, but they are the same men in essence, with no quality removed altogether. Usually, they are vastly improved. Especially is this last true of the many youths who think--it is a common failing of youth--that they know everything and are capable of all things. The Army modifies their self-conceit; it teaches them that they are but as other men, needing to learn. It first of all destroys the unhealthy growth of unjustifiable self-confidence, reducing these men to utter self-abasement; then, on this foundation, the Army and the training it involves gradually build up, not a belief in self-powers, but a knowledge of the capacities and powers of self, of their limitations as well as their extent. The braggart who goes to his military training comes back chastened and, if he still boasts, it is of things that he is really capable of doing, knowledge that he has actually obtained--he makes no claims that he cannot justify, as a rule. This much the Army of France does for the men who pass through it and back to their normal tasks in life. The life of the conscripts has been charged with blunting the finer sensibilities of those who have to undergo its rigours, but the charge cannot be allowed. For one might as well say that the engineer is rendered incapable of appreciating music, or the doctor has no conception of the beauty of a garden, by reason of the mathematical nature of the work accomplished by the one and the physical repulsiveness of much that the other has to perform. The Army and the training that it involves never injured a Frenchman yet, so long as the laws governing the Army received proper interpretation. In the end of the last century there were injustices prevalent both among men and officers, but the world and France gain wisdom with experience; the Republican Army as at present constituted is a growth of only forty years, and its predecessor, the Army of Napoleon the futile, showed by the war of 1870 what an immense amount of reform was necessary before French arms could regain their lustre. In the history of an army, forty years is a very short time, and, rather than cavil at the slowness with which reforms have been accomplished, it is due to France that one should admire the way in which the Army has been built up from so sorry a foundation into the great and effective machine of to-day. In civilian France, military ways persist. Habits of neatness and method, and accuracy in trifles, attest the military training that men have undergone. The very step of a Frenchman walking is reminiscent of the days when he was taught to march, and he has a respect for and knowledge of firearms which the average civilian of English life--unless he be addicted to some form of sport--never acquires. The Frenchman is never at a loss with a sporting gun, knows better than to point the weapon at the head of another man when loading, and in other ways betrays familiarity with the tool of a craft--one that many Englishmen regard as something to be handled carelessly or passed by as a thing of mystery. This is given only as an instance of the many ways in which the conscript system modifies men, for there are many ways in which modifications are effected. Some students of the subject question whether the French flexuousness and adaptability are results of the military system of the Republic or whether they are ingrained in the race independently of military training. Since practically every citizen is a soldier, this is a point that cannot be easily determined, but there can be no doubt that the characteristics in question are increased by military service. Every Frenchman who has passed through the Army is in possession of a little book which he guards most jealously, since in that book are inserted full particulars of his term of service with the colours, and all things relating to his military history, as well as details of his duties in case of mobilisation of the Army. The little book of the ex-conscript is to him what "marriage lines" are to a woman--except that the ex-conscript incurs penalties if he loses his book, while the woman who loses her "marriage lines" can always get another copy as long as the register containing particulars of the ceremony is in existence. It must be understood that, in case of need arising for the mobilisation of the Army, the body of men brought to the colours is so great that some system must be followed in bringing them on to a war footing. The little book contains particulars of the place at which the conscript on the reserve is to report himself, together with the day of mobilisation on which he will be required to join the colours--the actual mobilisation is spread over a period of days, in order that some men--the first line troops--may be drafted out to their posts before the rest come in. When the order for mobilisation has been given out--by the ringing of bells, proclamation by criers, and in various other ways--the reservist immediately consults his little book, and ascertains on what date he will have to present himself to the authorities, and at what station he is expected to rejoin. His wife or his mother or sister cooks him food for the day of his going, and, after a prayer at some wayside shrine or in some sanctuary, and perhaps an offering vowed to the Virgin or to the patron saint, the citizen sets out to become a soldier again. August, 1914, was the first time of complete mobilisation in the history of the Third Republic, and the system under which the men were gathered back to the colours worked smoothly in all its details. There was no confusion anywhere; to each man his place, to each unit its place, and the Army Corps went out to the Belgian frontier or to the edge of the provinces that slope down toward the Rhine, with ominous celerity, and with those interminable regimental songs sounding as they sound when men go out to manoeuvres at the end of the soldiers' year. The hour for which this Army had been prepared had come, and the Army was found ready to meet the hour. Although the effective strength of the French Army, when the last man has been armed and placed in the field, is about 4,800,000 men, it must not be supposed that the Republic maintains all these numbers as a fighting force in the field throughout the campaign. About a million and a half of men go out as the "first line," and from those who remain this line is strengthened as and where required. It has become clear since the battle of the Marne that almost a second army was collected under the shelter of the Paris forts to reinforce the retreating line of men who fell back from the Belgian frontier, and in this connection it may be noted that the traditional French method of conducting war is with sixty per cent of the men in the firing line, and the remaining forty per cent in rear as reserves. France's conduct of the war against Germany has shown that this method of fighting--diametrically opposed to the German conception of war--is still being adhered to, and the troops in the firing line by no means compose the whole of the French striking force. As to active service in the French Army, the general English view is that the French soldier, with the exception of the Algerian garrison, sees no service outside European bounds, and the deeds of French soldiers are ignored as regards French colonial possessions and expeditions. In the expedition to Tonquin, to which reference has already been made in connection with the Foreign Legion of the French Army, there were deeds done by individuals and by regiments that are worthy of memory besides the brilliant exploits of our own Army. It is not only to the war in the Crimea and the present campaign that we must look for evidence of the indomitable courage that the French undoubtedly possess, but also to service on the French colonial battlefields, in Chinese swamps and African wilds. The present campaign has proved that French soldiers are capable of retreating in good order when strategy renders a retreat necessary--a feat hitherto deemed impossible to the army whose sole strength was supposed to consist in its power of impetuous attack. The retreat from the Belgian frontier has rendered necessary a reconstruction of ideas as regards French psychology, and has shown that the training imposed on the conscripts of France in time of peace was the best that could be applied. Just as in the field the best general is the best psychologist, so in time of peace the best administration is that which, regardless of criticism of its methods, prepares its men most effectively for war, selecting the form of training to be applied in a way that takes into consideration the mental characteristics and temperament of the material required to be trained. The merits of the form of training selected can only be determined by the effectiveness of the trained material in action, and, granting these things, the conduct of the French Army in the present campaign is a splendid vindication of the peace training of that Army. The first stages of the war have been all against the French way of fighting--the way in which the French soldier is supposed to exhibit himself at his best; yet in retreat, and in action approximating in length and tedium to the monotony and continued exertion of siege warfare, the French soldier has given his commanders cause for pride. Let it be remembered that the men who are fighting the battles of France, and of all civilisation, on French soil in these closing months of 1914 are not like the veterans with whom Napoleon won his battles. The wars of the Napoleonic era, lasting for years as they did, brought into the field a host of trained men--trained in war by the practice of war, rather than by experiments under peace conditions; from the time of the Revolution onward there were sufficient veteran soldiers, seasoned in real warfare, to stiffen the ranks of any army that might be raised to attack--neither to retreat nor to defend, but to attack in accordance with French tradition. The Army of the Republic to-day is made up of men who have had two years' training apiece (with the exception of the small percentage of _re-engagés_, who also have had no war service) under peace conditions, and who for the most part have never seen a shot fired in anger, as the phrase goes. Yet out of this semi-raw material (semi-raw as far as war experience goes) France has raised an Army which may without exaggeration be termed magnificent, an Army that has kept the field under harder circumstances than those which brought about the surrender of Sedan, an Army that no more knows when it is beaten than does the British force fighting by its side. 
56293	----	book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.) TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example S^t or 3^{RD}. Some minor changes are noted at the end of the book. HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE TENTH, OR THE NORTH LINCOLNSHIRE, REGIMENT OF FOOT, CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE FORMATION OF THE REGIMENT IN 1685, AND OF ITS SUBSEQUENT SERVICES TO 1847. COMPILED BY RICHARD CANNON, ESQ. ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, HORSE GUARDS. ILLUSTRATED WITH PLATES. LONDON: PARKER, FURNIVALL, & PARKER, 30 CHARING CROSS. M DCCC XLVII. LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES & SONS, STAMFORD STREET, FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. GENERAL ORDERS. _HORSE-GUARDS_, _1st January, 1836_. His Majesty has been pleased to command that, with a view of doing the fullest justice to Regiments, as well as to Individuals who have distinguished themselves by their Bravery in Action with the Enemy, an Account of the Services of every Regiment in the British Army shall be published under the superintendence and direction of the Adjutant-General; and that this Account shall contain the following particulars, viz.:-- ---- The Period and Circumstances of the Original Formation of the Regiment; The Stations at which it has been from time to time employed; The Battles, Sieges, and other Military Operations in which it has been engaged, particularly specifying any Achievement it may have performed, and the Colours, Trophies, &c., it may have captured from the Enemy. ---- The Names of the Officers and the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates Killed or Wounded by the Enemy, specifying the Place and Date of the Action. ---- The Names of those Officers who, in consideration of their Gallant Services and Meritorious Conduct in Engagements with the Enemy, have been distinguished with Titles, Medals, or other Marks of His Majesty's gracious favour. ---- The Names of all such Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates, as may have specially signalized themselves in Action. And, ---- The Badges and Devices which the Regiment may have been permitted to bear, and the Causes on account of which such Badges or Devices, or any other Marks of Distinction, have been granted. By Command of the Right Honourable GENERAL LORD HILL, _Commanding-in-Chief_. JOHN MACDONALD, _Adjutant-General_. PREFACE. The character and credit of the British Army must chiefly depend upon the zeal and ardour by which all who enter into its service are animated, and consequently it is of the highest importance that any measure calculated to excite the spirit of emulation, by which alone great and gallant actions are achieved, should be adopted. Nothing can more fully tend to the accomplishment of this desirable object than a full display of the noble deeds with which the Military History of our country abounds. To hold forth these bright examples to the imitation of the youthful soldier, and thus to incite him to emulate the meritorious conduct of those who have preceded him in their honourable career, are among the motives that have given rise to the present publication. The operations of the British Troops are, indeed, announced in the "London Gazette," from whence they are transferred into the public prints: the achievements of our armies are thus made known at the time of their occurrence, and receive the tribute of praise and admiration to which they are entitled. On extraordinary occasions, the Houses of Parliament have been in the habit of conferring on the Commanders, and the Officers and Troops acting under their orders, expressions of approbation and of thanks for their skill and bravery; and these testimonials, confirmed by the high honour of their Sovereign's approbation, constitute the reward which the soldier most highly prizes. It has not, however, until late years been the practice (which appears to have long prevailed in some of the Continental armies) for British Regiments to keep regular records of their services and achievements. Hence some difficulty has been experienced in obtaining, particularly from the old Regiments, an authentic account of their origin and subsequent services. This defect will now be remedied, in consequence of His Majesty having been pleased to command that every Regiment shall in future keep a full and ample record of its services at home and abroad. From the materials thus collected, the country will henceforth derive information as to the difficulties and privations which chequer the career of those who embrace the military profession. In Great Britain, where so large a number of persons are devoted to the active concerns of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and where these pursuits have, for so long a period, been undisturbed by the _presence of war_, which few other countries have escaped, comparatively little is known of the vicissitudes of active service, and of the casualties of climate, to which, even during peace, the British Troops are exposed in every part of the globe, with little or no interval of repose. In their tranquil enjoyment of the blessings which the country derives from the industry and the enterprise of the agriculturist and the trader, its happy inhabitants may be supposed not often to reflect on the perilous duties of the soldier and the sailor,--on their sufferings,--and on the sacrifice of valuable life, by which so many national benefits are obtained and preserved. The conduct of the British Troops, their valour, and endurance, have shone conspicuously under great and trying difficulties; and their character has been established in Continental warfare by the irresistible spirit with which they have effected debarkations in spite of the most formidable opposition, and by the gallantry and steadiness with which they have maintained their advantages against superior numbers. In the official Reports made by the respective Commanders, ample justice has generally been done to the gallant exertions of the Corps employed; but the details of their services, and of acts of individual bravery, can only be fully given in the Annals of the various Regiments. These Records are now preparing for publication, under His Majesty's special authority, by Mr. RICHARD CANNON, Principal Clerk of the Adjutant General's Office; and while the perusal of them cannot fail to be useful and interesting to military men of every rank, it is considered that they will also afford entertainment and information to the general reader, particularly to those who may have served in the Army, or who have relatives in the Service. There exists in the breasts of most of those who have served, or are serving, in the Army, an _Esprit de Corps_--an attachment to everything belonging to their Regiment; to such persons a narrative of the services of their own Corps cannot fail to prove interesting. Authentic accounts of the actions of the great, the valiant, the loyal, have always been of paramount interest with a brave and civilized people. Great Britain has produced a race of heroes who, in moments of danger and terror, have stood "firm as the rocks of their native shore;" and when half the World has been arrayed against them, they have fought the battles of their Country with unshaken fortitude. It is presumed that a record of achievements in war,--victories so complete and surprising, gained by our countrymen, our brothers, our fellow-citizens in arms,--a record which revives the memory of the brave, and brings their gallant deeds before us, will certainly prove acceptable to the public. Biographical memoirs of the Colonels and other distinguished Officers will be introduced in the Records of their respective Regiments, and the Honorary Distinctions which have, from time to time, been conferred upon each Regiment as testifying the value and importance of its services, will be faithfully set forth. As a convenient mode of Publication, the Record of each Regiment will be printed in a distinct number, so that when the whole shall be completed, the Parts may be bound up in numerical succession. INTRODUCTION TO THE INFANTRY. The natives of Britain have, at all periods, been celebrated for innate courage and unshaken firmness, and the national superiority of the British troops over those of other countries has been evinced in the midst of the most imminent perils. History contains so many proofs of extraordinary acts of bravery, that no doubts can be raised upon the facts which are recorded. It must therefore be admitted, that the distinguishing feature of the British soldier is INTREPIDITY. This quality was evinced by the inhabitants of England when their country was invaded by Julius Cæsar with a Roman army, on which occasion the undaunted Britons rushed into the sea to attack the Roman soldiers as they descended from their ships; and, although their discipline and arms were inferior to those of their adversaries, yet their fierce and dauntless bearing intimidated the flower of the Roman troops, including Cæsar's favourite tenth legion. Their arms consisted of spears, short swords, and other weapons of rude construction. They had chariots, to the axles of which were fastened sharp pieces of iron resembling scythe-blades, and infantry in long chariots resembling waggons, who alighted and fought on foot, and for change of ground, pursuit, or retreat, sprang into the chariot and drove off with the speed of cavalry. These inventions were, however, unavailing against Cæsar's legions: in the course of time a military system, with discipline and subordination, was introduced, and British courage, being thus regulated, was exerted to the greatest advantage; a full development of the national character followed, and it shone forth in all its native brilliancy. The military force of the Anglo-Saxons consisted principally of infantry: Thanes, and other men of property, however, fought on horseback. The infantry were of two classes, heavy and light. The former carried large shields armed with spikes, long broad swords and spears; and the latter were armed with swords or spears only. They had also men armed with clubs, others with battle-axes and javelins. The feudal troops established by William the Conqueror consisted (as already stated in the Introduction to the Cavalry) almost entirely of horse; but when the warlike barons and knights, with their trains of tenants and vassals, took the field, a proportion of men appeared on foot, and, although these were of inferior degree, they proved stout-hearted Britons of stanch fidelity. When stipendiary troops were employed, infantry always constituted a considerable portion of the military force; and this _arme_ has since acquired, in every quarter of the globe, a celebrity never exceeded by the armies of any nation at any period. The weapons carried by the infantry, during the several reigns succeeding the Conquest, were bows and arrows, half-pikes, lances, halberds, various kinds of battle-axes, swords, and daggers. Armour was worn on the head and body, and in course of time the practice became general for military men to be so completely cased in steel, that it was almost impossible to slay them. The introduction of the use of gunpowder in the destructive purposes of war, in the early part of the fourteenth century, produced a change in the arms and equipment of the infantry-soldier. Bows and arrows gave place to various kinds of fire-arms, but British archers continued formidable adversaries; and owing to the inconvenient construction and imperfect bore of the fire-arms when first introduced, a body of men, well trained in the use of the bow from their youth, was considered a valuable acquisition to every army, even as late as the sixteenth century. During a great part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth each company of infantry usually consisted of men armed five different ways; in every hundred men forty were "_men-at-arms_," and sixty "_shot_;" the "men-at-arms" were ten halberdiers, or battle-axe men, and thirty pikemen; and the "shot" were twenty archers, twenty musketeers, and twenty harquebusiers, and each man carried, besides his principal weapon, a sword and dagger. Companies of infantry varied at this period in numbers from 150 to 300 men; each company had a colour or ensign, and the mode of formation recommended by an English military writer (Sir John Smithe) in 1590 was:--the colour in the centre of the company guarded by the halberdiers; the pikemen in equal proportions, on each flank of the halberdiers; half the musketeers on each flank of the pikes; half the archers on each flank of the musketeers; and the harquebusiers (whose arms were much lighter than the muskets then in use) in equal proportions on each flank of the company for skirmishing.[1] It was customary to unite a number of companies into one body, called a REGIMENT, which frequently amounted to three thousand men; but each company continued to carry a colour. Numerous improvements were eventually introduced in the construction of fire-arms, and, it having been found impossible to make armour proof against the muskets then in use (which carried a very heavy ball) without its being too weighty for the soldier, armour was gradually laid aside by the infantry in the seventeenth century: bows and arrows also fell into disuse, and the infantry were reduced to two classes, viz.: _musketeers_, armed with matchlock muskets, swords, and daggers; and _pikemen_, armed with pikes from fourteen to eighteen feet long, and swords. In the early part of the seventeenth century Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, reduced the strength of regiments to 1000 men; he caused the gunpowder, which had heretofore been carried in flasks, or in small wooden bandoliers, each containing a charge, to be made up into cartridges, and carried in pouches; and he formed each regiment into two wings of musketeers, and a centre division of pikemen. He also adopted the practice of forming four regiments into a brigade; and the number of colours was afterwards reduced to three in each regiment. He formed his columns so compactly that his infantry could resist the charge of the celebrated Polish horsemen and Austrian cuirassiers; and his armies became the admiration of other nations. His mode of formation was copied by the English, French, and other European states; but so great was the prejudice in favour of ancient customs, that all his improvements were not adopted until near a century afterwards. In 1664 King Charles II. raised a corps for sea-service, styled the Admiral's regiment. In 1678 each company of 100 men usually consisted of 30 pikemen, 60 musketeers, and 10 men armed with light firelocks. In this year the king added a company of men armed with hand-grenades to each of the old British regiments, which was designated the "grenadier company." Daggers were so contrived as to fit in the muzzles of the muskets, and bayonets similar to those at present in use were adopted about twenty years afterwards. An Ordnance regiment was raised in 1685, by order of King James II., to guard the artillery, and was designated the Royal Fusiliers (now 7th Foot). This corps, and the companies of grenadiers, did not carry pikes. King William III. incorporated the Admiral's regiment in the Second Foot Guards, and raised two Marine regiments for sea-service. During the war in this reign, each company of infantry (excepting the fusiliers and grenadiers) consisted of 14 pikemen and 46 musketeers; the captains carried pikes; lieutenants, partisans; ensigns, half-pikes; and serjeants, halberds. After the peace in 1697 the Marine regiments were disbanded, but were again formed on the breaking out of the war in 1702.[2] During the reign of Queen Anne the pikes were laid aside, and every infantry soldier was armed with a musket, bayonet, and sword; the grenadiers ceased, about the same period, to carry hand-grenades; and the regiments were directed to lay aside their third colour: the corps of Royal Artillery was first added to the army in this reign. About the year 1745, the men of the battalion companies of infantry ceased to carry swords; during the reign of George II. light companies were added to infantry regiments; and in 1764 a Board of General Officers recommended that the grenadiers should lay aside their swords, as that weapon had never been used during the seven years' war. Since that period the arms of the infantry soldier have been limited to the musket and bayonet. The arms and equipment of the British troops have seldom differed materially, since the Conquest, from those of other European states; and in some respects the arming has, at certain periods, been allowed to be inferior to that of the nations with whom they have had to contend; yet, under this disadvantage, the bravery and superiority of the British infantry have been evinced on very many and most trying occasions, and splendid victories have been gained over very superior numbers. Great Britain has produced a race of lion-like champions who have dared to confront a host of foes, and have proved themselves valiant with any arms. At _Creçy_, King Edward III., at the head of about 30,000 men, defeated, on the 26th of August, 1346, Philip King of France, whose army is said to have amounted to 100,000 men; here British valour encountered veterans of renown:--the King of Bohemia, the King of Majorca, and many princes and nobles were slain, and the French army was routed and cut to pieces. Ten years afterwards, Edward Prince of Wales, who was designated the Black Prince, defeated, at _Poictiers_, with 14,000 men, a French army of 60,000 horse, besides infantry, and took John I., King of France, and his son Philip, prisoners. On the 25th of October, 1415, King Henry V., with an army of about 13,000 men, although greatly exhausted by marches, privations, and sickness, defeated, at _Agincourt_, the Constable of France, at the head of the flower of the French nobility and an army said to amount to 60,000 men, and gained a complete victory. During the seventy years' war between the United Provinces of the Netherlands and the Spanish monarch, which commenced in 1578 and terminated in 1648, the British infantry in the service of the States-General were celebrated for their unconquerable spirit and firmness;[3] and in the thirty years' war between the Protestant Princes and the Emperor of Germany, the British troops in the service of Sweden and other states were celebrated for deeds of heroism.[4] In the wars of Queen Anne, the fame of the British army under the great MARLBOROUGH was spread throughout the world; and if we glance at the achievements performed within the memory of persons now living, there is abundant proof that the Britons of the present age are not inferior to their ancestors in the qualities which constitute good soldiers. Witness the deeds of the brave men, of whom there are many now surviving, who fought in Egypt in 1801, under the brave Abercromby, and compelled the French army, which had been vainly styled _Invincible_, to evacuate that country; also the services of the gallant Troops during the arduous campaigns in the Peninsula, under the immortal WELLINGTON; and the determined stand made by the British Army at Waterloo, where Napoleon Bonaparte, who had long been the inveterate enemy of Great Britain, and had sought and planned her destruction by every means he could devise, was compelled to leave his vanquished legions to their fate, and to place himself at the disposal of the British Government. These achievements, with others of recent dates, in the distant climes of India, prove that the same valour and constancy which glowed in the breasts of the heroes of Crecy, Poictiers, Agincourt, Blenheim, and Ramilies, continue to animate the Britons of the nineteenth century. The British Soldier is distinguished for a robust and muscular frame,--intrepidity which no danger can appal,--unconquerable spirit and resolution,--patience in fatigue and privation, and cheerful obedience to his superiors. These qualities, united with an excellent system of order and discipline to regulate and give a skilful direction to the energies and adventurous spirit of the hero, and a wise selection of officers of superior talent to command, whose presence inspires confidence,--have been the leading causes of the splendid victories gained by the British arms.[5] The fame of the deeds of the past and present generations in the various battle-fields where the robust sons of Albion have fought and conquered, surrounds the British arms with a halo of glory; these achievements will live in the page of history to the end of time. The records of the several regiments will be found to contain a detail of facts of an interesting character, connected with the hardships, sufferings, and gallant exploits of British soldiers in the various parts of the world where the calls of their Country and the commands of their Sovereign have required them to proceed in the execution of their duty, whether in active continental operations, or in maintaining colonial territories in distant and unfavourable climes. The superiority of the British infantry has been pre-eminently set forth in the wars of six centuries, and admitted by the greatest commanders which Europe has produced. The formations and movements of this _arme_, as at present practised, while they are adapted to every species of warfare, and to all probable situations and circumstances of service, are calculated to show forth the brilliancy of military tactics calculated upon mathematical and scientific principles. Although the movements and evolutions have been copied from the continental armies, yet various improvements have from time to time been introduced, to insure that simplicity and celerity by which the superiority of the national military character is maintained. The rank and influence which Great Britain has attained among the nations of the world, have in a great measure been purchased by the valour of the Army, and to persons who have the welfare of their country at heart, the records of the several regiments cannot fail to prove interesting. FOOTNOTES: [1] A company of 200 men would appear thus:-- __| | | |__| | 20 20 20 30 2|0 30 20 20 20 Harquebuses. Muskets. Halberds. Muskets. Harquebuses. Archers. Pikes. Pikes. Archers. The musket carried a ball which weighed 1/10 of a pound; and the harquebus a ball which weighed 1/25 of a pound. [2] The 30th, 31st, and 32nd Regiments were formed as Marine corps in 1702, and were employed as such during the wars in the reign of Queen Anne. The Marine corps were embarked in the Fleet under Admiral Sir George Rooke, and were at the taking of Gibraltar, and in its subsequent defence in 1704; they were afterwards employed at the siege of Barcelona in 1705. [3] The brave Sir Roger Williams, in his Discourse on War, printed in 1590, observes:--"I persuade myself ten thousand of our nation would beat thirty thousand of theirs (the Spaniards) out of the field, let them be chosen where they list." Yet at this time the Spanish infantry was allowed to be the best disciplined in Europe. For instances of valour displayed by the British Infantry during the Seventy Years' War, see the Historical Record of the Third Foot, or Buffs. [4] Vide the Historical Record of the First, or Royal Regiment of Foot. [5] "Under the blessing of Divine Providence, His Majesty ascribes the successes which have attended the exertions of his troops in Egypt to that determined bravery which is inherent in Britons; but His Majesty desires it may be most solemnly and forcibly impressed on the consideration of every part of the army, that it has been a strict observance of order, discipline, and military system, which has given the full energy to the native valour of the troops, and has enabled them proudly to assert the superiority of the national military character, in situations uncommonly arduous, and under circumstances of peculiar difficulty."--_General Orders in 1801._ In the General Orders issued by Lieut.-General Sir John Hope (afterwards Lord Hopetoun), congratulating the army upon the successful result of the Battle of Corunna, on the 16th of January, 1809, it is stated:--"On no occasion has the undaunted valour of British troops ever been more manifest. At the termination of a severe and harassing march, rendered necessary by the superiority which the enemy had acquired, and which had materially impaired the efficiency of the troops, many disadvantages were to be encountered. These have all been surmounted by the conduct of the troops themselves: and the enemy has been taught, that whatever advantages of position or of numbers he may possess, there is inherent in the British officers and soldiers a bravery that knows not how to yield,--that no circumstances can appal,--and that will ensure victory, when it is to be obtained by the exertion of any human means." THE TENTH, OR THE NORTH LINCOLNSHIRE, REGIMENT OF FOOT, BEARS ON ITS REGIMENTAL COLOUR THE _SPHINX_, WITH THE WORD _EGYPT_; AND THE WORDS "PENINSULA" and "SOBRAON;" IN COMMEMORATION OF ITS DISTINGUISHED SERVICES IN _EGYPT_ IN THE YEAR 1801; IN THE _PENINSULA_ FROM 1812 TO 1814; AND AT THE BATTLE OF _SOBRAON_ IN 1846. CONTENTS. YEAR PAGE 1685 Formation of the Regiment 1 ---- Arms and Uniform 2 ---- Station and Establishment 3 ---- Earl of Bath, and other Officers appointed to Commissions 4 1688 Declaration of the Regiment, and of the garrison of Plymouth, in favour of King William III. and the Protestant cause 5 1689 Six companies detached to Jersey and Guernsey 6 1690 Embarked for Flanders - 1691 Encamped at Anderlecht - 1692 Encamped at Halle 7 ---- Battle of Steenkirk - ---- Engaged at Furnes and Dixmude 8 1693 The French lines at D'Otignies forced 9 ---- Battle of Landen 10 1694 Encamped at Ghent -- 1695 Attack on Fort Kenoque 11 ---- Siege of Namur -- 1696 Returned to England and occupied quarters in London; afterwards in Suffolk and Essex 12 1697 Re-embarked for the Netherlands, and joined the army at Brussels -- ---- Treaty of Ryswick -- ---- Returned to England -- 1698 Proceeded to Ireland 13 1701 War renewed 13 ---- Embarked for Holland, and reviewed at Breda by King William III. -- ---- Encamped at Rosendael -- 1702 Decease of King William III., and accession of Queen Anne -- ---- March to Duchy of Cleves -- ---- Arrival at Nimeguen 14 ---- War declared against France -- ---- Siege of Venloo -- ---- -------- Ruremonde -- ---- -------- Stevenswart -- ---- -------- the Citadel of Liege -- 1703 Proceeded to Maestricht 15 ---- ------------ Tongres -- ---- Siege of Huy -- ---- -------- Limburg 16 ---- Spanish Guelderland wrested from France -- ---- Marched back to Holland -- 1704 Proceeded from Holland to the Danube -- ---- Joined the Imperial Army -- ---- Battle of Schellenberg -- ---- Crossed the Danube 17 ---- Joined the Imperial Army under Prince Eugene of Savoy 18 ---- Battle of Blenheim -- ---- Marshal Tallard and many officers and soldiers made prisoners 19 ---- Marched to Holland with prisoners -- 1705 Attacks on Helixem, Neer-Winden, and Neer-Hespen 20 1706 Encamped at Tongres 22 ---- Battle of Ramilies -- ---- Surrender of Brussels, Ghent, and principal towns of Brabant -- 1706 Surrender of Ostend 23 ---- Siege of Menin, on the River Lys -- ---- Capture of Dendermond and Aeth -- 1707 Encampment near the village of Waterloo 24 1708 Re-embarked for England to repel invasion by the Pretender -- ---- Returned to Flanders, landed at Ostend, and proceeded to Ghent -- ---- Re-taking of Ghent and Bruges by the French -- ---- Battle of Oudenarde 25 ---- Siege of Lisle -- ---- Town of Ghent re-captured 26 1709 Siege and capture of Tournay 27 ---- Battle of Malplaquet 28 ---- Siege and surrender of Mons 29 ---- Marched into winter-quarters at Ghent -- 1710 Forcing the French lines at Pont-à-Vendin -- ---- Siege and surrender of Douay 30 ---- Attack and surrender of Bethune -- ---- -------------------- of Aire and St. Venant 31 ---- Proceeded to Courtray -- ---- Winter-quarters at Courtray -- 1711 Encamped at Warde and on the plains of Lens -- ---- Forcing the lines at Arleux -- ---- Siege of Bouchain 32 1712 Negociations for peace -- ---- Duke of Ormond assumed the command of the army -- ---- Surrender of Quesnoy -- ---- British troops withdrawn to Ghent, and thence to Dunkirk -- 1713 Removed to Ghent 33 1714 ---------- Nieuport -- 1715 Returned to England -- 1722 Encamped on Salisbury Plain 34 ---- Reviewed by King George I. and the Prince of Wales -- 1723 Proceeded to Scotland -- 1724 Returned to England -- 1730 Embarked for Gibraltar -- 1749 Returned to Ireland 35 1751 Colours and costume regulated by Royal Warrant -- 1767 Embarked for North America 36 1768 Proceeded to Boston -- 1775 Advanced to Concord and Lexington;--commencement of American War 36 ---- Returned to Boston -- ---- Victory at Bunkers-Hill 38 1776 Evacuation of Boston 39 ---- Returned to Nova Scotia 40 ---- Attack and capture of Long Island -- ---- Capture of New York -- ---- ---------- White Plains -- ---- ---------- Forts Washington and Lee 41 ---- ---------- Rhode Island -- 1777 Embarked for Philadelphia -- ---- Attack at Brandywine Creek 42 ---- March to Germantown -- ---- Capture of Philadelphia -- ---- ---------- Billing's-Point 43 ---- Fight at Germantown -- ---- Returned to Philadelphia -- ---- Attack at Whitemarsh -- 1778 Concentrated at New York -- ---- Evacuation of Philadelphia -- ---- Attack at Freehold in New Jersey 44 ---- Returned to England 45 1783 Establishment reduced on termination of the American War 45 ---- Embarked for Ireland -- 1786 ------------ Jamaica -- 1795 Returned to England -- ---- Embarked for West Indies 46 ---- Disembarked on account of a storm, and casualties at Sea -- 1797 Proceeded to Portsmouth -- 1798 Embarked for Madras -- 1799 Removal to Bengal -- 1800 Embarked for Egypt 47 1801 Landed at Cosseir -- ---- Crossed the Desert of Arabia 48 ---- Arrived at Kenna and Girgee in Upper Egypt -- ---- Proceeded down the Nile to Rosetta, and El-Hamed 49 ---- Surrender of Alexandria -- ---- French Army evacuate Egypt -- ---- Authorized to bear the _Sphinx_ with the word "EGYPT" 50 1802 Encamped at Alexandria -- 1803 Arrived at Malta -- 1804 Removed to Gibraltar 51 ---- Second Battalion added to the establishment, and formed in Essex -- 1806 Battle of Maida 53 1807 Embarked for Sicily -- 1809 Proceeded on an expedition to Naples 54 ---- Returned to Sicily 55 ---- Second Battalion embarked for Walcheren -- ---- Returned to England -- 1810 Embarked for Gibraltar -- ---- Proceeded to Malta 56 1811 Embarked for Sicily -- 1812 First Battalion embarked for Spain 56 1813 Second Battalion proceeded against the Island of _Ponzo_ 57 ---- Returned to Sicily -- ---- First Battalion--Battle of Castalla 58 ---- Siege of Tarragona -- ---- Proceeded to Balaguer 60 ---- Accidental and destructive Fire -- ---- Marched to Valls and thence to Vendrills 61 ---- Blockade of Barcelona -- 1814 Cessation of hostilities -- ---- Arrived at Palermo 62 ---- Second Battalion embarked from Sicily for Malta -- 1815 Return of Napoleon Buonaparte to France -- ---- First Battalion embarked for Naples -- ---- Proceeded to Malta -- 1816 Peace restored; the First and Second Battalions incorporated 63 ---- Authorised to bear the word "PENINSULA," on the Colours and Appointments -- 1817 Embarked for the Ionian Islands -- 1819 Re-embarked for Malta -- 1821 Embarked for England -- 1823 Embarked for Ireland 64 1826 Embarked for Portugal 65 1828 Embarked for Corfu -- 1837 Returned to Ireland 66 1839 Embarked for England -- 1841 Proceeded to Scotland -- 1842 Removed from Scotland -- ---- Embarked for India 67 1845 Proceeded to Meerut -- 1846 Joined the army on the Sutlej -- ---- Battle of Sobraon 68 1846 Authorised to bear the word "SOBRAON," on the Colours and Appointments 71 ---- Occupation of Lahore 72 SUCCESSION OF COLONELS. 1685 John Earl of Bath 73 1688 Sir Charles Carney 74 ---- Earl of Bath (_re-appointed_) -- 1693 Sir Beville Granville 75 1703 Lord North and Grey -- 1715 Henry Grove 76 1737 Francis Columbine 77 1746 James Lord Tyrawley -- 1749 Edward Pole 78 1763 Edward Sandford 79 1781 Sir Robert Murray Keith, K.B. -- 1795 Hon. Henry Edward Fox -- 1811 Hon. Thomas Maitland 80 1824 Sir John Lambert, G.C.B. 81 1847 Sir Thomas McMahon, Bt. and K.C.B. 82 PLATES. Original Costume of the Regiment _to face_ 1 At the Battle of Steenkirk " 7 Colours of the Regiment " 36 Costume of the Regiment 1848 " 72 APPENDIX. Battles, Sieges, &c., from 1689 to 1697 83 --------------------- from 1702 to 1713 84 [Illustration: TENTH FOOT 1685 For Cannon's Military Records. ] HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE TENTH, OR THE NORTH LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT. [Sidenote: 1661 to 1684] After the Restoration, when King Charles II. had disbanded the army of the commonwealth, a small military force was embodied under the title of "guards and garrisons;" one of the independent companies of infantry incorporated for garrison duty was commanded by that distinguished nobleman, JOHN, EARL OF BATH, who had evinced fidelity and attachment to the royal cause in the rebellion in the reign of King Charles I., and during the usurpations of Cromwell; this company was stationed in the fortress of Plymouth, of which the EARL OF BATH was governor, and it was the nucleus of the regiment which forms the subject of this memoir. [Sidenote: 1685] In June, 1685, when JAMES, DUKE OF MONMOUTH, had landed in the West of England, with a band of armed followers from the Netherlands, and erected the standard of rebellion, commissions were issued, by King James II., for raising eleven companies of foot, of one hundred private soldiers each, which companies were united to the Plymouth independent garrison company, and constituted a regiment, of which the EARL OF BATH was appointed colonel, by commission dated the 20th of June, 1685, and the corps thus formed now bears the title of "THE TENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT." These eleven companies were raised in Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire; the town of Derby being the general rendezvous of the corps; and they were raised under the authority of royal warrants, bearing date the 20th of June, by the following gentlemen, who evinced their loyalty by coming forward to the support of the crown at that important crisis:--viz., Colonel, JOHN, EARL OF BATH; Lieut.-Colonel, SIR NICHOLAS STANNINGS; Major, SIR CHARLES CARNEY; Captains, MICHAEL BOURK, CHARLES POWELL, SIR THOMAS WINDHAM, EDWARD SCOTT, BERNARD STRODE, JOHN SYDENHAM, FRANCIS VIVIAN, and SYDNEY GODOLPHIN. After the suppression of this rebellion, many newly raised corps were disbanded, and the EARL OF BATH's regiment was reduced to ten companies of fifty private soldiers each. The regiment was armed with muskets and pikes; the uniform was _blue_, coats lined with _red_, red waistcoats, breeches, and stockings; round hats with broad brims, the brim turned up on one side and ornamented with red ribands; the pikemen wore red worsted sashes. This was the only infantry regiment clothed in blue coats; the other corps wore red coats; red had been generally worn by the English soldiers from the time of Queen Elizabeth; but several of Cromwell's regiments were clothed in blue, and King Charles II. clothed the royal regiment of horse guards in blue, and a regiment of marines, raised in his reign, in yellow. A few years after the revolution in 1688, the TENTH were clothed in red. In August, 1685, the EARL OF BATH'S regiment marched from Derby to Hounslow, and encamped upon the heath, where it was reviewed by the King, and afterwards marched to Plymouth, to relieve the Queen Dowager's regiment, now second foot. [Sidenote: 1686] The following statement of the numbers and rates of pay is copied from the establishment of the army, under the sign manual, dated the 1st of January, 1686. +----------------------------------------------+---------------+ | The Earl of Bath's Regiment. | Pay per day. | +----------------------------------------------+---------------+ | Staff. | £. _s. d._ | | | | | 1 Colonel, _as Colonel_ | 0 12 0 | | 1 Lieut.-Colonel, _as Lieut.-Colonel_ | 0 7 0 | | 1 Major, _as Major_ | 0 5 0 | | 1 Chaplain | 0 6 8 | | 1 Chirurgeon, iv_s._ 1 Mate, ii_s._ v_id._ | 0 6 6 | | 1 Adjutant | 0 4 0 | | 1 Quarter-Master and Marshal | 0 4 0 | | +---------------+ | Total for Staff | 2 5 2 | | +===============+ | The Colonel's Company. | | | | | | The Colonel, as Captain | 0 8 0 | | 1 Lieutenant | 0 4 0 | | 1 Ensign | 0 3 0 | | 2 Serjeants, xviii_d._ each | 0 3 0 | | 3 Corporals, i_s._ each | 0 3 0 | | 1 Drummer | 0 1 0 | | 50 Private Soldiers, at viii_d._ each | 1 13 4 | | +---------------+ | Total for one Company | 2 15 4 | | +---------------+ | Nine Companies more | 24 18 0 | | +---------------+ | Total | 29 18 6 | | | | | Per Annum, £10,922 12_s._ 6_d._ | | +----------------------------------------------+---------------+ Leaving Plymouth in March, 1686, the regiment occupied quarters at Guildford and Godalming until the 24th of May, when it pitched its tents on Hounslow-heath, where a numerous body of troops was assembled for exercise and review. At this camp the regiment had an independent company of grenadiers attached to it, and after the reviews it marched into garrison at Portsmouth. [Sidenote: 1687] In 1687, the following officers were holding commissions in the regiment:-- _Captains._ _Lieutenants._ _Ensigns._ Earl of Bath, (col.) Maurice Roch. James Mohun. Sir Cha. Carney, (lt.-col.) John Prideaux. Richd. Nagle. Sir Bev. Granville, (major) D. Bradshaw. Jas. Granville. Sir Thomas Windham. Cha. Harbine. Jacob Breams. Edward Scott. Richard Scott. James Steukly. Sydney Godolphin. Wm. Morgan. Jno. Granville. John, Lord Arundel. Thos. Trevanion. Edw. Chard. Bernard Strode. Thos. Lamb. Thos. Cary. Ranald Graham. John Long. Hercules Low. John Sydenham. Hy. Hook. John Jacob. John Granville. { Roger Elliott } Grenadier Co. { Roger Evans } _Chaplain_, Thos. Nixon. _Adjutant_, R. Elliott. _Chirurgeon_, James Yong. _Quarter-Master_, Jno. Freeman. The regiment left Portsmouth, in April, 1687, for Winchester and Taunton; in June, it once more pitched its tents on Hounslow-heath, and in August marched into quarters in London. It did not remain long in the metropolis: and after several changes of quarters it was placed in garrison at Plymouth. [Sidenote: 1688] When King James II., who was a zealous Roman Catholic, pursued the interests of papacy so far as to occasion much alarm among his Protestant subjects, the EARL OF BATH stood aloof from the measures of the Court, and he was one of the noblemen who communicated privately with the PRINCE OF ORANGE, to whom the nation looked for aid to oppose the arbitrary proceedings of the King. In November, 1688, when the Prince of Orange arrived with a Dutch armament, the TENTH and Thirteenth regiments were in garrison at Plymouth,--the TENTH occupying the citadel, and the two colonels were with their regiments. The Earl of Bath was in the interest of the Prince of Orange; but the Earl of Huntingdon adhered to King James: the lieut.-colonel of the TENTH, Sir Charles Carney, was a steadfast supporter of the Court, and the lieut.-colonel of the Thirteenth, Ferdinando Hastings, was a warm advocate for the Prince of Orange; thus the interest of the superior officers of the two regiments was equally divided. It appeared doubtful, for some time, to which party the garrison of Plymouth would devote itself; but eventually, the Earl of Bath, being the senior officer and governor of the fortress, ordered the Earl of Huntingdon to be arrested: he also ordered four Roman Catholic officers of the Thirteenth,--viz., Captain Owen Macarty, Lieutenants William Rhodesby, Talbot Lascelles, and Ensign Ambrose Jones, to be arrested; he then declared for the Prince of Orange, and induced the two regiments to engage in the same interest. The garrison having been settled in the name of the Prince of Orange, the Earl of Huntingdon and the Roman Catholic officers of his regiment were released. The news of the loss of Plymouth, and of the two regiments having declared for the Prince of Orange, together with similar events taking place in other parts of the kingdom, proved to King James that his soldiers would not fight against the Protestant religion and the laws of the realm. His Majesty deprived the Earl of Bath of his commissions, and appointed Lieut.-Colonel Sir Charles Carney to the colonelcy of the TENTH foot by commission dated the 8th of December. The regiment had, however, engaged in the interest of the Prince of Orange, and this change in the colonel produced no alteration in the sentiments of the regiment. King James fled to France, and on the 31st of December the Prince restored the Earl of Bath to the colonelcy. [Sidenote: 1689] The accession of the Prince and Princess of Orange to the throne was followed by a civil war in Scotland and Ireland; but the TENTH were intrusted with the charge of the citadel of Plymouth, and they were not employed in the field in 1689 or 1690; they, however, detached six companies to the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. [Sidenote: 1690] [Sidenote: 1691] In 1690, the powerful efforts of the French monarch to reduce the Spanish provinces in the Netherlands under his dominion, occasioned the regiment to be called into active service. Embarking from Jersey, Guernsey, and Plymouth, the TENTH foot, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Sir Beville Granville, nephew of the Earl of Bath, sailed to Ostend, and landing at that port marched up the country, and joined the army commanded by King William III. The regiment enjoyed the confidence of the King to a great extent, and on joining the army, it was ordered to pitch its tents near His Majesty's quarters at Anderlecht. It was formed in brigade with the seventh, sixteenth, and Fitzpatrick's (afterwards disbanded), under Brigadier-General Churchill, and after taking part in several movements, went into winter-quarters. [Illustration: _J. M. Jopling del^t._ _Madeley lith. 3 Wellington S^t. Strand._ TENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. AT THE BATTLE OF STEENKIRK, 3^{RD} AUG^T. 1692. _For Cannon's Military Records._ ] [Sidenote: 1692] Quitting its cantonments among the Flemish peasantry, in May, 1692, the regiment again took the field, and was employed in several operations. In the beginning of August it was encamped at Halle, and, early on the morning of the 3rd of that month, it advanced at the head of the main body of the confederate army to attack the French in position at _Steenkirk_. After passing through some narrow defiles among trees, the Third and TENTH foot halted at the extremity of a wood, at the moment when the brigades forming the van of the army were severely engaged with very superior numbers. A short distance in front of the TENTH, and near the skirt of the wood a little to the left, a regiment of Lunenburgers, commanded by the Baron of Pibrack, was contending with two French battalions, and was nearly overpowered; it was falling back, fighting, and in some disorder; the French were gaining ground; and its colonel, the Baron of Pibrack, lay dangerously wounded a few yards in front of the muzzles of the enemy's muskets. Prince Casimir of Nassau galloped up to the TENTH, and requested them to advance to the aid of the Lunenburgers; when the regiment formed line, the pikemen in the centre, and the musketeers and grenadiers on each flank, and Lieut.-Colonel Sir Beville Granville led it forward with great gallantry. At that moment the Lunenburgers were overpowered, and the French were hurrying forward with shouts, and a heavy fire of musketry, when suddenly the TENTH, conspicuous by their blue coats, scarlet breeches and stockings, and three stand of scarlet colours floating in the breeze, were seen issuing from among the trees in firm array. So noble a line of combatants, separating itself from the broken sections of the retreating Lunenburgers, startled the enemy; the French artillery thundered against its flanks,--their musketry smote it in front,--yet the regiment bore sternly forward to close on its numerous enemies, when the French fell back. Two serjeants of the TENTH sprang forward and rescued the Baron of Pibrack, bearing him from among his enemies to the rear, and the regiment pressed forward, without firing a shot, until it gained a hollow way beyond the skirts of the wood, where it halted, and the musketeers, taking sure aim over the bank, soon cleared the ground in their front of opponents. Numerous narrow defiles and other obstructions prevented the main body of the British infantry from arriving in time to support the brigades in advance; King William ordered a retreat, and Prince Casimir of Nassau arrived with orders for the TENTH to withdraw from their post. The Prince highly commended the conduct of the regiment on that, the first occasion of its being engaged, and its bearing proved a presage of future renown. The regiment had a number of private soldiers killed and wounded; also Captain Elliott, Lieutenants Thomas Granville and John Granville, wounded. Towards the end of August, the TENTH were detached from the main army, and having joined a number of troops which had arrived from England under Lieut.-General the Duke of Leinster, they were employed in seizing and fortifying the towns of Furnes and Dixmude. On the 22nd of September, as working parties of the seventh and TENTH foot were enlarging the ditch of a bastion, they found a quantity of hidden treasure, consisting of old French coins, amounting to nearly five hundred pounds sterling, supposed (according to D'Auvergne's history of the campaign of 1692) to have been concealed there during the civil war in Flanders towards the close of the preceding century. In the middle of October, the regiment marched to Damme, a little strong town, situated between Bruges and Sluys, where it passed the winter. [Sidenote: 1693] The TENTH regiment of foot appears in the list of troops under King William III., at Parck camp near Louvain, in June, 1693, and they were ordered to pitch their tents in the fields adjoining the defiles of Berbeck, to guard that avenue to the camp. While the army was at this place, several skirmishes occurred; but the only loss sustained by the TENTH was on the 25th of June, when an outpost of a serjeant's party, covering a number of horses at grass, was attacked, and three men were severely wounded. On the 1st of July, the regiment was detached from the main army, with other forces under the Duke of Wirtemberg, to attack the enemy's fortified lines between the rivers Scheldt and Lys. After a march of eight days, the troops arrived in front of the lines near _D'Otignies_, and on the following day the works were attacked at three points. The grenadiers formed the van of each attack; the right column was composed of Danes; the Argyle highlanders headed the centre column, and the TENTH foot took the lead of the column on the left. When the signal for the assault was given, the TENTH raised a loud shout and ran forward. The pikemen arrived at the little river Espiers, which ran in front of the lines, and cast a number of fascines into the water, but the stream carried them away. The grenadiers of the TENTH and other regiments, being anxious to signalize themselves, dashed into the current, at the same time the musketeers advanced to the bank and fired upon their opponents on the works. The river was so deep that many of the soldiers were up to the chin in water; but they gained the shore without serious loss,--sprang forward with astonishing rapidity,--forded the ditch,--pulled down the palisadoes,--and ascended the lines, sword in hand; the officers and grenadiers of the TENTH being the first that entered the works. As the soldiers climbed the entrenchments, shouting and flourishing their swords, the French fled, and the lines were carried with little loss. D'Auvergne states that the grenadiers of the EARL OF BATH'S regiment (TENTH) found a cask of brandy in one of the abandoned redoubts, which proved very welcome, as the soldiers had been exposed to a heavy rain for several days. After forcing the lines, contributions were levied on the territory subject to France, as far as Lisle: and the Duke of Wirtemberg was so well pleased with the conduct of the TENTH, that he made a donation of a ducat to each man, and the same to the men of the other regiments engaged in forcing the lines. While the TENTH were levying contributions, the main army under King William was defeated at Landen; after this disaster the regiment was ordered to join the army, but it was not engaged in any service of importance, and in October it marched into winter-quarters at Bruges. On the 29th of October, the Earl of Bath was succeeded in the colonelcy by his nephew, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Beville Granville. [Sidenote: 1694] Leaving Bruges in May, 1694, the regiment pitched its tents near Ghent. It served the campaign of that year in Brigadier-General Stewart's brigade, in the division commanded by Major-General Sir Henry Bellasis; and after taking part in several operations, and performing many long and toilsome marches, it proceeded into quarters at the pleasant town of Malines. [Sidenote: 1695] Early in the spring of 1695, the French commenced some new works between the Lys and the Scheldt, when five hundred men of the TENTH were withdrawn from Malines in the expectation of taking part in an attempt to interrupt the enemy's proceedings; but this enterprise was laid aside, and the regiment encamped at Marykirk until the army took the field, when it was joined by the men left in quarters. The TENTH were subsequently detached to Dixmude, in West Flanders; and they were one of the corps which pitched their tents before the _Kenoque_, a fortress at the junction of the Loo and Dixmude canals, where the French had a garrison. On the 9th of June, the grenadiers of the TENTH were engaged in driving the French from the entrenchments and houses near the Loo canal. A redoubt was afterwards taken, and a lodgment effected on the works at the bridge; in which service the regiment had several men killed and wounded. This enterprise was only designed as a diversion to favour the operations of the main army, and when King William had besieged the strong fortress of _Namur_, the regiment traversed the country to the banks of the Lys, and joined the covering army under the Prince of Vaudemont. When Marshal Villeroy advanced, with a force of very superior numbers, to attack the covering army, the Prince of Vaudemont retreated to Ghent, and during this retrograde movement, the commanding officer of the TENTH, Lieut.-Colonel Sydney Godolphin, and a serjeant and twelve men, resting at a house on the road too long, were made prisoners. The regiment was subsequently employed in several movements to protect the maritime and other towns of Flanders, and to cover the army carrying on the siege of Namur. In August it was encamped between Genappe and Waterloo, and after the surrender of the castle of Namur, it marched into quarters in the villages between Nieuport and Ostend. [Sidenote: 1696] In the spring of 1696, Louis XIV. endeavoured to weaken the power of the confederate army in Flanders, by causing England to become the seat of civil war. The partisans of King James were excited to rise in arms; a plot was formed for the assassination of King William, and a French army approached the coast to embark with King James for England. The TENTH foot was one of the corps selected to return to England on this occasion, and the regiment, having embarked at Ostend, arrived at Gravesend in March. In the meantime the conspirators had been discovered; a British fleet was sent to blockade the French ports, and the designs of Louis XIV. were frustrated. Several corps returned to Flanders; but the TENTH were selected to remain on home service. The regiment landed at Gravesend, occupied quarters a short period in London, and afterwards marched into extensive cantonments in the counties of Suffolk and Essex. [Sidenote: 1697] In May, 1697, the regiment was ordered to embark for the Netherlands, and it joined the army at the camp in front of Brussels in July; but in a few weeks afterwards the treaty of Ryswick gave peace to Europe. During the winter, the regiment returned to England; it landed at Gravesend and Tilbury in December, and marched into quarters in Essex. [Sidenote: 1698] [Sidenote: 1699] [Sidenote: 1700] Considerable reductions were made in the strength of the army, after the peace of Ryswick, and the TENTH regiment was one of the corps selected to proceed to Ireland; it embarked at Highlake in July, 1698, and was stationed in Ireland during the following two years. [Sidenote: 1701] Pursuing his schemes for the aggrandizement of his family with unceasing assiduity, the King of France procured the accession of his grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou, to the throne of Spain, and this open violation of existing treaties involved Europe in another war. Among the corps first ordered to proceed on foreign service to aid the continental powers in arresting the progress of French usurpations, was the TENTH regiment of foot. It embarked at Cork on the 15th of June, 1701, sailed to Holland, and was placed in one of the frontier garrisons of that country. In September it was encamped on Breda-heath, where it was reviewed, with the remainder of the British troops in Holland, by King William III., and afterwards returned to its former station in garrison. [Sidenote: 1702] In the spring of 1702, the regiment took the field to serve as auxiliaries to the army of the Emperor of Germany, England not having declared war against France; and at the camp at Rosendael, news was received of the death of King William III. and of the accession of Queen Anne on the 8th of March. From Rosendael the TENTH marched to the Duchy of Cleves, and encamped at Cranenburg on the Lower Rhine, forming part of the covering army during the siege of _Kayserswerth_. In June a French force of superior numbers marched through the forest of Cleves and plains of Goch to cut off the allied army from Grave and Nimeguen; in consequence of this movement the British, Dutch, and Germans at Cranenburg, struck their tents a little before sunset on the 10th of June, and, by a forced march, arrived within a few miles of _Nimeguen_, about eight o'clock on the following morning, at which time the French columns appeared on both flanks and in the rear. Some sharp fighting occurred; the British corps forming the rear-guard evinced signal gallantry, and the TENTH regiment distinguished itself: the enemy was held in check until the army effected its retreat under the works of Nimeguen. England declared war against France: additional troops arrived in Holland, and the EARL OF MARLBOROUGH assumed the command. The TENTH were engaged in the movements by which the French were driven from their menacing position near the confines of Holland. The regiment also formed part of the covering army during the siege of _Venloo_,--a fortress on the east side of the river Maese, which surrendered on the 25th of September. The regiment was next engaged in covering the sieges of _Ruremonde_ and _Stevenswart_, both of which places were captured in the early part of October. The army afterwards advanced to the city of _Liege_, which immediately opened its gates, but the citadel, and a detached fortress called the Chartreuse, held out. The TENTH regiment was employed in the siege of the citadel, and the grenadier company behaved with great gallantry at the capture of that fortress by storm on the 23rd of October. The citadel being carried by assault, the garrison was nearly annihilated; the garrison of the Chartreuse were eye-witnesses of this event, and surrendered immediately afterwards, from apprehension of a similar fate. The city of Liege being rescued from the power of the enemy, the regiment marched back to Holland, and passed the winter in garrison at Breda. [Sidenote: 1703] Sir Beville Granville having been appointed governor of Barbadoes, the colonelcy of the TENTH foot was conferred on William, Lord North and Grey, by commission dated the 15th of January, 1703. Colonel Lord North and Grey proved a very gallant aspirant for military fame; serving at the head of his regiment, and distinguishing himself on numerous occasions. The TENTH left their winter-quarters towards the end of April, 1703; on the 6th of May, they arrived at Maeswyck, where they halted on the following day; but, information having been received of the approach of a powerful French army to cut off the detachments of the confederate forces, the regiment struck its tents at sunset, with several other corps, and, by a forced march, arrived at the city of _Maestricht_ about noon on the following day. When the French army approached that city, the regiment was in position, being one of the corps stationed at Lonakin; some skirmishing and cannonading occurred, and the French withdrew without venturing a general engagement. When the Duke of Marlborough advanced against the French at Tongres, the TENTH were formed in brigade with the second battalion of the royals, and the sixteenth, twenty-first, and twenty-sixth regiments, under Brigadier-General the Earl of Derby. The enemy took refuge behind an extensive line of works, and the English General besieged the strong fortress of _Huy_, situate on the Maese above Liege. The TENTH foot were employed at the siege; and, on the 18th of August, when the enemy had vacated that portion of the town which lay beyond the river, Colonel Lord North and Grey took possession of it with the TENTH: another corps was afterwards placed under his lordship's command, and the regiment held this post during the remainder of the siege. _Huy_ having been captured, the siege of the city of _Limburg_ was next undertaken, and this fortress was surrendered before the end of September. Thus Spanish Guelderland was wrested from the power of France, and in October the regiment marched back to Holland, where it passed the winter. [Sidenote: 1704] While the Duke of Marlborough was capturing fortress after fortress in the Netherlands, the French and Bavarians had great success in Germany; their united efforts threatened to overturn the imperial throne, and, in 1704, the British commander led his army from Holland to the Danube, to the succour of the Emperor Leopold. The TENTH foot, commanded by Colonel Lord North and Grey, had the honour of being employed in this splendid enterprise, which elevated the reputation of the British arms, and immortalized the name of Marlborough for the conception of the movement, and the secrecy and rapidity with which it was executed. To engage in this undertaking, the regiment left its winter-quarters early in May, 1704, and directing its march to the Rhine, proceeded along the banks of that river to Coblentz, where it passed the Rhine and the Moselle on the 25th and 26th of that month. From Coblentz the army marched towards the Maine, and traversing the several states of Germany, arrived at the seat of war to co-operate with the forces of the empire. On the 2nd of July, after a long march through a difficult country, the British approached the fortified post of _Schellenberg_, a commanding height on the left bank of the Danube, where a body of French and Bavarians were stationed under the Count d'Arco, and about six in the evening, a detachment from each British regiment, with the foot guards, royals, and twenty-third, under Brigadier-General Fergusson, and a Dutch force under General Goor, advanced to attack the entrenchments. A very spirited resistance was made by the enemy, and, eventually, the TENTH were led up the contested height to join in the attack. Firmly and steadily the soldiers of the TENTH moved up the steep ascent, which was strewed with killed and wounded; arriving within range of the enemy's fire, an iron tempest smote the ranks, and the firm order of the regiment was shaken: a short pause ensued. At that moment the British cavalry approached to support the infantry, and the Germans under the Margrave of Baden arrived to prolong the attack and assail the enemy in the rear. Encouraged by these circumstances, the British and Dutch infantry raised a loud shout, and, breaking with terrific violence into the entrenchments, overpowered all resistance. The Duke of Marlborough led the British cavalry forward, and completed the overthrow of the enemy. The TENTH had Captain Crow and fifteen rank and file killed; three serjeants, and thirty-six rank and file wounded. Crossing the Danube, and advancing into Bavaria, the regiment was engaged in various operations; it proceeded to the vicinity of the enemy's fortified camp at Augsburg, and afterwards returned to the Danube at Donawerth: in the meantime a numerous body of French troops had traversed the Black Forest and joined the enemy. About ten o'clock on the night of the 11th of August, the army under the Duke of Marlborough joined the imperialists commanded by Prince Eugene of Savoy, at the village of Munster, near the bank of the Danube. On the following day the regiment was ordered forward to support the piquets, which were attacked by the enemy's hussars. At daybreak, on the morning of the memorable 13th of August, the regiment was under arms, to engage in a battle which appeared to involve the fate of the Christian world: it formed, on this occasion, part of the brigade under Brigadier-General Row. Advancing from the camp-ground, the soldiers arrived in front of the enemy's position, and the TENTH, commanded by their gallant young colonel, LORD NORTH AND GREY, were destined to attack the village of _Blenheim_, where the enemy had posted a numerous body of troops, thrown up entrenchments, and constructed palisades. Against this village, Brigadier-General Row's brigade advanced with great gallantry: the TENTH and Royal Scots Fusiliers led the attack, and were distinguished for their intrepid bearing; but all efforts to force the village against an enemy of so very superior numbers, and advantageously posted, proved ineffectual. As the brigade withdrew, it was charged by some French cavalry, who were repulsed by the fire of a Hessian brigade. Brigadier-General Fergusson led a brigade against the other side of the village; but without success. A sharp fire was afterwards kept up at this point, and the army deployed to engage the main body of the French and Bavarians. In the conflict which followed, British valour was conspicuous, and after a contest of several hours' duration, the French and Bavarian armies were overthrown and nearly annihilated; Marshal Tallard, and many officers and soldiers being made prisoners. When the main body of their army was overthrown, the French troops in Blenheim were insulated; thrice they attempted to escape, but they were forced back. They took shelter behind the houses and enclosures; but they were soon surrounded, and twelve squadrons of cavalry, with twenty-four battalions of infantry, surrendered prisoners of war. Thus ended the mighty struggle of this eventful day, so glorious to the British arms! The honours acquired by the regiment had been attended with the loss of many valuable lives. Captains Dawes, Sir John Sands, Cavendish, and Burton; Lieutenants Frazer and Wycks; Ensigns Breams and Dawson, were killed: Colonel Lord North and Grey lost his right hand; Major Granville; Captains Cunningham and Spotswood; Lieutenants Bulwer, Boylblanc, and Hornby; Ensigns Crow and Rossington, were wounded. The number of non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the regiment, killed and wounded, has not been ascertained. After passing the night on the field of battle, surrounded with the ensanguined trophies of victory, the TENTH were selected to guard the prisoners from Germany to Holland, in which service five British battalions were employed. The prisoners were marched to Mentz, where they were put on board of small vessels, and sailed to Holland. The regiment arrived at the Hague in October, and, having delivered up the prisoners, it was placed in garrison for the winter: its services are not, therefore, connected with the operations of the army in Germany after the victory at Blenheim. [Sidenote: 1705] A numerous body of fine recruits arrived from England, in the spring of 1705, to replace the losses of the preceding campaign, and in May, 1705, when the regiment took the field, its appearance was admired. It was reviewed by the Duke of Marlborough, at the camp on the left bank of the Maese, and afterwards marched to Juliers. From Juliers the regiment marched through a mountainous country to the valley of the Moselle, and pitched its tents near the ancient city of Treves. The army being united, it passed the rivers Moselle and Saar on the 3rd of June, traversed the difficult defile of Tavernen, and encamped within seven miles of Syrk. At this place the army halted, waiting for the imperialists, whose tardy movements and inefficient state disappointed the expectations of the English commander, and rendered it necessary for him to hurry back to the Netherlands to arrest the progress of the French on the Maese. In the forced march from Syrk to the Maese, the regiment lost many men from fatigue; and soon after its arrival, it was selected to take part in storming the enemy's fortified lines, which were protected by a numerous army. To render this great undertaking as certain as possible, these formidable barriers were menaced on the south of the Mehaigne, and the French troops being drawn in that direction, the point selected for the attack was thus weakened. On the evening of the 17th of July, the corps selected to commence the attack marched in the direction of _Helixem_ and _Neer-Hespen_, the TENTH forming part of the leading brigade of infantry; and they were followed by the remainder of the army. About four o'clock on the following morning, they approached the lines and surprised the enemy's guards. Inspired with emulation, the soldiers soon cleared the villages of Neer-Winden and Neer-Hespen, seized the village and bridge of Helixem, and carried the castle of Wange with little loss; the enemy being surprised and confounded by the suddenness of the attack. Encouraged by this success, and stimulated by the noble example of several officers, the troops rushed through the enclosures and marshy grounds, forded the river Gheet, and crowded across the fortifications; the French retreating in a panic. Thus the lines were forced, and the soldiers of the TENTH stood triumphant on the captured works, where the cross of St. George, floating in the air, served as a beacon to impart a knowledge of this splendid success to the main body of the army, still at some distance. A numerous body of the enemy's cavalry and infantry hurried to the spot to drive back the troops which had passed the lines, when some sharp fighting occurred, which ended in the overthrow of the enemy, who made a precipitate retreat behind the river Dyle. This daring enterprise was thus achieved; and the talents of the Duke of Marlborough, with the intrepidity and valour of the British soldiers, were admired by all nations. The English commander stated in his despatch, that the troops _acquitted themselves with a bravery surpassing all that could have been hoped of them_. The TENTH shared in the operations of the main army during the remainder of the campaign, but had no opportunity of distinguishing themselves in action: they passed the winter in garrison in Holland. [Sidenote: 1706] Each successive victory had inspired the troops with additional confidence in their commander, and in their own prowess: to besiege a town, or fight a battle, and not conquer, when the DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH commanded, appeared impossible. With a bold assurance that fresh triumphs awaited them, the soldiers took the field in May, 1706, and the TENTH foot joined the camp near Tongres on the 19th of that month. On the 23rd of May, as the army was advancing in eight columns, information was received that the French, Spaniards, and Bavarians, commanded by Marshal Villeroy and the Elector of Bavaria, were taking up a position at Mont St. André, with their centre at the village of _Ramilies_, and the allies prepared for battle. Diverging into the open plain, the allied army formed line and advanced against the enemy. The TENTH foot, being on the right of the line, proceeded, with a number of other corps, in the direction of the village of Autreglise, and made a demonstration of attacking the enemy's left. The French weakened their centre to support their left, and the British commander instantly seized the opportunity and attacked the weakened point. The TENTH foot were among the corps which, occupying some high ground on the right, were not engaged during the early part of the battle; but they had a full view of the conflict on the plain. At length a crisis arrived: the brigades on the right were ordered into action, when the TENTH evinced that intrepidity and firmness for which the regiment had been distinguished on former occasions, and another decisive victory exalted the fame of the British arms. The broken remains of the French, Spanish, and Bavarian legions were pursued for many miles, and an immense number of prisoners, cannon, standards, and colours was captured. The effect of this surprising victory was the immediate surrender of Brussels, Ghent, and the principal towns of Brabant, and the intelligence of these events produced such an electric sensation throughout England, that the gallant exploits of the heroes of _Ramilies_ became a general theme of conversation, and the subject of numerous addresses to the throne. Rewards were conferred on officers who had distinguished themselves, and the commanding officer of the TENTH, the gallant Lord North and Grey, was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and placed at the head of three battalions of infantry. Several towns in Flanders held out; and in June the TENTH marched to Arseele, and afterwards to Rouselaer, and formed part of the covering army during the siege of _Ostend_, which fortress was delivered up on the 8th of July. After the surrender of Ostend, the regiment was selected to take part in the siege of _Menin_, a strong town pleasantly situated on the little river Lys. This fortress was accounted the key to the French conquests in the Netherlands, and one of the masterpieces of the celebrated Vauban: the siege therefore excited an unusual degree of interest. The town was invested on the 23rd of July; and the conduct of the TENTH during the progress of the siege, corresponded with the high character of the regiment. Considerable loss was sustained in carrying on the attacks, but the soldiers had the gratification of witnessing this place added to the numerous conquests made during this memorable campaign. Dendermond and Aeth were afterwards captured; and in November the regiment took up its winter-quarters at Ghent. [Sidenote: 1707] During the campaign of 1707, the regiment formed part of the brigade commanded by its colonel, Brigadier-General Lord North and Grey, and it was some time encamped near the village of Waterloo. The English commander was unable, this year, to bring his cautious opponents to a general engagement. In October, the regiment returned to Ghent. [Sidenote: 1708] While the regiment was reposing in quarters at this city, the king of France fitted out a fleet, and embarked troops at Dunkirk, for the invasion of Great Britain, with a view of placing the Pretender on the throne. To repel the invaders, the TENTH regiment embarked for England in the middle of March, 1708, and arrived at Tynemouth on the 21st; but the French squadron, with the Pretender on board, was chased from the British coast by the English fleet, and the TENTH were ordered to Flanders: they landed at Ostend, and proceeded in boats to Ghent, where they arrived towards the end of April. In May the regiment quitted Ghent, and was engaged in the operations of the main army; and soon afterwards the French, by treachery and stratagem, obtained possession of the two towns of Ghent and Bruges. They also invested _Oudenarde_, and this circumstance led to a general engagement, in which the TENTH gained new honours. Passing the Scheldt on pontoon bridges near Oudenarde, on the 11th of July, the allied army encountered the legions of the enemy, commanded by his Royal Highness the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Vendome, in the fields beyond the river, and the battle immediately commenced. The TENTH, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Grove, passed the Scheldt by the bridge between Oudenarde and the abbey of Eename, and ascended the heights of Bevere. At this place they halted a short time, then descended into the plain, and engaged the French battalions in the grounds beyond the rivulet, near the village of Eyne. About five o'clock in the afternoon the regiment opened its fire, and it continued to gain ground upon its opponents, until the shades of evening gathered over the field of battle. The wings of the allied army gained upon the enemy, and the circling blaze of musketry enveloped the French troops, whose destruction appeared inevitable, but the darkness of the night soon rendered it impossible to distinguish friends from foes, and the Duke of Marlborough ordered his soldiers to cease firing, and to halt. The darkness favoured the escape of the enemy, and the wreck of the French army retreated in disorder towards Ghent. This victory prepared the way for an undertaking of great magnitude,--viz., the siege of _Lisle_, the capital of French Flanders,--a fortress deemed almost impregnable, and garrisoned by fifteen thousand men, commanded by the veteran Marshal Boufflers. This enterprise put the abilities of the generals, and the courage and endurance of the troops, to a severe trial. The TENTH formed part of the covering army under the Duke of Marlborough, while the siege was carried on by the brigades under Prince Eugene of Savoy. The services of the TENTH were of a varied character,--escorting supplies,--furnishing out-posts,--confronting the French army which advanced to raise the siege; and eventually the grenadier company joined the besieging army, and took part in the attacks on the town. When the Elector of Bavaria besieged Brussels, the TENTH formed part of the force which advanced to raise the siege. The enemy's strong positions on the _Scheldt_ were forced on the 27th of November; and the Elector made a precipitate retreat from before Brussels. The citadel of Lisle surrendered on the 9th of December, and, notwithstanding the lateness of the season, the soldiers of the TENTH were called upon to engage in another enterprise. They appeared before _Ghent_,--drove back the enemy's out-guards, and took part in opening the trenches between the Scheldt and the Lys, on the night of the 24th of December, on which occasion their colonel, Lord North and Grey, evinced signal gallantry, and he was rewarded, a few days afterwards, with the rank of major-general. On the 26th of December, ten companies of French grenadiers issued from the town to attack the besieging troops, and they put the first regiment they came in contact with in some confusion. The TENTH were immediately led to the spot, and they engaged the French grenadiers with spirit. The commanding officer of the regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Grove, was made prisoner, and Brigadier-General Evans, who commanded the troops at that point, was also captured; but the enemy was soon driven back into the town. On the 2nd of January, 1709, the governor surrendered; and the TENTH took up their quarters for the winter in the captured town. [Sidenote: 1709] From Ghent, the regiment marched, in the spring of 1709, to the plain of Lisle; and was afterwards encamped on the Upper Dyle. After menacing the enemy's lines, and causing Marshal Villars to draw all the troops out of the fortified towns, which could possibly be spared, to strengthen his army in the field, the allies suddenly invested _Tournay_. During the siege of the town the TENTH regiment formed part of the covering army, but when the citadel was attacked, this, with several other regiments, left the covering army, and marched to Tournay to take part in the siege. The citadel of Tournay was situated on some high ground, with a gentle ascent from the town, and the siege proved a service of the most difficult character. The peculiarities arose not so much from the strength of the fortifications, as from the multiplicity of the subterraneous works, which were more numerous than those aboveground. The approaches were carried on by sinking pits several fathoms deep, and working from thence underground, until the troops arrived at the casements and mines. The soldiers engaged in these services frequently encountered parties of the enemy, and numerous combats occurred in these gloomy labyrinths. On some occasions the men at work underground were inundated with water; on another occasion three hundred men were suffocated with smoke, and a hundred men were buried by the explosion of a mine. A detachment of the eighteenth foot was blown into the air, and their limbs scattered to a distance; and a battalion of Germans was destroyed by another mine; the TENTH foot also lost a number of men in the mines. At length it became difficult to induce the soldiers to enter these dark caverns, and engage in so appalling a service; they were, however, persuaded to persevere, and the citadel surrendered in the beginning of September. After the capture of Tournay, the allied army traversed the country with a view of besieging the city of Mons, the capital of the province of Hainault; but when on the march, the allies found the French army, under Marshals Villars and Boufflers, in position near _Malplaquet_, and resolved to hazard an engagement. At three o'clock on the morning of the 11th of September, the TENTH were on parade in the meadow where they had passed the night, and the chaplain performed divine service. A thick mist concealed the opposing armies from each other, but the din of hostile preparation was heard, and the soldiers, having confidence in their leaders, were anxious to acquire new laurels under their favourite chiefs. They waited till the sun broke forth, and then the battle commenced. Entrenchments, _abatis de bois_, and other defensive works, covered the front and flanks of the French, and the storming of these formidable works occasioned a greater loss of life, than occurred at the battles of Blenheim, Ramilies, and Oudenarde put together. The TENTH were formed in brigade, on this occasion, with the foot guards, royals, and thirty-seventh, and were in the column commanded by General Count Lottum. To this column was allotted the task of storming the enemy's entrenchments in the wood of Taisniere, which proved a difficult service. The foot guards led the attack, and behaved with great gallantry, but they encountered such formidable opposition that they were repulsed. The royals seconded the foot guards, and the buffs, being at the head of the next brigade, prolonged the attack to the left. The TENTH penetrated between the royals and the buffs, and the whole rushing forward with determined resolution, forced the entrenchments, when the French fell back fighting, but halted and renewed the contest in the wood. The TENTH, and other corps at this point, penetrated among the trees, and a sharp fire of musketry was kept up. The foliage was thick, every tree was disputed, and the wood re-echoed the din of battle. In the meantime a severe contest was taking place at other parts of the field, and obstacles deemed insurmountable were overcome; but the carnage was dreadful. The enemy's centre was forced; the cavalry of the allied army triumphed over the French horsemen, and the TENTH, and other British regiments in the woods of Taisniere, gained ground on their opponents. Eventually the French legions were driven from the field, with the loss of many prisoners, colours, standards, and cannon. When the soldiers of the allied army gazed at the formidable entrenchments, and other difficulties they had overcome, they were astonished at their own success. On this occasion the regiment did not sustain a very severe loss in killed and wounded: the only officers mentioned in the list are Lieutenants Fellowes and Elstead wounded. After the victory of Malplaquet, the siege of _Mons_ was undertaken, and the TENTH formed part of the covering army: the garrison surrendered on the 20th of October, and shortly afterwards the regiment marched into winter-quarters at Ghent. [Sidenote: 1710] Leaving its winter-quarters in the middle of April, 1710, the regiment directed its march to the vicinity of Tournay, where the allied army assembled. The capture of the small post of _Mortagne_ proved a prelude to another campaign in which several fortresses were wrested from the French monarch. By a forced march the enemy's lines were passed at _Pont-à-Vendin_, and the siege of _Douay_, a considerable fortress in the second line of defence which covered the frontiers of Artois, was undertaken. Douay is a town of antiquity, having been a place of note in the time of the first Counts of Flanders; the river Scarpe running through the town, the river Haine being near it, the works being also strong, numerous, and well garrisoned, the siege of this place was an important undertaking. The TENTH foot, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Henry Grove, had their post in the lines of circumvallation, but did not take part in the attacks upon the works. When the French army, under Marshal Villars, advanced to raise the siege, the regiment was in position to oppose the enemy, and it had several men killed and wounded by a heavy cannonade which occurred on that occasion. Marshal Villars did not hazard an engagement, and the governor of Douay, after a very gallant defence, surrendered on the 27th of June. After this conquest the English general resolved to attack _Bethune_, a strong town formerly belonging to the Counts of Flanders; but having been taken by Gaston, Duke of Orleans, it was annexed to the French monarchy at the peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. During the siege of Bethune, the TENTH had their post in the covering army encamped at Villars-Brulin, where the regiment was stationed until the garrison surrendered on the 29th of August. The next undertaking in which the army was engaged was the siege of _Aire_ and _St. Venant_, which towns were so situated as to admit of a simultaneous investment, and as the capture of these fortresses would secure the navigation of the Lys, and open a water communication with Tournay, Lisle, and Ghent, the skill of the generals and the valour of the troops were called forth to insure their reduction. The TENTH were among the corps engaged in the siege of Aire, and as the governor of that place made a very vigorous defence, a severe loss was sustained in killed and wounded. The regiment was several times warmly engaged in carrying on the attacks and storming the out-works; on which occasions its gallant bearing called forth the commendations of the Prince of Anhalt, who commanded the troops employed in the siege. On the 9th of November, the garrison surrendered; but the possession of Aire was purchased at a serious loss of brave soldiers. Thus, fortress after fortress fell before the superior skill of the commanders and the prowess of the troops composing the allied army. After the surrender of Aire, the TENTH marched to Courtray, a town of Hainault, situate on the river Lys, and defended by towers and a strong castle erected by Philip, Duke of Burgundy, in 1385: at this place the regiment passed the winter, and its losses were replaced by recruits from England. [Sidenote: 1711] Towards the end of April, 1711, the regiment was again in the field; it was reviewed at the camp at Warde by the Duke of Marlborough, on the 8th of June, and commended for its appearance and discipline: it afterwards encamped on the plains of Lens. A new line of formidable entrenchments, defended by a powerful French army under the command of Marshal Villars, appeared as a barrier to arrest the victorious career of the allied army; but the British General, by menacing the enemy's left, and making ostentatious preparations for storming the works at that point, occasioned the French troops to be drawn to that quarter; in the meantime he had privately assembled a number of corps at Douay, and by a forced march these formidable works were passed at the unguarded post of _Arleux_. The TENTH regiment of foot had the honor to take part in forcing these lines, on which occasion the British General developed that sublimity of military talent which has justly stamped this campaign as peculiarly scientific and glorious. The regiment was afterwards engaged in the siege of _Bouchain_, a well-fortified town, situate on both sides of the river Scheldt: and in carrying on the attacks, and performing its turn of duty in the trenches, the regiment had several men killed and wounded. The garrison surrendered in September, and after the damaged works were repaired, the TENTH went into winter-quarters. [Sidenote: 1712] The French monarch saw his generals overmatched, his soldiers beaten and dispirited, the barriers of his kingdom trampled down, and the great Duke of Marlborough ready to lead his victorious legions into the heart of France. Under these circumstances the ambitious Louis XIV. solicited peace. Negociations commenced before the TENTH foot took the field in April, 1712: the British troops were, however, assembled near Tournay, and the Duke of Ormond assumed the command in succession to the Duke of Marlborough. According to the returns of this period, the regiment brought six hundred and twenty-three rank and file into the field. From Tournay the regiment advanced to the vicinity of Bouchain; it subsequently formed part of the covering army, encamped at Cateau-Cambresis, during the siege of _Quesnoy_, which fortress surrendered on the 4th of July. Soon afterwards a suspension of arms was proclaimed between the British and French, preparatory to a treaty of peace, and the Duke of Ormond withdrew, with the troops under his orders, to Ghent, from whence several corps were detached to Dunkirk, to take possession of that fortress. [Sidenote: 1713] [Sidenote: 1714] The TENTH regiment of foot was subsequently quartered at Ghent; it remained in Flanders while the negociations were being carried on at Utrecht, and, in April, 1714, it was in garrison at the strong maritime town of Nieuport. While the regiment was in garrison at Nieuport, Queen Anne died (1st August), and was succeeded by King George I.; several corps were ordered home on this occasion, but the TENTH were selected to garrison one of the fortresses in Flanders during the negociations for the barrier treaty. [Sidenote: 1715] In the summer of 1715, the adherents of the Stuart dynasty, who were numerous, particularly in Scotland, made active preparations for the elevation of the Pretender to the throne, and Lieut.-General Lord North and Grey, being known to entertain sentiments favourable to the Stuart family, was removed from the colonelcy of the TENTH foot, which was conferred on the Lieut.-Colonel, Brigadier-General Henry Grove (who had often signalized himself at the head of the regiment), by commission dated the 23rd of June, 1715. King George I., supported by his parliament, adopted very energetic measures to oppose the designs of the Jacobites, and His Majesty, having great confidence in the zeal of Brigadier-General Grove, and in the attachment of the TENTH foot to the Protestant succession, gave directions for the regiment to return to England: it landed at the Tower-stairs, London, about the middle of August, and afterwards marched to Colchester. The rebellion broke out in Scotland in September, and the Earl of Mar headed the insurgent bands; but it was found necessary to detain a number of corps in England, to overawe the disaffected; and the TENTH were ordered to march, in the beginning of October, to Hammersmith, Kensington, and Chelsea, to be near the court. After the victories gained by the King's troops at Dumblain and Preston, the regiment marched to Lichfield and Newcastle, in Staffordshire, where it remained during the winter and the following spring. [Sidenote: 1716] [Sidenote: 1717] In the summer of 1716, the regiment was stationed in Warwickshire, and in 1717, in Lancashire. [Sidenote: 1722] The regiment continued to occupy various quarters in England, until the summer of 1722, when it was encamped on Salisbury Plain, where it was reviewed with a number of other corps, on the 30th of August, by King George I. and his royal highness the Prince of Wales. After the review, the regiment proceeded to Wolverhampton and Birmingham. [Sidenote: 1723] [Sidenote: 1724] During the summer of 1723, the regiment marched to Scotland, from whence it returned in 1724, and was stationed at Nottingham. [Sidenote: 1727] On the prospect of hostilities taking place on the Continent, in the spring of 1727, between the Emperor of Germany and the Dutch, the regiment was held in readiness to proceed on foreign service; at the same time its colonel was promoted to the rank of major-general, but no embarkation took place. On the 11th June, 1727, King George I. died, and King George II. was proclaimed Sovereign of Great Britain and Ireland on the following day. [Sidenote: 1730] In June, 1730, the regiment marched to Portsmouth, where it embarked for Gibraltar, and formed part of the garrison of that important fortress during the following nineteen years. [Sidenote: 1736] [Sidenote: 1737] [Sidenote: 1746] The decease of Lieut.-General Grove occurred on the 20th of November, 1736, and the colonelcy of the regiment remained vacant until June of the following year, when it was conferred on Major-General Francis Columbine, who commanded the regiment nine years, and was succeeded in December, 1746, by Lieut.-General James Lord Tyrawley, from the third troop of life guards, which King George II. had resolved to reduce, in order to diminish the public expenditure. [Sidenote: 1749] On the conclusion of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1749, the regiment was relieved from garrison duty at Gibraltar, and proceeded to Ireland. General Lord Tyrawley was removed to the fourteenth dragoons, in July, 1749; and in August King George II. conferred the colonelcy of the TENTH foot on Colonel Edward Pole, from the lieut.-colonelcy of the twelfth dragoons. [Sidenote: 1751] A royal warrant was issued on the 1st of July, 1751, in which the King's or first colour of the regiment was directed to be the great Union: the second colour to be of _bright yellow_ silk, with the Union in the upper canton, and in the centre of the colour the rank of the regiment, in gold Roman characters, within a wreath of roses and thistles on the same stalk. The costume of the regiment at this period was,--Three-cornered cocked hats bound with white lace; scarlet coats faced and turned up with bright yellow, and ornamented with white lace; scarlet waistcoats and breeches; white linen gaiters reaching above the knee; white cravats; buff belts. [Sidenote: 1757] [Sidenote: 1759] [Sidenote: 1762] Colonel Pole was promoted to the rank of major-general in 1757, and to that of lieut.-general in 1759. He commanded the regiment thirteen years, and died in the winter of 1762; when King George III. conferred the colonelcy on Major-General Edward Sandford, from the twenty-sixth regiment, by commission dated the 4th of January, 1763. [Sidenote: 1763] [Sidenote: 1767] [Sidenote: 1768] The regiment was stationed in Ireland during the whole of the seven years' war, but when the disputes between Great Britain and her North American colonies began to assume a serious aspect, the TENTH was one of the first corps ordered to proceed across the Atlantic. The regiment embarked from Ireland in the spring of 1767, and after a short stay in Nova Scotia, it was ordered to Boston, where, in 1768, the conduct of the populace assumed so violent a character as to render the presence of a military force necessary. [Sidenote: 1769] The policy pursued by the British government towards the North American provinces alienated the affections of the people from the mother-country, and the idea of these extensive colonies becoming a great and independent empire, having gained possession of many minds, the Americans became impatient of their condition. The events of each succeeding year appeared to mature the revolutionary designs of the colonists, and the determination to assert their independence became prevalent. [Illustration: COLOURS OF THE TENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT.] [Sidenote: 1775] In the spring of 1775, General Gage, who commanded the British troops at Boston, ascertained that the Americans were collecting military stores at Concord, about eighteen miles from Boston, and the flank companies of the TENTH, and of several other corps, embarked in boats, at ten o'clock on the night of the 18th of April, under Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Smith of the TENTH, for the purpose of destroying the stores. Proceeding to the entrance of the Cambridge-river, the troops landed at Phipps's farm, and advanced upon Concord, while the Americans, by the ringing of bells and the firing of guns, spread an alarm over the country. About four o'clock on the morning of the 19th of April, the light company of the TENTH, being in advance, approached the village of _Lexington_, where a body of American militia was forming; they were called upon to lay down their arms, but instead of obeying the order, they attempted to take shelter behind a stone wall, and several of them fired at the King's troops, wounding a soldier of the TENTH, which was the first blood shed in this unhappy contest. The light infantry responded to this act of hostility with an irregular volley, which killed and wounded several Americans, and dispersed the remainder: the commencement of the American war thus took place. After this rencounter, the flank companies continued their route to _Concord_, and Captain Parsons of the TENTH was detached with several companies to secure the bridge beyond the town, while the remainder of the detachment searched for and destroyed the military stores. The light companies of the fourth and TENTH regiments were posted on some heights near the bridge; crowds of armed men assembled on the high grounds near the town, and a party of Americans fired upon the soldiers at the bridge, killing three men and wounding several others, when the fire was returned, and the detached companies joined the main body in the town. The military stores having been destroyed, the troops commenced their march back to Boston, when the country was found swarming with armed men, who commenced a sharp fire from behind walls, fences, trees, &c., and skirmish succeeded skirmish until the soldiers were exhausted, and had expended nearly all their ammunition. Arriving at Lexington, they were met by a brigade of infantry and two guns, under Colonel Earl Percy, who formed his men into a square, with the exhausted flank companies in the centre, and, after a short halt, continued the retreat to Charlestown, from whence he crossed the river by the ferry to Boston, having lost several men from the incessant fire which the Americans kept up from behind walls, trees, and other coverts on both sides of the road. The regiment had two men killed; Lieut.-Colonel Francis Smith, Captain Lawrence Parsons, Lieutenant Waldron Kelly, Ensign Jeremiah Lester, and thirteen rank and file wounded. Hostilities having thus commenced, the whole province of Massachusetts-bay was speedily in arms, and an immense number of men invested Boston, where the King's troops were stationed on the land side. The Americans commenced constructing works on _Bunkers-hill_, a high ground beyond the river, from which it was determined to dislodge them, and the flank companies of the TENTH formed part of the force selected for this service. Embarking from Boston in boats, about noon on the 17th of June, the soldiers crossed the river, and landed on the opposite shore. The ships of war opened their fire upon the enemy's works, and the troops ascended the steep hill, which was covered with grass reaching to the knees, and intersected with walls and fences of various enclosures, and advanced to storm the works in the face of a well-directed fire. The difficulty of the ascent, the heat of the weather, and the enemy's superior numbers and incessant fire, combined to render this enterprise particularly arduous; twice the King's troops appeared to stagger; but recovering, they rushed forward with renewed ardour, and drove the Americans out of the works at the point of the bayonet; thus proving their superior bravery and discipline, by gaining a complete victory over an enemy three times as numerous as themselves and protected by entrenchments. The flank companies of the TENTH were among the troops which distinguished themselves, and every officer was wounded. Their loss was two serjeants and five rank and file killed; Captains Parsons, Fitzgerald, Lieutenants Pittigrew, Verner, Hamilton, Kelly, one drummer, and thirty-nine rank and file wounded. The valour of the British soldiers in North America excited the admiration of their sovereign and country; yet, the circumstances in which they were placed rendered it impossible for their prowess to be exercised with the prospect of ultimate success. The great superiority of the numbers of the enemy more than counter-balanced the advantages of superior skill and discipline, and the troops in Boston remained in a state of blockade; live cattle, vegetables, and even fuel, were sent for their use from England; many of the vessels were, however, wrecked, and others captured by the Americans, and great distress, sickness, and loss of life occurred. [Sidenote: 1776] No advantage being likely to result from the possession of Boston under the circumstances in which the troops were placed, it was evacuated in the middle of March, 1776, and the TENTH were moved to Nova Scotia. They were stationed at Halifax until June, when they sailed with the expedition to Staten Island, to take part in an extensive plan of operations. The regiment landed on Staten Island in the early part of July; reinforcements arrived from England, also a body of Hessians, and the TENTH, thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth, and fifty-second regiments, formed the third brigade of the army, under Major-General Jones, in the division commanded by Lieut.-General Earl Percy. On the 22nd of August, a descent was made on the south-west end of _Long Island_, and on the night of the 26th, the TENTH advanced, in support of the leading division, to seize on a pass in the mountains. This pass was occupied without opposition; the troops crossed the hills, and directed their march towards the enemy's lines at _Brooklyn_. Arriving at Bedford, an attack was commenced on the American battalions which were quitting the woody heights to return to their lines, and the enthusiastic ardour of the royal forces overcame all opposition. Encouraged by their success, and inspired with lively anticipations of victory, the soldiers urged their way towards the lines to storm the works; but they were ordered to desist, to spare the unnecessary effusion of blood which an attack by storm would have occasioned. The conduct of the British troops on this occasion was highly commended in General Sir William Howe's despatch. The Americans abandoned their lines, and retreated across the East River to New York. The TENTH having thus had the honour of taking part in the reduction of _Long Island_, crossed the river to New York Island, and were engaged in the movements by which the American army was driven from the city of _New York_. In the second week of October, the regiment again embarked in boats, and proceeded up the river to the vicinity of West Chester, where it went ashore; but afterwards re-embarked and sailed to Pell's Point, where a sharp skirmish occurred. The regiment was also engaged in the movements by which the passage of the Brunx river was effected, and the American army forced to abandon its fortified lines on _White Plains_. In the action on the 28th of October, the TENTH lost two men. From White Plains the army withdrew to engage in the siege of Forts Washington and Lee, which obstructed the navigation of the North River. _Fort Washington_ was invested, and on the 16th of November, the TENTH were engaged, under Lieut.-General Earl Percy, in assaulting the right flank of the enemy's entrenchments; they took part in carrying an advanced work, and afterwards passed the lines, which were carried in a most gallant manner, and upwards of two thousand provincials surrendered prisoners of war. The loss of the regiment was limited to Captain Mackintosh and three rank and file killed; five rank and file wounded. In the early part of December, the regiment was detached, with other troops, under Lieut.-Generals Clinton and Earl Percy, against _Rhode Island_, which was the principal station of the enemy's naval force, and from whence the Americans sent out privateers which interrupted the British commerce. The regiment sailed on this enterprise in the early part of December; a landing was effected on the morning of the 9th of that month, and the island was speedily reduced to submission to the British government. [Sidenote: 1777] After passing several months on Rhode Island, the TENTH embarked for New Jersey, and formed part of the army which took the field, under General Sir William Howe, in the early part of June, 1777. General Washington kept the American army in the mountain fastnesses, where he could not be attacked, except under great disadvantages, and the English general resolved on an expedition against Philadelphia. Embarking on board the fleet, the regiment sailed for Chesapeak-bay, and from thence up the Elk River, to Elk Ferry, where it landed about the end of August: the fifth, TENTH, twenty-seventh, fortieth, and fifty-fifth regiments, formed the second brigade under Major-General Grant. The American army took up a position at _Brandywine Creek_, to oppose the advance of the British on Philadelphia, and on the 11th of September the enemy's posts were attacked; the TENTH forming part of the force selected to attack the American troops posted at Chad's Ford. After a sharp cannonade, the troops rushed through the stream with fixed bayonets, the fourth foot taking the lead, and, overpowering all resistance, captured three brass field-pieces and a howitzer. The Americans were routed at all points, and they made a precipitate retreat. The TENTH had two rank and file killed, and six wounded, on this occasion. The regiment passed the night on the field of battle, and marched on the following day to Concord; on the 13th of September it arrived at Ashtown, and on the 25th the troops pitched their tents at Germantown, about six miles from Philadelphia, which city was taken possession of by the grenadiers. On the 29th of September, the TENTH and forty-second regiments were detached from the camp at Germantown, under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Stirling, of the forty-second, to attack a strong redoubt erected by the Americans on the Jersey shore, at a place called _Billing's-point_, to prevent the removal of a sunken barrier across the river Delaware. The two regiments crossed the river from Chester on the 1st of October, and on approaching the redoubt, three hundred Americans in garrison fled; having first set fire to their barracks and spiked their cannon. The TENTH and forty-second pursued the Americans about two miles, but were unable to overtake them. Billing's-point redoubt being thus captured, the obstructions to the navigation of the Delaware at that point were removed, and the TENTH and forty-second crossed the river to Chester, where they were joined by the twenty-third, and the three regiments escorted a large convoy of provisions to the camp at Germantown. The British general having sent off several detachments, the Americans resolved to hazard another battle, and they attacked the position at _Germantown_ at daybreak on the morning of the 4th of October; but were repulsed. The light company of the TENTH signalized itself on this occasion and had several men killed and wounded: the battalion companies of the regiment had their post on the right of the village, but they were not engaged. In the middle of October, the army removed to the immediate vicinity of Philadelphia, and two forts on the river were reduced. In the early part of December, the British advanced towards the enemy's fortified camp at _Whitemarsh_; the TENTH took part in several movements and skirmishes, designed to bring on a general engagement, but the Americans kept close behind their entrenchments and abatis-de-bois, and the British returned to Philadelphia. [Sidenote: 1778] The TENTH regiment passed the winter in comfortable quarters in the city of Philadelphia; but before the season for opening the campaign of 1778 arrived, the King of France concluded a treaty with, and agreed to aid, the Americans, which so completely changed the nature of the war, that it was deemed necessary to concentrate the army at New York. Philadelphia was evacuated in the middle of June, and the TENTH took part in the difficult service of retreating through a wild and woody country, intersected by rivulets, the bridges over which had been destroyed. On the 28th of June, the regiment was in advance under Lieut.-General Knyphausen, and as the last division of the army descended from the heights above _Freehold_, in New Jersey, the American troops appeared in the rear and on both flanks, and some sharp fighting took place, which terminated in the repulse of the enemy. The grenadier company of the TENTH had an opportunity of distinguishing itself on this occasion; it had Major Gardiner wounded, and several private soldiers killed and wounded. Having repulsed the enemy, the army continued its march, crossed the channel to Sandy Hook, and embarked from thence for New York. The TENTH had lost many men, during the period they had been in America, from fatigue, privation, disease, and other casualties, besides those killed and disabled in action with the enemy, and soon after the regiment arrived at New York, it was selected to return to England. The men fit for service, who volunteered to remain in the country, were transferred to other corps, and the remainder embarked from New York towards the end of October; they arrived in England in December, and immediately commenced recruiting their numbers. [Sidenote: 1781] After the decease of Lieut.-General Sandford, King George III. conferred the colonelcy of the regiment on Major-General Sir R. Murray Keith, K.B., from the late eighty-seventh foot (which was disbanded at the peace in 1763), by commission dated the 10th of October, 1781. [Sidenote: 1783] [Sidenote: 1784] [Sidenote: 1785] The American War having ceased in 1783, reductions took place in the military establishments, and the numbers of the Tenth Regiment were consequently diminished; in the autumn of 1783 the regiment embarked for Ireland, and it was stationed in that part of the United Kingdom during the years 1784 and 1785. [Sidenote: 1786] On the 2nd of March, 1786, the regiment embarked from Ireland for Jamaica, to relieve the first battalion of the sixtieth foot, which was ordered to proceed to Nova Scotia. [Sidenote: 1793] [Sidenote: 1794] [Sidenote: 1795] The regiment was stationed at Jamaica when the French Revolution occurred, which involved Europe in war and occasioned the West India islands to become the theatre of anarchy and devastation; the mulattoes and blacks imbibing the doctrine of equality, breaking the ties of subordination, and committing every description of crime. Active measures were adopted to rescue the French West India islands from republican domination; but the TENTH had sustained so serious a loss of men from disease during the nine years they had been at Jamaica, that they were ordered home to recruit: they arrived in England in August, 1795, and were stationed at Lincoln, from whence recruiting parties were sent out. After the decease of Lieut.-General Sir R. Murray Keith, Major-General the Honorable Henry Edward Fox, was appointed colonel of the TENTH foot, from the 131st regiment, by commission dated the 23rd of June, 1795. [Sidenote: 1796] The establishment was completed by drafts from other corps, and, in three months from the date of its arrival from Jamaica, the regiment was ordered to furnish seven companies to take part in completing the deliverance of the French West India Islands from the power of the republicans. The force designed for this service, under Major-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, sailed from Spithead in December, and the departure of the fleet, accompanied by a division of the royal navy under Admiral Christian, presented a most splendid spectacle; but this armament was overtaken by a storm, the fleet was dispersed, many vessels were wrecked, and others returned to Spithead. The ship containing the grenadier company of the TENTH, and several other corps, withstood the storm; but it had not been long at sea before the yellow fever broke out on board, when it returned to England, and the soldiers went into hospital at Plymouth, from whence the grenadiers of the TENTH marched to Chatham, where the regiment was assembled in 1796. [Sidenote: 1797] From Chatham the regiment embarked on an expedition to the Continent, but was ordered to land at Lymington, from whence it proceeded to the Isle of Wight, and was stationed on that island and at Portsmouth until the winter of 1798. [Sidenote: 1798] The TENTH, having been appointed to transfer their services from Europe to the British possessions in Hindoostan, embarked from Portsmouth during the winter, and arriving in the south of India, landed at the celebrated city and fortress of Madras, the capital of the British possessions in that quarter of the globe, on the 13th of April, 1799. [Sidenote: 1799] At Madras the regiment remained nearly four months, and on the 6th of August, it embarked for the rich and extensive province of Bengal, where it arrived on the 26th of the same month. [Sidenote: 1800] For fifteen months the TENTH were stationed in the Presidency of Bengal, in a country abounding in all that is essential to the comfort and even the luxury of man, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Richard Quarrell, and in November, 1800, they were sent down the river Ganges to be embarked for Egypt, which country was overrun by an army of French veterans, vauntingly designated the "Army of the East," and commanded by the celebrated General Buonaparte. [Sidenote: 1801] To effect the expulsion of the French "Army of the East" from Egypt, a British force sailed from Europe under General Sir Ralph Abercromby, and about six thousand men from India and the Cape of Good Hope, under Major-General Baird, were appointed to co-operate. To engage in this service, the TENTH sailed from Kidgaree on the 5th of December, joined the expedition, under Major-General Baird, at Bombay, and sailed from thence for the Red Sea. The original design was to proceed to the port of Suez, at the head of the Red Sea, on the borders of Arabia; but the monsoon had commenced before the fleet entered the Red Sea in April, 1801, and Major-General Baird resolved to land at Cosseir, and brave the difficulties of the desert, in the hope of affording important aid to the troops which had landed in Egypt from Europe. Eight companies of the TENTH arrived at Cosseir on the 15th of June, and the remainder of the regiment, having been separated by the monsoon gales, was some days later.[6] On landing, the country presented a frightfully desolate prospect, but the soldiers commenced their march through the desert with cheerful alacrity;[7] although suffering from excessive heat and dysentery, occasioned by bad water. The march was made during the night. A little way from Cosseir the soldiers entered a ravine, which appeared to be the old bed of a river, along which they travelled three days, when it terminated at Moilah. From Moilah the desert had a hard gravelly soil, generally, until the troops arrived at Baromba, where the first habitable spot was met with after leaving Cosseir; not a single hut having previously been seen. The troops suffered greatly from thirst and oppressive heat, with an almost irresistible inclination to sleep; some soldiers straggling from the line of march, that they might lie down and sleep, lost their lives. The little town of Baromba lay on the borders of the desert, and the Arabs offered milk, eggs, and poultry for sale, in great abundance, and very cheap. On arriving at Kenna, the regiment was ordered to proceed to Girgee, a large town of Upper Egypt, situate about a quarter of a mile from the river Nile. The regimental baggage was sent to Suez, but the "Cavera" transport foundered at sea, and all the baggage, books, &c. of the TENTH were lost. In the meantime, the British army from Europe had triumphed over the French before Alexandria, where General Sir Ralph Abercromby was mortally wounded; the French troops at Cairo had also surrendered, and the siege of _Alexandria_ was the next undertaking. The TENTH embarked from Girgee in dgerms, and proceeded down the Nile to the Island of Rhoda, where they encamped. On the 2nd of August they again embarked, and proceeded to Rosetta, a town celebrated for the beauty of its environs; beyond the Nile lay the richest parts of the Delta, the garden of Egypt. From Rosetta the regiment proceeded to El-Hamed, and joined the forces encamped at that place. Alexandria surrendered in the beginning of September, and Egypt was thus delivered; the French "_Army of the East_" being forced to evacuate a country from whence Buonaparte had vainly imagined he should extend his conquests throughout Asia. Lieut.-General (afterwards Lord) Hutchinson stated in his despatch:--"This arduous and important service has at length been brought to a conclusion. The exertions of individuals have been splendid and meritorious. The conduct of the troops of every description has been exemplary in the highest degree; there has been much to applaud, and nothing to reprehend; their ardour and regularity in camp having been as conspicuous as their courage in the field." In this service, although the TENTH had not been brought into contact with the enemy, their conduct had been exemplary, and they had sustained a loss of thirty men from the climate, and other casualties incident to the service in which they were employed. They received, in common with the other regiments, the expression of the high approbation of their Sovereign, the thanks of Parliament, and the royal authority to bear on their colours the "SPHYNX," with the word "EGYPT," to commemorate this splendid event. The officers were also rewarded with gold medals, presented to them by the Grand Seignior, in commemoration of the important service rendered to the Ottoman empire. The TENTH were selected to remain a short period in Egypt; they marched from El-Hamed on the 4th of December, arrived at Alexandria on the 5th, and encamped under the walls until the 18th, when they were removed into Fort Triangular. [Sidenote: 1802] In the city of Alexandria, formerly celebrated as the seat of learning and commerce, the regiment was stationed for several months. On the 29th of April, 1802, an explosion took place in the fort which the TENTH occupied, by which they had four men killed and ten wounded; also two Indian followers killed and ten wounded. The regiment was afterwards encamped near Alexandria; it was struck off the Indian establishment, and commenced receiving pay on the British on the 1st of May. [Sidenote: 1803] While the TENTH were encamped near Alexandria, the plague broke out among the natives. The army suddenly embarked on the 5th of March, 1803, leaving its camp equipage standing, and on the 7th the regiment sailed out of the Western Harbour. Arriving at Malta on the 27th of April, the regiment performed a quarantine of forty-two days, and afterwards sailed to Gibraltar, where it arrived on the 20th of June. [Sidenote: 1804] A treaty of peace was concluded with the French republic while the TENTH were in Egypt; but hostilities had recommenced before the regiment arrived at Gibraltar, and in 1804 a second battalion was added to the establishment. The head-quarters of the second battalion were fixed at Maldon in Essex; it was formed of men raised in Essex, for limited service, under the Additional Force Act, passed 20th July, 1804, and was placed upon the establishment from the 25th of December, 1804. [Sidenote: 1805] [Sidenote: 1806] The first battalion was stationed at Gibraltar during the years 1804, 1805, and 1806. In the meantime numerous changes occurred among the states of Europe, and the great success which at this period attended the French arms, enabled Napoleon Buonaparte, who, in 1804, had been invested with the title of Emperor of the French, King of Italy, &c., to assume the position of a dictator: his conduct towards the royal family of Naples occasioned the history of that court to become connected with the services of the TENTH regiment of foot. When war recommenced between Great Britain and France in 1803, Buonaparte occupied a portion of the Neapolitan territory with his troops. In 1805 a treaty of neutrality was concluded between the French Emperor and the King of Naples, by which the former engaged to withdraw his troops from the Neapolitan territory, and the latter was bound not to admit the fleets or armies of any of the states at war with France into his ports or territory. The conditions of this treaty were, however, violated by Ferdinand IV., who admitted an English and Russian armament into the Bay of Naples in November, 1805, and a body of British and Russian troops was landed at that city. The conduct of the King of Naples excited the indignation of the French Emperor, who concluded that this little kingdom was united with his enemies, and on the morning after the signatures were affixed to the treaty of Presburg, Napoleon issued a proclamation declaring that "the Neapolitan dynasty had ceased to reign," and denouncing vengeance against the family he had thus resolved to dethrone, in terms which left no hope of accommodation. The Russians withdrew from Naples, leaving the court to its fate. The British, under General Sir James Craig, were too few in number to defend the Neapolitan state, but they took possession of the island of Sicily, which they preserved in the interest of King Ferdinand IV. The armies of France, under Joseph Buonaparte, invaded the kingdom of Naples in the early part of 1806; the King and Queen fled to Sicily, which the British preserved as an asylum for their Majesties; they were accompanied and followed by part of the Neapolitan army, also by a number of persons connected with the court, and they took up their residence at the city of Palermo, situate in a bay on the northern coast of the island, where they received pecuniary aid from England. When their country was invaded, the Neapolitans exhibited neither public spirit nor the love of freedom, but abandoned their sovereign to his fate, and submitted to the invaders. Persons of all ranks attached themselves to the French interest, and Napoleon issued a decree conferring the crown of Naples on his brother Joseph and his legitimate heirs male, without prejudice to the eventual claim of the throne of France, but with the proviso that the crown of France and that of Naples should never be united on the same head. The city of Naples was illuminated, and the nobles were eager to manifest their attachment to their new king. Insurrections occurred in several places, but the French arms were successful, and the provinces became tranquil under the Buonaparte dynasty. It was important to England that Sicily should not fall under the dominion of France, and when the enemy made preparations for the invasion of the island, they were met in Calabria; the battle of Maida, on the 4th of July, 1806, proved the superiority of the British troops, and the provinces of Upper and Lower Calabria were restored to their legal sovereign. [Sidenote: 1807] The services of the TENTH regiment of foot became connected with the interests of the exiled royal family of Naples in the autumn of 1807, when the regiment embarked from Gibraltar, and arrived on the 28th of September at Messina, a city on the north-east side of the island of Sicily. The TENTH did not land at Messina, but were ordered round to Augusta, where they disembarked on the 2nd of October, and occupied quarters in the citadel. [Sidenote: 1808] On the 5th of April, 1808, Major J. Otto Beyer, five lieutenants, one ensign, six serjeants, and three hundred and sixty-two rank and file joined from England. About this period the two flank companies were ordered to be completed to one hundred rank and file each, and to join the flank battalion formed on the island. In June four companies were sent to reinforce the garrison of Syracuse, a fortified town situated on the south-east of the island, and celebrated in ancient times for its great population. These companies returned in August; but were again detached on the same services in October. [Sidenote: 1809] On the 20th of March, 1809, the head-quarters marched from Augusta, and the detachment from Syracuse, for Catania. At this celebrated city, which is beautifully situated in the Val di Demona, on the east coast of the island, and on the borders of Val di Nota, the regiment remained ten days, and afterwards marched to the port of Melazzo, and joined the army encamped on the plains of that town. Meanwhile Joseph Buonaparte had been removed to the throne of Spain, and the French Emperor had placed Marshal Murat, his brother-in-law, on the throne of Naples. In the beginning of June, General Sir John Stuart, Count of Maida, commanding the British troops in Sicily, embarked fifteen thousand men for the south of Italy, and for the capture of Naples, as a diversion in favour of the Austrians, who were once more at war with France. The TENTH regiment embarked on this enterprise, leaving two companies in garrison at Melazzo. The first attack made by the main body of the expedition was on Ischia, a small island in the gulf of Naples, situate about six miles from the coast. The batteries for the defence of the shores of the island being turned by the British troops, were successively deserted by the enemy, and after a short resistance, the garrison of Ischia surrendered. The garrison of Procida, another island on the same coast, was also forced to surrender; and forty gun-boats were captured. An attack was likewise made on the castle of _Scylla_, situate in a promontory in the straits of Messina, which separate Sicily from the Neapolitan territory. The TENTH regiment was selected to take part in this enterprise: having landed on the coast, it crossed the heights of Jovanni on the 14th of June, and proceeding through the mountains to the heights of Mela, immediately above the castle, bivouacked on the high grounds; at the same time the works were commenced for the attack. On the 29th of June a strong reinforcement of the enemy appeared, and the British troops were concentrated; but the French had so great an excess of numbers, that it was deemed necessary to withdraw. The stores were destroyed, the retreat effected, and the TENTH regiment was conveyed across the straits to the Messina side; having only sustained a loss of two men. The diversion so far succeeded as to prevent Murat taking part in the war with Austria, and the troops returned to Sicily: the TENTH were stationed in the citadel of Messina until the 8th of July, when they were encamped along the coast near the Faro. [Sidenote: 1810] During the summer of this year an expedition sailed from England against the coast of Holland, and Flushing, on the island of _Walcheren_, was captured. The second battalion of the TENTH embarked from Portsmouth on the 9th of November, and landed on the island of Walcheren on the 22nd of that month; but the climate proved very injurious to the health of the British soldiers, and the island was evacuated. The second battalion of the TENTH embarked from Flushing on the 10th of December, and on arriving in England it was ordered to Jersey, where it landed on the 17th of January, 1810. From Jersey the second battalion embarked on the 10th of April, 1810, for Gibraltar, and arrived at that important fortress in eighteen days. The battalion remained at Gibraltar three months, then embarked for the island of Malta, and landed there on the 12th of August. The first battalion remained on the coast of Sicily until November, when it marched into the citadel of Messina. [Sidenote: 1811] After the decease of General the Honorable Henry Edward Fox, who held the command of the regiment sixteen years, the colonelcy was conferred on Major-General the Honorable Thomas Maitland, from the fourth West India regiment, by commission dated the 19th of July, 1811. On the 22nd of August the second battalion embarked from Malta for the island of Sicily, and landed at Messina on the 27th of that month. [Sidenote: 1812] In the meantime, the efforts made by Great Britain to enable the Spaniards and Portuguese to deliver themselves from the power of Napoleon, began to assume a favourable prospect, and sanguine hopes of final success were anticipated. To aid the cause of Spanish independence, a small army was sent from Sicily to the eastern coast of Spain, and the first battalion of the TENTH was destined to take part in this service. The battalion left Messina in January, 1812, embarked at Melazzo, for Palermo, and was in quarters in that part of Sicily until June, when it joined the expedition which sailed for Spain. Approaching the coast of Spain towards the end of July, the armament appeared off Palamos, in Catalonia, but the town was too strong to be attached by so small a force, and the fleet sailed for Alicant, in Murcia, where it arrived at a critical moment, the Spanish troops in that quarter having been defeated by the French. The Anglo-Sicilian troops landed and advanced a few stages to Elda, but afterwards withdrew; the TENTH marching to Palermo, where they passed the winter, the soldiers being much disappointed at the state of inactivity in which they were detained. In November, the grenadier company of the second battalion embarked from Sicily, and joined the army on the eastern coast of Spain. [Sidenote: 1813] On the 16th of February, 1813, the second battalion embarked from Sicily, against the island of _Ponzo_, on the coast of Naples, which capitulated on the 26th of that month, when the battalion returned to Sicily. In the spring of this year, the distresses of the Spanish troops near Alicant, which could only be relieved by enlarging their cantonments, induced the British commander, Lieut.-General Sir John Murray, to make a forward movement. The TENTH formed part of the fourth column, which advanced by Xixona upon Alcoy; some fighting occurred, and the cantonments were enlarged. On the 18th of March, the regiment crossed the mountains to Ibithe, and on the 20th went into cantonments at Castalla. The French army under Marshal Suchet advanced in the early part of April, and attacked the outposts on the 12th, when Lieutenant Thompson of the TENTH regiment, deputy-assistant quartermaster-general, was killed by a cannon-shot. The Anglo-Sicilian army took up a position three miles from the pass of Biar; the TENTH having left their cantonments at Castalla, took post in the line. On the 13th of April, the enemy cleared the pass of Biar, and the battle of _Castalla_ was fought, when the French were repulsed and driven back through the pass: the TENTH did not sustain any loss on this occasion; on the day after the battle they marched to Alcoy, and, on the 19th of April, to Castalla. About this period, the grenadier companies of the first and second battalions returned to Sicily. The siege of _Tarragona_, a seaport of Catalonia, situate on a hill near the mouth of the river Francoli, having been resolved upon, the TENTH left Castalla on the 29th of May, embarked at Alicant on the 31st, and landed on the 3rd of June in the vicinity of Tarragona. Marshal Suchet advancing with an army of superior numbers, the siege was raised, and the troops were re-embarked, on the 8th of June, on which day the regiment had a man killed by a cannon-ball. On the following day the regiment landed at Balaguer, and remained a short time in Catalonia; it afterwards sailed for Alicant. During the voyage a violent tempest drove fourteen sail of transports on the sands off the mouth of the Ebro, and the "Alfred" transport, having two companies of the TENTH on board, was wrecked. After landing at Alicant, the regiment went into cantonments at Palermo. Lieutenant-General Lord William Bentinck assumed the command of the army in the east of Spain, in succession to Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray, on the 18th June, 1813. The following General Order was issued by His Lordship, dated _Alicant, 25th June, 1813_:-- "The Commander of the Forces sees with the utmost gratification the military spirit, and the determination to conquer, which pervades the whole army. We are engaged in a glorious cause,--the cause of universal liberty! It is the cause of us all; of those who are free, and those who are not. To-day the contest is fought in Spain and Germany, to-morrow it will be in Italy. Brave Italians, once so great, once masters of the world, but now, though brave and enlightened as ever, the unwilling slaves of a French tyrant, it is for the interest of the whole, that the efforts should be made where the enemy is the weakest. Success in Spain is success in Germany, in England, and in Italy! We form a great brotherhood; we must emulate each other in affection, union, and courage, and Providence, in whose hands is victory, will bless our cause!" Lieutenant-General Lord William Bentinck continued in command of this division of the army until the 23rd September, 1813, when his Lordship issued the following General Order, dated _Tarragona, 23rd September, 1813_:-- "The Commander of the Forces deeply laments that he is compelled to leave the army. It is a pleasing part of his duty to express his perfect satisfaction with the subordination and perseverance displayed by the troops upon all occasions. "He only regrets that the part assigned to this army in the plan of the campaign has not permitted the troops to partake in those brilliant triumphs, which would have been the just recompense of their valour and discipline." Lieutenant-General William Clinton succeeded Lord William Bentinck in the command of this division of the army on the 23rd September, 1813. The battle of Vittoria, on the 21st June, gained by the army under the Marquis of Wellington, changed the aspect of affairs in Spain, and the French troops in Murcia made some retrograde movements. The Anglo-Sicilian army advanced; the TENTH left their cantonments on the 5th of July, and, advancing into Catalonia, they once more appeared before the fortress of _Tarragona_, which was again invested. While before Tarragona, Assistant-Surgeon Rolston lost a leg, and a private soldier lost both feet from cannon-shot. The opposing armies in Catalonia made several movements, and the regiment withdrew from before Tarragona and proceeded to Balaguer. On the 22nd of August, five hundred men of the TENTH were sent into the interior to cut wood for the use of the army; during their absence a fire was accidentally kindled to the windward of the bivouac ground, and communicating rapidly to the dry grass and shrubs, the ground occupied by the TENTH regiment was soon enveloped in flame. The exertions of the few men of the regiment left in the lines were impeded by the explosions of the cartridges, and few of the arms and appointments of the corps were saved: four hundred stand of arms, and about the same number of sets of accoutrements, knapsacks, and suits of clothing were destroyed. By this accident the regiment was rendered unfit for the field; it embarked for Salo, and on arriving there, all the tailors and other mechanics were employed to refit it. Arms were also procured, and it was so speedily re-equipped, that it returned to the seat of war in the beginning of September: having landed at Villa Nova on the 5th of that month, it went into cantonments at Villa Franca. On the evening of the 12th of September, the advanced corps of the Anglo-Sicilian army posted at _Ordal_ were attached and overpowered by the superior numbers of the enemy. The TENTH were suddenly ordered out at two o'clock on the following morning, and they formed across the road, covering the retreat of the broken remains of the corps in advance. At daybreak the French cavalry appeared, advancing rapidly and in great force, when the regiment commenced retiring, and skirmishing with the enemy during the retrograde movement; the army falling back towards Tarragona. In the evening the regiment took post on a height near Vendrills, where it halted several hours, and afterwards continued its retreat to the vicinity of Tarragona. On the 24th of September, the regiment marched into quarters at Valls, and in October it was removed to Vendrills. The brilliant success of the allied army under the Marquis of Wellington, and the disasters of Napoleon in Germany, had a great effect upon the war in Catalonia, and the troops under Marshal Suchet withdrew from several posts. The TENTH marched, in February, 1814, to the vicinity of _Barcelona_, and formed part of the force employed in the blockade of that fortress. [Sidenote: 1814] Hostilities were terminated in April by a treaty of peace; Buonaparte was removed from the throne of France, and the Bourbon family restored.[8] The TENTH withdrew from before Barcelona, marched to Tarragona, and embarked at that port on the 25th of April; on the 19th of May they landed at the beautiful city of Palermo, situate in a bay on the northern coast of Sicily, where they went into barracks. In March, 1814, the second battalion embarked from Sicily, and landed on the island of Malta on the 24th of that month. [Sidenote: 1815] The return of Napoleon Buonaparte to France from Elba, and the declaration of war against the usurper by the allied sovereigns, in the spring of 1815, occasioned the TENTH to be removed from Sicily. They proceeded, in the first instance, by sea, from Palermo to Melazzo, and were stationed in the castle; at the same time the grenadier and light companies joined the flank battalion formed at Melazzo. The battalion companies afterwards sailed for Naples, where they landed on the 25th of May; three days after landing they went on board of two Neapolitan line of battle ships, "Geochinria" and "Carpi," and proceeded to Malta, where they landed on the 9th of June, and occupied Fort St. Elmo barracks. The battle of Waterloo was succeeded by the flight of Buonaparte from France, and his surrender to the captain of a British man-of-war. Three hundred men of the TENTH, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. O. Beyer were detached to Fort Emanoel, in charge of the Duke of Rovigo, Lieut.-General L'Allemand, and six other French officers who had belonged to the suite of Buonaparte: these officers had been sent to Malta as state prisoners. [Sidenote: 1816] Peace being restored, the army was reduced; the two battalions of the TENTH regiment, at Malta, were incorporated, and the invalids and limited-service men were sent to England; this took place in January, 1816. The good conduct of the regiment during the period it was employed on the eastern coast of Spain, in 1812, 1813, and 1814, was rewarded with the royal authority to bear the word "PENINSULA" on its colours. [Sidenote: 1817] In August, 1816, the regiment commenced embarking by detachments from Malta, for Corfu, where it was stationed until the end of August, 1817, when the head-quarters and five companies, under Colonel Travers, embarked for the islands of Cephalonia and Zante. [Sidenote: 1818] On the 21st of March, 1818, five companies embarked from Corfu, under the orders of Major Trickey, for Malta, and occupied the barracks in the Cottonera district. [Sidenote: 1819] In March, 1819, the head-quarters embarked from Cephalonia, and the detachment from Zante, for Malta, where the regiment was assembled, and occupied the lower St. Elmo barracks at Valetta, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Mathew Stewart, who was appointed from half-pay in succession to Colonel Travers, nominated an Inspecting Field-officer of Militia in the Ionian Islands. [Sidenote: 1820] During the year 1820, the regiment occupied the barracks in the Cottonera district, with detachments at Floriana, forts Manvel and Tigni, and the island of Giza. [Sidenote: 1821] From Malta, the regiment embarked, in April, 1821, for England, and landing at Portsmouth in June, was stationed at that fortress three months; it afterwards sailed to Plymouth, and occupied the citadel and Stonehouse barracks. [Sidenote: 1822] In April, 1822, the regiment embarked from Plymouth for Deptford, and after several changes of quarters it was stationed at Chatham and Sheerness. [Sidenote: 1823] On the 28th of May, 1823, the regiment embarked at Chatham, for Ireland; after landing at Cork, it proceeded to Fermoy, and in October it was removed to Rathkeale, with detachments at twelve other stations. [Sidenote: 1824] On the decease of Lieut.-General the Honorable Sir Thomas Maitland, G.C.B. and G.C.H., King George IV. conferred the colonelcy of the TENTH on Major-General Sir John Lambert, K.C.B. by commission dated the 18th of January, 1824. On the 8th January, 1824, Colonel Sir Robert Travers, was reappointed, in succession to Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, who retired from the service. [Sidenote: 1825] In April, the regiment was removed to Fermoy, and Lieut.-Colonel James Payler was appointed on the 2nd June, 1825, from the half-pay, unattached, in succession to Sir Robert Travers, promoted to the rank of Major-General. Lieut.-Colonel Payler assumed the command in June, 1825, and in September following the head-quarters were removed to Templemore. [Sidenote: 1826] From Templemore, the regiment was removed, in February, 1826, to Castlebar, where a pair of new colours, bearing a "SPHINX," with the words "EGYPT," and "PENINSULA," was presented to it by Lieut.-Colonel Payler, the commanding officer, on the 19th of May. After several changes of quarters, in the autumn of this year the regiment was formed into six service and four depôt companies, at Buttevant, from whence the service companies marched to Cork, where they embarked, in December, for Portugal, the government of which country had solicited British aid, in consequence of an apprehended insurrection, and an invasion from Spain, which threatened to oppose the introduction of a constitution conferring more liberty on the Portuguese people than they had previously possessed. [Sidenote: 1827] The service companies, under Lieut.-Colonel Payler, landed at Lisbon, in January, 1827; they formed part of the first brigade under Major-General Sir Edward Blakeney, and advanced up the country to Coimbra. The apprehension of invasion and insurrection ceasing to exist, the regiment left Coimbra, and occupied the palace and convent at Mafra, during the winter. [Sidenote: 1828] In March, 1828, the service companies embarked from Lisbon, for Corfu, where they landed on the 31st of that month, and were stationed at Port Raymond barracks. In December a detachment joined from the depôt in Ireland. [Sidenote: 1829] During the summer of 1829, the regiment was removed from Corfu to Zante, with detachments at the islands of Cerigo and Paxo. [Sidenote: 1830] [Sidenote: 1831] [Sidenote: 1832] The head-quarters remained at Zante during the years 1830 and 1831; in May, 1832, they were removed to Corfu, and in July to Vido; but returned to Corfu in December. [Sidenote: 1833] Lieut.-Colonel John Henry Belli was appointed on the 17th May, 1833, in exchange with Lieut.-Colonel Payler; and Lieut.-Colonel William Gardner Freer was promoted by purchase on 24th May, in succession to Lieut.-Colonel Belli, who retired. [Sidenote: 1836] Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Freer died at Corfu on the 2nd August, 1836, where he was in command of the regiment: he was succeeded by Brevet Lieut.-Colonel William Cochrane.[9] [Sidenote: 1837] Lieut.-Colonel W. Cochrane was appointed Assistant Adjutant-General at head-quarters on the 16th June, 1837, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Holman Custance from the half-pay. [Sidenote: 1838] The head-quarters continued to be stationed at Corfu and Vido alternately, until November, 1837, when the service companies of the TENTH were relieved from duty in the Ionian Islands, and embarked for Ireland, where they arrived in December, 1837, and January, 1838, and landed at Cork. [Sidenote: 1839] The regiment was stationed in Ireland until May, 1839, when it embarked at Dublin for England; it landed at Liverpool, and was afterwards quartered in Lancashire. [Sidenote: 1840] During the year 1840 the regiment was stationed at Burnley and Manchester. [Sidenote: 1841] The regiment proceeded to Newcastle-on-Tyne on the 25th June, 1841, and marched from thence to Scotland; it arrived at Edinburgh on the 21st, 24th, and 27th July, and proceeded to Glasgow on the 9th August following. [Sidenote: 1842] On the 29th March, 1842, Colonel James Considine was appointed from the half-pay unattached, in succession to Colonel Custance, who was nominated to the command of the Depôt Battalion in the Isle of Wight. In March, 1842, the regiment left Glasgow, and proceeded in divisions to Winchester. On the 1st April, it was augmented to the India establishment, preparatory to its embarkation for Bengal. It proceeded to Gravesend, and embarked in freight ships for Calcutta in April and May, 1842, under the command of Colonel Considine, K.H. The regiment disembarked at Calcutta in August and September of that year. Lieut.-Colonel Gervas Power was promoted on the 8th April, 1842, on the augmentation of the regiment: he died at Calcutta on the 30th December following; and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel John Luard, who was promoted from the twenty-first Royal North British Fusiliers on the 31st December. [Sidenote: 1843] [Sidenote: 1844] The regiment remained at Fort William, Calcutta, until the 15th November, 1844, when it marched for Meerut under the command of Major Franks. [Sidenote: 1845] The head-quarters arrived at Meerut on the 22nd February, 1845. Lieut.-Colonel Luard exchanged to the half-pay on the 28th March, with Colonel Sir George Couper, Bart., who retired from the service, and Lieut.-Colonel Thomas H. Franks was promoted by purchase, on the 28th March, 1845. Colonel James Considine died at Meerut on the 4th September, from an attack of cholera, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Strickland on the 5th September. [Sidenote: 1846] The regiment marched from Meerut, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Franks, on the 16th December, 1845, and joined the _Army of the Sutlej_ on the 8th January, 1846, both officers and men animated with the laudable desire to share the dangers, and to reap some of the laurels already acquired by the army in this brief but exciting campaign. A month, however, passed without the main army being employed in any occurrence of note, the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief taking advantage of the interval to collect the munitions of war; while on the other hand, the Sikhs, having been strengthened by reinforcements, continued to hold strong positions on the banks of the Sutlej; and notwithstanding their defeat in the battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah on the 18th, 21st, and 22nd December, 1845, they subsequently formed a strongly entrenched camp at _Sobraon_. Although the intelligence of the victory of Aliwal on the 28th January, 1846, and the sight of the numerous bodies which floated from the vicinity of that battle-field to the bridge of boats at Sobraon, apparently disheartened the enemy, and caused many of them to return to their homes, yet in a few days they appeared as confident as ever of being able in their entrenched position to defy the Anglo-Indian army, and to prevent the passage of the Sutlej. The heavy ordnance having arrived on the 8th February, the day on which the forces under Major-General Sir Henry Smith, who had been detached to Loodiana, and had obtained a signal victory over the enemy at Aliwal, rejoined the main body of the army, it was determined on coming at once to a battle with the Sikhs, to storm their entrenchments, and finally to drive them out of Hindoostan. This was an undertaking of some magnitude. From observations made during the time the head-quarters of the army were stationed at the village of Nihalkee, it was ascertained that the position at Sobraon was covered with formidable entrenchments, and defended by thirty thousand of the _élite_ of the Khalsa troops; besides being united by a good bridge to a reserve on the opposite bank of the river, on which was stationed a considerable camp, with artillery, which commanded and flanked the enemy's field-works on the British side of the Sutlej. About daybreak on the 10th February, the mortars, battering guns, and field-artillery were disposed on the alluvial land, embracing within its fire the enemy's works. As soon as the sun's rays cleared the heavy mist which hung over the plain, the cannonade commenced, but notwithstanding the admirable manner in which the guns were served, it would have been visionary to expect that they could, within any limited time, silence the fire of seventy pieces of artillery behind well-constructed batteries, or dislodge troops so strongly entrenched. It soon became evident to the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Hugh Gough, that musketry and the bayonet must ultimately decide the contest. Accordingly the seventh brigade, in which was the TENTH foot, reinforced by the fifty-third regiment, and led by Brigadier Stacy, was ordered to head the attack, to turn the enemy's right, to encounter his fire before his numbers were thinned, or spirit broken, and (to use the soldier-like expression of the Commander-in-Chief General Sir Hugh Gough) "_to take off the rough edge of the Sikhs in the fight_." An opportunity was now afforded for the TENTH to distinguish itself, and the regiment nobly availed itself of this opportunity. At nine o'clock the brigade moved on to the attack over the sandy flat in admirable order, halting to correct, when necessary, any imperfections in its line. For some moments, notwithstanding the regularity and coolness of the assault, so hot was the fire of the Khalsa troops, that it seemed almost impracticable to gain the entrenchments. A brief halt ensued, the brigade again advanced, and persevering gallantry triumphed. The TENTH foot, under Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, now for the first time brought into serious contact with the enemy, greatly distinguished itself. With cool and steady courage, the regiment marched on with the precision of a field-day, and _never fired a shot until within the works of the enemy_[10]--a forbearance much to be commended, and worthy of constant imitation, to which the success of the first effort, and the small loss sustained by the regiment, may be attributed.[11] Other brigades, at the moment of this successful onset, were ordered forward in support. The thunder of upwards of one hundred pieces of ordnance reverberated through the valley of the Sutlej, and it was soon perceived, that the weight of the whole force within the enemy's camp was likely to be thrown upon the two brigades (sixth and seventh) that had passed the trenches.[12] The Sikhs fought with the energy of desperation, and, even when some of their entrenchments were mastered with the bayonet, endeavoured to recover with the sword the positions they had lost. It was not until the weight of all three divisions of infantry, in addition to several regiments of cavalry, with the fire of every piece of field-artillery that could be sent to their aid, had been felt, that the enemy gave way. The Sikh regiments retreated at first in tolerable order, but the incessant volleys of the British soon caused them to take to a rapid and discomfited flight. Masses of them precipitated themselves on to their bridge, which being broken by the fire of the British, was incapable to sustain the multitude pressing forward, and the sudden rise of the Sutlej rendered the ford almost impassable, adding another obstacle to the escape of the enemy. A dreadful carnage ensued. The stream was red with the bodies of men and horses, the bridge in many places had given way, and it is considered, that, at least a third of the Sikh army perished in this battle; sixty-seven of their guns fell into the hands of the victors, together with two hundred small camel-swivels (zumboo-rucks), numerous standards, and vast munitions of war. In this manner ended the _Battle of_ SOBRAON; at six in the morning it commenced; at nine it became a hand-to-hand conflict; and by eleven the victory was gained. The TENTH regiment had Lieutenant Walter Yonge Beale, one serjeant, and twenty-eight rank and file killed. Lieutenants Henry R. Evans and Charles J. Lindam, two serjeants, and ninety-eight rank and file wounded. Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to authorise the TENTH regiment to bear on its colours and appointments the word _Sobraon_, in commemoration of its gallantry in that battle; and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Harte Franks was nominated a Companion of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath. The regiment left Nihalkee on the 11th February, crossed the Sutlej on the 13th, and on the 20th of the same month arrived before _Lahore_, where it was present at the occupation of that city, and at the signing of the treaty, which, while it convinced the world of the moderation and justice of the paramount power of India, is calculated to add to the stability of the Anglo-Indian empire, and also to provide for the future tranquillity of the Punjaub, by maintaining a Sikh government at Lahore, capable of controlling its army, protecting its subjects, and securing the British frontier against similar acts of aggression. On the 23rd of March, 1846, the regiment marched from Lahore, recrossed the Sutlej on the 26th of that month, and arrived at Meerut on the 15th of April following. It marched again from Meerut, _en route_ to Ferozepore, on the 27th of October, 1846, and arrived in cantonments on the 20th of November, where it remained encamped until the 28th of December, when it again proceeded to Lahore, under the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Strickland, with a body of troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, and occupied quarters in the garrison of that city on the 2nd of January, 1847. [Sidenote: 1847] The TENTH regiment continued in the occupation of Lahore, as a part of the garrison of that city, to the end of the year 1847, at which period this record is concluded. NOTES TO PAGES 45 AND 59. _Page 45._--In 1783, the regular regiments of infantry were authorised to assume "_County Titles_," in order to promote the recruiting service, and the Tenth was directed to bear the title of _North Lincolnshire_ Regiment in addition to the numerical title. _Page 59._--Lieutenant-General Lord William Bentinck returned to Sicily in October, 1813, and in February, 1814, he proceeded with a body of English and Sicilian troops, amounting to 6,500 men, from that island to Leghorn, from whence he published a Proclamation, inviting the Italians to shake off the French yoke: he subsequently landed his combined troops, and after a few slight actions made himself master of Genoa, on the 18th April, 1814. On the termination of the War in 1814 His Lordship retired for some time to Rome. [Illustration: _Madeley lith. 3 Wellington S^t. Strand._ TENTH FOOT. 1848. _For Cannon's Military Records._ ] FOOTNOTES: [6] Disembarkation Return, TENTH Foot, June, 1801--LANDED AT COSSEIR, 2 lieut.-colonels, 2 majors, 6 captains, 16 lieutenants, 5 ensigns, 5 staff, 46 serjeants, 18 drummers, and 854 rank and file. Lieut.-Colonel Samuel Auchmuty of the TENTH performed the duty of adjutant-general to the expedition. [7] Route from Cosseir on the Red Sea to Kenna on the Nile. Miles. From Cosseir to the New Wells 11 _Water._ Half way to Moilah 17 _No water._ Moilah 17 Water and provisions. Advanced Wells 9 _Water._ Half way to Legaitte 19 _No water._ Legaitte 19 _Water and provisions._ Baromba 18 Water. Kenna 10 The Nile. --- 120 The distances were thus computed at the time, but it was believed that they were greatly underrated. [8] Extract from a despatch from Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, dated _Toulouse, 19th April, 1814_:-- "Upon the breaking up of this army, I perform a most satisfactory duty in reporting to your Lordship my sense of the conduct and merit of Lieutenant-General William Clinton, and of the troops under his command since they have been employed in the Peninsula. Circumstances have not enabled those troops to have so brilliant a share in the operations of the war, as their brother officers and soldiers on this side of the Peninsula; but they have not been less usefully employed; their conduct, when engaged with the enemy, has always been meritorious; and I have had every reason to be satisfied with the General Officer commanding, and with them." [9] Now Deputy Adjutant-General to the Forces in Ireland. [10] Despatch of General Sir Hugh Gough, Commander-in-Chief in India. [11] A similar proof of coolness on the part of the TENTH Regiment of Foot was evinced at the Battle of _Steenkirk_, in 1692, and is narrated at page 8. [12] The sixth brigade consisted of Her Majesty's 80th regiment, and 33rd and 63rd regiments of native infantry. The seventh brigade consisted of Her Majesty's 10th and 53rd regiments, and 43rd and 59th regiments of native infantry. SUCCESSION OF COLONELS OF THE TENTH, OR THE NORTH LINCOLNSHIRE, REGIMENT OF FOOT. JOHN EARL OF BATH. _Appointed 20th June, 1685._ JOHN GRANVILLE, son of Sir Beville Granville, Knight, who was distinguished for his devotion to the royal cause during the rebellion in the reign of King Charles I., commanded his father's regiment of loyal Cornishmen in His Majesty's service, when in his fifteenth year, and was so conspicuous for valour and discretion beyond what is usually evinced at that age, that after taking part in several skirmishes in the west of England, he was placed at the head of a brigade of six regiments, with the rank of major-general, and he was severely wounded at the second battle of Newbury. He held the appointment of Gentleman of the Bedchamber to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, afterwards King Charles II., whom he attended, during the exile of the royal family, and shared in His Majesty's travels and afflictions in France, Flanders, Holland, and the island of Jersey. The King appointed him governor of the Scilly Islands, which he defended against the fleet of Cromwell, under Admirals Blake and Askew. He took part in bringing to maturity the measures which led to the restoration of the royal family, frequently consulting with General Monk, his near kinsman; and in April, 1661, His Majesty rewarded this faithful and zealous servant of the Crown with the dignity of Baron Granville of Kilkhampton in Cornwall, and of Bideford in Devonshire, Viscount Granville of Lansdown, and EARL OF BATH. He was heir to the titles of Earl of Carboile, Thorigny, and Granville, in Normandy, in as full and ample a manner as his ancestors had formerly enjoyed them, before that dukedom was lost to the Crown of England, and he was authorized, by royal warrant, to use the same. The EARL OF BATH was appointed governor of Plymouth and commandant of an independent company of foot in garrison at that fortress, and on the breaking out of the rebellion of James Duke of Monmouth, in June, 1685, his lordship was appointed colonel of a newly-raised corps, of which his independent company was the nucleus,--now the TENTH, or the NORTH LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT. When the destruction of the established religion and laws of the kingdom appeared to have been resolved upon by the court, the EARL OF BATH communicated with the Prince of Orange, and when His Highness arrived with an armament from Holland, he arrested the Earl of Huntingdon, and several other officers in garrison at Plymouth, and declared for the Prince of Orange, for which he was deprived of his commissions by King James, but he was restored by the Prince in three weeks afterwards. In 1693, he resigned the colonelcy of the TENTH foot, in favour of his nephew, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Beville Granville. He died in 1701. SIR CHARLES CARNEY. _Appointed 8th December, 1688._ SIR CHARLES CARNEY was an officer in the reign of King Charles II., and served on the Continent in the war between the United Provinces, the Emperor of Germany and France; and on the breaking out of the rebellion in 1685, he raised a company in the EARL OF BATH's regiment, now TENTH foot, of which corps he was appointed major, and was afterwards promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy, in succession to Sir Nicholas Stannings. He adhered to King James II. at the Revolution in 1688, and obtained the colonelcy of his regiment, but was removed by the Prince of Orange, on the 31st of December, 1688. He was not afterwards employed in the service. JOHN EARL OF BATH. _Reappointed 31st December, 1688._ _Resigned in October, 1693._ SIR BEVILLE GRANVILLE. _Appointed 29th October, 1693._ SIR BEVILLE GRANVILLE obtained a commission in the army in June, 1685, and served in the regiment of which his uncle, JOHN EARL OF BATH was colonel, now TENTH foot, of which corps he was appointed lieut.-colonel at the Revolution in 1688. He highly distinguished himself at the battle of Steenkirk in 1692, leading his regiment into action with cool collected valour, which procured for him the commendations of the general officers who witnessed his conduct. He also displayed intrepidity and firmness at the forcing of the French lines in 1693; and the Earl of Bath resigned the colonelcy of the TENTH in his favour, in the autumn of the same year. He continued to serve in the Netherlands, and commanded a brigade in the campaign of 1695. Queen Anne promoted him to the rank of major-general, and appointed him governor of the island of Barbadoes, when he was succeeded in the colonelcy of his regiment by Lord North and Grey. The climate of Barbadoes not agreeing with his constitution, he obtained permission to return to England, but died on his passage home in 1706. WILLIAM LORD NORTH AND GREY. _Appointed 15th January, 1703._ WILLIAM LORD NORTH AND GREY, of Rolleston, acquired great reputation in the wars of Queen Anne, while serving under the celebrated John Duke of Marlborough. He was appointed colonel of the TENTH regiment of foot in January, 1703, and served the campaign of that year at the head of his regiment, performing a conspicuous part at the siege of Huy. In the following year he accompanied his regiment to Germany, evinced signal gallantry at Schellenberg, and had his right hand shot off at the battle of Blenheim. This loss did not occasion him to retire from active service; but he continued at the head of the TENTH, and soon after the celebrated victory of Ramilies, in 1706, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and placed at the head of a brigade of infantry. During the campaign of 1707, he was at the head of the fifth brigade of foot; at the battle of Oudenarde, in 1708, he commanded a battalion of the royals, and the TENTH, twenty-first, and twenty-sixth regiments; he also took part in covering the siege of Lisle, and evinced signal gallantry at the siege and capture of Ghent. On the 1st of January, 1709, he was promoted to the rank of major-general, and in 1710 to that of lieut.-general. He served the campaign of 1712, under James Duke of Ormond, and his services were rewarded with the appointment of governor of Portsmouth. When measures were adopted to prevent the accession of the house of Hanover to the throne of Great Britain, Lord North and Grey espoused the interest of the Stuart dynasty, and became a secret advocate for the elevation of the Pretender to the throne. King George I. deprived his lordship of the colonelcy of the TENTH foot, and of the government of Portsmouth; also confined him in the Tower of London. He was subsequently released, and he withdrew to the Continent. Although a very gallant officer in the field, yet he lost sight of the best interests of his country; and during his residence at Brussels, he embraced the Roman Catholic religion. He died at Madrid in October, 1734. HENRY GROVE. _Appointed 23rd June, 1715._ This officer entered the army on the 1st of December, 1688, as an ensign in one of the regiments which had declared for the Prince of Orange. He was many years an officer of the TENTH foot, and served with the regiment in the wars of King William III., which were terminated by the peace of Ryswick in 1697. He also served the campaigns of 1702, 1703, and 1704, with the regiment, and was at the battles of Schellenberg and Blenheim. In the autumn of 1704 he succeeded Major Granville, who was wounded at the battle of Blenheim, in the majority of the TENTH, with which corps he served at the forcing of the French lines in 1705, and at the battle of Ramilies in 1706; and he succeeded lieut.-colonel Rawley in the lieut.-colonelcy of the regiment in the same year. Lieut.-Colonel Grove commanded the TENTH at the battle of Oudenarde, in July, 1708, and in December following he was taken prisoner at the siege of Ghent. He was liberated soon afterwards, and in the following year he commanded the regiment at the siege of the castle of Tournay, and at the battle of Malplaquet. The practice of giving medals, promotion, and inscriptions on regimental colours, for battles and sieges, had not been introduced; but lieut.-colonel Grove's services were rewarded with the rank of colonel in the army, and in 1711 he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. King George I. conferred the colonelcy of the TENTH foot on brigadier-general Grove, who was promoted to the rank of major-general in 1727, and to that of lieut.-general in 1735. He died on the 20th of November, 1736. FRANCIS COLUMBINE. _Appointed 27th January, 1737._ FRANCIS COLUMBINE served in the wars of Queen Anne, under the celebrated John Duke of Marlborough; he was many years an officer of the eighth regiment of foot, in which corps he rose to the rank of major, and he was subsequently promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the TENTH. He performed the duty of commanding officer of the TENTH upwards of twelve years, and preserved the regiment in a high state of discipline and efficiency. He was promoted to the rank of major-general on the 29th of October, 1735, and was rewarded with the colonelcy of the TENTH foot in 1737; on the 2nd of July, 1739, he was advanced to the rank of lieut.-general. He died on the 22nd of September, 1746. JAMES LORD TYRAWLEY. _Appointed 22nd December, 1746._ THE HONOURABLE JAMES O'HARA entered the army on the 15th of March, 1703, as lieutenant in the royal regiment of fusiliers, commanded by his father. He proceeded with his regiment to the relief of Barcelona in 1706; in the following year he served on the staff of the army in Spain, and was wounded at the battle of Almanza, where he was instrumental in saving the Earl of Galway's life. He afterwards served in Catalonia, and in the island of Minorca, and in 1713, he was promoted to the colonelcy of the seventh royal fusiliers, in succession to his father, at whose decease, in 1733, he succeeded to the dignity of BARON TYRAWLEY. The rank of brigadier-general was conferred on his lordship, in 1735, that of major-general, in July 1739, and in the following month he was removed from the royal fusiliers to the fifth horse, now fourth dragoon guards. In March, 1743, he was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general, and in April of the same year, he obtained the colonelcy of the second troop of horse grenadier-guards, from which he was removed, in 1745, to the third troop of life-guards, which gave him the privilege of taking the court duty of gold-stick. King George II. resolved to disband the third and fourth troops of life-guards, in 1746, and LORD TYRAWLEY was removed to the TENTH foot; he was again removed, in 1749, to the fourteenth dragoons; in 1752 to the third dragoons, and in 1755, to the second regiment of foot-guards. He was appointed governor of Portsmouth, in 1759, and was promoted to the rank of general in 1761. LORD TYRAWLEY held the appointment of governor of Minorca for several years, and was employed as envoy and ambassador to the courts of Portugal and Russia. He died in 1773. EDWARD POLE. _Appointed 10th August, 1749._ This officer was appointed cornet in the Scots Greys on the 23rd of January, 1709, and he served with his regiment in the Netherlands during the remainder of the war, which was terminated by the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713. He was at the battle of Malplaquet in 1709, and was actively employed in suppressing the rebellion in Scotland, in 1715 and 1716. He was several years major in the twenty-third foot; in 1739 he was promoted to the lieut.-colonelcy of the twelfth dragoons, and in 1749, King George II. rewarded his long and faithful services with the colonelcy of the TENTH foot. He was promoted to the rank of major-general in 1757, and to that of lieut.-general in 1759. His decease occurred in December 1762. EDWARD SANDFORD. _Appointed 14th January, 1763._ EDWARD SANDFORD served many years in the first regiment of foot-guards, in which corps he was promoted to captain and lieut.-colonel in February, 1748. On the 21st of April, 1758, he was appointed colonel of the sixty-sixth regiment, which was formed at that period of the second battalion of the nineteenth; and in June of the same year he was removed to the fifty-second foot. He was promoted to the rank of major-general in 1761; was removed to the TENTH regiment in 1763, and was advanced to the rank of lieut.-general in 1770. He died in 1781. SIR ROBERT MURRAY KEITH, K.B. _Appointed 10th October, 1781._ When King George II. discovered the excellent qualities of the Scots Highlanders, as soldiers of the regular army, His Majesty authorized several corps to be raised among the clans, and they proved a valuable addition to the military establishment of the kingdom. One of these corps was designated the eighty-seventh, or Highland volunteers; it was raised by Robert Murray Keith, who was appointed lieut.-colonel commandant on the 10th of May, 1760. This officer served with his regiment in Germany, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, and the Highland volunteers signalized themselves on several occasions, but they were disbanded at the peace in 1763. Lieut.-Colonel Keith was promoted to the rank of colonel in 1772, and to that of major-general in 1777; in 1781 he was appointed colonel of the TENTH foot, and promoted to the rank of lieut.-general. His services were rewarded with the dignity of Knight of the Bath. He died in 1795. THE HONOURABLE HENRY EDWARD FOX. _Appointed 23rd June, 1795._ This officer was appointed cornet in the first dragoon guards in 1770, lieutenant in 1773, and captain in the thirty-eighth foot in 1774. He was serving with his regiment at Boston, when the American war commenced, and throughout the campaigns which followed, he was actively employed. The thirty-eighth shared in the actions at Concord and Bunker's Hill in 1775; the capture of Long Island; the action at White Plains in 1776; and the expedition to Philadelphia in 1777. On the 12th of July, 1777, he was appointed major in the forty-ninth foot, which corps was also serving in America, from whence it was removed to the West Indies. About the period of its embarkation, he received his appointment to the lieut.-colonelcy of the thirty-eighth foot, then occupying the lines in front of New York. At the termination of the war he was appointed aide-de-camp to the King with the rank of colonel. In 1793 he received the rank of major-general, and the colonelcy of the 131st regiment, then newly raised, and two years afterwards his services were rewarded with the colonelcy of the TENTH regiment of foot; in 1799, he was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general. During the war which followed the French Revolution, when the British had taken possession of several places in the Mediterranean, the services of lieut.-general the Honourable Henry Edward Fox were transferred to the Mediterranean, where he held the local rank of general, excepting at Gibraltar, in 1801, and at Gibraltar, also, in 1804. In 1808, he was promoted to the rank of general, and his services were also rewarded with the government of Portsmouth. He died in 1811. THE HONOURABLE THOMAS MAITLAND. _Appointed 19th July, 1811._ THE HONOURABLE THOMAS MAITLAND, third son of James, seventh Earl of Lauderdale, was appointed ensign in the twenty-fifth foot in July 1777, and in the following year he was promoted to captain in the seventy-eighth regiment. In 1794 he obtained the lieut.-colonelcy of the sixty-second foot. He served in the West Indies during the early part of the war of the French Revolution; took an active part in the attempt to deliver, from the power of the republicans, the island of St. Domingo, where he obtained the local rank of brigadier-general in 1797; when St. Domingo was evacuated, his services were extended to the other islands, and in September, 1798, he was appointed colonel of the tenth West India regiment. On the 14th of September, 1799, he was promoted to the local rank of major-general on a particular service on the coast of France. In January, 1805, he received the rank of major-general, and in February of the same year he was appointed colonel of the third garrison battalion. He was appointed to the staff of the island of Ceylon, with the local rank of lieut.-general, on the 31st of July 1806, and in 1807, he obtained the colonelcy of the fourth West India regiment. In 1811, he was promoted to the rank of lieut.-general, and removed to the TENTH regiment of foot. On the 15th of July, 1813, he was appointed governor and commander-in-chief of the island of Malta and its dependencies; and he was subsequently nominated privy councillor of Malta, commander of the forces in the Mediterranean, and Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. He performed the important duties which devolved upon him in consequence of these appointments, to the satisfaction of the Crown, and to the advantage of the inhabitants of the islands committed to his charge, who highly prized the order, equitable rule, and personal safety they enjoyed under the protection of Great Britain. He was honoured with the dignity of Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, and Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order. He was greatly beloved and esteemed among the natives of the Ionian Islands, and a monument, erected by the inhabitants of Corfu, bears an inscription, in Greek, expressive of their estimation of his character and virtues. He died at Malta, on the 17th January, 1824, and was buried in the bastion which contains the remains of the celebrated Sir Ralph Abercromby. SIR JOHN LAMBERT, G.C.B. _Appointed 18th January, 1824._ GENERAL SIR JOHN LAMBERT, G.C.B. entered the army as an Ensign in the First Foot Guards in January, 1791; he was promoted to the rank of Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel on the 9th October 1793; he served in the campaign of 1793 in Flanders, was present at the siege of Valenciennes, the action of Lincelles, and the siege of Dunkirk. He served also with the Foot Guards in Ireland during the rebellion in 1798. In 1799 he embarked with the expedition to Holland, and was present in the actions of the 27th August, 10th and 19th September, and 2nd and 6th October of that year. He embarked for the Peninsula and served with Lieut.-General Sir John Moore in 1808 and 1809, and was present with him at the battle of Corunna. In 1809 he commanded the Light Companies of the First and Third Brigades of Foot Guards in the expedition to the Scheldt, and attained the rank of Colonel on 25th July, 1810. In May 1811 he embarked in command of the Third Battalion of the Grenadier Guards for Cadiz, from whence he proceeded in January 1812 with a Brigade to Carthagena. He returned to Cadiz on the 15th April, and assumed the command of the Reserve in the Isla de Leon, and in October of that year he joined the main army at Salamanca. He was promoted to the rank of Major-General on the 4th June, 1813, and was appointed to the Staff of the Army under Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula; he commanded a Brigade in the Sixth Division at the Battles of Nivelle, Nive, Orthes, and Toulouse, for which he received the distinction of a Cross. He was subsequently appointed to the Staff of the Division of the Army sent to America in 1814, and took part in the attack on New Orleans in January 1815, and at the siege of Fort Bowyer; he succeeded to the command of that division of the Army on the deaths of Major-Generals Pakenham and Gibbs. He returned from America in the spring of 1815, and arrived in sufficient time to take the command of a Brigade in the campaign of 1815, and to participate in the victory obtained at Waterloo. He was appointed to the colonelcy of the 10th Regiment of Foot on the 18th January 1824; he attained the rank of Lieutenant-General on 27th May 1825, and that of General on 23rd November 1841. In addition to the order of G.C.B., he was a Knight of the Third Class of Wladimir of Russia, and Commander of the Bavarian order of Maximilian Joseph. His decease took place on the 14th September 1847. SIR THOMAS M'MAHON, BART. and K.C.B. _Appointed from 94th Regiment, 28th September, 1847._ APPENDIX. _Battles, Sieges, &c., in the Netherlands, during the reign of King_ WILLIAM III., _from 1689 to the Peace of Ryswick, in 1697._ Battle of Walcourt 25 August 1689 --------- Fleurus 4 July 1690 Mons surrendered to the French 10 April 1691 Namur ditto ditto 20 June 1692 Battle of Steenkirk 3 August ---- Furnes and Dixmude captured -- Sept. ---- The French lines at D'Otignies forced 10 July 1693 Battle of Landen 29 July ---- Surrender of Huy 17 Sept. 1694 Attack on Fort Kenoque 9 June 1695 Dixmude surrendered to the French 16 July ---- Namur retaken by King William III. 25 July ---- Citadel of Namur surrendered 5 Sept. ---- Treaty of Ryswick signed 11 Sept. 1697 _List of Sieges, Battles, &c. in the Netherlands and Germany, during the Campaigns under the_ DUKE _of_ MARLBOROUGH _from 1702 to 1711._ Invested. Surrendered. Siege of Kayserswerth 16 April 17 June 1702 Skirmish near Nimeguen .. 11 June ---- Siege of Venloo 29 August 25 Sept. ---- Capture of Fort St. Michael .. 18 Sept. ---- Siege of Stevenswaert .. 3 Oct. ---- -------- Ruremonde .. 6 Oct. ---- Capture of Liege Citadel .. 23 Oct. ---- Siege of Bonn 24 April 15 May 1703 -------- Huy 16 August 25 Aug. ---- -------- Limburg 10 Sept. 28 Sept. ---- Battle of Schellenberg .. 2 July 1704 -------- Blenheim .. 13 Aug. ---- Siege of Landau 12 Sept. 24 Nov. ---- Huy captured by the French .. -- May 1705 Re-capture of Huy .. 11 July ---- Forcing the French lines at Helixem, near Tirlemont 18 July ---- Skirmish near the Dyle .. 21 July ---- Siege of Sandvliet 26 October 29 Oct. ---- Battle of Ramilies .. 23 May 1706 Siege of Ostend 28 June 8 July ---- -------- Menin 25 July 25 August ---- -------- Dendermond 29 August 5 Sept. ---- -------- Aeth 16 Sept. 3 Oct. ---- Battle of Oudenarde .. 11 July 1708 Siege of Lisle 13 August 23 Oct. ---- Capture of the Citadel .. 9 Dec. ---- Battle of Wynendale .. 28 Sept. ---- Passage of the Scheldt .. 27 Nov. ---- Siege of Ghent 18 Dec. 30 Dec. ---- -------- Tournay 27 June 29 July 1709 Capture of the Citadel .. 3 Sept. ---- Battle of Malplaquet .. 11 Sept. ---- Siege of Mons 21 Sept. 20 Oct. ---- Passage of the French lines at Pont à Vendin 21 April 1710 Siege of Douay 25 April 27 June ---- -------- Bethune 15 July 29 August ---- -------- Aire 6 Sept. 9 Nov. ---- -------- St. Venant 6 Sept. 30 Sept. ---- Passage of the French lines at Arleux .. 5 August 1711 Siege of Bouchain 10 Aug. 13 Sept. ---- Treaty of Utrecht signed .. 30 March 1713 LONDON: Printed by W. CLOWES and SONS, Stamford Street, For Her Majesty's Stationery Office. TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources. Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. For example, foot-guards, foot guards; out-post, outpost; intrusted; lodgment; dgerm. Pg xxxi, two missing items added to the list of 'PLATES', namely 'At the Battle of Steenkirk' and 'Costume of the Regiment 1848'. Pg 8, 'the Fench fell' replaced by 'the French fell'. Pg 19, 'non-commissoned officers' replaced by 'non-commissioned officers'. Pg 36, the Plate caption 'TENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT. [_To face page_ 1.' replaced by 'COLOURS OF THE TENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT.' Pg 76, 'October, 173.4' replaced by 'October, 1734.'. 
38288	----	OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE THE PATRIOTISM OF PEACE BY GEORGE H. MAXWELL THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE HOMECROFTERS RURAL SETTLEMENTS ASSOCIATION WASHINGTON MARYLAND BUILDING NEW ORLEANS COTTON EXCHANGE BUILDING 1915 _Copyright, 1916_, BY RURAL SETTLEMENTS ASSOCIATION. THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, U. S. A. TO ALL HOMECROFTERS THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED "_Peace hath her victories No less renowned than war_" PREFATORY NOTE _Ammunition_ is necessary to win a battle. Where it is a great _Battle for Peace_, to be fought with pen and voice, the ammunition needed is _facts_. Whenever the people of the United States know the _facts_ relating to the subject to which this book is devoted, _then what it advocates will be done_. Much fault has been found with Congress because of the country's unpreparedness. Congress is not at fault. "The stream cannot rise higher than the fountain." The will of the people is the law. The people of this nation are unalterably opposed to a big Standing Army. When they know that the safety of the nation can be assured without either the cost or the menace of militarism, the people will demand that it be done, and Congress will register that popular decree, gladly and willingly. It is not at all surprising that Congress does not yield to the clamor of the militarists when they know the adverse sentiment of the people on that subject. President Schurman of Cornell recently said: "It would be self-deception of the grossest character if Americans made their love of peace the criterion of the military policy and preparedness of their country. It would be madness to enfeeble and imperil the United States because we believe peace the chief blessing of the nations." All that is true. But when the problem is analyzed _there is no other way that can be devised_, except that proposed in this book, that will safeguard the nation against foreign attack or invasion, and do it _adequately_, without incurring stupendous cost or creating a menace to liberty. Americans are a brave people, but they have a hereditary aversion to the clank of a saber in time of peace. There are a few books that every one who wishes to master the subject should read. First among these is "Fields, Factories and Workshops," by Prince Kropotkin, published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. A new edition of this book has been recently issued which costs only seventy-five cents. "The Iron in the Blood" is a chapter in "The Coming People," by Charles F. Dole, published by T. Y. Crowell & Co. of New York. A reprint of this book can be had for twenty-five cents from the Rural Settlements Association. "The Secret of Nippon's Power" is another pertinent article, in "The First Book of the Homecrofters." A new and enlarged edition of this book will soon be issued. In the meantime copies of the first edition can be had for twenty-five cents from the Rural Settlements Association. More has been accomplished in Duluth, Minnesota, to prove the benefits of the Homecroft Life than in any other City in the United States. A special publication, descriptive of the Homecroft Work in Duluth, and a pamphlet by George H. Maxwell entitled, "The Cost of Living," which shows the relation to that subject of the Homecroft System of Education and Life, can be obtained by sending ten cents in stamps to the Rural Settlements Association, Cotton Exchange Building, New Orleans, La. The legislative machinery necessary to inaugurate the plans for work to be done through the Forest Service and the Reclamation Service is all provided for in the Newlands-Broussard River Regulation Bill. That bill provides for river regulation, flood prevention, land reclamation and settlement, and the establishment of forest plantations in all parts of the United States. It also brings the departments of the national government into coördinating by forming the Board of River Regulation. Through that board, all necessary plans would be worked out for coördinating other departments with the War Department, and completing the organization of the National Construction Reserve and the Homecroft Reserve. When perfected, those plans would be presented to Congress with a recommendation for their enactment. Those who favor the plan advocated in this book are urged to concentrate their influence first on the passage of that bill as the entering-wedge to the ultimate adoption of the entire plan. They are also urged to do all in their power to enlist the active interest of their friends by inducing them to study the subject and _get the facts_. Copies of the Newlands-Broussard River Regulation Bill and explanatory printed matter may be had without charge by writing to the National Reclamation Association, 331 Maryland Building, Washington, D. C. This book, OUR NATIONAL, DEFENSE--THE PATRIOTISM OF PEACE, has been published by the Rural Settlements Association. The price of the book is $1.25, including postage, and orders for copies, with remittance for that amount, should be sent to Rural Settlements Association, Cotton Exchange Building, New Orleans, La. GEORGE H. MAXWELL, _Executive Director_, Rural Settlements Association, National Reclamation Association. FOREWORD _Would it interest you to know_ that the people of the United States, having first blindfolded themselves with the self-complacence of ignorance, are walking along the crest of a ridge with a precipice on one side falling sheer into the abyss of devastation by war with an invading foreign power, while on the other side boils the seething crater of a social volcano? If so, _you will be convinced of that fact_, if you will carefully and thoughtfully read this book through from cover to cover; and _you will also be convinced_ that the only road to safety is that pointed out in this book. Would you not feel that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" when reflecting on the ease with which any of the Great European Powers could _again_ occupy and burn Washington, as it was burned in 1814, and capture and levy an enormous indemnity upon New York? Would you contemplate with indifference and equanimity _the annexation of the Pacific Coast of the United States to Japan_? Has it occurred to you that, unless we wake up, mend our ways and change our national policy, war is ultimately as inevitable between the United States and Japan as it has been for years between France and Germany? _Would it interest you to know_ that in the event of such a war the Japanese would be found fully prepared, while we are utterly unprepared; and that Japan would, within ten days, mobilize an army in California large enough to insure to them its military control; and that within four weeks thereafter they would land an army of 200,000 veteran soldiers on the Pacific coast? _Would it interest you to know_ that in such an emergency our navy would be impotent to check this occupation and invasion, and that our so-called but now confessedly misnamed coast defenses would be about as much protection as a large load of alfalfa hay; and that as part of this military occupancy by Japan of the territory lying between the Cascade and Sierra Nevada mountains and the Pacific Ocean, the Japanese would dynamite every tunnel, destroy the Colorado River railroad bridges, and fortify the mountain passes; and that the recapture of one pass by the United States would be a more difficult military undertaking for us than was the capture of Port Arthur or Tsing-Tao by the Japanese? _Would it interest you to know_ that the very real danger that California, Western Oregon, and Western Washington may be annexed to Japan and a thousand miles of deserts and inaccessible mountain ranges, instead of the Pacific Ocean, separate Japan from the United States, is a danger that exists because not one in ten thousand of the people of the United States will give the slightest heed to this question, which overshadows in importance every other question affecting the people of the United States? _Would it interest you to know_ that there is just as much, and more, danger that the desolating flames of war may sweep over and devastate Southern California as there was that they might sweep over and devastate Belgium? You doubtless will say, "That is impossible!" You would have said the same thing a year ago about Belgium, with much more of assurance and positive conviction. _Would it interest you to know_ that the doing of the things that would insure peace forever between the United States and Japan, as well as all European nations, would at the same time end all danger from the ravages of destructive floods, stop forest fires, perpetuate our forest resources, preserve the forest and woodland cover on our watersheds, create a great national system of inland waterways, reclaim every reclaimable acre of arid or swamp and overflow land in the United States, and reduce the cost of living by doubling the agricultural production of this country within ten years? _Would it interest you to know_ that the doing of the same things would end child labor, end woman labor in factories, end unemployment, end the whole multitude of evil and vicious influences that are degenerating humanity and deteriorating the race in the congested cities of this country, and safeguard the United States against the internal as well as the external dangers that now menace its future welfare? _Would it interest you to know_ that the doing of those same things would inaugurate an era of business prosperity, based on human welfare and advancement, instead of on human exploitation, and would insure the perpetuity of that prosperity? _Would it interest you to know_ that the things which it is proposed shall be done by the United States have already been done, practically and successfully, by Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand; and that they can and will be done in this country whenever the people wake up and decide to do something for themselves instead of waiting for somebody else to do it for them. If you doubt any of the foregoing statements, _read the book_; and you will be convinced of their _absolute truth_ and you will be appalled at the magnitude of the preventable calamity that menaces the people of the United States solely because of their heedlessness, indifference, and refusal to face facts. CONTENTS CHAPTER I Page SHALL THERE BE AN END OF WAR? 1 Question may be answered in the affirmative by the United States?--Facts must be made known to the people--Nationwide educational campaign is necessary--Every individual must be aroused to action--Appalling consequences of triumph of militarism--United States must lead the world in its overthrow--Cannot be dependent for peace on coöperation of other nations--Appalling losses may result from public apathy and indifference--Necessity for national policy for flood prevention--Naval is out of balance--Other things more needed than battleships--Nationalisation of manufacture of armaments and battleships--There must be an end of private profit from such manufacture--It inspires militarism and stimulates war. CHAPTER II INADEQUACY OF MILITARIST PLANS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 24 Militarists believe war inevitable--Urge United States is unprepared--Peace Advocates leave to Militarists all plans for National Defense--Militarists have no adequate plan--Enormous cost of large standing army--Menace of a military despotism--No reliance can be placed on State Militia--Impracticability of a Reserve composed of men who have served in the Regular Army--War must be recognised as a possibility--Hypocrisy of opposition to war by those who profit from so-called civilized warfare--Peace Propaganda must be harmonized with national defense--All plans far world Peace have thus far proved futile--United States spends enormous sums on Army without any guarantee of national defense--The Frankenstein of War can be controlled. CHAPTER III IMPREGNABLE DEFENSE AGAINST FOREIGN INVASION 44 Plans for national defense must primarily operate to prevent war--Reasons why War Department will never devise satisfactory system--Militarists have no sympathy with peace movement--It aims to render military profession obsolete--Standing Army is economic waste of money and men--It should be a great educational institution--Chairman Hay of Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, shows enormous cost of Standing Army and impracticability of Reserve as proposed by Army Officers--Comparison of Military Expenditures and Results in United States and Japan--Increase of Standing Army to 200,000 would be futile and unwarranted--European War will not bring disarmament--Warning of Field Marshal Earl Roberts--Standing Army promotes military spirit which increases danger of war. CHAPTER IV NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION RESERVE 74 Enlistment of Construction Corps in government Services in time of peace--Transformation of same organization into military force in time of war--National forces must be organized for conflict to save, not destroy, life and property--Forest Service and Reclamation Service work should be done by Reservists enlisted in Construction Corps--Same system should be adopted in all government services--Construction Reserve to be so trained as to instantly become army of trained soldiers whenever needed--More than work enough in time of peace for a million Reservists--planting forests--fighting forest fires--preventing floods--irrigating deserts--draining swamps--building highways, waterways, and railways--Importance of safeguarding nation against destruction by Nature's invading forces. CHAPTER V ADAPTABILITY OF SYSTEM FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 115 Swiss Military System ideal for Switzerland--Not adapted to United States as a whole--Reserve of wage earners impracticable--Their mobilization would cripple industry and cause privation for families--City clerks and factory workers lack physical stamina--A citizen soldiery needed of hardy men like founders of this nation--Anglo-Saxon stock is deteriorating in cities--Only remedy is Homecrofts for workingmen and their families--Otherwise Industry will destroy Humanity--Greatest danger to the City of New York is from within--Racial degeneracy is most serious menace--Patrician class warned against Roman System which resulted in Proscription and Confiscation--The spirit of Switzerland should sway the world--Inadequate Standing Army a serious danger--Invites attack against which it cannot defend--United States Standing Army gives no assurance of national safety. CHAPTER VI MENACE OF ASIATIC COMPETITION AND INVASION 135 Japanese influx into Hawaii and Pacific Coast States--Unexpected incident like blowing up of Maine might precipitate conflict--In that event peace advocates and governments might be powerless to prevent war--Japanese merit the good will of other nations--Reasons why they come to Pacific Coast--Japan is overpopulated--30,000,000 rural people on 12,500,000 acres--Population increasing 1,000,000 annually--More Japanese in California of military age than entire Army of United States--Japanese in South America and Mexico--United States must meet economic competition of Japan--Pacific Coast must be settled with Caucasian population that will cultivate the soil as Japanese would cultivate it if it were their country--Otherwise armed conflict with Japan inevitable. CHAPTER VII JAPAN AND THE COLORADO RIVER VALLEY 176 Another Japanese Empire could be created in the Drainage Basin of the Colorado River--What Japanese would do with that country if it were Japanese Territory--We waste annually water containing 357,490,000 tons of fertilizing material--5,000,000 acres can be reclaimed between Needles and Mexico--Every acre would support a family--Climate makes gardening equivalent to hot house culture out of doors--Inexhaustible supplies of nitrogen, phosphates, and potash for fertilizer--Enormous possibilities of electric power development--Japan would fight the Desert and Conquest it with same thoroughness that she fought Russia--Would develop vast Commerce from Colorado River and Gulf of California--Japanese Colonization in Mexico--Spirit of Speculation retards development by United States--What should be done with the Colorado River Valley--United States must reclaim and colonize that country the same as Japanese would do if it belonged to them. CHAPTER VIII STRENGTH OF A HOMECROFT RESERVE 213 A Homecroft Reserve in Scotland of one million Soldiers would have prevented this last great war--Scotch Homecrofters make such Soldiers as the Gordon Highlanders and the Black Watch--Story of the Gordon Highlanders--The Scots were the original Homecrofters--The description in "Raiderland" of the Homecrofts in Galloway--Grasping greed of intrenched interests drove the Homecrofters from Scotland--Same interests now blocking development in United States--Homecroft System of Education and Life would breed a race of stalwart soldiers in United States--Could leave home for actual service without disturbing industrial conditions--Homecrofters would be concentrated for training and organization--Would eliminate all danger of militarism or military despotism--Comparison in value of 1,000,000 trained Homecrofters with 1,000,000 immigrants--Homecroft Reserve System will end child labor and woman labor in factories and will also end unemployment. Chapter IX HOMECROFT RESERVE IN COLORADO RIVER VALLEY 247 United States owns land, water and power--Development by national government would result in vast profit to it--Australian System of Land Reclamation and Settlement should be adopted--Action should be prompt to forestall friction between United States and Japan--Will never have war with Japan except as result of apathy and neglect--United State must create in Colorado River Valley dense population settled in self-containing Communities--Characteristics of Country particularly adapt it to requirements for Homecroft Reserve--Safety of Southern California from invasion would be insured--Military Highways to San Diego and Los Angeles--Defense of Mexican Border--Homecroft Cavalry Reserve in Nevada similar to Cossack Cavalry System--Correction of Mexican Boundary Line to include mouth of Colorado River in the United States--New State of South California to be formed. CHAPTER X CALIFORNIA A REMOTE INSULAR PROVINCE 277 More easily accessible from Japan by sea than from United States by land, in case of war--Mountain Ranges bound it north, east, and south--All plans for defense of California with a Navy or coast fortifications are futile and a delusion--Bombardment of English towns and comparison of English Coast and California Coast--Japan would, if war were declared, seize Alaska, Philippines, and Hawaii--Would then transport an army of 200,000 to California--Railroad tunnels and bridges being destroyed by dynamite would render relief by United States impossible--Reliance on Panama Canal too uncertain--Quickness with which occupation of California would be accomplished by Japanese--Huge military difficulties in the way of United States reconquering it--Mountain passes would be fortified by Japanese--Railroad bridges, culverts, and tunnels across deserts would be dynamited--To recapture a single mountain pass more difficult than capture of Port Arthur--Death and Desolation are Supreme in the Southwestern Deserts--Japanese would rapidly colonize all vacant lands in California--The way to make the Pacific Coast safe is for the United States to colonize it first with a dense population of intensive cultivators of the soil. CHAPTER XI MILITARISM AND THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 301 Military caste absorbs to itself undue power--Danger seen in military opposition to improved system for river regulation--Military control of inland waterways detrimental to country--Army Engineers wedded to System of "Pork Barrel," political, piecemeal appropriations--Reason why Army methods of education hamper progress in river improvement--Mississippi River requires comprehensive treatment--Necessity for Source Stream Control on all upper tributaries--Why the Calaveras Reservoir was not built--Blunder in Construction of Stockton Cutoff Canal--War may be uncertain, but necessity for fight against floods and storms is certain--Description of a great Gulf Storm--Comprehensive plan for protecting lower delta of Mississippi River by great Dikes like those in Holland Safety from floods guaranteed by construction of Atchafalaya Controlled Outlet, Wasteway, and Auxiliary flood water channels. CHAPTER XII BENEFITS FROM THE NATIONAL HOMECROFT RESERVE SYSTEM 335 What this generation would bequeath to future generations--United States safeguarded against internal dangers and made impregnable against attack or invasion--No other plan will accomplish that result--Summary of reasons why Homecroft Reserve System will accomplish it--Comparison of cost of larger Standing Army and same number of Homecroft Reserve--Epitome of advantages of a Homecroft Reserve from the standpoint of Peace--Homecroft Reserve System must be evolved gradually--Rapid development would follow when system once well established--This is illustrated by growth of Rural Mail service, Electric lighting, aërial navigation, and telephone--Where the first 100,000 Homecroft Reservists should be located--50,000 Reservists in California, 50,000 in Louisiana, 80,000 in West Virginia, and 10,000 in Minnesota--Specification of apportionment to projects of the $100,000,000 that would be saved from military expenditures for increased Standing Army--Homecroft financial System proposed--Homecroft Certificates to be issued--Advantages of the Homecroft Reserve System to the Homecrofter--Economic power created for the Nation would result in Universal Peace. OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE THE PATRIOTISM OF PEACE CHAPTER I _Shall there be an end of war, and of all danger or possibility of war in the future, not only in this, but in all other countries, and shall we have universal peace on earth through all the coming centuries?_ That is the most momentous question that has ever confronted any nation in the history of the world. The United States of America stands face to face with it to-day, and can answer the question in the affirmative, if the people of this country so determine. On their decision depends, not only the safety and perpetuity of this nation, and the welfare of our own people, but the welfare of all the other nations and peoples of the earth as well, through all future time. _The question will have been answered in the affirmative whenever the plan proposed in this book shall have been adopted by the people of the United States._ Its adoption will strengthen every plan that can be devised to prevent war. It will vitalize the influence of this nation in behalf of peace. It will make the nation impregnable in case of war, if, notwithstanding all efforts to prevent it, war should come. In the great crisis through which civilization is now passing, the United States alone has the opportunity and the power to emancipate humanity from militarism, and prevent it from ever again being drawn into the maelstrom of war. Unless that is done, liberty, the world over, will be slowly submerged by the subtle and insidious growth of military power in the affairs of government, and our present civilization will ultimately go the way of all the civilizations of the past. If, on the other hand, this country rises to the opportunity, and provides a system of national defense which will not only safeguard the nation against foreign invasion or internal conflict, but will also at the same time promote human advancement, insure all the blessings of peace to the people, and check the growth of militarism, we will establish a civilization that will endure as long as the human race can inhabit the earth. The first thing that must be done to achieve that boon for humanity is to arouse the people of the United States to a realization of the fact that the settlement of this great question cannot be left by anyone to somebody else. Every man and every woman, the length and breadth of the land, must enlist in a great national campaign of education to get the real facts and all the facts into the minds of the people. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he." This is a government, not so much by the people as by the _thought_ of the people. Right thought must precede right action. Knowledge must go before right thought. The people cannot think right until they know the facts, and they must study and understand and analyze those facts and face them squarely. That can be brought about only by a nation-wide campaign in which every patriotic citizen must participate. Each must first learn the facts himself and then carry the knowledge to others--drive it home to them and stir them to action. To every reader of this book let it be said, as a personal message: When you have read this book, do not lay it down with the thought: "Yes, that is a good idea. I hope somebody will succeed in getting it done." Buckle on your own armor and helmet, lift up your own sword and shield, and go right out into your own community and make converts yourself, who are willing not only to think but to act and to _do things themselves_, to lift the deepening shadow of militarism from this nation, and rescue the world from the barbarism of war. The souls of the people must be set on fire to fight a great battle for peace and to save the ideals and traditions of our forefathers from being submerged under the rising tide of militarism. That battle must be fought with voice and pen against ignorance, indifference, and every powerful interest intrenched in selfish opposition to human advancement. Popular interest must be stirred to its depths to create an irresistible wave of public sentiment that will sweep away all opposition to the necessary expenditures and legislation. Every man who would be willing to serve his country in time of war must be enlisted to serve it in time of peace, by fighting in advance of war to safeguard against it and ultimately end it forever. Every woman who wants the menace of war lifted from the lives of the women of the world must show the faith that is in her by putting her whole heart and soul into the work of enlisting her own community in this great movement to do away with war, and to save the women of the future from the inhuman cruelties and heart-breaking agonies that war has brought upon them in the past. The people of this country must stubbornly stand their ground to check the future advance of militarism in the United States. For years it has been stealthily gaining, while the people at large have paid no heed. Military expenditures have grown larger and larger--they have trebled within a generation--and the people have voiced no vigorous protest. _They have been "asleep at the switch._" There must be an end of this indifference of the majority of the people, who have been selfishly and self-complacently attending to their own affairs while the world has been drifting into a bloody welter of war. It is only by chance that the United States has not already been drawn into it. Complications may at any time arise which will involve this nation in war. An interest must be awakened as tense and vivid and all-compelling as would be instantly aroused by an actual invasion of the United States by a foreign enemy, and it must be awakened far in advance of that invasion, to make sure that it never happens. For nearly two thousand years the gentle admonition "On earth Peace, Good Will toward men" has been the ideal which the human race has been struggling to attain. And after all these centuries we are in the midst of the most bloody and destructive war the world has ever known. Civilization has crashed backwards into the abyss of barbarism, in Europe at least, and no one can foresee the end. In the United States the trend is in the same direction. This country will soon become a great military nation if the present tendency is not sharply checked. Mere ignorance and indifference on the part of the people of the United States must not be allowed to stand in the way of the adoption of the national policy advocated in this book--a policy that will bring permanent and enduring universal peace to the world. That policy must be adopted. There can be no alternative. The final triumph of militarism would be too appalling to contemplate. Must every woman who bears a son live under the terror that she may have to dedicate him to be mangled in the service of the War God? Must every home remain liable to be ruined and destroyed by the fires of war? Must every fair and beautiful garden-land continue to be subject to the menace of devastation by marching armies or the bloody ruin of the battlefields? Must the flower of the world's manhood continue to be flung into the jaws of death to satiate the blood lust of militarism? Must the wheels of industry turn, and the sweat of human labor, for all time, be given to make machinery for human slaughter? Is there no inspiration to patriotism that will move the people to action but the death combat? Is there no glory to be won, that will stir heart and brain to supreme effort, except by causing human agony and devastation? Is there nothing else that will bring out the best there is in men but the stimulus of war, and its demands for sacrifice, even of life itself? Is there no higher service to their country to which women can give their men than to die fighting to kill the men of other women? Must this nation, as well as others, so impoverish itself by war and preparation for war that nothing is left to pay for protecting itself against Nature's destroying forces, flood and fire and waste of the country's basic resources? The intelligent and patriotic men and women of the United States would answer every one of these questions, with all the fervor of their being, in the way they must be answered to save civilization, if the questions could be put to them, face to face, by anyone who was ready to show them what to do to make good that answer and transform the desire into actual accomplishment. We must therefore arm the multitude with the facts and burn into their minds the clear-cut definite vision of the plan that must be carried out to make certain that accomplishment. That plan must provide that we shall first do the things which the people of this country can do by themselves alone without saying "by your leave" or "with your help" to any other nation. The influence of the adoption of a right national policy by the United States will draw the world into the current as soon as its practicability and benefits to humanity have been proved, but we must not begin with a plan that will fail unless adopted by all the great powers of the world. We cannot allow the success of our own basic plan for peace, _and for safeguarding this nation against war_, to depend on the coöperation of any other nation. That has been the difficulty with nearly every plan heretofore proposed for the permanent establishment of peace throughout the world. The agreement of all the nations could not be had, and without such agreement the plan was futile. Disarmament or the limitation of armaments is impracticable without the consent of all the great powers. Nationalization of the manufacture of armaments, if it is to be a world-wide influence, must have world-wide adoption. No plan for a peace tribunal can be successfully made effective without all nations agreeing to abide by its decrees. And then it will fail unless given power to enforce its decrees. That power will never be vested in it by the nations, not in this generation at least. All plans for arbitration rest on the same insecure foundation. Arbitration voluntarily of any one controversy between nations is practicable, where consent is expressly given to arbitrate that particular controversy. But a general plan based on an agreement made in advance to arbitrate all future unknown controversies would be unenforceable and would afford no assurance of peace. The plan for an international force, either army or navy, is too remote a possibility to be depended on now for practical results. Agitation of these projects is commendable and should be encouraged, but we cannot wait for their adoption to set our own house in order and insure its safety. In framing a national policy of peace for the United States, we must constantly and clearly draw the line of distinction between the deep-seated original causes of war, and causes which are secondary, or merely precipitating incidents. The assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo precipitated the present war, but it was not the cause of the war. Fundamentally, that cause was the check imposed by other nations on the expansion of the German Empire. The necessity for that expansion resulted from the rapid increase in the population, trade, and national wealth of Germany. The same problem faces the United States with reference to Japan and we cannot evade it by any scheme for arbitration or disarmament. We must squarely face and solve the economic problems that lie at the bottom of all possible conflict between this nation and Japan. A lighted match may be thrown into a keg of gunpowder and an explosion result. It might be said that the match caused the explosion. In one sense it did--_but it was not the match that exploded_. And gunpowder must be protected against matches, if explosions are to be avoided. So with national controversies. The economic causes must be controlled, and conflict avoided by action taken long in advance of a condition of actual controversy. In our dealings with Japan, as will be shown hereafter, we are sitting on an open keg of gunpowder, lighting matches apparently without the remotest idea of the danger, or of the way to eliminate it. But the situation on the Pacific Coast with reference to Japan is not the first instance of similar risks that have been run with most appalling losses as a consequence. The danger of an earthquake in San Francisco was known to everybody. Likewise it must have been known, if the slightest thought had been given to it, that an earthquake might disrupt the water system of the city and make it impossible to quench a fire that might be started by an earthquake. As San Francisco is now heedless of the need for a policy that will really settle the Japanese trouble, instead of aggravating it, so she was heedless of the earthquake danger. That heedlessness cost the city $300,000,000 in entirely unnecessary damage caused by fire. San Francisco was destroyed by fire, not by the earthquake. The earthquake was unavoidable, the fire was wholly preventable. That sort of heedlessness is typical of the American people. Busy with the present, they take no thought of the future. Every city in the United States which is liable in any year to a great flood, is equally liable to a great fire--a fire which might as completely destroy it as the San Francisco fire destroyed that city, because, owing to the flood, all the means provided for fire protection when there is no flood, would be rendered useless by the flood. Yet every such flood-menaced city in the United States stolidly runs the risk. No general precautions are taken to prevent such destruction, though it must be recognized as being possible at any time. Great floods will rarely follow one another in the same place. For this reason, flood protection for a city which has already suffered from a disastrous flood, like Dayton, is no more important than similar protection for all other flood-menaced cities. The only way to safeguard against floods, and the consequent risk of fire losses in flood-menaced cities, is that _all such cities_ should be completely protected against floods, under a nation-wide policy for flood protection and prevention. When appeal is made to Congress for legislation providing for such a policy and for the appropriations necessary to make it effective, we are told that so much money is required for military expenditures that none can be spared for protection against floods. Are we to go on for the next ten years doing as we have done in the last ten, and spend another billion dollars for the army and fortifications, while floods ravage unchecked? If we had been getting actual protection from foreign invasion for that billion dollars, there might have been some justification for its expenditure; but we are getting neither protection from foreign invasion nor protection from flood invasion. The fact that the people of the country at large give no heed whatever to the risk of tremendous losses of life and property by flood, arises from a fixed habit of apathetic indifference, and the fact that no commercial interest pushes steadily in behalf of flood protection. There is money to be made, and large dividends may be earned, by furnishing insurance against fire. Consequently the owner of every building in every city is constantly reminded by insurance agents of the importance and necessity of fire insurance. This has been done until public education, stimulated by private profit, has created a habit of thought which instinctively recognizes the danger of fire, and insures against it. The property owner who now fails to carry fire insurance is commonly regarded as assuming an unwarranted risk. The same conditions exist from a national point of view with reference to war. We build battleships, for example, largely because there is a huge private profit made therefrom, which warrants a nation-wide propaganda to educate and sustain a favorable public sentiment. The profit is large enough to permit of propitiating troublesome opposition by endowing peace palaces. That is a gruesome and ghastly hypocrisy that must come to an end, if the world is ever to attain to universal peace. The government should, if it needs them, build its own battleships; but the first thing it should do, before it builds any more battleships, is to provide for its other more pressing naval requirements, such as trained men, target practice, transports, coaling stations with adequate coal supplies, swift cruisers, torpedo boats, submarines, aëroplanes, and ammunition. After all that has been done, if it is made the law of the land that dividends shall no longer be earned by private corporations from building battleships or from manufacturing armor plate, it might be found that no more battleships ought to be built. By that time naval experts may have agreed that, as against torpedoes and aëroplanes, battleships are too uncertain a defense, and may have decided that we need something else. A battleship costs anywhere from ten to twenty million dollars, and they are too expensive to be built for experiment or ornament. The people of the United States have been relying on battleships for coast defense, but all Britain's battleships did not protect Scarborough or Hartlepool or Whitby. Neither have the battleships been able to protect themselves from torpedoes, mines, or submarines. Congress is a mirror. It merely reflects public sentiment. So long as the need for battleships and more battleships--for bigger and still bigger battleships--is constantly dinged into the ears of the people by the profit-takers from the government, just that long will public sentiment, and the legislation and appropriations that respond to it, be warped and one sided. Our navy will continue to be top heavy with dreadnoughts, and inadequate attention will be paid to the other things necessary for a symmetrically equipped and efficient naval defense. When private profits for building battleships shall have been eliminated, Congress will no longer skimp appropriations to man the battleships we now have, or for other naval equipment, in order to build more dreadnoughts. After this war, it ought to be possible to conduct to success a nation-wide, and possibly a world-wide propaganda to end forever the earning of dividends from human slaughter. That is the issue, bluntly and plainly stated, and those who profit by manufacturing the machinery of war must face it squarely. The time will come,--it is to be hoped it is near at hand,--when they will be held in the same estimation as are nowadays the pirates who forced their victims to walk the plank. Over-preparedness, as well as unpreparedness, may precipitate a war. The causes of the present European war were, however, more deeply rooted than that. It was inevitable that they would some day result in war. But the war would not have come at this time if Germany had not thought England unprepared. Nor would it have come if Germany had not been, as she supposed, invincible, because armed to the teeth by corporations like the Krupps that make war and the machinery for it the source of stupendous private profits and accumulated wealth. The growing temptation to create similar conditions in this country must be forever strangled. After the close of this war, the fields of battle in Europe must be cleared of war's devastations, and in the United States of America the field of industry must be cleared of all temptation for our merchants and manufacturers to become slaughterers by wholesale of human beings--murderers and manglers of whole battalions of their fellowmen--slayers of the fathers, brothers, husbands, and sons of millions of women. That is what they become when for money they furnish the means whereby it is done, or is to be in future done, by this or any other country. It is far better that capital should be idle and labor unemployed than that either should be used to promote death and devastation in return for dividends or wages. All available capital and labor can find occupation in doing things that will promote human welfare. To the extent that the machinery of war may be needed by any government, it should be manufactured for its own use by that government, and never by any private concern or corporation for profit. A world movement to that end is being organized and every patriotic citizen should bear a hand to promote its success. The United States has the opportunity to be the first nation to adopt this advanced and peace-promoting national policy. Whenever we have put an end to the making of private profit from the manufacture of battleships and machinery of war for our government, we will be relieved of much of the persistent pressure to make our navy top heavy with dreadnoughts, and to steadily increase our naval and military expenditures. More than that, we will then be able to get full, fair, and unprejudiced consideration, by the people at large, of every question relating to war or peace, or to our own preparedness for war, or the extent of the necessity for such preparedness. Now the people know only a part of the facts on which a comprehensive judgment should be based. They have been urged to do the things which, if done, would result in profit to the manufacturers of battleships or machinery of war. Knowing this, many people go to the other extreme and oppose everything in the way of an adequate military or naval system. This tends to endanger the nation by unpreparedness, just as the Militarists would endanger it by over-preparedness, or a one-sided and unbalanced preparedness, like having battleships without other things even more necessary for naval defense. The government should manufacture for itself all the machinery needed by it for war on land or sea. Its manufacture by anyone else should be prohibited by law. But it does not by any means follow that the government itself should refrain from manufacturing it, under the conditions that now prevail in the world. Neither does it follow that there will be no more wars. Nor again does it follow that the government should fail to be at all times adequately prepared for war. On the contrary, the possibility of war should be fully recognized and national defense should not be neglected. Under the conditions that surround this country to-day, no nation should more carefully than ours safeguard against the danger of unpreparedness. The United States should be, not unprepared, but fully prepared, and that can only be accomplished by carrying out the plan advocated in this book, for both immediate and ultimate national defense. The assumption that this country will never be involved in a foreign war is one which every fact of history, every trait of human character, and every probability of the future proves to be unwarranted, unless measures are taken and things done for national protection, and for the preservation of peace, that are as yet not even contemplated by the people of this country. The cost of those measures is so small, in comparison with the enormous losses this country would suffer if it became involved in a foreign war, that to forego them because of the cost involved would be as unwise as to fail to equip a passenger steamer with life preservers as a matter of economy. CHAPTER II _Advocates of Peace present no plan for national defense in case of war. They leave it to the Militarists to provide for that contingency. The Militarists have proposed no adequate plan for national defense. No plan has been evolved, other than that urged in this book, which would in all emergencies safeguard the nation against war, and at the same time be in sympathy with and strengthen every movement to promote peace._ To make this clear, the various schools of thought on the subject should be classified, and their views briefly outlined. On the one hand we have the _Militarists_. They constantly clamor for a bigger navy and a larger army on the ground that we are unprepared for war--unarmed, unready, undefended--and that war is liable to occur at any time. On the other hand we have the _Passivists_. They have the courage of their convictions. Believing in peace, they oppose war, and all the means whereby it is made. Having faith in moral influence, they oppose armaments. They are consistent, and urge that this nation should disarm and check military expenditures. In their peace propaganda before the people they have squarely and honestly contended for this national policy _for which they deserve infinite credit_. In case of war, they have no plan. _They leave that to the Militarists._ Between these two extremes we have the _Pacificists_. They deplore war and talk for peace, but believe in building battleships. They argue for arbitration and advocate disarmament, but have not opposed steadily increasing appropriations for naval and military expenditures by the United States. They justify this position on the plea that the best guarantee against war is an army and navy. They oppose war but not appropriations for war. They hold peace conferences and pass peace resolutions, but do not go before the committees of Congress and object to expenditures for armaments and militarism. In this class belong all peace advocates who are builders of battleships or manufacturers of armor plate or armaments, and their associates. This suggests the question whether such a manufacturer is a safe pilot for a peace movement, however generously it may be subsidized, and whether an armor-plate mill and a peace palace are appropriate trace-mates. It would be unfortunate if the subtle influence of subconscious self-interest should creep into peace councils or affect the policy of a peace movement. However that may be, the theory that armaments prevent war has been pretty well exploded by recent events. The Pacificists, in case of war, have no plan of their own to propose. _They, too, leave that to the Militarists._ Then we have the _Pacificators_. They advocate disarmament and a tribunal of peace in the nature of an international court to determine international differences and make binding decrees; and they propose the establishment of an international army and navy under the control of that court to enforce its decrees. Of course it must be conceded that this plan may fail, or its success be long delayed, and that in the meantime it affords no guarantee of peace. The Pacificators, however, propose no plan in the event of war. _They also leave that to the Militarists._ Finally comes the Woman's Movement for Constructive Peace, out of which has grown the organization of the Woman's Peace Party. Much may be hoped for from this organization if it will concentrate its strength, and not try to do too many things at once. If the women of the world will unite and put the same militant force behind the peace movement that they have put behind the suffrage movement they can end wars. There is no doubt of that. But it will require world-wide organization, good generalship, and great concentration of effort. "One thing at a time" should be their motto. The following platform was adopted by the Woman's Peace Party: "The purpose of this organization is to enlist all American women in arousing the nations to respect the sacredness of human life and to abolish war. (1) The immediate calling of a convention of neutral nations in the interest of early peace. (2) Limitations of armaments and the nationalization of their manufacture. (3) Organized opposition to militarism in our own country. (4) Education of youth in the ideals of peace. (5) Democratic control of foreign policies. (6) The further humanizing of governments by the extension of the franchise to women. (7) Concert of nations to supersede 'balance of power.' (8) Action toward the general organization of the world to substitute law for war. (9) The substitution of an international police for rival armies and navies. (10) Removal of the economic causes of war. (11) The appointment by our government of a commission of men and women, with an adequate appropriation, to promote international peace." That platform is a well condensed outline of a very comprehensive program. It covers the whole ground. Some of the things it advocates ought to be possible of accomplishment within a few years. Others will require generations. For example, it is well to frankly face the eventual necessity for it, but democratic control of the foreign policies of Germany and Russia, for instance, must be worked out by the people of those countries, possibly through bloody political revolutions. However, faith and not skepticism was the reason for publishing this platform in full. The tenth plank, "Removal of the economic causes of war," would include many features of the plan proposed in this book. As embodied in the book, the plan is specific. The platform is a generalization, and might include many other plans. But it will be observed that the platform does not suggest any plan as to what should be done by the Woman's Peace Party in the event of war or to safeguard the country from the dangers of actual war. They must concede that war may occur, pending the partial or entire success of their campaign to establish universal peace throughout the world. But they propose no plan covering the contingency of war. _They likewise leave that to the Militarists._ So, although we have plans galore to promote peace, we have in case of war no plans except those of the Militarists. They have three plans: _First:_ A standing army large enough for any contingency. _Second:_ A standing army, reënforced by state militia. _Third:_ A standing army with a reserve composed of men who have served a term of enlistment in the regular army. None of these plans could be relied on for national defense in the event of war between the United States and any one of the great world powers. That will be fully demonstrated in the subsequent chapters of this book. To insure the national safety as against such a contingency, a standing army of over 500,000 men would be necessary. It would cost this country $600,000,000 a year to maintain such a standing army, and the army itself would be a more dangerous menace than a foreign invasion. The utter worthlessness of state militia as a national defense in the event of war with a first-class power is strongly set forth in the warning by George Washington quoted in a later chapter. The impracticability of a reserve force like that proposed by the Militarists is clearly shown in the article from which quotations are made in a later chapter by Honorable James Hay, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives in the Congress of the United States. The situation when analyzed is certainly a most extraordinary one and can only be accounted for on the theory that the people of this country are not informed as to the facts and assume that we must be prepared for war, and able to defend ourselves in case of war, by reason of the stupendous expenditures we have been making for over ten years for the military branch of the government. To the average man it would seem as though $250,000,000 a year ought to be enough to provide for the national defense. The situation would be different if we had any assurance that the United States would never again be involved in a war. In that event we would need no plans for national defense. _But we have no such assurance._ The Peace Advocates give no guarantee against war. The Militarists believe war inevitable. Neither insures peace and neither is prepared against war. The people are between the upper and the nether millstone. We cannot be certain of peace. We are undefended in case of war. The situation is illustrated by the old darkey's coon trap that would "catch 'em either comin', or gwine." The frank belief of the Militarists that war must be regarded as inevitable is well expressed in the following quotation from a recent editorial in "The Navy," a journal published at Washington, D.C. "Since the beginning of the war in Europe, the assertion has been repeatedly made that this is the last great war; that the peoples of the world will be so impressed with the wanton destruction of life and property, that there will be organized some form of international arbitration that will prevent future wars. _Not so._ The war now raging between the nations of Europe is much more probably but the first of a series of tremendous world-wide conflicts that will be fought by the inhabitants of the earth for national supremacy, until the supremacy is obtained by a single people, or possibly by an amalgamated race, the ingredients of which are just now being thrown into the melting pot. "The wars of the past will sink into comparative insignificance when future historians compile statistics of coming conflicts among the nations of the earth." Whether all this be true or not, there is enough foundation for such beliefs to make it imperative that the comprehensive and complete plan set forth in this book should be adopted to harmonize the peace propaganda with plans for national defense in case of war. _It can be done and it must be done._ The plan proposed in this book will tremendously strengthen the peace propaganda and there is no reason why every Militarist should not heartily approve and accept it, unless he is making a profit out of the manufacture of war machinery or dependent on it for employment. In that event we must strongly appeal to patriotism and try to induce the surrender of personal profit or benefit in order that we may preserve the nation and promote human welfare. Anyone who rejects the possibility of war must be blind to current events. Sad indeed it is that it should be true, but none the less it is a staring fact that every theory that war between civilized nations had ceased to be possible has been rudely shattered by recent events. Every prediction that there would be no more wars has proved false. Every plan heretofore proposed to prevent war has thus far proved futile. Every influence relied on to put an end to war has proved a broken reed. The Socialists have inveighed against war. Now they are voting war loans and fighting in the armies. The labor organizations have long proclaimed their opposition to war. The war is on, and they are apparently giving little attention to it. Again and again it has been declared that kings make wars and the people fight them. That is all very true, in the past and in the present, but once more the people are doing the fighting. We have been told that the workingmen of the world have power to stop war. No doubt they have, if they would use it, but they will not do so. While this greatest of all the world's wars was brewing, the workingmen were busy manufacturing the machinery of destruction. And they are still doing it. And they will keep on doing it, as long as wages are to be earned that way. Every piece of shrapnel that crashes into a human brain, or tears a human heart, or mangles a human hand on a battlefield has been laboriously and patiently made by some other human hand working for wages in some factory. Some manufacturer has thereby made a profit. And the money to pay that profit was loaned to some Christian nation for its war chest by some sanctimonious pawn-broker of the class described in "Unseen Empire" by David Starr Jordan. It is civilized warfare, among civilized nations, in this age of civilization, sustained by civilized legislative representatives of civilized people, conducted by civilized soldiers, equipped for human destruction by civilized business men who furnish machinery of war that is manufactured by civilized workingmen. And the workingman makes wages, the business man earns his good dividends, the banker gets his snug profit, and the man at the top, "the man on horseback," who started the bloody orgy gets dividends, honors, special privileges, and greater power as his share in this twentieth-century massacre of humanity by the so-called humane methods of modern civilized warfare. _It is the hypocrisy of it all that makes it so revolting._ And if it were not that so many _are_ making wages or salaries or profits or dividends out of the whole organized scheme of modern warfare, it would be much easier to put an end to it. That is the vital point where the women of the world should strike first if they are to end war. It is the private profit made from war by a few that makes it so hard to stop the ruin by war of the many. The awful waste of war has been made clear, and yet the most monstrously wasteful war of history is now being fought. It has been urged that the huge debts owing for old wars made new wars impossible, but stupendous new war loans are now being made. The people of Europe were said to have reached the limit of endurance of war burdens, but they are bending their backs for a heavier load. America has expressed deep sympathy in the past for the war-ridden and burden-bearing nations of Europe, overlooking apparently, at least in recent years, some important facts. Germany makes no hypocritical pretenses to being a nation of peace. She is avowedly a nation of warriors and believes in war. But she gets something for what she spends besides soldiers and battleships. While she has been perfecting the most stupendous and perfectly organized war machine that has ever existed in the world, she has perfected just as gigantic and splendidly effective machinery for conducting the affairs of peace. Her people may well smile in their sleeves at us when we condole with them about the heavy war burdens that have been loaded upon them. They have at least got something effective and efficient for their money. We have got practically nothing. Germany has, it is true, spent huge sums for armament, but at the same time she has developed her internal resources, constructed vast public improvements, planted great forests, and built a system of waterways that is the marvel of the world. Have we done the same? No. Why not? Because we are told by the guardians of Uncle Sam's exchequer that we cannot afford it. We spend so much money on our army and navy,--a quarter of a billion dollars a year--for which we get nothing in return,--not even national defense,--that we are told we cannot afford to enter upon any great plans for internal improvements, or stop floods, or regulate rivers, or build a genuine waterway system. _And the people stand for it, and allow themselves to be "led by the nose as asses are."_ This, of course, is very gratifying to the speculators and exploiters who are gathering into their own capacious grab-bags what is left of the natural resources of the country. When this reason is added to their interest in armor-plate factories, it may account for some of their zeal for militarism. And of course they realize the necessity for a good large standing army that will keep the people from being troublesome when they discover that their heritage has been stolen from them. Any little incident like the French Revolution would be excessively annoying to the intrenched interests in this country. An army looks good to them, and the latch-string is always out, socially, to the members of the military caste who greatly enjoy the hospitality of the gilded caste. Every one who looks at all four corners of the situation in this country understands why every pretext is seized upon to get bigger and bigger appropriations for the army and navy. A navy provides a big profit in armor plate and an army provides protection for that profit. _The Wizards of Wall Street are wise._ They see a long way ahead. The people never see very far. They are easily scared by a hue and cry about unpreparedness when naval or military appropriations are wanted. They readily swallow the bait of economy, when the interests desire to defeat an appropriation that is needed to develop natural resources belonging to the people that are coveted by the Water Power Syndicates, or an appropriation that is needed to build waterways which would make competition for railroads. Water Power Syndicates and Railroads and Armor-Plate Mills are all controlled by the same coterie of intrenched interests. They understand each other and work together perfectly without even the necessity for a gentleman's agreement. _The people have been asleep a long time but some day they will wake up._ For years the Gospel of Peace has been proclaimed to the world from the United States. During that period we have been busy building battleships and piling up great private fortunes from making armor plate. We have been urging disarmament while spending millions to increase our own armaments. We have been advocating arbitration while constantly increasing our military expenditures. Since the day when Congress in a frenzy of patriotic outburst voted fifty millions in fifteen minutes to start our war with Spain, the peace propaganda has been vigorously prosecuted and in that period we have had war after war: the Spanish-American War, the Russo-Japanese War; war in the Philippines, war in Greece, war in the Balkans, war in South Africa, war in Algeria, war in Morocco, war in Tripoli, war in Mexico, war again in the Balkans, and now nearly all of Europe is ablaze with war and its flames are reddening Asia and Africa. It gives one an unpleasant, gruesome feeling to think about it. The substance seems always to have been on the side of war, the shadow only on the side of peace. That is no reason why the movement for peace should be abandoned, but is it not a reason for completely changing the ideals and methods of the peace movement, and adopting a plan such as is embodied in this book for a constructive peace propaganda, that will strengthen the peace movement, and at the same time solve our most difficult internal social and economic problems and make sure that if war ever does befall us we will be found not unprepared, not unarmed, not unready, not undefended? If everything were done that the most extreme Militarist advocates, we would still be undefended, and we will remain so until our whole military system is constructed anew, and a real system of national defense organized as outlined in this book. _The Frankenstein of war can be controlled._ But it can only be controlled by organizing a system of national defense against Nature's destroying forces, which can, by touching a button, be instantly transformed, if need be, into a force for national defense against a foreign invasion or to uphold the rights or honor of the nation. CHAPTER III _The Militarists will never initiate an adequate system for national defense in the United States, because such a system necessitates an organization under civil control in time of peace. It must be an organization that will at all times act as a self-operating and self-perpetuating influence to promote peace and prevent war. It must also automatically and instantly become an impregnable defense against foreign attack or invasion if, in spite of all precautions and efforts to prevent it, war should actually occur at any time in the future._ Whatever we do for national defense should be done primarily to _prevent_ and _safeguard against_ the breaking out of war. Every plan for national defense should, like the plan proposed in this book, be formulated with that end in view. That should be its clearly defined objective. There should be no possibility of any mistake about that. It should be made so plain that there never could be any misunderstanding as to that being the primary purpose of the plan. A national force should be organized primarily for civil duty in time of peace. It should be organized in such a way that it could at a moment's notice be converted into a military machine for national defense in case of war. But that conversion should be a secondary object. The necessity for such a conversion should be regarded as a remote possibility, to prevent which every human power would be exerted, but which might occur, notwithstanding all that could be done to prevent it. An illustration of this situation might be drawn from the case of an aëroplane constructed for aërial service. It would be needed and built for work in the air. But if it were possible that it might be needed for use over water, then it might be so constructed that in the event of falling on the water it could still keep afloat and propel itself. Aërial navigation would be the primary purpose of its construction. Water navigation would be secondary, and not intended to be resorted to except in case of accident. It would serve as a safeguard against death which might otherwise be caused by an event only remotely possible. If the necessity for making our system for national defense primarily an instrument of peace is constantly borne in mind, it will make progress easier and more rapid and certain. It will eliminate many complications that would result if we should undertake to look to the military establishment to formulate plans for a system of national defense that would be operative for peace as well as for war. In the past the whole matter of national defense has been left to the Army and Navy. That is the reason why no satisfactory system has been evolved. Naturally the Army and the Navy can see nothing in any plan which does not involve simply a greater army and a greater navy. If it is now left to the War Department to make plans for a military system that will be adequate for national defense, there are many reasons why a satisfactory system will never be devised. The idea would be incomprehensible to a Regular Army man that a national organization, available for civil duties in time of peace, could in time of war be automatically expanded into a military machine strong enough for the national defense. Men educated and trained in the military profession do not comprehend conditions outside of the purely military environment in which they live. They do not understand humanity or the temper of the people in civil life. They have been trained in an atmosphere of social exclusiveness and educated to believe that they belong to a superior caste. They live in a world of their own, separate and apart from their fellowmen. This is every whit as true in America as it is in Germany. The only difference is in the relative size of the armies. The Militarists have no real sympathy with any peace movement. They say that we always have had war and that we always will have war. They look forward with enthusiastic anticipation to the next war as an opportunity for activity and promotion. War is their trade, their profession. They regard with patronizing pity all who have risen to the higher level that regards war as an anarchistic anachronism, and are willing to make any sacrifice to end it forever. They have never read the chapter entitled "The Iron in the Blood" in "The Coming People," by Charles F. Dole. They are devoted to their duty, as they understand it, and are as brave and loyal _soldiers_ as ever existed on the earth. But really it is unreasonable to expect a soldier to be anything but a Militarist. He is bred if not born to war, trained to fight and to study the war game, the war maneuvers, to fortify, to attack, to repel, to figure out a masterly retreat if it becomes necessary. You cannot expect him to be a peace advocate or to work out plans which will prevent or abolish war. It is no part of his duty as he sees it to undertake to devise plans for peace that would render the professional soldier obsolete and relegate him and his brother soldiers to a place by the side of the chivalrous Knights of the Middle Ages, or the Crusaders who fought the Saracens to rescue the Holy Sepulcher from the infidels--picturesque and romantic but expensive and useless. Moreover, Army officers are hampered in all planning for constructive work by their rigid adherence to precedent. They have a medieval contempt for everything non-military, and for all civil duties and affairs. All this results from the existence of a military caste in this country which is as supercilious, self-opinionated, and autocratic as the military aristocracy of the most military ridden nation of Europe. They lack initiative and originality because their whole education has operated to drill it out of them, and to make men who are mere machines, doing what they are told to do, _and doing it well_, but doing nothing else. That is the exact opposite of the type of mind demanded in an emergency requiring initiative and the genius to originate and carry out new and better ways of doing things than those that have prevailed in the past. Men with the military training appear to entirely lack the analytical mind that seeks for _causes_, and comprehends that by removing the _cause_, the evil itself may be safeguarded against, or may in that way be prevented from ever coming into existence. _This fact is well illustrated by the stupendous losses the country has suffered from floods because the Army Engineers have for years so stubbornly refused to consider plans for controlling floods at their sources._ Solid arrays of facts presented to them have contributed nothing to breaking down their stolid egotism. They will not originate, or approve, any plan that does not center everything that is proposed to be done in the War Department and thereby enlarge its influence and prestige. They oppose every plan to coördinate the War Department with other departments, or to put the Army on the same plane with the others in working out plans for constructive coöperation. The members of the military caste do not seem to be able to comprehend that the stamp of an inferior caste which they put upon enlisted men, and the menial services exacted from private soldiers by their officers, create conditions that are revolting to every instinct of a man with the right American spirit of self-respect. They are a relic of the barbaric period when the private soldier was an ignorant brute. Those conditions alone are sufficient to render impracticable any plan for a reserve composed of soldiers who have served out their term of enlistment. In "On Board the Good Ship Earth," Herbert Quick says: "All institutions must sooner or later be transformed so as to accord with the principles of democracy--or they must be abolished. The great objection to standing armies is their conflict with democracy. They are essentially aristocratic in their traditions. The officers must always be 'Gentlemen' and the privates merely men. The social superiority of officer over man is something enormous. Every day's service tends to make the man in the ranks a servile creature, and the man with epaulettes a snob and a tyrant." The standing army to-day represents an economic waste of labor of the entire body of enlisted men. Many soldiers are demoralized by the inactivity or idleness of the life of the camp or the barracks. The whole conception of the military caste as to what the Army ought to be is medieval and monstrously wrong. The United States Army should be a training school for the very highest type of self-respecting, independent, and self-sustaining citizenship that this country can produce. It should be a great educational institution, training every enlisted man to be an officer in the Reserve, or to be a Homecrofter after he returns to private life. Daily manual constructive labor should be a part of every soldier's duty. The relation between officer and enlisted men should be that of instructor and student. Such a relation is entirely consistent with the absolute authority that would be vested in the instructor. The Army System should be such that an opportunity to serve a term as an enlisted man would be coveted as much as an appointment to West Point is now coveted. The Army should train men for civil life and citizenship, not ruin them for it as it now so often does. The many wrong conditions above referred to result from the unfortunate attitude of mind of those who compose the military caste. They would make it impracticable to ever successfully carry out any plan for useful constructive labor by enlisted men in the military service. If such a Reserve were made subject to the control of the War Department, it would be impossible to ever enlist as a Reserve a construction force composed of men who believe in the dignity of labor and refuse to recognize the superiority of any caste in American life or citizenship. If this statement is not a fact, why is it that no useful, constructive work is accomplished by the fifty odd thousand able-bodied enlisted men of our Regular Army? The same men would accomplish superhuman manual labor in case of war. And the same conditions would obtain if our army was 100,000 or 200,000 or 500,000 strong. This wasteful situation taken as a whole makes it impracticable to work out any plans which might otherwise be initiated or formulated by the War Department for creating a great reserve force that would be entirely under the control of the civil departments of the national government in time of peace. It is imperative that such civil control should prevail. Were it otherwise, the same danger of military domination in government affairs would arise that would result from the maintenance of a standing army in this country large enough to serve as a national defense in time of war with any first-class power. _And the establishment of a National Construction Service as a Reserve force, enlisted for work to be done under civil control in time of peace, but available for military service in time of war, constitutes one of the most practicable plans for creating a Reserve from which an army for national defense could be instantly mobilized in time of war._ The plan proposed by the War Department, of a short term of service in the regular army, followed by liability to service in a reserve made up of men discharged after this short-service term, could never be worked out effectively. The impracticability of that plan has been clearly shown by Representative James Hay, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, in a recent magazine article in which he says: "Military authorities, backed by the opinions of many persons high in civil life, insist that we should be provided with an adequate reserve of men, so that we may in any time of trouble have men who will be prepared to enter the army fully trained for war. In this I concur; but in a country where military service is not compulsory the method of providing a reserve is an extremely complex problem, one that has not yet been satisfactorily solved by anybody. It is proposed, among other things, to have short enlistments, and thus turn out each year a large number of men who will be trained soldiers. Let us examine this for a moment and see where it will lead, and whether any good will come out of it, either for the army or for the country. "After giving this question of a reserve for the army the most careful thought, after having heard the opinion of many officers of our army,--and those too best qualified to give opinions on a matter of this sort,--I am convinced that, under our system of military enlistment, it is impracticable to accumulate, with either a long-term or a short-term enlistment period, a dependable reserve force of fairly well trained men. To use our army as a training school would destroy the army as such, and fail utterly to create any reserve that could be depended upon as a large body of troops. "The proposal of the General Staff of the army has been that the men should enlist for two years and then spend five years in the reserve. The five years in the reserve is impossible in this country, because we have no compulsory military service and because it is intended by the authors of the plan not to pay the reserve men. And it is an open-and-shut proposition that men cannot be expected to enter the reserve voluntarily, without pay, when the regulations would require them to submit to such inconveniences as applying to the department for leave to go from one State to another or into a foreign country, and when they would be compelled to attend maneuvers, often at distant points, at least twice a year." The Militarists, the professional military men, and those who draw their inspiration from that source, present no plan for enlarging our army in time of war except: (1) The proposed Reserve system so clearly shown in the above quotation to be impracticable; (2) Reliance upon State Militia to reënforce the regular army--a plan rejected by all who are willing to learn by experience; and (3) The increase of the standing army, to bring it up to a point where it could at any time cope with the standing armies of other powers, and its maintenance there. Another quotation from the same article by Representative Hay will give the facts that show the impracticability of the plan for increasing the standing army: "But, in order to make more evident what Congress has given to the army and the consequent results that must have been obtained therefrom, let me call attention to the fact that during the last ten years the appropriations for the support of the military establishments of this country have amounted to the grand total of $1,007,410,270.48, almost as much as is required to pay all the other expenses of the government, all the salaries, all the executive machinery, all the judiciary, everything, for an entire year. "Thus, during this period, the army appropriations have annually been from $70,000,000 to $101,000,000; the Military Academy appropriations, from $673,000 to $2,500,000 a year; for fortifications, from $4,000,000 to $9,300,000; for armories and arsenals, from $330,000 to $860,000; for military posts, from $320,000 to $4,380,000; by deficiency acts, military establishment, from $657,000 to $5,300,000; and for Pacific railroads transportation and the enlisted men's deposit fund, a total for the ten years of $11,999,271. "The totals for the ten fiscal years 1905 to 1915 have been as follows: Permanent appropriations (including Pacific railroads transportation and enlisted men's deposit fund) $11,999,271.00 Fortification acts, armories and arsenals, and military posts in sundry civil acts, and deficiencies for military establishments in deficiency acts 113,071,133.17 Army appropriation acts 868,536,993.31 Military Academy acts 13,802,873.00 ---------------- Total $1,007,410,270.48 "However, in spite of this showing of the great expense of maintaining a small army, the Militarists keep up their clamor--particularly at such a time as this, and again whenever a military appropriation bill is up for consideration in the House--that this country be saddled with a great standing army. There is not the slightest need of such an establishment. But, if there were some slight indication of trouble with a fully equipped great power, would the people of this country be ready to embark on a policy that would mean the permanent maintenance of a regular standing army of 500,000 men? It would cost this country, at a conservative estimate, $600,000,000 a year to go through with such an undertaking." Now after fully weighing that situation in the mind, as set forth by Representative Hay, put beside it the following facts as given by Homer Lea, in "The Valor of Ignorance": "European nations in time of peace maintain armies from three hundred and fifty thousand to five hundred thousand men and officers, together with reserves of regulars varying from two to five million, with a proportionate number of horses and guns, for the same money that the United States is obliged to expend to maintain _fifty thousand_ troops with _no reserve_ of regulars. "_Japan could support a standing peace army exceeding one million men for the same amount of money this Republic now spends on fifty thousand._ "This proportion, which exists in time of peace, becomes even more excessive in time of war; for whenever war involves a country there exists in all preparation an extravagance that is also proportionate to the wealth of the nation. "_During the last few years of peace, from 1901 to 1907, the United States Government has expended on the army and navy over fourteen hundred million dollars: a sum exceeding the combined cost to Japan of the Chinese War and the Russian War, as well as the entire maintenance of her forces during the intervening years of peace._" And again, the same author says: "A vast population and great numbers of civilian marksmen can be counted as assets in the combative potentiality of a nation as are coal and iron ore in the depths of its mountains, but they are, _per se_, worthless until put to effective use. This Republic, drunk only with the vanity of its resources, will not differentiate between them and actual power. "_Japan, with infinitely less resources, is militarily forty times more powerful._ "Germany, France, or Japan can each mobilize in _one month_ more troops, scientifically trained by educated officers, than this Republic could gather together in _three years_. In the Franco-Prussian War, Germany mobilized in the field, ready for battle, over half a million soldiers, more than one hundred and fifty thousand horses and twelve hundred pieces of artillery in _five days_. The United States could not mobilize for active service a similar force in _three years_. A modern war will seldom endure longer than this. "Not only has this nation no army, but it has no military _system_." We have in the United States a military establishment adequate to suppressing riots, controlling mobs, preventing local anarchy, and protecting property from destruction by internal disturbance or uprisings in our own country. As a national police force, our army is an entirely adequate and satisfactory organization. But policing a mining camp and fighting an invading army, are two widely different propositions. So would fighting a Japanese army be from fighting a few Spaniards or Filipinos. When it comes to a "military system" adapted to the needs of a foreign war with a first-class nation, we have none; and thus far none has been proposed. A system that depends on creating the machinery for national defense by any plan to be undertaken _after hostilities have begun_, is no system at all, and cannot be classed as a system for national defense. It is a system for national delusion. A Volunteer Army belongs in this class, and so in fact does the State Militia. The question of national defense involves two separate and distinct problems: First, the defense of the nation against invasion by another nation. Second, the defense of the nation and of its social, civil, and political institutions from internal disturbance and civil conflict. It may safely be assumed that there will never again be a civil conflict between any two different sections of this country. That there will inevitably be such a conflict between contending forces within the body politic itself, no sane man will deny, if congested cities and tenement life are to be allowed to continue to degenerate humanity and breed poverty and misery. They will ultimately undermine and destroy the mental and physical racial strength of the people. We will then have a population without intelligence or reasoning powers. Such a proletariat will constitute a social volcano, an ever present menace to internal peace. Conflicts such as that which so recently existed in Colorado, approach very closely to civil war. They have occurred before. They will occur again. They may occur at any time. Whenever they do occur, it may be necessary to invoke the power of the nation, acting through the army as a police force, to preserve the peace and protect life and property. For that work it must be conceded that we need an army. As it has been well expressed, we need "a good army but not a large army." It may be conceded that we need for that purpose, and for Insular and Isthmian Service, and for garrison duty, an army as large as that now authorized by Congress when enlisted to the full strength of 100,000 men, _but no more_. Set the limit there and keep it there, and fight any plan for an increase. The question whether we should have an army of 50,000 men or 100,000 men is of comparatively small importance. As to that question there need be no controversy on any ground except that of comparative wisdom of expenditure. There are other things this country should do, _that it is not doing_, of more importance than to maintain an army of 100,000 instead of 50,000, or than to build more battleships at this time. An army needed as a national police force to safeguard against any sort of domestic disturbance is a very different proposition from the army we would need in the event of a war with any of the great world powers. An army of 100,000 is as large as we will ever need to safeguard against domestic disturbance. An army any larger than that, for that purpose, should be opposed as a menace to the people's liberties, and a waste of the nation's revenues. It is conceded on all sides, however, that if it ever did happen, however remote the possibility may be, that the United States became involved in a war with a foreign nation of our own class, an army of 100,000 men would be impotent and powerless for national defense. So would an army of 200,000 men. An army of 200,000 is twice as large as we should have in time of peace. In the event of war with any first-class power we would have to have an army five or ten times 200,000. It would therefore be utterly unwarranted and unwise to increase our standing army from 100,000 to 200,000. There is no reasonable ground or hypothesis on which it can be justified. Any proposition for such an increase should meet with instant and just condemnation and determined opposition. A war between the United States and some other great power is either possible or it is impossible. If it is impossible, then we need do nothing to safeguard against it. If it is possible, either in the near or distant future, then we should safeguard against it adequately and completely; we should do _everything that may be necessary to prevent war or to defend ourselves in the event of war_. To say that war is impossible is contrary to all common sense and reason, and runs counter to conclusions forced by a careful study of probabilities and of the compelling original causes for war that may in their evolution involve this nation. Field Marshal Earl Roberts told the English people, over and over again, that they were in imminent danger of a war with Germany. No one believed him--at least not enough of them to make any impression on public sentiment--and England was caught unprepared by the present war. Therefore, let full weight be given to Lord Roberts' declaration and warning as to the future, as recently published: "_I would ask them not to be led away by those who say that the end of this great struggle is to be the end of war, and that it is bound to lead to a great reduction of armament. There is nothing in the history of the world to justify any such conclusion. Nor is it consonant with ordinary common sense._" Such a statement as this, from such a man, cannot be whistled down the wind. This country must inevitably face the condition that in all probability the present war will increase rather than reduce the danger that the United States may become involved in war. It may be argued that Germany, once a possible antagonist, will be so weakened by this great conflict as not to desire another war. The contrary will prove true. If Germany should prevail, the ambition of her War Lords would know no limit, until Germany dominated the world. If Germany should not prevail, no matter how much she may be humbled by defeat, she will start over again, with all the latent strength of her people, to rebuild from the ruins a more powerful military nation than she has ever been. With the record before us of what Germany has accomplished since the close of the Thirty Years' War, can anyone deny that a great Teutonic military power might again be developed from the ashes of a ruined nation? If we look across the Pacific at Japan, we see a nation strengthened and proudly conscious of victory as a result of the present war. Whatever other nations may suffer, Japan gets nothing from this war but national advancement and national glory. The latter is a mighty asset for her, because of the inspiration and stimulus it affords to her people in all their national efforts and ambitions for advancement and expansion. Russia, England, and France, however great their losses may be, will come out of this war with enormously enlarged national strength, and with their national forces solidified and concentrated behind the military power in those governments. In none of them will this new accretion and concentration of military governmental power be thereafter voluntarily limited or surrendered. Let us then not deceive ourselves by any visions of world peace which exist only in dreams, or follow shadows into the quicksands in which we would find ourselves mired down if this nation were caught unprepared in a war with any of the great nations above named. The question of national defense, in the event of such a war, is not one of battleships, so on that point we need not trouble ourselves much with the controversy about how many battleships this country should build in a year. If we had as many battleships as England has to-day, they might prove a broken reed when tested as a means of national defense in case of a war with either England, France, or Japan. A standing army of 100,000 men, or even of 200,000 men, would prove utterly inadequate for our national defense in such a war. Worse than that, our whole military system is fatally defective. It entirely lacks the capacity of instant automatic expansion necessary to quickly put an army of a million men in the field. It would be imperative and unavoidable that we should do so, the moment we became involved in war with a first-class power. A million men would be the minimum size of the army we would need the instant war started with any great nation like Japan. As a system for national defense in such a war our standing army is a dangerous delusion. Its existence, and the false reliance placed on it, delays the adoption of a system that would prove adequate to any emergency. The militia system of the United States is another delusion, and in case of war would be little better than useless. Washington had his own bitter experiences to guide him, and he warned the people of this country against militia in the following vigorous terms: "Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as offense, and when a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. "No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by constant course of discipline and service. "I have never yet been a witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in a material degree, to so precarious a defense." In the face of all these facts, the people of the United States are groping in the dark. They may have a vague and glimmering idea of their danger, but as yet no definite and practicable plan for national defense in case of war has been suggested, except that proposed in this book. The beautiful iridescent dream and vision of an army of a million patriotic souls hurrying to the colors in the event of national danger brings only counter visions of Bull Run and Cuba, of confusion, waste, death, and devastation, before we could possibly get these men officered, trained, equipped, and organized to fight any first-class power according to the methods of modern warfare. As an illustration, what would our pitifully small army, and our almost raw and untrained levies of militia, do in a grim conflict with the 200,000 trained and seasoned and perfectly armed and equipped soldiers which Japan could land on our shores within four weeks, or the 500,000 she could land in four months, or the 1,000,000 she could land in ten months? We could not by any possibility get a military force of equal strength into action on the Pacific coast in that length of time or in anywhere near it. That is where our danger lies, and therein exists the startling menace of our unpreparedness for war. It is not that we lack men or money. No nation in the world has better soldiers than those now serving under our flag. We no doubt have the raw material for a larger army than any nation or any two nations could utilize for the invasion of our territory, but any one of three or four nations could humble and defeat us several times over before we could whip this raw material into shape for a fighting force and get it armed and equipped for actual warfare. The conclusion from this would on the surface naturally seem to be that we must have a larger standing army. The strange and apparently contradictory but undeniable fact is that a larger standing army, organized in accordance with our present military system, would merely increase our danger, and might precipitate a war that would otherwise have been avoided. A great standing army in this country would ultimately create the same national psychological condition that existed in Germany before this last war. There were many who averred when this war broke out that it was the war of the Kaiser and his War Lords, and contrary to the spirit and wishes of the German people. The exact opposite has been thoroughly established. Strange as it may seem, we must accept the fact that the German people, as the result of generations of education from childhood to manhood, look upon war as a necessary element of German expansion and the growth of the empire to which they are all patriotically devoted. More than this, ringed about as they have been for centuries with a circle of armed adversaries, it was inevitable that a spirit should be developed in the minds of the people that their only safety as a nation lay in Militarism, however much they might deplore its necessity as individuals, groan under its burdens, or personally dread military service. The moment the people of the United States accepted as a fact the belief that a standing army large enough for national protection is the only way for this country to safeguard against an armed adversary, that moment would the attitude of mind of our people towards war become the same as that of Germany and France. After this war it will be the attitude of mind of the people of Great Britain. England has been shaken to her core, and never again will she be found unprepared for war at any moment that it may come. CHAPTER IV _The system for national defense in the United States must embrace a National Construction Reserve, organized primarily to fight Nature's forces instead of to fight the people of another nation. It must be so organized that it will furnish a substitute for the supreme inspiration to patriotism, and the tremendous stimulus to energy and organized effort that war has furnished to the human race through all the past centuries of the existence of the race._ This National Construction Reserve must be an organized force of men regularly enlisted for a term in the service of the national government. The men in the Reserve must be under civil control when engaged in construction service, and under military control when in military service in time of war. Those enlisted in the Reserve would labor for their country in construction service in time of peace, building great works of internal improvement and constructive national development, with exactly the same spirit of patriotic service that they would fight under the flag and dig trenches or build fortifications in time of war. We must organize this National Construction Reserve for a conflict to conquer, subjugate, and hold in strong control the forces of Nature. We must organize our national forces and expend our national revenues for that conflict, instead of organizing them for devastation and human slaughter. We must organize a national system that will create, not destroy; that will conserve, not waste, human life, and homes, and the country's resources. We must plan to enlist our national forces in a great conflict with Nature, _to save life and property_, instead of enlisting them in conflicts with other nations _to destroy life and property_. We must develop a patriotism that will be as active in constructive work in time of peace as in destructive work in time of war. We must enlist a National Construction Reserve that will put forth in time of peace for constructive human advancement the same extraordinary energy and invincible determination that war arouses. The construction work of the Forest Service should be done by a Construction Corps enlisted in that Service. Every forester should be a reservist. A regularly enlisted force of fire-fighters and tree-planters should be organized--tens of thousands of them--to fight forest fires and to fight deserts and floods by planting forests. The planting and care of new forests should be done by regularly organized companies of enlisted men, detailed for that work, exactly as they would be detailed for a soldier's duties in time of war. The work of the Reclamation Service should be done, not by hired contractors, but by a Construction Corps of men enlisted in that Service. They should be set to work building all the works necessary to reclaim every acre of desert land and every acre of swamp or overflow land that can be reclaimed in the United States. The cost of all reclamation work done by the national government should be charged against the land and repaid with interest from the date of the investment. The interest charge should be no more than the government would have to pay on the capital invested, with an additional annual charge sufficient to form a sinking fund that would repay the principal in fifty years. The work of the Forest Service as well as that of the Reclamation Service should be put on a business basis. New forests should be planted where their value when matured will equal the investment in their creation, with interest and cost of maintenance. The same system of enlisting a Construction Corps to do all construction work should be adopted in every department of the national government which is doing or should be doing the vast volume of construction work which stands waiting at every hand. Each branch should have its regularly enlisted Construction Corps. All the different branches of the government dealing in any way with forestry or with the conservation, use, or control of water, in the War Department, Interior Department, Agricultural Department, or Commerce Department, should be coördinated and brought together in a Board of River Regulation. The coördination of their work should be made mandatory by law through that organization. All the details of perfecting the formation of the Construction Reserve and its organization for constructive service in time of peace and for military service in time of war should be worked out through this coördinating Board of River Regulation. The duty of the men enlisted in the National Construction Reserve would be not only to do the work allotted to them, but to do it in such a way as to dignify labor in all the works of peace. It should show the patriotic spirit with which work in the public service can be done to protect the country from Nature's devastations. It should demonstrate that such work can be done in time of peace, with the same energy and enthusiasm that prevail in time of war. _But in case of war_, the National Construction Reserve must be so organized that it can be instantly transformed into _an army of trained and seasoned soldiers_--soldiers that can beat their plowshares into swords at a day's notice, and as quickly beat the swords back into plowshares when weapons are no longer needed. In the development of this idea lies the assured safety of this nation against the dangers of unpreparedness in the event of war. There will be more than work enough for such a Construction Reserve to do in time of peace for generations yet to come. Such floods as those which swept through the Mississippi Valley in 1912 and 1913 are _an invasion by Nature's forces_. They bring ruin to thousands and devastate vast areas. They overwhelm whole communities with losses as great as the destruction which would be caused by the invasion of an armed force. Floods of that character are national catastrophes, as are likewise such floods as that which devastated the Ohio Valley in 1913, and the more recent floods in Southern California and Texas. Floods should be safeguarded against by an organized national system for flood protection. That National System for River Regulation and Flood Control should be brought into being and impelled to action by an overwhelming mental force, generated in the minds of the whole people. It should be a power as irresistible as that which projected us into the war with Spain, after the Maine was blown up in Havana harbor. The ungoverned floods which for years have periodically devastated the Great Central Valley of the United States can never be wholly safeguarded against by any sort of local defense. They must be controlled at their sources. The problem is interstate and national. Works to prevent floods in the Lower Mississippi Valley from Cairo to the Gulf of Mexico, must be constructed, maintained, and operated on every tributary of the Ohio, the Upper Mississippi, and the Missouri Rivers--a stupendous project but entirely practicable. The water must be conserved and controlled where it originally falls. It must be held back on the watershed of every source stream. If this were done, the floods of the Ohio River Valley could be so reduced, and the flow of the river so regulated, as never in the future to cause damage or destruction. The same is true of the Missouri and the Upper Mississippi Rivers. If the floods were controlled on the source streams and upper tributaries, the floods of the Lower Mississippi could be protected against by levees, supplemented by controlled outlets and spillways as additional safeguards. Millions of garden homes could in that way be made as safe in the delta of the Mississippi River now annually menaced by overflow as anywhere on the high bench lands or plateaus of the Missouri Valley. To do this work would be to defend a territory twice as large as the entire cultivated area of the Empire of Japan against the annual menace of destruction by Nature's forces. Is not that a national work that is worth doing? Is not that the right sort of national defense? Is it not an undertaking large enough to arouse and inspire the whole people of this great nation to demand its accomplishment? To do it right, and to do it thoroughly and effectively, necessitates the systematic organization of a Construction Corps under national direction for that work. It would require that we should put forth national energy as powerful, and mental and physical effort as vigorously effective, as that demanded by war. Why then should not a National Construction Reserve be organized to do that work as efficiently in time of peace as it could be done by a military organization in time of war, if the doing of it were a war necessity instead of a peace measure? If we ever succeed in safeguarding this and other nations against war, it will be because we have learned to do the work of peace with the same energy, efficiency, patriotism, and individual self-sacrifice that is now given to the work of war. It is because Germany learned this lesson three centuries ago with reference to her forests and her waterways that she now has a system of forests and waterways built by the hand of man and built better than those of any other nation of the world. This great work of safeguarding and defending the Mississippi Valley, the Ohio Valley, and the Missouri Valley from flood invasion, if done by the United States for those valleys, must, in the same way and to the same extent, be done by the nation for all other flood-menaced valleys throughout the country. It necessitates working out, in coöperation with the States and local municipalities and districts, a comprehensive and complete plan for water conservation, and its highest possible utilization for all the beneficial purposes to which water can be devoted. It necessitates the preservation of the forests and woodland cover on the watersheds, the reforestation of denuded areas, and the planting of new forests on a thousand hillsides and mountains and on treeless plains where none exist to-day. It necessitates the building of model communities on irrigated lands intensively cultivated, as object lessons, in a multitude of localities, to demonstrate the value, for many beneficial uses, of the water which now runs to waste in floods. It necessitates the establishment and maintenance of a great system of education to train the people in the intensive cultivation of land and the use of water to produce food for mankind, and thereby transform an agency of destruction into an agency of production on a stupendous scale. It necessitates building and operating great reservoir systems, main line canals, and engineering works, large and small, of every description that have ever been built anywhere in the world for the control of water for beneficial use, and to prevent floods and feed waterways. To have an inland waterway system in the United States, in fact as well as in name, necessitates building on all the rivers of this country such works as have been built on every river in Germany, such works as the Grand Canal of China, and such works as the English government has built or supervised in India and Egypt, and is now planning to build to reclaim again for human habitation the once populous but now desert and uninhabited plains of Mesopotamia. No argument ought to be needed to convince the people of the United States that this great work of national defense against Nature's forces should arouse the same patriotic inspiration and stimulate us to the same superhuman effort and energy that we would put forth to prevent any section of our country from being devastated by war. But if such an argument were needed it is found in the condition of Mesopotamia to-day, as compared with the days of Babylon's wealth and prosperity. The people who dwelt on the Babylonian plains, and who made that empire great and populous, sustained themselves by the irrigation of the desert. The same processes of slow destruction which are now so evidently at work over a large portion of our own country, gradually overcame and destroyed the people of Mesopotamia. The floods finally destroyed the irrigation systems. The desert triumphed over man. One of the most densely populated regions of the earth became again a barren wilderness. At the end of the Thirty Years' War Germany was a land wasted and destroyed by war, but war had not destroyed the fertility of the soil. Crops could still be raised in the fields, and trees could be planted on the mountains that would grow into forests. All this was done, and modern Germany rose out of the ruins of the Germany of three hundred years ago. War had destroyed only the surface, leaving the latent fertility of the land to be revived by indomitable human labor. In Mesopotamia it was different. There the forces of Nature destroyed the only means of getting food from the desert. Therefore the desert prevailed and humanity migrated or became extinct. Will anyone question that the defense of Mesopotamia against the desert should have aroused the same intensity of patriotism among her people that has been aroused in past wars for the defense of Germany, or as has been aroused for the defense of Belgium and France and England in the present war? Nature's processes of destruction work slowly but surely. In Mesopotamia they have gone forward to the ultimate end. An entire people who once constituted one of the greatest empires of the world have succumbed to and been annihilated by the Desert. Nature's forces have worked the same complete destruction in many other places in Persia and Asia Minor, and on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Northern Africa was once a fertile and populous country. Its wooded hillsides and timbered mountains gave birth to the streams by which it was watered. It is another region of the earth that has been conquered by the destroying forces of nature. The resources of vast areas of that country, its power to sustain mankind, have been finally destroyed by those blighting forces as completely as the city of Carthage was obliterated by the Romans. If the fertility of the lands of Northern Africa had been as indestructible by Nature's forces as the fertility of the lands of Central Europe, a new nation would have arisen in Northern Africa, nursed into being by that indestructible fertility. Wherever the natural resources are destroyed the human race becomes extinct. A battle with an invading army may lead to temporary devastation. A battle with the Desert, if the Desert triumphs, means the perpetual death of the defeated nation. _Which conflict should call for the greatest patriotic effort for national defense?_ Patriotism exerted for the intelligent protection of any country from the destruction of its basic natural resources, is aimed at a more enduring achievement when it fights the destroying powers of Nature than when it fights against a temporary devastation by an invading army. The complete deforestation and denudation of the mountains of China and the floods caused thereby resulted from the intensive individualism of her people, and from their utter lack of any systematic organization of governmental machinery to protect the resources of the country. An organized system of forest preservation and flood protection, based upon and springing from a spirit of patriotic service to the nation as a whole, would have saved China from the destruction of resources of incalculable value to her people, and it would have saved millions from death by famine. _Is death by war any worse than death by famine?_ The chief original causes of the great famines of China have been floods which were preventable. In some of her largest valleys the floods have resulted primarily from the denudation of the mountains and the destruction of the woodland and forest cover on the watersheds of the rivers. In "The Changing Chinese" by Prof. Edward A. Ross some vivid descriptions will be found of the havoc wrought by deforestation and flood. Here is one of the pictures he has drawn for us of Chinese conditions: "On the Nowloon hills opposite Hong Kong there are frightful evidences of erosion due to deforestation several hundred years ago. The loose soil has been washed away till the country is knobbed or blistered with great granite boulders. North of the Gulf of Tonkin I am told that not a tree is to be seen and the surviving balks between the fields show that land once cultivated has become waste. Erosion stripped the soil down to the clay and the farmers had to abandon the land. The denuded hill-slopes facing the West River have been torn and gullied till the red earth glows through the vegetation like blood. The coast hills of Fokien have lost most of their soil and show little but rocks. Fuel-gatherers constantly climb about them grubbing up shrubs and pulling up the grass. No one tries to grow trees unless he can live in their midst and so prevent their being stolen. The higher ranges further back have been stripped of their trees but not of their soil for, owing to the greater rainfall they receive, a verdant growth quickly springs up and protects their flanks. "Deep-gullied plateaus of the loess, guttered hillsides, choked water-courses, silted-up bridges, sterilized bottom lands, bankless wandering rivers, dyked torrents that have built up their beds till they meander at the level of the tree-tops, mountain brooks as thick as pea soup, testify to the changes wrought once the reckless ax has let loose the force of running water to resculpture the landscape. No river could drain the friable loess of Northwest China without bringing down great quantities of soil that would raise its bed and make it a menace in its lower, sluggish course. But if the Yellow River is more and more 'China's Sorrow' as the centuries tick off, it is because the rains run off the deforested slopes of its drainage basin like water off the roof of a house and in the wet season roll down terrible floods which burst the immense and costly embankments, spread like a lake over the plain, and drown whole populations." We are following faithfully in the footsteps of China in our national policy of non-action or grossly inadequate action. It is only a question of time when we will suffer as they have suffered, unless we mend our ways, and arouse our people to the spirit of patriotic service necessary, over vast areas in the United States, to protect our mountains, forests, valleys, and rivers from the fate of those in China. The Chinese people, lacking in national patriotism, were overcome by the invasion of barbaric hordes from the North, and were also overwhelmed by the destroying powers of Nature. A national spirit of patriotism, bearing fruit in national organization, would have protected them from both disasters, as it actually did protect the Japanese. The Japanese have not only successfully defended themselves against the aggressions of Russia. In the same spirit of energetic and purposeful patriotism, they have preserved and utilized to the highest possible extent the resources of their country. They have defended Japan against the destructive forces of Nature which have devastated China. The hillsides and mountains of many sections of China are bared to the bone of every vestige of forest or woodland cover. The floods have eroded the mountains and filled the valleys with the débris. Torrential floods now rage and destroy where perennial streams once flowed. In Japan, those perennial streams still flow from every hillside and mountain, feeding the myriad of canals with which her fertile fields are laced and interlaced. The result is that on only 12,500,000 acres of intensively cultivated soil Japan sustains a rural population of 30,000,000 people. The power of Japan as a nation lies in the racial strength of her people. That comes largely from the physical vigor and endurance developed by the daily labor of the gardeners who till the soil. They have the land to cultivate because the devotion of the people to the good of all has led them to preserve their forests and water supplies. Where would they be to-day if the same spirit of selfish individualism, and apathy and indifference to the national welfare, and to the preservation of the nation's resources, had dominated Japan, that has dominated China for centuries, and that now dominates the United States of America? In "The Valor of Ignorance," the author, Homer Lea, most truly says: "No national ideals could be more antithetic than are the ethical and civic ideals of Japan to those existent in this Republic. One nation is a militant paternalism, where aught that belongs to man is first for the use of the State, the other an individualistic emporium where aught that belongs to man is for sale. In one is the complete subordination of the individual, in the other his supremacy." The author might with equal truth have added that from the standpoint of the intrenched interests which control capital in the United States, and undertake to control legislation, Humanity and Mother Earth exist only for exploitation for private profit, and that the campaign to preserve and perpetuate our natural resources and regulate our rivers and build waterways and stop the ravages of Nature's devastating forces has not as yet succeeded only because it proposes to put the general welfare above speculation and exploitation. This condition will continue until the mass of the people of the United States have a great patriotic awakening and take hold of the duty of perpetuating the country's natural resources, with the same patriotic enthusiasm that they would fight a foreign invader. Let us not deceive ourselves. The majority of the people of the United States are as apathetic and indifferent to the great national questions involved in the preservation of our forests and water supplies, and of the fertility of our fields,--in the protection of our river valleys from floods,--in the defense of the whole Western half of the United States against the inroads of the desert,--in the protection of the mountain ridges of the Eastern half of the United States from deforestation,--and in the protection of our valleys from the fate which has befallen the valleys of China, as were the Chinese through the long centuries during which the grinding, destructive forces of Nature were devastating their country and bringing famine and ruin to millions of the people. Let us heed the lesson of China, and before it is too late enlist the National Construction Reserve to combat this menace which threatens the welfare of our people--grapple with floods in the lower valleys and with floods in the mountain valleys; with forest fires and with forest denudation; with blighting drouth and with desert sands. Let us recognize that our first duty to ourselves and to our country is to preserve the nation by preserving the resources within the nation, without which the human race must perish from the surface of the earth. Once this great fundamental need is recognized for protecting the nation's resources and protecting the people by preserving the means whereby the people live, a national system for bringing into action concerted human effort and constructive energy will be organized. It will be a system that will substitute for the patriotism, the inspiration, and the victories of war a higher patriotism, a more splendid inspiration, and a more glorious victory. That victory of peace which the people of the United States will finally win will be a greater achievement than anything which ever has or ever can be accomplished by warfare. This nation can readily manufacture for itself, and store away in its arsenals and warehouses, all the arms and equipment, all the munitions of war that we would need to conduct a victorious war against any nation of the world. It could train sufficient officers, without any increase of our military expenditures, to lead an army large enough to successfully repel any invasion that might ever be attempted in any part of the United States. In the event of a foreign invasion, what would we need that we would not have, _and could not get_, at least, _not quick enough to save ourselves from a stupendous disaster_? We would need and could not get _men_,--trained _men_,--men hardened and inured to the demands of military service in the field. That is the one and only thing we would lack. All the rest of the problem would be easy of solution. To undertake to enlist a militia of a million men in the United States would not supply this need. The most vital of all the many elements of weakness in militia, especially in this country to-day, would be the total lack of physical stamina and hardihood in the men themselves. Of what use are soldiers who can shoot, in these days of modern warfare, unless they can also dig trenches and endure hardships which are to the ordinary man impossible and inconceivable of being borne? This necessity for men, _trained and hardened men_, men inured to the hardships of military service, would be even greater in this country in the event of a war than in any European country, because of the more primitive condition of the country. Vast areas of the United States are uninhabited and waterless. The climate varies from the intolerable heat, to those not accustomed to it, of the southwestern deserts, to the freezing blizzards of the North. How are we to supply this need for men trained and toughened to every hardship that must be borne by a soldier fighting under our flag in time of war? The answer is, by enlisting them under the same flag to do the arduous work of peace, which will harden them for the work of war, if they are ever needed in that field of action. How many of our people are there who realize the work that is being done for Uncle Sam, every day in the year, by the few men who are giving themselves, in a spirit of patriotism equal to that of any soldier, to the field work of the Forest Service, to building forest fire trails, to fighting forest fires. They give warning nowadays of a forest fire, as the people of the Scottish border gave warning of an invasion in the Olden days. When an invading force was coming up from the South a warning was flashed across Scotland from the Solway to the Tweed with a line of balefires that flamed into the night from the turrets of their castles. It was a call to conflict. It put men on their mettle. So a call to fight a forest fire is a call to conflict and puts men on their mettle for a combat with the oncoming sweep of the devouring fire. Would not the men who are inured to the work of making surveys across rugged mountains, and to quarrying the rock, laying the stone, digging the canals, and doing all the hard physical work that must be done by the men who have built the great reservoirs and canals constructed by the Reclamation Service, be toughened and hardened by it and fitted to dig trenches in actual warfare, as they have been digging them in Belgium, France, Prussia, and Poland? For the hard and trying physical work of war there could be no better training than to do the labor for which the Reclamation Service has paid out millions of dollars in the last ten years. The surveyors of the Land Department, the topographers of the Geological Survey, the men in the field in every branch of Uncle Sam's service, who are winning for this nation its greatest victories, the victories of peace, are by that work physically developed into the very best and most efficient type of strong and rugged manhood--the stuff of which soldiers must be made. As a nation we must recognize this all important fact, and avail ourselves of it. We must build at least one branch of a Reserve that would constitute an adequate organized system of national defense on this foundation: That all government work shall be done by day's work and none by contract. That every dollar that is paid out by Uncle Sam for the doing of constructive government work, which could be temporarily suspended in time of war, shall be paid to a man who had been regularly enlisted in a Construction Reserve for the purpose of doing this work. That those men shall be trained to do that work, and paid for doing it, exactly as though no other object existed. And that every man so enlisted shall be liable instantly to military service if the need should arise, by reason of our country being involved in war with any other nation. Every man employed in that service should be enlisted for a term of from three to five years and trained in every way necessary to fit him to perform the duties of a soldier and to endure the hardships of a soldier's life in the event of war. The Forest Service is now absurdly and pitifully inadequate to the needs of the country. With the exception of small areas recently acquired in the White Mountain and Appalachian regions, its work is chiefly in the western half of the United States. The work of the Forest Service should be enlarged to meet the needs of the entire country. They should reforest every denuded mountain side, and plant millions upon millions of acres of forests in every State in the United States. That work should go on until in every State the matured forests are ample to provide for all its needs for wood or timber. The work of the Reclamation Service, instead of being confined to the West only, should be extended to the entire United States. It should be made to include reclamation by drainage and by protection from overflow just as it now includes reclamation by irrigation. Irrigation systems should be constructed and maintained for the purpose of demonstrating the value of water to increase plant growth, not only in the arid regions, but in every State, East as well as West. Every acre reclaimed should bear the burden of the benefit it received from the work of the national government and pay its proportion of the cost of reclamation. The entire investment of the government should be repaid with interest. The annual charge should include interest and a sinking fund that would return the capital invested, with interest, within fifty years. The original plan of the National Reclamation Act for a repayment in ten years without interest was wrong. It placed an immediate burden on the settler that was too heavy to be practicable. The Extension Amendment was likewise wrong, because no provision was made for interest. The indebtedness should have been capitalized at a very low rate of interest under some plan similar to the British System in India. The future success of reclamation work by the national government requires that the investment shall be returned with interest. In every State the works should be built, in coöperation with the States, municipalities, and local districts, that are necessary to extend to the people of every valley, from Maine to California, from Washington to Florida, and from Montana to Texas, complete assurance of protection from the flood menace in all years. The floods which have in the past brought such appalling catastrophes upon whole valleys and communities, at a cost of millions if not billions of dollars, should be harnessed and controlled and turned from demons of destruction into food-producers and commerce-carriers. If Japan should land an army on the Pacific Coast would we leave it to future generations to defend us against that invasion? It is equally monstrous and wrong for this generation to leave to future generations the building of the great works of defense necessary to check the invasion of our valleys by disastrous floods, or the destruction of our forests by the ravages of fire. Whenever a forest fire breaks out anywhere, there should be an adequate force of men enlisted in Uncle Sam's service for that purpose, to promptly extinguish it. It is as wrong to leave such work wholly to local initiative or action as it would be wrong to leave to the States the question of national defense from possible attack by other nations. Coöperation with the States there should always be, and this the States will willingly extend. Of that we need have no fear. But the initiative must be taken, and the basic plans made and furnished, by the national government. Otherwise the work will never be done that is necessary to defend the nation against Nature's invasions--against forest fires and floods, against drouth and overflow, against denudation and erosion, and against the slow but inexorable encroachments of the Desert in the arid region. The States will not and cannot do it. It requires the overshadowing authority, initiative and financial resources of the national government. The Office of Public Roads of the national government should be made a Service for _Construction_, like the Forest Service and the Reclamation Service. Whatever the national government does to aid in the construction of highways it should do by building them itself, whether they be built as models, to stimulate local interest, or as object lessons to the States through which they run, or as great national highways of travel, linking the Atlantic to the Pacific and the Great Lakes to the Gulf in a continuous system of roads as magnificent as those of ancient Rome. In time of war they would be military highways. In time of peace they would be national highways that would be traveled by multitudes of our people. A Waterway Service for _Construction_ should be created, wholly separate and apart from the War Department or any of its engineers or employees, to build for this country as complete a system of waterways as now exists in any of the countries of Europe--real waterways, waterways built to float boats on and to carry inland commerce. Waterways must be built for commerce and to constitute a national waterway system. The false pretense must stop of spending money on waterways merely as a club to lower railroad rates. That policy of indirection and sham has prompted the waste of too many millions of dollars of the people's money in this country. In this one great interrelated and interdependent work of forest and water conservation, of reclaiming land by irrigation, drainage, and protection from overflow, of regulating and developing the flow of rivers for power development and navigation, and doing everything necessary for the protection of every flood-menaced community and valley, enough men should be enlisted in the different services through which the work is to be done, to do this work with all the expedition required by the welfare of the people at large of this generation. This would necessitate the employment of an ultimate total of a million men, scattered throughout every State of the Union. Every dollar paid to them in wages, and every dollar expended in connection with their work, would prevent devastation or create values for the nation immensely larger than the total expenditure. The values created and benefits assured in time of peace would alone justify the expenditure. The value to the nation of such a great Reserve Force of trained and hardened men in time of war would again justify the expenditure. But in the initial expenditure both ends would be attained. What we pay out from year to year for the support of our Standing Army and our Navy, after each year has passed, is wasted and gone. It is too high a rate to pay for insurance, which in fact is no insurance at all against a possible war. If such a war should come, the Standing Army and the Navy would be hopelessly inadequate for our protection. The system must be changed. The Standing Army, without any increased expenditure, must be made a training school for all the officers needed for a Reserve of at least a million men. This should be done immediately! The day is at hand when the nation must take time by the forelock and in time of peace prepare for war, in a sane, intelligent, adequate, and effective way. If it is not done we run the grave risk, with the possibility of war always facing us, of being subjected by our national indifference to the fearful cost of such a conflict if we were forced into it unprepared. Shall we do this, and get back the full value of every dollar expended, or shall we face the ever growing possibility of a war of one or two or three years duration, costing us in cash outlay two or three billion dollars a year? It will be argued against this plan for an enlisted National Construction Reserve that the men would have no military training in the event that the need should instantly arise for utilizing them as soldiers. That objection should be removed, by applying to the entire Construction Service, the Swiss system of military training for a fixed period during each year, long enough to train a man for the work of a soldier, but not long enough to demoralize or ruin him as a man or as a citizen by the life of the barracks or the camp. The men enlisted in the Construction Service, and entirely under civil control in all the work they would do for ten months of the year, could be given military instruction during the remaining two months. That would not bring upon the people of this country any of the evils that would result from maintaining a standing army large enough to serve as an army of defense in the event of a foreign invasion. And yet, with such a trained Reserve Force already enlisted, the United States would be prepared to instantly put into the field an army of trained and hardened soldiers. Its Reserve Force would be so large that the mere existence of that force would make this nation one of the strongest nations of the world in any military contest. We might then rest assured that other nations would hesitate to attack us or invade our territory. That possibility of danger would be absolutely removed if the plan which will be later outlined for the creation of a National Homecroft Reserve were adopted as an additional means of national defense. It will again be argued that we have no system of training officers for an army of any such magnitude. This is quite true. It is an objection that must be met and overcome. The War Department should be required to train and provide these officers. The military posts on which such great sums have been spent for political reasons, and so few of which are located where they should be for real military reasons, should be turned into military training schools for officers. The rank and file of the regular army should be drawn from a class of men who could be trained in those schools in all the necessary knowledge of military science to qualify them to be officers. They might be private soldiers in the regular army, and at the same time commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the Reserve. A regular army of 50,000, if established on a proper basis, would be able to supply officers for a Reserve of 1,000,000 men. Every private soldier in the regular army should be a man fit to become an officer, and in process of training with that object in view. And when that training had been completed, he should be assigned to his detail or his command in the Reserve. A private soldier in time of peace in the regular army, he would instantly become an officer in the Reserve in time of war. The system should contemplate the retention in the government service, in some constructive capacity, of every man once trained as an officer and capable of rendering service as such in case of war. It is wrong to expect such men to return to private life with a military string tied to them, and take up the complicated duties of a commercial career, with the family obligations that they ought to assume resting upon them, without providing for the contingencies that a call for an immediate return to active service would create. Every soldier trained as an officer should be retained in the government service, either civil or military, under conditions which would make it possible for him to establish a family and a home, and at the same time be certain that his family would suffer no privation if he were called to active service in the event of war. This is not the place to work out the details of such a plan, but it is entirely practicable. The details should be worked out by the War Department. If the people will provide a Reserve of enlisted men under civil control, doing the work of peace in time of peace, and ready for the work of war in time of war, it would be a confession of incompetence for the War Department to question their capacity to train officers for this reserve. Doubtless, however, some of the present regular army idols would have to be shattered. One of the most serious aspects of our unpreparedness for any military conflict lies in the _incompleteness_ of the present system. As the author of "The Valor of Ignorance" well says, we have no military system. We have no means of training an adequate number of officers or holding them in readiness for service during a long period of peace. Provision should be made immediately for the War Department to train these officers. The plan outlined would eliminate the element of weakness that would result from an effort to utilize for national defense officers having no training except that acquired in the State militia. In the plan advocated, every officer needed for an army of a million men in the field would be ready at any moment to step into the service and would have been trained in the work by the military machine of which he would by that act become a part. The army should be cut away entirely from all participation in the civil affairs of the country, and should devote itself to its legitimate field of getting ready for a possible war and fighting it for us if it should ever come. Instead of blocking the way for the adoption of a comprehensive plan for river regulation and flood protection throughout the country for fear of interference with their existing privileges and authority, their work should be concentrated on the field they are created to fill. That field is the protection of the country from internal disturbance or external invasion. The civil affairs of the country should be conducted through organized machinery created for civil purposes, and not complicated with the red tape and rule of thumb methods of the War Department. For this work, initiative, constructive imagination and scientific genius must be evoked, and these the Army has not. So long as they cling to this field of work, just that long will progress be delayed, and the legitimate work of the Army be neglected. CHAPTER V _The system of national defense for every nation must be adapted to the conditions and needs of that nation. All nations are not alike. Each has its distinct problems. The solution, in each case, must be fitted to the nation and its people. There is no system now in operation in any other country that could be fitted as a whole to the United States. A system must be devised that will be applicable to the needs and conditions of this country._ The Swiss system is ideal for Switzerland. A mountaineer is a soldier by nature. Switzerland has a soldierly citizenry and can mobilize it instantly as a citizen soldiery. The Swiss system would have fitted Belgium in spots, but not as a whole. It is adapted to a rural people, who are individually independent and self-sustaining, but not to a manufacturing community, where the people cannot exist without the factory, or the factory without the people. It would be impracticable to adopt the Swiss system as a whole in the United States. It would fit some communities but not others. Military training would be beneficial to all boys, but our public school system is controlled by the States, counties, and local districts, and not by the nation. To adapt it to the Swiss system of universal military training in the public schools will require a propaganda to educate public sentiment that will necessitate years of patient work. A generation will pass before we will be able to mobilize a force for national defense from Reservists who will have received their military training in the public schools. A system of national defense would fail of its purpose if it crippled the industries of the country by depriving them of the labor necessary to their operation. In the United States, one of the most urgent reasons for having an automatically acting system of national defense perfectly organized in advance and ready in case of emergency, is to insure the continuance of the industries of the country without interruption, and to prevent any industrial depression or interference with the prosperity of the country. A system of national defense would fail of its purpose if it crippled industries by drawing away their labor. It would cause serious industrial derangement to mobilize an army of citizen soldiers from men already enlisted in the ranks of labor in mill, shop, factory, or mine. Besides that, the majority of them have families, and live from hand to mouth with nothing between them and starvation but the pay envelope Saturday night. The impracticability of recruiting soldiers or mobilizing a reserve force from wage earners or clerical employees with families dependent on their earnings for their living, must always be borne in mind. In Switzerland, the active, out-of-door life of the people makes the majority of them rugged and vigorous. They have sturdy legs and strong arms. They are sound, "wind, limb, and body." They are already inured to the work of a soldier's life and its duties, any moment they may be called to the colors. In this country the life of the apartments, flats, and tenements, and the frivolous, immoral, and deteriorating influences and evil environments of congested cities, are sapping the vitality of our people, and rapidly transforming them into a race of mental and physical weaklings and degenerates. Even now the great majority of them utterly lack the physical hardihood and vigor without which a soldier would not be worth the cost of his arms and equipment. It would overtax most city clerks and factory workers to walk to and from the football or baseball games that constitute our chief national pastime. About the only thing to which they are really inured is to sit on benches, for hours at a time, and to yell, loud and long, to add zest to games that are being played by others. It has been most truly said that "We are not a nation of athletes, we are a nation of Rooters." Many of our devotees of commercialized sport would perhaps be able to yell loud enough to scare the enemy off in case of war, but they would not be able to march to the battlefields where this soldierly aid might be required. A special automobile service would have to be provided for their transportation. Think of this the next time you see a howling mob of fans or rooters at a baseball or football game, and "Lest we forget," think also of England's lesson when she undertook to enlist soldiers from such a citizenry. Then consider very seriously whether you don't think we had better in this country create some communities of real men, like the Homecrofters of Scotland. There are many rural neighborhoods in Scotland from which every man of military age enlisted when the call came for soldiers to fight to sustain Britain's Empire power in this last great war. Do we want a citizen soldiery composed of such men as those who, since 1794, have served in the ranks of the Gordon Highlanders, or composed of such men as the Gardeners of Japan, who wrested Port Arthur from the Russians, or do we want to depend on a national militia of citizen soldiers enrolled from among the pink-cheeked dudelets and mush-faced weaklings from the apartments, flats, and tenements of our congested cities or factory towns, whose highest ambition is to smoke cigarettes, ape a fashion plate, or stand and gape at a baseball score on a bulletin board? They like that sort of sport, because they can enjoy it standing still. It necessitates no physical exertion. If they could ever be induced to enlist as soldiers, their feet would be too sore to walk any farther, before they had marched forty miles. A day's work with a shovel, digging a trench, would send most of them to the hospital with strained muscles and lame backs. And yet, trench-digging seems to be the most important part of a soldier's duty in these days of civilized warfare, when the machinery for murder by wholesale has been so splendidly perfected. If we are going to have a citizen soldiery in this country, the first thing we had better set about is to produce a soldierly citizenry--a race of men with the physical vigor of the Swiss Mountaineers, or of the men who founded our own nation, who fought the battles of the Revolution, who dyed with their red blood the white snows of Valley Forge, who marched through floods and floating ice up to their armpits to the capture of Fort Vincennes, who floated down the Ohio River on rafts or walked down the Wilderness Road with Boone, who fought Indians, broke prairie, traversed the waterless deserts, and conquered the wilderness from the crest of the Alleghenies to the shores of the Pacific, sustained by the strong women who stood by their sides and shared their hardships. The weakness of the United States as a nation to-day, a weakness much more deeply rooted than mere military unpreparedness, lies in the fact that as a nation we have no national ideals that rise above commercialism, no national ambitions beyond making or controlling money, which the devotees of Mammon delight to call "Practicing the Arts of Peace." Manhood and womanhood are being utterly sacrificed to mere money-making. National wealth is calculated in units of dollars, and not in units of citizenship. To accumulate wealth is the controlling ambition of our people, and not to perpetuate the strong racial type from which we are all descended. Not only is the original sturdy American Anglo-Saxon stock being degenerated, but we are bringing to our shores millions of the strong and vigorous races from Southern and Eastern Europe, and crowding them into tenements and slums to rot, both physically and mentally. That cancer is eating away the heart and corrupting the very lifeblood of this nation. Those conditions would soon be changed if the mass of our people, and particularly Organized Capital and Organized Labor, would place Humanity above Money. Capital thinks only of Dividends. Labor thinks only of Wages. Neither gives the slightest heed to making this a nation of Rural Homes and thereby perpetuating the racial strength and virility of the people of the nation. That can only be done by providing a right life environment for all wageworkers and their families, particularly the children. A home for a family is not entitled to be called a home, unless it is both an individual home and a garden home. It must be a Homecroft--a home with an abundance of sunshine and fresh air, in decent, sanitary surroundings--a home with a piece of ground about it from which in time of stress or unemployment the family can get its living by its labor, and thereby enjoy economic independence. Industry will destroy humanity unless a national system of life is universally adopted that will prevent racial deterioration. The only way that can be done is by a nation-wide abandonment of the artificial and degenerate life of the congested cities. The people must be educated and trained so that they will desert the flats and tenements as rats would abandon a sinking ship. Our first great national undertaking should be the creation of a national system of life that will realize the ideals of the Homecroft Slogan: "Every Child in a Garden, Every Mother in a Homecroft, and Individual Industrial Independence For every worker in a Home of his own on the Land." Unless the united power of the people as a whole is soon put forth to check the physical and racial deterioration now going on at such an appalling rate among the masses of our wageworkers,--the result of the wrong conditions that surround their lives,--nothing can prevent the eventual ruin of this nation. We are already on the downward course along which Rome swept to the abyss of human degeneracy in which she was at last destroyed by the same causes that are so widely at work in this country to-day. Employers of Labor are most directly responsible for these evil conditions. They cannot shirk that responsibility. They cannot evade the fact that the menace against which we most need national defense arises from the degeneracy that we are breeding in our midst. If we cannot do both, we had far better spend our national energies and revenues in fighting the evils that are rotting our citizenship, than in building forts and fortifications or maintaining a navy and an army for defense against the remote possibility of attacks by other nations. We hear much of the danger to New York from such an attack. New York is in far greater danger from the criminal, immoral, evil, and degenerating forces that she is nursing in her own bosom than she is from any military force that might be landed on our shores by a foreign invader. The enemies she has most to fear are her own Gunmen and Bomb-throwers; Black-handers and White-Slavers; Apaches, Dope Fiends, Gamblers, and Gangsters; Tenement House Landlords; Out-of-Works, and all the breeders of poverty, crime, insanity, disease, and human misery that are rampant in her midst,--the direct result of the system of industry and human life which she has herself created and for which she alone is responsible. This is no overdrawn picture. It is only the briefest possible outline of the evil conditions which less than a century of the Service of Mammon has bred in that mighty metropolis. Everyone who reads the newspapers which reflect the daily events of New York City will appreciate how impossible it is to portray in words the depth of degradation to which a great mass of humanity has sunk in that modern Babylon--rich as well as poor. The invasion that New York City should most fear, that of Vice and Crime and Degeneracy, has been accomplished. They have captured the outer fortifications and are intrenched within the citadel. The Goths are not _at_ the gates,--they are _within_ the gates. Uncle Sam has transformed the wild Apaches of the Southwest into steady and industrious laborers who have done yeoman work with the Construction Corps of the Reclamation Service in Arizona. New York is now breeding, in her modern canyons and cliff dwellings, a more bloodthirsty, cruel, and treacherous race of Apaches than were ever bred amid the mountain fastnesses and forbidding deserts of the Southwest. Do not these domestic enemies constitute a more immediate danger than any foreign enemy? The foreign enemy, with whose invasion the Militarists so delight to harrow our imaginations, is still in the remote distance--a future possibility, not even a probability on the Atlantic seacoast. _The greatest merit of the plan for national defense advocated in this book is that it will safeguard against danger from these domestic enemies, who are already in our midst, at the same time that it will safeguard, in the only adequate way yet proposed, against war or any possibility of a foreign invasion._ Many see the danger of a social or political cataclysm resulting from the saturnalia of degeneracy, disease, and crime that is being bred by tenement life and congested cities. Unfortunately they see no remedy for it but a stronger central government and a bigger standing army. This desire for a standing army to protect against internal social or industrial disturbance leads to enthusiastic advocacy, on any pretext whatever, for a bigger army and navy whenever opportunity is presented. If the truth were known, the majority of those who so vigorously advocate a bigger and still bigger army and navy, are prompted by fear of an enemy in our midst, arising from human degeneracy in cities or from social or labor conflicts, more than by any danger of conflict with another nation. The men who have built our great congested cities have undermined the pillars of the temple of our national strength and safety. Now they want protection from the consequences of their own work, which they so justly fear. They want this nation to adopt the Roman System, which finally worked Rome's destruction. They want soldiers hired to protect them because they fear the consequences of the things they have done, just to make money, and they cannot protect themselves from the dangers their own greed for wealth, at any cost to humanity, has created. The inevitable result of the establishment of such a system of national defense as they advocate would be a military oligarchy. Combined with our present money oligarchy, it would be politically invincible. In some great internal crisis or social and political disturbance, all power would be centralized and our government would be transformed into a military autocracy. From that time on we would follow in the footsteps of Rome to our certain doom as a people and a nation. It is a curious fact that this desire for protection from internal disturbance by a hired standing army comes from the very class in the United States which was, at the last, in Rome, ground between the upper and the nether millstones--between the army above and the proletariat below--in the final working out of the Roman System. The proscriptions of the Roman Emperors, to propitiate their armies, are forgotten by the modern patricians who clamor for a large standing army. The patrician class in this country, who are now in their hearts praying for a strong centralized military government,--patiently and persistently planning for it, and making steady progress, too,--are the very class whose estates were confiscated, and their owners proscribed and executed by thousands to enable the Roman Emperors to appropriate their wealth and from that source satisfy the demands of the Army. The Army had to be rewarded for their services in conferring the purple on the Emperor, which they did by virtue of their military control of the government. It was the Army who made and unmade Emperors. The Emperors bought the Army with money and bribed the populace with feasts and games. The money to do both was obtained by the proscription and plunder of the wealthy patricians, the same class which in our time is now trying so hard to establish a gilded caste in New York and other great centers of wealth and a strong military government for this nation. Whatever system of national defense is to be adopted in the United States, it must be a system in which the people themselves, as citizens and not as professional soldiers, furnish the human material for national defense. The people must control our army of citizen soldiery so absolutely that it can never be turned against their personal liberties or property rights. Let us heed the warning of Rome. It is none too soon. Let us beware of either confiscation or proscription as an evolution from a military government to a military despotism. Switzerland alone, of all the civilized nations, and the smallest of them all, stands to-day a living demonstration of the National Spirit and the National System of Universal Service to their Country that should be adopted by all the nations of the world, to the fullest extent that it can be made applicable to their conditions. The Swiss System provides adequate national defense by the entire citizenship of the nation. Any subversion of the people's liberties through the power of the Army is impossible because the people themselves constitute the Army. Australia has already adopted the Swiss System, substantially, and in consequence will escape the danger of military domination which will fasten itself on this country if our system of national defense is to consist only of a steadily increasing standing army. If we are to escape that danger we must never lose sight of the chief merit of the Swiss System, which is that every citizen participates in it and is affected by it, and we must as nearly as possible adapt it to the conditions existing in this country. There are many lessons that we might learn from the Swiss to our great national advantage. If the Spirit of Switzerland, the self-reliant independence of her people, and their physical and mental vigor, individually and collectively, her national motto "All for each and each for all," dominated a nation of 100,000,000 people, like the United States, with an area of 2,973,890 square miles, exclusive of Alaska, as it does a nation of something less than 4,000,000 people, with an area of only 15,976 square miles, that Spirit and that System of national defense would soon become the universal system of the world. The most dangerous military system for any nation, large or small, is a standing army large enough to invite attack, but not strong enough to repel it. That was the system of Belgium, and to that fact is due the destruction of Belgium. It is the present system of the United States. The most striking feature of our unpreparedness for war is the fact that it would be hopelessly impossible to defend ourselves against invasion without an army so huge as to dwarf our present army into insignificance. The Swiss System is the best for Switzerland and is no doubt the best for Australia, but when adapting it, so far as may be practicable, to the conditions existing in the United States, we must not fall into the error of assuming that numerical strength is the only thing necessary in calculating the strength of an army. Soldiers alone are not all that a nation needs for defense, no matter how well they may be trained and equipped, or drilled and officered, or supplemented by naval strength or fortifications. The foundations on which national defense must be built are social, economic, and human. The question involves every element of the problem of preserving and perpetuating even-handed justice to all, social stability, economic strength and independence, a patriotic citizenship, and a rugged, stalwart, and virile race. The population of Switzerland is less than that of the city of London, but if London were a nation by itself, with its congested population, human degeneration, artificial life, moral decay, and economic dependence, it would be impossible of defense from a military point of view. Just exactly in the proportion that the United States gathers its population into great cities, does it court the same elements of weakness, but with this practical difference. London, being a part of the British Empire, is safeguarded by the whole civil and military power of that nation. Our great seaboard cities, being a part of the United States, are practically defenseless, because our people have no system or policy of national defense. Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, in the event of an attack by the invading military forces of any of the Great Powers, would be surrendered just as Brussels and Antwerp were surrendered, to save them from destruction, if for no other reason. CHAPTER VI _The most serious menace to the future peace of this country arises not so much from the possibility of a sudden invasion in time of war by some foreign nation, as from the danger of racial conflict resulting from the slow, steadily increasing invasion of an Asiatic people in time of peace. Year after year they are coming in thousands to make their homes within the territory of the United States._ No one who has watched the steady increase of Japanese population in Hawaii and in our Pacific Coast States can fail to realize this danger. It is a danger that is already threatening us. It exists to-day, and will continue to exist every day in the future. It cannot be pushed aside. We cannot remove it by ignoring it. Some unexpected incident may at any time start excitement and cause an explosion that would precipitate a national conflict. In such an event either Japan or the United States might be forced into war by an irresistible upheaval of public sentiment. We had that experience in the case of the blowing up of the Maine. We must not ignore the possibility that some such moving cause for war might again occur, and start a flame against which the governments and the Peace Advocates of both nations would be powerless. It is unfortunate that the people of the United States generally have no appreciation of these facts, and give no thought to safeguarding against them. Their consideration should be approached with the most perfect friendliness and good feeling, nationally and individually, so far as the Japanese are concerned. Instead of antagonizing the Japanese, we should cultivate their good will. There is no nation on the earth--no other race of people--who more richly _deserve and merit the good will of other nations_. Those of the Japanese who come among us should be conceded to have come with the most pacific intentions. They come from an overcrowded country to one that is sparsely inhabited--a country that is to them a Land of Promise--a Land flowing with milk and honey--another Garden of Eden. All the majority of them want is so much of it as they can cultivate with their own labor. To their minds that means both comfort and a competence. They are poor and they long to be rich. Do they differ from us in that? They come to the Pacific Coast for the same reasons that the early settlers went into the great West and endured so many hardships to get homes on the land. They are impelled by the same desire to find the Golden Fleece that started the migration of the Pioneers of Forty-Nine. But the Japanese are coming to dig the gold out of gardens and orchards and vineyards, instead of from the placer mines. The average American who has much land on the Pacific Coast wants a tenant. The average Japanese wants only a hoe with which to till the land. Give him the land and the hoe and he will do the rest. He does not want to hire somebody to do the work for him or to find somebody who will pay him for the privilege of doing it. The Caucasian cultivators of the soil, where there are such, cannot stand against the competition of either the Chinese or the Japanese. The danger of racial controversy results from this economic competition. It is a struggle for the survival of the fittest. The Japanese is the strongest in that struggle. The Caucasian must succumb or fall back on his government for protection. In the case of the Chinese this controversy bred bitter strife. In the case of the Japanese it is liable at any moment to cause serious international controversy. That danger will continue until we put a population on every acre of the rich and fertile land on the Pacific Coast. On every such acre there must be an occupant who will till the land himself--not a mere owner looking for a tenant. The Japanese know the value of water as well as the value of land. Every cultivated acre in Japan is an irrigated acre. If we are to safeguard against the menace of conflict with Japan we must not only ourselves populate and cultivate the land that the Japanese covet, but we must conserve and use the water as well. We must do with the country what the Japanese people would do with it if it were theirs. So long as it remains, from their point of view, unoccupied and unused, they will covet it, and in the end they will possess it, unless we use and possess it ourselves in advance of them. Look at California! In the great central valley of that State, including the foothill country, there are 12,500,000 acres of the richest land in the world. The water with which to irrigate every unirrigated acre of it runs to waste year after year. Every acre of it could be irrigated. Every acre of it would support a family. It is so sparsely settled that to the Japanese mind it is vacant and unoccupied. The greater part of it is to-day unreclaimed. Some of it is producing grain or hay. The rest is pasture--grazing ground for herds of live stock where there should be gardens intensively cultivated and homes forming closely settled communities. In Japan, on 12,500,000 acres, the same area as in California and no better land, they have evolved a population of expert gardeners and their families of 30,000,000 rural people. There is not land enough in Japan to give back a comfortable living as the reward for their labor. The great mass of the farming people--really they are not farmers--they are gardeners--are very poor. California holds out to them a chance for every family to become rich from their point of view. Should we wonder that they come to California? The constant pressure of the population in Japan to overflow will make a corresponding inflowing pressure upon California. It is like the pressure of air upon a vacuum. The way to relieve the pressure is to fill the vacuum. California is the vacuum. Fill it with people of the Caucasian race who will till the soil they own with their own hands, and the pressure upon this California vacuum from Asiatic peoples will cease. If California's garden lands were as densely populated as Belgium was before the war, there would be no Japanese danger-zone, provided the California cultivators of the soil tilled their own acres, or acre, as the Japanese do in their own country and want to do in California. It would be necessary, in order to settle the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys of California in that way, to use for the irrigation of the San Joaquin Valley, all the flood water now wasted in the Sacramento Valley. That can be done. There is no question about it whatever. The first recommendation to do it was made by a Commission of eminent engineers appointed by General Grant, when President, to report on the irrigation of the San Joaquin Valley. It would require large and comprehensive planning, and the coöperation of the State and the nation. But had not the nation better spend millions to populate the country the Japanese covet, than to spend millions to fight a war with them to keep them out of it. Is it not better to settle the country, and in that way settle the controversy, than to run the risk of losing all the precious lives and treasure that a war would cost, and the risk of having California devastated by that war in the same way that Belgium has been destroyed? Ought not that awful possibility to be enough to awaken the people of the United States to the necessity of doing something, and doing it quick, _to populate the Pacific Coast_? If anyone doubts that the Japanese are gaining a firm foothold in our territory, and a foothold that is steadily growing stronger year by year, they will be convinced by the mere statement of the facts as to the Japanese influx into the United States. The facts relating to that influx and the menace it holds for this country in the event of a war with Japan, are dispassionately set forth in "The Valor of Ignorance," by Homer Lea, published in 1909. The author was a Californian, but had lived many years in the Orient. He had studied it deeply and thoroughly understood his subject. In his book he calls attention to the fact that the Japanese population in Hawaii increased from 116 in 1884 to 22,329 in 1896; and from 22,329 in 1896 to 61,115 in 1909. Then he gives us these facts: "Japanese immigration into the Hawaiian Islands, from 1900 to 1908, has been 65,708. The departures during this period were 42,313. The military unfit have in this manner been supplanted by the veterans of a great war, and the military occupation of Hawaii tentatively accomplished. "In these islands at the present time the number of Japanese who have completed their active term of service in the Imperial armies, a part of whom are veterans of the Russian War, exceeds the entire field army of the United States." Of more startling importance are the facts with reference to Japanese immigration to the mainland territory of the United States, which are given in the same volume as follows: Immigration by political periods: 1891-1900 24,806 1901-1905 64,102 1905-1906 14,243 1906-1907 30,226 ------ Total 133,377 During the last six years there have come to the United States (Report of Bureau of Immigration) 90,123 Japanese male adults. In California the Japanese constitute more than one-seventh of the male adults of military age: Caucasian males of military age 262,694 Japanese males of military age 45,725 In Washington the Japanese constitute nearly one-ninth of the male population of military age: Caucasian males of military age 163,682 Japanese males of military age 17,000 The foregoing rapidly increasing tide of Asiatic immigration forced attention to the subject, and in 1908 the Japanese government agreed voluntarily with the United States that in future passports should not be issued by the Japanese government to laborers desiring to emigrate from Japan to the United States. This temporarily checked this class of immigration and in the year ending June 30, 1908, the total immigration fell to 16,418; the year ending June 30, 1909, to 3,275; the year ending June 30, 1910, to 2,798. But note the steady increase since then! Year ending June 30, 1911, 4,575; year ending June 30, 1912, 6,172; year ending June 30, 1913, 8,302; year ending June 30, 1914, 8,941. These figures, however, give no adequate conception of the actual facts, as they have developed in California during the last ten years in such a way as to stimulate racial controversy. Some of the most beautiful and productive sections of the fruit-growing regions of California have been entirely absorbed by Japanese. Caucasian communities have become Japanese communities. Such a transformation is certainly not one that is calculated to allay racial controversy. The alien land law of California will not allay racial controversy--it will intensify it. Japan has protested against it, as she protested against our acquisition of Hawaii, and there has been no withdrawal of her protests. The Japanese government has shown a disposition to mitigate the danger of controversy by limiting the emigration of Japanese to this country, but that government can not control her people after they come to this country. If they cannot buy land they will lease it. That leads to all the trouble indicated in the following newspaper item: "Tacoma, Wash., Jan. 5 (1915).--The Tacoma delegation to the legislature, which will meet on January 11, has been notified that a bill will be introduced for a State referendum on a law to prevent leasing of Washington land to Asiatics. Many members of the legislature are pledged to support the measure. "Japanese gardeners, it is contended, are increasing in numbers, getting the best land about the cities under lease, and some of them lease land for 99 years or have a trustee buy it for them. Many Japanese marry 'picture brides' and later have their leases of titles transferred to their infant sons and daughters born here. "An amendment submitted in November permitting aliens to own land in cities was overwhelmingly defeated." There is very little doubt that the majority of the Japanese on the Pacific Coast are soldiers, veterans of the Japanese wars, and that in case of war Japan could mobilize on our territory between the Pacific Ocean and the inaccessible mountains constituting the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Ranges, more Japanese soldiers who are right now in that territory than we have United States troops in the whole mainland territory of the United States, or will have when our army is enlisted up to its full strength of 100,000 men. The figures given in "The Valor of Ignorance" show that in 1907 there were 62,725 Japanese of military age in the States of Washington and California. Since then, up to June 30, 1914, the Japanese immigration has been 50,481, and nearly all of those who come are men of military age. So that now we have no doubt more trained Japanese soldiers in California, Oregon and Washington, than our entire standing army if it were enlisted to its full quota of 100,000 men, including every soldier we have, wherever he may be stationed. And at the rate they are now coming, in ten years we will have more than our entire standing army would then be if we increased it to 200,000, as the Militarists urge should be done. _What are we going to do about it?_ That is the question that stares every citizen of the United States straight in the face. It may be that all cannot be brought to agree as to what ought to be done, but certainly all must agree that something should be done, and it is equally certain that neither an Exclusion Law, nor an Alien Land Law, nor an Alien Leasing Law, will settle the question, or relieve the strain of racial competition that is certain, unless obviated, to eventually breed an armed conflict with Japan. The same author who has been previously quoted, referring to the Philippine Islands, says: "The conquest of these islands by Japan will be less of a military undertaking than was the seizure of Cuba by the United States; for while Santiago de Cuba did not fall until nearly three months after the declaration of war, Manila will be forced to surrender in less than three weeks. Otherwise the occupation of Cuba portrays with reasonable exactitude the manner in which the Philippines will be taken over by Japan." Since this was written the events of the present war have still further strengthened the Japanese power in the Pacific. First China, then Russia, and now Germany have been eliminated. To complacently assume that Japan will never have occasion to cross swords with the United States, is surely a most mistaken attitude for the people of this country to delude themselves with. It is contrary to every dictate of common sense and reason, when the people of the Pacific Coast are forced for their own protection to enact legislation which Japan interprets as a violation of her treaty rights. The average run of people in other States give no thought to the matter. They say, "Yes, California has her problem with the Japs." It is not California's problem. It is the problem of the United States. And in calling attention to the practical impossibility of defending the Pacific Coast against Japanese invasion and occupation in the event of war, the author heretofore quoted from calls attention to the following facts, among others, showing our unpreparedness and the complete inadequacy of our defenses: "The short period of time within which Japan is able to transport her armies to this continent--200,000 men in four weeks, a half million in four months, and more than a million in ten months--necessitates in this Republic a corresponding degree of preparedness and rapidity of mobilization. "Within one month after the declaration of war this Republic must place, in each of the three defensive spheres of the Pacific Coast, armies that are capable of giving battle to the maximum number of troops that Japan can transport in a single voyage. This is known to be in excess of 200,000 men.... We have called attention to the brevity of modern wars in general and naval movements in particular; how within a few weeks after war is declared, concurrent with the seizure of the Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska, will the conquest of Washington and Oregon be consummated. In the same manner within three months after hostilities have been begun there, armies will land upon the seaboard of Southern California.... No force can be placed on the seaboard of Southern California either within three months or nine months that would delay the advance of the Japanese armies a single day. "The maximum force that can be mobilized in the Republic immediately following a declaration of war is less than 100,000 men, of whom two-thirds are militia. This force, made up of more than forty miniature armies, is scattered, each under separate military and civil jurisdiction, over the entire nation. By the time these heterogeneous elements are gathered together, organized into proper military units, and made ready for transportation to the front, the States of Washington and Oregon will have been invaded and their conquest made complete by a vastly superior force.... So long as the existent military system continues in the Republic there can be no adequate defense of any single portion of the Pacific Coast within a year after a declaration of war, nor the three spheres within as many years." Apparently neither the Militarists, nor the Passivists, nor the Pacificists, nor the Pacificators, ever give any thought or heed to the fact of danger from within as the result of a steadily growing alien population, permanently settled in the United States, and which would in the event of war constitute a force larger than any army we would have available for defense. The chief danger of an armed conflict with Japan arises from the existence in our midst of this alien population, and the danger that the pressure of their competition may breed strife similar to that which preceded the Chinese Exclusion Act, a situation which can never be applied to Japan without creating a certainty of war immediately or in the future. In this respect we are like a people living on the slopes below the crater of a volcano. We can never know when an eruption may take place or what its extent or consequences may be. All we do know is that the danger exists; and it is folly beyond the possibility of expression or description to ignore that fact, and perpetuate our national indifference and unpreparedness. It is this situation on the Pacific Coast, more than any other one thing, which makes the advocacy of disarmament for this nation so inconceivably dangerous unless Japan and China should also disarm, which we may rest assured they will never do. China is just entering upon a new era of militarism under a Military Dictator whose policy will be for arms and armament. If the disarmament of the United States were to be agreed to and carried out because other nations agreed to disarm, and Japan and China were willing to disarm, then the disarmament of Asiatic nations would have to be coupled with the further safeguard of an agreement stopping emigration from Asia to America--not only to North America, but to South America as well. It is not proposed by any of the advocates of disarmament to stop such immigration, nor will it be stopped. The fact that it will continue indefinitely through the years of the future is a fact which must be recognized as fundamental in dealing with the question of national defense for the United States of America. The economic conditions created by the Asiatic in America are more dangerous and difficult of adjustment than any problem resulting from the military or naval strength of any Asiatic nation so long as their people in times of peace will stay in Asia. But they will not stay in Asia of their own accord, and they will not be forced to do so. We must face not only the problems that will arise from a large Asiatic population on the Pacific Coast of the United States, but in South America, Central America, and Mexico. In a few generations the Japanese will control the northern Pacific shores of South America. Peru will come to be in reality a Japanese country. The Japanese will control because they will be in a majority, just as they now constitute a majority of the population of Hawaii. They will dominate the Indian population and will absorb or supplant the Spanish just as we have done in California. In the course of time the Japanese will control Mexico in the same way, unless we control it ourselves. It does not follow that we could not live at peace with the Japanese, if they controlled South America and Mexico, as we now live at peace with them when they only control Japan, Formosa, Sakhalin, Korea, and their sphere of influence in Manchuria, as well as Tsing Tau and their Pacific Islands. But if we are to do so, it can only be done by meeting their economic competition and establishing within our own territory a system of physical and mental development, a social and economic system, and a system of military defense, that will not only be equal but superior to theirs. The conflict between the races of Asia and the races of America is the age-old competition to test which is the stronger race. The fittest will survive. We cannot defend ourselves by temporary exclusion, as we have tried to do with the Chinese. It is only a question of time when China will emerge from the slumber of the centuries and provide herself with all the implements of modern warfare necessary to insist upon the same treatment for her people that we accord to other nations. It may be a long time before an armed conflict between the United States and Japan is precipitated, but it is inevitable, unless the national policy advocated in this book is adopted. War between this country and Japan within the next forty years, unless the present trend is checked, is as inevitable as it has been at all times during the last forty years between France and Germany, with this difference: The present European war is the result of primary causes that were so deeply rooted in wrong and injustice, that no human power could eradicate them. It is different with Japan. We have no long standing or deeply rooted controversy with Japan and we need never have if we meet the economic problem involved in this great racial competition between Asia and America. It is coming upon us, however, with the slow moving certainty of a glacier, and meet it we must. We must prevail or be overwhelmed, and unless we can face the economic conflicts involved and triumph in them, it is useless for us to undertake to hold our ground by militarism alone. The fact undoubtedly is that of all three of the plans now before the people of the United States for national defense or for preserving peace, the most dangerous and deceptive is that of the militarists, for a bigger standing army and a bigger navy. It would create a false and misleading feeling of security from danger which would becloud the real problems involved and make their solution more difficult, if not impossible. Japan to-day has the most efficient military system of any nation of the world. This statement refers to the _system_. Other nations may have larger armies, but Japan's military system, like that of Switzerland, is fitted into and matches with her whole social, commercial, and economic system. It is a part of the very fiber of her national being, and not an excrescence, as is our standing army. And behind this she has the most adaptable, industrious, and physically and mentally efficient and vigorous people of the world. The danger of war between the United States and Japan is not so much a present as a future danger. Whether it is in the near future or the far future depends largely on accident. The danger could be removed entirely if the American people would substitute intelligent study of the problem for bumptious conceit, and concerted action on right lines for aimless talk. Unless we do that our ultimate fate is as inevitable as that of Rome when she vainly strove by militarism alone to protect a decadent nation against the onslaughts of virile races. Our fate will not be so long delayed because we are now crowding into a decade the events that once evolved slowly through a century. We may reach in forty years a condition of relative weakness as against opposing forces which Rome reached only after four hundred years. There will never be a war between Japan and the United States if the people of this country will do unto the Japanese in all things as we would desire the Japanese to do unto us, if our situations were reversed, and they occupied this country and we theirs, _provided always_, that we at the same time recognize that the Japanese are the stronger rather than the weaker race, and cannot be exploited or their labor permanently appropriated for our profit rather than theirs; and _provided further_, that we recognize that Japan is enormously overpopulated; that her population, which has grown from only four or five million in the tenth century to over fifty million in the twentieth, is increasing at the rate of over 1,000,000 a year, and that _the hive must swarm_. This necessity sets forces in motion that are as irresistible in their workings as the laws that control the universe and direct the stars in their courses. Whenever race meets race in such a fundamental struggle for existence, the law of the survival of the fittest is inexorable. As Japan increases her population, she becomes stronger, because wherever her people go they root themselves to the soil. As we increase our population, we become weaker, because we steadily enlarge the proportion of our population that we crowd into congested cities where it _rots_. The poison of an Industrial System resting upon a system of life that destroys Humanity is filtering into the Japanese body politic, but before it seriously degenerates their racial strength the Japanese will see its evil effects on the State, and remove the cause. We see its evil effects on the State, but seem unable to shake off the grip of Commercialism which is responsible for it. We will never shake off that grip until we can rise to the higher level of patriotism which will subordinate Commerce and Industry to the welfare of Humanity. Unless we are willing to accept, as the inevitable end of our civilization, the fate of all the Ancient Civilizations, we must remember that no nation can endure in which one class is exploited for the benefit of another. The same rule applies inexorably to any attempt by the people of one country to exploit the people of another and live on their labor. If an armed conflict should be precipitated in the near future between this country and Japan it will grow out of racial controversies resulting from an effort to exploit the Japanese in the United States in the same way that we are exploiting the immigrants from European countries. The difficulty that now faces the people of the United States with reference to the Japanese problem arises from the fact that we can neither exploit, nor exclude, nor assimilate the Japanese, nor can we, under present conditions, survive their economic competition within our own territory. Let the question of exploitation be first considered. There is a strong contingent of Americans on the Pacific Coast who openly advocate Japanese immigration. They argue that our proud and superior race will not condescend to do the "_squat labor_," as they term it, that is necessary to get the gold from the gardens of California--and from her vast plantations of potatoes, vegetables, and other food products that are grown on the marvelously fertile soil of that State. So they want the Japanese to come and do the "squat labor" while the Aristocratic Anglo-Saxon reaps the lion's share of the profits as the owner of the land. _They tried that once with the Chinese, with what result?_ That the docile and subservient Chinese were the best field laborers that were ever found by any body of plantation-owners, and for a time the Caucasian owners of the orchards and vineyards and lordly demesnes of California prospered mightily from the profits earned for them by the labor of the lowly Chinese. _But what happened?_ The Chinese were not only faithful and industrious, they were frugal as well. They saved their money. Soon they were not only laborers, but also capitalists, in a small way. Then they began to buy land and work in their own fields, gardens, and orchards. The industries that produced food from land as the result of intensive cultivation with human labor were rapidly passing into the hands of the Chinese. They were rapidly buying the lands which were the basis of those industries. They were ceasing to work for the benefit of another race. They worked for themselves and their own benefit. And that was not all. One after another every manufacturing industry in California in which human labor was a large element of production was being absorbed by the Chinese. First they worked for American Manufacturers. Then they became their own employers and the American Manufacturer was forced out of business by the economic competition of a stronger race. In the end, it came to be seen of all men that the Caucasian Manufacturer, the Caucasian Wageworker, and the Caucasian Landowner, and food producer, were gradually surrendering to and being eliminated by the economic competition of the Chinese. So we excluded the Chinese. If we had not done so, in less than a generation the Pacific Coast would have been a Chinese Country, and no oppression or mistreatment to which they could have been subjected would have prevented it, if they had been allowed to continue the process of commercial and agricultural absorption that had progressed so far before we finally excluded them. Now the Japanese are repeating the same process of absorption. We cannot exclude them, and if we undertook to do so, it would only be postponing the evil day, when such a policy would breed an armed conflict. The Japanese regard the law that prohibits their acquisition of land as a violation of our treaty with them. They look to our own Courts to finally decide it to be unconstitutional. It may be a long time coming, but the final result of the law preventing them from acquiring land in California will be war with Japan _unless other measures are adopted to supplement one that will ultimately prove so futile_. The exclusion of the Japanese from the right to acquire land, but still permitting them to lease land, makes the situation more dangerous than it was before. It adds to all the dangers of the purely economic struggle which resulted from Chinese Competition, the additional danger of all the bad blood that a tenantry system inevitably develops. Every lease-hold will develop into a breeding place for friction and conflict between individual landlords and tenants, as well as conflicts between them as opposing classes, and will result finally in the same racial controversies that led up to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Already the Japanese tenantry in the Delta of the San Joaquin River have formed a protective association to enable them to oppose the organized power of the mass against any objectionable conditions imposed by their landlords, as well as to fix the rental they are willing to pay. Does anyone doubt that such a tenantry system will in time breed as much controversy as the Nonresident Landlord System has caused in Ireland? The Japanese Tenantry System in California must in the very nature of things be a Nonresident Landlord System. It can be nothing else. The community will be Japanese. The landlord will seek a home elsewhere, in a Caucasian community. His only thought will be to get all he can from those whose labor produces his income. Their only thought will be to make that amount as small as possible. We have created another "Irrepressible Conflict." Whether we will adjust it without a resort to arms is a very grave question. One of the most dangerous elements in this complicated problem is the self-complacent ignorance and refusal to face facts which characterizes the attitude of the people not only of the western half, but more particularly those of the eastern half of the United States. Not long ago a paroxysm of protest resulted from a rumor that a few hundred Japanese were about to settle in Michigan. But not the slightest heed is paid to the fact that a sister State has this problem already within her body politic eating like a cancer at her very vitals; that she is powerless to effectively settle the question by herself alone; and that no national disposition exists to settle it in the only way it can possibly be settled. The way to settle it is not by building more battleships, or enlarging our standing army, or in any way increasing our naval or military burdens, or doing anything that will now or hereafter tend to put the neck of the American people under the heel of militarism. There can be no settlement of this question other than the one urged in this book. The question is economic, and the settlement must be economic. Japan wants no war with us now. Of that we may rest assured. But any such treatment of the Japanese as we extended to the Chinese would bring war instantly. Whether the racial animosity that Japanese competition within our own territory will inevitably create can be controlled, and conflict caused by it averted, may well be doubted, unless the people of the entire United States will recognize the problem as vital and national, and forthwith apply the only possible practicable solution. We must recognize both the necessity and the right of Japanese expansion into new territories. That expansion means the upbuilding of enormous populations of Japanese in those countries. If ten millions of the most vigorous of Japan's teeming population could be transplanted from their native country to garden homes in other countries bordering the Pacific, where their allegiance to Japan would be unaffected, and colonies developed that would bear the same relation to the mother country that Canada bears to Great Britain, it would vastly benefit those who remained in Japan as well as those who emigrated. There must be such an emigration. It cannot be prevented. The United States should not oppose it. But where shall they go? _To the Philippines?_ There you project a controversy even by discussion. Of course Japan will not colonize the Philippines while we control them. Aside from that, the climate is undesirable. The Japanese want to colonize where they can reproduce their racial strength. The climate of the Philippines would destroy it. Generations will elapse before the Japanese will covet the Philippines in order to colonize them, though she might want them for other reasons. _Shall they go to Manchuria?_ Yes, to some extent, but the great body of the overflowing population of Japan will not go to Manchuria. It is a bleak, cold, dreary, and inhospitable country, already to a large extent cultivated and populated. The Japanese will not go to Manchuria for another reason. They are an Island people and the smell of the sea is in their nostrils. They already control the commerce of the Pacific and their ambition is to increase that commerce by every means in their power. The colonies they will found in the future, the countries that the swarming millions from Japan will covet and occupy will border the Pacific Ocean, where the ships that fly the Japanese flag will come and go as the couriers of a great commerce binding the colonies of Japan to the mother country. Where then will they go? _To South America?_ Yes, to its northern shores bordering the Pacific, to Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, more particularly to Peru. In a very few years, as history runs, there will be an immense Japanese population on these Northern Pacific shores of South America. It is not at all unlikely that in less than a century there will be a larger population in South America of the Japanese race than now exists in all of Japan. It will be recruited not only from the surplus population of the mother country, but from a rapid reproduction of the Japanese among the transplanted population. There will be no race suicide among the Japanese. They will stick to the land in these new countries and breed a race as sturdy as its progenitors. They will never adopt the Anglo-Saxon system of City Congestion and consequent Racial Extinction. _Will they go to Mexico?_ Yes, they will go to Mexico, and the Pacific Coast region of Mexico will be another breeding ground for this hardy and virile race, where likewise they will be tillers of the soil and a people hardened and strengthened by constant contact with Mother Earth. More than that, the Mexicans will speedily be taught, if they require the lesson, that if they harm a hair in the head of a Japanese, punishment and retribution will be sure, swift, and severe. They will live at peace with the Japanese for that reason. It is the only way to have peace in Mexico, and Japan is strong enough to enforce peace and the security of the lives and property of all her people that way. And because they will do that, they will eventually control and dominate Mexico, in a good deal the same way that England dominates India. Whenever they do that, they will protect not only their own people and their property, but that of all other peoples as well, and everybody will be as safe in Mexico as in Japan. But the waters that now run to waste in the Pacific Ocean, on the west coast of Mexico, will be harnessed to irrigate the orchards and gardens of the Japanese and an Asiatic and not a Caucasian race will possess Mexico. "_Why?_" some one asks. For the very simple reason that the Japanese will occupy Mexico because they want to reclaim and cultivate its waste lands, and not speculate in them or exploit somebody else who will cultivate them. Already the Japanese are as laborers cultivating large areas owned by American Capitalists in the delta of the Colorado River. That will not last. The Japanese will before very long organize associations among themselves and acquire and own the land or some other land which they can own and cultivate for themselves. There is no alien land law in Mexico that will prevent that and there will be none. The Japanese will see to that. Neither will there ever be any long continued peace or security for life or property in Mexico until either Japan or the United States enforces it. If we do not, they will. _That is as certain as fate._ And when they undertake the task, dragged into it by some outrage on their own people, shall we stay their hand, and say to them that the Monroe Doctrine applies to Asiatic as well as to European nations? It is only a matter of time when we will have to face that question with Japan. Japan will no more permit the Mexicans to commit outrages on the Japanese than she will permit us to do it. Some idea of the conflicts that race hatred may breed in Mexico will be gained by reading the quotation that follows from "In Mexico the Land of Unrest," by Henry Baerlin. In the preface of that book we find this description of a "gentle and joyous passage at arms" of the Mexicans with the Chinese. "I fancy that a number of the miscreants who, owing to a mere misunderstanding, massacred three hundred Chinamen in Torreon not long since--some were cut into small pieces, some beheaded, some were tied to horses by their queues and dragged along the streets, while others had their arms or legs attached to different horses and were torn asunder, some were stood up naked in the market gardens of the neighborhood and given over as so many targets to the drunken marksmen, thirteen Chinese employees of Yu Hop's General Store were haled into the street and killed with knives, two hundred Chinamen were sheltered in the city gaol, but all their money was appropriated and such articles of clothing as the warders fancied. One brave girl had nine of them concealed, and calmly she denied their presence even when her father had gone out to argue with the mob and had been shot for being on the Chinese side--a number of these miscreants, I fancy, are on other days delightful citizens."[1] [Footnote 1: "The Mexicans are descended, on the one side," says Mr. Cunningham Graham, "from the most bloodthirsty race of Indians that the Spanish Conquerors came across, and on the other side from the very fiercest elements of the Spanish race itself--elements which had just emerged from eight hundred years of warfare with the Moors."] Think you that the Japanese would submit to that without war? The account of this racial outrage may be overdrawn, but judging from what happened in our own country when the Chinese were being persecuted prior to the Exclusion Act, there is nothing inherently improbable in this account. It is no worse than the Turkish outrages that have often been committed on Christians in Asia Minor or in Europe. China has submitted to all such outrages because for centuries she has been a nation of peace, but the time is not far distant when she will do so no longer. With the United States, a nation with a government, in case of race conflict, leading to insult or injury to Japanese, we could make amends, or fight, as we chose, and we would probably make amends. In Mexico, likely at any time to be without a government, as she is now, a conflict with Japan would be very apt to result like the recent differences between the Turks and the English in Egypt. The Land of the Montezumas would become a Protectorate of the Land of Nippon and a part of its Empire Power. The Japanese problem would then be transferred from across the Pacific to across the Rio Grande, and Japanese cotton mills at Guaymas would get their cotton from the cotton fields of the Colorado River Valley. They would transport it by water down the Colorado River and across the Gulf of California and develop a great ocean commerce from the territory that is tributary to the Gulf of California. That includes the whole valley of the Colorado River if its transportation facilities were adequately and comprehensively developed, as the Japanese would develop it, by lines of Japanese steamers running up the Colorado River at least as far as Yuma. The American Railroads could not strangle Japanese competition. CHAPTER VII _The potential economic strength and creative power of the people of Japan may be illustrated by what they would do with the Colorado River Valley and watershed if it were to become Japanese territory, and what we must do with it if we are to hold our ground against their economic competition in the eternal racial struggle for the survival of the fittest._ The Colorado River has been aptly called the Nile of America. There is a most remarkable resemblance. In the valley of this American Nile another Egypt could be created. All the fertility, wealth, population, products, art, and romance of the Land of the Pharaohs could be reproduced in the valley of this great American river. A city as large as Alexandria at Yuma, and another as large as Cairo at Parker, are quite within reasonable expectations whenever the resources of the Colorado River country are comprehensively developed. But even that comparison of possibilities gives no adequate conception of what might be accomplished by the Japanese in the way of creative development in the drainage basin of the Colorado River. Another Japanese Empire could be made there, with all the vast productive power, population, and national wealth of the present Land of Nippon. That is what the Japanese would do with it if they had the country to develop according to Japanese economic ideals and their methods of soil cultivation and production. They know full well the possibilities of the Colorado River country. Already the Japanese cultivators of the soil are at the Gateway to this great valley, just below the international boundary line in Mexico. They are now doing there the manual labor necessary to develop and produce crops from Mexican lands owned by Americans in the lower delta of the Colorado River. The Japanese, if they had the opportunity, would give the same careful study to every minute detail of conquesting the Colorado River Valley from the Desert that they gave to defeating Russia in the war they fought to save their national existence against the sea power and land power of the Russian Empire. They would measure the water that runs to waste, as we have done. They would select and plat the land it should be used to irrigate, which we have not done. They would survey every reservoir site in the Colorado Canyon and test the foundations, which we have not done. They would calculate the aggregate volume of electric power that could be generated by a series of reservoirs in the Colorado Canyon, which we have not done. They would estimate, as we have done, the total amount of sediment carried by the river every year into the Gulf of California and wasted. They would find that the Colorado River discharges during an average year into the Gulf of California 338,000,000 tons of mud and silt as suspended matter, and in addition to this 19,490,000 tons of gypsum, lime, sodium chloride and other salts,--in all a total of 357,490,000 tons each year of fertilizing material. It is enough to give to 3,574,900 acres an annual fertilization of one hundred tons of this marvelously rich material that would be annually carried by the water to the land if proper scientific methods were adopted for the reclamation of the irrigable land located between Needles and Yuma, which is over three and a half million acres. The fertilization thus given to the land would be of value equal to that with which the Nile has fertilized Egypt every year since before the dawn of history. They would find that the total run-off from the Colorado River watershed that now runs to waste is enough to irrigate 5,000,000 acres of land located in the main valley of the river between the mouth of the Colorado Canyon and the Mexican boundary line. They would find that the area of land so located that can be irrigated by gravity canals is 2,000,000 acres; that 1,500,000 more acres can be irrigated by pumping with electric power generated in the river, and, from the best information now obtainable, that the area irrigated by pumping can eventually be enlarged another 1,500,000 acres, making a total in all of 5,000,000 irrigable acres in the main Colorado River Valley, including the Imperial Valley and the valley above Yuma. Including the entire watershed or drainage basin of the Colorado River, and all lands irrigable from underground supplies, and enlarging the irrigable area to the fullest extent that it would ultimately be enlarged by return seepage, they would find that they could eventually irrigate more than 12,500,000 acres, which is as much land as is now irrigated and cultivated in Japan. They would figure on _acreculture_ rather than _agriculture_, and would investigate to the minutest detail the problem of fertilization. They would figure on handling the silt of the Colorado River just as the silt of the Nile is handled in Egypt, fertilizing as large an area as possible with it. The Colorado River carries silt that is very fine and enough of it could be brought in the water every year to practically every irrigated field, to maintain the incredible fertility and productiveness of the bottom lands and increase that of the mesa lands. They would look for phosphate, potash, and nitrogen for fertilizers. They would find that an inexhaustible supply of potash could be manufactured from the giant kelp beds of the Pacific Coast. They would learn that there are in the territory included in the drainage basin of the Colorado River unlimited deposits of phosphate rock from which all needed phosphate could be mined. Nitrogen, they would ascertain, could be produced from the air in immense quantities by the use of the electric power which could be developed without limit in the canyon of the Colorado River. They would utilize for that purpose all the vast surplus of electric power from the Colorado River as it whirls and plunges down the most stupendous river gorge in the world. In addition to producing all they needed to fertilize their own lands they would produce enough nitrogen, potash and phosphates to supply the markets of the world. The land, the water, and the fertilizer being thus assured, they would find the climate such that even the intensive methods of gardening now customary in Japan, would give no idea of the possibilities of acreage production in the Colorado River Valley. In that valley acreculture would be hothouse culture out-of-doors. The hot climate of the country would be found, when this economic survey of it was made, to be its greatest asset. They would find that every product of the tropical and semi-tropical countries of the world could be here produced to perfection. They would find that by actual experience extending over many years, an acre of land in such a climate, closely cultivated and abundantly fertilized, and cropped several times a year, would produce from $1000 to $2000 net profit annually and even more, depending on the skill of the cultivator. They would find that the skilled soil-cultivators of Japan could by this system of hothouse culture out-of-doors, provide all the food for an average family for a year, and produce over and above that an average of $1000 net profit per acre every year. This would include every product now successfully grown in Southern California. They would find that the Colorado River could be canalized from Yuma to the Needles, and the Gila and Salt Rivers canalized from Yuma to Phoenix and Florence, and a ship canal built from Yuma to the Gulf of California. Then the products from this wonderfully prolific country could be shipped from Yuma to every seaport of the world. Through the Panama Canal they could reach every seaport on the Atlantic Coast. By trans-shipment at New Orleans to canal or river steamers or barges they would connect with a river system 20,000 miles in extent for the distribution of their products to inland territory. They would calculate the cost of reclamation and the value of the reclaimed land, measured by its productive power. They would figure that they could afford to spend on the reclamation of the land at least an amount equal to the value of one year's production from the land. That would be $1000 per acre. Figuring only on the 5,000,000 acres that could be reclaimed in the main lower valley of the Colorado River below the canyon, they would find that it would justify a total expenditure of five billion dollars. Some enterprising American Congressional Economist would then tell them that they surely could not contemplate spending that much _on anything but a war_. They would tell him that they were _going into a war with the Desert_ and they proposed to triumph in it, just as they triumphed in the war with Russia. There would be this difference: all they spent on the Russian War was gone past recovery. They had to spend it or cease to exist as a nation. In this war with the Desert they would spend five billion dollars, and for it they would create a country that would produce food worth five billion dollars a year every year through all future time. Then the American Speculator would come on the scene with his accumulated wisdom gained through many failures of colonization schemes because there were no colonists or not enough to keep up with the interest on the bonds issued. The American Speculator would warn the Japanese against such a gigantic blunder as they were about to make in undertaking such a stupendous colonization scheme. And the Japanese Statesmen and Financiers would point out to him not only that they had all the colonists they needed right at home in Japan, but that instead of its being necessary to spend a large sum of money to induce those colonists to emigrate to the new lands, they were having much trouble now to keep the colonists from going to the Pacific Coast where they are not wanted. They would explain that they are overcrowded in Japan; that their surplus population must go somewhere; that they are the most skilled gardeners and orchardists in the world; that the same men who would build the irrigation works, and the power plants, would settle right down on the reclaimed lands, glad to get an acre apiece, and live on it and cultivate it with their families. So the Japanese in this thorough way would go at this great work of wresting a new Japanese Empire from the Desert. They would not do any construction work until they had made a complete comprehensive plan of every detail of this new empire they were starting to build. Then they would go to the Colorado Canyon and begin by building a great diversion dam as far down the canyon as might be practicable to lift the water high enough to carry it in high line canal systems along both sides of the valley, and to bring it out on the mesa lands and use it where the land most needs the silt for a fertilizer. They would figure on first reclaiming all the mesa land on which the water could in this way be used, and then they would build pumping plants with which to irrigate the more elevated lands. They would reclaim the mesa land first because every acre of mesa land that was reclaimed would serve as a sponge to soak up the flood water. By carrying out that plan they would eventually relieve the lowlands in the floor of the valley from all danger of overflow. They would not have to spend anything to control the floods of the Colorado River. There would be no floods. The Japanese would begin at the right end of the problem, and build big enough at the start to solve it as a whole, comprehensively. Their plan would be to use up every drop of the flood water by irrigating land with it. There would never at any time of the year be any water running to waste in the lower river. There would never be in the main river more than enough water to supply the canals that irrigated the lowlands of the lower delta. The ship canal from Yuma to the Gulf, and the canals from Yuma to the Needles, Phoenix, and Florence would be not irrigating canals, but drainage canals. The Japanese would control and utilize all the water that now runs to waste in the Colorado River. They would save and use, not a part of it, but every drop of it. They would, as they have done in Japan, preserve the sources of the water supplies from destruction by overgrazing, deforestation, and erosion. They would build the Charleston Reservoir, on the San Pedro. They would stop the floods that now devastate that valley and wash away and destroy its farm lands. They would build the Verde Reservoir, the Agua Fria Reservoir, the San Carlos Reservoir, and every other reservoir on every tributary of the Colorado required to control for use the immense volume of water that we now waste. They would go into Colorado, Utah, and Nevada, and do the same thing in those States. They would build great dams and reservoirs in the Canyon of the Colorado River, and would produce therefrom electric power enough to furnish power for every farm and mine and city in the whole basin of the Colorado River, and power to pump back onto the mesas water which had once done duty by irrigating the lower lands. They would reclaim in the Drainage Basin of the Colorado River as much land as is now cultivated in all of Japan. They would subdivide it into Garden Homes for their industrious tillers of the soil. They would eventually put on such Garden Homes as many of their land-cultivators and gardener-soldiers with their families as they now have in Japan. They would be more prosperous because the land is more fertile and the crops would be more valuable. Their system of land cultivation would not be farming, as we understand it. It would be gardening, of the closest and most intensive kind. Such a system of land cultivation in the Colorado River Valley, under their system of development, would produce as much per acre as hothouse culture under glass in a cold climate. Everything that can be raised in Japan they would produce. Everything that can be raised in Egypt or Arabia, or anywhere on the shores of the Mediterranean, they would produce. They would make of the Colorado River Valley the greatest date-producing country of the world. Oranges, lemons, grape-fruit, and every known tropical and semi-tropical fruit of commerce would be raised by them in this American Valley of the Nile. They would establish a system of land tillage by their intensive methods which would support in comfort and plenty a family on every acre. They would eventually, in California, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and on the Colorado River Delta in Mexico, put 12,500,000 acres under such cultivation and settle it with as dense a population as they now have in Japan, where they sustain 30,000,000 rural people on 12,500,000 acres. That would leave them many millions of acres--of the higher, colder, and less fertile lands on the watersheds of the tributary streams in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah, for grazing and timber growing. The population sustained by these industries, added to that which would be sustained by mining, and electrical power, and the multitude of manufacturing industries which they would establish, would bring the total population of the basin of the Colorado River and its tributaries, under this Japanese development, up to fifty million people. That is a population as large as that which now bears on its shoulders all the burdens of the Japanese Empire, including its army and navy. The Japanese would pump from underground with electric power the last possible drop of available water to promote surface production. The great torrential downpours that come occasionally in that country would be controlled by systems of embankments and soaked into the ground to replenish the underground supplies instead of being allowed to run to waste, carrying destruction in their path. They would from their dams in the Colorado River Canyon develop power that would pump water high enough to reach such vast areas of rich and fertile land as the Hualpi Valley--at least enough to turn such lands into forest plantations where water enough for agriculture could not be provided for the land. Add to the wealth they would produce from their garden farms the wealth they would dig from the mines, develop from the water power, and produce in their factories, and they would create more annual wealth from this now desolate and uninhabited region in the Colorado River Valley than is to-day annually produced in the Japanese Empire. And more than that, they would be producing a strong and virile people. Every man would be a soldier in time of need and a Japanese army of more than five million men would be able to take the field at a moment's warning, leaving the youths who were too young and the men who were too old for military service, with the aid of the women and children, to cultivate the acre garden homes. Why is not all this done by the Caucasian race who now control this great valley of the American Nile--the people whose flag flies over it? Why, with all this incredible wealth lying undeveloped under our feet, do we not seize the necessary tools and develop it ourselves? Why indeed? The facts stated are facts, physical facts not to be denied. Why do we leave this empire untouched? _Because thus far our only system of development has been speculation and human exploitation._ Because we seem to have known no way of settling a new country except to permit a generation of speculators to skim the cream before the actual tillers of the soil get a chance to cultivate it. Because the agricultural immigrants from Italy--the ideal settlers for the Colorado River Valley--are being herded in Concentration Camps in the tenements of the congested cities. Their skill as gardeners is wasted, their knowledge of art and handicraft lost, their children morally and physically degenerated, and their racial strength diminished. Gunmen and black-handers are evolved from that evil environment. We are rotting a race of virile rural people, instead of directing the vast human power inherent in them to creating a new Valley of the Nile, and building a new Alexandria at Yuma and a new Cairo at Parker, and planting every family that was located on a Garden Home in that marvelously rich country in another Garden of Eden. Because the railroads and the water power syndicates, with their allies the War Department engineers, seem to have the power to perpetuate this system of Speculation and Human Exploitation, and in consequence to dedicate the Colorado River Valley to desolation. They apparently have the power to inject some deadly poison into the arteries and veins of conventions and congresses and legislative bodies that makes action impossible along any line of constructive effort that would free the people from the thralldom of corporate opposition to government construction. Australia and New Zealand,--Japan, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland have escaped from this thralldom and are a free and independent people, capable of directing the development of their resources, _and they are doing it_. The people of the United States have abolished human slavery, but they have been unable as yet to free themselves from the domination of organized capital or the influence of the aggregated appetite of an army of speculators and exploiters of our national resources. As a nation we are shackled by the Spirit of Speculation which insidiously opposes any legislation that would save our resources from speculative exploitation or directly develop them by government construction for the benefit of the people. Those who comprise this speculative class, which opposes all such constructive legislation, on the ground that it is paternalism, are the ones who cry loudest for the increase of Militarism. They want an army _hired_ to defend the nation and their property from attack. They constantly advocate increasing the $250,000,000 a year we now spend on our army and navy. Then they cry economy when it is proposed to spend less than half that amount every year throughout the whole United States to defend the country against the devastating forces of Nature. As a result the people are unable to safeguard against the recurrence of such appalling catastrophies as the Ohio Valley floods of 1913 or the Mississippi Valley floods of 1912 and 1913. The creation of a new empire, more populous, and with a people living in greater comfort and producing more wealth each year in the Colorado River Drainage Basin than in the Japanese Empire of to-day, cannot be permitted to be done by the Japanese because the territory belongs to the United States. And this country cannot be allowed to do it from the viewpoint of the speculators, unless it can be accomplished for the benefit of private speculation. The speculators insist they must be free from any restrictions that would prevent them from exploiting generations yet unborn who will till the soil and use the water power in their industries. _Let the Speculators have their way and what will happen?_ Already the inconceivable fertility of this region is known to the Japanese. Already they are quietly absorbing the opportunities to cultivate its land, either as laborers for American Landowners below the line in Mexico, or as tenants in the great Imperial Valley in California. They are as familiar as we are with the Orange Groves of Sonora. They know that on the Pacific Coast below Guaymas there are millions of acres of country just as beautiful as Southern California, but which is now unreclaimed, where the sparkling streams from the Sierra Madres course uselessly through thickets of wild lemon trees on their way to the ocean. If we wait for the speculators to do it, long before the time comes when they can get the aid from the national government necessary to enable them to reclaim and settle the desert lands, and develop the water power of the Colorado River, there will be a Japanese population of many millions in the Colorado River Delta below the line and on the Pacific Coast of Mexico. They will go to Mexico to cultivate the soil and live on it. The Caucasian as a rule goes to Mexico to get land away from the Mexicans and speculate on it or monopolize it. So long as that is our system of development, we cannot complain if the industrious Japanese go there and live on the land and produce food from it to help feed the people of all the earth. The American goes to Mexico in the hope of making enough money to be able to live without work. The Japanese goes there to get an opportunity to work and to dig his living from Mother Earth by his own labor. Which will prevail, think you, in the struggle to possess the unoccupied and untilled lands of the Pacific shores of Mexico? We are told we must employ more soldiers to protect us. The Japanese colonists, wherever they go, will go with both a hoe and a gun, and will protect themselves. If the Colorado River Valley is to remain dedicated to speculation and exploitation, we could not maintain upon its deserts a standing army large enough, if we should have a war with Japan, to make even a pretense of protecting it from invasion from the south by the Japanese after they have settled those Mexican lands. They would not stop with taking the Philippines and Hawaii, California, Oregon, and Washington. They would sweep up from the south with an army of a million men from Mexico and extend their dominion over all the arid region. From the Cascade and the Sierra Nevada Ranges to the crest of the Rocky Mountains and from the Canadian line to Mexico would become Japanese territory. But that is too long a time in the future, the average self-complacent American says, to be of any immediate interest. It would take the Japanese more than a generation to put a million colonists in Mexico. Perhaps it would. It will take the Japanese a generation to double the Japanese population on the shores of the Pacific in Asia and America. Now they have only fifty million people. In one generation more they will have a hundred million and a goodly portion of them will be in America. Is it any too soon for this nation to begin right now to build the safeguards against that danger? Bear in mind that there are men and women now living who remember Chicago when there was nothing there but Old Fort Dearborn and a few log houses. Bear in mind that in less than ten years, from 1900 to 1908, more than 65,000 Japanese emigrated to Hawaii, and that in a single year, 1907, 30,226 Japanese came to the United States, and that in 1909 the number of trained and seasoned Japanese soldiers in Hawaii exceeded the entire field army of the United States. How long would it take Japan to put a million colonists--men of military age--on the Pacific Coast of Mexico? In "The Great Illusion," Norman Angell argues that war must cease because it does not pay. Would that argument apply in case of a war between the United States and Japan, with reference to the Colorado River Country and the rest of the territory now lying in the United States between the Rocky Mountains on the east and the Pacific Ocean on the west? In the Colorado River Valley alone the Japanese would get 5,000,000 acres capable of being made to produce by their system of cultivation a net profit of $1,000 an acre, over and above a living for its cultivators. That would make a total of five billion dollars a year. In addition they would get 12,500,000 acres in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys in California which if they produced from it only a net profit of $500 an acre every year--would yield a total of two and a half billion dollars annually. Oregon, Washington and Idaho would add as much more land, making another two and a half billion dollars a year. That is a total annual production to which the Japanese would develop this land within a generation of Ten billion dollars a year--and very little of the land is to-day cultivated. Most of it is unreclaimed desert. In addition to this the mineral output of the states lying entirely within that territory for 1913 was as follows: Arizona $71,000,000 California 100,700,000 Idaho 24,500,000 Nevada 37,800,000 Oregon 3,500,000 Utah 53,000,000 Washington 17,500,000 Total $308,000,000 In addition, a considerable portion of the states of Colorado, New Mexico and Wyoming lies within the territory under consideration. The mineral output of these states for 1913 was as follows: Colorado $54,000,000 New Mexico 17,800,000 Wyoming 12,500,000 Total $84,300,000 The total mineral production of all the above named States, and including Montana, for the ten years ending with 1913 was $3,322,003,895. The lands in the delta of the Colorado River where the Japanese are now settling comprise more than a million acres of the most marvelously fertile land in all the world. The Japanese who are now going into the delta country of the Colorado River are not going where they are unwelcome. The American who wants to use their labor to cultivate his land, in order that he may get a profit from it without working the land himself, is busy starting the Asiatic invasion that will eventually sweep over that Land of Promise. It is an invasion that will ultimately transfer that country from American to Asiatic control, unless the American people wake up and decide without delay to do _the one and only thing_ that can possibly prevent this from happening. What is that "one and only thing" that they must do to save the Colorado River Valley for our own people? _Why it is to occupy, cultivate, use, and possess it ourselves, and do with it exactly what the Japanese would do with it if they possessed it as a part of the territory of the Empire of Japan._ What would have to be done to accomplish that has already been told. _How is it to be done?_ By thrusting to one side the speculators and exploiters and demanding from Congress the necessary legislative machinery and money to conquest the Colorado River Valley from the desert, with exactly the same inexorable insistence with which the money would be demanded if it were needed for defense against an invading German force that had landed in New England and was marching on New York; with exactly the same irresistible popular cyclone that will roar about the ears of Congress in the future, if their supine neglect now does some day actually lead to a Japanese invasion of the United States. If the people of the United States can get their feet out of the quicksands of land-speculation, water-speculation, power-speculation, and the operations of water-power syndicates, they can create a country as populous and powerful as the Japanese Empire in the Drainage Basin of the Colorado River. If we will eliminate that one great obstacle, we can do it ourselves, just as well as the Japanese could do it. Our subserviency to the Spirit of Speculation is the only thing that stands in the way of it. Every problem involved has been solved by some other country and partly solved by our own. There is no reason why the United States cannot adopt the Australian and New Zealand Systems for the acquisition, reclamation, subdivision, and settlement of land. There is no reason why the United States should not control its water power resources on such a stream as the Colorado River; and, when advisable, build, own, and operate power plants and distribute power. _Shall we admit that we cannot do what Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland have done?_ Under the United States Reclamation Act we have already undertaken to reclaim land for settlement, and to build power plants, but we have failed to safeguard the land or the power against speculative acquisition. However, what we have already accomplished has made for progress, and makes it easier to do what remains to be done. When we come to the qualifications of colonists, and the necessity that they should be Homecrofters, the question becomes more difficult, because the majority of the people of the United States have no conception of the possibilities of acreproduction or acreculture by a skilled and scientifically trained truck-gardener and fruit-grower and poultry-raiser. There are innumerable instances where truck gardens along the Atlantic Coast, on Long Island, and in New Jersey, Virginia, and Florida, are producing more than a thousand dollars worth of vegetables every year. It is a most common thing for berry-growers to realize that acreage product from an acre of berries in Louisiana or Washington. Celery, asparagus, lettuce, onions, and many other crops will yield as much when properly fertilized and cultivated. Anyone who doubts this can find ample proof of it at Duluth, Minnesota, or in California or Texas. Another thing should be borne in mind. One acre of land in the Colorado River Valley is the equivalent of five acres in a cold climate. Crops may be planted and matured so rapidly in that hot climate that plant growth more resembles hothouse forcing than ordinary out-of-door truck gardening. Another important fact is that all the tropical and semi-tropical fruits grow to perfection in that valley. This whole subject is exhaustively elucidated in "Fields, Factories and Workshops," by Prince Kropotkin, published by G. P. Putnam's Sons of New York. No one will form an opinion adverse to the possibilities of acreculture after reading that book. Successful acreculture requires, however, _a man who knows how_. The Japanese know how. The Chinese know how. The Belgians know how. Many of the French, Germans, and Italians know how. The Americans, with few exceptions, do not know how, _but they can be taught_. They will seize the opportunity to learn as soon as it is open to them as part of a large national plan. Every Homecroft Settlement created in the Colorado River Valley should be a great educational institution, a training school to teach men and women how to raise fruit, vegetables, and poultry, and how to prepare their products for market, and how to market them, and how to get their own food from their own acre by their own labor. _Thousands of the immigrants_ now coming to the United States from Southern Europe already know how to do all this and would make ideal colonists for the Colorado River Valley. _Thousands are out of work_ who, if healthy and physically fit, could be trained to garden in a year; to be good gardeners in three years; and to be scientific experts in gardening in five years. In the event of a war under existing conditions we would have to train a million recruits to be soldiers. It is equally certain that men can be trained to be gardeners and Homecrofters. It takes longer to train a Homecrofter than to train a soldier, but it is only a question of time. It can be done and it will be done by the United States as a measure of national defense as soon as the people can be brought to realize the great fundamental fact that the only way they can provide as many soldiers as they might need in some great national emergency is to begin in time of peace--and that means _now_--and train them to be both Homecrofters and soldiers, as the Japanese are trained. The Japanese are a nation of Homecrofters. The Homecroft Reservists who should be trained for national defense by the United States, will get their living as gardeners and Homecrofters when they are not needed as soldiers, or until they are needed as soldiers, as is the case in Japan with their organized reserve of 1,170,000 men and the great majority of their unorganized reserve of 7,021,780 men. The Drainage Basin of the Colorado River has an area of 265,000 square miles. Japan has an area of 147,655 square miles, less than the area of the drainage basin of the Colorado River in Arizona and New Mexico. Arizona alone contains 143,956 square miles, and has a population of only 204,354. Japan has a population of 52,200,200. She now sustains in the Home Country a standing army at peace strength of 217,032, with Reserves of 1,170,000, making a total war strength of about 1,400,000 and she has available for duty but unorganized a total of 7,021,780. The same Japanese System with the same Japanese population in the Colorado River Drainage Basin would sustain an army of the same strength. And they can do it on the Pacific Coast of Mexico, or on the Pacific Coast of South America, or anywhere else in as good a climate where they can get a territory of 147,000 square miles, of which 12,500,000 acres can be irrigated and intensively cultivated. _Is it not evident that it is the economic potentialities of the Japanese race that we must meet?_ We can do it in the Colorado River Country. In the main valley below the mouth of the Colorado Canyon we can maintain a permanent reserve of 5,000,000 men, Homecrofters and gardeners in time of peace, soldiers in time of war, and all organized, trained, and equipped--instantly ready for any emergency. All we would have to do to accomplish that, would be to reclaim and colonize the land, and train the colonists to be Homecrofters, and then apply the entire Military System of Switzerland or Australia to this one small tract of five million acres of land in the Colorado River Valley, with conveniently adjacent territory in Arizona and California in the drainage basin of the Colorado River. It would be entirely practicable to do that, because the National Government would control the School System, and would control the System of Life of the community and adapt it to the Homecroft Reserve System. Every one of 5,000,000 Homecrofters could leave his acre without hindrance to any organized industry and without jeopardizing the welfare of his family. The objections to a Reserve of Citizen Soldiery in the ordinary communities of the United States would have no application in these communities that had been created for the purpose of furnishing soldiers trained when needed in time of war, as well as to develop the highest type of citizenship in time of peace. A start could be made with 100,000 acres; 100,000 gardeners; 100,000 soldiers. The land and water required for that could be located to-morrow and construction work begun in a month. This number should be increased as rapidly as the land could be reclaimed and colonized with Homecrofters in acre homes and the organization of new communities perfected. The Reserve composed of Homecrofters occupying these acre homes should be known as the Homecroft Reserve. If no extension of this proposed Homecroft Reserve System were made into any other section of the country there would be soldiers enough in the Colorado River Valley to defend the Mexican Border, the Pacific Coast, and the Canadian Border from North Dakota to Seattle, at any time when the necessity arose for such defense. The establishment of this large Homecroft Reserve in the Colorado River Valley, fully trained and equipped for military service at a moment's notice, exactly as the Reserves of Switzerland are trained and equipped, would be a complete defense against any danger of Japanese invasion, which can be safeguarded against in no other way. _Is it not better to begin now and spend the money in conquering the Desert than to wait and spend it conquering Japan, or Japan and China combined?_ CHAPTER VIII _The value of the proposed Homecroft Reserve System as a force for national defense would have been demonstrated in the present European War if England had, years ago, established such a reserve in Scotland, instead of driving thousands of Homecrofters to other lands to make way for deer parks and hunting grounds. The Scotch Homecrofters, if that system for a Military Reserve had been established, would have been just such soldiers as those who have made the glorious record of the Black Watch and the Gordon Highlanders and other famous Scotch regiments. There might just as well as not have been a million of them in Scotland, trained and hardy soldiers, organized and equipped as the Reserves of Switzerland are completely organized to-day and ready for instant mobilization. The Scotch Homecrofters would have been getting their living in time of peace by cultivating their little crofts, and as fishermen, and would have been always ready to fight for their country in time of war._ Had there been such a Homecroft Reserve in Scotland, with a million men enlisted in it and fully organized, officered, and equipped for instant service in the field, Germany would have pondered long before starting this war. Would not the German people, as well as the English, be glad now if the war had never been started? But if, notwithstanding all this, the war had been started, an army of a million brave and hardy Scots would have been on the firing line before the German columns had got past Louvain. Belgium would have been protected from devastation. There would have been no invasion of France. But the English people stubbornly refused to heed warnings of the danger of war with Germany. _We are doing the same with reference to Japan._ The English with stolid, self-satisfied complacency pinned their faith entirely on their navy as a national defense. _We are doing practically the same thing, with reference to Japan._ And now the English have been awakened by an appalling national catastrophe which was preventable. _Must we be awakened in the same way?_ A Scotch Homecroft Reserve of a million men would have been an almost certain guarantee that no war would have broken out; and if it had, such a Homecroft Reserve would have been worth to England the billions of dollars she is now spending in a paroxysm of haste to train a million soldiers for service on the continent and to conduct the war. The Scotch Homecroft Reserve would have had the added value of being thoroughly trained and hardened troops as compared with the new levies they are now training to be soldiers. Those raw levies of volunteers, many from clerical employments, lack the qualities that would have been furnished by the Scotch Highlanders, or the descendants of forty generations of border-raiders, or the hardy fishermen of the Sea Coast and Islands of Scotland. Some idea of the sort of men who would have composed this Scotch Homecroft Reserve that England might have had, may be gained from the following very brief story of the Gordon Highlanders which appeared in the "Kansas City Times" of October 27, 1914: "Who's for the Gathering, who's for the Fair? (Gay goes the Gordon to a fight.) The bravest of the brave are at deadlock there. (Highlanders! March! By the right!) There are bullets by the hundred buzzing in the air: There are bonny lads lying on the hillsides bare; But the Gordons know what the Gordons dare When they hear their pipes playing. --'The Gay Gordons,' by Henry Newbolt. "One hundred and thirty years ago the bagpipes of the 'Gay Gordons' first swirled the pibroch. Since then they have played it in every clime and nearly every land where British troops have fought. "The Duke of Gordon was granted a 'Letter of Service' in 1794 to organize a Highland infantry regiment among his clansmen. Lady Gordon, 'The Darling Duchess,' took charge of the enlisting. Their son, the Marquis of Huntley, was the first colonel. "The Gordons first saw service against the French in Holland in 1799. Outnumbered six to one, they received their baptism of fire in a wild charge at Egmont-op-Zee that made all Great Britain ring with their praises. Their first laurels, won at a bloody cost, have never been dimmed. "From Holland they went to Egypt, and with the Black Watch, the Cameronians and the Perthshire Greybreeks stormed up the shore of Aboukir Bay and later the height of Mandora. The name of every battle of Napoleon's futile attempt to master Egypt appears on their battle flags. "They came home from there to line the streets of London at Nelson's funeral, a post of honor coveted by every British regiment. Next they appeared in Denmark and were at the fall of Copenhagen. Without a visit to Scotland the Gordons went to Spain and went through the glorious campaign of Sir John Moore. The French long remembered them for their fight at Corunna. "When the British were retreating, the Gordons were the rear guard. At Elvania Sir John galloped along their line. Ammunition was low and no supplies available. "'My brave Highlanders! You still have your bayonets! Remember Egypt!' the commander shouted. "The pipers took up 'The Cock o' the North,' the sobriquet of the Duke of Gordon, and routed the pursuing French. The Gordons went to Portugal. Almarez is on their flags. They followed the Duke of Wellington back into Spain and were in the fights that sent Joseph Bonaparte's army reeling home. "The Gordons stood with the Black Watch at Quatre Bras, and two days later were at Waterloo. It was the Duchess of Richmond, a daughter of the Duchess of Gordon who recruited the Gordons, who gave the famous ball in Brussels the night before Waterloo. The officers of the Gay Gordons hurried from that levee, which Lord Byron, another Gordon, has commemorated in a poem, to the field of battle. "The feat of the Gordons that day, in grabbing the stirrups of the charging Scots Greys, is one of history's most stirring pages. It is a striking coincidence that in the present war, just ninety-nine years later, the Gordons swung to the Greys' stirrups in another wild charge, this time against the Germans. "The Gordons went to the Afghan War in 1878. In 1881 they campaigned across the veldts against the Boers. The next year they stood at El-Teb and Tel-el-Kebir with their old friends the Black Watch. They marched to Khartum when their namesake, Gordon, was trapped. That over, they went back to India for another Afghan war. They marched by the scenes of their bloody fights when going to the relief of Lucknow. "In 1897 the Gordons were the heroes of all Britain. They, and a regiment of Gurkhas, charged a hill at Dargai in the face of almost superhuman difficulties. Two years later the regiment went to South Africa and fought valiantly through that war. At Eldanslaagte they were part of the column of General French, their present commander. "The red uniform coat of the Gordons is lavishly trimmed in yellow, which brought them the sobriquet of 'Gay Gordons.' Of all the Scotch regiments it has tried the hardest to keep its ranks filled with Scotsmen, 'limbs bred in the purple heather.' "Officially the Gordons are the Ninety-second Highland Infantry." England's original expeditionary force to the continent in 1914 was less than 200,000 men. Suppose it had been 1,200,000. It might just as well have been 1,200,000, if a Scotch Homecroft Reserve had been long ago established, as should have been done, and gradually increased until a million men were enlisted in it. Would any one question the fact, if there had been another million men in England's expeditionary army when it was first sent to the continent, that it would have completely changed the whole current of events in this war? It would have checked the German advance into France and Belgium. Not a foot of Belgium's territory would have been wrested from her. Neither Brussels nor Antwerp would have been surrendered. That conclusion is so self-evident and conservative, and the opportunity that England had to have such a force in reserve is so plain that it seems hard to believe that the United States will ignore its lesson and fail to establish a Homecroft Reserve in this country. England had the original stock from which to breed such a brave and hardy race of soldiers, and _they were the original Homecrofters_. There were not a million of them, but there were many thousands of them two centuries ago. There were so many that to-day there might easily have been a million such Homecrofters in England's army in Europe if the Homecroft Reserve System had been established when the trouble first began between the Homecrofters and the Great Landlords who finally succeeded in riveting the curse of land monopoly around Scotland's neck. It may be argued that this suggestion is an afterthought, and that, as the Arab saying puts it, "The ditches are full of bright afterthoughts." That may be true as to England. But it is not true as to the United States. If we knew that it would be two hundred years before the great final struggle would be fought to determine whether the Pacific Coast of the United States should be dominated by the Asiatic or Caucasian race, right now is the time when we should begin to breed and train our millions of men who will have to fight that battle for us whenever the time does come that it has to be fought. It is as inevitable as fate that the conflict will come unless we safeguard against it by peopling America with a race as hardy and virile as the races on the Pacific shores of Asia are to-day. The rugged physical manhood, rough daring and bravery, hardihood and endurance, self-reliance and resourcefulness, readiness for any emergency on land or sea, that characterized the type of men from whom the Homecroft Reserves would have been bred, and the rough rural environment in which they would have been reared, is strikingly described by S. R. Crockett in his novel "The Raiders." And in "The Dark o' the Moon," the sequel to "The Raiders," he tells of the first of the struggles that were begun two centuries ago by the Homecrofters of Scotland to preserve their immemorial privileges of elbow-room and pasturage, as against the selfishness of the Landlord System that finally prevailed. That system decimated Scotland of her bravest men and left in their places hunting grounds and great estates to be sold or rented to American Snobocrats, who are not fighting any of England's battles in this war. The early conflicts between the Landlords and the Homecrofters are referred to, and the scene of one of these conflicts is so interestingly told by the same author in his Book called "Raiderland," that the following quotation is made from it: "The water-meadows, rich with long deep grass that one could hide in standing erect, bog-myrtle bushes, hazelnuts, and brambles big as prize gooseberries and black as--well, as our mouths when we had done eating them. Woods of tall Scotch firs stood up on one hand, oak and ash on the other. Out in the wimpling fairway of the Black Lane, the Hollan Isle lay anchored. Such a place for nuts! You could get back-loads and back-loads of them to break your teeth upon in the winter forenights. You could ferry across a raft laden with them. Also, and most likely, you could fall off the raft yourself and be well-nigh drowned. You might play hide-and-seek about the Camp, which (though marked 'probably Roman' in the Survey Map) is not a Roman Camp at all, instead only the last fortification of the Levellers in Galloway--those brave but benighted cottiers and crofters who rose in belated rebellion because the lairds shut them out from their poor moorland pasturages and peat-mosses. "Their story is told in that more recent supplement to 'The Raiders' entitled 'The Dark o' the Moon.' There the record of their deliberations and exploits is in the main truthfully enough given, and the fact is undoubted that they finished their course within their entrenched camp upon the Duchrae bank, defying the king's troops with their home-made pikes and rusty old Covenanting swords. "There is a ford (says this chronicle) over the Lane of Grennoch, near where the clear brown stream detaches itself from the narrows of the loch, and a full mile before it unites its slow-moving lily-fringed stream with the Black Water o' Dee rushing down from its granite moorlands. "The Lane of Grennoch seemed to that comfortable English drover, Mr. Job Brown, like a bit of Warwickshire let into the moory boggish desolations of Galloway. But even as he lifted his eyes from the lily-pools where the broad leaves were already browning and turning up at the edges, lo! there, above him, peeping through the russet heather of a Scottish October, was a boulder of the native rock of the province, lichened and water-worn, of which the poet sings: "'See yonder on the hillside scaur, Up among the heather near and far, Wha but Granny Granite, auld Granny Granite, Girnin' wi' her grey teeth.' "If the traveller will be at the pains to cross the Lane of Grennoch, or, as it is now more commonly called, the Duchrae Lane, a couple of hundred yards north of the bridge, he will find a way past an old cottage, the embowered pleasure-house of many a boyish dream, out upon the craggy face of the Crae Hill. Then over the trees and hazel bushes of the Hollan Isle, he will have (like Captain Austin Tredennis) a view of the entire defences of the Levellers and of the way by which most of them escaped across the fords of the Dee Water, before the final assault by the king's forces. "The situation was naturally a strong one--that is, if, as was at the time most likely, it had to be attacked solely by cavalry, or by an irregular force acting without artillery. "In front the Grennoch Lane, still and deep with a bottom of treacherous mud swamps, encircled it to the north, while behind was a good mile of broken ground, with frequent marshes and moss-hags. Save where the top of the camp mound was cleared to admit of the scant brushwood tents of the Levellers, the whole position was further covered and defended by a perfect jungle of bramble, whin, thorn, sloe, and hazel, through which paths had been opened in all directions to the best positions of defence." "Such about the year 1723 was the place where the poor, brave, ignorant cottiers of Galloway made their last stand against the edict which (doubtless in the interests of social progress and the new order of things) drove them from their hillside holdings, their trim patches of cleared land, their scanty rigs of corn high in lirks of the mountain, or in blind 'hopes' still more sheltered from the blast. "Opposite Glenhead, at the uppermost end of the Trod valley, you can see when the sun is setting over western Loch Moar and his rays run level as an ocean floor, the trace of walled enclosures, the outer rings of farm-steadings, the dyke-ridges that enclosed the _Homecrofts_, small as pocket-handkerchiefs; and higher still, ascending the mountainside, regular as the stripes on corduroy, you can trace the ancient rigs where the corn once bloomed bonny even in these wildest and most remote recesses of the hills. All is now passed away and matter for romance--but it is truth all the same, and one may tell it without fear and without favour. "From the Crae Hill, especially if one continues a little to the south till you reach the summit cairn above the farmhouse of Nether Crae you can see many things. For one thing you are in the heart of the Covenant Country. "He pointed north to where on Auchencloy Moor the slender shaft of the Martyrs' Monument gleamed white among the darker heather--south to where on Kirkconnel hillside Grier of Lag found six living men and left six corpses--west towards Wigton Bay, where the tide drowned two of the bravest of womankind, tied like dogs to a stake--east to the kirkyards of Balmaghie and Cross-michael, where under the trees the martyrs of Scotland lie thick as gowans on the lea." "Save by general direction you cannot take in all these by the seeing of the eye from the Crae Hill. But you are in the midst of them, and the hollows of the hills where the men died for their 'thocht,' and the quiet God's Acres where they lie buried, are as much of the essence of Scotland as the red flushing of the heather in autumn and the hill tarns and 'Dhu Lochs' scattered like dark liquid eyes over the face of the wilds." Well may England, as she looked over the battlefields of Belgium, and mourned the thousands and tens of thousands of her brave men whose lives have paid the forfeit for her heedlessness, and listened to the bombardment of her North Sea coast towns by German battleships, and scanned the sky watching for the coming of the aërial invasion her people so much feared, have reflected on the pathos of those lines so often quoted: "Of all sad things of tongue or pen, The saddest are these, it might have been." _Shall we learn by their experience, or shall we follow in England's footsteps and have the same sort of an awakening?_ The same identical influences and traits of human character that drove the Homecrofters from Scotland will be responsible for our failure to take warning from England's lesson, if we do so fail. It is the disposition of intrenched interests to grasp for more and more, and constantly more, that has imperiled England's national life. The same grasping policy of the intrenched interests in the United States now imperils the national life of this nation in the future by the absorption of our national resources and what remains of our public domain into private speculative ownership while the toiling millions are crowded into the tenements. We could survive the loss of what the intrenched interests have already taken if they would only let loose on what is left and let Uncle Sam have a free hand to do with his own as is best for all his people in places like the Colorado River country. There the greater part of the land needed is still public land, and speculators have not as yet acquired the water rights and power possibilities. England could not and the United States cannot maintain a great standing army, but England could have established and maintained a Homecroft Reserve of a million men in Scotland, and we can do it in the Colorado River Valley, and other places where it ought to be done in the United States, provided the land and water power can be saved from the clutch of the speculators before they have so complicated the proposition as to interminably delay it while Uncle Sam is getting back from them what ought never to have been granted away. England had the Scotch Homecrofters, and drove them from the homes of their forefathers to make great estates. We have got to organize our Homecroft Reservists and locate them, and train them, but that can be done. There are thousands of the descendants of the Scotch Homecrofters serving England to-day in the Canadian Contingent Corps in Europe, and doubtless more than one of the crew of the Australian Cruiser that sunk the Emden could trace his pedigree back to a Galloway Drover, a Solway Smuggler, or a Border Raider. From the shielings of the Scotch Homecrofters there went out into the world a race that has made good, wherever it has gone. Would it not be well to think of that in the United States to-day and breed some more of the same sturdy Homecroft Stock in this country, for patriotic service either in peace or war? It was the active out-of-door life that made the Scotch Homecrofters strong. It is the sedentary, indoor life, or the monotony of factory work, that is now sapping the vitality of our people and working havoc with our racial strength. The pity of it is that we have a country where we can reproduce the strong races of many different countries, if we would only recognize that the necessity for doing it is the biggest and most important national problem we have. We can match the country and the people where nearly every big thing for the real uplift of humanity has been done in recent years. The Colorado River Drainage Basin has many characteristics like Australia, where they have adopted a very similar system of Land Reclamation and Settlement and the plan for Universal Military Service that is advocated in this book. We can duplicate Switzerland in West Virginia. We can match Belgium and Holland in Louisiana. We can do in Northern Minnesota what they have done in Denmark. We have many of the same problems in California that they have solved in New Zealand. The fact should be carefully borne in mind, and never for a moment lost sight of, that everything that is advocated in the plan proposed in this book for national defense is something that would be chosen as a thing to be done if it had been determined to carry out the most splendid plan that could be devised for human advancement and national welfare in time of peace in the United States. Such a plan, having regard only to times of peace, would embody the entire plan advocated in this book. Even the military training of entire Homecroft communities, so as to be prepared for that emergency in case of war, is a discipline that would be most beneficial to physical and mental development in time of peace, without any regard to its importance in the event of war. It is most remarkable that all this should be true, but the basic reason for it is that, after all, the highest ultimate objective of national existence in time of peace is to continually lift humanity to higher and higher levels of physical and mental development; and to persevere until we attain the highest possible type of rugged physical and mental strength in man and woman. When war comes, the thing most needed is men--strong, vigorous, and hardy men; and they are the ideal at which all plans for racial development should aim in time of peace. The Homecroft System of Life and Education eliminates the difficulties arising from a reliance in time of war on untrained levies in a country like ours, where so few are physically fit, without long training, for soldierly service. The Homecrofter, earning his living by digging it from the ground, is always strong and instantly fit for a soldier's work. The Homecrofter lives under conditions where he is not a cog in a wheel--not a part of any complicated industrial machine from which no part can be withdrawn without derangement of the whole. He is an independent unit in industry, self-sustaining, dependent on no one and no one dependent on him but his own family. If he is called away for military service, the family is able to conduct and cultivate the Homecroft, and gets its living therefrom. No one is left in need, as would so often happen in other cases, especially when State Militia might be called into real service. The Homecrofter earns his living in a way that makes it practicable for him to leave his accustomed vocation for a month or two every year for a period of military training without any prejudice or loss to him in that vocation. The more these advantages of the Homecroft Reserve System are studied from a military point of view, the more their value will be appreciated. A rural nation like Servia or Montenegro can be practically a nation of soldiers. Every man of military age is always ready for service. The Russian Cossack System accomplishes the same result. A nation of shopkeepers, commercial clerks, and factory employees cannot be utilized in that way for military service. The farming and rural population of the United States furnishes a better hope for a Citizen Soldiery in case of war than our city population, but in these days a farm has come to be really a factory, with complicated machinery, requiring training to operate it, and a chronic shortage of labor in busy seasons. Furthermore, rural population is as a rule so scattered that it would not be possible in time of peace to perfect the organization and give the Reservists the training necessary to prepare them for service in time of war and have them always ready for immediate action. In the Homecroft Communities a million men may be almost as close together all the time as though they were in a Concentration Camp in time of war. The organization of every company and regiment would be complete, officers and all, constantly in touch and working together to promote peace and do the work of peace but ready to do the work of war at any time if need be. Officers in the Homecroft Reserve should be Homecrofters, trained in all the military knowledge necessary, but also trained as Homecrofters and getting their living that way. It has often been said both of this country and of England that the country must not be turned into an armed camp, like the Continent of Europe. The fear is well grounded that if that were done the military spirit would soon dominate the nation and plunge it into all the evils of Militarism, with the danger always to be feared of an ultimate military despotism. The plan for a Homecroft Reserve entirely eliminates that objection. A great Homecroft community comprising a million acre Homecrofts, tilled and lived on by a million trained Homecroft Reservists, in the Colorado River Valley, would make no militaristic impression on the character of the people at large in the United States as a whole. And the same statement would hold good, if another similar Homecroft Reserve of a million men on a million acres in each State were established in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys in California, another in Louisiana, another in Minnesota, and another in West Virginia. And yet this immense Homecroft Reserve, aggregating an army of five million men in time of war, and ready at any time for instant service, would make the United States the most potentially powerful military nation in the world. The lesson of this last great war will be learned, before it is over, by all the nations of the world. That lesson is that _men_, men of reckless daring and dauntless bravery, men utterly indifferent to their own lives when they can be sacrificed to save the nation, men like the Belgian gardeners who have fought for their homeland in this war, men like the Japanese gardeners who threw away their lives against Port Arthur, men like the Scotch Homecrofters who charged with the Scots Greys at Waterloo and have fought through the fierce carnage of a hundred bloody battlefields to sustain and build Britain's Empire Power; such men as the Minute Men of Concord or the Southern Chevaliers who rode with Marion; such men as those who fought with Jackson at New Orleans, whether they were Lafitte's smugglers and pirates from Barataria Bay or Mountaineers from other state or planters from the great sugar plantations of Louisiana, _men who, all of them, are fighting for their homes and their country_, constitute a defense that rises above all others in strength and is the most powerful mobile force in modern warfare. Armed and equipped and organized they must be, and fired with the desperate valor that can be born only of patriotic devotion to a great cause; but when you have such men, and enough of them, no modern machinery of war, or engines of destruction, or fortifications can overcome them or stand against them. They are a force as irresistible as the eruption of a mighty volcano. Those are some of the things to set to the credit of the plan for a Homecroft Reserve if needed for national defense in time of war. Now measure their value in time of peace, for national defense against the evil forces that are gnawing at the very vitals of our national existence by degenerating our racial strength and physical and mental power as a people. There is a remedy for the physical degeneracy caused by congested cities. That remedy is that the populations of such cities shall be scattered into the suburbs where every family can have a home in which they can live in contact with nature. It must be a home with a garden, where they can, if need be, get their living from their own Homecroft. The Homecroft should be the principal source of livelihood for every family,--the factory employment, or the wage earned from it, should be secondary. This one condition, wherever it is brought into existence for an entire community, will end all labor conflicts and disturbances. The most pernicious and poisonous influence in American thought to-day starts from the minds of employers of labor who, sometimes perhaps subconsciously, think they must control labor by having the working people always on the edge of the precipice of starvation. The idea that the wage earner can only be controlled by being kept in a position of personal dependence and subserviency is as medieval, inhuman, and barbarously wrong as was the idea that human slavery was necessary for the control of labor. We have achieved religious liberty, political liberty, civil liberty, and personal liberty, but industrial liberty remains yet to be accomplished. Industrial slavery is the corner stone of our industrial edifice. It will continue so as long as the lives of great multitudes of wageworkers revolve around a _job_, and they know no other way to supply human needs but a wage. Better men will give better service, and employers will get better results, when every wage earner is located on a Homecroft from which he can in any hour of need provide the entire living for himself and family. That condition is the only permanent remedy for unemployment. When all wage earners--all men and women--in this country are trained Homecrofters, able to build a house and furnish it themselves by their own skill and knowing how to get their living from one acre, whenever need be, the Homecroft life will be the universal life of the working people, _and there will be no unemployment_. Unemployment will continue so long as there is a great mass of floating labor, living from day to day on a wage while it lasts, and starving when it stops. No scheme can be devised that will end the miseries caused by unemployment, so long as that system of a floating mass of workers is perpetuated. Human genius cannot prevent the ebb and flow of prosperity. Eras of depression are inevitable. When they come, thousands will be out of employment. Labor Bureaus, private or public, will not change that condition, because they cannot create jobs where none exist. It is philanthropy and not business for an employer to retain men out of sympathy for them when he does not need their labor. Philanthropy is a poor foundation on which to try to build any economic structure. Better by far have every workingman a Homecrofter, whose labor is needed on his homecroft, in home-garden or home-workshop, whenever it is not needed in some wage-earning employment. The labor of women and children in factories, aside from all other considerations, is an economic waste, from the broad standpoint of the highest welfare and prosperity for all the people. Any woman who is a trained Homecrofter is worth more in dollars and cents per day or per week for what she can produce from that homecroft than she can earn in any factory. The same is true of every child old enough to seek factory employment. Homecroft women and Homecroft children will never work in factories, and whenever their labor cannot be had the labor of men will be substituted and the whole world will be the better for it when that time comes. _But what has all this to do with a Homecroft Reserve?_ It has much to do with it. Every community of Homecrofters created to enlarge and maintain the Homecroft Reserve, would be a training school for Homecrofters. The term of enlistment for the educational training furnished by these great National Institutions for the training of Homecrofters would be five years. Each organized community would be practically a separate Homecroft village. Every one that was organized would make it easier to organize the next. Public interest would grow and the popular demand would force the rapid expansion of the plan as soon as its benefits in the field of the education of the people were realized--just as happened in the case of the rural free mail delivery. Whenever the nation starts, as is advocated in this book, to immediately establish a Homecroft Reserve of 100,000 in the Colorado River Country near Yuma; 100,000 in the San Joaquin Valley in California; 100,000 in Louisiana; 100,000 in West Virginia; and 100,000 in Minnesota,--500,000 in all,--and gets that part of its work for national defense done, each 100,000 will be rapidly extended to 1,000,000. That will mean that there will be 5,000,000 enlisted Homecroft Reservists being trained as soldiers of peace as well as soldiers for war--being trained to produce food for man with a hoe as well as to defend their country, if need arises, with a gun. Every Homecrofter and his entire family will be _students_, learning to be Homecrofters, all of them, and taking a five years' course. One fifth of the total 5,000,000 would be enlisted and the same number graduated every year. _What would be the result?_ Every year, year after year, 1,000,000 trained, scientific Homecrofters--trained in home-handicraft, and in fruit-culture, truck-gardening, berry-growing, poultry-raising, and in putting all their products in shape for marketing, whether in their own stomachs or in the markets of the world--would be graduated from these Homecroft villages comprising the Homecroft Reserves. Each would have had a five years' course in that training--a year longer than required for an ordinary college course and of infinitely more practical value to them than a college course. They would pay for the use and occupancy of the Homecroft, and for the instruction they would receive, a sum sufficient to cover all the cost of providing the instruction, and six per cent on the value of the Homecroft, four per cent interest and two per cent to go to a sinking fund that would equal the value of the Homecroft in fifty years. The government would get back every dollar it invested, with interest, and make the profit between the cost of the Homecroft and its fixed ultimate value of $1,000. That value would be from twenty to thirty per cent profit on the original investment by the government. Every one of the 1,000,000 Homecroft families that would be graduated every year would go out into the great field of our national life and activity, looking first for a Homecroft and second for employment in some industrial vocation. _Now how many of our people are there who can be induced to sit down and hold their heads in their hands until they have stopped the whirl in which most of their minds are involved, long enough to seriously weigh the difference in value to the country and to every industrial and commercial interest of 1,000,000 such trained homecrofters, compared with the 1,000,000 untrained and ignorant foreign immigrants whom we have been swallowing up every year for so many years in the maw of our congested cities?_ One million trained Homecrofters, with their families, coming each year into the social and industrial life of the whole people, scattering into every community where labor was needed, would in a comparatively few years solve every social problem and rescue the nation from its danger of eventual destruction by human congestion, the tenement life, and racial degeneracy. The graduated Homecrofters could never be induced to go into the congested tenement districts. They would insist on living in Homecrofts in the suburbs of the cities. The nation ought to adopt immediately the whole system of establishing Homecroft communities as training schools for 5,000,000 Homecrofters, from which 1,000,000 would be graduated every year, without any regard to the value of the plan for a Reserve for national defense. It should be done, if for nothing else, to check the congestion of humanity in cities, create individual industrial independence, end unemployment, end woman labor in factories, end child labor, and insure social stability and the perpetuity of the nation. [Illustration: THE NEW EMPIRE OF THE WEST IN THE DRAINAGE BASIN OF THE COLORADO RIVER--THE NILE OF AMERICA Map showing the Drainage Basin of the Colorado River and the Corrected Boundary Line and Neutral Zone between the United States and Mexico. The area of the Drainage Basin of the Colorado River is 265,000 square miles. Japan has an area of 147,655 square miles. That is a territory smaller than the area of the Colorado River Drainage Basin in Arizona and New Mexico.] CHAPTER IX _In the Colorado River Valley in Arizona and California, and in the State of Nevada, the national government already owns large tracts of land and controls the locations required for power development. The work that could be done immediately in establishing Homecroft Reserves on those public lands, would reclaim vast areas of arid lands and develop water power that would have a value far beyond the cost of the work. The financial advantages to the government would be strikingly demonstrated by the work done in those places. The danger of the occupation of California, Oregon, and Washington by a Japanese invading force, before we could mobilize an army on the Pacific Coast, would be entirely removed at a large and steadily increasing profit to our government._ That may seem incredible to the average reader but it is none the less true. Its truth arises from the fact that the enormous values in productive land and in water power that can be created have as yet no existence. They must be brought into existence by human labor, and large initial expenditures. Those expenditures are too large to be possible through the investment of private capital. When done by the national government, the profits would be large in proportion to the large original investment. The national government should, without any delay, declare its policy to reserve to itself all water rights and water power resources in the Colorado River Canyon. It should reserve for its own operations all public land in the main valley of the Colorado River below the Canyon. It should resume ownership of every acre of land in that territory that has been heretofore located and is as yet unreclaimed or unsettled. That land should be acquired under a system similar to the Australian system, by purchase under an agreement as to price. If the acquisition of any of the land in that way proves impracticable, private rights in the land should be condemned exactly as would private rights in land needed for forts or fortifications. The rapid development and settlement of the Colorado River Valley along the lines herein advocated is a measure of national defense and urgently so. Every year's delay brings the converging lines of possible friction between the United States and Japan closer together. Whatever system we may adopt for national defense in that direction should be so quickly adopted that the safeguards developed by it will be of rapid growth. This is more particularly important if we look at the matter from the right standpoint, and appreciate that what we do is done rather _to prevent war_ than to insure victory in case of war. We will never have a war with Japan unless it is the result of our own heedless indifference, apathetic neglect, and inexcusable unpreparedness. Immense tracts of land in the Colorado River Valley are still owned by the national government which are capable of reclamation. Having resumed ownership of all unsettled or unreclaimed lands in the valley now in private ownership, the Government should lay out a great system for the storage of the flood waters of the Colorado River in the canyon of the river. The water should be utilized to reclaim at least five million acres in California and Arizona. The works necessary for the reclamation of at least a million acres of this land should be carried to completion with all possible expedition. This one million acres should be brought to the highest stage of reclamation and cultivation, subdivided into Homecrofts of one acre each, and as rapidly as possible settled by men with families who either already know or are willing to learn how to get a comfortable living for a family from one acre of land in the Colorado River Valley. The Australian system of land reclamation and settlement should be applied to the colonization of these acre-garden farms or Homecrofts. On every one of them a house and outbuildings adapted to the climate should be built, costing not over $500. That is all that would be necessary in the way of buildings. Shade rather than shelter is needed and it is more important to provide ways to keep cool than ways to keep out the cold. Life is lived practically out-of-doors all the year round. These Homecroft settlements should be organized in communities of not less than one thousand each and, in advance of settlement, schoolhouses adapted to the climate and all necessary roads and transportation facilities should be brought into existence. The price to be paid for the right of occupancy of each acre Homecroft during the five year period of enlistment in the Educational System of the Homecroft Reserve Service, should be based, not on the cost, but on _the full value of the reclaimed land and its appurtenant water right plus the entire investment for house and community improvements and the overhead expense of its development_. No cash payment should be required from the settler. He should only pay the fixed annual rental for use and occupation from year to year. The test of his acceptability as an applicant would be his physical fitness for the labor required in the development of that country, as well as for possible military service in the event of war. The most important question would be his ability, with the help of his family, and with the instruction that would be given to all, to so cultivate and manage his acre Homecroft as to produce from it all the food needed by the family throughout the year. The first consideration in putting such a settler on the land would be the willingness of himself and family to do that one thing above all others and thereby demonstrate the practicability of the plan. There would thus be brought into existence something rare among American institutions--an independent and self-sustaining community of a million men of military age with families from whom the mainstay of every family would be available for military service without interference with complex commercial or industrial conditions, and without in the slightest degree subjecting the family to possible privation from lack of food, shelter, or raiment. The question of raiment in the Colorado River Valley involves, if necessity exists for economy, an expense so small as to be negligible. If the men from such a community were absent for five years in military service, the sale of surplus products and poultry in excess of the family needs for food, that could be produced from the acre, would amply supply the need of the family for clothes, and all their other necessary requirements. The character of the cultivation necessary upon such an acre would be peculiarly adapted to the labor which would be available from the old men, the boys, the women, and the children of the community. Each family would continue to live in its accustomed home indefinitely. If the men of military age were called on for military service, all rentals or other charges against the land or for water maintenance or for instruction or upkeep of roads and public works should be remitted during such a period of actual service and borne by the national government. And in the event of the loss of the head of the family in the service, the ownership of a completely equipped and stocked homecroft should vest in the family in lieu of a pension. Not only should the Australian land system be made applicable to such communities, so that each settler could secure his home without the payment of any cash down, or anything more than the annual rental, but the Australian or Swiss system of military service should likewise be adopted, with reference to all these communities and the entire section of the country embraced in the Colorado River Valley. The plan has no elements of uncertainty or impracticability. The land is there and the government already owns more than enough of it to carry out the plan without the acquisition of any land now in private ownership. The water necessary to reclaim the land runs to waste year after year into the Gulf of California, and it never will be fully conserved and utilized until the government takes hold and does it on a big interstate scale such as can be done only by the national government. The latent water power should be developed as fast as needed and perpetually owned by the national government. Every available acre of land that can be reclaimed in the main Colorado River Valley, and on the mesas adjoining it, should be acquired and gradually settled under this plan by the national government. Every new acre thus developed and settled would add to the economic strength of the nation as well as contribute to its military strength. The fact that this whole section of the country can be so readily adapted to the Australian system of land reclamation and settlement, and also to the Australian system of military service, is one of the strongest reasons for locating the first demonstration of the advantages of such communities in the Colorado River Valley. Other reasons exist, however, which should not be lost sight of. There is no other available section close enough to Southern California where a force could be developed and maintained that could be brought into action for the defense of Southern California quickly enough to make it safe to rely upon its efficiency for that purpose with certainty. But an army of a million men could be marched from the Colorado River Valley to Los Angeles or any point in Southern California in much less time than troops could be transported across the Pacific Ocean. To this end a great Military Highway should be built across the Imperial Valley to San Diego and thence to Los Angeles. Also another Military Highway paralleling the Southern Pacific Railroad from Yuma to Los Angeles with established stations for water supply on both routes at necessary intervals. These highways would in time of peace be a part of a transcontinental highway and would be constantly used by thousands of motor car travelers. No system of railroad or trolley transportation should be wholly depended on for the transportation of these troops. It should not be possible to check their advance by any interruption of traffic resulting from dynamiting bridges or tunnels or otherwise retarding or destroying rail communication. The assured safety to Southern California which would result from the proximity and readiness of the Homecroft Reserve would lie in the fact that every soldier from the Colorado River Valley could transport himself from his home to the point where he was needed, and be sure that he would get there in time to meet any invading force. It may be argued that a million men instantly liable for military service to defend our Mexican border or defend Southern California against possible invasion is more than would be needed. Right there lies the incontestable assurance of Peace. Neither Japan nor any other nation would ever seriously consider undertaking to land an army anywhere on the shores of the Gulf of California or the Pacific Ocean for attack upon any section of the United States if a million soldiers stood ready to step to the colors and shoulder their guns and military equipment and give their services wherever needed to repel such an invasion. Every man living under this Swiss-Australian Homecroft System of military service would be hardened and seasoned for the duties of that service. The activities of his life and the digging of his living from the ground would render him fit at all times for the heavy duties of soldiering. Not only would he be hardened to labor, but he would be inured to the trying climate of the Southwest, a climate so hot that people unaccustomed to it would melt in their tracks if they undertook any active physical labor under its blistering sun. Those who live in the climate, however, become readily acclimated to it, and are as satisfied with and loyal to the country as it is possible for human beings to be to the land of their home. The plan of setting apart and developing this particular section of the country as a source of supply and place for the maintenance of an adequate citizen soldiery, would be strengthened by certain enlargements of the plan that would be entirely practicable from every point of view. The period of the year when the men could best be spared from their homes for an interval of military training would be in the winter time. It would be found advisable, in training the men of the Colorado River Valley for military service, to move them once each year under military discipline to an encampment for field maneuvers at some point in Nevada far enough to the North to bring them within range of the cold winter climate to be found in many of the valleys of Nevada. The best possible training these men could have would be to march them with a full military equipment from the Colorado River Valley to this winter training ground, and then march them back again to their homes, once every year. That would be physical service that would qualify them for the hardest kind of long distance marching that they might be called upon to do in any event of actual warfare. The stimulating effect of the cold winter climate of Nevada on men from the hot climate of the Colorado River Valley would be of immense physical advantage to them, besides hardening them to campaigning in a cold country, as they would be hardened already by their home environment to campaigning in a hot country. A military road should be constructed for such use all the way from Yuma to Central Nevada, and then extended north to a point where it would connect with an east and west national highway leading from Salt Lake City to Reno, Sacramento, and San Francisco. There are other details which should be worked out to complete the comprehensive plan for the establishment and maintenance of such an adequate and efficient citizen soldiery. The most important of these would be the establishment of Institutions for Instruction--Homecroft Institutes--which would train not only the children but the parents as well, in every community subject to this system, in everything relating to the high type of land cultivation that would be necessary to the success of the plan. Coöperative methods in the distribution and sale of their surplus products should also be adopted. With careful study of all the questions involved relating to physical and mental stamina and strength and its development in that climate, a racial type could be developed with as much physical endurance as that of the Mojave Indians who have lived for centuries in that country. In the old days, before there were railroads or telegraph lines, their couriers would run for sixty miles without water over the desert. They have powers of endurance exceeded probably by no other living race of men. The settlements thus contemplated in the Colorado River Valley should be supplemented by the settlement, on Five Acre Homecrofts in Nevada, of as large a force of Homecrofters as might be needed for the Cavalry Arm of the entire Homecroft Reserves of the West and the Pacific Coast. This Homecroft Reserve Cavalry force should be located under the Australian system of land reclamation and settlement, and trained under the Australian system of universal military service. They should be located upon lands now owned by the national government or which could easily be acquired by it in various communities of anywhere from 100 to 1000 each, in all the valleys of the State of Nevada. That entire State has now a population of only 81,876 people, according to the census of 1910, and within its borders there are from three to five million acres of unoccupied and uncultivated lands, or land on which at present only hay or grain is grown, which could be subdivided into five acre farms and settled under the Australian land system by men with families who would get their living, each family from its five acres, and be there all the years of the future instantly ready at any time for military service whenever and wherever they might be called to the flag. It would be a very easy matter for the national government to coöperate with the State of Nevada in such a way that every law of the State and every plan for its development would fit in perfectly with this adequate and comprehensive plan for the establishment of a great Reserve force of Cavalry for the national defense. In Nevada, on the splendid stock ranges of that State, the system could be so developed as to establish a cavalry service large enough to serve all needs for that arm of the service, at least when needed anywhere in the Western half of the United States. The climate of Nevada and the stock ranges of that State will produce not only a hardy and vigorous race of men but will produce a hardy and vigorous race of horses as well. No horses in the world are stronger or better fitted for cavalry service than those bred in Nevada. Were this plan once adopted with reference to the State of Nevada, it would not be possible for the national government to reclaim land and make it ready for settlement, with a house on each five acre tract, fast enough to supply the demand for such homes by industrious families who would enthusiastically conform to all the conditions of Reservist service in order to get the advantages and the benefits offered by such a system of land settlement. Five acres of irrigated land intensively tilled will support a family anywhere in Nevada, but supplementing the five cultivated acres in the majority of cases, grazing privileges could be made appurtenant to the five acre farm which would materially increase its value and facilitate the establishment of an adequate Cavalry Service to be drawn from these Nevada communities. Each community of Homecrofters enlisted in this Cavalry Service should have set apart to them from the public lands an area of grazing lands which they could use through the formation of a coöperative grazing association, such as have been so successfully conducted in some of the other grazing States. In this connection, it may be interesting in passing to call attention to the similarity which this system of a Citizen Cavalry Service would have to the Cossack system in Russia. The Russian government maintains this invaluable cavalry arm of the Empire's military power without other expense than to furnish the arms and ammunition for each cavalryman, supplemented by a money payment when in service in lieu of rations. Land grants have been made to the Cossacks, in return for which they must give the military service which is the condition upon which the land grant was made. The total area of all these grants is in the neighborhood of 146,000,000 acres and many of the Cossack communities have been made wealthy from the timber and mines on their lands. These Cossack communities are self-governing political bodies within themselves, in all their local affairs. Their term of service begins with early manhood and ends only when they have reached the age of sixty. Their mode of life gives them all the physical vigor that could be attained by constant service, and when called to the colors in time of war, they regard active service as something to be much desired and it is entered upon with enthusiasm rather than regret. The same conditions would hold good if a National Homecroft Reserve Cavalry Service were established in Nevada. The farmer could leave his home without prejudice to his family and would welcome with patriotic enthusiasm a call to the colors. At the same time his home life and home environment would be free from all the monotony and innumerable evils of life in a military barracks or camp in time of peace. It would have all the variety of an active, out-of-door, free, and independent rural life in one of the most bracing and stimulating climates in the world, and in a State which, if it were fully developed under this plan, would have a population of at least five million citizens and their families, of the highest and most intelligent class that could be produced on American soil. This great Cavalry Service of our citizen soldiery in the State of Nevada could be so quickly transported to and mobilized at any point on the Pacific Coast between Seattle and Los Angeles, in the event of threatened invasion, that no nation could by any possibility land an army on our Pacific shores without being almost instantly confronted by an organized force of citizen soldiers with its full quota of cavalry--not an untrained mob of volunteers but hardened and trustworthy men of training and experience in all that a soldier can learn to do in preliminary training without actual warfare. The fact that such an overwhelming and irresistible force was known by all other nations to exist and to be available for immediate mobilization and defense, would in and of itself prove the best assurance we could have against the breaking out of a war which otherwise might well occur because of our hopelessly inadequate regular standing army and our utter unpreparedness so long as we have no adequate force of citizen soldiery. A citizen soldiery is what we must undoubtedly have in this country, but it must be a citizen soldiery trained and inured at all times in advance to the real hardships of war. They must have the physical stamina necessary to endure such hardships. They must be kept at all times physically fit by the labor of their daily life and the occupations whereby they earn their bread. They must be trained thoroughly and well in time of peace, as it is contemplated they shall be trained under the military system of Switzerland and Australia. That system would to a large extent be the model which would be the guide for the creation of the Homecroft Reserve, except that under the latter system the regular annual training period would be longer and the training more thorough and complete. It would be sufficiently so to make a reservist in every way the equal, so far as training goes, of a soldier in the regular army. The creation of a great Military Reserve under the plan proposed for a Homecroft Reserve in the Colorado River Valley for the national defense would require, for its complete and satisfactory fruition, the acquisition by the United States of the territory through which the Colorado River now flows from the present boundary line to the Gulf of California and extending around the head of the Gulf of California. The Gulf of California should be made neutral waters forever, by treaty between the United States and Mexico, and this treaty should be agreed to by all the nations of the world. The neutral waters thus created should extend far enough into the open sea so that all commerce from the shores of the Gulf of California or reaching the markets of the world through that waterway from any of the vast interior territory embraced in the drainage basin of the Colorado River, could at any time reach the ocean highways of commerce without danger of being waylaid by the hostile ships of war of any nation. The territory which the United States should thus acquire from Mexico by peaceful agreement and purchase should include the section of land lying north of the most southerly line of New Mexico and Arizona, which runs through or very close to Douglas, Naco, and Nogales, extended due west to and across the Gulf of California and thence to the Pacific Ocean. The land lying north and east of this line and the Gulf of California and Colorado River should become a part of Arizona. The land lying north of the same line and extending from the Colorado River and the Gulf of California on the east to the Pacific Ocean on the west, should become a part of the State of California. A neutral zone should be created, south of and parallel to the boundary line between the United States and Mexico, extending all the way from the Pacific Coast to the Gulf of Mexico at the mouth of the Rio Grande River. This neutral zone should be controlled by an International Commission. That commission should also have jurisdiction to determine any controversies that might arise with reference to the Gulf of California. They should have the same jurisdiction over that neutral sea zone as over the neutral land zone. The jurisdiction of such an International Commission might well be extended to cover all controversies that might arise between the United States and Mexico, as to which it might be given full powers as an International Commission of Conciliation or Arbitration, whenever such disputed question was referred to it by the Executive or Legislative authority of either government, and in all cases before an actual declaration of war should be made by either country against the other. Such an agreement would be of inestimable advantage to both countries, and would more than compensate Mexico for the transfer to the United States of the little corner of land which should be a part of Arizona and California. It is of no possible benefit to Mexico to hang on to it. Its acquisition by the United States is vital to its safe development. Its ownership by Mexico puts the great population that will eventually live in the valley of the Colorado River in the same position with reference to their national outlet to the sea that the people of the Mississippi Valley would be in, if some other nation owned the mouth of the Mississippi River, or that New York would occupy if, for instance, Germany or France owned Long Island and Staten Island and the territory immediately adjacent to the Narrows and Long Island Sound on the mainland. If the peace advocates in the United States, who limit their energies to the establishment of the machinery for arbitration or conciliation, would go one step farther and work out such a plan as that suggested above for getting rid of a national controversy before it becomes acute, they would render invaluable service to their country. The ownership of the delta of the Colorado River and the head of the Gulf of California is one of those certain points of danger that should be removed. The people of Mexico must realize that, and the creation of a neutral zone and the neutralization of the Gulf of California would be of infinitely greater value to Mexico than the small tract she would transfer to the United States could ever be under any circumstances. For Mexico to continue to hold it, creates a constant danger of friction or conflict which would be entirely removed if it were taken over by the United States. The situation now is exactly as though one man owned the doorway to another man's house. He could make no real beneficial use of it except to embarrass the owner of the house. Such a situation can only result in controversy. Is it not possible that the advocates of national arbitration and conciliation or of an International Court can be induced to see this and use their efforts to accomplish a great national benefit that is entirely practicable? The plan above proposed would have all the merits claimed for International Arbitration and Conciliation and for an International Peace Tribunal. That is what the proposed International Peace Commission between this country and Mexico would be, in fact, and its value and success being demonstrated in one place where it could be practically put in operation, it would be much easier to get the same plan adopted in wider fields by other nations, and perhaps gradually evolve a world-wide system for an International Peace Tribunal that way. Another change that should be made in existing boundary lines to facilitate the development of the resources of that country and its settlement by a dense population, is shown by the map on the following page. State lines in the arid region should have been located, so far as possible, where they would have followed the natural boundaries of hydrographic basins. When early errors can be now corrected with advantage to the people it should be done. The development of Northern California would be facilitated by separating it from Southern California at the Tehachapi Mountains. Then the great problem of the reclamation and settlement of the 12,500,000 acres in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys could be solved much easier than as the state is now constituted. It would also be to the advantage of Southern California to be able to deal with its vast problems of irrigation development without being complicated with those of Northern California. [Illustration] The accompanying map illustrates the lines which should be the boundary lines of the States of California, South California and Nevada. The North and South line between California and Nevada, running from Oregon to Lake Tahoe, should be continued south until it strikes the crest of the Pacific Watershed; thence it should follow the crest of that watershed southeast, south and southwest, until it joins the Pacific Ocean between Santa Barbara and Ventura. The southern boundary line of Utah should be extended until it intersects the line last described at the crest of the Pacific Watershed. The land north of the line so extended to the west and draining into Nevada, formerly in California, and comprising Mono and part of Inyo Counties should go to Nevada and all south of this east and west line should go to South California. Nevada would gain by the exchange and so would South California. A glance at the map will satisfy anyone of the advantages to all the sections affected which would accrue from this correction of present boundaries, and the creation of the new State of South California. CHAPTER X _California is a remote Insular Province of the United States--just as much an island as Hawaii, to all practical intents and purposes. It would be more easily accessible from Japan by sea, in case of war, than from the United States by land. It is bounded on the west by the Pacific Ocean, now nothing more than a large lake in these days of modern steamships. It is bounded on the east and south by mountain ranges from which a thousand miles of desert and the Rocky Mountains intervene before the populous sections of the United States are reached. On the north inaccessible mountains separate California from the plains and valleys of Oregon. There are hundreds of places on its coast where an army could be landed. To reach it from the north, mountains must be crossed. From the east, mountains must be crossed. From the south, mountains must be crossed. From the west, the gentle waves of the Pacific, in all ordinary weather, lap the sloping sands which for nearly a thousand miles tempt a landing on so fair a shore._ All this is true of Southern California, so far as its inaccessibility from the east is concerned, but it is more essentially true of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley. There you have a great bowl, fashioned by Nature in such a way as to open invitingly to the warm and equable winds that come from the Pacific and the Japan current, while on the north, west, and south are high mountain ranges that protect from the blizzards that come out of the north or the hot desert blasts from the south. This peculiar conformation of the great central valley of California makes its defense in case of war with any maritime nation a most difficult problem. The idea that the Pacific Coast of the United States or the coast of California can be protected by a navy seems so utterly without foundation that it is difficult to treat it seriously. Do those who delude themselves with that mistaken dream recall that Cervera steamed in from the sea and slipped into Santiago Harbor when practically the whole American Navy was searching and watching for him? If England cannot protect two hundred miles of seacoast from the raids of German battleships, can we protect two thousand miles? Does anyone doubt that if Germany had been so disposed, and her battleships had been convoying fast transports laden with soldiers, she easily could have landed them at Scarborough or anywhere along that part of the English Coast? Does anyone doubt that Japan could do the same thing anywhere along the Pacific Coast, particularly when the fact is borne in mind that in the summer, often for weeks at a time, the Pacific Coast is enveloped in dense fogs that are almost continuous? Does anyone question that the instant war was declared Japan would seize Alaska and the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands, and cut off all possibility of our navy operating anywhere except close to our few coaling stations on the mainland? If so, they should surely read "The Valor of Ignorance" by Homer Lea, not for the author's opinions, but just to get the cold hard facts which our national heedlessness makes it so difficult to get the people of this country to realize. In "The Valor of Ignorance" the fact is pointed out with the most specific detail that the number of transports Japan had, when that book was published--1909--was a transport fleet of 95 steamers with a troop capacity of 199,526 as against ten American transports. The author makes this further comment: "Should Japan embark on these two fleets an average of two Japanese to the space and tonnage ordinarily deemed necessary for one American, then the troop capacity on a single voyage of these fleets would exceed three hundred thousand officers and men together with their equipment and supplies. That this would be easily possible and would work no hardship on the men was demonstrated by the Japanese winter quarters in Manchuria during the Russian War." Is there anyone so blind as to believe that if such an army of invasion was started from Japan, convoyed by the Japanese navy, that we could find and destroy that entire navy and then find and destroy ninety-five transports before they could land their soldiers on the beaches along the peaceful shores of California, Oregon, and Washington? The greater part of every year they _are_ peaceful shores. That is why the name Pacific was chosen for that great ocean. The unique feature about this whole subject is that while the American people are utterly indifferent, Japan, in an incredibly short space of time, has equipped herself with everything needful for such an invasion,--Navy, Transports, and Soldiers, probably the most perfectly organized army in the world. That is the situation of California from the side of the Pacific Ocean. What is it from the land side? If Japan contemplated an invasion of our territory, how many are there who realize that just five dynamite bombs exploded in the right places would block a tunnel on every one of the railroads leading into the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley? The California and Oregon from the north. The Southern Pacific from the south. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe, the Central Pacific and the Western Pacific from the east. Blow up one tunnel on each line and do the job thoroughly and well as the Japanese would do it,--that's the Japanese way,--and it would be weeks and perhaps months before one single train could be got in or out of California. We may rest assured also that the Japanese, when they undertook that job, would not stop with blowing up one tunnel. They would blow up a dozen on every one of the railroads mentioned, and bridges and culverts and trestles. With a little dynamite, mixed with the reckless daring of the Japanese, California could be made inaccessible to an army from the east, except by sea, for a longer time than it would take to transport an army from Asia to America. No doubt the idea will occur to some that soldiers could be transported from the Atlantic Coast to California through the Panama Canal in time to meet such an emergency. But what would we transport them in? We have no ships. And it is no sure thing that the Japanese would not get the Panama Canal blown up and stop that channel of transportation, if war was begun between them and the United States. It would require nothing more desperate to accomplish it than we know the Japanese are ready for at any time the opportunity offered--nothing more desperate than Hobson's feat at Santiago. The Japanese are a farsighted people and war with them is an exact science. They master every detail in advance. They proved that in their war with Russia. There can be no doubt--not because they have any hostile intentions towards the United States, but merely because it is a part of the duty of their professional military scientists--that the plans are now made in the war office at Tokio, for every detail of the whole project outlined above for dynamiting every railroad into California and blowing up the Panama Canal, in the event of war between the United States and Japan. And it is quite probable that the men are detailed for the job and the dynamite carefully stored away with which to do the job, if the necessity arose for it. _The Japanese do not want a war with the United States._ Neither did they want a war with Russia. But it is a part of their religion to be prepared for war. It is the thorough Japanese way. Their way is not our way. They take no chances. We do nothing else but take chances. Because what we are doing or have done for national defense is as nothing. All we spend on our navy is wasted, so far as any possible trouble with Japan is concerned. If war came, it would come like the eruption of Mont Pelée, so unexpectedly and quickly that escape was impossible. The people of the United States, if we have a war with Japan, will awaken some morning and read in all their morning papers that the Panama Canal has been blown up, and that tunnels on all the railroads into California and the Colorado River Bridges at Yuma and Needles have been blown up; that the 50,000 or more Japanese soldiers in California have mobilized and intrenched themselves in impregnable positions in the mountains of the coast range near the ocean; that Japanese steamers have landed 10,000 more Japanese soldiers to reënforce the 50,000 already in California; that those same steamers have brought arms, ammunition, field artillery, aëroplanes, and a complete equipment for a field campaign by this Japanese army of 60,000 men; that those Japanese steamers have landed at some entirely unfortified roadstead in California: Bodega Bay or Tomales Bay or Purissima or Pescadero or Santa Cruz or Monterey or Port Harford or any one of a dozen other places where they could land between San Diego and Point Arena. The Japanese making this landing would within two days make a junction with the Japanese already in California. Then an army of occupation of 60,000 veteran soldiers is in military control of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley. How surprised the good people would be who have been so anxious to get enough of the "inferior people" who are willing to do "squat labor" for the American _owners of the country_, which had just been taken away from them by the Japanese. Does it make any American proud to contemplate that the whole situation above outlined is not only possible but that it is the exact thing that would happen if we had a war with Japan? Soldiers for defense? We could not get them there in time, and we cannot maintain a soldier in idleness in a barracks in California for every Japanese who is industriously earning his living in a potato field, doing "squat labor" and thinking the while that he wishes his country would make it possible, as she could so easily do, for him to own a potato patch himself. Let no one imagine he is not thinking about it. The Japanese are a farsighted and subtle people, with brains four thousand years old. And with this army of occupation of 60,000 Japanese veterans in possession of the great central valley of California, what would the Japanese do with our coast fortifications and the big guns that cost so much money and were designed to riddle Japanese battleships miles at sea? Why, the Japanese would just laugh at them. They would not be worth taking. If they thought they were they would take them, just as they took Port Arthur and Tsing Tau. But they would not try to do that until they had landed a couple of hundred thousand more veteran Japanese troops on the Pacific Coast. Then they would take our coast fortifications from the land side not so much by storm as by _swarm_. What would the California Militia be doing all this time? _It is better not to dwell on unpleasant subjects._ Most probably they would be defending San Francisco or Sacramento from invasion while the Japs were intrenching themselves in the appropriate places to control every pass across the Siskiyous or the Sierras or the Tehachapi Mountains, making it impossible to get across those mountains with an army, even though the army could first be got across the deserts to the mountains. In winter the Siskiyous and the Sierras would be made impassible by Nature's snow and ice and avalanches, without any other defenses being built by the Japanese. But one of the first things the Japanese would do would be to organize a force of aëroplane scouts with bombs to swoop out and down from their mountain aeries and dynamite culverts and bridges on every railroad approaching the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley. They could make it impossible to keep open railroad communication in any way other than by an adequate force to repel an aëroplane attack stationed at every bridge and culvert across a thousand miles of desert. Once the bridges across the Colorado River at the Needles and Yuma were blown up, the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe would be out of commission for months. What it would mean to get an army across the mountains into the great central valley of California cannot be appreciated by anyone who is unfamiliar with the stupendous canyons and chasms and the towering peaks of the Siskiyou and Sierra Nevada Mountains. Those who toiled over them with the Donner party could have told the tale to those who calculate on scaling those mountains with an army in the face of Japanese batteries defending every pass. It would be a task greater than the capture of Port Arthur to capture one pass and get it away from the Japanese after we had got into motion and started in with the job of reconquering California. The difficulty of getting an American army into Southern California after the Japanese had once occupied it, is described by Homer Lea in "The Valor of Ignorance" in the following warning words: "Entrance into southern California is gained by three passes--the San Jacinto, Cajon and Saugus, while access to the San Joaquin Valley and central California is by the Tehachapi. It is in control of these passes that determines Japanese supremacy on the southern flank of the Pacific coast, and it is in their adaptability to defence that determines the true strategic value of southern California to the Japanese. "Los Angeles forms the main centre of these three passes, and lies within three hours by rail of each of them, while San Bernardino, forming the immediate base of forces defending Cajon and San Jacinto passes, is within one hour by rail of both passes. "The mountain-chains encompassing the inhabited regions of southern California might be compared to a great wall thousands of feet in height, within whose enclosures are those fertile regions which have made the name of this state synonymous with all that is abundant in nature. These mountains, rugged and inaccessible to armies from the desert side, form an impregnable barrier except by the three gateways mentioned. "Standing upon Mt. San Gorgonio or San Antonio one can look westward and southward down upon an endless succession of cultivated fields, towns and hamlets, orchards, vineyards and orange groves; upon wealth amounting to hundreds of millions; upon as fair and luxuriant a region as is ever given man to contemplate; a region wherein shall be based the Japanese forces defending these passes. To the north and east across the top of this mountain-wall are forests, innumerable streams, and abundance of forage. But suddenly at the outward rim all vegetation ceases; there is a drop--the desert begins. "The Mojave is not a desert in the ordinary sense of the word, but a region with all the characteristics of other lands, only here Nature is dead or in the last struggle against death. Its hills are volcanic scoria and cinders, its plains bleak with red dust; its meadows covered with a desiccated and seared vegetation; its springs, sweet with arsenic, are rimmed, not by verdure, but with the bones of beast and man. Its gaunt forests of yucca bristle and twist in its winds and brazen gloom. Its mountains, abrupt and bare as sun-dried skulls, are broken with cañons that are furnaces and gorges that are catacombs. Man has taken cognizance of this deadness in his nomenclature. There are Coffin Mountains, Funeral Ranges, Death Valleys, Dead Men's Cañons, dead beds of lava, dead lakes, and dead seas. All here is dead. This is the ossuary of Nature; yet American armies must traverse it and be based upon it whenever they undertake to regain southern California. To attack these fortified places from the desert side is a military undertaking pregnant with greater difficulties than any ever attempted in all the wars of the world." Now after so easily taking California away from us because we stolidly refused, like the English people, to heed repeated warnings, what would the Japanese do? Southern California they would simply occupy with a military force and continue to occupy it. Its irrigable lands in the coast basin are already all reclaimed and densely populated. _The Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys would be the paradise that they would develop into a new Japan._ Already we have shown how they could duplicate the 12,500,000 acres of irrigated and cultivated land in Japan in the drainage Basin of the Colorado River. They could do it again in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys in California. There are 12,500,000 acres of the richest land in the world in those valleys and within two years after they had taken possession of it they would have several million Japanese reclaiming and cultivating it. They would bring their people over as fast as all the steamers of Japan could carry them. And long before we had got real good and ready to reconquer California they would have peopled its great central valley with a dense Japanese population who would fight us, the original owners of the country, to defend their homes from invasion. _What should the United States do to prevent all this?_ It should _immediately_, with just the same energy and expedition that it would act if an invading Armada had actually sailed from Japan, buy 100,000 acres of land in the San Joaquin Valley that can be irrigated from the Calaveras River and from the Calaveras Reservoir if it were built. It should subdivide that tract into one acre Homecrofts and put 100,000 Homecroft Reservists on it. It should go to work and build, right now and without any dilly-dallying or delay, the Calaveras Reservoir. Those 100,000 Homecroft Reservists should be set to work to build the Calaveras Reservoir and the irrigation system necessary to irrigate that particular Homecroft Reserve tract, and all the works necessary to protect the entire delta of the San Joaquin River from overflow and protect the channel of the river and broaden it below Stockton--"open the neck of the bottle" as they say in that locality. The government should go over onto the west side of the Sacramento Valley and buy another 100,000 acres, and subdivide it into one acre Homecrofts and enlist another corps of 100,000 Homecroft Reservists and put them on that land. Then it should set them to work to build a great wasteway, to temporarily carry off the flood waters of the Sacramento River--one that will not split the Sacramento River but that will safeguard Sacramento from that catastrophe. That work should be continued until it is finished. Another 100,000 acres in the neighborhood of Fresno should be likewise bought and another 100,000 Homecroft Reservists enlisted and located on it. They should be set to work to open a navigable waterway to Fresno and dig a great drainage canal that would also be a navigable canal, from Suisun Bay to Tulare Lake. Another 100,000 acres in the upper end of the west side of the Sacramento Valley should be acquired and settled with 100,000 Homecrofters who would work on the construction of the Iron Canyon Reservoir and other reservoirs on the Sacramento River and its tributaries, and on a great main line West Side Canal from the Sacramento River to the Straits of Carquinez. Another 100,000 acres on the west side of the San Joaquin Valley should be acquired and settled with 100,000 Homecrofters who would work on the construction of the lower section of the West Side Canal from the Straits of Carquinez to the lower end of the San Joaquin Valley. The government should not stop there. It should, as soon as the necessary legislative machinery can be evolved, go into the extreme southern end of the San Joaquin Valley and acquire 500,000 acres of land for a Homecroft Reserve of 500,000 families. It should build the works necessary to bring the water to irrigate this land from the Sacramento River by the great main-line canal from the river to the straits of Carquinez. Those straits should be crossed on a viaduct and the canal carried on down the west side of the valley, starting at an elevation high enough to cover the land to be irrigated in the lower valley. The increased value of the million acres would cover the entire cost of the works. Additional revenue could be earned by the furnishing of water to other lands under the canal in the Sacramento and also in the San Joaquin Valley. The coöperation of the State of California would be gladly extended and complete plans carried out for the reclamation of the San Joaquin Valley by a great canal on the east side of the valley heading in the Sacramento River near Redding, or at the Iron Canyon, and extending to the extreme southern end of the valley, as recommended by the Commission appointed by General Grant when President of the United States. That Commission was composed of General Alexander, Colonel Mendel, and Professor Davidson, three of the most eminent engineers and scientists of those days. An aggregate area of 12,500,000 acres would, as the result of this policy, be reclaimed and settled in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. Having created a dense population ourselves in that country there would be no unoccupied land to tempt the Japanese. And with 1,000,000 Homecroft Reservists ready at any time to meet and repel an invasion, our occupancy of the country would be assured forever. There would not be room left for many Japanese immigrants, and if some of them did come they would be in such a hopeless minority that no danger would result from their being here. No condition could then be imagined in the future that would create a possibility of Japan, even with all the countless millions of China combined with her, being able to land on the Pacific Coast an army large enough to stand a moment against a Homecroft Reserve of a million soldiers from the Colorado River Valley and another million from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. Whether it would be advisable to establish other Homecroft Reserves in Oregon and Washington would depend largely on the attitude of mind of the people of those States. If a few connecting railroad lines were built, troops could be transported by railroads running north across Southern California and Nevada to a connection with the railroads running down the Columbia River to Portland. These railroads would all be east of the mountains until they connected with the Columbia River Railroad and would be free from danger of being destroyed by the blowing up of tunnels. Of course it is a remote contingency that such a thing should ever become necessary, but if it ever did, the Canadian border could be defended with troops brought north through Nevada and Utah from the Colorado River Valley to great concentration camps at Chehalis and Spokane, in Washington, Havre in Montana, and Williston in North Dakota. As a matter of military precaution, the necessary connecting links should be built as military railroads, if nothing else,--such links as from Yuma to Cadiz, Pioche to Ely, Tonopah to Austin, Indian Springs to Eureka, and from Battle Mountain or Winnemucca as well as from Cobre on the Central Pacific line north to a connection with the Oregon Short Line. The ease with which these connections could be made, and the facility, in that event, with which troops from the Colorado River Valley could be transported to any point in North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Washington, or Oregon, as well as their [Illustration: Map showing Routes of Railway Transportation to Concentration Centers for Troops of the Reserves for the defense of the North Pacific Coast and Northern Boundary of the United States: 1, Albany; 2, Chehalis; 3, Spokane; 4, Havre; 5, Williston.] proximity when at home in the Colorado Valley, to any point where they might be needed along the Mexican border or in Southern California, emphasizes the advantages of the Colorado River Valley as a location for the first great Homecroft Reserve force of 1,000,000 men, supplemented by another force of an equal number of men in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys in California. Once that was done, the question of the defense of the Pacific Coast would be settled for all time, so long as this Homecroft Reserve force was maintained and kept always in readiness for immediate service. CHAPTER XI _The most dangerous aspect of the awakening of the people of the United States to a realization of their unpreparedness for war, and the appalling national disasters that might ensue from it, is the danger of creating a military caste which would gradually absorb to itself an undue control of Governmental authority and power, leading in the end to a military despotism._ _Already the danger of this is seen in the assumption of the arbitrary power over inland waterway development now exercised by the corps of Army engineers and the Board of Army engineers, and the strong opposition emanating from them against the adoption of any improved system of river control that would protect the people from such appalling disasters as those which overtook the Mississippi Valley in 1912 and again in 1913._ It is a fact capable of absolute demonstration that a large portion of the damage resulting from those floods was due to the stubborn refusal of the Army engineers to approve or adopt any plan for flood control that would supplement the levee system by source stream control of the floods on the upper tributaries, and by controlled outlets and spillways and auxiliary flood water channels in the lower valley. It is very doubtful whether the people of the delta of the Mississippi River will ever succeed in getting protection against the recurrence of devastating floods until this baleful influence of the Army engineers can be eliminated. There are several reasons why this military control of inland waterways is detrimental to the country. The military caste in the United States has developed remarkable capacity for turning to their own advantage the influence which their control over appropriations for river and harbor improvements has centered in them. The Army engineers are wedded to the present piecemeal system of appropriations, popularly known as the "Pork Barrel" System. The reason for this is that it practically vests in them the autocratic authority to determine whether the demands of the constituents of any Senator or Congressman for some local river or harbor improvement shall or shall not be granted. The representatives of the people, whether they be Congressmen or Senators, must humbly bow to a higher power and secure its gracious grant of consent or face the disappointment of their constituents. It ought not to be difficult for anyone with common sense, and with the most superficial knowledge of the manipulation of social and political influences in shaping legislation to understand the evils of this system, or the influence exerted through it by the military caste which is adverse to the best interest of the people at large. The "Pork Barrel" System, with its piecemeal appropriations for local improvements, without any underlying comprehensive plan, as long as it prevails, will block the way to all efficient waterway development, or protection from periodical damage by devastating floods. And it will never be changed until popular indignation and protest breaks the stranglehold that the military caste now has upon this class of legislation in Congress. Their attitude in this whole field of public development is in humiliating contrast with that of the Samurai of Japan when the whole system of government of that nation was reconstructed and reorganized. The Samurai, actuated by a patriotic and self-sacrificing desire to promote the general welfare, surrendered entirely the privileges and prerogatives that they held as a military class, and accepted a system which took from them all power and submerged them in the mass of the people. The military caste of this country apparently think only of their own aggrandizement, and persistently oppose any modifications of an evil system which would in the slightest degree involve a surrender of their autocratic authority or official prestige and power for the general welfare. In this stupendous field of national development, where immediate progress is so vital to the people of the entire country, the stubborn opposition of the military caste is the most serious obstacle in the way of a complete coördination of all the departments of the government in the solution of the whole problem of river regulation and flood control and the upbuilding of a great inland waterway system. Aside from that, there is an additional reason why the present system can never be relied upon for a complete solution of the problem of river regulation. This further difficulty lies in the system under which the military caste is organized. The military system which prevails in all matters administered through the Army, strangles all individual initiative and opinion. It automatically subordinates every engineer in the military service to the mental and personal domination of the chief of the Army engineers, whoever he may be. All original and creative engineering genius is muzzled or chloroformed as soon as it is born. If by any Caesarian operation it chances to come into being it is promptly strangled. Another incurable defect in the military system when applied to civil construction and internal development of the resources of the country, lies in the transfer of engineers from one assignment of duty to another after brief periods of service. This plan is no doubt advisable and possibly necessary in the military service. Its tendency is to bring all Army engineers up to a common general level of ability and experience. It destroys the peculiar originality and genius which can only result from long experience and training in one of the many special fields for which engineers must be developed in civil life. This Army system might not work so badly if applied only to harbors and harbor improvement work, but it destroys efficiency when applied to such problems as those presented by a great river system like the Mississippi River and its tributaries. An army engineer in charge of the Lower Mississippi River district may have learned something of that problem, but by the time he has learned it he is transferred to some other part of the country and given a different problem to study. Another engineer is put in his place, and by the time he in his turn has partially familiarized himself with the problem he is likewise transferred. And so it goes on, ignorance succeeds ignorance as fast as knowledge can be obtained. A martinet at the head of the Army Engineering corps can stifle and render useless to the country the most brilliant engineering genius if it blossoms forth with any new theory or original suggestion. The Army engineer corps is bound hand and foot by prejudice and pride of caste. The engineering corps is a unit, arbitrarily dominated, intellectually and professionally, by the chief of the corps. Nothing original can develop under such an atmosphere of mental repression. The best engineering talent in the world is suppressed and rendered valueless by that system of organization. It can never solve the intricate and novel hydraulic problems presented by the Mississippi River which, with all its tributaries, must be treated as a unit in order to control its floods. The people of the lower Mississippi Valley have for years endeavored to secure the construction of controlled outlets and spillways, but their most urgent efforts have fallen dead at the door of the Army engineers or their associates or subordinates. The contractors profit financially by the "Levees Only" system. The politicians share the power developed by the local political machines which control the huge expenditures for levee construction and maintenance. Both are ardent advocates and devotees of the military caste system which perpetuates their powers, privileges, and perquisites. The rest of the people, wherever they dare to entertain an independent opinion, recognize that the Mississippi Valley can never be rightly developed so long as the present "Levees Only" system continues to prevail. An engineering service composed entirely of engineers in civil life should be created to take over all the work relating to river regulation, flood control, and inland waterway construction, operation, and maintenance. The opposition to such a system for the administration of civil affairs by civil officials, instead of by the Army, has been based upon the plea that nobody but army officers can be trusted to be honest in the expenditure of the funds of the national government. Such an opposition is an insult to the civil engineering profession of the United States and is completely refuted by the splendid constructive accomplishments of the United States Reclamation Service. No one questions the personal honesty of the Army engineers, but their methods are enormously wasteful and without results anywhere near commensurate to the amount of their expenditures. The system championed and supported by them has resulted in the waste of about $200,000,000. That vast sum, if it had been wisely and economically expended, would have gone a long way towards creating conditions on our river systems in which the water that now runs to waste in devastating floods would have been put into the river at the low water season to float boats on that would carry our inland commerce. There never can be any escape from this carnival of waste and extravagance and impotent and useless expenditure until the whole system of river control and improvement is changed. Control of it must be taken away from the Army and vested in civil control. Another reason for divorcing the Army entirely from control of river work is that it seems impossible for an Army engineer to recognize or reason back to original causes. He can see in a flood only something against which he must build a fortification after the flood has been formed. This is well illustrated by the blind adherence of the Army engineers, or at least of their chiefs, to the delusion that floods of the lower Mississippi Valley can be safeguarded against by the "Levees Only" system of flood protection in that valley. They utterly ignore the cause of the floods and therefore refuse to consider any system of source stream control or of controlled outlets, spillways, and wasteways. Another illustration of this persistent adherence to mere local protection, instead of safeguarding against an original cause, is furnished by the work of the Army engineers in building the Stockton cut-off canal in California. This canal was built ostensibly to prevent the Stockton channel from being filled with sediment to the detriment of navigation. In fact it was built to protect the city of Stockton from overflow and flood damage. The first big flood that came filled up the cut-off canal and it is now useless. It would be clearly unavailing to reëxcavate it, because it would fill up again with the next big flood. The sediment which filled the canal was gathered by the river after it left the foothills and tore its way as a raging torrent through farms and fertile fields. It washed or caved them into the river and carried down and deposited the earth material in the cut-off canal. The Army engineers, however, or at least their chiefs, had steadfastly set their faces against reservoir construction for flood control. But for this they might have built the great Calaveras Reservoir which would have afforded complete protection for the city of Stockton against floods. By controlling the flood at its source, storing the flood waters, and letting them into the river below only in a volume not larger than the channel would carry, all damage to the valley and to farms lying between the foothills and the city of Stockton would have been avoided. No sediment would have been carried into the Stockton channel to impede navigation. The surplus flood water instead of running to waste would have been conserved and held back until needed for beneficial use. Any such plan as this would have been contrary to all the precedents and theories of the military engineers. All the damages resulting from failure to adopt it merely illustrate the necessity of escaping from those precedents and theories, and the pride of opinion which clings to them with such desperate tenacity. That escape must be accomplished, if we are ever to get river regulation and flood protection in this country. Stockton will never get it until the Calaveras Reservoir has been built, and no flood-menaced section of the country will get protection until it is afforded to it by engineering and constructive forces dominated by the civil and not by the military authority of the Government. The whole training of an Army engineer is wrong, when it comes to dealing with river problems and the control of floods which can only be safeguarded against by controlling the remote causes which result in the formation of the flood. The idea of preventing the formation of floods by controlling those original causes, preserving forest and woodland cover, preserving the porosity of the soil, slowing up the run-off from the watershed, or holding back the flood waters in reservoirs or storage basins, seems to be beyond the scope of the powers of conception and construction of the military engineers of the United States Army. They see only results, and seem unable to comprehend original causes. Not only this, but they also oppose, by all the political arts in which the Army engineers are so well versed, every proposition to coördinate the work of the Army engineers in the field of channel work and local flood defense, with the work of other departments of the national government. Every department of the national government must be coördinated which deals with water control, or with any beneficial use of water that would check rapid run off and hold back the flood water on the watershed where it originated, and in that way prevent the formation of a destructive flood. The entire willingness of the Army engineers to subordinate the welfare of the people in every flood-menaced valley to the stubborn determination of the military caste to retain and broaden their own powers and privileges in this one field of action, shows what might be expected from any increase in the members of that caste, or any enlargement of their control over the civil affairs of the country. The military caste in the United States will never approve any plan for national defense that does not center in and radiate from them. They will oppose it unless it broadens their influence and power, and imbeds it more strongly in the foundations of the Government. A plan such as is advocated in this book, will never have their coöperation, support, or endorsement, for the very simple reason that its primary object would be to remove the original cause of war and to contribute to the lessening of the power and prestige of the Army. The fact that it would at the same time supply the first and greatest need in the event of war--the need for toughened and trained men who could and would fight and dig trenches as well as seasoned soldiers--would gain no favor for the plan in the eyes of our military caste. The development of that system and the expenditures to be made for that purpose and the control of the men enlisted in it would not be vested in the War Department. The military caste in this and every country is trained to regard its profession as one whose duty it is to accomplish results by brute force and human slaughter. Its only conception of a soldier is a man-killing machine, whose chief use in time of peace is to serve as a basis for appropriations to sustain a military establishment with all its multitudinous expenditures. Their conception of war is that it is an inevitable orgy of human slaughter, against which humanity is powerless to protect itself. That a great force should be organized for patriotic service under civil control instead of military domination, to battle against the destroying forces of Nature, and subjugate and control them for the advancement of humanity and all the arts and victories of peace, runs counter to every fiber of being of the military caste. And yet, none but the most superficial student of history and humanity can fail to realize the necessity for such an army of peace in this country. It is certainly true that wars will never cease until the inspiration and patriotism and national ideals developed by such a peaceful conquest of the forces of Nature has been substituted for the tremendous stimulus which the human race has in the past drawn from armed conflicts between nations. And the fact must be clearly recognized that in this way a force can be provided that will be instantly available to take the place of seasoned soldiers at any moment in the event that this nation should be drawn into a war of defense or for the maintenance of any great principle of human rights or justice to humanity. We might be forced into a war within a year and we might succeed in preserving the peace forever. No man can tell, because no human mind can forecast the future or predict what events may occur that may be beyond our power to control, and which might force us into a war. We do know, however, that the fight against the floods of the Mississippi River, and the fight against the great storms from the Gulf of Mexico, must go on year after year through all the centuries to come during which man continues to inhabit the Delta of the Mississippi River. The memory of the great disaster to the city of Galveston, and the memory of the great floods of the Mississippi River in 1912 and 1913, are still fresh in the minds of the people. The defense of that part of our common country against such catastrophes in the future is worthy of the same patriotic energy and the same adequate expenditure that would be necessary to defend them against an armed invasion from Mexico or by any nation of the world. Were such defense afforded, results would be obtained of such enormous benefit to the United States in time of peace, without any regard to its relation to national defense in time of war, that to fail to do it would be as stupid as it would have been to fail to take the gold from the placer mines of California. The gateway from the Gulf of Mexico to the great central valley of this country opens into a region so vast that the area comprised within the watershed of the Mississippi and its tributaries embraces 41 per cent of the entire United States. This gateway opens into a great waterway system capable of being made continuously navigable all the year around through 20,000 miles of navigable waterways and commerce-carriers. The gateway from the Gulf opens to a country of greater potential agricultural wealth than any other section of the earth's surface of the same area. The lower Mississippi Valley has well been styled the "Sugar-Bowl" of the continent. The State of Louisiana alone is larger in area by 10,000 square miles than the combined area of Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. It is capable of sustaining a larger population and producing vastly more wealth than those three countries combined. If you draw a line straight north from the southernmost point of Texas to the northern line of Oklahoma, and then turn and go straight east, projecting the northern line of Oklahoma past Cairo, Illinois, to the Tennessee River, following up the Tennessee River to the northeast corner of Mississippi, and then follow the eastern boundary line of Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico, you have included within these extreme boundaries a territory as large as the whole German Empire. It is a territory possessing greater natural wealth and possibility of development than the German Empire, _provided_ the great problems of water control and river regulation are solved in such a way as to promote the highest development of this region for the benefit of humanity, and _provided further_ that the Coast region of this territory is protected not only from the floods of the river, but from the storms originating in the Gulf of Mexico. Protection from those storms requires the construction of a great dike similar to the dikes of Holland that will hold out the waters of the Gulf not only at their normal height, but will also hold them back when they attain the abnormal height which at rare intervals results from the hurricanes or great storms from the Gulf of Mexico, such as that which overwhelmed Galveston. Lafcadio Hearn, in "Chita," has described a Gulf Storm better than it will ever again be described. He prefaced the story of that storm with a picture of the havoc wrought by Nature's forces--the ceaseless charging of the "Ocean's Cavalry," that is quoted because it so clearly portrays the necessity for bulwarks of defense built in the spirit of military defenses. "On the Gulf side of these islands you may observe that the trees--when there are any trees--all bend away from the sea; and, even of bright, hot days when the wind sleeps, there is something grotesquely pathetic in their look of agonized terror. A group of oaks at Grande Isle I remember as especially suggestive: five sloping silhouettes in line against the horizon, like fleeing women with streaming garments and wind-blown hair--bowing grievously and thrusting out arms desperately northward as to save themselves from falling. And they are being pursued indeed;--for the sea is devouring the land. Many and many a mile of ground has yielded to the tireless charging of Ocean's cavalry; far out you can see, through a good glass, the porpoises at play where of old the sugarcane shook out its million bannerets; and shark-fins now seam deep water above a site where pigeons used to coo. Men build dikes; but the besieging tides bring up their battering-rams--whole forests of drift--huge trunks of water-oak and weighty cypress. Forever the yellow Mississippi strives to build; forever the sea struggles to destroy;--and amid their eternal strife the islands and the promontories change shape, more slowly, but not less fantastically, than the clouds of heaven. "And worthy of study are those wan battle-grounds where the woods made their last brave stand against the irresistible invasion,--usually at some long point of sea-marsh, widely fringed with billowing sand. Just where the waves curl beyond such a point you may discern a multitude of blackened, snaggy shapes protruding above the water,--some high enough to resemble ruined chimneys, others bearing a startling likeness to enormous skeleton-feet and skeleton-hands,--with crustaceous white growths clinging to them here and there like remnants of integument. These are bodies and limbs of drowned oaks,--so long drowned that the shell-scurf is inch-thick upon parts of them. Farther in upon the beach immense trunks lie overthrown. Some look like vast broken columns; some suggest colossal torsos imbedded, and seem to reach out mutilated stumps in despair from their deepening graves;--and beside these are others which have kept their feet with astounding obstinacy, although the barbarian tides have been charging them for twenty years, and gradually torn away the soil above and beneath their roots. The sand around,--soft beneath and thinly crusted upon the surface,--is everywhere pierced with holes made by a beautifully mottled and semi-diaphanous crab, with hairy legs, big staring eyes, and milk-white claws;--while in the green sedges beyond there is a perpetual rustling, as of some strong wind bearing among reeds: a marvellous creeping of 'fiddlers,' which the inexperienced visitor might at first mistake for so many peculiar beetles, as they run about sideways, each with his huge single claw folded upon his body like a wing-case. Year by year that rustling strip of green land grows narrower; the sand spreads and sinks, shuddering and wrinkling like a living brown skin; and the last standing corpses of the oaks, ever clinging with naked, dead feet to the sliding beach lean more and more out of the perpendicular. As the sands subside, the stumps appear to creep; their intertwisted masses of snakish roots seem to crawl, to writhe,--like the reaching arms of cephalopods.... Grand Terre is going: the sea mines her fort, and will before many years carry the ramparts by storm. Grande Isle is going,--slowly but surely: the Gulf has eaten three miles into her meadowed land. Last Island has gone! How it went I first heard from the lips of a veteran pilot, while we sat one evening together on the trunk of a drifted cypress which some high tide had pressed deeply into the Grande Isle beach. The day had been tropically warm; we had sought the shore for a breath of living air. Sunset came, and with it the ponderous heat lifted,--a sudden breeze blew,--lightnings flickered in the darkening horizon,--wind and water began to strive together,--and soon all the low coast boomed. Then my companion began his story; perhaps the coming of the storm inspired him to speak! And as I listened to him, listening also to the clamoring of the coast, there flashed back to me recollection of a singular Breton fancy: that the Voice of the Sea is never one voice, but a tumult of many voices--voices of drowned men,--the muttering of multitudinous dead,--the moaning of innumerable ghosts, all rising, to rage against the living, at the great Witch-call of storms...." The defense of the Gulf gateway of the United States of America not only against Nature's forces, whether coming in the form of an invasion by a mighty flood from the North, or the invasion of a great destroying storm wave from the South, must be accomplished by the adoption of a plan for the protection of that country similar to that proposed for the organization of a Homecroft Reserve in the Colorado River Valley and in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys and in the State of Nevada. The national government should immediately acquire not less than 1,000,000 acres of land bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and lying between Bayou Lafourche and Atchafalaya Bay and the Atchafalaya River. Then a great dike should be built by the national government from Barataria Bay, following the most practicable course along the shores of the Gulf to and along the eastern shore of the Atchafalaya Bay and River to Morgan City. Thence this great dike should skirt the northeastern shore of Grand Lake to the northern end of that lake. From there it should be continued north to the Mississippi River to a connection with that river near the headwaters of the Atchafalaya River. The material necessary for the construction of this great embankment and protecting levee from the Gulf north to the Mississippi River should be taken entirely from the eastern side of the embankment, and the channel thus constructed should be enlarged sufficiently to build an adequate protecting levee on the east bank of the channel. The artificial channel thus constructed should be so large as to constitute a controlled outlet and auxiliary flood channel which, with the ten mile wide Atchafalaya wasteway, would take off all of the flood flow of the Mississippi River at that point in excess of the high water level as it rests against the levees in all ordinary flood years. The purpose of this outlet and wasteway would be to make it impossible that in any year of unusual floods the levees or banks should be subjected to any greater hydrostatic pressure than in ordinary years. The point where this controlled outlet would leave the river would be approximately the same place where the great Morganza Crevasse broke through the levee and opened a way for the flood to sweep with its devastating force through the country between the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. [Illustration: Map of Louisiana, showing the Great Controlled Outlet at Old River and the Atchafalaya Wasteway, Auxiliary Flood Water Channels and Canals; and showing also the Spillways and Controlled Wasteways from the Mississippi River to Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne, and the Great Gulf Coast Dike.] Ten miles west of the great north and south embankment above described, on a north and south line which would pass close to the town of Melville in Louisiana and follow the west bank of the Atchafalaya River for some distance below Melville, another great embankment should be built, paralleling the one previously described. The material for the construction of this second embankment should be taken from its western side, thus forming a channel which should be used both as a drainage outlet and a navigable canal extending from the Bayou Teche to the Red River. At the point of its junction with the Red River, locks should be constructed which would prevent any of the floods of the Red River from ever entering or passing through this navigable drainage canal. From that point another great embankment should be extended by the most practicable route to the west or northwest, where a junction could be formed with the high land in such a way as to turn all the surplus flood drainage from the Red River and all other rivers to the north into the great ten-mile wide wasteway lying between the two embankments and running south from the mouth of the Red River or from Old River to Grand Lake. The volume of water that would make a flood twenty feet deep in a channel a mile wide could be carried through this wasteway with a flow of only about two feet in depth, and two great benefits thereby attained: First, the cutting power of the water could be controlled and its danger from that cause obviated. Second, the sediment carried by the water could be settled across a strip ten miles wide, which could be thereby brought to a level and its fertility enormously enriched by these sedimentary deposits which it would receive only in years of great floods. In the meantime and in other years the land could be used for meadow, or for the production of crops which could be grown after the danger of overflow in any season had passed. This ten-mile wide wasteway, supplemented by the auxiliary flood water channel paralleling its eastern embankment on the east, would completely control and carry to the Gulf all the excess flood water in years of extreme floods, and hold the high water level of the Mississippi River from Old River to the Gulf at an absolutely fixed level above which the river would never rise. The ten-mile wide wasteway could be extended north from the mouth of Red River to the bluffs at Helena. Then from Helena south the entire Mississippi Valley would be protected against danger from floods in the Mississippi River in the extraordinary flood years which may come only once in a generation, and yet may come in any two consecutive years as they did in 1912 and 1913. If this ten-mile wide wasteway, with its auxiliary flood water channel paralleling it, between it and the river, were constructed from Helena to the mouth of the Red River, and thence to the Gulf of Mexico, and in turn supplemented by source stream control of the floods of the Ohio, the Mississippi and the Missouri Rivers, the lowlands of the Mississippi Valley could be made as safe from overflow or damage by devastating floods as the highlands of the Hudson River or the dry plains of eastern Colorado. The entire area of the Mississippi River Valley now subject to overflow is about 29,000 square miles. This is an area one-third larger than the entire cultivated area of the Empire of Japan, which sustains a farming population of 30,000,000 people. The lands of the Mississippi River Valley are infinitely richer and of greater natural fertility than the farming lands of Japan. Every acre of the rich sedimentary soil of the Delta of the Mississippi River would, if intensively cultivated, produce food enough to feed a family of five, with a large surplus over for distribution to the world's food markets. The entire 1,000,000 acres to be acquired by the national government in Louisiana should be immediately acquired within the area bounded on the south by the great embankment along the shores of the Gulf of Mexico and on the west by the great wasteway and auxiliary flood channel to be built from the mouth of Red River to Atchafalaya Bay and on the north and east by the Mississippi River. This entire territory would be so absolutely and completely protected from all possibility of overflow by the proposed system of protection from floods or overflow and from Gulf Storms that any part of it could be safely subdivided into acre-garden-homes or Homecrofts. Every acre would be adequate for the support of a family when properly reclaimed, fertilized, and intensively cultivated. The variety of food that would be available for the people living on these one million Homecrofts would be greater probably than would be within the reach of people living in any other section of the world. The mild and equable climate would make practicable a successful growth of every possible product of garden, orchard, or vineyard, including oranges and grape-fruit. Proximity to the Gulf and a network of canals that would lace and interlace the country in every direction would furnish them, at trifling cost or none at all, with the most delicious sea-foods, fish, crabs, shrimps, crayfish, and oysters without limit. Every canal and bayou would furnish its quota of fish and the oyster beds of the Louisiana coast are capable of almost limitless extension. In addition to the cultivation of their Homecrofts for food from the ground, the Homecrofters enlisted in the Louisiana Homecroft Reserve would be afforded abundant occupation in catching or producing sea-food for themselves as well as for export. Anyone not familiar with the country can form no adequate conception of the stupendous possibilities of this bayou and Gulf coast country along this line of production and development. More than this, the luggermen of the bayous and the Gulf are the best coast-wise and shallow sea sailors in the world, and the bays and bayous of Louisiana, if inhabited by a dense population, would once again breed a race of seafaring people--sailors and fishermen--to man our navy or merchant marine. The complete adoption of the plan advocated for the reclamation and settlement of these swamp and overflowed lands, and the establishment there of a perpetual reserve available for military service whenever needed of a million seasoned and hardened citizen soldiers, involves doing nothing that has not already been done by other nations of the world. Holland has built dikes as defenses against the inroads of the ocean greater even than those proposed in Louisiana, and the plans of Holland for reclaiming for agriculture vast areas of land now buried beneath the waters of the Zuyder Zee are much bolder in conception and more difficult of accomplishment. Australia and New Zealand have both demonstrated the practicability and proved the success of a national policy of land acquisition and colonization. What Australia has done in the reclamation and settlement of her deserts, we can do not only on our deserts but also in our swamps. Switzerland and Australia have both proved the practicability of a military system similar to that which it is proposed to establish for the defense of the Gulf Gateway of this nation. The plan urged for Louisiana would in many respects be an improvement upon a plan which made it necessary to call men from commercial or industrial employment for military service. CHAPTER XII _The result of the adoption of the Homecroft Reserve System would be that this generation would bequeath to future generations a country freed forever from the menace of militarism or military despotism, and also freed from the burdens of military and naval establishments. At the same time, the United States would be safeguarded against internal dangers and made impregnable against attack or invasion by any foreign power. Every patriotic citizen of the United States should have that thought graven on his mind. No other plan can be devised that will accomplish those results._ The reasons why they will be accomplished by the Homecroft Reserve System may be briefly summarized. From the standpoint of national defense, and regarding war as a possibility, the following are the advantages of the system: _First:_ The maintenance of a Homecroft Reserve of 5,000,000 trained soldiers would ultimately cost the government nothing. The entire investment required for the establishment of the Reserve would be repaid with interest by the revenues from the Homecroft rentals, and ultimately a revenue of $300,000,000 would be annually returned to the national government in excess of the entire expense of the maintenance of the Reserves. _Second:_ There would be no burden of a pension roll as the result of actual service by the Homecroft Reservists in the event of war. The Life Insurance System embodied in the general plan for a Homecroft Reserve would be substituted for a pension system. _Third:_ Every requirement of necessary military training for actual service in the field would be provided. Each Department of the Homecroft Reserve, embracing a million men, would be concentrated and fully organized, with annual field maneuvers. _Fourth:_ The whole body of the Homecroft Reserve would be men physically hardened and trained to every duty required of a soldier in actual warfare. They would be inured to long marches and to every hardship of a campaign in the field. They would at all times be mobilized and ready for instant service. _Fifth:_ The whole 5,000,000 men in the Homecroft Reserve could be sent into active service without calling a man from any industry or commercial employment where he might be needed. The United States could put an army of five million men in the field at a moment's notice, without the slightest interference with commerce, manufacturing, or any branch of industry. _Sixth:_ No length of actual field service would impose any hardship or privation on the families of any of the Homecroft Reservists. Each family would continue to occupy and get its living from the Homecroft during the absence of the soldier of the family. The routine of the family and community life would continue undisturbed. For the first fifty year period the cost of maintaining our present standing army of less than _100,000_ men will be _five billion dollars_. _During that same period_ the revenues from the Homecroft Reserve rentals would repay the entire investment required for the establishment and maintenance of the Reserve, and the ultimate cost to the government of the maintenance for fifty years of a reserve of _five million men_ would be _nothing_. For the second fifty year period, the net revenues from the Homecroft Reserve rentals, over and above the entire cost of the maintenance of the Reserve, would be fifteen billion dollars,--$300,000,000 a year every year for fifty years,--more than enough to cover the entire expense of our standing Army and Navy, as at present maintained. In other words, the profit to the government from establishing a Military Reserve which would be at the same time a great _Educational Institution_ for training Citizens as well as Soldiers, and a Peace Establishment for Food Production, would be large enough to cover the entire cost of the nation's regular Military and Naval Establishments. For all time thereafter, the country would be relieved from the heavy financial burdens of maintaining them. The revenues that the regular Military and Naval Establishments will otherwise absorb could be diverted to building internal improvements, highways, waterways, railways, reclaiming lands, safeguarding against floods, preventing forest fires, planting forests, and supporting a great national educational system that would make the Homecroft Slogan the heritage of every child born to citizenship in the United States of America: _Every child in a Garden, Every mother in a Homecroft, and Individual Industrial Independence For every worker in a Home of his own on the Land._ From the standpoint of peace, if there should never be another war, and as a means of national defense against the dangers that menace the country from within--civil conflict, class conflict, social upheaval, racial deterioration, and a degenerated citizenship--the advantages of the Homecroft Reserve System may be epitomized as follows: _First:_ Every Homecroft Reserve Rural Settlement of 100,000 acres--100,000 Reservists--100,000 families, created by the national government, will be a model for an industrial community which will demonstrate that the cure for city congestion is the Homecroft Life in the suburbs or in nearby Homecroft Villages. _Second:_ It will further demonstrate that the physical and mental deterioration, poverty, disease, crime, human degeneracy, and racial decay now being caused by the tenement life can be prevented by the Homecroft Life. _Third:_ Child labor and Woman labor in factories will be proved to be economic waste because of the larger value of that labor at home devoted to producing food for the family from garden and poultry yard, and preparing and preserving it for home consumption. It will be demonstrated that no child or woman can be spared from a Homecroft for work in a factory. _Fourth:_ The fact will be established that the remedy for unemployment is universal Homecroft Training in the public schools, the establishment of all wageworkers in Suburban Homecrofts or Homecroft Villages, and that every unemployed man or woman shall be set to work learning to be a Homecrofter. _Fifth:_ One million scientifically trained Homecrofters would be graduated annually from the National Homecroft Reserve System,--ten million every ten years,--with their families. These would scatter into every section of the United States and would leaven a large loaf. They would be a tremendous force to counteract the evil influences generated in the tenements. No Homecrofter's family would ever be content to live in a flat or a tenement. They would have learned the productive value of a Homecroft--a home with a piece of ground that will produce food for the family. _Sixth:_ The demonstration of the value of the Homecroft Life spread throughout the United States by the millions of Homecroft Reserve graduates would lead to a complete reconstruction of the Public School System of every State. The year would be divided into two terms--one, a six months' term from fall until spring, during which the courses of study now pursued would be continued; the other, a six months' term from spring until fall, covering the entire growing season, during which fruit-growing, truck-gardening, berry-culture, poultry raising, home making, home-keeping, and home-handicraft would be taught. In the cities these Summer Homecroft Schools would be in the suburbs and would give every city child a chance to spend its days in the sunshine and fresh air, among the trees, birds, fields, and flowers, for six months of every year. Every great institution must have a gradual growth. The Homecroft Reserve System should be started on a comparatively small scale in places where the immediate need of the practical benefits it will accomplish are most manifest. Its enlargement will follow as a natural evolution. Once well under way, it will grow by leaps and bounds, like the rural mail service or the Agricultural Department of the national government. When the electric light was first demonstrated to be a scientific success, few realized in how short a time electricity would light the world. The development of electric transportation and of the automobile are familiar illustrations. Only a few years have elapsed since Kipling wrote "Across the Atlantic with the Irish Mail." How many would then have believed possible the work of the Aëroplane Service in the present war? And yet, all that has so far been done is only a forecast of greater development in aërial navigation in the near future. The original inventor of the telephone has seen the evolution of its vast utilization and recently was the first to talk over a wire across the continent. No one would for a moment question that the national government could establish an educational institution in which one thousand men with their families could be located in a cottage on an acre of ground, and the men trained in truck-gardening and poultry raising, and the women trained to cook the products of the garden and poultry yard for the family table. That is all there is to it; and to train a thousand men in that way is no more difficult than to take a thousand raw recruits and transform them into a regiment of trained soldiers. It is likewise beyond question that the same man can be trained for both vocations, and every Homecroft Reservist would be so trained. Gardeners make ideal soldiers. The Japanese proved that. No one familiar with the multitude of cases where it has been done, would have any doubt that a man and woman who know how to intensively cultivate an acre can produce from it what that man and that woman need for their own family to eat, and a surplus product worth from five hundred to a thousand dollars a year or more. Neither would they doubt that a thousand could do the same thing. Nor, again, would they doubt that one thousand men and women of average intelligence and industry, who did not know how, could learn the way to do it from competent instructors. If that can be done with one thousand it can be done with ten thousand; and if it can be done with ten thousand it can be done with one hundred thousand, or one million, or five million. It would indeed be strange if this nation could not train five million families so they would be competent truck-gardeners, when that vocation has been mastered by thirty million of Japan's rural population. The militarists contend that the Standing Army should be increased to 200,000 men, an increase of 100,000, assuming that the present army were enlisted up to its full authorized strength of 100,000. A Homecroft Reserve of 100,000 men, properly established, organized, and trained, would be of vastly more value to the country for national defense than an increase of 100,000 men in the Standing Army; but there should be no such limit on the extension of the Homecroft Reserve. It should be steadily increased until the full quota of 5,000,000 has been established. But in order to draw comparisons between the respective advantages of the two systems, let it be assumed that the establishment of a Homecroft Reserve were to be first authorized by Congress for 100,000 men, the same number that it is contended should be added to the regular Standing Army. In that event the most immediate beneficial results would be secured by the establishment of Homecroft Reserve Rural Settlements of ten thousand acres each (from which they should be developed to a strength of not less than one hundred thousand each as rapidly as possible) in the following locations: _In California_, ten thousand acres should be acquired by the national government in the vicinity of Redding in the upper Sacramento Valley, and settled with that number of Homecroft Reservists who would work on the Iron Canyon Reservoir and the system of diversion canals therefrom. Ten thousand acres should be acquired on the west side of the Sacramento Valley, near Colusa, and 10,000 Homecroft Reservists located thereon, who would work on a great system to control the flood waters of the Sacramento River, and to save and utilize the silt for fertilization by building a series of large settling basins. Ten thousand acres should be acquired near Stockton where 10,000 Homecroft Reservists would be located, who would work on the Calaveras Reservoir and an irrigation system to utilize the stored water therefrom, and also carry forward any further work necessary for the complete protection of Stockton and the delta of the San Joaquin River from floods. Ten thousand acres should be acquired near Fresno, where 10,000 Homecroft Reservists would be located, who would work on a navigable channel to Fresno and a drainage canal through the center of the San Joaquin Valley. Ten thousand acres should be acquired near Bakersfield, where 10,000 Homecroft Reservists would be located, who would work on the irrigation canals and systems necessary for the complete reclamation of the lands on which they were settled, and of other lands acquired by the national government in the San Joaquin Valley. That would provide a force of 50,000 Homecroft Reservists in the one particular portion of the United States where they are most likely to be needed for actual military service. _In Louisiana_, ten thousand acres should be acquired of the best garden land in the Bayou Teche Country, on which 10,000 Homecroft Reservists would be located, and set to work building the great Atchafalaya Controlled Outlet, and the western dike to form the Auxiliary Flood Water Channel from Old River to the Gulf of Mexico. Ten thousand acres should be acquired in the vicinity of New Roads, where 10,000 Homecroft Reservists would be located, and set to work building the north and south dike forming the eastern bank of the auxiliary flood water channel from Old River to Morgan City and thence to the Gulf of Mexico, to protect the whole territory between the Atchafalaya River and the Mississippi River from overflow by backwater from the Atchafalaya. That would establish 20,000 Homecroft Reservists at a point from which they could be quickly transported to any point where troops might be needed for the defense of the Gulf Coast or the Mexican Border. _In West Virginia_, ten thousand acres should be acquired in the valley of the Monongahela River and its tributaries in that State for 10,000 Homecroft Reservists who would do the work of building the necessary reservoirs and works for the regulation of the flow of the Monongahela River and the prevention of floods thereon. Ten thousand acres should be acquired in the valley of the Little Kanawha near Parkersburg, and between Parkersburg and Huntington, and 10,000 Homecrofters located thereon, who would labor on the works necessary for the development of all the water power capable of development in West Virginia and for the regulation of the flow of every river flowing out of West Virginia into the Ohio so there would be no more floods from those rivers. This West Virginia Department of the Homecroft Reserve could be transported to any point on the Atlantic Seacoast in a very brief time. In a day troops for the defense of New York could be rushed from West Virginia to that city over the Pennsylvania, Baltimore and Ohio and Chesapeake and Ohio Railroads. Ten thousand Homecrofters should be located in Northern Minnesota, in the Lake Region, where the Mississippi River has its sources. They should be set to work to enlarge the present National Reservoir System on the headwaters of the Mississippi River until the entire flow of the Mississippi River at Minneapolis and St. Paul had been completely equalized throughout the year, for the development of power at those cities, and for the improvement of navigation on the upper Mississippi. The construction work indicated above, which should be done by the Homecroft Reserve in the locations named, should be carried forward simultaneously with the work of reclaiming or preparing for cultivation in acre tracts and building the cottage homes on the lands set apart for the establishment of the Homecroft Reserves thereon. A part of the men should be engaged in this work while others were engaged on the projects above specified for the construction of which their labor would be utilized. The Reservists would be paid wages for all this work which would give them a start and enable them to establish themselves on their Homecrofts as soon as the houses were ready for occupancy. In many cases it would probably be found that families of Homecrofters would prefer to live on their homecroft while the work of completing its construction was being done, and would provide tents or inexpensive houses for such temporary occupancy, at their own expense. _The immediate establishment of these initial units of the Homecroft Reserve, aggregating only 100,000 men, would enlarge the military forces of the United States to the extent that it is now vigorously contended the standing army should be immediately enlarged._ Instead of being condemned to idleness in barracks, the soldiers comprising the increased forces would be doing useful and productive labor and would build enormously valuable internal improvements. It would cost $100,000,000 a year to maintain, as a part of the present military system of the United States, the proposed increase of 100,000 men, which the Militarists contend should be added to the regular army for our national defense. That $100,000,000 a year, divided among the projects above named, would provide the following amount for each project annually until completed: Iron Canyon Reservoir $10,000,000 Sacramento Flood Control 10,000,000 Calaveras Reservoir 10,000,000 San Joaquin River 10,000,000 Drainage Canal to Bakersfield 10,000,000 Atchafalaya Controlled Outlet 10,000,000 Atchafalaya Protection Levees 10,000,000 Monongahela Reservoirs 10,000,000 Ohio River Reservoirs 10,000,000 Mississippi River Reservoirs 10,000,000 ------------ Total $100,000,000 That amount of money for one year would complete most of the above projects. Another $100,000,000--the amount an additional 100,000 men added to the regular army would cost for the second year--would provide $1000 for the improvement of every acre of the total 100,000 acres purchased or set apart by the government for subdivision into one acre Homecrofts for the Homecroft Reserves in California, Minnesota, Louisiana, and West Virginia. Of that $1000 an acre, $100 would more than cover its cost, $200 an acre would cover the investment for reclamation and preparation for occupation, and $500 an acre would cover the cost of the house and outbuildings, leaving a surplus to the government of $200 an acre on each of the 100,000 Homecrofts. Every Homecroft would thereafter return to the government from the rental charge thereon, six per cent on a valuation of $1000 to cover interest and sinking fund, and an additional six per cent for all other expenses of instruction, operation, and maintenance. And perpetually thereafter, for all time, those 100,000 Homecrofts would provide a permanent force of 100,000 Reservists for the national defense, without any cost to the government for their maintenance. The Homecroft Reserves should be established on the basis of an organization of 1000--ten companies of 100 each--in one organized and united community. These community organizations, which would each furnish a regiment in the Reserve, would be organized primarily as Educational Institutions, with Instructors to train the Homecrofters in every branch of scientific truck-gardening, fruit-growing, berry-culture, poultry raising, preparing products for market and for home consumption, coöperative purchase of supplies and distribution of products, home-handicraft and "_housekeeping by the year_." The officers of each company and of the regiment would be resident Homecrofters like the rest. They would have received their military training in military schools established and maintained by the War Department for that purpose. No better use could be made of the military posts now in existence and of their equipment and buildings than to use them as military schools for training officers under the exclusive control and management of the War Department. Every company in the Homecroft Reserve should be thoroughly drilled at least once every week for ten months of the year, leaving two months for a long march and an annual encampment and field maneuvers. The number of regiments in the Homecroft Reserve could be increased just as fast as the necessary Educational and Military Instructors could be developed for the establishment of new Homecroft Reserve Rural Settlements. That would be very rapidly, after the first few years. Once the details had been worked out for one Homecroft Reserve Rural Settlement of 10,000 men, the duplication of the plan would be routine work. There would be no possibility of enlarging the system fast enough to keep pace with the applications for enlistment. The benefits to the individual who served a five years' enlistment in the Homecroft Reserve would be obvious to the whole people. More than that, the opportunity to combine a soldier's patriotic service to his country with home life and educational instruction for the entire family would appeal to a multitude of industrious families without capital. They would see the opportunity through that channel to establish themselves in homes of their own on the land. That is the ambition and hope of millions of our fast multiplying population. A charge of Ten Dollars a month as the rental value of each acre Homecroft would be a very low amount to be paid for the use and occupation of the Homecroft and the instruction and training going with it. That charge would provide an annual rental to the government of $120 from each and every Homecroft. That would cover, on a fixed valuation of $1000 on each Homecroft, four per cent interest and two per cent for a sinking fund, and would leave six per cent for cost of operation and maintenance, cost of educational instruction and schools, cost of life insurance, and cost of maintenance of military equipment and organization. In return for this annual rental of $120, the Homecrofter would get a home that would yield him a comfortable income, instruction in everything he would need to know to produce the desired results from its intensive cultivation, schooling for his children,--in fact every advantage that comes within the compass of a wage earner's life,--and during the five year period of enlistment he would learn what would be to him the most valuable trade he could be taught--the trade of getting his own living by his own labor and that of his family from an acre of ground. He would be able--and every enlisted Homecrofter would be trained with that end in view--to lay by enough from his sales of surplus products during the five years of his service to buy a Homecroft of his own, at the expiration of that term, in any part of the country where he desired to settle. He should save at least $2000 during the five years. A life and accident insurance system would be worked out in all its details, and a sufficient part of the annual rental of $120 a year set apart for that purpose to provide both accident and life insurance for every Homecrofter during the five year period of service in the reserve. In the event of the death or permanent disability of any Homecrofter, either in time of peace or during actual warfare, the fee simple title to an acre Homecroft in lieu of a pension should vest in his heirs or in the person who would have been entitled to a pension if the general pension system had been applicable to the case. In this way the burden on the people of an enormous pension roll as the aftermath of a war would be obviated. The value of the Homecroft secured in lieu of a pension would be much more than $1000. It would not only furnish a permanent home for the survivors, but a home that would yield them a living and $500 or $1000 a year and over as the income from fruit, berries, vegetables, and poultry produced on the Homecroft. The advantages to the family of the Reservist of this plan over the ordinary pension system is too manifest to need comment. Its advantage to the people can be appreciated when we bear in mind that the amount already paid out for pensions on account of the Civil War is $4,457,974,496.47 and $46,092,740.84 more on account of the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars. The Homecrofts that would go to the families of Reservists under this plan would not be located in the same communities as those occupied by active Reservists, but in Homecroft Rural Settlements created and organized for the special purpose of Homecroft grants in lieu of pensions or life insurance or accident insurance. The right to a Homecroft in lieu of a pension should arise not only in case of death, but also in the event of any serious permanent injury disabling the Reservist from active service or from labor in ordinary commercial or industrial vocations. _That is what the Homecroft Reserve System would offer to the individual Homecrofter. Is there any doubt that it is a good proposition for him and his family?_ The chief difficulty in bringing the public to a realization of the advantages of the Homecroft Reserve System, particularly its financial advantages, is to get away from the common idea that a thing can be done on a small scale, but not on a large scale. Many things can be done on a large scale better and more economically than on a small scale, _and this is one of them_. _The problem of providing adequately for the national defense of a country as big as the United States is a large problem and must be solved in a large way._ The total amount that it would be necessary for the United States to invest, in order to permanently establish a Homecroft Reserve of 5,000,000 trained soldiers, would be less than it has already paid out for pensions; and its whole investment in the Homecroft Reserve Establishment would be returned to the government with interest. The amount the United States has already paid for pensions amounts to $4,729,957,370.65. Within two years it will have exceeded five billion dollars. Most people lose sight of the magnitude of the present appropriations, expenditures, and operations of the United States, as well as of their wastefulness under the present military system. We are spending over $100,000,000 a year on a standing army of less than 100,000 enlisted men. That amounts to a billion dollars in ten years. It is five billion dollars in fifty years. And we may be certain that five billion dollars will be spent, and probably much more, in the next fifty years on a standing army. When that has been spent it is absolutely gone, just as much as though it had been invested in fire crackers and they had all been set off and there was nothing left, not even noise. It is not contended that this country should spend _less_ than $100,000,000 a year on its army, _but it is contended that it should not spend more_. And for what it does spend it should get larger results. $100,000,000 a year ought to be enough to maintain an army enlisted to the full strength of 100,000 men to which the army is now limited by Act of Congress. In addition it should support the necessary organization and training schools to furnish all the officers required for the National Construction Reserve and for the National Homecroft Reserve. The officers of the Homecroft Reserve should be permanently located as residents of the community where their regiment is established. The officers for the National Construction Reserve should be attached to the Regular Army except when detailed for the work of training those reserves during the period set apart for that work each year. At least one-half of the rank and file of a regular force of 100,000 men in the Standing Army should be composed of men trained for service as officers in the National Construction Reserve, and available for instant transformation into such officers. The training of those officers should be one of the most important functions of the Regular Army. The Army should forthwith take up that work and cease any further connection with the civil work of internal improvements. _If the Standing Army of the United States were increased to an actually enlisted strength of 200,000 men as is now being urged, it would mean the addition of another $100,000,000 a year to the military burdens of the people of the United States, and we would still be without any adequate national defense in case of war with a first-class power._ Now compare the plan for a Homecroft Reserve and its results, from the financial point of view, with this proposition to increase the Regular Army to a total strength of 200,000 men. The annual cost of an increase of 100,000 men in the Regular Army would be $100,000,000 a year; or $5,000,000,000 in fifty years. Every dollar of that huge sum would be drawn from the people by taxation. When spent it would be gone, leaving nothing to show for its expenditure. The economic value of the labor of 100,000 men would be wasted. That would be another $5,000,000,000 in fifty years, estimating the potential labor value of each man at $1000 a year. That makes the stupendous total economic loss and waste of money and human labor of ten billion dollars in fifty years,--an amount ten times as large as the whole national debt of the United States,--an amount as large as the combined national debts of Great Britain and France, which an eminent authority has said are so large that they never can be paid. _Measure up against that proposition the Homecroft Reserve plan and compare results:_ Every $1000 of capital invested in the establishment of the Homecroft Reserve will reclaim and fully equip an acre Homecroft with a Reservist and his family on it. There is no reason why the capital necessary for that should be provided from current revenues. In fact it should not be so provided, because it would be invested in property to be perpetually owned by the national government, from which future generations will derive an enormous annual revenue. A fixed average valuation of one thousand dollars for each Homecroft would be more than enough to cover the cost of reclamation, preparation for occupancy, building roads, houses, and outbuildings, water systems, sanitation, institutes for instruction, schools, libraries,--in fact everything needed to be done to make each Homecroft ready for occupancy as a productive acre garden home, with a complete community organization. It would also cover the cost of the original military equipment of the Reservist who would occupy the Homecroft. Each Reservist would pay for the use of the Homecroft and for educational instruction for himself and family, a net annual rental of $120, being twelve per cent on the fixed capitalized value of $1000 placed on each Homecroft. Of that rental of twelve per cent, four per cent would be apportioned to interest, and two per cent to create a sinking fund that would cover the entire principal in fifty years. The remaining six per cent would cover expenses of operation and maintenance, instruction, and all other expenses connected with the Homecroft Reserve Establishment, including military expenditures. The government would be under no expense whatsoever for the maintenance of this Homecroft Reserve Establishment that would have to be borne out of the general revenues, not even for field maneuvers. There would be no expenses of railway transportation to those maneuvers. Every regiment would march to and from its annual encampment. One hundred and twenty dollars a year would be the revenue to the government from one Homecroft. After that it becomes merely a question of multiplying units. The revenue from 5,000,000 Homecrofts would be $600,000,000 a year. As fast as the capital was needed for investment in the creation and establishment of Homecroft Reserve Rural Settlements, it could be easily secured by the government. A plan that would insure this would be the adoption of a financial system to cover this branch of the operations of the Government which would be modeled after the French Rentes System. Instead of Government Bonds, as they are now called, Government Homecroft Certificates would be issued, bearing four per cent interest, in denominations of twenty-five dollars. The interest on each certificate would be one dollar a year. If such certificates were available, the purse strings of the people would be opened to take them as readily as those of the French people were opened to take the securities issued by the French Government to pay the war debt of a billion dollars to Germany after the Franco-Prussian War. $500,000,000 a year of these certificates could be issued every year for ten years. That would complete the work of creating the entire Homecroft Reserve Establishment and provide the capital of $5,000,000,000 necessary for investment therein. Starting from that point, in fifty years thereafter the entire investment of $5,000,000,000 would have been repaid with all current interest, and the government would own the 5,000,000 Homecrofts free and clear of all indebtedness or financial obligations relating thereto. Now put the two propositions side by side and look at them. An increase of 100,000 men in the Standing Army would mean in fifty years: 1. An expense of $5,000,000,000 for maintenance. 2. An economic waste of another $5,000,000,000, being the potential labor value of the 100,000 men who would be withdrawn from industry. The Homecroft Reserve Establishment would provide a military force of 5,000,000 men instead of 100,000. It would provide for the maintenance of this immense force during the fifty years without any ultimate cost to the government. It would create and vest in the government in perpetual ownership property consisting of 5,000,000 acre Homecrofts worth $1000 apiece,--a total property value of $5,000,000,000 which would be acquired by the Government, and fully paid for from the Rental Revenues from the property during the fifty year period. It would thereafter provide from those Rental Revenues an annual income to the government of six per cent on $5,000,000,000 amounting to $300,000,000 a year. The potential labor value of the 100,000 men in each Homecroft Reserve Corps would be saved and transformed into an actual productive value of the $1000 which each would annually produce from his Homecroft. The productive labor value of each Corps of 100,000 Homecroft Reservists therefore would amount to $5,000,000 in fifty years. That is the same amount that would represent the economic waste during that same period, of the potential labor value of the additional force of 100,000 men which it is now proposed shall be added to the regular army. The economic value of the productive labor of the entire Homecroft Reserve of 5,000,000 men in the fifty years would be fifty times $5,000,000,000. And in order to save the enormous expense and waste that would result from increasing the standing army, and, in addition, to achieve the stupendous benefits that would result from the establishment of the Homecroft Reserve, it is only necessary that the same common sense business methods and principles should be applied to the operations of the government that any large corporation would adopt if it had the financial resources, of the United States. _Why should anyone be staggered at the proposition for the establishment of the Homecroft Reserve, or balk at it because it is big?_ When the national government owns 29,600,000 acres of national forests in the drainage basin of the Colorado River, is there any reason why it cannot reclaim and settle in one-acre garden homes, the comparatively small area of 1,000,000 acres which is only a part of what it owns in the main valley of the Colorado River between Needles and Yuma? If it can do that in the Colorado River Country is there any reason why it should not take a million acres of land in northern Minnesota, which it now owns, and reclaim it and settle it in one-acre garden homes? The government now owns, in addition to that land, 987,000 acres of national forest in Minnesota. If the government can acquire by purchase, as is now being done, another million acres of forest lands in the Appalachian Mountains under the Appalachian National Forest Act, is there any reason why it should not acquire a million acres of land in West Virginia and irrigate it and subdivide it into one-acre garden homes, and put Homecrofters on it to intensively cultivate the land? If it can do that in West Virginia, is there any reason why it should not be done in Louisiana or in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley in California? In the case of the establishment of the Homecroft Reserve Rural Settlements the government will see to it, itself, that its work does in fact result in actual home making, whereas speculators get the ultimate benefit of much of the other work that it does. If the government can maintain a Department of Agriculture at an expense of $20,000,000 in one year, for the instruction of farmers in _agriculture_, who get the benefit of that service without paying for it, is there any reason why it should not maintain educational institutions to train Homecroft Reservists in _Acreculture_, if they pay for the cost of that instruction and all the expenses of maintaining the necessary educational institutions? If the government can enlist men in the regular army for national defense and put them in camps and barracks in time of peace to waste their time in idleness, is there any reason why it should not enlist men in a Reserve and put them in Homecrofts, where their labor will be utilized in production, and the elevating influence of family and community life be substituted for the demoralizing influences of the life of the camp or barracks? There is no more reason why the government should not build and perpetually own the Homecrofts used for this national purpose of education and defense than there is that it should not own the Military Academy at West Point or the Naval Academy at Annapolis, or any land used by the Agricultural Department for any of its work, which is educational, or by the War Department, which is for national defense. The Homecrofts used to train and maintain in the service the Homecroft Reserves would be used for a combination of both purposes, and their cost would be just as properly classified as an expenditure for national defense as the cost of any existing camp, barracks, or army post now owned by the government. The burden of the Standing Army of less than 100,000 men now maintained by the United States could be very considerably reduced by establishing as large a portion of it as possible in the Homecroft System, were it not for the false ideals as to human values that are apparently so deeply imbedded in the minds of the military caste. _The entire Homecroft Reserve System should be organized as a separate department of the National government like the Forest Service or Reclamation Service, and should be known as the Homecroft Service._ The Homecroft Reserve in Minnesota should be known as the Department of the Reserves of the North; the Reserve in Louisiana as the Department of the Reserves of the South; the Reserve in West Virginia as the Department of the Reserves of the East; the Reserve in the Colorado Valley and Nevada as the Department of the Reserves of the West; and the Reserve in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys in California as the Department of the Reserves of the Pacific. The Louisiana Reservists would be trained as Homecrofters and sailors; the West Virginia and Minnesota Reservists would be trained as Homecrofters and Foresters; the Colorado River and California Reservists would be trained as Homecrofters and Irrigators--Conquerors of the Desert; the Nevada Reservists would be trained as Homecrofters and Cavalrymen,--the Cossack Cavalry of America,--and all would be good soldiers, as well as the very highest type of good citizens. [Illustration: Map showing Territorial Divisions and Locations of the Departments of the National Homecroft Reserves. Also showing the Corrected Mexican Boundary Line and Neutral Zone between the United States and Mexico, and the New State of South California.] During the entire two months devoted to the regular annual march, encampment, and field maneuvers, the members of the Homecroft Reserve would be under the military control and direction of the War Department, exactly as they would be in times of actual warfare. During the remaining ten months they would be under the civil jurisdiction of the Homecroft Service. One of the insuperable obstacles in the way of efficient national defense by State Militia is the impossibility of rapid mobilization, and the practical certainty that in case of actual war none of the States on the coast of the Atlantic or the Gulf of Mexico would permit their State Militia to be diverted from the protection of their own State. This would leave the great seaboard cities like Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, or cities located near the Atlantic Coast like Baltimore and Washington, without an adequate force for their protection in case of war. One of the chief reasons for concentrating a million of the Homecroft Reserves in one State would be to facilitate the establishment of a perfect military organization on a large scale as is required by modern warfare; and to avoid delay in mobilization and expense for transportation to annual encampments and field maneuvers. The Homecroft Reserve plan contemplates that there shall be no expenditure for railroad transportation except in the event of actual warfare. The Reserves in California and in the Colorado River Valley would be marched with their full equipment to one great concentration camp in Nevada for their annual encampment and for field maneuvers. The whole military organization, officers, auxiliaries, and military machinery, for an army of two million men would thus be given actual training every year in the complicated work of handling a great army in the field. That would not be possible if they were scattered over the United States from Dan to Beersheba, in little bunches of a company here and another there. Annual encampments for field maneuvers for the other sections of the reserve should be established at least 400 miles distant from their regular permanent Homecroft Reserve Rural Settlements. The Roman soldiers were trained to march twenty miles in six hours and carry their heavy equipment. The Emperor Septimius Severus marched at the head of his army on foot and in complete armor for eight hundred miles from the Danube to Rome in forty days--twenty miles a day. Such a march, once every year, should be a part of the training of every soldier in the Homecroft Reserve. There would be no difficulty in finding places in Texas adapted for the field maneuvers of the 1,000,000 men comprising the Homecroft Reserve in Louisiana, and the annual encampment of those in Minnesota could be located in Montana. In West Virginia the country is mountainous and smaller units of organization would be more easily adapted to that State, as in Switzerland. In West Virginia the government would not acquire its entire million acres in one body. It would be scattered into many different sections of the State, in practically every valley, but more particularly in the rolling country lying between the mountains and the Ohio River, which stretches all the way from Wheeling to Huntington in West Virginia. If it were desirable to concentrate the entire million men in one annual concentration camp, the best location for it would be in the northern part of the peninsula of Michigan. There are many reasons why West Virginia should be chosen for the establishment of the Homecroft Reserve for the eastern section of the United States. Its chief advantage is its central location, almost equi-distant between Maine and Florida and within marching distance from any point on the Atlantic seaboard, the Mississippi River, or the Great Lakes. Switzerland could be reproduced in West Virginia, with the climatic and physical conditions of the two countries so much alike. The Swiss Military System could be applied to the entire State. With a million regularly enlisted Homecroft Reservists at all times ready for service, there would then be in addition a large unorganized reserve composed of graduates from the Homecroft Reserves or who had received a military training in the public schools. It would be entirely practicable to engraft the entire Swiss system of universal military training in the public schools on the school system of the State of West Virginia. Switzerland has a total area of 15,975 square miles with a population of 3,741,971. West Virginia has an area of 24,170 square miles and a population of 1,221,119. The addition of 1,000,000 Homecroft Reservists to its population with their families, would bring the total population up to nearly twice that of Switzerland. The marvelous adaptability of West Virginia to the Homecroft idea and its possibilities as a fruit and vegetable and poultry producing country were fully set forth in an article in the "National Magazine" for December, 1913, which has been reprinted under its title, "West Virginia, the Land Overlooked," in a pamphlet issued by the Department of Agriculture of the State of West Virginia. The following pertinent statements are made in that article: "Fifty years of amazing progress in West Virginia gives a new significance to her motto, 'Montani semper liberi,' meaning 'Mountaineers always freemen.' There is something in the environment and in the rugged scenery of the State that gives its people the freedom loving spirit of the Swiss." The "strategic importance" of the State is shown in these words: "A circle with a radius of two hundred and fifty miles makes West Virginia the center of all the markets laved by the waters of the Atlantic and the great lakes on the north. Within this circle is located the capital of the nation and twelve of the world's greatest cities." With these facts in mind, anyone who will look at a map of the eastern half of the United States will agree that West Virginia is the right State in which to rear and train and concentrate the Reserve Force required for the defense of the east and the Atlantic seaboard. The northern half of the State of Minnesota affords perhaps the most perfect adaptability of any section of the United States to the plan for a Homecroft Reserve of one million men to be located there. The national government now owns more than a million acres of land that could be reclaimed for this purpose. The national government also owns national forests in the State of Minnesota aggregating close to a million acres. The land needed for the 1,000,000 Homecrofts could be selected from land already owned by the government, or other lands could be acquired. That country is the original Homecroft section in the United States. The people of Duluth have tried it out and found it good. Anyone who wants proof of the possibilities of acre production needs only to go to Duluth and make some investigations there. He will find unquestionable records of acreage production of vegetables, running all the way from $1000 to $4000 an acre in one year. The population of the United States is out of balance--too many consumers in cities--too few producers in the country--with a steadily increasing food shortage and higher cost of living in consequence. The annual production of food from the 5,000,000 acres owned by the national government, and intensively cultivated by the Homecroft Reserve, would tend largely to reduce the cost of living. It would aggregate more than half the value of the entire annual production from all the farms of the United States to-day. That would, however, be but a small part of the stupendous enlargement of the economic power of the United States that would result from the work that would be done by the National Construction Corps to increase the area available for food production, and enlarge the productiveness of lands already under cultivation. The great works that would be built by the Construction Corps of the Reclamation Service would accomplish: (_a_) The utilization of the waters of eastern streams for increasing the annual production of between 150 and 200 million acres by supplemental irrigation in the humid and sub-humid sections of the country; (_b_) The reclamation by irrigation of at least 75 million acres of land now desert in the western part of the United States; (_c_) The reclamation by drainage or protection from overflow of 75 million acres of swamp and overflow lands situated largely in the eastern and southern states. A total of 150 million acres of worthless deserts and swamps would be reclaimed and devoted to food production. That would be equivalent to the actual _creation_ of an area of that enormous extent of new lands where none had been before, and these new lands would be the most fertile and highly productive of any lands in the United States. If the annual gross production of the 150 million acres of reclaimed deserts and swamps were put at only $60 an acre, which is a low estimate, it would amount to $9,000,000,000 a year, and _the world needs the food_. The value of all the wealth produced on farms in the United States in 1910 was estimated by the Secretary of Agriculture to have been $8,926,000,000. The application of supplemental irrigation to lands in the United States already under cultivation by rainfall, as is done upon large areas in France, Spain and Italy, would double or treble the production of farm crops on such lands. And if 100,000,000 acres of those lands were intensively cultivated and fertilized, as is now done on much of the land devoted to truck-gardening on the Atlantic coast, the gross food production from every acre intensively tilled in that way can be increased more than $1,000 a year. That would mean an increase in the food supplies of the United States aggregating an annual total of _one hundred billion dollars a year_. These figures look so large as to seem visionary to those who are uninformed as to the facts, but it is only a question of multiplying units of from one to five acres into which the land would be subdivided for tillage by Homecrofters. With a population of 100,000,000 to feed now, and the practical certainty that it will be 200,000,000 in another fifty years, and 400,000,000 within a century, shall we hesitate to train the Homecrofters who would each produce a gross yield of more than $1,000 from every acre to feed our multiplying millions? _If we do not train millions of our people to be Homecrofters and intensive soil-cultivators, how are we going to feed our population when it reaches 200,000,000 or 400,000,000?_ All we need to do, to be sure of having at least 100,000,000 Homecrofters, each producing $1,000 worth of food from a one-acre-garden home or Homecroft, when our population has grown to 400,000,000 within a century, is to graduate 1,000,000 Homecrofters every year from the Homecroft Reserve Educational System as is in this book advocated and shown to be entirely practicable. Forestry also should be borne in mind in measuring the enlargement of the nation's economic power through the work of the National Construction Reserve, not only the perpetuation of present forests, but the establishment of new forest plantations by planting trees. The forestry resources of the nation should be administered and developed on a business basis. Forests should be planted on every acre of land better adapted to forestry than to agriculture. Forest plantations should be established and maintained near every city or town that would coöperate by maintaining a Forestry and Homecroft School as an adjunct to the forest plantation established by the national government. The value of matured forests should be carefully estimated, and the length of time required to bring them to maturity. Forestry Construction Bonds should be issued to cover the cost of the work of the Construction Corps of the Forest Service. They should be 100 year bonds, issued under a plan that would carefully estimate the income that would be derived from the forests after they had attained to maturity. The first fifty years should be allowed for the period of growth, during which only the interest on the bonds should be payable. The second fifty year period should be the period of liquidation, during which a sinking fund would be accumulated from sales of wood and timber sufficient to cover the entire principal of the bonds, in addition to the amount paid for interest thereon during the full term of one hundred years through which the bond would run. The generations of the future, who would derive the benefit from the work of this generation, would provide for the payment of the debt from the income from the forest resources which had been created for their benefit and bequeathed to them by this generation. A hundred years is none too far ahead to plan in formulating a great national forestry policy for such a nation as the United States. The adoption of the policy of developing this branch of the country's resources and economic power by a Forestry Bond Issue relieves the plan of any difficulty that might otherwise arise if the expenditures had to be met from current revenues. There is no right reason why this generation should bear the entire burden of planting what future generations will harvest. This generation would get a large benefit, but the benefits to future generations would be far greater. They would inherit the vast resources of wood and timber which would be created by the wise forethought of the present generation. Whenever this country has put itself on the economic basis that will be established by the adoption of the National Construction Reserve and Homecroft Reserve System, and maintains without ultimate cost to the government a system that insures to the United States greater military strength than that of any other nation, the economic currents and manifest benefits to the people created by that condition will force all other nations to abandon their systems of enormously expensive standing armies and armaments. The final power that must be relied on to ultimately make an end of war is the drift of economic forces--a power as irresistible as the onward flow of the Gulf Stream or the Japan Current. The universal adoption of the Homecroft System of Education and Life that would eventually be brought about by the establishment of the Homecroft Reserve would vest in the United States an economic power that no other nation could stand against, unless it adopted a similar system. We would have the economic strength that China has to-day, supplemented by all the advantages of national organization and modern science and machinery. After generations of following after false gods, we would have abandoned the fallacious teachings of Adam Smith and returned to the sound principles of national and human life laid down in "Fields, Factories and Workshops," by Prince Kropotkin. Kropotkin calls attention to the fact that in Great Britain alone the area under cultivation was decreased in the last fifty years more than five million acres. That land was once cultivated by human labor. The hardy yeomanry who tilled it have been forced into the congested cities or have emigrated to other lands, and the five million citizen soldiers that England might have had on those five million acres were not there when the day of her great need came. England is now paying the penalty of her adherence to the political economy of Adam Smith instead of to that of Kropotkin. She has pursued a national policy that counts national wealth in dollars instead of in men. Let us learn a lesson from England's mistakes, the mistakes which have brought upon her such an appalling calamity. If the 5,000,000 acres that have been thrown out of cultivation in England in the last fifty years were now settled with 5,000,000 Homecroft Reservists, under the plan proposed for adoption in the United States, those Homecrofters could pay off the national debt of Great Britain in just two years and live comfortably the meanwhile. A total net annual production of only $500 an acre, multiplied by the labor of 5,000,000 men for one year, would amount to $2,500,000,000. That would be enough to pay off the national debt of France in less than three years, and of Russia in less than two years. It would pay off the entire war debt of the world in twenty years. That gives some idea of the economic strength of a Homecroft nation, such as we must create in the United States of America. The possibilities of acreage production are steadily increasing as our scientific knowledge of the mysteries of plant growth and methods of fertilization advances. The United States is now at the forks of the road. Certain destruction is our fate if we continue the drift away from the land into the congested cities. If, instead of that, we become a nation of Homecrofters, no dream can picture the future strength of this country or the human advancement that its people will accomplish, to say nothing of the production of national wealth so great as to be practically inconceivable. In the future the power of the nations of the world will be in proportion to the wise use they make of their productive resources, and the extent to which they provide opportunities for _acreculture_ and create Homecroft Rural Settlements instead of crowding humanity into congested cities where they become consumers and cease to be producers of food. If the present war has proved anything it has proved that the one thing above all others which insures the national defense is trained and seasoned men,--and enough of them to overwhelm any invading enemy by the sheer force and weight of innumerable battalions. In all the future years the fundamental military strength of every nation is going to be measured by the number of such men that she has immediately available for instant service, with adequate arms and equipment. The establishment of a Homecroft Reserve by the United States of America will make of this nation a living demonstration of the truth of those immortal words of Henry W. Grady: "_The citizen standing in the doorway of his home--contented on his threshold--his family gathered about his hearthstone--while the evening of a well spent day closes in scenes and sounds that are dearest--he shall save the republic when the drum tap is futile and the barracks are exhausted._" THE SECRET OF NIPPON'S POWER THE FIRST BOOK OF THE HOMECROFTERS CONTAINS WE DARE NOT FAIL THE BROTHERHOOD OF MAN--Poem CHARITY--Poem CHARITY THAT IS EVERLASTING THE SECRET OF NIPPON'S POWER COMMERCIAL COMPETITION OF JAPAN A WARNING FROM ENGLAND THE GARDEN SCHOOL IS THE OPEN SESAME THE LESSON OF A GREAT CALAMITY OUR MOTTO--"DROIT AU TRAVAIL" THE SIGN OF A THOUGHT--THE SWASTIKA THE CREED AND PLATFORM OF THE HOMECROFTERS "HOMECROFT"--THE MAKING OF A WORD Price $1.00 Including Postage May be ordered by mail from RURAL SETTLEMENTS ASSOCIATION COTTON EXCHANGE BUILDING, NEW ORLEANS, LA. 
40479	----	IN THE FOREIGN LEGION BY ERWIN ROSEN LONDON DUCKWORTH & CO. HENRIETTA ST. COVENT GARDEN 1910 _All rights reserved_ Printed by BALLANTYNE & CO. LIMITED Tavistock Street, Covent Garden, London PROLOGUE Once upon a time there was a young student at a German University who found life too fresh, too joyous, to care very much for professors and college halls. Parental objections he disregarded. Things came to a climax. And the very next "Schnelldampfer" had amongst its passengers a boy in disgrace, bound for the country of unlimited possibilities in search of a fortune.... The boy did not see very much of fortune, but met with a great deal of hard work. His father did not consider New York a suitable place for bad boys, and booked him a through passage to Galveston. There the ex-student contracted hotel-bills, feeling very much out of place, until a man who took a fancy to him gave him a job on a farm in Texas. There the boy learnt a good deal about riding and shooting, but rather less about cotton-raising. This was the beginning. In the course of time he became translator of Associated Press Despatches for a big German paper in St. Louis and started in newspaper life. From vast New York to the Golden Gate his new profession carried him: he was sent as a war correspondent to Cuba, he learned wisdom from the kings of journalism, he paid flying visits to small Central American republics whenever a new little revolution was in sight. Incidentally he acquired a taste for adventure. Then the boy, a man now, was called back to the Fatherland, to be a journalist, editor and novelist. He was fairly successful. And a woman's love came into his life.... But he lost the jewel happiness. The continual fight for existence and battling for daily bread of his American career, so full of ups and downs, was hardly a good preparation for quiet respectability. Wise men called him a fool, a fool unspeakable, who squandered his talents in light-heartedness. And finally a time came when even his wife to be could no more believe in him. The jewel happiness was lost.... The man at any rate recognised his loss; he recognised that life was no longer worth living. A dull feeling of hopelessness came over him. And in his hour of despair he remembered the blood of adventure in his veins. A wild life he would have: he would forget. He enlisted as a soldier in the French Foreign Legion. * * * * * That man was I. I had burned my boats behind me. Not a soul knew where I was. Those who loved me should think that I was dead. I lived the hard life of a légionnaire; I had no hopes, no aspirations, no thought for the future; I worked and marched, slept, ate, and did what I was ordered; suffered the most awful hardships and bore all kinds of shameful treatment. And during sleepless nights I dreamed of love--love lost for ever.... Some five hundred years I wore the uniform of the Legion. So at least it seemed to me. Then--the great change came. One day there was a letter for me. Love had found me out across a continent. I read and read and read again. That was the turning-point of my life. I broke my fetters, and I fought a hard fight for a new career.... Now the jewel happiness is mine. ERWIN ROSEN HAMBURG, 1909 CONTENTS PAGE CHAPTER I LÉGIONNAIRE! In Belfort : Sunrays and fear : Madame and the waiter : The French lieutenant : The enlistment office of the Foreign Legion : Naked humanity : A surgeon with a lost sense of smell : "Officier Allemand" : My new comrades : The lieutenant-colonel : A night of tears 1 CHAPTER II L'AFRIQUE Transport of recruits on the railway : What our ticket did for us and France : The patriotic conductor : Marseilles : The gate of the French Colonies : The Colonial hotel : A study in blue and yellow : On the Mediterranean : The ship's cook : The story of the Royal Prince of Prussia at Saida : Oran : Wine and légionnaires : How the deserter reached Spain and why he returned 16 CHAPTER III LÉGIONNAIRE NUMBER 17889 French and American bugle-calls : Southward to the city of the Foreign Legion : Sidi-bel-Abbès : The sergeant is not pleased : A final fight with pride : The jokes of the Legion : The wise negro : Bugler Smith : I help a légionnaire to desert : The Eleventh Company : How clothes are sold in the Legion : Number 17889 35 CHAPTER IV THE FOREIGN LEGION'S BARRACKS In the company's storeroom : Mr. Smith--American, légionnaire, philosopher : The Legion's neatness : The favourite substantive of the Foreign Legion : What the commander of the Old Guard said at Waterloo : Old and young légionnaires : The canteen : Madame la Cantinière : The regimental feast : Strange men and strange things : The skull : The prisoners' march : The wealth of Monsieur Rassedin, légionnaire : "Rehabilitation" : The Koran chapter of the Stallions 48 CHAPTER V THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE FOREIGN REGIMENTS A day's work as a recruit : Allez, hurry up! : The Legion's etiquette : A morning's run : The "cercle d'enfer" and the lack of soap : The main object of the Legion's training : Splendid marchers : Independent soldiers : Forty kilometres a day : Uniform, accoutrements, baggage, victualling : The training of the légionnaire in detail : The légionnaire as a practical man : Specialties of the Legion : Programme for a week in the Legion : The légionnaire as a labourer 77 CHAPTER VI "THE LEGION GETS NO PAY" The money troubles of the Legion : Five centimes wages : The cheapest soldiers of the world : Letters from the Legion : The science of "decorating" : The industries of the légionnaires : What the bugler did for a living : The man with the biscuits : A thief in the night : Summary lynch law : Herr von Rader and la Cantinière : "The Legion works--the Legion gets no pay!" 105 CHAPTER VII THE CITY OF THE FOREIGN LEGION The daily exodus to town : Ben Mansur's coffee : The Ghetto : The citizens of Sidi-bel-Abbès and the légionnaires : How the Legion squared accounts with the civilians : A forbidden part of the town : Primitive vice : A dance of a night : The gardens : The last resting-place of the Legion's dead 117 CHAPTER VIII A HUNDRED THOUSAND HEROES--A HUNDRED THOUSAND VICTIMS The hall of honour : A collection of ruined talents : The battle of Camaron : A skeleton outline of the Legion's history : A hundred thousand victims : A psychological puzzle : True heroes : How they are rewarded : The chances of promotion : The pension system of the Foreign Legion 135 CHAPTER IX "MARCH OR DIE!" The Legion's war-cry : A night alarm : On the march : The counting of the milestones : Under canvas : The brutality of the marches : The légionnaire and the staff doctor : My fight for an opiate : The "marching pig" : The psychology of the marches : Excited nerves : The song of imprecations 155 CHAPTER X THE MADNESS OF THE FOREIGN LEGION An unpleasant occurrence : The last three coppers : The Roumanian Jew from Berlin : Monsieur Viaïsse : The Legion's atmosphere : The Cafard demoniacs : Bismarck's double : Krügerle's whim : The madness of Légionnaire Bauer : Brutal humour : A tragedy 176 CHAPTER XI THE DESERTERS The Odyssey of going on pump : Death in the desert : The Legion's deserters : A disastrous flight in a motor-car : The tragic fate of an Austrian engineer : In the Ghetto of Sidi-bel-Abbès : The business part of desertion : Oran and Algiers : The Consulate as a trap : The financial side of desertion : One hundred kilometres of suffering : Hamburg steamers : Self-mutilation : Shamming : In the Suez Canal : Morocco, the wonder-land 197 CHAPTER XII A CHAPTER ON PUNISHMENTS The return of the poumpistes : The scale of punishments in the Legion : Of spiteful non-commissioned officers : The Legion's axiom : Sad history of Little Jean : The punishment machine : Lost years : A légionnaire's earnings in five years--francs, 127.75 : The prisons in the Foreign Legion : Pestilential atmosphere : Human sardines : The general cells : Life in the prison : On sentry duty among the prisoners 226 CHAPTER XIII SOME TYPES OF VICE A variety of human vices : The red wine of Algeria : Shum-Shum : If there were no wine 248 CHAPTER XIV MY ESCAPE In the Arab prison : The letter : Days of suffering : Flight! : The greedy "Crédit Lyonnais" : Haggling in the Ghetto : The palm grove as a dressing-room : On the railway track : Arab policemen : Horrible minutes : Travelling to Oran : Small preparations : On the steamer _St. Augustine_ : Marseilles : Ventimiglia : Free 255 CHAPTER XV J'ACCUSE Two years after : Shadows of the past : My vision : Public opinion and the Foreign Legion : The political aspect of the Foreign Legion : The moralist's point of view : The "Legion question" in a nutshell : A question the civilised world should have answered long ago : Quousque tandem...? 274 CHAPTER I LÉGIONNAIRE! In Belfort : Sunrays and fear : Madame and the waiter : The French lieutenant : The enlistment office of the Foreign Legion : Naked humanity : A surgeon with a lost sense of smell : "Officier Allemand" : My new comrades : The lieutenant-colonel : A night of tears Another man, feeling as I felt, would have preferred a pistol-bullet as a last resource. I went into the Foreign Legion.... It was evening when I arrived in the old fortress of Belfort, with the intention of enlisting for the Legion. Something very like self-derision made me spend the night in the best hotel. Awakening was not pleasant. The sunrays played hide-and-seek upon the lace of the cover, clambered to the ceiling, threw fantastic colours on the white little faces of the stucco angels, climbed down again, crowded together in a shining little heap, and gave the icy elegance of the room a warm tone. Sleepily I stared at their play; sleepily I blinked at the enormous bed with its splendid covering of lace, the curious furniture, the wonderful Persian rug. Then I woke up with a start and tried to think. A thousand thoughts, a thousand memories crowded in upon me. Voices spoke to me; a woman's tears, the whispering of love, a mothers sorrow. And some devil was perpetually drumming in even measure: lost, lost, lost for ever.... For the second time in my life I felt the Great Fear. An indescribable feeling, as if one had a great lump in one's throat, barring the air from the lungs; as if one never could draw breath again. I had once experienced this fear in the valley of Santiago de Cuba, when one of the first Spanish shells from the blockhouse on San Juan Hill burst a few feet from me. This time it was much worse. Ah well, one must try to forget! I dressed with ridiculous care, paid my bill in the "bureau," and earned a lovely smile from madame for my gold piece. Ah, madame, you would hardly flash your pretty eyes if you knew! The head waiter stood expectant at the door, bending himself almost double in French fashion. He reminded me of a cat in bad humour. I gave him a rather large silver piece. "Well, my son, you're the last man in this world who gets a tip from me. Too bad, isn't it?" "Je ne parle pas...." "That's all right," said I. I walked slowly through the quaint narrow streets and alleys of Belfort. Shop after shop, store after store, and before each and every one of them stood flat tables packed with things for sale, taking up most of the pavement. Here was a good chance for a thief, I thought, and laughed, marvelling that in my despair the affairs of the Belfort storekeepers could interest me. Mechanically I looked about and saw a house of wonderful blue; the city fathers of Belfort had built their new market-hall almost wholly of sapphire-blue glass, which scintillated in the rays of the sun, giving an effect such as no painter has as yet been able to reproduce. I felt sorry that a building of such beauty should be condemned to hold prosaic potatoes and greenstuff. Vivacious Frenchmen and Frenchwomen hurried by hustling and jostling each other in the crowded streets.... Don't hurry about so. Life is certainly not worth the trouble! Ironical thoughts could not alter matters, nor could even the most wonderful blue help me to forget. I must get it over. A very young-looking lieutenant came up the street. I spoke to him in my rusty college French: "Would you please to direct me to the recruiting office of the Foreign Legion?" The officer touched his "kepi" politely and seemed rather astonished. "You can come with me, monsieur. I am on the way to the offices of the fortress." We went together. "You seem to be German?" he said. "I may be able to assist you. I am adjutant to the general commanding the fortress." "Yes, I am German, and intend to enlist in the Foreign Legion," I said, very, very softly. How terribly hard this first step was! I thought the few words must choke me. "Oh, la la...." said the officer, quite confounded. He took a good look at me. I seemed to puzzle him. Then he chatted (the boy was a splendid specimen of French courtesy) amiably about this and that. Awfully interesting corps, this Foreign Legion. He hoped to be transferred himself to the "étrangers" for a year or two. Ah, that would be magnificent. "The Cross of the Legion of Honour can be earned very easily in Southern Algeria. Brilliant careers down there! Oh, la la! Eh bien, monsieur--you shall wear the French uniform very soon. Have you anything particular to tell me?" Again that curious glance. I answered in the negative. "Really not?" the lieutenant asked in a very serious tone of voice. "No, monsieur, absolutely nothing. I have been told that for the Foreign Legion physical fitness is the only thing required, and that the recruiting officers cared less than nothing about the past lives of their recruits." "You're quite right," said the lieutenant; "I asked in your own interest only. If you had special military knowledge, for instance, your way in the Legion could be made very easy for you." Some time later I understood what he meant. Now I answered that I had served in the army like all Germans. Meanwhile we had reached a row of small buildings. Into one of them the lieutenant went with me, up a flight of steep, rather dirty stairs, into a dingy little office. At our entrance a corporal jumped up from his seat and saluted, and the officer spoke to him in a low tone. Then my little lieutenant left and the corporal turned to me. "Eh, enter la Légion?" he said. "Mais, monsieur, you are not dressed like a man desiring to gain bread by becoming légionnaire! Votre nom?" I reflected for an instant whether I should give my right name or not. I gave it, however. It did not matter much. "Eh, venez avec moi to the others. The médecin major will be here in a minute." So saying the corporal opened a door and gave me a friendly push. I drew back almost frightened. The atmosphere of the close little room was unspeakable. It was foul with the smell of unwashed humanity, sweat, dirt and old clothes. Long benches stood against the wall and men sat there, candidates for the Foreign Legion, waiting for the medical examination, waiting to know whether their bodies were still worth five centimes daily pay. That is what a légionnaire gets--five centimes a day. One of the men sat there naked, shivering in the chill October air. It needed no doctor's eye to see that he was half starved. His emaciated body told the story clearly enough. Another folded his pants with almost touching care, although they had been patched so often that they were now tired of service and in a state of continuous strike. An enormous tear in an important part had ruined them hopelessly. These pants and that tear had probably settled the question of the wearer's enlisting in the Foreign Legion. A third man, a strong boy, seemed very much ashamed of having to undress. These poor men considered nudity a vile and ugly thing, because, in their life of poverty and hunger, they had forgotten the laws of cleanliness. They were ashamed, and every move of theirs told it. There, in the corner, one of the men was shoving his shoes furtively as far as possible under the bench, that the holes in them might not be seen, and another made a small bundle of his tattered belongings, thus defying inspection. A dozen men were there. Some of them were mere boys, with only a shadow of beard on their faces; youths with deep-set hungry eyes and deep lines round their mouths; men with hard, wrinkled features telling the old story of drink very plainly. Nobody dared to talk aloud. Occasional words were spoken in a hushed undertone. The man beside me said softly, the fear of refusal in his eyes: "I've got varicose veins. D'you think they'll take me...?" My God, the Foreign Legion meant hope for this man--the hope of regular food! The daily five centimes were for him wages well worth having! The atmosphere was loathsome. I stared at this miserable crowd of hopeless men, at their filthy things, at their hungry faces; I felt like a criminal in the dock. My clothes seemed a mockery.... After what seemed an eternity of waiting the officers came in. A fat surgeon, an assistant and my lieutenant. I would have given something to have asked this doctor why in all the world these men could not be given a bath before examination.... First the doctor pointed at me. "Undress!" While I was undressing, the officers kept whispering together, very softly, but I could hear that they were talking about me, and that the lieutenant said something about "Officier Allemand." I smiled as I listened. It was very funny to be taken for a quondam German officer. I suppose they took me for a deserter; it certainly must have been rather an unusual event to find a well-dressed man enlisting in the Legion. The well-dressed man felt annoyed at this curiosity, this openly shown pity. It was absolute torture to me. How very ridiculous it all was--I fumbled at my watch-chain, trying to take off the little gold sovereign-case in order to open my waistcoat--I fumed at the stares of the officers who should have been gentlemen.... The looks of the doctor said plainly: "Humph, the fellow actually wears fine underclothes!" Why should they stare at me? Had I not the same right as these other poor devils to go to perdition in my own way? Why should they make it so hard for me in particular? Then I understood how human their curiosity was, and how ridiculous my irritability. The first step was made. I began slowly to understand what it meant to enlist in the Foreign Legion as a last refuge. I stood there naked before the médecin major, who adjusted his eye-glass as if he had a good deal of time to spare, and who took a long look at me. I stared quietly back at him. You may look as long as you wish, I thought, you fat, funny old fellow with a snub nose. You surely aren't going to complain of my physical condition. "Bon," said the doctor. A clerk wrote something in a book. This finished the ceremony. The doctor did not bother about such trifles as examining the lungs, heart or eyes. He was for simplifying things. Monsieur le major decided with a short look in each case, as the other men took their turn. Three men were refused. An old woman could have diagnosed their condition at a glance--they were cases for a hospital, and their doing military service was absolutely out of the question. The man with the varicose veins, however, was at once accepted. Bon! I could see how happy he was over his good fortune, and I envied him. The man had hope.... * * * * * Before a small window in the wall we new recruits waited, half an hour, an hour. At last the window was opened and the corporal put out his head. "Snedr!" he called. Nobody answered. "Snedr!!" he yelled, getting angry. Still no reply. Finally the lieutenant appeared beside the corporal, and looked over his list. "Oh," he said, "the man does not understand. Schneider!" "Here!" answered one of my new comrades at once. "Your name is Schneider?" the lieutenant asked. "Yes, sir." "Very well, in French your name is pronounced Snedr. Remember that!" "Yes, sir." "Sign your name here." The man signed. One after the other the new recruits were called to the little window, and each signed his name, without bothering to look at what he signed. I came last this time. The lieutenant gave me a sheet of hectographed paper, and I glanced quickly over its contents. It was a formal contract for five years' service in the Foreign Legion between the Republic of France and the man who was foolish enough to sign it. There were a great many paragraphs and great stress was laid on the fact that the "enlisting party" had no right upon indemnification in case of sickness or disability, and no claim upon pension until after fifteen years of service. "Have you any personal papers?" the lieutenant asked me suddenly. I almost laughed in his face--he was such a picture of curiosity. In my German passport, however, I was described as "editor," and I had a notion that this passport was much too good for an occasion like this. While searching my portfolio for "personal papers" I happened to find the application form of a life insurance company, with my name filled out. I gave this to the lieutenant with a very serious countenance. It was good enough for this. The officer looked at the thing and seemed quite puzzled. "Oh, that will do," he finally smiled, and gave me the pen to sign. I signed. And under my name I wrote the date: October 6, 1905. "The date was unnecessary," said the lieutenant. "Pardon me," I answered. "I wrote unthinkingly--it's an important date for me." "By God, you're right," said he. In single file we were marched to the barracks. One of the French soldiers who met us on the way stopped, and threw up his hands in laughing astonishment: "Eh!" And then, making a wry face, he yelled, in a coarse sing-song: "Nous sommes les légionnaires d'Afrique...." * * * * * Half an hour later three new recruits of the Foreign Legion, the recruit Schneider, the recruit Rader and the recruit Rosen, sat in a little room belonging to the quarters of the 31st French Regiment of Line. All three were Germans. Rader opened the conversation. "My name's Rader. Pretty good name, ain't it, though it isn't my name, of course. I might have called myself von Rader--Baron von Rader--while I was at it, but I ain't proud. What's in a fine name, I say, if you've got nothing to fill your stomach with? No, the suckers may call me Rader. My real name is Müller. Can't use it! Must have some regard for the feelings of my people...." "I mustn't hurt their delicate feelings," he repeated with a great roar of laughter. Then a long knife on the table attracted his attention. He took it up, mimicked the pose of a grand tragedian, opened his mouth and swallowed the knife, as if twelve-inch blades were his favourite repast. All at once the knife lay upon the table again, only to vanish in the coat-sleeve of Herr von Rader and appear again rather abruptly out of his left trousers pocket. "I'm an artist," Herr Rader, alias von Rader, alias Müller said with a condescending smile. "A good one, too. Strictly first class. Why, these monkeys of Frenchmen don't know nothing about art! Would they appreciate a true artist? Not a bit of it. Boys, since I hopped over the frontier and made long nose at the German cop I left on the other side with a long face, I haven't had much to eat. Remarkably less than was good for my constitution. So Herr von Rader went to the dogs--to the Foreign Legion, I meant to say. What's the difference--if they don't treat me with proper respect, I'll be compelled to leave them again. On French leave! Scoot, skin out, bunk it--see?" Then Herr von Rader fished a number of mysterious little boxes out of innumerable pockets, inspected them carefully, turned round to mask his artistic preparations, turned to us again--and his wide-opened satyr-mouth emitted a sheet of flame! Little Schneider (he was very young) stared at the phenomenon with startled eyes. "Grand, ain't it?" said Herr von Rader quietly. "I've a notion that this coon isn't going to waste his resources on French Africa. Oh no! Some fine day I'll give the niggers of Central Africa a treat. I'll go partners with some big chief and do the conjuring part of the business. Heap big medicine! There's only one thing worrying me. How about drinking arrangements? Palm-wine, ain't it? Boys, if only they have such a thing as beer and kümmel down there!--Say, old fellow (he turned to me) what do you think about this French absinthe?" I mumbled something. "Awfully weak stuff!" said Herr von Rader sorrowfully. "No d--d good!" If the comical fellow had known that, with his drollery and his fantastic yarns, he was helping me to battle with my despair, I suppose he would have been very much astonished.... There was a good deal of story-telling: about the hunger and the misery of such "artistes" of the road; about the little tricks and "petty larcenies," by means of which the ever-hungry and ever-thirsty Herr von Rader had managed to eat occasionally, at least, on his wanderings over the roads of many countries; about drinking and things unspeakable. Most of the stories, however, told of hunger only, plain and simple hunger. Then Schneider's turn came. His story was very simple. A few weeks ago he was wearing the uniform of a German infantry regiment garrisoned at Cologne. He was then a recruit. One Sunday he had gone drinking with some other recruits and together they made a great deal of noise in the "Wirthshaus." The patrol came up. As the non-commissioned officer in command put Schneider under arrest, the boy shoved his superior aside, knocked some of the soldiers of the patrol down and took to his heels. When he had slept off the effects of his carouse in a corner, he got frightened and decided on flight. A dealer in second-hand clothes gave him an old civilian suit in exchange for his uniform. As a tramp he wandered till he reached the French frontier, and some other tramps showed him how to get across the frontier-line on a dark night. In the strange country hunger came and---- "We always talked about the Legion. All the other Germans on the road wanted to enlist in the Legion. Anyway, I never could have gone home again. My father would have killed me." "No, he wouldn't," said Herr von Rader wisely. "You would have got all sorts of good things. It's all in the Bible. Yes, it is...." The door opened and a sergeant came in. "Is the légionnaire Rosen here?" I stood up. "The lieutenant-colonel wishes to speak to you. Come along to the parade-ground." "... Keep your hat on," said the lieutenant-colonel. He spoke pure German. "No, you need not stand at attention. I have heard of you and would like to say a few words to you. I have served in the Foreign Legion as a common soldier. I consider it an honour to have served in this glorious corps. It all depends on yourself: men of talent and intelligence have better chances of promotion in the Legion than in any other regiment in the world. Educated men are valued in the Legion. What was your profession?" "Journalist ..." I stuttered. I felt miserable. The stern grey eyes looked at me searchingly. "Well, I can understand that you do not care to talk about these things. However, I will give you some advice: Volunteer for the first battalion of the Legion. You have a much better chance there for active service. We are fighting a battle for civilisation in Algeria and many a splendid career has been won in the Legion. I wish you good luck!" He gave me his hand. I believe this officer was a fine soldier and a brave man. * * * * * Herr von Rader of the merry mind and the unquenchable thirst slept the easy sleep of light-hearted men; I heard the German deserter groan in his sleep and call for his mother. All night long I lay awake. The events of my life passed before me in mad flight. I was once more a boy at college; I saw my father standing by the dock at Bremerhaven and heard his last good-bye and my mother's crying.... Back to America my waking dreams carried me; I saw myself a young cub of a reporter, and remembered in pain the enthusiasm of the profession, my enthusiasm--how proud I was, when for the first time the city editor trusted me with a "big thing," how I chased through San Francisco in cabs, how I interviewed big men and wormed details out of secretive politicians ... how I loved this work and how sweet success had tasted. Lost, lost for ever. Forget I must--I tried to think of the time in Texas, the life on the Brazos farm, where hundreds of negroes had learned to respect me--after a little shooting and more kindness shown them in their small troubles; I tried to glory in remembrance of hard riding and straight shooting, of a brutal but gloriously free life. Why should I not live a rough life now? I should be on active service in the Legion. Crouching down behind my rifle in the firing-line, waiting for the enemy. I would have a life of excitement, a life of danger. Hurrah for the wild old life! Grant me adventures, Dame Fortune! But fickle Lady Fortune would not grant even a night's oblivion. During the long night I fought with a wild desire to scream into the darkness the beloved name.... I fought with my tears---- CHAPTER II L'AFRIQUE Transport of recruits on the railway : What our ticket did for us and France : The patriotic conductor : Marseilles : The gate of the French Colonies : The Colonial hotel : A study in blue and yellow : On the Mediterranean : The ship's cook : The story of the Royal Prince of Prussia at Saida : Oran : Wine and légionnaires : How the deserter reached Spain and why he returned Next morning we assembled on the parade-ground. A sergeant distributed silver pieces amongst us, a franc for each man, that being the meagre subsistence allowance given us for the long voyage to the Mediterranean. Besides, each man was given a loaf of bread. Then a corporal marched us to the railway station. The loaf of bread under my arm prompted me to look persistently at the ground. I was afraid of reading in the eyes of the passers-by wonder, surprise, or, worse still, compassion. The corporal took us to the Marseilles train, gave us his blessing, smoked a cigarette, and waited patiently until the train started. We travelled alone. But France ran no danger of losing her recruits on the way. The fact that we were intended for the Foreign Legion was written on our military ticket in howling big red letters. The conductor watched with great care. He was a Frenchman and a patriot and had his suspicions that these new sons of France might have the perfidy to break faith and leave the train at some place other than Marseilles. He therefore kept a sharp look-out--occupying a good strategic position right in front of our car--whenever the train stopped at stations. The thing would have been impossible, anyway; with that ticket one could never have passed the platform barriers. Said Herr von Rader: "They know all about their business. We are just little flies, don't you see, sonny, and this fine invention of a ticket is the thread wound about our little legs. We're prisoners, brother mine!" When we left the train at Marseilles, we saw our patriotic conductor run along the platform, signalling excitedly to a sergeant at the gate. "I've got them! Here they are!" was the meaning of this human semaphore. The conductor was a taxpayer and took good care that France should receive her dues. The sergeant and a corporal received us lovingly. The corporal took charge and marched us through the town, while the sergeant trotted along the sidewalk at a respectful distance. Without doubt he had no desire that any one should connect him with us. He was quite right. We did not look pretty and the night on the train had not enhanced what little beauty we may originally have possessed. Along the immense water-front of the port of Marseilles we marched; in the midst of a swarming throng of men, amongst a cosmopolitan human machine in full working blast. Past Arabs carrying heavy burdens and fat Levantines lazily strolling about, surrounded by Frenchmen of the south, always gesticulating, ever talking. Ship lay by ship. Elegant steam yachts were moored alongside of unkempt tramp-steamers, whose neglected appearance told of the troubles of money-making on the high seas. There were Levantine barques with funny round sails, whose crews were dressed in flannel shirts of two exclusive colours: a screaming red and a howling blue. Sailing-ships of some hundred different rigs lay there in line, enormous elevators discharged their unceasing flow of grain, and a colossal swivel bridge hung high in the air on her single pillar, seeming to defy all laws of gravitation. Casks, barrels, boxes, sacks went flying through the air, past our noses, shoved, pushed, thrown, bundled about, propelled by the heavy fists of men who apparently could not work without a tremendous amount of yelling and screaming. Surely the combined noises of fifteen large cities cannot equal the hellish babel of Marseilles' water-front. We had to walk more than an hour before we reached the little fort, once the nucleus of Marseilles' harbour defence, whose sole purpose now is that of a gate through which to pass recruits for the colonial armies of France. Fort St. Jean it is called. Over the mediæval drawbridge of the fort we marched. An enormous oaken door was opened by a couple of sentries. As we entered, a volley of whistles and yells greeted us--the salute for the new légionnaires of France. On the time-worn pavement of the courtyard were crowded in a dense mass the soldiers of the African corps who were waiting for the next troopship. Spahis and Zouaves and Tirailleurs, who crowded round us like a swarm of bees. "Oh, la la, les bleus pour la Légion!" (Here are the blues for the Legion.) "Why are we called blues?" I asked a Spahi corporal who happened to stand near me. "Blues?" he said. "Oh, well, that means recruits. Officially recruits are called 'les jeunes soldats,' young soldiers, but in the army we say the blues." "Wonder what it means," I said. The corporal lit a new cigarette and explained: "The origin of the name is uncertain. My captain told me once that it represented an old army tradition from Napoleonic times. The soldiers of Napoleon wore very stiff cravats to give shape to the high collars of their uniforms. These cravats are said to have been torture. They held the head like a vice, and it took a long time to get used to them. The recruits actually got blue in the face with these cravats round their necks, to the immense amusement of the old soldiers, who made fun of them: Aha, the blues--look at the blues!" Herr von Rader (in my memory he always figures as "Herr von Rader") gave me a nudge: "Say, old chap, take a look at the fellows with the colossal pants!" The Spahis were at their toilette, arranging their spacious red trousers in picturesque folds. Herr von Rader looked at them with great wonder. "My soul--what waste! Why, it's astonishing. Out of a single pair of these pants I could make pants for a whole family and have a fine skirt left for my grandmother!" Then came the Spahi's sashes. Two men helped each other at this important part of their toilet. One Spahi would fasten the blue sash, seven feet in length, and about half a yard in breadth, to his hip, and turn quickly about while his comrade held the other end, keeping the sash tight and tense until his brother-in-arms was rolled up in it. The Spahis seemed to attach great importance to the sit of their sashes, smoothing and tightening and re-tightening them with amusing coquetry. The great gloomy courtyard was one mass of soldiers. From a gallery a non-commissioned officer read off a string of names from a pay-roll, and in squads the soldiers went up the stairs to receive their travelling allowance. We recruits stood in a corner, not knowing what to do or whom to report ourselves to. Finally a corporal exhorted us to go to the devil. We were in the way. It would not be our turn for a long time. We could wait, we should wait, being nasty recruits, blues, nom de Dieu. Mumbling further things descriptive of how he despised blues he went off. Then came soldiers, carrying on boards long rows of little tin bowls. The Spahis and Zouaves crowded at once round the steaming pots, but Herr von Rader hurled himself in the fray, and captured portions for all of us. It was thus that I made the acquaintance of "la gamelle," the venerable tin eating bowl of the French army, baptized "la gamelle" centuries ago. I was tasting for the first time the soup of the French army, a mixture of bread and greenstuffs and small pieces of meat. The cooking of this soup was an ancient, time-honoured custom. The musketeers of Louis XIV., of Cardinal Richelieu and Cardinal Mazarin prepared their soup in the very same fashion. Lounging about the place we came to the canteen of this curious army hotel, and made our way through a labyrinth of wine-casks, which were massed in front of the little door. There was an awful din inside. We sat down at one of the long tables and were served with the French army wine at fifteen centimes a bottle. Good wine, too, but it was impossible to enjoy it quietly, the Lord of the Canteen, a fat little man with greedy eyes, being eager for business--second-hand clothes business. He pestered us unceasingly with his offers and demands. Herr von Rader sold his boots for half a franc, after a great deal of haggling, since he wanted the half-franc badly, but objected to going barefooted. The owner of the canteen, however (who evidently thought the buying of good boots at half a franc a good thing), solved the difficulty. Out of some corner he conjured a pair of shoes such as the French Zouaves wear. Although they were in a bad state of dilapidation, Herr von Rader figured out that four bottles of wine could be exchanged for fifty centimes, and the boots changed owners.... Of my possessions, the fat man desired my overcoat. He complimented me on my overcoat. An exceedingly beautiful overcoat--such an overcoat as a poor man like he, the fat man, would be very glad to have. When I entered the Legion I would have to sell it and I would be sure not to get more than two francs for it. He would give me four. I never would get as much as that in Algeria, he said. Half an hour he talked to me in the vain endeavour to talk me out of the overcoat. But the "poor man" had a much too prosperous look about him. Moreover, a Zouave whispered in my ear that the cochon of a canteen-keeper was getting rich by his little "business." So I told him to go to a place which we generally consider hot and disagreeable. Then the fat man tried it with the others, and made excellent bargains. For a few copper pieces he bought many things, for the twentieth part of their value, boots and coats and pocket-books. The Swiss recruit even sold his trousers. He got five sous for them. He got a pair of old French infantry trousers into the bargain since he had to have some sort of compensation for these very necessary garments. The fat man's greedy eyes had a happy light in them and he bought whatever he could lay his hands on. There was money to be made even out of the poor devils of recruits for the Legion! I preferred the open air. Leaving the wine and laughter behind me I walked through the fort and climbed up to the bulwarks. The cannon had vanished; where once they had been mounted there grew little tufts of grass on the gravel. I was quiet and lonesome on the old battlements. They commanded a view of the whole of Marseilles. The city and the port were enveloped in a curious yellowish light, the bright yellow of the South. Through a veil of yellow I saw the enormous massive street-blocks of Lower Marseilles, and far away the little villas of the suburbs, their flat roofs reflecting a multitude of colours, with an ever-dominating leitmotiv of yellow. The harbour seemed far away and its noises were dimly audible. The ship masts, the elevators, the bridges looked tiny and delicate as the threads of a giant spider's web. South of my bulwark there was the ocean and peace. Between the walls of St. Jean and the vis-à-vis, an ochre-coloured rocky promontory, there was a stretch of deep blue water, of the most beautiful blue in all the world. Herr von Rader had followed me. He didn't say a word, but sat quietly on the wall swaying to and fro, like a pendulum. From time to time he spat to the whispering waters below. And how pleased he was when he managed to hit a fisherman. But not a word he said. Little I cared for Herr von Rader and his contempt of the world. What a strange thing this ocean-bound fortress was! The mighty walls now enclosed but an inn. The fort had been turned into an inn in its old days. Its artillery had been sold for old iron long ago. It had ceased to be a fighting machine. It was a resting-place, an hotel for the recruits of France's colonial army to pass a day and a night until the troopship carried them to Africa or French Indo-China or Madagascar. Every day of the year the old fort received new guests--for a day and a night. Many thousands of men had lodged in it.... Fort St. Jean was France's gate for her colonial soldiers. For a few the gate to the Legion of Honour, for the majority the gate to suffering and misery and sickness, to a nameless grave in the hot sands of Africa. I wondered whither my road would lead me, in what manner I should perish.... * * * * * The packet boat on which we were transported to Africa had left Marseilles. Holding my hands to my ears, so that I might not hear a French word or a French sound and be reminded that I was a légionnaire, I stood in the bows staring at the wonders of Marseilles. There were a number of little islands wrapped in blue mist, playing hide-and-seek, until the sun appeared. Now the game was over and the veil of mist disappeared. The hills and the houses lay glorious in an ocean of colour. There was a rocky island with an ancient gloomy castle. I knew it to be the prison of Monte Christo, the great adventurer of the elder Dumas, and I felt very much as the imprisoned Count of Monte Christo must have felt. Marseilles disappeared. Ocean and sun arranged a wonderful play for a poor devil of a légionnaire. Far out to sea the sun would try to catch the little waves, throwing floods of brilliant light on pearly cascading water. And then the little waves escaped again, amidst fun and laughter, and ran off to inspect our ship. They struck the ship's sides and seemed very much surprised that they were so solid. They said so plainly enough, making a great deal of noise and fuss about it. But they soon became good-humoured again and told the nicest stories about fairy palaces of the deep and the peace of the ocean. Unthinkingly I had taken my hands down, and heard my new comrades quarrelling amongst themselves. The wine had not been fairly divided. The spell was broken. I recognised now well enough that I was standing on one of the lowest steps of the world's ladder, but I had not expected contempt, disdain and rough treatment to touch me so soon. The ship's cook began it. "Nix comprends," cried the cook. The old packet of the "Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes," on which we made the voyage across the Mediterranean to Oran, had made a miserable bargain when hiring that cook. The thing was called Jacques. It even answered occasionally to its name if it felt like it. It was malicious, wondrously versed in profanity, addicted to lying, and very filthy. The first day there was nothing to eat for us until evening. At three o'clock in the afternoon of the second day we were still waiting, very hungry indeed, for our first meal, and I thought it time to have a talk with Mr. Jacques. I told him that our board was paid for and that we wanted something to eat. Quick, too. The thing answered with a nicely chosen assortment of oaths. He swore like a--well, like a man from Marseilles. He was pleased to inform me that according to his opinion dirty légionnaires were expressly made to do a lot of waiting. If he should happen to have spare time on his hands, he might try and get something to eat for us. But he was not quite sure whether or not he would have time! Now this pleased me. I knew to a nicety how to arrange matters with this thing. "Well, my son," I said lovingly, "won't you please take a look at these eight comrades of mine? They are Germans and cannot talk French. But they are very good at smashing things. They're quite experts at that sort of thing. See how they are looking at you? I rather think they are going to beat you horribly." "Allez donc!" remarked the cook dubiously. He seemed uneasy. "They are Prussians. Very likely they'll kill you. I am going to help them at it." The cook took a look at me and a second look at the "Prussians." He was rather pale and seemed to think that he was up against it. First he cursed volubly, then he dived into his dark hole of a kitchen and fetched out a tin filled with macaroni, a number of loaves of bread, and a bucketful of wine--about a gallon. There were no knives, however, exactly four forks for nine men, and one little drinking-cup. The other day one of these packets foundered somewhere on the Algerian coast. I sincerely hope it was the packet I crossed on, and that Jacques the cook was drowned.... * * * * * On the evening of the second day a visitor came to us from the first-class part of the boat. He was a sergeant in the Foreign Legion and ventured among the third-class passengers to have a look at his new recruits. Being a Belgian, he could not talk German with them, and so I had the honour of conversation with him for a couple of hours. Yes, the Germans made fine soldiers, although they were very thick-headed. Such an obstinate race! It would be best for me if I foregathered with Frenchmen only in the Legion. My French needed cultivating badly, said the sergeant. Then he ordered a bottle of wine and talked about the Legion. Lies, mostly. One of his stories is worth the telling however. In 1880 a young German enlisted in the Legion. He was an excellent soldier, spoke a brilliant French, and was considered a good fellow. A detachment of the Legion, of which he was a member, was suddenly attacked by Arabs near Saida. The commanding officer, a lieutenant, was severely wounded, and all of the non-commissioned officers killed at the first attack. Now the young German took command and led a furious onslaught on the attacking Arabs, managing to hold out until help came. Shot in the breast he was carried into camp, and the colonel of the regiment gave his own Cross of the Legion of Honour to the dying man. The young German asked the surgeon whether he had a chance of life. The doctor said yes, of course. But, finally, the new Chevalier of the Legion of Honour was told the truth and thereupon demanded a short interview with his commanding officer. Telegrams went flying between the little desert station and the capital of Germany.... In the evening the légionnaire died. A week later a veiled lady appeared in Saida to take the body to the Fatherland. Chevaliers of the Legion of Honour escorted their dead comrade, and the French flag covered the coffin. The young German had been a royal prince of Prussia! "Do you actually believe this yarn?" I asked the sergeant. "It's an absolute fact!" said he, very serious and very much offended. The same story was told me, with slight variations, many times in the Legion. The "royal prince of Prussia" is part and parcel of the unwritten history of the Legion, told from légionnaire to légionnaire, and I have often wondered how much truth there may be in the legend. Very likely the man of Saida had been a German aristocrat, the black sheep of some good family, and in the course of time and telling the Legion had made him a royal prince of Prussia. * * * * * Oran came in sight. Nine recruits promptly lined up on deck, staring with wondering eyes at the land to whose shores destiny had sent them to work and wage war for strangers, for a nation whose language even they did not understand. Sandstone cliffs formed a rugged coast-line. From their heights batteries were firing. The target was pontooned in the sea at a distance of about 5000 yards from the shore. But the columns of water thrown up by the bursting shrapnel never reached it. The old sergeant shrugged his shoulders. "I am not interested in any shooting but in ours," he said; "anyway, at shooting with the old Lebel gun the Legion can beat any on earth." He was at least loyal to his Legion, the old grey-haired sergeant, even if he did tell so many lies.... The batteries were at any rate excellently masked. It was quite impossible to detect their positions. Even when the old sergeant showed me where they were mounted, I could see nothing. High up on the crags the heavy cannon had been built in, behind little sandhills, flanked by large rocks, the whole arrangement looking so very much like nature that none could have suspected that it was artificial. The positions of the guns were perfect. We gained the harbour. Suddenly the cliffs opened out East and West, leaving an enormous gap. Out jumped, as from a conjurer's box, the fortress of Oran, a maze of flat-roofed houses on hilly ground. The inner harbour was ridiculously small, just a little square, its room quite taken up by twelve torpedo-boats, two small cruisers and half a dozen merchant ships. We had hardly touched the pier when a corporal jumped on board. The famous corporal of the French army, the maid-of-all-work, the busy French corporal who attends to everything and has more real work to do than all the officers of a company together. He read off our names from a list and marched us off to quarters. It was a novel scene that met our gaze. Negroes, sparingly attired in loin-cloth and red fez, hurried past in a strange shuffling quickstep, carrying enormous loads on their heads; taciturn Arabs stood around, wrapped from head to foot in white burnous-cloth; officers promenaded with their women-folk and occasionally some fine lady would give us a look of curiosity and compassion. A Spahi orderly galloped by on a foaming horse and yelled in high amusement: "Bonjour, les bleus!" We were marched across the city square. The surroundings and houses had nothing typical about them until we began to pass through little alleys and byways, where naked black children were playing and rolling in the dirt and filth. Then the sand came. The fine African sand that plays such a rôle in a légionnaire's life. But the road was an ideal road, hard as stone under its sandy covering. A generation of légionnaires, now long dead, had built this road leading to the barracks high up in the hills. The road swept in mighty curves along the cliffs. After an hour of marching we came to some very antiquated barracks. They were a counterpart of Fort St. Jean in Marseilles, one of the military hostelries for the many men needed to feed France's colonial stomach. In the courtyard a lieutenant called the roll and seemed very much amused when the new French soldiers answered to their names with a stentorian German: "Hier!" We were assigned a nasty little hole of a room. A long wooden bench ran along one side. The bare boards, fifteen feet long and six feet broad, were to form our bed. There was a pitcher of water in one corner and a pile of thin brown blankets lay in another. The earthen floor was covered with half-smoked cigarettes and rubbish. After dark I slipped out, glad indeed to leave the wooden bench. The unventilated little hole was not good enough for a dog! I found a snug, quiet little corner in the courtyard and lay down, wrapped in my overcoat--for about five minutes. Then shadowy figures in the uniform of the Legion paid me a visit. Yes, a fine evening. Brilliant idea of mine, to sleep in the open air. Filthy place, those quarters for recruits! Yes, nom d'un pétard! The shadowy figures were old légionnaires, on special duty to keep the barracks in order. Did I like the Algerian wine? They wanted to know. I did not know anything about it? Impossible! Did I know that the price of a "litre," of a full quart, was but four sous even up here on the hills? Remarkably fine wine! "It's a pity [described with a variety of choice epithets] that we haven't the [here followed a similar ornate flow of oaths] four sous. And the canteen isn't closed yet!" Small wonder that then I made my first purchase in Africa. Several bottles of wine. ... Somebody knocked at a door hard by, attracted by the jingling of bottles presumably. The knocking was quite modest at first. Then it became imperious. "Who is it?" I asked. "Oh, that's Reddy. He's thirsty, I suppose," said one of the légionnaires. "He's in the lock-up." My new friends seemed to regard "being in the lock-up" as the most natural thing that could happen to a légionnaire. We all went to the door of the cell. There was a small air-hole high up in the wall and presently a hand holding a tin cup appeared. "Fill up!" a gruff voice demanded. One of the légionnaires climbed on another's shoulders and emptied the contents of half a bottle into the tin cup. "That's all right!" said the poor prisoner. "What is he locked up for?" I wanted to know. This the story. In the Legion he was nicknamed Reddy, being the happy possessor of a flaming head of red hair. Reddy was a veteran who had ten years of service to his credit and knew well enough that he was no good for anything in all the world except soldiering in the Legion. Ten years is a long time. But, when he was sent to the lonely old barracks on the Oran cliffs to play at housekeeping for recruits, a great desire for liberty came upon him. For hours together he would stare at the ocean. Finally he walked quietly down to the harbour on a fine evening and took his pick amongst the fishermen's boats. He did not waste time in considering whether or not the Arab proprietor of the chosen boat would like his proceedings. Such things as boats' chains did not worry Reddy. A large stone did the business. Reddy gave the boat a shove, hoisted sail, and sailed joyfully away. Spain was not far, and luck was with the deserter. In exactly seventeen hours the légionnaire reached the Spanish coast. He had landed at a very desolate spot, but after hunting about he managed to find fishermen's huts. Presently he was the guest of rough coast Spaniards, who did not quite know what to make of the man in red breeches. He got dried fish and nice clear water to live on. Reddy had forgotten all about civilian life, but in his dreams of freedom dried fish and water had not cut a special figure. He did not like it. He changed his mind, however, when a pretty Spanish girl appeared. The girl happened to be the wife of the man who had fed Reddy. The légionnaire neither knew nor cared. He chatted with the girl for an hour or so in a mixture of French and bits of Spanish and sign-talk, enjoying himself well enough until the husband joined in the conversation with a big knife. A gorgeous fight ensued. The other fishermen assisted their friend and Reddy had a hard run for it. But he reached his boat and got safely away, cursing freedom, Spain, and dried fish. For some time he cruised about and finally decided definitely that freedom was no good. In twenty-five hours he was back in Oran. The Arabian fisherman (who had seen the boat coming and wanted to talk things over) received a series of mighty kicks from Reddy in lieu of payment. Then the disgusted deserter reported to his commanding officer. He explained that he had jumped into the boat just for fun, that a big wind--a horrible storm, sir--had torn the boat from its chain and carried it out to sea. "Yes, sir, I nearly starved...." The captain happened to be a man with a sense of humour and Reddy got off with twenty days' imprisonment. "Damned lucky fellow, that! It's a wonder that he was not sent to the penal battalion. That means dying by inches, you know," said the légionnaires, and uncorked the last bottle. I stared at them. They laughed about Reddy's luck. They thought his adventure very funny, this tragical adventure of a man who knew how to fight for the freedom he desired and then did not know what to do with liberty when he had gained it. My God, ten years in the Foreign Legion!... CHAPTER III LÉGIONNAIRE NUMBER 17889 French and American bugle-calls : Southward to the city of the Foreign Legion : Sidi-bel-Abbès : The sergeant is not pleased : A final fight with pride : The jokes of the Legion : The wise negro : Bugler Smith : I help a légionnaire to desert : The Eleventh Company : How clothes are sold in the Legion : Number 17889 A bugle sounded. I was lying on the bare ground in a corner of the courtyard, dozing in that strange borderland between sleeping and waking. The bugle bothered me. The sounds were familiar, but my sleepy brain could not place them. Again and again the calls sounded and half dreaming I searched my memory. Now I remembered. It was the réveillé, the morning call of the American army. No, there could be no mistake--one never forgets the quick nervous air of the American regular's morning call, nor its impressive text: I can't get 'em up, I can't get 'em up, I can't get 'em up in the morning! I can't get 'em up, I can't get 'em up, I can't get 'em up at all! The old familiar sounds very naturally suggested old remembrances. I dreamt of a misty morning and a hammock slung between two mango-trees, somewhere in the valley of Santiago de Cuba, and a very tired war correspondent listening sleepily to the morning call floating over from the tents of the Sixth Cavalry hard by. A hazy recollection of fantastical foreign legions and broken fortunes crept into the dream. But surely there were no such things. Little Smiley, trumpeter of "B" troop of the Sixth, was sounding the morning call in his funny, drawn-out fashion--of course it was Smiley: I can't get 'em up at all.... It was but a dream. Awakening, I sat up and stared about me. Where was I, anyway? No mango-trees here, no tents, no Sixth Cavalry. And very slowly I realised that Cuba and war corresponding were things of the past, that the pebble-stones of the courtyard were part and parcel of a French barrack and the soldiers in flaming red trousers running about in the courtyard had a perfect right to call me their comrade. There had been no mistake however about the morning call. There it sounded for the third time: "I can't get 'em up"--the réveillé of the U.S. regulars! The riddle's solution was rather simple: The "get 'em up" signals of the French and the American army are exactly the same. For three days we stayed at the old barracks high up on the cliffs near Oran. On the third day the packet brought a new batch of recruits for the Foreign Legion, twenty men, most of them Germans. We were all bundled into a rickety little railway train and, at an average speed of about fifteen miles an hour, we raced towards the South, to Sidi-bel-Abbès, the recruiting depot of the Foreign Legion, and headquarters of the Legion's first regiment, the "Premier Etranger." It took us six hours to reach Sidi-bel-Abbès. As the distance was about eighty miles, I considered this a very poor performance and felt personally aggrieved by the train's slowness. I had yet to learn that from now on time would be no object to me. After leaving Oran our train crawled through beautiful gardens and pretty little villas. The gardens were followed by long stretches of fields and farmhouses, and then at last civilisation vanished. The desert sands of Africa claimed their right. The burning sun shone upon wavy lines of endless sandhills, upon naked sand. After six hours' ride we arrived in Sidi-bel-Abbès. The little station was swarming with men in the uniform of the Foreign Legion. At the primitive little platform gate stood a guard of non-commissioned officers, carefully watching for would-be deserters. A corporal took charge of us and we fell in line to march to the Legion's barracks. This first march through the streets and byways of Sidi-bel-Abbès was a strange experience. The city of the Foreign Legion seemed to be composed of peculiar odours and yellow colours in many varieties. I tried to classify the Sidi-bel-Abbès smell, but the attempt was a miserable failure. The strangely sweet scents coming from everywhere and nowhere, which apparently had a very composite composition, defied a white man's nose. They were heavy, dull, oppressive; now reminding one of jasmine blossoms, now of mould and decay. In an atmosphere of yellow floated these scents. The atmosphere was yellow; yellow were the old-fashioned ramparts of Sidi-bel-Abbès, built by soldiers of the Legion many years ago; yellow was the fine sandy dust on the streets; glaring yellow everywhere. The green gardens on the town's outskirts seemed but animated little spots in a great compact mass of yellow. Far away in the background the colossal ridges of the Thessala mountains towered in gigantic shadows of pale yellow. Even the town's buildings flared up in bright yellow. The people of Sidi-bel-Abbès, adapting themselves to nature in mimicry, must needs paint their houses yellow! There were a few other colours, but the universal yellow swallowed them up without mercy. Between long rows of stately palms and through shady olive groves we marched. An omnibus rattled past. All the seats were occupied by Arabs. The white splendour of a mosque shone from afar. On the balcony of its high minaret a Mohammedan priest in flowing white robes slowly walked to and fro, sharply outlined against the sky. The mosque was far away, but I could hear the priest's sonorous voice calling to prayer: "All' il Allah.... God is God." We passed through the ancient gates of the city, which was surrounded with thick, clumsy walls, encircling all Sidi-bel-Abbès. The old walls had seen plenty of fighting. In their time they had been very useful to the small garrison in the continuous struggle with the Beni Amer, who had again and again tried to retake the place. Along the large well-kept road we marched. Suddenly, at a turning, the barrack buildings loomed up on both sides of the road--the Spahis' cavalry barracks and the quarters of the Foreign Legion. * * * * * In single file we marched through a small side entrance alongside of the cumbrous barrack gate. On a long bench near the gate the guard was sitting. They stared at us, grinning stupidly. Their sergeant, with his hands in pockets and a cigarette between the teeth, sized us up, apparently inspecting our physique as if he were taxing a herd of cattle. Then he passed judgment. "Pas bon!" he remarked laconically to the corporal who escorted us. "No good!" An ugly welcome it was. I stared at the immense gravel-covered barrack yard and its scrupulous cleanness, at the immense buildings and their naked fronts, at the bare windows. Why, this must be a madhouse and I--surely I must be a madman, who had to live for five years (five years said the contract) in a place like this. A weird feeling crept over me. I must have lost my way. The moor had caught me. I was lost in the jungle. Shut in by these walls I must spend my life. Must I live among these uniformed human machines, amongst unthinking, unfeeling automatons? My head swam. A feeling of despair came over me.... Everywhere in the barrack buildings windows were thrown open, and légionnaires put their heads out, yelling: "Eh--les bleus! Bonjour, les bleus!" From all sides they came at a run, calling out to each other joyously, "Les bleus." Our arrival appeared to be an amusement that should not be missed. Hundreds of légionnaires gathered around us, while we were waiting for orders in front of the regimental offices. The contrast between the snowy neatness of their white fatigue uniforms and our shabby attire was very much in their favour. We stood a crossfire of questions, answers and jokes. "Hello! Hadn't enough to eat, eh?" somebody yelled in German. "That's as may be," replied Herr von Rader in cutting sarcasm. "You didn't come to the Legion because you had too much money, did you?" Applause and laughter greeted this answer. "Any one from Frankfort amongst you?" another asked. "Merde!" said he, as nobody replied and turned and walked off. Then came a surprise. A negro in the uniform of the Legion stalked up to me, regarding me dubiously, shaking his head as if he was not quite sure what to make of me. "Talk U.S.?" he asked finally. "Guess I do," I said. "Golly," yelled the nigger, "here's another! You'se a h---- of a d---- fool! Doucement, doucement, white man--now, don't get mad. You'se surely is a fool! What in h---- you want to come here for?" The humour of the situation struck me. Besides, I always rather liked darkies. "What did _you_ come here for?" I asked him. "Me?" said the nigger disgusted, "me? This child's been fooled, see? I'se in Paris (this here nigger's been 'bout pretty much) and a great big doggone Paris cop nabbed me, see? Oh, 'bout nuffing particular. I'se been having a swell time in one ob dem little Paris restorangs--sweet times, honey! I'se kissed all the girls and I'se kicked eberyding else. Say--it was a mess. But this here cop got in and he got me all right--no flies on the Paris cops, honey! In the station house they done a lot of talking to this here nigger, 'bout French penitentiaries, mostly. They did done tell me, it was penitentiary or Legion. This child stuck to the American Consul, o' course. Say, he was no good either. Says he, he done got no time to go fooling wid fresh niggers. Take yer medicine, says he. Which I did--taking the Legion. Nix penitentiary for me. That's what this child come here for, sonny! Bet yer a cigarette you'se be as sick of them Legion people in 'bout four weeks as this nigger is, sure. No good. Nix good. D---- bad!" "I knew that before," said I. "Then you'se sure done gone crazy, to come he-ar, sonny. Wait a bit, white man. I'se going to tell Smith. He's an American. He's all right. So long!" And in the shambling gait of his race he walked hurriedly away. One of the recruits hailed from Munich. He was in high debate with another Bavarian légionnaire.... "You're from Munich, you fool? There's no beer here!" the old légionnaire yelled. "Why didn't you stay in Munich and stick to the beer, eh? Isn't it bad enough if one Munich fool drinks their sticky old wine? Why, I've almost forgotten how a 'Masskrug' looks, and what the 'Hofbraühaus' is like. It's a sinful shame, it is. Yes, there's no beer here. You'll be surprised, you will!" I was still laughing at the two légionnaires from the city of beer and "Steins" when an old soldier started talking to me very softly. "Won't you give me your suit of clothes? You must sell it, you know, and you will not get more than a few sous for it." I looked at the man. "Why do you want my clothes?" I asked him. "To get away! I must get out of this! My God, if I had civilian clothes, I might get through. I'd run away at once and I am pretty sure I could manage to sneak out of Algeria. You'll give me your suit, won't you? This is about my only chance. I'll never have enough money to buy a suit. Is it all right? As soon as you are uniformed, I'll come for the suit. I can easily find out in what company they are going to put you." Again the man looked at me with scared, pleading eyes, anxiously waiting. He was evidently in deadly earnest. I was deeply impressed. He meant to desert, of course. I had read enough about the Foreign Legion to know that desertion from that corps was a desperate and perilous undertaking. This poor devil was determined to risk it and--I could help him. It occurred to me that, in a very short time, I might feel very much as he felt now. Certainly he should have my clothes.... "You can have them and welcome." "That's the best piece of luck I've had since I came to this 'verdammte' Legion," said the man. He was a German, a Pomeranian, I should say, judging from the dialect he spoke. Meanwhile Black (John William Black was the negro's very appropriate name) had come back, with a bugler who looked as much like a "Yank" as anybody could look. "So you're American?" the bugler asked. "About half of me is," I said. "Oh, German-American! I see. That's all right. It's pretty tough work here in the Legion; well, you'll see for yourself. I'm mighty glad to talk U.S. to a white man. The nigger's no good--you know you're not, Blacky!--and me and him are the only two Americans in this damfool outfit. Blacky's always kicking up a row about something, and he spends most of his time in prison, and when he's not there he generally manages to get drunk. Beat's me, on what! He's a pretty hard case, ain't you, Blacky?" "Shoore--I--am, you son-of-an-old-trumpet!" grinned the negro. "I wonder what company you'll be assigned to," continued the "son-of-an-old-trumpet." "If the sergeant should ask you whether you had any preference, tell him you would like to be assigned to the eleventh. That's my company. We could play poker. I could show you the ropes, too. Life's no snap in this outfit, you know!" "Aren't there any other Americans in the Legion?" "Oh yes, about twenty. There are seven with the fourth battalion of the first, somewhere in Indo-China. The second regiment of the Legion in Saida has thirteen or fourteen American légionnaires. Two of them are sergeants, and one is colour-sergeant; McAllister is his name. He's a good man. Yes, about twenty boys from the States have a hand in this Legion business!" "Garde à vous!" commanded the sergeant, coming out of the regimental offices. "Attention!" The roll was called and we were divided up amongst two companies, the third and the eleventh. I was assigned to the eleventh--"la onzième." We marched across the drill-ground to one of the barrack buildings. In the storeroom of the eleventh company underwear and white fatigue uniforms, woven from African "Alfa" fibres, were issued to us. Then each man got a nightcap. These rather unsoldierly caps were worn by all of the légionnaires in the cold African nights. Soap and towels the sergeant-major also distributed, remarking that we seemed to be badly in need of soap, which certainly was true. We were then marched off to a small house at the back of the drill-ground. Its one room contained a number of primitive shower-baths. While we were bathing, a sergeant watched at the door, critically inspecting and exhorting us again and again: "Bon Dieu, get a good wash! Be sure you get a thorough wash!" After we had dressed in the fatigue uniforms he commanded: "Take your civilian clothes under your arms," and led us to a little side entrance of the barracks. A sentinel opened the door--and hell broke lose. Arabs, Levantines, Spanish Jews, niggers beleaguered the door, and the sentinel had to use the butt of his rifle--he seemed to like the job though--to keep them from getting in. In many languages they yelled, gesticulating with hands and feet, jumping about, making a horrible noise. At first I had no idea what it all meant. Then I understood. They wanted to buy our clothes ... that was all. They got very excited over the business and seemed to think they could buy our things for a copper piece or two. Finally the sergeant acted himself as our agent and arranged prices. Even then it was a good thing for them. Any second-hand clothes dealer in any of the world's large cities would have looked at the scene with the blackest envy. A good suit of clothes fetched two francs, boots eighty centimes, white shirts and cravats were thrown into the bargain. Every one of the native "men of business" knew well, of course, that the recruits were forced to sell at once. Civilian clothes are not allowed to be kept in the Legion. None of the recruits got more than three or four francs for his things. It was a great piece of swindling. I was saved the trouble of bartering with the native riff-raff. The légionnaire who took an interest in my clothes turned up, while the sergeant was busy at the door, pulled my clothes-bundle softly from under my arm, stuffed it under his jacket and walked away in a hurry. Next day he was missed, Smith told me.... Our next visit was to the eleventh company's office, where our names and professions were entered on the company's lists. It was nothing but a matter of form. Herr von Rader declared that his father was the Chancellor of the German Supreme Court and that he himself was by profession a juggler and lance-corporal of marine reserves. And the colour-sergeant put it all down in the big book without the ghost of a smile. Each of us was given a number, the "matricule" number of the Foreign Legion. Our names mattered nothing. We were called by numbers: My number was 17889. From now on I was merely a number, a strict impersonal number.... They number men in penitentiaries. It was just the same in the Legion. I had got what I wanted. The great Legion's impersonality had swallowed me up. What was my name now?... Number 17889.... CHAPTER IV THE FOREIGN LEGION'S BARRACKS In the company's storeroom : Mr. Smith--American, légionnaire, philosopher : The Legion's neatness : The favourite substantive of the Foreign Legion : What the commander of the Old Guard said at Waterloo : Old and young légionnaires : The canteen : Madame la Cantinière : The regimental feast : Strange men and strange things : The skull : The prisoners' march : The wealth of Monsieur Rassedin, légionnaire : "Rehabilitation" : The Koran chapter of the Stallions The eleventh company's storeroom was in a state of siege. We besieged the place, pushing and being pushed, hunting for standing room, but everywhere standing in somebody's way. The "non-coms" had very soon exhausted their vocabulary of strong language and could only express their feelings in fervent prayers that fifteen thousand devils might fly away with those thrice confounded recruits--ces malheureux bleus. A corporal, two sergeants, a sergeant-major and half a dozen légionnaires detached for storeroom work continually fell over each other in their haste to get done at last with the trying on of uniforms and with the issue of the kit. Countless jackets and pants were tried on; they put numerous "képis" upon our sinful heads, and again and again they anathematised our awkwardness in priceless adjectives. In big heaps the property of our future Legion life was dealt out to us; red pants and fatigue uniforms, blue jackets and overcoats, sashes, knapsacks, field-flasks, leather straps and belts, a soldier's kit in a bewildering jumble. "Ready!" said the sergeant-major at last with a grin of relief. "And that's something to be thankful for. Here, Corporal Wassermann, take them away. Voilà! Off with your mess of recruits. Try and make légionnaires out of the beggars. Yes, you'll find it a big contract. I wish you joy, Corporal Wassermann." "En avant, marche!" commanded the corporal. Once more the non-commissioned officers of the storeroom told us exactly what they thought of us and where they wished us to go. Their remarks were extremely pointed and expressive of their disgust. We mounted three flights of stairs and the passing légionnaires of the company stared at us in curiosity. Through a long corridor we marched, until the corporal kicked a door open and led us into a big room, our future quarters. We looked about our new home. Twenty beds were in the room, ten on one side, ten on the other, perfectly aligned. In the middle of the room stood two big wooden tables and long benches, scoured gleaming white. Everything in the place was scrupulously neat and clean. A rack in the corner held our rifles. Suspended from the ceiling, over the tables, there was a cupboard--the "pantry" of our quarters. It struck me as very practical. Knives and forks, the men's tin plates and tin cups, our bread rations were kept there. Half a dozen légionnaires were sitting on bunks and benches, cleaning their rifles and polishing their leather belts--our comrades. Corporal Wassermann, lying in his bunk puffing a cigarette, took a good long look at us. He was little more than a boy. "Eh bien," he said, "I am your corporal. You will have to learn French as quickly as possible. That's very important. Keep your ears open and listen to everything that's said. That is the right way to go about it. We shall begin drilling to-morrow. To-day you will have to arrange your bunks and things. I shall arrange your bunks in such a fashion that each of you shall be placed between two old légionnaires. You've only got to watch how they fix their things and do the same. It is all very simple. When you have finished arranging your stuff, you can do what you please." Then he assigned a bunk to each of us and went off whistling. To the canteen, of course. * * * * * "Hallo!" said Smith. He had just come in. "That's all right. So you've not only been sent to the eleventh, but to my room as well. And that's all right. That's my bunk over there at the window. Take the one next. It's been given to a recruit already, you say? Oh, kick him out, kick him out. What do you suppose the corporal cares where you bunk. I'll fix it with him. And that's all right. I'm going to call you Dutchy. Now don't object, because I'm going to call you Dutchy anyhow, see?" He was evidently pleased. So was I. From the start I had taken a liking to this man with the sharply cut features and the curious air of infinite knowledge. The pasteboard card on his bed said: "Jonathan Smith, No 10247, soldat 1ère[1] classe." [1] The Foreign Legion and the French army in general make a distinction between first-class privates and second-class privates. The first-class private has the grade of a lance-corporal. He was the company's bugler, and had nine years' service in the Foreign Legion to his credit. Fever and privation and vice had engraved hard lines in his face, and when he rolled his cigarettes in French fashion, his hands trembled just a little. His hair was quite grey. He had fought against Chinese pirates in French Indo-China, he had campaigned in Madagascar and won the French medal for bravery on colonial service. During this campaign he had been shot in the shoulder and had had a severe attack of jungle fever. There was no garrison in Algeria, be it on the Morocco frontier, be it on the Sahara line, where he had not been stationed once at least. He was a perfect encyclopædia of all things connected with the Legion. He could swear fluently in English, German, French, and Arabian, and had even acquired a pretty fair knowledge of Chinese expressions of disgust. He was friend and brother to several Arabs with doubtful characters, he could recite whole chapters of the Koran by heart, and knew a great deal about Morocco. Which will be seen later on. He was in fact a man well worth knowing. From the very beginning there was a perfect understanding between us. He volunteered the information that he was a native of California and had "seen a few things in his life." I answered with the bare statement that I was a German, and had lived in the United States for some years. Both remarks were the basis for a tacit agreement to keep within the limits of strict impersonality. He lay on his bunk, and I tried to get some order in my newly issued belongings. "Your shoulders have been drilled into shape somewhere?" said Smith. "They were." "States?" "No, Germany." "Oh, I see. Thought you might have been in the U.S. army. Wish I had stuck to it." "Have you tried the Legion's tobacco yet?" he continued. We rolled ourselves cigarettes from strong, black Algerian tobacco, and Smith stretched himself comfortably on his bunk with his knees drawn up, his cap pulled down over his eyes. Smoking contentedly, the old soldier preached me the Legion's wisdom: "There's no money here--the pay is not worth speaking of, I mean. There's a lot of work. It's a hard life all round. That's the Foreign Legion. There's no earthly reason why any man should be fool enough to serve in this outfit, unless he's specially fond of being underfed and overworked. When I come to think of it--I don't know what the dickens made me stay nine years! Because there's something doing once in a while, I suppose. Well, I'll stick it out for the pension now. Anyway, you've joined the Legion--more fool you--you're here and you can make up your mind that you are here to stay. And you must look at things in the right way. Legion life can be stood right enough, if you don't let yourself be worried by anything at all, if you're as ice-cold as Chicago in January, and if you're lucky enough to see something doing. Whether we march against the Arabs or Chinese (there's a battalion of us in Indo-China, you know) or to 'Maroc' at last, that's all the same, but it's good to be on the move in the Legion. Then a légionnaire's life ain't half bad. Don't ever forget, though, to have your feelings frozen into an iceblock. Don't let anything bother you. No use getting mad about things here. Just say to yourself: 'C'est la Légion.' When you're dead played out, and you think you can't stand it any longer; when the fever's got you by the neck; when you're sitting and fuming in the 'cellule' (that's the prison, Dutchy), or when some sergeant's giving you hell--grin, sonny, and say to yourself: 'C'est la Légion!' That's the Legion. Do your work and don't worry. If any of the fellows get fresh, hit quick and hit hard--c'est la Légion. And don't forget that the main thing in this Foreign Legion business is neatness and cleanliness. You want to have your things in order, you want to be neat. So!" He rummaged in the bundle of uniform things on my bed, pulling out one by one jackets, pants, shirts, &c., and folding them with astonishing quickness. I watched him in wonder. This old soldier with his big rough hands had fingers as clever as any chambermaid's. Piece after piece he folded rapidly, smoothing every crease with almost ridiculous care. Each of the folded pieces he measured, giving each the same length, from the tips of his fingers to his elbow. Finally he erected with these bundles, upon the shelf at the wall over my bed, an ingenious structure of uniforms, the "paquetage" of the Legion. The légionnaire has no clothes-chest like the American regular. To get over this difficulty he invented his "paquetage," which is a work of art, solving the military problem of how to stow away several uniforms in a compact space without crumpling them. With half-shut eyes the bugler stood in front of my bunk and regarded his handiwork. "And that's all right," he said. "That's a 'paquetage,' how it should be. It's 'fantasie,' pure 'fantasie,' Dutchy dear. Making 'fantasie'[2] it is called in the Legion, if one tries to be always 'très chic' and 'parfaitement propre,' to be a swell. Yes, that's the Legion. We are lazy by preference, but we're always neat. Always!" [2] This curious expression of the Foreign Legion is, of course, an imitation of the Moorish "fantasia." The "paquetage" was not the only miracle. I was very much impressed by the way every bit of available space was put to the utmost use. A légionnaire keeps his linen in his haversack. For his letters, his books, for the few other articles of private property he possesses, he finds room in his knapsack; his brushes and his polishing-rags are carefully stored away in a little sack which hangs on the wall. Even the most trivial of his belongings has its appointed place. A légionnaire keeps his kit in such perfect order that he can find everything in the dark. While I was making my bed, the bugler looked on for a while, grinning all the time. Finally he couldn't stand it any longer. He pulled the blankets and the sheets I had spread out away again and started showing me how to make a bed "à la Légion." Bed-making was another of the Legion's tricks. In a few seconds Smith had arranged the bed-clothes in wonderful accuracy, blankets drawn tight as a drum, pillows placed in mathematical exactness. "Merde!" he said, "that's how we légionnaires fix our bunks. It's easy enough." "Merde?" I asked, "what does 'merde' mean, anyway?" It was a French word unknown to me. Smith used it continually, underlining his remarks with it, so to speak. He seemed to like it. He pronounced it with much care, lovingly. Naturally I thought that it must be some especially forceful invective, the more so as the sergeant-major in the storeroom (who certainly had not been in good humour) had said "merde" about five hundred times in ten minutes. And the other légionnaires in the room liked it apparently no less. The "merdes" were always flying about.... "Well, what is this 'merde'?" Smith nearly had a fit. "Merde?" he yelled, laughing as if he had suddenly gone crazy, "what 'merde' means? Why, you owl, 'merde' is ----." He used a word which certainly does not exist in the vocabulary of polite society, an old Anglo-Saxon substantive, describing a most natural function and expressing huge disgust when used as an invective. This little word is the favourite substantive of the Foreign Legion. It is _the_ substantive of the Legion! The English Tommy rejoices in his time-honoured adjective "bloody," the American revels in his precious "damned," the Mexican cavalryman enjoys his malignant hissing "caracho," and the légionnaire is distinctly unhappy without his well-beloved "merde." It's the most used word in the Foreign Legion. It has suffered curious derivations: Merdant, merdable.... It has a happy home in all French regiments--it is part and parcel of the French army's soldier-talk. The Legion worships it. Out of it the légionnaire has even fabricated a verb. When an officer gives him a "dressing down," the légionnaire says simply and devoutly: "Il m'enmerde!" The French army's primitive substantive of disgust is very ancient. It is time-honoured, it is classical. At Waterloo the commander of Napoleon's Old Guard is said to have replied to the challenge to surrender, pompously: "The Old Guard dies, but it does not surrender!" In the French army, however, it is an old tradition that he simply yelled: "Merde!" * * * * * Invectives of all descriptions were used with much vigour in our quarters just now. The old légionnaires took a delight in kicking the clumsy recruits about. In drastic terms they told them exactly what they thought of them, of their past, of their families, of their future. They felt very sorry (so they said) for the poor old eleventh company having been buncoed into taking such an awful pack of useless recruits. Many were the fools they had seen in the Legion, but never such idiots as we were. Pretty fellows, those recruits! A nice assortment of pigs! Fine times they (the poor old légionnaires) would have, living in the same quarters with these "bleus." "Why--there's one of 'em sitting on my bed. What's this bow-legged monkey doing on my bunk? Get off! Get off quick, son of a jackal! Do you suppose that my bunk's a manoeuvring-ground for dirty recruits?" The old légionnaires knew their business, however. Abuse alone was not good enough. They wanted to see practical results. So they explained to the "bleus" that recruits, and especially such recruits as now present, could never manage to build a "paquetage" without help. That was a foregone conclusion. Said one of them: "Can't you see that? If such a thing as intelligence had a place in your empty heads, you would have seen long ago that you needed help. Who's going to help you? We are. We old légionnaires will help you--we who know everything and can fix anything. But we're thirsty, you see. Tant de soif! Such a thirst. I put it to you: Is it right that recruits, recruits, mind you, who have just sold their clothes and got a lot of money in their pockets, should look on and say nothing, while their betters are dying of thirst. Is it right, eh?" There the others joined in: "Allons donc pour un litre--let's drink a litre in the canteen." The arguments of the old fellows met with enormous success. At frequent intervals old and young légionnaires left the quarters to pay a visit to the canteen and render homage to the immortal "litre" of the Foreign Legion. The whole performance was an old custom. Old légionnaires always rejoice when new recruits arrive--anticipating many pleasant walks to the canteen.... One of the recruits, a Swiss, on returning from the canteen found that the greater part of the kit on his bed had disappeared. Almost everything was gone. A complete uniform, a fatigue suit, an overcoat and several other things were missing. The Swiss, scared to death, asked every man in the room if he had seen his things. But his kit had vanished. The old légionnaires gathered about his bunk. Very likely he had lost part of his outfit while coming up the stairs, they said. They told him that one must look after one's kit in the Legion. If he could not find the missing uniforms, he would be certain to be sent to prison at the very least. He might even be punished with deportation into the penal battalion. Losing part of the uniform was the very worst crime known in the Legion. The Swiss ran up and down the stairs hunting for his lost uniforms, but naturally found nothing. Again the old légionnaires talked to him. They played their part very well. "You're a poor devil," they said. "We're sorry for you. We'll try and help you. It's a very difficult case, but we might be able to do something. The non-commissioned officer of the third company's storeroom is a pretty decent fellow. He'll do something for an old légionnaire. We'll try him. There's just the chance that he will give us the stuff you have lost from his stock of uniforms--for a little money. He's fond of making something on the quiet. Five francs would do, and what are measly five francs anyway, if they are the means of saving you from prison?" The poor devil was glad enough to get off with paying five francs. It was just what he had got for his clothes. ... Very soon the old soldiers came back. That good fellow of a sergeant had given them everything needed! Faultless new uniforms! And the Swiss recruit thanked the old thieves profusely. Personally I was angry at the shabby trick played on the poor devil. I had known from the very outset that it was only a trick. The rascals had stolen the recruit's uniforms, and had then sold him back his own things! It certainly was no business of mine, and I did not interfere. In a way the comic side of the thing appealed to my sense of humour, but it was a nasty trick all the same. While I was wondering whether I should tell that fool of a Swiss how he had been done, one of the old légionnaires happened to sit down on my bunk. "Get off my bed!" I said. Blank astonishment was written on the man's face. "What d----d cheek for a raw recruit. You impertinent ..." "My bed's my bed. Get off. Sit on your own bed. Just now you raised a row because one of us was sitting on yours. Get away from here and be quick about it." The old légionnaire rose slowly. "Viens là bas!" he yelled. "Come down below to the yard with me. I'll teach you that a good-for-nothing recruit should respect an old soldier. Come down!" Together we descended the stairs, a few other légionnaires following. The bugler was amongst them. "Give him hell," he said. "Look out for his feet!" I was very pleased with myself. It was bad enough to be in the Legion, but one could at least play the man.... At the back entrance of the company's quarters, in a small alley-way, we found a quiet spot to settle our little difference. He kicked furiously in French fashion, and I barely managed to escape. Then we closed in and in a second were rolling over and over on the gravel-covered ground. Now one had the upper hand, now the other. My antagonist's strength surpassed mine by far. I could do but very little in his iron grip. I began to wonder how many of my ribs would survive the fray. But all at once I got the upper hand. Again and again he tried to get a grip of my throat, but I caught his hand every time. We rolled over and over. My strength was fast sinking. At the last moment almost, I noticed a big stone on the ground quite near his head. I wrested my hand free. Seizing my antagonist by the hair, I pounded his head against the stone as hard as I could. Once--twice--four times.... His grip relaxed.... "Assez!" he yelled, "enough." "Très bien," the onlooking old légionnaires said, "very good." The bugler was disgusted. (So was I.) "Now that's the Legion all over. I wonder why the people here can't box like Christians instead of rolling about like pigs. You've licked him, though. And that's all right." The man I had "fought" with rose with some difficulty and walked up to me. We shook hands.... "You were in the right when you ordered me off your bed," he said. "Parbleu, that was a good idea with the stone. Eh, you'll be a good légionnaire very soon. We men of the Legion quarrel often, but at heart we're always comrades. C'est la Légion! I propose we return to our quarters again...." And in the room we brushed the dust from each other's uniforms, like old friends.... * * * * * "You're tired, I guess," said the bugler with a grin. "Let's go and have a litre." I had no objection. "I am paying for this," he declared, as we crossed the drill-ground. The regimental canteen was in a small building in a corner of the barrack square. We opened the door and--I at least must have looked very much surprised. There was an awful noise in the little room. A great many soldiers were talking and laughing and singing and yelling in many languages; in German, French, English, Italian and Spanish--there was the jingle of many bottles and glasses. As we entered a German was singing: Trinken wir noch ein Tröpfchen Aus dem kleinen Henkeltöpfchen, Oh, Suss ... a ... na! In sharp marching rhythm a Frenchman sang the refrain of one of the Legion's songs: Le sac, ma foi, toujours au dos ... The canteen was crowded. Hundreds of légionnaires in white fatigue uniforms or in blue jackets sat on the long benches, drinking, laughing. On the wooden tables bottles stood in long rows and deep red wine sparkled in the glasses. "There's no room here," I said. Smith grinned in answer: "Room? Nom d'un pétard, what do we want room for? The litre is the main thing, sonny!" Pushing through the crowd he reached the bar and held up a forefinger with a serious face. This seemed to be a well-known signal to the young woman behind the bar. Without saying a word she took three copper pieces from the bugler, giving him in exchange a full bottle of wine and two glasses. "Madame la Cantinière" could not be over twenty years old. Like a queen seated on her throne she held sway behind her bar and ruled the crowd of noisy, yelling légionnaires in quiet authority, imposing and comical at the same time. Madame la Cantinière was the sutler of the Foreign Legion. Old tradition demands that a woman should keep the Legion's canteen. "Madame la Cantinière de la Légion" usually is married, but she is the official head of the canteen and not her husband. The business belongs to her. On the march and in the field she wears the blue sutler's uniform and follows the regiment with her little sutler's waggon. On a bench in the corner Smith found seats for us, and had two big glasses filled (the Legion does not waste time drinking out of small wineglasses!)--had the glasses filled before we sat down. "Here's luck," he said. "There's no such thing as luck in this place, but one keeps on wishing for it just the same. Here's luck, Dutchy!" He emptied his glass at a gulp, wiping his soft fair moustache in great satisfaction. _And_ he refilled his glass at once. "The wine's good. And that's all right. Sonny, there are miles and miles of vineyards round this here Sidi-bel-Abbès. The hilly ground near the Thessala mountains is a single large vineyard. There are times in Algeria when they let the wine run on the street. It's so plentiful and cheap that it isn't worth the casks. There would be no Legion, I tell you, if it wasn't for the cheap wine!" With wondering eyes I surveyed the men in the canteen and the canteen itself. The smoke of many hundreds of cigarettes filled the place with a heavy bluish vapour. The noise was indescribable. One had to yell to be understood by one's neighbour, a quietly spoken word would have been lost in the turmoil. Everybody was yelling and everybody seemed to be in high glee. The légionnaires were having what they considered a good time. They jumped on the tables, kicking and dancing, jingled their glasses, threw empty bottles about and made fun of everybody and everything. Every minute the uproar increased. These hard-faced, hard-eyed men were like children at some forbidden game, trying to get as much fun as possible while the teacher was away. Suddenly a man with a wonderfully clear and strong voice began singing a love-song. Noise and tumult ceased at once. I listened in amazement. A légionnaire sang for his comrades, in a beautiful tenor voice, in a voice reminding me of great singers I had heard long ago. A poor devil of a légionnaire possessed a voice many a singer would have envied. He sang a French song, every verse closing pitifully: L'amour m'a rendu fou.... The song of a lover who had loved and lost, a song of love and ladies, of love's delights and love's misery, sung in the canteen of the Foreign Legion. With burning eyes I looked at the listening throng of men in red and blue until I saw nothing but their shadowy outlines like a far-away _fata Morgana_--I was lost in a dream of memories. Absolute quiet reigned. The song held these men of rough life and rougher manners spellbound; the glorious mellow voice, now clear as a trumpet, now low and sweet as a woman's caress, must have appealed to every heart. The song was at an end: L'amour m'a rendu fou.... For a moment, for a few seconds, all remained hushed. And then one would think that these men were ashamed of having been so soft-hearted. A légionnaire jumped on a table and yelled: "Silence.... No more fool songs for us! Vive le litre!" "Le litre!" ... a hundred men roared. The shouting and the uproar and the noise commenced anew. Blacky, the negro, had come in and was soon dancing the dance of his race. He was a master of the turnings and twistings of the cake-walk. There were universal yells of appreciation as he bent backwards, high-stepping grotesquely. Blacky was much applauded and seemed to be a very happy nigger. Madame la Cantinière did a roaring trade. The copper pieces were continually jingling on the tin-covered surface of the bar. La Cantinière was a very busy woman this evening, passing many hundreds of wine bottles to her thirsty clientèle of légionnaires. Glasses were broken, pieces of glass lay everywhere on the tables and on the floor, and here and there little red pools of wine had formed. The fun grew fast and furious and the noise almost unbearable. My friend the bugler had emptied glass after glass and was in high good humour. "Why, it is the regiment's holiday!" he laughed. The "fifth day" it was--pay-day. The Legion's humour called pay-day the regimental holiday. This humour was somewhat grim in view of the fact that pay in the Legion meant but five centimes a day, twenty-five centimes for the pay-roll period of five days. Twenty-five centimes are almost exactly five cents in American, or twopence-halfpenny in English money. So the Legion's "holiday" was at the bottom of all the noise and fun in the canteen! These men in the Legion measured the passing of time by their miserable pay-days only. Such a fifth day marked the glorious epoch when two comrades could buy exactly five "litres" of wine for their joint pay. Certainly such frivolity punished itself: there was no money left for the next five days' tobacco. So wise men in the Legion buy the customary package of tobacco for three sous, and drink but one bottle of wine every five days. This is what the soldier of the Foreign Legion works for: One bottle of wine and one package of tobacco every five days! Shrilly a signal sounded through the noise--lights out! Madame la Cantinière held up her hand, made a funny little bow, and said with a smile: "Bonsoir, messieurs.--Good night, gentlemen." The Legion teaches obedience.... In a very few seconds the canteen was empty and everybody was hurrying across the drill-ground to quarters. * * * * * When roll-call had been finished in our quarters and everybody had gone to bed, I quietly left the room. Sleep did not appeal to me that night. The still of night lay over the barrack-yard. The white moonlight shone on the bare walls of the barracks. The stars of far south glittered in their trembling beauty. I stared up into the splendour of the heavens and brooded over happiness far away--passed--dead.... I heard footsteps and saw a shadow moving somewhere on the other side. And over there a trembling awkward voice sang softly: L'amour m'a rendu fou.... Far into the night I crouched in a corner of the Legion's barrack-yard. * * * * * The first days, the first weeks of life in the Legion were quite sufficient to render me immune against strange things and strange sights. Sometimes it seemed to me as if my nerves were quite dulled. Every day brought monstrous sights and hideous impressions. I shuddered at unheard-of things and wondered at these strange specimens of humanity. But the next moment some new horror made me forget what I had just seen. In a few minutes' walk with the bugler round the barrack-yard one could meet with a variety of sights like the following: A légionnaire ran past us, shrieking in extreme pain, splashed with blood. He had cut off the forefinger and middle finger of his right hand so as to be unfit for active service. A poor crippled Arab, bent with age, stopped when he saw us. He was evidently on his way to the kitchen buildings to beg for food. In his hands he carried a Standard oil-can. A Standard oil-tin as receptacle for food in connection with an Arab, Algeria and the Foreign Legion struck me as something distinctly new. But there was more to follow. In very broken German the Arab addressed us: "Gut' Tag, légionnaires. Cigarette! Ick sein deutsch--Magdeburg gewesen--1870." The man had fought in the great Franco-German war and had been in Magdeburg as a prisoner of war! Hardly had I recovered from my surprise when a passing légionnaire made me stare in horror. The man had the grinning image of a skull tattooed on his forehead! He smiled at my frightened face and was evidently very pleased at the impression he had made. I remember saying to the bugler how horrible it was that a man should disfigure his face for life in such a manner, and I remember that Smith only shrugged his shoulders in reply. "Why, that's nothing," he said. "Tattooing of that kind is quite customary in the Battalion of the Disciplined." I could not agree with the bugler, I could not see a mere freak in this horrible tattoo-mark. To me it spoke of hope lost for ever, of a life so dreadful that a man no longer cared whether he was disfigured or not. Pleased with the notice he attracted, the légionnaire with the skull on his forehead walked up to us and spoke to me: "Eh, recruit, do you want to see something that very old légionnaires only have got?" He showed me a tobacco-pouch, apparently made of fine soft leather: "This is made of the breast of an Arab woman," said the man of the skull. "It is a very good tobacco-pouch. Made it myself. There are only seven in the whole regiment now. Chose--n'est-ce pas? That is something worth seeing!" With a grin of vanity he walked away. "Tobacco-pouch--an Arab woman's breast--my God, what is the meaning of this?" I asked of the bugler. Smith told me all about those horrible pouches. The man of the skull had not lied. During the last insurrection of Arabs in Algeria, in grim warfare far in the South, Arabian women had horribly mutilated the bodies of légionnaires and inflicted horrible tortures on the wounded. The soldiers of the Legion, maddened, thirsting for revenge, gave quarter to no Arab woman during those times. They retaliated in kind.... Of the horrible deeds they committed the dreadful tobacco-pouches gave evidence. On the same day I witnessed for the first time the prisoners' march of punishment. I stood aghast. Behind the quarters of the fourth company, in a small square between barrack building and wall, about thirty men were marching in a continuous circle, to the sharp commands of a corporal: "À droit--droit; à droit--droit; right about, march; right about, march." The prisoners marched round their narrow circle in fast quick-step, almost at a run, with backs deeply bent. Their knapsacks were filled with sand and stones, every man carrying a burden of from seventy to eighty pounds. All the prisoners had a hard strained look on their faces. Their fatigue uniforms were torn and soiled. Guards with fixed bayonets stood at the corners of the square, guarding the marching prisoners. The term prisoner must not be misunderstood. These men were not criminals. The légionnaires marching in the "peloton des hommes punis" had been punished with a term of imprisonment for small offences in the matters of discipline. They were not only put into prison, but also had to march on their ridiculous march of punishment for three hours every day, the stones in their knapsacks causing bad sores on their backs. These men, punished for some paltry military offence, were certainly treated as if they were criminals of the worst description. I tried to imagine what I should feel and what I should do if a sandsack were put on my back and I were driven round in this maddening march.... It was dangerous to think of these things. "Allez, let's go," said the bugler. "We all go to prison some time or another and it's not right to stare at the prisoners. They feel bad enough as it is." Stranger than the strange surroundings were many of the men of the Legion themselves. On the bunk opposite mine, the little pasteboard card customary in the Legion described the owner as follows: JEAN RASSEDIN 12429 SOLDAT PREMIERE CLASSE. Rassedin was a Belgian. He worked as clerk in the regimental offices. Shortly before "soup-time" in the afternoon his day's work was finished. Then he would come running into quarters, tearing off his old white barrack uniform as fast as he possibly could, throwing his things pell-mell on the bed. In a very few moments he had put on the uniform prescribed for town. For the "soup" he didn't care. He never had his meals in quarters. He went away at once after he had changed his uniform and never returned before two o'clock in the morning, having a "certificate of permanent permission" to leave the barracks. His manner was haughty. If one of his comrades tried to speak to him about something or other, he usually turned away without answering. Or he said: "M'en fou--I don't care for anything. Leave me alone." Monsieur Rassedin, légionnaire, took his meals in the best hotel of the town and spent more money than any other man in Sidi-bel-Abbès. Rassedin was a rich man. From the standpoint of the Foreign Legion, his wealth was the wealth of Croesus. He had been a non-commissioned officer in a Belgian cavalry regiment, had deserted for reasons unknown and joined the Legion. After being a légionnaire for a time, he got the news of the death of a rich relative, who had left him all his wealth.... So Monsieur Rassedin, légionnaire, had become rich. He always carried a few thousands francs about him. Three men of the company were employed by him to keep his things in order and to do all the cleaning and polishing for him. In the regimental office he paid the other clerks to do his work. He naturally preferred reading novels to copying lengthy reports. As he could afford to pay substitutes, the thing could easily be done. His family had succeeded in getting him a pardon granted for deserting. Monsieur Rassedin could have gone back to Belgium long ago, but he did not care to return to his native country. As soon as he had finished his term of five years' Legion service, he signed on again for another five years. The reason? "Disease," Smith said, when I asked him. There certainly was no question concerning men or things of the Legion that the man from California could not answer. "The poor devil's suffering from syphilis. Got it in Madagascar. I asked him once why in thunder he did not get out of this confounded Legion. "'Bugler,' he said in answer. 'You are an old légionnaire and I don't want to have trouble with you. But remember: You go your own way, and I'll go mine. Don't trouble me with your fool's remarks. There is poison in my body and in a few years I shall be very sick. No, I prefer putting a bullet through my brains in the Legion to returning to my country and then having to peg out. You'll die somewhere in the sand, my friend--I shall die strictly in my own fashion. What is the difference? Now come on, bugler. Want a bottle of champagne?'" Everybody in Sidi-bel-Abbès knew Rassedin, even the little black children in the streets. Many a time he used to throw franc pieces amongst them. In quarters Rassedin hardly spoke to anybody. His comrades were afraid of him. He was a man of enormous strength and had the reputation of fighting on the least provocation. But he could be very good-natured. Hardly a day passed without some old soldiers of the company coming to our quarters in search of Rassedin. They would simply rub their throats in pantomime: "Rassedin, tant d' soif.--Heap big thirst." Then Rassedin grinned and searched his pockets for copper pieces.... Then there was Latour, a Frenchman, serving his second year. Daily he received letters, a very unusual thing in the Foreign Legion; love-letters from a woman who was waiting for him five long years. Latour, who had committed a crime in France, expiated his deed in the Foreign Legion. He served solely for the purpose of "rehabilitation." Sentences of the Civil Court are in France entered in the personal papers of the criminal. Without his papers he cannot get work. Naturally employers are shy of taking men who have been in conflict with the law and such a man very seldom succeeds in finding work. It is a barbarous system. Ten years must elapse before such a man is considered rehabilitated and "clean papers" are issued to him. If a man is willing to serve in the Foreign Legion, however, the term of rehabilitation is shortened to five years, and after five years' service new papers are given to him. He has then a new start in civil life after five years instead of ten. Like many other French légionnaires, Latour was serving for rehabilitation. The strangest man of all, however, seemed to me this man Smith, American, légionnaire, philosopher. I have always believed, and believe yet, that he actually loved the Legion, that he could not part from the strange life there. He could speak Arabic like a native. Many a time when we were lying in our bunks, he would mumble to himself in Arabic for hours. If I, in curiosity, asked him what he was about, he would say: "Oh nothing, Dutchy. I'm a bit off my base. I very often am, you know." But occasionally he would straighten up and sit down beside me, talking of strange things, reciting whole chapters of the Koran. Like this: "Well, sonny, know anything about the Chapter of the Prophet's Stallions?" "You don't? Listen." "When of an evening the stallions, standing on three feet and placing the tip of their fourth foot upon the ground, were brought before the Prophet, he said: 'I have loved the love of things of this earth more than I have loved all thoughts of the things of heaven, and I have wasted the time in feasting my eyes on these horses. Bring them to me.' And when the horses were brought to him, he began cutting off their legs, one by one, saying: 'All' il Allah....'" "Yes, Dutchy, the Koran's something interesting." Many chapters of the Koran I have learned from Smith. Such things happened every day. But soon the enormities lost their power of fascination. A host of new impressions were forced upon me, until the senses were dulled and one soon got wonderfully indifferent--absolutely indifferent.... CHAPTER V THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE FOREIGN REGIMENTS A day's work as a recruit : Allez, hurry up : The Legion's etiquette : A morning's run : The "cercle d'enfer" and the lack of soap : The main object of the Legion's training : Splendid marchers : Independent soldiers : Forty kilometres a day : Uniform, accoutrements, baggage, victualling : The training of the légionnaire in detail : The légionnaire as a practical man : Specialties of the Legion : Programme for a week in the Legion : The légionnaire as a labourer When in the twilight of awakening day the first red-hot rays of African dawn penetrated through the windows of our quarters, the "garde-chambre," the man on duty there, arose noiselessly. He took good care not to make a noise, not from any delicacy of feeling on his part, but from the knowledge of the dire punishment which awaited him if he inconsiderately disturbed the sleep of his comrades. For the hours of sleep are a "Holy of Holies" to the légionnaire. When Herr von Rader was on duty for the first time, and in getting up made a slight noise, boots (heavy military boots!) were thrown at his head from all parts of the room, as a somewhat urgent reminder to be quiet. In a few minutes the orderly returned from the kitchen dragging with him a large earthenware jug, lighted the petroleum lamp which hung in the middle of the room, and his voice then sounded loudly through the room: "Au jus." (Sauce.) The sauce was coffee, strong, black, excellent coffee. Mechanically each légionnaire sat up in bed, and leaning on his arm mechanically felt behind him for the "quart," the tin mug, which hung on a hook at the head of the bed, handing it to the orderly, who went from bed to bed with his large jug and poured out coffee. The strong mixture soon dispelled all sleepiness, and when the shrill trumpet-blasts of the "réveillé" sounded from the barrack-yard, they all jumped out of bed. Now began a "Tohuwabohu" (pandemonium) of noise and hurrying to and fro. In half an hour the recruits had to muster in the yard. Corporal Wassermann, who liked to remain in bed until the last moment, called out continually: "Le--e--vez-vous donc.--Get up." Then he thundered out the famous "Allez, schieb' los!" of the Legion. The curious term has been introduced by German légionnaires and has passed into the vocabulary of Algerian French. Not only the soldiers continually used this funny mixture of German and French, but Arabs and negro children in the street, when they wanted to hurry each other up, shrieked out: "Allez, schieb' los!" "Allez, schieb' los! Pas du temps. No more time!" roared the corporal. The day began with hurry and scurry. The primitive lavatory was on the ground floor of the barracks and one was obliged to run up and down four flights of stairs in order to wash oneself. There was not a minute to spare. The boots had to be brushed; the blankets and mattresses of the bed had to be folded neatly and piled up at the foot of the bunk. Whilst this was being done the orderly shouted excitedly: "Quoi! Nom de Dieu--balayez au-dessous vos lits!" (Thunder and lightning! Sweep up under your beds.) The etiquette of the Legion in these things holds very strictly to old tradition; every légionnaire had to sweep under his bed, while the cleaning of the room was the work of the orderly on duty, who could of course not begin this work until the floor beneath the beds had been swept. That was the reason of all the "Quois" and "Nom de Dieus!" The man had every cause to be excited and angry. He had to drill like the others, and it was no trifle to have to sweep a large room, to dust and to fetch water; everything within ten minutes. And it had all to be in tip-top order, for a few minutes before commencing drill the colour-sergeant inspected quarters and if anything was not in order in the room the corporal was punished. And when the corporal was punished, he of course took care that his men were run in as well. Punctually at 6 A.M. we recruits mustered in the barrack-yard in drill uniform: white linen suit, blue sash, knapsack, cartridge-belt and rifle--uniforms and leather trappings of shining brightness. The almost pedantic cleanliness of the Legion, the coquetry of each individual légionnaire to put a certain amount of "chic" into his uniform, was the first thing Corporal Wassermann's vanity had taught us. In the quick easy marching pace of the Legion we went out to the "Plateau," a large open space near the negro quarter, surrounded by olive-trees and red African oaks. The yellow clayey ground was stamped hard by the marching of many thousands of légionnaires. On the one side of the "Plateau" was the "village nègre," the negro town. Close to the drill-ground the mosque, in proud white splendour, towered above the miserable, half-ruined huts of the negro quarter, and hour by hour sounded loudly from its minaret the priest's call to prayer: "All'il Allah. God is great...." "Arré, arré--go on, go on," yelled the Arabs, who drove their heavily laden donkeys across the place with much scolding and beating. By the side of the donkeys, like the beasts, heavily burdened, walked Arab women, the legs bare to above the knee, but the face modestly covered as prescribed by the teachings of the Prophet. Only a small portion of the forehead was left free by the veil, and this was painted with a bright red round spot of henna, the sign of the married woman. The Arabs glanced at us with timid side looks and hastened to pass on. Half-naked Arab and negro children raced about trying with comical "grandezza" to imitate the martial steps, and shouted Arab words at us which very likely were gross insults, until Corporal Wassermann picked up stones and drove them away. "Formez les faisceaux. Sac à terre." (Pile arms. Lay down your knapsacks.) "Pas gymnastique!" (At the double!) "En avant. Marche!" With this the daily routine began. It was the famous "Legion's breakfast," the lung-training of "double time." In the form of a wide square we went round the drill-ground, five minutes, ten minutes--un, deux, un, deux--always in sharp time. The corporal, a splendid runner, ran at the head, teaching us the trick on which everything depended here, to overcome the critical moment of lung exhaustion, to get the "second wind." Even if the breath came and went in short pumping gasps, if the eyes pained, and one commenced to stumble from exhaustion, one ran on until the lungs had got used to the extra exertion, until one had the feeling of being a machine, and could go on running for ever. Then came the command "A volonté"--(as you please)--and a race finished thirty minutes' exercise. This is the Legion's breakfast. It has cost many a man his lungs. Pause. The tormented lungs worked in short hard gasps. It was impossible to stand still. One was obliged to walk up and down quickly in order to gradually quieten the pumping lungs. The body had to expend all the strength it could in this morning drill. Swedish gymnastics, "le boxe," formed the alternative to this doubling. The training progressed very quickly. All the recruits had served in some of the world's armies, and the first rudiments of military wisdom had been drilled into them long ago. Three-quarters of my fellow-recruits were Germans, who did not understand any French, and to whom the French commands were Greek. Continual repetition was here necessary. "A gauche--gauche means left about," explained the corporal, and repeated it ten times, until "gauche" had been mastered. The most necessary French expressions were very quickly learnt by this most natural of all methods. A hot sun burned down on us. Ten times during a single forenoon every stitch of clothes on one's body was soaked with perspiration, and ten times it dried again. In the pauses one stood about, smoking hand-twisted cigarettes, the inevitable cigarette of the Legion smoked in every free moment, and by which the pause is measured according to the old custom of the Legion? The pause was the duration of a cigarette. When the corporal had finished smoking his cigarette he slowly walked to a distance of about one or two hundred metres and lifted his hand: "A moi." That meant we were to run up to him and recommence work. "I've never run so d----d fast in all my life," was Herr von Rader's continual lament. "I've an idea the suckers here are mistaking me for an express train!" At 11 A.M. we marched back to barracks. Knapsack and cartridge-belt were thrown into the "paquetage," and dead tired we threw ourselves upon our beds. But after a few short minutes, the soup signal rang out from the barrack-yard. "A la soupe, légionnaires, à la soupe, soupe, soupe." "Soupe ..." every one yelled. Woe if the orderly of the room did not rush to the kitchen, and woe if he did not reappear with the soup-kettle in the twinkling of an eye! In everything connected with food a genuine légionnaire stands no nonsense--he has too often suffered starvation on marches and campaigns not to appreciate "la gamelle." The morning soup, the first of the two daily meals, was the same every day: Bread soup, boiled together, with potatoes and vegetables, and a piece of meat. With it the grey-white French military bread was served, and every other day a quarter of a litre of heavy red wine. The food was eaten off tin plates at the two long tables in our quarters. There was, however, not room enough for all at the tables. The question of seats the Legion's etiquette decided; the privilege of sitting down at table belonged to the old légionnaires. After the soup the kitchen corporal rushed from room to room: "Aux patates--aux pommes de terre!" (To the potatoes!) The whole company marched down to the kitchen, and standing in a large circle peeled the day's supply of potatoes. Every one had to peel--he who had no pocket-knife had to make shift with a sharpened spoon-handle! The purchase of a pocket-knife was an exorbitant luxury on a wage of five centimes a day.... In the afternoon the old légionnaires went off on long marches or to field practice, or were ordered to "corvée," to work with spade and pick, whilst the recruits had instruction. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, after a second "soupe," which was exactly like the first, the official free time of the légionnaire began. But in reality the most tiresome work of all now began--cleaning and washing! Rifle cleaning, cleaning of uniforms, polishing the leather parts of the uniform. Leather! Even now I still think with a gentle shudder of the leather of the Legion, of the cartridge-belt and pouch! There is such a lot of trouble and work connected with these leather belts! The vainest "neuvaine" does not spend so much time over the whole of her toilette as does the légionnaire over the polishing of his cartridge-belt! The procedure was unutterably ridiculous, in the highest degree pedantic and unpractical, being irksome beyond all measure. You melted black wax over a match and put it on the leather. Then this wax had to be properly rubbed in with a flat piece of wood, till it was evenly distributed. Then began the real polishing with an arsenal of different rags. It took two hours to make cartridge-belt and pouch shine properly, till the légionnaire's vanity was satisfied.... Unpractical and old-fashioned as the "astiquage" is, it belongs to the etiquette of the Legion and is sacred. I had a special hatred of it and considered myself infinitely smart when I bought a bottle of leather dressing and simply painted my belts with it instead of working at them for two hours. It looked very well and was at all events more durable. But Corporal Wassermann almost fainted when he saw it. He tore the belt out of my hand, and in a fit of rage ran round to all the men's rooms, to show the other corporals what horrible things happen in this sinful world. A painted cartridge-belt! The old soldiers of the companies came running up and with many "merdes" and "noms d'un chien" surveyed in petrified astonishment the greenhorn who had been so audacious as to attempt to supplant the sacred "astiquage" of the Legion by painting! "But it is more practical," I said at length to the fuming corporal in the vain attempt to appease him. "Mais, ça ne marche pas!" he shrieked. "That will never do. If you were an old soldier and not a recruit, you would be locked up for ten days!" The greatest plague, however, was the washing. The white uniform had of course to be washed every day. In the back barrack-yard was the "lavabo," a large reservoir built of concrete, with cold running water, called in légionnaire's wit "cercle d'enfer" (Hell's circle). Every free hour the légionnaires stood shoulder to shoulder around the reservoir, in a large circle, shirt-sleeves turned up, with flushed and perspiring heads. Behind those washing other légionnaires waited patiently until a place at the reservoir became vacant. There they washed, rubbed, beat and rinsed until darkness set in. The white linen uniforms, the underclothing, and the linings of the uniforms had to be washed in cold water and with little soap. The small piece of soap which each man received once a month was not nearly enough, and few things were railed at as much as the lack of soap. Scarcely had one turned round, when lo and behold! the soap was gone. Nothing represented the poverty of the Legion so much as this "lavabo." The man who possessed a brush, an ordinary "washing-brush," and with this could simplify the work of washing, was as much envied as if he had been a millionaire--to lend such a brush was looked upon as an act of the greatest friendship! For drying purposes lines were hung up near by, and when one had hung up the wet clothes, one waited patiently until they were dry. A man who was careless or impatient, and who did not do so but went away, might afterwards survey the place on the line where his washing had been hanging--the wash itself was gone, had disappeared, been spirited away. With the half-dry wash one returned to the room, laid one's blanket on the table and "ironed" trousers and tunics by smoothing them with the sharp edge of the drinking-mug until they were free of creases. The poor devil of a légionnaire thus needed an hour for a piece of work which could have been done in a few minutes with the help of a flat-iron. But the foreign légionnaire is far too poor to possess such a treasure as a flat-iron.... * * * * * The object of our training was twofold: the training for prodigious marching performances, and the education of the individual to complete military independence. The working programme of the Foreign Legion, the whole of its military value, is embodied in these two ideas: Brilliant marchers--independent soldiers. In addition to these two advantages we have the financial consideration, on which the Foreign Legion's existence depends--the advantage of cheap, splendidly trained mercenaries, with whom the most daring military operations can be undertaken without consideration of the sacrifice of life involved. No nation, no parliament asks for an account of the dead. The Legion marches and acts independently, dies without attracting attention. The légionnaire can march. Forty kilometres a day is the fixed minimum performance. He must be able to do that, day by day, without interruption, without a day of rest, for weeks on end. That is the object of his training from the very beginning--the daily "pas gymnastique," the "double timing" in the long springy running stride of the Legion, the initiatory practice for marching. Several times every week the men must make practice marches over a distance of at least twenty-four kilometres, with full equipment, at the Legion's pace of five kilometres per hour, which has always remained the same. The only object of the practice marches is to teach the recruits steady quick marching. They neither end with a small manoeuvre, nor have they exercises such as scouting, or exploring the country by means of patrols. It is nothing but simple marching at a prescribed pace, a tramping onwards to fulfil a given task. The "marches militaires," as the practice marches are called, usually commence at midday, when the sun is at its hottest, after a hard morning's drill, so as to represent a practical exercise. On one of the military roads which branch off from Sidi-bel-Abbès in all directions, the march goes on until the twelfth kilometre is reached, and then the men are marched back again. On the march a légionnaire may carry his rifle as he pleases, either shouldered or by the strap, just as is most comfortable to him; he may take off his knapsack if it hurts him, and carry it in his hand; he is not ordered when to open his coat or when to shut it. The officers do not worry the marching légionnaires with paltry orders, and they are allowed to sing or to smoke as they please. When there is a large puddle on the road, or when one side of the road is stony, the column turns off of its own accord and marches where the road is best. In the course of many a whole-day march I have not heard a single word from the officers, no orders except the short whistle signals, which mean: "Column, halt!" and "Column, forward march!" As soon as the signal sounds for a halt, the front rows form front without orders, and every man sits or lies down during the halt as suits him best. The marches are regulated by the one principle: March as you like, with crooked back or toes turned in, if you think that nice or better, but--march! It is always being drummed into the légionnaire that he is intended for nothing else in this world except for marching. If the pangs of hunger are gnawing at his stomach or thirst parches his tongue, that is so much the worse for him, but is no sort of a reason for his not marching on! He may be tired, dead tired, completely exhausted--but he must not stop marching. If his feet are bleeding and the soles burn like fire, that is very sad--but the marching pace must not be slackened. The sun may burn till his senses are all awhirl, he must go on. His task in life is to march. The greatest crime that he can commit is to fail on the march. There is no such thing as an impossible marching performance for the regiment of foreigners. Each individual is inoculated with the one idea, it is hammered into him, that he has to march as long as he can control his legs. And when he can no longer control them, then he must at least try to crawl. It is a merciless system, which, however, produces wonderful soldiers. Inseparable from the march of the Legion is the baggage of the légionnaire. The French foreign soldier marches with an equipment called the "tenue de campagne d'Afrique." He wears splendidly made laced boots, white duck trousers held together at the ankles by means of leather gaiters, and the "capote," the heavy blue military cloak. The cloak is put on over the shirt, without any coat underneath, and its tails are buttoned back behind, so that thighs and knees are left free, and an untrammelled gait rendered possible, just as with the French soldiers. The only difference is that the légionnaire wears the "ceinture" round the body, the blue sash, about four metres long, of fine woollen cloth, which not only gives the body a firm support, but also does service as a tropical belt, indispensable in the sudden changes of temperature in Africa, where the glowing hot day is followed by an icy cold night. The red "képi" has a white cover, and, as further protection against the sun, a thin linen cloth-the "couvre-nuque," neck-cloth--is buttoned on to the "képi," covering the neck, ears and cheeks. There are consequently in the Legion comparatively few cases of sunstroke, which may sound rather surprising. He carries a rifle and a bayonet, two hundred to four hundred cartridges, cartridge pouch and knapsack, and the "sac." This knapsack is made of black varnished canvas with a unique system of straps, and has hardly any weight of its own. On the march it contains two complete uniforms, the légionnaire's linen and polishing cloths, partly in the inside and partly in "ballots," in carefully prescribed bundles. Tent canvas and blanket encircle the knapsack in a long roll. The collapsible tent-sticks are stuck in at the side. On the top is fastened the "gamelle" and fuel for the bivouac fire. In addition each man also carries one of the saucepans of the company or pioneer's implements. Knapsack, rifle and equipment altogether weigh almost fifty kilogrammes; no soldier of any other army carries such a load. With this kit he marches over sand under a burning sun, on very scanty rations. In barracks he gets a cup of black coffee on rising in the morning. At ten o'clock he gets his forenoon soup, at about 5 P.M. his afternoon soup. Two meals a day, both consisting of soup, in which are boiled all sorts of vegetables, a small piece of meat, and now and then a special vegetable as an extra, spinach, carrots or such-like. With this he eats the French military bread, a grey kind of bread which is very easily digested, undoubtedly nutritious, sufficient and palatable. When marching, however, the meat rations are dropped, and food consists almost exclusively of rice and macaroni. As a substitute for the bread he is served with a kind of hard ship's biscuit. Marching always commences in the early hours after midnight. It then goes on uninterruptedly, with the hourly halts for rest of five minutes, until the task has been completed. This is a peculiarity of the Legion from which there is no deviation, even when in the field. Be the distance ever so great, it is covered in _one_ march. The Légionnaire marches.... * * * * * The Foreign Legion, as an old troop of mercenaries, works like a machine. The newly recruited human material is quickly adapted to the old, faultlessly working parts. In barrack life and on the drill-ground the officers stand in the background. For these stages they are superfluous, and their work is confined to paper reports or to an occasional visit to the drill-ground. While I was serving in the Foreign Legion I only came into close touch with the officers of my company on the march. We scarcely knew them; the captain came into the company's office in the forenoon, and was not seen again for the rest of the day. The education of the men and their whole training is left to the non-commissioned officers, above all to the corporals. They were themselves once trained in the same service and possess, with rare exceptions, great talent in training their men to be independent. The system of the marches is brutal; the légionnaire must expend what there is in him of vital energy and human strength, but in the military service he is treated as a soldier, as a valuable soldier, whom one does not worry with pedantic demands and paltry red-tape affairs, but treats him in a sensible, I might say loving, manner, in order to draw from him the utmost he is capable of. From the military point of view he is really well treated. During my training I did not once hear a word of bad language, and if a strong expression was used, it was done in fun. Every morning and every afternoon nine recruits of the eleventh were taken to a secluded spot, a shady avenue near the Plateau, and were taken in hand by a corporal and a légionnaire, première classe. Every movement was explained to us, the purpose of every manoeuvre illustrated precisely, so that we knew why we had to make this or that exercise. The smallest details were all explained. It was not considered a crime if in lining-up one man was a trifle farther forward than the other; but if any man was awkward at boxing, that was considered a very serious thing, and he was drilled by himself until he grasped the fact that boxing was a most important matter, which sharpened wits and nerves. In the pauses the instructors spoke to us and explained a hundred little things. The gun had to be carried across the shoulder in a certain place, because that was the easiest way of carrying and balancing it. We were obliged to work hard, but never had the feeling of being bothered with anything unnecessary. It was practical work, the reason for which every one understood. This was repeated on a larger scale when drilling in companies. Everything was directed towards the practical and useful; one was not drilled mechanically, but by practical methods. The company drill was hardly ever conducted by the officers, but by the colour-sergeant of the company. Here the training of the individual to independence stepped in. In the course of the day every man was given a problem which he had to solve: the estimating of distances, the search for cover or ambush.... For instance, ten men were told off as a scout-patrol, and had to reach a certain spot without being seen. At the goal the whole company assembled, and every légionnaire could watch for himself how the scout-patrol carried out their task. Their movements were criticised by the watching légionnaires; in great excitement they debated if another way did not offer better cover, or if the patrol should not have remained longer at one point to get a wider range of view for their observations. This military criticism was looked upon with favour, and sergeants and corporals regularly took part in the discussion. This introduced into the hard service a suggestion of sport and individual interest, stirring the ambition and giving interest to the work. For all that the general work of the troop was not neglected and drill was not despised when necessary. To my mind the firing discipline, for instance, was perfect. "Being practical" was the leading principle of the whole training. Each man knew the length of his steps and knew that he required 117 or 120 or 125 steps to walk 100 metres. In interesting instructive lessons in the field the légionnaire learnt not only the rudiments of map-reading, but was taught to illustrate a report by a sketch, if it was only a rough one. The corporals took special pains with the talented and educated légionnaires, stirring their pride and ambition to achieve something out of the common. One had the feeling of working for a sporting competition. On clear, starry nights the company was often alarmed and marched into the surrounding country of Sidi-bel-Abbès. Far out in the open field we stopped. These exercises were conducted by our first lieutenant. He gathered the légionnaires round him in a circle and explained to them the constellations, their movements and their relation to each other. This was repeated so often till even the greatest dunce could find his bearings by means of the Pole-star and the Great Bear. Personal interest was brought into the soldier's work. One became independent, one knew the Why and the Wherefore. Again and again rifle-pits were dug, and sporting ambition urged us to work quicker than the next section. There was equal competition at the frequent drills in throwing up earthworks, and with wonderful rapidity entrenchments were built up of haversacks filled with sand. It was like watching a match to see the "escouades," the different sections of the company, endeavouring to be the first to have their tent up. With one pull they had the tent-cloth out of the knapsack, and fitted the sticks together; every one had his own piece of work--the one buttoned the tent canvas together, the other stretched the sides down tight, and the next one drove in the pegs. And like a miracle the little tent grew out of the ground. My squad held the record in tent-building with seventy seconds. It was looked upon as a matter of honour to turn out with the greatest speed and exactness, one was proud of being able to form square on the march in a few seconds. One ran like mad at the command "A genoux!"--an interesting manoeuvre, the purpose of which was to save oneself from bursting shells and volley fire. When the command "A genoux!" (Down on the knees!) sounded the whole line in long strides moved closely together, every single man fell on his knees and put his head as far under the knapsack of the man in front of him as possible, each one crowding close to his neighbour. No head, no back was visible, nothing but a compact mass of knapsacks. The head of each man was protected by the knapsack of the man in front, this and his own knapsack protecting him from shells and shrapnel. The "sac," with its contents of soft uniforms and underlinen, was proof even against a rifle-bullet. Everything was practical. All the bother with the "paquetage," the paltry and exact folding up of equipment according to a prescribed plan, meant in reality prompt readiness at shortest notice. The légionnaire has no wardrobe and is obliged to put a host of things into a ridiculously small space with methodical neatness. But the result of all this is that he can find every piece in the dark and stands with his kit packed according to marching regulations ten minutes after the alarm. The Legion understands its soldiering business. One must admit that. It shoots brilliantly. The general regulations for the computation of the shooting range are absolutely ignored by the Legion. But every man tests his gun over every range until he knows exactly, when given a distance, how his own gun shoots over it: at four hundred yards, a hand's-breadth up, and a hand's-breadth to the left ... and so on. The shooting-range at Sidi-bel-Abbès is never unoccupied, cartridges are not stinted, and a company would feel very unhappy if at least half of its men were not first-class shots. Money prizes are even given. I once got a prize of ten francs.... On the other hand, it is on the rifle-ground that one can see how the légionnaire is treated as a man. He is supposed to be a badly treated man, a desperate man, one not to be trusted. As a soldier the légionnaire must shoot, shoot much. As a desperate man he ought not to have arms in his possession. But the Legion has found a compromise. A corporal stands behind every légionnaire who shoots on the range, watching the shooter's every movement. From the same reason even the sentinels do not get any cartridges. The non-commissioned officer in command of the guard receives a small box with ammunition, locked and sealed and only to be opened in case of necessity. Is a sentinel attacked, then he must defend himself with his bayonet until he can alarm the guard and bring the officer on duty to the rescue with cartridges. Such things are significant. But they do not prevent the légionnaire from being a splendid soldier. Individual training--Boer tactics--practical instruction ... that is the Legion. And it marches. Now and then its marching powers are increased artificially. The "compagnies montées" one with each regiment, companies mounted on mules, have even done seventy kilometres a day. Every two men have a mule. The one rides and takes the baggage of his comrade marching alongside with him on the mule. Then they change about. The mounted companies lie far in the south and follow up the hostile Arabs with colossal forced marches. But on the whole "la Légion" depends on its legs. These brilliant professional soldiers march.... * * * * * I will give you, naturally translated, my company's weekly programme as it was hung up on the blackboard every Saturday: Monday 6-7 Boxing. 7.30-10 Company drill. 12 Military march. Tuesday 6-7 Gymnastics. 7.30-10 Skirmishing. 11-12 Instruction in hygienic rules in the field. 1 Work under the quartermaster's direction. Wednesday 5.30-6.30 Boxing. 7 Company musters for bathing. 8-11 Mending uniforms, preparation for inspection by the colonel. Thursday 5.30 March to the shooting-range. 12-1 Instruction in first-aid to wounded. 1.15 Work under the quartermaster's orders. Friday 5 Military march. 1-2 Instruction in taking cover in flat ground. 2.30 Work under the quartermaster's orders. Saturday 5.30 Run over six kilometres. 8-11 Company drill. 12 Cleaning of barracks and quarters. 4 Inspection of the barracks by the colonel. The men stand beside their beds in duck suit. N.B.--At the 11 o'clock muster each morning a part of the uniform, to be named each day by the adjutant, has to be presented for inspection. * * * * * Inseparable from the Legion's military value is the Legion's work. Not so very long ago Sidi-bel-Abbès was a sand-heap, on which only a "marabout" stood, the tomb of a pious saint, to which the Arab hordes of the Beni Amer made pilgrimages. At that time strange men came, gathered round the brand new flag of the Legion and convinced the sons of Amer in bloody battles that it would be good for their health to move farther south. These strange men built roads and burned bricks. They built solid fortification walls, drained that horrid little rivulet Mekerra, which flowed so sluggishly through the sand, and which smelt so badly; they laid out gardens and planted olive-trees. The barracks, the public buildings, most of the dwelling-houses arose under the hands of these industrious mercenaries. The légionnaire was always and is always still a workman. The heaviest work of the Foreign Legion is done on the smallest military stations in Algeria, down in the south, on the borders of the Sahara, where every day's bodily work means loss of health to a European. There the working column turns out day by day with pick and spade to build roads, whilst perhaps in an Arab village a few hours distant the civil authorities are distributing "relief" in the form of natural products to loafing Arabs. Eighty per cent. of Algeria's brilliant roads have been built by the Legion. The trowel is thrust into the légionnaire's hand. There, now you are a mason. He builds barracks for the troops and offices for the civil administration. He breaks the stones with which the roads are repaired. He performs the pioneer work of Northern Africa at a wage which a coolie would scoff at. His strength is made full use of. A grotesque example of this is the custom prevailing in the 2nd Regiment, stationed in Saida, to allow légionnaires to work for private people in the town. They, of course, get less wage for this than a common workman would ask for, but that in itself would not be so bad, because even the few francs a day mean wealth to a légionnaire. The peculiarity, however, the typical side of the whole affair, is that these workers have to hand over a part of their day's earnings to the funds of their company. The company enriches itself through their work. In the garrison life of Sidi-bel-Abbès the work of the Legion took grotesque forms. In my life I have spent several weeks on end in the saddle; while still very young I struggled for existence in the United States; I have suffered from hunger and cold, and for months I have had shivering fits of malaria--but I never experienced to such a degree the feeling that my physical strength was being pumped out of me to the last drop as during the time I spent in Sidi-bel-Abbès. I was always tired and every free moment found me stretched out at full length on my camp bed. During work I had the ambition (which to-day appears to me ridiculous) to be second to none in strength and endurance. Scarcely, however, was the work ended, when the bodily and mental depression set in. My captain was quite right when one day at inspection he stood still in front of me and said disapprovingly to the sergeant: "Il a maigri beaucoup!" (He has got very thin!) "Mais il fait son service," replied the sergeant. (He does his work.) That was of course the principal thing. The getting thin and feeling tired had their own good reasons. Like all légionnaires I was a working animal. Early in the morning the hard military service began. The afternoon brought the "corvée" work, and the evening the ridiculous small jobs of the barrack routine. The word "corvée," which literally means drudgery and in the military sense "work," I will not forget as long as I live, and will never read it again without shuddering. "Corvée" was a component part of almost every day in the Legion. The work was often so hard that every bone and every muscle in my body ached, often it was simply ridiculous and depressing. The greater part of the company mustered generally at 1 P.M. in the barrack-yard, and the sergeant "du jour" chose working parties, each of which was in charge of a corporal. That was something quite different to the military service. Indifferent as I must have been at that time, I nevertheless always noticed the sulky and disgusted faces the men made when they went to this work. In small groups we marched out of the barracks, armed with broom, pick and shovel. The Legion was there to work, and from the légionnaire one could ask things impossible in other French troops. If one saw a soldier working in Sidi-bel-Abbès, then he was sure to be a légionnaire. Arab Spahis or French soldiers of the line, who were also stationed in Sidi-bel-Abbès, had never such work to do as we did, and which should have been done by scavengers and navvies. That was the privilege of the Foreign Legion. From the Arab Spahis, that is to say from the natives, such work was not demanded. On the other hand, the Legion had often to supply men to put the forage of the "Spahis" under cover. That may sound paltry, but it is just these small things that characterise the way the légionnaire is taken advantage of. He is just good enough for any kind of work. We swept the public park of the town for the citizens of Sidi-bel-Abbès, whilst the gardeners stood idly by, watching us and ordering us about; we rooted out the undergrowth, and cleansed the brook which ran through the botanical gardens from mud and refuse. We emptied the drains in the officers' houses; we did scavengers' work in the filthy slums of the town. Once I was a member of a detachment that had to clean the sewers in the Arab prison. The work was loathsome beyond measure. We had taken with us a large barrow with casks, and had to haul from underneath the floors of the cells and prison rooms the large tin pans, and carry them to the barrow. We performed this disgusting work, whilst in the prison yard the loafing Arab rabble prowled around and made jokes at our expense. Sunday only was free from work, free from all kinds of service. We were not even mustered. And the légionnaire lies the whole blessed Sunday in bed. Towards evening he goes to the Jardin Public to listen to the concert given by the regimental band. He goes there because it is the Legion's custom--but he would much rather sleep on.... CHAPTER VI "THE LEGION GETS NO PAY" The money troubles of the Legion : Five centimes wages : The cheapest soldiers of the world : Letters from the Legion : The science of "decorating" : The industries of the légionnaires : What the bugler did for a living : The man with the biscuits : A thief in the night : Summary lynch law : Herr von Rader and La Cantinière : "The Legion works--the Legion gets no pay!" The poor fellows who enlisted because they had no money to buy a crust of bread made the biggest mistake of their lives when they thought to finish with their troubles by entering the Legion. Without exception every man in the Legion had his money troubles. Money was a thing of immense value in the Foreign Legion. The possession of a few francs made an enormous difference and created in the midst of the Legion's red-trousered equality the finest social grades and distinctions. Not only the value but also the power of money was enhanced in the Legion. Copper pieces meant a great deal here. Copper pieces purchased a few "litres" of wine, or a nocturnal carouse, or a substitute to help in doing hard work. The légionnaire with a little money was on quite a different footing to the man who had none. Rassedin, the wealthy Rassedin, was a prince in a surrounding of poor devils. A wide gap parted him from the other men. They flattered him to get into his good graces and accepted gladly his insolence, if there were but a few sous or a few good cigarettes to be had. Of our quarters he was the king. He reigned supreme. He was obeyed in all matters. It was too funny to see how his comrades hurried themselves when this man, the incarnation of the God of Mammon in the Legion, happened to express a wish, and how they then went off with beaming faces to the canteen to change the couple of sous they had earned into wine. The self-confidence with which the Belgian bore the dignity of his wealth (and what enormous wealth are a few thousand francs to a légionnaire!) was, considered by itself, only funny. But many a time I suspected that Rassedin, who knew so well what a frightful death was waiting for him, despised the petty greed of them all from the bottom of his heart. Money rules even in the Foreign Legion! The pay is five centimes daily, which is about one cent or one halfpenny. Exactly the fiftieth part of the daily pay of an American regular. The twenty-fourth part of a British soldier's daily pay. The comparison is grotesque. When one considers, however, that the man who enlists in the Foreign Legion sells his skin and is a "paid" mercenary, the comparison becomes astounding. The average légionnaire finds out in a remarkably short time that he has been a fool to enlist, that he is the victim of a system very near akin to slavery, that he is a working man without wages, a labourer without pay. An old French proverb says: Business is getting the other man's money! And very substantial values is La France getting out of the légionnaire. With this poorly paid Legion, the French Republic protects the boundaries of her territory in Algeria and conquers the southern deserts step by step--in the everlasting wars in French Tonquin the Legion's troops are always ready for service. Fighting is not the only work of the Foreign Legion, however. Only one-half of the légionnaire is a real soldier. The other half of him is workman, carpenter, builder, road-maker. He works hard and he is so cheap a workman that no Chinese coolie can compete with him. He receives board and clothes and a cent a day--the cheap soldier of the Legion, this funny soldier of "fortune." He can be made use of in the most terrible climates, for the most risky operations, simply because nobody troubles his head about him and because his officers have no account to render for his life or death. The sum of money which his work with pick and shovel, with mason's trowel and carpenter's axe has saved the French Government in all these years must be enormous. And if a bullet, or sunstroke, or typhoid fever, or dysentery carries away a légionnaire, the only expense he is the cause of is the making of a hole in the sand. So cheap! Truly, France's Foreign Legion is a well-paying enterprise! Glorious soldiers and successful workmen are remarkably cheap at five centimes a day.... Every five days the légionnaire gets his wages paid. He holds five copper sous in his hand and must decide whether to buy cigarette tobacco, or cleaning materials, or a bottle of wine. It is only enough for one of these three. The purchase of a box of matches, which are monopolised in Algeria and cost five centimes, is a very grave financial problem. Therefore matches are scarce. Nowhere in the world is one so often asked for a match as in the streets of Sidi-bel-Abbès and in the Legion's barracks. No wonder that the possession of a few silver pieces is something truly great for a légionnaire; no wonder that men like Rassedin rule as kings. Nowhere can the lesson of the value of money be so thoroughly learned as in the Foreign Legion. The money troubles of the Legion are, of course, ridiculously petty troubles. The luckiest man (considered from the Legion's point of view) is he who has kept up some sort of communication with home. The most appalling letters are then written to parents and relations and friends. Usually the poor devil of a letter-writer exaggerates a little, and his descriptions of famine and hardships are most moving. They must be very hard-hearted people indeed who do not acknowledge the receipt of such a letter with a small postal order. Then there is joy in the land of Sidi-bel-Abbès. For a day, or a few days, or even a week, the prodigal son with the postal order lives like a king. He has his boots cleaned for him, and would not dream of making his own bed as long as his money lasts. A comrade does that for him, and in reward is graciously permitted to share a drink. C'est la Légion! To play the "grand seigneur," if it is but for a day, is the average légionnaire's dream of happiness. He thinks it the finest thing in all the world to play at having a servant, if it's but for a day.... And this is the surest sign of the légionnaire's abject poverty. These lucky ones who receive a postal order occasionally represent the crème de la crème, the élite of society in the Foreign Legion. The others have to help themselves. They must "decorate themselves!" This "decorating" is a fine art in the Foreign Legion. It is a mixture of work, cunning, brains, and theft. "Decorate yourself!" That is the sum total of an old légionnaire's wisdom, and these two words are the only advice that he gives, or indeed can give, to the newcomer. Make your life in the Legion as easy as possible is the meaning of this advice; take care that your tobacco-pouch stays full, that your uniform is in order and your kit complete, that you have as often as possible the three sous necessary for your litre of wine. The way in which this "decorating" is carried out is a purely personal affair.... My friend the bugler used to make gaudy "ceintures" from coloured pieces of cloth and old leather-work, belts with crests and buttons of the Legion. He found good customers for his belts amongst the Arabs and occasionally amongst Spanish workmen in the little wine-shops of Sidi-bel-Abbès. In his special methods of decorating the old légionnaire developed an extraordinary business instinct. His transactions were not at all simple. An Arab never parts with hard cash--after the time-honoured manner of his kind. So the bugler had to "trade." He would exchange his gaudy rags for a pair of pretty golden-bossed Arabian shoes, or a grotesquely carved Arabian stick, or a morocco purse of fine leather-work. Then Smith would constitute one of the légionnaires on orderly duty in the officers' mess his agent. Paying customers could easily be found amongst the young officers. The final result was always the same: many litres of the sweet heavy wine of Algeria into which all the copper coins of the Legion invariably change. A légionnaire of the fourth company was generally known as "l'homme des biscuits!" His speciality was to gather in all the companies the biscuits given out twice weekly to complete the bread ration. They were like ship's biscuit and extremely hard. Most of the men would not touch them. So the biscuit man had a capital gathering ground, and in some cunning way, which he carefully kept secret, he took sack upon sack of these biscuits out of the barracks. In the market-place of Sidi-bel-Abbès he found plenty of customers. Others, less inventive, confined themselves to cleaning and washing for comrades better off than they. In some way every one tried to "decorate himself."... The main object in a légionnaire's life is the getting together of a few coppers. Decorating meant also occasional theft.... In matters of stealing the Legion draws the line very sharply. The theft of equipment, to replace lost or stolen parts, was considered absolutely respectable and gentleman-like. There was no other remedy, as the man who loses something is punished severely. Thieving "decorating" is a very simple thing and quickly learned. "I've lost a pair of trousers!" cries the recruit in despair. "That's nothing," says the old légionnaire. "Curse it, what shall I do then?" wails the new-comer. "Decorate yourself, you fool," says the old hand. Whereupon the recruit (after receiving detailed instructions from the wise old soldier) walks into the back yard, where the washing is hanging out to dry, and waits in a dark corner with great patience for an auspicious moment. A lightning snatch and a pair of somebody's trousers hanging innocently on the line are his. He has decorated himself. It's immoral, of course. It's theft right enough. It's deplorable ... but it is most convenient. The Legion does not worry about small matters of right or wrong. The Legion says: Each for himself; why didn't you keep an eye on your washing, you fool! Now such a single theft of a single pair of trousers naturally is but the first link in a long chain of trouser-stealing. The man who has been robbed has no other remedy than doing likewise. And so on.... In a very few days hundreds of pairs of trousers change owners, until somewhere in the long chain some one is struck who buys himself a new pair. Somehow or other it all comes right! The Legion considers this sort of theft sportsman-like and gentlemanly, a thing permitted, and it is a "point d'honneur" to be smart enough not to get caught by the rightful owner. But woe to the légionnaire who should ever extend his decorating operations to tobacco or money or even bread. The whole company would form a self-constituted detective corps and find the culprit out very soon. The rest would be--silence and hospital! * * * * * During one of the very first nights an ugly scene took place which showed only too well how a thief is treated in the Legion. In the middle of the night furious shouting made me jump out of bed. Sleepily I looked about me. Around Rassedin's bed stood a group of cursing and gesticulating soldiers. I went up to them. Smith and three others were holding in grips of iron a fourth man who could hardly speak for terror. His face was white as chalk. Rassedin stood there in his shirt, staring hard at the man caught. "You're from the tenth company?" "Yes," stammered the man. "What in hell are you doing in the eleventh then?" "Been drinking--got into the wrong quarters--let me go----" In the meantime all the men in the room had gathered and were standing around the group. "Nom de Dieu--what a dirty fellow!" said Rassedin. "Listen, you chaps. I had my money in my trousers and my trousers were under my pillow. Just now I felt something moving near me, jumped up and caught hold. Do you know what I caught? This chap's hand. What do you think of that?" "Voleur!" cried the bugler. "Thief!" The word acted like a signal. All at once fists were clenched, a bayonet gleamed, a struggle arose, and a dozen men rolled on the ground. The scene lasted for perhaps a minute. Then all was still--the man from the tenth company lay there gasping and covered with blood. His face was black, so terribly was it bruised. A blow from the bayonet had split his cheek and a stream of blood flowed over his blue jacket. The guard came up and the fellow was carried into hospital. "He wanted to steal my money! He wanted to decorate himself!" said Rassedin grimly. "For the present we've decorated him!" The man lay in hospital for weeks. That was the end of it. That night's lynch-law in our quarters was not inquired into. The punishment of the thief rests in the hands of his comrades. So decrees the custom of the Legion.... * * * * * When it came to "decorating," Herr von Rader was in his element. The Legion's little ways had nothing mysterious for him. In a week the whole Legion knew him and respected him as a man of brains and resource. Every evening he went across to the canteen. Money he had not. But he juggled untiringly with empty wine-bottles, performed the most difficult conjuring tricks with absinthe glasses, and used to tell Madame la Cantinière (who understood a little German) the funniest stories. Very soon he succeeded in making a deep impression on that worthy lady, the queen over so many desirable wine-casks. She found the clever Herr von Rader amusing, and she did something that she had never done before in her life. She gave the man of many tricks a gratis bottle of wine every evening, and into the bargain the change out of an imaginary ten-sous piece. Madame's Portuguese husband had no idea of this little secret of his wife's kind heart. Anyway, he need not have troubled himself: Herr von Rader had not the slightest intention of endangering Madame la Cantinière's conjugal fidelity--he only loved her wine.... Thus did Herr von Rader decorate himself with his glib tongue and his clever fingers. The soldiering part of his work was easy enough for him. Herr von Rader got on better under the flag of the Legion than all the other recruits. Sometimes, however (when Madame la Cantinière was in a bad temper or her Portuguese husband kept too sharp an eye on her), even Herr von Rader would fall into a thoughtful mood. Then he would rub away angrily at his leather equipment and propound practical philosophy. Something like this: "Nom de Dieu!" (Herr von Rader was already quite at home with the curses of the French language.) "Nom de bon Dieu! This Legion is no good. Nix good. Now, for an intelligent man like me there is a bottle of wine and a cigarette easily to be had anywhere in the world. You'll admit that! Is it easy here? It is not! I've got to waste a lot of thinking and fine art just to keep in cigarettes.... This Legion's rotten. I've been had. They've swindled me! I'll tell you what, mein Freund: I'm going to skin out. This boy is going to run away...." He did "skin out," some time afterwards. For it the cheerful Herr von Rader was to suffer the whole immeasurably hard punishment system of the Legion. Even this cheerful fellow, who knew so well how to help himself, and in consequence was far better off than the other men in the Legion, was troubled by the simple problem of the Foreign Legion! A problem which so many of the Legion's soldiers have tried to reason out with so many head-shakings. A problem which once an Arabian Spahi put very plainly in a few scornful words: "The Legion works--the Legion gets no pay!" CHAPTER VII THE CITY OF THE FOREIGN LEGION The daily exodus to town : Ben Mansur's coffee : The Ghetto : The citizens of Sidi-bel-Abbès and the légionnaires : How the Legion squared accounts with the civilians : A forbidden part of the town : Primitive vice : A dance of a night : The gardens : The last resting-place of the Legion's dead En ville! Off to Sidi-bel-Abbès! Every afternoon shortly before six o'clock there began a very exodus from the Legion's barracks to the town. A légionnaire would rather clean and polish for an hour after lights out in the semi-darkness of the night-lamp than miss his stroll to town. The daily walk in Sidi-bel-Abbès was part of the Legion's sacred tradition. At five o'clock the gigantic gates of the barracks were closed and only a little side door remained open. Here the sergeant of the guard posted himself and carefully inspected everybody who wanted to go out, so that the Legion's reputation for chic should not suffer. The uniform to be worn in town was prescribed every day by a special regimental order; each légionnaire had to wear the same uniform, red trousers and blue jacket or white trousers and blue overcoat, and everybody took an especial pride in looking as trim and smart as possible. Three thousand soldiers of the Legion used to stroll about the streets of Sidi-bel-Abbès every evening. For me this daily walk was a wondrous change from the Legion's routine. Above the gleam of the electric arc lamps shone the starry glory of a southern sky. Little black boys in white breeches, whose countless folds might have told endless stories of stolen trifles they had concealed, lounged at the street corners and cried the evening paper, the _Echo d'Oran_; Arabs in white burnouses, carrying in their hands the dangerous Arabian sticks, in which they find a never-failing missile, stood motionless, silently watching with looks of suspicion the "Rumis," the white foreigners who will always remain foreigners to them and whose customs they will never be able to understand. All Sidi-bel-Abbès was promenading; citizens of the town, officers and civilians of the "Bureau Arabe" with their womenfolk. In between came the Legion's heavy soldier-steps and the sound of gently rattling bayonets. Four streets, which run exactly north, south, east, and west, to Oran, Daya, Maskara, and Tlemcen, divide the town at right angles. They are the main streets in which the European shops and fashionable cafés lie. For private financial reasons the légionnaire does not buy in these shops and in the fashionable cafés he is badly treated. The légionnaire has no business in the main streets--from the honest citizen's point of view. Between the blocks of the main streets, however, a labyrinth of small courts and alleys is hidden. There the Spanish Jews and Arabs live, there trading and bargaining goes on incessantly. In this maze of dark alleys the men of the Legion were at home, in the treacherous wineshops which depended on the custom of the soldiers. "Bar de la Légion," or "Bar du Légionnaire," or "Bar de Madagascar" these hovels called themselves. Good wine is ridiculously cheap in Algeria. But out of the légionnaires extra money must needs be made. They were given a brew in the wineshops made from grapes which had been pressed already two or three times and to which a little alcohol lent flavour and "aroma." Beside the wineshops were Mohammedan restaurants in which one could eat "kuskus" and "galettes," tough pancakes with honey; restaurants in which knives and forks were looked upon as accursed instruments, which doubtless the devil of the Rumis must have invented for devilish purposes unintelligible to a true believer. Poverty and filth reigned in these places, but they were good enough for the poor despised légionnaire. One café in this quarter had an individuality of its own, depending exclusively on the custom of the Legion. In a corner by the theatre a pretty little Spanish girl had put up a wooden hut and filled it with rickety old chairs, to be treated and used with great care, given her in charity probably somewhere or other merely to get rid of them. There she sold coffee to the soldiers of the Legion. This little woman had a good eye for business. Her coffee was, 'tis true, merely coloured hot water and not especially good water at that, but the soldier of the Legion willingly drank it, for Manuelita's coffee was very cheap indeed, and a pretty smile and a coquette glance went with each cup. When business was slack the hostess would even chat a little. These tactics secured for the sly little Spaniard the faithful custom of the légionnaires. La Légion made love to Manuelita unceasingly.... The old légionnaires stole flowers for her, and if somewhere in Tonquin or on the Morocco border plundering had been going on, Manuelita would some months later be sure to receive the finest presents, stolen for her by her old friends of the Legion and carried about all the time in knapsacks. The Legion was grateful to Manuelita. She was the great exception. Besides her and Madame la Cantinière there was no woman in the town of the Foreign Legion who would even in her wildest dreams have deigned a légionnaire worthy of a glance. Smith would never have patronised this Café de la Légion. He knew something much better. To him I owed my acquaintance with Ben Mansur's coffee. His was a Moorish coffee-house. Finely coloured mosaics formed Arabian proverbs on the floor and against the walls there were long marble benches. Arabs crouched on these benches and smoked comfortably gurgling narghiles--the incarnation of quietude and silence. For hours they sat over a single cup of coffee, whose purchase gave them also, according to Arabian custom, the right of spending the night on the marble benches. In stolid silence they played "esch schronsch"--chess. One seldom saw a soldier of the Legion here, for Ben Mansur only spoke Arabic. Smith, however, was his bosom friend, and these two always greeted one another solemnly with deep bows, with their arms folded on the breast in Arab fashion. Ben Mansur's coffee was a dream of fairyland. All day and all night charcoal glowed in the ancient Moorish stove in the corner, and in a wonderful octagonal copper kettle, which must have done service for generations of Arabs, there simmered boiling water. A silver can contained a thick coffee brew, a kind of extract. From this Ben Mansur filled the little clay cups half full and poured in boiling water. Then he conjured dreamland into the tiny little cups, adding a drop here and a drop there from mysterious bottles, a drop of essence of oranges, a drop of hashish oil and a drop of opium. Ben Mansur's coffee, with its wonderful aroma and the restful oblivion which that little cup gave, was a wonder never to be forgotten. Smith and I used to sit on the marble benches by the hour, legs crossed in honour of the customs of our host's race. Before us stood the water-pipe of the Orient, a "narghile," filled with wonderful tobacco very different from the products of the Algerian tobacco monopoly. Ben Mansur would never take more than two sous, which is two cents, for both of us, no matter how many pipes we smoked or how many cups of coffee we drank. This was his idea of hospitality. Then again I used to wander with Smith through the dirty streets of the Jewish quarter, where the rubbish-heaps lay in the open streets and the atmosphere was tainted with every variety of smell. At the corners thin Spanish Jews, with the sharp features common to their race, haggled over a bargain; Algerian Jews walked stately through the alleys, in long flowing robes of blue and brown silk, men of importance who held the wealth of the country in their hands as the go-betweens of the world's trade and the riches of Algeria. Wealth and power dwelt in this miserable quarter of Sidi-bel-Abbès under the shell of poverty with which Israel is so fond of surrounding itself. In the Ghetto of Sidi-bel-Abbès no trifle is so small that it is not worth haggling about, and no proposition paltry enough to come amiss to the man of the Ghetto, whose love of money is so great that he does not despise even the Legion's small copper pieces. The Ghetto and the Foreign Legion have quite lively business connections, consisting principally in the change of small currency notes. Many banknotes which originally formed the kernel of a légionnaire's letter from home have wandered into the mysterious channels of Jewish trade. The Ghetto of Sidi-bel-Abbès has earned a small fortune in these small transactions. A légionnaire is seldom much of a man of business and he certainly is always in a big hurry to get his dollar or his five marks or his five pesetas changed into francs and centimes--so he submits with more or less grace to fantastic rates of exchange, getting little more than three francs for a dollar and about four francs for a "fünf Mark Schein." All other business of the Ghetto with the soldiers of the Legion is equally profitable--for the other man, be it understood, not, of course, for the légionnaire. Very often men of the Legion steal, under cover of darkness, silently through the little streets of the Jewish quarter carrying big bundles of brown woollen blankets and blue sashes, stamped in the middle and at the corners with the Legion's stamp in white paint, which marks them clearly as regimental property. But what's in a stamp! It can be got rid of easily enough with good will and a little turpentine.... Anything that a légionnaire may want to sell the second-hand merchants of Sidi-bel-Abbès buy; at prices below contempt, it is true, but all the same they buy it. The small silver coins of the Ghetto have been the ruin of more than one soldier of the Legion who in a fit of rage sold his uniform to the obliging trader and paid the penalty with a long term of imprisonment. Thus the interests of the Ghetto and the interests of the Legion are identical in a small way, and as a result the Ghetto man and the soldier are quite friendly with each other. The honest citizen of Sidi-bel-Abbès, however, a half-caste of Spanish or Levantine or French extraction, is anything but fond of the red-trousered foreigner. He despises the Legion and its men from the bottom of his heart and has quite forgotten that the very same Legion built his town for him in the beginning; that there would be no Sidi-bel-Abbès if there had been no Legion.... His woman-kind draw their skirts close about them when they meet a légionnaire in the streets, as if he were plague-stricken. He himself--why, he has managed to bring it about that the officers' mess is now merely used as an evening club, while the officers have to dine in hotels, in order that the honest citizen may make a little money out of them. The sub-lieutenants dine in one hotel, the first lieutenants in another, the unmarried captains and higher officers patronise a third. Every hotel had to have a share in the spoils, of course! The honest citizen is very indignant when the regimental band does not give a concert three times weekly for him; he has his public parks swept by the Legion and takes good care that all the provisions for the three thousand soldiers are bought in the town itself and nowhere else. For the trifling purchases which even a poor devil of a légionnaire sometimes makes he keeps a specially rubbishy class of article and charges double prices for it. The regiment of foreigners is a very good thing for the honest citizen of Sidi-bel-Abbès, but nevertheless he despises the Legion and the légionnaire--this citizen of the Foreign Legion's town. He takes good care, however, not to express his feelings of dislike too openly to Monsieur le Légionnaire, for he has more than once learnt that the men in red trousers are not to be trifled with. That they are much better left alone, in fact. The much-tried patience of the Legion has its strongly defined bounds and sometimes it gives way. When the Legion is not occupied in Tonquin or Madagascar or some such lovely neighbourhood, the regimental band gives a concert several times a week in the Place Sadi Carnot. The good man of Sidi-bel-Abbès always found this concert very fine, but what he did not like about it was that besides himself thousands of légionnaires promenaded in the Carnot square, enjoying the band's music as much as the civilians. One day the honest citizen drew a cordon of police around the Place Sadi Carnot, with orders to let no soldiers pass, and thought he would now have the music all for himself.... The légionnaires were struck dumb with astonishment at this unheard-of impudence and the Arabian policemen felt very uncomfortable. News of the "outrage" was sent to barracks and in a very few minutes the men of the Legion were assembled in full force, discussing in fifteen different languages the evident impossibility of living in peace with the honest citizen of Sidi-bel-Abbès. All at once an old soldier gave the word of command: "En avant par colonne du régiment--marche!" The Arabian policemen tumbled to right and to left, the citizens of Sidi-bel-Abbès vanished as if by a conjuring trick into the side streets, and in five minutes there was not a single soul in civilian clothes to be seen on the Place Sadi Carnot. The men in red trousers held the field in triumph. Since they were in fine humour and out for a real good time they promptly smashed up all the chairs on which the ladies and gentlemen of Sidi-bel-Abbès had been sitting, made a pile of them and lit up a grand bonfire while the regimental band played its gayest marches. In the meantime a deputation of citizens had rushed to the colonel of the regiment and made a great noise about these horrible légionnaires. The colonel merely laughed. "My good sirs," said he, "it is now eleven o'clock. My men have leave till midnight. In another hour all will be over." "But they have burnt the chairs," wailed the deputation. "I'm very glad they have not burned anything else," laughed the colonel. "You leave my men in peace and they'll let you alone." Since that time the honest citizen of Sidi-bel-Abbès has been rather more careful in his treatment of the Legion. It is true that an order of the town council says that a légionnaire can only get a ticket for the gallery in the town's theatre, but if a légionnaire with superfluous money wants a seat in the stalls, he can nevertheless get it. The honest citizen has learnt to respect the Legion's feelings. But, under the surface, the citizen's contempt of the Legion naturally remained. The soldier of the foreign regiment puts out the fires which break out in Sidi-bel-Abbès, he saves the citizens and their goods when the stream of the Mekerra becomes a roaring torrent in the rainy season, and he protects the helpless townspeople when the descendants of the Beni Amer try to institute the Jewish persecutions they are so fond of.... He does all that. But the poor devil of a mercenary has no money, and this is the Mortal Sin. * * * * * One quarter of the town was taboo to us légionnaires, strictly forbidden under a penalty of a month's imprisonment: the "village nègre," the negro town, the home of every sort of disease and crime. The beasts in human forms which house there had more than once killed a légionnaire to rob him of his sash or some such trifle. Forbidden things always have a mysterious power of attraction, and I was burning with curiosity. Slowly, keeping a sharp look-out for patrols, I crossed the big drill-ground one night and turned, close behind the mosque, into the maze of huts. It was a pitch-dark night, and I kept falling over the dirt-heaps and tripping in the holes in the hard trodden ground. At last I saw lights. The main street of the village nègre lay before me, a narrow little alley. I could have touched the walls on either side with outstretched arms. The miserable low houses were half in ruins, and irregular holes took the place of doors and windows. The alley, but a few paces long, was brightly illuminated by the light of half a dozen torches stuck in holes in the walls. In this narrow space the vice of Sidi-bel-Abbès was hidden. Songs and cries and shrieks filled the air. Before the huts women were sitting, poor prostitutes, who sold themselves for a few coppers and a drink of absinthe. Here was vice in its most primitive form. The night was cold. Braziers with glowing coals stood before every hut, and women crouched over them that they might better warm their bodies at the warmth of the fire. Modesty seemed to be a thing unknown. A negress with a figure full of strength lay there stretched at full length almost naked, with the warmth-giving firepan beside her. She was too worn out or too lazy to speak, she merely invited the passers-by with a gesture to come into her hut. Near her a Frenchwoman, in whose face her awful life had cut deep furrows, sat in a torn silk dress on the bare ground. Beside them Arabian girls crouched, children almost, the copper bangles on their arms and legs showing that they were from the far South. Italian women, with the characteristic gold earrings of their race, and Spaniards, with oily shining hair, quarrelled in high-pitched voices. The blazing light of the torches gave their faces an uncanny look. In the midst of these miserable women moved the scum of the population of Sidi-bel-Abbès. There were negroes in ragged linen coats who in daytime carried heavy burdens on their backs and spent their evenings regularly in the village nègre. Spanish labourers chattered and gesticulated with the Spanish girls. It was the meeting-place of the poor and the wretched, a corso of humanity at its worst. My bayonet rattling gently against the steel sheath startled the men and women. When they saw that they only had to deal with a single légionnaire and not with one of the much-feared patrols, they cried out to me from all sides--in a curious patois of low French mixed with Arabic. The little I understood of it was quite enough. The language of the légionnaire leaves nothing wanting in the way of force and clearness--the language of the village nègre was filth condensed. Two negresses began to quarrel as to whether a common légionnaire could be in possession of even one sou, a weighty question which was answered in the negative amid much laughter. The Frenchwoman, who was anything but sober, poked me in the ribs and begged me, hiccoughing, for a "petite absinthe." Obscene gestures and drunken cries everywhere. And in the corner there leaned in dignified repose an Arab policeman. It smelled of moschus and heavy sweet Arabian cigarettes. In Arabic the alley was called the Street of the Seven Delights. Smith had told me that. One could but shudder at the contemplation of the seven delights.... Then the comedy became clear to me. The honest citizen of Sidi-bel-Abbès despised the soldier of the Legion--but he tolerated the horrors of the village nègre. Short commands sounded from afar and the steady steps of a patrol drew near. If I was discovered, it meant prison for me, so I dived into the protecting darkness of a small by-street. Stumbling and falling continually I felt my way forward in the pitchy darkness, till I heard low voices. The alley took a sudden turn. I found myself in the court of a Moorish house. Arabs in white robes crouched and squatted on the ground smoking their narghiles. Most of them hardly looked up as I came in, and an old man with a long white beard nodded and smiled to me. On the glowing fire stood a copper kettle with bubbling hot water, and an old negro was making tea for the Arabs. On the wall on one side of the court a cloth was hung up, of fine brocade, with golden embroidery, on a ground of red and yellow, in fantastical arabesques. Many cushions were spread on the white sand. The Arabs themselves sat on finely woven yellow mats. At respectful distance from the men girls stood and lounged about, wondrous youthful forms with veil-like robes and countless copper ornaments on arms and legs, which tinkled at their slightest movement. All were sipping tea out of tiny little cups. All at once I heard English words, an old nursery rhyme: Humpty-Dumpty sat on a wall, Humpty-Dumpty had a great fall, And all the king's horses and all the king's men Could not put Humpty-Dumpty together again. Startled, I turned round and saw in the folds of an Arabian burnous the face of a white woman with fair hair and features who must once have been beautiful. Smoking an Arabian cigarette, she nodded dreamily with a happy smile and ever anew she would sing the nursery rhyme.... Suddenly a girl sprang up, bracelets jingling, a child almost, of the pure Arabian type. Fascinated, the Arabs and the other women stared at her; so still it was that one could hear the sound of one's own breathing. The girl let the thin veil of a garment she was wearing fall down to her hips and stood immobile as a statue for a minute or two, her arms stretched out, the head proudly thrown back, her eyes shining in triumph--courting admiration. She reminded me forcibly of a bronze statuette I had possessed in days gone by.... Very slowly the child of the South began to dance. The delicate veil swayed and waved in ever-changing folds around her body of pure copper colour. Her dancing was wondrously graceful--it was beautiful beyond dispute. A strange scene it was, enhanced by the very bright colours and the heavy sweet smells of mysterious perfumes. I stared in wonder at the dancing of this child of Nature and the wonderful rhythm of her movements. Faster grew the dance, the swinging and circling and posing. Suddenly the girl seized one of the torches and swung it in broad circles around her head. The firelight fell with its ruddy glow on her shining hair of black-blue. The hissing torch seemed to be enveloped in the swaying veil; ever faster grew that mad whirling. After a final lightning circle of the torch the girl fell down exhausted.... A low murmur of applause arose from among the Arabs and many silver coins were thrown to her on the mat. The woman who had sung the English nursery rhyme sat there as one stunned; she had forgotten herself and forgotten her surroundings. "My God," she kept on murmuring, "my God...." I stole away and went slowly home to barracks, worn out. * * * * * A flowery belt of gardens surrounds the town. In broad alleys, which had been trenches in days gone by, stood groups of palm-trees and olive groves, planted by the soldiers of the Legion many years ago in the short intervals of peace. The botanical garden of Sidi-bel-Abbès had also been founded by the foreign mercenaries, and, to this day, the Legion has the right to gather flowers from the beds of the Jardin Public for its dead, and sends three soldiers daily to keep the paths in order and work for the gardener. In return for this the regiment considers the Jardin Public its own private property, and on Sundays that wonderful garden, with its wealth of foliage and flowers, is the scene of a red-trousered invasion. Not very far from the Jardin Public lies the regimental garden, where the Legion raises its vegetables and plants its potatoes. I found it very funny when I was for the first time commandeered to carry dung in the Legion's garden--it seemed to me a most peaceful occupation for a modern mercenary.... Far out stretches the long line of flower gardens, with their narrow foot-paths shaded by olive-trees. Right at the end of the town, where the gardens come to an end and the sand begins, there lies the cemetery of Sidi-bel-Abbès. Its showy monuments, its well-kept flower-beds, and its silent groups of trees do not give it any particular claim to individuality. If you pass through the churchyard, however, you will come to a large open space. Many hundreds of grave mounds lie there. The black wooden crosses are one like the other. This is the last resting-place of the Foreign Legion's dead. The Legion's churchyard. I was once commandeered to work there. An aged corporal, who lived in a cottage in a corner of the cemetery, and in the days of his old age filled the post of grave-digger to the Legion, gave me gardening tools and a watering-can. I walked along the long rows of graves, pulling out weeds and watering the grass. An indescribable feeling of loneliness overcame me. So impersonal, so poor, so barren are those graves! They lie quite close together as if even in death the légionnaires must be drawn up in line for parade. The crosses are so small, so roughly painted, that one cannot get over the feeling that sordid economy is practised even on the last resting-place of the légionnaire. The crosses are hung with wreaths made of glass beads and with an artificial flower here and there. The name of the dead man is written on a small piece of board and underneath the name stands his number. To this comes the laconic addition: "Légion étrangère." I felt sorry for these poor fellows who even in the last sleep of death had to bear a number which reminded one of a convict prison. I went from cross to cross and read the various names. Almost every nation in the world has contributed to the graves in the cemetery of the Foreign Legion, though the German names on the little crosses have a large majority. A regiment of dead soldiers lies buried here. But it is only a small fraction of the Legion's dead. The others sleep somewhere in the sands of Africa--where they fell. Thirteen hundred légionnaires lie buried in Mexico. Hundreds and thousands rot in the swamps of Madagascar. Indo-China has been the death of hundreds of others. The wind swept the dead leaves which fluttered across from the cemetery of respectability over the graves of the légionnaires. I looked at the endless line of grave mounds and at the meaningless numbers. And I thought of an old German song: Verdorben--gestorben.... Ruined--dead! CHAPTER VIII A HUNDRED THOUSAND HEROES--A HUNDRED THOUSAND VICTIMS The hall of honour : A collection of ruined talents : The battle of Camaron : A skeleton outline of the Legion's history : A hundred thousand victims : A psychological puzzle : True heroes : How they are rewarded : The chances of promotion : The pension system of the Foreign Legion Close by the prison, parted from the little square of sand and gravel, which formed the prisoners' exercise-ground, by a low brick wall, there stands the Legion's hall of honour. A tiny little door is built into the wall and bears the inscription "Salle d'honneur." Day and night there stands a sentry with fixed bayonet before the regiment's holy of holies. For the soldiers of the Legion it is forbidden ground, and the officers only gather there on festive occasions. Late one evening I stole through the little gate. The sentry on duty was a man of my own company, whom I bribed with a packet of cigarettes to let me through. I found myself in a tiny garden. Fantastic figures in mosaic work covered the ground; everywhere were dense groups of palms and laurels, and a broad flight of steps led up to the vestibule in Moorish style. As I entered the hall a flood of colour met my gaze. The walls of the enormous room were covered with pictures. Flanking the entrance were the life-size portraits of two légionnaires, the one in modern African campaigning kit, and the other in the uniform of 1815, of the "Légion d'Hohenlohe." On the walls were the portraits of all the regiment's commanders and of the officers killed in battle. The names of the dead were inscribed on a marble slab in golden letters. I noticed with astonishment that the Foreign Legion's list of commanding officers contained many names unmistakably German. There were the Colonels Stoffel, de Mollenbeck, Conrad, de Hülsen, and Meyer. And in very good company were these German soldiers of fortune: the list showed the names of some of France's most famous soldiers and generals. Each of them had at some time or other commanded the Foreign Legion, each had won his first military laurels leading the regiment of strangers: men famous indeed, the Legion's pride: MacMahon, Canrobert, Bazain, de Négrier, Saussier.... Numerous pictures of battles represented episodes in the fights in which the Legion had taken part, and now and again among these paintings were real works of art. A number of these pictures come from the brush of Captain Cousin, while the allegorical frescoes on the ceiling are the work of an artist who wore the red breeches and blue coat of a common soldier. The légionnaire Hablutzel--the artist who decorated the Salle d'honneur--was a humble ranker. In the French Army the Legion's varied talents are famous, and there are several stories besides that of this humble artist. The history of the Legion can tell of many such as he. Five years ago the officers determined to build a new mess. There was only one objection to the fulfilment of this wish: the regimental coffers were wellnigh empty. It was the colonel's idea to seek help in the regiment itself. In spite of the fact that the garrison at that time consisted of only one battalion, it was found on inquiry to contain no less than seven architects. These seven soldiers became once more seven artists, and executed the plans for the new officers' mess. They agreed on the style of a Tonquin pagoda. Among the Norwegians of the regiment were several carpenters who were experts in artistic woodwork; there were more than enough builders and masons to be found, and the bankrupt owner of a brickfield was glad enough to return for a time to his old profession and assume the direction of a section told off to make bricks. In a few weeks the mess was ready--its cost was solely that of the raw material. The seven architects then once more shouldered their rifles. There is another famous instance. In one of the countless fights in Southern Algeria, a company got cut off from the main column and suffered heavy losses in a scrap with the Arabs. The number of wounded was very great, and nothing could be done for them, as the doctors and bearers were with the main column. At last the captain in the thick of the firing called out to his men: "Are there any doctors among you?" Three légionnaires at once stepped forward. One was a graduate of the Sorbonne, another had gained the diploma of the University of Zurich, and the third had attained to the rank of M.D. at a German University. Less strange, perhaps, but just as interesting, is the fact that for the building of a fort in the Legion three fortification experts reported themselves from a single company: two quondam Austrian pioneer officers, and a lieutenant from the British Royal Engineers. General de Négrier, who loved the Legion, used to say that les étrangers had three inestimable advantages: they were brilliant fighters, they marched till they dropped, and--there was nothing that they could not do. He would undertake to build an engine with his légionnaires; from their ranks he could assemble the faculties of a university; there were men among them who could not only fight through a war, but they could also write its history. The fact that the Foreign Legion's band is the best in the French army, and that it came back covered with glory every time it went to Paris to give concerts, is another proof of the many-sidedness of the Legion's talents. Many an artist who once played in the orchestra of one of the world's famous theatres afterwards carried the Legion's trumpets on his heavy-laden haversack. I hardly need to emphasise the fact that these légionnaires, who, by virtue of their professions and social standing, belonged to a different class of society, always represented the exceptions, and that the majority of the men in the Legion were very simple fellows, whose past had nothing at all interesting about it. It is always the exceptions that one notices. An editor of the _Temps_, who visited Sidi-bel-Abbès and struck up a chance conversation with me, said in astonishment: "I was speaking just now to a professor of Greek, and now you're a journalist. Is the Legion then a collection of ruined talents?" In between the paintings in the Salle d'honneur there stand the Legion's memorial tablets, with the names of the battles in which the Legion took part written on them: forty-eight great battles, fought in all corners of the earth, from Indo-China in the East to Mexico in the Far West. The most disastrous fight in the annals of the regiment was that of Camaron, in Mexico, on April 30, 1863. A creepy souvenir of this fight lies on a little table in the Salle d'honneur--an embalmed human hand. It is the hand of Captain Danjou, who was in command of a detachment of sixty men from the third company of the Legion who were killed to a man at Camaron. Over two thousand Mexican irregulars set upon the detachment in the neighbourhood of the village of Camaron. The detachment fought its way through the hostile cavalry to a farmhouse, entrenched itself there, and held out for a whole day against the overwhelming odds. Five times were they called upon to surrender, and five times was the answer--"Merde!" When the Mexicans at last took the house by storm, they found heaped up before the door a pile of dead. The few survivors were badly wounded. A few hours later relief came. But the French troops only found a heap of dead. Beside the captain's body lay his severed hand. Weapons from all countries adorned the walls of the Salle d'honneur. Straight Mexican swords and curved Arabian scimitars of pliant steel hung side by side; beside poisoned arrows from Madagascar there were old-fashioned bayonets which had done all sorts of bloody work in the Legion's service. In the Salle d'honneur there are souvenirs of almost a century of battles. The Foreign Legion was founded in the year 1831 under the name of "The African Auxiliaries." The continual fighting in Algeria used to decimate the French troops posted there. In the reign of King Louis Philippe the idea was started of reviving the mediæval institution of mercenaries, and of raising troops for service in Africa composed entirely of foreign adventurers. A Belgian adventurer who called himself Baron de Boëgard, with no particular authority, but still without active opposition on the part of the King's generals, collected around him a band composed of the doubtful characters of all nations. He assumed the title of lieutenant-general, and finally succeeded in persuading the military authorities that his fellows would make capital stuff for service in Algeria. About 4000 men took the oath of allegiance on the French colours in Marseilles and embarked for Africa. The French troops there turned up their noses at these tattered soldiers, and the hostile Arabs called them mockingly "the Bedouins from France,"[3] because they were so poor and ragged. The new-comers, however, plundered with such voracity as to astonish even the French troops, who were anything but scrupulous, and they were capital fighters into the bargain. A royal edict, dated March 10, 1831, sanctioned their incorporation in a Foreign Legion of their own under the name of the Legion Etrangère, on the pattern of the Légion d'Hohenlohe, which fought at the time of the Restoration. The regiment consisted of seven battalions, divided according to the different nationalities of the men: 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions Swiss and Germans. 4th battalion Spaniards. 5th battalion Italians. 6th battalion Belgians and Dutchmen. 7th battalion Poles. [3] The Arabs who had established themselves in the towns used to despise the vagabond Bedouins. After a short time the authorities left off separating the various nationalities from each other and contented themselves with teaching the foreigners the French words of command as quickly as possible. A period of fighting now began for the Legion such as no regiment in the world has ever experienced. Even in its first fights in Algeria the regiment suffered heavy losses. Then the King of France lent the Foreign Legion to the Queen Regent Christina of Spain to fight against the Carlists. For their services in Spain the Legion was to have been given 800,000 francs, but this sum was never paid. On the other hand, 3500 of the 4000 légionnaires fell in action. A bare 500 returned to Africa half starved and in rags. New recruits joined--there has never been a lack of men ready to serve in the Foreign Legion. Algeria was conquered after ceaseless fighting, in which the battles of Condiat-Ati, M'Shomesh, Constantine, and Zaatcha were only the more important fights in an endless campaign. Even at this period of its existence the Legion grasped the fact that its mission was not only to furnish soldiers, but also pioneers, labourers, and city-builders. They worked hard, building town after town, and there is to-day no city in French Northern Africa in which the first European building was not built by légionnaires. In the Crimean War the Legion was ordered to Russia, where, in the Battle of the Alma, it was the first regiment to come under fire and fought with great bravery. In General Canrobert's despatches 29 officers and men of the Legion were mentioned for bravery in the Battles of the Alma and Inkerman. In the siege of Sebastopol the Foreign Legion was very much to the fore and was cordially hated by the Russians. The besieged called them "the leather-bellies," from the great African cartridge-pouches which they wore in front. In the Crimea their losses were enormous, and Napoleon III. rewarded their services by naturalising a number of the Legion's officers and men. At that time the Legion never experienced years of peace, only months of peace at the most, and even these were few and far between. Les étrangers were hardly home from the Crimea when a rebellion among the Algerian Arabs broke out, which led to the famous Arab expedition. The mighty battle of Ischeriden brought the tribes of Beni Jenni, Beni Raten, and the Beni Amer into subjection. The regiment had a few hundred more to add to its list of dead and had won new honours, only, as a real regiment of mercenaries, to be transferred to a new field of battle. Real wandering Ahasvers were these African mercenaries. This time it was to Italy, to Magenta, that they were ordered. Again they came back, their numbers diminished by a thousand or more, and had to start once more from Sidi-bel-Abbès on an expedition against the natives in Morocco. Thus passed the year 1860. During the next two years the Legion was engaged in desultory fighting against the Arabs and Bedouins without, to their great disgust, bringing off any grande affaire. In February the Legion embarked for Mexico and witnessed the disastrous events of the short imperial period. They made roads, working hard, and occasionally brought off some mad exploit with the greatest bravery, adding that day at Camaron to the Legion's roll of honours. The result of the Mexican campaign, as far as the Legion is concerned, is best shown by their losses: 1918 men dead and missing; 328 died of their wounds; and 1859 met their deaths from various illnesses. On coming back to Algeria the Legion filled up its ranks once more and was scattered in little detachments over the province of Oran to play, for the sake of variety, the part of settlers, digging wells, building villages, and laying roads--till the year 1870. In the Franco-German War the Legion first came into action at Orleans. All the German légionnaires had, however, been left in Africa. After the conclusion of peace the Legion helped in the putting down of the Commune, where so much blood was shed, and made itself thoroughly hated in Paris. As had been the case since the foundation of the Legion, fights in Algeria began once more. The rebellion of the Kaid Si Hamze, in the year 1871 and the years following, brought them fresh campaigns. While de Négrier was colonel of the regiment he mounted a part of the Legion on mules, to be able to cover greater stretches of country, a system which has been kept up to this day, and which formed one of the first examples of mounted infantry. Till the year 1883 the légionnaires remained in Africa, and enjoyed a period of comparative quietude, which only brought a few Arab rebellions and a few dozen skirmishes. Then, however, they started off once more on their travels. The Far East, Tonquin, was the scene of a colonial war against a brave enemy and a murderous climate. The victories of Bac-Ninh, Hong-Hoa, Soc-Nam, and Chu are so many days of fame for these foreign mercenaries, whose regimental history during these fifty years will never meet its equal. In the year 1892 we find the Legion in Dahomey fighting against King Behanzin, in the year 1895 in Madagascar. At the present date we hear of the regiment chiefly in Morocco. This is merely a short sketch, a skeleton outline of the Legion's history--one of the most notable histories that any soldiers' chronicler can point to, the story of a band of homeless adventurers. Their pay was always ridiculously small, their punishments barbarous, and the discipline that they were subject to more than hard. And yet there were always thousands of recruits willing to shed their life's blood, who did not serve under the Legion's flag merely to earn their living, but formed one of the best bodies of troops in the world. What misery and misfortune must there be in Europe to bring thousands and thousands of poor and desperate men flocking to the Legion's standard, whose total in the eighty years of the regiment's existence must add up to an overwhelming figure. I have been through all the French books on the Legion to try and find the exact figure, but without success. The exact strength of the Legion has always been kept well to the background. The two regiments have now and then reached an enormous strength. Beauvoir, for instance, mentions that in the year 1895 a single company in Sidi-bel-Abbès was 4864 men strong. He gives the nationalities of the Legion in that year as follows: Alsatians 45 per cent. Germans 12 " Swiss 8 " Belgians 7 " Frenchmen 5 " Spaniards 5 " Italians 5 " Austrians 4 " Dutchmen 4 " From various countries 5 " The average strength of the two battalions varies between 8000 and 12,000 men. The percentage of deaths from illness, above all fever, is extraordinarily high, and when to this we add the many thousands killed in battle, and consider that desertions are very frequent, we come to the astounding conclusion that in eighty years a good deal over a hundred thousand men have served under the Legion's flag. In giving this figure I make no claim to accuracy. It may be far below the mark or again it may be a few thousands too high. Be that as it may, a mighty army of men of all nations has served in the Foreign Legion, working hard and suffering the most awful hardships under an iron discipline that punishes even the most trivial offences with the hardest of punishments. The pay has never been higher than it is now; not enough to purchase even the trifles which a soldier needs to clean his uniform and equipment, to say nothing about his personal needs, be they ever so small. The assertion that these hundred thousand men have made the French Government a present of their work and strength during all these years, and all too often of their lives, is no exaggeration. Even though the history of the Foreign Legion, the history of that ever-fighting band of men, reads like a romance of mediæval times, one is easily led to look at the matter from the French standpoint and to make the pharisaical assertion so commonly believed in France, that the Foreign Legion is the scum of humanity, useless human rubbish which has been turned into useful dung for colonisation, if one may use the expression, in the service of improvement. The modern thinker is much more inclined to ask himself in wonderment how it came that year after year so many men were willing to sell their lives for a country that was not their own. These thousands have not even had the inducement of high wages. Here we stand before a riddle, before some mysterious force which convinced these thousands of desperate men that the African Foreign Legion was their last refuge. The mighty deeds of the Legion are still more of a riddle. All these men have been clever enough to discover sooner or later what a very poor sort of bargain they made when they enlisted, and the Legion has always been a hotbed of seething discontent. As it is to-day, so has it always been; the only subject of conversation in the Legion is an endless discussion of that all-important question: how and when to desert. The légionnaire has enriched the French language with a variety of strange curses to give expression to his rage at the tyranny and infamous treatment of which he is the victim. It is really a marvel that these discontented fellows, soldiers who were always on the eve of deserting, always forgot their grievances when they came under fire. One or two were perhaps men of the type which frequently occurs in the Legion of to-day, who only enlist to meet death in a form which appeals to their fancy, and who volunteer for one dangerous expedition after another till they meet the bullet for which they are so eager. But these have always been the exceptions. To the others fighting has always been a delight. ... A detachment of men are stationed in an isolated fort. The heat of the sun is merciless, the hard work unbearable and the monotony of duty gets on their nerves: the whole garrison becomes restless and can only be kept in order with the greatest difficulty. Then comes the command to turn out: there is a prospect of soldiering in earnest: the men are beside themselves with joy--when they have to fight they are relieved from slavery. This enthusiasm and passion to get at the enemy is the redeeming feature of many a ruined life. It acts as a safety-valve: otherwise the men could never stand the deadly monotony of their lives. The soldiers of the Legion have never yet fought just because they had to fight, or because their officers urged them on to it or because they had to defend their own wretched lives. The history of the regiment can only tell of glorious attacks, of furious charges made with a bravery that absolutely disregards danger and death. These poor adventurers have their own individual ideas of honour for which they are proud to give their lives and which the only French general who ever understood the Legion expressed in a few enthusiastic words. It was General de Négrier who said: Some soldiers can fight--the légionnaire can die. That is the légionnaire's idea of honour: his own individual idea. He will never hear the signal for retreat. I have so often heard the murmur of discontent which runs through the ranks when the hated call is heard at a manoeuvre. Eleven times in its history has the Legion refused to obey when the signal for retreat was blown. In France the performances of the Foreign Legion have always been recognised. It is true that the recognition has taken no substantial form. Its officers have always reaped the reward of quick promotion, but the légionnaire himself has always remained a poor devil without pay and without the slightest hope for the future. * * * * * Five centimes daily wages! On paper the légionnaire is paid seven centimes a day. That's what stands in the French army list. Two centimes daily are, however, deducted for messing, so that the real wages are five centimes per diem. After the "second congé," when he has five years' service behind him, his wages are raised to ten centimes daily; a corporal gets twenty centimes--a scale of pay which has perhaps a parallel in the Chinese army, certainly nowhere else in the world. As a set-off against this miserable payment the French books on the subject draw attention to the chance of quick advancement. This, however, is a trifle contradictory to the actual facts of the case. In the Foreign Legion at present among a round three hundred officers there is only one who is not a Frenchman, a quondam officer in the Austrian army, who worked his way up from the ranks. Even among the non-commissioned officers the percentage of foreigners is very small. It can easily be understood that the colonel lays some stress on the fact that the non-coms shall be Frenchmen: this, however, renders the prospect of promotion for a foreigner proportionately small. It is only now and again that a foreigner rises further than the rank of corporal. When he is specially talented he may become a sergeant but hardly ever reaches the rank of colour-sergeant. An exception to this rule is made in the case of officers who have been turned out of other armies. For these, the Foreign Legion has special regulations. They are not asked to show any papers nor are inquiries made into the reasons why they were originally dismissed: all that is required is a photograph showing him in uniform. They are then let off all recruits' work and are sent to the "peloton des élèves caporaux," the non-commissioned officers' school, are in eight weeks corporal, and in four months sergeant. It is, however, a great rarity when one of these men rises any further. Often enough one hears that the Legion's pension is a liberal one. The Legion has a right to a pension after fifteen years of service, and then he gets 500 francs a year. That sounds very fine. The fact, however, remains that a man who spends fifteen years in all sorts of climates, and who works for fifteen years with the energy required of a légionnaire, can easily amass a small fortune. Another interesting fact is that very few légionnaires are capable of serving fifteen years. They die long before the time is up: either from fever, overwork, or an enemy's bullet.... No, the Legion's pension system is a mockery. The only sort of compensation that remains is the Cross of the Legion of Honour and the Médaille militaire, with both of which goes a sum of money; in the case of the Cross of the Legion of Honour a very considerable one. These distinctions, however, are so seldom conferred that they can hardly be taken into the question as representing a complement to the miserable pay, or as a possibility of earning anything other than coppers in the Legion. The only tangible reward that those heroes, to whose deeds of honour the Hall of Honour bears witness, have earned has been: Five centimes a day--those glorious days included. And what is the end of it all? The légionnaire's life in the Legion begins with the motto, "Work without pay," and at the end of it he stands in the street like a beggar, and does not know what in the world to do for a living. Even in the rare cases in which the climate and the hardships he has undergone have not ruined his constitution, and his health is still good, he is quite helpless. I have spoken with hundreds and thousands of these légionnaires who have served their time as they lounged about the courtyard of the barracks in Sidi-bel-Abbès, rejoicing that they had done with the Foreign Legion for ever. They were dressed in a dark blue suit, which is served out from the quartermaster's office to those who have served their time, being made of an ugly blue stuff, which looks like blue sacking. Of course their clothes did not fit them in the least, the trousers being either too long or too short, and the coat looked like a sack, for how could one expect them to take any trouble about a good fit in the quartermaster's office. As head-gear they wore an enormous flat cap, such as the sailors in the ports on the Mediterranean wear. This suit, together with boots, a single pair of socks and a shirt, was all that they possessed after five years of service. They had also the right of travelling free of charge to any town in France, and were given a franc a day as long as their journey lasted. No légionnaire, however, is transported to his real home, which is generally outside France. The majority, with grim humour, chose some town in the far north, generally Dunkirk, in order that the journey might be as long as possible. As a result of this the Mayor of Dunkirk wrote and begged the French Minister of War not to send any more légionnaires there. The authorities had not the faintest idea what to do with them; in Dunkirk there was not even enough work for the townsmen themselves. A légionnaire who has served his time is thus absolutely helpless, being stranded penniless in a totally strange town. His clothes are such as to prevent him applying for any work but that of a labourer, and the only papers he has to show are his certificates of dismissal from the Foreign Legion, which are worth very little in France. There are plenty of fine speeches made about the glorious Foreign Legion in the French Republic, but there is a prejudice against having anything to do with a légionnaire in the flesh there. Everywhere he is shown the door, and the poor devil begins a terrible course of starvation. How often have I seen these men come back again with a batch of recruits to Sidi-bel-Abbès, and their old comrades mockingly asking them why they were in Africa once more. It was always the same old story: for days and weeks and even months starving and half perished with cold they had struggled against their fate, and gone from house to house seeking work until their clothes were mere rags and their boots were worn out. Finally, they had despaired of ever finding work, and had begun to coquet with the thought that in the Legion they had at least had enough to eat, with the result that in a few days they had sought out the nearest recruiting-office, and had bound themselves for a further five years of slavery. This after five long years of work--the gratitude of France. CHAPTER IX "MARCH OR DIE!" The Legion's war-cry : A night alarm : On the march : The counting of the milestones : Under canvas : The brutality of the marches : The légionnaire and the staff doctor : My fight for an opiate : The "marching pig" : The psychology of the marches : Excited nerves : "Cafard" : The song of imprecations Weeks passed. Recruit time was over, and I was serving with the troops. From the very beginning I was anxious to do my duty as well as I could. The real soldier's duties were a pleasure to me, and like the other légionnaires who daily debated the chances of receiving marching orders, I longed with fantastical impatience for active service. The Legion always seemed to me to be in a state of feverish impatience, always on the jump, always expecting marching orders. The regiment's traditional fiery military spirit infected even the youngest recruits. When vague rumours of a new rising of the Arabs on the Morocco frontier penetrated to the barracks, or when the _Echo d'Oran_ with the laconic brevity of official telegrams announced new skirmishes in Indo-China, the news spread like wildfire through the Legion's quarters. Everywhere you could see groups of légionnaires, speaking of their hopes of at last receiving marching orders. When an especially exciting report had been spread, they sometimes stood in crowds before the regimental offices, waiting for one of the clerks to rush down the stairs with the news: "Faites le sac." Pack your knapsacks! This is the old ominous war-cry that sounds from room to room when the Legion mobilises, the dry business-like password calling the Legion to its military business. The thirst for adventure, which is an element of the Legion, as inseparable from it as poverty and hard work, always lay in the air. For the first time I heard the alarm sounded in the middle of night. I jumped up out of my sleep in a fright. "Aux armes!" the bugle sounded from the barrack-yard. The sergeants and corporals rushed through the barracks crying the alarm, "Aux armes!"--To arms! All at once the stillness of the night was turned into a perfect pandemonium--shouting and yelling and roaring sounded from room to room, the barracks were in an uproar. "Faites le sac. En tenue de campagne d'Afrique," the corporals shouted, and renewed rejoicing answered them. The "African field equipment" was not such a simple thing, and in spite of all the yelling and shouting we worked with feverish excitement, for in ten minutes we had to stand in the barrack-yard ready for marching. There was singing and whistling everywhere while the knapsacks were packed and everybody wondered whether we were going "au Maroc" at last or whether the Arab tribes of the South were in rebellion again. The cartridge-cases were brought from the magazine and their covers burst open with hatchets. The packets of cartridges were thrown from man to man. We tore off the cardboard covering and ... saw that they were blank cartridges. "Merde!" roared Corporal Wassermann. Roaring and singing stopped as if by magic. As blank cartridges only were served out, it could but be a question of a short manoeuvre and the Legion would not dream of working up enthusiasm for an ordinary "marche militaire." In this case the short manoeuvre march really extended over three hundred kilometres--three hundred kilometres to the South, three hundred kilometres back again; a total distance of six hundred kilometres, which is about four hundred miles.... By the light of a lantern the companies formed up in the barrack-yard. In a moment the baggage and ammunition carts were packed, because the Legion always carries sharp ammunition on the march to be prepared for any emergency. Then we went out into the night to the tune of the Legion's march. Any one who has once heard the march of the Legion will never forget it, its peculiar sharp rhythm broken by the bugles' storm signal. The Legion's band is forbidden to play it in the garrison or on the parade--the regimental march is played before the enemy or on long marches. Sidi-bel-Abbès woke up as soon as the band commenced to play in the quiet streets; windows were thrown open and out of the corners all the riff-raff of the sleeping town came into view: miserable-looking white men and dirty negroes looked at the marching company with sleepy eyes in high astonishment. In a few minutes we were out of town and marched along the yellow sandy road in dim moonlight. The marching order was in column of four as is customary in the Legion. I marched in the first row of fours of my company. In the front the four drummers plodded along close behind our captain's white horse. Abreast of the captain walked Lieutenant Garde-Jörgensen, a Dane, a soldier of fortune.... The silent march into the night was trying for my burning curiosity, and I did a most unmilitary thing: "Where are we going to, Lieutenant?" I asked. The officer nearly burst with laughter. "I don't know myself where we are going to," he said. "If you were an old légionnaire you would not ask, my boy. We are marching. We are probably marching for a long time. We are always marching. We never know if we are only going to manoeuvre or to meet the enemy. That's how it is. Tiens! will you have a cigarette?" The first rows were laughing and Smith was shouting in his deep voice: "Le sac, ma foi, toujours au dos." Renewed laughter. Every one was talking and wondering where we were marching to and how long the march would last. Some of them thought it was nothing but a night march; others discussed the probability of "real work" being in sight. "What do you think you know about it?" said Smith to me with a grin. "Nothing. We march, sonny, and that's all there is to do. God and the colonel know what's going to come of it." We heard the clatter of a galloping horse and turning our heads curiously we saw a bright spot on the uniform of the rider, sparkling like a star. The rider was the Commander-General of Algeria, and the shining spot on his breast was the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. "Oh, la la," said Smith, shaking his head. "Tell you what, Dutchy, if the old man himself has got up in the middle of the night you may send your little legs a message to get ready for a lot of work. Now we shall march, sonny. You can bet your bottom dollar on that. The old man there means manoeuvring, heaps of it, or--Arabs." Milestone after milestone passed by and the jokes ceased very soon, as the marching regiment settled down to business. Silently the regiment tramped onwards. The knapsack pressed heavily; heads went down and shoulders bent low to spread the heavy weight on the back; the gun-straps cut into the shoulders until one's right arm was almost lame and the painful prickly feeling caused by the non-circulating blood had grown permanent. After the first ten kilometres a shrill signal-whistle sounded and the whole company wheeled off to the roadside to rest in long line for five minutes. I pulled off my knapsack and threw it upon the ground with a feeling of relief, joyful at getting rid of the heavy weight for a few minutes. To my great astonishment, the other men kept their knapsacks on their backs and at once threw themselves at full length on the ground. Later on I did the same. The halt was so short that one lost priceless seconds in taking off and strapping on the knapsack, seconds only, but even seconds are precious for the marching légionnaire. Five minutes is but a short span of time. But never in my life has a time of rest seemed so delicious, so beneficial, so reviving as when I lay stretched out on the hot African sand for those pitifully short five minutes.... The company wheeled into column again and trudged forwards on the endless road, whose straight sameness was only interrupted by the mile-stones. With each mile it became quieter in the marching rows. The legs and back were strained to the utmost, and a word spoken appeared a waste of energy. One seemed to be a machine, marching on mechanically behind the man in front when once put in motion; each man was sufficiently occupied with himself. If any one in utter weariness took a step to the right or a step to the left out of marching line, he got an oath hurled at him--you were so tired that even the slight touch of your comrade swaying out of line was an extra burden to the tormented body. When the morning mists and the bitter cold of the dawn were followed by the hot burning sun, we had accomplished a march of forty kilometres, and the time came when our legs refused to do any more. When the signal sounded for rest, we fell down helpless, and when we started marching again, it looked as if a crowd of invalids and old men were slowly wandering down the road. The worn-out legs revenged themselves for the hard usage they had received. During the halt the flow of blood was hemmed in the limbs. Standing on one's feet again, one felt a sharp stinging pain in the soles. Every step was torture. For five minutes afterwards one crawled along as best one could, till one became once more an unfeeling automaton. Again the slow progress past the milestones. At eleven o'clock in the morning we reached a little village. The marks on the last milestone said that we were fifty kilometres from Sidi-bel-Abbès. We passed by the old rickety houses of the village, and at a given signal the regiment halted, the companies forming up on the dry, sandy piece of ground to the left of the street. Then followed the command: "Halt!" and immediately afterwards the order: "Campez!" In a moment we had piled our arms. The knapsacks were thrown to the ground and the folding tent-supports and the tent-covers pulled out. Then the corporal of each section stepped out of the line, holding the tent-poles high above his head to mark the tent line for the whole company. Again a short command, and in a few seconds the waste surface of sand was covered with little white tents. It was a miracle. We were so well drilled and each individual knew his part so well that it only took a few seconds to pitch a tent. With surprising quickness the long rows of soldiers were turned into a tent encampment and five minutes afterwards the officers' tents were pitched in a final row. In the meantime Madame la Cantinière had hauled out of her sutler's cart folding tables and benches, ready to do a roaring trade with the tired-out légionnaires. The heavy Algerian wine was indeed a blessing after such a march and the poor devil who in these marching days did not possess a few coppers felt poor indeed. In ten minutes the narrow trenches for cooking were dug out and in twenty places camp fires flared up simultaneously. The patrol marched round and round the white "soldiers' city." The food, consisting of macaroni and tinned meat, was greedily devoured. After this the quiet of utter exhaustion reigned in the camp. The légionnaires lay huddled together in the tiny tents, on blankets spread out on the ground, covered with their cloaks, while the knapsacks served for a pillow. The rifles were brought into the tents and tied firmly together with a long chain by the corporal of each squad, who fastened the end of the chain to his wrist as a further precaution, for the Arabs had a habit of creeping through the lines on a dark night and stealing the much-coveted weapons from the tents. The patrols of the Legion have standing orders to challenge an Arab only once at night and then to fire. Even in this first night the watch caught a thief. The Arab was badly treated and he was delivered up to the civil authorities in the village the next morning in a horrible condition. By seven o'clock in the evening the whole camp was fast asleep, sleeping the sleep of exhaustion. An hour after midnight, in the flittering light of a magnificent starry sky, the companies formed up and continued the route to the South. This march lasted eight days. On one day the troops covered forty kilometres, making up the average again the next day with fifty kilometres. The monotony of this march and the physical strength and endurance it claimed of each of us cannot be described. At last, at the beginning of the real desert, we depended on the oasis-wells with their poor supply of water to quench our thirst, and the want of water was added to our sufferings. At night, when starting on the march, the field-flasks were filled. The distribution of water was conducted under sharp supervision. Every man got two litres of dirty, muddy water. Company orders warned us to save up half a litre for the morrow's "soupe." On camping next day every légionnaire had to give up half a litre of water to the mess of his company for cooking purposes. Whoever had emptied his field-flask during the heat and weariness of the march and was unable to deliver any water only got a handful of raw rice given him; he had to get it cooked as best he could. This is one of the many brutal rules in force on these marches and there is method in it. Contrary to most of the légionnaires, I have always seen the necessity for the hard marching discipline. Troops that have to march in such droughty country must be able to economise their water rations. This is simply a law of necessity. There is another brutal feature of the Legion's marches: cruel at first sight but it is really kindness to the men. A légionnaire who faints on the march is tied to the baggage-cart. A pole is pushed through the sides of the cart at about the height of a man's arms and the légionnaire roped to it by the shoulders. The pole keeps him in a standing position--the cart rolls on. He either has to march or he is dragged along the uneven ground. Seeing the thing done for the first time, I was filled with indignation at the apparent brutality of this torture. But afterwards I understood. In the wars in the South the fighting value of the Foreign Legion depends solely on its marching capability. Very often the ambulance is not able to follow. If the légionnaire remains behind the company in the desert, if only a kilometre, he is irretrievably lost. Hundreds and hundreds of men incapable of marching have found a terrible end in this way. The Arab women, who are far more cruel than the men, soon surround the helpless man, who suffers a painful death, after being horribly mutilated and disfigured. Separation from the troops means death. This was not only the case at the time of the great Arab mutiny, which affected the whole of Algeria, but is the same to-day. Peace between the French and the Arabs down in the far south of Algeria is a myth. At the small military stations on the borders of the Sahara little skirmishes are a daily occurrence. When the station is alarmed and the thirty or forty men garrisoned there set out to pursue the pillaging Bedouin tribes, every légionnaire knows well that now he must march, or if he cannot march any more, he must die. March or die! Death at the hands of Arab women! The légionnaire does not count the Bedouin or the Arab as a personal enemy; he is rather grateful to the robber of the desert for being the cause of a little change and excitement in the terribly monotonous life on the border stations. But upon the Arab woman the old légionnaire looks as upon a devil. He thinks of the hellish tortures that wounded men have suffered at the hands of Arab women, he remembers the mutilated bodies of légionnaires who had died an awful death after being tortured for many hours. In the fourth year of his service, Rassedin had been ordered to one of the little Sahara stations, where he had seen much of the cruelty of the Arab women. Once a scouting party of his detachment found a skeleton in the sand of the desert. Shreds of a uniform showed that the skeleton had once been a soldier of the Legion. The skeleton's head was lying between the legs.... Another time the corporal of Rassedin's squad was missed at the morning call. In the evening he had taken a walk just in the neighbourhood of the station and had not returned. After a short search they found him. "He was dead. But even in death I could see the frightful agony in his wide-open eyes," Rassedin declared. "Both legs were broken and bent backwards. The lower part of his body was slashed to pieces, but none of his wounds was deadly. They must have tormented him for hours. From that time we made no difference between men and women in fighting, but shot down every one. How did we know that it had really been women who had tortured the corporal? The dead man clutched a piece of a glass bracelet in his hand, which he must have torn off the arm of his tormentor in the struggle. Such bangles are only worn by the Bedouin women." That is the reason why the légionnaire has come to look upon the Arab woman as the incarnation of the Devil. I have already recorded the story of the soldier with the skull tattooed on his forehead, who showed me a tobacco-pouch made out of a woman's breast.... * * * * * As an example of unnecessary, quite unjustifiable brutality I will tell you what I had to suffer personally during the manoeuvre march. Whether freezing under the thin blanket in the cold icy nights in that climate of quickly changing temperatures was the cause, or the bad water, or the physical over-exertion of the marches, at any rate I suffered from tormenting pains in the stomach. Every few minutes during the march I got cramps and could only painfully drag myself along, doubled up like a worm. When we got to camp my strength was done. I went to the doctor's tent accompanied by the "caporal du jour" with the sick list. The doctor, an army surgeon, whose name I unfortunately have forgotten, pulled the book angrily out of the corporal's hand, and roared at him: "On the march there are no sick men. Your company ought to know that." The corporal shrugged his shoulders. "By order of the captain!" he said laconically. Now the doctor turned to me. "What's wrong?" I briefly described the cramps in my stomach, and emphasised that I only wished to ask for something to relieve the pain, an opiate, perhaps, and that I intended to continue my duties. He looked at me for a moment, and then said contemptuously: "What do you know about opiates? To judge from your accent you are an Englishman." "No, monsieur le docteur, a German." "Well, I will tell you something. We know these little tricks. All the same if you're English, German or Hottentot, I take you to be quite a common simulator. I shall give you a certificate of being 'non-malade'--not sick. Non-malade, corporal." I was crushed. Astonishment fought with anger. At the very moment when the doctor was speaking to me I was almost doubled up with pain. "Not sick!" That meant not only the loss of an opiate, but also heavy punishment. Any one who is declared by the doctor as "not sick" is at once held guilty of simulation, and punished with the usual four days' imprisonment. I saluted and said: "Non-malade, monsieur le docteur? Without any examination?" "Va-t-en!" roared the surgeon. "Get out of this." The corporal shook his head as we went through the camp, and advised me to be patient. He believed that I was in pain, and he knew that that "pig of a doctor" had already sent many a man to his doom. But a complaint would only make matters worse, he said. I did not answer and thought of the coming night. I should be tied to a peg in front of the watch-tent, and would be obliged to lie on the bare ground in the icy cold without any covering because I had been imprudent enough to ask for a little medicine. Maddening anger arose within me. When the corporal had made his report, my captain sent for me: "You have not been punished so far?" "No." "What is the reason of your simulating?" Then I lost control over myself, and in a fit of excitement hurled reproaches and accusations at the officer. The doctor was a fool and a disgrace to his profession. His diagnosis was an infamous and deliberate lie, and it was a disgrace that such people held authority. I do not remember everything I yelled out then, but it was a nice collection of the choicest epithets--rank insubordination! At length my attack of mad fury ended with my demanding to be taken before the commander of the regiment, and I threatened (this must have been very ridiculous) to complain to the French Minister of War. The captain listened to me quietly and said: "I believe that you have been badly treated. I will write a letter for you to the assistant surgeon, who will give you medicine. I should not advise you to send in a complaint to the regiment." Then after a pause: "What do you really expect? What do you want? We are in the Legion. You are a légionnaire--don't forget that again, légionnaire!" If I had not in my complete loss of self-control ventured to air my opinions in language unheard of in the Legion, I should very likely have left the ominous peg in front of the guard-tent as a dead man. Thanks to the opium pills of the assistant surgeon I was able, however, to march the next day with the others, but not without exerting every spark of my will-power. The time from one milestone to the other seemed endless. The expectation of the five minutes' rest at the fifth milestone was the power that drove me forward. I counted my steps in order to make me forget the pain in the mechanical occupation of counting. One hundred and twenty steps represented one hundred metres; when I had counted ten times one hundred and twenty, we had covered a kilometre, the fifth part of the road to rest.... At last we reached our paradise, the few minutes of exhausted rest. And then the torment began afresh.... The manoeuvres in a desert covered with peculiarly sharp stones, three hundred kilometres south of Sidi-bel-Abbès, occupied exactly eight hours, and from the standpoint of the Legion they were superfluous and consequently useless. The development of the firing-line, the skilled search for cover, the rush of the bayonet attack, the understanding of all the orders, the complete discipline under fire, are things which, in the never-ending practical military training of this fighting regiment, become part and parcel of the légionnaire's flesh and blood. The closing manoeuvre was (I heard our captain discussing these matters with Lieutenant Garde) nothing more than a small private entertainment on the part of our colonel, who wished to show off with his regiment; a military amateur dramatic performance. On the other hand, the commander-general had said to his adjutant that it was a great pleasure to him to give his légionnaires an "airing." The regiment had already idled about barracks for six months, and might in the end forget that its real home was amongst the sand of the desert, and that it had no other object in life than to march, march a lot, to go on marching. The légionnaires knew this fad of the general's well enough, and never called him anything else but the "marching pig." The fat sergeant of our first "peloton" used to say, with great lack of respect: "As soon as I see the fellow I feel tired...." When the general was still colonel and in command of the first regiment, he once met a drunken légionnaire in one of the side streets of Sidi-bel-Abbès. The man, only just capable of saluting, got the mad idea to address his colonel. "Eh, mon colonel," he stammered, "I am still very thirsty. Ten sous, mon colonel." The colonel treated him to a stony stare. This look out of the hard eyes turned the légionnaire sober in a moment, and a brilliant idea struck him. "You know I am the best marcher in my company, mon colonel." At this the colonel smiled and gave him a five-franc piece. It is these little anecdotes and the rough jokes in the jargon of the Legion that are typical of the great weight laid on the marching performances in the Foreign Legion, without regard to the wear and tear of the human machine, without consideration of the many lives that are lost. Even General de Négrier, the only commander that the Legion loved because he loved the Legion and knew how to come into personal touch with each légionnaire, knew no mercy in the matter of marching. When he was commander of the Foreign Legion he did everything in his power for his troops. Each légionnaire was allowed to come to him with his personal affairs, every wounded man was a hero in his eyes, a brave man, for whom he could not do enough. But when he saw an exhausted légionnaire stumble out of the ranks and collapse during the terrible marches in Madagascar, the expression in his face became hard and pitiless. That was a grievous crime in his eyes. Then he would cry out the three words that have since become a proverb of the Legion: "March or die!" Marches which no European commander would attempt are nothing out of the common; they are the basis on which the Foreign Legion has won its laurels. But they are also the foundation for illness, decline, and death. In each of these marches is embodied the principle of absolute disregard for human life. The possibility of such disregard is one of the chief advantages of the Foreign Legion in the eyes of the authorities. From a military point of view the marches of the Legion are splendid, a triumph of training and discipline; from a humane standpoint they are the height of unprincipled exploitation. No New York Jewish clothes-dealer, who keeps hundreds of people at starvation wages at the sewing-machines, does such a splendid piece of business as "la Légion," which for a mere nothing saps the life from thousands of human creatures. It is not the cruelties of the penal battalion, not the brutality of punishments, not the poor devils who for some mere trifle are shot under martial law, that illustrate best the horrors of the Legion system. It is the marches that do this; the marches of the Foreign Legion condemn the system of the Foreign Legion! Our manoeuvre march of 600 kilometres occupied sixteen days. On the stages in the far south the rations consisted almost entirely of rice, and to the hardships of the daily 40 kilometres the pangs of hunger were added. In spite of that the distance daily covered remained the same. I still suffered from pains in my stomach. To-day it is a puzzle to me how I managed to march 300 kilometres in this condition in the burning sun and to stand the cold during the nights. But others were no better off. They marched with open wounds in their feet; with blisters between neck and shoulder-blades, where the straps of the heavy knapsack pressed; with eyes inflamed by the sun; with severe bronchial troubles; with bleeding and festering sores on their thighs. Many limped, and most marched bent wellnigh double, sunk together--a miserable, pitiful sight. Surly, silent, raging bitterness pictured in the hard lines of the face and in the tired eyes, we stamped onwards. The only words heard were curses. Our nerves were strained to bursting-point. Over the whole troop lay the strain of over-exertion, bodily and mental nerve-sickness. The Foreign Legion has manufactured a special expression of its own for this mental state--"Cafard." The "cafard" reigned. The "cafard" of the Foreign Legion, a near relative to tropical madness, is a collective name for all the inconceivable stupidities, excesses and crimes which tormented nerves can commit. The English language has no word for this condition. In "cafard" murder hides, and suicide and mutiny; it means self-mutilation and planless flight out into the desert; it is the height of madness and the depth of despair. Many nights we were roused from sleep by a pandemonium of noise. Légionnaires--légionnaires in "cafard"--jumped round the tents in the dim light of the watch-fires, roaring the old Legion song out into the night. The "song" commenced with abusing the corporal and went on through the whole scale of charges up to the commander-general--in a horrible Legion French, of which the chief advantage was its extraordinary power of detailed expression. No officer was passed over in this song and each one was carefully mentioned by name, so that there might be no mistake.... The song was painted with insults in rainbow colours. The insinuation that Captain So-and-So kept up his private harem with the funds of the company was one of the most harmless, and with the assertion that he was an old monkey, the register of the regiment commander's sins only began. At the top of their voices the "cafard" madmen shrieked this song of insubordination out into the still night, until the camp became lively. With many oaths the sentries tussled with the mad singers, and from out of the darkness bawling voices roared applause. Such things were not taken seriously. The "singers" were bound to pegs in front of the guard-tent over the night, to give them a chance to cool down, and they had to join their companies at day-break--to march on. When we got back to Sidi-bel-Abbès, our uniforms and our spirits were in sad condition.... CHAPTER X THE MADNESS OF THE FOREIGN LEGION An unpleasant occurrence : The last three coppers : The Roumanian Jew from Berlin : Monsieur Viaïsse : The Legion's atmosphere : The Cafard demoniacs : Bismarck's double : Krügerle's whim : The madness of Légionnaire Bauer : Brutal humour : A tragedy In the interval between the terrible exertions of the great manoeuvre march and a period of hard work in the sewers of the Arab prison of Sidi-bel-Abbès, something I had long been dreading occurred. Even by changing my few gold pieces into the smallest of coppers, I could not spin them out eternally. One fine day the sum of my riches consisted of three thick, round copper pieces. Although big and heavy, they were not worth more than a few cents. I lay stretched out on my bed, tired and vexed. Smith, who, being a bugler, was not obliged to waste his strength in cleaning Arab sewers, was chaffing me. He thought it a great joke to inquire with friendly solicitude about the unpleasant details of my work. I did not like his raillery. Wishing for revenge, I remembered with grim humour that the state of my finances would be of a certain interest to my friend Smith. "Hallo, bugler," said I. Smith, lounging on his bed, muttered something about privileged sons of the Prophet--and inquired if the Arab convicts had been satisfied with my work? "Bugler, I've no more money!" I said. He jumped up from his bed, looking at me aghast. "What d'you say?" "My money is finished." Smith's face grew long. He was evidently thinking of the countless casks of wine lying stored in Sidi-bel-Abbès.... All at once his face cleared. He had found a way out of the difficulty. "Send for some more!" he advised. I shook my head. "Nonsense," said the bugler, with the happy confidence of the Legion. "They'll send you some, a légionnaire always gets something sent him. Shall I help you to write a real, nice, touching letter, Dutchy?" Again I shook my head. But the bugler would not let me off so easily. Going through the different grades of relationship, he inquired as to my connections. When I declared with intentional spitefulness that they were all as poor as church mice, he swore a little in Arabic and thoughtfully repeated a chapter of the Koran, treating of the duties of friendship. A little inspired by this, he asked for a whole hour about my former friends. I told him that they were either dead or on the point of starvation. The bugler thought this ridiculous, but with much tact did not continue the subject, coming, no doubt, to the conclusion that I had either killed somebody or robbed a bank in good old Germany. Nothing but that could keep a légionnaire from writing begging letters! I let the philosopher keep his opinion. After thinking deeply for a time, he muttered nothing but a resigned, "C'est la Légion." After a while he asked: "And is there really nothing left?" Without saying a word, I pulled out my three copper pieces. Then a slight smile spread over his face. "Do you know, we'll buy drink with that," he said softly. As we went down the stairs to the canteen, he wisely proposed buying two half-bottles instead of a whole one, for the half-bottles were always filled three-quarters full by Madame la Cantinière. In this way we got the fullest measure possible for the three coppers. My friend the bugler emptied the bottle with great respect, till not a drop was left. Then he became sad again, but said in a comforting way: "Inschallah--and if we haven't any money, sonny, then we've got none. But if I were you, I should after all write to somebody for a little brass----" Only now, in my utter destitution, did I really recognise my position. The few pieces of silver I had still had in my possession, which in former times would just have been sufficient for a few theatre tickets or a few hundred cigarettes, had, in the land of Sidi-bel-Abbès, been a fortune, and had saved me from much wearisome, petty work. Thanks to them, I had been able, after long marches or heavy fatigue duty, to go straight into town without having to bother about polishing and washing. The smallest coin could purchase release from these burdens--now all this was at an end. For hours after I came off duty, I, like the others, stood at the wash-tub, or tediously polished my leather-work. My horizon had narrowed; now it only encircled the drill-ground, barrack-yard, and my bunk in the Legion's quarters. I spent hours lying on my bed and staring at the whitewashed wall opposite, with the long shelf on which the knapsacks were packed. My interests were now quite taken up by all the petty, trifling considerations of the Legion. I quarrelled with the others whether it were really my turn to fetch fresh water in the big earthenware jug; I disputed the highly important matter of sweeping underneath my bed, and it was a question of vital interest to me whether I was ordered to scrub the bench or the large table at the great Saturday cleaning.... The bench was so much easier to do. The days all passed in the same monotonous manner. The grey sameness tired the brain and made one indifferent to the little considerations and small services that people should render to each other when living such a hard life, crowded into so small a space. Everywhere the worst side of human nature showed itself, and even the greatest fool was soon clever enough to find out the bad points of the man who worked beside him by day and slept next to him at night. Petty malice, ill-natured gossip, ridiculous intrigues formed the atmosphere of the Legion. I learnt to know a great deal about human nature, and what I learnt was not inspiriting. With the exception of jolly Herr von Rader, Abramovici was the only man I knew who had a spark of humour left in him. He was the queerest character in the room. He declared he was a Roumanian, but only spoke German, and that with a terrible Berlin accent, which was, to say the least, very strange in a Roumanian. When questioned as to his religion, he told the corporal that he was a "pork-eating" Jew. I suppose he meant that he had no delicate convictions. The man was tall and very thin and appeared to be made of india-rubber. His long neck was surmounted by a head like that of a bird of prey, continually turning from side to side so as not to miss an opportunity of stealing something from his comrades. He had a vile mouth under his enormous nose. In a whining tone he swore all day long at providence in general and the Legion in particular. Nobody could resist his volubility and he was the first, the last, and the only légionnaire who ever succeeded in never doing any work. The explanation of his French nickname, "Viaïsse," was that the india-rubber man repeated the Yiddish phrase of lament, "Wie haisst!" about ten times in one sentence. Once when he made a complaint about something or other to the captain, the latter had thrown up his hands in despair and called out, "Viaïsse, viaïsse, sacré nom de Dieu! toujours viaïsse--what does the fellow want?" The whole regiment laughed at "Monsieur Viaïsse"; he was never called by his real name, Abramovici, but officers and corporals called to him: "Eh, Viaïsse, come here!" He never worked. He was only saved from punishment by his inherent gift of humour. He was very tall, his arms nearly reaching to the ground. If one of his superiors ever ventured to give him any work to do, the scraggy "india-rubber man" appeared to personify a whole Ghetto. His eyes grew large and staring, the nose purple, and the head moved backwards and forwards like a pendulum. Then Viaïsse took a deep breath, and a mad flow of words poured from his vile mouth, while the long arms, with the outspread claw-like fingers, waved frantically in the air. "... Wie haisst! nom de Dieu, de bon Dieu de la Légion--damn me, why should I work myself to death? I've had to drill the whole forenoon and have got nix to eat but a poor soup. I'm a stricken man and will have to get some extra food if I am not to fall down dead like a dog, you jewel of a sergeant. Wie haisst! I am a ruined man if I don't get some food at once. Well?" It is impossible to repeat it all. Words fail me when I try to reproduce my friend Abramovici's grand flow of language. In one respect he was indeed a friend to me; no one ever made me laugh as much as he did. On the day of his arrival with the depot-train from Oran, I happened to hear when the sergeant of the company for the first time ordered him to do some work. Abramovici nearly got a fit at this unheard-of demand. His arms waved frantically in the air like a windmill, and wild words flowed from his mouth. The poor sergeant wished to put in a word sideways. He wished to give a quiet command, he wanted to get furious. But he could not. He could only see with numb astonishment the lurid red nose, he turned away to get out of the reach of the "windmill arms," and at last fell down on the nearest bed with a horrible Arab oath, and laughed as he had never laughed before in his life. When he at last recovered his breath again, he said in broken German: "Oh, Gott in Himmel, cet homme là, zu viel sprechen.--Talks too much." But Abramovici went on jabbering, until at last his harangue ended in laments to the God of his Fathers. This was the way he always got off--one so seldom hears a laugh down there that Monsieur Viaïsse was highly appreciated by officers and men. He called me his friend. He began our friendship with the conventional question: "Wie haisst! will you give me a cigarette?" Many a cigarette the Roumanian Jew from Berlin got from me, as long as there was silver in my pocket. In return he assured me of his high esteem, and when longing for a smoke called me "Herr Baron." When with the silver pieces the cigarettes came to an end, our friendship suffered a little in consequence. I myself lived in a state of continual irritation. The least trifle put me into such a rage that I can hardly credit it to-day. Often enough I would tear down my "paquetage" from the shelf, destroying what had been wearisome work, just because some trousers or jacket did not seem to be folded correctly. It had been nothing else but "cafard" when I had roared at the captain because the doctor refused to give me an opiate on the march--it was exactly the same "cafard" in a milder form when I roared at this or that comrade just because he was in my way when I was busy polishing. My vexation, my irritability, my brooding was the madness of the Foreign Legion. No légionnaire escapes from it. The rest of my comrades in the room all had at different times the "cafard" more or less seriously.... Crowded together like horses in a bad stable the men became dangerous. They fought over the quarter of a litre of the Legion wine that was apportioned to us every second day, and watched with ridiculous suspicion that the next man did not get more than he did; one quarrelled over a piece of bread; one took one's neighbour for a thief who wanted to steal a bit of black wax for leather polishing. If one man got more work to do than his neighbour, he cried murder and roared out about protection, and favouritism, and vicious preference. This was the atmosphere in which the Legion whims were developed. It was really strange how many of the légionnaires had a screw loose, often only harmless peculiarities, but which could increase to madness. All idiocy in the Legion is called "cafard." A légionnaire is gloomy, sitting sullenly on his bed for hours, speaking to no one. If you ask him what is the matter, he will answer with a gross insult. He sits thinking all the time and does the queerest things. He has the "cafard."... His madness may turn into a senseless explosion or fit of fury; men suffering from "cafard" will run a bayonet through their comrade's body, without any reason, without any outward cause. Sometimes they rush out into the desert, sometimes they tear every piece of their outfit into rags, just to vex themselves and others thoroughly. The "cafard" is at its worst in the hot season when the sun burns down relentlessly from the cloudless, deep blue sky, with the strange greenish colouring of the horizon peculiar to Algeria. Then the barrack-yard of the Foreign Legion lies deserted. It is so hot that the stones on the yellow clayey ground seem to move in the glimmering overheated air. The légionnaire sentries wear the flowing white neck-protector, and have stuffed wet cloths into their képis. In the soldiers' quarters the légionnaires lie on their mattresses and take their siesta, the strictly prescribed rest from 11 A.M. until 3 P.M. The white man is a useless object in the sun-blaze of the hot season. In the infernal heat of the soldiers' rooms the "cafard" has often been the cause of great disaster. It has often happened that during the siesta légionnaires have suddenly jumped out of the window, three stories high, without any outward cause whatever. Once (very likely when affected with "cafard") I wrote down during the siesta a description of what our men's room looked like. These few lines are the only thing I ever wrote in the Legion: "I lay on my bed half naked. The room was as hot as a stove, filled with the stench of perspiration. A brilliant strip of sunlight played through the long room from window to window. Oh, the heat, the heat. Even the walls felt hot. In the bare, whitewashed room the men lay groaning on their beds in all kinds of possible and impossible positions. Some were swearing, others quarrelling--nothing brings on the "cafard" so quickly as physical suffering. Two Spaniards were quarrelling in the loud gesticulating manner of their race; a German in the next bed had fallen asleep, and was muttering words of German in his dream. He was dreaming of his mother. In the other corner of the room a Frenchman was shouting frantically to some one to give him a brush--his own brush was lost. His bed neighbour hummed a marching song, half in Arabic, half in French, always with the same refrain: "'Si le caporal savait ça, il dirait: Nom de Dieu.' "Another man slowly and automatically rubbed his leather straps, a third one informed everybody that the sergeant was a rogue and was working him to death. Here the German awoke. Disturbed in his sleep he yelled out: 'Shut up you beggars.' And the Frenchmen and Spaniards began to curse on hearing German words. "'Monsieur le Caporal'[4] sat up slowly and tiredly and, leaning on his elbow, said in a low tone of voice: [4] "Monsieur le Caporal" was Corporal Wassermann's nickname, because in the eyes of the légionnaires he was far too particular in his manners and language when giving orders. "'A little silence, please.' "The Spaniards laughed and a Frenchman said under his breath, the damned 'casque à pique,' meaning the Prussian helmet, might leave honest légionnaires in peace during siesta. "The corporal did not move. In his quiet even tone he went on speaking: 'Silence. You all know that during siesta all noise is forbidden. Legrand, for using the epithet "casque à pique," I punish you with two days' barrack arrest. You are not serving in a French line regiment, but in the Foreign Legion. You understand, do you not, that in the Foreign Legion no man is taxed with his nationality. And in every respect it is very unwise to vex your corporal. Ça y est.' "At that the légionnaire laughed and quiet reigned once more. "My God, the heat was terrible. Then all at once a slashing, metallic sound. One of the Spaniards had pulled down the long bayonet that always hangs over a légionnaire's bed, and was in the act of assaulting his countryman and comrade. The corporal sprang between the two and sent one flying to the right, the other to the left. In a second the whole place was in an uproar. The two Spaniards threw themselves upon each other, anxious to kill each other. The other légionnaires laughed and howled out through it all.... "At last the signal, 'Debout, légionnaires, debout!' 'Up, up!' sounded down in the yard. The siesta was at an end." This is what I wrote while lying half naked in my bed, groaning at the heat. The description has the advantage of the impressions of the moment. This was what happened when the "cafard" was at its "best." Then again whole numbers of soldiers are affected by it in the same way. The légionnaires of half a company would put their heads together, planning some act of desperation. One time it would be mutiny en masse, at another time desertion in a body. This madness is well known wherever a company of légionnaires is stationed. In some kind of form it is always present. It is the cause of the horrible tattooing, of drinking and brawling; it is the reason for that peculiar longing for continual change, that restlessness typical of the Foreign Legion. The légionnaires are themselves not aware what influence the "cafard" has on them. When an old légionnaire says grumpily, "J'ai le cafard," he is just telling his neighbours to keep clear of him, that he has a bad fit of the blues, that it is advisable for his comrades to leave him alone. He has no idea that a hidden power, like unto madness, is making him act in such a manner, he only believes himself to be in a bad humour. But the bad humour rises and increases, often driving him to murder, more often to suicide. The légionnaire cannot foresee the effects of the "cafard." The typical "cafard demoniacs," the old grumpy fellows who do their duty like machines and at other times hardly speak at all, are instinctively feared, as if their comrades knew that at any moment the least trifle could lead to an outbreak of the dormant madness. I have witnessed such an explosion (that is the proper term for it). We had a man in our company who had served for many years in the Legion. He was a Frenchman and had worn the Legion's uniform for more than ten years. He got out of our way whenever he could, and when his duties were over, slunk away into lonely corners of the barrack-yard. Every fifth day he left the barracks, on pay-day, to return reeling, evidently drunk, just before evening muster. He never was rowdy, but silent as usual, he threw himself upon his bed. Where he went to, where he bought his wine, with whom he drank it, nobody knew. One pay-day, when the half of our company was on guard-duty, he for once came back too late. The barrack-gates had long been closed; Smith and I were still sitting on the bench in front of the guard-room, the sergeant and the other légionnaires were lying inside on their bunks. All at once the sentry at the gate called the officer on duty with the laconic report: "Sergeant--la porte!" The gate! Swearing, the man came with his keys. Outside stood the grumpy old légionnaire, swaying from side to side and his képi at the back of his head. "Bertillon?" the sergeant said, unlocking the gate. "You ---- old pig, you ought to know by this time when to come home." Bertillon staggered in and remained standing in front of the sergeant. "Be off with you and get into your quarters!" he commanded. "You can be jolly glad that your own company is on guard duty, else you would have been locked up at once. Allez--schieb' los!" The old légionnaire stared at the sergeant. Suddenly, without saying a word, he hit him right in the face with his fist. "Aux armes!" the reeling sergeant yelled. Bertillon had pulled out his bayonet and was slashing and hitting at every one, roaring like a wild beast. A terrible tussle ensued. We were twelve to one, but it took us more than a quarter of an hour to get the upper hand of the "cafard" madman, and every one had been more or less wounded by his bayonet. At length we contrived to throw blankets over his head, and strapping him up like a parcel, we threw him into the prison. On opening the cell the next morning he was found dead. At the post-mortem examination the army surgeon stated that the bursting of an artery in the brain had been the cause of death. These are the worst cases of "cafard." Generally the peculiar malady of the Foreign Legion shows itself in all kinds of peculiar whims. Smith's comical reciting of the Koran chapters was such a whim. Many developed some kind of fixed idea. The cook of my company was an old légionnaire who had served in the Legion for fifteen years and was soon to be pensioned off; his fixed idea was that he was Bismarck's double. His name was Schlesinger. Like the German Prime Minister, he had the stature of a giant, and in his heavy face with the bald head, in the sharp eyes, there certainly was a slight resemblance to the features of the "man of iron." The Legion, being good-natured and having a great sense of humour, did old Schlesinger the favour of never calling him anything else but "Bismarck." Herr von Rader was the first one to draw my attention to him. He had heard of the cook's peculiarity and ... forthwith rushed to the kitchen. He lounged about the door till the cook, getting suspicious, came to see if the intruder intended stealing. Hardly had von Rader seen him, when he called out in astonishment: "Good gracious! that surely must be Bismarck!" The cook drew himself up majestically and smiled condescendingly. "Such a likeness!" in a surprised voice from von Rader. "Very like--n'est-ce pas?" said Schlesinger, highly flattered. "Really wonderful! You surely must be a relation of the Bismarck family?" "That may be," nodded the cook, very much pleased. This was quite a new idea. It had never entered his head that he might be related to Bismarck. "You're certainly a relation," said von Rader in a tone of conviction, "an illegitimate." "Très possible--très possible," the cook murmured, proud and happy. "Are you a young soldier?" he asked the man who had put the wonderful idea into his poor old légionnaire's head. "That's so," groaned von Rader. "I am like you, and have once been something better. My father" (von Rader lowered his voice to a whisper as if he were disclosing the greatest secret), "my father was a count!" Bismarck was much impressed by his announcement. "And now I must starve in the Legion," added von Rader sadly. "Pas ça," said Schlesinger, and, disappearing into the kitchen, he returned with a large piece of roast pork. "Tiens, camarade. To-morrow we will talk again about--about our ancestors. Mais--say nothing." "Nothing," assured von Rader, putting his finger to his lips. From that day the pseudo-Bismarck and the pseudo-count were seen together almost daily, and von Rader always had a piece of meat in his knapsack, when we had to eat dry bread in the drill pause. If any one called the cook "Schlesinger" he was deeply offended and did not answer; even the officers called him Bismarck. There was another légionnaire I cannot forget--Little Krügerle. His whim was--to steal grapes. A very funny idea, for Krügerle never ate grapes himself; he did not like them. With great trouble he got them into the barracks and then gave them away. His one idea was to steal the grapes. This was his cafard, his special rage against the possessors of vineyards. But his cafard had its own tale.... Grapes were worth very little in Algeria, but when every year at the grape harvest three thousand légionnaires strolled in the evenings along the paths beside the vineyards, when each légionnaire ate about five pounds of grapes, taking another ten pounds under his cloak--then the Spanish grape-farmers grew angry. They sent a deputation to the colonel, declaring that his légionnaires were worse than a locust-plague. The colonel abused them all and sent out a command that all who transgressed again would be punished. The légionnaires laughed--were a little more careful, but stole quite as many grapes as formerly. Seeing that it would not do like this, the Spaniards engaged Arabs, gave them small-shot guns and told them not to spare the offenders. The following morning the army surgeon was much astonished, on going his daily round, to find sixty-five légionnaires wounded by small shot. The extraction of all the small shot took so much time that he got furious and went to the colonel and complained. The latter, having an idea what was the matter, examined the "invalids," who promptly told a great story of having been suddenly attacked by Arabs. The colonel laughed and ordered them all to be locked up for four weeks on bread and water. Now the Spaniards were left in peace, because the grapes were not worth while being shot and locked up for, the légionnaires said sadly. But from this time dated little Krügerle's cafard. Every day he went out to steal grapes. With the greatest patience and cunning he crawled about in the vineyards and stole grapes. Once he was shot and ran right back to the barracks and into the soldiers' room. Five minutes later, all the fifteen men there were busily occupied in digging the countless shot out of their comrade's back--with pocket-knives! Krügerle underwent the operation with more or less tranquillity--but it was worth suffering a little; if he had gone to the surgeon, four weeks of cellule arrest would have been his lot. He swore great oaths--but went stealing grapes again the following day. * * * * * The germ of madness, of tragedy, always lies hidden in the cafard. I was a witness of the following tragedy. In our room in the corner by the window an Austrian had his bed. His name was Bauer. He had joined the company with a new batch of recruits, shortly after I did, in good health, fresh and curious like all the other recruits: an average man, who did not easily learn the French words of command, but did his work conscientiously. Week by week he got quieter. Stupidly he did his work and spoke to nobody. In his free time he sat on his bed moodily staring in front of him. Now and then he would be punished for neglecting his uniform, but this did not seem to make any impression on him at all. He returned from prison as moody as before. Nobody took any notice of him. All at once the poor quiet creature became the centre of attraction, an object of ridicule and enmity, and for weeks the gossip of the Legion's quarters. Suddenly Bauer was attacked by a most ravenous appetite. If possible he was quieter than formerly; but when the midday soup appeared, he fell over it like a wild animal, devouring it greedily, and greedily he watched us while we were eating. When we had finished, he crept up to the table, examining the empty dishes in the hope of finding a few drops left. After this he would rush down to the kitchen to the old cook to beg some leavings from him. The other men in the room were so brutalised by their own misfortunes in life that they only looked upon this poor devil as a clown to serve for their amusement. They threw pieces of bread into corners, and yelled with pleasure when Bauer crawled about on all-fours under the beds to look for the coveted morsel. They poured petroleum into his soup, and were wild with delight when the poor fellow nevertheless emptied the dish greedily. Day by day Bauer grew worse. From the other soldiers' quarters, even from the other companies, the légionnaires came at soup-time to our room to inspect the prodigy. All the time he sat crouching on his bed, smiling vacantly and gobbling down whatever he could get. He would gnaw at the dry bone held out to him by a légionnaire with the same grin as he would chew a piece of hard leather given to him by another man. It was the beginning of insanity.... Soon the whole regiment was talking about the man with the unappeasable appetite. If any one wished to have a joke, they brought the glutton a dry crust or a piece of hard Legion biscuit, just to watch him devour it. For weeks these scenes occurred, without the authorities thinking it necessary to interfere. The end came suddenly. One day we only found half-chewed crusts on our table instead of the usual daily portion of bread. Bauer had stolen away from his work and eaten our rations! The légionnaires threw themselves upon him--where their own comforts were concerned it was no joking matter. One of them struck the poor devil, who, biting and scratching and hitting at every one, shrieked like a madman. The watch was roused, and the poor fellow, chained hand and foot, was carried across to the infirmary. Three days after, the eleventh company conducted a small black cart to the grave-yard of Sidi-bel-Abbès. In the rudely made coffin on the cart lay the remains of Légionnaire Bauer. In the infirmary he had smashed his head against the wall.... At the grave the captain said briefly, in a cold voice: "Recevez les derniers adieux de votre chef et de vos camarades." This was his funeral sermon. CHAPTER XI THE DESERTERS The Odyssey of going on pump : Death in the desert : The Legion's deserters : A disastrous flight in a motor-car : The tragic fate of an Austrian engineer : In the Ghetto of Sidi-bel-Abbès : The business part of desertion : Oran and Algiers : The Consulate as a trap : The financial side of desertion : One hundred kilometres of suffering : Hamburg steamers : Self-mutilation : Shamming : In the Suez Canal : Morocco, the wonderland Even Herr von Rader had the cafard--the fever to desert--and his good humour diminished perceptibly under its influence. In low cunning the equal of the oldest and craftiest légionnaire, he had quite got the trick of decorating himself, and certainly got along much better than most of the other recruits. But, as a veteran on the high road of life, he had a very highly developed sense of the practical side of human affairs. To take and not to give had always been his most sacred rule of life; living without working was for him the acme of human cleverness. Now, however, Herr von Rader began to reckon out for himself, with a face that got longer and longer, the Legion's pet arithmetic example: that he had to do an immense amount of work and got little or no pay for it. He found this very trying. "My friend," he said to me once, "I'm off. I just guess I won't bother you with details, but I'm sorry to have to tell you that this honourable regiment will have to get on as best it can without me. I'm going to clear out." I warned him and kept telling him that it was utter folly to desert in this happy-go-lucky way without civilian's clothes and without any money. Herr von Rader merely shook his head: "It's true enough that I've a large balance of poverty! On the other hand, I've a thundering lot of impudence--an absolutely immense and overwhelming quantity of impudence--and I guess, in spite of everything, I'll take that little pleasure trip and have a look at the neighbourhood. Somewhere round here there must be a nigger tribe who would consider it an honour when a chap like me with a real white skin does some swell conjuring for them. Why, they'll jump at the chance of making me their medicine man. Anyway, I'm off! If you're a wise man, you'll come too. It'll be fine enough even if it does not last for long. And I'll tell you a secret: in the sergeants' room the big service revolver is hanging comfortably on the wall. I've a sort of an idea that that piece of property will be off about the same time as me--on French leave! That's a great consolation for me, quite apart from the fact that I shall be damned glad to annoy that fool of a sergeant! Won't you come?" I declined with thanks. Herr von Rader now sought other followers. In every spare moment he gathered a following from among the young men around his bed. They lounged about and smoked cigarettes forging their plans for flight. More than once I went and listened to them and more than once I gave them a warning, but they were so wrapped up in their idea that all good advice was quite wasted. They wanted to make a bee-line for the south, marching only at night and avoiding all houses and villages. Then they thought of going west and working through into Morocco. One of them had found an old map of Northern Africa, and on this they had marked out their route. Their bayonets and the revolver they were going to steal were to be their weapons. They were not in the least afraid of Arabs or Moroccans, and about provisions they didn't worry themselves very much, as Herr von Rader cold-bloodedly pointed out that they were six strong men and could easily procure the necessaries of life by force. In reality they were very indifferent as to all these details. The only idea that they had in their heads was that they would soon have done with their wretched lives as légionnaires, and roam at large, free men once more. They were thoroughly infected with the fever for desertion, which was ever to be found in the Legion. Plans for flight and their feasibility were ever being discussed in whispers, and this formed a part of the Legion's atmosphere--desertion was always the favourite topic of conversation in quarters and in the canteen. This was only natural. There is not a single man in the Legion who does not sooner or later repent his folly, recognising that it was the maddest thing he ever did in his life when he signed that ominous contract in the enlistment bureau. He has to work as he never worked in his life before, and he has less money in his pocket than in the most needy times of his civil life. Even if he had been a miserable beggar, a wretched copper had not such an enormous value in his eyes nor had it been so hard to earn as in these days of poverty in the Foreign Legion. He is wretchedly poor, living under the strictest military discipline, working hard and getting less than nothing out of his life. At first the strangeness of his surroundings has a certain charm: but the harder he has to work and the oftener he becomes acquainted with the heavy penalties which no légionnaire escapes for long, the quicker comes the lust for freedom. The idea of flight gradually ripens in him. He talks about it with his friends; in every spare moment he washes and cleans for the non-commissioned officers to earn a few coppers, and every evening he sits with the veterans, with the old grey-haired fellows who have breathed the air of the Legion so long that they are no use for any other sort of work, and who, as if under a spell, no matter how often they have sworn never to don the red trousers again, always come back again to the Legion. They know Algeria like the palm of their own hand and gladly sell their priceless wisdom for a litre of canteen wine. But in this case good advice is not worth much. Money is the main necessity for flight. If good intentions counted for anything in the matter, the percentage of deserters would reach a fabulous figure; but the poor fellows who go out on foot, without a penny in their pockets, very seldom get away and are generally brought back in a few days by the gendarmes. Hunger and thirst almost always drive them into the Arab villages or to the Spanish peasant settlements on the main roads, which are so often patrolled that detection is unavoidable. Then is the wisdom of the old légionnaire a vain thing indeed--against enemies like hunger and thirst the truant can do nothing. In addition to the lust for freedom the légionnaire has generally got the cafard: a feeling of hatred for anything connected with the Legion, the extraordinary impulse which leads him to undertake the maddest and most hopeless things rather than stay a day longer in the Legion. When they are as ill as this the poor fellows run off no matter where, without the slightest consideration or preparation. The Legion has coined a special expression for this kind of desertion: "Going on pump"--in French, "Aller au poump." An extraordinary word of unknown origin. You "go on pump." One evening as we sat in quarters cleaning our leather equipment, an old légionnaire, an Austrian, suddenly got up. "You damned set of fools," he cried, "I'm going out. I'm going on pump." As he spoke he buckled on his bayonet. "I hope I'll never see the blasted lot of you again." He went out and never returned. Several weeks afterwards there was shown to us at roll-call the photograph of a body that had been horribly maimed. It was the Austrian. A patrol had found him by the Morocco frontier. The officer in command, to whose equipment according to regulation a camera belonged, had taken the photograph. Each company in the Legion got a copy of this awful picture, in order to identify the corpse. The regiment has quite a series of these pictures, all showing a man's naked body, hacked about in the most appalling fashion. This is the work of the Moroccan brigands, to whom the légionnaire, staggering hither and thither under the influence of the cafard, is a real source of joy. His uniform and bayonet are priceless possessions, easily won with a few sword-strokes. Besides, there is the consideration that Allah and his prophet reward a pious deed like torturing a dog of a Christian. Hundreds of légionnaires who have started out in cafard have met with this awful death in the desert, martyred, maimed and tortured. In general, however, the légionnaire finds going on pump, this flight into the desert, this mad rush for freedom without any real goal and without any sort of preparation, something quite natural that everybody tries once at any rate in the course of his career. In cafard.... As a rule the men desert in little groups, without any equipment but the uniform they wear and the bayonet that clanks at their side. They go forth at night, before nine o'clock, while the barrack gates are still open, and run, under cover of the darkness, madly through the sandy vineyards. They are miserably cold in the chilly African night, and the pangs of hunger soon assail them. But they keep going on: they are accustomed to accomplish miracles of marching even when loaded with the Legion's heavy baggage; without it they cover enormous distances. Five minutes at the double with that long cat-like stride of the Legion which never tires those who have once got the knack of it--and then five minutes' marching. They go on like this without stopping all through the night, and in the morning the truants are a good sixty kilometres from the garrison. Arriving at some lonely farm or other in the grey of the morning, they obtain a crust of bread and a sip of wine. It is very seldom the sympathetic heart of the Spaniard that takes pity on them: no, it is more often the bayonets which advise him to be obliging and conciliatory. In the daytime the poumpistes hide among the rocks or bury themselves in a deep hole in the sand. When night comes on they start on their way once more, ever southwards, keeping their bearings by the stars as they have learnt to do in the Legion--for a very different purpose it is true. When they hear the sound of horses' hoofs they take cover in deadly terror and lie for hours, still as mice, until the patrol has long passed out of sight below the horizon. Thus the days pass by. Bands of energetic and enterprising runaways often terrorise the Arabs in the lonely settlements for weeks on end, until the oppressed ones send for help and a fight results in which the deserters are of course sadly worsted. Desperate fellows "on pump," who are determined to reach Morocco at any price, sometimes succeed in getting hold of a rifle. They have then a weapon to defend themselves against the brigands. They cannot take their own rifles with them, for with rifles they would never be allowed to pass the barrack gates. A tough old veteran, who knows the frontier, marches with the utmost care. He knows that there is a triple row of tents, a quarter of a kilometre apart. One dark night he creeps through. This operation takes a long time to carry out. The tents, it is true, are a long way apart from each other, and it seems easy enough to get through. But this is only at first sight. For every 200 yards there stands a sentry guarding the line till the next tent is reached. The line of tents is almost endless. Were the deserter to attempt to creep through direct or even in a slanting direction, he could not possibly avoid being noticed by one of the sentries who are stationed in a triangular arrangement. But he knows the trick. He creeps through 100 yards from a sentry and then strikes off at an angle of 45 degrees until he reaches the next row. Then straight on once more and then off again at an angle.... Now he works himself, crawling on his stomach and burying himself in the sand for hours at a time, up to a tent in the outside line. He steps silently into the tent, feels about with care--and he is the possessor of a rifle and a cartridge-belt. Thus armed he has now a chance of life and of getting safely across Morocco. * * * * * In most cases, however, after a few days of golden freedom, a freedom consisting of perpetual marching and ceaseless hunger, the man on pump meets his fate in the shape of a band of mounted "Goums,"[5] and finds himself, after a very short space of time, looking down the muzzles of their revolvers. He then has to go back the same way he came, fastened by a long chain to one of the Goums' horses, panting and coughing with the exertion of keeping up with the horse, which he must do if he doesn't want to be dragged over the sand and stones. Thus he is taken from station to station till the garrison is reached. If he is lucky enough not to have lost any part of his equipment and has not been absent more than a week, he is tried by the regiment, and gets off with sixty days' cellule--solitary confinement in the dark. If, however, any part of his uniform is missing, he is tried for theft and desertion by the court-martial in Oran, which is noted for its Draconic sentences. [5] "Goums" is the Legion's name for the Arab gendarmes. "Traveaux forcés," penal servitude for years, is then his fate--a penalty which usually means death, for there are very few constitutions that can stand the terrible life in the penal settlements. Rader and his friends were poumpistes of this type. One evening the man of strong language and never-failing wit was missing when the roll was called. Several others were reported missing from various rooms, and the next morning the whole company knew that six Germans had deserted _en bloc_. The sergeant of our section made a list of the uniform and equipment Herr von Rader had left behind. He cursed, as only a lazy sergeant in the Legion can curse, his own personal bad luck because the six deserters, being in his company, now gave him a lot of work and worry. At the evening roll-call the colour-sergeant appeared in person in our room and ordered Corporal Wassermann to take good care that no more of the men under his charge deserted: otherwise he'd make it d----d hot for him. The captain, however, sent for all the Germans in his company. He made us a long speech in the company's bureau: We had all served our time in Germany and we ought really to be content with the life in his company. There was no flogging in the Legion! When anybody thought he had a ground for complaint he should report himself at once to the captain. The Legion was a regiment of foreigners, and one nation was treated in exactly the same way as another: a German soldier in it had naturally exactly the same rights as every one else. He would be very sorry if his men took to deserting. It was quite hopeless to try! A description of the deserters had been telegraphed long ago to all the stations in Algeria, the police all along the coast were on the look-out, and in a few days we should see the truants brought back to the regiment. "You only get into trouble when you desert, as it is very heavily punished!" "The whole thing is this," said Smith when we came back into our room. "The cap'n is champion fencer of France, and thinks he must be always practising in the fencing saloon! He hasn't the least idea what things really look like in the company!" Even a raw recruit knew much more of what went on in the company than its leader. The non-commissioned officers took very good care that the captain did not learn too much.... In reality the colour-sergeant and the non-commissioned officers were all-powerful. The captain was merely what one might call the owner of the business, who signed the punishment sheets and reports which his managers laid before him, without bothering his head about details. The non-coms had the mess-allowance in their hands, put down whatever men they pleased on the punishment sheet for absolutely nothing at all, and would very quickly have done to death any one who made a complaint, even if at first he got his rights by complaining. "By the beard of the Prophet," laughed Smith, "I'd like to see what happened to the chap who made a complaint. Why, the whole bally lot of non-coms would be down on him in less than no time, and in a couple of weeks he'd be a Zephyr in the penal battalion. That's what happens when you complain, Signor Capitano. But he's quite right about deserting is our champion captain. We do see most of 'em again." Then he went over to Rassedin and asked him if he thought that Rader and the other five poumpistes would get away. Rassedin shook his head and laughed, making with his thumb and forefinger that counting gesture which means paying all the world over. "No money," he said dryly. The other veterans too thought that Rader and the other five were not the sort of men who would succeed in surmounting the difficulties of a flight unprovided with money. The flight of the six comrades was an inexhaustible topic of conversation in the company. Smith used to spin one yarn after another of mad bids for freedom. Two of these histories I shall never forget. While Smith was in the second battalion at Saida, there were two brothers in his company, two Englishmen of good birth. The final and maddest freak of their mad lives landed them in the Legion. When their family learnt that they were wearing the Legion's uniform, they did all they could to procure their freedom. In vain! Petitions to the French Secretary of War were of no avail, and the English Consul in Algiers naturally refused to intervene. Finally the two brothers were sent a large sum of money and they tried their luck at deserting. They were no farther than Saida station when they were arrested and marched back to prison. As soon as they were free again they made a second attempt at flight and got as far as Oran. But their descriptions had been telegraphed there and they were arrested as they were going on board the steamer. This time they were sent for six months to the penal battalion. The poor devils must have written despairing letters home. Their relations were determined to get them free at any price. With an English merchant as go-between, they bribed a Levantine, who hired an automobile and waited days and days by Saida, in the neighbourhood where the convicts had to work. After long delay the brothers succeeded in escaping at night from their tent. They reached the appointed rendezvous in safety, found the Levantine with his motor waiting for them, and started off as quickly as the sand would allow. The automobile, however, had attracted notice in Saida, and the military authorities came at once on the idea that these dauntless deserters had hit on the unusual method of flight by motor-car. Telegrams flew from station to station, and the Arab police barricaded a narrow part of the road a little north of Sidi-bel-Abbès, which passes at this point through a rocky part of the country, absolutely impassable for vehicles. A short time afterwards the motor came up. The runaways took no notice of the warnings of the gendarmes who rode to meet them, and crashed at full speed into the pile of stones. The motor was overturned, the two deserters being killed immediately. The Levantine was seriously injured and brought into the hospital at Sidi-bel-Abbès, where he died a few days later. The other story is a really sad one. An Austrian engineer had, as a young man, for some reason or other enlisted in the Foreign Legion. After a while he managed to escape and worked his way home to Austria again. He must have been a clever fellow, for he soon gained a distinguished position in his profession. Fortune smiled upon him. He made a notable invention, which made him a wealthy man. Ambition led him to send the machine he had invented to the World's Exhibition in Paris. In the distinguished engineer nobody would recognise the deserter from the Foreign Legion--at least so he thought. But cruel fate willed otherwise. Standing by his machine at the exhibition he was recognised by an officer from his company who was just then on leave in Paris. The officer did his duty as a soldier and had the deserter arrested. At one blow the man who had worked his way from the depths of poverty to the top of his profession, who looked upon the days in the Legion as merely a dark shadow on his life, became once more a légionnaire. A few days in a Parisian military prison, a few hours' journey by rail in a prisoners' compartment, the short sea-voyage to Oran, the cruel minutes before the court-martial--and then perpetual, blunting work in an Algerian mine, truly a living death. And thus this man had to live for many a long month, till the horrible climate carried him off.... * * * * * Flight from the Legion is always a risky and difficult undertaking, risky since there is always the severest punishment waiting for the deserter who gets caught. Even the possession of really plentiful means is no guarantee for a successful flight. There are so many hindrances to surmount, such a mountain of difficulties to be climbed. To begin at the beginning. The Ghetto of Sidi-bel-Abbès supplies the clothes. Buying civilian clothes is the first chapter of a légionnaire's flight, the first part of his preparations for which the would-be deserter needs not only money but also a finely developed talent for haggling and bargaining. To open negotiations is very easy: the légionnaire simply addresses a passer-by in one of the little alleys and whispers to him that he knows of some one who would perhaps buy civilian clothes. In one case in a hundred the passer-by shakes his head and goes his way. In the ninety-nine other cases he looks pleased, and in just such a whisper tells the légionnaire to follow him into his house without attracting attention. Once there, the bargaining begins. Heaps of old clothes are fetched, until something is found somewhere about the customer's size. Boots, shirt, collar, hat, and tie are all found. To an honest man of business the transaction would seem somewhat strange. These Ghetto transactions have an underlying principle of their own: furnish as poor goods as possible at as high a price as you can get! The buyer is already nervous at the prospect of his flight, so, in spite of all, he pays an absolutely fabulous price. Fifty francs is usually the price of an old suit, of which the trousers come, perhaps, from Germany, the waistcoat from France, and the coat from Italy, and which would be very dear at ten francs. The "business friend" next claims a gold piece for allowing the légionnaire to change his clothes in his house; a further gold piece arranges for the care of his uniform, which a légionnaire who is at all careful will not be persuaded so easily to leave in the lurch. For the deserter captured without his uniform is tried for theft by court-martial, and the military tribunal in Oran always passes sentence of a long term of penal servitude. But the man of Israel is willing enough--provided he gets a gold piece for it--to take care that the uniform and entire equipment of his customer is safely preserved for the poor regiment. Neatly bound together the uniform lies idle for a few days. Then, one dark night, a youth from the Ghetto throws the parcel over the wall of the barracks. A ticket has been pinned on beforehand, on which the name and number of the owner has been written so that the gentlemen in the quarter-master's office needn't cudgel their brains wondering how to register this parcel from heaven. All so considerate! The runaway, however, wanders through the alleys of the Jewish quarter and the streets of Sidi-bel-Abbès, taking great care to avoid instinctively saluting the officers and non-coms he meets. His money, with which he bought his civilian clothes, and of which there is still enough for his railway journey and passage, is a mighty help to him. He must not attract notice anywhere; he must bridle his tongue, lest the curious French which is individual to the Legion betray him, and he must act the rôle of the harmless traveller to a nicety. He naturally cannot begin his journey from the station of Sidi-bel-Abbès, which is watched by a commando of the Legion's non-commissioned officers day and night. No, he must go on foot to one of the stations on the way to his destination; the farther from Sidi-bel-Abbès he is, the less likely he is to attract attention. So he makes a long night march, keeping a sharp look-out for the patrols of Arab police. Then comes the railway journey to a coast town. The only two towns that come in question are Oran and the town of Algiers, since regular lines of steamers only run from these two ports. Oran is mostly avoided, because it is so near to Sidi-bel-Abbès, and because there are so many of the Legion's officers to be met with there. The journey to Algiers, on the other hand, is very expensive, and it often happens that the truant's money is exhausted, and he lands there penniless. In this case German légionnaires usually go to the German Consulate, but only receive the stereotyped reply that there is no money at the Consul's disposal "for purposes like this." The Consulate is not only powerless to help them, but, into the bargain, is one of the best and most efficient mouse-traps a French gendarme could want. Old légionnaires always give you the same warning: "For the Lord's sake don't go to the Consul in Algiers." If, in spite of this, a deserter does go to the Consul, he is merely told that he cannot possibly gain assistance there. And now the trap begins to do its work. The police in Algiers know well enough that there are a great many escaped légionnaires among the men who come to the Consulate. When any one comes out looking in the least bit suspicious, they receive him tenderly and inquire lovingly about his papers. The deserter is then done for.... I should like to know whether the German Consul in Algiers has the slightest idea that, in all innocence, he has been the ruin of so many German légionnaires. The runaway whose money has been swallowed up by the railway journey and who cannot pay his passage over sea, must in most cases give himself up for lost. It is generally only a question of a few days till he is arrested. A careless word in a wine-shop, a lame excuse when he seeks work and can show no papers--in short, the whole system of denunciation which is so flourishing in Algiers very soon hands him over to the police. And even when he has money enough to pay his passage on one of the Mediterranean lines, and has his ticket safe in his pocket, he is not yet in safety. Most of the runaways who have succeeded in reaching Algiers make the mistake of taking a passage on one of the German or English lines of steamers, and is arrested at the eleventh hour as he goes on board. It is on the foreign ships that they keep a specially sharp eye. On the French boats, on the other hand, which ply between Algiers and Oran, you don't need any papers or even a passport, because the authorities look upon these boats as an internal French means of communication. The route from Algiers to Tunis is absolutely safe for the deserter. There, nobody notices him in the enormous rush of the Levantine traffic, and he needs no passport to cross to an Italian port. But the expense is enormous. Among the légionnaires who desert, the number of those who can escape in civilian clothes by the comparatively safe way of the railway and the Mediterranean boats is very small. Travelling costs money.... A flight over the town of Algiers needs really quite a little capital--150 francs at least. This is a very low estimate, for the purchase of clothes alone takes about seventy francs. How few of the men in the Legion can raise such a sum like this! In most cases they are poor devils who have no one in the wide world who could or would send them a sum of this sort; most of them never had a franc to their name while they were in the Legion, to say nothing of a gold coin. Men like this are seldom successful in their flight, even when they spend months and months in preparation and discuss their route a hundred times over with the veterans of the Legion. They don't run blindly into the desert like the poumpistes, who don't really want more than a few days of runaway freedom. Their way is also to the coast. In uniform! On foot! In these two expressions there is expressed the deserter's whole difficulty. Although the distance from Sidi-bel-Abbès to the coast is only about one hundred kilometres, not a very great stretch for a légionnaire who is accustomed to long marches, it is beset with danger for every yard of the way. The runaway can be recognised a long way off by his uniform. True, he only marches by night. But the starlit nights of Algeria are very bright, and he has to creep from rock to rock and from hollow to hollow, to avoid being seen by the patrols. By day he lies motionless in the sand. He suffers hunger and thirst for days on end, and lives on fruits, which he steals when hunger drives him to risk discovery. When he has reached the coast in safety, the game of hide-and-seek begins anew. He often lies for days in some little coast town, where the Mediterranean tramp-steamers touch, concealed in a shed or in some old boat on the shore, till a ship carrying the German or English flag comes into port. He swims out to this ship in the middle of the night, climbs on board, and hides in one of the ship's boats, or in the coal-bunker. He first makes his appearance when the ship is on the high seas as a more or less pleasant surprise for the captain. He is now safe--they can hardly throw him overboard. There are, moreover, a great many captains who shut their eyes when a runaway of this sort is discovered, and even if the ship is still lying in port do not give him up. There are some even who carry their humanity so far as to stand a certain amount of unpleasantness with the authorities for his sake. These are mostly German ships, and above all, ships from Hamburg. Deserters from the Legion land over and over again in the old Hansa town, and again and again you may read in the Hamburg daily papers that deserters have arrived with such and such a ship, and have been taken charge of by the police authorities. Now and then they go just as they stand, in their uniform, with bayonet and all the rest of it, to the paper's offices and tell the worried editor about their life and sorrows in the Legion.... These are those who have had luck; the tiny proportion of penniless deserters who are successful in their flight. Not freedom but prison awaits the large majority at the finish of their attempt. The Arab gendarmes are paid a bonus on the deserters they arrest, which amounts to many thousand francs a year! The regiment is acquainted with many other means of desertion, if by "desertion" you understand every means by which the deserter can free himself from work in the Legion. In the terrible heat of summer, when the difference in temperature between day and night is simply enormous, sickness, in many a grim form, stalks through Algeria. The drinking water becomes infected, and typhoid sets in: the légionnaire who is tired of active service can be pretty sure of a long spell of illness. But to make quite certain he helps matters artificially--with an extraordinary measure in vogue in the Legion: he drinks a mixture of absinthe and milk. Every veteran in the Legion swears this hellish drink never fails to bring on an attack of fever! The object of this suicidal method of desertion is naturally to avoid work in the Legion by a long spell of sickness--its object is always attained; mostly so effectively that the man never takes his place on parade again, but rests for ever in the Legion's cemetery! In the same way self-mutilation may be met with: the chopping off of a finger which renders the légionnaire unfit for active service. Others simulate illness or madness. This the suspiciousness and brutality of the doctors in the Legion renders very difficult. Now and then a légionnaire with a will of iron manages to play the comedy of madness successfully. The means employed are sometimes rather drastic. Some years before I entered the Legion, a Belgian served in my company who shammed for a whole year. He dirtied the men's quarters in such a fashion that his comrades fell upon him and ill-treated him in every possible way, but he merely answered their curses and reprisals with an inane laugh. Neither curses nor blows seemed to make the least difference to him. This fellow had grit. He played his part as a lunatic, as unpleasant for himself as well as for others, without ever wavering. They shut him up, they compelled him to do the hardest work, they brought him into hospital and wellnigh starved him or tortured him with drugs; he was confined for weeks in the dark, he was sent to the hospital at Daya and treated with cold water--all in vain! His method and his smile remained unchanged! After thirteen months the doctors felt themselves checkmated, gave up the job as hopeless and certified him mad. The colonel, purely out of curiosity, sent for the lunatic, who must needs have an attack of his particular malady in the regimental bureau itself. As soon, however, as he was home again in Belgium, he wrote postcards to the officers and to several members of his company.... He had foiled them all and they were the idiots! The most unmitigated ass of them in his humble opinion was the regimental doctor! If possible the surgeon-major in the Algerian corps was a bigger fool still! Tremendous energy is, however, necessary to bring a sham of this sort to a successful issue, and cases like this constitute a tiny minority. The doctors in the Foreign Legion are both clever and suspicious and the result is that there is always a good dose of Legion's brutality included in their treatment. All those who reported themselves sick, and hadn't some outward and visible sign of their ailment to show, were treated from beginning to end as shams. Our médecin-major was an especial terror to the légionnaires. I only came into personal contact with him twice; the first time was on a manoeuvre march when he refused me the medicine I wanted, and the other time was when I was vaccinated. There was an epidemic of small-pox in Sidi-bel-Abbès, and the whole of the Legion had to be vaccinated as quickly as possible. We were marched by companies into the great drill-hall where Monsieur le Major and his assistants were at work. Such a method of vaccination as this man employed I have never seen in my life and I have been vaccinated at least a dozen times. I am acquainted with every method of vaccination, from the gentle lancet-prick employed in Germany to the method in use in America, where they pare away the skin with a piece of ivory. As our company marched past the assembled doctors in Indian file I saw to my astonishment that the men were bleeding severely. When my turn came I flinched involuntarily--the doctor drove the lancet three times so forcibly into my upper arm that a regular fountain of blood spurted out. It was pure brutality. Nothing more or less. This was typical of the man. It was his custom, the first time a man reported himself ill, to send him back to his company and give him three days' arrest for shamming. If the fellow appeared again he tried the effect of emetics followed by a long period of starvation. The only time he was supposed to be reasonable was when he saw symptoms of typhoid, which was his special hobby. The Legion was thoroughly afraid of the hospital! They were desperate fellows indeed who tried shamming! * * * * * The topic of desertion from the Foreign Legion is wellnigh inexhaustible. When the transports sail from Oran or Marseilles to Indo-China with relief companies of the Legion on board, the Suez Canal is a favourite means of deserting. According to the Canal regulations the steamers must slacken speed in the narrow straits of Suez, and the légionnaire takes the opportunity to jump overboard. He swims the short stretch to land and is then safe. The sentries on the transports may not use firearms in the international waters of the Suez Canal, and therefore cannot fire on the deserter as he swims. Neither is extradition from the English or Egyptian authorities to be feared. Several of these transports from the Foreign Legion pass through the Suez Canal every year, and these desertions are so frequent that the Ghetto of Port Said pays a fixed price of ten shillings for the capital service boots of the Legion! Desertions _en masse_ occur now and then, but these may be classed as mutinies rather than as desertions. In Southern Algeria, in the loneliness of the desert, the garrison of some small fort occasionally breaks out, marching for the Morocco frontier. The next bevy of troops soon brings the runaways back again, and even if it comes to a shot or two the superiority of the numbers against them soon brings the mutineers to reason. A mutiny like this generally ends in the mutineers being shot. An act of this sort is nothing else than an outbreak of madness caused by the dreadful monotony of service on the lonely stations in the desert. It is an outbreak of the cafard! The poor devils should be treated by a doctor instead of being sentenced by a court-martial. The Foreign Legion is a fruitful field for hypnotic suggestion. In my time a number of légionnaires deserted from Sidi-bel-Abbès, with the intention of fighting their way through to Morocco. Morocco was just then talked about till the idea became surrounded with a sort of halo. The attempt itself was pretty hopeless--the men were driven to it by the suggestive power of the words, "le Maroc." Morocco was the Legion's fairyland, the land the soldier longed for. Not a single day went by without a rumour of fighting in Morocco raising excitement in the Foreign Legion to fever pitch. Dark war-clouds were gathering on the horizon. From the frontier there came continual reports of the intrigues of the pretender, and in the inland of Morocco mighty battles were fought at short intervals. Among the watchful officers of French Africa every one was certain that the internal troubles in Morocco were not merely the petty splutterings of the usual native fireworks, but the first sparks of a mighty bonfire. The Foreign Legion knew of this; then all that was discussed in the officers' mess filtered through to the regiment through its own various private channels. Orderlies came rushing into the barracks in a fever of excitement as soon as they came off duty in the mess and told their friends in the Legion all about the heated debates that had taken place and which all revolved around Morocco. The servants of the staff officers brought news of Moroccan visitors closeted with their masters; Spahis who had served their time in the Morocco frontier garrisons and who were quartered on the regiment on their way through to Oran, told how sharp duty on the frontier now was, and how the garrisons were perpetually being strengthened. The veterans put their heads together and discussed the prospects of a bloody war! They had wonderful stories to tell of the golden treasures of Morocco, of the jewels that the better classes wore, and in their fancy they pictured an Eldorado of plundered wealth and booty. These mysterious rumours grew from day to day. More than half of the regiment's officers were ordered to the little frontier towns, and it was not unnatural when the Legion found in this a sure sign of fighting to come. With a broad smirk, an orderly brought the news that the colonel had engaged two masters to teach him Arabic, and it was easy to see how proud he was of the enormous supply of ammunition which was sent out from France. Recruiting began with zeal in the Spahi barracks opposite. Arab recruits with their splendid horses joined daily. Sections for telegraph duty went off to the frontier to see to the old wires and to lay new ones; volunteers were called for to form a corps for the heliographs, and veterans whose time was up got the tip from one or other of the officers that it would be very much to their advantage to stay on and not to take their dismissal just then.... In this roundabout way, through non-coms, orderlies, and soldier servants, everything was perhaps very much distorted, but it all sounded very probable and typical. The Legion is like a mighty ear-trumpet--through its countless channels it gathers up the officers' gossip and intrigues for its own uses, and really knows a good deal about the state of affairs in Northern Africa; it knows that the military circles at the head of affairs in Algeria have their own axe to grind, and that the clever catch-phrase "pénétration pacifique" was formed in an officers' club, and that greedy squinting at Morocco is as old as the occupation of Algeria! It was as if every one stood under the ban of a mesmerist. The longing for "le Maroc" spread to the légionnaires, who gave practical evidence of their longing for change and excitement, deserting in crowds. Most of them met their deaths. The border tribes cut their throats. Others had more luck. In the army of the pretender, the present Sultan, Mulai Hafid, there used to be several officers who were once soldiers of the Foreign Legion! CHAPTER XII A CHAPTER ON PUNISHMENTS The return of the poumpistes : The scale of punishments in the Legion : Of spiteful non-commissioned officers : The Legion's axiom : Sad history of Little Jean : The punishment machine : Lost years : A légionnaire's earnings in five years--francs 127.75 : The prisons in the Foreign Legion : Pestilential atmosphere : Human sardines : The general cells : Life in the prison : On sentry duty among the prisoners "Nom de Dieu!--voilà les poumpistes!" cried the sergeant of the guard at the barrack gates. Every one sprang up. We of the guard (my company was on guard that day) crowded round the gate; the adjutant vaguemestre, the regimental postmaster, ran out of his little office opposite the guard-room; a couple of officers came up, and légionnaires streamed out from everywhere in a wild rush for the entrance to the barracks. "The poumpistes have come back!" they cried to each other. It was in fact the truants from our company, poor Rader and his five friends. They were indeed a pitiful sight. Two gendarmes brought them in. They were all six bound together by a thin steel chain. Their dirty uniforms hung around them in rags; they were faint and emaciated and looked dead tired. Their faces were scarred. Rader had a blood-stained bandage round his right arm. In their eyes you could read the deadly fear of the punishment that awaited them. They had, of course, been treated pretty badly by the gendarmes. They looked round them shyly, ashamed of their helplessness and of their fetters. Herr von Rader alone had not lost his sense of humour. "How are you? Glad to see you!" he said to the sergeant! "I am back again all right." In the little bureau of the officer of the day the two gendarmes had their depositions taken and received the usual receipt from the regiment for the safe delivery of the deserters. They withdrew looking very pleased with themselves, for this receipt was worth 25 francs, entitling them to their reward. The poumpistes were kept waiting in front of the guard-room, still joined together by the chain. When Herr von Rader noticed me, he greeted me with many head-shakings: "Damned rotten business!" he said quite loud. "Mein Freund, they didn't make me a medicine man after all. The conjuring didn't work! All at once five damned Arab gendarmes rode up to us, holding their revolvers under our noses. I couldn't conjure them away.... Positively couldn't! Well, and then we had to walk back. Say, I don't care much about promenading when I am tied to a horse's tail. And the beggar of a horse did run, I can tell you--and I behind it--because I was tied to its tail, see?" "Silence!" commanded the sergeant. "No talking here." When the formalities of the surrender were over, the six deserters (I was one of the guard who escorted them with fixed bayonets) were marched off to prison. The keys rattled. The sergeant of the guard considered it necessary to give vent to his bad humour in many superfluous remarks about "the dirty, ragged, good-for-nothing lot of poumpistes, whom the penal battalion would soon cure of skinning out," and gave Rader, who was the last to cross the cell's threshold, a mighty kick. Rader fell at full length. Then the heavy door swung to behind them.... A few years ago Herr von Rader and his companions would have been sentenced to quite a curious kind of punishment which was at that time considered in the Foreign Legion to be a radical cure for deserters--a kind of mediæval torture which, by the way, was not kept for deserters solely, but came into use very often. This was the "silo" and the "crapaudine." The silo consisted of a funnel-shaped hole in the ground, broad at the top and pointed towards the bottom. A regular funnel. Into this hole, used as a cell for solitary confinement, the misdoers would be thrown, clad only in a thin suit of fatigue clothes, without a blanket or any protection at all against the rain or against the sun, at the mercy of the heat by day and the cold by night. The poor devils would be left for several days in this "prison." They could not lie down, for the bottom part of the hole was only one or two feet square. They spent day and night alternately standing and crouching, now in pouring rain, now in the burning sun. They very soon became ill from the foul vapours. When at length they were taken out of the silo, they could neither walk nor stand and had to be carried into hospital. Now and then a silo prisoner died in his hole. They say in the Foreign Legion that it was General de Négrier who abolished the silo. When he was inspecting Saida, he found a row of fifteen silos, one beside the other, and every single one occupied. He had the unfortunates taken out and they fell down in a dead faint on coming into the fresh air. Thereupon the general had every one of the silos filled up before his own eyes and forbade the silo penalty ever being used again. A more primitive but perhaps a still more brutal torture was the crapaudine. The man to be punished was simply tied up into a bundle and thrown into a corner, his hands and feet being tied together on his back, till they formed a sort of semicircle. Such a crapaudinaire lay there helpless day and night, totally unable to move. The most he could do when he tried very hard was to roll from one side to the other. For a quarter of an hour a day he would be set free and got bread to eat and water to drink. A day and a night in the crapaudine was enough to deprive a man of the use of his limbs--several days gave him his quietus. This penalty has also been abolished. It exists still in a milder form. In the field and on the march an offender is often punished by being bound to two posts driven into the ground. To-day the punishments in the Legion are not quite as cruel as they once were. At any rate their cruelty is not quite so apparent. Rader's friends got off with fourteen days' prison, while he himself, after waiting in prison an age for his trial, was sentenced by court-martial. The poor fellow had lost his cap and belt and got a year's penal servitude for "theft of equipment." What happened to him there I have never heard. There is no fixed penalty for desertion. In general the poumpistes are treated pretty mildly and sentenced, when they happen to be recruits, to 40 to 120 days' prison. Only when they are recruits. The veterans are always brought before the court-martial. But this is merely the general rule; if, for instance, a deserter has managed to get for some reason or another into the sergeant's or some other non-commissioned officer's "black books," the charge against him will be certain to include the loss of some part of his uniform, even when this is not in the least the case. The Foreign Legion has its own ideas of the subjects of pains and penalties. Viewed from the surface of things, there actually is a sort of scale of punishment. At the beginning comes extra corvée, which is quite bad enough. For little omissions in the daily routine, for a paquetage not quite accurately put together, or for a button not polished well enough, the offender can be sentenced by the sergeant of his section to perform the heavy duties of the corvée, while his comrades are making their repairs or having instructions. As long as I served in the Legion I was never punished for a fault of my own, not even with extra corvée--I took good care not to give the slightest excuse for punishment. More than once, however, I made the acquaintance of general corvée. This was our sergeant's speciality. When he inspected our quarters in the morning and found some petty excuse for finding fault, he did not bother with details, but just said: "Eh, corporal! A dirty, nasty room! Disgusting! The whole lot of you extra corvée this afternoon, under your supervision, corporal!" Whereupon the corporal cursed and every fellow in the room anathematised the sergeant as a "sale cochon"--a filthy swine. As the "swine," however, was clothed with the bristles of authority, the extra corvée had to be performed in spite of all curses and anathemas. Pretty nearly as frequent as this was confinement to barracks. This comes next in the scale of punishments and is always connected with "salle de police." Salle de police is only another name for the general cells in the prisons. Above all the offenders are not allowed to leave the barracks in their spare time. In other respects they do their duty as usual. When their day's work is finished, however, at five o'clock, they are called out every half-hour and sometimes every quarter of an hour to the drill-ground, where their names are called over by the sergeant of the guard. Any one who happens to miss one of these roll-calls finds himself in prison for a week. In their fear of not hearing the signal the men have not a single minute's quiet, and can hardly find time to clean their kit for the morrow. At nine o'clock, at the evening roll-call, they must report themselves in the guard-room, and are shut up in the salle de police for the night--in the general cells, which are filled to overflowing. Sleep among the crush of men and in that nauseating atmosphere is only possible for a few hours, when the tired body demands its right in spite of the disgusting surroundings. Next morning at five they are dismissed and have to perform the usual routine work with the rest of the company. Eight days' "salle de police" are looked upon as a very light punishment--a sure sign that the average légionnaire's susceptibilities are not all too fine. Salle de police was something quite in the ordinary run of affairs for us: confinement to barracks was a part of life in the Legion. In our quarters I was the only man who had not made its acquaintance, and that was the merest chance, luck plain and simple. No one excited himself about extra corvée and confinement to barracks. Every single man in the Legion had, however, a mighty respect for the prison. Prison, arrest in the regimental lock-up, is the Legion's real punishment. Imprisonment in the Legion is made up of the hardest work possible, and living under the most awful sanitary conditions; one can only form an idea of what this punishment is like when one has had a look at the Legion's prisons.[6] [6] See close of chapter. Next comes "cellule," solitary confinement on starvation diet. Then come the "Zephyrs," those condemned to the penal battalion. Every two or three weeks a transport of Zephyrs left the barracks in old ragged uniforms. In the battalion itself they have to wear the coffee-brown clothes of the convict. "The sections for the reformation of incorrigibles" is the official name for this battalion, and deportation to the Zephyrs is the severest punishment which can be put into execution without the authority of a court-martial. The official grasp of the meaning of the word incorrigible is, however, a trifle strange sometimes. Under the strictest surveillance these unfortunates carry on pioneer work in the far south. They make roads, they dig wells, they build new stations in the most unhealthy parts of Algeria, far removed from all civilisation. They have to work as even a légionnaire, to whom the hardest work is so familiar, would only work under the sternest compulsion. And if extra pioneer work is needed in the south, if, for instance, a new road is to be built, the battalion's numbers increase with amazing rapidity. It is really astonishing how the number of incorrigibles in the Legion increases just when the military administration needs men--for work! "Much work--many Zephyrs!" says the Legion's proverb. The scale finishes with the heavy military punishments, from penal servitude to the death sentence, and here the decision of the Algerian court-martial in Oran is final. Its sentences are renowned for their pitiless severity. To be brought before this court-martial the légionnaire need not have committed any very grave offence. It is enough if he has lost some part of his uniform. In a well-known French historical work on the subject of the Foreign Legion, Roger de Beauvoir writes: "Each of the two discipline sections is 150 men strong: of these 300, 200 at least are in the penal section for selling part of their kit. It used to be the custom to 'let the stomach pay' for this offence, _i.e._, the offender was put on bread and water till he had replaced the lost equipment from the mess allowance that was saved. This punishment was finally considered too barbarously old-fashioned, and the court-martial took its place, which passes sentence of six months' imprisonment. The légionnaires long for the old régime!" And thereby hangs a tale. A very sad story, too.... No sensible man will attempt to dispute the fact that iron discipline is essential for the lurid mixture of human material in the Legion. If the justice of the Foreign Legion was in practice what it is in theory--stern but just--one could not say a word against it. It is, however, only just in theory, in the intention of the military law-makers. In reality it is the justice of unlimited tyranny; made so by the individual tyranny of officers and non-commissioned officers in individual cases, and in general by an obstinate tenacity to the letter of the law. Every French officer and every French court-martial acts under the time-honoured assumption that the légionnaire makes a brave soldier, but is in all other respects a thoroughbred rogue and knave, and that one cannot go far wrong in assuming the worst about him. The word of a superior is always accepted as proof of guilt. There is no better illustration of this than the everlasting heavy penalties which are meted out for "theft of equipment." This sort of theft exists, of course. Theft is not a thing to be very much wondered at when the men's wages are five centimes a day. But many hundreds of innocents are punished for this offence in the course of a year. The favourite trick of non-commissioned officers, when they have a spite against a man, is to inspect his kit suddenly. Some trifle or other, a tie or a couple of straps, are quite sure to be missing and then there is the _casus belli_! "Lost is stolen--sold!" Thus the axiom of the Legion's authorities, against which the most positive assertions are of no avail. Now and then an offender of this sort is leniently treated, and let off by the regiment with sixty days' imprisonment; in the majority of cases, however, he is tried by the court-martial. A typical case: "Jean the Unlucky" was the nickname of a young Frenchman in my company who had been sentenced in his second year of service to six months in the penal section for stealing a sash. He swore he was innocent, and as far as I can tell he spoke the truth, as his mother sent him twenty francs every month. Thus he was quite well off according to Foreign Legion ideas, and certainly need not have risked a heavy penalty by selling his ceinture for a few sous. The probabilities were in favour of his innocence, but that did not help him. He was sentenced. He survived his six months in the hell of the penal battalion and was then sent back to his company. And now his troubles really began. At the time of his trial he had, in his rage at the false accusation, made more than one biting remark about our adjutant and his little ways. This the colour-sergeant never forgot. In spite of the fact that Little Jean was a quiet fellow, who did his duty to the best of his ability, a good soldier and a capital shot, he kept wandering backwards and forwards between the prison and the company, the company and the prison. Nothing he could do was right. Sometimes his boots were not properly cleaned, sometimes his bed was a centimetre out of the dead straight line in which beds must stand, and at another time he had not stood properly at attention at roll-call. Such were Little Jean's grave offences against the holy spirit of the Legion's discipline--ridiculous accusations, which bore the stamp of spite so plainly that even our careless captain should have noticed it. These human machines punished automatically, without feeling, without thinking for an instant. The sergeant's reports demanding punishment for Little Jean's awful sins were signed automatically. When the sergeant put him down for eight days' confinement to barracks, the captain mechanically increased the penalty to eight days' imprisonment, because Jean le malheureux, coming from the penal section, had naturally a very bad reputation. Then came the commander of the battalion, who, not caring to be outdone in matters of discipline, doubled the dose. The sergeant's modest eight days' confinement to barracks had now grown to sixteen days' imprisonment. But now came the embodiment of authority in the regiment in the person of the colonel. This colonel had his own ideas as to how one should treat the pernicious elements in the regiment: "Second-class soldier Jean Dubois, No. 14892, 11th company, is sentenced by the colonel to 40 days' imprisonment for continued slackness and insubordination." That was read to us the next time the regimental orders came out. You see, the machine worked admirably. Its mechanism runs with wonderful accuracy. Any one who took an interest in the matter could work the whole thing out in advance. Dubois did this. He knew well enough what was waiting for him--from day to day he became quieter, from day to day sadder, so that at length he hardly spoke at all to his comrades. He could do nothing to protect himself; he hadn't even enough energy left for flight. Good Lord, he had long lost that little bit of energy he had, lost it--somewhere down south in the sunburnt wastes, where the penal battalion works and suffers. The machinery ground on.... Eighty days' imprisonment was Little Jean's next dose. After that he got sixty days' cellule--just for a change. If you consider only the number of days, you might think he had got off pretty cheaply this time. Not a bit of it. These sixty days were days of starvation. For cellule means hunger and emaciation--awful hunger and awful emaciation. After his sixty days of diet cure Dubois came back to the company for just a week, if I remember rightly. Then the machine began to work again. This time it was a month he got.... Thirty days' imprisonment--for this incorrigible and insubordinate subject! No, one really cannot be surprised that the colonel lost all patience. So he refused to confirm the punishment and sent the black sheep of the company to trial by court-martial. And once more the machine began to do its work. Two years' imprisonment, two years' penal servitude in a fortress, for Jean le malheureux! With the next batch of convicts they carried him off to Oran. I have heard nothing of him since--I do not know how he fared as a convict. In my unconquerable optimism I am ready to assume that this two years' interregnum did not do particular harm to Little Jean's health and that he returned home, having done his duty by the Foreign Legion, dapper and cheerful as he used to be. Even this supposition gives us a very pretty bit of arithmetic. Jean Dubois' original period of service 5 years Extra service for time spent in the penal battalion 6 months Ditto for regimental punishments 7 months Ditto for imprisonment in fortress 2 years --------------- Total time Jean Dubois had to serve in place of his original five years 8 years 1 month In this optimistic piece of arithmetic my optimism even goes so far as to assume that Jean the Unlucky, during his two years of imprisonment and during the rest of his period of service, did not incur any additional penalties. If I, however, compel myself to consider his career from a pessimistic point of view, the sum works out much more prettily. Dubois had not a very strong constitution and it is quite possible that the penal battalion, plus imprisonment, plus starvation, plus despair, quite finished him off. In that case the loss of a blue scarf, a spiteful sergeant and the crass stupidity of a series of officers have been the death of him. But if Jean Dubois really got over his years of prison--when he returns home (he is a Frenchman!) his strength will not be worth much in the workaday world. While I think of it. There is yet another very pretty piece of arithmetic. Little Jean was a thoughtful man. When he comes back home after his long years of Legion he will perhaps sit down and work out how much he has earned in these eight, long, hard years. The example would look like this: Francs First year of service, 5 centimes a day 18.25 Second year of service, 5 centimes a day 18.25 Third year of service, 5 centimes a day 18.25 Fourth year of service, 10 centimes a day 36.50 Fifth year of service, 10 centimes a day 36.50 ------ Grand Total 127.75 The other three years? In these Little Jean worked free, gratis, for nothing. These three years were "rabiau," as they say in the Legion, of no use, superfluous. In his three "rabiau" years Little Jean naturally got no pay. Why should a convict get paid? So you see Little Jean's earnings amounted to the grand total of 127 francs 75 centimes--earned in eight years. Besides all this, this worthless fellow had been fed all this time! And clothed into the bargain. Yes--c'est la Légion! * * * * * The prison in the barracks at Sidi-bel-Abbès used always to loom before me like a threatening spectre. On both sides of the entrance to the barracks, close to the road, but separated from it by a high wall, lay the two little houses with their flat tin roofs which caught the sun's rays so pitilessly. Inside there were rows and rows of cell doors in the long narrow corridors. The single cells were a little more than three yards long and one yard broad; the general cells were perhaps five yards square. There was no light, and a little hole in the wall and an opening over the door were the sole means of ventilation. The floor was flagged or of clay. There was a wooden bench in each cell, a water-jug, and an old tin pail. The single cells and the general cells were exactly alike in their "fittings"--whether five men or fifty were shut up in these cells made no difference! They got, according to the regulations, one water-jug and one pail! I was never (and even to-day that is a satisfaction to me) shut up in the Legion's prison. But I have seen enough, when I was on guard there, to have had quite enough of the prison without any nearer experience of it. I repeat: five yards square, thirty, forty, or more occupants: an air-hole nine inches in diameter high up in the walls and a tiny crack over the door. Any of these cells would at once be condemned by a veterinary as unfit even for a pigsty! Before réveillé at five o'clock in the morning all the sentries on guard were marched up to the prison, and the sergeant opened the cells, whereupon an awful stench streamed out. He read out the names from the prison register, and the prisoners came out of the cells into the passage as their names were called. Then they began to clean up. The pails were carried by two men, accompanied by a sentry, to the sewer openings in the barrack-yard. When the bigger cells were over-filled (and this was almost always the case) they looked awful. The room was like a sewer, flooded, pestilential.... To clean the cells there were only a couple of old brooms in the prison. A few pails of water were flooded over the floor, carelessly and hurriedly, for the sergeants did not care about wasting too much time on the "prisonniers." A little water and a few strokes with the broom! What is not washed away trickles through the cracks and crannies in the stone floor and forms a new basis for pestilence. The bowl of black coffee which forms the légionnaire's breakfast is not given to the prisoners. They get no breakfast. They are allowed to wash themselves at the basin in the corridor. Then they are led out to work, on an empty stomach, frozen through by the chilly African night spent uncovered on a hard wooden bench, and faint from breathing in that pestilential atmosphere. All those who were sentenced to short terms of imprisonment were commandeered to clean up the barrack-yard, to split wood, and to break stones. The prisoners with longer sentences, and those in cellule, had to go out to the "march of punishment," marching round in a small circle for two hours on end, carrying heavy bags of sand, now and then doubling for the sake of variety. When the corporal in command was in bad temper he made them go through a course of Swedish gymnastics into the bargain. This was tremendous work when burdened with the heavy sack, and it strained the muscles and nerves in a way that nothing else could. At ten o'clock the prisoners were given soup. They never got full rations, since as long as they were in prison their mess allowance ceased as well as their pay. The soup is thin, and the piece of meat which swims in it is as small as may be.... Their bread rations consist of half of what they get in the company. The prisoners in solitary confinement are placed on starvation diet. Their soup consists of hot water with little bits of potatoes and bread-crusts, and they only get this every other day. In the interval they have to live on bread--on a quarter of the Legion's bread rations. One must have seen how terribly emaciated these poor fellows become in a few days to be able to do justice to the barbarity of a system which has three main ideas: undernourishment, overwork, frightful sanitary conditions. After they have finished "dinner," their work begins again. The drill suits had got dirty, and bore signs of the nights they had gone through. The operation, too, of emptying the tin pails cannot be performed without the suits being considerably the worse for it. But the drill suits were only changed when an inspection by the colonel was imminent, and clean underclothes were a luxury absolutely unknown in prison. The sergeants on guard always considered it an important part of their duties to treat the prisoners as badly as possible. In the prison it simply rained curses. Many sergeants took an especial delight in inspecting the prisoners every three hours throughout the night. They had to come out into the yard, and the sergeant read their names and numbers by the light of the lantern, taking as long about it as he could, while the poor wretches had to stand there motionless in their thin clothes for half an hour in the cold night air. This would be repeated three or four times a night. In this way the sergeant manages to while away his dreary night on guard, and had in addition the pleasing sense of having played his little part in the regiment's system of justice. Under discipline in the Foreign Legion they understand a series of variations, improvements or otherwise, on the mediæval systems of torture. It is merely the petty offences against discipline that are punished in these hovels. I was on the watch in the narrow corridor of one of these prisons, pacing to and fro on the cold flags with fixed bayonet. Eight hours before the poumpistes, Rader and the rest of them, had been brought in. Through the narrow opening between the wall and the prison, a little strip of starlit sky could be seen, and down the narrow passage the cold night wind howled. But it could not drive away the pestilential stench which hung heavy over the prison and which was perpetually being increased by the vapours from the ventilation holes and the tiny openings in the cellules. This awful smell tortured my nerves and rendered sentry-go in the prison anything but pleasant. Besides Rader and his fellow-deserters, there were forty others in the general cell. When at ten o'clock at night the sergeant inspected the prison and the cells were opened, I saw how the men lay huddled together on the wooden benches, man to man, like sardines packed in a tin. But in spite of this scarcely twenty out of the forty prisoners could find room on the bench. The others crouched in the corners, sleeping with their knees drawn up to their chins; several lay on the bare floor, filthy though it was. It was freezing cold for them in their thin drill clothes. The prison blankets they had been given were hardly worth calling blankets, ancient rags, so thin that one could see through them like a veil and so small that the men had the choice of covering their feet or their bodies; the blankets were not big enough to do both. They were stiff with dirt and most of them were alive with vermin. In the daytime they were just thrown into a corner of the cell. It was no wonder that the men who had just been shut up in this cell could not sleep. Once I heard Rader ask gently who was doing sentry. He must have stood on the shoulders of one of his comrades to be able to reach the ventilation hole, which was high up in the wall. When I answered it was I, he said he could not stand it any more in there--hadn't I a cigarette? I spitted a packet of cigarettes on my bayonet and handed it up to him. "Keep up your pecker, old man," I whispered. "Good Lord, good Lord ..." was the reply, in a pitiful tone which hadn't even a touch of Rader's droll humour left in it. The sound of groans and curses reached me continually from the cell; all spoke very gently for they knew that they would be severely punished if a noise was heard. It is a prison custom for the sentry in the corridor to let the butt of his rifle fall loudly on the floor when he hears the sergeant coming. This is a warning signal. When in their excitement they spoke a little louder I could now and then hear through the opening what they were saying. In eloquent French, one of the prisoners, whose accent proclaimed him to be a man of education, was complaining of life in the Legion, and all was still in the cell while the ringing voice spoke in passionate excitement. Snatches of what I heard are still fixed in my memory: "My God, if I could only die!--My friends, I've always done my duty here.--I've marched and marched and marched for four long years.--For four years I've borne burdens, exposed to wind and weather, and have tired my strength.--Four long years! Yes, I've lost my tie, oh, la la, a thin blue rag worth a couple of centimes--and was marched off to prison! I'd stolen the tie, I'd sold it--who believes the word of a légionnaire! _Mea culpa_, my friends!" "_Mea maxima culpa!_" repeated the speaker quietly. "'Tis true one has never been much use and has made a monstrous thing of one's life--you and I and all of us! And why not? That's all past and done with now. All the same--I'm ashamed of the country in which the Foreign Legion can exist. I'm a Frenchman. But I say: Damn the Legion, damn the land of the Legion...." And over all there hung the pestilential vapours in the tiny room with the crowded humanity within. When I was relieved at midnight the sergeant asked: "Anything unusual?" "No, nothing special," I answered. CHAPTER XIII SOME TYPES OF VICE A variety of human vices : The red wine of Algeria : Shum-Shum : If there were no wine It was always a marvel to me that neither cards nor dice played the slightest part in the life of the Legion, in sharp contrast with the important part they take in the life of the English Tommy, and especially of the American soldier, who is an incorrigible gambler. On a little station in Texas a detachment of sly old regulars in the course of the single night that they were quartered there cleaned out all the cowboys of the neighbourhood. I was one of the victims. But that's another story.... Anyhow, the Legion is free from the vice of gambling. This is perhaps hardly to be wondered at; five centimes wages. The possibility of winning or losing five centimes is hardly worth a throw of the dice. In its place all the vices of almost every nation in the world can be found in the Foreign Legion. This is not saying too much; I've looked on. Vicious influences are, however, much stronger in Indo-China and in French Tonquin, where the garrisons of the various stations are all drawn from the Legion. Veterans like Smith used to tell me things about the life in Tonquin that almost made my hair stand on end. In the inland districts the stations are quite small, and a few légionnaires have to look after a large number of natives. The entire system of justice on such a station, including the power of life and death, lies in the hands of a couple of young officers and a few sergeants and corporals. Surrounded by all possible human vices in their very worst forms, to whose influence the deadly monotony inevitable on one of these stations is added, the men live exposed to constant danger occasioned both by the intrigues among the natives and the murderous climate. The one seeks relief in spirits, the other swears by opium. The fact that opium-smoking plays an important part in the life of the French Navy and among the French Army officers in the Colonies has been made public often enough already: every veteran in the Legion knows well enough that in Toulon and Marseilles there are countless opium dens which depend solely on the custom of French officers. These opium dens were thoroughly discussed in the French press during the trial of the midshipman Ullmo. The habit of opium-smoking has, in nearly all cases, been acquired in Indo-China. Spirits, opium, and loneliness form the fruitful soil in which the Legion's vice takes root. In solitary cases even the officers come under its influence. When this happens the results are sometimes very terrible.... Among the garrisons of Indo-China the most notorious used to be those of Sui-can and Bac-le. A certain Lieutenant Duchesne, who was later killed in battle, many say by his own men, and the fact that the bullet hit him in the back goes to prove the truth of this statement, has made his name immortal in the Legion in this connection. Though he has been dead several years, one still hears of his cruelty. His légionnaires were all forced to submit themselves to his vicious freaks, resistance being punished with the penal section, which is ten times worse in Tonquin than those in Algeria. The obedient, however, were promoted. Even to-day the same sort of thing can be found here and there in Indo-China. There are always stories like this to be heard in the Legion, adjutants and sous-officiers being freely named who are said to owe their promotion to the vicious preference of some officer or other. A good deal is perhaps spiteful gossip, but the stories are so frequent, and the details given are so minute, that there must be a certain amount of truth in them. In addition to these outside influences, a further cause of depravity is the involuntary celibacy to which the légionnaire is subjected. And this celibacy has its origin in a financial consideration: the five centimes per day. ... One always comes back again to the same point from which one started. Whoever really knows the Foreign Legion, whoever takes the trouble to probe the depths of its misery and sin, of its brutality and vice, always comes back, like a man walking in a circle, to the same source of all its ills: the pitiful wage that's not worth calling a wage which this business enterprise pays: this infamous business enterprise that a chivalrous nation has so long tolerated and tolerates still. * * * * * All human vices are to be found in the Legion. And first among the minor ones comes drunkenness. This takes the first place, occurring most frequently and being the most characteristic and easily indulged, in a country where the price of a litre of heavy wine varies between ten and twenty centimes. Das ist ja eben das Malheur: Wer Sorgen hat, trinkt auch Likör. "The man who has troubles, drinks"--Algerian wine, or in Indo-China a horrible spirit, which is distilled, I believe, from rice and which rejoices in the name of "Shum-Shum," and has the advantage of an uncommonly high percentage of alcohol. It has only one drawback, and that is its infernal smell, which delicate European noses cannot stand. The légionnaire, however, drinks it: while drinking he holds his nose, since he hardly values its aroma as he does its alcohol. I have often heard old légionnaires singing the praises of Shum-Shum. One could get accustomed to its smell, they said, and it made one very, very drunk. The droll verses of the old German humourist, Wilhelm Busch, with their subtle point, might have been written for the Legion. How they drank in the canteen of the Foreign Legion in Sidi-bel-Abbès. The litre--a litre of wine--took the place of the current coinage. Thus it was nothing unusual for a légionnaire, when asked to wash for a comrade well endowed with this world's goods, to raise one finger: that meant, of course, a litre. "If we hadn't wine...." I shall never forget Smith's pet expression. There are no statistics on this point. I am, however, quite certain that a good half of the miserable wages paid to the Foreign Legion are spent in purchasing the red wine of Algiers. In addition to this, nine-tenths, nay ninety-nine-hundredths of the notes and postal orders which the légionnaires are continuously sent by anxious parents and relations in Europe go to swell the coffers of Madame la Cantinière. This is in no sense an accusation. When one considers the life of the soldier of the Legion with understanding, one recognises that no one in the world has more cares than he, no one a better right to his few hours of oblivion. Yes, the African légionnaire has a hard life, and drunkenness in his case is really almost excusable. I only want to show what a prominent rôle the red wine of Algeria does play in the life of the Legion. It is, it is true, the most general vice, but it is the only means of obtaining a few moments of bliss, and the sole source of pleasure. Wine is the cause of a great many punishments. Drunkenness is a "sale offense," to use the soldier's expression, a dishonourable offence that is severely punished, and which continually furnishes the penal section with new material. As an instance of this I will give you the story of a man in my company, a Belgian named Lascelles. At regular intervals he got a postal order for a small sum sent him from some relative in Europe. On receiving his money, he vanished as soon as he came off duty and did not come back to the barracks again for at least twenty-four hours. As long as his coppers lasted, he used to go from wine-shop to wine-shop and empty bottle after bottle. On his return he would be immediately locked up for overstaying his leave of absence; generally, however, to celebrate the event he had made a great disturbance, and committed a series of more or less grave offences, for each of which he was punished singly. Every month the time he spent in prison grew longer and longer, beginning with a trifling eight days and increasing to a month's solitary confinement. In between whiles, Lascelles was a capital soldier, who did his work willingly enough. When, however, his name was read out at roll-call--a postal order for Lascelles--one could be sure that a day later would find him in prison once more. In a few months he had worked his way up the regimental scale of punishments, and then came the inevitable end and he was sent off to the penal section. Lascelles' misfortunes were at any rate his own fault. It often happens, however, that spiteful sergeants in the Legion take advantage of a man's love of drink to work his ruin. A sergeant has a spite against a man and waits patiently for the day when he comes into the barracks in a state of intoxication. He then follows him to his quarters and gives him some order or other. The man feels how needless and spiteful this is, and, being hardly in a condition to think of danger, answers with a curse. This is just what is wanted. Even when the man is sober enough to do what he has been ordered, he is severely punished for his curse. Should he continue to be "insubordinate" he comes before the court-martial. This is a very old trick in the Legion, and only recruits or very old légionnaires under the influence of drink and suffering at the same time from the cafard are caught by it. The average légionnaire is careful, and, drunk or sober, obeys every order no matter how furious he may be. "Nix Zephyrs pour moi," he says. "Ah yes, there is another side to the proverb, 'If there were no wine....'" * * * * * Every vice was represented there. The most brutal egotism and boundless avarice ruled that hard life. One grudged one's comrade a crust of bread, a sip of wine, or a piece of meat. The man who had a few shillings sent him was an object of hate and envy. Intrigue--slander--lying--theft--the Legion brings all the bad points in a man's character to full development. Whose fault is it? CHAPTER XIV MY ESCAPE In the Arab prison : The letter : Days of suffering : Flight! : The greedy "Crédit Lyonnais" : Haggling in the Ghetto : The palm grove as a dressing-room : On the railway track : Arab policemen : Horrible minutes : Travelling to Oran : Small preparations : On the steamer _St. Augustine_ : Marseilles-Ventimiglia : Free The days came and the days went, and with every day I understood more what it meant to be a légionnaire in Africa. The knowledge so gained was not pleasant. One day I was on guard in the Arab prison of Sidi-bel-Abbès, an ugly, gloomy building in the middle of the town. An old retired sergeant of the Legion was overseer of the Arab prison, and with the help of two gendarmes kept the Arab prisoners in strictest order. The prison was always crowded with native sinners, for the petty thefts in the market-place and the constant fights in the negro quarter kept the cells of that grey building near the Place Sadi Carnot always full. The native prisoners had often made trouble, and mutinies had been quite frequent. The last outbreak had been very serious, so since that time the Legion had sent a guard every day to the Arab prison consisting of a corporal and six men. My rifle with fixed bayonet over my shoulder, I kept pacing slowly on the top of the broad wall surrounding the prison in an enormous square. The sun burned down pitilessly. In the tiny courtyard small groups of Arab prisoners cowered in the sulky silence of inactivity. All talking was forbidden in the prison. The overseer's sharp words of command now and then, and the ring of my steps on the stones of the wall, sounded into the silence. Mechanically I followed the path prescribed for "sentry-go," marching round and round the prison square. From the high wall I had a view of all Sidi-bel-Abbès. The town was like a city of the dead in this frightful heat. The blinds in all the houses were pulled down and there was not a soul to be seen in the streets. In the hot, trembling air the faint outlines of the mountains of Thessala glittered in the far distance. There was not a breath of wind. Two légionnaires in white fatigue uniforms turned into the street leading to the prison. They were men from our company, bringing us our evening soup. They called out something to me that I could not understand and I acknowledged it with an indifferent nod. Then they knocked at the gate of the prison and had to wait an age till the overseer opened it with his jingling bunch of keys and they could carry their soup-pail into the guard-room. Some minutes later one of them came into the yard by the guard-room and beckoned to me to come nearer to him. As I approached, I saw that he held a white something in his hand. "Eh, une lettre pour toi!" he cried. "Here's a letter for you." Very much annoyed I called down to him to hurry up and get out of this. It was too hot for practical jokes. I never got letters.... "But here is one," said the man. "Your name, your company, your number--everything all right! La la--I'm off--I'll give your letter to the corporal. May Allah better your bad temper! Sapristi, how hot it is!" I had to wait half an hour until I was relieved. Those were terrible minutes. A letter--a letter for me? It seemed almost impossible. There was nobody in the world who could or should know where I was or what I was doing. The blood rose in hot waves to my head--and all at once I recognised that there was only one human being who could have written to me--that her love was not dead. Slowly the seconds, the minutes went by. I waited in indescribable suspense. The sun was sinking. The houses of Sidi-bel-Abbès were bathed in its ruddy glow. Below me in the prison yard I heard a noisy chattering in guttural Arabic. The prisoners were being given their food and were then allowed to speak. The poor devils' chatter seemed to pierce my brain; that buzzing noise down below hurt me, until I could not stand it any longer. "Be quiet there!" I cried. There was immediate silence. A gendarme called out to me that I had made a mistake and that talking was allowed. "Pas defendu de parler," he said to the prisoners, and the Arabs looked up at me with angry eyes. And I had to go on waiting, waiting.... This awful suspense seemed to have lasted for hours when the corporal at last came to relieve me. The conventionality of passing orders and sentry instructions was being gone through; we were on service and it was contrary to all discipline--but I could not wait any longer. "You've a letter for me, corporal?" I asked. "Yes, there is a letter for you," he answered. "You can have it as soon as I have done relieving the sentries. En avant--marche!" A new period of anxious waiting and torturing expectation.... At last the corporal of the guard came back and put his hand in his pocket: "Voilà!" On the white envelope I saw the characters of the handwriting I knew so well. I went out into the square which was now empty, as the prisoners had been locked up in their cells again. I read and read--again and again.... Love stretched out its hand to the lost soldier of the Legion and spoke to him of happiness to come. Long years hence when the légionnaire would be no longer a légionnaire. The letter's many pages bore traces of tears. I wanted to tear off my uniform, that brand of slavery condemning me to inactivity. Within me all was in a whirl. In the darkness of the ugly court I dreamed dreams of the past and hopes of the future so hopelessly far off. During the four hours from watch to watch I sat motionless in the prison-yard. In these few hours there came to me that energy which meant the beginning of a new life. Then it was my turn for sentry duty again. And then I sat down at the small table in the guard-room while the corporal and the other men slept, and wrote an endless letter with the corporal's pencil on the back of report forms. Page upon page.... The next day a letter from my mother came; a letter that neither asked questions nor held reproaches. It only spoke of love and anxiety for me. This letter solved the riddle of how my whereabouts had been discovered. After long months of waiting and wondering the people who loved me got the idea that I might be in the Foreign Legion, since the last letter they received from me had been dated from the French fortress, Belfort. My mother wrote to the general in command of the fortress and to the French Secretary of War. The answer was long delayed, but at last the news came that I had joined the Foreign Legion at Sidi-bel-Abbès--that I was the légionnaire number 17889! With that hour in the Arab prison which brought me the first letter, the days of suffering began. I performed my duty and did my work like a machine, thinking of nothing but the letters which the next post would bring me. I hardly spoke a word to anybody in those times. When I was off duty I went for long walks in the still paths by the fortifications in order to be alone. Finally only one idea governed my thoughts: Flight! Week after week I received letters every day, begging and beseeching me to have patience. I was to remember that all hopes for the future would be shattered if I was caught deserting. Better to wait for years than to risk everything. But I could not wait. And one day there came a registered letter from my mother. When I opened it, I held banknotes for a large sum of money in my hand.... This meant freedom! I crossed the court of the barracks as one in a dream. This money in my pocket meant new life for me--my mother had for the second time given me life. I knew what a sacrifice this money meant; how hard it must have been for my mother with her tiny widow's pension to scrape together such a sum of money for me. And all at once a wave of happiness overcame me--I should be free! I should be able to thank those loving ones who were helping me.... * * * * * I got that letter at five o'clock in the afternoon. I was just off duty and had come back to the barracks, having been pulling out weeds in the Legion's cemetery. That should be my last bit of work as légionnaire. Not a single hour I intended to wait. There was no more rest for me in the land of Sidi-bel-Abbès. In our quarters my comrades were sitting at supper as I came back from the regimental post-bureau, and Smith was much surprised at my eating nothing, and at my putting on at once my extra uniform. He looked suspiciously at me, as if he had an idea that I had something out of the way on my mind. I would have been only too glad to say a last good-bye to the old bugler who had been a true friend to me in his rough way, but he was sitting at table with the rest of the men. When I had finished dressing and had quietly taken my letters and the few trifles I wanted to take with me out of my knapsack, Smith came up and lay down on his bed as usual after supper. "Good-bye, old man," I whispered. "You've been a good fellow." Smith did not move. Only his eyes lighted up.... "Got money?" he asked gently. "Yes." "Then it's all right. Good-bye, sonny--good-bye!" As I went out the other men were sitting on the benches doing the various odd jobs which were part of life in the Legion. They rubbed and polished--polished and rubbed. At that time they were hardly more to me than a passer-by in the street. Now, I confess, the face of every one of them is indelibly burnt into my brain. I was to be subjected to a final annoyance. The sergeant of the guard stopped me at the gate of the barracks, because in my excitement I had buttoned up my overcoat on the wrong side. He said he had a good mind to turn me back for my carelessness. "Nom de Dieu! you pig, don't you know that this month the overcoats are buttoned on the right side?" But he let me go. Through the crowd of légionnaires I hurried down the promenade. The first place I had to go to was the "Crédit Lyonnais," the famous French bank which had a branch in Sidi-bel-Abbès near the Place Sadi Carnot. The greater part of my money consisted of Belgian banknotes, which naturally were not in circulation in Algeria, and I thought I should be able to have them changed at the bank more quickly and cheaply than anywhere else. There I made a mistake. The clerk at the counter explained in a roundabout way that Belgian banknotes were of no use to them, and that it would cost a lot of money to send them to Paris. He was only greedy, of course (everybody in Sidi-bel-Abbès is), and trying to get an especially high commission out of me. Perhaps he thought that a légionnaire should be too pleased at having so much money to bother about a few francs more or less. There he was in error. I replied I should complain to the colonel of my regiment that the only bank in Sidi-bel-Abbès tried to overcharge a simple soldier. Whereupon this greedy clerk of a world-famous bank grumblingly took my notes and gave me French money for them. Through the brightly illuminated main streets, saluting officers right and left, I hurried to the Ghetto. In the very first alley of the Ghetto I met an old fellow who looked promising. I tapped him on the shoulder. "Eh! Civilian clothes?" The Jew raised his forefinger warningly. "Can't sell to légionnaires." I turned on my heels and went slowly on. But he was after me already. "How much?" "Twenty francs." "Fifty!" "Thirty." "Forty-five!" "Look here," I said. (The conversation was held in bad Algerian French, of course.) "I'll give you forty francs, and that settles it. But I've got to have those clothes quick." The Jew looked at me dubiously, and held out the palms of his hands. One could not be mistaken about the gesture: he had his doubts about my solvency. So I reassured the old man by showing him a few gold pieces. Now the son of Israel was quite satisfied, and led me a few steps farther on into a house. A tiny little lamp was smoking in a foul-smelling room. "Sarah!" called out my companion. An old woman came hobbling out of a neighbouring room, and when she heard what was wanted went off and fetched a heap of clothes. Amongst them there was a suit which looked fairly respectable. It fitted me pretty well, and in the natural order of things we began haggling again. Fifty francs changed hands. Then I gave the Ghetto man another gold piece. "Now hurry up and get me a hat somewhere, a pair of boots, a collar and a tie." But here the fat old woman with her shrill voice began to make difficulties. I was bringing misfortune on them. It was after business hours anyway. I must not stay in the house any longer--it was far too dangerous. "Allez vous en--allez vous en!" The old lady began to get on my nerves, and I went willingly enough. At the corner I waited for the old Jew. In ten minutes he came back, and said that he could for twenty francs get me a really good outfit, boots, an extra collar, a good hat and a pair of gloves; for an extra twenty he could procure an excellent revolver. He got the money, and after a short time came back with two bundles. At the end of the next street there was the high wall of the fortifications. From the inside I could climb over easily enough. The drop to the ground on the other side was a pretty big one, but I landed unhurt in the sand, in the middle of a palm grove. From the open windows of a villa close to the grove a flood of light streamed, and I could hear the merry sounds of a waltz. I could see the couples dancing. Many officers were amongst them. But there was no danger of being seen; it was pitch dark among the palms. In feverish haste I tore off my uniform and put on the civilian clothes. They fitted me well. It was quite a strange feeling fastening a collar and tie once more.... And when I had changed I nailed uniform and overcoat, and boots and belt, and everything to a palm with the bayonet, wondering who would find them in the morning! I drew on my gloves and my toilet was complete. In the villa the band (it was the Legion's band too) was playing a German waltz: "Das ist das süsse Mädel...." With a feeling very much akin to fright I walked to the nearest gate in the fortification walls. The soldiers on guard there, however, did not take the slightest notice of me. This gave me more confidence. Slowly and unostentatiously I crossed the promenade as though I were merely a respectable citizen out for a stroll. Légionnaires were promenading everywhere. More than once I had to turn and make a detour to avoid meeting non-commissioned officers of my own company. It was an exciting walk. At last I had passed through the main streets and came to a suburban road leading straight to the railway station. The little station was quite deserted. I looked carefully about me to see whether anybody was watching me, and then climbed down the steep embankment to the railroad tracks, leading straight to the north to Oran. In the meantime it had become quite dark. From afar the lights of the station and of the switch-signals were shining; the lines themselves lay hidden in pitch-darkness. I began to run. At first I kept stumbling over the sharp stones between the rails and once I fell at full length. Soon, however, I got the hang of the thing, springing from sleeper to sleeper. I ran as hard as I could. A quarter of an hour, half an hour. Then I had to stop, coughing and out of breath. It was beginning to drizzle. The landscape was cloaked in inky darkness and there was only a faint gleam of light on the horizon far behind me to show where Sidi-bel-Abbès lay.... As far as I could tell I must have covered about five kilometres. My feet were paining me. I drew off one of my boots and found that there were long rows of nails sticking up inside and that the soles were damp with blood. I tore up my handkerchief and made a pad from the rags to cover the nails. But the horrible little monsters bored through even this. Anyhow, it was far better than before. I examined the revolver in my pocket and it was a pleasant surprise to find that it was a capital weapon, a Browning pistol. The old Jew, who certainly knew nothing about weapons, had, with the revolver, atoned for his sins in the matter of boots! Once more I started forward. My feet had to get accustomed to the nails whether they liked it or not. From now on I kept up an alternate double and walk, husbanding my strength as I had learnt to do in the Legion, running five minutes at the double and then walking five minutes, always following the railway's bee-line for the north. Once I heard the roar of a train behind me and lay down flat in the sand by the rails. Thus hour after hour went by. I had already passed three stations, which merely consisted of a few houses which lay there deserted in the darkness. As I passed a lonely signal-house a dog began to bark and I started off in deadly terror, running like a madman till I had left the beast tearing at his chain far behind me. How thankful I was for the silence and darkness.... I breathed with difficulty, I had been running so hard. My clothes were soaked with sweat, and when I stopped for a moment to rest, an icy shiver passed over my whole body. But I pulled myself together, for I wanted to reach a medium-sized station, where it would not be so noticeable when I took a ticket for Oran. The rain soon stopped again. And now the moon began to shine fitfully through the gaps in the clouds, even this faint light being much more than I cared about. A terrible fear of being seen by a police patrol came over me. All at once the country became hilly. On either side of the rails there lay mighty rocks, great jagged boulders of sandstone, and I rejoiced in the shelter they gave me. I had been running for some minutes between the rocks when I heard a strange noise. At first I thought it was another train. But as the sound grew nearer and grew clearer I knew what it was: galloping horses! Through a gap in the rocks I could see the fine white line which marked the road. It was scarcely a hundred yards away from the railway. On this road a patrol was coming along at a gallop.... Had the police already seen me? Just before, where the country was flat, my silhouette must have stood out sharply defined against the sky in the moonlight. In a paroxysm of fear I crawled in between two rocks and held my breath to listen. The horses drew nearer and nearer, the beat of their hoofs on the roadway ringing out loud and clear. Peeping out of my hiding-place I could see the dark forms of horses and their riders. Now they were up with me. I heard a sharp exclamation in Arabic. The three men pulled up their horses and came to a halt. I pulled out my pistol. The barrel shone in the moonlight. I hastily covered up the weapon with my coat, for fear it should betray my hiding-place. Then I carefully cocked the pistol and felt whether the cartridge-frame was in order. A feeling of icy calmness came upon me. I made up my mind not to stir from my hiding-place and not to fire until the gendarmes were quite close to me in their search. I considered the matter carefully. Two full cartridge-frames I took in my left hand, ready to refill the chamber. My idea was to empty the magazine in quick shooting in order to get in as many shots as possible before they recovered from their surprise. Down below some one lit a match. It burned for a moment only. I heard one of the gendarmes laugh. Then the three men galloped forward again. One of them must have asked his comrades for a match.... The noise of the galloping horses was soon lost in the distance, but for a long time I sat trembling from head to foot between the two rocks. The tears of over-excitement were running down my face as I put up the pistol. I could have yelled for joy that this awful danger was over. When I stood up again, I fell back against the rocks. My trembling knees could not support my body.... * * * * * Les Imberts was the name of the station. It was forty-two kilometres distant from Sidi-bel-Abbès; in seven hours I had covered a distance of about thirty English miles. When at four o'clock in the morning I reached the station and deciphered its name and its distance from Sidi-bel-Abbès in the darkness, there was not a human being to be seen. The stillness of night still lay upon everything. A few hundred yards from the station a number of freight cars stood. I jumped into one of them and studied, lighting one match after another, the Algerian time-table which my careful mother had sent me. The first train to Oran went at a few minutes past five. The first thing to be done was to care for my outer man a little. I climbed out of the car again and found, after a long search, a barrel half full of water standing under a shed. Day was just breaking. After a very hurried wash I hid again in one of the cars, brushing my clothes and cleaning my boots with my handkerchief. I was very glad of the extra collar which my friend of the Ghetto had purchased. Finally I had a look at myself in my tiny looking-glass. It would do! Indeed, the effect was not half bad. It would do very well; decently dressed people were scarce in Algeria.... At five o'clock I started on a roundabout route for the station. A dozen people stood waiting on the platform, amongst them an Arab policeman leaning lazily against the wall. I went straight up to the ticket office. "Oran--première classe!" "Sept-soixante," said the official. "Seven francs and sixty centimes." I jumped into the nearest first-class compartment, and found to my joy that it was empty. The train started off. During the two hours' journey from Les Imberts to Oran I brought my dress into decent order and smoked innumerable cigarettes to drive away my sleepiness. At the barrier in Oran a sergeant of Zouaves and a corporal of the Legion were watching for deserters, but they didn't take the slightest notice of me. Until ten o'clock I wandered about the town. Then I went to the office of the French Mediterranean line and took a second-class ticket for Marseilles. The passenger boat _St. Augustine_ was due to start at five in the afternoon. All at once I became very sleepy. I could hardly keep my eyes open, but I had not the courage to go to an hotel and rest there for a few hours. So I went into a restaurant and enjoyed a long-drawn-out French dinner and a bottle of heavy Burgundy. Suddenly I remembered that it would look suspicious if I started on a sea voyage without any luggage. For a few francs I procured a big valise whose paste-board sides looked really "the same as leather," and bought newspapers at every corner to stuff my "luggage" with. At a few minutes to five I went on board the steamer. With a cigarette between my lips and a bundle of newspapers under my arm I walked up and down the deck, read _Le Rire_, and did all I could to assume a careless mien. In reality I was in a very serious situation. The question was: Had a telegram from the regiment with my description reached Oran already or not? The half-hour struck, but the _St. Augustine_ was still in dock. Police came and went. All at once I felt myself go pale as death; a patrol of four Zouave sergeants was coming up the gangway. They went over the whole ship, looking carefully about them. Then they interchanged a few words with the captain and went on again.... I was just beginning to breathe again, when a gendarme came up to me and asked, saluting courteously: "Monsieur is a Frenchman?" "Non, monsieur, an Englishman," I answered quietly, and smiled at the gendarme in spite of the icy fear gripping at my heart. If he should chance on the idea of asking for my papers I was lost! "Your name, please?" "Eugene Sanders." "Profession?" "Engineer--from Tlemcen--on the way to Nice." "Thank you." ... After a few minutes the ship's bell rang out, the gangways were pulled in, and the screw began to revolve. I went into my cabin and went to sleep. During the whole of the sea voyage I had not a single thought, not a single hope, not a single fear--I merely slept. As the _St. Augustine_ ran into harbour in Marseilles, a new difficulty presented itself. What would the custom-house say to my valise filled with paper? Luggage of this sort would have made anybody suspicious. Chance came to my aid. A number of boats crowded around the ship, and several boatmen climbed on board to offer their services as porters, and so on. I went up to one of them and told him that I wanted to be put on shore as quickly as possible. Could he do it? "For five francs," the fellow said. "All right. Row me over." My satchel I left on board to avoid the customs inspection. A gangway had already been let down from the side of the steamer, and I stepped down into the boat with my boatman. Ten minutes later I stood on the "quai" in Marseilles. In another five minutes I had found a cab and was on my way to the station. Half an hour later I was seated in a compartment of an express train for the Riviera. A Riviera journey in the darkness.... Toulon flew past--Cannes. In Nice I could hear even in the railway-train the noise of the carnival which was nearing its end--the platform was covered with confetti. We reached Monaco--Monte Carlo, with its brilliantly illuminated casino. At last we reached Ventimiglia: the first Italian station! It was one o'clock in the morning. I stormed into the telegraph-office and despatched two telegrams to my two dearest.... Free--free again! CHAPTER XV J'ACCUSE Two years after : Shadows of the past : My vision : Public opinion and the Foreign Legion : The political aspect of the Foreign Legion : The moralist's point of view : The "Legion question" in a nutshell : A question the civilised world should have answered long ago : Quousque tandem...? Two years have passed. They were years of fighting and years of toil. Years in which I burnt much midnight oil, and in which every tiny success meant worlds to me. My personal attitude towards the Foreign Legion was a rather peculiar one at first. For several months I forced myself never even to think of the time when I was in the Legion. Those times should merely be to me a dim shadow of the past. I looked upon them as an ugly page that I should only too gladly have torn out of the book of my life: since, however, I could not rid myself of them in this way I avoided ever opening the book at this page.... But the past which we should like to forget has an unpleasant way of forcing itself upon us, unbidden and against our will. Often as I lay back in my arm-chair in an idle quarter of an hour, scenes from my life in the Legion mingled dimly with the blue smoke of my cigarette. An endless procession of légionnaires would pass before me, a procession of men loaded like beasts of burden, their backs bent almost double, panting and gasping as they struggled forward in the sand: I could see their staring eyes, their rounded backs. I felt the tortures they were undergoing, how they struggled forward till their last ounce of strength was spent: even their groans were audible to me. Every one of these men seemed to look at me with hatred. You sit there in your arm-chair? In an atmosphere of culture? Amongst beautiful things of art? You belong to us! Off to your place, légionnaire, on the wing of the first row of fours in the eleventh company. Quick march, légionnaire, or die! When I spent a golden coin on some amusement I seemed to see the hands of the légionnaires, trembling claw-like hands, grasping for my money and trying to rend it from me. Gold! Wealth unheard of after the miserable coppers of the Legion! Give it to us, said those fingers, give it to us! Have you forgotten our five centimes, légionnaire? My imagination worried me. I gave a part of the story of my life price, and after much hesitation wrote this book. I have only described the ordinary routine of life in the regiment of foreigners as I myself experienced it. It is merely a tiny part of what every légionnaire undergoes. I wanted to show the légionnaire--how he lives, and how he must work. I did not dream of being able to warn foolish young fellows about the Legion. It is impossible to warn a fool. But I thought, and think still, that a true and exact description of the French Foreign Legion would perhaps help to put an end to an institution which is a disgrace to civilised humanity, and which should be to the civilised nations of to-day as unintelligible as the slave trade.... And above all I wanted to get rid of those visions which troubled me. In considering the Foreign Legion one must above all be careful not to go to work with common-places, nor to start from general axioms. The idea is so prevalent that the soldiers of the Foreign Legion are lost and ruined men, even criminals--morally and practically useless at best. A good-for-nothing lot of fellows who are no loss to anybody. One is apt to dispose of the légionnaire in a few trite remarks. Men of learning write from their arm-chairs to the papers about "the hirelings who have sold themselves into slavery, thus helping to revive the feudal system of the Middle Ages." If, however, the question were more closely inquired into, I am sure that it would be found that these rogues and vagabonds are not, in reality, quite so bad. True, I can bring forward no positive proof of this. There are no statistics about the Foreign Legion, and I am in no better position than any other human being to bring forward authentic material. There are not even official figures about the strength of the two regiments. I admit, willingly enough, that a large percentage of the men in the Foreign Legion really deserve the callous summing up that one is wont to apply to the whole regiment. All that I have seen and heard in Africa, however, has convinced me that the other and greater part of the men in the Foreign Legion are anything but the lost souls one imagines them to be. They come into the Legion as poor workmen. Their story is the sad one of the vagabond workman who had to starve on the French high road, because he could not speak the language. It is these men who have always formed the heart of the Foreign Legion. It is the pangs of hunger that drives men into the Foreign Legion--French and English, Germans and Italians, Spaniards and Austrians, men of all countries, men of all races. Yes, hunger is a most efficient recruiting sergeant for the Foreign Legion. The hungry man who seeks a refuge in the Foreign Legion gets, it is true, his daily bread; he is, all the same, disgracefully swindled. It cannot be repeated often enough how hard the légionnaire has to work, how miserable his existence is, how he gives his whole strength for a wage that is not worth mentioning. We are so practical in our modern ideas of life; every workman knows well enough the exact value of his work in the current coin of the realm, and takes advantage of every opportunity of getting a higher wage. And, in an age which is ever improving the standard of living, and which has so absolutely changed the ideas of the poorer classes, how is it possible that a business concern like the Foreign Legion--it is really nothing but a business concern, a commercial undertaking--can always get hundreds and thousands of labourer-soldiers, for a wage compared with which the wages of the tiniest village are riches? The results are startling when one compares the Foreign Legion with the world's two other mercenary armies, those of America and England, both of which countries, by-the-by, take great care to keep up a certain moral standard among their soldiers. These two armies, in sharp contrast to the Foreign Legion, pay their soldiers exceptionally well. The least that an American regular receives is thirteen dollars a month; the English Tommy gets a shilling a day. And these are soldiers and not workmen. They are mercenaries, like the légionnaire, but at any rate they are well-paid mercenaries. The miserable wages, together with the existing conditions of life in the Legion, are enough to convince even a Frenchman that the existence of the Foreign Legion is a sin against the very first principles of humanity--and has been for eighty years. In the sand of Algeria, in the swamps of Madagascar, in the fever-pested plains of Tonquin, in the valleys of Mexico, there lie these men of every nation, these men who have died in the Foreign Legion, who have sold their lives for their rations and five centimes a day. If one leaves the dead in peace and only considers the living, one reaches the same conclusion: robbery, and robbery of the destitute at that! A sin against every principle of humanity! Oh, thrice accursed Legion: forcing inexperienced young fellows into its ranks, who would never join did they know what lies before them; absolutely callous as to the value of human life, forcing its soldiers to conditions of life which must ruin their health for ever! It is not for this alone that the Legion is answerable. It is also answerable for the vices of the Legion, for it is the life in the Legion that has brought the tiny seeds of these vices to full bloom. * * * * * About the political aspect of the Foreign Legion there can be no two opinions. The Foreign Legion is an antiquated, ridiculously out-of-date survival of the feudal system of the Middle Ages, with all the disadvantages of the mercenary system, but without the romantic halo which in days gone by hung around the soldiers of fortune. According to modern ideas, it is absolutely monstrous that one of the most cultured nations of the world should have in its pay a corps composed of men of all nationalities, and who are, as is generally acknowledged, very often foreign deserters, who enlist to save themselves from starvation. Their colours bear the unsatisfying motto, "Valeur et Discipline." The inscription on the national flag, "Honneur et Patrie"--"For Honour and our Country"--could hardly be given to these "mixed pickles." But these two words, "Valeur" and "Discipline," are pregnant with meaning. Comparisons with the English and American armies are not only of interest as far as the pay is concerned; there is in all respects a vast difference between these two armies and the Foreign Legion. Only men of British birth can join the British army. The American army takes foreigners into its ranks, but only those who possess the so-called first papers, _i.e._, have sworn before a magistrate that they intend to become American citizens after the prescribed five years. The American mercenary is looked upon as an American citizen and has to take the oath of allegiance. The Foreign Legion, on the other hand, knows no oath at all. The printed bit of paper that the recruit for the Foreign Legion signs is merely a contract, a statement of the conditions of service. This contract is the only chain which fetters the légionnaire to the Legion--a contract which, according to every one of our modern ideas of international law, is null and void. To-day, in international law, contracts opposed to public morality are much talked about, and what could be more immoral in every sense of the word than this contract that the French Republic makes with its recruits, this contract in which what is got out of a man and what he is paid stand in such an unsatisfying relation to each other. As I have said before, there can be no two opinions about the Foreign Legion. Every one with sound ideas of political economy must agree that it is an unheard-of condition of affairs when a nation is allowed to receive the deserters and criminals--I speak now of that other half of the Foreign Legion--of the States surrounding it, indeed from all the States in the world, with open arms, and to make use of them on principle for a special military organisation. One cannot speak too strongly about this transaction, which is a piece of military blackguardism with something more than despicable about it. And not only the feudalism of the Middle Ages survives in the Foreign Legion but also the morals of those times, when a poor devil enlisted because he did not know of anything better to do with his life: of those times when a deserter was valued because he made a pair of arms and legs the less in the opposing force. In the Foreign Legion's enlistment bureaux a recruit gets a special welcome when he announces that he is a deserter, and is then looked upon as a really valuable addition to the corps. It is also a fact that France offers sanctuary to all criminals who fly from justice. The Foreign Legion will only give up murderers--every other kind of criminal is safe there. And France's selfish reason for this is that she can thereby fill the ranks of a regiment that is always fighting for France and which is always ready to do the hardest work for her in the most unhealthy climates. The average Frenchman has, during the Legion's eighty years of existence, contented himself with attributing the successes of the Foreign Legion to the French flag, and has always looked upon the Foreign Legion as a profitable and patriotic institution. It is only quite of late that the Foreign Legion has come to be looked upon in France as a problem. To-day the Foreign Legion is not an institution that every Frenchman considers quite in the natural order of things. Even the French Ministry of War has busied itself with the "Legion problem." It could not, however, quite make up its mind to give up the Legion. The possibility of employing a soldier who receives five centimes a day, and who can be made use of for all sorts of dangerous undertakings in the worst of climates, is too great a temptation. Perhaps the real reason for this tenacity is that France, who is so proud of her military traditions, finds it hard to bring herself to dissolve a corps which has been in existence for more than eighty years and which has been led by many a famous general and marshal of France. It has been suggested that it would be a good idea to change the method of recruiting. Passports should be demanded to make sure that the recruit had not got into trouble with the authorities of his own country. Deserters from the armies of other countries should on no condition be accepted. There is a diversity of opinion about these suggestions in French military circles. One party asserts that with the deserters the Foreign Legion would lose the flower of its strength, the soldiers who have been trained in other armies. The other side urges that if the pay were raised and the time the men must serve in order to qualify for a pension shortened, the adventurous life in the Foreign Legion and the hope of promotion would always bring more than enough good stuff from all nations for service under the Legion's flag. In these debates the military point of view is the only one of importance and since, considered from this point of view, the Legion has always borne itself splendidly, things have been left as they were. All suggestions for a change in the organisation of the Legion have naturally been made very quietly. All the same the Legion has, of late, come very much before the public in France. There is no doubt that they are beginning to look at the Foreign Legion a little critically in France. The number of those who doubt that the country is right in keeping up this barbarous institution is growing daily. Referring to the great mutiny of the soldiers of the Legion at Saida, Jaurès wrote in the _Humanité_: "The Foreign Legion will doubtless be a source of everlasting difficulty to us; the idea of forming a body of troops for the French army from foreign deserters is at any rate an unusual one." This is a step in the right direction. They are beginning to talk about the problem of the Foreign Legion. Its existence is no longer considered absolutely natural. The question has been raised. If the Foreign Legion did not exist, and some member of the French parliament were to suggest the formation of a corps of foreign mercenaries, preferably foreign deserters, the suggestion would doubtless be received with indignation. The tactless politician would be sure to be confronted with the somewhat obvious remark that it would be unworthy of the dignity of France to gather a band of foreigners under the tricolour to defend French soil. One would hear some very pretty speeches on the subject. That sort of thing can be tolerated in the Balkan States or in Venezuela or Honduras, but not in our proud France. Some deputy or other would be certain to warn the nation--the warning is a very obvious one--that other States could institute Foreign Legions, filling their ranks with French deserters. Think of the shudder that would pass through the land at the idea of English ships manned by, or German colonies conquered by, French deserters. ... The Foreign Legion lives upon its past. The Frenchman is accustomed to it and hardly notices what an anachronism it is. The problem of the Legion is so easy. It can be divided into two questions: Is it fair to pay a man who works really hard a daily wage of five centimes? Is it fair to make use of a poor devil's misfortunes, or the fact that he has got into trouble with the authorities of his native land, in this way for national purposes? The answer to these questions is not difficult. In later years especially, the French Government has made a clean sweep of many French institutions that seemed to be incompatible with the fair fame of France. One can be quite sure that it will in course of time be recognised that the Foreign Legion must be done away with. One is only tempted to ask: How long will it last? _Quousque tandem...?_ Printed by BALLANTYNE & CO. LIMITED Tavistock Street, Covent Garden, London 
29984	----	THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST WEST INDIA REGIMENT. THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST WEST INDIA REGIMENT. BY A.B. ELLIS, _Major, First West India Regiment._ AUTHOR OF "WEST AFRICAN ISLANDS" AND "THE LAND OF FETISH". London: CHAPMAN AND HALL, LIMITED, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN. 1885. CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS. I beg to return my best thanks to A.E. HAVELOCK, Esq., C.M.G. Administrator-in-Chief of the West African Settlements; Lieutenant-Colonel F.B.P. WHITE, of the 1st West India Regiment; V.S. GOULDSBURY, Esq., Administrator of the Gambia Settlements; A. YOUNG, Esq., Lieutenant-Governor of Demerara; F. EVANS, Esq., C.M.G., Assistant Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast Colony; ALFRED KINGSTON, Esq., of the Record Office; and RICHARD GARNETT, Esq., of the British Museum, for the very valuable assistance which they have rendered me in the collection of materials for this Work. CONTENTS. PAGE INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER I. THE ACTION AT BRIAR CREEK, 1779--THE ACTION AT STONO FERRY, 1779 26 CHAPTER II. THE SIEGE OF SAVANNAH, 1779--THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTOWN, 1780--THE BATTLE OF HOBKERK'S HILL, 1781 33 CHAPTER III. THE RELIEF OF NINETY-SIX, 1781--THE BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS, 1781--REMOVAL TO THE WEST INDIES 43 CHAPTER IV. THE EXPEDITION TO MARTINIQUE, 1793--THE CAPTURE OF MARTINIQUE, ST. LUCIA, AND GUADALOUPE, 1794--THE DEFENCE OF FORT MATILDA, 1794 53 CHAPTER V. MALCOLM'S ROYAL RANGERS--THE EVACUATION OF ST. LUCIA, 1795 63 CHAPTER VI. THE CARIB WAR IN ST. VINCENT, 1795 69 CHAPTER VII. MAJOR-GENERAL WHYTE'S REGIMENT OF FOOT, 1795 77 CHAPTER VIII. THE CAPTURE OF ST. LUCIA, 1796 85 CHAPTER IX. THE RELIEF OF GRENADA, 1796--THE REPULSE AT PORTO RICO, 1797 93 CHAPTER X. THE DEFENCE OF DOMINICA, 1805 103 CHAPTER XI. THE HURRICANE AT DOMINICA, 1806--THE REDUCTION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. CROIX, 1807--THE RELIEF OF MARIE-GALANTE, 1808 117 CHAPTER XII. THE CAPTURE OF MARTINIQUE, 1809--THE CAPTURE OF GUADALOUPE, 1810 125 CHAPTER XIII. THE EXPEDITION TO NEW ORLEANS, 1814-15 141 CHAPTER XIV. THE OCCUPATION OF GUADALOUPE, 1815--THE BARBADOS INSURRECTION, 1816--THE HURRICANE OF 1817 160 CHAPTER XV. THE DEMERARA REBELLION, 1823 170 CHAPTER XVI. THE BARRA WAR, 1831--THE HURRICANE OF 1831--THE COBOLO EXPEDITION, 1832 178 CHAPTER XVII. THE MUTINY OF THE RECRUITS AT TRINIDAD, 1837 188 CHAPTER XVIII. THE PIRARA EXPEDITION, 1842--CHANGES IN THE WEST AFRICAN GARRISONS--THE APPOLLONIA EXPEDITION, 1848 208 CHAPTER XIX. INDIAN DISTURBANCES IN HONDURAS, 1848-49--THE ESCORT TO COOMASSIE, 1848--THE SHERBRO EXPEDITION, 1849--THE ESCORT TO RIO NUNEZ, 1850 218 CHAPTER XX. THE STORMING OF SABBAJEE, 1853--THE RELIEF OF CHRISTIANSBORG, 1854 228 CHAPTER XXI. THE TWO EXPEDITIONS TO MALAGEAH, 1854-55 236 CHAPTER XXII. THE BATTLE OF BAKKOW, AND STORMING OF SABBAJEE, 1855 248 CHAPTER XXIII. CHANGES IN THE WEST AFRICAN GARRISONS, 1856-57--THE GREAT SCARCIES RIVER EXPEDITION, 1859--FIRE AT NASSAU, 1859 257 CHAPTER XXIV. THE BADDIBOO WAR, 1860-61 265 CHAPTER XXV. THE ASHANTI EXPEDITION, 1863-64 276 CHAPTER XXVI. THE JAMAICA REBELLION, 1865 286 CHAPTER XXVII. AFRICAN TOUR, 1866-70 298 CHAPTER XXVIII. THE DEFENCE OF ORANGE WALK, 1872 304 CHAPTER XXIX. THE ASHANTI WAR, 1873-74 317 CHAPTER XXX. AFFAIRS IN HONDURAS, 1874--THE SHERBRO EXPEDITION, 1875--THE ASHANTI EXPEDITION, 1881 333 APPENDIX 343 INDEX 361 MAPS. 1. ST. VINCENT _facing page 69_ 2. GRENADA " 93 3. DOMINICA " 103 4. MARTINIQUE " 125 5. GUADALOUPE " 133 6. THE GAMBIA SETTLEMENTS " 178 7. THE GOLD COAST " 215 8. BRITISH HONDURAS " 219 9. THE MELLICOURIE RIVER " 236 10. SWARRA CUNDA CREEK " 265 11. THE COUNTY OF SURREY, JAMAICA " 287 12. ORANGE WALK " 305 13. THE ROUTE TO COOMASSIE " 319 14. BRITISH SHERBRO " 337 THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST WEST INDIA REGIMENT. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. At the present day, when our Continental neighbours are outvying each other in the completeness of their military organisations and the size of their armies, while in the United Kingdom complaints are daily heard that the supply of recruits for the British Army is not equal to the demand, it may not be out of place to draw the attention of the public to a source from which the army may be most economically reinforced. The principal difficulty experienced by military reformers in their endeavours to remodel the British Army on the Continental system, is that caused by the necessity of providing troops for the defence of our vast and scattered Colonial Empire. Without taking into consideration India, our European and North American possessions, a considerable portion of the army has to be employed in furnishing garrisons for the Cape Colony, Natal, Mauritius, St. Helena, the Bermudas, the West Indies, Burmah, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, etc.; which garrisons, though creating a constant drain on the Home Establishment, are notoriously inadequate for the defence of the various colonies in which they are placed; and the result is that, whenever a colonial war breaks out, fresh battalions have to be hurriedly sent out from the United Kingdom at immense expense, and the entire military machine is temporarily disarranged. In size, and in diversity of subject races, the British Empire may be not inaptly compared with that of Rome in its palmiest days; and we have, in a measure, adopted a Roman scheme for the defence of a portion of our dominions. The Romans were accustomed, as each new territory was conquered, to raise levies of troops from the subject race, and then, most politicly, to send them to serve in distant parts of the Empire, where they could have no sympathies with the inhabitants. In India we, like the Romans, raise troops from the conquered peoples, but, unlike them, we retain those troops for service in their own country. The result of this attempt to modify the scheme was the Indian mutiny. The plan of a local colonial army was, however, first tried in the West Indies. At the close of the last century, when the West India Islands, or the Plantations, as they were then called, were of as much importance to, and held the same position in, the British Empire as India does now, there was in existence a West India Army, consisting of twelve battalions of negro troops, raised exclusively for service in the West Indies. As India was gradually conquered, and the West India trade declined (from the abolition of the slave trade and other causes), the West India Colonies, by a regular process, fell from their former pre-eminent position. Each step in the descent was marked by the disbandment of a West India regiment, until, at the present day, two only remain in existence; and it is a matter of common notoriety that those two are principally preserved to garrison Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast Colony, British Honduras, and British Guiana--colonies the climates of which, experience has shown, are fatal to European soldiers, who are necessarily in time of peace, from the nature of their duties, more exposed to climatic influence than are officers. Economy was, of course, the cause of this continued process of reduction, for, until recently, such gigantic military establishments as those of Germany, Russia, and France were unheard of; and Great Britain was satisfied, and felt secure, with a miniature army, a paper militia, and no reserve. All this is now changed, and the necessity of an increase in our defensive power is admitted. These negro West India troops won the highest encomiums from every British commander under whom they served. Sir Ralph Abercromby in 1796, Sir John Moore in 1797, Lieutenant-General Trigge in 1801, Sir George Provost in 1805, Lieutenant-General Beckwith and Major-General Maitland in 1809 and 1810, all testified to the gallantry, steadiness, and discipline of the negro soldiers. Sir John Moore, speaking of the new corps in 1796, said "they are invaluable," and "the very best troops for the climate." To come to more recent times, in 1873 the 2nd West India Regiment bore for six months the entire brunt of the Ashanti attack, and had actually forced the invading army to retire across the Prah before the men of a single line battalion were landed. In fact, the efficiency of West India troops was, and is, unquestioned. This being so, it may be asked, why should not the present number of regiments composed of negro soldiers be increased for the purpose of garrisoning the colonies, especially those of which the climate is most prejudicial to English soldiers? This would not be a return to the former state of affairs, for when we had twelve negro regiments they were all stationed in the West Indies, whereas the essence of the present scheme is to send them on service in other colonies. Such an augmentation of our West India, or Zouave, regiments certainly appears politic and easy. I will also endeavour to show that it would be economical. Each West India battalion would take the place of a Territorial battalion now serving abroad. The latter would return to the United Kingdom, be reduced to the Home Establishment, and have from 300 to 400 men passed into the Reserve. Repeat this process seven or eight times, and the services with the colours of between 2000 and 3000 European soldiers are dispensed with, the Reserve being increased by that number. In addition, negro soldiers being enlisted for twelve years' service with the colours, negro regiments on foreign service would not require those large drafts sent to white battalions to replace time-expired men, transport for which so swells the army estimates; while the negro being a native of the tropics, invaliding home would be reduced to a minimum. The pay of the black soldier is ninepence per diem, against a shilling per diem to the white, so that there would be some saving effected in that way. In fact, it has been calculated that for an annual addition to the army estimates of some £27,000, six new negro battalions, each 800 strong, could be maintained; giving, on the one hand, an addition of 4800 to our present military force, and on the other, an increased Reserve, and six more Territorial battalions in the United Kingdom, ready to hand on a European emergency. To this may be added the lives of scores of Englishmen yearly saved to their country. By the Territorial scheme now in force in Great Britain, an attempt has been made to localise corps on the German system, irrespective of the fact that Germany has no colonies, while those of Great Britain are most numerous. In Germany, in time of peace, each army corps is located in a district, from which it never moves, and in which the Reserve men, destined to complete the regiments to war strength, are compelled to live. Thus, when a general mobilisation takes place, the men are on the spot, and join the regiments in which they have already served. France has adopted this system, with the exception that army corps are not permanently located in districts, and the army thus localised is the one for European service only. For her colonies an entirely distinct army is maintained, composed of men specially enlisted for foreign service. In Great Britain we have neither adopted the German system nor the French modification of that system; but a scheme of localisation, with the main-spring of localisation removed, has been endeavoured to be grafted upon our old system, under which the regular army is sent on service in time of peace to distant portions of the globe. Should the mobilisation of an army corps be necessary in England, the Reserve men would, in a large number of cases, find the regiments in which they had formerly served, on foreign service. It would then be necessary to draft them into regiments to which they were strangers, in which they would take no interest, and where they would be unknown to their officers. On the other hand, should it be necessary to despatch suddenly six or seven battalions to India or the Cape, they have to be made up to a war strength from other corps, for they have been reduced to a skeleton establishment in order that men may be provided for the Reserve. Localisation, to be effectual, must be thorough; but it and the demands of foreign service are so incompatible that they cannot be efficiently combined. At the present time, neither is said to be in a satisfactory condition, and the Reserve, which was expected to have risen to a total of 80,000 men, consists of 32,000 only. Military reformers have long since arrived at the conclusion that if the British Army is to be maintained at such a footing as to give weight to the voice of Great Britain in the councils of Europe, we must have two distinct armies; namely, one for home service, ready for a European imbroglio, and a second to which the defence of the colonies can be entrusted. The objection to this has been, hitherto, the great expense, for it has always been taken for granted that this Colonial Army would consist of white soldiers; and the question of increased pay, supply of recruits, and periodical removal of men to the United Kingdom, over and above the cost of the Territorial Army, had to be considered. With negro troops, however, for the Colonial Army, this objection, if it does not entirely disappear, is reduced at least by three-quarters. Should it be tried on a small scale and found successful, there need be no reason why in time almost the whole of the Territorial battalions should not be withdrawn from foreign service. In this way localisation could be made a reality; and with such vast untouched recruiting grounds as our colonies offer, there can be no doubt as to the practicability of raising the negro regiments required. Such regiments might also partly compose the garrisons of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Aden, and Ceylon. There is, indeed, no reason, except the hatred of the Hindoo for the negro, why such regiments might not serve in India. As the negro would never coalesce with the natives of India, a new and entirely reliable force, indifferent to tropical heat, and not requiring a vast retinue of camp-followers, would be always at hand. Of course, negro battalions could never be employed in cold latitudes, for the negro suffers from cold in a manner which is incomprehensible even to Europeans who have passed the best part of their lives in the tropics. Instead of being braced by and deriving activity from the cold, he becomes languid and inert; and nothing but the rays of the sun can arouse him to any exertion. Even in West Africa, during the Harmattan season, natives may be observed in the early morning, hugging their scanty clothing around them and shivering with cold; while the ill-fated expedition to New Orleans showed what deadly havoc an inclement climate will play with negro troops. Next, as to the men of whom these negro regiments would be composed. It is too much the custom in Great Britain, in describing a man of colour, to consider that all has been said that is necessary when he is called a negro; yet there are as many nationalities, and as many types of the African race, as there are of the Caucasian. No one would imagine that a European was sufficiently described by the title of "white man." It would be asked if the individual in question were an Englishman, German, Frenchman, and so on; and the same kind of classification is necessary for the negro. On the western coast of Africa, the portion of the African continent from which North and South America and the West Indies obtained their negro population, there are at least twenty different varieties of the African race, distinct from each other in features and even in colour; and these are again subdivided into several hundred nations or tribes, each of which possesses a language, manners, and customs of its own. In the days of the slave-trade, the slave-dealers adopted certain arbitrary designations to denote from what portion of the coast their wares were obtained. For instance, slaves shipped from Sierra Leone and the rivers to the north and east of that peninsula, and who were principally Timmanees, Kossus, Acoos, Mendis, Foulahs, and Jolloffs, were called Mandingoes, from the dominant tribe of that name which supplied the slave-market. Negroes from the Gold Coast kingdoms of Ashanti, Fanti, Assin, Akim, Wassaw, Aquapim, Ahanta, and Accra were denominated Koromantyns, or Coromantees, a corruption of Cormantine, the name of a fort some sixteen miles to the east of Cape Coast Castle, and which was the earliest British slave-station on the Gold Coast. Similarly, slaves from the tribes inhabiting the Slave Coast, that is to say, Awoonahs, Agbosomehs, Flohows, Popos, Dahomans, Egbas, and Yorubas, were all termed Papaws; while those from the numerous petty states of the Niger delta, where the lowest type of the negro is to be found, were known as Eboes. Thousands of men of these tribes, and others too numerous to mention, were carried across the Atlantic and scattered at hap-hazard all over the West India Islands. At first tribal distinctions were maintained, but in the course of years, in each island they gradually disappeared and were forgotten; until at the present day a West India negro does not describe himself as a Kossu or a Koromantyn, but as a Jamaican, a Barbadian, an Antiguan, etc. It would naturally be supposed that as the West India Islands all received their slave population in the same manner, and that as in each there was the same original diversity of nationalities, subsequently blended together by intermarriages and community of wants and language, a West India negro of the present generation from any one island would be hardly distinguishable from one from any other. Nothing, however, would be further from the truth. Since the abolition of slavery, the conditions of life in the various islands have been so different--in some the dense population necessitating daily labour for an existence, while in others large uncultivated stretches of wood and mountain have afforded squatting grounds for the majority of the black population--that, in conjunction with diversity of climate, each group of islands is now populated with a race of negroes morally distinct _per se_. The difference between a negro born and bred in Barbados and one born and bred in Jamaica is as great as between an American and an Englishman, and the clannish spirit of the negro tends to increase that difference. At the present time the negro of Jamaica does not care to enlist in the 2nd West India Regiment, which is largely recruited in Barbados; and, in the same way, the Barbadian declines to serve in the 1st West India Regiment, because it is almost entirely composed of Jamaicans. While the negroes of the West Indies have thus lost all their tribal peculiarities in the natural course of progress and civilisation, those of West Africa have remained at a standstill; and there is to-day as much difference between the hideous and debased Eboe and the stately and dignified Mandingo, between the docile Fanti and the bloodthirsty Ashanti, as there was one hundred and fifty years ago. Civilising influences have made this contrast between the Africans and their West India descendants still more striking. The latter have, since the abolition of slavery, been living independent lives, in close contact with civilisation, and enjoying all the rights of manhood under British laws. From their earliest infancy they have known no language but the English, and no religion but Christianity; while the former are still barbarians, grovelling in fetishism, cursed with slavery, ignorant, debased, and wantonly cruel. The West India negro has so much contempt for his African cousin, that he invariably speaks of him by the ignominious title of "bushman." In fact, the former considers himself in every respect an Englishman, and the anecdote of the West India negro, who, being rather roughly jolted by a Frenchman on board a mail steamer, turned round to him and ejaculated, "I think you forget that we beat you at Waterloo," is no exaggeration. Just as the negro races of West Africa are distinct from one another, and the West India negro from all, so are the coloured inhabitants of both those parts of the world entirely distinct from the Kaffir tribes of South Africa; and a coalition between Galeka or Zulu inhabitants and West India troops would be as impossible as the fraternisation of a Territorial battalion with the natives of India. Apart, however, from the fact that negro troops could always be safely employed alone outside the colony in which they were bred, history has shown that the fidelity of West India soldiers is beyond question. Indeed it would be difficult to say what stronger ties there could be than those of sentiment, language, and religion, and the association from childhood with British manners, customs, laws, and modes of thought. When to these are added discipline, the habit of obedience, and that well-known affection for their officers and their regiment which is so particularly an attribute of the West India soldier, it must be acknowledged that the guarantees of fidelity are, with the single exception of race, at least as good as those of the linesmen. In India, the native army consists of men hostile to us by tradition, creed, and race, who consider their food defiled if even the shadow of a British officer should chance to fall across it, and assuredly it would be as safe a proceeding to garrison our colonies with English negroes as to garrison India with such men. Yet that is done at the present day, and excites no remark. The English-speaking negro of the West Indies is most excellent material for a soldier. He is docile, patient, brave, and faithful, and for an officer who knows how to gain his affection--an easy matter, requiring only justness, good temper, and an ear ready to listen patiently to any tale of real or imaginary grievance--he will do anything. Of course they are not perfect; they have their faults, like all soldiers, and when they chance to be commanded by an officer who is unnecessarily harsh, or who speaks roughly to them, they manifest their displeasure by passive obedience and a stubborn sullenness. English soldiers, on the other hand, under such circumstances, proceed to acts of insubordination, and it is for military judges to say which mode of expression they prefer. The West African negro does not appear to such advantage as a soldier. Although all the specimens, with the exception of the Sierra Leone negro, possess the first necessary qualification of personal courage, they are dull and stupid, and cannot be transformed into intelligent soldiers. It may be wondered why the Sierra Leonean, who alone among the West Africans is an English-speaking negro, should be worse than his more barbarian neighbours; but I believe the solution may be found in the fact that the large proportion of slaves landed in former days at Sierra Leone from captured slavers were so-called Eboes, from the tribes of the Niger delta; which tribes all ethnologists are agreed in describing as among the lowest of the African races, and which, it may be remarked, are even at the present day addicted to cannibalism. The West African soldier is a mere machine, who mechanically obeys orders, and never ventures, under any circumstances, to act or think for himself. Should an African be placed on sentry, he fulfils to the letter the orders read to him by the non-commissioned officer who posts him, but frequently entirely ignores their spirit. Sometimes this is productive of amusing incidents. For instance, some years ago, among the orders for the sentry posted at Government House, Sierra Leone, was one to the effect that no one was to be permitted to leave the premises after dark carrying a parcel. This order had been issued at the request of the Governor, to prevent pilfering on the part of his servants. One evening the Governor was coming out of his house with a small despatch-box, when, to his surprise, he was stopped by the sentry, an old African. "But I'm the Governor," said the astonished administrator, "and I had that order made myself. You mustn't stop me." "Me no care if you be Gubnor or not," replied the imperturbable African. "The corporal gib de order, and you no can pass." And Her Majesty's representative had to turn back and leave his despatch-box at home. The greatest objection to the African, however, is the strange fact that no amount of care or attention on the part of his instructors can ever make him a good or even a fair shot. In the 1st West India Regiment there are still a few Africans remaining, most of whom have from twelve to eighteen years' service; and who have annually expended their rounds without hitting the target more than once or twice during the whole musketry course. Give these men a rifle rested on a tripod, and tell them to align the sights upon some given mark, and they cannot do it. They will frequently aim a foot or two to the right or left of an object only a few yards distant. Every possible plan has been tried to make them improve, but all have equally failed; and, in consequence, Africans are not now enlisted. Still, although on account of this failing, African troops could never, in these days of long-range firing, meet Europeans in the field, a battalion of Africans would be quite good enough for bush fighting against an enemy like the Ashanti, a still worse marksman, and worse armed; or against tribes armed with the spear or assegai. Of course one reason of the African's dulness is that until he enlists, that is until he is from twenty-four to thirty years of age, he has never exercised his mind in any way; and the long years of mental idleness have produced a sluggishness which makes it extremely difficult for him to acquire anything new that requires thought. After enlisting, he picks up a species of unintelligible English, but that is the most that he can do. It is pitiful to see these men, some of them now old, struggling day after day, according to regulation, in the regimental school, to learn their letters. It is to them the greatest punishment that could be inflicted, and though they attend school for years, they rarely succeed in doing more than master the alphabet. In former days, whenever the cargo of a captured slaver was landed at Sierra Leone, a party from the garrison used to be admitted to the Liberated African Yard for the purpose of seeking recruits amongst the slaves. Many of the latter, pleased with the brilliant uniform, and talked over by the recruiting party, who were men specially selected for this duty on account of their knowledge of African languages, offered themselves as recruits. If medically fit, they were invariably accepted, though it must have been well known that they could not possibly have had any idea of the nature of the engagement into which they were entering. Some fifteen or twenty recruits being thus obtained, they were given high-sounding names, such as Mark Antony, Scipio Africanus, etc., their own barbaric appellations being too unpronounceable, and then marched down in a body to the cathedral to be baptised. Some might be Mohammedans, and the majority certainly believers in fetish, but the form of requiring their assent to a change in their religion was never gone through; and the following Sunday they were marched into church as a matter of course, along with their Christian comrades. Although thus nominally christianised, they still remained at heart believers in fetish, for it is a remarkable fact that no adult West African has ever become a bonâ-fide convert, and the missionaries have long since given up attempting to proselytise grown persons, reserving all their efforts for children. Holding, as they did, in great dread all fetish, or obeah, practices; usually someone amongst them, more cunning than the rest, professed an acquaintance with the supposed diabolical ritual; and gained influence with, and extorted money from, his more timid comrades. Officers now in the 1st West India Regiment can remember the time when, there being many Africans in the regiment, the feathers of parrots or scraps of rags might be found in the neighbourhood of the orderly room. Whenever this was the case, it was known that an African was about to be brought before his commanding officer for some neglect of duty or breach of discipline; and these fetishes had been placed there to induce the colonel to deal leniently with the offender. Ridiculous as this practice must seem to every educated person, it sometimes produced the most serious effects upon the credulous Africans; and I have heard old officers speak of instances, which came within their own knowledge, of soldiers who, having found old bones, broken pieces of calabashes, or glass, placed on their beds, immediately resigned themselves to death, saying that "fetish was thrown upon them," and in nine cases out of twelve, so certain were they that it was impossible to escape the coming doom, they positively frightened or worried themselves to death. The professors of fetishism likewise drove a good trade in amulets which rendered the wearer invulnerable. On one occasion at Sierra Leone, a young African who had been recently enlisted displayed with much pride a gri-gri or amulet which he wore on his wrist, and which, he asserted, rendered him invulnerable. His West India comrades laughed at him; and the African, indignant at the doubt thrown upon the efficacy of his charm, drew his knife, and, before he could be stopped, plunged it into his thigh to prove that he spoke the truth. His eyes were opened, unfortunately, too late; for though he was at once removed to the hospital, he died from the effects of this self-inflicted wound. In West India regiments the practice of fetish was made a military crime, and was severely punished. Sufferers or imaginary sufferers from fetishism, however, rarely complained to their officers, for they believed that the occult art practised by the professor was superior to any power held by man, and consequently, culprits were but seldom detected. With the disappearance of Africans from West India regiments, the offence of fetishism has, however, also disappeared. Military crime in West India regiments is of comparatively rare occurrence. Even when the 3rd West India Regiment was in existence, there was less in the three negro regiments than in one of the Line; while drunkenness is confined to the few black sheep who will be found in every body of men. Riots or disturbances between West India soldiers and the inhabitants of the towns in which they are quartered are unheard of, and in every garrison they receive the highest praise for their unvarying good and quiet behaviour. In fact they are merry, good-tempered, and orderly men, who do not wish to interfere with anyone; and, owing to their temperate habits, they are not led into the commission of offences by the influence of drink. Of course, the popular idea in Great Britain of the negro is that he is a person who commonly wears a dilapidated tall hat, cotton garments of brilliant hue, carries a banjo or concertina, and indulges in extraordinary cachinnations at the smallest pretext; but this is as far from the truth as the creature of imagination in the opposite extreme, evoked by the vivid fancy of Mrs. Beecher Stowe. The bravery of the West India soldier in action has often been tested, and as long as an officer remains alive to lead not a man will flinch. His favourite weapon is the bayonet; and the principal difficulty with him in action is to hold him back, so anxious is he to close with his enemy. It is unnecessary here to refer to individual acts of gallantry performed by soldiers of the 1st West India Regiment, they being fully set forth in the following history; but of such performed by soldiers of other West India regiments the two following now occur to me. Private Samuel Hodge, a pioneer of the 3rd West India Regiment, was awarded the Victoria Cross for conspicuous bravery at the storming of the Mohammedan stockade at Tubarcolong (the White Man's Well), on the River Gambia, on the 30th of May, 1866. Under a heavy fire from the concealed enemy, by which one officer was killed and an officer and thirteen men severely wounded, Hodge, and another pioneer named Boswell, chopped and tore away with their hands the logs of wood forming the stockade, Boswell falling nobly just as an opening was effected. Again, in 1873, during the Ashanti War--when it was reported, on the 5th of December, by natives at Yancoomassie Assin that the Ashanti army had retired across the Prah--two soldiers of the 2nd West India Regiment volunteered to go on alone to the river and ascertain if the report were true. On their return they reported all clear to the Prah; and said they had written their names on a piece of paper and posted it up. Six days later, when the advanced party of the expeditionary force marched into Prahsu, this paper was found fastened to a tree on the banks of the river. At the time that this voluntary act was performed it must be remembered that, on the 27th of November, the British and their allies had met with a serious repulse at Faisowah, through pressing too closely upon the retiring Ashantis; that this repulse was considered both by the Ashantis and by our native allies as a set-off against the failure of the attack on Abracampa; that the Houssa levy was in a state of panic, and no reliable information as to the position of the enemy was obtainable. It was under such circumstances that these two men advanced nearly sixteen miles into an (to them) unknown tract of solitary forest, to follow up an enemy that never spared life, and whose whereabouts was doubtful. Other qualifications apart, however, West India troops have proved themselves of the very greatest value on active service in tropical climates from the very fact that, being natives of the tropics, they can undergo fatigue and exposure that would be fatal to European soldiers. In campaigns in which both the West India and the European soldier are employed, all the hard and unpleasant work is thrown upon the former, and the publication in general orders of the thanks of the officer in command of the force is the only acknowledgment he receives; for newspaper correspondents, naturally anxious to swell the circulation of the journals they represent, while giving the most minute details of the doings of the white soldier, leave out in the cold his black comrade, who has few friends among the reading public of Great Britain. Occasionally, facts are even misrepresented. For instance, the defence of Fommanah, on the 2nd of February, 1874, which was really effected by a detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, was, in an account telegraphed to one London daily paper, attributed to the 23rd Regiment, of which corps there were only six or seven men in the place, and those in hospital. On the last occasion on which West India troops served with Line battalions, namely in the Ashanti War of 1873-74, West India soldiers daily marched twice and even three times the distance traversed by the white troops; and, south of the Prah, searched the country for miles on both sides of the line of advance, in search of carriers. It is not too much to say, that if the two West India regiments had not been on the Gold Coast, no advance on Coomassie would, that year, have been possible. In December, 1873, the transport broke down; there was a deadlock along the road; each half-battalion of the European troops was detained in the camp it occupied, and the 23rd Regiment had to be re-embarked for want of carriers. The fate of the expedition was trembling in the balance, and the control officers were unanimous in declaring that a further advance was impossible, and that the troops in front would have to return by forced marches. Prior to this, the want of transport had been felt to such an extent that the West India soldiers had been placed on half rations; a step, however, which was not followed by any diminution of work, which remained as hard as ever. In this emergency the two West India regiments, with the 42nd--to whom all honour be due--volunteered to carry supplies, in addition to their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition. They acted as carriers for several days, and moved such quantities of provisions to the front that the pressure was removed and a further advance made possible. Even if more carriers had been obtained from the already ransacked native villages, they could not have arrived in time, for the rainy season was fast approaching and the delay of a fortnight would have been fatal. There was a peculiar irony of fate in the expedition being thus relieved of its most pressing difficulties through the exertions of the West India regiments. It had been Sir Garnet Wolseley's original intention to take into Ashanti territory only the Rifle Brigade, the 23rd, and the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments; and, on the arrival of the hired transport, _Sarmatian_, he wrote, on the 15th of December, that he did not propose landing the 42nd. In the course of the next three days, however, he changed his views, and, in his letter of the 18th December, gave as his reason: "I find that the one great obstacle to the employment of a third battalion of English troops, viz., the difficulty of transport, is as great in the case of a West India regiment. The West India soldier has the same rations as the European soldier, and a West India regiment requires, man for man, exactly the same amount of transport as a European regiment." The 42nd, therefore, was to be landed and taken to the front, while the 1st West India Regiment was to remain at Cape Coast Castle and Elmina as a reserve. Afterwards, when the transport failed, it was found that the West India soldier could do the work of the European on half rations, and carry his own supplies as well. West India regiments at the present day labour under many disadvantages. Owing to the two battalions having to furnish garrisons for colonies which really require three, they are alternately for one period of three years divided into three detachments, and for the next period of three years into six. No lieutenant-colonel of a West India regiment can ever see the whole of his regiment together. The largest number that, under present circumstances, he can ever have under him at any one station is four companies; and the most he can have under his actual command at any one time is six companies on board a troopship. Thus in a regiment there are sometimes three, and sometimes six, officers vested with the power of an officer commanding a detachment; and however conscientiously they may endeavour to follow out a regimental system, every individual has naturally a different manner of dealing with men, and a certain amount of homogeneousness is lost to the regiment as a whole. Endless correspondence is entailed, and sometimes questions have to remain open for months, until answers can be received from distant detachments. In small garrisons, also, drill becomes a mere farce; for, after the clerks, employed men, and men on guard and in hospital are deducted, there are perhaps only a dozen men or so left for parade. In spite of all these drawbacks the regiments still maintain a wonderful efficiency, and afford another proof of the soldierlike qualities of the West India negro. Another disadvantage is that a West India regiment is never seen in England, the British public knows nothing of such regiments, has no friends, relatives, or acquaintances in their ranks, and consequently takes no interest in them. Yet they are a remarkably fine body of men, and a picked battalion of the Guards would look small beside them if brigaded with them in Hyde Park. So little is known, that I have sometimes been asked if the officers of West India regiments are also black, and it is with a view to making the regiment to which I have the honour to belong better known to the public at large, that the following history has been written. There has been no attempt at descriptive writing, facts being merely collected from official documents, so that the authenticity of the narrative may be unquestionable. In order that the earlier chapters may be the more readily understood, it may be as well to state that, with the 1st West India Regiment, which was called into existence in the _London Gazette_ of the 2nd of May, 1795, were incorporated two other corps; of which one, the Carolina Corps, had been in existence since 1779, while the other--Malcolm's, or the Royal Rangers--had been raised in January or February, 1795. It is from the Carolina Corps that the 1st West India Regiment derives the Carolina laurel, borne on the crest of the regiment. CHAPTER I. THE ACTION AT BRIAR CREEK, 1779--THE ACTION AT STONO FERRY, 1779. In the autumn of 1778, during the War of the American Independence, the British commanders in North America determined to make another attempt for the royal cause in the Southern States of Georgia and South Carolina, which, since the failure of Lord Cornwallis at the siege of Charlestown in July, 1776, had been allowed to remain unmolested. With this view they despatched Colonel Campbell, in November, from New York, with the 71st Regiment, two battalions of Hessians, three of Loyal Provincials,[1] and a detachment of Artillery, the whole amounting to about 3500, to make an attempt upon the town of Savannah, the capital of Georgia. Arriving off the mouth of the Savannah River on the 23rd of December, Colonel Campbell was so rapidly successful, that, by the middle of January, not only was Savannah in his hands, but Georgia itself was entirely cleared of American troops. It was about this time that the South Carolina Regiment, the oldest branch of the 1st West India Regiment, was raised. Numerous royalists joined the British camp and were formed into various corps;[2] and the South Carolina Regiment is first mentioned as taking part in the action at Briar Creek on the 3rd of March, 1779,[3] the corps then being, according to Major-General Prevost's despatch, about 100 strong. The action at Briar Creek occurred as follows: In the early part of 1779, General Prevost's[4] force was distributed in posts along the frontier of Georgia; Hudson's Ferry, twenty-four miles above Savannah, being the upper extremity of the chain. Watching these posts was the American general, Lincoln, with the main body of the American Army of the South, at Purrysburgh, about twenty miles above Savannah, and General Ashe, who was posted with about 2000 of the Militia of North and South Carolina and Georgia, at Briar Creek, near the point where it falls into the Savannah River. General Ashe's position appeared most secure, his left being covered by the Savannah with its marshes, and his front by Briar Creek, which was about twenty feet broad, and unfordable at that point and for several miles above it; nevertheless, General Prevost determined to surprise him. For the purpose of amusing General Lincoln, he made a show of an intention to pass the river; and, in order to occupy the attention of Ashe, he ordered a party to appear in his front, on the opposite side of Briar Creek. Meanwhile General Prevost, with 900 chosen men, made an extensive circuit, passed Briar Creek fifteen miles above the American position, gained their rear unperceived, and was almost in their camp before they discovered his approach. The surprise was as complete as could be wished. Whole regiments fled without firing a shot, and numbers without even attempting to seize their arms; they ran in their confusion into the marsh, and swam across the river, in which numbers of them were drowned. The Continental troops, under General Elbert, and a regiment of North Carolina Militia, alone offered resistance; but they were not long able to maintain the unequal conflict, and, being overpowered, were compelled to surrender. The Americans lost from 300 to 400 men, and seven pieces of cannon. The British lost five men killed, and one officer and ten men wounded. After this success, the British and American forces remained on opposite sides of the River Savannah, until the end of April, when General Lincoln, thinking the swollen state of the river and the inundation of the marshes was sufficient protection for the lower districts, withdrew his forces further inland, leaving General Moultrie with 1000 men at Black Swamp. By this movement Lincoln left Charlestown exposed to the British. General Prevost at once took advantage of this, and, on the 29th of April, suddenly crossed the river, near Purrysburgh, with 2500 men, among whom was the South Carolina Regiment, which had been considerably increased by accessions of loyalists and freed negroes. General Prevost advanced rapidly into the country, the militia under Moultrie, who had considered the swamps impassable, offering but a feeble resistance, and retiring hastily, destroying the bridges in their rear. On the 11th of May, the British force crossed the Ashley River a few miles above Charlestown, and, advancing along the neck formed by the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, established itself at a little more than cannon-shot from the city. A continued succession of skirmishes took place on that day and the ensuing night, and on the following morning Charlestown was summoned to surrender. Negotiations were broken off in the evening, much to the disappointment of the British general, who had been led to suppose that a large proportion of the inhabitants were favourable to the royal cause, and that the city would fall easily into his hands. He now found himself in a dangerous predicament. He was without siege guns, before lines defended by a considerable force of artillery, and flanked by shipping; he was involved in a labyrinth of creeks and rivers, where a defeat would have been fatal, and General Lincoln with a force equal, if not superior to his own, was fast approaching for the relief of the city. Taking all this into consideration, General Prevost prudently struck camp that night, and, under cover of the darkness, the direct line of retreat on Savannah being closed, returned to the south side of the Ashley River. From thence the army passed to the islands of St. James and St. John, lying to the southward of Charlestown harbour, and commencing that succession of islands and creeks which extends along the coast from Charlestown to Savannah. In these islands the army awaited supplies from New York, of which it was much in need; and, on the arrival of two frigates, it commenced to move to the island of Port Royal, which at the same time would afford good quarters for the troops during the intense heats, and, from its vicinity to Savannah, and its excellent harbour, was the best position that could be chosen for covering Georgia. Directly General Lincoln discovered what was taking place, he advanced to attack. St. John's Island is separated from the mainland by a narrow inlet, called Stono River, and communication between the mainland and the island was kept up by a ferry. On the mainland, at this ferry, General Prevost had established a post, consisting of three redoubts, joined by lines of communication; and, to cover the movement of the army to Port Royal Island, he here posted Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland with the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment, a weak battalion of Hessians, the North Carolina Regiment, and the South Carolina Regiment, amounting in the whole to about 800 men. On the 20th of June, General Lincoln made a determined attempt to force the passage, attacking with a force variously estimated at from 1200 to 5000 men and eight guns. Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland's advanced posts, consisting of the South Carolina Regiment, were some distance in front of his works; and a smart firing between them and the Americans gave him the first warning of the approach of the enemy. He instantly sent out two companies of the 71st from his right to ascertain the force of the assailants. The Highlanders had proceeded only a quarter of a mile when they met the outposts retiring before the enemy. A fierce conflict ensued. Instead of retreating before superior numbers, the Highlanders persisted in the unequal combat till all their officers were either killed or wounded, of the two companies eleven men only returned to the garrison; and the British force was sadly diminished, and its safety consequently imperilled by this mistaken valour. The whole American line now advanced to within three hundred yards of the works, and a general engagement began, which was maintained with much courage and steadiness on both sides. At length the regiment of Hessians on the British left gave way, and the Americans, in spite of the obstinate resistance of the two Carolina regiments, were on the point of entering the works, when a judicious flank movement of the remainder of the 71st checked the advance; and General Lincoln, apprehensive of the arrival of British reinforcements from the island, drew off his men, and retired in good order, taking his wounded with him. The battle lasted upwards of an hour. The British had 3 officers and 19 rank and file killed, and 4 officers and 85 rank and file wounded. The South Carolina Regiment had Major William Campbell and 1 sergeant killed, 1 captain, 1 sergeant, and 3 rank and file wounded.[5] The Americans lost 5 officers and 35 men killed, 19 officers and 120 men wounded. Three days after the battle, the British troops evacuated the post at Stono Ferry, and also the island of St. John, passing along the coast from island to island till they reached Beaufort in the island of Port Royal. Here General Prevost left a garrison under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, and proceeded with the remainder of his force, with which was the South Carolina Regiment, to the town of Savannah. The heat had now become too intense for active service; and the care of the officers was employed in preserving their men from the fevers of the season, and keeping them in a condition for service next campaign, which was expected to open in October. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 1: De Lancey's Corps, the New York Volunteers, and Skinner's Corps.] [Footnote 2: "Annual Register," 1779, Beatson's "Memoirs," Gordon's "History of the American War," etc. etc.] [Footnote 3: Beatson's "Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. iv. p. 492.] [Footnote 4: Major-General Prevost had come from Florida and assumed command in January.] [Footnote 5: "Return of the killed, wounded, and missing at the repulse of the Rebels at Stono Ferry, South Carolina, June 20th, 1779."] CHAPTER II. THE SIEGE OF SAVANNAH, 1779--THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTOWN, 1780--THE BATTLE OF HOBKERK'S HILL, 1781. At the opening of the next campaign, although General Prevost had been obliged to retire from Charlestown and to abandon the upper parts of Georgia, yet, so long as he kept possession of the town of Savannah and maintained a post at Port Royal Island, South Carolina was exposed to incursions. The Americans, therefore, pressed the French admiral, Count D'Estaing, to repair to the Savannah River, hoping, by his aid, to drive the British from Georgia. D'Estaing, in compliance, sailed from Cape François, in St. Domingo; and with twenty-two sail of the line and a number of smaller vessels, having 4800 French regular troops on board and several hundred black troops from the West Indies, appeared off the Savannah so unexpectedly that the _Experiment_, a British fifty-gun ship, fell into his hands. On the appearance of the French fleet, on September 9th, General Prevost immediately called in all his outposts in Georgia, sent orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, at Port Royal, to rejoin him at once, and exerted himself to strengthen the defences of the town of Savannah. For the first three or four days after the arrival of the fleet, the French were employed in moving their troops through the Ossabaw Inlet to Beaulieu, about thirteen miles above the town of Savannah. On the 15th of September, the French, with a party of American light horse, attacked the British outposts, and General Prevost withdrew all his force into his works. On the 16th, D'Estaing summoned the place to surrender. Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland's force had not yet arrived, the works were still incomplete, and General Prevost was desirous of gaining time; he consequently requested a suspension of hostilities for twenty-four hours. This was granted, and in that critical interval Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, by the most extraordinary efforts--for one of General Prevost's messengers had fallen into the hands of the enemy, who had at once seized all the principal lines of communication--arrived with the garrison of Port Royal, and entered the town. Encouraged by this accession of strength, General Prevost now informed Count D'Estaing that he was resolved to defend the place to the last extremity. On the 17th, D'Estaing had been joined by General Lincoln with some 3000 men, which, with the French troops, raised the total besieging force to something over 8000. The besieged did not exceed 3000. The enemy spent several days in bringing up guns and stores from the fleet, and on the 23rd the besieging army broke ground before the town. On the 1st of October, they had advanced to within 300 yards of the British works. On the morning of the 4th of October, several batteries, mounting thirty-three pieces of heavy cannon and nine mortars, with a floating battery of sixteen guns on the river, opened fire on the town. For several days they played incessantly on the garrison, and there was continued skirmishing between the negroes of the Carolina regiments and the enemy.[6] On the morning of the 9th of October, the enemy, under a furious cannonade, advanced to storm in three columns, with a force of 3000 French under D'Estaing in person, and 1500 Americans under Lincoln. General Prevost, in his despatch to Lord George Germain, dated Savannah, November 1st, 1779, says: "However, the principal attack, composed of the flower of the French and rebel armies, and led by D'Estaing in person, with all the principal officers of either, was made upon our right. Under cover of the hollow, they advanced in three columns; but having taken a wider circuit than they needed, and gone deeper in the bog, they neither came so early as they intended nor, I believe, in the same order. The attack, however, was very spirited, and for some time obstinately persevered in, particularly on the Ebenezer Road Redoubt. Two stand of colours were actually planted, and several of the assailants killed upon the parapet; but they met with so determined a resistance, and the fire of three seamen batteries, taking them in almost every direction, was so severe, that they were thrown into some disorder, at least at a stand; and at this most critical moment, Major Glasier, of the 60th, with the 60th Grenadiers and the Marines, advancing rapidly from the lines, charged (it may be said) with a degree of fury; in an instant the ditches of the redoubt and a battery to its right in rear were cleared.... Lieutenant-Colonel de Porbeck, of Weissenbach's, being field officer of the day of the right wing, and, being in the redoubt when the attack began, had an opportunity, which he well improved, to signalise himself in a most gallant manner; and it is but justice to mention to your lordships the troops who defended it. They were part of the South Carolina Royalists, the Light Dragoons (dismounted), and the battalion men of the 4th 60th, in all about 100 men, commanded (by a special order) by Captain James, of the Dragoons (Lieutenant 71st), a good and gallant officer, and who nobly fell with his sword in the body of the third he had killed with his own hand." After their repulse from the Ebenezer Redoubt, the enemy retired, and, a few days afterwards, the siege was raised, the Americans crossing the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry and taking up a position in South Carolina, while the French embarked in their fleet and sailed away. During the assault the French lost 700 and the Americans 240 killed. The British loss was 55, four of whom belonged to the South Carolina Regiment, who were killed in the redoubt, where also Captain Henry, of that corps, was wounded. According to the "Journal of the Siege of Savannah," p. 39, the garrison of the redoubt in the Ebenezer Road was as follows: 28 Dismounted Dragoons. 28 Battalion men of the 60th Regiment. 54 South Carolina Regiment. --- 110 In the same work is the following: "Two rebel standards were once fixed on the redoubt in the Ebenezer Road; one of them was carried off again, and the other, which belonged to the 2nd Carolina Regiment, was taken. After the retreat of the enemy from our right, 270 men, chiefly French, were found dead; upwards of 80 of whom lay in the ditch and on the parapet of the redoubt, and 93 were within our abattis." The strength of the South Carolina Regiment at the termination of the siege was: 1 colonel (Colonel Innes), 1 major, 4 captains, 7 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 15 sergeants, 7 drummers, and 216 rank and file. Nothing of note took place in Georgia and South Carolina till January, 1780, when Sir Henry Clinton arrived in the Savannah River with a force destined for the reduction of Charlestown. He had sailed from New York on the 26th of December, 1779, and, having experienced bad weather, put into the Savannah to repair damages. Sir H. Clinton selected a portion of General Prevost's force at Savannah to take part in the coming operations, and among the corps so selected was the South Carolina Regiment, which is shown in the return of troops at the capture of Charlestown as "joined from Savannah." On the 10th of February, the armament sailed to North Edisto, where the troops disembarked, taking possession of the island of St. John next day without opposition. On the 29th of March, the army reached Ashley River and crossed it ten miles above Charlestown; then, the artillery and stores having been brought over, Sir H. Clinton marched down Charlestown Neck, and, on the night of the 1st of April, broke ground at 800 yards from the American works. The garrison of the city consisted of 2000 regular troops, 1000 North Carolina Militia, and the male inhabitants of the place. On the 9th of April, the first parallel was finished, and the batteries opened fire; and Charlestown finally capitulated, after an uneventful siege, on the 12th of May. In the "Return of the killed and wounded" during the siege, the South Carolina Regiment is shown as having had three rank and file wounded. Sir H. Clinton sailed from Charlestown on the 5th of June, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command. The latter meditated an expedition into North Carolina, and, for the preservation of South Carolina during his absence with the main body of the troops, he established a chain of posts along the frontier. One of these posts was at Ninety-six, and for its defence was detailed the South Carolina Regiment, under Colonel Innes, with Allen's corps, "the 16th and three other companies of Light Infantry."[7] Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour was then in command of the post, but was soon after relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger. The garrison of Ninety-six remained undisturbed till September, 1780, when, Lord Cornwallis having moved into North Carolina and occupied Charlotte, Georgia was almost denuded of troops; and an American leader, Colonel Clarke, took advantage of this to attack the British post at Augusta. Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, who commanded there with 150 men, finding the town untenable, retired towards an eminence on the banks of the Savannah, named Garden Hill, and sent intelligence of his situation to Ninety-six. Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, with the 16th and the South Carolina Regiment, at once marched to his relief. Colonel Clarke, who had captured the British guns and was besieging the garrison of Garden Hill, upon being informed of Cruger's approach raised the siege, and, abandoning the guns which he had taken, retreated so hurriedly that, though pursued for some distance, he effected his escape. In the spring of 1781, Lord Cornwallis had again invaded North Carolina, and, having defeated the American general, Greene, at Guildford Court House, had continued his march towards Virginia, expecting the enemy to make every effort to prevent the army entering that state. General Greene, however, allowed Lord Cornwallis to pass on, and then, having assembled a considerable body of troops, made a sudden descent upon the British posts in South Carolina, where Lord Rawdon had been left in command. These posts were in a line from Charlestown by the way of Camden and Ninety-six, to Augusta in Georgia. Camden was the most important, and there Lord Rawdon had taken post with 900 men. On the 20th of April, 1781, General Greene appeared before Camden, which was a village situated on a plain, covered on the south by the Wateree, a river which higher up is called the Catawba; and below, after its confluence with the Congaree from the south, assumes the name of the Santee. On the east of it flowed Pinetree Creek; on the northern and western sides it was defended by a strong chain of redoubts, six in number, extending from the river to the creek. Lord Rawdon's force was so small that the approach of Greene to Camden necessitated the abandonment of the ferry on the Wateree, "although the South Carolina Regiment was on its way to join him from Ninety-six, and that was its direct course; he had, however, taken his measures so well as to secure the passage of that regiment upon its arrival three days after."[8] General Greene, whose force amounted to 1200 men, determined to await reinforcements before attacking, and on the 24th of April he retired to Hobkerk's Hill, an eminence about a mile north of Camden, on the road to the Waxhaws. Here Lord Rawdon resolved to attack him, and on the morning of the 25th, with 900 men, he marched from Camden, and, by making a circuit, and keeping close to the edge of the swamp, under cover of the woods, he gained the left flank of the Americans, where the hill was most accessible, undiscovered. The alarm was given, while the Americans were at breakfast, by the firing of the outposts, and at this critical moment a reinforcement of American militia arrived. So confident was General Greene of success that he ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, with his cavalry, to turn the right flank of the British and to charge them in the rear, while bodies of infantry were to assail them in front and on both flanks. The American advanced parties were driven in by the British after a sharp skirmish, and Lord Rawdon advanced steadily to attack the main body of the enemy. The 63rd Regiment, with the volunteers of Ireland, formed his right; the King's American Regiment, with Robertson's corps, composed his left; the New York volunteers were in the centre. The South Carolina Regiment and the cavalry were in the rear and formed a reserve.[9] Such was the impetuosity of the British that, in the face of a destructive discharge of grape, they gained the summit of the hill and pierced the American centre. The militia fell into confusion, their officers were unable to rally them, and General Greene ordered a retreat. The pursuit was continued for nearly three miles. The Americans halted for the night at Saunders' Creek, about four miles from Hobkerk's Hill, and next day proceeded to Rugeley Mills, about twelve miles from Camden. After the engagement the British returned to Camden. The American loss was 300; the British lost 258 out of about 900 who were on the field. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 6: "The True History of the Siege of Savannah," published 1780.] [Footnote 7: "The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America," by Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton, London, 1787.] [Footnote 8: Tarleton, p. 461.] [Footnote 9: "Martial Register," vol. iii. p. 110.] CHAPTER III. THE RELIEF OF NINETY-SIX, 1781--THE BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS, 1781--REMOVAL TO THE WEST INDIES. Lord Rawdon was not in a position to follow up his success at Hobkerk's Hill, and on the 3rd of May, 1781, Greene passed the Wateree, and occupied such positions as to prevent the garrison at Camden obtaining supplies. Generals Marion and Lee were also posted at Nelson's Ferry, to prevent Colonel Watson, who was advancing with 400 men, from joining Lord Rawdon, and Watson was obliged to alter his route. He marched down the north side of the Santee, crossed it near its mouth, with incredible labour advanced up its southern bank, recrossed it above the encampment of Marion and Lee, and arrived safely with his detachment at Camden on the 7th of May. Thus reinforced, Lord Rawdon determined to attack Greene, and, on the night of the 8th, marched from Camden with his whole force. Greene, who had been informed of this movement, passed the Wateree and took up a strong position behind Saunders' Creek. Lord Rawdon followed him and drove in his outposts, but, finding the position was too strong for his small force, he returned to Camden. Camden being too far advanced a post for Lord Rawdon to hold with the few troops at his disposal, he evacuated it on the 10th of May, and retired by Nelson's Ferry to the south of the Santee, and afterwards to Monk's Corner. In the meantime, attacks were made on the British posts in Georgia, Augusta itself being taken on the 5th of June, while the post of Ninety-six in South Carolina was closely invested by General Greene with the main American army in the Southern States. About this time, a change took place in the South Carolina Regiment. Lord Rawdon, in a letter to Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis, dated Charlestown, June 5th, 1781, speaks of the difficulty which he has experienced in the formation of cavalry, and goes on to say that the inhabitants of Charlestown having subscribed 3000 guineas for a corps of dragoons, out of compliment to those gentlemen "I have ordered the South Carolina Regiment to be converted into cavalry, and I have the prospect of their being mounted and completely appointed in a few days." On the 3rd of June, Lord Rawdon had received considerable reinforcements from England, and on the 9th he left Charlestown with about 2000 men, including the South Carolina Regiment in its new capacity, for the relief of Ninety-six. In their rapid progress over the whole extent of South Carolina, through a wild country and under a burning sun, the sufferings of the troops were severe, but they advanced with celerity to the assistance of their comrades. On the 11th of June, General Greene received notice of Lord Rawdon's march, and immediately sent Sumpter with the whole of the cavalry to keep in front of the British army and retard its progress. Lord Rawdon, however, passed Sumpter a little below the junction of the Saluda and Broad Rivers, and that officer was never able to regain his front. In the meantime, the Americans were pushing hard the garrison of Ninety-six; they were nearly reduced to extremities, and in a few days must have surrendered; but the rapid advance of Lord Rawdon left Greene no alternative but to storm or raise the siege. On the 18th of June, he made a furious assault upon the place; but, after a desperate conflict of nearly an hour, was compelled to retire. Next day he retreated, crossing the Saluda on the 20th, and encamping at Little River. On the morning of the 21st, Lord Rawdon arrived at Ninety-six, and the same evening set out in pursuit of Greene, who, however, retreated; and Rawdon, despairing of overtaking him, returned to Ninety-six. He now found it necessary to evacuate that position and contract his posts; and, having destroyed the works, he marched towards the Congaree. There, on the 1st of July, while out foraging, two officers and forty dragoons of the South Carolina Regiment were surrounded and taken prisoners by Lee's Legion. This blow sadly crippled Lord Rawdon, who was much in need of cavalry, and two days later he retreated to Orangeburgh. The summer heats now coming on, Lord Rawdon proceeded to England on sick leave, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart in command of the troops in South Carolina and Georgia. The new commander at once proceeded with the army to the Congaree, and formed an encampment near its junction with the Wateree. Towards the end of August, while Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart was expecting a convoy of provisions from Charlestown, he received information that General Greene, who had been reinforced and was now at the head of 2500 men, was moving towards Friday's Ferry on the Congaree. The American cavalry was so numerous and enterprising that the expected convoy, then at Martin's, fifty-six miles from the British camp, would inevitably fall into their hands unless protected by an escort of at least 400 men; and Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart's force being too small to admit of so considerable a body being detached without risk, he determined to retreat by slow marches to Eutaw Springs, about sixty miles north of Charlestown, and meet the convoy on the way. General Greene followed the retiring British, and, on the 7th of September, arrived within seven miles of Eutaw Springs. Being there reinforced by General Marion and his corps, he resolved to attack next day. At six in the morning, two deserters from the American army entered the British camp, and informed Stuart of the approach of the enemy; but little credit was given to their report. At that time Major Coffin, with 140 infantry and 50 of the South Carolina Regiment, was out foraging for roots and vegetables--the army having neither corn nor bread--in the direction in which the Americans were advancing. About four miles from the camp at Eutaw, that party was attacked by the American advanced guard and driven in with loss. Their return convinced Colonel Stuart of the approach of the enemy, and the British army was soon drawn up obliquely across the road on the height near Eutaw Springs. The firing began between two and three miles from the British camp. The British light parties were driven in on their main body, and the first line of the Americans attacked with great impetuosity. For a short time the conflicting ranks were intermingled, and the officers fought hand to hand. At that critical moment, General Lee, who had turned the left flank of the British, charged them in the rear. They were broken and driven off the field, their guns falling into the hands of the Americans, who eagerly pressed on their retreating adversaries. At this crisis, Colonel Stuart ordered a strong detachment to take post in a large three-storey brick house, which was in rear of the army on the right, while another occupied an adjoining palisaded garden, and some close underwood. The Americans made the most desperate efforts to dislodge them from their posts; but every attack was met with determined courage. Four pieces of artillery were brought to bear on the house, but made no impression on its solid walls, from which a close and destructive fire was kept up, as well as from the adjoining enclosure. Almost all the gunners were killed and wounded; and the guns had been pushed so near the house that they could not be brought off. Colonel Washington attempted to turn the British right, and charge them in rear; but his horse was shot under him, and he was wounded and made prisoner. After every attempt to dislodge the British from their position had failed, General Greene drew off his men, and retired to the ground which he had left in the morning. This conflict had lasted nearly four hours. The Americans lost 555, the British 693. The British kept their ground during the night, and next day began to retreat. About fourteen miles from the field of battle, Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart was met by a reinforcement, under Major McArthur, marching from Charlestown to his assistance. Thus strengthened, he proceeded to Monk's Corner. Eutaw Springs was the last engagement of importance in the southern provinces. The British soon retreated to a position on Charlestown Neck, and confined their operations to the defence of the posts in that vicinity; while in Georgia, the British force was concentrated at Savannah. The surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, in October, 1781, and the subsequent peace negotiations, put an end to the hostilities in America. Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton says: "It is impossible to do justice to the spirit, patience, and invincible fortitude displayed by the commanders, officers, and soldiers during these dreadful campaigns in the Carolinas. They had not only to contend with men, and these by no means deficient in bravery and enterprise, but they encountered and surmounted difficulties and fatigues from the climate and the country, which would appear insuperable in theory and almost incredible in the relation. They displayed military and, we may add, moral virtues far above all praise. During renewed successions of forced marches, under the rage of a burning sun and in a climate at that season peculiarly inimical to man, they were frequently, when sinking under the most excessive fatigue, not only destitute of every comfort but almost of every necessary which seems essential to existence. During the greater part of the time they were totally destitute of bread, and the country afforded no vegetables for a substitute. Salt at length failed, and their only resources were water and the wild cattle which they found in the woods. About fifty men, in this last expedition, sunk under the vigour of their exertions and perished through mere fatigue." At the cessation of hostilities, the South Carolina Regiment and the Loyal American Rangers were removed to Jamaica, and as they are shown in the Jamaica Almanack for 1782 as being then in the island, they presumably arrived there about December, 1781. The South Carolina Regiment was probably dismounted, as it is shown as being stationed at Fort Augusta in Kingston harbour. At this time, the reinforcing of the West India Islands by provincial corps was considered most important, and in a letter to Sir Guy Carleton we find the following: "The object of reinforcing those islands is so important, that His Majesty wishes to have it understood that every provincial corps embarking for the West Indies shall immediately be put upon the British Establishment." It was, probably, on some such understanding that the two corps above mentioned proceeded from South Carolina; but the promise, if made, was never fulfilled, and neither of the two ever appeared in any Army List. The following is the list of officers of the South Carolina Regiment given in the Jamaica Almanack: Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant--CAPTAIN LORD CHARLES MONTAGU, 88th Regiment. Major--JAMES BALMER. Captains--G.C. MONTAGU, ROBERT PALMER, W. OLIPHANT, W. LOWE. Lieutenants. R. MARSHALL. J. CARDEN. H. RUDGLEY. M. RAINFORD. H. CRADDOCK. D. M'CONNELL. P. SERGEANT. J.P. COLLINS. -- ODONNELL. A. CLERK. J. PETRIE. -- SMITH. Ensigns. W. SPLAIN. -- BELL. -- SMITH. J. KENT. -- FARQUHAR. B. MEIGHAN. -- THOMAS. The South Carolina Regiment remained in Jamaica until the general disbandment of the provincial corps in 1783. The lieutenant-colonel commandant was given an independent company, and the whites, both officers and men, were pacified with grants of land. The black troopers, however, were a source of difficulty. These troopers, some of whom were originally free, while some had been purchased by the British Government, were in those days of slavery something of a "white elephant" in a large slave-holding colony like Jamaica. The planters, fearful of the consequences of the example to their slaves of a free body of negroes who had served as soldiers, agitated for their removal from the island, but, on the other hand, no other island was willing to receive them. There is no trace of how the difficulty was finally settled, but in a letter, dated War Office, June 15th, 1783, signed R. Fitzpatrick, and addressed to Major-General Campbell, commanding in Jamaica, the receipt of his letter concerning the disbandment of the provincial troops in the island is acknowledged, and the removal of "the blacks of the South Carolina Regiment" to the Leeward command approved of. Some time, then, in September, 1783, the black troopers were removed to the Leeward Islands, and in the "Monthly Return of His Majesty's Forces in the Leeward and Charibee Islands, under the command of Lieutenant-General Edward Mathew," we find them formed into a corps, with a body of black artificers, who had served in South Carolina at the sieges of Charlestown and Ninety-six, and thirty-three black pioneers who had been included in the surrender of Yorktown. The following is the state of this corps: RETURN OF THE BLACK CORPS OF DRAGOONS, PIONEERS, AND ARTIFICERS. A. Captains. B. 1st Lieutenants. C. 2nd Lieutenants. D. Sergeants Present. E. Drummers and Trumpeters Present. F. Present, fit for duty. G. Sick in Quarters. H. Sick in Hospital. I. On Command. J. Total. K. Total of the Whole. +------------+----------------+-----------+---+---+-------------------+---+ | | | Officers | | | Effective Rank | | | | | Present. | | | and File. | | |Where | +---+---+---+ | +-------------------+ | |Stationed. | Companies. | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | +------------+----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ |Grenada | Capt. Mackrill | 1 | - | - | 3| 1 | 25| 7 | 10| 23| 65| 70| |St. Vincent | Capt. Anderson | 1 | - | 1 | 14| 5 | 46| 4 | -|138|188|209| |Grenada | Capt. Millar | 1 | - | - | 3| - | 19| 4 | 4| 19| 46| 50| +------------+----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ | | Total | 3 | - | 1 | 20| 6 | 90| 15| 14|180|299|329| +------------+----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ The officers of this corps were, according to Bryan Edwards, vol. i. p. 386, taken from the regular army, and the companies were commanded by lieutenants of regulars, having captains' rank. Artificers, it may be as well to observe, were sappers and miners. The Royal Engineers at about this date consisted of various companies of Artificers; later on they were called Sappers and Miners; and, finally, Royal Engineers. CHAPTER IV. THE EXPEDITION TO MARTINIQUE, 1793--THE CAPTURE OF MARTINIQUE, ST. LUCIA, AND GUADALOUPE, 1794--THE DEFENCE OF FORT MATILDA, 1794. In February, 1789, all three companies of the "Black Corps of Dragoons, Pioneers, and Artificers" were stationed in Grenada, and from that date until June, 1793, they are shown in every monthly return, with a strength varying from 279 to 268, and an increase of four first lieutenants. In February, 1793, the news of the French declaration of war was received in the West Indies, and orders were soon after transmitted from England to the Commander-in-Chief in the Windward and Leeward Islands to attempt the reduction of the French islands. Tobago was taken on the 17th of April without much trouble, the majority of the planters in that island being English; and an attack on Martinique was next meditated. The whole of the British force in the West Indies was known and acknowledged to be inadequate to the reduction of that island; but such representations had been spread throughout the army, concerning the disaffection of the greater part of the inhabitants of all the French islands towards the Republican Government lately established, as to create a very general belief that the appearance of a British armament before the capital of Martinique would alone produce an immediate surrender. Major-General Bruce, on whom the chief command of the troops had devolved, was assured by a deputation from the principal planters of the island that "a body of 800 regular troops would be more than sufficient to overcome all possible resistance." These representations induced Major-General Bruce, in conjunction with Admiral Gardner, to undertake an expedition; and the troops having been embarked at Grenada in the men-of-war, the armament arrived off Cape Navire, Martinique,[10] on the 11th of June, 1793. There the general met the officer commanding the French Royalists, and, as the latter proposed an attack upon the town of St. Pierre, the 21st Regiment was landed at Cape Navire on the 14th, and there posted, to enable the Royalists to concentrate in the neighbourhood of St. Pierre, where the remainder of the British force joined them on the 16th. "The British troops consisted of the Grenadiers, Light Infantry, and Marines from the fleet, with the Black Carolina Corps, amounting in all to about 1100 men."[11] The Royalists were said to number 800. On the afternoon of the 17th, the enemy made an attack, but were driven back by the pickets, with the loss of one officer and three men killed on the part of the British. An attack on the two batteries which defended St. Pierre was planned for the morning of the 18th, but failed, owing to the want of discipline on the part of the Royalists. Major-General Bruce says: "The morning of the 18th was the time fixed for the attack, and we were to move forward in two columns, the one consisting of the British troops, the other of the French Royalists; and for this purpose the troops were put in motion before daybreak; but, unfortunately, some alarm having taken place amongst the Royalists, they began, in a mistake, firing on one another, and their commander being severely wounded on the occasion, the whole body, refusing to submit to any of the other officers, retired to the post from which they had marched." This conduct showed the general that no reliance could be placed on the Royalists, and that the attack on St. Pierre, if carried out at all, would have to be done by the British troops alone, whose numbers were not equal to the task. He, consequently, ordered the troops to return to their former positions, and on the 19th they re-embarked. As to have left the Royalists in Martinique would only have been to leave them to be massacred by the Republicans, those unfortunate people were embarked on the 19th and 20th, and the 21st Regiment being taken on board at Cape Navire on the 21st, the expedition returned to Grenada. It may be wondered whence came the Black Carolina Corps mentioned by Major-General Bruce, but it is evident that by that designation the Black Corps of Dragoons, Pioneers, and Artificers was locally known; for in the monthly return, dated May 1st, 1794, the "state" of the corps is headed, "Return of the Black Carolina Corps," and the title, "Black Corps of Dragoons, Pioneers, and Artificers" ceases, from that date, to be used in any official document. The strength of the corps in that return is 258 of all ranks. The failure of Major-General Bruce's attempt on Martinique induced the British Ministers to send out an armament under Sir Charles Grey for the reduction of all the French West India Islands; and, until the arrival of this force at Barbados, in January, 1794, the Black Carolina Corps remained quietly in garrison at Grenada. The troops from the various islands--and amongst them all three companies of that corps--were collected at Barbados during the remainder of January, and, on the 4th of February, the expeditionary force, 6085 strong, set sail from Carlisle Bay. The army, in three divisions, landed at three separate points in Martinique; the first at Gallion Bay, on the northern side of the island, on the evening of the 5th of February; the second at Cape Navire, nearly opposite on the south, on the 8th of February; and the third at Trois Rivières, towards the south-east. The British were so rapidly successful that, by the 17th of February, the whole of the island, except the two fortresses of Bourbon and Fort Royal, were in their hands. The services of the Black Carolina Corps up to that date are not known in detail, but the return of killed and wounded shows the Dragoons as having had one rank and file killed. On the 20th of February, Forts Bourbon and Fort Royal were completely invested, and the pioneers and artificers of the Carolina Corps were busily engaged on the siege works. On the north-east side the army broke ground on the 25th of February; and on the western side, towards La Caste, fascine batteries were erected with all possible expedition. By the 16th of March, the advanced batteries were pushed to within 500 yards of Fort Bourbon, and 200 yards of the enemy's nearest redoubt. On the 20th of March, the fortress of Fort Royal was carried by Captain Faulkner, of the _Zebra_; and General Rochambeau at once sent a flag from Fort Bourbon offering to capitulate. The terms were accordingly adjusted on the 23rd, and on the 25th, the garrison, reduced to 900 men, marched out prisoners of war. Martinique being now entirely conquered, Sir Charles Grey left there, as a garrison under General Prescott, five regiments, and one company of the Carolina Corps; and proceeded, on the 31st of March, with the remainder of the force to the attack of St. Lucia. That island had no means of defence against so considerable an invading force; and, on the 4th of April, the British colours were hoisted on the chief fortress of Morne Fortune; the garrison, consisting of 300 men, having surrendered on the same terms of capitulation that had been granted to General Rochambeau. The 6th and 9th Regiments, with a company of the Carolina Corps, being left as a garrison for St. Lucia, Sir Charles Grey returned to Martinique, and commenced his preparations for an expedition to Guadaloupe.[12] Guadaloupe really consists of two islands, separated from each other by a narrow arm of the sea, called La Rivière Salée, which is navigable for vessels of fifty tons. The eastern island, or division, which is flat and low-lying, is called Grandeterre; while the western, which is rugged and mountainous, is named Basseterre. On the 8th of April, the troops, with the remaining company of the Carolina Corps, sailed from Fort Royal, Martinique; and, about one o'clock in the morning of the 11th, a landing was effected at Grosier Bay. Before daybreak on the 12th, the fort of La Fleur d'Épée was carried by assault, and the greater part of the garrison put to the sword. Fort St. Louis, the town of Point à Pitre, and a new battery upon Islet à Cochon being afterwards abandoned, the possession of Grandeterre was complete. The reduction of Basseterre was effected on the 21st of the same month; and the company of the Carolina Corps, with other troops, being left in garrison in Guadaloupe, the general returned to Martinique. The British, however, were not permitted to remain long in peaceable possession of their most recent conquest; for on the 3rd of June, a considerable French armament arrived off Point à Pitre. Fort Fleur d'Épée was taken by storm, and the place not being tenable after this loss, the British crossed over to Basseterre. Several prisoners were taken by the French, and amongst them were some of the Carolina Corps, for in the return of that corps for February, 1795, dated March 1st, there is the following note: "Some of the corps are prisoners at Point à Pitre, but their number cannot be ascertained." In a later return, however, we find that they consisted of one sergeant and eight rank and file. On the 2nd of July, the British made an ineffectual attempt to recover Point à Pitre, and soon after established their head-quarters at Berville, in Basseterre. The camp at Berville was invested in September, and on the 6th of October it was compelled to capitulate. Thus the whole of Guadaloupe, with the exception of Fort Matilda, situated above the town of Basseterre, and which was still held by a British garrison, was recovered by the French. At the surrender of Berville, 300 French Royalists, who were in the British camp, were massacred by the orders of Victor Hugues, the French commander. Fort St. Charles, Basseterre, had been rechristened Fort Matilda by the British on its surrender on the 21st of April, 1794, and against it Victor Hugues now moved all his forces. The fort was commanded by Lieutenant-General Prescott with a garrison of 610 men, including the company of the Carolina Corps which had come to Guadaloupe. General Prescott, in his despatch, dated "On board H.M.S. _Vanguard_, at sea, December 11th, 1794," says: "To enter into a minute detail of the siege, which commenced on the 14th of October, and terminated by evacuating it on the 10th of December, would not only too much occupy your time, but might be deemed equally unnecessary. It may be sufficient to remark that on entering the fort I found it totally out of repair, the materials composing the wall-work thereof being of the worst kind, and having apparently but little lime to cement them properly. By the middle of last month the works were very much injured by the daily and frequent heavy fire of the enemy, and almost all the carriages of our guns rendered useless. These were in general in a very decayed state, but even the new ones for the brass mortars that were made during the siege gave way from the almost incessant fire we kept up; so that upon the whole, what from the nature of our defences and the small number of our garrison, we were in a very unfit state to resist the very vigorous exertions of our enemy, who began to prepare additional forces about the 20th of last month, but who, from a number of causes, and especially from heavy and continued rains, could not open their new batteries till the 6th of this month. On that day they began to fire from twenty-three pieces of cannon, four of which were thirty-six-pounders, and the rest twenty-four-pounders, and from eight mortars, two of thirteen inches and two of ten. The fire was very heavy and continued all day and night, and by it all the guns on the Gallion bastion were dismounted, and the bastion itself a heap of ruins. Every day after this grew worse until the 9th, on the evening of which day I went into the ditch accompanied by the engineer, when we were both but too well convinced of the tottering state of the works from the Gallion along the curtain, and indeed the whole, from the east to the north-east. I could not hesitate a moment about the necessity of evacuating the fort. I therefore sent off immediately to Rear-Admiral Thompson, who commanded the detachment of the squadron left for our protection, to acquaint him with the necessity of evacuating the fort next evening, and to request that he would have the boats ready to take off the garrison at seven o'clock. I kept this my design a profound secret until half-past six o'clock of the evening of the 10th, when I arranged the march of the garrison.... The embarkation continued with little or no interruption, and was happily completed about ten o'clock at night, without its being discovered by the enemy, who continued firing as usual on the fort till two or three o'clock on the morning of the 11th, as we could plainly perceive from the ships. My satisfaction was great at having thus preserved my brave garrison to their king and country." During the siege of Fort Matilda, the Carolina Corps lost 1 killed and 3 wounded, 2 of whom afterwards died of their wounds. In the "State of the Garrison of Fort Matilda, as embarked on the 10th of December, 1794," the strength of the company of the Carolina Corps is shown as 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 4 sergeants, and 30 rank and file. After the evacuation, this company was stationed at Martinique; so that at the close of the year 1794, two companies were in that island, and one in St. Lucia. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 10: See map.] [Footnote 11: Major-General Bruce's despatch.] [Footnote 12: See map.] CHAPTER V. MALCOLM'S ROYAL RANGERS--THE EVACUATION OF ST. LUCIA, 1795. In the commencement of the year 1795, a new corps was raised in the West Indies, which was sometimes called Malcolm's Corps, sometimes Malcolm's Rangers, and at others the Royal Rangers. It first appears in the "Monthly Return of His Majesty's Forces in the Windward, Leeward, and Caribee Islands," dated the 1st of May, 1795, as follows: ROYAL RANGERS, COMMANDED BY CAPTAIN MALCOLM, 41ST REGIMENT. A: Capt. Commandant. B: Captains. C: 1st Lieutenants. D: 2nd Lieutenants. E: Sergeants Present. F: Drummers Present. G: Present fit for Duty. H: In Hospital. I: In Quarters. +-------------+---------------+---+---+------------------------+ | | Commissioned | | |Effective Rank and File.| | | Officers. | | | | | +---+---+---+---+ | +-----+-----+----+-------+ | | | | | | | | | Sick and | | | Stations. | | | | | | | | Wounded. | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----+ | | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | Total.| +-------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----+----+-------+ | Martinico | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 149 | 28 | 27 | 204 | +-------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----+----+-------+ This officer is mentioned by Bryan Edwards, vol. iii. p. 452: "Lieutenant Malcolm, of the 41st Grenadiers, was appointed Town Major" (of St. Pierre, Martinique, in 1794) "in consideration of his distinguished conduct and active services at the head of a body of riflemen, which was composed of two men selected from each company of the 1st Battalion of Grenadiers. We shall have occasion to mention this officer afterwards." This body of riflemen, raised during the operations in Martinique, in March, 1794, must, if the above statement of its formation be correct, have been European, for there were no black troops employed in the reduction of that island, except the Carolina Corps. The corps of riflemen is not shown in any return, and it is probable that at the termination of the active operations the men rejoined their respective battalions. The Royal Rangers, shown in the return of the 1st of May, 1795, were black; for Sir John Vaughan, in a letter dated Martinique, April 25th, 1795, which gives an account of the operations in St. Lucia in that month, says: "The flank companies of the 9th Regiment and the black corps under Captain Malcolm were the troops engaged." These Royal Rangers, then, were almost certainly entirely distinct from the "body of riflemen," and the success which had attended Captain Malcolm's efforts with the first body probably led to his being employed in raising the second, about February or March, 1795. In the month of April, 1795, one company of this corps, numbering 121 of all ranks, was in St. Lucia, and the other company, 112 strong, in Martinique. Victor Hugues, having succeeded in ousting the British from Guadaloupe, commenced, early in 1795, active measures for the recovery of the other islands that had been wrested from France in the previous year, and the plan which was first ripened appears to have been that against St. Lucia.[13] "No official and scarcely any other accounts of the event are to be found, but the invasion of this colony appears to have been effected about the middle of February.... Nor can the strength of the invading force be now ascertained. That force was probably few in number, and stolen into the island in small bodies, and under cover of the night. Aided, however, by an insurrection of the slaves, people of colour, and democratical whites, it was sufficient to wrest from us the whole of the colony, with the exception of the two posts of the Carenage and the Morne Fortune."[14] Affairs remained in this situation till about the middle of April, when Brigadier-General Stewart resumed active operations, in the hope of recovering the lost ground. On the 14th of that month, he suddenly disembarked near Vieux Fort, with a force consisting of a portion of the 6th and 9th Regiments, the company of the Carolina Corps which had remained in the island since its capture in 1794, and one company of the new corps of Malcolm's Rangers; and, after two days' skirmishing, that town was abandoned by the French on the 16th, and immediately taken possession of by the British, the enemy falling back upon Souffriere, their chief stronghold. "Resolved to follow up his blow, General Stewart advanced against Souffriere. Undismayed, however, by their recent defeats, the Republicans had collected together a very formidable force, for the defence of their main position. On his march, the British general was suddenly attacked by a division which had been placed in ambush, and it was not till after a severe struggle that the enemy were driven back." Sir John Vaughan, in a despatch dated Martinique, April 25th, 1795, says: "He was attacked by the enemy upon his march on the 20th instant, who had formed an ambuscade. The flank companies of the 9th Regiment, and the Black Corps under Captain Malcolm, were the troops engaged. The enemy, after a severe conflict, were driven back. Captain Malcolm, and Captain Nesbitt of the 9th, were wounded, after behaving in a most gallant manner." On the 22nd of April, the troops reached the neighbourhood of Souffriere, near to which, on the mountainous ground, the attack was made. The contest continued warmly for seven hours, and though the greatest exertions were made by the British, they were finally compelled to retreat to Choiseul, with a loss of 30 killed, 150 wounded, and 5 missing. In the four days' fighting between the 14th and the 22nd of April, Malcolm's corps lost 48 out of a total of 121.[15] At Choiseul the troops embarked and returned to Vieux Fort, and thence to Morne Fortune and the Carenage, which General Stewart considered his force strong enough to hold until the arrival of reinforcements. Two months passed away without the occurrence of any event worthy of notice. Sickness, in the meantime, was making great ravages amongst the British, one-half of whose force was generally unfit for service. The enemy, on the other hand, were daily gaining fresh accession of strength. From Guadaloupe arms and other supplies were frequently transmitted; and though some of the vessels fell into the hands of the British cruisers, many more of them reached their destination in safety. The French now began to act decisively. They first reduced Pigeon Island, and, on the 17th of June, made themselves masters of the Vigie. On this last post the communication between the Carenage and Morne Fortune depended, and the enemy now prepared for a general assault upon the latter. As, in the weak condition of the garrison, it would have been imprudent to await the meditated attack, Brigadier-General Stewart determined to evacuate the position; and, on the evening of the 18th, the whole of the troops embarked on board H.M.S. _Experiment_, undiscovered by the enemy, and proceeded to Martinique. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 13: Bryan Edwards.] [Footnote 14: See map.] [Footnote 15: Return of the killed, wounded, and missing in the actions on the following days, of the troops under the command of Brigadier-General Stewart, in the island of St. Lucia. * * * * * 14th of April, 1795. Royal Rangers--1 sergeant, 5 rank and file, wounded. 15th of April. Royal Rangers--2 rank and file, killed; 1 sergeant, 4 rank and file, wounded. 20th of April. Royal Rangers--6 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 sergeant, and 18 rank and file, wounded. 22nd of April. Carolina Corps--1 rank and file, wounded. Royal Rangers--4 rank and file, killed; 5 rank and file, wounded. Names of the Officers killed and wounded. Captain Robert Malcolm, of the Royal Rangers, wounded.] CHAPTER VI. THE CARIB WAR IN ST. VINCENT, 1795. Some little time before the arrival, at Martinique, of the company of Malcolm's Rangers from St. Lucia, the company of that corps which had remained in the former island had been despatched, with the 3rd Battalion of the 60th Regiment, to St. Vincent. Since the month of March, 1795, that island had been devastated by a war between the Caribs, assisted by the French, and the British garrison. This war had been carried on with varying success, and the most horrible atrocities on the part of the Caribs, until the end of May, when the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Vaughan, went over to St. Vincent from Martinique, to satisfy himself as to the state and military wants of the colony; and, finding the enemy strongly posted within a short distance of the town of Kingston itself, immediately on his return to Martinique despatched the above-mentioned reinforcement, which arrived at St. Vincent in the beginning of June. The principal position of the enemy was at the Vigie This post was situated on a ridge, forming the south-west side of the valley of Marriaqua, and consisted of three small eminences of different heights; that nearest the sea, though the lowest, being the most extensive of them all, and that to the fortifying of which they had paid the most attention. Lieutenant-Colonel Leighton, commanding the troops in St. Vincent, on being reinforced, determined to carry into execution a long meditated attack upon the Vigie. Accordingly, on the night of the 11th[16] of June, the troops marched through the town, and halted about ten o'clock at Warawarrow River, within four miles of the Vigie. The force was composed of detachments from the 46th and 60th Regiments, the company of Malcolm's Rangers, the St. Vincent Rangers, almost all the southern and windward regiments of the militia, and a small party of artillery. At Warawarrow River the troops were divided into three columns; and the third was further divided into small bodies to hold the passes at Calder Ridge, and prevent the escape of the enemy. Just before daybreak, the westernmost redoubt, which overlooked the road coming from Kingston, was attacked and carried almost without opposition, the enemy retiring to their principal stronghold. The grenadiers and Malcolm's Corps had in the meantime forced their way through the bush on Ross Ridge, and being met by the light company, which had kept along the road, the whole of the British advanced against the third and strongest redoubt. At the upper end of the road a deep trench had been dug, which obstacle for some little time delayed the guns; but, by great exertions they were lifted up a bank eight or ten feet in height, and then opened fire. For some time the enemy returned the British fire with great spirit. About eight o'clock, however, they beat a parley, and sent out a flag of truce to propose terms, which were refused. The troops were now led to the assault, and in a short time carried the works, which were defended by the French from Guadaloupe, the Caribs having retired early in the morning, and escaped to the windward portion of the island. "Never did troops display greater gallantry than did the British, militia, and rangers on this occasion."[17] The British killed and wounded amounted to 30; 250 of the enemy are said to have fallen. In the redoubts were taken three four-pounders and sixteen or seventeen swivels. At the close of the action, Malcolm's and the St. Vincent Rangers were sent out to scour the valley of Marriaqua, and destroy the huts of the Caribs. This service they effectually accomplished before nightfall, having killed and taken prisoners many of the fugitives, and driven the remainder into Massirica. A detachment of the 60th being left in the Vigie Lieutenant-Colonel Leighton, on the morning of the 13th of June, marched with the remainder of the troops, by several routes, towards the Carib district. So little opposition was made to their march, the enemy constantly falling back from ridge to ridge, that on the afternoon of the 16th they reached Mount Young, from which the Caribs fled with such haste that they left standing their houses, in all of which considerable quantities of corn were found. This carelessness of the enemy provided the British with a very welcome shelter. It was fortunate, also, that they had not attempted to dispute the hills and passes; for, had they done so, the troops would have suffered greatly, seven men, even as it was, having expired on the march from fatigue alone. As soon as Mount Young was in our possession, the troops were busily employed in spreading devastation through the Carib district. In Grand Sable and other parts of the country, many houses were burned, and more than 200 pettiaugres and canoes destroyed. Several hundred slaves were also sent out, under the protection of military detachments, to dig up and destroy the provisions of the enemy. On the 4th of July, a detachment of the 46th and Malcolm's Rangers took, after a sharp action, the enemy's post at Chateaubellair, near Walliabon, with a loss of 14 killed and 39 wounded of the 46th, and 2 killed and several wounded of Malcolm's. The evacuation of St. Lucia by Brigadier-General Stewart was, however, as far as St. Vincent was concerned, attended by fatal consequences. The proximity of the former island enabled the French unceasingly to pour in new reinforcements to their Carib allies in St. Vincent; and, towards the end of August, a small British post which had been established at Owia was surprised by a detachment from St. Lucia, and the whole of the guns and large quantities of supplies captured. Encouraged by this success, Victor Hugues resolved to endeavour to wrest St. Vincent from the British, as he had already wrested Guadaloupe and St. Lucia; and, in the middle of September, he landed in St. Lucia with a force of some 800 men. These, embarked in four vessels, which escaped the _Thorn_ and _Experiment_, the British ships of war on the station, landed at Owia Bay, St. Vincent, on the morning of the 18th of September; and the force of the enemy was now so vastly superior to that of the British, that it became impossible for the latter to retain their advanced positions. Orders were at once sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Leighton to abandon Mount Young without delay, and retire to the vicinity of Kingston. They were carried into execution on the night of the 19th. Having destroyed their supplies and left their lights burning in their huts as usual, to deceive the enemy, the troops were silently put in motion. They reached Biabou the next evening, and, bringing in the detachment which was there quartered, reached Zion Hill on the 21st; being then distributed among the posts in the neighbourhood. The retreating British were speedily followed by the Caribs and French, who drove off the cattle from several estates, and finally took up a position on Fairbairn's Ridge, by which the communication was cut off between Kingston and the Vigie. The detachment of the 60th at the latter post being short of supplies, Lieutenant-Colonel Ritche, of the 60th, with 200 of that corps and 150 of the St. Vincent Rangers, was detached to escort the necessary stores. His division had nearly reached its destination when it fell in with the enemy; a sharp action ensued, victory was on the eve of declaring for the British, when, struck by an unaccountable panic, they suddenly gave way and fled in all directions. The supplies fell into the hands of the enemy, and a number of the mules were killed. The news of this terrible disaster spread dismay through Kingston, for it was thought that the enemy would at once attack all the British posts. It was resolved to at once abandon the Vigie; and to facilitate this step, Brigadier-General Myers, with the 46th and Malcolm's Rangers, marched from Dorsetshire Hill, and posted himself opposite the enemy, as if threatening an attack. This movement had the desired effect. The enemy called in all the detachments which invested the Vigie, and thus enabled the officer commanding that post to retreat at night through heavy rain to Calliaqua, and thence proceed to Kingston in boats. While the troops were using the utmost exertion to strengthen the posts in the neighbourhood of Kingston, an unexpected reinforcement arrived from Martinique, on the 29th of September. It consisted of the 40th, 54th, 59th, and 2nd West India Regiments,[18] into which latter the St. Vincent Rangers were at once drafted. Major-General Irving also came over from Martinique to assume the command. The first effect produced by the arrival of this succour, was the retiring of the enemy from their advanced position on Fairbairn's Ridge to the Vigie, where they now collected the whole of their strength. From this post Major-General Irving determined to dislodge them; and, on the night of the 1st of October, the troops marched for that purpose. One column, consisting of 750 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Strutt, marched by the high road and took post upon Calder Ridge, on the east of the Vigie, about three in the morning. A second column, consisting of 900 men, under Brigadier-General Myers, crossed the Warawarrow River, and detached one party to proceed round by Calliaqua, and another to move up the valley, and climb the heights near Joseph Dubuc's. With this last force was Malcolm's Corps; and, to gain the point to which they were directed, it was necessary to cross a deep rivulet and ascend a steep hill covered with bushes and wood. In doing this it suffered a heavy loss, both of officers and men, from the enemy, who fired upon it almost in security under shelter of the bushes. The British, however, still pressed on, and at length arrived on the top of the Marriaqua or Vigie Ridge. During the ascent of the hill, Malcolm's Corps lost one man killed and two wounded. In the meantime, the remainder of the second column were struggling in vain to reach the summit of the same ridge; at a point where the enemy had strongly occupied a thick wood, and thrown up a small work. Though the opposing forces were within fifty paces of each other, not an inch of ground was won on either side. Firing commenced at seven in the morning, and was kept up till nightfall. All this time the British were exposed to a violent tropical downpour of rain, which rendered the abrupt declivity so slippery that it was almost impossible to maintain a foothold on it; and, finding he could make no impression on the enemy, the general, about 7 p.m., gave orders for the troops to retire. During the night, the enemy, from some unknown cause, abandoned the Vigie, and that so hastily that they left behind them, undestroyed, both guns and ammunition. They continued their retreat till they reached the windward part of the island, and the British in their turn advanced. For the remainder of the year, the troops were employed in circumscribing, within as narrow limits as possible, the French and their Carib allies; and, though great hardships were endured, no engagement worthy of note took place. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 16: Coke; Bryan Edwards says the 8th.] [Footnote 17: Coke.] [Footnote 18: See next chapter.] CHAPTER VII. MAJOR-GENERAL WHYTE'S REGIMENT OF FOOT, 1795. The terrible mortality which thinned the ranks of the British troops in the West Indies, induced the British Ministers to think of reinforcing the army with men better calculated to resist the influence of the climate. The West India Governors were instructed, therefore, in 1795, to bring forward in their respective legislatures a project for raising five black regiments, consisting of 500 men each, to become a permanent branch of the military establishment. There were already several black corps in existence, for Mr. Dundas, during a debate in the House of Commons on the West India Expedition, on the 28th of April, 1795, said that "the West India Army of Europeans and Creoles consisted of 3000 militia and 6000 blacks."[19] These black corps were distributed amongst the various islands, and were the Carolina Corps, Malcolm's or the Royal Rangers, the Island Rangers (Martinique), the St. Vincent Rangers, the Black Rangers (Grenada), Angus' Black Corps (Grenada), the Tobago Blacks, and the Dominica Rangers. Some of them, notably the Carolina Corps, Malcolm's Corps, and the St. Vincent Rangers,[20] were paid by the Imperial Government, and were consequently Imperial troops; although none of the corps appeared in any Army List, nor were appointments thereto and promotions therein notified in the _London Gazette_. The five black regiments, now proposed to be raised, were to be in addition to those small black corps already in Imperial pay, and which were to be blended into three permanent regiments. Consequently, in the Army List dated March 11th, 1796, showing the state of the army in 1795,[21] we find the following eight corps, indexed under the heading of "Regiments raised to serve in the West Indies:" Whyte's Regiment of Foot (Carolina and Malcolm's Corps). Myers' " " (St. Vincent Rangers). Keppell's " " (probably the Dominica Rangers). Nicoll's " " } Howe's " " } Whitelock's " " }(the five new regiments). Lewes' " " } Skerrett's " " } Major-General Whyte's regiment was called into existence by the _Gazette_ of the 2nd of May, 1795; Major-General John Whyte, from the 6th Foot, being appointed colonel. On the 20th of May, Major Leeds Booth, from the 32nd Foot, was appointed lieutenant-colonel; and other officers were rapidly gazetted to it. On the 8th of August, Captain Robert Malcolm, of the 41st Foot, was promoted major in Whyte's regiment. The following is the list of officers appointed to the regiment in 1795: MAJOR-GENERAL WHYTE'S REGIMENT OF FOOT. Rank. Name. Rank in the Regt. Army. Colonel John Whyte April 24, 1795 M.G., Feb. 26, 1795 Lt.-Col. Leeds Booth May 20, 1795 Major Robert Malcolm July 1, 1795 Lieut.-Col., Oct. 5, 1795 Capts. James Abercrombie " " Major, March 1, 1794 Edward Cotter " " Francis Costello " " Alan Hampden Pye " " Ralph Wilson " " Thomas Cunninghame " " (C.) William Powell Aug. 24, 1795 Thomas Deane Sept. 1, 1795 .............. .............. .............. .............. Lieuts. Ross Gillespie July 1, 1795 Dec. 20, 1794 Henry Maxwell " " March 8, 1795 David Butler " " Benjamin Chadwick " " James Reid " " James Stewart " " James Sutherland " " James Calder " " Andrew Coghlan Aug. 24, 1795 Sept. 14, 1792 Henry Goodinge Sept. 1, 1795 Thos. Page Sept. 16, 1795 .............. (11 vacancies) .............. Ensigns William Graham July 1, 1795 James Cassidy " " -- McShee " " -- Lightfoot " " -- M'Callum " " -- Froggart " " -- McLean " " R.W. Atkins " " John Egan " " James Reed " " (Cornet) W. Connor " " -- Crump " " John Morrison " " Donald M'Grace " " William Reid " " -- Dalton Sept. 1, 1795 Thomas Byrne " " C.B. Darley Sept. 9, 1795 Christ. Thos. Roberts Oct. 5, 1795 .............. .............. .............. Adjutant .............. Qrmr. -- McWilliam Nov. 18, 1795 Surgeon -- Bishop June 10, 1795 Chaplain .............. It was intended that each of these regiments raised for service in the West Indies should have a cavalry troop, and in the _London Gazette_ are the following: MAJOR-GENERAL WHYTE'S REGIMENT OF FOOT. August 1, 1795 Lieutenant--Powell, from the 8th Foot, to be Lieutenant of Cavalry. August 29 Lieutenant--Powell, Lieutenant of Cavalry, to be Captain of Cavalry. July 11 Acting Adjutant--Connor, from Lieutenant-Colonel McDonnel's regiment, to be Cornet. But this idea was soon abandoned, and in 1797 the cavalry troop disappeared. The 1st West India Regiment (for so it was at once styled in the West Indies, although in the Army List and the _London Gazette_, the designation "Major-General Whyte's Regiment of Foot" was not discontinued until February, 1798) first appears in the "Monthly Return for the Windward, Leeward, and Caribee Islands," in September, 1795, as follows: A: Colonel. B: Lieut.-Colonel. C: Majors. D: Captains. E: Lieutenants. F: Ensigns. G: Chaplain. H: Adjutant. I: Quarter-Master. J: Surgeon. K: Mate. L: Sergeants Present. M: Drummers Present. N: Present, fit for duty. O: Sick. P: Recruiting. Q: Total. +-----------------+---------+-----------------------+--+--+----------+ | | | Officers Present. | | | | | | +-------------+---------+ | |Effective | | | |Commissioned.| Staff. | | |Rank&File.| | Regiments |Stations.+-------------+---------+ | +----------+ | or Corps. | |A|B|C|D|E | F|G|H|I|J|K| L| M| N|O|P| Q | +-----------------+---------+-+-+-+-+--+--+-+-+-+-+-+--+--+--+-+-+---+ |Maj.-Gen. Whyte's|Martinico|-|-|-|3| 1| 5|-|-|1|-|-| 6| 6|43|4|4| 51| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |Brig.-Gen. Myers'|Martinico|1|-|-|2| 1| 1|-|-|1|-|-| 5| 6|41|5|5| 51| +-----------------+---------+-+-+-+-+--+--+-+-+-+-+-+--+--|--+-+-+---+ | |Total. |1|-|-|5| 2| 6|-|-|2|-|-|11|12|84|9|9|102| +-----------------+---------+-+-+-+-+--+--+-+-+-+-+-+--+--+--+-+-+---+ and the following note is, in the same Return, appended to the state of the company of the "Black Carolina Corps," which was in Grenada; the other two companies having remained in Martinique since their removal there from St. Lucia at the end of April, 1795. "This corps has been reformed, and fifty of the men, who were fit for service, have been drafted into the 1st New West India Regiment. When the remainder of the corps can be collected together, it is possible a few more may be found fit for service." Major-General Whyte's, or the 1st West India Regiment, remained at Martinique, without any further accession to its strength than these fifty men from the Carolina Corps, till December, 1795. In the "Muster Roll of His Majesty's 1st West India Regiment of Foot, for 183 days, from the 25th of June to the 24th of December, 1795, inclusive," the list of officers is given as already shown. Captain James Abercrombie, Lieutenants David Butler, Benjamin Chadwick, and James Sutherland are shown as "drowned on passage," and the following note is added: "Some few of the dates of enlistments and enrolments of the non-commissioned officers and drummers may not probably be quite exact, and some others may have been engaged in England not down on the muster roll, all the regimental books, attestation papers, etc., having been left in possession of the paymaster, Brevet-Major Abercrombie (no adjutant at that time being appointed), who was lost in December or January last on board the _Robert and William_ transport, No. 44, on the voyage to this country." The non-commissioned officers and drummers were Europeans, one sergeant and three corporals being shown as "sick and absent in England" in this roll; and, in the next, a drummer is similarly shown. The roll is signed by Leeds Booth, Lieutenant-Colonel; Ed. S. Cotter, Captain and Paymaster; and Thomas Holbrook, Acting Adjutant. The following is the proof table: A: Colonel. B: Lieut.-Colonel. C: Major. D: Captains. E: Lieutenants. F: Cornets. G: Ensigns. H. Adjutant. I. Chaplain. J. Quartermaster. K. Surgeon. L. Mate. M. Sergeants. N. Corporals. O. Drummers. P. Privates. +--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ | | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | +--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ |Present | - | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5| - | - | 1 | - | - | 10| - | 12| 9| |Absent | 1 | - | 1 | 8 | 6 | - | 13| - | - | - | 1 | - | 7| 3 | 3| 27| |Non-effective | - | - | - | 5 | 7 | - | 5| - | - | 1 | - | - | 5| 8 | 5| 13| +--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ | Total. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14| 14| 1 | 23| - | - | 2 | 1 | - | 22| 11| 20| 49| +--------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ Although it was intended that the privates of West India regiments should be black, yet, apparently, white men were not prohibited from serving in the ranks; for, in later muster rolls, two or three privates are shown as "enrolled in England," and one of these is afterwards shown as "transferred to 60th." A volunteer, David Scott, who joined 29th May, 1797, was also promoted ensign in November of that year. These enrolments of Europeans only occur in the first three years of the regiment's existence, and negro privates were available for promotion to, at least, the rank of corporal very early; for a Private John Lafontaine, who was promoted corporal, is shown in the muster roll terminating December 24th, 1796, as "claimed as a slave." The pay of a private in a West India regiment was then sixpence per diem. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 19: In the Account of the Extraordinary Expenditure of the Army, from 25th December, 1795, to 6th December, 1796, is the following: On account of pay for sundry black corps for the year 1795, raised for service in the West Indies £10,120 12 9 On account of ditto for the year 1796 60,095 10 3 ------------ £70,216 3 0 ] [Footnote 20: "The military force in St. Vincent consists at present of a regiment of infantry and a company of artillery, sent from England; and a black corps raised in the country, but provided for, with the former, on the British Establishment, and receiving no additional pay from the island."--Bryan Edwards, vol. i. p. 428.] [Footnote 21: The Army List for 1795 is dated January 1st.] CHAPTER VIII. THE CAPTURE OF ST. LUCIA, 1796. In January, 1796, the company of Malcolm's Royal Rangers that was at St. Vincent was moved to St. Christopher; the other company still remained at Martinique, and both, in April, 1796, were selected to take part in the expedition to St. Lucia. "That island could then muster for its defence about 2000 well-disciplined black soldiers, a number of less effective blacks, and some hundred whites, who held positions both naturally and artificially strong, and were plentifully supplied with artillery, ammunition, and stores. The post on which the Republicans chiefly confided for their defence was that of Morne Fortune. It is situated on the western side of the island, between the rivers of the Carenage and the Grand Cul de Sac, which empty their waters into bays bearing the same name. Difficult of access by nature, it had been rendered still more so by various works. In aid of this they had also fortified others of the mornes, or eminences, in its vicinity. The whole of this position, embracing a considerable extent of ground, it was of the utmost importance to invest closely, with as little delay as possible, that the enemy might not escape into the rugged country of the interior, and thus be in a condition to carry on a protracted and harassing war, which experience had already more than once proved to be highly detrimental to an unseasoned invading force. "To accomplish this desirable purpose, the British general determined to direct his troops on three points, two of them to the north, and the third to the south of Morne Fortune. The first division was to land most to the north, in Longueville Bay, covered by several vessels, which were intended to silence the batteries on Pigeon Island. Choc Bay was the spot where the centre division was to be put on shore; and the third was to disembark at Ance la Raye, some distance to the southward of the hostile post."[22] The fleet with the troops destined for the attack of St. Lucia, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, sailed from Carlisle Bay, Barbados, on the 22nd of April, and anchored in Marin Bay, Martinique, on the evening of the 23rd, where Malcolm's Rangers joined the force, sailing for St. Lucia on the 26th. The troops arrived off that island on the evening of the same day, and 1700 men, under the command of Major-General Campbell, composing the first division, were immediately landed in Longueville Bay; without encountering any further opposition than a few shots from the battery on Pigeon Island, the fire of which was speedily silenced by that of the ships. A strong current had driven the transports so far to the leeward that it was not practicable to land the centre division till the following morning. Major-General Campbell was meanwhile on his march, and his progress was only feebly opposed by about 500 of the enemy, who ultimately retired from Angier's Plantation to Morne Chabot, and allowed him to effect a junction with the centre division. The current having acted still more powerfully on the vessels which conveyed the third division, under Brigadier-General Morshead, two or three days elapsed before the disembarkation in Ance la Raye could be entirely executed. The troops at length took up their appointed station, and thus held Morne Fortune invested on its southern side. To complete the investment on the northern quarter it was necessary to obtain possession of Morne Chabot, which was one of the strongest posts in the vicinity of Morne Fortune. At midnight of the 27th, therefore, two columns, under Brigadier-Generals Moore and Hope, were despatched to attack the Morne on two opposite sides; and, by this means, not only to carry the position, but likewise to prevent the escape of the troops by which it was defended. This plan, the complete success of which would have materially diminished the strength of the Republican force, was in part rendered abortive by a miscalculation of time. The column of Brigadier-General Moore, consisting of seven companies of the 53rd Regiment, 100 of Malcolm's Rangers, and 50 of Lowenstein's,[23] advanced by the most circuitous route; while Brigadier-General Hope, with 350 men of the 57th, 150 of Malcolm's Rangers, and 50 of Lowenstein's, took the shorter road. Misinformed by the guides, Brigadier-General Moore's column fell in, an hour and a half sooner than it had expected, with the advanced picket of the enemy, who were thus put on their guard. At the moment when they were discovered, the troops, in consequence of the narrowness of the road, were marching in single file, and to halt them was impossible. In this state of things their leader resolved not to give his opponents time to recollect themselves, but to fall on them with his single division. The spirit of the soldiers fully justified the gallant resolution of their commander. Having been formed as speedily as the ruggedness of the ground would admit of, they proceeded to the assault. The Republicans made a stubborn resistance, but it was an unavailing one, as they were finally driven from the Morne with considerable loss. Nevertheless, as the second column did not arrive till the combat was over, the fugitives succeeded in making good their retreat. On the following day the victors also occupied Morne Duchasseaux, which is situated in rear of Morne Fortune. In the hope of obtaining some advantage to counterbalance this misfortune, the enemy, on the 1st of May, made a brisk attack on the advanced post of grenadiers commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel MacDonald, of the 55th Regiment. They were, however, repulsed with much slaughter, though not till forty or fifty men, and several officers, were killed or wounded on the side of the British, among them being Captain Coghlan, 1st West India Regiment, attached to the 48th Regiment, who was wounded. At the south side of the Morne Fortune the enemy had erected batteries, which precluded any vessels from entering into the bay of the Grand Cul de Sac. To open this bay to our fleet was an object of much importance, as at present it was necessary to convey the artillery and stores from a great distance, which could not be done without the previous labour of opening roads through an almost impracticable country. It was, therefore, resolved to make an attempt on these batteries. The principal attack was to be conducted by Major-General Morshead, whose division, in two columns, was to pass the river of the Grand Cul de Sac; the columns of the right at Cools, and that of the left at the point where the waters of the stream are discharged into the bay. To second this force, Brigadier-General Hope, on the night of the 2nd of May, was to advance from Morne Chabot with 350 men of the 42nd Regiment, the light company of the 57th, and part of Malcolm's Rangers, the whole being supported by the 55th Regiment, which was posted at Ferrands. A part of the squadron was likewise to lend its assistance, by keeping up a cannonade on the works of the enemy. Before the time arrived for putting this plan into execution, Major-General Morshead was taken ill, and the command devolved upon Brigadier-General Perryn. No change, however, took place in the arrangements which had been formed. "At dawn of day, the division under Brigadier-General Hope began to accomplish its part of the service by carrying the battery Seche, which was situated within a short distance of the works of Morne Fortune. The assailants suffered so little in the assault, that they would scarcely have had anything to regret, had it not been for the fall of the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.[24] On the south side of the Morne, and at the extremity of the line of attack, Colonel Riddel, who led the column of the left, made himself master of the battery of Chapuis, and established himself there. Had the remainder of the project been as well executed, the proposed object would have been completely attained. Unfortunately, however, from some unexplained cause, the division which was the connecting link of the whole, that which was entrusted to Brigadier-General Perryn, did not perform its allotted part, by crossing the river at Cools. The consequence of this was that the victorious columns were left insulated, and would have been exposed to no trivial danger, had the enemy felt a sufficient reliance upon their own strength to incite them to act with the requisite promptitude and vigour. Painful, therefore, as it was to retire before a routed foe, the British troops were compelled to abandon the batteries which they had won, and to fall back upon their original stations. The ships at the same time returned to their former anchorage. Our loss on this occasion was 105 men; of whom only a very few were among the slain." The Vigie was now the only post occupied by the enemy in the vicinity of Morne Fortune, and this was attacked by the 31st Regiment on the night of May 7th; the assault, however, being repulsed with a loss of 200 men. The main position was now invested by regular siege works, and the task which the British had to perform was attended with no small difficulty. "The country itself was of the most inaccessible kind, the chain of investment was ten miles in extent, all the roads that were necessary were to be made, of carriages there were none, horses were scarce, and the Republicans had been industrious in availing themselves of all the natural obstacles to our progress, and in creating as many others as their ingenuity could contrive." Malcolm's Corps rendered good service on these works, and the men being better able to stand the fatigue and exposure than Europeans, were constantly employed. By May 16th, the first parallel was completed, and on the morning of the 24th, the 27th Regiment, supported by the 53rd and 57th, succeeded in effecting a lodgment within 500 yards of the fort. The Governor, acknowledging that further resistance was futile, demanded a suspension of hostilities; terms of surrender were agreed upon, and on May 26th, 2000 men marched out as prisoners of war. One hundred pieces of ordnance, ten vessels, and large stores of ammunition fell into the hands of the British. Sir Ralph Abercromby sailed from St. Lucia on the 4th of June to the relief of Grenada and St. Vincent, leaving Brigadier-General Moore for the pacification of the first island with the 31st, 44th, 38th, and 55th Regiments, O'Meara's corps of Rangers,[25] and the German Yagers. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 22: Bryan Edwards.] [Footnote 23: Lowenstein's Rangers were Europeans. They were afterwards drafted into the 60th.] [Footnote 24: Return of killed, wounded, and missing, in the attack made on the enemy's batteries, May 3rd, 1796. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's Rangers: 3 rank and file, killed; 2 rank and file, wounded; 2 captains, 1 lieutenant, 7 rank and file, missing. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm dead of his wounds. The names of the officers of Malcolm's returned missing, not known.] [Footnote 25: Raised in 1796. This corps became the 12th West India Regiment in 1799.] CHAPTER IX. THE RELIEF OF GRENADA, 1796--THE REPULSE AT PORTO RICO, 1797. Grenada, like St. Vincent, had been ravaged by the French and insurgent slaves since March, 1795, and the relief of that island was one of the first cares of Sir R. Abercromby. On leaving St. Lucia, the division of the troops intended for Grenada was ordered to rendezvous at Cariacou, one of the Grenadines; there Sir Ralph Abercromby met Major-General Nicolls, then commanding in Grenada, and arranged with him the general plan of operations. Before, however, those operations are described, it will be necessary to go back to the month of March, 1796, when a company of the Carolina Corps arrived in Grenada from Martinique, with detachments from the 8th, 63rd, and 3rd Regiments, under Major-General Nicolls. Shortly before the arrival of this reinforcement, the French and insurgents had compelled the British to evacuate Pilot Hill, in the neighbourhood of Grenville, and had taken up a strong position at Port Royal. On the 23rd of March, Major-General Nicolls landed to the south of Port Royal; during the night the guns were got in position, and at daybreak opened on the enemy's works. The post occupied by the enemy was a hill of very steep ascent, particularly towards the summit, upon which a fort was constructed, and furnished with four six-pounders and some swivels. The first object of the British commander was to gain a position between the enemy and the open country, and thus leave them no alternative but to surrender at discretion, or precipitate themselves over a high cliff; but they had established themselves so strongly to protect their right that this failed. In the meantime two large vessels full of troops to reinforce the enemy arrived in the bay under Port Royal, from Guadaloupe; and Brigadier-General Nicolls found it necessary to storm the enemy's post without further delay. The troops employed in this service were detachments from the 3rd, 29th, and 63rd Regiments, under Brigadier-General Campbell; at the same time, 50 men of the 88th, with the company of the Carolina Corps, Colonel Webster's Black Rangers, and Angus' Black Corps, moved against the enemy's right flank, to dislodge some strong parties which were posted on the heights. Owing to the difficult nature of the ground, it was nearly two hours before the latter column could reach the enemy, when a heavy fire commenced on both sides. The ascent was steep and difficult, encumbered with rocks and loose stones and covered with dense bush. From the summit of the ridge the enemy poured in a destructive fire, to which the British could only reply at a great disadvantage, and, after losing heavily, the column commenced to retire. Observing this retrograde movement, Major-General Nicolls sent the 8th Regiment in support and ordered Brigadier-General Campbell to proceed to the assault of the redoubt. Repulsed at the first attempt the troops again pushed on, at length gained the summit of the ridge, drove the enemy into their redoubt and scrambled in after them through the embrasures. The enemy then fled in all directions, some threw themselves down the precipices, whilst others tried to escape down the hill through the thick underwood; but there was so heavy a fire kept up on them from above by the British that they were forced to attempt to escape along a valley, where they were charged by a detachment of the 17th Light Dragoons, and cut to pieces. The British loss consisted, in killed and wounded, of 110 Europeans and 40 of the various black corps. The Carolina Corps lost one man killed and six wounded. Affairs were thus situated when the fall of St. Lucia enabled Sir R. Abercromby to send reinforcements to Grenada. The troops, with whom were Malcolm's Rangers, disembarked at Palmiste, on the 9th June, while Brigadier-General Campbell, with the troops already in the island, advanced from the windward side to take the enemy in rear. Captain Jossey, the commandant of the French troops at Goyave, near Palmiste, seeing that resistance must be unavailing, surrendered that post, with those of Mabouia and Dalincourt; but Fedon, the leader of the insurgent slaves, who knew he could expect no mercy, retired at the head of about 300 men to two strong and almost unapproachable positions, called Morne Quaquo and Ache's Camp, or Forêt Noir, in the mountains of the interior. In these recesses he did not despair of being able to tire out his pursuers; but Major-General Nicolls did not give him time to throw any additional obstacles in the way of the troops. On the 18th of June he despatched against him, from opposite quarters, two divisions, under Brigadier-General Campbell and Count d'Heillemer; while Lieutenant-Colonel Gledstanes was posted with the 57th Regiment at the head of Grand Roy Valley, and the grenadiers of the 38th Regiment, with the Carolina Corps and Malcolm's Rangers, advanced against a post which the enemy had at the head of Beau Séjour Valley. The dispositions were so admirably carried into effect, that the whole of the enemy's posts were captured, nearly at the same moment, on the morning of the 19th. "Many of the blacks were slain upon the spot, and the remainder were promptly hunted down in the woods by detachments of the military. No quarter was given to these ruffians, nor was any deserved by them, their last efforts having been marked by a foul and wanton murder. When they saw that their position at Morne Quaquo, which they had regarded as impregnable, was on the eve of being forced, they led out twenty white prisoners, stripped them, tied their hands behind them, and put them to death. It was impossible, after having witnessed this act of baseness and cruelty, that anything short of their extermination should satisfy the victors."[26] Fedon, and a number of his followers, escaped to the woods; what became of the former was never known, but the black corps were employed up to December, 1796, in hunting down and capturing the stragglers, and it was not until the end of that month that peace was entirely restored to Grenada. Whyte's, or the 1st West India, Regiment had remained at Martinique without any addition to its strength during the operations in St. Lucia and Grenada. It had, however, according to the muster rolls for 1796, transferred, on the 24th of March of that year, four sergeants and nine corporals to Malcolm's Rangers, probably in anticipation of the speedy drafting of the whole of that corps into its own ranks. In the Monthly Returns of troops for March and April, 1796, Malcolm's Royal Rangers are shown as "under orders for drafting into the 1st West India Regiment," and in the May Return the corps ceases to be shown separately, and has no "state" of its own. As we have seen, however, it continued to act separately in St. Lucia in April and May, and in Grenada from June to December; and it was not until its return to Martinique on the 28th of December, 1796, that the drafting was finally completed. Of the Carolina Corps all the men fit for service were collected at Martinique, the remainder being formed into an invalid company at Grenada. It may be thought that the process of forming the 1st West India Regiment was being carried on very slowly, but it was more rapid than that of any other West India Regiment, except the 2nd; while the 3rd, even on the 24th of December, 1797, had no non-commissioned officers, no privates, and only two drummers. No military event worthy of note took place in the year 1797, in which the Carolina Corps or the 1st West India Regiment took part, except the expedition to Porto Rico, in which the pioneers of the former corps were engaged. Sir Ralph Abercromby, with a force of 3000 men, sailed from Martinique on the 8th of April, and, after a delay at St. Christopher's, for the purpose of procuring pilots and guides, reached Porto Rico on the 17th and anchored off Cangrejos Point. Next day the troops disembarked, and, after a slight skirmish with the enemy, took up a position before the town. The siege continued for a fortnight without the British making any appreciable progress, while the force of the enemy, originally larger than that of the besiegers, was receiving continual accessions from various parts of the island. Sir Ralph Abercromby, therefore, determined to abandon the attempt, and the troops were accordingly re-embarked on the 30th of April. In March, 1797, one company of the Carolina Corps that was at Martinique, 78 strong, was drafted into the 1st West India Regiment; and, on the return of the expedition from Porto Rico, the remaining company (Pioneer) was also drafted, and the Carolina Corps ceased to exist. The following is the list of the officers who were serving in the 1st West India Regiment in 1797, and it may be observed that so many changes had taken place that, out of 43 officers who were gazetted to the regiment in 1795, only 22 were left in 1797: Rank. Name. Rank in Regiment. Army. Colonel John Whyte April 24, 1795 M.-G., Feb. 26, 1795. Lt.-Col. Leeds Booth May 20, 1795 Major Charles Miller Nov. 30, 1796 Captains Edward Cotter July 1, 1795 Francis Costello July 1, 1795 William Powell Aug. 24, 1795 A.A. Nunn Feb. 2, 1797 November 17, 1795. Robert Brown June 1, 1797 September 30, 1796. James Maitland July 23, 1797 James Stewart July 24, 1797 Lieuts. William Graham Nov. 30, 1796 James Cassidy Dec. 1, 1796 -- M'Shee Dec. 2, 1796 -- Lightfoot Dec. 3, 1796 -- M'Callum Dec. 4, 1796 -- Froggart Dec. 5, 1796 -- M'Lean Dec. 6, 1796 John Egan Dec. 8, 1796 James Reed Dec. 9, 1796 W.J. Speed Jan. 11, 1797 -- Connor March 1, 1797 William Reid March 2, 1796 Thomas Byrne March 3, 1796 J.C. Roberts July 1, 1796 John C. M'Kay July 2, 1796 Ensigns Donald M'Grace July 1, 1795 -- Dalton Sept. 1, 1795 C.B. Darley Sept. 9, 1795 -- Horsford July 1, 1797 David M'William July 2, 1797 Morgan O'Meara July 3, 1797 Charles Marraud July 4, 1797 Niel Campbell July 5, 1797 Adjutant Thomas Holbrooke April 17, 1796 Qtrmastr. -- M'William Nov. 18, 1795 Surgeon John Lindsay Dec. 25, 1796 During the active operations of the year 1796 the West India colonists had offered no objection to the scheme of raising five new black regiments, but, in 1797, when the question of providing for them was brought before the various Legislatures, the plan met with the most determined opposition. When, on the 17th of January, Governor Ricketts communicated it to the House of Assembly in Barbados, and requested the concurrence of that House, the Speaker, Sir John Gay Alleyne, immediately rose and moved: "That the design of five regiments, etc. (as expressed in the message), will, as far as such a design is likely to affect this island, prove rather the means of its destruction than its defence." This resolution was carried, with two others, without a dissenting voice. "The Assembly of Jamaica was no less decided and unanimous in its opposition to the measure. It refused to make any provision whatever for the subsistence of the 6th West India Regiment, which was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Whitelocke. In this decision it was sanctioned by the general voice of the white population. Meetings were held in almost every parish of the island, in all of which the scheme of raising black corps was heavily censured, as being, in the first place, unnecessary, the negroes being already compellable to serve in case of emergency; and, in the second place, as being of a nature to produce ultimately, and perhaps at no distant period, the most destructive effects to the persons and the property of the colonial proprietors."[27] The British ministers were reluctant to abandon that which appeared to be a cheap and ready mode of recruiting in the western hemisphere, and consequently persevered in their project, even increasing the number of West India regiments in 1799 to twelve. That the fears of the colonists were groundless time soon showed. In 1801, at St. Martin's, the 8th West India Regiment, "composed of new negroes, who had never before faced a foe, behaved with the utmost gallantry." In 1803, the 3rd West India Regiment did good service at the capture of St. Lucia, as did the 6th at the reduction of Surinam in 1804. In 1809, at the Saintes, where the 3rd and 8th West India Regiments were engaged, "the black troops distinguished themselves by their discipline and valour." How the 1st West India Regiment remained true to its colours the succeeding chapters will show.[28] FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 26: Bryan Edwards.] [Footnote 27: Bryan Edwards.] [Footnote 28: It is true that the 8th West India Regiment mutinied at Dominica, in 1802, but it was under conditions which, to a certain extent, extenuated it. For more than six months the men had been defrauded of their pay. Being utterly uneducated and all new negroes, they were ignorant of the proper methods of obtaining redress, and consequently showed their resentment by violence.] CHAPTER X. THE DEFENCE OF DOMINICA, 1805. The 1st West India Regiment remained stationed at Fort Edward, Martinique, during the whole of 1797, and up to the month of December, 1798; its strength at no time during this period being above 350 men. In December, 1798, it was removed to St. Lucia, six companies being quartered at Vieux Fort and two at Maboya, in the same island. The strength then was 343, and the "state" shows 157 as wanting to complete the establishment. The regiment remained at St. Lucia until July, 1801, when it was moved to Port Royal, Martinique. In January, 1802, two companies were detached to St. Vincent, and, in July, the remainder of the regiment, with the exception of one company that remained in Martinique, followed them to that island, from whence a company was soon afterwards detached to Antigua. In October, these detachments rejoined head-quarters, but, in April, 1803, two other companies were sent to Grenada. In May, 1804, the regiment, with the exception of one company at Grenada and another sent to St. Vincent, was moved to Dominica. In this year the establishment of West India regiments was increased from 500 to 1000 men; and in December, 1804, the strength was 618. The rupture of the Treaty of Amiens had, in 1803, led to fresh conflicts in the West Indies, in which, however, the 1st West India Regiment had taken no share; but in the spring of 1805, while it was still stationed at Dominica, the light company being with the 46th Regiment at Morne Bruce, and the remainder of the regiment (except the two detachments) at Prince Rupert's, its turn for active service came. On the 22nd of February of that year, the island was attacked by a French combined naval and military force, under Admiral Missiessy and General La Grange, which force had been despatched from France specially for the reduction of Dominica. The enemy's flotilla consisted of the following vessels: Guns. Majestueuse 120 Magnanime 74 Suffren 74 Jemmappes 74 Lion 74 Armide 44 Gloire 44 Infatigable 44 Lynx 16 Actéon 16 --- 580 The French regular troops employed were: 26th Regiment 1600 2nd Battalion Piedmontese 2000 Dismounted Cavalry 250 Artillery 250 Detachments of Corps 500 ---- 4600 Exclusive of the marines of the various ships. The enemy's force sailed from Martinique on the afternoon of February 21st, 1805; and, flying the British flag, arrived off Dominica between 3 and 4 a.m. on February 22nd. The British commander-in-chief, Brigadier-General Prevost, deceived by the colours of the ships, sent the captain of the fort, an artillery officer, on board the _Majestueuse_, to conduct the supposed British admiral and his fleet to a safe anchorage.[29] Shortly afterwards the boats pushed off with the troops, and the squadron changed its colours to French. Directly this was perceived, the grenadier company of the 46th, with the light company of the 1st West India Regiment (107 rank and file), under Captain O'Connell, and a company of militia, marched from the garrison at Morne Bruce to Point Michell, about three miles distant. At this spot the enemy concentrated, and effected a landing under a heavy fire from the fleet. Two thousand eight hundred troops having been landed at the extremity of a cape within a short distance of Point Michell, they advanced towards that place in column of subdivisions, the only formation which the restricted space would admit, the point being bounded by inaccessible heights on the right, and a broken and rugged shore on the left. The two companies of the 46th and the light company of the 1st West India Regiment were posted behind the walls of some ruined buildings in the village of Point Michell, which afforded excellent cover, and where they were entirely sheltered from the fire of the enemy's shipping; while the French had to advance on a narrow front, entirely exposed to their fire. The attack commenced about 5 a.m. Four times the enemy were led to the assault, and as many times they were repulsed. At about 6.30 a.m. the remainder of the 46th and some local militia arrived, and the struggle continued; but not without loss on our side, Major Nunn and Captain O'Connell, 1st West India Regiment, being wounded, the former mortally, and four men killed. At last, the enemy, finding all his endeavours to force the position were ineffectual, landed the remainder of his troops to leeward of the town of Roseau, on the British right, and attacked Fort Daniel, a small redoubt mounting a six-pounder gun, and defended by 2 artillerymen, and 1 sergeant and 5 men of the 1st West India Regiment. These were all made prisoners in the work, which the enemy had attacked with 500 men. Brigadier-General Prevost then retired with the militia to the heights of Woodbridge Estate; and, the British right being now turned, the regulars, some 200 in number, who had been so gallantly defending the left, retired to effect a junction with the garrison at Fort Rupert, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, 1st West India Regiment. This was effected by Captain O'Connell, although wounded, in four days, by the mountain paths, while Brigadier-General Prevost arrived at the same place by the Carib Trail.[30] In the meantime the town of Roseau had been set on fire, and the whole of it destroyed, except a few small houses belonging to free negroes. The French, after blowing up the fortifications, embarking some guns and spiking others, re-embarked; taking with them such of their prisoners as were regulars, and levying a contribution of £5500 upon the inhabitants, and on February 27th the force set sail for Guadaloupe. The French in their attack on Point Michell had lost over 300 men, and in selecting that spot for landing they had displayed a most astonishing ignorance of the locality, for, if a force had at once been put ashore between Point Michell and Fort Young at Roseau, the British could hardly have ventured upon a serious defence. The loss sustained by the British regulars was 21 killed, 21 wounded, and 8 prisoners. The loss of the militia is not stated, but was considerable, the French accounts fixing it at 200. The following despatch addressed to Earl Camden, K.G., one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, by Lieutenant-General Sir William Myers, Bart., commanding the troops in the Windward and Leeward Islands, gives the official account of this affair: "BARBADOES, _March 9th, 1805_. "MY LORD, "I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship a copy of a despatch from Brigadier-General Prevost, dated Dominica, 1st of March, 1805. The details contained therein are so highly reputable to the Brigadier-General and the small portion of troops employed against so numerous an enemy, that I have great satisfaction in recommending that their gallant exertions may be laid before His Majesty. "The zeal and talent manifested by the Brigadier-General upon this occasion, it is my duty to present for the Royal consideration, and at the same time I beg to be permitted to express the high sense I entertain of the distinguished bravery of His Majesty's troops and the militia of the colony employed on that service. "The vigorous resistance which the enemy have experienced, and the loss which they have sustained in this attack, must evince to him, that however inferior our numbers were on this occasion, British troops are not to be hostilely approached with impunity; and had not the town of Roseau been accidentally destroyed by fire, we should have little to regret, and much to exult in. "Your Lordship will perceive by the Returns that our loss in men, compared to that of the enemy, is but trifling; but I have sincerely to lament that of Major Nunn, of the 1st West India Regiment, whose wound is reported to be of a dangerous kind; he is an excellent man, and a meritorious officer. "I have, etc., (Signed) "W. MYERS, "Lieutenant-General." "Copy". "HEAD QUARTERS, PRINCE RUPERT'S, "DOMINICA, _March 1st, 1805_. "SIR, "About an hour before the dawn of day on the 22nd ultimo, an alarm was fired from Scot's Head, and soon after a cluster of ships was discovered off Roseau. As our light increased, I made out five large ships, three frigates, two brigs, and small craft under British colours, a ship of three decks carrying a flag at the mizen. The frigates ranging too close to Fort Young, I ordered them to be fired on, and soon after nineteen large barges, full of troops, appeared coming from the lee of the other ships, attended and protected by an armed schooner, full of men, and seven other boats carrying carronades. The English flag was lowered, and that of the French hoisted. "A landing was immediately attempted on my left flank, between the town of Roseau and the post of Cachecrow. The light infantry of the 1st West India Regiment were the first to march to support Captain Smart's company of militia, which throughout the day behaved with great gallantry; it was immediately supported by the grenadiers of the 46th Regiment. The first boats were beat off, but the schooner and one of the brigs coming close on shore to cover the landing, compelled our troops to occupy a better position in a defile leading to the town. At this moment I brought up the grenadiers of the St. George's Regiment of militia, and soon after the remainder of the 46th Regiment, and gave over to Major Nunn these brave troops with orders not to yield to the enemy one inch of ground. Two field-pieces (an amuzette and a six-pounder) were brought into action for their support under the command of Sergeant Creed of the 46th Regiment, manned by additional gunners and sailors. These guns, and a twenty-four-pounder from Melville battery, shook the French advancing column by the execution they did. "I sent two companies of St. George's Militia, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Constable, and a company of the 46th, to prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of the position occupied by Major Nunn. "On my return I found the _Majestueuse_, of 120 guns, lying opposite to Fort Young, pouring into the town and batteries her broadsides, followed by the other seventy-fours and frigates doing the same. "Some artillery, several captains of merchantmen with their sailors, and the militia artillery, manned five twenty-four-pounders and three eighteens at the fort, and five twenty-fours at Melville battery, and returned an uninterrupted fire; from the first post red-hot shot were thrown. At about 10 o'clock, a.m., Major Nunn, most unfortunately for His Majesty's service, whilst faithfully executing the order I had given him, was wounded, I fear mortally. "This did not discourage the brave fellows. Captain O'Connell, of the 1st West India Regiment, received the command and a wound almost at the same time; however, the last circumstance could not induce him to give up the honour of the first, and he continued on the field animating his men and resisting the repeated charges of the enemy until about one o'clock, when he obliged them to retire from their position with great slaughter. It is impossible for me to do justice to the merit of that officer; you will, I doubt not, favourably report his conduct to His Majesty, and at the same time that of Captain James of the 46th Regiment, and Captain Archibald Campbell, who commanded the grenadiers of that corps. "Foiled and beat off on the left, the right flank was attempted, and a considerable force was landed near Morne Daniel. The regulars, not exceeding 200, employed on the left in opposing the advance of three columns, consisting of upwards of 2000 men, could afford me no reinforcement; I had only the right wing of the St. George's Regiment of militia to oppose them, of about a hundred men. They attacked with spirit, but unfortunately the frigates had stood in so close to the shore to protect this disembarkation, that after receiving a destructive fire, they fell back and occupied the heights of Woodbridge Estate. Then it was that a column of the enemy marched up to Morne Daniel, and stormed the redoubt defended by a small detachment, which, after an obstinate resistance, they carried. On my left, Captain O'Connell was gaining ground, notwithstanding a fresh supply of troops and several field-pieces, which had been brought on shore by the enemy. I now observed a large column climbing the mountains to get in his rear. "The town, which had been for some time in flames, was only protected by a light howitzer and a six-pounder to the right, supported by part of the light company of the St. George's Regiment. The enemy's large ships in Woodbridge Bay, out of the reach of my guns, my right flank gained, and my retreat to Prince Rupert's almost cut off, I determined on one attempt to keep the sovereignty of the island, which the excellent troops I had, warranted. I ordered the militia to remain at the posts, except such as were inclined to encounter more hardships and severe service; and Captain O'Connell, with the 46th Regiment, under the command of Captain James, and the light company of the 1st West India Regiment, were directed to make a forced march to Prince Rupert's. I then allowed the President to enter into terms for the town of Roseau; and then demanded from the French general that private property should be respected, and that no wanton or disgraceful pillage should be allowed; this done, only attended by Brigade-Major Prevost, and Deputy Quartermaster-General Hopley, of the militia forces, I crossed the island, and in twenty-four hours, with the aid of the inhabitants and the exertions of the Caribs, I got to this garrison on the 23rd. After four days' continued march through the most difficult country, I might almost say, existing, Captain O'Connell joined me at Prince Rupert's, himself wounded, and bringing in his wounded, with a few of the Royal Artillery, and the precious remainder of the 46th and the 1st West India Light Company. "I had no sooner got to the fort than I ordered cattle to be driven in, and took measures for getting a store of water from the river and the bay. I found my signals to Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Broughton, of the 1st West India Regiment, made from Roseau soon after the enemy had landed, had been received, and that in consequence he had made the most judicious arrangements his garrison would allow for the defence of this important post. "On the 25th, I received the summons[31] I have now the honour to transmit, from General of Division La Grange, and without delay sent the reply[32] you will find accompanying it. "On the 27th the enemy's cruisers hovered about the Head; however, the _Centaur's_ tender, _Vigilante_, came in and was saved by our guns. I landed Mr. Henderson, her commander, and crew, to assist in the defence we were prepared to make. "As far as can be collected, the enemy had about 4000 men on board, and the whole of their force was compelled to disembark before they gained one inch of ground. "I entrust this despatch to Captain O'Connell, to whom I beg to refer you. His services entitle him to consideration. I am much indebted to the zeal and discernment of Fort-Adjutant Gualy, who was very accessary to the due execution of my orders. "I cannot pass unnoticed the very soldierlike conduct of Lieutenant Wallis, of the 46th Regiment, to whom I had entrusted the post of Cachecrow, or Scot's Head. On perceiving our retreat he spiked his guns, destroyed his ammunition, and immediately commenced his march to join me at Prince Rupert's with his detachment. Nor that of Lieutenant Schaw of the same corps, who acted as an officer of artillery and behaved with uncommon coolness and judgment while on the battery, and great presence of mind in securing the retreat of the additional gunners belonging to the 46th Regiment. On the 27th, after levying a contribution on Roseau, the enemy re-embarked, and hovered that day and the next about this post. This morning, the French fleet is seen off the south end of Guadaloupe, under easy sail. "Our loss--you will perceive by the returns I have the honour to transmit--was inconsiderable when compared with that of the enemy, which included several officers of rank and about 300 others. "I have, etc., (Signed) "GEORGE PREVOST. "Lieutenant-General Sir William Myers, "Bart., etc., etc., etc. "P.S.--As I find I cannot spare Captain O'Connell from the duty of this garrison, I must refer you to the master of a neutral vessel, who has engaged to deliver this despatch." * * * * * Extract from Minutes of the House of Assembly, Dominica, dated Roseau, 2nd May, 1805: "Resolved, that the Committee of Public Assembly be instructed to write to England for a monument to be erected to the memory of Major Nunn, of the 1st West India Regiment, who gallantly fell on Feb. 22nd, 1805. "Resolved, that the thanks of this House be presented to Captain O'Connell, of the 1st West India Regiment, and that the sum of one hundred guineas be appropriated for the purchase of a sword for him. "Resolved, that the thanks of this House be presented to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the 1st West India Regiment, for their gallant conduct on the same occasion." Similar sentiments were expressed, and conveyed to the regiment, at a meeting held on May 23rd, 1805, at the London Tavern, Lord Penrhyn president. Captain O'Connell was promoted to Major, 5th West India Regiment, and Lieutenant Winkler to Captain, vice O'Connell. Return of the killed and wounded in the actions of the 22nd of February, 1805, at Point Michell, Morne Daniel, and Roseau, in the island of Dominica. 1st West India Regiment--9 rank and file, killed; 1 field officer, 1 captain, and 8 rank and file, wounded. For its services on this occasion the 1st West India Regiment was permitted to inscribe the word "Dominica" on its colours. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 29: This does not appear in Brigadier-General Prevost's letter, but is mentioned in that of General La Grange.] [Footnote 30: "During a continued march of four days, through an exceedingly difficult country, that brave officer (Captain O'Connell) did not leave behind even one of his wounded men."--BRYAN EDWARDS.] [Footnote 31: A summons to surrender.] [Footnote 32: A refusal.] CHAPTER XI. THE HURRICANE AT DOMINICA, 1806--THE REDUCTION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. CROIX, 1807--THE RELIEF OF MARIE-GALANTE, 1808. In 1806, Dominica was visited by a terrific hurricane, from which the 1st West India Regiment suffered some loss. On the afternoon of the 9th of September the sky became totally overcast, and masses of clouds gathered over the island. About 7 p.m. a tremendous thunderstorm commenced, accompanied by violent gusts of wind, which increased in strength, until by 10 p.m., every vessel in the harbour, to the number of sixteen, was either sunk or driven ashore. The rain fell in such torrents that the whole of the barracks on Morne Bruce, where a company-of the 1st West India Regiment was stationed, and nearly the whole of those on Morne Cabot, were carried away, and three men of the 1st West India Regiment were killed, and several injured. Every house from the River Mohaut to Prince Rupert's was overthrown, and the town of Portsmouth was laid in ruins. In Roseau, 131 persons were killed or wounded, the greatest mischief being there caused by the overflowing of the river, which inundated the town in all directions, every house which obstructed its passage being swept away by the torrent. "No pen," says a witness of the scene, "can paint the horrors of that dreadful night! The tremendous noise occasioned by the wind and rain--the roaring of the waters, together with the shock of an earthquake, which was sensibly felt about midnight--the shrieks of the poor sufferers crying out for assistance--the terror of those who in their houses heard them, and dared not open a door or window to give succour, and who momentarily expected to share the same fate, formed a scene which can hardly be conceived, and is still more difficult to be described." The regiment remained stationed at Dominica until the month of April, 1807, when it was removed to Barbados, with the exception of four companies which had been detached to Grenada and Tobago, and which soon after rejoined head-quarters at Barbados. In this year also, the establishment of West India regiments was augmented by a second lieutenant-colonel, Major Samuel Huskisson, from the 8th Foot, being appointed the second lieutenant-colonel of the 1st West India Regiment by the _Gazette_ of the 2nd of June. A war having broken out with Denmark, the British Ministers, early in September, 1807, sent out orders to the Commander of the Forces in the West Indies, to reduce the Danish islands of St. John, St. Thomas and Saint Croix, and the 1st West India Regiment, with the other troops stationed at Barbados, embarked in men-of-war under General Bowyer, on the 15th of December, to proceed on this duty. On the 19th of December the expedition reached Sandy Point, Saint Christopher's, and receiving some troops from that garrison, sailed again the same day; arriving at St. Thomas, where it was joined by reinforcements from Antigua and Grenada, on the 21st. A summons to surrender was at once sent to the Governor, Von Scholten, the terms of which he accepted next day, and surrendered the islands of St. Thomas and St. John with their dependencies. A small garrison of the 70th Regiment being left at St. Thomas, the 1st division of the troops, in which was included the 1st West India Regiment, sailed on the evening of the 23rd for Saint Croix. The expedition arrived off the town of Frederickstadt on the 24th; and the Governor having capitulated on the 25th, the troops were landed, and the forts and batteries taken possession of, a royal salute being fired as the British colours were hoisted. Next night, the garrison and town of Christianstadt, on the other side of the island, were also occupied. The 1st West India Regiment during this expedition was commanded by Major Nathaniel Blackwell; and after the surrender of Saint Croix, it at once returned to Barbados. In January, 1808, three companies were detached from Barbados to Antigua, and one to Tobago; the detachment at Antigua rejoining head-quarters in October of the same year. The next service seen by the regiment was at Marie-Galante,[33] in 1808. Deseada and Marie-Galante, the former a few miles to the north-east, and the latter a few miles to the south-east of Guadaloupe, had been captured by Captain Selby and a naval force in March, 1808. Deseada, the French Governor of Guadaloupe allowed to remain unmolested; but Marie-Galante was so good a privateer station, and its loss also brought the British so much more nearly in contact with him, that he determined to try to recover it. The attempt was made on the 23rd of August, by Colonel Cambriel, who, with about 200 men in seventeen boats stole over from Guadaloupe and landed near Grand Bourg. They were preparing to attack the battery when they were espied from the _Circe_; thirty of whose seamen hurried on shore, threw themselves into the battery before the French could reach it, and gave them such a warm reception as to compel them to retreat. The enemy's boats were seized by the _Circe_, and the escape of the French being thus cut off, they retired to the centre of the island. Intelligence of their landing was forwarded to General Beckwith, at Barbados, who lost no time in sending Lieutenant-Colonel Blackwell[34] with three companies of the 1st West India Regiment against them. The following is Lieutenant-Colonel Blackwell's report to General Beckwith: "GRAND BOURG, MARIE-GALANTE, "_Sept. 4th, 1808_. "SIR, "I have the honour to inform you that the troops which you were pleased to place under my command arrived here, in H.M. Ship _Captain_, on the 29th of August; and finding from Captain Pigot, commander of this island, that the French troops were strongly posted within three miles of Grand Bourg, I was immediately landed with the three companies of the 1st West India Regiment; and having obtained an increase of my force, of about 140 marines, and some sailors, together with a six-pounder, from the army schooner _Maria_, I lost no time in fulfilling the instructions I received from you. "I have now much satisfaction in reporting, that after a pursuit of the enemy for five days and nights, and having during that period had four engagements with him, in each of which he was repulsed, and obliged to make most precipitate retreat, leaving behind him arms, ammunition, etc., at every different post that had been attacked, and at one place in particular, nine mariners (who had been taken prisoners on the first landing of the enemy), and at another, a brass six-pounder, which had only arrived from Guadaloupe two days, and which was found spiked; by constantly marching and harassing him, we found, on coming within one hundred yards of his front yesterday morning, that he was willing to surrender, and sending out a flag of truce, I granted the following terms: 'That the French troops might march out from the ground they then occupied with the honours of war, but that they should lay down their arms in front of the troops, and surrender themselves as prisoners of war, and that all prisoners taken since their arrival in the island should be immediately returned.' I was, however, much astonished to find that Colonel Cambriel, who had commanded the army, was not present when they surrendered, but I have since understood that he had quitted it the morning previous, and had returned to Guadaloupe, but I have some reason to imagine he is still in this island. "The field-piece I had taken from the army schooner became useless after the first day, from the tract of the country the enemy led us over; I therefore sent it back to Grand Bourg, and at the same time I directed fifty marines to occupy the post of Delosses, three miles from town, which kept up the communication with the interior of the island. "In our several attacks, it gives me pleasure to say that we have had only two privates wounded, one of them since dead. The loss on the part of the enemy I have not ascertained, but imagine it to have been considerable. I am sorry to mention to you that a gentleman from Antigua, of the name of Brown, being a prisoner of war, was in rear of the enemy's picket when attacked on the evening of the 2nd instant, and received a mortal wound. The force which has been brought from Guadaloupe I have not yet exactly found out, but from all accounts must have been above 200 rank and file. "From the return I send herewith, you will find that 162 privates have laid down their arms, and there are at present many who have been sick dispersed through the country. The inhabitants that joined were very considerable. I believe their number amounted to from four to five hundred.... "I have likewise to return my best thanks to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates who were under my command, for the cheerfulness with which they went through the long and harassing marches, and I think it is a duty incumbent upon me to mention to you their extreme good conduct since they have been in the field. "I have the honour to be, etc., (Signed) "NATH. BLACKWELL, "Lieut.-Colonel 4th W.I. Regiment." "Return of prisoners who surrendered on the 3rd of September, 1808: 4 captains, 8 lieutenants, 162 rank and file, 1 staff. "Return of arms, ammunition, and accoutrements taken and destroyed from 30th August to 3rd September: 1 field-piece, 450 firelocks, 200 belts and pouches, and 24 kegs of ball-cartridge. "Ammunition for field-piece not ascertained." On this occasion was captured the drum-major's staff of the French 26th Regiment (now in the possession of the 1st West India Regiment), bearing the motto: "La République Française une et indivisible. Battalion 26me," and surmounted by the cap of Liberty. Of the companies of the regiment employed on this service, one was the grenadier company under Captain Cassidy, another the light company under Captain Winkler, and the third a battalion company under Lieutenant Nixon. On the return of the detachment to Barbados it was formed up on a garrison parade at St. Ann's on the right of the regiment; and Lieutenant-General Beckwith, after thanking Lieutenant-Colonel Blackwell and the officers and men engaged for their meritorious exertions, presented the former with a sword. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 33: See map of Guadaloupe.] [Footnote 34: Major Nathaniel Blackwell, 1st West India Regiment, was, by the _Gazette_ of May 24th, 1808, promoted Lieutenant-Colonel of the 4th West India Regiment, for his services at the reduction of the Danish West India Islands. At this time he had not yet joined his new corps.] CHAPTER XII. THE CAPTURE OF MARTINIQUE, 1809[35]--THE CAPTURE OF GUADALOUPE, 1810. The 1st West India Regiment continued doing duty at Barbados until January 27th, 1809, when eight companies joined the expedition against the Island of Martinique. The interception, in the summer of 1808, of some despatches from the Governor of Martinique to the French Ministry asking for supplies and additional troops, and describing the condition of the island as almost defenceless, first directed the attention of the British Government to the reduction of this French colony. Preparations for the attack began at Barbados in November, 1808, the expedition assembled at Carlisle Bay, Barbados, in January, 1809, and on the 28th of that month the force sailed for Martinique. The expeditionary force was under the command of Lieutenant-General Beckwith, and consisted of two divisions, each of two brigades, the 1st Division being commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, and the 2nd Division by Major-General Maitland. The 1st West India Regiment was included in the 1st Division. Six battalion companies, with the 13th and 8th Regiments, formed the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Colville; while the grenadier company (Captain Winkler), with the 7th, 23rd, and a light battalion, in which latter was the light company, 1st West India Regiment, formed the 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Hoghton. On the 30th of January the expedition arrived off the Island of Martinique, and on the evening of the 31st the troops disembarked, the 1st Division landing at Malgré Tout, Bay Robert, and the 2nd near St. Luce and Point Solomon on the opposite side of the island. The 1st Division marched the same night to De Manceaux Estate. The roads were in a wretched condition from the rains, and the horses being done up from the length of time which they had been on board ship, the troops were obliged to drag the guns themselves. After a short rest the force continued its march to Papin's, which it reached at midnight. Here the main body of the 1st Division halted for the night, while the grenadier company of the 1st West India Regiment, with the 7th Regiment, pushed on to the heights on De Bork's Estate. On the day following they were joined by the 23rd and the light infantry battalion, and advanced to the heights of Morne Bruno, the French skirmishers falling back slowly before them, while keeping up a smart fire. From this point the grenadier company, 1st West India Regiment, advanced with the 7th, the 23rd being in support, against the French position on the heights of Desfourneaux. The enemy, under General De Hondelot, were well placed on the crest of the ridge, with a mountain torrent in their front, and a strong force of artillery drawn up on their left flank. The flank companies of the 7th were ordered to turn the French right, while the light battalion, with which was the light company, 1st West India Regiment, moved against his left, and the grenadiers of the 1st West India Regiment, with the remainder of the 7th, advanced against the centre. The troops rushed forward, fording the stream under a heavy fire, and attacking the enemy, who was greatly superior in numbers, with the bayonet, drove him from his position. From this point, with the co-operation of the 2nd Brigade, the French were beaten back to the heights of Surirey, where they made a determined stand, but by a brilliant charge, the British carried the hill, and forced them to take shelter under the guns of their redoubts.[36] The troops encamped for the night on the position which they had won, while the enemy took up a second position, strengthened by two redoubts connected by an entrenchment. Next morning, February 2nd, the British made a movement to turn the French right, and, being much annoyed by the enemy's advanced redoubt, the light battalion and the 7th Regiment were ordered to take it. They were repulsed with considerable loss, but, on the following night, the 2nd division of the British having come up, the enemy abandoned the work and spiked the guns, retiring with all his force to Fort Bourbon, or Desaix. While the 1st Division had thus been engaged at Morne Bruno and Surirey, the 2nd had been equally successful. Upon landing at St. Luce, a detachment of the Royal York Rangers took possession of the battery at Point Solomon, on the south side of Fort Royal Bay, thus securing a safe anchorage for the fleet. The same corps then pushed on and invested Pigeon Island, a small fortified island which commanded the anchorage in the upper part of the bay, and which had to be captured before any attempt could be made against the formidable fortresses of Bourbon and Fort République. Batteries were erected on Morne Vanier, from which Pigeon Island was shelled with such success that the garrison surrendered. The way being now open for the fleet, preparations were commenced for the capture of Fort Bourbon. It was decided to attempt to take the place by storm, and on February 4th, the 1st Division, which, under Sir George Prevost, had marched over from Surirey, advanced to the assault, the grenadier companies forming the "forlorn hope." The fire from the enemy's guns was, however, so heavy and well-directed that the attempt failed, notwithstanding the most conspicuous gallantry on the part of the British, and the troops retired with a loss of 330 killed and wounded, the grenadier company of the 1st West India Regiment having suffered heavily. General Villaret, the French commander, supposing Fort Bourbon to be impregnable, abandoned Fort République, leaving in it 4 mortars and 38 heavy guns, and collected his entire force, some 3000 in number, in Fort Bourbon. Being well supplied with food and ammunition, he resolved quietly to wait in the citadel; confident that the British army would gradually melt away from the sickness caused by the heavy rains, which had now set in and fell incessantly. On the 7th February a British force entered by night the abandoned Fort République; and, though the work was furiously bombarded from Fort Bourbon, in two days the guns which had been left in the fort were unspiked and the fire returned. In the meantime other batteries had been in course of construction, and by February 18th Fort Bourbon was completely invested. The enemy were then summoned to surrender, but General Villaret declaring that he would rather bury himself under the ruins of the citadel, the bombardment commenced. The British batteries, six in number, opened fire simultaneously at 3.30 p.m. on Sunday, February 19th, and the fire was hotly returned. At Colville's battery, where were four companies of the 1st West India Regiment, the brushwood in front of the guns was set on fire, and was only extinguished with much difficulty, and a terrific fire was kept up on both sides. On February 20th the enemy ceased firing during the whole day, recommencing again on February 21st; but on the 22nd a shell from our batteries having blown up the magazine, the enemy sent out terms of capitulation. These were rejected, but on the 24th the place surrendered; the garrison, 2700 in number, became prisoners of war, and three eagles remained as trophies in the British hands. The following general orders were issued during this brilliant campaign: 1. Morne Bruno, February 3rd, 1809.--"The benefit the advanced corps, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, have produced to His Majesty's service, from the gallant and successful attack made upon Morne Bruno and the heights of Surirey, on the 1st instant, by the 1st Brigade of the army and the light battalion, under Brigadier-General Hoghton, demands from the Commander of the Forces a reiteration of his acknowledgments, and his assurance to the brigadier-general, and to the commanding officer of the Royal Fusiliers, of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and of the light battalion, also to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of those regiments, that he will not fail to lay their meritorious exertions before the King. The exertions of all the corps engaged yesterday were conspicuous; and, although the state of the works possessed by the enemy did not admit of their being carried by the bayonet, which rendered it the general's duty to direct the corps employed to retire, they manifested a spirit and determination which, when tempered by less impetuosity, will lead to the happiest results." 2. February 27th, 1809.--"The grenadier company, with a detachment of the battalion of the 1st West India Regiment, who were engaged with the enemy both on the 1st and 2nd of February, 1809, having been omitted to be mentioned in the general orders of February 3rd, referring to those operations, the Commander of the Forces takes the present occasion to acknowledge their services. From the day of the regiment landing, to that of the enemy's surrender, it served with the greatest credit under all the disadvantages to which a West India regiment is exposed. The hard and severe work is generally performed by them, which the European soldiers could not undergo from the climate." During this campaign the 1st West India Regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tolley; and, in token of its services, it was permitted to retain two brass side-drums and five battle-axes, which it had captured from the enemy. The 1st West India Regiment continued to serve in Martinique till the 17th of May, 1809, when the head-quarters and six companies were removed to the Island of Trinidad. There they remained until the month of December following, when an expedition was formed for the reduction of Guadaloupe. Since the expulsion of the British in 1794, that island had enjoyed a period of tranquility; its armament had been considerably increased under successive governors, slavery had been re-established, and its harbours swarmed with privateers, which preyed upon British commerce. The incessant annoyance and loss to our trade caused by these vessels, was a strong incentive for a descent upon the island. Added to this, it was a colony of considerable importance to France; the mother country depending, in a great measure, upon it for colonial produce. The British army was assembled at Prince Rupert's Bay, Dominica, where, on the 22nd of January, 1810, the flank companies of the 1st West India Regiment joined. The force was under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir George Beckwith, and was thus composed: 1ST DIVISION--MAJOR-GENERAL HISLOP. {Light Companies of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 3rd Brigade--Brig.-General { 6th, and 8th West India Regiments 500 Maclean {90th Foot 500 {8th West India Regiment 400 {Battalion made up of 13th and 63rd 4th Brigade--Brig.-General { Regiments 600 Skinner {York Light Infantry Volunteers 200 {4th West India Regiment 400 2ND DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL HARCOURT. {Light infantry 500 1st Brigade--Brig.-General {15th Foot 300 Harcourt {3rd West India Regiment 400 {Grenadiers of the 1st, 4th, and 8th 2nd Brigade--Brig.-General { West India Regiments 300 Barrow {25th Foot 600 {6th West India Regiment 350 RESERVE. {Grenadiers 300 5th Brigade--Brig.-General {Royal York Rangers 900 Wale {Royal Artillery 300 {Military Artificers 100 On the 23rd of January the fleet sailed from Dominica, the 2nd Division being ordered to proceed to the Saintes, to prepare for disembarking near Basseterre, while the 1st Division and the Reserve made for the north-eastern quarter of that part of Guadaloupe which is called Cabesterre. The light infantry battalion of the 3rd Brigade effected its landing at 9 a.m. on the 28th of January, without opposition, at the Bay of St. Marie; and immediately possessed itself of the heights, so as to cover the disembarkation of the remainder of the 1st Division and the Reserve. The whole of the troops were landed about half-an-hour after noon, and the light infantry battalion was ordered forward as the advance guard of the division. It reached the village of Marigot about sunset, and crossing the river (called Rivière des Pères Blancs), halted in the mountains in the most advantageous position for maintaining itself during the night. The remainder of the division encamped at Marigot. The troops had marched this day with three days' cooked provisions in their havresacks. The Reserve remained at St. Marie to cover the landing of munitions and supplies. On the 29th of January, the troops were under arms an hour before daylight, and the light battalion, being again pushed to the front, reached Bannaniers by sunset. There the division encamped for the night, while the light companies of the 1st and 3rd West India Regiments were ordered to possess themselves of the strong pass of Lacasse, above the British position. On the same day, the 29th, the 2nd Division, after making a feint of disembarking at Trois Rivières to draw off the attention of the enemy, proceeded in the ships to the western side of the island. On the 30th of January, at daybreak, the 1st Division again advanced. Between 9 and 10 a.m. the light battalion, which was still leading, descended the heights on the side of Trois Rivières, and coming up with the rear of a detachment of the enemy, dispersed it after a short conflict. Pursuing its march it reached the open ground, or savannah, at Loriols Trois Rivières about 11 a.m., and there halted to allow the column to come up. The enemy's position was now in front, and consisted of a line of redoubts and entrenchments on the commanding heights of Petrizel. Major-General Hislop at once made his dispositions for an attack on the following morning; the light battalion moving to the left, and the 4th Brigade, with the remainder of the 3rd, extending along the heights to the right. In the execution of this order, the light battalion, advancing along the high road towards the enemy's position, alarmed him to such a degree as to induce him to open fire from all his batteries and entrenched lines, not only from Petrizel, but also from his post at Dolé; from which he kept up for some time an incessant fire, without doing any other injury than killing one man, and wounding another. The troops took up their positions in the meantime without further inconvenience. Towards the close of the evening numbers of the enemy were seen ascending the mountains above their works at Petrizel. The heat this day had been excessive, and the country through which the troops marched exceedingly difficult, the strong pass of Trou au Chien lying in their way. The night closed in with heavy rain. On the 31st, at daylight, not a soul was to be seen near the enemy's works; and, it having been ascertained that they were evacuated, the light company of the 1st West India Regiment was ordered to march at noon and take possession. The 1st Division remained halted during the 1st of February, and on the 2nd, the light battalion, as advanced guard of the 4th Brigade, was ordered to march, by a very difficult ascent, to the centre of the Palmiste heights; while the remainder of the 3rd Brigade moved to the right of the same heights, by an easier route. The troops bivouacked on the heights for the night. While these operations had been going on, the 2nd Division had, at 10 a.m. on the 30th of January, disembarked at a bay to the northward of the village of Les Vieux Habitans and about three leagues to the north of the town of Basseterre. The troops gained the heights above the village after a slight skirmish, and encamped on the ground for the night. During the two succeeding days the 2nd Division was employed in bringing up guns to a height near Post Bellair. By the combined movements of the two divisions, General Ernouf, the French commander, was now, by the night of the 2nd of February, hemmed in at the extremity of the island between the sea and the British army. He had judiciously chosen his position, which was naturally strong, and which he had strengthened by all the artificial means in his power. He was posted on heights, his left supported by the mountains of Matouba, and every accessible point of his line covered by abattis and stockaded redoubts. In his front was a river, the passage of which, exceedingly difficult in itself, was rendered much more so by a detachment of troops stationed behind abattis. The ground also, between the river and the heights, was bushy and full of rugged rocks, and of course highly unfavourable to the march of the assailants. It was on the 3rd of February that the British troops were put in motion to dislodge him from his advantageous position. The 1st Division, soon after dawn, descended the north side of Palmiste, passed the river Gallion, and under a heavy fire from a battery at the bridge of Vozière, formed on the opposite heights, taking up a position so as to intercept the communication between the town of Basseterre and the enemy's camp. The 2nd Division had, during the night of the 2nd, pushed forward the grenadiers of the 2nd Brigade and a detachment of the 6th West India Regiment to occupy the ridge Beaupère St. Louis, on the upper part of which the strong post of Bellair was situated. On the morning of the 3rd the enemy perceived what had been done, and moved out in force to dislodge the British. The 1st Brigade was immediately ordered up in support; but, before it could gain the heights, a smart action had taken place, and it only arrived in time to complete the defeat of the enemy. In this engagement the grenadier company of the 1st West India Regiment lost 2 rank and file killed, Captain Cassidy and 9 rank and file wounded. During the remainder of the day the troops of the 2nd Division were moved up to Bellair, and the whole army remained on the ground during the night. Next morning, the 4th, the British advanced to the final assault of the position. The 1st Division was charged with the operations on the right, while the task of turning the left was entrusted to Brigadier-General Wale with the Reserve. At dawn of day the light company of the 1st West India Regiment and the York Light Infantry were ordered to advance to the enemy's post at the bridge of Vozière. For some time they were unseen, but a picket of the enemy, moving along the opposite side of the ravine, discovered them; and, opening fire, a general discharge soon followed, in the face of which the British rushed forward and carried the work. Almost at the same moment, Brigadier-General Wale, who, with the Reserve, had forded the Gallion River, and under a heavy fire ascended the heights, carried the enemy's works on the left; and General Ernouf's situation had become so critical, that he at once hoisted flags of truce in the works which he still retained at Matouba. On the 5th of February, the terms of capitulation were signed, the French marching out with military honours, and becoming prisoners of war. The British loss was 52 officers and men killed, 250 wounded, and 7 missing. The French lost 600 killed, and 2000 prisoners. Captain H. Downie, of the 1st West India Regiment, was mentioned in despatches for gallantry at the storming of the work at the bridge of Vozière. The following general order was published, dated Beau Vallon, Guadaloupe, 6th Feb., 1810: "The enemy are now prisoners of war, to be sent to England, and not to serve until duly exchanged. Thus through the exertions and general co-operation of the fleet and the army, has been effected the important conquest of this colony in nine days from the landing of the 1st Division. The Commander of the Forces returns his public thanks to the officers of all ranks for their meritorious exertions, and to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers for the cheerfulness with which they have undergone the fatigues of a march, difficult in its nature, through the strongest country in the world, and the spirit which they have manifested upon all occasions to close with the enemy." In this campaign, it may be observed, all the hard work had fallen to the lot of the 1st Division, and especially to that of the light infantry battalion of the 3rd Brigade, which had, by forced marches, moved across the whole breadth of the island, from St. Marie to the neighbourhood of Basseterre, over a wild and broken country, in six days. For their services at the capture of Guadaloupe, Captains Cassidy and Winkler were appointed brigade-majors at Trinidad and Grenada respectively; and the words "Martinique" and "Guadaloupe" were inscribed on the colours of the regiment, "as a mark of royal favour and approbation of its gallant conduct at the capture of those islands in 1809 and 1810." On the completion of this service the flank companies rejoined head-quarters at Trinidad, as did the two companies detached at Martinique and the two at Barbados. The whole regiment was then stationed in Trinidad, seven companies being at St. Joseph's and three at Orange Grove. This arrangement lasted until March, 1814, when the head-quarters and four companies were moved to Martinique, four companies to St. Lucia, and two to Dominica. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 35: This island had been restored to France by the Treaty of Amiens.] [Footnote 36: The grenadier company of the 1st West India Regiment lost 1 rank and file, killed; 1 drummer, 18 rank and file, wounded; 1 subaltern, missing.] CHAPTER XIII. THE EXPEDITION TO NEW ORLEANS, 1814-15. In July, 1814, the 1st West India Regiment was removed to Guadaloupe, except two companies detached to St. Martin's and Marie-Galante, and remained so stationed until it was selected to take part in the expedition to New Orleans. In June, 1812, the United States of America had declared war against Great Britain, Washington had been captured by the British on July 24th, 1813, and the war had been carried on with varying success until towards the close of the year 1814. In October of that year an expedition to New Orleans was decided upon; the force was to rendezvous at Negril Bay, Jamaica, and for that place the 1st West India Regiment embarked at Point à Prène, Guadaloupe, on November 14th, 1814. Lieutenant-Colonel Whitby, who had for the first time joined the regiment on the previous day, was then in command. The assembly of the fleet, and the concentration of troops at a point so near to their own coast, had aroused the suspicions of the Americans; and the treachery of an official in the garrison office at Jamaica enabled them to receive positive information as to the aim and destination of the expedition. This official communicated the intelligence to an American trader residing in Kingston, and the latter at once sailed in a coasting schooner for Pensacola; where General Jackson, who commanded the United States army of the South, was on the point of marching to the relief of St. Mary's, then being attacked by a naval force under Rear-Admiral Cockburn. The American general, upon learning of the proposed expedition, at once marched to the Mississippi, concentrated a force of 13,000 men in and around New Orleans, and threw up works on either side of the river to defend the passage in the neighbourhood of the town. On the 26th of November, 1814, the British fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir A. Cochrane, having on board a force of some 5000 men under Major-General Keane, sailed from Negril Bay and arrived off the Chandeleur Islands near the entrance of Lake Borgne, on December 10th. "To reduce the forts which command the navigation of the Mississippi was regarded as a task too difficult to be attempted, and for any ships to pass without their reduction seemed impossible. Trusting, therefore, that the object of the enterprise was unknown to the Americans, Sir Alexander Cochrane and General Keane determined to effect a landing somewhere on the banks of Lake Borgne, and pushing directly on, to take possession of the town before any effectual preparation could be made for its defence. With this view the troops were removed from the larger into the lighter vessels, and these, under convoy of such gun-brigs as the shallowness of the water would float, began on the 13th to enter Lake Borgne."[37] The Americans, however, being well acquainted with what was taking place, opposed the passage of the lake with five large cutters, each armed with six heavy guns, and these were immediately attacked by the smaller craft of the British. Avoiding a serious engagement, they retired into the shoal water where they could only be attacked by boats, and owing to the delay in getting together a sufficiently powerful flotilla, it was not till the 15th that they were captured, and the navigation of the lake cleared. The vessels of a lighter draught having all run aground in a vain endeavour to pass up the lake, the troops were embarked in boats to carry them up to Pine Island, a distance of thirty miles. "To be confined for so long a time as the prosecution of this voyage would require, in one posture, was of itself no very agreeable prospect; but the confinement was but a trifling misery when compared with that which arose from the change in the weather. Instead of a constant bracing frost, heavy rains, such as an inhabitant of England cannot dream of, and against which no cloak could furnish protection, began. In the midst of these were the troops embarked in their new and straitened transports, and each division, after an exposure of ten hours, landed upon a small desert spot of earth, called Pine Island, where it was determined to collect the whole army, previous to its crossing over to the main. "Than this spot it is scarcely possible to imagine any place more completely wretched. It was a swamp, containing a small space of firm ground at one end, and almost wholly unadorned with trees of any sort or description. The interior was the resort of waterfowl; and the pools and creeks with which it was intercepted abounded in dormant alligators. "Upon this miserable desert the army was assembled, without tents or huts, or any covering to shelter them from the inclemency of the weather.... After having been exposed all day to the cold and pelting rain, we landed upon a barren island, incapable of furnishing even fuel enough to supply our fires. To add to our miseries, as night closed, the rain generally ceased, and severe frosts set in, which, congealing our wet clothes upon our bodies, left little animal warmth to keep the limbs in a state of activity; and the consequence was, that many of the wretched negroes, to whom frost and cold were altogether new, fell fast asleep and perished before morning." By December 21st the whole army was collected at Pine Island, and next day it was formed into three brigades, the 1st West India Regiment with the 21st and 44th Regiments composing the 2nd Brigade. The 1st West India Regiment, which had left Negril Bay 500 strong, was now so reduced by mortality and sickness that barely 400 men were in a condition to take the field. The cold was intense, and, considering the latitude, 29° N., almost incredible. It appears that when the regiment left Jamaica no attempt was made to furnish the men with warm clothing, and their sufferings from this cause, they being all natives of the tropics, can be better imagined than described. During the voyage the regiment had been much scattered in small craft, where the soldiers were obliged to sleep on deck, exposed to the torrents of rain which fell by day and to the frosts that came on at night; and, being unaccustomed to the severity of an American winter, large numbers of them died from cold and exposure, the 5th West India Regiment suffering equally with the 1st. On December 22nd, the 1st Brigade (1600 strong) left Pine Island in boats to proceed to Bayou Catalan, a small creek eighty miles distant, which ran up from Lake Ponchartrain, through the middle of an extensive swamp, to within ten miles of New Orleans. Next day it landed at the mouth of the creek and advanced along an overgrown footpath on the banks of a canal, its movements being concealed by the tall reeds of the swamp. After being delayed by several small streams, it finally emerged from the morass, and entering the cultivated portion of the district took up a position across the main road from Proctorsville to New Orleans, the Mississippi being on its left and the swamp on its right. The exhausted troops, without any camp equipment, encamped for the night on the position. They were not, however, allowed to enjoy a long period of rest. Late in the evening a large schooner was observed stealing up the river, until she arrived opposite the bivouac fires around which the men were asleep; and before it could be ascertained whether she was a friend or foe, a broadside of grape swept through the camp. Having no artillery with them, and no means of attacking this formidable adversary, the troops sheltered themselves behind a bank. The night was as dark as pitch, and the only light to be seen was the flash of the enemy's guns as he continued to pour broadside after broadside into the camp. To add to the miseries of the condition of the British it began to rain heavily, and the earth, barely raised above the level of the river, became a vast puddle of slime, in which the soldiers were compelled to lie down to avoid the iron showers of grape that tore through the air. In the meantime the 2nd Brigade, with the 1st West India Regiment, had embarked in the remainder of the boats from Pine Island, about ten hours after the departure of the 1st Brigade, and after being exposed to an incessant downpour of rain during the night of December 22nd, had arrived at the mouth of the Bayou Catalan at nightfall on the 23rd. In the stillness of the night the sound of the guns of the schooner as she opened fire on the 1st Brigade were distinctly heard, and the troops, stimulated to fresh exertions, hurried on to the assistance of their comrades. As they drew nearer to the camp, the roll of musketry was heard, for the enemy had brought up a force of 5000 men from New Orleans, thinking to overwhelm the solitary 1st Brigade in the dark, and had unexpectedly opened a semicircle of fire upon it. The 2nd Brigade pushed on, and arrived just in time to prevent the Americans turning the British right, which, owing to their local knowledge, they had partially succeeded in doing. Coming up the canal bank, the 2nd Brigade in their turn took the enemy in flank, and a hand-to-hand conflict took place along the whole line, the British fighting with the energy of despair in the darkness and depths of the wood, and trusting to the bayonet alone. At last, about 3 a.m. on the 24th, the enemy retired, beaten off at all points. The losses in the night's engagement, and the deaths from cold and exposure that had occurred during the passage from Pine Island, had so thinned the already attenuated ranks of the 1st West India Regiment, that on the morning of the 24th, only 16 sergeants and 240 rank and file were available for duty. The officers serving with them were Major Weston, Captains Isles and Collins, Lieutenants McDonald, Morgan, Miller, Magee, Pilkington, McKenzie, and Dalomel. Notwithstanding the repulse which the Americans had experienced, the schooner continued to annoy our troops. She had anchored in the river beyond musket range, and, from that safe distance, continued to pour round-shot and grape into the camp, which had been increased on the evening of the 24th by the arrival of the 3rd Brigade, consisting of the 93rd and the 5th West India Regiment. On December 25th, Captain Collins, 1st West India Regiment, was killed by a shot from one of her guns, and there were several other casualties in the regiment. On that day, however, Sir Edward Pakenham, who had been sent out from England to assume the command, arrived, bringing some guns with him. During the night a battery was quietly thrown up opposite the schooner, and at daybreak a heavy cannonade was opened on her with red-hot shot. Before long she was set on fire, and blew up, while another vessel, which had come to her assistance, was compelled to cut and run up the river. The main obstacle to an advance being now removed, Sir Edward Pakenham divided the army into two columns. The right column, commanded by Major-General Gibbs, consisted of the 4th, 21st, 44th, and 1st West India Regiments; the left, under Major-General Keane, was composed of the 85th, 93rd, 95th, and 5th West India Regiments. In the meantime the American general had occupied a position facing the British, with the Mississippi on his right, and an impenetrable morass on his left, covering New Orleans, and rendering an advance on that town impossible, until his position had been carried by a front attack. The ground thus occupied, about 1000 yards in breadth, had been fortified so as to be almost impregnable. Three deep parallel ditches had been dug across the whole front; in rear of these was a strong loop-holed palisade, and several batteries had been erected so as to bring a cross-fire to bear upon the level plain, across which the British would have to advance to the assault. The right flank of the enemy was further protected by a strong work thrown up on the right bank of the Mississippi, which effectually prevented our gun-boats turning the position, should they succeed in entering the river. The night of December 26th was spent in continual alarms. Small bodies of American riflemen would creep down upon the pickets under cover of the darkness, and, firing upon the sentries, prevent the main body from obtaining any sleep. "Scarcely had the troops lain down, when they were aroused by sharp firing at the outposts, which lasted only till they were in order, and then ceased; but as soon as they had dispersed, and had once more addressed themselves to repose, the same cause of alarm returned, and they were again called to their ranks. Thus was the night spent in watching, or at best in broken and disturbed slumbers, than which nothing is more trying, both to the health and spirits of an army." At daybreak on the 27th, the pickets were withdrawn, and the British formed in order of attack. The right column took post near the skirts of the morass, throwing out skirmishers half-way across the plain to meet the American riflemen, while the left column drew up upon the road. It was a clear, frosty morning, and in this formation the troops advanced, the enemy's skirmishers slowly falling back before them. After an advance of about four miles the American position was sighted, and the British were saluted by a heavy cannonade from the batteries and shipping. "Scarce a ball passed over or fell short of its mark, but all striking full into the midst of our ranks, occasioned terrible havoc. The shrieks of the wounded, therefore, the crash of firelocks, and the fall of such as were killed, caused at first some little confusion; and what added to the panic was, that from the farm-houses beside which we stood bright flames suddenly burst forth. The Americans, expecting this attack, had filled them with combustibles for the purpose; and directing against them one or two guns, loaded with red-hot shot, in an instant set them on fire. The scene was altogether very sublime. A tremendous cannonade mowed down our ranks, and deafened us with its roar; whilst two large châteaux and their out-buildings almost scorched us with the flames, and blinded us with the smoke which they emitted." The troops having formed line, advanced to storm the enemy's works. The right column, after a sharp and victorious skirmish with an advanced body of the enemy, arrived at the edge of the marsh, through which it endeavoured in vain to penetrate. At the same time the left column reached the first ditch, or canal, and, being unable to cross it, there halted, the men endeavouring to shelter themselves from the enemy's fire in a wet ditch about knee-deep. The troops being unable to close with the enemy, Sir Edward Pakenham ordered them to retire. This was effected by battalions, the last corps moving off about noon; and by nightfall the army was encamped about two miles from the former camping-ground, and the same distance from the enemy's position. The 28th, 29th, and 30th, were occupied in bringing up guns from the fleet, on which duty the two West India Regiments and the seamen were employed. Major Weston and Lieutenant Magee, 1st West India Regiment, died from exposure and fatigue while engaged in this work. During the night of the 31st, six batteries, mounting in all 30 pieces of heavy cannon, were completed, at a distance of some 300 yards from the American lines, and at dawn the artillery duel commenced. During the whole of the day a heavy cannonade continued, till, towards evening, the British ammunition began to fail, and the fire in consequence to slacken. The fire of the Americans, on the other hand, increased; and, landing a number of guns from their vessels, they soon compelled the British to abandon their works. The enemy made no attempt to secure the guns, and during the night they were removed. Sir Edward Pakenham now decided to send a portion of his force across the river to attack the fort on the right bank and turn its guns upon the main position, whilst the remainder should at the same time make a general assault along the whole entrenchment. "But before this plan could be put into execution, it would be necessary to cut a canal across the entire neck of land from the Bayo de Catiline to the river, of sufficient depth and width to admit of boats being brought up from the lake. Upon this arduous undertaking were the troops immediately employed. Being divided into four companies, they laboured by turns, day and night.... The fatigue undergone during the prosecution of this attempt no words can sufficiently describe; yet it was pursued without repining, and at length, by unremitting exertions, they succeeded in effecting their purpose by the 6th of January." On January 1st H.M.S. _Vengeur_ arrived off the Chandeleur Islands with a convoy of transports, containing the 7th and 43rd Regiments, under Major-General Lambert, and these two battalions, each 800 strong, joined the army on the evening of January 6th. Next day the final arrangements were made. Colonel Thornton, with the 85th, the marines, and a body of seamen, in all 1400 men, were to cross the river immediately after dark, seize the batteries on the right bank, and at daylight commence firing on the enemy's line, which at the same moment was to be attacked by the remainder of the army. Major-General Keane, with the 95th, the light battalion, and the 1st and 5th[38] West India Regiments, was to attack the enemy's right, Major-General Gibbs, with the 4th, 21st, 44th, and 93rd, force the left, whilst Major-General Lambert was to hold the 7th and 43rd in reserve. In accordance with this scheme, Colonel Thornton at nightfall moved his force down to the brink of the river, but no boats had arrived. Hour after hour elapsed, and then at last only a sufficient number to transport 350 men made their appearance. With this small force Colonel Thornton determined to make the attempt, and pushed off. The loss of time which had occurred was however fatal, for day began to break before the boats had crossed the river, and though the troops carried the batteries by assault, after a short but obstinate resistance, the alarm had already been carried to the main body of the enemy, and they were thoroughly prepared for defence. The capture of the works on the right bank had, however, really made the front attack upon the American lines unnecessary; for the passage of the river now being clear, the armed boats from the canal could have passed up the stream and taken the whole of the position in rear. Had this been done, the American general would inevitably have been obliged to abandon his defences, falling back upon New Orleans, and we should have obtained possession of his formidable position without the loss of a man. Major-General Pakenham, however, still persevered in his original intention, and ordered the assault to take place. There had been so much mismanagement, that the advance, which should have taken place at dawn, did not commence till some time after daylight. The officer, whose duty it was to have prepared fascines for the purpose of filling the ditches, had neglected his work; and, at 2 a.m., the hour at which he had been directed to have them ready, not one was made.[39] Eventually an insufficient number were got together, but "the 44th, which was appointed to carry them, had either misunderstood or neglected their orders, and now headed the column of attack, without any means being provided for crossing the enemy's ditch, or scaling his ramparts." "The indignation of our brave leader on this occasion may be imagined, but cannot be described. Galloping towards Colonel Mullens, who led the 44th, he commanded him instantly to return for the fascines and ladders, but the opportunity of planting them was lost; and, though they were brought up, it was only to be scattered over the field by the frightened bearers, for our troops were by this time visible to the enemy. A dreadful fire was accordingly opened upon them, and they were mowed down by hundreds while they stood waiting for orders." The word being given to advance, the other regiments rushed on to the assault. On reaching the first ditch a horrible scene of carnage ensued; the few fascines that were thrown down floated away; there were no ladders, and the men, crowding to the edge of the ditch in the hope of closing with the enemy, fell in heaps. Many threw themselves into the water, and endeavoured to struggle across, but were shot down, or drowned. On the right, Major-General Keane's column had, though reduced to half its strength, succeeded in passing the ditches near their junction with the marsh, and pushed on desperately to the palisade. But to scale this obstacle without ladders was no easy matter. Some few, indeed, by climbing upon their comrades' shoulders succeeded in entering the works, but only to be at once shot down; while those who remained outside were exposed to a flanking fire that swept them down by scores. The two West India regiments distinguished themselves by their desperate valour, so much so, indeed, as to win encomiums from the American general, Jackson. On the left there had been a slight success, the 21st Regiment having stormed and taken a three-gun battery; but they were not supported, and the enemy, forcing their way into the work, retook it with great slaughter. In vain was the most obstinate courage displayed, the British were beaten off at all points. "Sir Edward saw how things were going, and did all that a general could do to rally his broken troops. Riding towards the 44th, which had returned to the ground, but in great disorder, he called out to Colonel Mullens to advance; but that officer had disappeared, and was not to be found. He therefore prepared to lead them himself, and had put himself at their head for that purpose, when he received a slight wound in the knee from a musket-ball, which killed his horse. Mounting another, he again headed the 44th, when a second ball took effect more fatally, and he dropped lifeless into the arms of his aide-de-camp." Major-Generals Keane and Gibb were, almost at the same moment, borne off the field severely wounded. "All was now confusion and dismay. Without leaders, ignorant of what was to be done, the troops first halted and then began to retire; till finally the retreat was changed into a flight, and they quitted the ground in the utmost disorder. But the retreat was covered in gallant style by the reserve. Making a forward motion, the 7th and 43rd presented the appearance of a renewed attack, by which the enemy were so much awed that they did not venture beyond their lines in pursuit of the fugitives." The British loss in this action was over 1000 killed; while the Americans stated their total loss to be 8 killed and 14 wounded. The 1st West India Regiment had 5 rank and file killed, 2 sergeants and 16 rank and file wounded. The following officers were wounded: Captain Isles, Lieutenants McDonald and Morgan, Ensigns Miller and Pilkington; and all, with the exception of Ensign Miller, severely so. Lieutenants McKenzie and Dalomel, the only remaining officers of the regiment with the expedition, were publicly thanked by Major-General Lambert for the courage which they had displayed, and the able manner in which they had withdrawn the remnant of their corps from the enemy's palisades. The capture of New Orleans being now despaired of in the shattered condition of the force, a retreat was determined upon. As it was impossible, without great risk, to return to the fleet by the route by which the army had come--there not being sufficient boats to embark more than a third of the force at a time--it was decided to make a road from the firm ground to the water's edge, a distance of many miles, through the very centre of a morass, where human foot had never before trodden. The difficulties experienced in making this road were immense. Sometimes for miles together no firm soil could be found, nor trees to furnish brushwood, and all that could be done was to lay down bundles of reeds on the morass. Nor were the enemy idle; there was constant skirmishing at the outposts, and a continual fire was kept up on the camp from a six-gun battery mounted on the bank of the river. After nine days' incessant toil the road was completed; the sick and wounded were first removed, then the baggage and stores, and on January 17th, the infantry alone remained in the camp. On the evening of the 18th it also began its retreat. Leaving the camp-fires burning as if no movement were taking place, battalion after battalion stole away in the darkness in the most profound silence. Marching all night over the fragile road of reeds, through which the men sank knee-deep into the mud, the army reached the borders of the lake at dawn. Boats were in readiness, and regiment after regiment embarked and set sail for the fleet, the only loss being the capture of a boat containing two officers and forty men of the 14th Light Dragoons. After remaining a few days at the Chandeleur Islands, the naval commander decided, in concert with Major-General Lambert, to make an attack on Mobile, and the fleet accordingly proceeded to that place. On February 12th, Fort Bowyer, which commanded the entrance to the harbour, surrendered, and a British garrison being left in the citadel, the fleet retired to Isle Dauphin, West Florida. Hostilities were then terminated by a treaty of peace, and the 1st West India Regiment returned to Barbados, where early in March, Brigade-Majors Cassidy and Winkler rejoined from the West India staff. The former succeeded to the majority, vice Weston, deceased.[40] FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 37: "The Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans," by an Officer.] [Footnote 38: According to Major-General Lambert's despatch to Earl Bathurst, the 5th West India Regiment was to cross the river with Colonel Thornton.] [Footnote 39: This officer was afterwards dismissed the service.] [Footnote 40: The British force employed in this expedition has been thus estimated: 14th Dragoons 295 Royal Artillery 570 Sappers and Miners 98 4th Foot 747 21st Foot 800 44th Foot 427 85th Foot 298 93rd Foot 775 95th Foot 276 1st and 5th West India Regiments 1040 Seamen and Marines 1200 Staff Corps 57 ---- 6583 7th Foot } arrived on January 6th { 750 43rd Foot } { 820 ---- 8153 Out of the ten officers who accompanied the regiment on this ill-fated expedition one was killed, two died from exposure, and five were wounded.] CHAPTER XIV. THE OCCUPATION OF GUADALOUPE, 1815--THE BARBADOS INSURRECTION, 1816--THE HURRICANE OF 1817. A few months after the disastrous expedition to New Orleans, and while the 1st West India Regiment was still stationed at Barbados, an expedition was formed by Lieutenant-General Sir James Leith, commanding the forces in the Windward and Leeward Islands, against the Island of Guadaloupe, the Governor of which, Admiral Comte de Linois, a staunch Bonapartist, had thrown off his allegiance to Louis XVIII., when the news of the escape of Napoleon from Elba had reached the West Indies, and had, on June 18th, 1815, proclaimed the latter Emperor. On the formation of this expedition, Captain Winkler, 1st West India Regiment, was appointed to the staff. The fleet with the troops from Barbados, among whom were 400 picked men of the 1st West India Regiment, under Major Cassidy, attached to the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Major-General Murray, sailed from Carlisle Bay, Barbados, on the 31st of July, while other troops from St. Lucia, Martinique, and Dominica, rendezvoused at the Saintes. The force from Barbados anchored in the Bay of St. Louis, Marie-Galante, on the 2nd of August; but it was not until the night of the 7th that the troops from the Leeward were all assembled at the Saintes. The internal state of Guadaloupe and the season were both so critical that Sir James Leith determined to attack at once; and on the morning of the 8th the whole fleet stood towards the Ance St. Sauveur. It was the intention of the general to attack in three columns, each of one brigade, but the scarcity of boats and the heavy surf necessitated that each brigade, should disembark in succession. A portion of the 1st Brigade being landed without opposition at Ance St. Sauveur, and ordered to drive the enemy from the broken ground and ravines about Trou au Chien and Petit Carbet, the fleet dropped down to Grand Ance, where the principal attack was to be made. There, after the enemy's batteries had been silenced by the fleet, the 2nd Brigade, with the remainder of the 1st, were landed; and after a short but sharp skirmish with a body of the enemy, advanced with the bayonet and drove him from his position at Petrizel. The approach of night put an end to further advance, and the troops bivouacked on the ground they had won. Next morning, the 9th, at daybreak, the troops advanced in two columns. The 1st Brigade moved upon and occupied Dolé, while the 2nd Brigade marched by difficult mountain paths upon the left of Morne Palmiste, by Petrizel, and by this turning movement compelled the enemy to withdraw his posts and retreat to Morne Palmiste by noon. While this had been taking place the 3rd Brigade had disembarked in the vicinity of Bailiff, to leeward of Basseterre, and after a short struggle had occupied that capital. In the afternoon of the 9th, the 1st and 2nd Brigades converged upon Morne Palmiste, and clambering up the rugged and bush-covered heights, compelled the enemy, after the exchange of a few shots, to evacuate his works and retire to Morne Houel, where he had eight guns in position. While the British were still occupying the defences on Morne Palmiste, intelligence was brought to Sir James Leith that the French Commander of Grandeterre, with the whole of his available force, was moving in rear of the 1st and 2nd Brigades to endeavour to form a junction with the main body of the enemy at Morne Houel. The detachment of the 1st West India Regiment was at once despatched to reinforce the rear-guard, and to occupy in force all the passes of the Gallion, a river running through a formidable ravine at the foot of Morne Palmiste. The troops from Grandeterre being thus cut off, endeavoured to form a junction by unfrequented paths through the woods; but, being met at every point by the skirmishers of the 1st West India Regiment, who searched the woods in every direction, they were compelled to abandon the attempt and retire at dusk. The night closed in with torrents of rain, and the British, having been told off in columns in readiness to attack the formidable position of Morne Houel at daybreak next morning, bivouacked on the ground, without shelter, and drenched to the skin. About 11 p.m., the Comte de Linois sent a messenger to propose terms of surrender; but nothing being definitely settled, the troops were put in motion at daybreak on the 10th. As they drew near to the works, however, the French hoisted the British flag on Morne Houel in token of surrender, and the position was occupied without resistance. This success put an end to the active operations. The British loss in this, the third invasion of Guadaloupe, amounted to 16 killed and 40 wounded. The 1st West India Regiment suffered no loss. The following general order was issued, dated Head-Quarters, Government House, Basseterre, Guadaloupe, 10th August, 1815: "The Commander of the Forces congratulates the army on the conquest of Guadaloupe being accomplished, and desires the generals and other officers, and the troops employed on that important service, to accept his best thanks for the gallant, zealous, and active manner in which they have compelled the enemy to surrender. "It is certainly a matter of gratifying reflection to the troops employed, not only that a colony of such importance should be placed under the British flag, but that the exertions of the army have, in two days, defeated all the preparations and force of the enemy; thus sheltering the peaceable inhabitants from a formidable and sanguinary system of revolutionary violence which had been practised against their persons and property, and which threatened the entire destruction of social order. "Lieutenant-General Sir James Leith will not fail to represent the steadiness and good conduct of the troops to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief." Guadaloupe, however, was not at once reduced to a state of tranquility. A number of French soldiers, who had deserted previous to the surrender of the island, took refuge in the woods, whence they carried on a desultory and ferocious war against the British posts. The 1st West India Regiment, being composed of men better able to support the hardships of a guerilla war, carried on in a country naturally difficult, during the height of the tropical rains, was continually employed against these insurgent bands, and several men were killed and wounded in unknown and forgotten skirmishes. Major Cassidy and Captain Winkler were each presented with a sword of honour by the major-general; and the order of the Fleur de Lys was transmitted to them by Louis XVIII., for their services in Guadaloupe. Major Cassidy and the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, remained in Guadaloupe until the 10th of October, 1815, on which day they embarked for Barbados, arriving at that island on the 26th. The regiment being then very much below its strength, on account of the heavy losses which it had sustained during the expedition to New Orleans, it was determined to transfer the majority of the privates who remained to the 3rd, 4th, 6th and 8th West India Regiments, and reform the regiment from a body of some 700 American negroes, who, in the late war with the United States, had served with the British, and had been temporarily organised as Colonial Marines. On the 14th of December, the skeleton of the regiment embarked in H.M.S. _Niobe_ for Bermuda, where the Colonial Marines were then stationed, and arrived at St. George's on the 9th of January, 1816. It was only then discovered that the number of men with whom it was intended to reform the regiment, did not exceed 400; most of whom were of but poor physique, and, moreover, unwilling to engage. At first the authorities determined to force these men to enlist, but ultimately the whole plan was abandoned; and the skeleton of the regiment left Bermuda on the 18th of March to return to the West Indies. It arrived at Barbados on the 1st of April; and the men who had already been transferred being sent back to it, the corps was completed with drafts from the late disbanded Bombor Regiment. This was effected in time to enable the 1st West India Regiment to take a very active part in the suppression of an alarming insurrection of slaves, which broke out suddenly at Barbados on Easter Sunday, the 14th of April, 1816. "The revolt broke out in St. Philip's parish, shortly after sunset, and it extended, in the two following days, to the parishes of Christ Church, St. John and St. George. A conflagration upon a high ridge of copse-wood called Bishop's Hill, in the parish of St. Philip's, was the first signal. Shortly after, the canes upon eight or nine of the surrounding estates were set on fire. Some few of the rebels were furnished with fire-arms, and a scanty supply of ammunition, and the remainder were armed with swords, bludgeons, and such rude weapons as they had been able to procure. Their approach was announced by the beating of drums, the blowing of shells, and other discordant sounds. They demolished the houses of the overseers, destroyed the sugar works, and fired the canes.... Sixty estates were more or less damaged, many of them to a considerable amount."[41] As soon as the news reached Bridgetown, martial law was proclaimed, the 1st West India Regiment was at once ordered to march, and the militia of the island were called out. Major Cassidy, who was in command of the 1st West India Regiment, found the rebels occupying a position on the heights of Christ Church, on Grazett's Estate, a dense mob of half-armed slaves crowning the summits of the low hills. He endeavoured to parley with them, but without success; and an advance being ordered, the 1st West India Regiment stormed the heights, and at the point of the bayonet drove the rebels from their position. Not a shot was fired by the regiment on this occasion, Major Cassidy being anxious to save bloodshed as much as possible; but a large body of the slaves offered a furious resistance, closing with and aiming blows at the soldiers with their rude weapons, and endeavouring to wrench the muskets from their hands, so that a considerable number of the insurgents were thus killed and wounded. This resistance only lasted for a few minutes, and the slaves, broken and dispirited, fled in all directions; only to be hunted down and fired upon by the militia all over the disaffected portions of the island. The 1st West India Regiment took no part in the pursuit and the capture or slaughter of the fugitives, this duty being left to the European militia, who, if the author of "Remarks on the Insurrection in Barbados"[42] may be believed, were guilty of many excesses. By the planters this revolt was attributed to the introduction of the Slave Registry Bill into the British Parliament, and it was discovered that several free men of colour, who had for several months previous attended nocturnal meetings of slaves on the estates where the insurrection began, had told the slaves that a law was being passed in England to make them free, and that as the King was giving them their freedom the King's troops would not be employed against them. Amongst other articles taken from the rebels by the 1st West India Regiment was a flag bearing the figure of a general officer (supposed to be intended for the King), placing a crown in the hands of a negro who had a white woman on his arm. Beneath these figures was the following motto: "Brittanie are happy to assist all such friends as endeavourance." In the struggle on Christ Church heights the regiment lost one man killed and seventeen wounded. The following general order was issued, dated August 26th, 1816: "Colonel Codd, in communicating the following letters conveying the thanks of the Members in Council and House of Assembly at Barbados to himself and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men employed during the late insurrection of slaves, feels it his duty to specify the commanding officer and corps whose good conduct on that occasion he has already reported in his official despatch to the Commander of the Forces, namely, Major Cassidy and the 1st West India Regiment." In November, 1816, the regiment was removed from Barbados and distributed amongst the following islands: Head-quarters. The Grenadier, Light, and 1 Company at Antigua = 3 2 Companies at St. Christopher = 2 1 Company at Montserrat = 1 2 Companies at St. Lucia = 2 2 Companies at Dominica = 2 -- 10 Lieutenant-Colonel Whitby commanded at head-quarters. Nothing of note occurred till October, 1817, when, on the 21st of that month the Island of St. Lucia was visited with a most violent hurricane in which the Governor, Major-General Seymour, was so severely injured that he died a few days afterwards; and Brevet-Major Burdett, 1st West India Regiment (then commanding the garrison), together with his wife, child, and servants, was killed by the fall of his house and buried under its ruins. The distress that the troops endured was great. The whole of the buildings on Morne Fortune and Pigeon Island, with the exception of the magazine and tanks, were levelled with the ground, and the fragments, together with the men's clothing and equipment, carried off by the wind to the woods about Morne Fortune. The hurricane had struck the island so rapidly that, although an order to evacuate the barracks was given at once, the men had barely time to escape from the buildings before they fell with a crash. The town of Castries was laid in ruins, and twelve vessels that were in harbour were driven ashore. When the hurricane abated, the killed and wounded were moved under the parapet of Fort Charlotte and temporary shelter erected from the ruins. In January, 1819, when Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. Clifton retired, the second lieutenant-colonelcy in the regiment was abolished. In May of that year the head-quarters and three companies were moved to Barbados, two companies remaining at Antigua, two at St. Lucia, two at Dominica, and one at Tobago. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 41: Bryan Edwards.] [Footnote 42: Published in London in 1816.] CHAPTER XV. THE DEMERARA REBELLION, 1823. On the 25th of October, 1821, the establishment of the 1st West India Regiment was reduced from ten to eight companies, which were thus distributed: Head-quarters and 3 Companies at Barbados. 1 Company at Demerara. 1 " " St. Lucia. 1 " " Dominica. 1 " " Antigua. 1 " " Tobago. -- 8 No change took place in this distribution until 1823, when the light company rejoined the head-quarters at Barbados, from Tobago. In August, 1823, an alarming insurrection broke out among the slaves in the district of Mahaica, on the east coast of Demerara. The first notice of the impending rising was communicated, on the morning of the 18th of August, by a mulatto servant, to Mr. Simpson, of Plantation Reduit (now Plantation Ogle), a place distant some six miles from Georgetown. The servant stated that all the negroes on the coast plantations would rise that night; and Mr. Simpson at once proceeded with the intelligence to Georgetown, warning the various planters at their habitations _en route_. The Governor appeared to doubt the reliability of the information, but called out a troop of burgher horse, and proceeded with a portion of it to Plantation Reduit. There a considerable body of negroes, armed with cutlasses, sticks, and a few muskets, was met; and, after a short parley with them, which led to no result, the Governor returned at once to Georgetown, and called upon the officer commanding the troops for assistance. A detachment of the 21st Regiment, and No. 8 Company of the 1st West India Regiment, the whole being under the command of Captain Stewart, of the latter corps, at once marched up the coast; while the militia of Georgetown was called out and patrolled the town. A body of the rebels, who had with them as prisoners several Europeans, was met near Wittenburg Plantation. On the approach of the troops the slaves opened a desultory fire, which did no damage, and a volley being returned, they dispersed in all directions. The force under Captain Stewart then proceeded further up the coast, encountering and dispersing other parties of slaves. Next day, the 19th of August, martial law was proclaimed, for nearly all the negroes employed upon the coast estates had risen and were overrunning the country, capturing every European they met. Continually dispersed by the troops, they reassembled again, and, after being repulsed by a detachment of the 21st in an attack upon the post of Mahaica, a body of some 2000 of the better-armed slaves collected together and began to advance on Georgetown. By this time another detachment of the 21st Regiment had come up from Georgetown, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Leahy of that corps, who joined the troops already in the field, and moved with his whole force against this more formidable body of insurgents. Proceeding past pillaged houses and destroyed bridges, the troops at last fell in with the rebels, and Lieutenant-Colonel Leahy, after reading a proclamation that had been issued by the Governor, warned them that if they did not disperse the men would open fire. After waiting for some time, the order to advance was given, and the slaves at once commenced firing. This was returned by the troops, and after a conflict of a few minutes' duration the rebels fled in all directions. This was the last occasion on which the slaves assembled in any considerable force, but a constant skirmishing was kept up along the whole line of the coast; and two companies of the 1st West India Regiment, which were despatched from Barbados when the news of the insurrection reached there, and arrived at Demerara on the 26th of September, were actively employed in assisting to restore tranquility in the colony and in the apprehension of the ringleaders of the rebellion. Captain Chads, Lieutenants Strong and Lynch, and Ensign Brennan were the officers who were serving with these two companies. The following general order was published, dated Head-quarters, Camp House, 17th December, 1823: "Major-General Murray has great satisfaction in communicating to the troops and militia within this colony the following extracts from letters from Lord Bathurst, and the Commander of the Forces, Sir Henry Ward, the former conveying the approbation of His Majesty, and the latter that of His Royal Highness, the Commander-in-Chief, for their conduct during the late insurrection. The Commander-in-Chief takes this opportunity of again returning his thanks to the officers and troops for the uniform support he has received from the former, and for the good conduct of the latter, during the late operations; by these means alone have those services been accomplished which have occasioned His Majesty's flattering marks of approbation." Extract (No. 1) of a letter from the Right Honourable Lord Bathurst, to His Excellency Sir John Murray: "Downing Street, 23rd October, 1823. "I have received your several despatches, as per margin, reciting the series of events that had occurred from the first intimation received by you on the 18th of August last, of a disposition towards insurrectionary movements on the part of the slave population in the District of Mahaica, and concluding with an account of the general termination of the revolt, which had yielded to the prompt and judicious measures of remonstrance and resistance offered by you, and which you represent to have been so admirably enforced by the civil and military authorities under your command. With respect to those measures, I have laid them before His Majesty, and they have received his most gracious approbation, which you will convey to the officers, both civil and military, who have so distinguished themselves on this occasion." Extract (No. 2) of a letter from His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, to Sir Henry Ward, K.C.B., commanding the Windward and Leeward Islands: "I have received your further despatch reporting to His Lordship the issue of this revolt, so satisfactorily and judiciously terminated by the prompt and vigorous measures taken by Major-General Murray, and the exemplary zeal, discipline and good conduct of the 21st Regiment, the 1st West India Regiment, and the Militia, which entitle officers and men to the greatest credit." Ensign Miles, of the 1st West India Regiment, the only officer serving with No. 8 Company under Captain Stewart, died a few days after the termination of the rebellion, of fever produced by fatigue and exposure in hunting down the rebel leaders. In February, 1824, the Court of Policy passed a vote of thanks, and conferred a gift of 200 guineas on the regiment, to be expended in the purchase of plate, as a mark of the high estimation in which the inhabitants of the colony held the services of Captain Stewart and his detachment. "KING'S HOUSE, DEMERARA, "_19th July, 1824_. "SIR, "I have the honour to enclose to you for the information of Captain Stewart and the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, which served with so much credit to itself under his command during the late revolt in this Colony, the accompanying resolution of the Honourable Court of Policy, expressive of the sense entertained by the Court of that officer's conduct, and that of the officers and men placed under him during that distressing period. "I have, etc., "JOHN MURRAY, "Major-General. "To Major Capadose, "Commanding Detachment, 1st West India Regiment." "Extract from the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Honourable Court of Policy of the Colony and dependant Districts of Demerara and Essequibo, at an extraordinary and adjourned meeting held at the Court House, George Town, Demerara, on Tuesday, the 13th of January, 1824. "The Court of Policy, feeling anxious to mark its sense of the eminent service performed, in the late unhappy revolt, by the troops composing the garrison, as well as by the Militia of the United Colonies, take the opportunity afforded it by the cessation of Martial Law, to express its highest approbation of, and to return its warmest thanks to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for the able and judicious measures adopted by him, which succeeded in putting a speedy termination to a Revolt, in its nature most serious and alarming.... "The steady and soldierlike conduct of the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment commanded by Captain Stewart, the Court cannot too highly estimate; and it begs, as a testimony of its lasting regard, to be allowed to present to the Mess, through Captain Stewart, the sum of two hundred guineas, to be laid out in plate." On the 25th of October, 1824, the three companies stationed at Demerara were removed to Barbados, where they arrived on the 2nd of November. The following brigade order was published at Demerara prior to the embarkation of the detachment: "The detachment of the 1st West India Regiment under Major Capadose, will embark on board the _Sovereign_ at half-past six on Monday morning, the 25th instant, and the transport will proceed to Barbados with the evening tide of that day. "The Major-General commanding the district cannot allow these excellent troops to embark without expressing to them his approbation of their excellent conduct and discipline, and his cordial wishes for their health and good fortune. The unremitting attention of Major Capadose in the command of the detachment, and of Brevet-Major Gillard, Captain Hemsworth, and Lieutenant Strong, in that of their respective outposts, have given the Major-General unqualified satisfaction, and he requests those officers to accept his thanks." The distribution of the regiment was now as follows: 5 companies at Barbados, 1 at St. Lucia, 1 at Dominica, and 1 at Antigua, and this was continued till the 21st of February, 1825, when the head-quarters, with 4 companies, embarked on board the _Sovereign_ transport, and proceeded to the Island of Trinidad, to relieve the 3rd West India Regiment, ordered to be disbanded. The head-quarters landed at Port of Spain, Trinidad, on February 23rd, and were quartered at Orange Grove Barracks, being removed to San Josef Barracks on May 1st, 1828. In April, 1826, a second lieutenant-colonelcy was re-established in the regiment, Major Henry Capadose being promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, without purchase, on the 22nd of that month. CHAPTER XVI. THE BARRA WAR, 1831--THE HURRICANE OF 1831--THE COBOLO EXPEDITION, 1832. In 1826, owing to the difficulty found in obtaining a sufficiency of recruits in the West Indies, it was decided to send a company of the 1st West India Regiment to Sierra Leone, there to be stationed as a recruiting company, the recruits to be sent to the head-quarters of the regiment as opportunities occurred. The recruiting company embarked at Trinidad on the 17th of April, 1826, in the _Duke of York_ brigantine, and proceeded to Dominica, where it was transhipped to the _Jupiter_ transport. Captain Myers proceeded in charge of it to England, where it was inspected by Major-General Sir James Lyon, and it finally arrived at Sierra Leone on August 16th, 1826. Captain Myers having obtained sick leave in England, Captain Stewart, Lieutenant Brennan, and Ensign Russell, were the officers who had charge of the company. The recruiting was so successfully carried on, that on July 9th, 1827, 73 recruits joined the head-quarters of the regiment at Trinidad; on December 27th, 1828, 182; and on February 28th, 1829, 39; the last being volunteers from the Royal African Corps. In 1829, Captain Evans and Lieutenant Montgomery proceeded to Sierra Leone to join the recruiting company. The recruiting company continued being occupied with its peace duties until the year 1831, when the Barra War broke out. Towards the end of September, 1831, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Gambia Settlements sent an urgent despatch for assistance to the Governor of Sierra Leone. The news arrived at the latter place on October 1st, and on the 4th a force under Captain Stewart, 1st West India Regiment, consisting of detachments from the recruiting companies of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments, from the Sierra Leone Militia, and from the Royal African Corps, sailed for the Gambia in H.M. brig _Plumper_, and the _Parmilia_ transport. The events which led to this movement were as follows: In August, 1831, disturbances having occurred amongst the Mandingoes[43] living in the neighbourhood of Fort Bullen, Barra Point, Ensign Fearon, of the Royal African Corps, by direction of Lieutenant-Governor Rendall, had proceeded with thirty men of his corps and a few pensioners, on the night of August 22nd, to the stockaded town of Essaw, or Yahassu, the capital of Barra, to demand hostages from the king. At Essaw this small force was attacked by a large body of Mandingoes, and compelled to retire to Fort Bullen, to which place the victorious Mandingoes advanced, completely investing it on the land side. The day following, Ensign Fearon, having lost twenty-three men out of his little force, evacuated the work, which was in an almost defenceless condition, and retired across the river to the town of Bathurst. After this defeat the chiefs of the neighbouring Mohammedan towns sent large contingents of men to the King of Barra; several thousand armed natives were collected at a distance of three miles only from Bathurst, and that settlement was in such imminent danger that the Lieutenant-Governor was compelled to send to Sierra Leone for assistance. On November 9th the reinforcements arrived in the Gambia, and found Fort Bullen still in the hands of the natives, who fortunately had confined themselves to making mere demonstrations, instead of falling upon the settlement, which lay entirely at their mercy. On the morning of November 11th a landing was effected at Barra Point by the force, consisting of 451 of all ranks, under cover of a heavy fire from H.M. brig _Plumper_ (Lieutenant Cresey), the _Parmilia_ transport, and an armed colonial schooner. The enemy, estimated at from 2500 to 3000 strong, were skilfully covered from the fire of the shipping by the entrenchments which they had thrown up, and from which, as well as from the shelter of the dense bush and high grass, they poured in a heavy and well-sustained fire upon the troops who were landing in their front. Notwithstanding all disadvantages, however, the British pushed on, and, after an hour's hard fighting, during which the enemy contested every inch of ground, they succeeded in driving them from their entrenchments at the point of the bayonet, and pursued them for some distance through the bush. The British loss in this action was 2 killed, 3 officers[44] and 47 men wounded. The next few days were occupied in landing the guns, and placing Fort Bullen in a state of defence; and at daybreak on the morning of November 17th the entire force marched to the attack of Essaw, the king's town, leaving the crew of H.M. brig _Plumper_, under Lieutenant Cresey, in charge of Fort Bullen. On approaching the vicinity of the town the troops deployed into line, and, the guns having been brought to the front, a heavy fire was opened on the stockade. This was kept up for five hours, and was as vigorously returned by the enemy from their defences, with artillery and small arms. The rockets were brought to bear as soon as possible, and the first one thrown set fire to a house in the town; but the buildings being principally composed of "swish," and the natives having taken the precaution of removing the thatched roofs of the greater number, the rockets produced but little effect, as they could do no injury to the walls. Towards noon some of the enemy were observed leaving the rear of the town, and shortly afterwards a very superior force of natives appeared in the bush on the British right, threatening an attack in flank. A second body was also observed making a lengthened detour on the left, apparently with the intention of attacking the British rear. The men's ammunition being almost exhausted, and the artillery fire, though well sustained, having produced no effect upon the strong stockades which surrounded the town, it was deemed prudent to retire, and the force was accordingly withdrawn to Benty Point, having suffered a loss during the day of 11 killed and 59 wounded. Lieutenant Leigh, of the Sierra Leone militia, and 5 men subsequently died of their wounds. On December 7th, Lieutenant-Colonel Hingston, Royal African Corps, arrived with reinforcements and assumed the command. Immediately upon this accession to the British strength, the King of Barra notified his desire to open negotiations, and, terms being proposed which he accepted, a treaty was finally concluded and signed at Fort Bullen on January 4th, 1832. The detachment of the recruiting company, 1st West India Regiment, returned to Sierra Leone on the conclusion of the war. In the West Indies, the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment stationed at Barbados, had, in 1831, suffered from a violent hurricane which visited that island on the 10th of August of that year. The barracks and hospitals at St. Ann's were completely ruined, 36 men of various corps were killed, and a commissariat officer, with three of his children, and his entire household, entombed in the ruins of his house. An officer of the garrison, who gives an account of this hurricane,[45] says: "Describe the appearance of our barracks, I really cannot. This I can say, in truth, that in no part of the world, a more beautiful range of buildings, or on a more liberal scale or appropriate site, could have been found. The establishment was complete in all respects for every branch of a small army. It was the depôt of our West India military possessions. Well--in two hours during this awful night almost every building in the garrison was destroyed.... What a moment was that, when, thanks be to Heaven, the gale in some degree abated. The officers crept out one after the other, and the scene that followed can be compared only to that which one sees and feels after an action--who has escaped?--who is dead?... The first person I found wounded was Mrs. Brocklass, the lady of an officer of the 1st West India Regiment, who, with three fine children, finding the roof over them falling, hastened from under it. She had the misfortune to be knocked down by some shingles, received a blow on the head, and had two or three ribs broken; the children fortunately escaped: her husband was on duty in a most perilous situation.... The huts which were the quarters of the married people of the 1st West India Regiment were blown to pieces, and four men and one woman severely injured. The north building of the men's new barracks accommodated the left wing of the 36th Regiment, besides which a detachment of the 1st West India Regiment was quartered on the ground floor. None of the latter were hurt, but two men of the 36th were killed. The greater part of the spacious galleries was carried away, some of the arches that supported them fell, and many were very much broken. None of the roof remains that will ever be of service." Towards the end of the year 1832, numerous complaints were made by native traders who were in the habit of trading to the Sherbro and the adjacent territories, that they were molested and their goods plundered by a marauding party of Mohammedan Acoos, who had established themselves in the vicinity of the Ribbie River. These Acoos were liberated Africans, that is, slaves who had been set free from captured slavers at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and had, contrary to the regulations then in force, clandestinely left the Colony. A party of volunteers, having been despatched to gather information concerning these rebels, ascertained that they had been joined by other parties of marauders, and had established themselves at a place called Cobolo, on the northern bank of the Kates, or Ribbie River. The manager of the Waterloo District also reported various outrages and depredations committed by this band. On December 13th, 1832, the Hastings company of volunteers, with that of Waterloo, marched from the village of Waterloo towards Cobolo, distant by road some thirty miles, with orders to capture and bring in the leaders of the rebels. Next morning, as this force was approaching Cobolo, the Acoos, who were concealed in the bush, fired upon the head of the column, and the volunteers at once, and without firing a shot, turned and ran in the greatest confusion; nor did they recover from their panic till they had reached Waterloo. The Acoos pursued the fugitives for some little distance, and killed seven of their number. The rising, originally trivial, had now, through the shameful behaviour of the volunteers, become serious. The news of the defeat spread with great rapidity among the unruly tribes on the frontier of the Colony; and a Mohammedan priest, proclaiming himself a prophet, placed himself at the head of the movement. The Governor acted with promptitude; and recognising the great danger of delay, despatched, on December 17th, all the available men from the garrison of Sierra Leone, under Lieut.-Colonel Hingston, Royal African Corps. The recruiting company of the 1st West India Regiment accompanied the force, under the command of Lieut. W. Montgomery, 1st West India Regiment. The troops proceeded to Waterloo in boats, and were there joined by the Wellington company of the Sierra Leone militia, and the Hastings company of volunteers. At the same time, H.M. brig _Charybdis_ (Lieut. Crawford) was sent with the York company of volunteers to the mouth of the Ribbie River, with orders for the seamen and marines to ascend the river in boats, co-operate with Lieut.-Colonel Hingston's column, and cut off the retreat of the rebels. Lieut.-Colonel Hingston's force marched from Waterloo on December 18th, and, halting for the night at Bangowilli, about twenty miles from the former village, advanced towards Cobolo next morning at daybreak. The march was unusually fatiguing, and for many miles the troops had to move through rush beds and mangrove swamps, frequently up to the hips in mud and water. On emerging upon the dry ground near Cobolo the report of fire-arms was heard in front, and scouts being thrown forward, it was learned that the Kossoos, which tribe had suffered most from the predatory propensities of the rebels, had taken up arms and were then engaged in attacking Cobolo. The troops at once pushed on, and a few minutes after their arrival on the scene, the Acoos, completely routed, fled in all directions, many being killed and a great number drowned while endeavouring to escape across a neighbouring creek. The British force remained at Cobolo for four days, daily sending out small parties in pursuit of the dispersed rebels. By one of these parties Oji Corri, the leader of the movement, was shot down; and the rebellion being at an end the troops returned to Freetown, Sierra Leone, on December 28th; a detachment of the 2nd West India Regiment, under Lieutenant Lardner, being left at Waterloo to watch the movements of the Mohammedan Acoos in the neighbouring villages. Lieutenant Montgomery, 1st West India Regiment, died at Freetown of fever, on April 9th, 1833, and this event left the recruiting company without an officer of the corps until the arrival in Sierra Leone of Captain Hughes on November 29th, 1834. In the West Indies one company had been removed from the head-quarters at Trinidad to Tortola in May, 1834, and this detachment was, in January, 1836, moved to St. Vincent. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 43: The Mandingoes are a warlike Mohammedan tribe, inhabiting the territory inland from the Gambia River to Sierra Leone.] [Footnote 44: Captain Berwick, Royal African Corps; Lieutenant Lardner, 2nd West India Regiment; and Captain Hughes, Gambia Militia.] [Footnote 45: An account of the fatal hurricane by which Barbados suffered in 1831, published at Bridgetown, Barbados, 1831. "DETACHMENT 1ST WEST INDIA REGIMENT. "Return of the men killed and wounded during the late hurricane, 15th August, 1831: "Killed--Henry Read, private. "Wounded--4 privates. (Signed) "H. BROCKLASS, Lieut., 1st W.I. Regt." ] CHAPTER XVII. THE MUTINY OF THE RECRUITS AT TRINIDAD, 1837. On April 1st, 1836, the 1st West India Regiment was increased from eight to ten companies, and recruits being obtained with difficulty, the Government commenced the injudicious practice of enrolling the slaves, disembarked from captured slavers, in the West India regiments. In September of that year the slaves from two slavers which had been captured off Grenada by H.M.S. _Vestal_, 112 in number, were drafted into the 1st West India Regiment. Similarly, in January, 1837, 109; on May 20th, 112; and on May 21st, 93 slaves, recently disembarked from slavers captured by H.M.S. _Griffon_ and _Harpy_, were sent to the regiment. Thus, in the years 1836-7, 426 such slaves were received, 314 of them in the year 1837 alone. The formality of asking these men whether they were willing to serve was never gone through, many of them did so unwillingly; and it must be remembered that they were all savages in the strictest sense of the word, entirely unacquainted with civilisation, and with no knowledge of the English language. The majority of them were natives of the Congo and of Great and Little Popo, two towns on the western frontier of Dahomey; and it may be here remarked that the negroes of these districts have maintained their reputation for ultra-barbarism even to the present day. The only result to be anticipated from such a wholesale drafting of savages into a regiment was a mutiny, and every inducement to mutiny appears to have been afforded them. Instead of dividing them proportionately between the head-quarters and the detachments, they were nearly all kept at the former; and but three weeks before the actual rising, as if to further remove all check, 100 rank and file, all old soldiers, were sent from Trinidad and distributed between St. Lucia and Dominica. Thus, on June 18th, 1837, the day of the mutiny, with the exception of the band, officers servants, and mess-waiters, all the men at San Josef's barracks, Trinidad, were slaver recruits. The ringleader of the movement was one Dâaga, or Donald Stewart, and the following account of him, and of the mutiny, is taken from Kingsley's "At Last": "Donald Stewart, or rather Dâaga, was the adopted son of Madershee, the old and childless king of the tribe called Paupaus,[46] a race that inhabit a tract of country bordering on that of the Yarrabas.[47] These races are constantly at war with each other. "Dâaga was just the man whom a savage, warlike, and depredatory tribe would select for their chieftain, as the African negroes choose their leaders with reference to their personal prowess. Dâaga stood six feet six inches without shoes. Although scarcely muscular in proportion, yet his frame indicated in a singular degree the union of irresistible strength and activity.... He had a singular cast in his eyes, not quite amounting to that obliquity of the visual organs denominated a squint, but sufficient to give his features a peculiarly forbidding appearance; his forehead, however, although small in proportion to his enormous head, was remarkably compact and well formed. The whole head was disproportioned, having the greater part of the brain behind the ears; but the greatest peculiarity of this singular being was his voice. In the course of my life I never heard such sounds uttered by human organs as those formed by Dâaga. In ordinary conversation he appeared to me to endeavour to soften his voice--it was a deep tenor: but when a little excited by any passion (and this savage was the child of passion) his voice sounded like the low growl of a lion, but when much excited it could be compared to nothing so aptly as the notes of a gigantic brazen trumpet. "Dâaga having made a successful predatory expedition into the country of the Yarrabas, returned with a number of prisoners of that nation. These he, as usual, took bound and guarded towards the coast to sell to the Portuguese. The interpreter, his countryman, called these Portuguese 'white gentlemen.' The white gentlemen proved themselves more than a match for the black gentlemen; and the whole transaction between the Portuguese and the Paupaus does credit to all concerned in this gentlemanly traffic in human flesh. "Dâaga sold his prisoners, and under pretence of paying him, he and his Paupau guards were enticed on board a Portuguese vessel: they were treacherously overpowered by the Christians, who bound them beside their late prisoners, and the vessel sailed over 'the great salt water.' "This transaction caused in the breast of the savage a deep hatred against all white men; a hatred so intense that he frequently, during and subsequent to the mutiny, declared he would eat the first white man he killed; yet this cannibal was made to swear allegiance to our sovereign on the Holy Evangelists, and was then called a British soldier. "On the voyage the vessel on board which Dâaga had been entrapped was captured by the British. He could not comprehend that his new captors liberated him: he had been overreached and trepanned by one set of white men, and he naturally looked on his second captors as more successful rivals in the human, or rather inhuman, Guinea trade; therefore, this event lessened not his hatred for white men in the abstract. "I was informed by several of the Africans who came with him, that when, during the voyage, they upbraided Dâaga with being the cause of their capture, he pacified them by promising that when they should arrive in white man's country he would repay their perfidy by attacking them in the night. He further promised that if the Paupaus and Yarrabas would follow him, he would fight his way back to Guinea. This account was fully corroborated by many of the mutineers, especially those who were shot with Dâaga; they all said the revolt never would have happened but for Donald Stewart, as he was called by the officers; but Africans who were not of his tribe called him Longa-longa, on account of his height. "Such was the extraordinary man who led the mutiny I am about to relate. "A quantity of captured Africans having been brought hither from the islands of Grenada and Dominica, they were most imprudently induced to enlist in the 1st West India Regiment. True it is, we have been told they did this voluntarily; but it may be asked, if they had any will in the matter, how could they understand the duties to be imposed on them by becoming soldiers, or how comprehend the nature of an oath of allegiance, without which they could not, legally speaking, be considered soldiers? I attended the whole of the trials of these men, and well know how difficult it was to make them comprehend any idea which was at all new to them by means of the best interpreters procurable. "To the African savage, while being drilled into the duties of a soldier, many things seem absolute tyranny which would appear to a civilised man a mere necessary restraint. To keep the restless body of an African negro in a position to which he has not been accustomed; to cramp his splay feet, with his great toes standing out, into European shoes made for feet of a different form; to place a collar round his neck, which is called a stock, and which to him is cruel torture; above all, to confine him every night to his barracks--are almost insupportable. One unacquainted with the habits of the negro cannot conceive with what abhorrence he looks on having his disposition to nocturnal rambles checked by barrack regulations. "Formerly the 'King's man,' as the black soldier loved to call himself, looked (not without reason) contemptuously on the planter's slave, although he himself was after all but a slave to the State; but these recruits were enlisted shortly after a number of their recently imported countrymen were wandering freely over the country, working either as free labourers, or settling, to use an apt American phrase, as squatters; and to assert that the recruit, while under military probation, is better off than the free Trinidad labourer, who goes where he lists and earns as much in one day as will keep him for three days, is an absurdity. Accordingly, we find that Lieutenant-Colonel Bush, who commanded the 1st West India Regiment, thought that the mutiny was mainly owing to the ill-advice of their civil, or, we should rather say, unmilitary countrymen. This, to a certain degree, was the fact; but, by the declaration of Dâaga and many of his countrymen, it is evident that the seeds of the mutiny were sown on the passage from Africa. "It has been asserted that the recruits were driven to mutiny by hard treatment of their commanding officers. There seems not the slightest truth in this assertion; they were treated with fully as much kindness as their situation would admit of, and their chief was peculiarly a favourite of Colonel Bush and the officers, notwithstanding Dâaga's violent and ferocious temper often caused complaints to be brought against him. "On the night of the 17th of June, 1837, the people of San Josef were kept awake by the recruits, about 280 in number, singing the war-song of the Paupaus. This wild song consisted of a short air and chorus. The tone was, although wild, not inharmonious, and the words rather euphonious. As near as our alphabet can convey them, they ran thus: "Dangkarrée Au fey Oluu werrei Au lay. which may be rendered almost literally by the following couplet: "Air by the chief: 'Come to plunder, come to slay.' "Chorus by followers: 'We are ready to obey.' "About three o'clock in the morning, their war-song (highly characteristic of a predatory tribe) became very loud, and they commenced uttering their war-cry. This is different to what we conceive the Indian war-whoop to be; it seems to be a kind of imitation of the growl of wild beasts, and has a most thrilling effect. "Fire was now set to a quantity of huts built for the accommodation of African soldiers to the northward of the barracks, as well as to the house of a poor black woman called Dalrymple. These burnt briskly, throwing a dismal glare over the barracks and picturesque town of San Josef, and overpowering the light of the full moon, which illumined a cloudless sky. The mutineers made a rush at the barrack-room and seized on the muskets and fusees in the racks. Their leader, Dâaga, and a daring Yarraba named Ogston, instantly charged their pieces--the former of these had a quantity of ball cartridges, loose powder, and ounce and pistol balls, in a kind of gray worsted cap. He must have provided himself with these before the mutiny. How he became possessed of them, especially the pistol balls, I never could learn; probably he was supplied by his unmilitary countrymen; pistol balls are never given to infantry. Previous to this Dâaga and three others made a rush at the regimental store-room, in which was deposited a quantity of powder. An old African soldier, named Charles Dixon, interfered to stop them, on which Maurice Ogston, the Yarraba chief, who had armed himself with a sergeant's sword, cut down the faithful African. When down, Dâaga said in English, 'Ah, you old soldier, you knock down.' Dixon was not Dâaga's countryman, hence he could not speak to him in his own language. The Paupau then levelled his musket and shot the fallen soldier, who groaned and died. The war-yells, or rather growls, of the Paupaus and Yarrabas now became awfully thrilling as they helped themselves to cartridges; most of them were fortunately blank, or without ball. Never was a premeditated mutiny so wild and ill-planned. Their chief, Dâaga, and Ogston, seem to have had little command of the subordinates, and the whole acted more like a set of wild beasts who had broken their cages, than men resolved on war. "At this period, had a rush been made at the officers' quarters by one half (they were more than 200 in number), and the other half surrounded the building, not one could have escaped. Instead of this they continued to shout their war-song, and howl their war-notes; they loaded their pieces with ball cartridge or blank cartridge and small stones, and commenced firing at the long range of white buildings in which Colonel Bush and his officers slept. They wasted so much ammunition on this useless display of fury that the buildings were completely riddled. A few of the old soldiers opposed them and were wounded, but it fortunately happened that they were, to an inconceivable degree, ignorant of the right use of fire-arms--holding their muskets in their hands when they discharged them, without allowing the butt-end to rest against their shoulders or any part of their bodies.[48] This fact accounts for the comparatively little mischief they did in proportion to the quantity of ammunition thrown away. "The officers[49] and sergeant-major[50] escaped at the back of the building, while Colonel Bush and Adjutant Bentley came down a little hill. The colonel commanded the mutineers to lay down their arms, and was answered by an irregular discharge of balls, which rattled amongst the leaves of a tree under which he and the adjutant were standing. On this Colonel Bush desired Mr. Bentley to make the best of his way to St. James's Barracks[51] for all the disposable force of the 89th Regiment. The officers made good their retreat, and the adjutant got into the stable where his horse was. He saddled and bridled the animal while the shots were coming into the stable, without either man or beast getting injured. The officer mounted, but had to make his way through the mutineers before he could get into San Josef, the barracks standing on an eminence above the little town. On seeing the adjutant mounted, the mutineers set up a thrilling howl, and commenced firing at him. He discerned the gigantic figure of Dâaga (alias Donald Stewart), with his musket at the trail: he spurred his horse through the midst of them; they were grouped, but not in line. On looking back he saw Dâaga aiming at him; he stooped his head beside his horse's neck, and effectually sheltered himself from about fifty shots aimed at him. In this position he rode furiously down a steep hill leading from the barracks to the church, and was out of danger. His escape appears extraordinary: but he got safe to town, and thence to St. James's, and in a short time, considering it is eleven miles distant, brought out a strong detachment of European troops; these, however, did not arrive till the affair was over. "In the meantime a part of the officers' quarters was bravely defended by two old African soldiers, Sergeant Merry and Corporal Plague. The latter stood in the gallery near the room in which were the colours; he was ineffectually fired at by some hundreds, yet he kept his post, shot two of the mutineers, and, it is said, wounded a third. Such is the difference between a man acquainted with the use of fire-arms and those who handle them as mops are held. "In the meantime Colonel Bush got to a police station above the barracks, and got muskets and a few cartridges from a discharged African soldier who was in the police establishment. Being joined by the policeman, Corporal Craven, and Ensign Pogson, they concealed themselves on an eminence above, and, as the mutineers (about 100 in number) approached, the fire of muskets opened on them from the little ambush. The little party fired separately, loading as fast as they discharged their pieces; they succeeded in making the mutineers change their route. "It is wonderful what little courage the savages in general showed against the colonel and his little party, who absolutely beat them, although but a twenty-fifth of their number, and at their own tactics, _i.e._ bush fighting. "A body of mutineers now made towards the road to Maraccas, when the colonel and his three assistants contrived to get behind a silk-cotton tree, and recommenced firing on them. The Africans hesitated, and set forward, when the little party continued to fire on them; they set up a yell, and retreated down the hill. "A part of the mutineers now concealed themselves in the bushes about San Josef Barracks. These men, after the affair was over, joined Colonel Bush, and, with a mixture of cunning and effrontery, smiled as though nothing had happened, and as though they were glad to see him; although, in general, they each had several shirts and pairs of trousers on, preparatory for a start to Guinea, by way of Band de l'Est. "In the meantime the San Josef militia were assembled to the number of forty. Major Giuseppi and Captain and Adjutant Rousseau, of the second division of militia forces, took command of them. They were in want of flints, powder, and balls; to obtain these they were obliged to break open a merchant's store; however, the adjutant so judiciously distributed his little force as to hinder the mutineers from entering the town or obtaining access to the militia arsenal, wherein there was a quantity of arms. Major Chadds and several old African soldiers joined the militia, and were by them supplied with arms. "A good deal of skirmishing occurred between the militia and detached parties of the mutineers, which uniformly ended in the defeat of the latter. At length Dâaga appeared to the right of a party of six at the entrance of the town; they were challenged by the militia, and the mutineers fired on them, but without effect. Only two of the militia returned the fire, when all but Dâaga fled. He was deliberately reloading his piece, when a militia-man, named Edmond Luce, leaped on the gigantic chief, who would have easily beat him off, although the former was a strong young man of colour, but Dâaga would not let go his gun; and, in common with all the mutineers, he seemed to have no idea of the use of the bayonet. Dâaga was dragging the militia-man away, when Adjutant Rousseau came to his assistance, and placed a sword to Dâaga's breast. Doctor Tardy and several others rushed on the tall negro, who was soon, by the united efforts of several, thrown down and secured. It was at this period that he repeatedly exclaimed, while he bit his own shoulder, 'The first white man I catch after this I will eat him.' "Meanwhile about sixteen of the mutineers, led by the daring Ogston, took the road to Arima, in order, as they said, to commence their march to Guinea; but fortunately the militia of that village, composed principally of Spaniards, Indians, and Sambos, assembled. A few of these met them and stopped their march. A kind of parley (if intercourse carried on by signs could be so called) was carried on between the parties. The mutineers made signs that they wished to go forward, while the few militia-men endeavoured to detain them, expecting a reinforcement momently. After a time the militia agreed to allow them to approach the town; as they were advancing they were met by the Commandant, Martin Sorzano, Esq., with sixteen more militia-men. The Commandant judged it imprudent to allow the Africans to enter the town with their muskets full-cocked, and poised ready to fire. An interpreter was now procured, and the mutineers were told that if they would retire to their barracks the gentlemen present would intercede for their pardon. The negroes refused to accede to these terms; and while the interpreter was addressing some, the rest tried to push forward. Some of the militia opposed them by holding their muskets in a horizontal position, on which one of the mutineers fired, and the militia returned the fire. A mêlée commenced, in which fourteen mutineers were killed and wounded. The fire of the Africans produced little effect: they soon took to flight amid the woods which flanked the road. Twenty-eight of them were taken, amongst whom was the Yarraba chief, Ogston. Six had been killed, and six committed suicide by strangling and hanging themselves in the woods. Only one man was wounded among the militia, and he but slightly, from a small stone fired from a musket of one of the Yarrabas. "The quantity of ammunition expended by the mutineers, and the comparatively little mischief done by them, was truly astonishing. It shows how little they understood the use of fire-arms. Dixon was killed, and several of the old African soldiers were wounded, but not one of the officers was in the slightest degree hurt. "I have never been able to get a correct account of the number of lives this wild mutiny cost, but believe it was not less than forty, including those slain by the militia at Arima, those shot at San Josef, those who died of their wounds (and most of the wounded men died), the six who committed suicide, the three who were shot by sentence of the court-martial, and one who was shot while endeavouring to escape (Satchell). "A good-looking young man, named Torrens, was brought as prisoner to the presence of Colonel Bush. The colonel wished to speak to him, and desired his guards to liberate him; on which the young savage shook his sleeve, in which was a concealed razor, made a rush at the colonel, and nearly succeeded in cutting his throat. He slashed the razor in all directions until he made an opening; he rushed through this: and notwithstanding that he was fired at, and, I believe, wounded, he effected his escape, was subsequently retaken, and again made his escape with Satchell, who after this was shot by a policeman. "Torrens was retaken, tried, and recommended to mercy. Of this man's fate I am unable to speak, not knowing how far the recommendation to mercy was attended to.[52] In appearance he seemed the mildest and best-looking of the mutineers, but his conduct was the most ferocious of any. The whole of the mutineers were captured within one week of the mutiny, save this man, who was taken a month after. "On the 19th of July, Donald Stewart, otherwise Dâaga, was brought to a court-martial. On the 21st, William Satchell was tried. On the 22nd, a court-martial was held on Edward Coffin; and on the 24th one was held on the Yarraba chief, Maurice Ogston, whose country name was, I believe, Mawee. Torrens was tried on the 29th. "The sentences of these courts-martial were unknown until the 14th of August, having been sent to Barbados in order to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief. Lieutenant-General Whittingham, who approved of the decision of the courts, which was that Donald Stewart (Dâaga), Maurice Ogston, and Edward Coffin, should suffer death by being shot; and that William Satchell should be transported beyond seas during the term of his natural life. I am unacquainted with the sentence of Torrens. "Donald Stewart, Maurice Ogston, and Edward Coffin were executed on the 16th of August, 1837, at San Josef Barracks. Nothing seemed to have been neglected which could render the execution solemn and impressive; the scenery and the weather gave additional awe to the melancholy proceedings. Fronting the little eminence where the prisoners were shot was the scene where their ill-concerted mutiny commenced. To the right stood the long range of building on which they had expended much of their ammunition for the purpose of destroying their officers. The rest of the panorama was made up of an immense view of forest below them, and upright masses of mountains above them. Over these, heavy bodies of mist were slowly sailing, giving a sombre appearance to the primeval woods which, in general, covered both mountains and plains. The atmosphere indicated an inter-tropical morning during the rainy season, and the sun shone resplendently between dense columns of clouds. "At half-past seven o'clock the condemned men asked to be allowed to eat a hearty meal, as they said persons about to be executed in Guinea were always indulged with a good repast. It is remarkable that these unhappy creatures ate most voraciously, even while they were being brought out of their cell for execution. "A little before the mournful procession commenced, the condemned men were dressed from head to foot in white habiliments trimmed with black; their arms were bound with cords. This is not usual in military executions, but was deemed necessary on the present occasion. An attempt to escape on the part of the condemned would have been productive of much confusion, and was properly guarded against. "The condemned men displayed no unmanly fear. On the contrary, they steadily kept step to the Dead March which the band played; yet the certainty of death threw a cadaverous and ghastly hue over their black features, while their singular and appropriate costume, and the three coffins being borne before them, altogether rendered it a frightful picture; hence it was not to be wondered at that two European soldiers fainted. "The mutineers marched abreast. The tall form and horrid looks of Dâaga were almost appalling. The looks of Ogston were sullen, calm, and determined; those of Coffin seemed to indicate resignation. "At eight o'clock they arrived at the spot where three graves were dug; here their coffins were deposited. The condemned men were made to face to westward; three sides of a hollow square were formed, flanked on one side by a detachment of the 89th Regiment and a party of artillery, while the recruits, many of whom shared the guilt of the culprits, were appropriately placed in the line opposite them. The firing party were a little in advance of the recruits. "The sentence of the courts-martial and other necessary documents having been read by the fort adjutant, Mr. Meehan, the chaplain of the forces, read some prayers appropriated for these melancholy occasions. The clergyman then shook hands with the three men about to be sent into another state of existence. Dâaga and Ogston coolly gave their hands; Coffin wrang the chaplain's hand affectionately, saying, in tolerable English, 'I am now done with the world.' "The arms of the condemned men, as has been before stated, were bound, but in such a manner as to allow them to bring their hands to their heads. Their nightcaps were drawn over their eyes. Coffin allowed his to remain, but Ogston and Dâaga pushed theirs up again. The former did this calmly; the latter showed great wrath, seeming to think himself insulted; and his deep, metallic voice sounded in anger above that of the provost-marshal, as the latter gave the words, 'Ready! present!' But at this instant his vociferous daring forsook him. As the men levelled their muskets at him, with inconceivable rapidity he sprang bodily round, still preserving his squatting posture, and received the fire from behind; while the less noisy, but more brave, Ogston, looked the firing-party full in the face as they discharged their fatal volley. "In one instant all three fell dead, almost all the balls of the firing party having taken effect.[53] The savage appearance and manner of Dâaga excited awe. Admiration was felt for the calm bravery of Ogston, while Edward Coffin's fate excited commiseration. "There were many spectators of this dreadful scene, and amongst others a great concourse of negroes. Most of these expressed their hopes that after this terrible example the recruits would make good soldiers." * * * * * The foregoing account is identical with that in the regimental records, with the exception that the Yorubas are not in the latter credited with so large a share in the mutiny. According to Colonel Bush's account, the greater majority of the mutineers were Popos, Congos, and Eboes; the Yorubas who took part in it being very few in number. On the other hand, both Sergeant Merry and Corporal Plague, who defended the officers' quarters against the recruits, were Yorubas. It is, perhaps, needless to add, that after this no more wholesale draftings of slaves into the regiment took place. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 46: Now spelt Popos.] [Footnote 47: The Yorubas are a warlike Mohammedan tribe living in and around Lagos. The Houssa Constabulary is largely recruited from them.] [Footnote 48: This is the manner in which West African savages usually fire, and it is dictated by motives of sound prudence, for the Birmingham muskets with which they are supplied by British traders are so unsafe (the barrel not uncommonly being made of old iron piping), and the charges of powder used are so immense, that the bursting of a piece is looked upon as an ordinary occurrence; and when firing they like to keep their muskets as far removed from their bodies as possible. The majority of the mutineers fired in this manner, because, having been less than three weeks in the regiment, they had not yet been drilled with arms.] [Footnote 49: All young ensigns just arrived from England to join the regiment.] [Footnote 50: Sergeant-Major D. Cantrell. He had been the first to give the alarm.] [Footnote 51: Eleven miles distant from San Josef.] [Footnote 52: Torrens was sentenced to death, but, at the intercession of Colonel Bush, the sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life.] [Footnote 53: The firing party was furnished by the 1st West India Regiment.] CHAPTER XVIII. THE PIRARA EXPEDITION, 1842--CHANGES IN THE WEST AFRICAN GARRISONS--THE APPOLLONIA EXPEDITION, 1848. On the 7th of December, 1837, the head-quarters of the 1st West India Regiment embarked at Trinidad for St. Lucia, leaving one company at St. James' in the former island; and, after a detention of ten days in quarantine at Pigeon Island, landed on the 24th of December at Gros Islet, St. Lucia, and occupied Morne Fortune Barracks and Fort. The detachments were stationed in Tobago, Demerara, and St. Vincent. In the early part of the year 1839, the strength of the regiment being very much above its establishment, owing to the large drafts of recruits from Sierra Leone, Lieutenant-General Sir S.F. Whittingham issued an order, dated February 1st, authorising an augmentation to twelve companies. On the 1st of July of the same year the regiment was further increased to thirteen companies, it being notified at the same time that it was to be considered only a temporary arrangement, as the surplus over 1000 men were eventually to form another corps. On December 7th, 1839, the head-quarters of the regiment proceeded from St. Lucia to Demerara, to relieve the 76th Regiment, which was suffering heavily from the prevailing epidemic of yellow fever, arriving at the latter colony, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Capadose, on December 13th. The distribution of the regiment was then: Head-quarters and 2 companies at Demerara, 3 companies at Barbados, 1 at Trinidad, 1 at Tobago, 1 at St. Lucia, 1 at St. Vincent, 1 at Grenada, 1 at Dominica, and 1 at Antigua. By Horse Guards order of the 1st of July, 1840, the Royal African Corps and the three supernumerary companies of the 1st West India Regiment were formed into one corps, and designated the 3rd West India Regiment; the 1st West India Regiment remaining at the ordinary establishment of ten companies. New colours were presented to the regiment at Demerara on May 24th, 1841. In September and October of the same year a violent epidemic of yellow fever broke out in Demerara, and the mortality amongst the men of the 52nd Regiment was so alarming that that corps was moved to Berbice, and the entire duties of the garrison fell upon the 1st West India Regiment. The whole of the officers of the 52nd Regiment occupying the west wing of the Georgetown Barracks fell victims to this dreadful scourge, as did Captain French and Lieutenants de Winton and Archdale of the 1st West India Regiment. On the 11th of January, 1842, a detachment of the regiment, consisting of two lieutenants (Bingham and Wieburg), two sergeants and twenty-seven rank and file, left Georgetown, Demerara, by direction of the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Lord John Russell), to proceed to Pirara, on the south-western frontier of British Guiana, and expel a party of Brazilians who had for some time encroached on British territory. The country through which the party had to pass was unexplored and almost unknown, and the duties were most arduous. It was intended to reach Pirara by ascending the Essequibo and Rypumani Rivers, and, to effect this, a particular description of boat, locally called _corials_, had to be built, each capable of holding eight men, including the Indians who paddled. During the journey seventy-three rapids or falls were crossed, in most instances the _corials_ being unladen and the stores carried above the falls; and it was not until February 12th that Lieutenant Bingham's party reached a point on the Rypumani, eleven miles from Pirara. Next day they took possession of the village of Pirara, which they found occupied by a detachment of Brazilian troops who had been quietly sent over the border. Having selected and fortified a position, and raised temporary shelter for his men, Lieutenant Bingham--as the Brazilian commander declined to withdraw--despatched Lieutenant Bush, 1st West India Regiment, who had accompanied the party as a volunteer, to Georgetown for further instructions. That officer arrived there on March 11th, and on April 19th he again started with a small reinforcement under Ensign Stewart. This second party reached Pirara on May 21st, and found the detachment all well, but half-starved, as the Brazilians refused to sell them anything, and the stores had been some time exhausted. However, on the arrival of the reinforcement the Brazilian troops considered it advisable to withdraw across the frontier; and, with the exception of a few occasional night forays made by half-breeds and Indians in the pay of the Brazilians, the detachment met with no further opposition. In 1843 it was decided to make an alteration in the system under which the West Coast of Africa was continuously garrisoned by the 3rd West India Regiment, and to remove that corps to the West Indies. The West African garrisons were to be composed of two companies from each of the three West India regiments; and, in accordance with this scheme, two companies of the 1st West India Regiment, under Captain L.S. O'Connor, embarked at Barbados for Sierra Leone on March 22nd, 1843, arriving at the latter place in the month of May of the same year. Early in 1844 the 3rd West India Regiment left West Africa for the Bahamas, and the two companies of the 1st West India Regiment, with one of the 3rd West India Regiment, composed the garrison of Sierra Leone, while that of the Gambia consisted of two companies of the 2nd West India Regiment and one of the 3rd. This arrangement was almost at once upset by the necessity of furnishing a garrison for the Gold Coast, over which the Crown had, in 1843, resumed jurisdiction, as it was suspected that the Government of the merchants, which had been established at Cape Coast Castle since 1831, connived at the maintenance of the slave trade; and, in January, 1844, one captain, two subalterns, and 100 men of the 1st West India Regiment left Sierra Leone for the Gold Coast. In the same year, two companies of the regiment, under the command of Captain Robeson, proceeded from Demerara to Jamaica, disembarking there on June 1st. This was the first occasion on which any portion of the corps was stationed in that island. On the 25th of February, 1845, the head-quarters, with the Grenadier and No. 8 Companies, embarked at Demerara in the _Princess Royal_ transport, and sailed for Jamaica, to relieve the head-quarters of the 2nd West India Regiment ordered to Nassau, disembarking at Port Royal on March 6th. The distribution of the regiment was then as follows: The Grenadier, No. 1, No. 8, and the Light Company in Jamaica,[54] No. 5 at Demerara, No. 2 at Trinidad, No. 3 at Dominica, No. 6 at Grenada, No. 4 at Sierra Leone, and No. 7 at Cape Coast Castle. During the last six months of this year (1845) over 300 recruits joined the head-quarters from West Africa. In 1846, No. 5 Company was removed from Demerara to Tobago, and the detachments at Dominica and Grenada rejoined head-quarters in Jamaica, where No. 2 and No. 5 Companies also rejoined on the 16th of December, 1847.[55] In the beginning of the year 1848, the King of Appollonia, a state on the western frontier of the Gold Coast Colony, closed the roads leading to Cape Coast Castle, stopped all trade, and maltreated several British subjects. Messengers were sent to him by the Lieutenant-Governor demanding explanation and redress, with no other result than the detention and imprisonment of the messengers; and matters were at last brought to a crisis by the murder of the French Commandant of Assinee and his boat's crew, the pillaging of Dutch canoes at Axim, and the capture of some Dutch subjects. The only force Mr. Winniett, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Gold Coast, had at his disposal was No. 7 Company of the 1st West India Regiment, then commanded by Lieutenant E.H. Bingham; but, with the assistance of some influential merchants, he succeeded in raising an expeditionary force of from 4000 to 5000 natives. On the 24th of March, 1848, the Lieutenant-Governor marched, with half the native levies and the company of the 1st West India Regiment, from Cape Coast Castle to the then Dutch settlement of Axim, 120 miles distant from Cape Coast and about twenty miles from Atemboo, or Attaambu, the King of Appollonia's chief town and residence. By the 3rd of April the whole force was concentrated at Axim, and on the 6th, at 5 a.m., it moved onwards towards Appollonia. The country consisting of impenetrable forest, the force had to march from Axim to Appollonia along the sandy beach; and there were the mouths of two considerable rivers to be crossed. The first river, the Ancobra, was reached at 6 a.m.; and, although a very heavy sea was breaking on the bar, the passage of the stream was commenced in canoes, which had been brought from Axim for that purpose. The first detachment consisted of the native allies, and, as soon as the canoes gained mid-stream, several hundred armed Appollonians appeared on the further bank, and opened fire on them as they came within range. Several natives were struck, and three of the canoes being upset the remainder returned to the bank they had just left. It being found impracticable to induce the native auxiliaries to make a further attempt to force the passage, this duty devolved upon the company of the 1st West India Regiment, which the Lieutenant-Governor had originally intended holding in reserve; and, under cover of a fire from two rocket-troughs, it crossed the river in the canoes, driving the Appollonians, in spite of a smart resistance, into the bush. The remainder of the force then passed over, several natives being drowned in the surf during the passage; and at 10 a.m. they pushed on, reaching the Appollonian village of Asantah about 1 p.m. This place was found to be deserted, and here the force encamped for the night. Next morning at daybreak a further advance was made, and about 6 a.m. the Abmoussa River--or, rather, Lagoon--was reached. A very heavy and dangerous surf was breaking on the bar, and the dense bush on the further bank, which grew close down to the water's edge, was observed to be full of armed men. The company of the 1st West India Regiment was again called upon to lead the way, and the men, embarking in the canoes, paddled out into the breakers. A continued and furious fusillade was at once opened by the concealed enemy upon the men, who were unable to reply, as their attention was entirely occupied in keeping the canoes from capsizing. Fortunately, the Appollonians fired wildly, and their powder was of bad quality; for, although almost every man of the detachment was struck by slugs or fragments of iron, only eleven were wounded, and those slightly. A canoe was, however, unhappily upset, and two men beaten against the rocks and drowned. The company formed up on landing, and advanced steadily through the bush against the enemy, who offered but a feeble resistance and soon retired altogether. One man was shot dead while stepping ashore, an ambushed native firing at him at the distance of a few feet only. The native allies now passed over, and the march was continued. Parties of the enemy were observed hovering round the flanks, but no attack was made, and at 3 p.m. a halt was ordered at the village of Barcoo. The force was here divided into two parts, of which one, consisting entirely of natives, was to move through the bush and prevent the king escaping inland; while the other, consisting of the company of the 1st West India Regiment with the remainder of the native allies, was to march along the beach and attack the town in front. This movement would probably have been successful, had the division of natives performed the duty allotted to them; but, being fired upon by some ambushed Appollonians, they refused to proceed further, and when the company of the 1st West India Regiment reached Atemboo, they found it entirely deserted. The success which had so far attended the expedition, however, produced such an effect upon the native mind that, on March 9th, the principal chiefs of Appollonia came in to Atemboo to make submission; and, as it was reported that the king was in hiding in the immediate neighbourhood, parties were sent out in search of him. On the 18th his wives and family were captured to the westward, near the old fort, and the day following, a party of the 1st West India Regiment brought in a body of 121 men, all heavily manacled with irons weighing from fifty to ninety pounds, and who had been intended to be sacrificed at an approaching "custom." Two of these men thus unexpectedly saved from a horrible death volunteered to point out where the king was concealed, and some men of the regiment being sent out under their guidance, succeeded in capturing him in his hiding-place, in the midst of a mangrove swamp. The object of the expedition being accomplished by the capture of the king, the force moved back to Axim, on the 21st of March, and, on the evening of the same day, the Lieutenant-Governor, with the captive king and the company of the 1st West India Regiment, embarked on board the merchant brig _Governor_, arriving at Cape Coast Castle on the 24th. Lieutenant-Governor Winniett in his despatch says: "I cannot speak too highly of the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment. During its march of more than 120 miles, sometimes through very bad roads, and under the powerful rays of the sun, the crossing of five rivers, and other circumstances of disadvantage, no complaints were heard, neither was a man seen in a state of intoxication during the campaign. Mr. Bingham, the officer commanding the detachment, was most active in executing all orders entrusted to his care, and I have great pleasure in bringing him under your Lordship's notice." FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 54: The companies in Jamaica were detached thus: No. 1, No. 8, and Grenadier Company at Up Park Camp. The Light Company between Port Antonio and Montego Bay.] [Footnote 55: The distribution in Jamaica then was: Grenadier, Light, No. 2, } at Up Park Camp. and No. 5 Companies } No. 1, at Spanish Town. No. 8, at Port Royal. No. 3, at Falmouth } To occupy posts vacated No. 6, at Lucea } by the 38th Regiment. ] CHAPTER XIX. INDIAN DISTURBANCES IN HONDURAS, 1848-9--THE ESCORT TO COOMASSIE, 1848--THE SHERBRO EXPEDITION, 1849--ESCORT TO RIO NUNEZ, 1850. While No. 7 Company had thus been engaged on the Gold Coast, the quinquennial relief for the West African garrisons had sailed from the West Indies, No. 2 and No. 5 Companies, 1st West India Regiment, having embarked at Jamaica on February 21st, 1848. They arrived at Sierra Leone in April, and No. 5 Company being there landed to relieve No. 4, No. 2 proceeded to Cape Coast Castle to relieve No. 7. The two relieved companies rejoined the head-quarters at Jamaica on July 2nd, 1848. No. 8 Company having been sent to Nassau in February, and the light company in July, while No. 1 had been despatched to Honduras in May, the distribution of the regiment in August, 1848, was as follows: 2 companies in West Africa, 2 at Nassau, 1 in Honduras, and 5 in Jamaica. No. 1 Company had been sent to Honduras in reply to an urgent appeal for a reinforcement from the Honduras Government, that colony being threatened with the horrors of an Indian war. In 1847 a war broke out between the Yucatecans and the Indians, and caused much anxiety to the British colony, whose strict neutrality satisfied neither of the contending parties. The Yucatecans, being driven out of the southern portion of Yucatan, took refuge in our territory, and raids and reprisals were frequent between them and the Santa Cruz Indians. In 1848 the town of Bacalar, situated on the shores of a lake, about twenty miles from the northern frontier of British Honduras, was captured by the Indians, and the fugitives, streaming into the colony, spread alarm amongst the colonists. It was at this time that reinforcements were applied for, and No. 1 Company, under Major Luke Smyth O'Connor, despatched from Jamaica. On arriving at Belize the company was at once moved up to the Hondo, and towards the end of May a portion of it proceeded on escort duty with a British commissioner to Bacalar to endeavour to arrange a peace. That town had been the scene of the most frightful atrocities, and the streets were found strewn with the dead bodies of men, women, and children. Negotiations failing, the escort returned to the Hondo. Collisions now became frequent between the Yucatecans and the Indians, and our northern border became a rallying point for both sides. The small British force was continually harassed by alarms and forced marches taken to prevent violation of British territory, until towards the close of 1848, it being rumoured that the Indians intended to cross the Hondo and sack Belize, it was withdrawn from the north for the protection of that town. Additional reinforcements were now asked for, and on March 29th, 1849, No. 4 Company, under Captain Meehan, embarked at Jamaica for Honduras. In January, 1849, No. 1 Company had again advanced to the Hondo, and were within a few miles of Chac Creek on that river, when the sanguinary struggle between the Yucatecans and Indians took place. Hearing the sound of firing the troops marched to the spot, and finding the Indians employed in roasting the dead bodies of the defeated Yucatecans, were only with the utmost difficulty restrained from attacking them. But the most strict orders had been given for the preservation of British neutrality, and nothing could be done. Indeed, the Indians were themselves well aware of the advantages which they derived from our neutrality, and were exceedingly careful not to come into contact with the British; even going so far as on one occasion to shoot a chief and flog six men, who had been accused of committing an outrage across the Hondo. In March, 1849, Major O'Connor visited Bacalar to endeavour to make peace, but without success; and the two companies of the regiment remained stationed on the Hondo, amid the same scenes of horror, until February, 1852, when they rejoined head-quarters at Jamaica. To return to the companies in West Africa. In September, 1848, Mr. Winniett, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Gold Coast, received instructions from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to proceed on a mission to Coomassie, the capital of the Ashanti kingdom, for the purpose of establishing friendly relations between Great Britain and that power. Captain Powell, 1st West India Regiment, was then in command of No. 2 Company, stationed at Cape Coast Castle, and he, with forty-eight men of the regiment, accompanied the Lieutenant-Governor as an escort. The mission left Cape Coast Castle on the 28th of September, 1848, crossed the River Prah on October 4th, and on the 8th reached the village of Karsi, about two miles from Coomassie. There the party halted to prepare for the entry into the capital, and, at noon, the King's messengers having informed them that everything was in readiness for their reception, they proceeded towards Coomassie. Captain Powell says: "At a distance of about a mile from the town, a party of messengers with gold-handled swords of office, arrived with the king's compliments. After halting for a short time, we proceeded to the entrance of the first street, and then formed in order of procession, the escort leading. Presently a party of the king's linguists, with four large state umbrellas, ensigns of chieftainship, came up to request us to halt for a few minutes under the shade of a large banyan tree in the street, to give the king a little more time to prepare to receive us. After a brief delay of about twenty minutes, during which a large party of the king's soldiers fired a salute about a hundred yards distant from us, we moved on to the market-place, where the king and his chiefs were seated under their large umbrellas, according to the custom of the country on the reception of strangers of distinction. They, with their numerous captains and attendants occupied three sides of a large square, and formed a continuous line about 600 yards in length, and about ten yards in depth. After we had passed along about three-fourths of the line, we found the king surrounded by about twenty officers of his household, and a large number of messengers with their gold-handled swords and canes of office. Several very large umbrellas, consisting of silk velvet of different colours, shaded him and his suite from the sun. These umbrellas were surmounted by rude images, representing birds and beasts, overlaid with gold; the king's chair was richly decorated with gold; and the display of golden ornaments about his own person and those of his suite was most magnificent. The lumps of gold adorning the wrists of the King's attendants, and many of the principal chiefs, were so large that they must have been quite fatiguing to the wearers. We occupied about an hour in moving in procession from the banyan tree, where we had rested on entering the town, to the end of the line prepared for our reception; after which we proceeded to an open space at some distance from the market-place, and there took our seats. At 3.15 p.m. the chiefs commenced moving in procession before us, and this lasted until 6 p.m. Those whom we had first saluted in the market-place passed us first. Each chief was preceded by his band of rude music, consisting chiefly of drums and horns, followed by a body of soldiers under arms, and shaded by a large umbrella. The king was preceded by many of the officers of his household, and his messengers with the gold-handled swords, etc. etc. When he came opposite the governor, and received our military salute, he stopped, and approaching him took him cordially by the hand. After the king, other chiefs, and a large body of troops, passed in due order; and at 6 p.m. the ceremony closed." At 9.30 a.m. on October 26th, 1848, the mission left Coomassie on its return journey to the coast, and arrived at Cape Coast Castle on November 4th. This was the first occasion on which a British Governor, or a body of regular troops, had ever visited Coomassie. In March, 1849, a further change took place in the distribution of the regiment in the West Indies, No. 7 Company, under Captain R. Hughes, proceeding to Nassau from Jamaica. There were thus the head-quarters and 3 companies in Jamaica, 3 in Nassau, 2 in Honduras, and 2 in West Africa. In June, 1849; the Acting Governor of Sierra Leone found that the state of affairs in Sherbro, a low-lying tract of country some seventy-five miles to the southward of Sierra Leone, imperatively called upon the British to take steps for putting an end to the war which for a long time had been carried on between the rival chiefs of the Caulker family, and had utterly paralysed trade. H.M.S. _Alert_ and _Adelaide_ were to be employed, but as a military force was required to proceed with the naval one, the under-mentioned force embarked in the Colonial steamer _Pluto_ on the 18th of June: Captain Grange, Lieutenant Jones, and 45 men of the 1st West India Regiment, and 44 men of the 3rd West India Regiment. The expedition arrived at Yawrey Bay, at the mouth of the Cockboro River, on the 19th of June, when a stockaded fort was shelled and destroyed by the _Adelaide_. The expedition then proceeded to Bendoo, and after some delay, owing to the difficulty in inducing the chiefs to come in, returned to Yawrey Bay on the 29th, where negotiations were held and a treaty of peace between the Government and rival chiefs signed. The detachments rejoined at Freetown, Sierra Leone, on July 7th. On the 29th of November, 1849, Lieutenant Tunstall and 34 men of No. 2 Company of the 1st West India Regiment, left Cape Coast Castle and proceeded to Appollonia in canoes, in aid of the civil power. After an absence of three weeks, during which they endured great hardships from exposure and fatigue, they rejoined their detachment at Cape Coast. In the beginning of the year 1850, the Rio Nunez was in such a disturbed state as to necessitate the Governor of Sierra Leone taking steps for the protection of British subjects there. Some influential chiefs of the river having also besought the intervention of the Government to restore peace, commissioners were appointed, and as war was actually being carried on at the time, a military force was detailed to accompany them. This force consisted of Lieutenant Searle and 33 men of the 1st West India Regiment and Captain Prendergast and 34 men of the 3rd West India Regiment, and it embarked in H.M.S. _Teazer_ on the 22nd of February, 1850. The _Teazer_ arrived at the Rio Nunez on the 24th, and proceeded up the river to Ropass, a town some distance up the stream, where the commissioners landed with the escort. A "palaver" was held at this place on March 1st, the rival chieftains being attended by large bodies of armed men, but no satisfactory arrangement was arrived at, and next day the commissioners and troops proceeded to Walkariah, a town higher up the river. Here matters were finally amicably settled, and the party returned to Sierra Leone on March 9th. In the West Indies there had been little change since 1849, except that on the 13th of February, 1851, the head-quarters and two companies were removed from Up Park Camp to Spanish Town; and a detachment consisting of half a company, under Ensign Cave, was sent to Turk's Island in December, 1851. This latter rejoined head-quarters in Jamaica in January, 1852; and in February, No. 1 and No. 4 Companies, under Captain Robeson, rejoined from Honduras. In the same year, however, they again went on detachment: No. 1, under Captain Grange, to St. Christopher's, and No. 4, under Lieutenant Imes, to Barbados. The distribution of the regiment in September, 1852, was thus: the Grenadier, No. 3 and No. 6 Companies, at Jamaica; the Light, No. 7 and No. 8 Companies, at Nassau, No. 4 at St. Christopher's, No. 1 at Barbados, No. 5 at Sierra Leone, and No. 2 at Cape Coast Castle. In February, 1852, Major L. Smyth O'Connor, 1st West India Regiment, had arrived at Sierra Leone and assumed command of the troops in West Africa, and finding in May that the company on the Gold Coast was reduced by deaths to only 50 rank and file, he recommended that it should be recalled to Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast Corps, then almost completed, being quite sufficient for the garrison of the Gold Coast. In September, 1852, Major O'Connor was appointed Governor of the Gambia, and as by Horse Guards letter of September 20th, 1852, "it was considered expedient that he should continue invested with the command of the troops on the West Coast of Africa, and move the head-quarters to the Gambia," this was done in October, 1852. The War Office having approved of Major O'Connor's recommendation, No. 2 Company, 50 strong, arrived at Sierra Leone from Cape Coast Castle on March 20th, 1853. CHAPTER XX. THE STORMING OF SABBAJEE, 1853--THE RELIEF OF CHRISTIANSBORG, 1854. On March 23rd, 1853, No. 3 and No. 6 Companies, under Captain A.W. Murray and Lieutenant Upton, embarked at Port Royal, Jamaica, in the troopship _Resistance_, for the relief of the West African garrisons. On May 17th, the _Resistance_ arrived at the Gambia with four out of the six companies forming the relief for the detachments of the three West India regiments, and reinforcements being urgently required for the suppression of a hostile movement amongst the Mohammedans at Sabbajee, they were landed. On the 25th of May, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Connor prepared to take the field with a force of 603 men, consisting of 463 of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd West India Regiments, 35 pensioners, and 105 of the Gambia Militia. A field battery, consisting of 2 six-pounder field-guns and 2 howitzers, was also organised. On the 30th May, the brigade marched from Bathurst to Josswung, a distance of eight miles, where a camp was formed; and on June 1st, the force advanced to the attack of Sabbajee.[56] Sabbajee was one of the oldest Marabout towns in Combo, and boasted the possession of the largest mosque in that portion of Africa. The town, more than a mile in circumference, was surrounded by a strong stockade, double ditches, and outward abattis; and the inhabitants, who could muster 3000 fighting men, were, from their predatory and warlike habits, the dread of the surrounding country. On approaching the town, a strong body of the enemy was observed stationed round the mosque, while the stockade was lined with men. A portion of the stockade presented the appearance of having been removed, but had in reality only been laid lengthwise, so as to form a very formidable obstacle; while a deep trench dug in rear was crowded with men, who, in perfect security, could fire upon the advancing British, should they fall into the trap which had been laid for them, and attempt to carry the town at this point. The force was drawn up in three divisions: the 1st West India Regiment, under Captain A.W. Murray, forming the centre division; the 2nd West India Regiment, under Captain Anderson, the right; and the 3rd West India Regiment, under Captain Brabazon, the left. At about four hundred yards from the stockade the field battery opened fire, and with such precision that after a few rounds the roof of the mosque and those of the adjacent houses were in flames. Observing the disorder caused amongst the enemy by the burning of their sacred building, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Connor determined to seize the opportunity, and storm. The right and left divisions extended in skirmishing order, the centre remaining in column, and the whole advanced to the assault. The enemy kept up a heavy fire from the loop-holes of their stockade, over which the green flag was flying; but at the same moment the three divisions, which had in advancing formed a crescent, rushed at the stockade at three different points, and, clambering over, got at the enemy with the bayonet. This was more than they could stand, and abandoning their stockade, they fled down the streets and escaped through sally-ports in the rear of the town. A strong body of fanatics, however, still held the mosque, the fire in the roof of which they had succeeded in extinguishing, and, amid the beating of war-drums and cries of "Allah" from the priests, kept up a smart fire upon the troops as they entered the large central square in which the mosque stood. To have stormed the building would have involved great sacrifice of life; the men, therefore, were directed to occupy the houses enclosing the square, and open fire, until the rockets could be brought into play. The second rocket fired whizzed through the roof of the mosque, the defenders of which, however, only increased their drumming and shouts of defiance, for they were secure in their belief of the local tradition, which said that the mosque was impregnable and indestructible. In a very few minutes flames began to appear on the roof, and, though the enemy worked hard to extinguish it, it rapidly increased, until the mosque was untenable. Dozens of the fanatics blew out their brains rather than surrender, while others threw themselves out of the windows and passages, and rushed sword in hand, in a state of frenzy, upon the British. The coolness and steadiness of the troops was, however, more than a match for the mad rage of the Mandingoes, who were shot down one after another, until the whole of the defenders of the mosque were killed or made prisoners. The remainder of the enemy, who fled at the storming of the stockade, had taken refuge in the neighbouring woods, and, the object of the engagement being accomplished by the capture of the town, they were not pursued. The stockade and mosque being destroyed, the force left Sabbajee on June 4th, and returned to Josswung, where, by an arrangement with the King of Combo, a portion of that kingdom, including the town of Sabbajee, was ceded to the British. The mosque was a singularly strong building, and for a day and a half resisted every effort to pull it down, being eventually reduced to ruins by blasting the walls with bags of gunpowder. It consisted of a large central hall, with walls made of baked clay, three feet in thickness, and an external corridor running round the whole circumference of the inner apartment. The roof, conical in shape, was supported by six masonry pillars. As the Gambia was still in an unsettled state, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Connor deemed it prudent to increase its garrison at the expense of that of Sierra Leone. No. 6 Company of the 1st West India Regiment was therefore detained at Bathurst, and on June 8th, No. 3 Company, under Captain Murray, proceeded in the _Resistance_ to Sierra Leone. On arriving at that station, on June 17th, Captain Murray assumed the command of the troops. No. 2 Company embarked at Sierra Leone for Jamaica on June 22nd, arriving at Kingston on August 5th. On October 18th the _Resistance_ returned from the West Indies with the remaining companies destined for the quinquennial relief, and No. 5 Company, embarking in her on October 22nd, reached Jamaica on November 25th. The West African garrisons were now as follows: At the Gambia, one company of the 1st West India Regiment, two of the 2nd, and one of the 3rd; at Sierra Leone, one of the 1st West India Regiment, and one of the 3rd. In the West Indies the following changes had taken place: Nos. 7 and 8 Companies had been moved in August from Nassau to Barbados and Dominica respectively, and, in July, the light company had proceeded from Nassau to Jamaica. In December, 1853, the distribution of the regiment was then as follows: 4 companies at Jamaica, 2 at Barbados, 1 at Dominica, 1 at St. Christopher's, 1 at Sierra Leone, and 1 at the Gambia.[57] In September, 1854, the inhabitants of Christiansborg, a Danish settlement on the Gold Coast four miles from Accra, which had been recently purchased by the British, rose in rebellion against the Colonial authorities. The only armed force then on the Gold Coast consisted of the Gold Coast Artillery, recruited from amongst the Fanti tribes, and this body the rebels blockaded in the Castle of Christiansborg. On the outbreak of the rebellion, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Gold Coast at once sent to Sierra Leone for assistance; and, on the 12th of October, the following detachments embarked at Sierra Leone in H.M.S. _Britomart_ and _Ferret_: Lieutenant Strachan and 33 men of the 1st West India Regiment, Captain Rookes and 46 men of the 2nd West India Regiment, Lieutenant Haneahan and 31 men of the 3rd West India Regiment. From the Gambia were also despatched in the Colonial steamer _Dover_, on the 24th of October: Ensign Anderson and 25 men of the 1st, Captain Mockler and 70 men of the 2nd, and Lieutenant Hill and 23 men of the 3rd West India Regiment. The troops from Sierra Leone and the Gambia arrived at Christiansborg on the 27th of October and the 7th of November respectively. Several small skirmishes had taken place between the Gold Coast artillery and the rebels without either side gaining any material advantage; but, on the arrival of the reinforcement from Sierra Leone, the siege was raised, and the natives retired inland to some villages on the plain behind Christiansborg. There, like all undisciplined bodies, they gradually melted away; the chiefs, finding their followers abandoning them, were compelled to ask for terms; and directly negotiations were opened, the detachments of the three West India regiments re-embarked to return to Sierra Leone, sailing from Christiansborg on the 12th of November. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 56: See map.] [Footnote 57: This year, 1853, appears to have been particularly unhealthy in the West Indies, to judge from the following inscription, taken from an intramural monument in Kingston Cathedral Church: TO THE MEMORY OF THE FOLLOWING: Capt. Robt. Mostyn, 3rd W.I.R., died of yellow fever, at Nassau, Bahamas, 23rd July, 1853, æt. 27. Ensign John Alex. Gordon Pringle, 3rd W.I.R., died of yellow fever at Kingston, Jamaica, 31st July, 1853, æt. 21. Assist.-Surg. Walter William Harris, 1st W.I.R., attached to 3rd W.I.R., died at Up Park Camp, of yellow fever, 4th Aug., 1853, æt. 24. Lieut. John Maryon Wilson, 3rd W.I.R., died at Up Park Camp, of yellow fever, 13th Aug., 1853, æt. 22. Eliza Chancellor Wilson, wife of the above, died at Up Park Camp, of yellow fever, 5th Sept., 1853, æt. 22. Cath. Elizabeth, wife of Lieut. Wm. Hen. Wilson Hawtayne, 3rd W.I.R., died of yellow fever at Nassau, Bahamas, 9th Aug., 1853, æt. 23. Asst.-Surg. Gideon Jas. Wm. Griffith, 3rd W.I.R., died of yellow fever at Lucia, 26th Aug., 1853, æt. 23. Also, Selina Maria, wife of Capt. C.S.H. Hingston, 3rd W.I.R., died at Up Park Camp, 11th April, 1854, æt. 23. Erected by the officers of the 1st and 3rd W.I. Regts. ] CHAPTER XXI. THE TWO EXPEDITIONS TO MALAGEAH, 1854 AND 1855. The troops that had been despatched from Sierra Leone and the Gambia for the relief of Christiansborg, returned to Sierra Leone, in H.M.S. _Prometheus_, on the 25th of November, 1854, and in consequence of the hostile attitude assumed by the chiefs of the Mellicourie and Scarcies Rivers, and the outrages committed by natives on mercantile factories in those rivers, the Governor of Sierra Leone decided to detain the contingent which had been sent from the Gambia, in order to have a sufficient force to overawe the chief of Malageah, the principal offender, and compel him to sign a treaty of trade. With this view, accordingly, detachments of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd West India Regiments, numbering in all 401 officers and men, under the command of Captain Rookes, 2nd West India Regiment, embarked in H.M.S. _Prometheus_ and _Dover_, on the 2nd of December, and sailed for the Mellicourie River, on which the town of Malageah is situated. The officers of the 1st West India Regiment who accompanied the expedition were Captain R.D. Fletcher, Lieutenant Connell, Lieutenant Strachan, and Ensign Anderson. On December 4th, the expedition arrived off Malageah, and the river-banks having been reconnoitred, Captain Heseltine, of H.M.S. _Britomart_, who had been appointed diplomatic agent with powers to negotiate, directed a landing to be made. The troops disembarked, and meeting with no opposition, advanced on the town, seizing and occupying the mosque and the king's house, while a second body took possession of all the approaches to the town. By these means, a party of some 200 chiefs and Marabouts, who filled the mosque, were surrounded. In the meantime, the 1st Division, under Captain R. D'Oyley Fletcher, 1st West India Regiment, had proceeded to a creek to the eastward of the town, which they ascended in the boats of the _Britomart_, and then crossing by bye-paths through the swamp and bush to the back of the town, where they dispersed a body of 150 natives armed with rifles and muskets, they joined the main body before the mosque. Negotiations were opened by the diplomatic agent, and continued for about half-an-hour; when, as it was noticed that the Marabouts were gradually leaving the mosque and all going in one direction, a reconnoitring party of ten men, under Lieutenant F.J. Connell, 1st West India Regiment, was sent to the northern side of the town. Lieutenant Connell, on reaching the town gate, found from 1800 to 2000 natives armed with fire-arms, spears, bows and arrows, formed in a semicircle, from eight to ten deep, facing the small picket that had been there posted. The whole of the main body, with the seamen and marines, was at once ordered up, and took up a position on the plateau to the north of the town, facing the natives, while a detached party occupied the walls and gates. At first there was a disposition on the part of the natives to resist this movement, but it was so rapidly executed that they were taken by surprise, and, losing cohesion, they soon after gradually dispersed. The king, Bamba Mima Lahi, now signified his desire to come to terms, promised to comply with all demands, and to pay one thousand dollars as a fine for his offences. The force accordingly re-embarked, the object of the expedition having been effected without bloodshed, and returned to Sierra Leone on December 6th. The following letter may be of interest: "H.M.S. BRITOMART, "_Sierra Leone, December 6th, 1854._ "SIR, "In bringing back the troops that have been embarked on board the _Prometheus_ and landed at Malageah, and who, whilst afloat, have been under my command, I beg to bear testimony to their quiet, orderly, and zealous conduct, both afloat and ashore, where, had it not been for the above good qualities, collision would have been inevitable. "To Captains Rookes, Mockler, and Fletcher, and the officers of the force, I beg to return my sincere thanks for their zealous and active co-operation; further comment on my part would be presumptuous. "A. HESELTINE, "Commander and Senior Naval Officer. "Lieutenant-Colonel Foster, "Commanding troops." On the 14th of December, the Gambia contingent sailed for the Gambia in the Colonial steamer _Dover_, and the garrison of Sierra Leone remained at its ordinary strength of three companies. In May, 1855, as the King of Malageah had not observed the stipulations of the treaty that had been forced upon him, and had not paid the fine of one thousand dollars, the Acting Governor of Sierra Leone, a gentleman of colour, determined to take steps for his punishment. On the 21st of May, accordingly, he sent for Captain R. D'Oyley Fletcher, 1st West India Regiment, who was then in command of the troops, and informed him that it was his intention to send a force of 150 men, that very day, to burn the town of Malageah, and, if possible, capture the king. He added that the troops would proceed in H.M.S. _Teazer_, then lying in the harbour. Captain Fletcher, in reply, said that he could not approve of the proposed arrangements; that since a force of 400 men had been deemed necessary to extract a promise from the king, it was, to say the least, injudicious to endeavour to force him to fulfil that promise with only 150 men. He stated that at the last expedition more than 2000 armed natives had been seen, and he considered it inadvisable to proceed to actual hostilities without a force proportionate to the duty to be performed. He further suggested that the expedition should be delayed for two or three days, so that the detachments of the 2nd West India Regiment might be brought in from Waterloo and the Banana Islands, and the whole garrison employed on the duty. The Acting Governor overruled these objections, insinuated that Captain Fletcher was actuated by fears for his personal safety, and finally peremptorily ordered the force he had mentioned to embark. In consequence, on the evening of May 21st, Captain Fletcher, Lieutenant Strachan, Lieutenant Wylie, and 69 men of the 1st West India Regiment, with Lieutenants Keir and Beazley and 79 men of the 3rd West India Regiment, embarked on board the _Teazer_. Lieutenant Vincent, 2nd West India Regiment, was attached to the 1st for duty, and Deputy-Assistant-Commissary-General Frith and Surgeons Marchant and Bradshaw accompanied the troops. The _Teazer_ arrived off Benty Point, at the mouth of the Mellicourie River, on the morning of May 22nd, and, after a delay of a few hours, in consequence of the difficulty in crossing the bar, the expedition arrived off Malageah. Lieutenant-Commander Nicolas, of the _Teazer_, and Mr. Dillet, the Acting Governor's private secretary, had been appointed commissioners, and, by their direction, the troops disembarked about 10 a.m. A flag of truce was flying on the king's house, and, as he showed a disposition to come to terms, the commissioners determined to depart from their instructions, and make an attempt to settle the affair without having recourse to force. They accordingly informed the king that if he would pay the fine his town would be spared; and they granted him one hour for this purpose, warning him that if at the expiration of that time the money was not forthcoming, the town would be shelled. Two hours having passed without any communication having been received from the king, the _Teazer_ at noon opened fire, and the troops advanced on the town, covering their flanks with skirmishers. This advance would have been unnecessary had the _Teazer_ been supplied with rockets; but there being none, the men were obliged to set fire to the houses. It would be difficult to imagine a worse-planned expedition. The troops gained the central square of the town, and, in compliance with the written instructions, set fire to the mosque, the king's house, and other principal buildings; and ultimately the whole town appeared to be in flames. The left division, under Lieutenant Vincent, was exposed to a desultory fire, during the whole of these operations, from the enemy concealed in the bush; and large numbers of natives were observed gathering on the plateau to the north of the town. As it seemed impossible that any portion of the town could escape the conflagration, and as the heat from the burning buildings was intense, the troops retired to the river bank, and embarked in the _Teazer's_ boats. Scarcely had the seamen dipped their oars into the water, to pull out into the stream, than a volley was poured into the boats from the dense bush which grew close down to the edge of the water; and the ambushed enemy then commenced firing rapidly, but fortunately with so little precision that the troops succeeded in reaching mid-stream with a loss of only five wounded. The boats continued their course to the ship, and the troops re-embarked. The town was still in flames, but they were gradually subsiding, and before nightfall were entirely extinguished, leaving a considerable portion of the town still unconsumed. The commissioners, upon this, decided, as it was too late to land again that day, to drop down the river as far as Benty Point for the night, and to return next morning to complete the work of destruction. Captain Fletcher then objected to any second landing being made, pointing out that the whole country was now alarmed, and that the people of Malageah would be reinforced by those of Fouricariah (a populous town further up the river), and that quite enough had been done to punish the king. The commissioners agreed with his views, but decided that their orders were so peremptory that they could not, without running the risk of censure, leave the river until the entire town had been destroyed. At 5.30 a.m. on May 23rd, the _Teazer_ left Benty Point, and steaming up the river, anchored off Malageah, in which the ruins were still smouldering. The vessel was so ill-provided with munitions of war that hardly any shell remained from the previous day. What little there was, was thrown amongst the houses to endeavour to fire them, and the attempt being unsuccessful, it became necessary to land the men. The dense bush around the town having been well searched with grape and canister to clear it of any lurking enemy, the troops, 135 in number, were landed on the bank of the mangrove creek running inland towards the town, and no enemy appearing, they advanced to set fire to the buildings that had hitherto escaped destruction. The advanced guard of thirty men, with whom were Lieutenant-Commander Nicolas and Mr. Dillet, who had landed to point out which houses it was most important to thoroughly destroy, had only advanced some two hundred yards from the bank of the creek, when they were received with a murderous discharge of musketry from the enemy concealed in the bush. Almost the whole of the advanced party were shot down in this one volley, twenty men being killed on the spot, and Lieutenant-Commander Nicolas and Mr. Dillet severely wounded. The main body, seventy-five in number, under Captain Fletcher, at once hurried up to prevent the wounded falling into the hands of the barbarous natives, and behaved with great gallantry, for though falling thick and fast under the tremendous fire which the concealed enemy--to the number of several hundreds--poured into them from a distance of ten or twelve yards, they held their ground until the wounded had been safely conveyed to the boats. Scarcely had this been accomplished than the rear-guard of thirty men, under Lieut. Keir, 3rd West India Regiment, was attacked by a large number of natives who had moved through the bush, and actually succeeded in cutting off our men from the boats. The enemy advanced with great determination into the open, thinking to overwhelm this small party, and they were only driven back into the bush by repeated volleys and a final charge with the bayonet. By this time fully one-third of the men who had landed having been killed, and a great number wounded, the order was given to retire, which was done steadily, the ground being contested inch by inch. At this time Company Sergeant-Major Scanlan, of the 3rd West India Regiment, and six men who were covering the retreat, fell, the former mortally wounded; and some of the bolder of the natives, rushing out of their concealment, seized Deputy-Assistant-Commissary Frith, and dragged him away into the bush, where he was barbarously murdered in cold blood. Scanlan was lying in the narrow path, his chest riddled with bullets, when the chief fetish priest of the place, to encourage the natives to make further efforts, sprang upon a ruined wall in front of him, and began dancing an uncouth dance, accompanying it with savage yells and significant gestures to the dying man. He paid dearly for his rashness, however, for Scanlan, collecting his strength for a last supreme effort, seized his loaded rifle, which was fortunately lying within reach, and discharged it at the gesticulating savage, who threw up his arms and fell dead. The next moment Scanlan was surrounded by a horde of infuriated barbarians, and his body hacked into an undistinguishable mass. The troops, sadly diminished in number, at last reached that portion of the mangrove creek where they had left the boats. Of these there had been originally but two, and one having at the commencement of the action been used to convey Lieutenant-Commander Nicolas and Mr. Dillet, under the charge of Surgeon Bradshaw, to the ship, one only remained for the men to embark in. The tide having fallen, this was lying out near the entrance of the creek, separated by an expanse of reeking mud from the shore. The men, seeing their last chance of safety cut off, threw themselves into the mud, in which many sank and were no more seen. Some few, however, succeeded in floundering along, half wading and half swimming, until they reached her, and climbed in. She was, however, so riddled with bullets, that she filled and sank almost immediately. Captain Fletcher, Lieutenant Wylie, Lieutenant Strachan, and Lieutenant Vincent, with some thirty men, endeavoured to make a last stand upon a small islet of mud and sand, near the left bank of the creek; but Lieutenant Wylie was shot dead almost at once, and Lieutenant Vincent, being shot through the body, jumped into the water, to endeavour to swim to the ship. In a few seconds seventeen men had fallen out of this devoted band, and the survivors, plunging into the creek, swam down towards the river. The natives lined the banks in crowds, keeping up a heavy fire upon the men in the water; and Captain Fletcher and Lieutenant Strachan, who were the last to leave the shore, only reached the _Teazer_ by a miracle, they having to swim more than half a mile to reach her. As the last of the survivors gained the vessel, the natives, between two and three thousand in number, lined the banks of the river, brandishing their weapons and uttering shouts of defiance; and the heads of several of the killed, horribly mutilated, were held out towards the ship on spears, amidst cries of exultation. All the ammunition for the _Teazer's_ guns having already been expended in shelling the town and clearing the bush, it was impossible to reply to the enemy, and the vessel proceeded slowly down the river, returning to Sierra Leone next day. The casualties of this day were as follows: The 1st West India Regiment, out of 62 men who landed, lost 38 killed and 3 wounded. The 3rd West India Regiment, out of 73 men who landed, lost 46 killed and 8 wounded. Total, 95 killed and wounded, out of a force of 135 men. The casualties amongst the officers were nearly equally heavy. Out of the ten Europeans who were under fire, three, namely Lieutenant Wylie, 1st West India Regiment, D.A.C.G. Frith and C.S.M. Scanlan were killed; and three, Lieutenant Vincent, 2nd West India Regiment, Lieutenant-Commander Nicolas, and Mr. Dillet, severely wounded. It was learned afterwards that the reason so large a force was assembled at Malageah was that it was the time for the annual gathering of the river tribes, to hear the laws read by the Alimani. This circumstance ought of course to have been known to the Acting Governor, who was well acquainted with the customs of the people. The Imperial Government held him responsible for this defeat, and, in November, 1855, he was relieved of his post, and charged "with having, when Acting Governor, on the 21st of May, 1855, without authority, and upon insufficient grounds, sent an expedition against the Moriah chiefs in the Mellicourie River, beyond the Colony, with orders to burn or destroy the town of Malageah, planned without foresight or judgment, disastrous in its termination, and disgraceful to the British power," and was suspended from his office of Queen's Advocate and from his seat at the Council Board. CHAPTER XXII. THE BATTLE OF BAKKOW, AND STORMING OF SABBAJEE, 1855.[58] The company of the 1st West India Regiment stationed at the Gambia was the next to see active service, but fortunately under circumstances less disastrous than had fallen to the lot of the company at Sierra Leone. In June, 1855, the inhabitants of Sabbajee again began to exhibit signs of lawlessness; and, early in July, an influential Mohammedan of that town, named Fodi Osumanu, sent an armed party to the British settlement at Josswung to seize a woman, whose husband he had already placed in confinement in Sabbajee itself. In consequence of this outrage a warrant was issued for the apprehension of Fodi Osumanu, and, as a precautionary measure, the constables despatched to put the warrant in force were accompanied by a small party of the 2nd West India Regiment, under Lieutenant Armstrong, 3rd West India Regiment. They arrived at Sabbajee on the morning of July 16th, and at first Fodi Osumanu offered no opposition to his arrest; but, on gaining the central square of the town, he endeavoured to break away from the police, and, upon this signal, the Mandingoes rushed upon the British from every street and alley. Nothing but the coolness and steadiness displayed by both officers and men, saved the whole from destruction. Forming square, they retreated steadily out of the town, repulsing the repeated attacks of the natives, and retired in good order to Josswung, and thence to the military post at Cape St. Mary's. In effecting this, two men were killed, and the Queen's Advocate, Lieutenant Davis, 2nd West India Regiment, and Lieutenant Armstrong were wounded, the latter so severely as to render amputation of the right arm necessary. Intelligence of this occurrence being carried to Bathurst in a few hours, the Governor, Lieutenant-Colonel L. Smyth O'Connor, 1st West India Regiment, at once called out all the available force of the Colony; and, aware that every half-hour was of importance, as the inhabitants of Sabbajee were receiving reinforcements from the disaffected Mandingo towns of Jambool, Burnfut, and Cunju, and had already burned and pillaged Josswung, he marched the same day. The force consisted of 120 men of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd West India Regiments, with 120 of the Royal Gambia Militia; and, on arriving at Cape St. Mary's, on the evening of July 16th, it was joined by 26 pensioners of the West India regiments. The officers of the 1st West India Regiment present were Lieutenant-Colonel O'Connor, Lieutenant E.F. Luke, and Lieutenant Henderson. Early next morning the whole force marched towards Sabbajee, meeting with no resistance until it arrived at the wood of Bakkow. To reach Sabbajee it was necessary to pass through this wood, a jungle of dense tropical vegetation, only traversable by a single bush path some five feet in breadth, and, before entering this defile, Colonel O'Connor wisely ordered rockets to be thrown amongst the trees, with a view to ascertaining if they covered any concealed enemy. Hardly had the first rocket fallen than the wood appeared alive with men, who, from every bush and tree, opened a destructive fire upon the British. This was promptly and steadily replied to by the detachments of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd West India Regiments, which were in the van, and the action became general. The militia were drawn up in two bodies, one acting as a support to the regulars, and the other as a reserve; and the latter, shortly after the commencement of the engagement, retreated without orders, and without firing a shot. The party of militia in support, as soon as they observed the flight of the reserve, fell back hurriedly in great confusion, nor could their officers nor the Governor himself succeed in stopping them, and both parties of militia retired upon Cape St. Mary's, abandoning their wounded. The detachments of the West India regiments still held their ground; but at the end of half an hour, as it was manifestly impossible, with the now greatly reduced numbers, to force the passage of the wood, and as the enemy were observed extending in large numbers round both flanks so as to threaten the line of retreat, the order was given to retire upon Cape St. Mary's. This was effected in good order, the victorious natives following the retreating force for more than two miles, and keeping up an incessant fire. The combined detachments suffered in this affair a loss of twenty-three killed and fifty-three wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel O'Connor was himself severely wounded in the right arm and left shoulder. The news of this repulse was received with the greatest consternation at Bathurst, which was entirely denuded of troops and quite at the mercy of the rebellious Mandingoes. Preparations for defence were at once undertaken, all the reliable natives, principally persons in the employ of the Government or of the merchants, in all some 200 in number, were armed, and a vessel was despatched to the neighbouring French settlement of Goree to seek assistance. The Mandingoes, fortunately, made no attempt to follow up their success, and the chiefs of British Combo having volunteered their aid to the Government, a number of their men were armed, and on July 29th some sharp skirmishing took place between them and the Mandingoes in the neighbourhood of Bakkow, in which the Combos lost twenty-five killed, but without reaping any success. On the afternoon of July 30th, the French brig-of-war _Entreprenant_, Captain Villeneuve, arrived, bringing with her eighty men, which was all the disposable force the French Governor of Goree had at his command; and all preparations being completed by the night of August 3rd, the combined British and French force marched from Cape St. Mary's next morning at daybreak. The French had brought with them three twelve-pounder field-guns, which, with a 4-2/5-inch howitzer, and three rocket-troughs in the possession of the British, were formed into a battery under the command of Lieutenant Morel, of the French marine artillery. The force was further increased by an irregular contingent of some 600 loyal natives. As on the former occasion, no opposition was encountered until arriving at the wood of Bakkow, where the enemy showed in great force, and opened a heavy fire from the shelter of the forest. The irregular contingent, supported by the detachments of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments, replied to the enemy's fire in a most effective manner; but so determined was the resistance, that the Mandingoes, when silenced in our front, taking advantage of the cover afforded by the high grass and clumps of monkey-bread trees, made repeated attacks on the flanks, and even at one time threatened the rear. Shell and rockets were thrown into the wood, and the village of Bakkow, which was occupied by the enemy, was burned; but it was not until after two hours' obstinate fighting, in the course of which the detachments of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiment had four times to repulse flank attacks with the bayonet, that the passage could be forced. The wood being traversed, the force debouched upon the plain of Sabbajee, a sandy level, covered with a scanty growth of Guinea grass and dotted with clumps of dwarf palm. The guns were at once placed in position for breaching the stockade, and fire was opened with wonderful precision. A few rounds only had been expended, when a large body of natives from the disaffected and neighbouring town of Burnfut made a sudden and determined onslaught on our flank, charging furiously forward with brandished scimetars. This was met by a party of French marines and the detachments of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments, who, after firing a volley at a very close range, charged gallantly with the bayonet and speedily routed the enemy, who took refuge in a neighbouring copse. Being ordered to dislodge them from this cover, the detachments of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments advanced in skirmishing order, and after a short but sharp conflict, drove them out on the further side. After a bombardment of an hour and a half, seeing that the enemy extinguished the thatched roofs of their houses as fast as they were ignited, and that the ammunition was becoming exhausted, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Connor determined to carry the stockade by storm. The detachments of the West India regiments formed up in the centre, a division of French marines being on either flank, and the whole dashed forward to the assault in the face of a tremendous fire of musketry that was opened throughout the entire length of the loop-holed stockade. In a few seconds the troops were under the stockade, which was composed of the stout trunks of trees, standing some eighteen feet high, and braced on the inner side by cross-beams. A temporary check was here experienced (the men having no ladders for escalading), during which the Mandingoes kept up a close fire from their upper tier of loop-holes, while others crouching in the ditch in rear hewed and cut at the feet and legs of the troops through the apertures in the stockade on a level with the ground. The check was, however, of short duration, for the British opened fire on the enemy through their own loop-holes, and drove them back, while others, clambering over the rough defences, effected an entrance. After this, the Mandingoes offered but a feeble resistance, and soon fled into the open from the further side of the town. Here they were pursued and shot down by the irregular contingent, who had been sent to cut off their retreat as soon as it was seen that the stockade was carried. The enemy's loss during the assault was exceedingly heavy, the ditch in rear of the stockade, and in which they were principally sheltered, being full of dead. The loss of the combined force, exclusive of irregulars, was seventeen killed and thirty-one wounded. Inside the stockade the 1st West India Regiment captured two kettledrums, of which one was a war-drum, and the other a death-drum, that is to say, a drum that is only beaten when an execution is taking place. These drums, consisting of polished hemispherical calabashes, of a diameter of about thirty inches at the drum-head, are now in the possession of the regiment. The following letter, referring to these operations, which terminated with the capture of Sabbajee, was published in general orders at the Gambia, on the 26th of October, 1855: "HORSE GUARDS, "_Sept. 6th, 1855._ "SIR, "The General Commanding-in-Chief having had before him the despatches which were addressed to the Adjutant-General on July 30th and 6th ultimo, giving an account of the proceedings, from the 16th July to the 4th August last, of the force under your command against the Mohammedan rebel town of Sabbajee, which was eventually taken by assault at the point of the bayonet, I am directed to assure you of Lord Hardinge's satisfaction at the perusal of those despatches, and that he considers the gallantry and steadiness displayed by the troops on this occasion, and the judgment with which they were directed by you, to be deserving of high praise. "His Lordship further desired that the expression of his sentiments might be communicated accordingly to yourself and to all the troops concerned. "I have, &c., (Signed) "C. YORKE, "Military Secretary. "Lieut.-Colonel O'Connor, "1st West India Regiment, "Commanding troops, Western Coast of Africa." In the West Indies nothing of importance had occurred, and no change of station had taken place, since December, 1853. In this year, however (1855), No. 8 Company rejoined head-quarters at Jamaica from Dominica, and No. 1 was moved from St. Christopher to Demerara. The distribution, then, at the close of 1855, was: No. 2, No. 5, No. 8, the Grenadier and Light Companies at Jamaica, No. 7 and No. 4 at Barbados, No. 1 at Demerara, No. 3 at Sierra Leone, and No. 6 at the Gambia. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 58: See map.] CHAPTER XXIII. CHANGES IN THE WEST AFRICAN GARRISONS, 1856-57--THE GREAT SCARCIES RIVER EXPEDITION, 1859--FIRE AT NASSAU, 1859. In January, 1856, it was determined to make a further change in the mode of garrisoning the settlements on the West Coast of Africa, and the following letter was issued on the subject: "HORSE GUARDS, "_2nd January, 1856_. "In obedience to orders from the Secretary of State, War Department, the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief is pleased to direct that instead of the detachments to the western coast of Africa being furnished, as at present, by two companies from each of the West India regiments, the settlements in that part will be garrisoned by a wing composed of six companies, to be furnished in succession by each of the West India regiments. "At the next relief the 1st West India Regiment will furnish six companies accordingly, each company made up and kept effective to 100 rank and file, the force to be distributed as at present, viz.: "Gambia 3 Companies. "Sierra Leone 3 Companies. "The remaining four companies of the 1st West India Regiment will be stationed at Jamaica, as a depôt to receive and train recruits, and maintain the efficiency of the companies on the coast of Africa." In anticipation of this change, and as recent events at the Gambia and Sierra Leone had shown the necessity for an increase in the strength of the detachments, No. 2 Company of the 1st West India Regiment, under Captain W.J. Chamberlayne, embarked at Jamaica for Africa in the _Sir George Pollock_ on February 19th, 1856. It arrived in the Gambia on April 1st, and detachments to McCarthy's Island, 179 miles up the River Gambia, and to Fort Bullen, were at once furnished from it. No other change in the distribution of the regiment took place in this year, with the exception that No. 5 Company, under Captain R. Hughes, was moved from Jamaica to Barbados in December. In January, 1857, No. 1 Company from Demerara, and Nos. 4 and 7 from Barbados, embarked on board the troopship _Perseverance_, for Africa, under the command of Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, and Captains Hughes and Macauley, arriving at Sierra Leone on February 28th. Nos. 1 and 7 Companies were there disembarked, and the _Perseverance_ then proceeded to the Gambia, where No. 4 Company was landed. In accordance with the scheme that the remaining four companies of the regiment should be stationed at Jamaica, No. 5 Company rejoined there from Barbados on April 17th; but, two months later, the scheme was again revised, and, on June 4th, the head-quarters and four companies embarked for Nassau, New Providence, under Lieutenant-Colonel F.A. Wetherall. The detachments on the West Coast of Africa were very much subdivided, that of the Gambia furnishing garrisons for Fort Bullen, Cape St. Mary, and McCarthy's Island; and that of Sierra Leone a garrison for Waterloo. In April, 1857, the garrison of Fort Bullen was reinforced by No. 2 Company under Captain Chamberlayne from Bathurst, in consequence of disturbances having broken out between the King of Barra and one of his principal chiefs named Osumanu Sajji, and was withdrawn in May, on tranquility being restored. In August, 1858, the natives of Sherbro threatened to plunder the British factories that had been established on Sherbro Island, and stopped the trade, and for the protection of the lives and property of the Consul and British subjects, a detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, under Captain R. Hughes, proceeded in H.M.S. _Spitfire_ to Sherbro Island on September 1st. They there landed and remained until October 2nd, when, all fears of an attack being at an end, they returned to Sierra Leone. In January, 1859, however, another attack was threatened by the Mendis, and a detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, under Captain Luke, was sent for the protection of the factories in H.M.S. _Trident_ on January 15th, returning to Sierra Leone on February 18th. In September and October, 1858, Captain Luke, 1st West India Regiment, who was then on leave of absence on the Gold Coast, served with the expeditionary force against the rebel Krobo stronghold of Krobo Hill. Captain Cochrane, Gold Coast Artillery, commanding the force, in concluding his despatch of October 26th, 1858, says: "It is not too much to say that all who have joined the expedition have done their best to further its interests, but I beg especially to call your Excellency's notice to the voluntary services of Captain F.H. Luke, of the 1st West India Regiment, whose energy, zeal, and disinterestedness, have been warmly commended by every officer here, and are deserving of honourable mention." In February, 1859, the town of Porto Lokkoh, distant some forty miles from Sierra Leone, and on the Sierra Leone River, was burned and pillaged by a body of Soosoos who had, for some time back, established themselves at Kambia, on the Great Scarcies River. For previous outrages committed by them, Kambia had been bombarded by a naval squadron under Commodore Wise on February 1st, 1858, after which the Soosoos had entrenched themselves in a stockaded work, or war fence, near Kambia. There they had been suffered to remain, but the destruction of Porto Lokkoh, the chief _entrepôt_ of the Sierra Leone trade, necessitated further measures being taken against them. Consequently, on March 20th, 1859, the Governor of Sierra Leone, Colonel Stephen Hill, proceeded with a force of 203 men of the 1st West India Regiment, under Major A.W. Murray, in H.M.S. _Vesuvius_, _Trident_, and _Spitfire_, to the Great Scarcies River, where they arrived at daybreak on the 22nd. The officers of the regiment serving with the expedition were Major Murray, Brevet-Major Pratt, Lieutenants Fitzgerald, Mackay, and Mawe, Ensigns Ormsby and Temple. Colonel Hill, in his despatch, says: "The troops having landed to the right of the town, I formed the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, under Major Murray, into four divisions; and the marines formed, under the command of Captain Hill, 2nd West India Regiment, A.D.C., another division. A party of the former corps, acting as gunners, accompanied the Marine Artillery, who took charge of two mountain howitzers. "Having extended one division in skirmishing order, I advanced; and, finding the first stockade deserted I passed on to the furthest one, which was then occupied by the sailors of the second division of boats under Commander Close. I then proceeded to the extreme left of all the defences, and halted in clear ground to await the arrival of our native allies. Shortly afterwards Commodore Wise sent to inform me that the enemy, who had retired before us with some loss, were in the jungle to our left at the head of some rocks, on which they could cross the river at low water. I immediately extended two divisions of the 1st West India Regiment as skirmishers, with the marines supporting one, and a division of the 1st West India the other, leaving one division in reserve in charge of the howitzers, after having first fired some rounds of shell into the jungle. "Our advance was most difficult, the bush being almost impenetrable. However, we persevered, and, having reached a high point overlooking the country around, and not seeing any enemy, I ordered a halt, and, after some time, we retired unmolested, the Soosoos never having allowed us to close with them. The Commodore then sent me a second message to the effect that he had seen about 500 men, who had, on our advance, retired across the river, over the rocks, and disappeared in the bush on the opposite side. "The detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, under Brevet-Major Pratt, kept the ground during the night; and our allies having arrived, and been placed in possession of the stockades, the troops were re-embarked on the 24th, and we proceeded on our return to Sierra Leone, where we arrived on the 26th. "I have much pleasure in stating that all the officers and men under my orders performed their duties in an exceedingly zealous and satisfactory manner, exhibiting a cheerful obedience, and only anxious to close with the enemy. None but those present could form a just estimate of the difficulty attending our advance, and the consequent physical exhaustion. The heat was intense; a great part of the jungle had been fired, and the bushes and the high grass formed a network through which we were obliged to cut our way." On January 8th, 1860, the men of the companies of the 1st West India Regiment stationed at Nassau specially distinguished themselves at an alarming fire that there broke out at Fort Charlotte, and the following Garrison Order was published on the subject: "Lieutenant-Colonel Bourchier takes the earliest opportunity in his power of expressing his thanks to Major R. D'O. Fletcher, the officers, the non-commissioned officers, and the men of the 1st West India Regiment, for the prompt manner in which they turned out and lent their efforts to avert the extension of the late fire at Fort Charlotte. "Such occasions as this test the discipline of a corps in a high degree, the more so when, as in the present instance, the danger of an explosion from the proximity of the flames to the magazine was imminent. "Where all were zealous, the conduct of Ensign Bourke, 1st West India Regiment, was most conspicuous, who, assisted by Company Sergeant-Major Mason and a party of four men of the regiment, placed wet blankets on the most exposed portion of the roof of the magazine, which was then actually ignited; and it will be most gratifying to Lieutenant-Colonel Bourchier to bring the circumstance under the notice of H.R.H. the General Commanding-in-Chief." At the Gambia nothing of moment had occurred since 1807, with the exception that a violent epidemic of fever broke out at Bathurst in September, 1859, to which one officer and several men of the regiment succumbed. CHAPTER XXIV. THE BADDIBOO WAR, 1860-61. The next active operations in which the 1st West India Regiment was engaged, took place at the Gambia, where the King of Baddiboo, an important Mohammedan state up the river, had in August and September, 1860, plundered the factories of several British traders, and afterwards refused to pay compensation. The Governor of the Gambia, Colonel D'Arcy, resolved to blockade the kingdom of Baddiboo, in the hope that the enforced suspension of trade would compel the king to come to terms, and, on October 10th, 1860, the gunners of the companies of the 1st West India Regiment stationed at Bathurst embarked in the barque _Elm_ and the schooner _Shamrock_, to close all the Baddiboo river ports. On November 3rd additional gunners were sent in the schooner _Hope_, and the blockade was strictly enforced, the natives not being allowed to export any articles of produce or import anything. While the blockade was still in force, the wing of the 2nd West India Regiment, which had been wrecked in the troopship _Perseverance_ at Maio, one of the Cape Verde Islands, while on its way to relieve the wing of the 1st West India Regiment, arrived in West Africa in various vessels, three companies at the Gambia and three at Sierra Leone; and as in January, 1861, the blockade had manifestly failed in its object of inducing the King of Baddiboo to indemnify the plundered merchants, Governor D'Arcy determined to take advantage of the presence of an unusual number of regular troops to organise a formidable expedition; which step was rendered necessary from the fact that the numerous Mohammedan tribes around the settlement and on the banks of the river were narrowly watching events, and had, owing to the long delay in punishing the King of Baddiboo, already commenced to show signs of lawlessness. On January 12th, 1861, the hired transport _Avon_ arrived at the Gambia to convey the wing of the 1st West India Regiment to the West Indies, and Colonel D'Arcy proceeded in her to Sierra Leone to make arrangements for the services of a portion of the garrison of that settlement. On February 2nd, he returned to the Gambia in the _Avon_ with three companies of the 1st West India Regiment and one of the 2nd West India Regiment. The expeditionary force now consisted of six companies of the 1st West India Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. Murray, and four of the 2nd West India Regiment, under Major W. Hill; the Gambia Militia were called out, and the West India detachments at McCarthy's Island, Cape St. Mary's, and Fort Bullen replaced by pensioners. Everything being in readiness, the Governor decided to make one last endeavour to arrive at a peaceful solution of the difficulty (although the king's people had recently, on several occasions, fired on the schooners blockading the river), and despatched H.M.S. _Torch_ with a flag of truce to Swarra Cunda Creek. Commander Smith returned with the intelligence that the natives had prepared stockaded earthworks, were assembled in large numbers, and had refused to hold any communication with the ship. On February 15th, the expedition left Bathurst, and steaming up to Swarra Cunda Creek, some forty miles up the river, anchored there for the night. The troops were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, 1st West India Regiment, and were thus distributed: The gunners of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiment on board H.M.S. _Torch_. Nos. 1 and 7 Companies, 1st West India Regiment, on board the Colonial steamer _Dover_. Nos. 2 and 3 Companies, 1st West India Regiment, on the schooner _Elizabeth_. Nos. 4 and 7 Companies, 2nd West India Regiment, on the schooner _Margaret_. The _Dover_, after distributing her contingent amongst the other three vessels lying in the creek, returned to Bathurst the same night to bring up Nos. 4 and 6 Companies of the 1st West India Regiment and two companies of the 2nd West India Regiment. On February 16th, the whole force being collected, the _Torch_ and the _Dover_ steamed up the creek to the trading landing-place of Swarra Cunda, towing the schooners. The earthworks were observed to be full of armed men, who shouted and brandished their weapons, amid a tremendous beating of war-drums. The _Torch_ anchored about 180 yards from the earthworks, the two schooners lying above her and the _Dover_ below, in such positions as to be able to bring a cross-fire to bear. The Governor, being still anxious to avoid bloodshed, hailed the enemy through his interpreter, calling upon them to surrender. They replied with yells of defiance, and were then informed that if they did not abandon their works the ships would open fire in half-an-hour. The half-hour having elapsed without any result, except a considerable accession to the enemy's strength, fire was opened from the guns of the _Torch_ and _Dover_, while the troops poured in a destructive storm of musketry. The enemy replied with great spirit; and, although the sixty-eight-pounder shell were crushing through the earthworks and carrying away large portions of the parapets, some of the warriors continued calmly up and down in full view on the most exposed portions of the works, to encourage the others; and it was not until this terrible fire of shell and musketry had lasted for three hours, that the natives began to abandon their works, retiring even then very gradually. This movement being observed, a landing was at once ordered; and the boats, which had been collected together under cover of the _Torch_, pulled in rapidly for the landing-place. Before, however, they reached the shore, some 800 natives, who had occupied the extreme right of the earthworks, which had not suffered from our fire as much as the other portions, rushed down to oppose them. The landing was effected in the teeth of all opposition, the troops wading ashore and attacking the enemy with the bayonet. Colonel D'Arcy in his despatch says:--"Nothing could exceed the gallantry of the landing on the part of the officers and men of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments; and now commenced a smart skirmish with a numerous enemy, in which our black soldiers evinced a gallantry and a determination to close which I felt proud to witness." While this stubborn and hand-to-hand conflict was at its height, a shrill cry was suddenly heard in rear of the enemy, and at once, as if by a preconcerted plan, those natives who were disputing the landing broke and fled, while, at the same moment, a body of some 300 cavalry debouched from the shelter of a clump of dwarf palms, and came down at full gallop on the troops, who were already somewhat scattered in pursuit of the retreating enemy. The men at once formed rallying squares, and in a moment the Mandingo horsemen were amongst them, brandishing their scimetars and discharging matchlocks and pistols. The fire from the squares was so steady and well sustained, that, with one exception, the enemy could effect nothing. They rode round and round the squares for a few minutes, uttering shouts of defiance and endeavouring to reach the men with their spears; and finally, a good many saddles having been emptied, galloped off as rapidly as they had come, their long robes streaming out behind in the wind. The one exception referred to was that of a group of three men of the 1st West India Regiment and two of the 2nd, who, having advanced too far in pursuit, had become separated from their comrades, and, on the sudden appearance of the cavalry, had not time to reach any of the squares. They stood back to back, surrounded by the enemy, until overwhelmed by force of numbers and ridden down, being afterwards found lying where they had stood, surrounded by eleven dead Mandingoes whom they had shot or bayoneted. This cavalry charge was the last hope of the enemy; and no sooner was it repulsed than they withdrew in great disorder. The troops pursued for a short distance, but as it was not deemed advisable to scatter the small force, especially as the day was beginning to close, they were soon recalled, and the men bivouacked on the ground they had so ably won, the bivouac being so arranged that the guns of the _Torch_ could sweep the front and one flank. Wells were dug, the dead buried, and the night passed without further disturbance. Next morning, the 17th, the Gambia Militia Artillery, with 400 native allies, arrived and landed, and in the afternoon the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments, under Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, after a short resistance, took and destroyed the stockaded town of Carawan, situated to the right of the position. Encouraged by this success, the native allies and the Gambia Militia Artillery advanced to the town of Swarra Cunda, to the left of the position, and finding it abandoned, destroyed it also. During the ensuing night, H.M.S. _Arrogant_, Commodore Edmonstone, arrived in the Gambia River, and early next morning the _Dover_ brought the Commodore, with a naval brigade of seamen and marines, up to Swarra Cunda Creek. This unlooked-for accession of strength determined Lieutenant-Colonel Murray to advance into the interior, and strike a blow that would bring the war to a conclusion. Cattle were obtained for the field-guns, which were then landed, and about noon on the 18th, the force marched inland, four companies of the 1st West India Regiment forming the right division, four of the 2nd West India Regiment the left division, and two of the 1st the reserve, with the guns on the flanks. The country through which the advance was made was a level sandy plain, covered with tall grass, and dotted here and there with clumps of baobab and dwarf palm. Occasionally a few clearings for the cultivation of the ground nut were met, but as a rule the march was made through grass more than waist high. The enemy showed in force, but made no serious opposition to the advance; and, though large bodies of cavalry were observed hanging about the flanks and rear, they showed no disposition to close, and the towns of Kinty-Cunda and Sabba were destroyed without loss on our side, and very small loss, if any, on the part of the enemy. The 19th and 20th were devoted to changing the camping ground, and arranging a plan of campaign against Indear, the king's town, in which the shipping might be used as a base; but, on the afternoon of the latter day, a slave-girl, who came into the camp to claim British protection, reported that the king's warriors, having been largely reinforced, had come down from Indear, and had erected a stockade on the ruins of Sabba. Although it did not suit Lieut.-Colonel Murray's plans to return to Sabba, he did not consider it advisable to leave this unexpected challenge unanswered; and, on the morning of February 21st, the force again marched for Sabba. On approaching that town it was ascertained that a double stockade had been built, which appeared to be full of armed men, while detached parties were observed partially concealed in the long grass to the left of the stockade, and facing our right. The troops were halted and formed for attack, the Naval Brigade, consisting of seamen and marines from H.M.S. _Arrogant_, _Falcon_, and _Torch_, being in the centre, four companies of the 1st West India Regiment on the right, four of the 2nd on the left, and two of the 1st in reserve. The howitzer battery at once opened on the stockade, and, after a few rounds, the centre advanced to within effective rifle range and commenced firing. Directly this movement took place, the detached parties of Mandingoes on our right approached skirmishing through the tall grass, and attacked the four companies of the 1st West India Regiment, while large bodies of cavalry simultaneously appeared on the left, threatening the flank of the 2nd West India Regiment. While the 1st West India Regiment was hotly engaged on the right, the field-guns of the Gambia Militia Artillery, under Colonel D'Arcy, who was present as a volunteer and honorary colonel of that corps, were hastily brought up, and opened fire on the stockade, to breach it. As it was apparent that this would be a work of some time, the timber of which the stockade was built being quite stout enough to withstand for some time the fire of light guns, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray directed the Commodore to storm. In an instant the seamen extended, and, advancing at a sharp run, clambered over the stockades, and, attacking the enemy with the bayonet, soon carried the place. Acting in concert with this forward movement of the centre, the right (1st West India Regiment) closed on the natives with whom they had been engaged, and, cutting them off from the stockade, killed or wounded the entire force on this side, with a loss to themselves of one officer (Lieutenant Bourke) and twenty-two men severely wounded, besides slight casualties. The cavalry on the left, seeing the turn affairs had taken, withdrew without making any attack. The Naval Brigade lost Lieutenant Hamilton, of the _Arrogant_, and three men killed, and twenty-two wounded. Ensign Garsia, of the 1st West India Regiment, had a narrow escape. Shortly before the Naval Brigade had advanced to storm, he had been despatched by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray with an order to Major Hill, commanding on the left, and, in crossing the front of the stockade under a heavy fire, both he and his horse were shot and rolled over together, Ensign Garsia being very severely wounded. While thus lying at a distance of some seventy yards from the stockade, a Mohammedan, dressed in yellow--a colour only assumed in this part of the world when the wearer is engaged in some desperate enterprise--climbed over the stockade and ran towards the wounded man with a drawn scimetar in his hand. He escaped numerous shots that were fired at him, reached Ensign Garsia, and had actually raised his scimetar to strike off his head, when a wounded sailor, who was lying on the ground, shot him dead, with his cry of exultation on his lips. No sooner was the enemy dispersed and in full retreat, than messengers arrived from the King of Jocardo, whose territory is separated from Baddiboo by the Swarra Cunda Creek, begging an interview with the Governor, and promising that, if he would grant a three days' armistice, he would bring together all the chiefs of the Baddiboo towns, who were now anxious for peace, but afraid to come in. The Governor acceded to these terms, but, in case of negotiations failing, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray proceeded with his preparations for an advance on Indear on the morning of the 25th. On the 24th, the Governor received another message from the King of Jocardo, begging him to extend the armistice for another day, the distance to the different towns being so great. This was granted, and at 6 a.m. on the 26th, the King of Baddiboo came to terms, promising to pay a considerable sum to the Government as a fine for his past misdemeanours, and leaving hostages in the Governor's hands. The officers of the 1st West India Regiment who took part in this expedition were Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. Murray, Captains H. Anton, J.A. Fraser, J. Fanning, and G.H. Duyer, Lieutenants A. Temple, J. Moffitt, R. Brew, T. Edmunds, J. Bourke, and Ensigns M.C. Garsia and T. Nicholson. Lieutenant-Colonel Murray was awarded the C.B. for his services. CHAPTER XXV. THE ASHANTI EXPEDITION, 1864. The head-quarters and four companies of the 1st West India Regiment had been removed from Nassau to Barbados in the hired transport _Avon_, before that vessel sailed for West Africa, and on the 3rd of March, 1861, the six companies of the regiment embarked in her at the Gambia for the West Indies. During the four years' tour of service which they had just completed, five officers had fallen victims to the fatal West African climate, Lieutenant Kenrick having died at Sierra Leone, in August, 1857; Lieutenant Leggatt, in February, 1859; Brevet-Major Pratt, in July, 1859; and Captain Owens, in July, 1860; while Lieutenant E. Smith had died at the Gambia, in September, 1859. On the arrival of the wing from West Africa, the regiment was distributed in the West Indies as follows: The head-quarters, with Nos. 5, 7, and 8, the Grenadier and Light Companies at Barbados; Nos. 1 and 2 at St. Lucia; No. 3 at Trinidad; and Nos. 4 and 6 at Demerara. Towards the close of the year the practice of selecting men for flank companies was forbidden by Horse Guards General Order, and the grenadier and light companies became Nos. 9 and 10. The regiment remained thus stationed until December, 1862, when the three existing West India Regiments were called upon to furnish two companies each for the formation of a new 4th West India Regiment, and Nos. 9 and 10 Companies of the 1st West India Regiment were transferred. In the same month, No. 1 Company rejoined head-quarters from St. Lucia. The establishment of the regiment was now eight instead of ten companies as formerly. On the 23rd of December, 1862, a detachment of three companies (Nos. 5, 7, and 8) embarked in the troopship _Adventure_, under Lieutenant-Colonel Macauley, and proceeded to Honduras, arriving there on January 3rd, 1863. A war of reprisals between the Santa Cruz and Ycaiché Indians was then raging on the frontier, and the greatest vigilance was necessary to prevent violation of British territory, the detachments of the regiment at the outposts of Orange Walk and Corosal being continually employed. In March, 1863, the whole of the southern side of Belize was destroyed by fire, and the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment there stationed received the thanks of the Legislative Assembly for the assistance it had rendered in preventing the conflagration spreading, a sum of $200 being voted for the men, "as an acknowledgment of the valuable services rendered by them." In this, or the preceding year, companies were designated alphabetically instead of numerically; No. 1 becoming "A," No. 2, "B," and so on. On the 31st of October, 1863, A Company, with the head-quarters, embarked at Barbados on board the troopship _Megæra_, which had arrived the day before from Demerara with D and F Companies. The vessel then proceeded to St. Lucia, where B Company was embarked, and all four went to Nassau. The distribution of the regiment was then: 4 companies at Nassau, 3 in Honduras, and 1 in Trinidad. In 1863 occurred what is usually called the Second Ashanti War. It was caused, as almost every Ashanti war or threat of invasion has been caused, by the refusal of the Governor of the Gold Coast to surrender to the Ashanti King fugitives who had sought British protection. In revenge for this refusal an Ashanti force made a raid into the Protectorate, and reinforcements were at once asked for by the Colonial Government. In December, 1863, B Company, 1st West India Regiment, under Captain Bravo, embarked at Nassau in H.M.S. _Barracouta_ for Jamaica, and proceeded, towards the end of February, 1864, to Honduras, in the troopship _Tamar_. There E and G Companies embarked, and all three, under the command of Major Anton, sailed for Cape Coast Castle on the 2nd of March, arriving there on the 9th of April. The officers of the regiment serving with these companies were Major Anton, Captains Bravo and Hopewell Smith, Lieutenants J.A. Smith, Gavin, Roberts, Smithwick, Lowry, Barlow, Allinson, and Ensign Alt. On the arrival of the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment at Cape Coast Castle, the strength of the expeditionary force was as follows: Officers. Men. 1st West India Regiment 11 300 2nd West India Regiment 6 170 3rd West India Regiment 6 170 4th West India Regiment 30 850 5th West India Regiment 4 10 --- --- 57 1,500 The rainy season--the most unhealthy period of the year on the Gold Coast--was then commencing, and the Government appear to have had some idea of making an advance upon Coomassie at its close--about the month of June or July. In order to have everything in readiness for the forward movement, depôts of stores and munitions of war had been established at Mansu and Prahsu, and at Swaidroo in Akim, detachments of troops being stationed at these places for their protection. These detachments the Colonel commanding the troops on the Gold Coast determined to maintain during the rainy season, and it fell to the lot of B and G Companies of the 1st West India Regiment to be detailed for the fatal duty of relieving the detachment then encamped at Prahsu. Towards the end of the month of April these two companies, under Captains Bravo and Hopewell Smith, started amidst continuous torrents of rain on their march of seventy-four miles to the Prah. They had, since their arrival, been encamped with E Company on the open space to the west of the town known as the parade ground, there being no accommodation for them in the Castle; and owing to the unsanitary condition of the site and the want of proper shelter, had already begun to suffer from the effects of the climate. On arriving at the Prah they encamped at the ford of Prahsu, at a point where the river, making a sudden bend, enclosed the encampment on three sides. Here in the midst of a primeval forest, on the banks of a pestilential stream, without proper shelter or proper food, they remained for nearly three months. The sickness that ensued was almost unparalleled. Before they had been a month encamped, four officers and 102 men were sick out of seven officers and 214 men who had marched out of Cape Coast; and the hospital accommodation was so bad that the men had to lie on the wet ground with pools of water under them. The rains were unusually severe, the camp speedily became a swamp, the troops had worse food than usual, and, above all, were compelled to remain inactive. The small force had no means of communication with the coast, and no expectation of a reinforcement; and, had the enemy made an appearance, the troops were hardly in a fit state to defend themselves. Day after day torrents of rain fell; it was impossible to light fires for cooking purposes except under flimsy sheds of palm branches; and night after night officers and men turned into their wretched and dripping tents hungry and drenched to the skin. Neither was there any occupation for the mind or body, and universal gloom and despondency set in. It was no unusual thing for two funerals to take place in one day, and the unfortunate soldiers saw their small force diminishing day by day, apparently forgotten and neglected by the rest of the world. By a general order published at Cape Coast Castle, on the 30th of May, 1864, the garrison at Prahsu was, on account of the sickness there prevailing, reduced to 100 men; and on the 6th of June, G Company, under Captain Hopewell Smith, marched from the Prah and proceeded to Anamaboe, a village on the sea-coast some thirteen miles to the east of Cape Coast Castle. B Company still continued to suffer severely, and on the 18th of June, 57 men were in hospital out of a total strength of 100. At last the Imperial Government resolved to put a stop to the waste of life that was taking place, and sent out instructions to the Colonial Government that all operations against the Ashantis were to cease, and the troops to be withdrawn. The welcome intelligence reached Prahsu on the 26th of June, but the work of burying the guns and destroying the stores and ammunition, which had been collected there at such great labour and expense that the Government did not care to incur it again in their removal, occupied several days, and it was not until the 12th of July that the detachment marched out of the deadly camp on the Prah. On the 27th of July, the hired transport _Wambojeez_ arrived at Cape Coast Castle, to remove the detachments of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments to the West Indies, and on the 30th they embarked. The day before their embarkation the following general order was issued: "(General Order, No. 285.) "BRIGADE OFFICE, CAPE COAST CASTLE, "_28th July, 1864_. "Paragraph 3.--The Lieutenant-Colonel commanding feels great pleasure in publishing, for the information of the officers and soldiers of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments about to embark for the West Indies, the following handsome testimony of their soldierlike conduct while employed on the late expedition, by His Excellency Governor Pine, in which feelings and kind sentiments the Lieutenant-Colonel fully concurs, adding his own thanks to Major Anton and Captain Reece for the ready and cheerful manner in which they co-operated with him in carrying out the duties of the command, and to the officers and men under their respective orders. "It is a pleasing duty to the Lieutenant-Colonel to have to announce to these corps that, from the day they took the field until this hour, not a complaint has been brought by an inhabitant against any of the men, so excellent has the conduct of all been. "It is also gratifying to Lieutenant-Colonel Conran to see so few men on the sick list when about to embark, considering the large numbers that were reported sick on their return from the front." "GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CAPE COAST, "_27th July, 1864_. "SIR, "On the eve of the departure of the detachments of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments, which have been annexed to your command on my requisition since April last, I request that you will be pleased to permit me, through you, to record my thanks as Governor of these settlements for the services they have performed conjointly with yourself and regiment. "I feel that I have been the means of imposing upon Her Majesty's troops a laborious, ungracious, and apparently thankless duty; but my intentions and motives have been so fully, and I trust, satisfactorily discussed throughout Great Britain, that I dare hope that the officers and men will believe that I invited them to participate in a constitutional measure, which I felt convinced would add to their military reputation and honour. "To the decision of Her Majesty's Government as to its altered policy we are all compelled to bow, and it only remains for me to express my regret to every officer and man of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments, for the natural and laudable disappointment which they have experienced in not being engaged in more active military operations, and to tender my heartfelt thanks for the prompt and ready obedience with which they responded to my call on behalf of our Royal Mistress, and for their patience and endurance under extraordinary trial. "Major Anton I have served with, and marked with admiration his display of fortitude, moral courage, and disinterested kindness during the fearful epidemic of 1859 in the Gambia. Captain Bravo, as second in command in the Gambia, was my esteemed friend, and enjoyed the respect of all who knew him. * * * * * "This hasty and imperfect notice I trust you will not deem unworthy of being communicated to the highest military authority, and I shall esteem myself fortunate indeed if I shall be instrumental in the remotest degree in their advancement. "I have, etc., (Signed) "RICHARD PINE, "Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Gold Coast. "The Hon. Colonel CONRAN, "Commanding the troops on the Gold Coast." The _Wambojeez_ arrived at Barbados on the 3rd of September; there the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment embarked by companies in H.M.S. _Pylades_, _Greyhound_, and _Styx_, for Jamaica, and disembarked at Port Royal on the 15th of September. H and C Companies rejoining at Jamaica soon after from Honduras and Trinidad, the distribution of the regiment was as follows: head-quarters and three companies at Nassau, five companies in Jamaica. NOTE.--Out of the 11 officers and 300 non-commissioned officers and men who landed at Cape Coast Castle on the 9th April, only 6 officers and 269 non-commissioned officers and men re-embarked on July 30th, 5 officers having been invalided, and 31 men having died during their short stay of three months and a half. CHAPTER XXVI. THE JAMAICA REBELLION, 1865. In October, 1865, a rebellion broke out amongst the black population of Jamaica. On the 7th of that month, at the Petty Sessions at Morant Bay, a prisoner, who had been convicted of an assault, was rescued from the police, and on the 9th a warrant was issued for the apprehension of two persons named Bogle and several others, who were stated to have taken an active part in the riot of the 7th. Six policemen and two rural constables proceeded, early on the morning of the 10th of October, to execute this warrant at Stony Gut, about five miles from Morant Bay, where Paul Bogle and some other of the alleged rioters lived. They found Bogle in his yard, and told him that they had a warrant for his apprehension. He desired to have the warrant read to him, which was done. He then said that he would not go, and upon one of the policemen proceeding to apprehend him, he cried out: "Help, here!" At the same time, a man named Grant, who was with him, and who was addressed as "Captain," called out, "Turn out, men." Almost immediately a body of men, variously estimated at from 300 to 500, armed with cutlasses, sticks, and pikes, rushed out from a chapel where Bogle was in the habit of preaching, and from an adjoining cane-field, and attacked the policemen. The police were, of course, overpowered. Some of them were severely beaten. Three of their number were made prisoners and detained for several hours, being ultimately only released upon their taking an oath that they would "join their colour," and "cleave to the black." So far, perhaps, the disturbances might have been considered to be nothing more than an ordinary riot; but the proceedings of the rioters on the following day soon put their intentions beyond all reasonable doubt. On the 11th of October the Vestry, consisting of certain elected members and magistrates, assembled in the court-house at Morant Bay about noon, and proceeded with their ordinary business till between three and four o'clock, when notice was given that a crowd of people was approaching. The volunteers were hastily called together, and almost immediately afterwards a body of men, armed with cutlasses, sticks, bayonets, and muskets, after having attacked the police station and obtained possession of such arms as were there deposited, were seen entering a large open space facing the court-house, in front of which the volunteers had been drawn up. The Custos, Baron Ketelhodt, went out to the steps, and called to the people to know what they wanted. He received no answer, and his cries of "Peace! peace!" were met by cries from the crowd of "War!" As the advancing mob drew near, the volunteers retired till they reached the steps of the court-house. The Custos then began to read the Riot Act. While he was in the act of reading it stones were thrown at the volunteers, and Captain Hitchins, who commanded them, was struck in the forehead. The captain, having received authority from the Custos, then gave the word to fire. The order was obeyed, and some of the rioters were seen to fall. The volunteers were soon overpowered, and the court-house, in which refuge was sought, was set on fire. Many people were barbarously murdered while trying to escape. Eighteen persons, including the Custos, two sons of the rector, the Island Curate of Bath, the Inspector of Police, the captain, two lieutenants, a sergeant, and three privates of volunteers were killed. Thirty-one persons were wounded. After this the town remained in possession of the rioters. The gaolers were compelled to throw open the prison doors, and fifty-one prisoners who were there confined were released. Several stores were attacked, and from one of them a considerable quantity of gunpowder was taken. An attempt was made to force the door of the magazine, where about 300 stand of arms were stored. Fortunately the endeavour was not successful. Major-General L.S. O'Connor, commanding the troops in Jamaica, was inspecting the left wing of the 1st West India Regiment, under Major Anton, at Up Park Camp, on the morning of the 11th of October, when the news of the riot at Stony Gut on the 10th arrived, with a requisition from Governor Eyre for 100 men in aid of the civil power. In less than an hour Captain Ross's company paraded and marched to Kingston, where they embarked in H.M.S. _Wolverine_. Unfortunately, it not being supposed that there was any necessity for urgency, the _Wolverine_ did not leave Port Royal for Morant Bay until daybreak on the 12th. At about noon on the 12th the news of the massacre of the magistrates reached Port Royal, where Major-General O'Connor was inspecting the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, under Captain Luke. In two hours from the receipt of the intelligence, the company embarked on board H.M.S. _Onyx_, and landed at Morant Bay on the morning of the 13th. Captain Ross, on arriving at Morant Bay, had found the town deserted by all the Europeans, except Mr. Georges, who was severely wounded with three musket balls in his leg. The bodies of the unfortunate magistrates, many of which were barbarously mutilated, were buried by this company. This duty performed, the men patrolled the roads in the neighbourhood, and many ladies, whose husbands had been murdered or taken prisoners, and who had fled with their children, on the approach of the rioters, to bamboo thickets or other shelter, hearing the sound of the bugles, came in for protection. Numbers of them had passed the night in copses, from which, trembling with terror, they had seen their houses pillaged. On the 12th of October, large parties of the rebels, armed with guns and cutlasses, marched in military order through Bath and other contiguous districts. Stores were pillaged, and property taken or destroyed. Blue Mountain Valley Estate, Amity Hall, Monklands, which is sixteen miles from Morant Bay, and Hordley Estate, were all attacked by the insurgents, the occupiers barely escaping with their lives. At Blue Mountain Valley and Amity Hall, barbarous murders were perpetrated. On the 13th of October, martial law was proclaimed throughout the county of Surrey (except the county and city of Kingston), and Major-General O'Connor immediately took steps to hem in the disturbed districts. On the 15th of October, a detachment of the 1st West India Regiment was sent to Port Antonio; and at mid-day, Captain Hole, of the 6th Regiment, with 40 men of his own corps, and 60 of the 1st West India Regiment, under Ensign Cullen, marched from that place to Manchioneal, twenty miles eastward of Port Antonio. On the same day, 120 men of the 6th Regiment, under Colonel Hobbs, occupied (as head-quarters) Monklands, in the district of the Blue Mountain Valley, about sixteen miles from Morant Bay. Captain Strachan's company of the 1st West India Regiment proceeded to Spanish Town, whence Lieutenant Allinson, with 31 men, was sent on to Linstead, where a repetition of the Morant Bay massacre was apprehended. A detachment of the 6th was sent to Buff Bay to protect some valuable sugar estates. On the 13th and two succeeding days the insurgents continued their course through Port Morant northward to Manchioneal, and on to Mulatto River and Elmwood; the last of which places is situated in the most northerly part of St. Thomas-in-the-East, where that parish abuts upon Portland. As they advanced with the cry of "colour for colour" they were joined by a considerable number of negroes, who readily assisted in the work of plundering. The houses and stores were sacked. The intention also of taking the lives of the whites was openly avowed, and diligent search was made for particular individuals. But in each case the imperilled person had timely notice, and sought safety in flight. Elmwood was the point furthest from Morant Bay to which the disturbances extended; the arrival of the troops at Port Antonio, on the 15th, putting a stop to the further progress of the insurgents northwards. Thus in the course of four days the rebels had spread over a tract of country extending from White Horses, a few miles to the west of Morant Bay, to Elmwood, at a distance of upwards of thirty miles to the north-east of that place. In the meantime, detachments of troops were rapidly converging upon the disturbed districts. As the rebels were reported to be occupying Stony Gut, an almost impregnable ravine three miles in length, a detachment of the 6th Regiment was sent to dislodge them. Captain Luke, 1st West India Regiment, by a rapid and judicious movement of his company towards Cuna Cuna Gap, rescued from the hands of the insurgents upwards of eighty Europeans and influential people of colour, who had, with their wives and children, been in hiding for three or four days in the woods and mountains, and conveyed them to a place of safety. Captain Hole moved towards Bath from Manchioneal, and, in a despatch to Brigadier-General Nelson, he mentions "a meritorious act of three privates of the 1st West India Regiment deserving commendation. The three men got separated from their party, and proceeded as far as the Plantain Garden River, where a great number of rebels are lurking. The soldiers encountering the rebels, shot several--among them three of the murderers of Mr. Hire--and brought back with them two cartloads of plunder, among which was some of Mr. Hire's clothing, and other property." Kingston, as has been said, was exempted from martial law, and consequently became the refuge of the most disaffected people. Arrests were made hourly, and upwards of two hundred political prisoners were confined in the military custody of the 1st West India Regiment at Up Park Camp, which was under martial law. Threats were daily circulated that the city would be fired in various places, and the streets were patrolled by day and night. Sunday, the 22nd of October, was said to be fixed for a massacre of the loyal inhabitants while at church, and such universal panic prevailed, that every place of worship was on that day empty. The insurgents gradually dispersed as the troops advanced, numbers being captured. On the 23rd of October, Paul Bogle, the ringleader, was taken; and, on the 24th, was tried and hanged. On the same day, George William Gordon, a coloured member of the House of Assembly, who had been tried by a court-martial on the 21st, and found guilty of complicity in the rebellion, was hanged at Morant Bay. All the insurgents taken in arms were put to death, and the houses of those who were known to have taken part in the insurrection were burned. By these vigorous measures all outward signs of resistance were crushed, and the movement prevented from becoming general; though reports were constantly received from various parts of the island, of disloyalty and seditious intentions. On the 29th of October, letters D and F Companies of the 1st West India Regiment, with Major McBean, Captains Ormsby and Smithwick, Lieutenants Lowry, Niven, Hill, and Bale, and Ensign Cole, arrived from Nassau. Detachments were at once sent to Port Maria under Captain Ormsby, to Savannah la Mar under Lieutenant Hill, and to Vere under Lieutenant Bale. The 2nd West India Regiment, arriving from Barbados, was stationed along the north-western coast of the island. From evidence subsequently obtained it was evident that the rising had been long planned, and that the outbreak at Morant Bay was premature. It is clear that meetings took place, where bodies of men were drilled, oaths administered, and the names of persons registered. The insurgents were so confident of ultimate success that the crops were uninjured, and the buildings for the most part preserved; they openly avowing that they intended taking them for themselves, when the whites were expelled. The rebels appear to have expected that the Maroons would join them, but that people remained faithful to their allegiance, and assisted in the suppression of the disturbances. Although all the rebels in the field were taken or dispersed before the end of October, the island was not entirely quiet for some time after; and as late as the 14th of December, a detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, under Captain Ross, was sent from Black River to Oxford Estate, thirty miles distant, that place being reported to be disaffected. Major-General O'Connor, in his despatch reporting the restoration of order, says: "The men employed in the field, exposed to the tropical sun, heavy rains, constant and long marches by day and night, have all (the 2nd 6th Regiment, and the 1st West India Regiment) highly distinguished themselves by their patience, perseverance, and general good conduct." He might have added that the fidelity of the black soldiers of the 1st West India Regiment could hardly have been put to a more crucial test. Nine-tenths of those men were Jamaicans, born and bred, and in the work of suppressing the rebellion they were required to hang, capture, and destroy the habitations of not only their countrymen and friends, but, in many instances, of their near relatives. Yet in no single case did any man hesitate to obey orders, nor was the loyalty of any one soldier ever a matter for doubt. Governor Eyre having, by his prompt and vigorous measures, saved the colony of Jamaica from a repetition of those horrors which devastated the French West India Islands in the early part of the century, was subjected to a most vindictive and ungenerous attack on the part of the Exeter Hall party in England. By that party the judicial executions of the rebels were stigmatised as "atrocities," while the massacre at Morant Bay and the murders of the planters were only spoken of as "unfortunate occurrences." Owing to their clamour, a commission was sent out from England to inquire into the state of affairs in the colony. The commission arrived at the following conclusion: "That though the original design for the overthrow of constituted authority was confined to a small portion of the parish of St. Thomas-in-the-East, yet that the disorder, in fact, spread with singular rapidity over an extensive tract of country, and that such was the state of excitement prevailing in other parts of the island, that had more than a momentary success been obtained by the insurgents, their ultimate overthrow would have been attended with a still more fearful loss of life and property." Many of the disaffected negroes, finding that they were being backed up by an influential party in England, preferred the most unfounded charges against several of the officers who had been most active in the suppression of the rebellion. Amongst others, Ensign Cullen, of the 1st West India Regiment, was charged with having had three men wantonly shot at Duckinfield Suspension Bridge, on the 21st of October, while on the march from Manchioneal to Golden Grove; and Staff-Assistant-Surgeon Morris, who had been in medical charge of Ensign Cullen's detachment, was charged with shooting a fourth man. After these charges had been allowed to hang over these officers' heads for nearly a year, they were given an opportunity of clearing themselves before a general court martial, which assembled at Up Park Camp on the 2nd of October, 1866, and terminated its proceedings on the 4th of December. It is needless to say that both were acquitted.[59] For the valuable and efficient services rendered by the regiment during this rebellion, the House of Assembly in Jamaica voted the sum of £100 to be expended in plate. In March, 1866, all being quiet in Jamaica, Captain Smithwick's company returned to Nassau in H.M.S. _Sphynx_, being followed by Captain Ormsby's company, in August, in H.M.S. _Barracouta_. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 59: The following was the composition of the court: Lieutenant-Colonel R.T. Farren, C.B., Depôt Battalion--President. Major W.R. Williamson, 48th Regiment } " J.H. Campbell, 71st " } Captain F.D. Walters, 44th " } " J.G. Day, 28th " } " J.A. Barstow, 89th " } Members. " J.L. Seton, 102nd " } " C.V. Oliver, 66th " } " J.T. Ready, 66th " } Captain Maclean, Rifle Brigade--Officiating Judge Advocate. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel C.F.J. Daniell, 28th Regiment--Prosecutor. ] CHAPTER XXVII. AFRICAN TOUR, 1866-70. In August, 1866, it again became the turn of the 1st West India Regiment to furnish a portion of the garrisons of the Western Coast of Africa. The system of these garrisons had again been changed, and now consisted of one battalion divided between Sierra Leone and the Gambia, and half a battalion distributed between the Gold Coast and Lagos. At this time the left wing of the 2nd West India Regiment was garrisoning the two latter colonies, and the 1st West India Regiment was to garrison the two former. On the 29th of August, 1866, four companies under Major Anton embarked at Jamaica in H.M.S. _Simoom_, and proceeded to Africa; two being landed at the Gambia on the 28th of September, and two at Sierra Leone on the 6th of October. The _Simoom_, returning to the West Indies, embarked the remaining company at Jamaica in November; and proceeding to Nassau, the head-quarters and three companies there stationed were also embarked, the whole arriving at Sierra Leone, under Captain Bravo, on the 31st of December. The distribution of the regiment now was: Head-quarters, with A, B, D, E, F, and G Companies at Sierra Leone; C and H Companies at the Gambia. Major Anton was in command at the latter station, and on the 25th of May, 1867, Lieutenant-Colonel Yonge arrived at Sierra Leone and assumed command there. In the beginning of August, 1867, a disturbance of a serious character occurred on the Gold Coast at Mumford, a town situated half-way between Cape Coast Castle and Accra; and Lieutenant H.F.S. Bolton, 1st West India Regiment, who, being temporarily in the employ of the Colonial Government, was Civil Commandant of the latter town, was despatched with a party of the 2nd West India Regiment to establish order. The cause of the disturbance was an old-standing quarrel between two of the native companies at Mumford, and a conflict had taken place, resulting in a large number of killed and wounded. On the arrival of the troops the principal offenders were arrested, and order was restored. Since the arrival of the regiment in Africa, small detachments had been furnished from Sierra Leone to Sherbro, Songo-town, and the island of Bulama, at the mouth of the Jeba River. In September, 1867, the troops were withdrawn from the latter station. In October, 1867, Lieutenant Bolton was employed in arresting some recalcitrant chiefs at Pram-Pram, near Accra, Lieutenant Ness, 2nd West India Regiment, with a detachment of that corps, acting under his orders. The service was attended with considerable difficulty and some danger, and the following general order was published on the subject, dated Cape Coast Castle, January 15th, 1868: "The officer commanding the troops has much gratification in publishing in orders an extract of a letter received from the Horse Guards, expressing the approval of His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, of the manner in which the difficult duties were carried out by the officers and troops employed in the recent expedition to Pram-Pram. "'The attention of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief having been drawn to a despatch, received at the Colonial Office, from the Administrator-in-Chief of the West Africa settlements, containing a very favourable account of the conduct of Lieutenant H.F.S. Bolton, of the 1st West India Regiment, and Lieutenant (now Captain) Ness, of the 4th West India Regiment,[60] and of the troops under their command, on a recent expedition to some chiefs at Pram-Pram and Ningo, on the Gold Coast; I am directed to acquaint you that His Royal Highness considers the report to be highly satisfactory, and I have to request that you will express to the officers and troops employed on the service in question, His Royal Highness's approval of the manner in which they carried out the very difficult duties they had to perform.'" On the 9th of August, 1868, at the request of the Governor-in-chief, the garrison of the 2nd West India Regiment on the Gold Coast being much below its allotted strength, E Company, 1st West India Regiment, 100 strong, proceeded to Cape Coast Castle, under Lieutenant C.J.L. Hill, and, in consequence of this reduction of the Sierra Leone garrison, the Songo-town detachment was withdrawn. In January, 1869, a company under Captain K.R. Niven, with Ensign W.A. Broome, was despatched to Sherbro Island for the protection of British subjects, an invasion of that island being hourly expected. The presence of the troops soon produced the desired effect, and the detachment returned to Sierra Leone on the 27th of February. In April, 1869, in consequence of the difficulty experienced by the Colonial Government in arresting certain rebellious chiefs at the Amissah River, about twenty miles to the east of Cape Coast Castle, the police having been attacked and driven off, the Acting Administrator, Mr. W.H. Simpson, applied for a military party to aid in establishing the authority of the Government over the people of that place; and, on the 7th of that month, Lieutenant E.G. Macdonald, 1st West India Regiment, with twenty-five non-commissioned officers and men of letter E Company, marched for Anamaboe, leaving that place next morning for Amissah River. On arriving there the chiefs were captured with some little difficulty, and the party returned to Cape Coast next day. On the 1st of April, 1869, the 4th West India Regiment was disbanded, and the three remaining West India regiments were each augmented by one company; the detachment of the 4th West India Regiment at Jamaica being formed into the ninth, or letter "I," Company of the 1st West India Regiment. On the 30th of September, 1869, it embarked for Honduras in the brigantine _W.N.Z._, under Major McAuley, arriving at its destination on the 14th of October. In May, 1869, the Gambia was visited by a severe epidemic of cholera. Owing to the sanitary measures adopted by Major W.W.W. Johnston, 1st West India Regiment, commanding the troops, the regiment escaped with only eighteen deaths out of the 200 men there stationed between the 5th of May and the 6th of June, the period when the epidemic was at its height; while in the town there were more than 1500 deaths, out of a population of some 5000. In 1870 the three years' tour of service of the regiment on the West Coast of Africa expired. The 3rd West India Regiment having been disbanded, a considerable reduction in the West African garrisons became necessary, and it was intended that the relief for the eight companies of the 1st West India Regiment should consist of four companies of the 2nd. On the 24th of May, the head-quarters, with A, B, and F Companies, under Captain Samson, embarked at Sierra Leone in H.M.S. _Orontes_, which, proceeding to the Gambia, took on board the two companies there on the 29th. The head-quarters, with the three companies from Sierra Leone, landed at Jamaica on the 27th of June, and the _Orontes_ then sailed for Nassau, where the two companies from the Gambia were disembarked. On the return of the troopship to the West Coast of Africa with the four companies of the 2nd West India Regiment, the company of the 1st West India Regiment at Cape Coast Castle was embarked on the 24th of August, and the remaining two at Sierra Leone on the 27th. All three proceeded to Jamaica, under the command of Captain J.A. Smith, and landed at Kingston on the 3rd of October. The distribution of the regiment was now as follows: head-quarters and six companies at Jamaica, two at Nassau, and one at Honduras. On the 15th of November, F Company, under Captain Butler, embarked at Jamaica for Honduras; thus making up the detachment at that station to two companies. During the West African tour of 1866-70, two officers succumbed to the influence of the climate, Lieutenant Gavin having died at Sierra Leone on the 22nd of February, 1869, and Lieutenant Maturin on the 7th of December of the same year. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 60: By the Gazette of September 25th, 1867, Lieutenant R.E.D. Ness, 2nd West India Regiment, was promoted Captain, by purchase, in the 4th West India Regiment.] CHAPTER XXVIII. THE DEFENCE OF ORANGE WALK, 1872. On the 1st of September, 1872, a most determined attack was made by the Ycaiché Indians on the outpost of Orange Walk, British Honduras, which was garrisoned by thirty-eight men of the 1st West India Regiment, under Lieutenant Joseph Graham Smith. Orange Walk is situated on a deep and sluggish stream in the northern district, named the New River,[61] at a distance of some thirty-three miles from its mouth, and, in 1872, contained a population of about 1200 souls, the majority of whom were either Indians or Hispano-Indians, and indifferent to British rule. The business portion of the town, and most of the shops or stores, were on hilly ground, considerably above the river-bed, and built here and there, without an attempt at order or regularity. About midway between the river and this upper portion of the town was the barrack, consisting of one large room, sixty feet by thirty feet, the two ends of which were partitioned off, leaving the central part for the men's quarters. The partitioned portion at the south end was used as a guard-room. The walls of the building were constructed of _pimentos_, or round straight sticks, varying from half-an-inch to three inches in diameter, driven firmly into the ground, in an upright position, as close together as possible, and held in their places by pine-wood battens. The roof was composed of palm-leaves, or "fan-thatch." The floor was boarded. On the south-eastern side of the barrack, the ground fell towards the river, which was about fifty yards distant. About ten yards from the water's edge was a large quantity of logwood, packed in piles four feet high, and some little distance from each other. Across the road, on the southern side, were several native houses; to the east, and about forty yards distant, was a group of four small buildings consisting of commissariat stores and the officers' quarters; while the nearest building on the north was the Roman Catholic Church, about eighty yards off. How or when the invaders crossed the Rio Hondo, the northern boundary of the colony, has not been ascertained; but it is a significant fact, suggestive of strong suspicions against the loyalty of the Indian and mixed Spanish-Indian population, whose small settlements were dotted here and there on the line of march of the invaders, that no information was conveyed, either to the district magistrate at Orange Walk, or to the officer commanding the small detachment, that an enemy was at hand, prepared, as the settlers must have known, to attack and plunder the town. The Indians, consisting of about 180 braves, or fighting men, and 100 camp followers, led by Marcus Canul, chief of the Ycaiché, approached the town about 8 a.m. on Sunday, the 1st of September. They were divided into three sections, each of 60 men, and they entered the town at three different points; one attacking the upper portion, and pillaging and setting fire to the houses and stores, the other two marching directly upon the barracks, but from opposite sides. Of these latter two, one took up a position behind the stacks of logwood, thus commanding one side and one end of the barrack; and the other established itself close to the officers' quarters, under cover of a stone building, which commanded the other side of the barrack and the end already commanded from the stacks of logwood. So sudden and unexpected was the attack, that Lieutenant Graham Smith and Staff-Assistant-Surgeon Edge, who were both at the time having their morning baths, barely had time to escape to the barracks; Lieutenant Smith, with nothing on but his trousers, and Dr. Edge in a state of nudity; while the first notice the men in the barrack had of the approach of the enemy, was the shower of lead which rattled on the building. Lieutenant Graham Smith says: "At about 8 a.m. on September 1st, I was bathing, when I heard the report of a gun and the whizz of a bullet along the road running past the south end of the barrack-room. I looked out of the door of my house facing the barracks, and saw the corporal of the old guard, which had just been relieved, running towards me. He said, 'The Indians have come.' I repeated this to Dr. Edge, who was living in the same quarters with me, then put on my trousers, ran across to the barrack-room, and got the men under arms as quickly as possible." Before Lieutenant Graham Smith had reached the barracks, the two divisions of the enemy had taken up their respective positions, and were pouring in unceasing discharges of ball, which penetrated the pimento sticks and raked the building from end to end. The guard, the only men who had ammunition in their possession, returned the fire, and at this moment Lieutenant Smith arrived with Dr. Edge. Sergeant Belizario, coming forward and asking for ammunition to serve out, reminded Lieutenant Smith that he had left the key of the portable magazine, in which the ammunition was kept, in his quarters. The open space between his quarters and the barrack-room was swept with an unceasing shower of lead; but there was no help for it, and the key had to be fetched. Accompanied by Sergeant Belizario, Lieutenant Smith ran over to his house, seized the key, and ran back. Most marvellously both escaped injury, though the ground all around them was cut up by bullets. The portable magazine was kept in the partitioned end that served as a guard-room, and there was no door of communication between the central portion, where the men lived, and this room. Sergeant Belizario therefore ran out of the barrack-room, along the side of the building, into the guard-room, and endeavoured to drag the portable magazine back with him. He succeeded in moving it outside the guard-room and a little way along the wall, but further he could not drag it. All this time he was exposed to a heavy fire, and every musket-barrel from the stone building on the eastern side of the barrack was pointed at his body. Finding that all his efforts to move the magazine were fruitless, Sergeant Belizario unlocked it, and, taking out the ammunition, passed packet after packet to the men inside, through the opening under the eaves left for ventilation, between the thatched roof and the top of the pimento wall, till the magazine was emptied. This done, he returned to the barrack-room. He seemed to have borne a charmed life, for he was untouched, while the portable magazine was starred with the white splashes of leaden bullets. A hot fire was now opened by the soldiers, and Lieutenant Graham Smith, taking a rifle, placed himself at the west door of the barracks to try and pick off some of the most daring of the Indians. Whilst there he was struck in the left side, and, at the same instant, Private Robert Lynch, who was standing next him, fell dead, pierced by two shots. Notwithstanding his wound, which was very severe, the ball penetrating the left breast a little above the heart, and passing nearly through him, finally lodging under the left shoulder-blade, Lieutenant Smith continued directing and encouraging his men; and finding that the whole interior was swept by the missiles of the enemy, against which the frail pimento-sticks were no protection, he ordered the men to turn down their cots, and, lying on their beds, to fire over the iron heads of the cots. In this position they were tolerably well sheltered, though the Indians were so close that several of the iron heads were shot through. In this place it will be proper to refer to a soldier who, all this time, was outside the barrack. This was Private Bidwell, who, when the Indians arrived, had just been posted sentry on a commissariat store close to the officers' quarters. The occupation of one of this group of buildings cut him off from the barrack-room; so, after bayoneting one Indian, he ran over to an enclosure belonging to Don Escalente, situated to the north of the store. From the shelter of the fence of this enclosure he fired into the Indians in the stone building till his ten rounds of ammunition were exhausted. He then said to Don Escalente, "I am going over to the barracks for more cartridges," and, before he could be dissuaded, ran out from the shelter and endeavoured to cross the open space to the barrack. On the way he received a mortal wound, but succeeded in joining his comrades. The Indians, impatient at the delay caused by the obstinate resistance of the soldiers, now vacated the houses on the further side of the road, opposite the southern end of the barracks, and set fire to the thatched roofs, hoping to involve the barracks in a general conflagration. The houses burned fiercely, and the flames spreading across the road, caught a small kitchen situated not ten yards from the barracks. The Indians raised yells of triumph, for they considered it certain that their foes would now be driven from their shelter and then easily overpowered by force of numbers. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the dry palm-thatch of the barracks did fail to ignite, but it did so fail, and the kitchen, after blazing up violently for a few minutes, fell in and burned itself out harmlessly. By the destruction of these buildings the position of the soldiers was improved, the Indians now having no cover immediately opposite the south end of the barrack, and being compelled consequently to concentrate behind the stacks of logwood. A party, however, of them made a circuit and appeared on the north-west corner of the barrack, from whence they commanded the road bounding the north side of the building. After the firing had continued for an hour and a half, Mr. Price, and another American gentleman from Tower Hill Rancho, about four miles from the barracks, having heard what was taking place, mounted and rode towards the scene of the conflict. Creeping up the river bank unperceived through the thick woods, they suddenly rode into and fired upon the Indians who were in rear of the stacks of logwood. The latter, taken by surprise, and not knowing by what unexpected force they were attacked, left their cover for a moment and appeared on the side nearest to the barracks. The soldiers perceiving this movement, and thinking that the Indians were going to attempt to rush the building, fixed bayonets, and some ran to the doors to defend the entrances. Mr. Price and his companion, taking advantage of this and the momentary surprise of the Indians, rushed forward and threw themselves into the barracks. The enemy's fire redoubled after this, and it was hotly kept up until about half-past 1 o'clock; it then began to slacken, and by 2 o'clock had ceased altogether. For some time no one stirred, it being suspected that the cessation of the attack was only an Indian ruse; but after a quarter of an hour had elapsed, Sergeant Belizario was sent out with a party to reconnoitre. He reported that the enemy was in full retreat, and was sent to follow them up and watch their movements. No pursuit could be attempted. Lieutenant Graham Smith was, by this time, incapable of further action, and out of the detachment of thirty-eight men, two had been killed and fourteen severely wounded. The attack lasted altogether six hours. The Indian loss was about fifty killed; the number of their wounded could not, of course, be ascertained, but amongst them was Marcus Canul himself, who was mortally wounded, and died before recrossing the Hondo. Of the civilians, the son of Don Escalente, a boy fourteen years of age, was killed, and seventeen were wounded. While the Indians had been occupied in their attack on the barracks, the European women and children had escaped from the scene of the outrage and crossed the river in boats. Thence they had made their way through the dense forest to the village of San Estevan, about seven miles below Orange Walk. Over 300 bullet-holes were counted in the walls of the barrack-room, and in many places the palmettos were shot away in patches. On the morning following the attack, a rumour reached the barracks that the Indians were again in force near the town, and preparing to renew the attack. Every preparation for giving them a warm reception was made; but Sergeant Belizario and a small party, who went out to reconnoitre, found that the rumour was false, although several Indians were seen in the bush and fired upon. In the meantime the news of the invasion had reached Corosal and Belize, and Captain F.B.P. White, with Lieutenant Bulger and twenty men, arrived at Orange Walk at midnight on the 4th, being followed next day by a further reinforcement of fifty-three officers and men, under Major W.W.W. Johnston, but the Indians had already retired beyond the frontier. A colonist, in a letter to _The Times_ on this affair, says: "Concerning the conduct and proceedings of the military during and subsequent to the late invasion and attack, I have nothing to say but what redounds to their credit and high character as British soldiers; and if medals and crosses were distributed among the dusky warriors of Her Majesty's land forces in this part of her dominions as freely as among other branches of the service, all I can say is that every one of the brave fellows, who held with such determined valour and tenacity the barracks at Orange Walk on that memorable Sunday morning against such fearful odds, would be entitled to a medal at least." The following general order was issued: "The Colonel commanding the forces in the West Indies has received with much satisfaction an account of the successful defence of the post of Orange Walk, British Honduras, by a detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant J. Graham Smith, against an assault of a large force of Indians. "He has much pleasure in recording his high approbation of the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Smith, who, severely wounded at the outset of the attack, maintained the defence of his post, and retained command as long as his strength enabled him to do so; it was then successfully maintained under the direction of Staff-Assistant-Surgeon Edge, and Sergeant Belizario, 1st West India Regiment, to whom also great praise is due for their conduct and exertions; the gallant conduct of Lance-Corporals Spencer and Stirling, Privates Hoffer, Maxwell, Osborne, Murray, and W. Morris, has also been favourably mentioned. "The Colonel commanding will have great pleasure in bringing the conduct of these officers and soldiers to the favourable notice of His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, and also the judicious and energetic measures taken by Major W.W.W. Johnston, 1st West India Regiment, commanding the troops in British Honduras, who proceeded in person to the post which had been assailed, and followed up the retreating enemy." In reply to the report made by Colonel Cox, C.B., commanding the troops, the following letter was received, and ordered to be embodied in the records of the regiment: "HORSE GUARDS, WAR OFFICE, S.W., "_15th November, 1872_. "SIR, "Having had the honour to receive and submit to the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, your letter of the 23rd September last, with its several enclosures, containing a detailed account of the exemplary and gallant conduct of a detachment of the 1st West India Regiment, in repelling an attack of Indians on the Orange Walk outpost of the Colony of British Honduras, together with a letter on the same subject addressed to this department by the officer commanding the 1st West India Regiment: "I have it in command to acquaint you that His Royal Highness, after consultation with the Secretary of State for War on the subject, has decided that the following recognition shall be at once made of the services of the officers and men employed on that occasion, viz.: "That Lieutenant Smith, late 1st West India Regiment, who was gazetted to the 57th Regiment in August last, shall be immediately promoted to a Company in the 97th Foot. "That Staff-Assistant-Surgeon Edge shall be promoted to the rank of Surgeon, as soon as he has qualified for the higher position, and a notification to this effect will be published in the London Gazette, hereafter. "That Sergeant Edward Belizario shall receive the distinguished conduct medal, with an annuity of £10, to be given at once, in excess of the vote, until absorbed on the occurrence of a vacancy. "That Lance-Corporals Spencer and Stirling shall be granted the distinguished conduct medal without annuity, and promoted to the rank of Corporal, to be borne supernumerary till absorbed. "I am also to request that the men of the detachment specially named in the margin[62] may be commended for their good conduct, and the commanding officer of the regiment requested to record their claims, and give such recognition of them regimentally as may be possible from time to time. "That you will publish these, His Royal Highness's decisions, in your general orders. "And that a copy of this letter may be furnished to the officer commanding the 1st West India Regiment, for the purpose of being entered in the Regimental Records. "I have, etc., (Signed) J.W. ARMSTRONG, D.A.G." In consequence of the attack on Orange Walk, and on the application of the Governor of Honduras, Captain Gardner, Lieutenant Bale, and fifty men of the regiment, embarked at Jamaica, on the 25th of September, in H.M.S. _Fly_, as a reinforcement for Honduras. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 61: See Map.] [Footnote 62: Privates Hoffer, Maxwell, S. Osborne, Murray, R.A. Morris, and W. Tell.] CHAPTER XXIX. THE ASHANTI WAR, 1873-4. On the 9th of December, 1872, the King of Ashanti despatched from Coomassie an army of 40,000 men to invade the British Protectorate on the Gold Coast. This army crossed the Prah in three divisions on January 29th, 1873, and spread itself slowly over the country, ravaging as it advanced. In August, 1870, the garrisons on the West Coast of Africa had been reduced to four companies, two at Sierra Leone, and two at Cape Coast. This reduction, no doubt, was one of the principal causes which led to the invasion, for at that time there were only 160 soldiers of the 2nd West India Regiment to defend 160 miles of territory. In June, 1873, the head-quarters of the 2nd West India Regiment being ordered from Demerara to Cape Coast Castle, A Company of the 1st West India Regiment embarked at Kingston, Jamaica, on the 10th of that month, and proceeded to Demerara to garrison that place. In September, the native levies that had been raised on the Gold Coast to resist the Ashantis being found utterly worthless, it was decided to send three battalions from England and the 1st West India Regiment from Jamaica, to invade in turn the Ashanti territory and dictate terms of peace at Coomassie. On the 15th of November, the two companies (C and H) from Nassau, under the command of Major Strachan, arrived at Jamaica, and, on the 3rd of December, the head-quarters and five companies (B, C, E, G and H), under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, embarked at Kingston on board the hired transport _Manitoban_. Proceeding to Barbados, A Company, which had been moved from Demerara, was embarked on the 9th of December, and the same evening the regiment sailed for the Gold Coast, arriving at Cape Coast Castle on the 27th, and disembarking on the 29th, 575 strong. The officers serving with the expeditionary force were Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, Major W.W.W. Johnston, Captains Sampson, Butler, Niven, J.A. Smith, Steward, and Shearman, Lieutenants Allinson, C.J.L. Hill, Bale, Molony, Cole, Bell, Clough, Elderton, Beale-Browne, and Barne, and Sub-Lieutenants Harward, Spitta, Hughes, Burke, Edwardes, Tinkler, and Ellis. The regiment on landing was encamped on Prospect and Connor's Hills, two heights overlooking the town of Cape Coast, and Colonel Maxwell assumed command of the garrison in the Castle. Sir Garnet Wolseley having already driven the Ashantis out of the Protectorate after the actions at Dunquah and Abracampa in November, and having garrisoned the various stations between Cape Coast and the Prah, had, a few days before the regiment landed, gone on to Prahsu with his head-quarter staff. The _Himalaya_ and _Tamar_, with the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, which had been cruising about outside for sanitary reasons, now came into the roadstead, where the _Sarmatian_, with the 42nd Highlanders, was already lying, and everything was ready for the advance on Coomassie. Accordingly, before daybreak on the 1st of January, the right half-battalion of the Rifle Brigade landed and commenced its march to the front, followed the next morning by the other half-battalion. On the mornings of the 3rd and 4th the two half-battalions of the 42nd landed, and passed to the front in a similar manner. The Fantis had shown so much disinclination to act as carriers, and so few had been obtained, that the advance of these two battalions had exhausted all the available carriers, and there were none for the 23rd Fusiliers. It was necessary to adopt stronger measures, unless the expedition was to fall through, and on the 4th of January the 1st West India Regiment was posted in a cordon of sentries around the town of Cape Coast, while the armed police seized all the able-bodied men in the town, except those employed as canoe-men. This step was entirely successful, and on the morning of the 5th the right half-battalion of the 23rd landed and marched to the front, being followed next morning by C Company of the 1st West India Regiment. The difficulty with the carriers had in the meantime increased instead of diminishing. Numbers had deserted, abandoning their loads, and the transport was almost in a moribund condition, the 23rd Regiment being even re-embarked for want of carriers. Sir Garnet Wolseley in this emergency called upon the West India regiments for assistance, saying that the fate of the expedition was hanging in the balance; and in response to his appeal, they both volunteered to carry supplies, in addition to their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition. Accordingly, on the 7th of January, the head-quarters of the regiment, under Colonel Maxwell, with A and E Companies, marched to Inquabim, the first stage; being followed the next morning by G and H Companies, under Captain Butler; while B Company remained at Prospect Hill to furnish the necessary garrison guards at Cape Coast Castle. The head-quarters arrived at Dunquah on the 8th, where C Company had been halted by Colonel Colley, who was in charge of the transport and communications, and had already been actively engaged driving in carriers and furnishing escorts for the convoys of provisions. On the 9th, at 1.30 a.m., A Company, under Captain Shearman, paraded and marched into the Ecumfie district for the purpose of driving in carriers from that neighbourhood, and, at the same hour, the head-quarters and E Company continued their march to Mansu, where they arrived the same evening. Provisions being now urgently required at the stations immediately in front of Mansu, 78 men of E Company, being all that were available, and 140 of the 42nd Highlanders, started at three o'clock in the morning of the 12th, as carriers, each man with a load of 50 lb. weight, besides his arms and accoutrements. On the evening of the same day Captain Butler, with H Company, arrived at Mansu. The carriers continued deserting by whole tribes, and the need of them had become so urgent, that orders were issued to shoot any attempting to desert, while parties of the regiment were continually passing backwards and forwards between Dunquah and Mansu as guards over the convoys. To relieve the pressure, 94 men of G and C Companies left Dunquah on the 13th with ninety-four 50-lb. loads, and, reaching Mansu the same day, started next morning at daybreak for the Prah. On the 17th, Captain Butler marched with H Company to Essecooma, a place about twenty miles due east from Mansu, to drive in carriers, and a similar party was sent out next day from Dunquah, under Lieutenant Roper, to Adjumaco and Essiaman. During all these arduous duties, and since the 8th of January, so great was the scarcity of provisions at the front, that the non-commissioned officers and men of the regiment were placed upon half rations of salt meat and biscuit, without the grocery ration. On Sunday, the 18th of January, the transport being now in sufficient order, owing to the number of carriers driven in from the surrounding districts by the regiment, the advance of the army commenced, and the head-quarters of the 42nd Regiment marched from Mansu; their left wing, and 100 men of the 23rd Fusiliers, moving up from Yancoomassie Fanti, and occupying their lines for the night. The Rifle Brigade moved simultaneously to the front from the stations ahead. Next morning, E Company, under Captain J.A. Smith, marched with the left wing of the 42nd for the Prah, and G Company, under Captain Steward, came up to Mansu from Dunquah, leaving A and C Companies, under Captains Niven and Shearman, at Dunquah and the Adjumaco district. On the 23rd, orders were received from the front by telegram, that the head-quarters and 200 men were to march for the Prah at once, there to receive further orders. Captain Butler, who had been ordered in with H Company from Essecooma, two days before, arrived at Mansu the same evening, and the next morning, the head-quarters and G Company marched for the Prah, H Company following on the 25th. Halting at Sutah and Yancoomassie Assin, the head-quarters arrived at Prahsu on the 27th, and on the morning of the 28th, the 200 men required crossed the Prah and marched to Essiaman. During this march the men had been obliged to carry their _tentes d'abri_, blankets and waterproof sheets, and seventy rounds of ball ammunition, in addition to their field kits and arms and accoutrements. On arriving at Essiaman, E Company, which, under Captain J.A. Smith, had crossed the Prah a day or two before, was found occupying an important post at the cross roads. A few minutes after reaching this village, urgent orders were received to push on as quickly as possible to the summit of the Adansi Hills, and again proceed to the front with all speed, leaving fifty men at Fommanah, the capital of Adansi. On the 29th, the head-quarters were at Accrofumu; on the 30th, they crossed the Adansi Hills, and halted at Fommanah for the night, leaving E Company, under Captain Smith, at the cross-roads at the foot of the hills, in accordance with later orders that had been received, and Lieutenant Spitta with twenty-five men at the summit. The men were now becoming much exhausted from their long marches, marching, as they did, double stages every day. Their burdens were unusually heavy for troops, and they were still kept on half rations. At Fommanah a very pressing letter was received from the chief of the staff, asking at what hour next day the regiment might be expected to join the head-quarters of the army at Insarfu, what numbers it could put into the field, and whether the boxes of small-arm ammunition ordered up from Prahsu had arrived with it. A considerable action was considered imminent on the morrow. At daylight on the morning of the 31st, the head-quarters marched to Ahkankuassie, leaving Captain Steward and Lieutenant Hughes with fifty men at Fommanah. At about eight o'clock the sound of heavy and sustained musketry was heard, and the men, eager to join in the first battle fought on Ashanti soil, pushed on. At Adadwasi a large number of carriers, with reserve ammunition, who had halted there, frightened at the sound of the firing, were found, and were at once taken on, arriving at Insarfu about 1.30 p.m. The firing, which had ceased for a short time, now recommenced, the Ashantis making one of their favourite flank attacks on Quarman, the next village in front. The situation appeared grave, the town being crowded with terrified carriers and wounded men, and Lieutenant Hill with a half-company was sent out to act with the 2nd West India Regiment and skirmish. After a time, however, the musketry ceased, and the carriers, with the reserve ammunition, were pushed on hurriedly under the escort of a company of the Rifle Brigade, the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments being directed to hold Insarfu. Scarcely had the carriers started than the firing again commenced, the ambushed Ashantis having attacked the convoy, which fell back upon Insarfu. After a short delay, a second attempt was made to get the ammunition through to the front, and this time it proved successful. It was now dark, and Captain Buckle, R.E., who had been killed that morning, was buried outside the town, the firing party of the 1st West India Regiment being employed as skirmishers to protect the funeral party, instead of in the usual manner. The next morning, orders were received for the 2nd West India Regiment to proceed to Amoaful, and hold it until the return of the army from Coomassie; while the 1st West India Regiment was directed to hold Insarfu, in which was the 2nd field hospital with 120 wounded officers and men. The work was arduous in the extreme, the men, when not on sentry or patrol, being employed in clearing the thick bush round the town, and endeavouring to strengthen the post. While the engagement at Amoaful, Quarman, and Insarfu was going on, a party of the 1st West India Regiment, which was escorting treasure from Fommanah to Dompoassi, was fired upon by some ambushed Ashantis about one hundred yards from the latter village. The escort promptly returned the fire, but the carriers all dropped their loads and ran away. After firing a few desultory shots the Ashantis retired, and the escort remained with the scattered boxes of specie, which were too numerous for them to carry on themselves. Fortunately the fugitive carriers, running headlong into Fommanah, spread the alarm, and Captain North, of the 47th Regiment, immediately marched with a party of the 1st West India Regiment, under Lieutenant E. Hughes, and a few men of Russell's Regiment, to Dompoassi, near which he found the treasure quite safe, it having, with the exception of one box, which had been dropped by its bearer some three hundred yards down the road, away from the rest, and where a turn in the path hid it from sight, been collected together by the escort. No trace was found of the enemy, and the party of the 1st West India Regiment returned to Fommanah. On the morning of the 2nd of February, the head-quarters of the army advanced from Amoaful to march on Coomassie. There were, notwithstanding the defeat on January 31st, still large numbers of Ashantis on the flanks of the road, in the neighbourhood of Quarman and Insarfu. During the day succeeding the battle, they concentrated lower down the road, and, on the morning of the 2nd of February, made a desperate attempt to sever our line of communications by attacking the post of Fommanah. "The post was in command of Captain Steward, 1st West India Regiment, who had a garrison of 1 officer and 38 non-commissioned officers and men, 1st West India Regiment; and Lieutenant Grant, 6th Regiment, with 102 of the Mumford Company of Russell's Regiment. There were also present two transport officers--Captain North, of the 47th Regiment, and Captain Duncan, R.A.--three surgeons, and two control officers; and in the palace, which was situated in the main street of the long straggling town, and used as a hospital, were 24 European soldiers and sailors, convalescents. The pickets had reported Ashantis in the neighbourhood early in the morning, and had been reinforced; but the village was far too large to be capable of defence by this small garrison; and when, about 8.30 a.m., the place was attacked from all directions by the enemy, they were able to penetrate into it. Captain North, in virtue of his seniority, assumed the command, but while at the head of his men was shot down in the street of the village, and was obliged by severe loss of blood to hand over the command to Captain Duncan, R.A. "The enemy, as has been said, penetrated into all the southern side of the village, which they set on fire; meanwhile the sick from the hospital were removed to the stockade at the north end of the village, which was cleared as rapidly as possible, the houses being pulled down by the troops and labourers acting under Colonel Colley's order.[63] "At half-past two, Colonel Colley reported as follows: 'We have now cleared the greater part of the village, preserving the hospital and store enclosure. Difficult to judge of numbers of the Ashantis; they attack on all sides, and occasional ones creep boldly into the village, but generally keep under cover of the thick bush, which in places comes close to the houses.' The firing ceased about 1 p.m.; but on a party going down for water an hour later, they were hotly fired upon. No further attack was made upon the post. "This attack on Fommanah seriously interfered with the transport arrangements. Hitherto, though a few shots had been fired at different convoys, the panics and difficulties had always been overcome by the energy of the transport officers; but the vigour and strength of this attack frightened the carriers so thoroughly that it was impossible to move them for some days." In this affair the 1st West India Regiment lost one sergeant and five privates wounded, and Russell's irregulars three men wounded. The Ashantis, although repulsed, still remained in the neighbourhood of Fommanah, and on February 3rd, an escort over a convoy of carriers, consisting of a sergeant and three men of the 1st West India Regiment, was fired upon between Dompoassi and Fommanah, the sergeant and one private being wounded. The European Brigade pushed on to Coomassie, after several days' hard fighting, entered the Ashanti capital on the evening of the 4th of February, burned it and marched out on the 6th, and arrived at Insarfu on the downward journey on the 9th. Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, commanding the head-quarters of the 1st West India Regiment at Insarfu, was directed to break up his post, burn the town as soon as all the troops had passed through, and then to follow to Fommanah, where Sir Garnet Wolseley intended remaining a few days, in order to endeavour to arrange a treaty with the Ashantis. The head-quarter staff left Fommanah on February 14th for Cape Coast, and the European troops being ordered to push on, on account of the commencement of the rains, the 1st West India Regiment was detailed to relieve the 42nd as the rear-guard of the army. On it fell the duty of destroying the fortified posts to the north of the Prah, and the removal of the sick and wounded and stores. Carriers were still so scarce that it was not until the 20th that Essiaman was cleared out and the stockade destroyed, and the three rear companies of the regiment marched into the bridge-head at Prahsu--which, during the advance to Coomassie, had been held by C Company, under Captain Niven--on the 21st. On the 23rd they crossed the Prah, and the bridge was then destroyed. By the 27th of February all the European regiments had embarked for England, the 2nd West India Regiment was under orders for the West Indies, and upon the 1st West India Regiment fell the duty of garrisoning the colony. Two hundred men were left at Prahsu, where a strong redoubt had been constructed, fifty at Mansu, and the remainder at Cape Coast. On the departure of Sir Garnet Wolseley, on the 4th of March, Colonel Maxwell, of the 1st West India Regiment, administered the government of the Gold Coast. Previous to the departure of the General the following general order was published: "(General Order No. 43.) "HEAD-QUARTERS, CAPE COAST CASTLE, "_3rd March, 1874_. "Before leaving for England the Major-General commanding wishes to convey to the soldiers of the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments his appreciation of their soldierlike qualities, and of the manner in which they have performed their duties during the recent campaign. Portions of the 2nd West India Regiment have been in every affair in the war, and the regiment generally has undergone fatigue and exposure in a most creditable manner. "When, owing to the desertion of carriers, the transport difficulties became serious, the men of both these regiments responded most cheerfully to the call made upon them, and, by daily carrying loads, helped to relieve the force from its most pressing difficulties. "In saying 'good-bye,' the Major-General assures them he will always remember with pride and pleasure that he had the honour of commanding men whose loyalty to their Queen, and whose soldierlike qualities, have been so well proved in the war now happily at an end." The rains having set in at the Prah, and much sickness prevailing, it was decided to relieve the posts between that river and the coast. In fact, the mortality that had occurred at Prahsu in 1864 showed that West India troops should not be encamped there without urgent necessity; and no such necessity now existed, as the King of Ashanti had agreed to the treaty, which had been left unsettled up to Sir Garnet Wolseley's departure. Captain J.A. Smith, with fifty men of the regiment, escorted the Ashanti chiefs sent down by the king, and arrived at Cape Coast on the 12th of March. On the 18th, H Company marched in from Prahsu, and embarked on the 20th for Sierra Leone in the transport _Nebraska_, which vessel also conveyed the 2nd West India Regiment to the West Indies. C Company was the last withdrawn from the Prah, arriving at Cape Coast on April 2nd. It had been most disappointing to the two West India regiments to have been prevented from entering Coomassie, within some twenty-five miles from which their head-quarters were halted. West India regiments rarely have opportunities of seeing active service elsewhere than on the West Coast of Africa; and, although the duties assigned to them in the second phase of the war were most important, holding, as they did, the detached posts from the Prah up to the front, keeping open the communications, protecting the convoys, sick and wounded, and constantly furnishing patrols and escorts, yet they felt it rather hard to have been deprived, in their solitary field for distinguishing themselves, of the honours of fighting beside their European comrades at Amoaful and Ordahsu. On the return of the regiment from the bush, the fatigues and exposures of the campaign began to have their effect upon both officers and men. In ordinary years, in times of peace, Europeans who are seasoned to tropical service, can serve for twelve months in the deadly climate of West Africa without suffering much loss; but any unusual exposure or hardship is at once followed by an alarming increase of sickness. The 1st West India Regiment was the only corps which, after enduring all the fatigues of a campaign in the most deadly climate in the world, did not enjoy the advantage of a change to a healthier station. Added to this, the season proved to be unusually unhealthy, and that variety of African fever known as "bilious remittent," which can only be distinguished from yellow fever by the fact of its not being contagious, broke out. Sub-Lieutenant L. Burke succumbed to this scourge on March 1st, Lieutenant T. Williams on April 9th, Lieutenant W.S. Elderton on May 10th, and Sub-Lieutenant E.W. Huntingford on June 12th, while Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, Lieutenant Clough and Lieutenant Roper, being invalided, died on passage to England, and Captain Butler after arriving in England. In addition to these deaths, eight other officers were invalided, and out of twenty-six officers who were serving with the regiment on the 28th of February, only ten were left in West Africa on the 30th of June. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 63: Colonel Colley had arrived at the northern side of the village, from Ahkankuassie, soon after the command had devolved upon Captain Duncan.] CHAPTER XXX. AFFAIRS IN HONDURAS, 1874--THE SHERBRO EXPEDITION 1875--THE ASHANTI EXPEDITION, 1881. While the regiment had thus been engaged on the Gold Coast, the detachment left at Orange Walk had, in January 1874, had a narrow escape of a brush with the Santa Cruz Indians. On the 2nd of that month, in accordance with a requisition from the magistrate at Orange Walk, Captain F.B.P. White and Lieutenant J.R.H. Wilton, with forty men of the 1st West India Regiment, left that station about noon for Albion Island, in the River Hondo, distant about twelve miles, to demand the restitution of a woman who had been abducted by an armed party of Santa Cruz Indians from a place called Douglas, in British territory. The Hondo was reached about 4.30 p.m., and Captain White, finding a number of Santa Cruz Indians cutting bush, as if for an encampment, on the British side of the river, directed them to accompany him; and crossing to the island in their boats, sent them to tell the chief that he had a message to deliver to him. On landing on Albion Island it was found that the public ball-room of San Antonio, a large, open, shed-like building peculiar to these Spanish-Indian towns, which was situated on a small hill, was occupied by an armed force of the Indians, about seventy strong. Opposite to them, on the nearest rising ground, the detachment was at once formed up, partly covered by a chapel. After some time the chief of the Santa Cruz came over to Captain White's party, and inquired what was wanted of him; when he was told that no message could be delivered to him as long as he had an armed party on British soil, and that he must surrender his arms. After some little discussion the chief agreed to do so, provided that they were returned when his men left the island; and, on these terms, ten or eleven rifles were brought in; but while this was being done, a trumpet sounded in the public ball-room, and the Santa Cruz, quickly gathering together, began to load their rifles. The chief, being asked for an explanation of this sudden change, replied that his braves were only cleaning their guns, but at the same moment a sub-chief came up, and loudly declared that the Santa Cruz would not give up their arms. The troops were rapidly posted in advantageous positions, and Captain White then informed the chiefs that if their men would not lay down their arms they must leave San Antonio at once, first handing over the woman who had been abducted. Some discussion ensued, but Captain White remaining firm, the chiefs agreed to go, and moved their men down to the boats. At the last moment, however, it was discovered that the woman, who was the cause of the expedition, was in one of the boats, and their departure was stopped until she was landed, and given in charge of the troops. The Santa Cruz now refused to stir, but remained in their boats, which were moored to the bank. It being feared that the Indians were only delaying for reinforcements, thinking to overpower the British in the darkness, Captain White sent Lieutenant Wilton with ten men to give them a peremptory order to push off within a quarter of an hour. The Indians received the message with laughter, asking, "What will you do, if we do not go?" It was now rapidly becoming dark, and the country, wild and savage in itself, was entirely strange to both officers and men. After ten minutes had elapsed, without the Indians giving any sign of departure, Captain White had the "close" sounded, drew in his sentries, and descended towards the boats with fixed bayonets. Upon this the Indians pushed off, and were soon lost to sight in the darkness. The detachment remained under arms all night at San Antonio, and next morning, it having been ascertained that the Indians had retired across the frontier, the troops returned to Orange Walk. The following letter was forwarded upon this subject: "HORSE GUARDS, WAR OFFICE, "_17th March, 1874._ "SIR, "The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief has perused the report which you forwarded to the Adjutant-General on the 29th of January, of the proceedings of the troops at Orange Walk, in British Honduras, who were called out in aid of the civil power against a band of Santa Cruz Indians in January last, and I am to request that you will cause Captain White, 1st West India Regiment, by whom they were commanded, to be informed that His Royal Highness considers that the discretion and firmness displayed by him in the performance of this difficult duty is very commendable to that officer. "I have, etc., (Signed) "R.B. HAWLEY, "Asst. Mil. Sec." In July, 1874, the head-quarters of the regiment were moved from the Gold Coast to Sierra Leone, one company being left in garrison at Cape Coast Castle, and one at Elmina. As in June the two companies stationed in Honduras had, with the one left in Jamaica, been removed to Demerara, the distribution of the regiment in July, 1874, was: Head-quarters and four companies (A, B, C, and H) at Sierra Leone, two (E and G) on the Gold Coast, and three (D, F, and I) in Demerara. In July, 1875, disturbances once more broke out in British Sherbro. The inhabitants of the town of Mongray, on the river of the same name, in that month made a raid upon Mamaiah, a town on the British frontier, plundered several factories there, and carried off thirty-three British subjects as slaves. Fresh outrages were committed later on, and, on the 8th of October, 1875, Lieutenant-Governor Rowe, C.M.G., with forty men of the 1st West India Regiment, under Sub-Lieutenant G.V. Harrison, and sixty armed police, left Sierra Leone in the colonial steamer _Lady of the Lake_. The detachment was landed at Bendoo in Sherbro next day. Negotiations were at once opened with the Mongray chiefs, resulting in the surrender of the captives on the 15th, and on the 25th the party returned to Sierra Leone. Almost immediately after, fresh disturbances broke out in another portion of Sherbro, on the Bargroo River, and, on the 15th of November, Lieutenant-Governor Rowe left Freetown in the colonial steamer _Sir A. Kennedy_, with Captain A.C. Allinson, Lieutenants J.H. Jones, and A.S. Roberts, and ninety men of the 1st West India Regiment, fifty armed police, a 4-2/5-inch howitzer, and a rocket-trough. The disturbance arose from a raid of Mendis upon villages in British territory, thirteen of which they plundered and destroyed, afterwards erecting a "war-fence" at a place called Paytaycoomar, in British Sherbro. Here the Commandant of Sherbro, Mr. Darnell Davis, attacked them with a few policemen, and was repulsed with a loss of three killed and several wounded, himself severely. The expedition, on arriving at Sherbro, established a camp at Tyama Woroo in Bargroo, and all preparations for an advance being completed by the 27th of November, the troops marched on that day, occupying Mosangrah on the 30th. On the 3rd of December, Lowarnar, a town to the eastward, was entered, and on the 5th a move was made on the stockaded town of Gundomar, which was abandoned by the enemy on the approach of the force. The dead body of one of the captives taken from British Sherbro, recently strangled, was found in the stockade, and the town was accordingly burned. On the 6th the force advanced on Moyamba, which was also found to be evacuated by the enemy, and was burned. On the 9th the troops left Moyamba and marched to Yahwi-yamah, which was also destroyed, with the outlying stockaded villages of Mocorreh, Bettimah and Mangaymihoon. On the 10th Modena was destroyed, and the force marched through Mowato and Geeavar to Sennehoo, arriving there on the 16th. To this latter town several of the chiefs came in to treat, bringing 212 of the captives with them, and on the 18th a treaty of peace was arranged, the Mendis promising to pay a fine of 10,000 bushels of rice. The troops returned to Sierra Leone on the 24th of December. The country through which the detachment of the 1st West India Regiment had marched was most difficult. It consisted of dense forest, through which the only advance could be made along narrow paths, wide enough only for the passage of men in single file, and obstructed by fallen trees, swamps, and unbridged streams. Numerous swamps, black and full of malaria, had to be crossed, and, though the noon-day sun was excessively hot, the nights, owing to excessive damp, were very cold. Heavy showers of rain fell almost daily, and from sunset till an hour after sunrise the whole country was buried in an impenetrable fog. The stockades were of the same character as those found at Mongray, but were here in some instances further fortified by mud walls, fifteen feet high, and about twelve feet thick at the base. Inside the walls were ditches about six feet wide and eight feet deep. In some of the towns, machicoulis galleries had been constructed over the gates, and the entrances further protected by semicircular mud bastions. In March, 1877, the 1st West India Regiment was relieved on the West Coast of Africa by the 2nd West India Regiment, E and G Companies embarking in H.M.S. _Simoom_, at Cape Coast Castle, on the 24th of February, and the head-quarters, with A, B, C, and H Companies, at Sierra Leone on the 3rd of March. On arriving at the West Indies the regiment was thus distributed: Head-quarters, with A, D, E, and I Companies, at Jamaica, C and F at Honduras, G and H at Barbados, and B at Nassau. During its three years' tour of West African service the regiment had suffered very heavy loss amongst the officers. In addition to the eight deaths that occurred in 1874, directly after the Ashanti war, Captain W. Cole died in Ireland of fever contracted on the Gold Coast; Lieutenant-Colonel Strachan and Sub-Lieutenant Turner in England; and Sub-Lieutenants S.B. Orr and G.V. Harrison at Sierra Leone in 1876. The regiment remained without change in the West Indies until December, 1879, when the head-quarters and six companies embarked in H.M.S. _Tamar_ for West Africa, leaving D, E, and I Companies at the depôt at Demerara. The head-quarters and four companies disembarked at Sierra Leone on the 17th of January, 1880, and the two remaining companies proceeded to Cape Coast Castle. In February, 1880, there being some slight disturbance in the neighbourhood of the Ribbie River, a small party of the 1st West India Regiment proceeded thither as an escort to the Governor, with Lieutenants Madden and Tipping. The whole returned to Sierra Leone without any casualty, after an absence of a few weeks. On the 28th of January, 1881, news was received at Sierra Leone that the Ashanti king, Mensah, had threatened an invasion of the Gold Coast Colony, and a reinforcement was urgently demanded. In consequence, Captain H.W. Pollard, 1st West India Regiment, commanding the troops on the West Coast of Africa, despatched to Cape Coast Castle next day in the mail steamer _Cameroon_ letter B Company, under Captain Ellis, and letter H Company, under Lieutenant Garland. These two companies arrived at their destination on the 2nd of February, and on the 9th the former proceeded to Anamaboe. This rapid arrival of reinforcements induced the king to repudiate the action of his envoys, but affairs were still in a very critical situation, and much alarm prevailed in the colony. Early in March, Lieutenant-Colonels Niven and Smith and Major White arrived from England, bringing with them letter A Company from Sierra Leone. On the 18th of March, five companies of the 2nd West India Regiment arrived in the hired transport _Humber_. Negotiations were protracted till April, when an embassy arrived from Coomassie, and the difficulty was finally settled. On the 2nd of May, the head-quarters, with A, F, and G Companies, returned to Sierra Leone, leaving B, C, and H at Cape Coast Castle and Anamaboe. In February, 1882, C Company also proceeded to Sierra Leone. It was intended at the termination of the African tour of the regiment, in January, 1883, to reduce the garrisons in West Africa from six to three companies, and the steamship _Bolivar_ was chartered to carry out the relief in two trips. That vessel, however, was wrecked off the Cobbler's Reef, at Barbados, and H.M.S. _Tyne_ was sent in her place. The latter embarked H Company at Cape Coast Castle on the 6th of February, 1883, and F and G Companies at Sierra Leone on the 14th, all three proceeding to Jamaica under the command of Major C.J.L. Hill. On the return of the _Tyne_ to West Africa with three companies of the 2nd West India Regiment, the head-quarters and remaining three companies of the 1st West India Regiment, at Cape Coast Castle and Sierra Leone, were embarked on the 1st and 11th of April respectively, and sailed for Jamaica under the command of Captain Ellis, arriving at their destination on the 28th of April. On the 5th of May, B, G, and F Companies embarked in the _Tyne_, the first two for Honduras and the third for Nassau. On the conclusion of the inter-island trooping, the _Tyne_ proceeded with the head-quarters and three companies of the 2nd West India Regiment to West Africa, the Government having, in consequence of threatened complications with Ashanti, abandoned their scheme of reducing the African garrisons. The distribution of the 1st West India Regiment is now (May, 1883): Head-quarters and three companies (A, C, and H) at Jamaica, two (B and G) in Honduras, one (F) in Nassau, and three (D, E, and I) in Demerara. APPENDIX. SUCCESSION OF HONORARY COLONELS. Major-General John Whyte 24th April, 1795. Lord Charles Henry Somerset 5th January, 1804. Sir Peregrine Maitland, K.C.B 22nd February, 1830. Major-General the Hon. Sir Henry King, K.C.B. 19th July, 1834. Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicolay, K.C.H. 30th November, 1839. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry F. Bouverie, K.C.B., G.C.M.G 13th May, 1842. Lieutenant-General Sir G.H. Bromley Way 21st November, 1843. General Sir George Thomas Napier, K.C.B. 29th February, 1844. Lieutenant-General Sir George Bowles, K.C.B. 9th September, 1855. General Sir Arthur Borton, K.C.B 2nd May, 1876. SUCCESSION OF LIEUTENANT-COLONELS. 1. Leeds Booth 23rd May, 1795 { From Brevet-Major, { 32nd Foot. 2. George Rutherford 30th Dec., 1797 { From Major, 27th Foot, { _vice_ Booth to 87th { Regiment. 3. James Maitland 22nd April, 1803 { From 60th by purchase, { _vice_ Rutherford, who { retires. 4. Alexander Cumine 20th March, 1804 { From 75th Foot, _vice_ { Maitland, who exchanges. 5. C.D. Broughton 21st April, 1804 { By purchase, _vice_ { Cumine, who retires. 6. Samuel Huskisson 2nd June, 1807 { From Major, 8th Foot, { without purchase, on { establishment of a second { Lieutenant-Colonelcy. 7. Benjamin D'Urban 29th Sept., 1807 { From 9th Garrison { Battalion, _vice_ { Huskisson, who exchanges. 8. John Irving 9th Jan., 1808 { From 2nd West India { Regiment, _vice_ D'Urban, { who exchanges. 9. George H. Duckworth 16th Jan., 1808 { From Major, 67th { Foot, by purchase, _vice_ { Irving, who retires. 10. Henry Tolley 27th Feb., 1808 { From Major, 71st { Foot, without purchase, { _vice_ Broughton, { cashiered. 11. W.S. Wemyss 18th June, 1808 { From 48th Foot, _vice_ { Duckworth, who exchanges. 12. Joseph Morrison 2nd Dec., 1809 { From Major, 89th { Foot, with purchase { _vice_ Tolley, appointed { to 16th Foot. 13. Jonathan Yates 21st July, 1810 { From Major, 47th { Foot, by purchase, _vice_ { Wemyss, who retires. 14. Clement Whitby 16 July, 1811 { From Major, 17th { Foot, with purchase, { _vice_ Morrison, { appointed to 89th Foot. 15. J.M. Clifton 10th Sept., 1814 { Without purchase, _vice_ { Yates, appointed to { 49th Foot. (Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton retired, Jan. 23rd 1819, and the second Lieutenant-Colonelcy was abolished.) 16. James Cassidy 12th Dec., 1822 { By purchase, _vice_ { Whitby, who retires. 17. Francis Frye Brown 12th Jan., 1824 { From half-pay, 6th { West India Regiment, { _vice_ Cassidy, who { exchanges. 18. Richard Doherty 6th Dec., 1827 { From half-pay, _vice_ { Brown, who retires. 19. William Bush 4th Sept., 1835 { From half-pay, _vice_ { Doherty, appointed to { 89th Foot. 20. Henry Capadose 22nd April, 1836 { Without purchase, on { re-establishment of a { second { Lieutenant-Colonelcy. 21. Edward Rowley Hill 1st Jan., 1847 { Without purchase, _vice_ { Bush, appointed { Inspecting Field Officer { of a recruiting district. 22. Robert Hughes 14th April, 1848 { _Vice_ Capadose, { deceased. 23. Fred. Aug. Wetherall 1st May, 1855 { From Major, 3rd West { India Regiment, by { purchase, _vice_ Hughes, { who retires. 24. Luke Smyth O'Connor 21st Sept., 1855 { Without purchase, _vice_ { Hill, appointed to a { Provisional Depôt { Battalion. 25. Edward Last 24th Nov., 1857 { From Brevet { Lieutenant-Colonel, 99th { Foot, _vice_ Wetherall, { deceased. 26. Henry Dunn O'Halloran 23rd March, 1858 { From Brevet { Lieutenant-Colonel, { Depôt Battalion, _vice_ { Last, appointed to 21st { Foot. 27. Augustus William Murray 16th March, 1860{ Without purchase, _vice_ { O'Halloran, retired { upon full pay. 28. Bowland Moffatt 4th March, 1862 { From half-pay, _vice_ { O'Connor, who retires { upon half-pay. 29. James Travers 4th March, 1862 { Without purchase, _vice_ { Murray, who retires { upon half-pay on being { appointed { Deputy-Adjutant-General, { Windward and Leeward { Islands. 30. James Shortall Macauley 29th July, 1862 { Without purchase, _vice_ { Travers, retired on full { pay. 31. William M'Bean 18th Dec., 1866 { By purchase, _vice_ { Moffatt, who retires. 32. G. Nigel K.A. Yonge 3rd April, 1867 { From half-pay, late { 67th Foot, _vice_ { Macauley, who retires on { half-pay. 33. Henry Anton 8th June, 1867 { Without purchase, _vice_ { M'Bean, who retires. 34. James Maxwell 17th Aug., 1870 { From half-pay, late { 34th Foot, _vice_ Yonge, { who retires on half-pay. 35. J.M. M'Auley 4th Oct., 1871 _Vice_ Anton, deceased. 36. W.W.W. Johnston 24th Dec., 1873 { _Vice_ M'Auley, who { retires. 37. W.H.P.F. Strachan 15th April, 1874 { _Vice_ Maxwell, deceased. 38. Knox Rowan Niven 24th March, 1877 { _Vice_ Strachan, { deceased. 39. Joseph Alexander Smith 29th Jan., 1879 _Vice_ Johnston, retired. 40. F.B.P. White 4th March, 1882 _Vice_ Niven, retired. STATIONS OF THE 1ST WEST INDIA REGIMENT FROM JUNE, 1795, TO JUNE, 1883. 1795 (June). Head-quarters and 8 companies at Martinique. 1798 (December). Head-quarters and 6 companies at Morne Fortune, St. Lucia. 2 companies at Maboya, St. Lucia. 1801 (July). Head-quarters and 8 companies at Martinique. 1802 (January). Head-quarters and 6 companies at Martinique. 2 companies at St. Vincent. 1802 (July). Head-quarters and 6 companies at St. Vincent. 1 company at Martinique. 1 company at Antigua. 1802 (October). Head-quarters and 8 companies at St. Vincent. 1803 (April). Head-quarters and 6 companies at St. Vincent. 2 companies at Grenada. 1804 (May). Head-quarters and 6 companies at Dominica. 1 company at St. Vincent. 1 company at Grenada. 1807 (January). Head-quarters and 6 companies at Barbados. 3 companies at Grenada. 1 company at Tobago. 1807 (November). Head-quarters and 10 companies at Barbados. 1808 (January). Head-quarters and 6 companies at Barbados. 3 companies at Antigua. 1 company at Tobago. 1808 (October). Head-quarters and 9 companies at Barbados. 1 company at Tobago. 1809 (February). Head-quarters and 8 companies at Martinique. 2 companies at Barbados. 1809 (June). Head-quarters and 6 companies at Trinidad. 2 companies at Martinique. 2 companies at Barbados. 1809 (August). Head-quarters and 10 companies at Trinidad. 1814 (March). Head-quarters and 4 companies at Martinique. 4 companies at St. Lucia. 2 companies at Dominica. 1814 (July). Head-quarters and 8 companies at Guadaloupe. 1 company at Marie-Galante. 1 company at St. Martin's. 1814 (December). Head-quarters and 10 companies at New Orleans. 1815 (February). Head-quarters and 10 companies at Barbados. 1815 (August). Head-quarters and 6 companies at Barbados. 4 companies at Guadaloupe. 1815 (December). Bermuda. 1816 (March). Head-quarters and 10 companies at Barbados. 1816 (November). Head-quarters and 3 companies at Antigua. 1 company at Montserrat. 2 companies at St. Christopher's. 2 companies at St. Lucia. 2 companies at Dominica. -- 10 == 1819 (January). Head-quarters and 3 companies at Barbados. 2 companies at Antigua. 2 companies at St. Lucia. 2 companies at Dominica. 1 company at Tobago. -- 10 == 1821 (October). Head-quarters and 3 companies at Barbados. 1 company at Demerara. 1 company at Tobago. 1 company at St. Lucia. 1 company at Dominica. 1 company at Antigua. -- 8 == 1823 (May). Head-quarters and 4 companies at Barbados. 1 company at Demerara. 1 company at St. Lucia. 1 company at Dominica. 1 company at Antigua. -- 8 == 1823 (September). Head-quarters and 2 companies at Barbados. 3 companies at Demerara. 1 company at St. Lucia. 1 company at Dominica. 1 company at Antigua. -- 8 == 1824 (October). Head-quarters and 5 companies at Barbados. 1 company at St. Lucia. 1 company at Dominica. 1 company at Antigua. -- 8 == 1825 (February). Head-quarters and 4 companies at Trinidad. 1 company at Barbados. 1 company at St. Lucia. 1 company at Dominica. 1 company at Antigua. -- 8 == 1826 (February). Same as in 1825, with the addition of a recruiting company at Sierra Leone. 1827 (January). Head-quarters and 3 companies at Trinidad. 1 company at Barbados. 1 company at St. Lucia. 1 company at Dominica. 1 company at Antigua. 1 company at Grenada. 1 company at Sierra Leone. -- 9 == 1834 (May). Head-quarters and 2 companies at Trinidad. 1 company at Barbados. 1 company at St. Lucia. 1 company at Dominica. 1 company at Antigua. 1 company at Grenada. 1 company at Tortola. 1 company at Sierra Leone. -- 9 == 1837 (December). Head-quarters and 5 companies at St. Lucia. 1 company at Trinidad. 1 company at Tobago. 1 company at Demerara. 1 company at St. Vincent. 1 company at Sierra Leone. -- 10 == 1839 (December). Head-quarters and 2 companies at Demerara. 3 companies at Barbados. 1 company at Trinidad. 1 company at Tobago. 1 company at St. Lucia. 1 company at St. Vincent. 1 company at Grenada. 1 company at Dominica. 1 company at Antigua. 1 company at Sierra Leone. -- 13 == 1840 (September). Head-quarters and 2 companies at Demerara. 2 companies at Barbados. 1 company at Trinidad. 1 company at Tobago. 1 company at St. Vincent. 1 company at Grenada. 1 company at Dominica. 1 company at Sierra Leone. -- 10 == 1843 (November). Head-quarters and 5 companies at Demerara. 2 companies at Sierra Leone. 1 company at Grenada. 1 company at Tobago. 1 company at St. Vincent. -- 10 == 1844 (June). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, No. 8 and No. 5 at Demerara = 3 companies. Light and No. 1 at Jamaica = 2 No. 2 at Trinidad = 1 No. 3 at Dominica = 1 No. 4 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 6 at Grenada = 1 No. 7 at Cape Coast = 1 -- 10 == 1845 (March). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Light, No. 1 and No. 8 at Jamaica = 4 companies. No. 5 at Demerara = 1 No. 2 at Trinidad = 1 No. 3 at Dominica = 1 No. 4 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 6 at Grenada = 1 No. 7 at Cape Coast = 1 -- 10 == 1846 (June). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Light, Nos. 1, 3, 6, and 8 at Jamaica = 6 companies. No. 2 at Trinidad = 1 No. 4 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 5 at Tobago = 1 No. 7 at Cape Coast = 1 -- 10 == 1847 (December). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Light, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 at Jamaica = 8 companies. No. 4 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 7 at Cape Coast = 1 -- 10 == 1848 (August). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7 at Jamaica = 5 companies. Light and No. 8 at Nassau = 2 No. 1 at Honduras = 1 No. 5 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 2 at Cape Coast = 1 -- 10 == 1849 (March). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, No. 3 and No. 6 at Jamaica = 3 companies. Light, No. 7, and No. 8 at Nassau = 3 No. 1 and No. 4 at Honduras = 2 No. 5 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 2 at Cape Coast = 1 -- 10 == 1852 (September). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, No. 3, and No. 6 at Jamaica = 3 companies. Light, No. 7, and No. 8 at Nassau = 3 No. 1 at St. Christopher's = 1 No. 4 at Barbados = 1 No. 5 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 2 at Cape Coast = 1 -- 10 == 1853 (December). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Light, No. 2, and No. 5 at Jamaica = 4 companies. No. 4 and No. 7 at Barbados = 2 No. 1 at St. Christopher's = 1 No. 8 at Dominica = 1 No. 3 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 6 at the Gambia = 1 -- 10 == 1855 (December). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Light, Nos. 2, 5, and 8 at Jamaica = 5 companies. No. 4 and No. 7 at Barbados = 2 No. 1 at Demerara = 1 No. 3 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 6 at the Gambia = 1 -- 10 == 1856 (December). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Light, and No. 8 at Jamaica = 3 companies. Nos. 4, 5, and 7 at Barbados = 3 No. 1 at Demerara = 1 No. 3 at Sierra Leone = 1 No. 2 and No. 6 at the Gambia = 2 -- 10 == 1857 (June). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Light, No. 5 and No. 8 at Nassau = 4 companies. Nos. 1, 3, and 7 at Sierra Leone = 3 Nos. 2, 4, and 6 at the Gambia = 3 -- 10 == 1861 (April). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Light, Nos. 5, 7, and 8 at Barbados = 5 companies. No. 4 and No. 6 at Demerara = 2 No. 1 and No. 2 at St. Lucia = 2 No. 3 at Trinidad = 1 -- 10 == 1862 (December). (Head-quarters) Grenadier, Light, and No. 1 at Barbados = 3 companies. Nos. 5, 7, and 8 at Honduras = 3 No. 4 and No. 6 at Demerara = 2 No. 2 at St. Lucia = 1 No. 3 at Trinidad = 1 -- 10 == 1863 (July). (Head-quarters) A at Barbados = 1 company. B at St. Lucia = 1 C at Trinidad = 1 D and F at Demerara = 2 companies. E, G, and H at Honduras = 3 -- 8 == 1863 (November). (Head-quarters) A, B, D, and F at Nassau = 4 companies. E, G, and H at Honduras = 3 C at Trinidad = 1 -- 8 == 1864 (April). (Head-quarters) A, D, and F at Nassau = 3 companies. B, E, and G on the Gold Coast = 3 C at Trinidad = 1 H in Honduras = 1 -- 8 == 1864 (October). (Head-quarters) A, D, and F at Nassau = 3 companies. B, C, E, G, and H in Jamaica = 5 -- 8 == 1865 (November). (Head-quarters) A at Nassau = 1 company. B, C, D, E, F, G, and H in Jamaica = 7 companies. -- 8 == 1866 (August). (Head-quarters) A, D, and F at Nassau = 3 companies. B, C, E, G, and H in Jamaica = 5 -- 8 == 1867 (January). (Head-quarters) A, B, E, F, D, and G at Sierra Leone = 6 companies. H and C at the Gambia = 2 -- 8 == 1868 (August). (Head-quarters) A, B, D, F, and G at Sierra Leone = 5 companies. C and H at the Gambia = 2 E at Cape Coast = 1 -- 8 == 1870 (November). (Head-quarters) A, B, D, E, and G in Jamaica = 5 companies. C and H at Nassau = 2 F and I in Honduras = 2 -- 9 == 1874 (January). (Head-quarters) A, B, C, E, G, and H on the Gold Coast = 6 companies. F and I in Honduras = 2 D in Jamaica = 1 -- 9 == 1874 (July). (Head-quarters) A, B, C, and H at Sierra Leone = 4 companies. E and G at Cape Coast = 2 D, F, and I at Demerara = 3 -- 9 == 1877 (April). (Head-quarters) A, D, E, and I at Jamaica = 4 companies. C and F in Honduras = 2 G and H in Barbados = 2 B at Nassau = 1 -- 9 == 1880 (February). (Head-quarters) A, B, H, and F at Sierra Leone = 4 companies. C and G at Cape Coast = 2 D, E, and I in Demerara = 3 -- 9 == 1881 (March). (Head-quarters) A, C, G, and H at Cape Coast = 4 companies. B at Anamaboe = 1 F at Sierra Leone = 1 D, E, and I in Demerara = 3 -- 9 == 1881 (June). (Head-quarters) A, F, and G at Sierra Leone = 3 companies. B, C, and H at Cape Coast = 3 D, E, and I in Demerara = 3 -- 9 == 1882 (March). (Head-quarters) A, C, F, and G at Sierra Leone = 4 companies. B and H at Cape Coast = 2 D, E, and I in Demerara = 3 -- 9 == 1883 (March). (Head-quarters) A and C at Sierra Leone = 2 companies. B at Cape Coast = 1 company. F, G, and H in Jamaica = 3 companies. D, E, and I in Demerara = 3 -- 9 == 1883 (June). (Head-quarters) A, C, and H in Jamaica = 3 companies. B and G in Honduras = 2 D, E, and I in Demerara = 3 F at Nassau = 1 -- 9 == INDEX TO THE NAMES OF OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, AND PRIVATES OF THE FIRST WEST INDIA REGIMENT, MENTIONED IN THE FOREGOING PAGES. A Abercrombie, J., 79, 82 Allinson, A.C., 279, 290, 318, 337 Alt, _Ensign_, 279 Anderson, _Capt._, 52 ----, _Ensign_, 234, 237 Anton, H., 275, 278, 282, 284, 289, 298, 299, 346 Archdale, _Lieut._, 210 Atkins, R.W., 80 B Bale, J.E., 293, 316, 318 Balmer, J., 50 Barlow, E.H., 279 Barne, W.C., 318 Beale-Browne, G.E., 318 Belizario, E. _Sergt._, 307, 308, 312, 313, 315 Bell, _Ensign_, 51 ----, T., 318 Bentley, _Lieut._, 197 Bidwell, _Pte._, 309 Bingham, E.H., 210, 213, 217 Bishop, _Surg._, 80 Blackwell, N., 119, 120, 121, 123, 124 Bolton, H.F.S., 299, 300 Booth, Leeds, 79, 83, 99, 343 Borton, _Sir_ A., 343 Bourke, J., 263 Bouverie, _Sir_ H.F., 343 Bowles, _Sir_ G., 343 Bravo, A., 278, 279, 284 Brennan, _Ensign_, 173, 178 Brew, R., 275 Brocklass, H., 183 Broome, W.A., 301 Broughton, C.D., 107, 113, 344 Brown, F.F., 345 ----, R., 99 Bulger, C.O., 312 Burdett, G.S., 169 Burke, L., 318, 332 Bush, _Lieut._, 211 ----, W., 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 202, 203, 207, 345 Butler, D., 79, 82 ----, F. le B., 303, 318, 320, 321, 322, 332 Byrne, T., 80, 99 C Calder, J., 79 Campbell, N., 100 ----, W., 32 Cantrell, D. _Sergt. Major_, 197 Capadose, H., 176, 177, 209, 345 Carden, J., 50 Cassidy, J., 80, 99, 124, 137, 139, 158, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167, 345 Cave, _Ensign_, 226 Chads, _Major_, 173, 200 Chadwick, B., 79, 82 Chamberlayne, W.J., 258, 259 Clarke, _Bt. Lieut.-Col._, 258 Clerk, A., 50 Clifton, J.M., 344 Clough, H.T., 318, 332 Coffin, E. _Pte._, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Coghlan, A., 80, 89 Cole, W., 293, 318, 340 Collins, F., 148 ----, J.P., 50 Connell, F.J., 237 Connor, W., 80, 81, 99 Costello, F., 79, 99 Cotter, E., 79, 83, 99 Craddock, H., 50 Craven, _Corporal_, 199 Crump, _Corporal_, 80 Cullen, _Ensign_, 290, 296 Cumine, A., 343 Cunninghame, T., 79 D Dalomel, _Lieut._, 148, 157 Dalton, _Lieut._, 80, 100 Darley, C.B., 80, 100 Deane, T., 79 De Winton, _Lieut._, 210 Dixon, C. _Pte._, 195, 202 Doherty, R., 345 Downie, H., 138 Duckworth, G.H., 344 D'Urban, B., 344 Duyer, G.H., 275 E Edmunds, T., 275 Edwardes, C.G.W.E., 318 Egan, J., 80, 99 Elderton, W.S., 318, 332 Ellis, A.B., 318, 341, 342 Evans, _Capt._, 179 F Fanning, J., 275 Farquhar, _Ensign_, 51 Fitzgerald, C.L., 261 Fletcher, R. D'O., 237, 239, 240, 242, 244, 246, 263 Fraser, J.A., 275 French, _Capt._, 210 Froggart, _Lieut._, 80, 99 G Gardner, D., 316 Garland, V.J., 341 Garsia, M.C., 274, 275 Gavin, _Lieut._, 279, 303 Gillard, _Bt. Major_, 177 Gillespie, R., 79 Goodinge, H., 80 Graham, W., 80, 99 Grange, _Capt._, 224 H Harris, W.W., 233 Harrison, G.V., 337, 340 Harward, _Sub. Lieut._, 318 Hemsworth, G., 177 Henderson, _Lieut._, 250 Henry, _Capt._, 37 Hill, C.J.L., 293, 301, 318, 324, 342 ----, E.R., 345 Hoffer, _Pte._, 314, 315 Holbrook, T., 83, 100 Horsford, T., 100 Hughes, E., 318, 324, 326 ----, R. _Lieut.-Col._, 187, 345 ----, R., 223, 258, 259 Huntingford, E.W., 332 Huskisson, S., 118, 344 I Innes, _Colonel_, 37, 39 Irving, J., 344 Isles, E. Ellis, 148, 157 J Johnston, W.W.W., 302, 312, 318, 328, 346 Jones, J.H., 337 ----, _Lieut._, 224 K Kenrick, _Lieut._, 276 Kent, J., 51 King, _Sir_ H., 343 L Lafontaine, J. _Corporal_, 84 Last, E., 345 Leggatt, _Lieut._, 276 Lightfoot, _Lieut._, 80, 99 Lindsay, J., 100 Lowe, W., 50 Lowry, A.G., 279, 293 Luke, E.F., 250, 260, 289, 292 Lynch, _Lieut._, 173 ----, R. _Pte._, 308 M Macauley, _Capt._, 258 ----, J.S., 277, 346 McAuley, J.M., 302, 346 McBean, W., 293, 346 M'Callum, _Ensign_, 80, 99 M'Connell, D., 50 McDonald, A., 148, 157 Macdonald, E.G., 301 M'Grace, D., 80, 100 M'Kay, J.C., 99 Mackay, _Lieut._, 261 McKenzie, _Lieut._, 148, 157 Mackrill, _Capt._, 52 McLean, _Lieut._, 80, 99 McShee, _Lieut._, 80, 99 McWilliam, D., 100 ----, _Lieut._, 80, 100 Madden, G.C., 340 Magee, _Lieut._, 148, 151 Maitland, J., 99, 343 ----, Sir P., 343 Malcolm, R., 63, 64, 66, 79, 90 Marraud, C., 100 Marshall, R., 50 Mason, _Sergt.-Major_, 263 Maturin, _Lieut._, 303 Mawe, T.G., 261 Maxwell, H., 79 ----, J., 318, 320, 329, 332, 346 ----, _Pte._, 314, 315 Meehan, _Capt._, 220 Meighan, B., 51 Merry, _Sergt._, 198, 207 Miles, _Ensign_, 174 Millar, _Capt._, 52 Miller, C., 99 ----, _Lieut._, 148, 157 Moffatt, B., 346 Moffitt, J., 275 Molony, C.A., 318 Montagu, C., 50 ----, G.C., 50 Montgomery, W., 179, 186, 187 Morgan, _Lieut._, 148, 157 Morris, W. or R.A. _Pte._, 314, 315 Morrison, John, 80 ----, Joseph, 344 Murray, A.W., 228, 229, 232, 261, 266, 267, 271, 272, 273, 275, 346 ----, _Pte._, 314, 315 Myers, _Capt._, 178 N Napier, _Sir_ G. T, 343 Nicholson, T., 275 Nicolay, _Sir_ W., 343 Niven, K.R., 293, 301, 318, 322, 329, 341, 346 Nixon, L., 124 Nunn, A.A., 99, 106, 109, 110, 111, 115 O O'Connell, _Capt._ 105, 106, 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116 O'Connor, L.S., 211, 219, 220, 226, 227, 228, 230, 232, 249, 250, 251, 256, 288, 289, 290, 294, 345 Odonnell, _Lieut._, 50 Ogston, M. _Pte._, 195 et seq. O'Halloran, H.D., 345 Oliphant, W., 50 O'Meara, M., 100 Ormsby, W., 261, 293, 297 Orr, S.B., 340 Osborne, S. _Pte._, 314, 315 Owens, _Capt._, 276 P Page, T., 80 Palmer, R., 50 Petrie, J., 50 Pilkington, _Lieut._, 148, 157 Plague, _Corporal_, 198, 207 Pogson, _Ensign_, 199 Pollard, H.W., 340 Powell, _Capt._, 221 ----, W., 79, 81, 99 Pratt, _Bt. Major_, 261, 262, 276 Prendergast, _Capt._, 225 Pye, A.H., 79 R Rainford, M., 50 Reed, J., 80, 99 Reid, J., 79 ----, W., 80, 99 Roberts, A.S., 337 ----, C.T., 80 ----, J.C., 99 ----, _Lieut._, 279 Robeson, _Capt._, 212 Roper, J., 321, 332 Ross, W.J., 289 Rudgley, H., 50 Russell, _Ensign_, 178 Rutherford, G., 343 S Samson, A.M.W., 303, 318 Satchell, W. _Pte._, 202, 203, 204 Scott, D., 83 Shearman, F., 318, 321, 322 Smith, E., 276 ----, Hopewell, 279, 281 ----, J.A., 279, 303, 318, 322, 323, 331, 341, 346 ----, J.G., 304, 306, 307, 308, 309, 311, 313, 315 ----, _Lieut._, 50 ----, _Ensign_, 51 Smithwick, W. FitzW., 279, 293, 297 Somerset, _Lord_ C.H., 343 Speed, W.J., 99 Spencer, _Lce. Corpl._, 313, 315 Spitta, H.H., 318, 323 Splain, W., 51 Steward, C.B., 318, 322, 324, 326 Stewart, _Capt._, 171, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179 ----, _Ensign_, 211 ----, J., 79, 99 Stirling, _Lce. Corpl._, 314, 315 Strachan, W.H.P.F., 234, 237, 240, 246, 290, 318, 340, 346 Strong, _Lieut._, 173, 177 Sutherland, J., 79, 82 T Tell, W. _Pte._, 315 Temple, A., 261, 275 Thomas, _Ensign_, 51 Tinkler, J., 318 Tipping, C.W.G., 340 Tolley, H., 131, 344 Torrens, _Pte._, 202, 203 Travers, J., 346 Tunstall, _Lieut._, 224 Turner, J.M.S., 340 U Upton, _Lieut._, 228 W Way, _Sir_ G.H.B., 343 Wemyss, W.S., 344 Weston, R., 148, 151 Wetherall, F.A., 259 Whitby, C., 141, 168, 344 White, F.B.P., 312, 333, 334, 335, 336, 341, 346 Whyte, J., 77, 99, 343 Wieburg, _Lieut._, 210 Williams, T., 332 Wilson, R., 79 Wilton, J.R.H., 333, 335 Winkler, J., 116, 124, 126, 139, 158, 160, 164 Wylie, _Lieut._, 240, 246, 247 Y Yates, J., 344 Yonge, G.N.K.A., 299, 346 THE END. CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS. 
39893	----	[Illustration: _Photo by Marceau_] DEFENSELESS AMERICA BY HUDSON MAXIM [Illustration] "_The quick-firing gun is the greatest life-saving instrument ever invented._" Page 83. HEARST'S INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY CO. NEW YORK Copyright, 1915, by HEARST'S INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY CO., INC. _All rights reserved, including that of translation into the foreign languages, including the Scandinavian_ FOREWORD * * * * * THIS BOOK IS PRESENTED WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE AUTHOR To a Few Selected Leaders of American Thought and Shapers of Public Opinion * * * * * DEAR READER: I send you this book in the hope that if not already convinced, you will be convinced by it of the defenseless state of this country--convinced that our danger is as great as our weakness. I hope that you may be moved to use your influence that this country may, by adequate preparation against war, safeguard the property, honor and lives of its people and the sanctity of the American home from violation by a foreign foe. If you are already convinced of our great need then the reading of this book may still strengthen your conviction and stimulate your efforts in the cause of national defense. After you have read the book, kindly lend it to your friends, that they also may read it. Defenseless America was published a year ago at two dollars per copy. Several editions of the book have already been printed and sold. Soon after the publication of the work I presented ten thousand copies, with my compliments, to students graduating in American universities. This has given many persons the impression that Defenseless America is a book for free distribution. To correct such an impression, let me say most emphatically that this book is not free, except to a few persons whom I have selected, and to whom I have sent it free at my own personal expense, for the good of the cause of national defense. The book has exerted so marked an influence in rousing the people of this country to their needs for defense against the red hell of war, that the publishers, through patriotic duty, have placed the good it is doing above all considerations of profit to themselves, and have supplied me copies of this edition of the work absolutely at cost. The publishers have also put an edition of the book on sale, of which this copy is a specimen, at only fifty cents a copy. In order to enable them to do this, I have cut out all royalties on sales which they may make. This edition of the book may be bought of or ordered through any book store at fifty cents a copy, or from the publishers, Hearst's International Library Company, 119 West 40th Street, New York, N. Y., who will send single copies of the book to any address on receipt of sixty cents, or they will send ten copies of the book, in a single package, to any address on receipt of five dollars--fifty cents a copy. Copies of the regular library edition, printed on superior paper and bound in extra cloth, gold stamping, may be obtained from booksellers or direct from the publishers at two dollars a copy. Many of the readers of this book have already seen that wonderful motion picture play, "The Battle Cry of Peace," founded upon it. Commodore J. Stuart Blackton, President of the Vitagraph Company of America, who wrote the scenario of "The Battle Cry of Peace", has this to say about Defenseless America:-- "To the fearless patriotism of Hudson Maxim and the plain, practical, straightforward truths in his book, 'Defenseless America,' I owe the inspiration and impetus which caused me to conceive and write the scenario of 'The Battle Cry of Peace.' "The object of both book and picture is to arouse in the heart of every American citizen a sense of his strict accountability to his government in time of need, and to bring to the notice of the greatest number of people in the shortest possible time the fact that there is a way to insure that peace for which we all so earnestly pray." Commodore Blackton, being a staunch patriot and a man with phenomenal vision and breadth of understanding, and being one of the largest producers of motion pictures in the world, saw at once, as soon as he read Defenseless America, that the best way to impress the American people with the message of the book, as he had himself been impressed by reading it, was to visualize that message in a great motion picture. Then the people would be able to see, with their own eyes, those terrible things happening in our country and in our very homes, which are happening abroad and which are surely going to happen to us if we do not prepare, and immediately and adequately prepare to save the country. Faithfully yours, HUDSON MAXIM. MAXIM PARK, LANDING P.O., NEW JERSEY, 1916 PREFACE The main object of this book is to present a phalanx of facts upon the subject of the defenseless condition of this country, and to show what must be done, and done quickly, in order to avert the most dire calamity that can fall upon a people--that of merciless invasion by a foreign foe, with the horrors of which no pestilence can be compared. We should bring a lesser calamity upon ourselves by abolishing our quarantine system against the importation of deadly disease and inviting a visitation like the great London Plague, or by letting in the Black Death to sweep our country as it swept Europe in the Middle Ages, than by neglecting our quarantine against war, as we are neglecting it, thereby inviting the pestilence of invasion. Self-preservation is the first law of Nature, and this law applies to nations exactly as it applies to individuals. Our American Republic cannot survive unless it obeys the law of survival, which all individuals must obey, which all nations must obey, and which all other nations are obeying. No individual, and no nation, has ever disobeyed that law for long and lived; and it is too big a task for the United States of America. It is the aim of this work to discover truth to the reader, unvarnished and unembellished, and, at the same time, as far as possible, to avoid personalities. Wherever practicable, philosophic generalizations have been tied down to actualities, based upon experiential knowledge and innate common-sense of the eternal fitness of things. The strong appeal of Lord Roberts for the British nation to prepare for the Armageddon that is now on, which he knew was coming, did not awaken England, but served rather to rouse Germany. Admiral Mahan pleaded long with his country for an adequate navy. All the Great Powers of the world except America were stimulated by his logic to strengthen their navies. The beautiful, imaginative, logical language of General Homer Lea, on America's military weakness, in his "Valor of Ignorance" and "The Day of the Saxon," has caused many a gun to be made, many a battalion of troops to be enlisted, and many a warship to be built--in foreign countries. The eloquent words of wisdom of Lord Roberts, Admiral Mahan, Homer Lea, and all real friends of peace and advocates of the only way of maintaining peace--by being prepared against war--have fallen on a deaf America. I am well aware of the fact that nothing I can say will rouse the people of my country to the reality and magnitude of their danger, and to a true appreciation of the imperative necessity for immediate preparation against war. Possibly this book may lessen a little the effect of the pernicious propagandism of the pacifists--may somewhat help Congressional appropriations for defense--may place a few more men and a few more guns on the firing-line, and thereby save the lives of a few of our people--may save a few homes from the torch--may lessen the area of devastation--may, by adding a little power to our resistance, help to get slightly better terms from the conquerors for our liberation. Pacifism has ringed the nose of the American people and is leading them, blind and unknowing, to the slaughter. War is inevitable. It matters not that, if this country could be roused, it might be saved. When it is impossible to vitalize the impulse necessary to the accomplishment of a thing, that thing is impossible. So, I say, war is inevitable and imminent. The American people could not now be roused sufficiently to avert the impending calamity even by a call that would rift the sky and shake down the stars from heaven! Fate has decreed that our pride shall be humbled, and that we shall be bowed to the dirt. We must first put on sackcloth, ashed in the embers of our burning homes. Perhaps, when we build anew on the fire-blackened desolation, our mood may be receptive of the knowledge that we must shield our homes with blood and brawn and iron. HUDSON MAXIM. Maxim Park, Landing P.O., New Jersey. March, 1915. CONTENTS PREFACE v OUR GREAT OBSESSION xiii I DANGEROUS PREACHMENTS 1 II CAN LAW BE SUBSTITUTED FOR WAR? 22 III OUR INCONSISTENT MONROE DOCTRINE 56 IV MODERN METHODS AND MACHINERY OF WAR 68 V THE NEEDS OF OUR ARMY (With Letter from General Leonard Wood) 113 VI THE NEEDS OF OUR NAVY 141 VII LANGUAGE OF THE BIG GUNS 181 VIII AËRIAL WARFARE 203 IX OUR ARMAMENTS NOT A BURDEN 222 X EGO-FANATIC GOOD INTENTIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO NATIONAL DEFENSE 235 XI A DANGEROUS CRIMINAL CLASS? 247 XII THE GOOD AND EVIL OF PEACE AND OF WAR 265 WHAT SHALL THE END BE? 306 INDEX 309 ILLUSTRATIONS The Vast Territory that Our Inflated Monroe Doctrine Obligates Us to Defend 60 The Heart of America 76 Relative Numerical Strength of Field Artillery 104 Portrait of General Leonard Wood, U. S. A. 114 Number of Officers and Enlisted Men of U. S. Regular Army 118 Strength of Regular Armies on Peace Footing 124 Portrait of Admiral Austin M. Knight, U. S. N. 150 Strategic Spheres of Vital Importance in the Pacific 160 Battleship Strength of the Nations 168 How New York Could Be Bombarded from a Position off Rockaway Beach Beyond the Range of Our Forts 188 Opposing Fleets in Action _between_ 197 and 198 Some Annual United States Expenditures 226 Enormous Resources of the Warring Nations 232 Casualties of Peace and War Compared 296 INTRODUCTION OUR GREAT OBSESSION Success in every human pursuit depends upon ability to discern the truth and to utilize it. Facts, though they may be stern, are our best friends, and we should always welcome them with an open mind. Napoleon said that with good news there is never any hurry, but with bad news not a moment is to be lost. Consequently, those who discover to us certain facts of serious concern are our friends, even though it may be bad news. It is every man's duty, not only to himself, but also to those dear to him, to know the truth about anything which may menace his and their welfare, in order that he and they may become awakened to the danger and prepare for it accordingly. Those who deceive us by warning us of danger when there is no danger may not do us any harm; in fact, they may even do us good by cultivating our alertness and awareness. The hare may jump at a thousand false alarms to every one of actual danger; but it is the false alarms that have given him the alertness to save himself when real danger comes. On the other hand, those who convince us that there is no danger when there is great danger are the worst of enemies; they expose us, naked of defense, to the armed and armored enemy. Among the great deceivers with whom the human race has to contend is the confidence man, for he plays upon the fears, vanity, and credulity of his victim with the skill of a Kubelik upon the violin. He enlists his victim with him, and they work together to the same end. No man is greatly deceived by another except through his own co-operation. Every one has his pet egoistic illusion always under the spotlight of self-view; to him, his own importance is a veritable obsession. A nation is only a compound of individuals, and what is true of an individual also holds true of any aggregation of individuals. We, the people of the United States of America, are at this moment, and have been for many years, afflicted with a dominating egoistic obsession concerning our greatness, our importance, and our power, while we correspondingly underrate the greatness, the importance, and the power of other nations and races. Our accomplishments have indeed been marvelous, and we have not neglected to award them all the marveling that is their due. There is no denying the fact that in many competitive pursuits requiring intellectual acuteness for the greatening of material welfare we have outstripped the rest of the world. But the rest of the world has been busy, too, and though we may possibly deserve more credit for our accomplishments in the aggregate than any other people, still, others have far outdone us in many important respects. Our hitherto isolated and unassailable geographical position has enabled us to utilize our unequaled resources to become the greatest industrial and the wealthiest people in the world. We have not been obliged to concern ourselves very much thus far with measures for national security, and having at home all the land we needed, we have acquired the habit of looking upon national armaments in the light of frills, which we must maintain merely for national respectability. Many of us look upon our Navy as dress-parade paraphernalia, to be worn on gala occasions. Our response to the advocacy of a sufficient navy, of coast fortifications, and of a standing army adequate to our needs, has been that we have no use for either army or navy, and that coast fortifications would be a useless expense. Our enormous wealth and inexhaustible resources have been and still are pointed out as reasons why we require no armaments, although, as a matter of fact, they are the strongest possible reasons for armaments of a magnitude proportionate to that wealth and those resources. In America, we pride ourselves upon our so-called free institutions, blindly believing that they are free, and that, therefore, every man being an aristocrat, we, by consequence, have no aristocracy, entirely oblivious to the fact that we have merely substituted the esteem of wealth, and the power and the privilege which it represents, for the esteem of family worth and family name, and the power and the privilege which they represent. Isolation and wealth beget vanity and arrogance; and vanity, resting upon the laurels of past accomplishments, rapidly fosters decadence and weakness; so that the very pride of strength and virility begets weakness and effeminacy. It has been said that usually there are but three generations between shirt-sleeves and shirt-sleeves. The old man trades upon the name made in the days of his younger strength, and the son, seldom possessing the strength of the father, trades on the father's name, while the third generation generally gets back to shirt-sleeves again. Although this statement is not a general truth, it has truth enough to excuse it. The main reason why luxury and opulence lead to degeneracy, weakness, and effeminacy, is that those who live on Easy Street, being relieved of the intense strife necessary to gain a livelihood and to climb to positions of opulence and power, suffer from weakness and decay, and finally find their way down to shirt-sleeves, at the foot of the economic and social ladder, either to be submerged in hoboism, or to make the climb of old progenitors over again. What is true of individuals and families in this respect holds true also of nations, only it takes a little longer time, starting from shirt-sleeves, to get back to shirt-sleeves again. We Americans were taught by the promoters of the American Revolution--in short, by the fathers of our country--that all men are created equal in respect to privilege, and that no class distinction and no class privilege were worthy of honor unless earned. By consequence, the symbol and the badge of our class distinction became the dollar. Taught to despise aristocracy, we immediately created for ourselves a new aristocracy in the shape of a plutocracy. This aristocracy of wealth was fast becoming as tyrannical and unbearable and as much a menace to the freedom of the people as the old aristocracy which it had replaced. The old aristocracy had been established by the right of the sword; the new aristocracy had been established by the purchasing power of the dollar, and the people learned that combinations of wealth were a compelling power as great as the combination of armies, and that a government dominated by the dollar might become as intolerable as any form of absolutism. Then there came another American revolution, led by the labor unions, which proved that it is only necessary for the people to organize, in order to conquer with the short-sword of the ballot as effectually as with the sword of steel. Unhappily, just as intolerance and avarice have always led conquerors to be overgrasping and tyrannical, so have intolerance and avarice made prosecutions under the Sherman Law veritable persecutions. Now that the common people have found their power, nothing under heaven can halt them, or prevent them from abusing that power, except a higher education of the common people and their leaders, compelling them to understand the great truth that the people of a nation must co-operate with a patriotism that shall emulate the spirit of the hive of bees so admirably interpreted by Maeterlinck. Nevertheless, we must remember that, while we may with advantage imitate the bee in this respect, the bee does not progress. There has been no enlightenment in bee-life for a hundred thousand years, for the very reason that the bees are dominated by that beautiful spirit of the hive. We owe our ability to progress and to become more and more highly intelligent and enlightened, to the existence of that instability and heterogeneity which stimulate and develop us by causing us to strive for stability and homogeneity. Life is a series of reactions between the individual and environing stimuli. For this reason, stern and exacting stimuli are required to develop a man to the full. In all the ages during which the race has been developing there have existed formative influences of the sternest and most exacting kind; so that, just as our ears are constituted to hear only a certain character of sounds, and sounds of a limited pitch, duration, and loudness, and are deaf to all other sounds, so are we constituted to react only to certain environing stimuli, and to react with each stimulus in a certain definite measure, and only in a certain definite measure. It is impossible for us to react supremely, or to be developed supremely, by mediocre stimuli, but we must have supreme stimuli, and in order to get those stimuli, there must be a prompting to activity that demands of a man every ounce of his strength; and everything that is dear to him must be staked to bring out and develop all the latent, larger energies that are in him. Nothing that can be said and done by all the friends of national defense will make this country take adequate measures for its defense. Nothing but a disastrous war will supply the necessary stimulus. In all the history of the world, this truth has been made manifest--that no nation can be made adequately to prepare against war, no matter what the menace may be, without either suffering actual defeat, or being so embroiled in war as to realize the necessity for preparedness. This country must first be whipped in order to prepare sufficiently to prevent being whipped. Therefore, our business at the present time is to pick our conquerors. I choose England. I would much rather see the red-coat in the streets of New York than the spiked helmet. I would much rather see the genial face of the British Tommy Atkins than the stern mystery of the Japanese face. If England does not give us a good, timely whipping, we are going to be whipped by Germany or Japan, and the humiliation will be more than is really needed to stimulate us for adequate preparation. When the present war is over, the precipitation of a war with England may not depend on what England will choose to do, but it may depend on what we shall choose to do. We have been a lamb rampant for a long time in a jungle alive with lions, and we have owed our security to the fact that the lions have been watching one another, and have not dared to avert their eyes long enough to devour us. If we did not have a grandiose sense of our importance and power, we should not need a whipping in order to prepare against war, but so long as we believe that we can beat all creation without any preparation, we are going to act just as though it were true, and England, although she may be friendly, may be forced, by our inconsiderate bluff and arrogance, to declare war on us. Much better England than any other country. England now has no territorial aspirations that would make her want to annex some of our land. She would be satisfied with a good big indemnity, which we could well afford to pay for the benefit we should gain from the war. If England will merely come over seas, and whip us, and tax us for the trouble, and thereby lead us to prepare adequately to defend ourselves against less friendly nations, she will do us the greatest possible good. We are living and working not alone for ourselves, but also for those who are our own, and for all others insomuch as their interests and their welfare are in common with our own. Our welfare is part and parcel of the aggregate welfare of all those for whom we are working, and our welfare and their welfare are not only a condition of the present, but are also a condition of the future. The welfare of our children and our children's children, and of those whose interests will be in common with theirs, is part and parcel of our own present welfare. This is the true philosophy by which we who are sane and conscientious are guided. Upon such philosophy are based all economics and all prudence. The false philosophy of the selfish and the sensual, the spendthrift and the debauchee, is the philosophy of such as they whose acts of omission and commission brought on the French Revolution, and who said, "_Après nous le déluge_"; but such should not be our philosophy. Therefore, if now there be a calamity in the making, which we are able to foresee must surely descend upon the heads of our children, even if it does not come soon enough to fall upon our own heads, it is a thing that should awaken our concern and stimulate our inquiry, and lead us to seek ways and means for averting it. It is a fact, which I absolutely know as certainly as anything can be known in human affairs, that we, and all of those who are near and dear to us, are sitting today on a powder magazine with the train lighted, and it is only a question of the slowness, or quickness, of the fuse when the time shall arrive for the explosion. The laws that govern human events are as mathematically accurate and as immutable as the laws that govern the motions of the heavenly bodies; the laws that govern human reactions--the reactions between men and men, communities and communities, nations and nations--are as immutable and are governed as exactly by the laws of cause and effect as are chemical reactions. Nothing can happen without a cause, and there can be no cause that does not make something happen. Every event is the child of its parents--cause and effect. Now let us look at the parentage of the cause and effect whose progeny are soon to bring upon us the great red peril of war, and, finding us unprepared, will treat us as Germany has treated Belgium. We are rich--our country from one end to the other possesses a vast wealth of enticements to the invasion of a foreign foe--and we are defenseless. These conditions are the parents of vast impending calamities. Europe, today, is involved in the greatest war in the history of mankind, and--in spite of all the saving grace of our so-called modern civilization, in spite of all the mercifulness of the Christian religion, in spite of all the charitable kindness of the Red Cross--the sum of brutality, savagery, and misery of this war is certainly not much less than it has been at any other time in the history of a striving world, every page of which has been written with blood. We have arrived at a time when we must decide whether or not our safety can be better secured and peace maintained with armaments or without armaments. DEFENSELESS AMERICA CHAPTER I DANGEROUS PREACHMENTS "There will be no war in the future, for it has become impossible now that it is clear that war means suicide." _I. S. Bloch, "The Future of War," 1899._ "What shall we say of the Great War of Europe ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall say that it will never come. Humanly speaking, it is impossible." _Dr. David Starr Jordan, "War and Waste," 1913._ They who are loudest in their vociferations about the calamities that the warring nations of Europe have brought upon themselves are those peace-palavering persons who have been telling us all along, during the past twenty-five years, that human nature had improved so much lately, and the spirit of international brotherhood had become so dominant, that the fighting spirit was nearly dead in the souls of men. The peace praters have assured us from time to time that the last great war of the world had been fought; they have told us that no great nations would dare to go to war any more, because war between any of the Great Powers would now mean bankruptcy and national suicide; they have assured us that all international differences would hereafter be settled by jurisprudential procedure, and that law would be substituted for war. About fifteen years ago, a M. de Bloch "proved" in his book, entitled "The Future of War. Is War Now Possible?" that war had become so deadly and destructive, and, above all, so expensive, as to be impossible. So impressed was the Czar of Russia with de Bloch's arguments that he called a conference of the nations to consider disarmament. Since that time a thousand different persons have, in a thousand different ways, "proved" to us that war on a large scale was not only impossible, but also absolutely unthinkable. Droll, isn't it, that the nations keep right on fighting? We are consoled, however, by the insistence of the peace prophets that this war is truly the last great war. We are assured that this war will be the death of militarism, and then the lamb can safely cuddle up to the lion. Consequently, we have been told that, war on a large scale being now impossible, the United States needs no army and no navy, and that it would be folly to waste the taxpayers' money on such useless things. Many believe that this country should set the other nations of the world a great moral example by pulling the teeth of our dogs of war, making them lambs, and inviting the lions to lie down with them, unheedful of the lesson of all ages that when the lion does lie down with the lamb, the lamb is always inside the lion. Furthermore, we have been assured that the mere possession of armaments leads a nation to wage war, because being able to fight makes one want to fight; and that, obviously, the best way to avoid a fight is to be unable to fight. I quote the following from Theodore Roosevelt's book, "America and the World War":-- * * * * * "_These peace people have persistently and resolutely blinked facts. One of the peace congresses sat in New York at the very time that the feeling in California about the Japanese question gravely threatened the good relations between ourselves and the great empire of Japan. The only thing which at the moment could practically be done for the cause of peace was to secure some proper solution of the question at issue between ourselves and Japan. But this represented real effort, real thought. The peace congress paid not the slightest serious attention to the matter and instead devoted itself to listening to speeches which favored the abolition of the United States navy and even in one case the prohibiting the use of tin soldiers in nurseries because of the militaristic effect on the minds of the little boys and girls who played with them!_" * * * * * When the prophet Isaiah told the Jews that there were big troubles brewing for them in the East, he spoke to unhearing ears, because unwilling ears. There were in those days, as in our day, the false prophets of peace who said that Isaiah was wrong; that there was no cause for worry about the indignation of Jehovah; that even at the worst His wrath could be appeased at any time, as necessity might arise, by a few burnt offerings and sacrificial mumblings. Their assurances were more pleasing than the warnings of Isaiah, so the Jews listened to the false prophets instead of to Isaiah, and they paid the penalty in Babylonian bondage. The Isaiahs of true prophecy have long warned the people of this country that there is big trouble brewing for us in the East and in the Far East, and that we need armaments and men trained to arms to safeguard us against that trouble. These Isaiahs have told us that we cannot safeguard ourselves by any sacrifices made upon the altar of international brotherhood, or forefend ourselves against the great red peril of war by a few mumblings written down in arbitration treaties; but that we must have guns and men behind the guns. The Isaiahs who have been telling us these things are our true peace-advocates. Those self-styled peace-men who are telling us that the best way to avoid war is to be unable to defend ourselves are not peace-men, but war-breeders. Though they emulate the dove in their cooing, they are far from being doves of peace. They ought to be styled dubs of peace. Their intentions may be good, yet they are enemies of peace, and betrayers of their country. Those who prevent the building of coast fortifications, which are our modern city gates, by advising against them, betray their country as actually as those who opened the gates of Rome to the hordes of Alaric. Those who are trying to defeat our Congressional appropriations for a larger navy, for an adequate army, and for sufficient coast fortifications, although they may mean well, are as truly enemies of their country as if they should, in war, contribute to the armament and fighting force of an enemy, for the effect in both cases is identical. Again I quote from Mr. Roosevelt: * * * * * "_We object to the actions of those who do most talking about the necessity of peace because we think they are really a menace to the just and honorable peace which alone this country will in the long run support. We object to their actions because we believe they represent a course of conduct which may at any time produce a war in which we and not they would labor and suffer._ "_In such a war the prime fact to be remembered is that the men really responsible for it would not be those who would pay the penalty. The ultra-pacifists are rarely men who go to battle. Their fault or their folly would be expiated by the blood of countless thousands of plain and decent American citizens of the stamp of those, North and South alike, who in the Civil War laid down all they had, including life itself, in battling for the right as it was given to them to see the right._" * * * * * But the false prophets of peace have assured us all along that there is no danger whatever of war between the United States and any other country. They tell us further that our armaments are a menace to other nations; that they evidence suspicion of other nations, and thereby place us under suspicion. According to such philosophy, the college man who becomes an athlete is a trouble-breeder, for the reason that the mere possession of muscle makes him a menace to other men. Now, if we are in any danger of war, we ought to do the right thing to secure the safety of our country, of our homes and our families, and all things that are dear to us. If it be true that the possession of armaments is an inducement for those who have them to use them, and if it be true that armaments fret the fighting spirit of other nations as a red rag frets a bull, and thereby lead to war, then, surely, we do not need more armaments, but less. Instead of arming ourselves any more, we should disarm until we are defenseless enough to be perfectly safe. On the other hand, if there be any likelihood that this country may be invaded by a foreign foe, we should be prepared to meet the invaders in the right way, and with the right spirit. If it be the proper way to go and meet them as the inhabitants of Jerusalem went out to meet Alexander, with the keys to our gates, and with presents and sacrificial offerings, then we should adopt that way of preparing to pave their path with flowers and make them drunk on grape-juice and the milk of human kindness. Dr. David Starr Jordan believes in disarmament. He further believes that armor-plate, guns, battleships, and ammunition should not be made by private manufacturers, but that, on the contrary, these things should be made exclusively by the government, for he is of the opinion that manufacturers of war materials foment disorder and promote war in order to bring themselves more business. Long association with the manufacturers of war materials, especially of explosive materials, has enabled me to know whereof I speak, and I do know that such a belief is the utterest nonsense. The manufacturers of war materials with whom I am acquainted are among the staunchest of peace men, and they would no more be guilty of promoting war to bring themselves business than a reputable surgeon would be likely to string a cord across the street to trip up pedestrians and break their limbs in order to bring himself business. In the treatment of human physical ailments, we should deem it folly to confound remedy with disease, and to hold the physician responsible for pestilence. No one would think of looking upon our science of sanitation and our quarantine system as breeders and harbingers of pestilence, and no one would think that our laws against crime and our system of police protection tend to foster crime. Yet such is the attitude of many well-intentioned but overzealous persons with respect to our naval and military system and armaments. They consider them breeders and harbingers of war. An army and navy are merely a mighty quarantine system against the pestilence of war. We must fortify our shores, police our seas with armor-clads, and be prepared to patrol the skies with aëroplanes around our entire national horizon when the need may come. But it is urged that the people are overburdened with the cost of maintaining armies and navies. Assuming that the burden is great, was it ever less? Was it ever so small as it is now, compared with the numbers and wealth of the people? Again, cannot we well afford to bear a considerable burden of armaments as an insurance against war, and as a further insurance that if war comes, it will be far less deadly than it would be without them? If Dr. Jordan were better acquainted with the manufacture of war materials, he would know that they can be made more cheaply, with equal excellence, by private concerns, than by the government. Furthermore, he would know that big manufacturers of war materials are obliged to employ a very large force of skilled labor, and that this labor has to be supplied employment when there are no government orders for war materials. For example, the manufacture of armor-plate by the United States Steel Corporation is only a small part of that company's business. The manufacture of guns and armor-plate by the Bethlehem Steel Company does not keep it constantly occupied, and it has to furnish other employment for its men when government orders are not forthcoming. Consequently, it is obliged to make things besides armor-plate and guns and war materials. The du Pont explosives companies do a far larger business in high explosives and smokeless powders for commercial purposes than they do for government purposes. Therefore, if the manufacture of war materials were to be confined entirely to government shops, then the government would truly have to promote war to keep its employees busy. At any rate, the government would have to maintain a large labor force, making war materials alone, for the government could not devote itself to the manufacture of automobiles, chairs, cloth, artificial leather, dynamite, sporting powder, and the like, for commercial purposes, as private manufacturers do. There is another reason why the private manufacturers of war materials should be encouraged by the government, and it is that, in the event of war, the government would find the large capital and plants of the wealthy Steel Trust, the Bethlehem Steel Company, and the du Ponts available for the purpose of national defense in addition to the government's own resources. This is very important. The battle of Lake Erie was quite as much a du Pont victory as a Perry victory; for the resources, energy, and generalship of the du Pont Powder Company overcame inconceivable difficulties, carted the powder from Wilmington, Delaware, all the way overland to Lake Erie, and got it there on time. It is unfortunate that a person's confidence in his knowledge of a subject is often directly proportionate to his ignorance of the subject. It is a psychological truth that ignorance may be taught, just like anything else, and a person may become very erudite in things which are not true, just as he may in things which are true. Dr. Jordan, in recent public utterances, has said that he would rather the United States should lose its Pacific possessions than that we should go to war; and he has remarked that now, while the world is drunk with war, is a bad time to lay in more liquor. This is an ingenious metaphor, and well designed to trip the intelligence of the unwary. As a matter of fact, when the world is drunk with war, and rapine, murder, and plunder are rife, it is exactly the time to lay in more ammunition. Had Dr. Jordan been in the position of Captain John Smith in the Virginia colony, when the Indians were on the war-path, he would have advised the settlers to disarm and destroy their stockades and forts. The Indians at that time went on the war-path and got drunk for war because they had a grievance. When the present war is over and international commerce is re-established, we are destined to give some other nation a grievance, for the same reason that we then gave those Indians a grievance, and that other nation will go on the war-path, just as those Indians did, and that other nation when it takes up the torch and the sword and gets a taste of blood, is going to be as savage as the men engaged in the present European conflict. There are two kinds of true prophets: The one kind, like Isaiah, who is directly inspired of God; and the other kind, who judges the future by the lessons of the past. The scientist is a true prophet; but he is not one of the inspired kind. The way he does his predicting is the way of the astronomer, who uses a base line the width of the earth's orbit in order to triangulate the parallax of a star. So the scientific prophet triangulates the parallax of future events from a base line compassing all human history. There is no one lesson which history teaches us more plainly than that the possession of wealth by a defenseless nation is a standing _casus belli_ to other nations, and that always there has been the nation standing ready to attack and plunder any other nation when there was likely to be sufficient profit in the enterprise to pay for the trouble. Never have we seen any treaty stand for long in the way of such practices between nations. Treaties have always been mere scraps of paper, which, like the cobweb, ensnare the weak, while they let the strong break through. It is strange that those who recommend that this country try the experiment of disarmament to secure peace by setting other nations a great moral example, should not have read history to see whether or not the experiment were a new one; and whether or not, judging by past experiments, it were likely to prove a success or a failure. Should these men look back through history, they would find that ancient Egypt tried the experiment, and went down under the sword and torch of fierce invaders from over the desert. They would learn that the Greeks tried the experiment and found it a failure. They would learn that India and China have bled through the ages because of their peaceableness. They would learn that the fall of Carthage was due not so much to the superior military power of Rome, or to the reiterations of Cato that Carthage must be destroyed, as it was to the peace talk of Hanno, which withheld the necessary support of Hannibal in Italy. They would learn that when old Rome lost her vigor and neglected her defenses, she was hewn to pieces by fierce barbarians. They would learn that the fathers of our own country, after the Revolution, tried the same old experiment, with the result that the city of Washington was captured and burned by the British in the war of 1812. They would learn, furthermore, that all prophets who have said that the nations will war no more, have been false prophets. Four years before the Russo-Japanese war, I wrote an article for a New York magazine, in which I prophesied that war, and predicted Japanese victory. I predicted also at the same time that there would be in the near future a general European conflict. It has come. The following quotations from that article may be of interest: * * * * * "_By far the greatest probability of imminent war lies in the Far East, between Russia and Japan. Japan feels the sting of the Russian whip that made her drop Port Arthur and withdraw from the continent of Asia, thus relinquishing the chief advantages gained by her victory over China. The whole sum paid Japan by China as a war indemnity has been expended on her navy and on armaments. In the East, in both naval and military strength, she is superior to Russia_. "_Whether or not we shall soon have war will depend on whether Japan will quietly wait until Russia shall have finished the Trans-Siberian Railway, secured Korea, intrenched and fortified herself along the Asiatic coast, and built a fleet of sufficient strength entirely to overawe the little empire. It is doubtful if Japan will wait for the time when Russia shall be ready to strangle her. She may strike and drive Russia from Korea and secure, as well, a fair share of Chinese territory; or, what amounts to the same thing, a lease of a portion of the Celestial Empire. She will thereafter be better able to protect her interests in Chinese trade and opportunities. Should she strike soon, and she and Russia be left to themselves, Japan ought to win, for she is close at hand and will be able to bring to bear upon the points of collision a much greater force than Russia. She will also be able to act with correspondingly greater celerity._ * * * * * "_If we would essay to predict future events, we must draw the lines of divination in the direction that we see the nations grow, and these lines must be parallel with those of great commercial interests--be parallel with those of national self-interests. We then have but one more question to consider, on which to base à priori judgment. It is the question of might--of national resources and blood and iron._ "_What was true on a small scale, with primitive tribes of men, is also true on a large scale, with the great world powers of today. In early times, like the ebb and flow of the tides of the sea, conquest and re-conquest, victory and defeat, followed one another. Then destruction succeeded growth and growth destruction._ "_As the great banyan tree constantly encroaches upon the territory of surrounding flora, to overtop and blight and kill all upon which its shadow falls, so do and so must nations in their growth encroach upon their neighbors._ "_In recent times, the tremendous strides made in the arts and sciences, and the birth of new industries, and the enormous growth of all, have provided room and occupation for the earth's great dominating peoples. Vast land areas have been reclaimed, and boundless resources developed. Thus far the overflow has been upon the lands of the tameless American Indian--of the lazy African--of the docile Hindoo, and the simple savage of the southern seas. Now it is China's turn, and the wolves of greed, in the guise of trade, are already howling at her gates._ "_Growth is proceeding with constantly accelerating rapidity, and soon the overflow must be on lands already filled to overflowing--not then with simple savages. It will then be Greek to Greek, over fortresses that frown along the whole frontier. Then there will be a clash. It is coming. Where the storm will first break, and when, is a question. That a great conflict will come, and at no distant date, is certain."--"The Home Magazine," July, 1900._ * * * * * At the first annual banquet of the Aëronautical Society four years ago, I predicted exactly the use of the aëroplane in war that it has had since that time. President Taft was one of the speakers, and his subject was his pet peace and arbitration treaties. He said that there were not likely to be the requisite wars for testing out the aëroplane, as predicted. He said that there was going to be a shortage of wars. Since that time, we have had the revolution in China, the Italian war with Tripoli, the Balkan wars, a continuous revolutionary performance in Mexico, and finally, we have the present great European War. Not much of a shortage in wars, truly! The following quotation from Dr. David Starr Jordan's "War and Waste" is an excellent illustration of the prophetic wisdom that is keeping the United States of America unprepared against war: * * * * * "_What shall we say of the Great War of Europe, ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall say that it will never come. Humanly speaking, it is impossible._ "_Not in the physical sense, of course, for with weak, reckless, and godless men nothing evil is impossible. It may be, of course, that some half-crazed archduke or some harassed minister of state shall half-knowing give the signal for Europe's conflagration. In fact, the agreed signal has been given more than once within the last few months. The tinder is well dried and laid in such a way as to make the worst of this catastrophe. All Europe cherishes is ready for the burning. Yet Europe recoils and will recoil even in the dread stress of spoil-division of the Balkan war...._ "_But accident aside, the Triple Entente lined up against the Triple Alliance, we shall expect no war...._ "_The bankers will not find the money for such a fight, the industries of Europe will not maintain it, the statesmen cannot. So whatever the bluster or apparent provocation, it comes to the same thing at the end. There will be no general war until the masters direct the fighters to fight. The masters have much to gain, but vastly more to lose, and their signal will not be given._" * * * * * Eight years ago, when the great Peace Conference was held at Carnegie Hall, New York, to discuss the limitation and abolishment of armaments, the most notable of the pacifists represented were invited by the Economic Club of Boston to attend a banquet in that city for the free hot-airing of their views. There was much sophistical palaver about destroying our old battle-flags and leveling our soldiers' monuments and all landmarks and reminders of war. William T. Stead, however, was more rational, and he was annoyed by the silly impracticable nonsense of some of the dubs of peace. Stead's better sense was evidenced by the fact that the following winter he recommended to the British Parliament that England build two battleships to every one built by Germany. Invited to speak in defense of armaments, I held that we must arm for peace, and not disarm for it. I began my remarks by telling them this story: In a small paragraph in an obscure place upon the back page of a leading Boston paper, I once saw the announcement that Herbert Spencer, the great philosopher, was very ill, and not expected to live. On the front page of the same paper, under bold headlines, was a three-column article on the physical condition of John L. Sullivan. John L. Sullivan was a fighter, while Herbert Spencer was only a philosopher; hence the difference in public interest. John L. Sullivan, in his time, standing on the corner, would deplete the hall and break up any peace meeting in the world, and block the street with massed humanity for a square, jostling for a sight of him. Several years ago, a reverend gentleman by the name of Charles Edward Jefferson elicited much applause by his public utterances on the blessings and advantages of non-resistance and meekness mild. He made it as clear as the day dawn of June, to the unreasoning, that it is all a mistake to build guns, warships, and coast fortifications; that our war colleges are not institutions of actual learning at all, but are institutions for teaching ignorance. He declared that militarism is squandering the taxpayers' money by the hundreds of millions, and all because the advocates of militarism and the friends of militarism are perverse and wilfully wot not what they do, though wisdom radiant as the rainbow stares them in the face; and because our military men, who have been educated at government expense and who, we have thought, were devoting their lives to the country's service in studying its needs and fighting its battles, are desirous merely of promotion and of widening the sphere of their activities. According to Dr. Jefferson, these men are not what we have supposed them--a bulwark against trouble, but are trouble-makers, ignorant of the primary essential of their profession, namely militant meekness; and instead of being guardians of peace and an assurance against war, they are actual war-breeders. He seems to think that there is a real conspiracy to squander the taxpayers' money in the interest of a military clique. A man may be wrong, and yet be honest. Prejudice is honest. Dr. Jefferson is doubtless honest, and if it should be that he is right, then his doctrine is practicable. If he is right, our military men are wrong. If our army and navy officers, who have been educated at the public expense and in the school of experience, do not know and understand better this country's needs in the respects and particulars for which they have been educated than does this good ecclesiastic, then it is proved that the church is a better military school than Annapolis or West Point. Theology, and not military science, should hereafter be taught in those institutions. The military parade should be called in from the campus and be replaced by knee drill in the chapel, and hereafter, at Annapolis, at West Point, and along the firing-line, the command should be Shoulder Psalms, instead of Shoulder Arms. Let us lay down our arms and spike our guns, disband the military parade from the campus, as the sentimentalists desire us to do, and we shall very soon, with Kubla Khan, hear "ancestral voices [George Washington's among them] prophesying war." CHAPTER II CAN LAW BE SUBSTITUTED FOR WAR? I am a peace advocate--that is to say, I am one who advocates an active campaign in the cause of peace, employing the best means and instruments for the accomplishment of practical results. Unfortunately, a wide difference of opinion exists in the ranks of those who style themselves peace advocates as to how the war against war can best be fought. That difference of opinion is as to whether we should arm for the fray, or disarm for it. Shall we go into the fight with sword and buckler, and with armor on, prepared to return blow with stronger blow; or shall we go into the fight with bared breasts, and, when we receive a blow upon one cheek turn the other cheek also, and let both our eyes be blackened and our nose be skinned in order to shame our antagonist, by giving him an object lesson of the horrors of war? Ernst Haeckel has said there is nothing constant but change. He might have said also that there is a no more consistent thing in its constancy than human inconsistency. That other great philosopher, Herbert Spencer, declared that, as he grew older, the more and more he realized the extent to which mankind is governed by irrationality. Josh Billings said, "It is not so much the ignorance of men that makes them ridiculous as what they know that is not so." The complex problems of ethics, eugenics, economics, and human dynamics, which enter into all questions and problems of peace and war, are like so many Chinese puzzles to the ordinary mind. There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of minds--the ratiocinative and the irrational; in other words, the logical and the illogical. The logical mind proceeds scientifically from sure premises to just conclusions, taking no direction and traveling no faster and no farther in any direction than warranted and justified by ascertained fact. The irrational or illogical mind, on the contrary, is unable to discriminate between belief and knowledge, between facts and fancies. Consequently, this type of mind proceeds from guess to conclusion, with the result that final judgment is necessarily distorted, warped, and swerved from truth just in proportion as the basic guess is incorrect or false. There is a no more momentous problem before the world today than that of international jurisprudence, especially with respect to the maintenance of peace where practicable, and the control of wars, when wars are inevitable or necessary; and there is no subject of such moment more fruitful of irrationalism. In the light of practical common-sense, there is nothing funnier in the writings of Mark Twain than the inconsistent prating of our peace sophists. It is as though they let not their right-hand brain know what their left-hand brain is doing. They are usually brimmed and primed with sacrificial sentimentality and over-soul. Their delicatessen natures shrink from contact with the stern, man-making realities of life. They are the disciples of soft stuff. The mush and moonshine of maudlin sentimentalism are their element. They possess no powers of discrimination between the actual and the erroneous. The guise of fact is no recommendation to them unless it fits into their scheme. An error is far more welcome if it comes in a garmenture that conforms with their ideals. They put their union label on what we receive by the grace of God, but they fail to recognize and appreciate that they cannot comprehend the infinite; that what to them seems disorder and confusion in the world may be the most perfect order in the eye of God. They cannot understand how infinite wisdom, infinite justice, and infinite mercy should have created a warring world; consequently, they have set themselves the task of repairing the faults of creation and of recreating the world to suit their own ideas as to what infinite wisdom and mercy ought to be. When one of these peace sophists gets into a fight, however, he promptly prays to God to help him whip the other fellow. The pacific sentimentalist is usually a most arrant coward. In time of war, the cowardly sentimental pacifists are the loudest in appeals to Almighty God to fight on their side and to lead their army to victory--that same army which in time of peace they have done everything in their power to disarm and disband. Recently, when speaking at a church, I was asked the question, "How long is it going to take to make might right?" I asked my interrogator this question: "If, at the creation, you had been consulted and your advice asked as to whether or not a world should be made in which all life should feed on other life, and half of the animal creation should be made prey for the other half; whether everything should be made tooth and nail, claw and scale, hunter and hunted, terror and blood, strife and war; whether or not the cat should train for the hunt by torturing the little bird--how would you have replied to God?" My querist did not answer me, but went home to think it over. I do not purpose to make any apology for Infinite Wisdom. My pacifist friends are doing that constantly. It is my humble opinion that the Creator did the best He could for us, and that we ought to be thankful and grateful. I believe with Pope, that: "_Spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, One truth is clear--whatever is, is right._" I realize that the most perfect order is confusion to the mind that is not constituted to comprehend it. I know that the macrocosmic mechanism moves with mathematical exactitude, and that we, in comparison, are mighty only in our arrogance; that, in fact, we are but microscopic specks in the drift of worlds. Nature seems to care little for individuals, but very much for races and species; little indeed for a person, very much for a people. The terms right and wrong, good and bad, are entirely relative. Right for an individual may not be so for a large aggregation of individuals. The welfare of a nation or a people may not be the welfare of the world, and God has His eye on the world. _The wrong are weak, the right are strong. This mean the two terms right and wrong; And truth sought out to any length, Finds all wrong weakness, all right strength._ FORMATIVE STRIFE Primeval man found himself thrust into an environment where all animal life fed on other life, and half the animal creation was prey for the other half. He was one of the hunted. Yet, with less strength but greater cunning, he was destined to master all. Man's supremacy has been developed by warfare of wit, craft, and cunning, versus brute force. Primitive man found himself "up a tree" in both the actual and the metaphoric sense. His teeth and claws were no match for those of the leopard and the sabre-toothed tiger. He had no recourse but flight until stern necessity taught him to wield a club. Then he climbed down from his abode in trees, and began the conquest of the earth. The club made man a traveler. His forays with that weapon taught him to walk and fight upon his hind legs, and gave him his erect carriage. But he had to travel a long and thorny pathway indeed, armed only with a club, before he invented the stone hatchet and spear of sharpened flint or bone. It was a far-flung span across the gulf of time from the tree-home to the cave in the hill, his new abiding-place. The bow and arrow, which enabled him to kill at long range, were his next weapon, and were the greatest invention of all time. The protection of the heart with the left arm and shield, with the right arm free to wield the sword or hurl the javelin, made man right-handed. Armed with the bow and arrow, spear and shield, man was equipped still better for travel; and ever since travel has been widening out the sky and broadening man's mental horizon. The fighting spirit widened the acquaintance of different peoples, and the terrible menace of some savage common enemy forced different tribes to unite and build up nations. Union against danger is the best instructor of self-government, and the best guarantee of internal good behavior. It is generally recognized that man is a product of his environment; that he is in body and mind the sum of his own and ancestral experiences; that he is omnivorous; that he drinks water and breathes air; and yet, many persons fail to recognize the inevitable concomitant conclusion that he is also of necessity a warring animal, and that the formative influences of the fierce struggle for existence have made him what he is. His life is a series of reactions to environing stimuli; and he is actuated and shaped by those stimuli, and just as those stimuli have been necessary to his growth, so they are still necessary to his continued growth, and even to his very existence. In other words, the formative influences that have made and sustained man are still necessary to his maintenance. The character of the strife may be changed, and is already largely changed, from war to business. But the intensity of the struggle cannot be alleviated one whit, because it is impossible, in the nature of things, to maintain man's strength of character in any other way. He could live a little longer without strife than without food or air or water, but the absence of strife would be as fatal to him in the end as would be the absence of food, air, or water. The struggle for existence has always been a business proposition with man, and business today is a struggle for existence as intense and merciless as the struggle in war. In olden times, piracy and war for plunder were the principal business of mankind. Today, business is a warfare, and though it may be law-abiding, still the weak go down under it and suffer and die under it as surely as they did in old-time wars. The relation of strength to weakness remains unchanged, and the reward for strength and the penalty for weakness are as great as they ever were. There now exists, as always, the same intensity of incentive of all classes to strive for something more and something better than they have. Though the condition of all classes has improved, the struggle of individual with individual is as great, the strife of class with class is as intense as ever. The ownership of one's earnings, with freedom to apply and enjoy them, was the greatest prize ever offered to stimulate the working genius of this world, and the results during the past hundred and fifty years have been phenomenal. The world has progressed more within that time in those things which tend to complete living than it had previously progressed in all the ages that had dragged their slow length along since the world thawed out of the ancient ice. But human agencies, like all agencies in nature, are essentially rhythmical. In order to accumulate the necessary energy and enthusiasm to go far enough in the right direction, we inevitably go too far, and, when the pendulum returns, it swings to the other extreme. It is important to realize the great truth that freedom ends when it aims beyond the spirit which strives for the greatest good to the greatest number. According to Herbert Spencer, the criminal classes are composed of those who have been pushed out of the race in the struggle for existence under modern conditions. They were normal components of society in the past, when all men were soldiers and all soldiers were bandits, and the principal business of mankind was piracy and war for plunder. There being no longer the ever-present opportunity to join in an inter-tribal or an international war for robbery, the soldier-bandit now makes war upon society. All of the Huns and Vandals in our midst are today armed with the short-sword of the ballot. How important it is then that they should be taught to know and to understand that in the use of this weapon their work should be formative and not deformative; that it should be constructive and not destructive! SUBSTITUTION OF LAW FOR WAR The poet's words, "The parliament of man, the federation of the world," have become a very familiar quotation in recent years. Anciently all wisdom was taught in poesy, and we have never yet quite freed ourselves from the age-long habitude of receiving as unimpeachable wisdom whatever may be said in verse. To the common mind, a statement in didactic verse has the proselyting power of Holy Writ. Now, this line of Tennyson, "The parliament of man, the federation of the world," points us toward a Utopia, without hope of actual attainment. There is at the present time a growing good intention to put an end to wars by international conciliation and arbitration; in short, to substitute law for war. We must, however, keep strongly in mind the interdependence of law and force, and the consequent interdependence of international law and armaments. Conciliation must not be confounded with arbitration, and persuasion must not be confounded with law. Law has been aptly designated "codified custom." Actually, law is an attempt to construct experience into prophecy. We are able to judge of the sufficiency of new laws only by the sufficiency of laws in past practice. The error is very common, to confound as having the same meaning terms of quite opposite meanings--for example, it is a very common error to confound society with government, and civilization with enlightenment. Society is an order of things by virtue of which we are able to co-operate with one another and to enjoy mutuality of possessions which gives them their only value; while government is an order of things for the purpose of protecting society. The world has arrived at great enlightenment, and has attained some degree of civilization. Self-interest is becoming more and more altruistic, and altruism is becoming more and more profitable. We are not so barbarous as we used to be, but we still slaughter one another to adjust international differences. This cannot be esteemed civil procedure. Enlightenment may be very uncivil, and civility may not be enlightenment. The great problem yet remains of uniting under practical laws the nations of the earth into a family of nations. This is not a work for dreamers or sentimentalists; but is purely a business proposition, which can be effected only to the extent that the best interests of all the contracting parties are thereby secured. When will arbitration be able to realize the Utopian dreams of the pacifists? General Homer Lea answers the question once for all in the following expressive terms: * * * * * "_Only when arbitration is able to unravel the tangled skein of crime and hypocrisy among individuals can it be extended to communities and nations. Thence will International Arbitration come of its own accord as the natural outgrowth of national evolution through the individual. As nations are only man in the aggregate, they are the aggregate of his crimes and deception and depravity, and so long as these constitute the basis of individual impulse, so long will they control the acts of nations._ "_When, therefore, the merchant arbitrates with the customer he is about to cheat; when trusts arbitrate with the people they are about to fleece; when the bulls and bears arbitrate with the lambs they are about to shear; when the thief arbitrates with the man he is about to rob, or the murderer with his victim, and so on throughout the category of crime, then will communities be able to dispense with laws, and international thievery and deception, shearing and murder, resort to arbitration._" * * * * * The men who control our city and state politics and make and enforce our city and state laws all over the country are not always honest, but, on the contrary, they are often notoriously corrupt, notwithstanding the fact that they have much stronger incentives to be honest here than they would have in dealing with foreign nations and strange peoples. What, therefore, are we to expect of their integrity and their honesty in the settlement of international disputes and in the enactment and execution of international laws? What an enormous field for graft it will be when some weaker nation tries to get its rights at the coming international tribunal! Our laws are now notoriously inadequate with respect to theft, burglary, highway robbery, and municipal-government graft. The amount of money loss to the people of this country through the failure of our laws to suppress these iniquities is enough to support a standing army of half a million men, build four battleships a year, and place us on such a defensive footing as absolutely to preclude all danger of war with any foreign power. Has human nature improved so much lately that special privilege will no longer result from special power? Has the human race progressed so much lately that privilege and oppression will not follow power; wealth and luxury follow privilege; and degeneracy and disorganization follow wealth and luxury? The race has certainly not so altered that men do not grow old and die; and nations, like men, have their youth, their middle age, their decrepitude and death. Periodically, some religio-pathological sect will announce the conclusion of an understanding with the Great Reaper, whereby, through certain incantations or breathing exercises, death may be indefinitely postponed; but they, like other mortals, keep on dying. Those good men who are the leaders in the present peace movement must realize the fact that the carrying out of their project will devolve, not upon them--not upon the philanthropist, the sentimentalist, and the humanitarian--but upon the politician. The actual procedure of the Hague congresses enables us to forecast exactly this result. The judicial bench of that court was a bargain-counter, over which political advantage was bartered for political advantage. It was no real love of peace that dominated those tribunals: only the powerful nations spoke or were heard. No protection was suggested for the weaker nations, who, presumably, would be most benefited by international arbitration. They were quite out of the running. International arbitration will ultimately become a political machine. Nothing can prevent it, and there is no reason to believe that those politicians who will have control of the international arbitration machine will be any more honest than other machine politicians. ALL LAW MUST BE BACKED BY FORCE It is a popular belief that when the paradoxical conciliatory legal persuasion in the form of arbitration goes into effect, we shall no longer require any armaments, but may forge our swords into plow-shares and spears into pruning-hooks, disband our armies, and return the soldiers to the shops and farms. We are prone to forget that law is as much a representative of the requisite power behind it for its enforcement as a paper dollar is a representative of the requisite gold available for its redemption. A well-known orator came very near becoming President through a popular misconception as to the interdependence of gold and paper money, and he failed to get the Presidency because of a public awakening to the error. We are prone to forget, furthermore, that it is the respect for power behind law that makes possible its enforcement. Any law to adjust international differences by arbitration will simply be an embodiment of the collective wisdom of allied Powers in the exercise of force, and a force that is representative of their banded armies and navies. International law is static military force. War is the dynamic form of the same force. I believe in international arbitration for all it is worth. It is a good thing to push along. It will unquestionably lessen the frequency of wars, but many wars are sure to come in spite of it, and because of it. NON-JUSTICIABLE DIFFERENCES There are ills of national bodies politic that can be cured only by the sword. Insurmountable differences between various nations and races of men are always sure to arise, as impossible to arbitrate as the differences between the herbivora and the carnivora. The existence of the carnivora depends upon the sacrifice of the herbivora. Their interests are, from their very nature, antagonistic, and their differences are, by consequence, insurmountable, and not justiciable. The harmony of nature depends upon inharmony between the meat-eaters and the vegetable-eaters, and the harmony of modern progress has likewise depended in large measure upon formative inharmony between peoples. Such radical differences and such concomitant radical diversity of interests exist among the various races of men that the task of harmonizing their interests, aims, and activities will be about as great as would be that of bleaching their skins to a uniform color. It is a practical impossibility to enact international laws that will make the welfare of each nation the concern of all, with no subordination of any one to the welfare of another. Will arbitration be able to place all peoples upon a plane of equality? Will it be able to secure to all, even the meanest, equal rights to enjoyment of property, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Will arbitration be able to make the Anglo-Saxon, the Teuton, the African, and the Oriental meet one another on common ground, and share and share alike, live and let live, when their interests come into collision? If arbitration cannot do this--if arbitration does not do this--if it does not treat all with strict impartiality, then those who are ill-treated are going to rebel, and wars will still come. Between nations no sentimental consideration exists or is possible, sufficiently effectual to exert more than the merest microscopic influence as a deterrent of war. Self-interest always has been, and always will be, the deciding factor in the settlement of international disputes. War uncloaks international hypocrisy, and the people are seen in their true character. The attitude of the warlike and powerful nations in the past toward the weaker nations has been very similar to that of the carnivora toward the herbivora. International arbitration may somewhat lessen the burden of armaments, but the time will be long before it can lift the burden. The orators who plead at the International Tribunal will speak in the voice of the deep-throated guns behind them; their persuasion will be that of cold steel, and neither brotherly love nor international sympathy will be their guide, but self-interest, and no demands will be relinquished except from policy in their observance of such rights of others as are warded by the frowning ramparts of opposing force. Unless all the nations of the world join in the pact, then arbitration will simply be an alliance for the benefit of the allies themselves as against all others. There will be nothing new in such an arrangement. The Six Nations of New York did the same thing; they formed a federation and settled their differences by arbitration, and it was a good thing for the Six Nations; but it was not a good thing for the neighboring Indian tribes. We Americans expect to get all we want any way, either with or without arbitration. If we expected that the Chinese would be forced upon us, or our rights and privileges curtailed in the Orient, we should not think of joining in an arbitration pact for a minute. There will always be the warfare of commerce for the markets of the world, and it will be tempered with avarice, not mercy; and commercial warfare will become more and more severe as the nations grow, and as competition, with want and hunger behind it, gets keen as the sword-edge with the crowding of people into the narrow world. UNCHANGING HUMAN NATURE Human nature is the same today as it was in the ante-rebellion days of human slavery. It is the same as it was when Napoleon, with the will-o'-the-wisp of personal and national glory held before the eyes of emotional and impressionable Frenchmen, led them to wreck for him the monarchies of Europe. Human nature is the same today as it was in Cæsar's time, when he massacred two hundred and fifty thousand Germans--men, women, and children--in a day, in cold blood, while negotiations for peace were pending, and entered in his diary the simple statement, "Cæsar's legions killed them all." Human nature is the same today as it was in the cruel old times, when war was the chief business of mankind, and populations sold as slaves were among the most profitable plunder. Yes, human nature is the same as it has always been. Education and Christian teaching have made pity and sympathy more familiar to the human heart, but avarice and the old fighting spirit are kept in leash only by the dominance of necessity and circumstances, which the institutions of civilization impose upon the individual. The following is quoted from "Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain," by the late Professor J. A. Cramb: * * * * * "_War may change its shape, the struggle here intensifying it, there abating it; it may be uplifted by ever loftier purposes and nobler causes. But cease? How shall it cease?_ "_Indeed, in the light of history, universal peace appears less as a dream than as a nightmare, which shall be realized only when the ice has crept to the heart of the sun, and the stars, left black and trackless, start from their orbits._" * * * * * Max Müller has told us that the roots of some of our words are older than the Egyptian Pyramids. Far older still are the essential traits of human nature. The human nature of today will be the human nature of tomorrow, and the human nature of tomorrow will be in all essential respects the same as it was in ancient Rome, Persia, and Egypt, and even in the palmy days of sea-sunk Atlantis. The best of us are at heart barbarians under a thin veneer of civilization, and it is as natural for us to revert to barbarous war as for the hog to return to his wallow. If we were able to apply to the upbuilding of our Army and Navy the money that goes to political graft throughout the country, and the money that has been squandered, and is still being squandered through our notorious vote-purchasing pensions, we could place ourselves upon a war footing that would be an absolute guarantee of permanent peace. It is not, therefore, very encouraging, to enlarge this failing system of laws, in order to save an annual expenditure certainly less than what the defects of our laws now cost the country. Even though international wars may be prevented by a court of arbitration, can rebellion and civil war be prevented, and ought they always to be prevented? JUSTIFIABLE WARS When the unjust laws of an iniquitous government make existence intolerable for the great mass of the people of a country or of a colonial possession; "when in the course of human events, it becomes necessary" for a people to throw off the yoke of oppression, as we did in our War of the Revolution, or as the French people did in the French Revolution, or as the great Chinese people have lately done by their rebellion against the domination of an intolerable savage Manchu monarchy, then war is the only remedy, and freedom can then plead only with the sword. I quote the following from Theodore Roosevelt's "America and the World War": * * * * * "_In 1864 there were in the North some hundreds of thousands of men who praised peace as the supreme end, as a good more important than all other goods, and who denounced war as the worst of all evils. These men one and all assailed and denounced Abraham Lincoln, and all voted against him for President. Moreover, at that time there were many individuals in England and France who said it was the duty of those two nations to mediate between the North and the South, so as to stop the terrible loss of life and destruction of property which attended our Civil War; and they asserted that any Americans who in such event refused to accept their mediation and to stop the war would thereby show themselves the enemies of peace. Nevertheless, Abraham Lincoln and the men back of him by their attitude prevented all such effort at mediation, declaring that they would regard it as an unfriendly act to the United States. Looking back from a distance of fifty years, we can now see clearly that Abraham Lincoln and his supporters were right. Such mediation would have been a hostile act, not only to the United States but to humanity. The men who clamored for unrighteous peace fifty years ago this fall were the enemies of mankind._" * * * * * Those who are oppressed by the superincumbent weight of society, and labor for mere existence, with no hope of freedom from poverty, are slaves as much as were those made bondsmen in old-time wars. It matters little whether the wolf at the door be a creature of sociological conditions, or a creature of war. The evil is no less real. James Russell Lowell, in his admirable poem on France and the French Revolution, said about the most expressive, the most potential, and altogether the best thing that has ever been said illustrative of the uncontrollable massiveness of the popular will, which, under the stimulus of patriotism or the smart or burden of accumulated wrongs, can stampede a nation into war: "_As, flake by flake, the beetling avalanches Build up their imminent crags of noiseless snow, Till some chance thrill the loosened ruin launches And the blind havoc leaps unwarned below, So grew and gathered through the silent years The madness of a People, wrong by wrong. There seemed no strength in the dumb toiler's tears, No strength in suffering;--but the Past was strong: The brute despair of trampled centuries Leapt up with one hoarse yell and snapt its bands, Groped for its rights with horny, callous hands, And stared around for God with bloodshot eyes._" The justification of war depends entirely upon the conditions which produce it. In short, war is justifiable only when it is a remedy for evils greater than the evils of the war. War is sometimes a very bitter remedy; nevertheless, there are diseases much worse than the remedy. The horrors of the French Revolution, bad as they were, remedied a condition still more horrible, for the condition of the French common people, "bowed by the weight of centuries," had become so abject that life was intolerable; no change could be for the worse. Under such circumstances there is no fear of death; the fear of death is only fear of the loss of life through love of life. When existence is intolerable, and there is no hope in the heart for better things, life, having no value, is not much loved, and death has no terrors. In spite of all the bloodshed of the reign of terror, in spite of all who fell under the leadership of Napoleon, the French people were benefited by the Revolution a thousand-fold more than they were injured by it. If arbitration could prevent such wars, which are man's God-given privilege that a people may secure its inalienable rights, then arbitration, in that respect, would be an iniquitous thing. War, at best, is a horrible business. It is a reversion to the brute force of primitive savagery, and is never justifiable except in the extremity of last resort. But we must appreciate and acknowledge the fact that the horrors of war, the sacrifice of treasure, the sacrifice of life, are no arguments whatever against war when inalienable human rights are at stake that must be fought for, and that are worth the sacrifice. There are at times objects and obligations which are worth the sacrifice. To prevent war in such cases would be a disgrace and a crime. As Admiral Mahan says, "Even the material evils of war are less than the moral evil of compliance with wrong." CHRISTIANITY AND WAR In 1901, the editor of _The Christian Herald_ requested me to write an article in answer to the following question: "Is it consistent for a loyal Christian, who believes that war is contrary to the teachings of the Prince of Peace, to engage in the manufacture of material designed exclusively for the purpose of war?" In my reply, I pointed out that the great majority of Christians throughout the world, while they hate war, are often called upon themselves to become warriors and to fight for their doctrine of peace. The Rev. T. De Witt Talmage was chosen to reply to my article, which he did by agreeing with all I had said. According to the annals of history, wars have almost invariably been caused by one party attempting to rob another party, or one people another people. On such occasions, it is self-evident that the blame for the wars rested with the robbers. Those who fought in defense of their lives and property, although actual participants in warfare, were guiltless. Of course, the attempt to rob and plunder has sometimes been mutual, and both participants have been aggressors, as were Napoleon and Alexander in the Russian war. In the great majority of cases, however, one side has been on the aggressive, and the other on the defensive. When an officer of the law catches an evil-doer in the act, and is attacked by him, if, in making an arrest, the officer is compelled to draw his own revolver and shoot the malefactor, he does a justifiable act. We have here war in miniature, and it may be taken as a type of all wars. While we are free to grant that wars are wrong, yet the wrong rests entirely with the offenders, instead of with the defenders, of human right. Housebreaking is wrong, yet the brave knight who, in mediæval times, breached a castle wall to free some prisoner unjustly held, did a wholly commendable act. Similarly, one nation which raises an army to free from bondage slaves held by another nation, does an equally commendable act, and the blame for the war rests with those who hold the slaves. War is an ugly and an awful thing, while some peace theories are very beautiful, and they are quite safe in times of peace; but when, in the past, slaves had to be freed, then the true Christians took down their old swords and shouldered their old guns, and went to the front. If we read the inscriptions on the monuments erected to the memory of those who died in our great Civil War, we find it was an army of Christians who fell. War is often a necessity. It cannot always be avoided, and, when it comes, we want the best tools we can get with which to fight. It is criminal negligence for a nation not to be prepared against war. It is criminal negligence for a great nation not to be abreast of the times in arms and equipment. Often at the bayonet's point, trade and civilization and even Christianity, have been forced upon the savage, and upon exclusive and unwarlike peoples, and now Christianity, civilization, and militarism, sisters of strange relation, hand in hand, embrace the world. In "Sartor Resartus" Carlyle says: "_The first ground handful of nitre, sulphur, and charcoal drove Monk Schwartz's pestle through the ceiling. What will the last do?_" His own answer is that it will "... _achieve the final undisputed prostration of force under thought, of animal courage under spiritual_." Again Carlyle says, in the same work: * * * * * "_Such I hold to be the genuine use of gunpowder: that it makes all men alike tall. Nay, if thou be cooler, cleverer than I, if thou have more mind, though all but no body whatever, then canst thou kill me first, and art the taller. Hereby, at last is the Goliath powerless and the David resistless; savage animalism is nothing, inventive spiritualism is all_." * * * * * What does the Bible say about Christ's mission of peace? * * * * * "_And suddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly host praising God and saying, Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men" (Luke II: 13, 14)._ "_And thou, child, shalt be called the Prophet of the Highest ... to guide our feet into the way of peace" (Luke I: 76, 79)._ "_And his name shall be called ... The Prince of Peace" (Is. IX: 6)._ * * * * * I hold that there is nothing whatever in the foregoing quotations inconsistent with warring for the right. From the nature of things, war is often the price of peace, and justice can only be enforced by the sword. In the great American Rebellion it was the voice of guns alone that could command the emancipation of the slaves. An apostle of the Prince of Peace may often best serve his Master by becoming a good soldier. The Christian armies that turned back and drove out of Europe the invading Moors rendered their Master better service than had they, in order to escape war, fled before the advancing hosts of Islam. Should China and India become really aroused and advance during the next twenty-five years as rapidly as has Japan during a like period in the past, and should the great "Yellow Peril" rise in its might, and threaten the Christian World, is there a single soldier of the Cross now enlisted in the cause of Peace who would not then buckle on his cartridge-belt, shoulder his gun, and go and fight in the defense of his religion and his home? I must confess my belief that, if invasion were threatened on the Atlantic Coast, some of the pacifists I have met would not buckle on the cartridge-belt, but would, on the contrary, gird up their loins, take the advice of Horace Greeley, and go West. Let us again quote from the Scriptures: * * * * * "_The Lord is a man of war_" (_Ex. XV: 3_). "_The Lord of Hosts is his name_" (_Is. LI: 15_). "_Blessed be the Lord my strength, which teacheth my hands to war, and my fingers to fight" (Ps. CXLIV: 1)._ * * * * * It is evident that the modern Christian misunderstands Christ's true mission, for he said: * * * * * "_Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword" (Matt. X: 34)._ "_I am come to send fire on the earth" (Luke XII: 49)._ "_And he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one ... for the things concerning me have an end" (Luke XXII: 36, 37)._ * * * * * St. Paul said: * * * * * "_For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil" (Rom. XIII: 4)._ * * * * * Dr. Lyman Abbott, who is one of the best of America's big men, and one of the biggest of America's best men, has the following to say about war: * * * * * "_I am not, therefore, one of those who think that war is always wrong. I cannot think that Jesus Christ Himself inculcated the doctrine that force never could be used--He who, when He saw the traders in the Temple, did not wait to argue with them nor to appeal to their conscience, for He knew that they had neither reason nor conscience, but drove them out with a whip of small cords, driving the cattle before Him and overturning the tables of the money-changers and letting the money roll upon the floor. I am not afraid to follow Him with whatsoever force it may be necessary for righteousness to put on, when unrighteousness has armed herself to commit wrong. I cannot think all war is wrong. If I did, I should not want to look upon a Bunker Hill Monument, for it would be a monument to our shame; I should want never to speak the name of Gettysburg, for my lips would blister and my cheeks would blush; I should want to bury in the grave of oblivion the names of Washington and Grant._" * * * * * There can be but one interpretation of Christian duty and but one interpretation of true peace. Without justice, the mere absence of war does not constitute peace to the Christian. Neither to the Christian is warfare waged in the interest of justice incompatible with the peace principles which underlie his religious faith. Therefore, the true interpretation of peace is absence of war, where justice reigns, and the true Christian mission is to see that justice be done, for without it there can be no righteous peace. Such peace as can reign with injustice becomes the abettor of injustice. While I believe in international conciliation and arbitration, peace and good will, I do not believe in unlimited arbitration. I do not believe that arbitration can ever be a universal panacea with which all evils can be cured without resort to firearms. There are times when throats have to be cut, and when God is on the side of the executioner. When a nation persists perennially in war, it can only be brought to peace by some other nation which will meet it on the battlefield. Christ established the dictum that they who take the sword shall perish by the sword. War begets war. The sword brings the sword. As Napoleon said about sparing murderers and abolishing capital punishment, "_Que messieurs les assassins commencent_." We want to put a stop to wars to save life. I wonder why it is that we are not equally anxious to prevent loss of life from other causes besides war. Why are we not equally interested in preventing the tremendous loss of life from easily preventable railroad disasters? An international movement for safety equipment and sanitation, with an enlistment of effort and money equal to that being devoted to this great peace movement would save many more lives every year than the annual loss in the Napoleonic wars. Dr. Strong, President of the American Institute of Social Service, stated at a dinner several years ago, that the number of persons killed and wounded every year in the United States alone by railroad accidents, steamship accidents, workshop accidents, accidents in the streets, and other accidents--all very largely due to preventable causes--amounts to more than 500,000. In the Japanese-Russian war a total of 333,786 men were killed and wounded on both sides, not counting the losses in naval battles. During the same period in the United States alone the great army of American laborers engaged in manufacturing and building operations suffered a loss of 425,000 killed and injured; 92,000 more were therefore killed and injured in our industries in one year than during that entire war. I wonder why it is that we are not as enthusiastic in this social-service work as we are in attacking the problem of war. Is it that there is more glory and more that appeals to the martial imagination in attacking war and warriors than there is in the prosaic, tame, and glamourless enterprise of simply saving human life in peaceful pursuits for the mere sake of saving it? Is it the old war spirit in the breasts of the peace men that moves them? Are they fighters, too? In attacking war, do they feel that they are somehow identified with the pomp and circumstance of glorious war? CHAPTER III OUR INCONSISTENT MONROE DOCTRINE "If you want war, nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and betray him against himself." _William Graham Sumner_, "_War and Other Essays_." A doctrine is a creed, usually mandatory, framed by one person or set of persons, for the belief or conduct of another person or set of persons. A doctrine is not necessarily based upon principles of right, equity, justice, or even expediency. Doctrines are directions written on the guide-boards of fanaticism. An exact truth is never proclaimed as a doctrine: there is no doctrine of mathematics. The Monroe Doctrine, which pledged the United States to defend American republican institutions, north and south, against monarchical encroachments from the Old World, with the dependable support of England, was proclaimed in 1823, mainly in response to a Continental doctrine called the Holy Alliance, formed in 1815 by and between Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France. The Holy Alliance was in effect a system of mutual political monarchical insurance, under which the forces of the allied Powers could be used to subdue revolution against the institution of kingship. The French Revolution, followed by the democratic empire of Napoleon, had severely shaken the old intolerant and intolerable order of things. The Holy Alliance was an expedient of the old order to insure itself against democratic institutions. A revolution in Spain in 1820 was promptly suppressed by the Holy Alliance, and the Spanish people, who had raised their heads and begun to look around for freedom, were again bowed under the yoke of the detested Bourbons. The Holy Alliance was surely a most unholy alliance. Russia, by a ukase in 1821, claimed the right to keep the vessels of all other Powers out of the North Pacific Ocean. That was a Russian "Monroe Doctrine" which helped to make Monroe a doctrinaire. In 1823 Spain lost, through revolutions, all of her American possessions except Cuba and Porto Rico, and Portugal had lost Brazil. France had lost the island of Haiti. The United States naturally sympathized with the newly-formed states built on the ruins of the Spanish and Portuguese empires. They had mostly adopted republican institutions, becoming sisters of the great northern republic. James Monroe was not the father of the child named for him, for the actual formulator of the Monroe Doctrine was John Quincy Adams, at that time Secretary of State, who got the cue from George Canning. England wanted unrestricted trade with the Spanish-American countries; she had no need of additional territory on the American continent, but she saw danger in its acquisition by other nations. George Canning tried four times in 1823 to get the United States to join England in her declaration of the open-door policy. Monroe favored the proposal, but finally Adams convinced the President that it would be better to avoid any entangling arrangement with England, and to stand alone. On the second of December, 1823, in his annual message to Congress, President Monroe made the following declaration on behalf of the United States: * * * * * "_The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by European powers.... We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling, in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States._" * * * * * Such was the birth of the famous Monroe Doctrine. Its recognition by England made it effective. The Monroe Doctrine has nothing whatever to do with international law. It is simply an expression of British national policy for the United States. Our diplomacy, being a branch of our politics, is often inconsistent with our national policy. American justification for the doctrine appears to have been mainly dependent upon the fact that we had no intentions of encroaching upon the spheres of influence of any of the nations of the Old World, but that we intended to safeguard what we conceived to be our legitimate sphere of influence. The American Republic was very young when the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed--a doctrine which, as one writer has said, is "the most magnificent bluff in all history, and so far the most successful." During the American Civil War, France, with the connivance of England, conceived the plan of establishing in Mexico the empire of Maximilian. We were too busy at the time, settling some little differences of opinion within our family of states, to exact recognition of our protest. After the memorable exchange of compliments and courtesies between Grant and Lee at Appomattox, however, Uncle Sam indicated to Napoleon the Little that the Imperialists must be kicked out. Lacking the support of France, they were kicked out by the Mexicans. While through the Monroe Doctrine the United States served notice on the nations of the Old World to keep hands off the American continent, the doctrine at the same time constituted an implied promise on our part to keep hands off any territory beyond the confines of America. So long as the policies of Great Britain did not run counter to our Monroe Doctrine, it was destined to be quite effective in preventing land-grabbing on the American continent by other European Powers. But the Monroe Doctrine possesses an innate dog-in-the-manger aspect, certain some day to bring trouble, for the great nations of the world have far outgrown the expectations of our forefathers; their commerce has become an inseparable part of the commerce of South American countries, and their interests in like measure have become identified with the interests of those countries. Just to the extent that their welfare and the welfare of the South American republics become mutual are they likely to be brought into collision with the Monroe Doctrine, and, when the collision comes, it means war, unless the United States abandons that doctrine. [Illustration: The Vast Territory That Our Inflated Monroe Doctrine Obligates Us to Defend] Our self-assumed protectorate over the South American republics is not welcomed by those countries. They resent our arrogance. We have never cultivated trade with them, nor joined them in the development of their industries, and have never financed their enterprises. Even when an American citizen has paid a visit to a South American country, he has first found it necessary to go to England and take ship from there. The European countries, on the other hand, have promoted business relations with the South American republics, have supplied them with working capital and cultivated their friendship, confidence, and respect, while we have done nothing of the sort. The citizens of the United States whom the South Americans have seen in their dominions have usually been adventurous, irresponsible fortune-hunters. Their trouble-breeding propensities have not tended to foster amicable feeling between the great Republic of the North and her Southern sisters. So long as the Monroe Doctrine did not circumscribe the ambitions of the United States the institution possessed some semblance of vitality; but, when the explosion came that blew up the _Maine_, it also exploded the Monroe Doctrine, for immediately the United States, abandoning its time-honored policy of keeping within American confines, and out of entangling alliances and complications with other nations, reached out a grasping hand and seized upon the Far Pacific possessions of Spain, right at the door of China and within the legitimate sphere of influence of Japan. Yet, curiously enough, we still adhere to the old proclamation, America for the Americans, oblivious of the equal right of China and Japan to proclaim, Asia for the Asiatics. Several years ago, I spoke at a luncheon of the Twentieth Century Club in Boston. I was seated beside a noted Japanese diplomat. He said, "Mr. Maxim, you have a Monroe Doctrine--America for the Americans; we also have a similar doctrine--Asia for the Asiatics; but we are not ready to enforce ours yet, and you are not ready, and are not likely to be ready, to enforce yours. A little later, we shall inquire by what logic you can proclaim America for the Americans, and disclaim our right equally to proclaim Asia for the Asiatics." The Japanese are a far-seeing and a patient people. They know how to wait, but they know also when to strike, and how to strike with the force of a Jovian thunderbolt. They are no longer merely a cute little picture-book people. They have risen with stupendous strides into a very eminent position as a World-Power, a Power to be reckoned with. They are different from us, but we have no right to consider them our inferiors. They may very possibly prove to be our superiors. A government of the people and for the people is a failure if the government does not take measures for the adequate defense of the people. Self-preservation is the first law of nature. Consequently, it is a law which must be observed as the chief element of greatness. I quote the following from "The Valor of Ignorance," by General Homer Lea: * * * * * "_How unreasonable is it to expect that the combined nations of Europe, with all their military strength, shall remain restricted to one-twelfth of this world's land, burrowed into and hewn over for the last thousand years, while this Republic, without armies, shall maintain dominion over one-half the unexploited lands of the world! Or that Japan, possessed of two-thirds the population of this nation and a military organization fifty-fold greater, shall continue to exist on her rocky isles that are, inclusive of Korea, but one-two-hundred-and-fiftieth of the earth's lands, while an undefended one-half lies under the guns of her battleships!_ * * * * * "_The Monroe Doctrine is Promethean in conception, but not so in execution. It was proclaimed in order to avoid wars; now it invites them...._ "_The Monroe Doctrine, if not supported by naval and military power sufficient to enforce its observance by all nations, singly and in coalition, becomes a factor more provocative of war than any other national policy ever attempted in modern or ancient times.... Societies, religions, unions, business men, and politicians on the one hand, spare no effort to debase every militant instinct and military efficiency or preparation necessary for its enforcement, while, on the other, they demand that the Chief Executive shall assert to the entire world this Republic's intention to maintain, by the force of arms if necessary, this most warlike and encompassing policy ever enunciated by man or nation._" * * * * * The Monroe Doctrine did not require that any American possessions of the European monarchies should be relinquished, but simply that they should not be extended; and that, if relinquished or lost, they should not be re-established as monarchical possessions. England, being in possession of the vast domain of Canada in North America, British Honduras and British Guiana in South America, and a goodly number of the West Indian islands, was in a position to look with favor on the Monroe Doctrine, because in the event of Great Britain being defeated in war by any of the Great Powers, her victor or victors would be unable to seize any of her American possessions, for automatically the United States would become an ally of Great Britain, and would, in order to defend the Monroe Doctrine, have to defend these possessions. When Sir Charles Tupper was High Commissioner of Canada, the writer saw him in London, and suggested to him that it would be a good idea for the Canadians to buy some automatic guns. He replied that Canada was very peculiarly situated; that she could not be attacked successfully by any Power unless the British fleet were first destroyed, which was not likely, and, in the possible event of that fleet being destroyed, then the United States would be obliged to defend Canada in order to defend the Monroe Doctrine. The peace sophists often refer to the unfortified border-line between the United States and Canada as an argument in favor of the abolition of armaments throughout the world. They fail to perceive that the same unarmed condition would not work between European countries, as, for example, between France and Germany. If the people of Canada and the United States were as different in race, language, ideals, and ambitions as are the French and Germans; and if, also, the two countries were as thickly settled and the inhabitants as land-hungry; and if each had a history as antagonistic as the French and Germans; then fortifications would be needed on the Canadian border. But the Canadians and ourselves are of the same race, we speak the same tongue, we have similar ideals and ambitions, and our history is not antagonistic; on the contrary, it has been largely a common history--the history of England, the mother country. England and France were obligated to defend Belgium against Germany. Their defenses consisted mainly in bluff, but they were, nevertheless, far better prepared to support Belgium than we would be to support any South American country against German aggression. The navy of England is so far superior to ours that should she at any time care to ignore the Monroe Doctrine and colonize in South America we should be absolutely unable to prevent her. She would be able to isolate us from South America and from the rest of the world, within the continental territory of the forty-eight states. An impenetrable barrier of British warships would lie between us and the Panama Canal. Therefore, it will be seen that our Monroe Doctrine is an Anglo-American compact, an _entente_, which we are obliged to defend if it should be in the interest of Great Britain, and which Great Britain would not be obliged to observe in case she might want to ignore it: Let us invite Admiral Mahan to conclude this chapter: * * * * * "_In the Monroe Doctrine, as now understood, and viewed in the light of the Venezuela incident, with the utterances then made by our statesmen of all parties, we have on hand one of the biggest contracts any modern state has undertaken._" * * * * * CHAPTER IV MODERN METHODS AND MACHINERY OF WAR "In the course of time, no one knows when or how soon, the family of nations may get to playing at cards, and beyond the sea, perhaps, will be found a 'full hand' against our three 'aces'--the Navy, Coast Fortifications, and the Militia." _Lieut. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, U.S.A._ "Whenever a nation's attitude toward war is evasive, its conduct indecisive, and its preparation an indifferent, orderless assembling of forces, it prepares for defeat." _Homer Lea._ In the _Sunday American_ of the seventeenth of January of this year, Mr. Andrew Carnegie gave expression to some opinions that challenge the attention of all thinking people of our country who, in this trying time of war, are becoming aroused and are asking themselves the question: Are we adequately prepared against the dread eventuality of war, and if not adequately prepared, why not? There is no person, of howsoever humble a station, whose opinion has not some weight. Horace Greeley--or was it Henry Ward Beecher?--once said that his views upon a very important subject underwent a material change from conversation with a blacksmith while having his horse shod. The opinion of Andrew Carnegie, the greatest steel and iron smith the world has ever known, is certain to have great weight with a very large number of persons, whatever the subject may be upon which he expresses himself. The world owes Andrew Carnegie a debt of deep gratitude for many most munificent and beneficent actions, and our gratitude to him has begotten love for him, and our gratitude and our love beget our sympathetic attention whenever he speaks. Consequently, when Mr. Carnegie speaks upon the subject of our national defense, he is bound to exercise a tremendous power for good or evil, and this power for good or evil is directly proportionate to the extent that his opinions are right or wrong. At this time, the question of our national defense is one of so serious concern that anything a well and favorably known man says may have a determining effect upon the minds of many persons, and thereby be fruitful of national good or national harm. If Mr. Carnegie is right in his belief that our best defense is in military defenselessness, then he is doing the country a great service through the wide publicity given to his opinions. If, on the other hand, he is in the wrong, he is doing this country a very great injury, and his words not only help defeat Congressional appropriations for building more guns, but also help to spike the few guns we have. Let us first consider some of the more remarkable and also the more radical of his statements. He says, to quote: * * * * * "_Not one of the great nations has the slightest desire to be other than friendly with the United States. We are a friend to all; an enemy of none. They could gain nothing by a war with us, nor would we by a war with them. We have no territorial ambitions, and only desire to be left alone._ "_As for this foolish talk of an invasion, that is an impossible contingency. Imagine any country being able to successfully bring enough troops to accomplish anything worth while from a military standpoint from a point three thousand miles off and attack a hundred millions of people!_ "_I have always said that if at any time any country was foolish enough to attempt invasion the best possible plan would be to make their landing as easy as possible, point out to them the best possible roads, and allow them to go as far as they desired to go inland. Then warn them to look out, and turn a million of our 16,000,000 of militia loose upon them. Getting in would be easy, but how to get out would result in surrender._ "_There is no other country in the world so well equipped to repel invasion or make it so hot for an enemy should he land as to make him exceedingly sorry he ever tried it._" * * * * * The foregoing statements of Mr. Carnegie contain in a nutshell the whole pith and gist of the present anti-armament peace advocacy, backed by the ten-million-dollar Carnegie foundation, representing an income of half a million dollars a year. Now, if it happens to be a fact that these views of Mr. Carnegie and his coterie of peace advocates are wrong, and if we need to take immediate and radical measures for our national defense, then whenever the Carnegie advocacy prevents a battery of guns being built, the resultant injury to the country is as great as though a battery of our guns were to be destroyed, or as though a battery of guns were made for a possible enemy. Truly, as Mr. Carnegie states, we are friendly to other nations, and we do not want any of their territory, but I do not agree with him that we have nothing which they might want, for we are both very rich and very defenseless, and the history of nations has shown that always the rich and the defenseless sooner or later become the prey of the poor and the powerful. One after another of the surrounding nations will likely be drawn into the war before it is over. After the present belligerents have settled their scores with the sword, there will be other scores to be settled between the victors and the neutral nations. Differences between the warring and the neutral powers--differences which, in time of peace, might produce very strained relations or precipitate war--may now be lightly passed over as mere discourtesies. But, after the war, some of the acts of the neutrals that at present seem quite insignificant may be magnified to advantage as _casus belli_. It is my opinion that, whichever side wins, the United States will likely have to fight the winner within a short time after the war is over, for neither the Germans nor the Allies, in the heat of passion that now dominates them, will be in a mood to forgive some of the things that we may feel compelled to do in the maintenance of our neutrality. In short, the things that we may be led to do to avoid being embroiled in the present war may serve to embroil us with the victors, unless the war should end in a draw. Mr. Carnegie thinks it would be quite a difficult undertaking for a foreign nation to land troops enough on our shores successfully to contend with our people. Our expert army and navy officers, who have been educated at government expense, and who are supposed to know about such matters, tell us that it would be impossible for us to mobilize and bring to the front more than 30,000 of our standing Army during the first month; and that it would be impossible to mobilize and get our militia into shape to resist an army of 100,000 of the well-trained and well-armed troops of one of the Great Powers, inside of a year and a half. Also, our naval and military experts tell us that it would require not only months, but years, to get our Navy into such efficient fighting trim as to be able to resist the navy of any one of the leading Great Powers of the world. They tell us that we are so short of ammunition that we might easily exhaust the present supply in the first four weeks of the war, and possibly in the first few days of the war. We are in the habit of speaking of our Navy as ranking somewhere second or third from the top. As a matter of fact, we rank much lower than that, because of the shortage of our ammunition supply. Just as a steam-engine cannot be run without fuel, regardless of its size and power, so a navy cannot be run without gunpowder. When the present war broke out, France, Germany, and England each had ten times as much smokeless powder on hand as we had. We have between forty and fifty million pounds of smokeless powder at the present time, whereas we should have 500,000,000 pounds. The only difficulty in landing as large an army as an enemy might desire upon our shore, would be in overcoming our fleet. Once our fleet were smashed, an enemy could land a hundred thousand men, either on our Atlantic or on our Pacific seaboard, long before we could mobilize the troops we have. In fact, a quarter of a million men could be landed before we could get the troops we have into fighting shape. Let us examine for one moment Mr. Carnegie's proposition to welcome an army of invaders, showing them the best roads to the interior, and then turning lose on them a million improvised citizen soldiers. Like Pompey, Mr. Carnegie seems to believe that he can raise an army at will by stamping his foot upon the ground. Not only should we have to raise the million men, but also we should have to provide small arms, Maxim guns, rapid-fire field-cannon, and siege howitzers for them. At least four years' instruction and experience in the use of these weapons would be required; furthermore, the men would have to be imbued with the courage that veterans have, which can be acquired only after much experience on the firing-line; they would have to be officered by men of military education and training, and lastly, they would need large corps of trained and experienced engineers, and also a trained commissariat. None of these things can be created in a day, or a month, or made efficient in a year, so that the army of invaders, after it had received the Carnegie welcome and had taken possession of the country, would have quietly to wait for us to get ready to swoop down on them, as Mr. Carnegie suggests. When the present war is over, should one of the belligerent nations, with its veteran fighting blood up, attack us, how are we prepared to meet that attack? Our army and navy men tell us that our position is pathetically defenseless. They tell us that, should our Navy be destroyed or evaded, and an army of only a hundred thousand men, equipped with all of the arms and paraphernalia of modern warfare, be landed on our coast, the invading army could go anywhere it might see fit, live off the country, capture our big cities, and hold us up for ransom in spite of all that we could do. What could we do? How could we flee? Where could we flee? We simply could not flee. Most of us have doubtless thought that if war should be declared, we would seek safety in the interior. But immediately war is declared, all the railroads and all automobiles will be commandeered for military purposes. All banks will close. All securities will be rendered worthless, and we, reduced to penniless hoboes, will be compelled to stay right here and face the music. Let us assume merely that an invading army of a hundred thousand men should be landed near New York. Should this army send out detachments to capture the places where our arms and munitions of war are made, they would not have far to go. A RICH PRIZE FOR A HOSTILE ARMY They would find the smokeless powder works of the United States Army and the Picatinny Arsenal, where all the smokeless powder and high explosives of the United States Army are stored, near Dover, New Jersey, about thirty-five miles from New York; also they would find there the big naval depot for ammunition and explosives. At Bridgeport, Connecticut, they would find the Union Metallic Cartridge Works, and the American and British Manufacturing Company's Works for the manufacture of rapid-fire cannon, and at New Haven they would find the Winchester Repeating Arms and Cartridge Company's Works and the Marlin Firearms Works. At Springfield, Massachusetts, they would find the Smith and Wesson Revolver Works and also the United States Arsenal, where our rifles are made. At Hartford, Connecticut, they would find the Colt Patent Firearms, and the Pratt and Whitney Works; at Ilion, New York, the Remington Small Arms Works, and at Utica, New York, the Savage Arms Works. They would find one of our most important big-gun factories at Troy, New York, and another at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, where also much of our armor-plate is made. The big Cramp Shipbuilding Works would be found at Philadelphia. They would find at Groton, Connecticut, the factory where all the interior parts of the Holland submarine boats are made, and at Fore River, Massachusetts, the big shipyard where the Holland submarine and other war vessels are constructed. [Illustration: The Heart of America] They would find the Lake Submarine Torpedo Boat Works at Bridgeport, the United States Naval Torpedo Station at Newport, Rhode Island, and one of our biggest navy yards, together with the E. W. Bliss Torpedo Works, in Brooklyn. The New York Arsenal they would find unprotected on Governor's Island. They would find the great duPont Smokeless Powder Works at Carney's Point, Parlin and Pompton Lakes, New Jersey, and at various points in New Jersey the largest and most important high-explosives works in the world. Take a map of the United States, and a pair of compasses, and with one point placed on the Hudson River, at Peekskill, New York, draw a circle having a radius of a hundred-and-sixty miles. There will be included within that circle all of the above-mentioned ammunition and armament works, which constitute nearly all the smokeless powder works, cartridge works, torpedo-boat works, small-arms works, and big-gun and armor-plate works in the United States. Also, this circle will include not only New York and nearby cities, but also Boston, Albany, Syracuse, Philadelphia, and the most important coal fields of Pennsylvania. The conquest of this area would not be a work of months, or of years, but only of a few days, and the thing would be done before we had time to mobilize the available fighting forces we have, much less to enlist and train and arm a citizen soldiery. This vital area is the solar plexus of Uncle Sam, and an army of a hundred thousand trained men, landed on our Atlantic seaboard, would be able to capture this entire area and subdue the populace as easily as the police force of New York can subdue a rioting mob. While we were arming and training our million men to make the Carnegie swoop, the army of invaders would be very busy. They would commandeer all our above-mentioned factories, and proceed to operate them with skilled American labor, which they would also commandeer and force to work, just as the Germans have forced the Belgians to work for them, and Mr. Carnegie's army of citizen soldiers would find themselves without means either of arming themselves or of supplying themselves with ammunition or of getting the skilled labor necessary to do the work. But this is not all that the invaders would be doing while we were getting our million men together. They would have means of knowing what we were doing, and they would send out a detachment and defeat our whole enterprise. They would probably levy on New York City for a billion dollars, and levy upon all the cities in the captured area for every dollar that could be squeezed from the inhabitants under threats of destruction. Not only this, but they might take the notion, and probably would take the notion, to annex the conquered territory, just as Germany has annexed Belgium, and, as we should then automatically become citizens of the enemy's country, we should be conscripted and forced to fight our own people, just as the Belgians, according to report, have been forced into the ranks of the Germans. Such a military measure is not new; it is as old as war itself. Frederick the Great frequently forced his prisoners to fight in his own ranks, and Napoleon Bonaparte sometimes gave them the option of joining his legions or of faring much worse. Attila took with him the entire male population of the countries through which he passed as additions to his military host. Those who resisted were immediately killed, and those he did not need were killed, whether they resisted or not. As to what may be done in war, there is no arbiter but necessity. To receive an invading army is not so pleasant a thing as Mr. Carnegie assumes. As guests they are just about as lovable and make just about as good pets in the family as rattlesnakes, cobras, scorpions, and tarantulas. A few Americans who were caught in the war zone when the present war broke out got some useful knowledge of war's inconveniences and harassments. What the people for whom there was no escape suffered in Belgium and Northern France, is beyond our powers of conception. No one who has not had personal experience can form the least idea of the barbarous atrocities perpetrated by an invading army on the defenseless population. Invaders always live off the invaded country. It is considered more important that they should live well than that any one else should live at all. If, after the invaders' wants are supplied, there is enough left for the people to live on, well and good; if not, then the people must starve. The invaders must have food and clothing and the bare necessaries of life; also, they must have luxuries. They must have cigars and cigarettes, wine, women, and song. If our country should be invaded, we should not only have to furnish food, clothing, cigars, cigarettes, and wine for the armies of the enemy, but also our wives and our daughters and our sweethearts would be commandeered to supply the women and song. Occasionally, an American citizen, with more manhood than discretion, would resent a nameless indignity, and kill some military blackguard, who would immediately be avenged by the burning of the town and the corralling and shooting of the people with machine-guns. This is not an overdrawn picture--the thing has actually been done in the present war. It is very likely that some of us who look upon this page will be forced to see wife or daughter or sweetheart namelessly maltreated to gratify the brutal lust of an invader, and lose our own life for a blow on the scoundrel's jaw or a stab in his ribs, unless--aye, there's the rub--unless this whole country awakens to its danger and rises up as one man and demands prompt and adequate defensive measures for national protection. As this saving thing is not likely to happen, the entire country east of the Alleghanies will probably be Belgiumized with fire and the sword, depredated, degraded, and desolated by an invading army within a very short time after the European War is over. This is an age of mechanics--an age wherein man-made mechanism more and more replaces hand work. Everywhere in our industries of peace, we have seen labor-saving machinery replace the labor of human hands. Today all the men in the world could not do by hand all of the world's ploughing, sowing, reaping, and carrying of the world's food to market; all the women in the world could not, today, do the world's sewing without the sewing-machine; and all the men in the world and all the women in the world combined could not, today, do a tenth of the world's writing without the typewriter and type-setting and printing machinery. One of the giant dredges that have been ladling out of the Panama Canal the vast landslides, can do the pick and shovel and wheelbarrow work of a thousand men. Everywhere, in everything we do, and in everything done for us, we find human hands now mainly engaged in guiding the work of labor-saving machinery. The people of the United States of America have been able to develop their enormous resources and to keep abreast of the world's industrial progress mainly by the invention of labor-saving machinery under the protection of our patent law. In our competition with other nations for the markets of the world, no one thinks of referring to the prowess of our unskilled citizen soldiers of industry unsupported by machinery, but all reliance is placed upon our multiform labor-saving machinery, and our skilled labor behind that machinery. With these pregnant facts before us, it is very strange that it should not be perfectly plain to every one that what is true of labor-saving machinery in peace is likewise true in war. It is very strange indeed that there should be intelligent men and women among us unable to see and to understand that labor-saving machinery and labor skilled in its use are as applicable and as indispensable to successful warfare as to peaceful industry. Furthermore, labor-saving machinery in war is life-saving machinery. The quick-firing gun is the greatest life-saving instrument ever invented. These persons do not seem to appreciate that war is an industry. As a matter of stern fact, war is, and has always been, the biggest and the most vital industry of mankind, and in no other industry is labor-saving machinery so important and so vital, and in no other industry does so much depend upon the skill of the labor operating the machinery. We are the slaves of belief, and we love our chains. Although our faith may be false, we hate the hand that tries to free us. The people of this country have a great false faith in the fighting qualities of their citizen soldiery, improvised in time of war. They point proudly to the War of the Revolution and the War of the Rebellion to prove how our volunteer soldiers can fight. They overlook the fact that fighting was then mostly done by hand; that now it is mostly done by machinery, and that it is just as foolish and absurd to think of taking untrained men off the farm to operate the guns and machinery of war as it would be to try to operate the factories with them where the guns and machinery are made. It takes as long today to convert a farmer into a skilled soldier as it does to convert him into a skilled mechanic. Battles are no longer decided merely by the patriotism and personal bravery of the rank and file, nor even by their numbers, but by the efficiency and sufficiency of machinery and materials of destruction and the science and scientific experience of the commanding officers. There is no time to build steam-fire-engines or to train fire brigades after a conflagration has broken out. A citizen soldiery without years of training in the discipline and weapons and mechanism of modern warfare is only a mob, as easily scattered by a few real soldiers as chaff by a whirlwind. George Washington held the following opinion about the value of militia in warfare: * * * * * "_Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as offense, and when a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force ... the firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence."--Washington._ * * * * * If Washington held it a mistake to rely on untrained, undisciplined men in time of war, who can differ with him today, when not only bravery and discipline are required, but also a knowledge of the complicated enginery of warfare? It is obvious to any one that ten men armed with the modern magazine shoulder-rifle, with a range of more than two miles, would easily be able to defeat a thousand men--a hundred times their number--armed with slings and bows and arrows, short-swords and spears, as was the army of Hannibal. Hannibal's famous Balearic slingers were able to hurl a slug of lead through a man. But ten riflemen would have time to kill a thousand of them before they could get within sling range. A thousand of the famous English bowmen who fought at Agincourt could all be destroyed by our ten riflemen before they could get within bowshot. The same thing holds equally true with old short-range and obsolete firearms, as compared with the longer range and more accurate guns of the latest pattern. Ten good marksmen, armed with the latest rifles, could kill a thousand equally skilled marksmen armed with the old muzzle-loaders of the Civil War, before they could get within range. These ten men would each be able to fire with ease a carefully aimed shot every two and a half seconds; the ten men could fire 250 aimed shots a minute. A thousand men, armed with the old muzzle-loaders, would surely have to advance at least a mile and a half after coming within range of the modern rifles before they could get the ten riflemen within range of their muzzle-loaders. Charging forward on the run, it would take them at least ten minutes to cover the mile and a half. In that time the ten riflemen would be able to fire 2,500 carefully-aimed shots. Such is the difference in the potentiality of troops dependent upon suitable arms. With the modern automatic magazine-rifle a single soldier would be able to defeat a hundred men armed with the old smooth-bore single-shot muzzle-loaders of the Civil War; in fact, he would be able to kill or wound every one of them in an open frontal attack over level ground with his long-range rapid-fire rifle before they could get near enough even to reach him with their short-range muskets. One man operating an automatic machine-gun would be more than a match for a thousand men, armed with the old Civil War musket in an open-view frontal attack, over a distance covered by the range of the machine gun. In fact, with this weapon, firing 600 shots a minute, he could play the gun on their advancing line with the freedom of a hose pipe, and put them _hors de_ _combat_ in a few minutes--certainly, before they could get near enough to reach him with their short-range guns. Half a dozen automatic machine-guns supported by a battery of half a dozen modern rapid-fire field-guns throwing shrapnel shell at the rate of from thirty to forty a minute, planted on Cemetery Hill, would have been able to defeat Pickett's charge at Gettysburg more quickly than did the entire Army of the Potomac. It is obvious, therefore, that a nation's war potentiality depends very largely upon its preparedness to fight by machinery, and that a mere citizen soldiery, without the machinery of modern warfare, is as impotent in the face of modern war engines as a swarm of ants in the face of an anteater. It is obvious that, whereas fighting machinery is very expensive, modern warfare is a very costly business, and a business requiring an enormous investment; and also that, whereas a thing is worth most in war which can, for the least cost, produce the best results, machinery becomes much more valuable than life. A single field-piece may be worth more than a hundred men, and at times even more than a thousand men. In modern warfare, the cost in treasure and machinery is of far greater concern than the loss in blood. Therefore, the efficiency and great cost of all kinds of modern fighting equipment have served to give the great nations pause, and to make them consider well the awful risk before precipitating war. The progress in fighting machinery of every sort has been so rapid, and the number of wars so few, that until now there has been no adequate opportunity to test fighting machinery in actual warfare. In direct proportion as warfare becomes more scientific, complicated, and expensive does it require longer time to prepare for war, both in the making of the enginery and in the making of the soldiers. Time signifies only the measure of change. Consequently, time is merely a relative term, indicative of the sequence in a series of happenings or eventuations. If the universe were annihilated, there would be no such thing as time because nothing would happen. Were we to be attacked by any foreign Power, we should be able to rely, not upon what we might be able to produce three or four years afterward, but upon what we should be able to put into action at once. Modern methods and machinery of war cause events to move many times as fast as in former wars. Three months is a long time after war is declared. A six months' war today is relatively as long as a six years' war used to be. The following extract from Bernhardi's "How Germany Makes War" is evidence of that expert's opinion of the factor of time: * * * * * "_If Germany is involved in war, she need not recoil before the numerical superiority of her enemies. But so far as human nature is able to tell, she can only rely on being successful if she is resolutely determined to break the superiority of her enemies by a victory over one or the other of them before their total strength can come into action, and if she prepares for war to that effect, and acts at the decisive moment in that spirit which made Frederick the Great seize the sword against a world in arms._" * * * * * Napoleon once said, "The fate of nations often hangs on five minutes," and, "God fights on the side of the heaviest artillery." Also, he said, in effect, that the art of winning battles depends upon the concentration on the chief point of attack of a force superior to the enemy at that point. If we pass our finger down the pages of history, we shall find the above expression of Napoleon thoroughly substantiated and vindicated. Most great battles have been won by the concentration of a superior force upon an inferior force at some vulnerable point, and often quite irrespective of the sizes of the opposing armies taken as a whole. Everything depends upon the quickness in concentration of concerted action. The herculean physique of Goliath did not count for much after little David hit him with the pebble. He needs be a big man indeed not to be whipped when even a small antagonist has succeeded in thrusting a dagger close to the heart. Armies, like individuals, have vital parts, the penetration of which means defeat. Alexander the Great frequently met and annihilated armies many times larger than his own. He was often weaker than the enemy as a whole, but at the point of attack he was always vastly the stronger. This enabled him to crush the enemy in detail. Hannibal, Cæsar, Charles Martel, Marlborough, Cromwell, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Grant, Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Sheridan--all great captains--appreciated and applied this winning principle: Be able to strike the enemy upon one given point with greater force than he shall be able to oppose, and strike first; then follow up the advantage and crush the enemy in detail by concentrated force always superior at the point of attack, however inferior to the general force to which it is opposed and through which it penetrates. Broadly speaking, the machinery of modern warfare adds a thousand-fold to the potentiality of the soldier in battle above his potentiality at the time of the Civil War. Ten thousand men, armed with modern guns and all the paraphernalia of modern warfare, would on the battle-line be more than a match for a million men armed with the old smooth-bore guns of the Civil War. As a matter of fact they could kill all that surrounded them as fast as they approached from every quarter, and they could advance through the opposing lines with absolute freedom without the loss of a single man from the fire of the enemy. Let us see for one moment what ten thousand men would be able to do upon such a host in open frontal attack: Let us assume that the ten thousand were armed with a thousand automatic guns, and, say, a hundred rapid-fire field-guns, in addition to the usual magazine shoulder-rifle. As soon as the enemy came in sight, the ten thousand would open on them with their hundred field-guns, pouring into their ranks a perfect storm of shrapnel. The old, smooth-bore field-guns of the enemy would be completely disabled before they could be brought within cannon-shot of the ten thousand. As soon as the enemy came within rifle range, the ten thousand would open on them with their thousand automatic machine-guns and magazine-rifles. As an automatic machine-gun fires at the rate of 600 shots a minute, a thousand would fire at the rate of 600,000 shots a minute. The magazine shoulder-rifles would fire aimed shots at the rate of twenty-five a minute, and the quick-firing field-guns would each fire shrapnel at the rate of forty a minute. Making every allowance for stoppages and for variables, dispersion of fire and bad marksmanship, there would be enough effectual hits with the shrapnel, the automatic machine-gun fire, and the magazine-rifle fire, to kill or wound every man of the enemy before that enemy could get near enough to reach the ten thousand with their old smooth-bore muskets. Every automatic gun and every quick-firing field-gun and every magazine shoulder-rifle puts in the hands of our soldiers the means of avoiding a corresponding sacrifice of their lives. Not only this, but every automatic gun that we make and furnish our troops enables one man to do the work of a hundred men; it enables a hundred men to remain at home engaged in peaceful pursuits while only one man has to go to the battle front and fight. Then let us realize the fact that every automatic gun saves a hundred lives from jeopardy. Every magazine-rifle saves ten lives, and every quick-firing field-cannon saves easily a hundred lives. This should make a strong appeal to the professional pacifists who pretend that they want to save life. Surely, if war cannot be prevented, and all history, and the present moment as well, prove that it cannot, then we should make it as merciful as possible, and fight it in a way that will cause as little sacrifice of life as possible. In estimating the cost of war in human lives, we cannot count values that may be placed upon them by sentiments of humanity, but only such values as, when destroyed, make the losing nation economically so much the poorer. According to I. S. Bloch, a new-born child of the farming class has a value of twenty-five dollars. At five years of age, he has a value of two hundred and fifty dollars; at ten years of age, he is worth about five hundred dollars; at fifteen, he is worth almost a thousand dollars; and at twenty, he is worth a little more than a thousand dollars. His maximum value is at twenty, and he begins to depreciate in value as he grows older, because of his shortened days of service. Therefore, the average economic value of soldiers may, according to Mr. Bloch, be put at a thousand dollars. According to David Starr Jordan, it costs about fifteen thousand dollars for each soldier killed in battle, so that, according to these two eminent peace advocates and peace propagandists, when the Germans slay, say, a thousand of the Allies, the loss to the Allies is the value of the thousand men, namely, a million dollars, and as it costs the Germans fifteen times as much to kill them as they are worth, the loss to the Germans is fifteen million dollars; so that the actual German loss is fifteen times as great as that of the Allies. But as the Allies are killing a good many Germans, they are generously sharing with the Germans a fair proportion of the cost of the war. These figures are not far out of the way. The fact is that, in modern warfare, the actual loss of life for the numbers engaged is correspondingly less than it used to be, while the cost is correspondingly greater. In modern warfare, the loss of money is far greater than the loss of life. It is more the dollar than blood, that is now shed. In ancient times, when men fought hand to hand in compact form, with short-sword, spear, and battle-axe, they used often to slay half the numbers engaged--easily ten times as many for the numbers engaged as are now slain. There are more than ten million Allies now under arms against more than seven million Germans and Austrians. These numbers have not as yet all been brought face to face with one another on the line of battle, owing to modern methods of warfare; but under old-time methods with old-time arms, they would have been at once brought into collision in two enormous armies. In ancient times, less mobilization could be effected in a year than can now be effected in a month, but when the collision came, the issue of the war was decided on one great field. If these great European armies were armed with short-swords, spears, and battle-axes, as armies used to be, instead of with modern war weapons and enginery, they would, during the time they have been engaged, very likely have slain a third of their number--certainly ten times as many in proportion to the numbers engaged as have actually been killed in the present war. Even a tenth of their numbers would be a million and a half. Never in all history have such vast numbers of men been drawn up in line of battle. Never have they been so scientifically armed, and, consequently, never have they, for the numbers engaged, killed so few. Modern machine-guns and quick-firing guns, with bullets and shrapnel and canister, are so deadly that troops in mass form cannot live for a minute in front of them, but as opposing armies with modern war machinery line up at the present greater tactical distances, and throw out their men in long-extended battle-lines, and spread them over correspondingly wide areas, the fight becomes one largely of gun against gun, engine against engine, with the result that not nearly so many lives are lost as there would be if the fighting were done by hand, and hand to hand, in close order. The German siege guns smashed the forts of Liège and Namur from a distance of nine miles. As nations are bound to fight, it is far more merciful that they should be armed to the teeth, but it is vastly more expensive. Can we not afford, however, to spend dollars instead of men to kill our enemies? Therefore, even according to the facts and figures of those two eminent peace-men, I. S. Bloch and Dr. David Starr Jordan, the money loss today is a concern fifteen times more serious to the economic welfare of a nation than is the loss in lives. It is a very strange paradox indeed that the professional peace-propagandists, who claim to be actuated mainly by considerations of humanity, should advocate disarmament and the inevitable reversion to the old and more deadly arms and methods of warfare, on account of the greater expensiveness of warfare conducted with modern scientific arms and methods. By doing away with our present highly scientific and very expensive war enginery and fighting methods, the nations would be able, in a war like the present, to kill one another at very much less cost. They would then be able to kill ten times as many in a given time, while the cost would be only a small fraction of the present cost. It is a matter of solemn certainty that the quick-firing gun is the most beneficent implement of mercy that has ever been invented, and every peace advocate in the world and every lover of his kind should appreciate this fact and use his influence in favor of armaments which serve to make war expensive, and tend both to prevent war, and to save life when war comes. Let us for a moment suppose that the great European Powers had disarmed fifteen years ago when the Czar of Russia broached the subject to them. What would have been the result? This war would have come just the same, and probably much sooner; and it would have been ten-fold more bloody, even had the nations flung themselves upon one another armed with scythes, carving-knives, wood-axes, and common tools of trade, or even had they fought, as the simple cave men did, with clubs and stones. Love of home and country--patriotism--on the one hand, and race hatred on the other, are far more potent in the human heart than any lately created sentiments of international brotherhood and humanity. Before this war came, it was a common preachment of the peace-men and a common belief of the multitude, that many socialists, members of brotherhoods of labor and other opponents of war, would refuse to fight, and if drafted would shoot down their officers from the rear. But nothing of this kind has happened. When this war broke out, socialist, labor unionist, and preacher of international brotherhood joined with their militant fellow-countrymen in singing the "Marseillaise," "Wacht am Rhein," "Britannia Rules the Waves," and rushed to arms and to war, and are now fighting like demons, shoulder to shoulder with the imperialist and the war lord. In order that we may be made as right-seeking as possible, God has ordained the trials of strife and hardship which force us to get busy, and thereby develop our usefulness. Human duty may be expressed in the following terms: The best preparation for the attainment of success in life is the acquisition of a thorough realization of the fact that no one deserves more from the world than he earns out of it, and that the bigness or littleness of any one is exactly proportionate to his use to the world, and that, consequently, actual self-service is impossible except indirectly through world-service. Whatever may be done in the service of an individual to help him attain success and find comfort, or to lessen his discomfort, may not be best for the general good, because individual welfare must, in the end of things, be subservient to the general welfare. It sometimes becomes perfectly right and proper that individual life should be sacrificed for national life, but never national life for individual life. The nation has, however, its obligations to the individual, and obligations as exacting as those of the individual to the nation. If a nation does not exercise due and reasonable diligence to safeguard its people against war and does not provide itself with the necessary trained men and machinery to forefend war, then the obligation of the individual to the nation in the event of war is just so much lessened. The leading of an untrained and ill-armed, improvised citizen soldiery against an army of trained veterans, with all of the equipment of modern warfare, results in useless, senseless slaughter. If a nation does not prepare itself to demand and enforce respectful treatment of its citizens in foreign countries, then its citizens should have no patriotism, for they are like men and women without a country. But when a nation is armed with guns, and armed with the purpose to defend its citizens, wherever they may be, to the last man and last pinch of gunpowder, and is so adequately prepared with labor-saving, life-saving machinery that in the event of war the minimum of human sacrifice shall be made, then it is the duty of every man to place himself unreservedly at the service of his country. If the people of this country could be roused to a realization of what invasion means, there would be no longer heard any senseless prating about an unarmed peace, but the whole people would rise in their might and demand adequate armaments and an adequate army and navy, and the senseless peace fanatics would be burned in effigy. We have for half a century listened with confidence to the assurance that we are so splendidly isolated by broad seas that we need not fear invasion. Our inadequate Navy is today the only bulwark against invasion, for modern means of transportation over seas have reduced the ocean to a ferry. Both England and Germany have navies superior to our own, and would be able to destroy our Navy, and land on our unfortified shores a hundred thousand men in less than two weeks--half the time that would be required for us to mobilize our little Army of thirty thousand men. Japan is not so far away as she used to be. She has been rapidly narrowing the Pacific, and she could land a quarter of a million men on the Pacific coast in less than a month, much quicker than we could get our thirty thousand regulars there to receive them. We are no longer splendidly isolated from other nations. We are isolated only from ourselves, and we are truly splendidly isolated in that particular. The other nations are isolated only by such time and difficulty as they would have to encounter in order to bring veteran troops to our shores, with all the necessary equipment of war, and, as we have seen, this is an isolation of less than a month, while we are isolated by unpreparedness by at least fifty months, for it would take more than four years, if we should start now, to raise, equip, and train an army that would compare in numbers, equipment, and training with the army that any one of the Great Powers could place upon our shores in a month. In a recent interview, Secretary of War Garrison said: * * * * * "_If tomorrow any first-class military power should attack the United States in force and should succeed in getting her warships and soldier-laden transports past our fleet, landed out of range of our coast defenses, once fairly ashore she could pulverize our small regular army and punish us to a humiliating degree, if not actually make us sue for peace, before we could raise and train a volunteer army adequate to cope with the invaders. In other words, at present our navy is our only considerable bulwark against invasion. Even such part of our militia as we could depend on and the available regular army would make an extremely small force, our army being in size only a local police force, well trained and highly efficient indeed, but in numbers little more than twice the size of the police force of New York City--that is, not large enough for our great country even as a mere police force._" * * * * * Let us, for argument's sake, assume for a moment that we were to be invaded with an army of only a hundred thousand men, trained, equipped, and supplied with the supreme adequacy with which the troops of the other Great Powers are trained, equipped, and supplied. The enemy would line up in a battle-front three times as long as our little thirty thousand could be stretched with equal powers of concentration, or if our thirty thousand were to be stretched out a hundred miles we should be at least three times as weak as the enemy at any point of attack, even were our thirty thousand to be as well equipped and as well supplied as the troops of the enemy. But we should be without the requisite field artillery, and the artillery that we should have would be without the requisite training. We should be without the needed cavalry, and our cavalry would be without proper organization and experience. We should be without ammunition trains, and very short of ammunition. Our troops, hustled together, and rushed to the front for the first time to face a real enemy, would be unprepared to behave like an army, and, what is very important, they would have no hope of success. Despair would be in the heart of every man. Both officers and men would know that there were no ready resources, no reserves and reserve supplies behind them, and no adequate arrangements for providing any. Every man of the thirty thousand would know that he was being sacrificed in atonement for national blundering, just as at Balaklava the noble Six Hundred were by a blunder sacrificed in the charge of the Light Brigade. PREPONDERANCE OF GUN-FIRE It is strange how little the law of battles is understood by most persons. Most persons imagine that in a fight between our Navy and another navy, or between our Army and the army of an enemy, although the enemy might have the advantage in the number of ships and in the size and range of guns, the advantage would be immaterial and one which might be balanced by the superiority of our personnel, and that, although we might be somewhat short of the required field batteries and ammunition, the superior fighting qualities of our men would render them more than a match for the enemy, even in the face of superior gun-fire. It does not appear to have been fully recognized even by the advocates of better equipment for the American Army, how vitally important is length of range in field artillery. In the Boer War, the British field batteries found themselves at great disadvantage in face of the longer French guns of the Boer batteries. In the present European war, the great long-range German howitzers, pummeling forts into heaps of scrap, and their plunging fire blowing great craters along the battle-front, spread terror in the ranks of the Allies, similar to the terror that the Romans felt when the fierce Gothic giants slid down the Alps into the vineyards of Italy. But the long-range French field-artillery soon restored confidence, for it was found that the French field batteries could outrange the German batteries. We need field-guns of longer range. We need field-guns that shall not only equal in range those now in use in Europe, but also we need guns of even longer range. We should have field-guns of a range sufficient to command sky-line from opposing sky-line. Here is an opportunity for the vaunted American genius to assert itself. It is necessary that the facts as they actually are should be recognized and appreciated. Victory in a naval battle today depends absolutely upon the weight of the broadsides and the speed of the vessels, which enables them to manoeuvre and choose positions of advantage with respect to the enemy; while victory or defeat in a land fight depends upon the weight of gun-fire, which can be directed against the positions of an enemy. The actual number of infantry engaged is of secondary importance. It is artillery that is of supreme importance. Should we be involved, our field artillery must pave the way with the dead bodies of the enemy before our infantry can advance. Also, the batteries of the enemy must be silenced by our own batteries before they, with their gun-fire, shall be able to silence ours. Other things being equal, therefore, it is the number of field batteries that, more than anything else, turns the tide of battle for defeat or victory. If the enemy's guns have a longer range than ours, then they will be able to silence our batteries while far beyond the range of our guns. They will be able to destroy our artillery, while we should not be able even to injure theirs. [Illustration: Relative Numerical Strength of Field Artillery] Let us picture a land fight: Our aërial scouts inform us that the enemy is approaching, and that they have already mounted their long-range field artillery on a convenient ridge; also that they have placed their big howitzers on an adjoining lowland under the concealment of a wood, and that this formation is repeated in similar units from ridge to ridge and hill to hill over a front a hundred miles in length. The enemy has also dug long lines of trenches far in advance of their artillery. The enemy's position is well beyond the range of our artillery. We are unable to reach the enemy's position with our guns, while the enemy, being provided with guns of much longer range, is able to storm our position along our entire front, and to throw shrapnel shell into the trenches filled with our men, which stretch along the lowland in front of our positions. We try to dig additional trenches to advance our front, but the men sent to do the work are very quickly killed by the shrapnel fire of the enemy. We see with our field-glasses that the enemy has sent out detachments to advance the line of their trenches. We fire at them, and find that our shrapnel falls far short. The enemy, seeing this, advances and digs trenches close up to the limit of the range of our guns. All at once, the enemy opens fire with shrapnel upon our entire line of trenches, and with shrapnel and howitzers upon all our fortified positions. We return the fire, but without any effect; the range of our guns being too short to reach the enemy. Many of our guns are quickly silenced. The perfect hurricane of shrapnel thrown upon our trenches has killed large numbers of our men and confounded the remainder. The infantry of the enemy now advances pell-mell over the intervening space, still under cover of artillery fire. Field batteries of the enemy also advance rapidly and take up new positions. Finding our positions untenable, our army retreats precipitately, taking with it a few remaining guns, and our men re-form their batteries on commanding positions to cover our retreat, but they are soon dislodged by the long-range guns of the enemy. Finally, our army takes up its stand far in the rear, forming a new battle-front, which has been previously fortified. The enemy advances, repeats the previous tactics, forming a long battle-front on commanding positions just beyond the range of our guns, and again proceeds to dislodge us, and drive us back by their long-range gun-fire. Our loss in men and guns has been enormous. The enemy, on the contrary, has lost no guns, and but few men. It will be seen that the enemy can very easily proceed in this manner into the interior, and conquer the whole country without suffering very much discomfiture, unless we have guns of as long or longer range than the enemy has, and as many of them, also as many skilled troops to operate them. Most persons imagine that infantry, armed with the modern long-range magazine-rifles, can go into battle, and shoot large numbers of an enemy, and that, if the infantry is numerous and daring enough and brave enough, they will be able to whip the enemy without the support of field artillery. This is a grave error. An army of a million men, consisting entirely of infantry, armed with modern shoulder-arms, would be completely over-matched and easily defeated by an army of 25,000 men amply equipped with modern field artillery. The infantry would be wholly unable to get within musket-range, because they would all be destroyed by the shrapnel of the enemy before they could get near enough to fire a single effective shot. A hundred thousand English, Germans, or Japanese, equipped with the longest and best modern field artillery, with plenty of ammunition and supply trains, air-scouts and engineer corps, could, in our present defenseless condition, march through this country as Xenophon's ten thousand marched through ancient Persia. They could cut their way through all opposition that we could offer. We have neither the infantry, nor the artillery, nor the cavalry, to oppose them, and the artillery we have is of so much shorter range that at no time could we get near enough to the enemy to reach him with our guns. If war comes between us and any of the Great Powers, the splendid young men of the country--husbands, fathers, sons, brothers, lovers--will have to go to the front and meet the invaders. If they go forward equipped with the necessary arms, ammunition, and enginery of war, and are well trained and well officered, then they will be able not only to hold their own against the invaders, with comparatively little loss of life, but also to repel and drive out the enemy and save our land from spoliation and our homes from despoliation. If, on the other hand, they are to be sent forward without the necessary arms, ammunition, and enginery, and without training, and incompetently or incompletely officered, as the pacifist propagandists and other sentimentalists are advising and planning that they be sent, then they will go just like lambs to the slaughter. The zone of fire in front of the enemy's trenches will be heaped high, acres wide and miles long, with their dead bodies; and writhing, groaning, shrieking, agonized forms of the wounded will crawl over and under the dead toward the hope of safety and mercy. Into such a hell are the hyper-sentimental peace sophists planning to send those you most love, those to whom you most cling, and on whom you most depend; and you are aiding and abetting the crime if you believe the words of these false reasoners. Every word you aim against necessary preparedness for war may, in the final reckoning, aim a gun at the heart of him whom you love more than all the world; and you might be able to say a word that would protect him with a gun. That human attribute which, more than any other, distinguishes man from the brute, is imagination. Also, it is the attribute which, more than any other, differentiates the normal man from the criminal. If, in imagination, a would-be murderer could foresee the distorted face and the despairing agony of his dying victim, and could foresee the tear-streaming eyes of those mourning for him, he would, unless brazened against every feeling of pity, stay his hand. If those who, through their ignorance, false belief, or hypocrisy and desire for publicity, are planning to sacrifice the unimaginable thousands of our best young men in the bloody shambles of war, as an offering to false faith, vanity, or hypocrisy, could only foresee in imagination the long lines of manhood swept and annihilated by the withering fire of an enemy, without guns to return that fire, then possibly they might submerge personal limelight-lust for considerations of mercy. If you believe them, and speak as they are speaking, and advise as they are advising, against adequate national defense, you should at once change your belief, and use your voice and every resource at your command in future to forefend this country and avert the great useless sacrifice. Come, young lady reader, let us, in imagination, stand together on the firing-line: Those regiments lining up are from New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts. They are forming for a charge. It is the only way. Those shells, bursting among them with such deadly effect, are shrapnel from the quick-firing guns of the enemy placed just over the crest of yonder distant ridge; and those huge plunging projectiles, which throw up great inverted cones of earth, with fragments of men, are from the enemy's big howitzers, located under cover of the wood that fringes the horizon. If we only had the necessary quick-firing field-guns and shrapnel ammunition, and the necessary field howitzers, we might dislodge or silence those deadly batteries of the enemy. At any rate, we should be able to engage them efficiently and cover the charge of our troops. We should also be able to storm that line of trenches, to the discomfiture of the enemy hidden there in vast numbers, and thus to prepare for the onset of our men. But we have neither the guns nor the ammunition. See--the order is given. Onward they go. Watch them, the brave fellows! Why does the front line lie down so suddenly, with a few left standing? My friend, they are not lying down; they are dead. But they are not all killed, a large number of them are wounded. They are torn in every inconceivable, horrible manner of mutilation. And look!--the other lines go down, too; some lying still, others writhing on the ground. One of those poor devils, with hands clenched in the grass and gnawing the earth, is your brother! See--a huge howitzer shell explodes right among them. The young man whom you were to marry on his return from the war was standing on the verge of the crater when the explosion came, and he is now lying there, with both eyes blown out by the awful blast and hanging on his cheeks. There are visions of you in the blasted eyes, and there are thoughts of you in the dazed brain, and his dying breath is a whisper of your name. Will you continue to think thoughts and speak words which may drive him to that awful death? The picture is horrible. That of the blasted eyes is revolting. True, and for this reason it may not come within the artistic, as outlined in the philosophy of Longinus; but it is not my purpose here to be artistic. My very purpose is to visualize the horrible, because the only way for the people of this country to prevent this on-coming horror is to make the necessary military preparations for national defense. But, young lady, this is not the end of the dreadful picture: Let us look into your home. The awful news comes--our men are beaten with enormous slaughter; father, brother, sweetheart--all your home's defenders--are dead. The invaders who have murdered them are in the street outside. There comes a summons at the door. A certain number of the enemy have been billeted to your house, and you must play the genial hostess. Though they get drunk, and ill-treat you beyond the power of words to tell, there remains no remedy. Your dear ones, who were your natural defenders, have been sacrificed on the altar of false faith in defenselessness as a deterrent of war. CHAPTER V THE NEEDS OF OUR ARMY * * * * * LETTER FROM GENERAL LEONARD WOOD GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N. Y., _February 6th, 1915._ _Dear Mr. Maxim:_ _I am very glad indeed to learn of your interest in military preparedness. The subject is one which is of vital importance to the American people. We do not want to establish militarism in this country in the sense of creating a privileged military class, dominating the civil element, receiving especial recognition, and exercising perhaps an undue influence upon the administration of national affairs, but we do want to build up in every boy a realization of the fact that he is an integral part of the nation, and that he has a military as well as a civic responsibility. All this can be done without creating a spirit of militarism or of aggressiveness. Take Switzerland as an example. Here we have a country where every boy and young man who is physically sound receives, largely as a part of his school work, military training to the extent necessary to make him an efficient soldier. This is a policy which ought to be followed with our youth. It is not enough that a man should be willing to be a soldier. He should also be so prepared as to be an efficient one. This can only be accomplished through training. Switzerland and Australia have shown that this can be done through the public-school system, and with a resulting vast improvement in public morals and the quality of citizenship. The criminal rate in Switzerland is only a small fraction of ours. Respect for the law and constituted authorities, the flag of the country, and a high sense of patriotism are evident on all sides, and yet there is practically no standing army._ _We have here a patriotic people, living not with arms in their hands, or with a large standing army, but trained, equipped, and ready to efficiently and promptly defend the rights of their country. This I believe is the ideal we should strive for. We need a standing army big enough for the peace work of the day, i.e., the garrisoning of our foreign possessions, the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, Panama, the little garrisons in Porto Rico and Alaska, and a force in the continental United States adequate for the peace needs of the nation._ _We must never again trust ourselves to the emergencies of a great war without proper preparation. If we do we shall meet with an overwhelming disaster. Preparedness is really an insurance for peace, and not an influence for war._ [Illustration] _To send our men untrained into war to meet equally good men, well trained and disciplined, was once described by Light Horse Harry Lee, of Revolutionary fame, as murder. Perhaps this is too strong, but it certainly is a gross disregard of human life._ _Very truly yours,_ LEONARD WOOD. MR. HUDSON MAXIM, _698 St. Mark's Ave., Brooklyn, N. Y._ * * * * * The facts given in this chapter have been gathered from many authoritative sources. It would be very comforting if these facts were known only to the American people, but unfortunately they are already known to the military authorities of all the other nations. Other nations are all very well aware of our unpreparedness; therefore, I am giving out no national secrets. English, German, French, Russian, and Japanese navy and military experts know exactly the men and equipment we possess. It is the American people only who are not aware of the truth about our unpreparedness. This ignorance is largely due to the beguilers who have set the face of a great mass of our people against armaments, and have made them turn deaf ears to every voice that tries to rouse them to their danger. Our ship of state has been drifting down stream like a raft. The only reason the raft has not been wrecked lies in the fact that we have been fortunate enough to have a pretty clear stream to ourselves all the while, with no breakers and no cataracts in sight. But there are breakers and rapids and cataracts down stream, and we are at last nearing them rapidly. Even as long ago as 1880, General Emory Upton spoke thus prophetically: * * * * * "_In time of war the civilian as much as the soldier is responsible for defeat and disaster. Battles are not lost alone on the field; they may be lost beneath the Dome of the Capitol, they may be lost in the Cabinet, or they may be lost in the private office of the Secretary of War. Wherever they may be lost, it is the people who suffer and the soldiers who die, with the knowledge and the conviction that our military policy is a crime against life, a crime against property, and a crime against liberty. The author has availed himself of his privilege as a citizen to expose to our people a system which, if not abandoned, may sooner or later prove fatal. The time when some one should do this has arrived._" * * * * * In 1912, Admiral Kane said: "They told me in London, 'You are living in a fool's paradise. Some day you will wake up with a fight on your hands, and you won't be ready for it.'" Not only must the United States solve the great problem of shaping a military policy that will enable us to establish an adequate force for national defense in time of war, to build up and man our Navy, construct and man coast fortifications, and enlist, arm, and train an adequate army, but also there must be faced the far more difficult problem of enlisting the co-operation of the American people in the enterprise. The fathers of our country, believing that a large standing Army would be a menace to the liberties of the people, ordained that our Army, in time of peace, should not exceed twenty-five thousand. Since then, Congress has several times raised the limit until we now may have an Army, in time of peace, of not more than a hundred thousand men. As a matter of fact, we have a regular Army of 93,016, both staff and line. As this Army has to be spread out over our entire continental and outlying possessions, the sight of an American soldier of our regular Army is about as rare an occurrence as the sight of a sea-serpent. Within the actual limits of our forty-eight states we have but 48,428 regular troops. Of these 17,947 must be kept in our coast fortifications, even as a pretense of garrisoning them. This leaves only 30,481 mobile troops, including engineers, cavalry, infantry, and field artillery. We have a militia on paper numbering 127,000, men and officers. Only 60,000 of these, however, are in readiness for service. Therefore, we have in the United States to-day a regular Army of 48,000, and 60,000 militia ready for duty, or 108,000 men and officers altogether. In time of war not a man of our militia could well be spared for military service to repel an invader, for in such troublesome times they would all be needed for police duty to maintain order and obedience throughout the country. General Wood recently told us that it would take a month to mobilize even our little Army of thirty thousand men. Out of the 127,000 officers and men of the militia which we have on paper, only 60,000 being available, and only 30,000 of our regulars being available, we could place on the firing-line only 90,000 men and officers, and there would be no reserves. When Napoleon, the world's greatest military captain, went into battle, he always kept a large and powerful force in reserve, to give confidence to those on the firing-line, and to save the day in case of a reverse, and possibly to turn defeat into victory, and at the worst to cover a retreat, and save the army from rout. This same need exists with us for a large national reserve of well-armed and well-trained men, ready to be called from civil life to refill the depleted ranks of an army at the front. [Illustration: Number of Officers and Enlisted Men of United States Regular Army] Our regular Army is, in men and guns, but a mere nucleus of what we ought to have, and of what we must have to save this country from defeat and abject humiliation should war come. Not only this--the artillery we have is without adequate field organization. It would take at least four months to train additional personnel in order to get our field artillery ready for duty. It would take us four times as long, therefore, to get our own artillery on the firing-line, ready for battle, on either our eastern or western seaboard, as it would for an enemy to get its artillery there. It is we ourselves who are handicapped by isolation, not the enemy--isolation not of space, but of time. If it be true that God fights on the side that is the best equipped with artillery, God could not be expected to fight on the side of our militia. Our militia at the present time has only sixty-five organized batteries, with four guns each. It is absolutely imperative that we should have seventy-nine additional batteries, with six guns each, even moderately to complete our equipment in field artillery. Think of it! Our militia has less than half the number of field batteries necessary for battle. It is also worthy of mention that these batteries are without ammunition trains, and without officers or men for the new organization, and we have not the necessary horses to draw the batteries we already have. Our militia is entirely without siege artillery, while neither our militia nor our regular Army is equipped with field mortars or howitzers of the larger calibers now used abroad, which have been so terribly effective in the present war. Not only are foreign nations far ahead of us in actual existing war strength in men and guns, but also they have each an efficient system whereby their present equipment may be rapidly expanded. We have no such system. OUR FATAL ISOLATION Never yet have we perceived the important truth that in this age of war machinery, requiring months and years to create, isolation by time is an equivalent to isolation by distance. Our own isolation in the matter of the time required for us to raise and train armies and equip them with shoulder-rifles, automatic guns, quick-firing cannon, siege howitzers, ammunition supply trains, and to build, man, and equip with guns, battleships, battle-cruisers, torpedo-boat destroyers, submarines, and, no less important, to equip flying machines with trained aviators, would be a far more serious handicap to us than our isolation by the seas would be to our enemies. The _Scientific American_, February 6, 1915, says: * * * * * "_We could not supply the men for the necessary field-artillery organization for four months, or the ammunition trains and ammunition for a year and a half, and not a gun is yet made or appropriated for, for the volunteers. The militia is short in cavalry and requires over fifty additional troops of cavalry to provide the divisional cavalry alone. There is an alarming absence of auxiliary troops. Most of the militia cavalry is poorly mounted, much of it practically without mounts, and, with the exception of a few special organizations, has had little or no field training. It needs months of hard work in camp. Engineers, signal and medical troops of the militia are as a rule insufficient in number, deficient in organization, equipment, and reserve supplies, and very many of them are far below their prescribed strength and without available personnel to fill them up._" * * * * * The following is quoted from a statement made before a Congressional committee in 1912, by General William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army, and one of the ablest officers that the Army has ever had: * * * * * "_So far as transporting troops is concerned, the sea as a highway is not an obstacle, but a facility. It is very much easier to get any number of troops across the Atlantic Ocean than it would be to get the same number over anything like the same distance on land. Marine transportation is the very best kind you can have; the easiest, least expensive, and most expeditious, if you are considering large bodies of troops and large amounts of material. The fuel charge for transportation in good tramp steamers does not amount to one two-hundred-and-fiftieth part of a cent per ton per mile. The sea is a splendid means of transportation. The distance is only ten days for a vessel of very moderate speed, and you can carry a thousand men on a vessel of 3,000 tons' capacity without any trouble at all. There are any number of vessels to be had, and there is no resistance on this side against a well-equipped force of a hundred thousand men._" * * * * * SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS We have in our regular Army to-day about 4,572 officers. The number of English officers killed, wounded, and missing during the first six months of the European war was, in round numbers, 5,000, a little more than the total number of our officers. It has been estimated by the most able authorities, among them the editor of the _Scientific American_, whom I quote, that: "In case of invasion we would need 380,000 stationary volunteer coast-guard troops to guard the approaches to our cities and coast-defense works." We should also require an additional 500,000 men at the very least. To be rational, we should have a mobile army of a million men. In this enormous country a standing army of a million men would, comparatively speaking, be small. It would still be one-fifth the size of the German army, one-tenth the size of the Russian army, and it would be less than the available Japanese army. Surely this great Republic can afford to maintain a standing army equal to that of Japan! The number of officers we have at the present time would, of course, be practically lost in our proposed mobile army of a million men. Radical and immediate measures should at once be taken to increase tenfold the officer-making capacity of West Point. Also, any private in the ranks should, by meritorious conduct manifesting military promise, be open to promotion to West Point, to complete his education there. This would be a tremendous stimulus and encouragement to the rank and file. The burglar who has begun to plan to rob a house and has commenced inspection of the locality to keep tab on the movement of the police in the vicinity, has already declared war on that house. The bank-raider who has begun to spy on the cashier of a bank and the nocturnal habits of the people of the town, and has equipped himself with the kit of tools and the explosives to breach the vault where the cash lies, has already declared war on that bank. In this same sense, and to this same extent, there is more than one nation that has already declared war on the United States. Their spies have been working among us for years, and they have the kit of tools and the explosives all ready to breach our Navy and our coast fortifications. Our lack of field-guns for our artillery and our lack of ammunition are very clearly put in the _Scientific American_ of February 13, 1915: * * * * * "_We have in the hands of troops, or stored, 634 completed guns. We have under manufacture or contract, 226. These guns will probably not be completed for at least a year and a half. In other words, the number of completed guns is a little less than half the total number deemed necessary for the field force of 500,000 men, and provides no guns whatever for the coastguard troops or new volunteer organizations which will be required in addition to the 500,000 field force. Of ammunition, we have, made and under contract, approximately 30 per cent. for the entire project of guns (1,292). Half of this is under manufacture or contract, so that there is not more than 15 per cent. actually completed. For the guns on hand and under manufacture we have, of ammunition on hand and under manufacture, about 41 per cent.; actually on hand, approximately, 20.5 per cent. For the guns actually made (634) we have 27 per cent. of the ammunition necessary. For the guns now in the hands of the regular army and militia we have about 44 per cent. of the ammunition necessary. It should be remembered, however, that the guns in the hands of the regular army and militia at the present time are less than half the guns required for these forces when properly equipped with guns, even under our scheme for the assignment of guns and ammunition, which is in both instances far lower than in any of the great armies today, and the present war has indicated, in the case of one great power at least, that the consumption of ammunition has exceeded twice their maximum estimates, and that the proportion of artillery will, in future, be increased._ [Illustration: Strength of Regular Armies on Peace Footing] "_At the rate of even last year's appropriations, which were the largest made for field-artillery guns and ammunition, it will take between eight and nine years to complete our present modest estimate for guns and ammunition, and the necessary equipment in the way of ammunition trains and other accessories._" * * * * * We are told in the Report of the Chief of Ordnance, 1914, that no permanent ammunition trains have been provided. The following figures give the personnel of our regular Army, and of our militia. They are taken from the Report of Major-General Wotherspoon, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, for the period from April 22, 1914, to November 14, 1914: _Actual strength of the United States Army_, exclusive of Philippine scouts: Officers 4,572 Men 88,444 Authorized strength: Officers 4,726 Men 95,977 Hence, shortage: Officers 154 Men 7,533 Of total enlisted strength, 22.50 per cent., including recruits and recruiting parties, belong to the non-combatant and non-effective class, and are not with the colors; 19.45 per cent. are in that branch whose special function is coast-defense. Mobile army (engineers, cavalry, field artillery, and infantry) is 58.05 per cent. of actual strength, and comprises: Officers 2,738 Men 51,344 Omitting cooks, musicians, scouts, etc., mobile strength is: Officers 2,738 Men 45,968 Mobile strength in continental United States: Enlisted men 30,481 _Ammunition:_ We need 11,790,850 artillery rounds. We have on hand and being manufactured 580,000 " " We need 646,000,000 rifle cartridges. We have on hand and being manufactured 241,000,000 " " We need a supply of 9-1/2, 12-1/2, and 16-1/2 howitzers. We have only thirty-two 6-inch howitzers and smaller pieces, none larger. _Militia:_ Total enlisted men, 119,087, of which only 52.56 per cent. have had any rifle practice, and only 33.43 per cent. have qualified as second-class marksmen or better. From the Report of the Chief of Staff for the year ending June 30, 1914, we learn that out of our 120,000 militiamen, 23,000 failed to present themselves for the annual inspection; 31,000 absented themselves from the annual encampment; and 44,000 never appeared on the rifle range from one year's end to the other. Congressman Gardner tells us, further, that 60 per cent. of our militia were unable, in 1913, to qualify even as third-class marksmen, and that half of that 60 per cent. (30 per cent.) did not even try to qualify. For years prior to the breaking out of the great European conflict, Lord Roberts pleaded with the English people, and prayed that they might hear his appeal to prepare for war with Germany. Like a voice crying in the wilderness, he called the British nation to arms. His voice was not heeded, and the nation did not arm. The voice of Lord Roberts sounded harshly on the ears of sensitive English officialdom. Lord Haldane, to emphasize his attitude, disbanded 80,000 British troops at the very moment when England should have enlisted and begun to train 800,000. Also, he threatened to abolish Lord Roberts' pension if he did not keep quiet. The grand old soldier was spared by a kind Providence to stand on the firing-line when the great war came which he had foreseen, and there he saw thousands of his country's dead who had fallen from failure to regard his timely warning. We have a Lord Roberts, too. There is a grand old American soldier who for years has appealed to us to fly to arms with all speed in preparation against war. He has even greater reason than Lord Roberts had, because our danger is many times greater than was England's danger. We are practically defenseless, while England was not. I quote the following from the American Lord Roberts, General Leonard Wood: * * * * * "_... We have neither guns nor ammunition sufficient to give any general commanding an army in the field any assurance of success if attacked by an army of equal size which is supplied with its proper quota of field-artillery._ "_The fire of modern field-artillery is so deadly that troops cannot advance over terrain swept by these guns without prohibitive losses. It is therefore necessary to neutralize the fire of hostile guns before our troops can advance, and the only way to neutralize the fire of this hostile field-artillery is by field-artillery guns, for troops armed with the small arms are as effectual against this fire until they arrive at about 2,000 yards from it as though they were armed with knives. This field-artillery material and ammunition cannot be quickly obtained. In fact, the Chief of Ordnance estimates that almost one year would be required to supply the field-artillery guns needed with one field army of a little less than 70,000 men. No war within the past 45 years has lasted for one year, so that after war is declared it would probably be over before we could manufacture an appreciable number of guns; and the same applies to ammunition._ "_The Ordnance Department states that by running night and day with three shifts Frankford Arsenal could turn out about 1,600 rounds of ammunition per day, and that if private manufacturers were given orders to run under war conditions they could begin deliveries of ammunition in from three to four months, and after getting under way could turn out about 100,000 or 200,000 rounds per month for two or three months, and after a total time of six months the production would perhaps equal 250,000 rounds per month. The best estimates indicate that at the end of the first six months not to exceed 350,000 rounds could be procured from all sources, including the Government plant. After this six months there would be no particular difficulty in securing ammunition as rapidly as might be needed._ "_... It is my belief that ... unless private manufacturers are now encouraged to manufacture ammunition for our guns after war is declared, they will not be in any condition to do so until after the war is finished, and the supply of ammunition during the war will be limited to what the arsenals can turn out. At present this is about 1,600 rounds per day, running three shifts, and this ammunition, under ordinary battle conditions, could be fired by eight guns in one day of battle. If guns are not supplied on the battlefield with the ammunition which they can be reasonably expected to use, they are not efficient, and when a gun has exhausted the ammunition supplied it becomes as perfectly useless as junk; in fact, it is worse than junk, for it must be protected by other troops._ "_In the Russo-Japanese War the Russians expended during the war, exclusive of the action around Port Arthur, 954,000 rounds._ "_At Mukden in nine days they expended 250,000 rounds._ "_One battery of eight guns at Mukden fired 11,159 rounds, or 1,395 rounds per gun._ "_At Liaoyang eight Russian guns fired in three hours 2,500 rounds, or 312 per gun._ "_During August 30 and 31 the First and Third Siberians, with 16 batteries of 8 guns each, fired 108,000 rounds, or 844 rounds per gun._ "_At Schaho, in a four-days' fight, the artillery of the First Infantry Division--48 guns--fired 602 rounds per gun._ "_At this same battle in 45 minutes, 20 minutes of which were not occupied by firing, 42 guns fired 8,000 rounds, or 190 rounds per gun in 25 minutes of actual firing._ "_The War Department believes, after extended study, that in case of war with a first-class power an army of 500,000 men will be needed to give this country any chance of success against invasion, and that this force will be needed at once. To make it efficient it must be given its proper quota of field-artillery. To do this this artillery must be on hand, for it cannot be supplied after war is started. A municipality might as well talk about buying its fire-hose after the conflagration has started. A fire department without its proper equipment is worthless, irrespective of the number of men it has; and so would be your armies, unless you provide in peace the material which will make them effective in war."--Statement of facts by Major-General Leonard Wood, Hearings on Fortifications Bill, Dec. 9, 1913._ * * * * * IS CONGRESS TO BLAME? The blame for our undefended condition is generally attributed to Congress. It is true enough that the main blame rests with Congress, but it must be remembered also that Congress represents the will of the people. Every Congressman goes to Washington in the interest of his constituents. He goes there to dicker for them and to swap votes with other Congressmen in exchanging Congressional concession for Congressional concession. His constituents want a post-office in their district, or a river deepened, or widened, or want a navy yard in their state, and he is ready to vote for similar concessions to all other Congressmen who will vote for the concessions his constituents require. Every Congressman is mindful of the fact, and every time he returns home he is reminded of the fact that he has not been sent to Congress for his health, but for the health of his constituents, and if he hopes to be returned, he must see to it that he gets what they have sent him after. They have not sent him there to support an appropriation bill for a larger army or a larger navy. The people are imbued with the belief that the country as a whole is big enough and prosperous enough to be safe. They know little or nothing, and care less, about national defenses. No calamity has ever come upon us for lack of defenses. Why should they worry? Also, they have been assured from the pulpit and the Chautauqua and by circulars sent out by the peace societies that we not only do not need more defenses, but, on the contrary, we do not need those we have; and they are asked to write personal letters to their Congressmen urging them to vote against any appropriations to increase our national defenses. I am not arguing for a large standing army, but merely for an adequate army--an army big enough to intercept an invading army that might be landed on our shores in the event of our Navy being destroyed or evaded. The American people are imbued with the idea that a large standing army is a menace to liberty. Whatever justification there may be for this attitude, it is certain that, if we are to yield to this point of view, and get along with a comparatively small effective army, it is absolutely indispensable that we should have a navy certainly as powerful as any in the world, with the single possible exception of that of England. All arguments that may be made against a large standing army become arguments in favor of a very large navy. In view of the comparative weakness of our present Navy, we need an effective army of at least a million men. If, however, our Navy were to be brought to first rank and the Swiss system of military training in public schools were to be adopted, we could get along with a much smaller army. By the adoption of such a system, we should soon have a very large trained reserve force in civil life, which could be drawn upon in case of need. Assuming the adequacy of our Navy and coast fortifications, General Wood believes that, if the Swiss system of military training in public schools were to be adopted, we could get along very well with a standing army of from 200,000 to 225,000 men. A navy, however large, could not, by any possible stretch of the imagination, be termed a menace to our liberties, and, as ex-Secretary Meyer has said, we are rich enough to match dollars for national defense with any other nation in the world. It is common belief that military training and service in preparation for national defense menace democratic institutions. In the days of her greatest virility and military prowess, Rome was a republic. But we must not conclude, because a country is governed by a congress and a president elected by the people, that all its institutions are more free or less autocratic than the institutions of a limited monarchy, or even an absolute monarchy. We, in the United States, often pass laws that are so arbitrary, unprecedented, unwarranted, and confiscatory, as to make absolutism wince. The cities of Germany are governed so wisely and so well that could we have that system transplanted here, it would be almost worth our while to invite German conquest of the country. No man's patriotism rises higher than his realization of the need that his country has for him. None of us likes our taxes any too well. Nevertheless, they bring home to us a better realization of the interdependence of the government and the individual. We love those for whom we make sacrifices, and those to whom we give favors. Benjamin Franklin desiring the favorable regard of a prominent person, made it opportune for that eminent person to do Franklin a favor. Conscription, like that enforced in Germany, makes good citizens. It implants in them a sense of duty and obligation to the government, and creates a greater respect for ruling power and for law and order. In this country, the ideas of the average individual concerning his obligations to the government and the government's obligations to him are vague and crude to the last degree. Conscription would largely remedy this by teaching duty to the government. The government has exactly the same right to levy on the individual for military service as it has to tax him for anything else. Just as the government has the right to tax the individual for financial support of the government, so it has the right to tax the individual for military support of the government. Conscription makes the government and the individual partners for the common welfare. Few persons in this country consider themselves partners of the government. In ancient Sparta, all individuals were the property of the government; all children were owned by the state. Consequently, the people owned the state, and the state owned the people. It is proper that the state and the individual should own each other, insomuch as their interests are mutual, just the same as husband and wife own each other. Perhaps the best system of preparing the youth and young men of a country for military service is that practised in Switzerland. Switzerland is a typical democracy, and yet no country in the world has a more universal and efficient system of military training for its youth and young men. After the conclusion of the war of 1870, Germany, guided by the iron will of Bismarck, divulged to Switzerland that the mailed fist had an itching palm for Swiss territory. Immediately an army of a hundred thousand Swiss mobilized on the frontier. They were the best-armed, the best-trained, and altogether the most efficient soldiers in Europe. Every man of them could shoot to kill. They were the flower of the mountains. Bismarck concluded that the game was not worth the candle. If Switzerland had not been armed to the teeth and ready, that country to-day would be a part of Germany. The Swiss have not the remotest idea of making an aggressive move on any neighboring country, but they hold themselves in perfect readiness to see to it that no other nation can find it profitable to make an aggressive move on Switzerland. Switzerland makes her military training a part of her school system. The chubby, rosy-cheeked little Swiss boys are taught to play soldier with wooden imitation guns, and as they grow, the training later becomes more comprehensive, more exacting, more scientific, until, finally, the young men find real guns in their hands, find themselves commanded by, and receiving instructions from, real officers, and they are taught to shoot. When their school training is over, their military training and term of military service also are over. They are ready for civil life, but, too, they are ready at any moment for the call of their country from civil life to shoulder rifle and knapsack and go to the front. This is the system that we should adopt in our country. It places no burden upon the schoolboy or the young man; on the contrary, it is a source of keen enjoyment, like any other manly game. The beneficial psychological effect is simple: The youth is taught obedience, his powers of perception are quickened, his alertness increased, his physique greatly strengthened, his health benefited, and his personal habits governed by laws of temperance and hygiene, with the result that his efficiency for usefulness in all the business and affairs of civil life afterward is greatly enhanced. Thus, in Switzerland, the earning power of the population is increased out of all proportion to the cost for the training and maintenance of the entire army. Mr. Richard Stockton, Jr., in his book, "Peace Insurance," ably expresses the value of military training, as follows: * * * * * "_Military training has an important value entirely apart from its actual military value. This is conclusively proven in the numerous military schools of the United States. The majority of these schools disclaim any attempt to train soldiers, but include military training merely to make better citizens. They find that the man trained militarily learns obedience, promptness, cleanliness, orderliness, coolness, and secures that priceless asset known as executive ability--the ability to make others obey. Such schools form a stronger character and make better men._ "_If this is true in a military school, it must be equally so with similar training received elsewhere. If thousands of parents pay from $500 to $1,500 per year to secure this training for their boys, surely there is some gain to the nation in the men who receive this training in the army. The fact is too well attested by educators throughout the world to admit of serious questioning._" * * * * * It is possible that German militarism, by becoming absolutism, has grown from servant to master in Germany. However this may be, one thing is certain, that German progress in the industrial arts and sciences, in municipal and general government economics, has made the German people more efficient and potential per capita than the people of any other country on earth. Consequently, we must admit either that the Germans are inherently superior intellectually to the people of other nations, or that they have acquired their present economic superiority by reason of some procedure which they have followed, and with which other nations have not kept pace. The natural assumption is that militarism is responsible for the German culture of efficiency. It is not an unreasonable conclusion, in view of the evidence, that German militarism is the greatest school of economics that the world has ever seen. CHAPTER VI THE NEEDS OF OUR NAVY "Look at the accomplished rise of Japan; think of the possible national awakening of China; and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. Only those Powers who have great navies will be listened to with respect when the future of the Pacific comes to be solved." _Kaiser Wilhelm II._ A famous English philosopher once took his son to the House of Parliament, and said to him, "Now, my boy, I want you to witness with what ignorance and irrationality we are governed." Were that same philosopher and his son to witness some of our American legislative proceedings, he would find still greater ignorance and inconsistency for the edification of his son. The fathers of our country thought it necessary to the security of our government that all naval and military authority should be subordinate to the civil authority. Congress is able absolutely to dominate the Army and Navy. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are generally civilian politicians. It certainly does seem inconsistent to take a man out of civil life, who, very likely, may be wholly ignorant of naval and military matters, and, through preconceived prejudice, unalterably opposed to actual naval and military needs, and place him in a position seriously to interfere with the work of the officers who have been educated at government expense at West Point and Annapolis. The Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy ought not to be changed, regardless of merit, or the lack of it, every time we change a President. Those important offices should be lifted out of politics. A man's political qualifications for an office usually depend not a whit upon his being suited to the office by his ability to perform the duties of the office, but simply upon what he has done for the party to earn the appointment. There is a huge difference between political merit and official merit. Political merit relates entirely to party service, and may constitute demerit when squared with the generally accepted moral code and standard of human behavior. A Secretary of the Army or a Secretary of the Navy may, by previous training, ignorance, effeminacy, or, even worse, by pacific bias, be entirely unsuited to such a position and entirely incapable of broadly perceiving militant duty. Such changing of our war and naval secretaries is as harmful as it would be to change the head of a hospital every month, with the same disregard of qualifications derived from previous education, training, and experience. Evidently, it would be disastrous to place in supreme command of a hospital first an allopath, then change him a month later for a homeopath, replace the homeopath with an osteopath, followed by a Christian Science healer, then a spiritualistic clairvoyant, finally a Hindoo swami. Such a rotation of hospital heads would hit the patients pretty hard. When, however, we get a Secretary of the Navy of the caliber of Theodore Roosevelt, or of ex-Secretary Meyer, then the Navy profits by having a civilian for its head, because such men as these, who are natural judges and masters of men, are able to make use of the greater knowledge and experience of those under them, and they have the additional advantage of being _en rapport_ with the civilian's point of view, while from the fact that they are civilians, they escape the unreasoning prejudice of the anti-militarists, who believe that all naval and military men are actuated by ulterior motives and self-interest when trying to get Congressional support for the Army and Navy. A man who, through study and experience, has become a specialist in a certain line of work, is better qualified to do work in that line and to know its needs than is a person who has had no such knowledge and no such experience. In legal matters, we go to a lawyer to get advice, and we generally take it, and pay for it. There is an old saw that he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client. The American Congress is composed almost entirely of civilians, who are qualified neither by study nor experience to pass judgment on the needs of our Army and Navy. They are as unable correctly to diagnose the condition of our Navy and to prescribe rational remedies as a pastry cook would be to diagnose and operate for appendicitis, or to prescribe for the treatment of pneumonia. It is hard to understand how there could be any one in the country unable to perceive this patent truth--that a person educated and trained to a thing all his life ought to know more about that thing than a person who has had no such training and no such experience. Yet the officers of the Army and Navy are not permitted to give public expression to their views on naval and military needs. I quote from the New York _Times_ the following remarks on a significant incident: * * * * * "_Washington, Feb. 17, 1915.--Secretary Garrison to-day instructed Brigadier-General Scott, chief of staff of the army, to call upon Captain William Mitchell, of the general staff, to explain published remarks attributed to him on the unpreparedness of the United States for war._ "_Captain Mitchell was quoted as having said that 'it would take the United States about three years to put an army of one million trained men in the field, and in that time an enemy could take and hold our American seaboards.'_ "_Secretary Garrison said he considered such utterances, if made in public at present, injudicious and improper._" * * * * * When a hunter goes out with a gun after game, he does not consider it good sport to shoot a four-footed beast or flying fowl without first giving the victim a chance for its life, and an opportunity to give the alarm to its fellows; yet our army and navy men, under the present gag rule, are not given a sportsman's chance to escape being shot, through our national unpreparedness, or even to give a cry of warning to their fellows. Even the murderer is given a chance to present his case before being executed, but the American soldier is not afforded any such opportunity. Our Congress allows itself to be dominated by impossible pacific ideas, and consequently neglects to take the necessary sane precautions to safeguard the country against war, or even to avert disaster in case of war, and yet, when there arises a _casus belli_, Congress feels no moral compunction against declaring war and sending its ill-equipped, thin-ranked, ill-provided Army to the front to face inescapable death. If the troops run out of ammunition on the firing-line, they cannot retire, but must keep their line unbroken, even though they are all killed. At the battle of Spottsylvania Court House, in the Civil War, the regiment in which my brother Leander served was caught in exactly this position. They had been drawn up to defend a baggage train. They held their places, and loaded and fired until their ammunition was exhausted; and still they held their places under a rain of bullets from the enemy, until reënforcements came. Of that company, which went into the fight a hundred strong, eighty-four were killed, among them my brother. In war, the lives of a few hundred, or even a few thousand soldiers, count for nothing, if the position they are holding has a greater strategic value than their lives. When food runs short, it sometimes becomes strategically a good bargain to sacrifice the lives of a thousand men in a forage raid to bring in a thousand sheep. In such a case, a sheep is worth more than a man, because the sheep can be eaten, and the man cannot. There are some things in this world that we are able to know are absolutely wrong. Of these, nothing is surer than that it is wrong to forbid our army and navy officers the public expression of their opinions, which would give the country the benefit of their knowledge and experience. Not only this, but it is a great injustice to the officers of the Army and the Navy, for, if war comes, it is they who will have to stand on the firing-line--not the individuals of civilian officialdom. When, in the near future, our fleet is sent to intercept the on-coming superior fleet of an enemy, those officers who must stand on the bridge and at their posts on the decks--and go down with their ships--are the very men now gagged by civilian red tape. If they could speak, and tell you and me and all of us the truth and the naked truth, then very likely their lives could be saved, and the sacrifice of their ships and their crews avoided. If the actual truth about our defenselessness were generally appreciated, our whole people, as Antony said of the stones of Rome, "would rise and mutiny" against the legislative and bureaucratic officialdom and the fanatical peace propaganda that are teaching the people ignorance and folly while muting the tongues of those who should speak. A nation is but a composite individual. Just as the male head of the family, being the natural protector of the family, has, in all ages, needed strong arms for the defense of the family, so, in all ages, have nations needed strong arms for national defense. These are the army and the navy. When army and navy are weak, then the nation, regardless of other elements of prowess, is correspondingly weak, and, more than that, the nation that is not safeguarded by a strong army and a strong navy is a poor nation, regardless of its resources and visible wealth. For the value of wealth and resources is very largely dependent upon their security--upon the power of the army and navy to defend or guarantee the title to them. That man is not a rich man, the title to whose property is questionable and likely at any time successfully to be disputed. The value of wealth depends entirely upon the ability of its possessor to control and utilize it, which includes the ability to defend his title to it. The same thing holds true with a nation. The value of its wealth depends entirely upon its ability to control and utilize it, subject absolutely to ability to defend it. You and I, reader, may count ourselves worth a certain sum. But if our property is not so safeguarded as to ensure our continued possession and benefit of it, and to ensure to our children and our children's children the possession and benefit of it, then we are by no means so rich as we should be were our title guaranteed by adequate national defenses. We are at once the richest country in the world, and, in proportion to our wealth, the poorest; for, in proportion to our wealth, we are the most defenseless. By consequence, we are without guaranty of title to our property, and we may at any time be robbed of it. An adequate army and an adequate navy are the only possible means by which American titles to property can be guaranteed. Just as it is worth all it costs, and more, for owners of real estate to have the title to their property guaranteed by a title-guarantee company, and just as the property is by such guaranty enhanced in value more than the cost of the guaranty, so the guaranty of title to American property dependent upon an adequate army and navy is worth far more than the entire cost of them, by virtue of enhanced values. When a nation, like the United States, has become a World Power, with outlying possessions in distant seas and within the spheres of influence of other powerful nations, it assumes obligations just in proportion to the hazards involved in the maintenance of title. Also, when a nation, like the United States, has a world-compassing commerce, its obligations are just as large as its commerce, and its need of a navy adequate to defend its commerce is, for that purpose alone, exactly as great as its need of the commerce. But, in addition to this great need, there is the still greater need of a navy of such magnitude and potentiality as effectually to safeguard the country against invasion. Although we should have an army of sufficient size and possessed of so efficient equipment as ultimately to repel invasion, still the cost in life and treasure for repulsion and expulsion would exceed many times the cost of the warships and naval equipment necessary to prevent invasion. The American people are not all agreed that we should have a navy. There is a very large percentage of the population who believe that we ought not to have any at all. But there is one ground, I think, for common agreement: Admiral Austin M. Knight, President of the Naval War College, one of the best-informed and ablest officers in the Navy, as well as one of the most scholarly men in the country, says: * * * * * "_If we are to have a navy it should be as efficient as it can possibly be made. And everybody who knows anything about the Navy knows that this is not its present condition._" * * * * * I shall quote further from a recent speech of Admiral Knight: * * * * * "_There is much about the Navy which is splendidly efficient. But as a whole it is far less efficient than it can and ought to be. Our ships are fine. Our officers are capable, industrious, and ambitious. Our enlisted men are the equals of those in other navies. But efficient ships and officers and men do not alone make an efficient navy. They must be welded into an efficient whole by a unity of organization and administration and purpose which coördinates their capabilities and directs their efforts towards a common end, wisely selected and very clearly seen. Here is the first point at which we are lacking. We are lacking also in that harmonious composition of the fleet which is needed to give to every element of it the support that it needs from other elements, to make up a symmetrical and well-balanced whole. And we are lacking to a marked degree in absolutely essential facilities for the care and preservation of our ships, especially in the matter of dry-docks._ [Illustration] "_Finally, we are lacking in efficient organization of the personnel. Here, so far as officers are concerned, the conditions are altogether deplorable. In a service like the Navy, where spirit is everything, where enthusiasm must be the driving power back of every activity, I ask you to picture the effect of a condition where a young officer, graduating from the Naval Academy full of spirit and enthusiasm, finds himself confronted with a prospect of promotion to the grade of Lieutenant at the age of 52 years._ "_If you ask me who is responsible for these conditions, I can only reply that the responsibility comes home to nearly all of us. Some of it, I am sure, rests with me;--much of it, I believe, with you. Certainly it cannot be attributed in excessive measure to any one administration of the Navy Department, for it has existed for half a century at least. So let us not cloud the issue by assuming that it is a new condition, and that all administrations up to some recent date have been models of wisdom and efficiency, or that Naval Officers themselves have always been ready with good advice. Speaking as the representative of Naval Officers as a body, I frankly admit that we have not always seen clearly what was needed, and have not always worked together even for ends which we did see clearly. As for the Secretaries of the Navy, it is not surprising that many of them have failed to realize that their first duty was to strive, in season and out of season, to promote the War efficiency of the Navy as a whole. Many of them have not remained in office long enough to learn this. Some, perhaps, have realized it more or less clearly but have not found at hand an organization through which they could produce results. A few have made material contributions toward improved conditions...._ "_A large part of the responsibility, especially that connected with the small size and the unbalanced composition of the Fleet and the lack of dry-docks, rests with Congress, which has always approached naval legislation from the wrong side so far as efficiency is concerned;--asking, not what do we need for efficiency? but what can we afford to spend for efficiency? Behind the responsibility of Congress lies the responsibility of the Country,--and you, gentlemen, represent the Country--because it has not insisted upon having what was needed, without reference to cost. It may be that this attitude of both Congress and the Country is necessary and even inevitable. But I am one of those who believe that this great Country of ours can afford to have anything in the way of national defense which it needs, and I assume that all present here to-night agree that we need a navy, and if a navy, then an efficient one, and that whatever efficiency costs is the measure of what we can afford to spend._ "_What constitutes an adequate Navy for the United States? The answer will depend, of course, upon the purpose for which we assume that the Navy is to be used. We are all agreed, I presume, that it is not to be used for aggression. Is it, then, to be used solely for defense? If we answer 'yes,' we ought to do so with a full recognition of what we are to defend and also of the elementary maxim that the best defense is a vigorous offense. In other words, no matter how resolute we may be to use our Navy only for repelling aggression, it does not follow that we should plan for meeting the aggressor only at our gates. Even if we had no interests outside our borders and no responsibilities for the defense of our outlying possessions and dependencies, we should still, as reasonable beings not wholly ignorant of history, prepare to project our battle line toward the enemy's coasts and to assume a course which would throw upon him the burden of replying to our initiative. In this sense, then, we need a navy for offense; that is to say, for offensive action with a defensive purpose. In shaping our plans along these lines, we should not overlook the fact that the policy which dictates the measure of our defense must take full note of the larger national policy which it is to enforce;--in relation, for example, to the Monroe Doctrine, the Panama Canal, the Philippines, and other matters which are at once of national and of international significance."_ * * * * * If the United States does not need a navy, then we should dispose of the fighting ships we have and disband the personnel. If, on the other hand, we do need a navy, there is one consideration, and one consideration alone, that can rightfully determine the size and power of that navy--namely, its adequacy to serve the purpose for which it is intended. A fighting ship is built, equipped with armament, manned, and coaled for one sole purpose--that of adequacy in a fight. Its success or failure--in short, its usefulness or uselessness--depends entirely upon its fighting adequacy against a possible opponent. An ocean-liner is built, manned, and coaled to fight tempestuous seas, and safely make the voyage; but unless the ship is built sufficiently staunch, has sufficiently powerful engines, is well manned, and has coal enough for the trip, it is in no sense a success, or useful; on the contrary, it is an utter failure and worse than useless. The same thing holds true of a navy: Unless it can defeat the fleet of an enemy, and return from the voyage, it is a failure, and worse than useless. A naval disaster in our present condition would be likely to be an irreparable calamity, while a naval victory might likely win the war. It is for this big difference that we need a navy. Consequently, the entire use of a navy may be summed up in the one word, _superiority_ over a possible enemy. When two men run for a municipal office all the votes cast for the loser are of no value to the loser, and all campaign funds spent in getting them have been wasted; the only votes that are of value to the winner are those that constitute his majority. Similarly, in a naval battle, it is the majority of votes cast by the winning guns that secures the victory, for all of the other votes cast by the guns are balanced by an equal number of votes cast by the guns of the enemy. The total value of a navy may be summed up in the value of one battleship, which gives a conquering preponderance in gun-fire. Admiral Knight recently said: * * * * * "_The War College considers that every effort of the Fleet, and every effort of the Department in connection with the Fleet, should have for its sole aim the war efficiency of the Fleet. Every effort which does not directly contribute to this end is in itself a wasteful expenditure of energy, and so far as it is a diversion from this end, is distinctly harmful._" * * * * * Among all those who have occupied positions of trust and power, and whose business it has been to recognize and provide for our naval and military needs, it is remarkable how few have had the necessary breadth of view to grasp the strategic situation, and perceive its requirements without making silly and costly mistakes, like that of the construction of our first three battleships, the _Oregon_, the _Massachusetts_, and the _Indiana_, merely for coast-defense purposes. None of these ships was qualified for service in distant waters. Then, when the war with Spain came, we held our breath while the _Oregon_ rounded the Horn. Think of the United States of America being in such straits for fighting ships as actually to hang national hope on the old _Oregon_. A single shell from one of the huge guns of an up-to-date British super-dreadnought has a striking force equal to the energy required to lift the old battleship _Oregon_ bodily to a height of more than six feet. There is no middle course for the United States. We must play the game as a World Power, and as other nations are playing the game. To get fair play we must provide ourselves with the weapons with which they are providing themselves. If we do not, we shall be brushed aside with a ruthless hand, and shall find our commerce circumscribed on every side by inimical spheres of influence--dead lines over which we shall not dare to pass. It is necessary for us not only to fortify the Panama Canal, but also to maintain a navy of sufficient prowess to enable us to reach that Canal at all times, and under all conditions, for it is indispensable that we maintain communication with our defenses there. Should we become involved in war with England or Germany, the navy of either being more powerful than ours, we should be immediately isolated from the Panama Canal zone. Similarly, Japan could successfully blockade the Pacific approaches to the Canal. We have, at enormous expense, cut a great waterway through the Isthmus, and established a short route between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The Canal is our property. Other nations of the world may use it. We generously built it for the world's welfare. It will, however, be valuable in time of war for the passage of our warships; in fact, it will be a vital necessity to us. But our ability to use it for that purpose will be entirely dependent upon the ability of our Navy to keep the sea clear of an enemy's ships at either end. The war with Spain was very useful, because it brought the truth home to us that the command of the American seas is absolutely vital to us. Immediately following the Spanish War, we rapidly built up our Navy, until it became second only to that of England. But we have, of late years, been slipping back, until now our Navy occupies third place, with a likelihood of soon dropping down to fifth place. In 1905, England evolved the great modern dreadnought, which was as much of a revolution over existing types of fighting ships as was Ericsson's _Monitor_ over the fighting ships of its time. The dreadnought relegated all existing battleships to the second line. The dreadnought was so much superior in size, in speed, in gun-fire, and in all defensive and offensive qualities, that it took its place at once as the indispensable first-line battleship. England, Germany, France, Japan, each recognizing the tremendous superiority of the dreadnought, enlarged their naval appropriations, and built dreadnoughts. The American Congress, however, failed to recognize the serious character of the crisis. It failed to appreciate the fact that the dreadnought meant a revolution in battleship construction. Instead of naval appropriations being increased according to our needs, they were decreased. As a result, there are now two nations at least that could whip us off the seas, while the navies both of France and Japan are likely very soon to rank above us. All our illusions about our splendid isolation would vanish with the destruction of our fleet. A European Power could, in less than two weeks, land upon our shores an army of from 100,000 to 200,000 men. Here, the question naturally arises: How would they be able to get past our coast fortifications? We have spent about $160,000,000 on our coast fortifications, but they were never intended for the protection of our entire coast line. They were intended only to defend our important cities and harbors and naval bases. They actually protect but a very small fraction of our many thousand miles of shore. As the _Scientific American_ has justly stated, our coast fortifications should not be so named; instead, they should be designated as city-and-harbor fortifications. It would be quite impracticable adequately to defend our long stretch of seaboard by means of coast fortifications. The only coast fortifications that can effectually serve us are battleships. It is absolutely indispensable to our integrity as a nation that we have a fleet sufficiently powerful to defend our whole coast against invasion. These questions present themselves: How are we to ascertain what our naval needs are? How shall we prepare to meet them? Of whom shall we seek guidance? Several years ago the Navy Department organized the General Board of the Navy, headed by Admiral Dewey. This Board studied our needs with great diligence and care, and Congress was advised accordingly. All the leading navies of the world have a technical body corresponding to our General Board, but in other countries that body speaks with authority, while our General Board may only advise. Congress pays but little attention to these advisers. It is a principle of our government that the voice of the greatest number shall rule, and the people of this country have come to believe that the majority is more likely to be right than the minority. Many falsely believe that in the matter of wisdom there is safety in mere numbers; that the opinion of a hundred men is of more value than the opinion of a single man. Multiplying the number of individuals possessing a limited amount of knowledge and an unlimited amount of ignorance does not raise the high-water mark of their united wisdom. Wisdom means intellectual height. Some men are seven feet high intellectually, while others are not more than a foot high. The average of conscientiousness is much higher than the average of intelligence. A man's sincerity cannot be used as a yard-stick for measuring his intellectual height. Sincerity and conscientiousness are sister entities, and are largely a measure of intellectual bias, whose other name is prejudice. [Illustration: Strategic Spheres of Vital Importance in the Pacific] We may compare the intellectual height of men with one another in a manner similar to comparing their physical height, only there is a much greater disparity in the intellectual than there is in the physical. If we take a man six feet high, and stand another man beside him of equal or less height, the height of the two men is no greater than that of the first man. If we add a hundred men of average height, we shall find that the average height of the whole line is considerably less than that of the six-footer with whom we started. The same thing holds true with the intellectual height of men. We may put a man in each chair in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, and the total height of the voting wisdom of the majority will be only the average height of that majority, and it will be less than that of one man who might be selected for his wisdom from their number. Any one member of the General Board of the United States Navy is likely to know much more about the needs of the Navy and what Congress should do for the Navy than is known by all members of the House and Senate put together. Representative Gardner very possibly knows more about our naval and military needs and what Congress ought to do for the Army and Navy than is known by all the other members in Congress. In fact, he may likely know more about the subject and be able to advise the country with greater wisdom upon our needs for national defense than a line of average Congressmen standing shoulder to shoulder in a string that would girdle the earth. Napoleon said, "He goes fast who goes alone." Always, the great national issues that make history have been decided in each case by one man, and all great national crises have depended upon the decisive action of one man. In recognition of this principle, Rome, in times of great peril, chose a dictator. The Medo-Persian empire was the architecture of one man, Cyrus the Great. The Persian empire was conquered and destroyed by the genius of one man, Alexander the Great. Rome was brought to her knees by one man, Hannibal. He ultimately failed, and Carthage was destroyed, because of one man, an eloquent enemy of Hannibal, Hanno, at home in Carthage, who was a peace-advocate. Rome was saved from destruction at the hands of the Teutons and Cimbri solely by the military genius of Marius. Cæsar walked alone through Gaul, solitary in his height above his whole army; by comparison, all men of his age were pygmies. Charles Martel alone saved Europe from the Moors. Peter the Great, the amazing architect of Russia, was impatient of advice and brooked no interference with his purpose. Cromwell alone was the governing brain of England. Frederick the Great was great because he played the game of war lone-handed. Napoleon Bonaparte was so intellectually tall that he towered over Europe like a colossus, and he played kings like pawns in the game of war. Bismarck played a lone hand in the creation of the German empire. During the entire Civil War, Abraham Lincoln parried with wit the advice of friends. To his enemies, he masked with mirth an inscrutable purpose, while he sat solemn and solitary at the helm. So, always and always, it has been. Great national games have been games of solitaire. We need a national leader who shall have such size and quality of brain, and be possessed of such soul, courage, and wisdom as shall qualify him to use the power of his high office to the full to help save this country from the dire calamity that is impending. Although the General Board knows a thousand times more about our needs and what we ought to do to provide for them than is known to the entire American Congress, still Congress, dominated by the pride of ignorance, believes that it knows best, oblivious to the fact that the voiced ignorance of a thousand men may have less truth in it than the voiced wisdom of a single man. Members of Congress assume the responsibility of deciding what the strength of the Navy shall be, and what shall be its composition. Congress, not the General Board, decides how many battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines we shall have; how many officers and men they shall carry. The result is disastrous, for our Navy is inefficient and ill-balanced. It is dangerously weak where it should be strongest. During the administration of Lord Haldane (then Mr. Haldane) the British Admiralty Board resigned because four battleships had been cut from the estimates for new construction, which were set at the minimum of national requirements; and it is due to forcing the matter by this action that the British have the four big battle-cruisers, of the _Queen Elizabeth_ type, carrying 15-inch guns, which throw a shell weighing 1,925 pounds, and which out-range all other guns on ships. Robert Blatchford, whom Mr. Winston Churchill dubbed a "ridiculous Jingo," said, in a remarkable series of articles written before the outbreak of the present war for _The Daily Mail_ in the hope of arousing the British public to their danger: * * * * * "_But the British people do not believe it. The British people take little interest in foreign affairs, and less in military matters. The British people do not want to bother, they do not want to pay, they do not want to fight, and they regard as cranks or nuisances all who try to warn them of their danger._ "_The danger is very great, and is very near. It is greater and nearer than it was when I began to give warning of it, more than five years ago...._ "_The people are conceited, self-indulgent, decadent, and greedy. They want to keep the Empire without sacrifice or service. They will shout for the Empire, but they will not pay for the Empire or fight for it. Germany knows this. The world knows it. The Cabinet Ministers know it. But no Minister dares to say it. We are in sore need of a man...._ "_While the articles have been appearing in The Daily Mail I have received letters of strong approval from Lord Roberts and Lord Charles Beresford, and from many officers of the Army and the Navy._ "_Are all these men ignorant and stupid, and are political wisdom and military knowledge confined in these islands to the lawyer who runs our Army, the lawyer who runs our Navy, and the simpering nonentities who edit the Nonconformist organs?_ "_The Liberal Government made a fatal blunder when they hesitated to lay down the four extra dreadnoughts. They were trying to economize. They were hoping for a cheaper way out of the difficulty. They were waiting for something to turn up. The Germans knew this, and made a tremendous effort to get ahead of us. It is not safe to trust the tradition of Micawber against the tradition of blood and iron._ "_Had the British Government, instead of trying to save a few millions, asked the nation boldly for the full amount required, and set about the necessary work in earnest, the Pan-Germans might have had an unpleasant time with the German taxpayer._ "_It is time our Government and people recognized the facts. Germany has challenged us. If we show weakness we are lost. We cannot bluff our enemy. We cannot evade him. We cannot buy safety for an old song. We can only hold our own against so powerful and resolute an antagonist by showing an equal power and resolution._ "_In the crisis to which I have just referred we took the weak course when we ought to have taken the strong one. Economy at such a time is the most profligate extravagance._ "_When the Government held the four dreadnoughts back, they should have been pushing a dozen dreadnoughts forward; when they tried to save a few millions they should have laid out fifty millions. Instead of reducing the artillery and pottering about with a handful of Territorials they should have demanded an Army._ "_But the Cabinet were afraid. We want a_ man.... "_I do not want war; I want peace. I am not an enemy of the Germans, but a friend. I like Germany; but I love England, as a man loves his mother, or his wife, or his comrade, or his home._ "_And the Empire is in danger; and we are unready; and we need a_ man.... "_If only we can get the British people to understand in time._" * * * * * Now, reader, carefully weigh this wonderfully prophetic language, spoken by an Englishman to the English people, before the great war came, which is now wringing millions upon millions of pounds sterling from the English purse, and wringing blood from the veins of thousands upon thousands of young men gathered from the length and breadth of the whole empire, and wringing tears from millions of mourning eyes; let us take this powerful appeal of Blatchford to the English people and conceive it to be my own appeal now, to you and the whole American people. We are in the same danger that England was, and unless we prepare as England did not prepare we shall be wrung even more than England is wrung. Our naval officers, who, more than all others, know what we should have in kinds of ships, in numbers of ships, and in personnel, are ignored. It is a case of the blind leading those who see clearly. After the most careful and thorough, investigation and weighing of our Navy's actual needs, the General Board of the Navy figures closely, as near to the danger point as they dare, in order that their recommendations may stand a better chance of approval by Congress. But Congress assumes that, being naval men, they have an ax to grind and are naturally strongly biased in the direction of extravagance, and the Board's wise recommendations are accordingly discounted. We have only 33 battleships less than twenty years old, eleven of which belong to the second line, with four building and authorized, which will make 37 in all. The General Board thinks that we should have 48 battleships less than twenty years old. We have but 68 destroyers, while the General Board thinks that we should have 192 destroyers. The General Board thinks that we could squeeze along with a minimum of 71,000 men to man our present fleet, without taking into account additional trained men needed for signal and tactical work on board auxiliary vessels, and without any provision for warships now building. As a bare fact, we have only 52,300 men. Thus we are short 18,000 of the men needed to man the fleet we have. In addition to this, there is a shortage in sight of 4,000 men required to man the fighting ships that will go into commission in 1915 and 1916. Our naval experts tell Congress that we shall need 50,000 more men for the Navy as soon as they can be enlisted and drilled; but the ears of Congress are deaf to the appeal. Yet a whisper for a new post-office can be heard by a Congressman from his home district a thousand miles away. [Illustration: Battle Ship Strength of the Nations] We have only 7,700 men in our naval militia. We have no naval reserve. Congressman Gardner informs us, as a result of his investigations, that it would take five years to get a reserve of 25,000 sailors. Our best-informed naval officers recommend for coast defense the immediate construction of a hundred submarines of the latest and most successful type. As a matter of fact, this number is far too few. We now have but 58 submarines, including those built, building, and authorized to be built. Many of those we have are obsolete and absolutely worthless. The following is an extract from a report by the General Board of the Navy in 1913, which is very enlightening: * * * * * "_The absence of any definite naval policy on our part, except in the General Board, and the failure of the people, Congress, and the executive government to recognize the necessity for such a policy, has already placed us in a position of inferiority which may lead to war; and this inferiority is progressive and will continue to increase until the necessity for a definite policy is recognized and that policy put into operation._" * * * * * A fleet, to be effective, must be so constituted, organized, and trained as to benefit in the highest degree from team work. It must be able, like a baseball team, to act with the precision of a machine. In addition to battleships, a fleet must have an appropriate number of battle-cruisers, smaller cruisers, transports, scouts, destroyers, submarines, colliers, tank-ships, supply ships, repair ships, mine-laying ships, tenders, and gunboats. Hospital ships should not be forgotten. Admiral Fiske says: * * * * * "_We have only one mine-layer. We need five additional mine-layers. On board that one mine-layer are only 336 mines. Germany had 20,000 mines when the war started_." * * * * * A fleet without fuel-ships is like a fleet without stokers. A fleet without scouts is blind. It cannot see the enemy's movements, while its own movements lie under the eyes of the enemy. The videttes are called the eyes of an army. Similarly, the scouts of a fleet are the eyes of the fleet. A fleet without these eyes, when hunted by a fleet that has them, is in the same position as a hunted ostrich with its head hidden in the sand. Of these fast scouts, with minimum speed of 25-30 knots an hour, we have only three; Germany has 14, and Great Britain has 31. Two fleets maneuvering for attack--one provided with scouts and the other without them--are relatively in the position of two men, armed with revolvers, fighting in a room, one blindfolded and the other with eyes uncovered. As Admiral Knight has observed, battleships alone do not make a fleet, much less a navy. Our fleet is greatly weakened by our lack of destroyers. A fleet should always be accompanied by a large number of these vessels to support the scouts, and also to do scout duty themselves. They stiffen the screen about the battleships, and, when an opening is present, they are ready to dash against the enemy. In the Civil War and in the Spanish War we were able largely to employ improvised merchant vessels for fuel-ships and scouts; for the sole reason that our enemies were even more miserably unprepared than ourselves. Had we, at the time of the Spanish War, been called upon to fight a really first-class Power, we should have been swept off the seas. Fuel-ships and scouts cannot be improvised under modern conditions. They must be ready before war comes. It is just as fallacious to imagine that we can strengthen our Navy with improvised ships and personnel after war is declared, and get it in trim to meet a modern fleet in the pink of condition of preparedness, as it would be for an invalid cripple to imagine that he could train and get into condition for a victorious fight with a John L. Sullivan after entering the ring. Of all arts and sciences, that of war is the most highly specialized. The greatest intelligence and skill are called into play to produce special tools, and to render their use highly efficient. The armies and navies of the European nations and of Japan are trained, just as college athletes are trained for boat-racing, baseball, football, and competitive contests of the gymnasium. The personnel is kept in the pink of condition for prompt and decisive individual effort and also for supreme collective effort in team work. A pugilist finds it necessary to train with the most complete thoroughness to get himself into prime condition for a fight, while his opponent is training in the same manner. When they meet, it is not the strength, skill, and endurance of the normal man that counts in the fight, but it is the supernormal manhood that has been added to the normal man. An ordinary untrained citizen, although he may possess undeveloped resources equal to those of the trained pugilist, would have no chance whatever in a fight with him. Similarly, such an army and a navy as we should be able to improvise in time of war would have no more chance of success against an army and fleet of a European nation or of Japan than the average citizen would have with a skilled, toughened, and hardened pugilist. There is one source of our naval weakness that of itself alone may bring disaster. It is incomprehensible that such a condition should be allowed to exist. When a fleet goes into distant waters, it should have a nearby base. We have neither the coaling stations nor the dry-docks and harbors of refuge that are absolutely indispensable to the fleet of a country with world pretensions. It is absolutely vital that we should be able to defend the Panama Canal, but we have no dry-docks or efficient repair-shops there, and we have none within a thousand miles of there. A couple of million dollars well spent to remedy this defect might, Admiral Knight declares, very conceivably double the efficiency of the fleet in a critical emergency by making it possible for every ship to go out in perfect condition. We have capable naval bureaus of Ordnance, Construction, and Repair, and for the direction of personnel; but these bureaus are not responsible for the readiness of the fleet for war. Admiral Knight suggests a remedy. He says: * * * * * "_This is the last and great defect in the efficiency of the Navy. How shall it be remedied? The answer is, I think, by the creation in the Navy Department of a 'Division of Strategy and Operations' preferably not co-equal with the present Bureaus but superior to them and standing between them and the Secretary. This arrangement would be a recognition of the fact that all the activities of the present Bureaus should lead up to the Secretary through a channel which coördinates them all and directs them toward war efficiency._ "_The title proposed for the new office:_ DIVISION OF STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS, _covers very completely the ground that I have in mind. As standing for Strategy this Division would plan what to do; and as standing for Operations, it would direct the execution of its plans. It would correspond more or less closely with the General Staff of the Army and the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, whose duties are thus defined:_ "1._ Preparation for war: All large questions of naval policy and maritime warfare--to advise._ 2. _Fighting and seagoing efficiency of the fleet, its organization and mobilization, including complements of ships as affecting total numbers, system of gunnery and torpedo exercises of the fleet, and tactical employment of air-craft, and all military questions connected with the foregoing; distribution and movements of all ships in commission and in reserve._ 3. _Superintendence of the War Staff and the Hydrographic Department._" * * * * * HOW MONEY APPROPRIATED FOR THE NAVY IS WASTED George von Lengerke Meyer, former Secretary of the Navy, has many times in recent years called attention to the fact that a large proportion of the money appropriated for the upbuilding and up-keep of our Navy has been misapplied to the building and up-keep of useless navy yards. During the first fifteen years of the present century, we spent $1,656,000,000 on our Navy, while during the same period Germany spent $1,137,000,000. Notwithstanding the fact that during this period Germany spent 31 per cent. less money on her navy than we did on ours, she has a more powerful navy than we have. This difference represents a sum of more than half a billion of dollars. With that amount of money we could have built two super-dreadnoughts a year, for the past fifteen years, costing $15,000,000 each, with $60,000,000 to spare for battle-cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. In short, had we spent our naval appropriations as economically as have the Germans during the past fifteen years, we might have had thirty more battleships than we now have, all super-dreadnoughts of the _Queen Elizabeth_ type, the latest and most powerful pattern. This number of up-to-date super-dreadnoughts would have far more than doubled the battle strength of our Navy. We should have out-classed England in battleship strength. The following facts are so pregnant and so important and so ably expressed that I can do no better than to give them in Mr. Meyer's own words: * * * * * "_Until within a few years no naval appropriation could pass the Senate which did not meet the sanction of both a Northern and Southern Senator, each of whom was a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs. It is interesting, in consequence, to analyze some of the appropriations between 1895 and 1910._ "_In 1899 a site was purchased in Frenchman's Bay, Maine, at a cost of $24,650--far above the assessed valuation--and later an additional amount of $600,000 was expended to obtain there an absolutely unnecessary coaling-station, which has since been dismantled, as it was practically unused._ "_At the Portsmouth Navy Yard, so called, in Kittery, Maine, a dock was built at an expense of $1,122,800, and later it was found necessary to blast away rock in the channel in order to reach the dock, at an additional expense of $745,300._ "_Between 1895 and 1910 improvements, machinery, repairs, and maintenance in the yard amounted to $10,857,693, although there was a large navy-yard within seventy miles._ "_On the other hand, at Port Royal, South Carolina, a dock was built at the insistence of the Southern Senator, at a cost of $450,000, which proved useless, and, although the original cost of the site was but $5,000, it was not abandoned as a naval base until $2,275,000 had been expended._ "_Not the least daunted by this extravagant waste, the same Senator determined to have a share of the naval melon for his State, so, with the assistance of the Northern Senator, he obtained the establishment of another naval station at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1901. There was no strategic value thus accomplished, nor was it necessary, with the Norfolk Navy-Yard located at Hampton Roads. The $5,000,000 which has been squandered at Charleston includes a dry-dock built for battleships, costing $1,250,000, but which experience shows can only be used by torpedo-boat destroyers and gunboats. The $5,000,000 could have been employed to great advantage at the Norfolk Navy-Yard, where the battleship fleet generally assembles. A portion even could have been used wisely at Key West, Florida, a supplementary base of real strategic value for torpedoes and submarines--a protection to the Gulf of Mexico and the mouth of the Mississippi River, and on account of its geographical situation, Key West would serve as a base of supplies to the fleet in the Caribbean Sea._ "_The purpose of the navy-yards is to keep the fleet in efficient condition. Their location should be determined by strategic conditions, their number by the actual needs of the fleet. The maintenance of navy-yards which do not contribute to battle efficiency is a great source of waste._ "_The United States has over twice as many first-class navy-yards as Great Britain, with a navy more than double the size of ours, and more than three times as many as Germany, whose navy is larger than that of the United States._ "_The total cost of navy-yards up to June 30th, 1910, with land, public works, improvements, machinery, and maintenance, including repairs, amounts to $320,600,000._ "_Overburdened with a superfluous number of navy-yards distributed along the Atlantic coast from Maine to Louisiana, in 1910 I recommended that Congress give up and dispose of naval stations at New Orleans, Pensacola, San Juan, Port Royal, New London, Sackett's Harbor (New York), Culebra, and Cavité, none of which was a first-class station. The average yearly cost of maintaining these stations between 1905 and 1910 was $1,672,675, and very little useful work had been performed at any of them. Later, I practically closed them, but could not abolish or dispose of them, no action having been taken by Congress. Pensacola and New Orleans have since been reopened by my successor._ "_The interests of the country and the interests of the Navy would be best served by one first-class naval base with sufficient anchorage for the entire fleet, north of the Delaware, equipped for docking, repairing, etc., and another station of equal capacity at Norfolk, in Chesapeake Bay, with Guantanamo, Cuba, to serve as the winter-station rendezvous._ "_On the Pacific coast we are fortunate in having only two naval stations, one at Bremerton, on Puget Sound, established in 1891, with ample depth of water, costing to date about $9,000,000; and the other at Mare Island, established in 1850, some thirty miles from the harbor of San Francisco, with inadequate depth and width of water along its water-front. The total costs, with maintenance and repairs, have amounted to $35,000,000, and, on account of insufficient depth of water, none of the battleships built in the last eight years could have been berthed there...._ "_Building battleships without an adequate force of men is equal to wasting money; only ten ships of the first line and eleven of the second, according to the Navy Department, can be placed in full commission for service, due to a shortage of men and officers._ "_To provide a proper complement for all vessels of the Navy which could still be made useful would require an additional force of 18,556 men and 933 line officers, according to the testimony of Admiral Badger before the Naval Committee, December 8, 1914._ "_That we have not been getting proper return for money expended in the Navy is not known to the majority of our people, nor is it realized to what extent political influences have misdirected the appropriations during the past twenty-five years. The remedy will only come from absolute publicity._ "_Let a special committee be appointed to investigate the conditions in the Navy._ "_Let a special committee of military experts from the Army and Navy be appointed to recommend what naval stations shall be abolished and sold and if any shall be established to take their places._ "_Let Congress inaugurate a national council of defense made up of members of the Cabinet, Senate, and House, with the chiefs of staff from the Army and Navy, that more efficient co-operation may be obtained between the executive and legislative branches of the Government in respect to military requirements._ "_Let Congress establish a general staff in the Navy._" * * * * * CHAPTER VII LANGUAGE OF THE BIG GUNS In the present war, the big guns, both on land and sea, have told their own story, and they have commanded conviction of their usefulness in proportion to the loudness of their voice. Following the introduction of armor-plate by Ericsson's _Monitor_ and the _Merrimac_, armor-plate was answered by increasing the size of guns and projectiles. Brown prismatic powder was developed to slow the burning and lessen the initial pressure, thereby securing a better maintenance of pressure behind the projectile in its passage along the bore of the gun. Guns weighing more than a hundred tons were built in England for the use of brown prismatic powder, but it was found that after firing a few rounds, the guns drooped at the muzzle under the shock of discharge, and lost their accuracy. The invention and development of smokeless gunpowder, mainly during the ten years between 1887 and 1897, resulted in radical improvements in guns of all calibers. Only about 44 per cent. of the products of combustion of the old black powder and the brown prismatic powder were gaseous. The balance, about 56 per cent., were solid matter, and produced smoke. It will be seen, at a glance, that smokeless powder, whose products of combustion are entirely gaseous, possesses enormous ballistic advantages, quite independent of its smokelessness. Less than half the products of combustion of the old smoke-producing powders being gaseous, much energy was absorbed from the gases, to heat and vaporize the solid products constituting the smoke. Additional heat was consumed by the work of expelling the smoke from the gun. The products of combustion of smokeless powder are not only practically all gaseous, but also they are much hotter than the products of combustion of the old, smoky, black powder. Owing to this fact, smokeless powder may be considered about four times as powerful as the old black powder. When a projectile is thrown from a gun, although it is not heated appreciably, yet heat-energy represented by its velocity is absorbed from the expanding gases of the powder charge. When a 12-inch projectile weighing a thousand pounds is thrown from one of our long naval guns, it has a striking energy, fifty feet from the muzzle, of about 50,000 foot-tons--that is to say, it strikes with a force equal to that of 50,000 tons falling from a height of one foot, or one ton falling from a height of 50,000 feet. As the 12-inch naval gun weighs about 50 tons, the energy absorbed from the gases in the shape of velocity of the projectile is sufficient to lift a thousand 12-inch guns to a height of one foot. As a projectile weighs half a ton, the force of the blow is about the same as though the projectile were to be dropped from a height of twenty miles, with no deduction for the resistance of the atmosphere. When the projectile is stopped, a quantity of heat is re-developed exactly equal to that absorbed from the powder gases in giving the projectile its high velocity; and the quantity of heat absorbed from the powder gases in throwing a thousand-pound projectile from our big naval guns is sufficient to melt 750 pounds of cast iron, which is enough to heat the projectile white hot. Obviously, when the projectile strikes armor-plate, either the plate or the projectile must yield, for the reason that the projectile brings to bear upon a 12-inch plate an energy sufficient to fuse a hole right through it, and this is substantially what it does. The hard and toughened steel of the plate is heated and softened by the force of impact, and, although the projectile may be cold after it has passed through, it actually does fuse a hole through the plate, the metal flowing like wax from its path. The introduction of smokeless cannon-powder was followed by a recession from guns of great weight and caliber, to guns of smaller weight and smaller caliber, the aim being to make up for the greater smashing power of huge projectiles, thrown at a lower velocity, with projectiles of smaller size, thrown at much greater velocity and having a greater power of penetration of armor-plate, which was constantly being made thicker and tougher and harder in order to resist the impact of armor-piercing projectiles. As armor-plate continued to increase in thickness and in powers of resistance, guns of bigger and bigger caliber had to be made, capable of withstanding the enormous pressure necessary to throw projectiles of sufficient size and at sufficiently high velocity to penetrate any armor-plate that could be opposed to them. With every improvement in armor-plate, the gun and the projectile have been improved and enlarged, until now no armor-plate carried by any ship can withstand the naval guns of largest caliber. In its race with armor-plate, the gun has thus far been the winner. The victory of the _Monitor_ over the _Merrimac_ at Hampton Roads, half a century ago, was far less decisive than was the victory of armor-plate over the gun of that time. The whole world well remembers the story of how the _Monitor_ arrived in the nick of time, and saved the Federal fleet from destruction. But the salvation of the Northern fleet was of little advantage, for the advent of the _Monitor_ rendered obsolete and useless every warship of every fleet in the world. Great Britain found herself without a navy. There was universal consternation. It was a world-wonder that no government had before resorted to so simple an expedient, and one whose utility was so very evident. It must be remembered that the guns of that period were muzzle-loading smooth-bores, and that the round, solid projectiles thrown by them were intended merely to knock holes in the sides of wooden warships and to pound down the walls of brick or stone forts. Bombshells were then thin, hollow spheres of cast iron, charged with black gunpowder, and they were not intended for penetration, their destructiveness depending upon the fragments hurled by their explosion, or upon their ignition of inflammable material. It is a curious phase of human progress that what is old and tried is venerated and conserved with solicitous regard out of all proportion to merit. Innovations must not only have evident merit, but their merit must also be so indubitably proven by application and use as to replace the old and revered, in spite of the opposition of overzealous conservatism. The substitution of the sail for the galley-slave was a very slow process, until it received especial stimulus in the fierce forays of the marauding Northmen and the raids of the Mediterranean corsairs. Similarly, did the sail slowly give way to steam. A modern wooden steam-launch or a forty-foot motor-boat, with cedar sides, driven by gasolene-engines and armed with a single three-and-a-half-inch gun, would be able today to attack and destroy the famous _Monitor_ of Ericsson, in spite of its armor-plate, for the reason that the launch or motor-boat would have vastly greater speed, and also for the reason that its gun would have vastly greater range, and would be able to penetrate the soft iron armor of the _Monitor_ with projectiles charged with a high explosive to explode inside. The motor-boat, lying outside the range of the huge 11-inch guns of the _Monitor_, could hold a position of perfect safety during the conflict, and, by consequence, would need no armored protection. Thus we see that the sufficiency of armor-plate must, other things being equal, inevitably depend upon insufficiency in range and penetrating power of the gun to which it is opposed. An unarmored vessel, with guns capable of penetrating the armor-plate of an opponent having shorter-range guns, needs only to have superior speed in order to choose a position out of range of the armor-clad's guns, and, atmospheric conditions being favorable, to destroy it without itself being exposed to any danger whatsoever. But there are other conditions which prevent the gun, however long its range and however great its power of penetration, from being a complete defense in the absence of armored protection. These conditions are--the limit of vision due to the rotundity of the earth, even in clear weather, the limitation of vision, at much nearer distances, in thick or hazy weather, and, of course, the greatly increased difficulty of hitting at extreme ranges. Also, it is necessary to be able to observe, from the fighting-tops, where trial shots strike, in order to get the correct range, and lay the guns exactly upon the target. In the recent North Sea fight, firing began at more than 17,000 yards, or about ten miles; 12-inch and 13-inch shells from the British ships struck the _Bluecher_ before more than the upper works of the _Bluecher_ could be seen from the decks of the British ships. Only by the fire-control officers, a hundred feet above the decks, could her whole hull be seen. When the first huge shells came plunging down out of the sky upon the _Bluecher_, her gunners could not see the ships from which they came. It is true that with much more powerful guns than those of her enemy, an unarmored vessel would be able to shoot right through any armored protection opposed to them. But there is the danger that an armored ship of an enemy may emerge from the fog or haze, or from out of the darkness at night, and then neither speed nor weight of gun-fire might save the unarmored ship. The unarmored vessel would not be able with her small guns, if she carried them, materially to injure her armored enemy, whereas the enemy, with its secondary batteries, firing with enormous rapidity and faster than the speed of the heavier guns, would be able to riddle her in a few moments. Consequently, it is considered wise to employ sufficient armor to afford protection against the rapid-fire guns of smaller caliber. Such armor also at longer ranges affords considerable protection against the big guns, for it must be expected that not all projectiles will strike the plate at right angles. They strike at all angles, and sometimes at very sharp angles, and glance off, in which case armor of moderate thickness may save a ship by diverting the shots, while, if she were wholly unarmored, she might be destroyed. We may then conclude that an ideal fighting ship would be one having very great speed, carrying very large and powerful guns, and protected by armor-plate of but moderate thickness. Actually, such a ship is the modern battle-cruiser. We have as yet not one of these ships in our Navy, while the Japanese have two of the most powerful in the world, and more building; England has eight, and more building; Germany has four, and more building. [Illustration: _How the Fleet of an Enemy with fifteen-inch guns could Bombard and Destroy Forts hancock, Hamilton and Wadsworth and also all of Brooklyn and part of Manhattan, from a position beyond the range of the Guns of those Forts; also showing how, after Fort Hancock is destroyed, the Fleet could move yet nearer for the Destruction of Forts Hamilton and Wadsworth, and still be out of range of those Forts, and finally, after their Destruction, how it could Bombard New York, Jersey City and Brooklyn at Short Range._] The first improvements following the advent of armor-plate were made, as might be supposed, in the gun and in the projectile. The old smooth-bore, with spherical projectile, was replaced by the breech-loading rifle and the conical projectile having a copper driving ring and gas-check, by which a projectile possessing enormously greater mass for its caliber could be hurled at much higher velocity and kept point on. Extraordinary improvements have been continuously made in armor-plate, to harden and toughen it and to give it greater powers of resistance, while battleships have been made larger and larger to support heavier and heavier armor-plate. Nevertheless, the first improvement in guns and projectiles that followed the advent of the armor-clad, gave the gun the lead, and the gun has kept the lead ever since. Today, the long-range, high-power naval gun, charged with smokeless powder, and throwing a projectile made of tempered steel inconceivably tough and hard, and charged with high explosive, is the most powerful dynamic instrument ever produced by man. A 12-inch naval gun throws a projectile weighing half a ton, at a velocity nearly three times the speed of sound. A charge of three hundred and seventy-five pounds of smokeless powder, strong as dynamite, is employed for the projectile's propulsion. It may be safely assumed that at fighting ranges the residual velocity of a 12-inch, armor-piercing, half-ton projectile, thrown from one of the most powerful 12-inch naval guns, develops heat enough upon impact to fuse its way through 12-inch plate. When a solid body comes into collision with another solid body, the energy of motion is instantly converted into heat, except such portion of it as may be consumed in fragmentation, and retained in the motion of the flying pieces. If two armor-plates, twelve inches in thickness, could be brought together face to face, each with a velocity equal to that of a modern 12-inch projectile, the energy of the impact would be sufficient to melt both plates. New suns are created by the occasional collision of great celestial bodies in their flight through space. The heat generated by such collisions is, however, vastly greater than that developed by the collision of a projectile against armor-plate, for the reason that the velocity of celestial bodies is so much greater, being commonly from thirty-five to fifty miles per second, and sometimes as high as two hundred miles per second, instead of but three-quarters of a mile per second. The heat developed by the collision of worlds is sufficient not only to fuse them, but also to gasefy them, and reduce them to their ultimate elements. All the suns that emblazon the evening sky have been created in this manner, and the heat generated by their natal impact is sufficient to maintain their radiant energy for hundreds of millions of years. Planets are born, some of them to become inhabited worlds, finally to grow old and die, with the extinguishment of all life upon them, while their parent sun is still blazing hot. The earth is being constantly bombarded with meteorites, usually of very small size. But the earth is armor-plated with its envelope of air. The impact of meteorites upon this envelope, at the enormous speed at which they are traveling through space, is fatal to them, and they are dashed to pieces and consumed upon it, as though it were a solid shield of hardest tempered steel. It is seldom, indeed, that a meteorite has sufficient size and mass to penetrate through the atmosphere to the earth's surface. Were it not for the protection offered by the earth's envelope of air, every living thing upon its surface would be very soon destroyed by the meteoric bombardment from the heavens. A minute particle of meteoric dust, traveling at celestial velocity, would be more deadly than a bullet from a shoulder-rifle. When a projectile is fired from a gun, it encounters the same atmospheric resistance, in proportion to its velocity and mass, as is encountered by a meteorite, the resistance increasing in a ratio something like the square of the velocity. When a battleship fires a 12-inch shot at another war-vessel ten miles away, the velocity is greatly reduced during flight, for an enormous amount of energy is consumed in punching a 12-inch hole ten miles long through the atmosphere. Gravitation, also, is drawing the projectile toward the earth with a constant pull of half a ton, to counteract which the trajectory must be made an upward curve. This makes the path longer, and consumes additional energy in raising the projectile to the top of the trajectory. If a projectile could be thrown from a gun at a velocity equal to that of a meteor, it would blaze like the sun during flight, for the metal upon its surface would be fused and gasefied by the resistance and friction of the air. It would not make any difference whether it were made of the toughest, hardest tempered steel, or whether it were made of soft iron. The velocity would be so great that it would pass through the heaviest armor-plate without appreciable reduction of speed. If the projectile were of lead, it would require armor-plate of a greater thickness to stop it than if it were of steel, for the reason that its mass or weight for its bulk would be greater. Distance and the intervening air are our most efficient protection. No armored defense now employed is wholly effectual, except the range be long. By consequence, then, future naval battles will be decided more and more by speed and size of guns, rather than by armored protection. Were two modern dreadnoughts to battle at as close range as did the _Monitor_ and the _Merrimac_, immediate destruction would be mutual. They would cripple each other more in four minutes than did the _Monitor_ and the _Merrimac_ in the four long hours during which they pounded each other. The _Alabama_ and _Kearsarge_ fought for more than an hour, within bowshot of each other, before the _Alabama_ was destroyed. Were two of the biggest and most heavily armored battleships in the world to fight today at as close range, one or the other of them would be destroyed in a very few minutes. The projectiles fired from the monster naval guns now weigh many times as much as those thrown from the guns of either the _Monitor_ or the _Merrimac_, and these huge projectiles have also a multiplied velocity. The total thickness of the armor of the _Monitor's_ turret was ten inches. An iron wall of the character used in Ericsson's turret, five feet in thickness, would not afford adequate protection against our modern, monster guns. Of course, the character of armor-plate has been vastly improved since that time. Instead of being merely soft iron, as was that of the _Monitor_, armor-plate is now made of the hardest and toughest tempered steel that science can produce. So, also, is the projectile. The projectile has far more than held its own. It is necessary, therefore, that the most heavily armored ships, as well as those unarmored, must fight today at long range, depending mainly upon skilled marksmanship and power and range of guns, rather than upon armored protection. A battle at close range between two huge modern dreadnoughts would be as deadly to both combatants as a duel between two men standing close together, face to face, holding pistols at each other's breast. When a chemical engineer makes an invention, and needs money for its exploitation, he first interests capitalists by letting them see the invention practised on a laboratory scale, embodying essentially the same conditions as would be involved in the larger commercial application. Similarly, we may get a very just and dependable idea of the relative efficiency of guns and armor-plate on a naval-battle scale, by taking into consideration what would be the result of a lesser conflict, embodying essentially the same conditions. Suppose two men were to fight a duel, one wearing armor capable of protecting him as efficiently against rifle balls as the heaviest armor carried by any warship today is capable of protecting it against modern cannon-fire; the other wearing no armor, and being thereby enabled to run much faster than his armor-clad opponent. Obviously, if the unarmored man had a gun of longer range than that carried by the protected man, he would be able to keep out of range of his enemy's gun, while still keeping him well within range. Thus he would be able to continue firing at him until he killed him, without in return being hit at all. At the battle of Santiago, the American fleet made only about two per cent. of hits with its 12-inch guns. Since that time very great improvements have been made in fire-control, and the accuracy of gun-fire. Today, a battle-cruiser, going at the rate of thirty knots, will hit an object on the sky-line a tenth the size of a battleship with the accuracy that Buffalo Bill from horse-back would hit a man's hat at a distance of twenty paces. In the naval battle between von Spee and Cradock, off the coast of Chili, they opened fire on each other with deadly effect at 12,000 yards. In the running fight off the Falkland Islands, most of the execution was done at a range of 15,000 yards. In the North Sea fight, according to the report of Admiral Beatty, the British shots began to take effect on the enemy at ten miles, and the whole battle was fought at a range of over seven miles. The German guns, being mounted so that they could be elevated much more than the British, were able to shoot not only as far, but even farther. The British guns, however, were much more effective, because of the greater weight of metal thrown. When projectiles are increased in size the atmospheric resistance at equal velocity increases as the square of the diameter, while the mass increases as the cube of the diameter. Consequently, large projectiles lose less velocity during flight, in proportion to their weight, due to the resistance of the air, than do smaller projectiles. Only within the last few years has rapid-fire with very large guns become possible. Now, however, loading machinery has been so perfected that the limit is no longer that of hand-power. Wherever in nature forces are opposed, there is a tendency toward an equilibrium. There is now a tendency toward the establishment of an equilibrium between the power of offense and the power of defense--between gun-fire and armor-plate. Nevertheless, the mean force of gun-fire remains still far superior to that of armored resistance. The mean armored resistance is now about on a par with that of the moderate caliber guns, as, for example, 6-and 8-inch guns. If there were no larger guns than those of 6-and 8-inch caliber, guns and armor-plate would be about neck and neck in the race. Consequently, we must look to the winning of naval victories by the employment of guns of more than 8-inch caliber. Speed is of such supreme importance in naval engagements that its value should be especially emphasized. Superior speed enables the fleet possessing it to choose its own position, thus determining the range and the direction from which the attack shall be made. If the fleet happens to have guns of larger caliber and longer range than the enemy, it may be important, also, to choose its weather by keeping out of action until it can fight at the maximum range of its own guns. The slow fleet must always fight at a disadvantage. [Illustration: _Fig. 1.--Two fleets, F and S, go into action in parallel lines, the range being chosen by the fleet, F, having ships of greatest speed and guns of longest range._] [Illustration: _Fig. 2.--The faster fleet, F, forges ahead, concentrating the fire of both its front ships on the van ship of the slow fleet, while the rear ship of flee S is thrown out of range and out of action._] [Illustration: _Fig. 3.--The faster fleet, F, bends its course in front of the slower fleet, S, with increased concentration of fire on the leading ships of the latter, throwing its two rear ships out of action._] [Illustration: _Fig. 4.--The faster fleet, F, doubles around and crumples the slower fleet, S, and pours into its foremost ships and overwhelming enfilading fire, while its four rear ships are thrown out of action._] [Illustration: _Fig. 5.--The slower fleet, S, is forced into a circular position and destroyed, while its rear ships are constantly kept out of action._] Let us picture two opposing fleets drawn up for battle. The fleet with fastest ships and guns of longest range, lining up at the maximum effective distance for its fire, steams at first in a line parallel with the enemy and in the same direction that the enemy is steaming. The faster fleet is soon able to run its van ships forward of the van ships of the enemy, turning in front of them, thereby bringing the front ship of the enemy's line under the combined fire of its own two foremost ships, while the rearmost ship in its line of battle gets out of range of the rearmost ship of the enemy, placing the latter entirely out of action. This movement is continued until the enemy's line is encircled, crumpled up, and destroyed. Therefore, we see that superior speed enables the fleet possessing it to put a portion of an enemy's fleet entirely out of action, while at the same time placing the remainder of the enemy's ships under the combined fire of a superior number. In June, 1897, I delivered a lecture before the Royal United Service Institution of Great Britain, in which I illustrated and recommended the employment of a gun of very large caliber for use on fighting ships and in coast fortifications. The United States government had, several years previously, adopted the multi-perforated smokeless cannon-powder invented by me. This form of grain rendered it possible to use a pure nitro-cellulose smokeless powder in large guns, because it greatly reduced the initial area of combustion in proportion to the mass, while as the combustion progressed this condition was reversed and a very large area was presented to the flame of combustion in proportion to the mass. Consequently, the initial pressure in the gun was much reduced, while greater pressure was maintained behind the projectile in its flight through the gun than could be obtained by any other form of grain. This made possible the attainment of a very high velocity, with a comparatively low initial pressure and, consequently, with comparatively small strain upon the gun. For this reason, and because of the low heat in the combustion of pure nitro-cellulose powder, the erosive action upon the gun was reduced to a minimum. I invented another and a special form of multi-perforated grain by means of which a yet lower initial pressure for a given density of loading was secured, the rate of combustion being still more highly accelerated. Believing that the advantages of projectiles of great size, carrying a very large bursting charge, could be better illustrated by a gun of extraordinary caliber, I designed a cannon having a caliber of twenty-four inches, but having a weight of only 43 tons, the weight and length of the gun being the same as the British 12-inch 43-ton gun. This gun was designed to throw a semi-armor-piercing projectile weighing 1,700 pounds, and carrying an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds, the total weight of the projectile being 2,700 pounds. While the projectile was not designed to pierce heavy armor, it was capable of penetrating the decks and sides of light-armored cruisers and deep into earth or concrete for the destruction of forts. It was a veritable aërial torpedo. By means of the special form of multi-perforated smokeless powder designed for this gun, the huge projectile could be thrown to a distance of nine miles with the gun at maximum elevation, and still with a comparatively low chamber pressure. The projectile was provided with a safety delay-action detonating fuse, designed to explode it after having penetrated the object struck, thereby securing the maximum destructive effects. It is reported that the Germans have made a huge howitzer weighing 45 tons, having a caliber of 23-1/2 inches, which also is capable of throwing a projectile weighing more than a ton to a distance of nine miles. The drawings used in my lecture were published in the _Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, April, 1898, and re-published in many scientific and engineering magazines, and in newspapers both here and abroad. The descriptions of this gun and projectile were illustrated, as was the manner of its employment for the destruction of the kinds of forts destroyed by the Germans at Liège and Namur. The use of high explosives in big armor-piercing projectiles is now universal, but on the publication of my lecture in 1897 I was subjected to much criticism, especially in some of the London newspapers, whose editors took issue with me as to the practicability of throwing large bursting charges of high explosives from high-power guns. Prior to that time the only success achieved in throwing large charges of high explosives was by use of the Zalinski pneumatic dynamite gun, a battery of which had been made and mounted at great expense at Sandy Hook. These air-guns imparted a maximum velocity of only about 600 feet per second to the projectile. The maximum charge was 600 pounds of nitro-gelatin. The projectile had no penetrating power whatsoever, and was designed to go off on impact. My proposition to throw large charges of a high explosive from a big gun, at high velocity, using a propelling charge of gunpowder, appeared to many to be a very hare-brained intention indeed, to say nothing of shooting it through armor and exploding it behind the plate. On my return to America in 1898, I laid the matter before General A. R. Buffington, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, United States Army, and Admiral Charles O'Neil, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, United States Navy. General Buffington sent me to Sandy Hook, where my new explosive, Maximite, was subjected to a very thorough trial. The first 12-inch projectile charged with it was buried in sand in an armor-cased cellar, and exploded. More than seven thousand fragments of the projectile were recovered, being sifted out of the sand. Twelve-inch projectiles charged with Maximite were repeatedly fired through 12-inch armor-plate without exploding. Later, similar projectiles, armed with a fuse, were fired through the same plate and were exploded behind the plate. Although Maximite was fifty per cent. stronger than ordinary dynamite, yet it was so insensitive to shock as to be incapable of being exploded without the use of a very strong detonator. Maximite was the first high explosive successfully to be fired through heavy armor-plate, and exploded behind the plate, with a delay-action fuse. The fuse employed at that time was the invention of an army officer. Later, my fuse was subjected to a very long series of tests, and it was finally adopted in 1907 as the service detonating fuse by the United States Navy. If Uncle Sam would listen with an understanding mind to the language of the big guns now speaking on land and sea, he would immediately build a large number of huge howitzers. He would build a large number of good roads, capable of standing the tread of these howitzers. He would build as well a goodly number of battle-cruisers, as big and as fast as any afloat in foreign seas, and armed with guns ranging as far as the guns of any foreign power. CHAPTER VIII AËRIAL WARFARE In the present European War is being tested the enginery of destruction and slaughter that has been building and accumulating for half a century. It is the most stupendous experiment that the human race has ever tried. The magnitude of it confounds the senses; the horror obsesses the mind and stumps realization. The influence of improvements in all kinds of weapons and machinery of war is further and further to complicate strategics. The more that invention, science, and discovery are employed in the development and perfection of implements of war, the more the use of those implements requires high inventive genius and high scientific skill. Before the outbreak of the war there were many military engines awaiting a practical trial in actual service, among them the dirigible balloon. During a period of forty years the nations of the world have been obliged to do a good deal of guessing, in spite of calculations based on previous experience in wars whose mechanism was very simple and crude as compared with the present engines of war. But the improvements in weapons employed on terra firma did not constitute so far a step away from experience as engines of aërial warfare. Those engines of war which have been mainly the subjects of guess-work are the aëroplane and that dreadnought of the air, the Zeppelin, especially the latter. The advent of the aëroplane introduced an entirely new set of problems. Before the advent of the aëroplane, the navigation of the air was confined to the balloon. Contrary to expectation, the aëroplane, instead of putting the balloon out of the race, served only to stimulate higher development of the balloon, with the result that the dirigible balloon and the aëroplane have been developed side by side. From the outset, it was recognized that the chief desideratum in the development of the aëroplane consisted in greater stability, and especially in automatic equilibration. The first aëroplanes were very imperfect. At the time of the early exhibitions which I witnessed, it was necessary to plan them to take place in the calm of the evening, just before sundown. The aëroplane could not go up in a wind. No aëronaut would have undertaken to go up except when there was no wind. Even a moderate breeze made them quite unmanageable. Now, however, the aëroplane can rise in a gale of wind, and fly right into the teeth of a hurricane. The old-style balloon could only go with the wind. It could make no headway against it, but had to float like a feather on the lightest breeze. The modern dirigible, however, which has reached its highest degree of perfection in the Zeppelin, can travel through still air at a speed of sixty miles an hour, the speed of a gale of wind, and can brave a fifty-mile gale at a speed of ten miles an hour. This is altogether remarkable when we take into account the fact that the Zeppelin, with all its load, must be lighter than air, and therefore, for its size, lighter than the fluffiest eiderdown. LIMITATIONS OF THE AËRIAL BOMB Aviation makes a strong appeal to the imagination, and this fact, together with errors and misconceptions in the popular mind concerning the use and power of high explosives, has led to many strange predictions and weird conclusions about the destruction which dirigibles and aëroplanes would be capable of doing by dropping bombs from the sky. Since the advent of aviation, many inventors have directed their energies to aërial bombs and bomb-dropping appliances. There have been, from time to time, fearful forecasts of the destruction of warships, coast fortifications, and large cities; for it was claimed that air-craft would be able to drop explosive bombs capable of wrecking the heaviest battleship and of blowing up coast fortifications and utterly laying waste cities and towns. It was predicted that the aëroplane would be able, with its bombs, to scatter armies like chaff before the whirlwind. The hopes of those who have believed in such dire destructiveness of bomb-dropping from air-craft have been dashed to the ground, with the bombs they have dropped. Of course, aviators may drop any form of infernal machine which, on exploding, will mangle by-standers with fragments of scrap iron, but the effect must necessarily be very local. The most effective use aviators can make of bombs and infernal machines is to destroy one another in the sky and to attack magazines and storehouses, wireless stations, hangars, and balloon-sheds within the enemy's lines, and beyond the reach of other means of attack. Also, in connection with the attack of advancing troops, aërial bombs dropped from aëroplanes may be used with effect, especially in disentrenching an enemy. At sea, too, with the latest types of aëroplane, bombs of sufficient size and weight and power of penetration may be used destructively against unarmored or light-armored war-vessels. A more efficient means, however, than has yet been adopted is needed to secure the required accuracy. Naturally, such bombs are admirably adapted to the destruction of dirigible balloons. The swift-winged aviator is able to manoeuvre at will around and above a huge dirigible and to attack it from any quarter. There is probably no one subject about which there is more popular error than concerning the use and destructive effects of high explosives. An anarchist once attempted to blow up London Bridge with two small sticks of dynamite, and succeeded merely in getting himself into trouble. At another time, a dynamiter entered the Houses of Parliament and exploded ten pounds of dynamite in one of the large corridors, with the result that it only made a hole in the floor and smashed a few windows. As a matter of fact, airships are capable of working comparatively small damage by dropping bombs, unless the bombs can be made to hit and penetrate the object struck before exploding, for the reason that, unless confined, explosives have but little effect. When a mass of high explosive is detonated upon a firm, resisting body, like the earth, or the deck of a battleship, or armor-plate, the effect is to rebound from the resisting body with small result. For example, when a mass of high explosive is set off on the earth's surface, the ball of incandescent gases bounds upward, spreading out in the form of an inverted cone. While it will blow a hole of considerable size into the ground, still the effect in a horizontal plane is practically nil. The windows of buildings standing in the vicinity of an explosion of this character are not blown inward, but are blown outward in the direction of the explosion by atmospheric reaction. At Sandy Hook, several years ago, an experiment was tried with two hundred pounds of guncotton exploded against a twelve-inch plate, immediately back of which were placed a cage containing a rooster and a hen, and another cage containing a dog. The guncotton was hung against the plate and detonated. The effect upon the plate was nil. On examination, it was found that the dog and the two fowl had been made rather hard of hearing. That was the only noticeable effect upon the animals. We all remember the test of the big, eighteen-inch Gathmann gun at Sandy Hook about twelve years ago, which threw a bomb containing six hundred pounds of compressed guncotton that was exploded against the face of a twelve-inch Kruppized plate. The first shot produced no visible effect except a yellow smudge on the face of the plate. It took three shots even to crack the plate and to shift it in its setting. In competition with the Gathmann gun, a twelve-inch army rifle was fired against another plate of the same size and thickness and mounted in the same manner. The projectile contained only twenty-three pounds of Maximite. Yet, as the projectile penetrated the plate before the Maximite was exploded, a hole was blown through it a yard wide, and it was broken into several pieces. These tests proved the effectiveness of even a small quantity of high explosive when properly confined, as by explosion after penetration, and the utter ineffectiveness of a large mass of high explosive when not confined or when exploded on the outside of a body. Bombs carried by an airship and dropped upon the deck of a battleship may damage the superstructure a little, but they can have no material effect upon the ship itself, unless they are made heavy enough and strong enough, with the proper armor-piercing shape, and are dropped from a sufficient height to pierce the deck. Not unless the bomb can be made to penetrate an object before exploding can it effect much destruction. At Santiago, the _Vesuvius_, with its pneumatic guns, threw several six-hundred-pound bombs, and exploded them on the Spanish fortifications, but the effect was wholly insignificant. Several years ago, when the subway was being built, a dynamite magazine accidentally exploded in front of the Murray Hill Hotel. The magazine probably contained at least a ton of dynamite. A lot of windows were broken in the vicinity, some persons were injured, and a multitude badly scared, but the damage done even to the Murray Hill Hotel was comparatively small. It has been predicted that Germany would send across the Channel a large fleet of airships and blow up British towns with the bombs that her great gas-bags might drop out of the heavens. Now, at last, the much-vaunted and long-anticipated Zeppelin invasion has come, and what is the result? Four peaceful citizens killed, and about ten thousand dollars' worth of property damage. Let us suppose that the Germans should send a fleet of a hundred airships to drop bombs upon the city of London, returning to Germany each day for a new supply; and let us suppose that each airship should carry explosives enough to destroy two houses every day, which would be far more than they could actually average. Yet, if this aërial fleet should be able to destroy two hundred houses a day, or say, roughly, sixty thousand houses a year, it would succeed in destroying just about the annual growth of London, for that city has, during the past ten years, built sixty thousand new houses every year. The dirigible balloon has one signal advantage over the aëroplane in the matter of bomb-dropping. It can both carry bigger bombs and remain stationary and hover while it drops them. With the aëroplane, however, there is necessarily great difficulty in hitting underlying objects, on account of the high speed at which it must travel to sustain flight. In order to float, an aëroplane must travel about thirty miles an hour. Even at this speed, it is moving forward at the rate of forty-four feet a second, and as a bomb travels at the same speed as the aëroplane, except for the retardation of the air, it moves forward forty-four feet the first second, while dropping sixteen feet. The next second the bomb falls sixty-four feet and moves forward forty-four feet, and so on. Sixty miles an hour is a moderate speed for an aëroplane, however, and at that speed the bomb travels forward eighty-eight feet per second when it is dropped, so that, during the first second, while it descends but sixteen feet, it moves forward eighty-eight feet. It falls sixty-four feet the next second, and moves forward eighty-eight feet, and so on, descending in a parabolic curve, so that, by the time it strikes the earth, it may be several hundred feet from the place at which it is aimed. Although the dirigible balloon, a Zeppelin, for example, may hover in a stationary position at will when dropping bombs, still it constitutes such an enormous target that it must fly very high in order to keep out of range of gun-fire. Guns are now made which can reach air-craft at the height of two miles. At that height, or at half that height, there can be but little accuracy in bomb-dropping, even from the stationary Zeppelin. The efficiency of a fighting machine is exactly proportionate to the amount of life and property that it can destroy in a given time with the minimum exposure of property and life in order to do the work. If a fleet of a dozen Zeppelins should be able to attack and destroy an entire British fortified town like Dover, it would be a good investment. If, however, the loss that it would be able to inflict upon the enemy were only equal to the loss that the British would inflict upon it, then it would be a bad investment, or at least, an investment without profit, for the reason that, in war, it is poor policy to risk the destruction of a valuable war-engine merely for the destruction of what may be termed non-belligerent property of an enemy, such as the dwellings of the inhabitants of a city. Suppose, for example, that a couple of Zeppelins should be able to destroy houses in a British town having a value ten times as great as the value of one of the Zeppelins, and, in the attack, should lose one of the Zeppelins, it would not be a profitable raid, for a Zeppelin, being useful for scouting purposes, is a potential factor in deciding the issue of the war, whereas the houses have practically no bearing on the issue of the war. It is good policy to use both men and machinery of war only for the destruction of men and machinery of an enemy, and not for the destruction of non-combatant inhabitants and property. Much has been said about gun-fire from air-craft upon underlying troops. A man standing on the earth, being seen endwise, presents a much smaller target to the vertical fire of the air-man than he presents when fired at horizontally from the earth, because in the one case he is seen end-to, and in the other case side-to. Besides, several other men may be exposed to the horizontal fire. The air-man, however, is a conspicuous target, and if his machine is hit and crippled the result is fatal to him. AËROPLANE AND DIRIGIBLE COMPARED As I have for many years predicted, the chief use of air-craft, whether aëroplane or dirigible balloon, is for purposes of reconnaissance. This war has amply demonstrated the fact that air-craft are of enormous value. They have rendered surprises in force practically impossible. Each side has been able to keep itself fully aware of the numbers and disposition of opposing troops. The aëroplane costs but a fraction of what the Zeppelin costs, while the Zeppelin presents a target enormously larger. It constitutes a target so big as to make the broad side of a barn blush with envy. As one effective hit will bring down either aëroplane or Zeppelin alike, obviously, the aëroplane has the advantage over the Zeppelin, as a target, equal to the difference in size multiplied by the difference in cost. Furthermore, the aëroplane is far more mobile and more rapid in flight than the Zeppelin. In judging of the value of the Zeppelin for purposes of reconnaissance on land, as compared with the aëroplane, we must take into account the fact that a large number of aëroplanes can be built for the cost of a single Zeppelin, and manned with the crew of a single Zeppelin, and that these many aëroplanes, operating in concert, will be able to do much more effective work than one Zeppelin. If the Allies would be good enough not to shoot at them, Zeppelins might be very efficient indeed, hovering along the battle-front. These dirigibles have been very conspicuous for their absence from the battle-front in the war. The use of the Zeppelin as a troop-ship has yet to be proven, and its value for the purpose will depend upon how it compares with the aëroplane for the same purpose. Aëroplanes capable of carrying at least a dozen soldiers each, with the arms and equipment of a raider's outfit, can now be built. Obviously, as a large number of such aëroplanes can be built at the cost of a single Zeppelin, and as the aëroplane can travel even faster than the Zeppelin, the Zeppelin cannot for one moment compare with the aëroplane, even for the purpose of carrying troops. There is one purpose, however, for which the Zeppelin is admirably adapted, where it is much superior to the aëroplane, and it is for reconnaissance over sea. The Zeppelin can hang on the sky and scan the sea as a hawk scans a field for its prey; and as it can carry a wireless apparatus capable of transmitting messages to a distance of two hundred miles or more, it can keep the German fleet constantly informed of the positions of the British fleet in the near seas. It is thus able to direct a sortie of ships when the numbers and disposition of the enemy's ships are such as to insure success. The Zeppelin has also a very important use in the detection of submarines, for the reason that from a vertical position submarines, under favorable conditions, can easily be seen at considerable depths below the surface, and the Zeppelin, with its long-range wireless, is able promptly to report such valuable information. I am of the opinion that the Germans have planned and built their Zeppelins mainly for oversea fighting against England, and for a prospective invasion of England. I think they must have been disappointed in the lack of destructiveness that their bombs have had when dropped from Zeppelins, while the moral effect on England must also have been disappointing. From the point of German advantage, it would be a good plan to frighten the British if it would take the fight out of them, but it is a very bad plan to frighten the British if it puts more fight into them. The Zeppelin raids have certainly had the effect of stimulating the British fighting spirit. It is especially regrettable that the United States Government did not heartily co-operate with the Wright Brothers to lead the world in the development of the aëroplane; but nothing of the sort was done. "We have," as Congressman Gardner says, "been experimenting and expecting and reporting and contracting and considering--in fact, we have been doing everything except building aëroplanes." The Wright Brothers, however, were received with glad foreign embrace. They were generously encouraged abroad, both by co-operative and competitive experiments and by liberal purchases. The result was that, on the breaking out of the European War, France, for example, had 1,400 aëroplanes, while the United States had but twenty-three, mostly obsolete. The United States Government has followed its time-honored custom of allowing its naval and military inventions to be developed and perfected abroad before adoption here. Prior to the outbreak of the European War, this government ordered from abroad an up-to-date French aëroplane with two Salmson motors, and one of the latest German aëroplanes with two Mercedes motors, with the intention of building a few of these machines. Then came the European War. The American purchases were commandeered, and we were thereby prevented from acquiring the much-desired air-craft. The de Bange obturator, an indispensable part of the breech mechanism of all large guns, was originally an American invention, but this Government allowed it to be developed and perfected abroad and given a foreign name. Ericsson's _Monitor_ was taken up by Europeans, right where its private builders left it, and it has been developed, mainly in England, into the modern super-dreadnought. The interchangeable system of manufacture of small arms was developed and perfected in America, but received no encouragement from the government. This system is now universally employed in the manufacture of small arms, and also in the manufacture of all kinds of machinery. It is for this reason that we are able to get a spare part for an automobile that will fit in place perfectly without having it specially made. Before the advent of the interchangeable system of manufacture of firearms, a sportsman in England went to his gunsmith to be measured for a shotgun just as he went to his tailor to be measured for a suit of clothes. At that time, no two guns were made exactly alike, and no piece of one gun would fit any other gun, while now all the parts of one gun will fit in the places of corresponding parts in every other gun of the same pattern. The year the United States Government adopted multi-perforated smokeless powder, Congress appropriated only $30,000 for smokeless powder, the orders to be divided among the different manufacturers. This meant that inventors, like myself, who had started in a small way, were driven out of business. I went to England with my multi-perforated smokeless-powder grain, which had been adopted by the United States Government, but found it hard to get foreign manufacturers to recognize either the superiority of the multi-perforated grain or of the pure nitro-cellulose powder. The excessive erosion, however, of guns used in the present war, due to the use of powders containing a high percentage of nitroglycerin, is already making those countries using nitroglycerin powders look longingly to the superior smokeless powder used in the United States. The United States Government has as yet taken no steps worth considering toward the obtainment of Zeppelins, or any other practical dirigible balloon. At the present time, there is not one in the American service. At the outbreak of hostilities abroad, France had 22 dirigibles and 1,400 aëroplanes; Russia, 18 dirigibles and 800 aëroplanes; Great Britain, 9 dirigibles and 400 aëroplanes; Belgium, 2 dirigibles and 100 aëroplanes; Germany, 40 dirigibles and 1,000 aëroplanes; Austria, 8 dirigibles and 400 aëroplanes; while the United States had, as I have mentioned, only 23 aëroplanes, mostly obsolete. Last year, the Secretary of the Navy appointed a Board to investigate the subject of aviation for the Navy, and to make recommendations. The Board recommended the appropriation of $1,300,000 for that year, but Congress cut off the first left-hand numeral and appropriated the sum of $350,000 for the purpose. The present war has demonstrated that air-craft are the eyes of both armies and navies. If the Wright Brothers could have come to the country's aid in the Spanish War, the American fleet would not have remained in doubt outside Santiago Harbor. Before the advent of aviation, one of the chief desiderata to a commanding officer was to find out what the enemy was doing behind the hill. Without the aëroplane, it is impossible to prevent surprises in force, and to avoid the deadly ambuscade. The aëroplane is absolutely indispensable for the location of masked batteries. It is impossible, without aëroplanes, even to approximate the number and disposition of troops to which an army may be opposed. It is necessary to have not only a sufficient number of aëroplanes, especially designed and equipped for this purpose, but also other aëroplanes, armed and equipped, to co-operate with them, and defend them against attack from the aëroplanes of the enemy. Just as dreadnoughts require battle-cruisers, and both require torpedo-boat destroyers, and all require other scout-ships and submarines, for co-operation against a fleet of an enemy, so do dirigibles and the different types of aëroplanes, according to their purpose, require one another for concert of action. What we have already seen of battles fought in the sky leads us to surmise that aërial battles of the future will be fought on a much larger scale. It will be found that the commander who expects to conquer the ground held by an enemy must first conquer the sky. Aviation carries war into the third dimension. Not only must the advance or retirement of troops be supported by artillery thundering from hill to hill, but also the troops must be supported and guided by pilots in the sky. The last Congress appropriated $1,000,000 for the aviation purposes of the Navy. It is the same million dollars that was cut from last year's appropriation, which ought to have been expended for the purpose during that period. It is a strange paradox that America, which has led the world in discovery and invention as applied to the industrial arts and sciences, should follow the rest of the world in their adoption by the Army and Navy. The trouble is not with the bureaus and boards of the Army and Navy, which have merely the power to recommend such things, but it is the fault of Congressional false economy. As long as we allow other nations to lead us, both in the character and quantity of naval and military equipment, we are destined always to be weaker than other nations in that equipment; consequently, when war comes, we spend money with the extravagance of frenzy to remedy the defect. We economized before the War of 1812, and during that war we wasted ten times as much as we had saved by our economy. We had disqualified ourselves by our economies to such an extent before the outbreak of the great Civil War that this conflict became one of the most deadly and most expensive in the history of the world. What we saved by our economies, compared to what we lost by them on that occasion is like a drop of water to a river of water. But we failed to profit by the experience, and, when the Spanish War broke out, we spent money with all the lavishness of prodigal inefficiency. If we could only be as wise as we have been lessoned by our sad experience, we would immediately take adequate measures to forefend ourselves against a repetition of such experiences; and one of those measures would be the building of an aërial fleet commensurate with our large needs. CHAPTER IX OUR ARMAMENTS NOT A BURDEN Life being a reaction between the individual and environing stimuli, it naturally follows that those stimuli not destructive are necessarily formative. The health and development of nations are governed by the same law that governs the health and development of individuals. When an individual is subjected to a burden that does not break him, or to a trial that he is able to master, he is strengthened, not weakened, by the burden or the trial. Every individual is constantly being attacked by microbes of disease. So long as he possesses sufficient powers of resistance to repel invasion of disease, his ability to resist disease is strengthened, and his immunity to further attacks is increased. It is only when disease gets inside a man that it becomes a destroyer. It is not a bad thing for a hen, but, on the contrary, it is a very good thing for a hen to lay eggs and sit on them and hunger for three weeks in order to hatch the chicks, and then to scratch for them and hunt for them until they are able to take care of themselves. She is stronger, healthier, more intelligent, more competent, and altogether a better hen because of her exertion and her sacrifice. The rearing of her chicks imposes no burden on the farmer, because she gets the wealth for their growth out of the ground. The human mother who bears and rears sons and daughters is supremely rewarded for all the pain and the burden. The husband and wife who toil for each other and their children are able to arrive thereby, and only thereby, at most complete living and the goal of supreme happiness. Happiness is our sense of the normal exercise of faculty; consequently happiness is the feel of normal life; unhappiness the feel of abnormal life. Just as we are strengthened by bearing all burdens that are not so heavy as to crush us beneath their weight, so the nation is enriched by the burdens it bears and the expenditures it makes for the general welfare of its people. We may help our understanding of this matter by recognizing the truth that everything primarily comes out of the ground, and that whatever comes out of the ground, whether from agriculture or mining, is newly-created wealth. Whatever stimulates a more active development of our natural resources produces accordingly a proportionate amount of new wealth. The people have been taught, until the belief is now well-nigh universal, that the cost of establishing, equipping, maintaining, and supporting a standing army, the cost of building, manning, and supporting a large navy, and the expense of manufacturing and storing large supplies of ammunition and other war-materials, represent just so much dead loss to the taxpayers of the country. It is necessary to correct this error, and to disseminate the truth that the building of battleships, the manufacture of arms and ammunition, the manufacture of supplies of food and clothing, require large numbers of laborers and skilled artisans, who become a great market for food and supplies of every description for their convenience and comfort, thereby giving employment to myriads of others, back to the farmer; while the money paid for wages and produce is kept constantly in circulation. It is the difficulty of paying taxes from the pockets of poverty that makes taxes burdensome, and not their size. If the ability to pay a given amount in tax be tripled, the tax itself may be doubled, and the taxpayers still be the gainers. Wealth is what labor gets out of the ground; and whatever stimulates labor, or creates a demand for labor, is a direct stimulus to prosperity, by increasing both the number of laborers and the hours of labor, and by affording a market for the products of labor. If all of those thrown out of positions in a panic were to be put to work by the government in the production of war-materials, there would result no hard times, and the entire country would be better off. The large standing army indispensable to Germany costs vast sums annually, but the standard of personal efficiency is raised so much by military training, and industry is so stimulated to meet government requirements, that the Germans have captured markets all over the world for the sale of their manufactured products in ever-increasing quantities. According to statistics, we Americans spend every year on sensuous indulgence, on our hilarities--joy food, joy drink, joy dope, and night-outings--nine thousand million dollars, which, in gold, would weigh more than thirteen thousand tons--the weight of a good-sized battleship. The biggest super-dreadnoughts cost $15,000,000 each, built in pairs; built a hundred at a time, they certainly would not cost over $12,000,000 each. We could build, for what we spend on sensuous indulgence, 750 super-dreadnoughts; we could build 160 super-dreadnoughts a year for what we spend on alcoholic beverages; 83 a year for what we spend on tobacco; three a year for what we spend on chewing-gum. The total amount that we spend each year on our Army and Navy is about $250,000,000. Consequently, we spend more than twelve times as much on alcoholic drinks and tobacco as we do on our Army and Navy. I do not mean to preach a temperance sermon, or to advise against the use of tobacco. Nevertheless, I do think that for every dollar we spend on indulgence, we might drop a couple of cents into the side-till just for insurance--for the safety of our country against war, in order that our joys of living may be continued. The small burden of armaments in proportion to the burden of luxuries is very well stated in the following quotation from "Some Economic Aspects of War," by Professor C. Emery:-- * * * * * "_Certainly Bloch is not likely to minimize the extent of such expenditures, as he has been one of the leading writers to show the immensity of this burden, and yet he himself states that the military expenditures of different European countries vary from 2 per cent. to 3.8 per cent. of the total income. Even Germany, with her great organization, takes less than 3 per cent. of the actual income for its maintenance, both of army and navy; and when we think of the expenditures for luxuries, many of them harmful in themselves, the extent of military expenditures appears even less. In Germany, for instance, three times as much is spent for intoxicating drinks as for the support of military and naval establishments. One-third less consumption of beer and liquor on the part of the German people would take care of this part of the budget altogether._" * * * * * [Illustration: Some Annual United States Expenditures] There is no branch of insurance so important as insurance against war. There is no other thing insured, of which the loss is so vital as that of one's country, and there is no kind of insurance where the cost of security is so small in comparison with the value of the thing insured. Mr. Stockton puts this very clearly in his book, "Peace Insurance":-- * * * * * "_For insurance against loss by burglary, the nation expends $2,850,000 annually; for insurance against crime in the form of municipal, county, and state police we expend $110,000,000 annually; making a total of $112,850,000 expended for premiums on crime insurance alone.... A total annual amount on fire and crime insurance combined is $594,186,104, or about 350 million more than for all our military forces. Considering these figures we may conclude that our military expenditures are by no means greater than the probable loss by a war; that they are small compared with the amounts spent for fire and crime insurance, and that the insurance rate is low compared with that for other kinds of insurance in effect in the business world._" * * * * * During periods of peace, there tends to be established an equilibrium of supply and demand between our developed industries and our undeveloped resources. Consequently, when war comes and stimulates enormously all our developed industries--arts, sciences, and manufactures--a correspondingly greater demand is placed upon our natural resources, and their development is proportionately increased. The result is that the nation as a whole is not impoverished in the least by the burden of armaments, but is rather benefited by their support. Also, a nation may likewise be economically benefited by actual war, so long as it has such resources, number of population, industrial arts and sciences, and naval and military equipment as to prevent subjugation and the humiliation and degradation of being forced to pay ransom or tribute in the shape of a large war indemnity to a foreign Power. The fact that a war indemnity takes gold out of the country, and gives it to another people, makes the indemnity a national calamity. But when money is spent within the country, as it is for armaments, the condition is entirely different. The following excerpt from "The Valor of Ignorance," by General Homer Lea, admirably presents this: * * * * * "_Budgets are but the sums total of the symbols of wealth. Whether they are great or small, the wealth of the nation varies not one potato. An individual measures his wealth by coinage, but a nation only by that which coinage represents._ "_As a man squanders his money, he becomes impoverished; but it is only when the resources and means of producing that which money represents are destroyed or diminished that the wealth of a nation is lessened. The armament of a nation, instead of being indicative of its impoverishment, is rather an indication of its capacity._" * * * * * It is a law of psychology that, when we are subjected to a supreme test, we develop unrealized resources within ourselves; resources that never would be developed, nor could be, except through such trial. By consequence, it is evident that supreme trial is an indispensability to the best development of either individuals or nations. However severe may be the trial that results in the supreme development of the natural resources of the nation, and of the dormant resources in its people, it is essentially beneficial to the nation. Herbert Spencer said that, just as it is impossible to get a five-fingered hand into a three-fingered glove, with a separate finger in each pocket, so it is impossible to get a complex thought into a mind not sufficiently complex to receive it. It is doubtless impossible, therefore, to prove to the pacifist mind that the money spent in building warships cannot be counted as so much loss to the nation. The money spent by the government in building fighting-ships could not be esteemed so much money lost, even if the ships were useless. The government taxes the people for the money to build the ships, and then pays the money back to the people again for the ships. The people get their money all back, and the government gets the ships. The people lose nothing, and the government is the gainer to the value of the ships. It may be argued that the labor of the people is lost, but what of it? Labor is neither money nor wealth; it merely represents time. It does not hurt the laborers to do the work; on the contrary, it does them good. They pay but an infinitesimal part of the tax for building the ships. Their occupation constitutes them a market for manufactured articles and farm produce, which pays the manufacturers and the farmers a profit far in excess of their part of the tax for the ships, since by the increased demand they both get better prices and sell more goods. The farmer exerts additional effort to supply the demand, for the laborers who build the ships, and the manufacturers who supply their wares, call upon the farmer for greater supplies of produce than they could call for if the fighting-ships were not built. The farmer, always glad to get more out of the ground when he can sell to advantage, is stimulated to extra effort to get the greater profit, and he is made richer for it. The manufacturer is made richer for it, and the laborer is helped by higher wages and by more continuous occupation. The result is that the fighting-ships have cost nothing. On the contrary, their production has benefited all. Everybody is made better and richer through the building of them. It is especially significant and pertinent that the added employment of labor in the construction of armaments adds greatly to the number of taxpayers. Consequently, the burden of taxation is thereby borne by a larger number of persons, with a corresponding lessening of the burden on each individual. This is one of the reasons why poverty is not increased by increased government expenditures in the employment of labor. The enjoyment of life being derived entirely from exercise of our faculties, the more useful exercise we get within our strength, the happier we are. The building of battleships, by putting us more to use, serves the double purpose of getting more wealth out of the ground and making us happier. It may be argued that this would not be true if our economic institutions were not slack, and that, by perfecting these institutions, every one would receive his due amount of normal stimulus, and would be getting out of the ground his normal amount of wealth. This is all very true, but our economic institutions are not yet perfected, and the cost of building battleships comes out of the slack in our institutions. The work merely helps take up some of the slack. When we have looked upon our Navy, remembering what the pacifists have told us about its enormous cost, we are strongly impressed with the colossal expenditure, not realizing that the Navy has actually cost nothing. Its production has been a source of profit and benefit to the people. That which determines the size of a burden is the ability to bear it. Our burden of armaments, borne upon the united backs of a hundred million people, with an aggregate wealth of more than a hundred and thirty billion dollars, with an annual increase of wealth of over four billion dollars, becomes insignificant compared with the ability to support it. Size, like distance and time, has no meaning, except in a relative sense, for space and time are limitless. As compared with space, a mustard seed is exactly as large as the sun. We hear much about the tremendous burden of the present conflict upon the warring nations. The pacifists tell us that they are destined so to exhaust themselves that, when the war is over, we need have no fear of any one of them, or of a coalition of them, because they will have neither men nor money with which to fight. [Illustration: Enormous Resources of the Warring Nations] The first six months of the war cost about six billion dollars. Now, assuming that the first year of the war should cost even as much as fifteen billion dollars, this would be only five per cent. of the wealth of the warring Powers. But, it must be remembered, that the same thing largely holds true in the case of war that holds true in the case of armaments in time of peace. The cost comes out of the ground, for the most part. In short, the wealth created by the added stimulus in great measure compensates for the loss, especially when the money spent is chiefly returned to the people themselves. The actual out-of-pocket loss to the nations in the present war, taking into account its economic advantages, even during the war, will probably not exceed two and a half per cent., and I doubt if it will amount to that much. The total number of killed and wounded in the European War during the first six months is estimated at about two million. Most of those wounded will suffer very little permanent injury. The population of the warring nations is more than four hundred millions, taking into account only such part of the vast Indian population in proportion to the percentage of troops furnished by them as compares with the percentage furnished from the United Kingdom to the number of its inhabitants. Consequently, the total loss in killed and wounded during the first six months of the war was less than a half of one per cent. of the population, and as the number of killed does not exceed ten per cent. of the total number of killed and wounded, the loss during the first six months was about a tenth of half of one per cent.; in other words, only about a twentieth of one per cent. After the war has run for a year, the total loss in killed and wounded will not exceed one per cent. of the inhabitants, and the total in killed will not exceed a tenth of one per cent. When the war is over, any one of the warring Powers, unless Germany is exceedingly humbled, will be in better condition in every way to fight us than it would have been before the war broke out. CHAPTER X EGO-FANATIC GOOD INTENTIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO NATIONAL DEFENSE "If you will study history you will find that freedom, when it has been destroyed, has always been destroyed by those who shelter themselves under the cover of its forms, and who speak its language with unparalleled eloquence and vigor."--_Lord Salisbury._ There is a no more consistent thing in its constancy than human inconsistency. Many of those who are most pretentious about the virtue of a meek and lowly spirit manifest characteristics the exact opposite of their self-vaunted pretensions. Often the most enthusiastic and devout workers for a principle are themselves, when put to trial, most pronounced violators of that principle. Some years ago, while on ship for England, I formed the acquaintance of Sir William Wyndeer, of Australia. He told me that there was a famous woman pacifist on board, who wanted to meet me. She was a notorious militant moral reformer--the Carrie Nation of England. I went with him to where she was sitting on the deck in a steamerchair, and, on being introduced, sat down beside her. She opened the conversation with the remark: "Do you know that men like you ought to be hanged; that hanging is too good for you; that men like you, who invent and make explosives and guns to kill people, ought to be killed with them yourselves? That would give you a dose of your own medicine." I replied by asking her what she thought of the Armenian atrocities, which were at that time being perpetrated. "What do I think of them?" she answered. "I think just this--that, if I were the Queen of England, I would put an end to that business pretty quick." "How would you do it?" I asked. "Why," she responded, "I would go there with an army, and exterminate those beastly Turks." "If you were to do that," said I, "surely you would need some of the tools for killing people, like those you blame me for inventing, would you not?"--She would not speak to me after that. In the Dark Ages, they who were responsible for inflicting upon heretics the most exquisite tortures, were the foremost good-intentionists of their time. They believed they were following the teachings of Christ, and applying them in their business and social relations. Their aim was to practise what they preached: "Love one another," "Love thy neighbor as thyself," "On earth peace, good will toward men." So imbued were they with what they conceived to be divine principles that it was self-evident to them that there was no excuse for any one holding any other opinion than theirs, and that any one who held a different opinion was an enemy of God and man, and should be punished accordingly. They called difference from their opinion heresy, which was branded as the most heinous of all crimes. Those good-intentionists of the Torquemada type racked, flayed, and burned, with a meek and lowly spirit, for the love of God. The horror of St. Bartholomew was to them merely a frolic of brotherly love. Advocates of disarmament, non-resistance, and the subversion of the military spirit are themselves most militant creatures. They fail to see that, if retiring, non-resistant pacifism is the best policy for a nation to adopt in order to get what it wants, they themselves should adopt such pacifism to get what they want. While they decry every manner of aggression, still they undertake to enforce their doctrines by most aggressive practices. Never in all human history has any person or class of persons attempted to proselyte others to a doctrine of mildness, meekness, self-sacrifice, and lowly-spiritedness without attempting to enforce the doctrine. In so doing, the practice has been the exact opposite of the preachment. Robespierre and Marat notably exemplified this truth. Before the French Revolution, Robespierre was noted as a pacifist of the most pretentious cheek-turning type, and Marat was a pacific moralist dyed in the wool. When raised to dictatorial power, however, Robespierre became the wickedest and most venomous of all the fanged monsters of cruelty in the history of mankind; while bloody Marat, clothed with authority, used murder as the sole means of reform. The actions of Robespierre and Marat were the exact opposite of their code for the conduct of others. The advocates of non-resistance may be perfectly conscientious. It is not to be doubted for one moment that the majority of them are actuated by the best intentions and the kindliest of motives. Torquemada sincerely hoped to do a great good by torturing heretics in the Spanish Inquisition. He is notable among those who have paved broad highways of Hell with good intentions. The hyper-sentimental pacifists are today actively engaged in paving a broad highway through this country, over which the hell of war is invited by them. Devotion to the end justified the means to such a well-meaning fanatic as Torquemada. The same was doubtless true of Catherine de' Medici, who mothered the massacre of St. Bartholomew. The bloody Duke of Alva, Executioner Extraordinary to Philip II of Spain, who undertook the task of killing the entire population of the Netherlands, because their religious opinion differed from the Spanish brand, could not have been so enthusiastically devoted to the monstrous villainy had he not been inspired by what was to his mind the best of intentions. It is remarkable what an influence a very little thing may sometimes have in shaping the policy of a people or the fate of a nation. Religious sects have been formed upon the various interpretations of a single phrase; a difference of opinion about the meaning of a word has set them at one another's throats. Millions upon millions of dollars have been spent in the United States in peace propagandism, and eloquent lungs have hoarsed themselves to defeat Congressional appropriations for defense, simply because the phrase, _preparation for war_, has been used instead of the phrase, _preparation against war_. An organization of American women, under the head, Woman's Peace Party, has lately been created. The main resolution adopted by the organization is the following: * * * * * "_Resolved:_ "_That we dencunce with all the earnestness of which we are capable the concerted attempt now being made to force this country into still further preparedness for war. We desire to make a solemn appeal to the higher attributes of our common humanity to help us unmask this menace to our civilization._" * * * * * They have made the grave mistake of using the expression for _war_ in place of the expression _against war_. The pacifist propagandists, the army and navy men, and all their friends and supporters, are alike agreed that it is wise to make efficient preparations _against_ war. None of us wants war, but when we, who believe in armaments, speak of them as preparations _for_ war, then the pacifists are in immediate disagreement with us. Let us, therefore, in future substitute the phrase _against war_ for the phrase _for war_. Among the organizers of this so-called party are women of national prominence. They are sincere in their purpose, their aim is high. They are emulating the dictum of Emerson, for they have hitched their wagon to a star--Dr. David Starr--(never mind the Jordan). They solemnly make this pledge: "_We do hereby band ourselves together to demand that war should be abolished._" It is well to note that they have used the word _should_ instead of _shall_. The greatest difficulty in teaching truth is to remove the bias of false learning; for a firm conviction, once established in the mind, gives the mind a fixed set in a certain direction. This is strongly exemplified by the fact that persons who have been proselyted to a certain religious creed can seldom be made to change their faith. We are what our opinions are. Our opinion shapes our destiny to its own bent. In short, a man is absolutely at the mercy of his opinion. We have very little to do, however, with the shaping of our own opinion. That is mostly shaped by others. We go to church to have our opinion bent, or its present bent stiffened. We attend a lecture and get a new kink put into our opinion; we converse with our friends, and they dent our opinion; we read books and newspapers, learn something, and are swerved in the direction of our learning, especially in the direction of public opinion. Always and always, while we think that we are shaping our own opinion, we are having it shaped by others. The estimable ladies of the Woman's Peace Party are merely parading like sandwich men, disporting a legend written on a board by the man higher up, with whom they believe it is most creditable to agree. At the present time, the false teachings of the peace-propagandists have so proselyted public opinion that every public speaker, aspiring to popular favor, finds it easy, even with a weakling voice and a halting speech, to get his audience with him, and to win a reputation for eloquence and wisdom by prating the bromidial spielings of the peace-propagandists. A great many men and women in this country hold the same false opinion that the ladies of the Woman's Peace Party hold. Possibly something besides the humiliation of this country by war may lead them into the light of understanding. War, however, will do it, and by their able co-operation with the forces of the future enemies of the country, they are hastening the advent of that war. If we were to disarm, as these ladies advise, war would come upon us with consternate suddenness. Then, when they saw the desolation and the waste; saw their homes in flames; when they saw innocent citizens clumped in open spaces and shot down with machine-guns; when they saw little children, lean as shadows, starving everywhere; when they encountered insult and maltreatment at every turn; then all their womanhood would revolt and rise up with an altered mind. Like the light that descended from Heaven on Saul of Tarsus, the light of the truth would descend on those ladies through the smoke of their burning homes--that armed preparedness against such a dread eventuality as war is the supreme of virtue, and its neglect the worst of crimes. By their help that war is very likely to come, and if it does come, we shall find them, as the women of England, ministering angels in the hospitals of the wounded. We shall find them at the recruiting stations, urging enlistment. We shall find them fitting out their sons, husbands, and brothers for the front. We shall find them, as in England, training in the use of arms as a last emergency reserve. We shall find them, as in England, doing police duty, that the city guardians may go to the front. As the women of Carthage cut the hair from their heads to make bow-strings, so these very women of the Peace Party, as the women of England are doing, as the women of Germany are doing, will sacrifice their jewelry, and all their most precious possessions, to supply the sinews of war. It is a mistake to suppose that, because men bear arms in war, they are the chief sufferers in war, or make the chief sacrifices. The sexes suffer equally, for to win victory they make mutual and equal sacrifices, and in defeat they suffer mutually every conceivable and every inconceivable laceration of body, pride, and honor. The supposition is erroneous that woman is less brave or less militant in war than man. In times of peace, when her help is not needed in the sterner affairs of life, she may be as gentle as a dove and as kind as a purring kitten; but, when her help is needed in stern affairs, she is never found wanting. When the cubs are in danger, "the female of the species is more deadly than the male." The abject condition of Belgian women and children since the German invasion is merely typical of what women and children must inevitably suffer at the hands of invaders. It matters not whether a country be invaded by Germans, Frenchmen, or Englishmen, or by Americans. The stern exigencies of war require that the invaders shall bend every energy and employ every resource to the attainment of the main purpose--victory. The invaders themselves are compelled to make extreme sacrifices, and to bear extreme suffering and privation, and are not in a mood to take on more burden or to suffer extra privations, and, above all, to risk success, in order to alleviate the suffering of the enemy's women and children. Sympathy and mercy, however, do often lead them to be far kinder than would best suit the demands of stern necessity. It was when Sherman found himself compelled to drive out the civil inhabitants of Atlanta, to prepare for his march to the sea, that in reply to protests on behalf of the women and children, he made his world-famous declaration, "War is hell; and we cannot civilize it or refine it." The supreme duty of a nation is to safeguard its people from such a crisis and such a calamity. It is useless to lament the miseries of our women and children, after we have, through neglect of national defenses, brought the calamities of war upon them. With strange inconsistency, the women of the Woman's Peace Party, though they bemoan the lot of the poor women and children of Belgium, are by their own acts inviting the same calamity to fall upon themselves and on their children. Herbert Spencer observed that individual life is a tendency to establish an equilibrium between internal and external forces. This observation applies also to the life of social organizations, except that, when applied to nations, it should be differently stated, as follows--the life of a nation is the tendency to establish an equilibrium between internal forces, and also between those forces and external forces. Opposing forces separately tend toward instability of equilibrium, but collectively, by operating against one another, they tend to the establishment of an equilibrium. Individual action in a group of individuals tends to heterogeneity, aggregated action to homogeneity. One of the mainsprings of progress is the pertinacity of enthusiasts and faddists. Even the self-appointed ego-fanatic moral reformers are often useful, because they tend to throw society out of balance. This rouses the great mass of the people to inquiry and raises them to a broader understanding, with the result that, in the end, pernicious propagandists, who have overshot the mark, are brought back nearer the mark, and the sane mass of the people brought nearer the mark. A fanatic reformer sometimes injects dynamic force into a static condition. It seems to be a rational assumption, therefore, that, in all things where organized feminist fanaticism of both men and women is today working evil, the great body of sane and normal men and women ought to exert their united influence to the full as a stabilizer, or equilibrator of the social organization. CHAPTER XI A DANGEROUS CRIMINAL CLASS? "Probably the most curious feature of the naval program is the regularity with which the sky clouds over as the day for the consideration of naval appropriations approaches. Year after year, after a long spell of pleasant weather, all at once storm clouds have drifted across the heavens, international relations have become suddenly strained, and the whole land has lain in the shadow of an impending conflict. Fortunately, the storm blows over as soon as the votes are counted, and in the beautiful sunlight which follows the storm, workmen are seen constructing additional battleships. Suspicious persons have occasionally imagined they saw a connection between the international weather and the Navy League." _Dr. Charles E. Jefferson._ "It is criminal that we should expend vast sums on warships and armament on the advice of interested parties alone...." "War scares are heard the world over. The world over they are set going by wicked men for evil purposes." _Dr. David Starr Jordan, "War and Waste."_ The pacifists have delved out of the infinite latency a very startling alleged truth, which they are effulging in language of lavish luminosity, to the effect that it is necessary only for a man to have a pecuniary interest or personal advantage involved in order to commit any kind of crime. They have discovered that room for a motive establishes the motive and proves the crime. They have discovered that those things which we call integrity and honor and conscience are no deterrents whatsoever to the commission of the most heinous offense against one's fellow men, so long as there is profit in it. They believe that, if only there is money in the game, an inventor or manufacturer or merchant will scheme for the commission of wholesale poisoning, maiming, and murder. They believe that the inventors and manufacturers of guns necessarily foster war in order to promote the sale of their wares. They surmise that inventors and manufacturers of smokeless powders and high explosives are capable of standing with the "black hand," capable of being gladdened at the dynamite outrage, at the street riot, at the slaughter of song-birds--anything that will consume dynamite or burn gunpowder. According to the pacifists, the principal lay of makers of war-materials is to connive with the officers of the Army and Navy to stir up international dissension and foment war, in order to create a demand for their products. The pacifists believe that army and navy officers are only too willing to co-operate in the nefarious business, because war brings higher pay and rapid promotion. They believe that it matters not to these "interested parties" how many of their countrymen are sacrificed on the firing line, or how many widows and orphans are made. The groans of the wounded and dying on the battle-field, and the lamentations in the desolated home, are music to the ears of those who supply the war-materials; for, with every shot from a rifle, fifty grains of gunpowder are burned, while bullets enough miss their mark to equal the weight of each man they kill. Consequently, there is substantial profit to the cartridge-maker and the gunpowder-manufacturer for every man killed with a rifle ball. But it is in shrapnel and the ammunition for the big guns that the greatest profit lies. Field-guns fire away ammunition costing from ten to twenty dollars a shot, at the rate of from twenty to forty shots a minute. This costs a lot of money. At the battle of Mukden, in the Russo-Japanese war, one battery of eight guns fired 11,159 rounds, or 1,395 rounds per gun. Think of the expense of that ammunition, and the profit to the manufacturers! It is estimated that when the big naval guns are fired, the cost of the smokeless-powder charge, the projectile and bursting charge, together with the wear and tear of the gun, amounts to more than $2,000 a shot, and the damage done to a warship hit may be many millions. Look at it any way you will, war, according to the pacifist notion, is a real Klondike for manufacturers of war-materials. The peace sophists have been able to put two and two together, with the conclusions that such an opportunity for profit is too strong for human nature to resist, and that, as they have found room for the motive, they have proved the crime. Of course, their accusation is a pretty severe arraignment of human nature, after all these years of civilization and Christian enlightenment. It is strange how human nature can have improved so much lately, as claimed by the pacifists, and how the spirit of brotherhood and good-will can have suddenly become so dominant that the peoples of the earth now despise war, and are so afflicted with the horrors of it that, just as soon as the great European War is over, they are not going to fight any more, while still the makers of war-materials remain in the primitive savagery of the stone age. It seems to me that, if human nature has so improved as to be an efficient bar to a nation against waging war for plunder, regardless of the advantage and the profit, it ought also to be a similar bar to inventors and manufacturers of war-materials, and to army and navy officers, against precipitating war for pecuniary or personal advantage. But, according to pacifist reasoning, those "interested parties" are more endowed with the spirit of the hyena than with the spirit of brotherhood. Perhaps, however, the manufacturers of war-materials, and army and navy officers, were not home when the great improvement in human nature knocked at their door. If considerations of mere personal profit are sufficient to make the best of us foster war, which the peace fanatics esteem wholesale murder, it is strange that the inventors and manufacturers of drugs and medicines, the proprietors of drugstores, and the medical profession and undertakers, do not form a league and co-operate in spreading infectious diseases, in order to create a greater demand for their wares and for their services. Of course, the reason may be that they have not yet thought of it, and it may be wrong for me to suggest the thing to them. Still, it is queer that it has not been suggested to them by what the pacifists have said concerning the conduct of our army and navy officers and of the inventors and manufacturers of war-materials. Let us see what the facts actually are: The inventors and manufacturers of war-materials, and our army and navy officers, by virtue of the study and experience that qualify them for their business or profession better than others, are also qualified better than others to judge what are our actual needs for national defense. If the manufacturers of war-materials, and our army and navy men, are to be convicted of inciting war on the evidence that by so doing they create a demand for their services, then necessarily others benefited by a like demand may be convicted on the same evidence. Mr. Andrew Carnegie himself is the greatest of all American armorers. He it was who introduced the Bessemer steel process into the United States, from which all our gun-makers and all our armament-makers have greatly benefited. It is his name and that of Herr Krupp which Neptune reads graven in the walls of fighting-ships. He still draws an income from his interests in the great armor-making steel corporation--an annual income big enough to pay the combined salaries of all the four thousand officers of the United States Army. Truly, if the discovery of room for a motive proves both the motive and the crime, and is sufficient to convict these four thousand men of being willing to sell their souls in order to raise their salaries a few dollars, Mr. Carnegie himself is at least open to suspicion. Likewise, the varied and many institutions--incubators of the doves of peace--born of the great armor-maker's generosity, which continue to be his beneficiaries, cannot escape the suspicion that taints their pedigree. Even the leading man--the principal star on the stage where _Uncle Sammy unter Alles_ is being played--Dr. David Starr Jordan, is paid from the Carnegie Peace Foundation with money equally tainted by the sweaty hands of the grimy men who are forging armor-plate in the Smoky City. But we all know that Mr. Carnegie is above any such suspicion. We know that the pacifist method of reasoning must be false. The education of our army and navy officers teaches them not alone military science, but also national devotion and personal honor. Devotion to duty is necessary in order to keep them in the service, under the altogether inadequate pay they receive. The pay of the American army and navy officers is smaller, in proportion to their knowledge and the value of their services, than that of any other class of men in the country. If every army and navy officer should abandon the service for a position in civil life when he could get a raise of wages for so doing, there would not be a corporal's guard left in the service. Whenever a public work is placed in charge of an army or navy officer, there is no _sub-rosa_ rake-off, or divvy with civilian contractors. There is absolutely no graft of any kind in their service, and the government is sure of getting the maximum amount of work for the minimum cost. Not one cent of graft has fallen upon the palms either of Colonel Goethals or of any other army officer in the whole course of construction of that mighty work--the Panama Canal. New York City tried to get Colonel Goethals as Police Commissioner. He has received scores of offers of positions in civil life at many times his present salary, because of the military capacity and honor that make the Goethals sort of service very valuable. I know many army and navy men intimately. I have had opportunities of hearing their off-guard conversations and interchange of ideas on all manner of subjects, and have thereby been enabled to see their character revealed to the naked soul, and I have never yet discovered any other attitude or tendency among them than the emulation of exactly that type of honor, efficiency, and manhood which is Colonel Goethals'. I cannot award this same high praise to the politicians I have known. An army or navy officer always drives just as close a bargain as he can on behalf of the government when doing business with civilians, although the economics of the transaction is of no personal concern to him. When a politician makes a bargain, his first consideration is: "Where do I come in?" His next consideration is: "Where does the party come in?" Duty to the government is a minor consideration. It is the demand for a thing that leads to its invention, just as it is the demand for a thing that leads to its manufacture. The demand must precede the production. When the inventor designs a gun, or invents a new explosive, he does not simultaneously try to invent ways and means of creating a market. He may, on the contrary, be inspired with a spirit of patriotism, and feel that in the event of war his work will be of signal service to his country, both by killing his country's enemies and by saving the lives of his own people. The manufacturers of war-materials are much more likely to be actuated by honorable motives, and to make large sacrifices from a spirit of patriotism, than are the manufacturers of soap, agricultural machinery, or automobiles. The builders of Ericsson's _Monitor_ were not able to get the government either to approve or to back the enterprise. They were, however, fortunately inspired by a high spirit of patriotism, and by a strong belief in Ericsson's invention; consequently, they built it at their own expense. It was completed just in the nick of time. The terrible _Merrimac_ appeared before the _Monitor_ was quite ready. She could laugh at forts, and the projectiles from the guns of our wooden navy glanced off her mailed sides like raindrops off a duck's back. Whether she would be able to run up the Potomac and bombard Washington, was a question only of the depth of water. The little coterie of bureaucrats in Washington, who had ridiculed the fantastic innovation of Ericsson, were now on Uneasy Street, and sent urgent appeals for the _Monitor_ to be made ready and sent to Hampton Roads with all speed. The peculiar craft did arrive on the morning of the second day of the naval fight. The result is one of the good stories of history--a story that has never been quite equaled in fiction. The _Monitor_ had not yet been accepted by the government when she fought the _Merrimac_; she had not yet received the government's approval. A country Reuben, who saw a giraffe for the first time at a circus, looked the animal over, and, finding that it did not conform to his ideas of what an animal ought to be, remarked, "By gum, there ain't no sich critter!" Likewise, the naval experts at Washington did not believe that there could be any such fighting-ship. After that fight, however, the _Monitor_ was quickly purchased, and hurried orders were given for more _Monitors_. The patriotism and pluck of the warship-builders saved the country. The pacifists are strongly urging what they term the nationalization of all manufacture of war-materials; that is to say, that all such materials should be made at government plants. Their object is to have the work done by disinterested persons, who will not be tempted to promote war in order to make a market for those materials. By admirable inconsistency, the pacifists would, in so doing, place the manufacture of war-materials in the hands of army and navy officers, whom they pronounce the most pernicious of all promoters of war. Before Congress acts upon the suggestion of the pacifists to nationalize the manufacture of all war-materials, it would be well to see what would have happened in the past, had the thing been done sooner. We can judge from that concerning the advisability of adopting the measure now. If it had been adopted at the time of the Civil War, Ericsson's _Monitor_ never would have been built, because its building depended upon private personal patriotism and private enterprise. If the measure had been adopted twenty-five years ago, then naturally, during that period, private invention and private enterprise would have been eliminated, and the government would not have profited from civilian genius and energy. Let us see, then, what private invention and private enterprise have done for the government for the past quarter-century, since the advent of smokeless powder. Colonel E. G. Buckner, vice-president of the du Pont Powder Company, in an article in _Harper's Weekly_, of June 27, 1914, places the credit for the four most important inventions in the development of smokeless powder--first, to Vieille, of France, who produced gun-cotton; second, to Mendeléeff, of Russia, who told us how to colloid it; third, to Francis G. du Pont, who eliminated danger in the manufacture; and, fourth, to Hudson Maxim, who invented the multi-perforated grain that gave absolute control over the burning. It will be seen that two of the most important steps in the development of smokeless powder were made by American civilian inventors. The alcohol replacement invention of Francis G. du Pont and my own invention of the multi-perforated grain, rendered possible the use of a colloid of pure nitro-cellulose as a smokeless cannon-powder. It would be absolutely impossible successfully to make a pure nitro-cellulose cannon-powder without these two inventions. If the manufacture of smokeless powder had been nationalized twenty-five years ago, this government would not stand, as it stands today, ahead of all other governments, in the excellence of its smokeless powder. When the government first ordered a pure nitro-cellulose powder, large quantities of solvents were consumed in its preparation. Private manufacturers introduced new processes to overcome this difficulty, resulting in a material reduction in the cost of the powder, which has already effected a saving to the government of more than $2,000,000. It is a peculiarity of smokeless powder that, regardless of however stable it may be when first made, it gradually begins to decompose after long standing, which, until recently, necessitated its destruction. Several years ago, however, Mr. Francis I. du Pont, son of the Francis G. du Pont above-mentioned, invented a process for the successful reworking of smokeless powder that has begun to decompose, at a mere fraction of the original cost, making it just as good as ever. This invention alone will hereafter save the government more than a million dollars a year. When the new army rifle was developed, it was found that the smokeless powder then used by the army, containing nitro-glycerin, was so erosive as to destroy the accuracy of the arm when only 1,600 rounds had been fired. The government obtained from abroad some smokeless powder, which enabled 3,000 rounds to be fired before the gun was destroyed, but after that number of rounds, the rifling was practically obliterated. A private manufacturer invented a new smokeless rifle-powder, with process and apparatus for its manufacture. With this powder, it is now possible to fire as high as 20,000 rounds before the accuracy of the gun is destroyed. This invention easily multiplies the life of the army rifle by six. As the army rifle will now last six times as long by the use of this powder as it would by the use of any other powder, the value of the invention to the government is by far the chief value of the gun itself. Consequently, it is estimated that this invention alone represents a value for the guns that the government now has on hand of more than $15,000,000. Not only does our small-arms powder effect a great saving in the wear and tear of our shoulder-rifles, but also our pure nitro-cellulose cannon-powder effects a similar saving in the life of our big guns. Our big guns, using pure nitro-cellulose powder, last, with equal accuracy, more than twice as long as British guns, which use cordite. It will be seen from the foregoing considerations and figures that private genius and private enterprise alone have saved the government very many millions of dollars. Of course, it may be argued that, since guns and ammunition and all kinds of military implements and engines have been perfected, there is not now room for civilian inventors to be so useful to the government during the next twenty-five years as they have been in the past twenty-five. A similar attitude of the average mind would have existed had the same question been raised twenty-five years ago. When our Patent Office was first established, the Commissioner of Patents predicted that within fifty years everything possible of invention would have been invented and that then the Patent Office would have to be abolished for lack of business. The number of inventions received by the Patent Office, however, has rapidly increased, and is still rapidly increasing. More inventions are received now each year at the Patent Office than were received during the first fifty years of its existence. The reason for this is that every invention, either directly or indirectly, creates a demand for other inventions. The inventor is still working in virgin soil, and the room for invention is infinite. If the manufacture of war-materials were to be nationalized, not only would the government rob itself of the aid of large quasi-government manufactories, but also it would rob itself of the benefits of the inventive genius of the whole people. The value of that genius may be approximated by recalling what citizen inventions have done since the outbreak of the American Civil War. Breech-loading guns of all kinds, the percussion cap, cartridges for small-arms, fixed ammunition for quick-firing guns, the breech mechanism for all guns, the built-up gun, the great improvements in steel manufacture, the revolving turret and the _Monitor_ type of fighting-ship, the steam turbine, the internal-combustion engine, all of the great inventions in smokeless powders and high explosives, and their adaptability to use in ordnance, the submarine torpedo-boat, the self-propelled torpedo, the aëroplane and the dirigible, and any number of other inventions indispensable to modern warfare, have been the invention of civilians. Of course, army and navy officers have invented a great many important things themselves, and have rendered great service in the development of civilian inventions. But it must be remembered that army and navy officers constitute but a very small part of the population. Even were army and navy men ten times more proficient in the invention of war-materials than civilian inventors, the number and value of civilian naval and military inventions would preponderate enormously over those of government officers. We have been assured all along by the peace sophists that, if war should come, the great American genius would rise to the occasion and spring to our rescue, with all manner of destructive contrivances, capable of annihilating armies and sweeping fleets of fighting-ships off the seas. If the beautiful nationalization plan of the peace sophists, however, were to be carried out, the great American genius would get no opportunity to fructify the prophesied militant cataclysmic ogerism to the discomfiture of our enemies. No other government has nationalized the manufacture of armaments and war-materials to the exclusion of private manufacturers. On the contrary, other governments strongly encourage private manufacture, for they realize the vast importance of drawing upon the inventive genius of the whole people, and of enlisting private energy, private enterprise, and private capital in government work. The French government for more than a hundred years has made all its own gunpowder, but its chief gun-works are private enterprises. Possibly, if the French smokeless powder had been perfected by private enterprise to meet government requirements, those requirements would have been more exacting with private manufacturers than with government manufacturers, and the battleships _Jéna_ and _La Liberté_ would not have been blown up by the spontaneous combustion of bad gunpowder. If this government were to nationalize the manufacture of its war-materials, we know, by what has been done in the past, through private enterprise and private inventive genius, that the government would suffer enormously. In this era of Congressional investigations, it would be well to have a government inquiry made as to whether or not there should be a new classification of acts of treason. It should be inquired whether or not, in time of peace, public preachments should be allowed advocating the disbanding of our Army and the destruction of our Navy--acts which in time of war might be interpreted as treason, and the offenders backed up against a wall and shot. It should be inquired whether or not foreign emissaries, and possibly spies, have not for years been collaborating with American advocates of disarmament. It should be inquired whether or not the Washington lobby that has been operating against governmental appropriations for the Army and Navy, has not received foreign support. If these things have not been done by representatives of foreign countries, with such a wide-open opportunity, then the diplomats and strategists of foreign nations ought to be sent to a kindergarten for instruction. Could anything be more likely than that foreign Powers should possess the sagacity to grasp such an opportunity to weaken our defenses? CHAPTER XII THE GOOD AND EVIL OF PEACE AND OF WAR "All states are in perpetual war with all. For that which we call peace is no more than merely a name, whilst in reality Nature has set all communities in an unproclaimed but everlasting war against each other." _Plato._ So much has been said based on ignorance and false premise about the good and evil of war, and the good and evil of peace, that a few cold, relevant facts will not be out of place here. In stating these facts, the writer is standing neither as sponsor for war nor as sponsor for peace. He is not posing as a judge qualified to pass sentence on peace or on war, but merely as one who understands the subject sufficiently to throw some new light upon it. In bearing witness to the cruelty and mercilessness of Nature, the writer assumes no responsibility for what Nature has done; he was not consulted. In bearing witness to the evils and benefits of war, and the evils and benefits of peace, the writer does not thereby either palliate the evils, or stand responsible for them; neither does he assume credit for their benefits and blessings. He realizes, however, that the bearer of bad tidings is associated with the ill-feeling they inspire, although he may be wholly innocent of the ill. While too much stress cannot be laid upon the horrors of war and the individual suffering incurred thereby, still it is not just to lay to the account of war or militarism every ill that flesh is heir to, as is done by many of the pacifi-maniacs. As a matter of fact, it would be as justifiable to attack peace because of the evils that develop in times of peace. We do not, however, on that account conceive peace to be a misfortune, but a blessing. While our pacifists promote war by their teachings, they declaim against war and picture its horrors and calamitous results. One would naturally suppose that, appreciating what a terrible thing war is, they would take the most scientific and dependable means of safeguarding this country against such a calamity; but, as a matter of fact, they are doing everything in their power to abolish the one means that can safeguard us against war. With consistent inconsistency, they place the blame for war on the advocates of adequate armaments--the true peace-advocates and peace-makers and enemies of war, who are forefending us against war. The advocacy of armaments is construed by them as the advocacy of war; measures for peace are confounded with measures for breaching the peace. A curious phase of the matter is that many friends of armaments themselves make a similar mistake, and think that in defending armaments they are called upon to defend war also. As a matter of fact, war has no defense, except as a last resort. But when there is no other way, and when the maintenance of peace would be a greater calamity than war, then war is to be recommended as the lesser evil. It is, nevertheless, undeniably an evil, though a necessary one, just as a surgical operation is a necessary evil--but one which, if successful, results in such good as far to outweigh the evil. The peace sophists tell us that there has never been a good war or a bad peace; that always in war the best specimens of manhood have been slain, leaving the weak and unfit for breeding purposes. They tell us that the Napoleonic wars lowered the stature of the entire French nation by two inches. They tell us also that during all past ages war for plunder has been the principal business of mankind. The following arraignment of war by General Hiram M. Chittenden is a very fair sample of this method of reasoning: * * * * * "_Both in its restriction upon marriage and in its destruction of life war thus destroys the most precious seed and leaves the inferior from which to propagate. In proportion as wars are long continued, and draw heavily upon the population, these deleterious effects are apparent. The campaigns of Napoleon were a mighty drain upon the vigor of the French people. It has been held that the average stature of the French was thereby diminished by more than an inch. How much their intellectual and moral stature was shrunken by that debauchery of crime, who can say? The decadence of the Roman people was due more to the waste of its best blood in war than to the causes commonly accepted. War reverses the process of natural selection and, instead of producing the survival of the fittest, produces the survival of the most unfit._" * * * * * According to statistics of the pacifists, from the year 1496 B.C. to the year 1861 A.D.--a period of 3,357 years--there were 227 years of peace and 3,130 years of war--thirteen years of war for every year of peace. Now, if what we are told about the degenerative effects of war is true, since we know that war has been prevalent in all ages, the natural conclusion is, what a lot of rapscallions we must be! If war, instead of tending to secure the survival of the fit, secures the survival of the unfit, then after a thousand centuries of strife we must be signally unfit. The trouble with such statistics is that, instead of leading us toward the truth, they lead us into error. It may be perfectly true that for every year of general peace there have been thirteen years when there was a war somewhere on the earth; but this does not imply in the least that peace was not more general than was war, even during those thirteen years when there was a war. We must remember that the history of nations does not tell us much about the affairs of the people in times of peace; it is their wars that have made history. As we look back through time at the large number of wars, we clump them together in perspective. We place the wars, as it were, all on the map at once, instead of placing them years and centuries apart. Just as there is always in human life more joy than sorrow, more pleasure than pain, more good than ill; so, in the history of the world, there has been more of peace and prosperity than there has been of war and calamity. John Ruskin possessed the rare ability to perceive truth that pointed one way, while his feelings pointed in the opposite direction. Although he had an emotional nature and a highly artistic temperament, he was still a man of so broad views, with so comprehensive a mind at the other end of the optic nerve, that he could ratiocinate in spite of his emotions. The following is what he had to say on war: * * * * * "_All the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war; no great art ever rose on earth but among a nation of soldiers. There is no great art possible to a nation but that which is based on battle. When I tell you that war is the foundation of all the arts, I mean also that it is the foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of men. It was very strange for me to discover this, and very dreadful, but I saw it to be quite an undeniable fact. The common notion that peace and the virtues of civil life flourished together I found to be utterly untenable. Peace and the vices of civil life only flourish together. We talk of peace and learning, of peace and plenty, of peace and civilization; but I found that these are not the words that the Muse of History coupled together: that on her lips the words were peace and sensuality, peace and selfishness, peace and death. I found in brief that all great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; that they were nourished in war and wasted in peace; taught by war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace; in a word, that they were born in war and expired in peace._" * * * * * We must not conclude, from the above quotation from Ruskin, that he was an advocate of brutality versus humanity, for he was not. The thought he meant to convey was simply this--that only a supreme trial, a supreme responsibility, where country, life itself, and that which is dearer than life--home--are staked on the issue, can bring out the highest virtues. The struggle for inalienable human rights, whose observance is freedom, has been the greatest influence to stimulate the genius and the virtues of men, and these things have been accomplished, and could only have been accomplished, by war. The humanity of Ruskin is well brought out in the following quotation: * * * * * "... _Depend upon it, all work must be done at last, not in a disorderly, scrambling, doggish way, but in an ordered, soldierly, human way--a lawful or 'loyal' way. Men are enlisted for the labor that kills--the labor of war: they are counted, trained, fed, dressed, and praised for that. Teach the plough exercise as carefully as you do the sword exercise, and let the officers of troops of life be held as much gentlemen as the officers of troops of death; and all is done: but neither this, nor any other right thing, can be accomplished--you can't even see your way to it--unless, first of all, both servant and master are resolved that, come what will of it, they will do each other justice._" * * * * * Ralph Waldo Emerson held the same opinion about war as that held by John Ruskin. He quoted and approved the old Greek, Heraclitus, who said, "War is the father of all things." After quoting this expression, Emerson said, "We of this day can repeat it as a political and social truth." Also, he said, "War passes the power of all chemical solvents, breaking up the old cohesions, and allowing the atoms of society to take a new order." As a matter of fact, social order, in time of peace, like a cultivated field, settles and solidifies, and it must be broken down into subsoil, to support a new and vigorous growth. The breaking by plough and dynamite, uprooting and submerging all undesirable growth, is rewarded by healthy and vigorous crops of a desirable growth. The very privations that have to be endured by large numbers of persons during a great war, stimulate economy, invention, and extraordinary endeavor, and serve to teach many useful lessons and to impart valuable experiential knowledge, which is applied both during the war, and, with greater advantage, when the war is over. When a country is at war, all its industries are not rendered stagnant or idle, but many of them are stimulated to extraordinary effort when cut off from import by blockade. The legend about the stature of the French nation being lowered two inches as a result of killing off so many of the best men of France during the Napoleonic wars, is a very plausible one, and one that has been made great use of by the pacifists. But no one has thought to inquire whether or not, during the past century, the average stature of the Spaniards and the Italians also has been lowered. Perhaps, if we should inquire, we might learn that the color of the hair and eyes and skin of the French had somewhat darkened during that period. We might learn the truth that the effect upon the stature and the color of the eyes and skin and hair was mainly due to another kind of warfare--that of the southern blood of the Latin against the blood of the blond Norseman. We might learn that in Italy, Spain, and France, the posterity of the Norse giants, who long ago overran and conquered those countries, did not thrive well there, but slowly died down. We might learn that in those lands the blood of the blond is gradually overcome by the blood of the brunette; and that, as the blond races are larger in stature, the stature of the mixed Latin races is lowered in proportion to the disappearance of the blond type. The ancient Roman was much shorter in stature than even the present Italian or Frenchman. Warfare has always subjected the weak, the puny, the poor, the ill, the indigent, and the incompetent to privations, trials, and strains of such severity that they have died in large numbers. They have not been so able as normal persons to escape the sword and to resist famine and disease; consequently, fewer of them have survived than of the more fit. It is, however, argued by the peace sophists, that in modern warfare only the most able-bodied men are selected for military duty, and also that the weak and unfit who remain at home are not subjected to the same exterminating influences as formerly. As a matter of fact, comparing the results of war today with those in former years, we find the percentage of deaths among the incompetent stay-at-homes far larger than among the soldiers at the front. It is true that medical science secures the survival of a much larger percentage of stay-at-home incompetents than in former years, but medical science saves also a much larger proportion of those injured in battle than formerly, so that the ratio of survival between the fit and the incompetent is today in favor of the fit. The conditions that tend to secure the survival of the fittest are even more effective today than they were in old-time wars. The unpleasant truth should be realized that invading armies must, with other luxuries, have women. As a result, they leave a large progeny--wrens in the nests of the doves of peace. Hence, inasmuch as soldiers are the pick of the manhood of their country, they are likely to do about as much toward securing the survival of the fit in an enemy's country as they would have in their own country. There is another very important consideration, which is that war is a great mixer of races, and that usually mixed types benefit enormously from their compound blood. Furthermore, the mingling of races and peoples has in all times served greatly to spread knowledge of one another, and they have always profited largely from the mingled knowledge. Soldiers visiting distant lands have brought home acquaintance with new arts and sciences and broader ideas of international usefulness. The soldiers of the North, who marched with Sherman through Georgia to the sea, returned years afterward and built cotton mills, iron foundries, and machine-shops all over the South, and stimulated the South with Northern energy and Northern capital. We know that the inhabitants of the earth are constantly growing more fit; consequently, we know that they cannot be growing constantly more unfit, due to the degenerative influence of war. The history of nations is a history of wars; consequently we know as untrue the contention of the peace sophists that war secures the survival of the unfit. We know that exactly the opposite must be true; that war secures the survival of the fit. There is yet another thing of which the peace sophists have never thought, and could not be expected to think--the tremendous self-saving potentiality of the race. As I have pointed out elsewhere, Nature seems to care little for individuals, but everything for a race or species; consequently, Nature has forefended herself by very ample measures to insure the survival of the fit. If every able-bodied man in the world today were to be slain, and only the weak and puny left, although the injury would be incalculable and would make the whole race stagger, still the next generation of men would be almost as able-bodied and as fit as the present generation. Let us see why: It is because of that great potentiality--atavism. Children inherit not only directly from their parents, but their inheritance harks back to grandfather, great-grandfather, and even to remote ancestry. Just as a stream of water burdened with impurities is self-purifying when it suns itself on the bright pebbles and on grass and moss that web and tangle it, so life is self-purifying and self-regenerative. Nature is constantly reaching higher and higher. The acquired characteristics of parents tend to become instinctive in their children. Instinct is largely inherited experience. Nature strives to protect herself against degeneracy. Though bad conduct on the part of parents harmfully affects the child, yet such influences are less potent than those that are regenerative. If this were not true, Nature's ends would not be so well secured. There is in all animal organisms a certain innate power of resistance to germs of disease, and there is likewise in man a similar power of resistance to degeneracy. The forces that operate to protect the individual operate also to shield the species by affording protection against evil inheritance. Abnormal types are not always representative of diseased or degenerate conditions; other considerations must be weighed. Even some criminals may be atavic examples of a class of individuals who were better suited to live under the savage conditions that existed many generations ago. Nature has resources for her protection far beyond our ken. Some of them have, by our inquiry, been discovered. We have discovered that not only do we immunize ourselves to withstand repeated attacks from the same disease, but also our children to some extent inherit that immunity. When syphilis, the most abominable disease that ever afflicted mankind, was brought to Europe by the sailors of Columbus, the Europeans, possessing no immunity against it, died by hundreds of thousands. It afflicted equally all classes, from peasant to king. This disease among the West Indian tribes was slow-moving, and comparatively mild; but it became exceedingly virulent, rapid, and almost always fatal, in the blood of the unimmunized people of the Old World. This disease alone has been more harmful to the human race than all the wars of the world since the dawn of human history. Although today the Old-World races have acquired considerable immunity to that affliction and although science has discovered a rational and comparatively successful treatment, it is still the greatest single degenerative influence with which the race has to contend. Its evil potency is greatly enhanced by the facility with which it weds alcoholism, and breeds tuberculosis, cancer, and paranoia. The old pioneers sowed the western continent and the islands of the sea with the germs of smallpox and measles. Smallpox, terrible anywhere, was tenfold more so with the newly discovered peoples. Measles was more fatal with the Indians than smallpox with the Europeans. Only recently, in Alaska, whole communities have been wiped out by the measles. Even chicken-pox, harmless with us, was nearly always fatal to the inhabitants of the Pacific Islands. The races, however, gradually but surely, developed immunity, and the great world-scourges are now largely robbed of their terrors. Similarly has mankind developed powers of recuperation that largely tend to immunization against such degenerative effects as are of war. When a large limb is lopped from a tree, the mother-stem puts out a new shoot, and grows another strong limb in its place; similarly, when limbs are lopped from the human family tree, new limbs are stimulated to growth. This peculiarity of living things is strangely manifested in certain species, particularly among the lower orders of animals. Certain animals have no way of seeking self-preservation except by breeding in such large numbers as to supply the appetites of all enemies, and glut the demand. A big salmon sometimes lays a gallon of small eggs, often numbering as high as 27,000,000. Certain species of polyp are provided no means whatever, either by speed or powers of resistance, to defend themselves, but they breed so rapidly that they cannot all be eaten. * * * * * Now that we have defended war against the charge of securing the survival of the unfit, and have proved that, on the contrary, war has, during all the ages, been instrumental in securing the survival of the fit, let us, without presuming against peace, see whether or not peace has a blameless record. The long periods of peace during the past century have allowed the peoples time and opportunity to acquire wealth and luxury, and to develop peculiar tastes, especially along emotional lines.... Modern fiction is a universal love story. Art is largely a portrayal of sentimentality. In olden times, when human suffering in every guise, born of war, was very common, the appeals of the poor, the weak, and the infirm were not much heeded, for there were ever present such severe and exacting concerns as to command the attention and to absorb the resources of the people. In time of peace less rigid economy is practised than in time of war. Dangers and hardships, which are the concomitants of war, have been found in all ages better formative influences for making hardy, successful men than a life of ease, comfort, and luxury. Consequently, in time of peace there is a far more preponderant tendency toward degeneracy and national decay than there is in time of war, in spite of the large numbers of fine specimens of manhood that are killed in war. When Cyrus the Great, with his hardy mountaineers, had conquered the peace-loving, comfort-loving people of the lowlands, he told his soldiers that they must not make their homes in the lowlands, but must return to their mountain fastnesses, because if they settled to a life of ease and luxury, they would become unwarlike, effeminate, and degenerate, like the lowlanders they had conquered and enslaved, and later would themselves be conquered and enslaved by other mountaineers inured to privations and hardships, who would descend upon them. Witness the wisdom of Herodotus, who said: * * * * * "_It is the settled appointment of Nature that soft soils should breed soft men, and that the same land should never be famous for the excellence of its fruit and for the vigor of its inhabitants._" * * * * * Montesquieu said: * * * * * "_The barrenness of the soil makes men industrious, sober, hard-working, courageous, and warlike, for they must obtain by their own exertion that which the earth denies them, whilst the fertility of a country produces in them love of ease, indolence, and a sense of cautious self-preservation._" * * * * * The ancient Spartans in time of peace voluntarily subjected themselves to every privation and hardship necessary to keep them in prime condition for instant war. Nature is never moved by pity. Nature is not a sentimentalist. The earthquake shock is no respecter of persons. When a ship founders, the angry waves of the sea show no mercy to the drowning, and have no pity for those struggling to survive in the life-boats. The arctic airs of winter are as savage to those exposed to them as are the teeth of wolves. All animal life on the earth must constantly contend with both the devouring elements of Nature and the devouring greed of other animal life. Pity is a child of the imagination, and is, for that reason, a peculiarly human attribute. It is a very noble trait, and is of material aid in greatening mutual human usefulness. Nevertheless, no one thinks for a moment of blaming any of the lower animals for their appetites and passions; they are understood to be normal and necessary. Similarly, all our normal appetites and passions are necessary. Considered in the broad, as natural attributes, there are no such things as bad normal emotions and passions; it is only when they become perverted by degeneracy or abuse that they are evil. The passion of pity may be perverted and abused just as the sex appetite or the appetite for food and drink. If human pity had dominated the council at the creation of the world, the result would have been infinite injury, because none of the higher orders of animals, even man himself, could have been developed. In short, there would have been no intelligent beings on earth. During periods of peace, a large number of persons, moved by pity for the indigent, the halt, the lame, the blind, extend to them the alleviating hand of charity. Philanthropy finds favor in the public eye, and charity becomes a cheap and easy means of courting public opinion. The philanthropist with means for gratifying his passion of pity, or the ambitious aspirant for public favor with cash to invest in public opinion, finds himself soon surrounded with a multitude of itchy-palmy hands to help him spend his money to buy what he is after, and at the same time obtain profit for themselves. Consequently, objects of charity become opportunities to be prized and made the most of. Charity organizations are supported both by well-meaning sympathetic persons and by publicity-purchasing persons and their press-agents. Many an ambitious politician or social climber finds it profitable to become a patron of some supposedly deserving charity. Recently, some one inquired into the methods of a New York charity organization, and found that the sum paid in salaries to the various officers of the society was more than twice the amount actually expended in charity. But those who donated the money got what they paid for; the hangers-on of the society got what they wanted, and thereby lessened the actual harm that the money would have done had it all reached its supposed objects. While a limited amount of well-directed charitable effort may be for the general good, still by far the larger part of promiscuous charity does harm. Broadly speaking, charity of all kinds is wrong in principle, because the misfortunes of the unfit are a part of natural processes for their elimination, and anything done by charity to defeat the decrees of Nature is wrong. These are some of the responsibilities for which we friends of peace must stand, if we succeed in preventing war by preparedness against war. Those who are advocating the abolition of armaments, and are thereby fostering war, have not this responsibility; for, if they are successful in what they are teaching and doing, the pretty constant warfare that will prevail among the great nations during the next century will cure much of the hypersentimentalism that finds expression in large degenerative charities; and these charities will be swept away under the tread of marching armies. Whereas, if we succeed, by our advocacy, in securing adequate armaments, and thereby maintain enduring peace, then nothing can prevent our great promiscuous charities from continuing to secure the survival of the unfit with the continuous pollution of the blood-stream of the race from their degenerate blood through intermarriage with normal persons. The arrestation of the self-purifying processes of Nature which are intended to clarify the blood of the race, by breeding the unfit and turning them back upon the race, is like turning the sewage of a city into its water supply. If all incompetents--the hopelessly diseased and degenerate--were to be exterminated, it would be a very good thing for the race. Such methods have actually been practised in the past. At one time, when ancient Babylon was besieged, all the aged and diseased were murdered; and in ancient Greece, deformed or diseased children were killed at birth. But the trouble with this method is that no men possessing the human qualities rendering them worthy of survival could be found among us to do the wholesale executions. The mere possession of the inhuman qualities necessary to carry out the wholesale slaughter would elect the executioners themselves for slaughter. Man cannot be pitiless, like Nature, without himself becoming unworthy of pity, and, consequently, unworthy of survival. Human survival must be co-operative. Human reproduction depends somewhat on lovability. According to the law of natural selection, a lovable person is selected rather than an unlovable person. Neither sex is so apt to fall in love and mate with a person of the other sex who is pitiless, as with one possessing pity and sympathy. Pity and sympathy, just like the love of parenthood, are bonds of the family. A community--a nation--is only a larger family. Charity and sympathy make men gregarious. A world without charity or sympathy would be most unattractive. Human companionship in its higher values would not exist. Nevertheless, when charity and sympathy build and support large almshouses, until, as in London, one-third of all the property tax goes to the poor fund, then charity becomes an institution for breeding paupers and imbeciles. Such charity is the misuse of a virtue. Nine-tenths of all the paupers of one generation in England are children of the paupers of a preceding generation. The following is what an eminent Englishman has to say of the condition of things in his country: * * * * * "_We have a standing army of 1,200,000 paupers, and our permanent and occasional paupers number together at least 3,000,000. Our paupers are maintained at a yearly cost of about £30,000,000 to the community, and were it not for the Draconic administration of our poor-laws all our work-houses would be overcrowded by workers who would gladly exchange freedom and starvation wages for the confinement of the workhouse. No other nation has an army of paupers similar to that of Great Britain."--J. Ellis Barker,_ in "_Great and Greater Britain._" * * * * * A CAT STORY Once upon a time there was an excellent Queen who ruled over a beautiful and fruitful island. The island was not large; it had an area of only a few square miles, and the inhabitants numbered but a thousand. They lived mainly by fishing and agriculture. The Queen loved both her people and her cats. As she would not allow a kitten killed, cats soon overran the palace. Some of these cats, dominated by the mousing instinct, took up their habitation in the fields and woods; for mice, small birds, squirrels, and all manner of cat-game were plentiful on the island. The cats continued to multiply, until they became a great pest to the farmers, killing their chickens, ducklings, and song-birds. Then the good Queen divided the island between her people and her cats. She gave a tenth of the island to the cats. A fence was built between the cats and the people. The cats soon multiplied to the number of 20,000, but there was not forage enough to feed them through the next winter; consequently, half of them died during the cold weather. In the autumn of the following year there were again 20,000 cats on the island, half of which were doomed to die by starvation during the winter; but the kind-hearted Queen taxed the people for food sufficient to feed the cats, and to save as many lives as possible. The succeeding summer being long and fruitful, the cats thrived well, and the next autumn there were 50,000 cats on the island, and as there was but forage enough to winter 10,000 cats, 40,000 must starve during the coming winter, unless fed. Again the Queen taxed her people, and the cats were saved; but, to the amazement of the Queen and her little people, the next autumn brought 100,000 hungry cats to be fed, and it had come to a point where either the people or the cats must starve. With grief, the Queen decided in favor of the people, for it was evident that, if the people were allowed to starve to save the cats, the cats also would starve without the people. That year, 90,000 cats starved to death on the island. Thus, the good Queen's well-meant charity, intended to save 10,000 cats from starving to death, finally resulted in 90,000 cats starving to death. Actually, her attempt to lessen cat misery multiplied that misery nine-fold. Now, what was true of those cats applies with exactly equal truth to the rearing of paupers and incompetents in times of peace. * * * * * In all the countries of the civilized world today, there are institutions for rearing and educating idiots. Sometimes, a section of an idiot's skull is cut out, and the skull trepanned in order to give his little brain room to expand. In this way, an idiot, incapable of feeding himself, may develop intelligence enough to vote, under the instruction of the ward-heeler, or he may even develop into a public expounder of the beauties of defenselessness as a safeguard against war. The most common of all errors of conviction is the belief that knowledge of right-doing necessarily leads us to do right. But the truth is, that we are mainly guided by sentiment, even when it is diametrically opposed to our knowledge of right. No branch of our learning is more strongly fortified by facts of experience than that thoroughbred animals cannot be bred from scrub stock; that superior types of dogs cannot be bred from mongrels; that a fast trotting-horse is never sired by a Mexican burro or foaled by a heavy draughtmare. We know absolutely that identically the same laws govern the breeding both of human beings and of the lower animals, and that exactly according to the seed sown will the fruit be. If sentiment leads us to sow tares among the wheat, we inevitably injure the wheat. No breeder of the lower animals would, from sentimental considerations, employ inferior types for his purposes. With human growth, just as with the growth of vegetation in forest and field, there is only a certain limited amount of room in the sun, and a certain limited amount of nourishment and moisture in the soil. When charity aids an inferior type to secure a plot of earth and a plot of sky, it can do so only at the expense of some better type, which would otherwise have conquered the spaces for itself, had not the inferior specimen had charity as an ally. Apropos of this philosophy, I quote the following from an article in _Science_ by G. H. Parker, Professor of Zoölogy, of Harvard:-- * * * * * "_Thus asylums, retreats, hospitals, and so forth, have been established by private munificence or public grants. More or less under the protection of these institutions has grown up a body of semi-dependents and defectives whose increase it is that excites the apprehension of the eugenists. That in the past such individuals have always formed a part of our race cannot be doubted, but that they ever showed a tendency to increase comparable with what seems to be occurring at present is highly improbable. The occasion of this increase is not, in my opinion, merely the exigencies of modern civilization; it is at least in part due to the immense spread of humanitarian activities which have characterized the last century of our civilization._" * * * * * If Andrew Carnegie were to give $100,000,000 for the support of paupers in the United States and Great Britain, and another $100,000,000 for the saving and kindly treatment and support of imbeciles and incompetents, more continuous harm to the race would result, by securing the survival of the unfit, than would result from a perpetual war between any two of the nations now engaged in the great European conflict. As all charities thrive like a green bay tree in times of peace, and are neglected in times of war, it will be seen that charity alone in times of peace is more potent in securing the survival of the unfit than war could possibly be. About here, the reader may conclude that I am just as inconsistent in advocating armaments to preserve peace, which, I hold, tends to foster degeneracy and decay, as are the pacifists who, by advocating disarmament, promote war, which, they hold, is most potential in fostering the same thing. But this is not so striking an inconsistency as may first appear, because, as I have shown, nation-wide military training, such as that practised in Switzerland, would make for regeneracy and efficiency far more than all our charities, vices, and profligacy make for degeneracy and decay. No branch of education--not even all the prevalent preachments on the subjects of hygiene, moral reform, cleanliness, temperance, and right living--would be so influential for betterment as would the introduction of the Swiss system of military training. In order to be a good soldier, a man must be fit, just as a college athlete must be fit; and military training, like the training of the college athlete, compels him to observe the hygienic laws of right living. We grow upon what we do and what we eat. If we live on an unbalanced food, which supplies too much of one kind of nourishment and too little of another, we become unbalanced in body and mind. Similarly, if our occupation exercises some of our organs and faculties too much and others not enough, we become unbalanced in body and mind. The saying is trite that a sound mind requires a sound body. Likewise, a balanced mind must have a balanced body. The occupations of civil life, if not constantly accompanied by systematic, scientific mental and physical training throw us out of balance. The success of Muldoon's famous human repair-shop depends entirely upon building up by proper food and strenuous exercise long-neglected organs and faculties. The lower branches of a tree, which do not receive the necessary exercise from the wind, and the necessary vitalizing stimulus of the sun, gradually atrophy, and wither, die, and drop off; likewise do unused and unstimulated organs and faculties of the body shrink toward atrophy and pale toward death. The only part of a tree that is alive is where the sap runs. All the rest of the tree is dead. Organs and faculties of the human body not adequately exercised to circulate through them the required amount of sap, gradually begin to die. Lord Kitchener is the Muldoon of the new English army. The raw recruits are trained for their coming fight in much the same manner that a pugilist is trained. They are made to take the long walk out and the sharp run home, carrying weights; they wrestle and spar; perform all manner of calisthenics and gymnastics; are fed proper food, and are made properly to bathe. To the great majority of them, this man-making training is a revelation, but they find themselves so improved in health and so strengthened in body and mind that, when they return to civil life, they will still utilize much of the useful knowledge of how to get fit and keep fit; and just as the hard work imposed upon the soldiers is made easier by their military training, so, when they return to civil life, they will find all their tasks much easier of accomplishment. The following is quoted from a letter just received by me from a prominent English clergyman: * * * * * "_The war is making the Britisher a new man, and he is blissfully unconscious of the conversion in himself. Every class is feeling the uplift. He will be stronger in his religion, his politics, and his commerce. Half the men in Kitchener's Army hate fighting and taking life. They have enlisted for conscience' sake. Naturally they will make the finest soldiers._" * * * * * Soldierly fitness includes not only those sterling qualities of higher manhood--cleanliness, temperance, efficiency, and moral stamina, raised from a semi-subconscious latency into conscious action by a military training--but also it includes that very important attribute--devotion. A military training develops a vague sense of patriotism whose height is a hurrah for country, to that height of devotion where one will gladly die for his country. In South America, there is a very potential little republic where military training produces just such beneficial results in a very high degree. Chili, perhaps, comes nearer to Germany in economic efficiency than any other country in the world. Nothing could be more absurd than the fear of the American people that a good-sized standing army of trained soldiers would menace their liberty. The very preparation, by education and training, necessary to make a good soldier, being the very best training in the world to make him a good citizen, would constitute one of the strongest fortifications possible to defend us against ourselves. It would act as a gyroscopic stabilizer for our democratic institutions, and an equilibrator for our vacillating hot-air ship of state. One of the very best books that I have yet seen upon the subject of peace and war is "Peace Insurance," by Richard Stockton, Jr., published in January, 1915, by A. C. McClurg and Company. It is a book that cannot fail at this time to do a large amount of good, and I heartily recommend it to the reader. I quote the following from its pages: * * * * * "_To avoid exaggeration we shall quote first Mr. Kirkpatrick, who attempts to show the horrors of war in his book, 'War--What For?' by extracts from the New York Independent of March 14, 1907_: "'_It is the common consensus of opinion among investigators that industrial casualties in this nation number more than 500,000 yearly. Dr. Josiah Strong estimates the number at 564,000. As there are 525,600 minutes in a year, it may readily be seen that every minute (day and night) our industrial system sends to the graveyard or to the hospital a human being, the victim of some accident inseparable from his toil. We cry out against the horrors of war.... But the ravages ... of industrial warfare are far greater than those of armed conflict. The number of killed or mortally wounded (including deaths from accidents, suicides, and murders, but excluding deaths from disease) in the Philippine War from February 4, 1899, to April 30, 1902, was 1,573. These fatal casualties were spread over a period of three years and three months. But one coal mine alone in one year furnishes a mortality more than 38 per cent. in excess of this._ "'_The Japanese War is commonly looked upon as the bloodiest of modern wars. According to the official statement of the Japanese Government, 46,180 Japanese were killed, and 10,970 died of wounds. Our industrial war shows a greater mortality year by year._ "'_But we are all of us more familiar with the Civil War, and we know what frightful devastation it caused in households North and South. It was, however, but a tame conflict compared with that which rages today, and which we call peace. The slaughter of its greatest battles are thrown in the shade by the slaughter which particular industries inflict today. Ask any schoolboy to name three of the bloodiest battles of that war, and he will probably name Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, and Chickamauga. The loss on both sides was_: Killed Wounded _Gettysburg_ _5,662_ _7,203_ _Chancellorsville_ _3,271_ _18,843_ _Chickamauga_ _3,924_ _23,362_ ------ ------ _Total_ _12,857_ _69,408_ "'_But our railroads, state and interstate, and our trolleys in one year equal this record in the number of killings and double it in the number of woundings.'_ [Illustration: Casualties of Peace and War Compared] "_Said Dr. Josiah Strong in the_ North American Review _for November, 1906_: "'_We might carry on a half-dozen Philippine wars for three-quarters of a century with no larger number of total casualties than take place yearly in our peaceful industries._ "'_Taking the lowest of our three estimates of industrial accidents, the total number of casualties suffered by our industrial army in one year is equal to the average annual casualties of our Civil War, plus those of the Philippine War, plus those of the Russian-Japanese War._ "'_Think of carrying on three wars at the same time, world without end._' "_Said President Roosevelt in his Annual Message for 1907_: "'_Industry in the United States now exacts ... a far heavier toll of death than all of our wars put together.... The number of deaths in battle in all the foreign wars put together for the last century and a quarter, aggregate considerably less than one year's death record for our industries.'..._ "_Glancing over these comparisons between war and peace, we find that much of the horror of war dwindles away. Comparing those actually killed in industry and accident with those killed or dying from wounds in various wars, we find that the annual peace rate is approximately two and a half times that of the average annual Japanese loss, three times that of the Union loss in the Civil War, five times the Russian loss in the Japanese War, six times the Confederate loss in the Civil War, twenty-eight times the English loss in the Anglo-Boer War, and ninety times the American loss in the Spanish War. In other words, it would take the average annual deaths of the English and French in the Crimea, the Americans in the Mexican War, the North in the Civil War, the Americans in the Spanish War, the English in the Boer War, and the Japanese in the Russian War to approach the annual United States peace rate. Assuming the burden of all these wars, at once, and without ceasing, would be no more a drain than our peace death rate! Need we say more as to the cost in lives, as to the sorrowing mother, sweetheart, and wife? Think of these things. Where now is the bestiality and horror? Does it belong more to war where comparatively few die for their country willingly and nobly, or to peace where the multitudes die for sordid gain--for dollars and cents? Would it not be meet for the pacifists, assuming that they have the best interest of the country at heart, to turn first to the horrors of peace, and lastly to the horrors of war?_" * * * * * It is well to observe that a very large percentage of the injuries and deaths in the United States in times of peace, noted by Dr. Strong, are due to preventable causes, and one of the best remedies is a military training. In Germany, the number of persons per capita of population killed and injured by accidents in time of peace is not half as great as it is in the United States. These losses are part of the high price that this country pays for inefficiency. They could be very largely remedied by military training, which quickens awareness and alertness. Many an accident resulting in severe wounding or death is due to undeveloped and untrained powers of mind, and to lack of physical co-ordination. In the works of the National Cash Register Company, at Dayton, Ohio, where all employees are given the equivalent of military training in care and efficiency, personal injury through accidents is almost entirely eliminated. A man who has been taught to play football and to box and wrestle in his youth is not nearly so likely in after years to fall and injure himself, or to be hit by a trolley car, or automobile, as one who has not had that training. Similarly, a man who, in his youth, has had his mind developed to quick alertness, and every muscle of his body brought under the domination of the will by military training, is far less likely to be injured by accident than one who has not had a military training. Consequently, many of the ills of peace may be cured by the practice of the very medicine that is the best remedy for war. William James, in an article entitled, "The Moral Equivalent of War," starts out with the remark, "The war against war is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party." He adds that, "There is something highly paradoxical in the modern man's relation to war." He continues: * * * * * "_Ask all our millions north and south whether they would vote now to have our war for the Union expunged from history, and the record of a peaceful transition to the present time substituted for that of its marches and battles, and, probably hardly a handful of eccentrics would say yes._ "_Yet ask those same people whether they would be willing in cold blood to stand another civil war now to gain another similar possession, and not one man or woman would vote for the proposition._" * * * * * Let us suppose that the same Southern states that then seceded were to secede again today, capture all the negroes there and all men and women whose skins are tinted by negro blood, enslave them, and establish anew the auction block at the slave market: then let us ask the people of the North Mr. James's second question. What defense has the average person against being convinced by such sophistry, coming from so eminent a psychologist and philosopher as William James? The conclusion of the average person is: "A great man like him must know better than I, he having made a study of such things." This article was given wide circulation by the Association for International Conciliation. It was also published in _McClure's Magazine_, and again in the _Popular Science Monthly_. Others have said, and are saying, similar silly things about the war against war, but they are not men of such intellectual eminence as was William James. It is true that Dr. David Starr Jordan is a very prominent person, and says things even sillier than anything that William James said, but exactly there is the saving grace of his sayings. Some of his conclusions are so utterly irrational and absurd as to enable a very large number of persons to perceive their falsity, whereas the error is not so easily perceived in such statements as the foregoing quoted from Mr. James. Let us examine the proposition to make war on war. The only common-sense way to wage war on war is to war against the evils that produce war. To wage war on war, which comes like the visitation of a physician, to cure ills, would be like waging war on the medical profession to cure a decimating pestilence. To arrest the hand of the surgeon in order to save bloodshed is to let the patient die of cancer. Our Civil War was merely a great surgical operation which removed a malignant cancer from the breast of Columbia. Mars, the old and experienced surgeon, made a good job of it. Columbia's ailment was one that could not be cured by physic, poultice, incantations, or other quack nostrums, which, Mr. James suggested, might have been tried. The patient had to be operated on with the sword, so that the question as to the right or wrong of the Civil War, and as to whether it should have then been fought, and whether, if it had been delayed till now, it should now be fought, depends upon a choice of evils--depends entirely upon whether or not American slavery was a greater evil than the American Civil War. Two of my brothers were killed in the awful struggle to free the slaves and save the Union. It was worth the price to them, to me, and to the rest of my family; and I am of the opinion that every other family in the country who made a like sacrifice would agree with me that to free four millions of human beings from bondage was worth the price. Emancipation then not only freed four millions, but it saved, between that time and now, more than twenty millions from the yoke and the lash. But, what is still more important, the emancipation of the slaves emancipated their masters also--emancipated all of us, North and South--and raised the proclamation of human equality by our country's fathers from a mockery and a shame to a reality. If there were men and women and children bought and sold in this country today, you and I, reader, would mix up in the infamous business with gun and sword, and we would not wait long to do much voting about it, either. "Great national problems," said Bismarck, "are solved not by speeches and resolutions of majorities, but by blood and iron." It is very evident that it would have been wrong in 1860 for some powerful external force, waging war against war, to have prevented the Civil War, and thereby have prevented the emancipation of the slaves. It is all very well at this time to prate about the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the differences between the North and South before the Civil War broke out. That is exactly what was tried. Even after the war broke out, Lincoln, one of the greatest men that America ever produced, tried with all his might to do that very thing. War was the only way. A very large percentage of the wars of the world have been waged for freedom--have been wars for justice, and against tyranny. To war against such wars would be to war for tyranny, and against freedom and justice. Actually, those who today are recruiting for the war against war are asking you to enlist in a campaign to shackle the hands of the oppressed in future years, and tie them down with ball and chain to prevent them from striking for liberty. They are to be denied the right of war for freedom, which was our right in the Revolution. Every man exerts a positive influence either for good or for evil. If the advocates of disarmament and non-resistance are exerting a good influence, then I am exerting a bad influence, and every advocate of armed defense is a worker of evil. You, reader, must judge between us. If it is wrong to insure with armaments against invasion of this country, which invasion would mean the violation of our homes, the rape of our wives and daughters and sisters and sweethearts; if it is right to invite invasion by non-resistance, and wrong to oppose it with force; if, when an enemy injures us, it is the correct thing to let him add insult to the first offense; then it is wrong to be a man, it is wrong to resent dishonor of the home, and all of us who have any manhood in us should be emasculated. If, when this country is invaded, some militant scoundrel, forcing his way into your home, should lay the hand of violent lust on trembling wife or daughter, would you observe the pacifist policy of non-resistance, or would you kill him right there, even if it cost you your life? I know your answer. The invading army would be lessened by one soldier, or there would be one less American. CONCLUSION WHAT SHALL THE END BE? Is it possible to prescribe a remedy for war? We know that law, unsupported by force, cannot be substituted for war. We know that war will obey no law other than that of necessity, and, consequently, that the settling of national differences at an international court of conciliatory arbitration is not workable. We know that no nation will abide by the dictates of any such court when those dictates are opposed to its interests, unless that court has the power to enforce its decrees. We know, then, that an international court of arbitration can dispense only such justice as may be consistent with the interests and necessities of the nations possessing the power to dominate that court; therefore, we know that the greatest measure of justice and the greatest security for peace that may be expected are only what may be pledged by the union of a majority of the great nations in a pool of their national interests and necessities, to maintain such international order as shall be consistent with the terms of the pool. All other nations outside of the pool will then be compelled to observe the law of the pooling nations, because the necessity of keeping peace with these dominant Powers will be greater than any other necessity. The justice that the weaker nations may expect will depend upon the degree in which their individual interests are the mutual concern of the larger interests. Armies and navies will then become veritable international police forces, and the necessity for large competitive armaments will be very greatly lessened. There will then be greater security for peace, although this striving world is not likely soon to be a safe and quiet nesting place for the dove of peace; because at any time, when the necessities of the pooling nations shall put too great a strain on the compact, then the pool will break and war ensue. The great aim of the peoples of the nations should not be for a Utopian peace based on merely sentimental grounds, but for a peace secured by so practicable an _entente_ and pact between the great Powers as shall, entirely aside from sentiment, work for the best welfare of the world. Russian, Teuton, Frenchman, Anglo-Saxon, when you shall have returned your blood-wet swords to their scabbards, then join hands over-seas with us Americans, who are kin to all the blood you have spilled, and let us take serious counsel of one another. But, Americans, though we may turn our face toward the morning that should come, such posturing cannot, any more than the cock's-crow, bring the morning; and until the great international compact be made, we shall be able to find safety only by adequate preparation to stand alone against the dread eventuality of war. INDEX Abbott, Dr. Lyman, opinions of war, 52-53. Aërial bomb: few advantages, many disadvantages of, 205-11. Aërial Warfare, Chapter VIII, 203. Aëronautical Society, first annual banquet of, 16. Aëroplane, served to stimulate development of balloon, 204; imperfections of first, 204; advantages over Zeppelin, 214; less expensive than Zeppelin, 214; French and German, ordered by U. S., 216-17; foreign countries possessing, 218-19; indispensable for location of masked batteries, 219. Air-craft, chief use of, 213; the eyes of both army and navy, 219; a necessity in present-day warfare, 219-20; lack of, in America, 220-21. _Alabama_, the, 193. Alexander the Great, 90. Alva, Duke of, undertook to kill entire population of Netherlands, 239. American and British manufacturing works, 76. Arbitration, international, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 46, 306. Armaments, a safeguard against war, 6, 7, 8, 9. a small burden in proportion to burden of luxuries, 226; benefits of, 228; added employment of labor in construction of, decreases individual taxation, 231. Armor-plate, introduction of, 181; increase in thickness of, 184; inferior to the gun, 184; sufficiency of, dependent upon insufficiency of gun to which it is opposed, 186; improvements in, 189. Army, our, strength of, in numbers, 100, 117, 118; lack of artillery and training in, 102; ignorance of people as to proper equipment of, 103, 115; lack of system in, 120; shortage of officers of, 122, 123; personnel of our regular, 126; total enlisted strength of, 126, 127; mobile strength of, 127; injustice done officers of, 146; a standing, one of the strongest fortifications, 294. Attila, 79. Automatic magazine-rifle, its effectiveness over old methods of warfare, 86, 87. Balaklava, the noble Six Hundred at, 102. Balloon, developed with aëroplane, 204; modern, 205; dirigible, has one advantage over aëroplane, 210. Battle-cruiser, modern, absence of any in U. S., 188; adopted by foreign countries, 188. Beatty, Admiral, reports on North Sea fight, 195. Belgian women, abject condition of, 244, 245. Bernhardi, extracts from his "How Germany Makes War," 89. Bessemer steel process introduced by Carnegie, 252. Bethlehem Steel Company, manufacture of guns and armor-plate, 9, 10, 76. Billings, Josh, on ignorance, 23. Bismarck, 163. Blatchford, Robert, writer for _The Daily Mail_, quoted, 164-67; mentioned, 167. Bliss, E. W., Torpedo Works, 77. Bloch, M. de, author of "The Future of War," against possibility of war, 2; discussed, 93, 95. _Bluecher_, the, 187. Bombshells, 185; dropped from airship not very effective, 209. "Britannia Rules the Waves," 97. Buckner, Colonel E. G., vice-president of du Pont Powder Company, 257. Buffington, General A. R., 200, 201. Cæsar, massacres by, 40; mentioned, 90, 162. Can Law Be Substituted for War? Chapter II, 22. Canal, Panama, 157, 173. Canning, George, attempts to join England in her open-door policy, 58. Cannon designed by Mr. Maxim to illustrate advantages of projectiles of great size, 198; description of, 198, 199. Carlyle, quotations from, 49. Carnegie, Andrew, 68, 290; his ideas on military defenselessness, 69; quotation from, 70-71; his views discussed, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80; greatest American armorer, 252. Chaffee, Lieut.-Gen. Adna R., quotation from, 68. Charity, evils of, 283, 284, 285, 289; J. Ellis Barker on, 286; cat story illustrating evils of mistaken, 286-88; thrives in time of peace, forgotten in times of war, 291. Chittenden, Hiram M., his arraignment of war, 267-68. _Christian Herald, The_, 46. Colt Patent Firearms, 76. Congress, dependent upon will of people, 132-33; has power to dominate Army and Navy, 141; not qualified to pass judgment on Army and Navy, 144; neglects to take necessary precautions against war,145; decides strength of Navy,164; and the General Board, 168. Conscription, values of, 136; enforced in Germany, 136. Cradock and von Spee, naval battle between, 195. Cramb, Professor J. A., quotation from, 41. Cramp Shipbuilding Works, 77. Cromwell, 90, 163. Crozier, General William, statement of, 121-22. Cyrus the Great, 280. Dangerous Criminal Class, A? Chapter XI, 247. Dangerous Preachments, Chapter I, 1. De Bange obturator, an American invention, 217. Dirigibles, foreign countries possessing, 218-19. Disarmament, repeatedly a failure, 12, 13. Diseases, germs of, sown by old pioneers, 278. Dreadnought, evolved by England, 158; superiority of, recognized by Germany, France, Japan, 158; not appreciated by American Congress, 158; cost of, 225. Du Pont Company, The, 9, 10, 77. Du Pont, Francis G., eliminated danger in manufacture of gun-cotton, 257, 258. Economic Club of Boston, 18. Ego-Fanatic Good Intentions and Their Relation to National Defense, Chapter X, 235. Emerson, Ralph Waldo, his opinion about war, 271-72. Emery, Professor C., quotation from his "Some Economic Aspects of War," 226. European War, predicted, 13, 14, 15, 16. Falkland Islands, running fight off, 195. Fiske, Admiral, quoted, 170. Formative strife, man as a master, 27, 28, 29. Franklin, Benjamin, 135-36. Frederick the Great, 79, 90. French batteries outrange German, 103. French Government, maker of its own gunpowder, 262. Fuel-ships, 170, 171. "Future of War, The," by M. de Bloch, an argument against possibility of war, 2. Gardner, Congressman, 128, 161, 169, 216. Garrison, Secretary of War, interviewed, 100, 101. Gathmann gun, 208. General Board of Navy, organized, 160; headed by General Dewey, 160, 163, 164. and Congress, 168; report of, 169. Germany, government of, 135; militarism of, 139; progress in industrial arts and sciences, 139; superiority of, intellectually, 140; fight of, with England at North Sea, 195; standing army of, 225. Goethals, Colonel, character of, 253-54. Good and Evil of Peace and of War, The, Chapter XII, 265. Grant, 90. Great Powers, 101, 108. Gun, increase in size and strength, 184; dependence of, upon armored protection, 187; high-power naval, most powerful dynamic instrument, 189. Gunpowder, smokeless, invention and development of, 181; four times as powerful as black powder, 182. Guns, field, necessity for, 103, 104; helplessness of infantry without, 107; superiority over armor-plate, 196. Haeckel, Ernst, 22. Hague Congresses, 35. Haldane, Lord, 128, 164. Hannibal, 90, 162. Hannibal's Balearic slingers, 85. Hanno, 162. Herodotus, quoted, 281. Herr Krupp, 252. Holland submarine boats, 77. Holy Alliance, formed 1815, 56; purpose of, 56, 57; actions of, 57. Howitzers, German use of, 103; governmental need of, 201-2; Germans reported makers of huge, 199. Huns and Vandals of present day, 31. _Indiana_, the, 156. Indulgence, statistics of U. S., 225-26. International Tribunal, 39. Inventions: gun-cotton, 257; multi-perforated grain, 257, 258; process for successful reworking of smokeless powder, 259; army rifle, 259; smokeless rifle-powder, 259; value to government, 259-60. breech-loading guns, steam turbine, submarine torpedo boat, etc., 261. Isolation, fatal, of U. S., 120. James, William, attitude toward war, 300; discussed, 301. Japan, strength increasing, 100. Japanese, a far-seeing people, 62, 63; possessors of two powerful battle-cruisers, 188. Jefferson, Charles Edward, advocates peace, 19, 20, 247. _Jéna_, battleship, 263. Jordan Dr. David Starr, believes in disarmament, 7; says war materials should be made by government, 7, 9; opposes war, 11; quotations from his "War and Waste," 1, 17, 18, 247; discussed, 93, 95, 240, 301; paid from Carnegie Peace Foundation, 252. _Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, drawings of Mr. Maxim published in, 199. Kaiser Wilhelm II, quoted, 141. Kane, Admiral, quoted, 116. _Kearsarge_, the, 193. Kitchener, Lord, Muldoon of new English army, 293. Knight, Admiral Austin M., quoted, 150-54, 155, 171, 173-74. Lake Submarine Torpedo Boat Works, 77. _La Liberté_, battleship, 263. Language of the Big Guns, Chapter VII, 181. Law, substitution of, for War, 31-32; inadequacy of, 34; must be backed by force, 36. Lea, General Homer, quotations from, 33, 63, 64, 68, 228-29. Lee, 90. Lincoln, Abraham, 163. Lowell, James Russell, quotation from his poem, 44, 45. Machinery, modern, labor-saving, 81, 82, 83; a strong factor in a nation's preparedness for war, 87; expense of, 87, 96; a means of shortening length of war, 88; assists the soldier in battle, 90; saves human life, 92. Mahan, Admiral, 46; quoted, 67. Manufactories of munitions of war, unprotected, 77, 78. Marat, a pacific moralist, 238. Marius, military genius of, 162. Marlborough, 90. Marlin Firearms Works, 76. "Marseillaise," 97. Martel, Charles, 90, 162. _Massachusetts_, the, 156. Maxim, Hudson, his proposition of throwing large charges of explosives from big guns criticised, 200; inventor of multi-perforated grain, 257, 258. Maximite, first trial of, 201; first explosive successfully fired through armor-plate, 201. Medici, Catherine de', 238. Mendeléeff, told how to colloid gun-cotton, 257. _Merrimac_, the, 181, 184, 185, 192, 193. Meyer, G. von L., ex-Secretary of Navy, 135, 143, 175; quoted, 176-80. Militia, lack of batteries in, 119; lack of officers in, 120; actual strength of, 127. Modern Methods and Machinery of War, Chapter IV, 68. _Monitor_, Ericsson's, 158, 181, 192, 193; victory over _Merrimac_, 184, 185; inferior to modern battleships, 193; developed into super-dreadnought by Europeans, 217; builders of, inspired by spirit of patriotism, 255; tardy acceptance of, by government, 256. Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed, 56; actual formulator of, John Quincy Adams, 58; inconsistencies of, 60, 62; General Lea on, 63-4; England's attitude toward, 65; an Anglo-American compact, 66. Monroe, President, declaration of, 58-9. Montesquieu, quoted, 281. Mukden, battle of, 249. Müller, Max, 41. Multi-perforated grain, invented by Mr. Maxim, 198. Murray Hill Hotel, explosion in front of, 209-10. Napoleon, 40, 45, 57, 79, 89, 118, 162, 163; his "_Que messieurs les assassins commencent_," 54. Navy, U. S., Admiral Knight on the, 150-54; necessity for superiority in, 155; gradually slipping back, 158; inadequate, 99, 100; constituents for a proper, 170, 171. waste of money appropriated for, 175. Needs of Our Army, The, Chapter V, 113. Needs of Our Navy, The, Chapter VI, 141. New York Arsenal, 77. New York _Times_, quoted, 144-45. O'Neil, Admiral Charles, 200. _Oregon_, the, 156. Our Armaments Not a Burden, Chapter IX, 222. Our Inconsistent Monroe Doctrine, Chapter III, 56. Parker, Professor G. H., quoted, 290. Patent Office, inventions received by, increasing, 260. Peace, conference, 18; praters, advocates, and prophets of, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 108, 247; falseness of position of pacifiers toward, 109, 110, 235, 236, 237, 241, 242, 248, 249, 250, 253, 256, 257, 266; Bible and, 49, 50; sophists, 109, 262, 267, 274, 275; tends more to degeneracy and national decay than war, 280. Peter the Great, architect of Russia, 163. Picatinny Arsenal, 76. Plato, on war, 265. Pratt and Whitney Works, 76. Projectiles, power and weight of, 183; improvements in, 188-89; distance most efficient protection from, 192; larger ones lose less velocity than smaller, 195-96. _Queen Elizabeth_, the, latest and most powerful type of dreadnought, 175. Remington Small Arms Works, 76. Report of the Chief of Ordnance, 1914, 125. Report of the Chief of Staff, 128. Roberts, Lord, 128, 129. Robespierre, a noted pacifist, 238. Roosevelt, Theodore, quotations from, 3, 5, 43; caliber of, 143. Royal United Service Institution of Great Britain, 197. Ruskin, John, on war, 269-71. Russia, Czar of, 96. Russian "Monroe Doctrine," 57. Russo-Japanese War, predicted, 13. Salisbury, Lord, quoted, 235. Santiago, battle of, 195. Savage Arms Works, 76. _Scientific American_, quoted, 121; 124-25; mentioned, 159. Scriptures, quotations from, 49, 50, 51, 52. Secretary of Army and Secretary of Navy, 141, 142; should not be treated politically, 142. Secretary of War, 141. Sheridan, 90. Sherman, his famous declaration about war, 244. Smith and Wesson Revolver Works, 76. Smokeless cannon-powder, invented by Mr. Maxim, 197-98. Smokeless multi-perforated powder, adopted by U. S. Government, 218. Socialists take part in war, 97. South American republics and the United States, 60, 61. Sparta, ancient, power of government in, 136. Speed, of supreme importance in naval engagements, 196-97. Spencer, Herbert, philosopher, 19, 23, 30, 229, 245. Spottsylvania Court House, battle of, 146. Stead, William T., recommends that British Parliament build two battleships to every one built by Germany, 18. Steel Trust, 10. Stockton, Mr. Richard, Jr., quoted, 139, 227; his book on "Peace Insurance," quotations from, 295-99. Strong, Dr., President of American Institute of Social Service, 54, 299. Sullivan, John L., fighter, 19, 172. Sumner, William Graham, quotation from, 56. Swiss system of military training, 134, 137, 138, 291. Talmage, Rev. T. de Witt, 47. Tennyson, 31. Torquemada, 238. Tupper, Sir Charles, 65. Twain, Mark, 24. Union Metallic Cartridge Works, 76. United States Army, powder works of, 76. United States Arsenal, 76. United States Naval Torpedo Station, 77. United States Steel Corporation, 9. United States, a world-power, 149, 157. Upton, General Emory, prophetic speech of, 116. _Vesuvius_, the, 209. Victory, naval, dependent upon weight of broadsides, 104; land, upon weight of gun-fire, 104. Vieille, producer of gun-cotton, 257. "Wacht am Rhein," 97. War, ex-President Taft's views on, 16; China's, 16; Italian, with Tripoli, 16; Balkan, 16; Mexican, 17; European, 17, 103, 232, 233; Dr. Jordan's views on, 17-18; when justifiable, 42, 43, 45; and Christianity, 46-55; Civil, 85, 86, 87, 90, 302, 305; Boer, 103; Spanish, 158, 221; as an art, 172; of 1812, 221; advantages of, 270, 271, 272, 273; survival of fittest in, 274; mixer of races, 274; remedy for? 306-308. War materials, manufacture of, by government and private individuals, 9, 10, 251, 252; manufacturers of, actuated by honorable principles, 255. Washington, George, opinion of war, 84, 85. Winchester Repeating Arms and Cartridge Works, 76. Woman's Peace Party, resolutions of, 239-40; mistaken ideas of, 241, 242; bravery of, if war should come, 242, 243, 244; inconsistency of, 244. Wood, General Leonard, 118, 134. letter from, 113-15; quotation from, 129, 130, 131, 132. Wright Brothers, encouraged abroad, 216; Wright Brothers, mentioned, 219. Wyndeer, Sir William, 235. Zalinski pneumatic gun, 200. Zeppelin, subject of guess-work, 204; speed of, 205; little accuracy in bomb-dropping from, 211; an enormous target, 211; more expensive than aëroplane, 213; use as troop-ship yet to be proven, 214; advantages over aëroplane, 215; important use in detection of submarines, 215; not one in U. S., 218. PRAISE FROM PATRIOTS Extracts From a Few of Hundreds of Letters Praising HUDSON MAXIM'S DEFENSELESS AMERICA THEODORE ROOSEVELT: "'Defenseless America' is a capital book. I hope it will have the widest possible circulation throughout our country. The prime duty for this nation is to prepare itself so that it can protect itself; and this is the duty that you are preaching in your admirable volume." OSCAR S. STRAUS: "'Defenseless America', coming from an expert, will awaken interest in the most practical method of securing peace by safeguarding our national existence. I am in fullest accord with your Conclusion--an international compact with adequate international force to maintain it, and give adequate guarantee to enforce its decrees." S. S. MCCLURE: "A most convincing book on an extraordinarily important subject, done in a manner not only convincing but irrefutable." REAR-ADMIRAL CHARLES D. SIGSBEE: "I should not have said that the subject could be treated in a way to make it fascinating to the popular reader, yet I now think that is precisely what you have done. May the book bear good fruit!" GARRETT P. SERVISS: "'Defenseless America' ought to go into the hands of ten million American citizens before another month passes. You have done a magnificent thing for your country! In God's name, may she turn from the silly twaddle of the pacifist wiseacres, and save herself, even on the crumbling verge!" GEORGE VON LENGERKE MEYER: "It will go a great ways toward aiding the people of this country to realize the necessity of a proper national defense and a preparedness against war." MRS. JOHN A. LOGAN: "I wish that every official in the land could read it." DR. ORISON SWETT MARDEN: "A colossal, monumental treatment of the subject." FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: "You have brought the whole question of National Defense to a basis which can be readily understood by the average layman." LIEUT. BARON HROLF VON DEWITZ: "In 'Defenseless America' you explode a crater of information on the subject such as has never been detonated before." COL. BEVERLEY W. DUNN: "I wish to congratulate you on the conspicuous and valuable service that you have rendered the people of the United States in writing this book." DR. E. C. BECK: "I want to thank you from the bottom of my heart for this masterpiece of revelation on your part, this opus which I look upon in the nature of an historical event. May the Lord use your book to pound a little sense into our fellow citizens." REV. J. F. STILLEMANS: "I am only one of thousands who would welcome an edition as cheap as possible of 'Defenseless America' so that we could distribute it freely." CLEVELAND MOFFETT: "'Defenseless America' is great stuff and ought to be read by every loyal American." W. SIDNEY JOPSON: "The direct results of reading 'Defenseless America' were that I went to Plattsburg and applied for admission in our National Guard." PRAISE FROM EDITORS No Serious Book Has Ever Been More Highly Praised by the Leading Newspapers of America. PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC LEDGER: "A book by an expert in modern armament who writes with graphic power what he knows better than anyone in this country--a solemn warning." NEW YORK AMERICAN: "No book issued on the subject marshals with equal skill so great an array of facts as Mr. Maxim's volume. In the present state of national thought upon our military and naval needs this book is most valuable." WASHINGTON STAR: "In origin and treatment this is a surpassing study whose sheer information, apart from its personal conclusions, is worth the serious attention, not only of the legislator, but of the plain man behind the lawmaker." DETROIT FREE PRESS: "Hudson Maxim makes a call to arms against war. Here is an argument for proper armament from a man who not only foretold the Japanese war and named the victor, but also prophesied the present conflict and by knowledge and study of world's conditions knows what he is talking about and makes his warning timely." LOS ANGELES TIMES: "A powerful book on an imminent and national problem that every thinking citizen should read with care." BOSTON TRANSCRIPT: "Shows how it is safer for a country like the United States with so large a territory to defend, to prepare, so that no foreign nation will be anxious to try a struggle with us. The peace of the United States will then rest on a firm foundation." BALTIMORE SUN: "The book is brilliantly written, with the severity of one who intensely desires to drive a truth home and with the assurance of one who feels his statistics unassailable and his arguments unanswerable. He is supported by many witnesses whose knowledge must be respected. There is no smallness in the writer's attitude. He appears to feel intensely his mission as prophet and patriot." CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER: "Here is a man, frankly interested in war, who seems utterly honest in his beliefs. The book contains an expert elucidation of the weaknesses of the American army and navy. It has practical suggestions for improvement. It is, in fact, a complete text book for the student of American preparedness or unpreparedness, written, of course, in a sincerely ex parte manner." BROOKLYN CITIZEN: "The book should be read and studied carefully by every lover of his country." LEWISTON JOURNAL: "'Defenseless America' is a ringing and insistent call, calculated to startle the average American out of his peaceful and complacent sense of security." NEW YORK PRESS: "The book is interesting--as interesting as a well-written and absorbing novel, only it deals with vital facts that have a bearing on the lives and fortunes of every one in this country." THE OUTLOOK: "We wish that we could think that those who are opposed to any preparation against war by this country would read and consider this book of Mr. Hudson Maxim." LIFE, N. Y.: "One of the early lumber-camp tales ended with a stirring scene in which a big, sandy-haired hero, caught in the path of a bursting log jam, hurls his cap defiantly into the advancing wall of destruction, just before it whelms him. Such a gesture, futile yet magnificent, is suggested by Hudson Maxim's fiery appeal to the sleeping intelligence and lulled self-interest of his countrymen, 'Defenseless America.' The book contains a remorseless marshaling of stern facts, fused into prophecy by a sort of incandescent logic. It is the first bold proclaiming of the bitter 'civilization' truths revealed by the vast disillusionment of the war. And these are here flung, as the author feels, into the face of approaching national disaster." THE SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN: "The scope of 'Defenseless America' is so all-embracing, that the author has given a veritable mine of information upon the subject of war and war material. Mr. Maxim is well qualified by his long and successful association, as a practical and successful inventor, with the production of the implements of war, to write upon the technical side of the question; and this he does with a characteristic force and lucidity which will render the subject perfectly understandable and full of fascinating interest for the average layman." REVIEW OF REVIEWS: "A graphic and effective presentation of facts revealing the defenseless condition of this country and indicating what must be done to avert national humiliation." "THIS POWERFUL BOOK HAS JARRED AMERICAN COMPLACENCY AS NO OTHER BOOK HAS EVER DONE" From The New York American One of the most remarkable men of our time has written a book--and the book is probably the most startling document ever placed before the American people. Its author is Hudson Maxim, world-famous inventor, writer on many topics of public interest, member of the Naval Advisory Board--and an American patriot. His book, called "Defenseless America," has fallen among the complacent, the self-satisfied, the careless and the indifferent like a seventeen-inch shell. It is a pitiless book--pitiless in its facts, pitiless in its logic, pitiless in its conclusions. Mr. Maxim knows what he is writing about; he is one of the greatest authorities on military affairs in the world. His book has the cold steel precision of truth. He shows that all wars have economic causes, no matter how they are painted over with sentiment. And he demonstrates that one of the most urgent economic incentives to war that has ever existed will be the relative condition of Europe and the United States at the close of the Great War. Imagine the victors of this gigantic conflict--Allies or Teutons--impoverished in money and resources, with the most colossal public debt in the world's history hanging over them, but possessing an enormous army of trained veterans and a world-beating navy. Then, on this side of the Atlantic, a nation that thinks it "can whip all creation," and acts on that principle--a hundred million over-fed, money-making people, nine-tenths of whom could not load a modern infantry rifle if they should ever happen to see one; a country of countless dollars protected by obsolete battleships and submarines that can neither float nor sink; a nation rich but undefended, confident but weak, dictatorial in manner but powerless in action. America sits on an open powder barrel. Will the Victors of the Great War apply the match? Get this stirring and tremendous book, and read what will happen--in Mr. Maxim's own words. He will tell you where the match will be applied, what points in controversy will bring on the collision--and then what will take place with startling swiftness. And-- He tells what may be done, even at this late day, for effective defense. * * * * * As Mr. Maxim has cut out all royalty, publishers are thereby enabled to furnish a special edition of the book, of which this volume is a sample, at only fifty cents a copy. The book may be obtained of or ordered through any bookstore, or the publishers, Hearst's International Library Company, 119 West 40th Street, New York, will send it postage-paid to any address for sixty cents, or ten copies in a single package for five dollars--fifty cents a copy. The library edition, superior paper and binding, may still be had at two dollars a copy. 
11352	----	GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR BY GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI TRANSLATED BY ALLEN H. POWLES 1912 All the patriotic sections of the German people were greatly excited during the summer and autumn of 1911. The conviction lay heavy on all hearts that in the settlement of the Morocco dispute no mere commercial or colonial question of minor importance was being discussed, but that the honour and future of the German nation were at stake. A deep rift had opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic action of the Government. Public opinion, which was clearly in favour of asserting ourselves, did not understand the dangers of our political position, and the sacrifices which a boldly-outlined policy would have demanded. I cannot say whether the nation, which undoubtedly in an overwhelming majority would have gladly obeyed the call to arms, would have been equally ready to bear permanent and heavy burdens of taxation. Haggling about war contributions is as pronounced a characteristic of the German Reichstag in modern Berlin as it was in medieval Regensburg. These conditions have induced me to publish now the following pages, which were partly written some time ago. Nobody can fail to see that we have reached a crisis in our national and political development. At such times it is necessary to be absolutely clear on three points: the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to be surmounted, and the sacrifices to be made. The task I have set myself is to discuss these matters, stripped of all diplomatic disguise, as clearly and convincingly as possible. It is obvious that this can only be done by taking a national point of view. Our science, our literature, and the warlike achievements of our past, have made me proudly conscious of belonging to a great civilized nation which, in spite of all the weakness and mistakes of bygone days, must, and assuredly will, win a glorious future; and it is out of the fulness of my German heart that I have recorded my convictions. I believe that thus I shall most effectually rouse the national feeling in my readers' hearts, and strengthen the national purpose. THE AUTHOR. _October, 1911_ CONTENTS PREFACE INTRODUCTION Power of the peace idea--Causes of the love of peace in Germany-- German consciousness of strength--Lack of definite political aims --Perilous situation of Germany and the conditions of successful self-assertion--Need to test the authority of the peace idea, and to explain the tasks and aims of Germany in the light of history CHAPTER I THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR Pacific ideals and arbitration--The biological necessity of war--The duty of self-assertion--The right of conquest--The struggle for employment--War a moral obligation--Beneficent results of war --War from the Christian and from the materialist standpoints-- Arbitration and international law--Destructiveness and immorality of peace aspirations--Real and Utopian humanity--Dangerous results of peace aspirations in Germany--The duty of the State CHAPTER II THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR Bismarck and the justification of war--The duty to fight--The teaching of history--War only justifiable on adequate grounds--The foundations of political morality--Political and individual morality --The grounds for making war--The decision to make war--The responsibility of the statesman CHAPTER III A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT The ways of Providence in history--Christianity and the Germans-- The Empire and the Papacy--Breach between the German World Empire and the revived spiritual power--Rise of the great States of Europe and political downfall of Germany after the Thirty Years' War--Rise of the Prussian State--The epoch of the Revolution and the War of Liberation--Intellectual supremacy of Germany--After the War of Liberation--Germany under William I. and Bismarck--Change in the conception of the State and the principle of nationality--New economic developments and the World Power of England--Rise of other World Powers-- Socialism, and how to overcome it--German science and art-- Internal disintegration of Germany and her latent strength CHAPTER IV GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION Grounds of the intellectual supremacy of Germany--Germany's role as spiritual and intellectual leader--Conquest of religious and social obstacles--Inadequacy of our present political position-- To secure what we have won our first duty--Necessity of increasing our political power--Necessity of colonial expansion-- Menace to our aspirations from hostile Powers CHAPTER V WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL Points of view for judging of the political situation--The States of the Triple Alliance--The political interests of France and Russia-- The Russo-French Alliance--The policy of Great Britain-- America and the rising World Powers of the Far East--The importance of Turkey--Spain and the minor States of Europe--Perilous position of Germany--World power or downfall--Increase of political power: how to obtain it--German colonial policy--The principle of the balance of power in Europe--Neutral States--The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States--Germany and the rules of international politics --The foundations of our internal strength CHAPTER VI THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY FOR WAR Its necessity--Its twofold aspect--The educational importance of military efficiency--Different military systems--Change in the nature of military efficiency due to the advance of civilization-- Variety of methods of preparation for war--The armaments of minor States--The armaments of the Great Powers--Harmonious development of all elements of strength--Influence on armaments of different conceptions of the duties of the State--Permanent factors to be kept in sight in relation to military preparedness-- Statecraft in this connection CHAPTER VII THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR Our opponents--The French army--The military power of Russia-- The land forces of England--The military power of Germany and Austria; of Italy--The Turkish army--The smaller Balkan States --The Roumanian army--The armies of the lesser States of Central Europe--Greece and Spain--The fleets of the principal naval Powers--The enmity of France--The hostility of England-- Russia's probable behaviour in a war against Germany--The military situation of Germany--Her isolation--What will be at stake in our next war--Preparation for war CHAPTER VIII THE NEXT NAVAL WAR England's preparations for a naval war against Germany--Germany's first measures against England--England and the neutrality of the small neighbouring States--The importance of Denmark--Commercial mobilization--The two kinds of blockade: The close blockade and the extended blockade--England's attack on our coasts--Co-operation of the air-fleet in their defence--The decisive battle and its importance--Participation of France and Russia in a German-English war CHAPTER IX THE CRUCIAL QUESTION Reciprocal relations of land and sea power--The governing points of view in respect of war preparations--Carrying out of universal military service--The value of intellectual superiority--Masses, weapons, and transport in modern war--Tactical efficiency and the quality of the troops--The advantage of the offensive--Points to be kept in view in war preparations--Refutation of the prevailing restricted notions on this head--The _Ersatzreserve_--New formations--Employment of the troops of the line and the new formations--Strengthening of the standing army--The importance of personality CHAPTER X ARMY ORGANIZATION Not criticism wanted of what is now in existence, but its further development--Fighting power and tactical efficiency--Strength of the peace establishment--Number of officers and N.C.O.'s, especially in the infantry--Relations of the different arms to each other--Distribution of machine guns--Proportion between infantry and artillery--Lessons to be learned from recent wars with regard to this--Superiority at the decisive point--The strength of the artillery and tactical efficiency--Tactical efficiency of modern armies--Tactical efficiency and the marching depth of an army corps--Importance of the internal organization of tactical units--Organization and distribution of field artillery; of heavy field howitzers--Field pioneers and fortress pioneers--Tasks of the cavalry and the air-fleet--Increase of the cavalry and formation of cyclist troops--Tactical organization of the cavalry--Development of the air-fleet--Summary of the necessary requirements--Different ways of carrying them out--Importance of governing points of view for war preparations CHAPTER XI TRAINING AND EDUCATION The spirit of training--Self-dependence and the employment of masses-- Education in self-dependence--Defects in our training for war on the grand scale--Need of giving a new character to our manoeuvres and to the training of our commanders--Practical training of the artillery-- Training in tactical efficiency--Practice in marching under war conditions--Training of the train officers and column leaders-- Control of the General Staff by the higher commanders--Value of manoeuvres: how to arrange them--Preliminary theoretical training of the higher commanders--Training of the cavalry and the airmen; of the pioneers and commissariat troops--Promotion of intellectual development in the army--Training in the military academy CHAPTER XII PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR The position of a World Power implies naval strength--Development of German naval ideals--The task of the German fleet; its strength --Importance of coast defences--Necessity of accelerating our naval armaments--The building of the fleet--The institution of the air-fleet--Preliminary measures for a war on commerce-- Mobilization--General points of view with regard to preparations for the naval war--Lost opportunities in the past CHAPTER XIII THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION The universal importance of national education--Its value for the army--Hurtful influences at work on it--Duties of the State with regard to national health--Work and sport--The importance of the school--The inadequacy of our national schools--Military education and education in the national schools--Methods of instruction in the latter--Necessity for their reform--Continuation schools--Influence of national education on the Russo-Japanese War--Other means of national education--The propaganda of action CHAPTER XIV FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR Duties of the State in regard to war preparations--The State and national credit--The financial capacity of Germany--Necessity of new sources of revenue--The imperial right of inheritance--Policy of interests and alliances--Moulding and exploitation of the political situation--The laws of political conduct--Interaction of military and political war preparations--Political preparations for our next war--Governing factors in the conduct of German policy EPILOGUE The latest political events--Conduct of the German Imperial Government --The arrangement with France--Anglo-French relations and the attitude of England--The requirements of the situation GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR INTRODUCTION The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. With the increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a solution at the present time. We have been capable of soaring upwards. Mighty deeds raised Germany from political disruption and feebleness to the forefront of European nations. But we do not seem willing to take up this inheritance, and to advance along the path of development in politics and culture. We tremble at our own greatness, and shirk the sacrifices it demands from us. Yet we do not wish to renounce the claim which we derive from our glorious past. How rightly Fichte once judged his countrymen when he said the German can never wish for a thing by itself; he must always wish for its contrary also. The Germans were formerly the best fighting men and the most warlike nation of Europe. For a long time they have proved themselves to be the ruling people of the Continent by the power of their arms and the loftiness of their ideas. Germans have bled and conquered on countless battlefields in every part of the world, and in late years have shown that the heroism of their ancestors still lives in the descendants. In striking contrast to this military aptitude they have to-day become a peace-loving--an almost "too" peace-loving--nation. A rude shock is needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their military strength. This strongly-marked love of peace is due to various causes. It springs first from the good-natured character of the German people, which finds intense satisfaction in doctrinaire disputations and partisanship, but dislikes pushing things to an extreme. It is connected with another characteristic of the German nature. Our aim is to be just, and we strangely imagine that all other nations with whom we exchange relations share this aim. We are always ready to consider the peaceful assurances of foreign diplomacy and of the foreign Press to be no less genuine and true than our own ideas of peace, and we obstinately resist the view that the political world is only ruled by interests and never from ideal aims of philanthropy. "Justice," Goethe says aptly, "is a quality and a phantom of the Germans." We are always inclined to assume that disputes between States can find a peaceful solution on the basis of justice without clearly realizing what _international_ justice is. An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted in the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbed in commercial life. The Germans are born business men, more than any others in the world. Even before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was perhaps the greatest trading Power in the world, and in the last forty years Germany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansion of her political power. Notwithstanding our small stretch of coast-line, we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in the world, and our young industries challenge competition with all the great industrial States of the earth. German trading-houses are established all over the world; German merchants traverse every quarter of the globe; a part, indeed, of English wholesale trade is in the hands of Germans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. Under these conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides. Our trade and our industries--owners no less than employés--do not want this development to be interrupted. They believe that peace is the essential condition of commerce. They assume that free competition will be conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars have never disturbed our business life, and that the political power regained by war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce. Universal military service, too, contributes to the love of peace, for war in these days does not merely affect, as formerly, definite limited circles, but the whole nation suffers alike. All families and all classes have to pay the same toll of human lives. Finally comes the effect of that universal conception of peace so characteristic of the times--the idea that war in itself is a sign of barbarism unworthy of an aspiring people, and that the finest blossoms of culture can only unfold in peace. Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seem entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire received with "astonishment and indignation" from Frederick the Great, that "the rights of States can only be asserted by the living power"; that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we Germans, cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require the greatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. We regard our warlike preparations as an almost insupportable burden, which it is the special duty of the German Reichstag to lighten so far as possible. We seem to have forgotten that the conscious increase of our armament is not an inevitable evil, but the most necessary precondition of our national health, and the only guarantee of our international prestige. We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power. Besides this clamorous need of peace, and in spite of its continued justification, other movements, wishes, and efforts, inarticulate and often unconscious, live in the depths of the soul of the German people. The agelong dream of the German nation was realized in the political union of the greater part of the German races and in the founding of the German Empire. Since then there lives in the hearts of all (I would not exclude even the supporters of the anti-national party) a proud consciousness of strength, of regained national unity, and of increased political power. This consciousness is supported by the fixed determination never to abandon these acquisitions. The conviction is universal that every attack upon these conquests will rouse the whole nation with enthusiastic unanimity to arms. We all wish, indeed, to be able to maintain our present position in the world without a conflict, and we live in the belief that the power of our State will steadily increase without our needing to fight for it. We do not at the bottom of our hearts shrink from such a conflict, but we look towards it with a certain calm confidence, and are inwardly resolved never to let ourselves be degraded to an inferior position without striking a blow. Every appeal to force finds a loud response in the hearts of all. Not merely in the North, where a proud, efficient, hard-working race with glorious traditions has grown up under the laurel-crowned banner of Prussia, does this feeling thrive as an unconscious basis of all thought, sentiment, and volition, in the depth of the soul; but in the South also, which has suffered for centuries under the curse of petty nationalities, the haughty pride and ambition of the German stock live in the heart of the people. Here and there, maybe, such emotions slumber in the shade of a jealous particularism, overgrown by the richer and more luxuriant forms of social intercourse; but still they are animated by latent energy; here, too, the germs of mighty national consciousness await their awakening. Thus the political power of our nation, while fully alive below the surface, is fettered externally by this love of peace. It fritters itself away in fruitless bickerings and doctrinaire disputes. We no longer have a clearly defined political and national aim, which grips the imagination, moves the heart of the people, and forces them to unity of action. Such a goal existed, until our wars of unification, in the yearnings for German unity, for the fulfilment of the Barbarossa legend. A great danger to the healthy, continuous growth of our people seems to me to lie in the lack of it, and the more our political position in the world is threatened by external complications, the greater is this danger. Extreme tension exists between the Great Powers, notwithstanding all peaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed that their aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so often pressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacific settlement. In this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peaceful methods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable, our German nation is beset on all sides. This is primarily a result of our geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but also because we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtual upstarts, between the States which have earlier gained their place, and now claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have for centuries been paramount only in the realm of intellect. We have thus injured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. It must be reserved for a subsequent section to explain the political situation thus affected, but one point can be mentioned without further consideration: if a violent solution of existing difficulties is adopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, the Germans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forces brought into play against them. On the other hand, the issue of this struggle will be decisive of Germany's whole future as State and nation. We have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. We shall be beset by the greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from this struggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carry through a Seven Years' War for our position as a World Power, if we gain a start on our probable enemy as _soldiers_; if the army which will fight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forces of the nation; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops, but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight for all their dearest possessions. These were the considerations which induced me to regard war from the standpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the great tasks of the present and the future which Providence has set before the German people as the greatest civilized people known to history. From this standpoint I must first of all examine the aspirations for peace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul of the German people, according to their true moral significance. I must try to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life of nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality. I must endeavour to develop from the history of the German past in its connection with the conditions of the present those aspects of the question which may guide us into the unknown land of the future. The historical past cannot be killed; it exists and works according to inward laws, while the present, too, imposes its own drastic obligations. No one need passively submit to the pressure of circumstances; even States stand, like the Hercules of legend, at the parting of the ways. They can choose the road to progress or to decadence. "A favoured position in the world will only become effective in the life of nations by the conscious human endeavour to use it." It seemed to me, therefore, to be necessary and profitable, at this parting of the ways of our development where we now stand, to throw what light I may on the different paths which are open to our people. A nation must fully realize the probable consequences of its action; then only can it take deliberately the great decisions for its future development, and, looking forward to its destiny with clear gaze, be prepared for any sacrifices which the present or future may demand. These sacrifices, so far as they lie within the military and financial sphere, depend mainly on the idea of what Germany is called upon to strive for and attain in the present and the future. Only those who share my conception of the duties and obligations of the German people, and my conviction that they cannot be fulfilled without drawing the sword, will be able to estimate correctly my arguments and conclusions in the purely military sphere, and to judge competently the financial demands which spring out of it. It is only in their logical connection with the entire development, political and moral, of the State that the military requirements find their motive and their justification. CHAPTER I THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR Since 1795, when Immanuel Kant published in his old age his treatise on "Perpetual Peace," many have considered it an established fact that war is the destruction of all good and the origin of all evil. In spite of all that history teaches, no conviction is felt that the struggle between nations is inevitable, and the growth of civilization is credited with a power to which war must yield. But, undisturbed by such human theories and the change of times, war has again and again marched from country to country with the clash of arms, and has proved its destructive as well as creative and purifying power. It has not succeeded in teaching mankind what its real nature is. Long periods of war, far from convincing men of the necessity of war, have, on the contrary, always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible, from the political intercourse of nations. This wish and this hope are widely disseminated even to-day. The maintenance of peace is lauded as the only goal at which statesmanship should aim. This unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our days a quite peculiar power over men's spirits. This aspiration finds its public expression in peace leagues and peace congresses; the Press of every country and of every party opens its columns to it. The current in this direction is, indeed, so strong that the majority of Governments profess--outwardly, at any rate--that the necessity of maintaining peace is the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks out the aggressor is universally stigmatized, and all Governments exert themselves, partly in reality, partly in pretence, to extinguish the conflagration. Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action. They usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote their own political aims. This was the real position of affairs at the Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of the United States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried to conclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first and foremost with England, but also with Japan, France, and Germany. No practical results, it must be said, have so far been achieved. We can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts. This is shown by the fact that precisely those Powers which, as the weaker, are exposed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest need of international protection, have been completely passed over in the American proposals for Arbitration Courts. It must consequently be assumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the Americans, with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced "perfidious Albion" to accede to the proposals. We may suppose that England intended to protect her rear in event of a war with Germany, but that America wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy of sovereignty in Central America without hindrance, and to carry out her plans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive interests of America. Both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage over the other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share for themselves. Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts of President Taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace, and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister for Foreign Affairs in England, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure of the United States an era in the history of mankind. This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, and marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often been shown by a race of Epigoni. "It has always been," H. von Treitschke tells us, "the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played with the dream of perpetual peace." Everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the endeavours to diminish the dangers of war and to mitigate the sufferings which war entails are justifiable. It is an incontestable fact that war temporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economic development, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes the primitive brutality of man. It is therefore a most desirable consummation if wars for trivial reasons should be rendered impossible, and if efforts are made to restrict the evils which follow necessarily in the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential nature of war. All that the Hague Peace Congress has accomplished in this limited sphere deserves, like every permissible humanization of war, universal acknowledgment. But it is quite another matter if the object is to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary place in historical development. This aspiration is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws which rule all life. War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization. "War is the father of all things." [A] The sages of antiquity long before Darwin recognized this. [Footnote A: (Heraclitus of Ephesus).] The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of all healthy development. All existing things show themselves to be the result of contesting forces. So in the life of man the struggle is not merely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. "To supplant or to be supplanted is the essence of life," says Goethe, and the strong life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the most favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. This struggle is regulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws and by the interplay of opposite forces. In the plant world and the animal world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy. In the human race it is consciously carried out, and regulated by social ordinances. The man of strong will and strong intellect tries by every means to assert himself, the ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort the individual is far from being guided merely by the consciousness of right. The life-work and the life-struggle of many men are determined, doubtless, by unselfish and ideal motives, but to a far greater extent the less noble passions--craving for possessions, enjoyment and honour, envy and the thirst for revenge--determine men's actions. Still more often, perhaps, it is the need to live which brings down even natures of a higher mould into the universal struggle for existence and enjoyment. There can be no doubt on this point. The nation is made up of individuals, the State of communities. The motive which influences each member is prominent in the whole body. It is a persistent struggle for possessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs the relations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far only as it is compatible with advantage. So long as there are men who have human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests come into being and occasions for making war arise. "The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the law of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. The extrasocial, the supersocial, struggle which guides the external development of societies, nations, and races, is war. The internal development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work--the struggle of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of nations--war. In what does the creative power of this struggle consist? In growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeat of the other! This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates." [B] [Footnote B: Clauss Wagner, "Der Krieg als schaffendes Weltprinzip."] That social system in which the most efficient personalities possess the greatest influence will show the greatest vitality in the intrasocial struggle. In the extrasocial struggle, in war, that nation will conquer which can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral, material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defend itself. War will furnish such a nation with favourable vital conditions, enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thus promote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectual and moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those which render possible a general progressive development. They confer victory because the elements of progress are latent in them. Without war, inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. "War," says A. W. von Schlegel, "is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in Nature." Now, it is, of course, an obvious fact that a peaceful rivalry may exist between peoples and States, like that between the fellow-members of a society, in all departments of civilized life--a struggle which need not always degenerate Into war. Struggle and war are not identical. This rivalry, however, does not take place under the same conditions as the intrasocial struggle, and therefore cannot lead to the same results. Above the rivalry of individuals and groups within the State stands the law, which takes care that injustice is kept within bounds, and that the right shall prevail. Behind the law stands the State, armed with power, which it employs, and rightly so, not merely to protect, but actively to promote, the moral and spiritual interests of society. But there is no impartial power that stands above the rivalry of States to restrain injustice, and to use that rivalry with conscious purpose to promote the highest ends of mankind. Between States the only check on injustice is force, and in morality and civilization each people must play its own part and promote its own ends and ideals. If in doing so it comes into conflict with the ideals and views of other States, it must either submit and concede the precedence to the rival people or State, or appeal to force, and face the risk of the real struggle--i.e., of war--in order to make its own views prevail. No power exists which can judge between States, and makes its judgments prevail. Nothing, in fact, is left but war to secure to the true elements of progress the ascendancy over the spirits of corruption and decay. It will, of course, happen that several weak nations unite and form a superior combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself is stronger. This attempt will succeed for a time, but in the end the more intensive vitality will prevail. The allied opponents have the seeds of corruption in them, while the powerful nation gains from a temporary reverse a new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory over numerical superiority. The history of Germany is an eloquent example of this truth. Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of Nature, and the instinct of self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a natural condition of existence. "Man is a fighter." Self-sacrifice is a renunciation of life, whether in the existence of the individual or in the life of States, which are agglomerations of individuals. The first and paramount law is the assertion of one's own independent existence. By self-assertion alone can the State maintain the conditions of life for its citizens, and insure them the legal protection which each man is entitled to claim from it. This duty of self-assertion is by no means satisfied by the mere repulse of hostile attacks; it includes the obligation to assure the possibility of life and development to the whole body of the nation embraced by the State. Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors--that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity. The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. At first the procedure is pacific. Over-populated countries pour a stream of emigrants into other States and territories. These submit to the legislature of the new country, but try to obtain favourable conditions of existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants, with whom they compete. This amounts to conquest. The right of colonization is also recognized. Vast territories inhabited by uncivilized masses are occupied by more highly civilized States, and made subject to their rule. Higher civilization and the correspondingly greater power are the foundations of the right to annexation. This right is, it is true, a very indefinite one, and it is impossible to determine what degree of civilization justifies annexation and subjugation. The impossibility of finding a legitimate limit to these international relations has been the cause of many wars. The subjugated nation does not recognize this right of subjugation, and the more powerful civilized nation refuses to admit the claim of the subjugated to independence. This situation becomes peculiarly critical when the conditions of civilization have changed in the course of time. The subject nation has, perhaps, adopted higher methods and conceptions of life, and the difference in civilization has consequently lessened. Such a state of things is growing ripe in British India. Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. It may be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races, and yet the State wishes to retain the surplus population which the mother-country can no longer feed. Then the only course left is to acquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct of self-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreign soil. It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right. The threatened people will see the point of Goethe's lines: "That which them didst inherit from thy sires, In order to possess it, must be won." The procedure of Italy in Tripoli furnishes an example of such conditions, while Germany in the Morocco question could not rouse herself to a similar resolution.[C] [Footnote C: This does not imply that Germany could and ought to have occupied part of Morocco. On more than one ground I think that it was imperative to maintain the actual sovereignty of this State on the basis of the Algeçiras Convention. Among other advantages, which need not be discussed here, Germany would have had the country secured to her as a possible sphere of colonization. That would have set up justifiable claims for the future.] In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things. Just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances a convincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel the same result. In America, England, Germany, to mention only the chief commercial countries, industries offer remunerative work to great masses of the population. The native population cannot consume all the products of this work. The industries depend, therefore, mainly on exportation. Work and employment are secured so long as they find markets which gladly accept their products, since they are paid for by the foreign country. But this foreign country is intensely interested in liberating itself from such tribute, and in producing itself all that it requires. We find, therefore, a general endeavour to call home industries into existence, and to protect them by tariff barriers; and, on the other hand, the foreign country tries to keep the markets open to itself, to crush or cripple competing industries, and thus to retain the consumer for itself or win fresh ones. It is an embittered struggle which rages in the market of the world. It has already often assumed definite hostile forms in tariff wars, and the future will certainly intensify this struggle. Great commercial countries will, on the one hand, shut their doors more closely to outsiders, and countries hitherto on the down-grade will develop home industries, which, under more favourable conditions of labour and production, will be able to supply goods cheaper than those imported from the old industrial States. These latter will see their position in these world markets endangered, and thus it may well happen that an export country can no longer offer satisfactory conditions of life to its workers. Such a State runs the danger not only of losing a valuable part of its population by emigration, but of also gradually falling from its supremacy in the civilized and political world through diminishing production and lessened profits. In this respect we stand to-day at the threshold of a development. We cannot reject the possibility that a State, under the necessity of providing remunerative work for its population, may be driven into war. If more valuable advantages than even now is the case had been at stake in Morocco, and had our export trade been seriously menaced, Germany would hardly have conceded to France the most favourable position in the Morocco market without a struggle. England, doubtless, would not shrink from a war to the knife, just as she fought for the ownership of the South African goldfields and diamond-mines, if any attack threatened her Indian market, the control of which is the foundation of her world sovereignty. The knowledge, therefore, that war depends on biological laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it from international relations must be demonstrably untenable. But it is not only a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an indispensable factor in civilization. The attitude which is adopted towards this idea is closely connected with the view of life generally. If we regard the life of the individual or of the nation as something purely material, as an incident which terminates in death and outward decay, we must logically consider that the highest goal which man can attain is the enjoyment of the most happy life and the greatest possible diminution of all bodily suffering. The State will be regarded as a sort of assurance office, which guarantees a life of undisturbed possession and enjoyment in the widest meaning of the word. We must endorse the view which Wilhelm von Humboldt professed in his treatise on the limits of the activity of the State.[D] The compulsory functions of the State must be limited to the assurance of property and life. The State will be considered as a law-court, and the individual will be inclined to shun war as the greatest conceivable evil. [Footnote D: W. von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkelt des Staates zu bestimmen."] If, on the contrary, we consider the life of men and of States as merely a fraction of a collective existence, whose final purpose does not rest on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers, and if we look upon all enjoyment merely as an accessory of the chequered conditions of life, the task of the State will appear in a very different light. The State will not be to us merely a legal and social insurance office, political union will not seem to us to have the one object of bringing the advantages of civilization within the reach of the individual; we shall assign to it the nobler task of raising the intellectual and moral powers of a nation to the highest expansion, and of securing for them that influence on the world which tends to the combined progress of humanity. We shall see in the State, as Fichte taught, an exponent of liberty to the human race, whose task it is to put into practice the moral duty on earth. "The State," says Treitschke, "is a moral community. It is called upon to educate the human race by positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should develop in it and through it into a real character; that is, alike for nation and individuals, the highest moral task." This highest expansion can never be realized in pure individualism. Man can only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in a community, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. He must be in a family, in a society, in the State, which draws the individual out of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, and makes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. The State alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest degree of life.[E] [Footnote E: To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, and thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads to error, since in a human race conceived as a whole struggle and, by Implication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. Any action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide domain of Utopias.] War, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if it is waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation. As human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which calls for war, while materialism--in theory, at least--repudiates it. If we grasp the conception of the State from this higher aspect, we shall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless its political power increases. The higher object at which it aims is closely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. It is only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most splendid perfection. The development of all the best human capabilities and qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action which power creates. But when the State renounces all extension of power, and recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it is content to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when "at peace on sluggard's couch it lies," then its citizens become stunted. The efforts of each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost. This is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all small States, and every great Power that mistrusts itself falls victim to the same curse. All petty and personal interests force their way to the front during a long period of peace. Selfishness and intrigue run riot, and luxury obliterates idealism. Money acquires an excessive and unjustifiable power, and character does not obtain due respect: "Man is stunted by peaceful days, In idle repose his courage decays. Law is the weakling's game. Law makes the world the same. But in war man's strength is seen, War ennobles all that is mean; Even the coward belies his name." SCHILLER: _Braut v. Messina_. "Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social petrifaction and stagnation. It is well that the transitoriness of the goods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience. War alone teaches this lesson." [F] [Footnote F: Kuno Fischer, "Hegel," i., p. 737.] War, in opposition to peace, does more to arouse national life and to expand national power than any other means known to history. It certainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but at the same time it evokes the noblest activities of the human nature. This is especially so under present-day conditions, when it can be regarded not merely as the affair of Sovereigns and Governments, but as the expression of the united will of a whole nation. All petty private interests shrink into insignificance before the grave decision which a war involves. The common danger unites all in a common effort, and the man who shirks this duty to the community is deservedly spurned. This union contains a liberating power which produces happy and permanent results in the national life. We need only recall the uniting power of the War of Liberation or the Franco-German War and their historical consequences. The brutal incidents inseparable from every war vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. All the sham reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters are unmasked. Great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth, and honour come to the front and are put into play. "A thousand touching traits testify to the sacred power of the love which a righteous war awakes in noble nations." [G] [Footnote G: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 482.] Frederick the Great recognized the ennobling effect of war. "War," he said, "opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it; every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues." "At the moment when the State cries out that its very life is at stake, social selfishness must cease and party hatred be hushed. The individual must forget his egoism, and feel that he is a member of the whole body. He should recognize how his own life is nothing worth in comparison with the welfare of the community. War is elevating, because the individual disappears before the great conception of the State. The devotion of the members of a community to each other is nowhere so splendidly conspicuous as in war.... What a perversion of morality to wish to abolish heroism among men!" [H] [Footnote H: Treitschke, "Politik" i., p. 74.] Even defeat may bear a rich harvest. It often, indeed, passes an irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but often, too, it leads to a healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorous constitution. "I recognize in the effect of war upon national character," said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "one of the most salutary elements in the moulding of the human race." The individual can perform no nobler moral action than to pledge his life on his convictions, and to devote his own existence to the cause which he serves, or even to the conception of the value of ideals to personal morality. Similarly, nations and States can achieve no loftier consummation than to stake their whole power on upholding their independence, their honour, and their reputation. Such sentiments, however, can only be put into practice in war. The possibility of war is required to give the national character that stimulus from which these sentiments spring, and thus only are nations enabled to do justice to the highest duties of civilization by the fullest development of their moral forces. An intellectual and vigorous nation can experience no worse destiny than to be lulled into a Phaecian existence by the undisputed enjoyment of peace. From this point of view, efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily detrimental to the national health so soon as they influence politics. The States which from various considerations are always active in this direction are sapping the roots of their own strength. The United States of America, e.g., in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universal peace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention to money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred million dollars which they spend on their army and navy; they thus incur a great danger, not so much from the possibility of a war with England or Japan, but precisely because they try to exclude all chance of contest with opponents of their own strength, and thus avoid the stress of great political emotions, without which the moral development of the national character is impossible. If they advance farther on this road, they will one day pay dearly for such a policy. Again, from the Christian standpoint we arrive at the same conclusion. Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "Love God above all things, and thy neighbour as thyself." This law can claim no significance for the relations of one country to another, since its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature cannot be political. Its object is to promote morality of the individual, in order to strengthen him to work unselfishly in the interests of the community. It tells us to love our individual enemies, but does not remove the conception of enmity. Christ Himself said: "I am not come to send peace on earth, but a sword." His teaching can never be adduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. There never was a religion which was more combative than Christianity. Combat, moral combat, is its very essence. If we transfer the ideas of Christianity to the sphere of politics, we can claim to raise the power of the State--power in the widest sense, not merely from the material aspect--to the highest degree, with the object of the moral advancement of humanity, and under certain conditions the sacrifice may be made which a war demands. Thus, according to Christianity, we cannot disapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morally and historically. Again, we should not be entitled to assume that from the opposite, the purely materialistic, standpoint war is entirely precluded. The individual who holds such views will certainly regard it with disfavour, since it may cost him life and prosperity. The State, however, as such can also come from the materialistic standpoint to a decision to wage war, if it believes that by a certain sacrifice of human lives and happiness the conditions of life of the community may be improved. The loss is restricted to comparatively few, and, since the fundamental notion of all materialistic philosophy inevitably leads to selfishness, the majority of the citizens have no reason for not sacrificing the minority in their own interests. Thus, those who from the materialistic standpoint deny the necessity of war will admit its expediency from motives of self-interest. Reflection thus shows not only that war is an unqualified necessity, but that it is justifiable from every point of view. The practical methods which the adherents of the peace idea have proposed for the prevention of war are shown to be absolutely ineffective. It is sometimes assumed that every war represents an infringement of rights, and that not only the highest expression of civilization, but also the true welfare of every nation, is involved in the fullest assertion of these rights, and proposals are made from time to time on this basis to settle the disputes which arise between the various countries by Arbitration Courts, and so to render war impossible. The politician who, without side-interests in these proposals, honestly believes in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted. Two questions in this connection are at once suggested: On what right is the finding of this Arbitration Court based? and what sanctions insure that the parties will accept this finding? To the first question the answer is that such a right does not, and cannot, exist. The conception of right is twofold. It signifies, firstly, the consciousness of right, the living feeling of what is right and good; secondly, the right laid down by society and the State, either written or sanctioned by tradition. In its first meaning it is an indefinite, purely personal conception; in its second meaning it is variable and capable of development. The right determined by law is only an attempt to secure a right in itself. In this sense right is the system of social aims secured by compulsion. It is therefore impossible that a written law should meet all the special points of a particular case. The application of the legal right must always be qualified in order to correspond more or less to the idea of justice. A certain freedom in deciding on the particular case must be conceded to the administration of justice. The established law, within a given and restricted circle of ideas, is only occasionally absolutely just. The conception of this right is still more obscured by the complex nature of the consciousness of right and wrong. A quite different consciousness of right and wrong develops in individuals, whether persons or peoples, and this consciousness finds its expression in most varied forms, and lives in the heart of the people by the side of, and frequently in opposition to, the established law. In Christian countries murder is a grave crime; amongst a people where blood-vengeance is a sacred duty it can be regarded as a moral act, and its neglect as a crime. It is impossible to reconcile such different conceptions of right. There is yet another cause of uncertainty. The moral consciousness of the same people alters with the changing ideas of different epochs and schools of philosophy. The established law can seldom keep pace with this inner development, this growth of moral consciousness; it lags behind. A condition of things arises where the living moral consciousness of the people conflicts with the established law, where legal forms are superannuated, but still exist, and Mephistopheles' scoffing words are true: "Laws are transmitted, as one sees, Just like inherited disease. They're handed down from race to race, And noiseless glide from place to place. Reason they turn to nonsense; worse, They make beneficence a curse! Ah me! That you're a grandson you As long as you're alive shall rue." _Faust_ (translation by Sir T. Martin). Thus, no absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share the same ideas in their private and social intercourse. The conception of the constitutional State in the strictest sense is an impossibility, and would lead to an intolerable state of things. The hard and fast principle must be modified by the progressive development of the fixed law, as well as by the ever-necessary application of mercy and of self-help allowed by the community. If sometimes between individuals the duel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must a universal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicated relations between nations and States! Each nation evolves its own conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical life. These various views bear in themselves their living justification, and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, and none can say that one nation has a better right than the other. There never have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. Here and there particular relations can be brought under definite international laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification. Even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive international code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an injustice, and thus dishonour itself. Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring people, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, and is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably in the civilized world. Every Arbitration Court must originate in a certain political status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and must treat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of the contracting parties do not agree, as an encroachment. In this way every progressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which may easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check the expansion of the young and vigorous State in favour of one which is sinking in the scale of civilization. These considerations supply the answer to the second decisive question: How can the judgment of the Arbitration Court be enforced if any State refuses to submit to it? Where does the power reside which insures the execution of this judgment when pronounced? In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908 that the High Court of International Justice established by the second Hague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and binding decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share this idea. With a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe that public opinion must represent the view which the American plutocrats think most profitable to themselves. They have no notion that the widening development of mankind has quite other concerns than material prosperity, commerce, and money-making. As a matter of fact, public opinion would be far from unanimous, and real compulsion could only be employed by means of war--the very thing which is to be avoided. We can imagine a Court of Arbitration intervening in the quarrels of the separate tributary countries when an empire like the Roman Empire existed. Such an empire never can or will arise again. Even if it did, it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to all human progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and the unchecked rivalry of different groups. So long as we live under such a State system as at present, the German Imperial Chancellor certainly hit the nail on the head when he declared, in his speech in the Reichstag on March 30, 1911, that treaties for arbitration between nations must be limited to clearly ascertainable legal issues, and that a general arbitration treaty between two countries afforded no guarantee of permanent peace. Such a treaty merely proved that between the two contracting States no serious inducement to break the peace could be imagined. It therefore only confirmed the relations already existing. "If these relations change, if differences develop between the two nations which affect their national existence, which, to use a homely phrase, cut them to the quick, then every arbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke." It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an Arbitration Court can never replace in its effects and consequences a warlike decision, even as regards the State in whose favour it is pronounced. If we imagine, for example, that Silesia had fallen to Frederick the Great by the finding of a Court of Arbitration, and not by a war of unparalleled heroism, would the winning of this province have been equally important for Prussia and for Germany? No one will maintain this. The material increase in power which accrued to Frederick's country by the acquisition of Silesia is not to be underestimated. But far more important was the circumstance that this country could not be conquered by the strongest European coalition, and that it vindicated its position as the home of unfettered intellectual and religious development. It was war which laid the foundations of Prussia's power, which amassed a heritage of glory and honour that can never be again disputed. War forged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the New Germany could grow up as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future. Here once more war showed its creative power, and if we learn the lessons of history we shall see the same result again and again. If we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most opposite aspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? It is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and thus to realize the highest moral unselfishness. It is proposed to obviate the great quarrels between nations and States by Courts of Arbitration--that is, by arrangements. A one-sided, restricted, formal law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. The weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most disastrous consequences for humanity generally. With the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimate appeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration. So, too, when men lose the capacity of gladly sacrificing the highest material blessings--life, health, property, and comfort--for ideals; for the maintenance of national character and political independence; for the expansion of sovereignty and territory in the interests of the national welfare; for a definite influence in the concert of nations according to the scale of their importance in civilization; for intellectual freedom from dogmatic and political compulsion; for the honour of the flag as typical of their own worth--then progressive development is broken off, decadence is inevitable, and ruin at home and abroad is only a question of time. History speaks with no uncertain voice on this subject. It shows that valour is a necessary condition of progress. Where with growing civilization and increasing material prosperity war ceases, military efficiency diminishes, and the resolution to maintain independence under all circumstances fails, there the nations are approaching their downfall, and cannot hold their own politically or racially. "A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the political world when national character and military tradition act and react upon each." These are the words of Clausewitz, the great philosopher of war, and he is incontestably right. These efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, not merely lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in Nature where the struggle for existence is eliminated, but they have a direct damaging and unnerving effect. The apostles of peace draw large sections of a nation into the spell of their Utopian efforts, and they thus introduce an element of weakness into the national life; they cripple the justifiable national pride in independence, and support a nerveless opportunist policy by surrounding it with the glamour of a higher humanity, and by offering it specious reasons for disguising its own weakness. They thus play the game of their less scrupulous enemies, just as the Prussian policy, steeped in the ideas of universal peace, did in 1805 and 1806, and brought the State to the brink of destruction. The functions of true humanity are twofold. On the one hand there is the promotion of the intellectual, moral, and military forces, as well as of political power, as the surest guarantee for the uniform development of character; on the other hand there is the practical realization of ideals, according to the law of love, in the life of the individual and of the community. It seems to me reasonable to compare the efforts directed towards the suppression of war with those of the Social Democratic Labour party, which goes hand in hand with them. The aims of both parties are Utopian. The organized Labour party strives after an ideal whose realization is only conceivable when the rate of wages and the hours of work are settled internationally for the whole industrial world, and when the cost of living is everywhere uniformly regulated. Until this is the case the prices of the international market determine the standard of wages. The nation which leaves this out of account, and tries to settle independently wages and working hours, runs the risk of losing its position in the international market in competition with nations who work longer hours and at lower rates. Want of employment and extreme misery among the working classes would inevitably be the result. On the other hand, the internationalization of industries would soon, by excluding and preventing any competition, produce a deterioration of products and a profound demoralization of the working population. The case of the scheme for universal peace is similar. Its execution, as we saw, would be only feasible in a world empire, and this is as impossible as the uniform regulation of the world's industries. A State which disregarded the differently conceived notions of neighbouring countries, and wished to make the idea of universal peace the guiding rule for its policy, would only inflict a fatal injury on itself, and become the prey of more resolute and warlike neighbours. We can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of these efforts after peace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling with arms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of most countries. "God will see to it," says Treitschke,[I] "that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!" [Footnote I: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 76.] Nevertheless, these tendencies spell for us in Germany no inconsiderable danger. We Germans are inclined to indulge in every sort of unpractical dreams. "The accuracy of the national instinct is no longer a universal attribute with us, as in France." [J] We lack the true feeling for political exigencies. A deep social and religious gulf divides the German people into different political groups, which are bitterly antagonistic to each other. The traditional feuds in the political world still endure. The agitation for peace introduces a new element of weakness, dissension, and indecision, into the divisions of our national and party life. [Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p. 81.] It is indisputable that many supporters of these ideas sincerely believe in the possibility of their realization, and are convinced that the general good is being advanced by them. Equally true is it, however, that this peace movement is often simply used to mask intensely selfish political projects. Its apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes its danger. Every means must therefore be employed to oppose these visionary schemes. They must be publicly denounced as what they really are--as an unhealthy and feeble Utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. Our people must learn to see that _the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy_. The policy of a great State has positive aims. It will endeavour to attain this by pacific measures so long as that is possible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that in momentous questions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation, the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep this conviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, the idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating law of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The apostles of the peace idea must be confronted with Goethe's manly words: "Dreams of a peaceful day? Let him dream who may! 'War' is our rallying cry, Onward to victory!" CHAPTER II THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR Prince Bismarck repeatedly declared before the German Reichstag that no one should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility of intentionally bringing about a war. It could not, he said, be foreseen what unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation, and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. In his "Thoughts and Reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect: "Even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a nation, and we cannot see the cards held by Providence so closely as to anticipate the historical development by personal calculation." [A] [Footnote A: "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii., p. 93.] We need not discuss whether Prince Bismarck wished this dictum to be regarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered it as a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried out for so long. It is difficult to gauge its true import. The notion of forcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. We must not think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem to be forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by the pressure of the whole political situation. Prince Bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strict letter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at the decisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his own initiative. The thought which he expresses in his later utterances cannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principle of political conduct. If we wish to regard it as such, we shall not only run counter to the ideas of our greatest German Prince, but we exclude from politics that independence of action which is the true motive force. The greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of the natural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of the controlling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. It does not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions are unavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favourable position affords prospect of a successful issue. In this way statecraft becomes a tool of Providence, which employs the human will to attain its ends. "Men make history," [B] as Bismarck's actions clearly show. [Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 28.] No doubt the most strained political situation may unexpectedly admit of a peaceful solution. The death of some one man, the setting of some great ambition, the removal of some master-will, may be enough to change it fundamentally. But the great disputes in the life of a nation cannot be settled so simply. The man who wished to bring the question to a decisive issue may disappear, and the political crisis pass for the moment; the disputed points still exist, and lead once more to quarrels, and finally to war, if they are due to really great and irreconcilable interests. With the death of King Edward VII. of England the policy of isolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against Germany, has broken down. The antagonism of Germany and England, based on the conflict of the interests and claims of the two nations, still persists, although the diplomacy which smoothes down, not always profitably, all causes of difference has succeeded in slackening the tension for the moment, not without sacrifices on the side of Germany. It is clearly an untenable proposition that political action should depend on indefinite possibilities. A completely vague factor would be thus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already many unknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or less dependent on chance. It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician Bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a weak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated should determine political action. For the moral justification of the political decision we must not look to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, and sincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical value is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of the probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness of decision. If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as necessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his country the proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Minister cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far more unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and courage for decisive political action failed at the favourable moment. In the face of such considerations a theory by which a war ought never to be brought about falls to the ground. And yet this theory has in our day found many supporters, especially in Germany. Even statesmen who consider that the complete abolition of war is impossible, and do not believe that the _ultima ratio_ can be banished from the life of nations, hold the opinion that its advent should be postponed so long as possible.[C] [Footnote C: Speech of the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, on March 30, 1911. In his speech of November 9, 1911, the Imperial Chancellor referred to the above-quoted words of Prince Bismarck in order to obtain a peaceful solution of the Morocco question.] Those who favour this view take up approximately the same attitude as the supporters of the Peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively as a curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizing importance. According to this view, a war recognized as inevitable must be postponed so long as possible, and no statesman is entitled to use exceptionally favourable conditions in order to realize necessary and justifiable aspirations by force of arms. Such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notion that the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least the chief duty, of any policy. To such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definite answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not only the right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring about a war. Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the happiest results, both politically and socially. A feeble policy has always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness to take the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to adjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself as to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter. Our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the most striking examples of this. The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the steps of his glorious ancestor. "He noticed how his state occupied an untenable middle position between the petty states and the great Powers, and showed his determination to give a definite character (_décider cet être_) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge the territory of the State and _corriger la figure de la Prusse_, if Prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great name of 'Kingdom.'" [D] The King made allowance for this political necessity, and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight. None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible. He had always determined to be the aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself favourable prospects of success. We all know what he achieved. The whole history of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generally would have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power of decision which he showed. [Footnote D Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 51.] We see a quite different development under the reign of Frederick William III., beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which our nation cannot be too often reminded. It was manifest that war with Napoleon could not permanently be avoided. Nevertheless, in spite of the French breach of neutrality, the Prussian Government could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the allied Russians and Austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a great moral cost. According to all human calculation, the participation of Prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive superiority. The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and would have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not the moral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great had ingrained on her by his wars. At the darkest moment of defeat they shone most brightly. In spite of the political downfall, the effects of Frederick's victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspired his State and his people. This is clearly seen in the quite different attitude of the Prussian people and the other Germans under the degrading yoke of the Napoleonic tyranny. The power which had been acquired by the Prussians through long and glorious wars showed itself more valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; it was not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possible the heroic revival of 1813. The German wars of Unification also belong to the category of wars which, in spite of a thousand sacrifices, bring forth a rich harvest. The instability and political weakness which the Prussian Government showed in 1848, culminating in the disgrace of Olmütz in 1850, had deeply shaken the political and national importance of Prussia. On the other hand, the calm conscious strength with which she faced once more her duties as a nation, when King William I. and Bismarck were at the helm, was soon abundantly manifest. Bismarck, by bringing about our wars of Unification in order to improve radically an untenable position and secure to our people healthy conditions of life, fulfilled the long-felt wish of the German people, and raised Germany to the undisputed rank of a first-class European Power. The military successes and the political position won by the sword laid the foundation for an unparalleled material prosperity. It is difficult to imagine how pitiable the progress of the German people would have been had not these wars been brought about by a deliberate policy. The most recent history tells the same story. If we judge the Japanese standpoint with an unbiased mind we shall find the resolution to fight Russia was not only heroic, but politically wise and morally justifiable. It was immensely daring to challenge the Russian giant, but the purely military conditions were favourable, and the Japanese nation, which had rapidly risen to a high stage of civilization, needed an extended sphere of influence to complete her development, and to open new channels for her superabundant activities. Japan, from her own point of view, was entitled to claim to be the predominant civilized power in Eastern Asia, and to repudiate the rivalry of Russia. The Japanese statesmen were justified by the result. The victorious campaign created wider conditions of life for the Japanese people and State, and at one blow raised it to be a determining co-factor in international politics, and gave it a political importance which must undeniably lead to great material advancement. If this war had been avoided from weakness or philanthropic illusions, it is reasonable to assume that matters would have taken a very different turn. The growing power of Russia in the Amur district and in Korea would have repelled or at least hindered the Japanese rival from rising to such a height of power as was attained through this war, glorious alike for military prowess and political foresight. The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has always led to happy results. Even an unsuccessfully waged war may sometimes be more beneficial to a people than the surrender of vital interests without a blow. We find an example of this in the recent heroic struggle of the small Boer States against the British Empire. In this struggle they were inevitably defeated. It was easy to foresee that an armed peasantry could not permanently resist the combined forces of England and her colonies, and that the peasant armies generally could not bear heavy losses. But yet--if all indications are not misleading--the blood shed by the Boer people will yield a free and prosperous future. In spite of much weakness, the resistance was heroic; men like President Stein, Botha, and De Wett, with their gallant followers, performed many great military feats. The whole nation combined and rose unanimously to fight for the freedom of which Byron sings: "For freedom's battle once begun, Bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, Though baffled oft, is ever won." Inestimable moral gains, which can never be lost in any later developments, have been won by this struggle. The Boers have maintained their place as a nation; in a certain sense they have shown themselves superior to the English. It was only after many glorious victories that they yielded to a crushingly superior force. They accumulated a store of fame and national consciousness which makes them, though conquered, a power to be reckoned with. The result of this development is that the Boers are now the foremost people in South Africa, and that England preferred to grant them self-government than to be faced by their continual hostility. This laid the foundation for the United Free States of South Africa.[E] [Footnote E: "War and the Arme Blanche," by Erskine Childers: "The truth came like a flash ... that all along we had been conquering the country, not the race; winning positions, not battles" (p. 215). "To ... aim at so cowing the Boer national spirit, as to gain a permanent political ascendancy for ourselves, was an object beyond our power to achieve. Peaceable political fusion under our own flag was the utmost we could secure. That means a conditional surrender, or a promise of future autonomy" (pp. 227-228). Lord Roberts wrote a very appreciative introduction to this book without any protest against the opinions expressed in it.] President Kruger, who decided on this most justifiable war, and not Cecil Rhodes, will, in spite of the tragic ending to the war itself, be known in all ages as the great far-sighted statesman of South Africa, who, despite the unfavourable material conditions, knew how to value the inestimable moral qualities according to their real importance. The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results. War, nevertheless, must always be a violent form of political agent, which not only contains in itself the danger of defeat, but in every case calls for great sacrifices, and entails incalculable misery. He who determines upon war accepts a great responsibility. It is therefore obvious that no one can come to such a decision except from the most weighty reasons, more especially under the existing conditions which have created national armies. Absolute clearness of vision is needed to decide how and when such a resolution can be taken, and what political aims justify the use of armed force. This question therefore needs careful consideration, and a satisfactory answer can only be derived from an examination of the essential duty of the State. If this duty consists in giving scope to the highest intellectual and moral development of the citizens, and in co-operating in the moral education of the human race, then the State's own acts must necessarily conform to the moral laws. But the acts of the State cannot be judged by the standard of individual morality. If the State wished to conform to this standard it would often find itself at variance with its own particular duties. The morality of the State must be developed out of its own peculiar essence, just as individual morality is rooted in the personality of the man and his duties towards society. The morality of the State must be judged by the nature and _raison d'être_ of the State, and not of the individual citizen. But the end-all and be-all of a State is power, and "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle in politics." [F] [Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] Machiavelli was the first to declare that the keynote of every policy was the advancement of power. This term, however, has acquired, since the German Reformation, a meaning other than that of the shrewd Florentine. To him power was desirable in itself; for us "the State is not physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect and promote the higher interests"; "power must justify itself by being applied for the greatest good of mankind." [G] [Footnote G: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3, and ii., p 28.] The criterion of the personal morality of the individual "rests in the last resort on the question whether he has recognized and developed his own nature to the highest attainable degree of perfection." [H] If the same standard is applied to the State, then "its highest moral duty is to increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for the higher community of which he is a member; but the State is itself the highest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the duty of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for there is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot sacrifice itself to something higher. When a State sees its downfall staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of a State." [I] [Footnote H: _Ibid._] [Footnote I: _Ibid_., i., p 3.] I have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of political morality better than in the words of our great national historian. But we can reach the same conclusions by another road. The individual is responsible only for himself. If, either from weakness or from moral reasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, the consequences of his actions recoil only on him. The situation is quite different in the case of a State. It represents the ramifying and often conflicting interests of a community. Should it from any reason neglect the interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legal personality, but it injures also the body of private interests which it represents. This incalculably far-reaching detriment affects not merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass of individuals and the community. Accordingly it is a moral duty of the State to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian and promoter of all higher interests. This duty it cannot fulfil unless it possesses the needful power. The increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the first and foremost duty of the State. This aspect of the question supplies a fair standard by which the morality of the actions of the State can be estimated. The crucial question is, How far has the State performed this duty, and thus served the interests of the community? And this not merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the State, and thus indirectly its higher aims. It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be erroneous. Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State must be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy. "Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." [J] This argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads logically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means; that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measures are permissible. [Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.] A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual. So far as I know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feel bound to attempt one at this point. War, with which I am dealing at present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the seriousness of warlike measures. I must deviate here a little from my main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of political morality. The gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as is generally assumed. The power of the State does not rest exclusively on the factors that make up material power--territory, population, wealth, and a large army and navy: it rests to a high degree on moral elements, which are reciprocally related to the material. The energy with which a State promotes its own interests and represents the rights of its citizens in foreign States, the determination which it displays to support them on occasion by force of arms, constitute a real factor of strength, as compared with all such countries as cannot bring themselves to let things come to a crisis in a like case. Similarly a reliable and honourable policy forms an element of strength in dealings with allies as well as with foes. A statesman is thus under no obligation to deceive deliberately. He can from the political standpoint avoid all negotiations which compromise his personal integrity, and he will thereby serve the reputation and power of his State no less than when he holds aloof from political menaces, to which no acts correspond, and renounces all political formulas and phrases. In antiquity the murder of a tyrant was thought a moral action, and the Jesuits have tried to justify regicide.[K] At the present day political murder is universally condemned from the standpoint of political morality. The same holds good of preconcerted political deception. A State which employed deceitful methods would soon sink into disrepute. The man who pursues moral ends with unmoral means is involved in a contradiction of motives, and nullifies the object at which he aims, since he denies it by his actions. It is not, of course, necessary that a man communicate all his intentions and ultimate objects to an opponent; the latter can be left to form his own opinion on this point. But it is not necessary to lie deliberately or to practise crafty deceptions. A fine frankness has everywhere been the characteristic of great statesmen. Subterfuges and duplicity mark the petty spirit of diplomacy. [Footnote K: Mariana, "De rege et regis institutione." Toledo, 1598.] Finally, the relations between two States must often be termed a latent war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties are determined to employ them. I believe after all that a conflict between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it is recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimately moral nature of that end. Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action. But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There are conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of things; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and the infringement of the right appears morally justified. York's decision to conclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation of right, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was made under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the Prussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral. Now it is always justifiable to terminate an immoral situation. As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the _ultima ratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful methods are insufficient to secure its integrity. This power, as we saw, rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values. War therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is not threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is the ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. Thus apparently trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully justifiable _casus belli_ if the honour of the State, and consequently its moral prestige, are endangered. This prestige is an essential part of its power. An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword must be drawn to do so. In deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration is whether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for the power of the State to justify the determination to fight; whether the inevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflict greater injury on the interests of the State than the disadvantages which, according to human calculation, must result if war is not declared. A further point to be considered is whether the general position of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of military success. With these considerations of expediency certain other weighty aspects of the question must also be faced. It must always be kept in mind that a State is not justified in looking only to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage of the existing generation. Such policy would be opposed to all that constitutes the essential nature of the State. Its conduct must be guided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step is gained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for the future. "The true greatness of the State is that it links the past with the present and the future; consequently the individual has no right to regard the State as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life." [L] [Footnote L: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 3.] The law of development thus becomes a leading factor in politics, and in the decision for war this consideration must weigh more heavily than the sacrifices necessarily to be borne in the present. "I cannot conceive," Zelter once wrote to Goethe, "how any right deed can be performed without sacrifice; all worthless actions must lead to the very opposite of what is desirable." A second point of view which must not be neglected is precisely that which Zelter rightly emphasizes. A great end cannot be attained except by staking large intellectual and material resources, and no certainty of success can ever be anticipated. Every undertaking implies a greater or less venture. The daily intercourse of civic life teaches us this lesson; and it cannot be otherwise in politics where account must be taken of most powerful antagonists whose strength can only be vaguely estimated. In questions of comparatively trifling importance much may be done by agreements and compromises, and mutual concessions may produce a satisfactory status. The solution of such problems is the sphere of diplomatic activity. The state of things is quite different when vital questions are at issue, or when the opponent demands concession, but will guarantee none, and is clearly bent on humiliating the other party. Then is the time for diplomatists to be silent and for great statesmen to act. Men must be resolved to stake everything, and cannot shun the solemn decision of war. In such questions any reluctance to face the opponent, every abandonment of important interests, and every attempt at a temporizing settlement, means not only a momentary loss of political prestige, and frequently of real power, which may possibly be made good in another place, but a permanent injury to the interests of the State, the full gravity of which is only felt by future generations. Not that a rupture of pacific relations must always result in such a case. The mere threat of war and the clearly proclaimed intention to wage it, if necessary, will often cause the opponent to give way. This intention must, however, be made perfectly plain, for "negotiations without arms are like music-books without instruments," as Frederick the Great said. It is ultimately the actual strength of a nation to which the opponent's purpose yields. When, therefore, the threat of war is insufficient to call attention to its own claims the concert must begin; the obligation is unconditional, and the _right_ to fight becomes the _duty_ to make war, incumbent on the nation and statesman alike. Finally, there is a third point to be considered. Cases may occur where war must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is no prospect of success. The responsibility of this has also to be borne. So at least Frederick the Great thought. His brother Henry, after the battle of Kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of the Marquise de Pompadour in order to purchase a peace with France. Again, after the battle of Kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, but the King absolutely refused to abandon the struggle. He knew better what suited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred to die sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace. President Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress of the United States of America on December 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought. "It must ever be kept in mind," so the manly and inspiriting words ran, "that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just war is in the long-run far better for a nation's soul than the most prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice.... It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than not to have fought at all." To sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the higher sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in itself morally justifiable. Such decision is rendered more easy by the consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and military situation. It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy, especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only heightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to the reputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better to fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties. No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employ war as a political means. So long as all human progress and all natural development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible. When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must gradually acquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only await the favourable moment to strike--the moral duty of the State towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable. When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered by affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements of superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances to promote its own political aims. The danger of a war may be faced the more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be obtained with comparatively small sacrifices. These obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, active policy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse and concentrate all the living forces of the State, conscious of the truth of Schiller's lines: "The chance that once thou hast refused Will never through the centuries recur." The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of the future to the present need of peace. It is obvious that under these circumstances it is extremely difficult to answer the question whether in any special case conditions exist which justify the determination to make war. The difficulty is all the greater because the historical significance of the act must be considered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of its justification. War is not always the final judgment of Heaven. There are successes which are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries. The ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of long epochs.[M] [Footnote M: Treitschke, "Politik," i., p 2.] 54 The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a great State must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries; but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical imperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." [N] [Footnote N: Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernuft," p. 30.] He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State, and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other way settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of political morality. He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his hands. He must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as the fixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this point he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true interests of the State; then only can he act systematically in the definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing favourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the hour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he rise with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Luther once described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men write and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the business of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and the marches, etc.--that is what the petty and simple do who only look with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work."[O] [Footnote O: Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation."] Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order to further the interests of the German people, and what possibilities of war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of State and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political purposes correspond to these problems. CHAPTER III A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT The life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it is consciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. The same holds good of nations and States. They are, as it were, personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitely various in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capable of the most different achievements, and serving the most multifarious purposes in the great evolution of human existence. Such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of the materialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nation to-day. According to it, all that happens in the world is a necessary consequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity become conscious. It denies the difference between the empiric and the intelligible Ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom. This philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. It seems everywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of the insufficient human intelligence. The existence of the universe is opposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity are incomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space and time. The essential nature of force and volition remains inexplicable. We recognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world; the impelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from our understanding. A systematic explanation of the universe is quite impossible from the human standpoint. So much seems clear--although no demonstrable certainty attaches to this theory--that spiritual laws beyond the comprehension of us men govern the world according to a conscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetual change. Even the gradual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hidden moral law. At any rate we recognize in the growing spread of civilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer and higher forms of life. It is indeed impossible for us to prove design and purpose in every individual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is too limited and anomalous. But within the limitations of our knowledge of things and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try to understand in broad outlines the ways of Providence, which we may also term the principles of development. We shall thus obtain useful guidance for our further investigation and procedure. The agency and will of Providence are most clearly seen in the history of the growth of species and races, of peoples and States. "What is true," Goethe once said in a letter to Zelter, "can but be raised and supported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated by its history." The formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of States, the laws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forces have a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which work towards disintegration, and thus produce inevitable downfall. We are here following the working of universal laws, but we must not forget that States are personalities endowed with very different human attributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and that these subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development of States as a whole. Impulses and influences exercise a very different effect on the separate national individualities. We must endeavour to grasp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of the naturalist. Each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if we wish to learn the general trend of its development. We must study the history of the German people in its connection with that of the other European States, and ask first what paths its development has hitherto followed, and what guidance the past gives for Our future policy. From the time of their first appearance in history the Germans showed themselves a first-class civilized people. When the Roman Empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbarians there were two main elements which shaped the future of the West, Christianity and the Germans. The Christian teaching preached equal rights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters and slaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed the attention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond the grave as the true goal of existence. It made the value of man as man, and the moral development of personality according to the laws of the individual conscience, the starting-point of all development. It thus gradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whose morality rested solely on the relations with the state. Simultaneously with this, hordes of Germans from the thickly-populated North poured victoriously in broad streams over the Roman Empire and the decaying nations of the Ancient World. These masses could not keep their nationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. The States which they founded were short-lived. Even then men recognized how difficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against a higher. The Germans were gradually merged in the subject nations. The German element, however, instilled new life into these nations, and offered new opportunities for growth. The stronger the admixture of German blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did the growing nations appear. In the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world. The Latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the Germans with the Roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separated itself from the Germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of the Alps and in the districts of Scandinavia. At the same time the idea of the Universal Empire, which the Ancient World had embraced, continued to flourish. In the East the Byzantine Empire lasted until A.D. 1453. In the West, however, the last Roman Emperor had been deposed by Odoacer in 476. Italy had fallen into the hands of the East Goths and Lombards successively. The Visigoths had established their dominion in Spain, and the Franks and Burgundians in Gaul. A new empire rose from the latter quarter. Charles the Great, with his powerful hand, extended the Frankish Empire far beyond the boundaries of Gaul. By the subjugation of the Saxons he became lord of the country between the Rhine and the Elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in Italy by the conquest of the Lombards, and finally sought to restore the Western Roman Empire. He was crowned Emperor in Rome in the year 800. His successors clung to this claim; but the Frankish Empire soon fell to pieces. In its partition the western half formed what afterwards became France, and the East Frankish part of the Empire became the later Germany. While the Germans in the West Frankish Empire, in Italy and Spain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had gradually amalgamated with the Romans, the inhabitants of the East Frankish Empire, especially the Saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintained their Germanic characteristics, language, and customs. A powerful German [A] kingdom arose which renewed the claims of Charles the Great to the Western Roman Empire. Otto the Great was the first _German_ King who took this momentous step. It involved him and his successors in a quarrel with the Bishops of Rome, who wished to be not only Heads of the Church, but lords of Italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives in order to prove their pretended title to that country. [Footnote A: German (Deutsch=diutisk) signifies originally "popular," opposed to "foreign"--_e.g._, the Latin Church dialect. It was first used as the name of a people, in the tenth century A.D.] The Popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. Living in Rome, the sacred seat of the world-empire, and standing at the head of a Church which claimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own way of the idea of universal imperium. The notion was one of the boldest creations of the human intellect--to found and maintain a world-sovereignty almost wholly by the employment of spiritual powers. Naturally these Papal pretensions led to feuds with the Empire. The freedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritual dominion. In the portentous struggle of the two Powers for the supremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the German Empire, the Imperial cause was worsted. It was unable to mould the widely different and too independent subdivisions of the empire into a homogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish particularism of the estates. The last Staufer died on the scaffold at Naples under the axe of Charles of Anjou, who was a vassal of the Church. The great days of the German-Roman Empire were over. The German power lay on the ground in fragments. A period of almost complete anarchy followed. Dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those bad characteristics of the German people, contributed to extend this destruction to the economic sphere. The intellectual life of the German people deteriorated equally. At the time when the Imperial power was budding and under the rule of the highly-gifted Staufers, German poetry was passing through a first classical period. Every German country was ringing with song; the depth of German sentiment found universal expression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and German idealism inspired the minnesingers. But with the disappearance of the Empire every string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise above the coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. The material prosperity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were better regulated, and developed to an amazing extent; the Hanseatic League bore its flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the great trade-routes, which linked the West and Orient, led from Venice and Genoa through Germany. But the earlier political power was never again attained. Nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smouldered in the breasts of that German people, which had submitted to the Papacy, and was destined, once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time in the spiritual domain. As she grew more and more worldly, the Church had lost much of her influence on men's minds. On the other hand, a refining movement had grown up in humanism, which, supported by the spirit of antiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic to the Church. It found enthusiastic response in Germany, and was joined by everyone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. Ulrich von Hutten's battle-cry, "I have dared the deed," rang loud through the districts of Germany. Humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the Reformation, which conceived in the innermost heart of the German people, shook Europe to her foundations. Once more it was the German people which, as formerly in the struggle between the Arian Goths and the Orthodox Church, shed it's heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now for national independence also. No struggle more pregnant with consequences for the development of humanity had been fought out since the Persian wars. In this cause the German people nearly disappeared, and lost all political importance. Large sections of the Empire were abandoned to foreign States. Germany became a desert. But this time the Church did not remain victorious as she did against the Arian Goths and the Staufers. It is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained a mighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself. Politically the Catholic States, under Spanish leadership, won an undisputed supremacy. But, on the other hand, the right to spiritual freedom was established. This most important element of civilization was retained for humanity in the reformed Churches, and has become ever since the palladium of all progress, though even after the Peace of Westphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religious freedom. The States of the Latin race on their side now put forward strong claims to the universal imperium in order to suppress the German ideas of freedom. Spain first, then France: the two soon quarrelled among themselves about the predominance. At the same time, in Germanized England a firs-class Protestant power was being developed, and the age of discoveries, which coincided roughly with the end of the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War, opened new and unsuspected paths to human intellect and human energy. Political life also acquired a fresh stimulus. Gradually a broad stream of immigrants poured into the newly-discovered districts of America, the northern part of which fell to the lot of the Germanic and the southern part to that of the Latin race. Thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial empires, and consequently, of world politics. Germany remained excluded from this great movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputes and religious wars. On the other hand, in combination with England, the Low Countries and Austria, which latter had at the same time to repel the inroad of Turks from the East, she successfully curbed the French ambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. England by these wars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world. Germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more in political power. She broke up into numerous feeble separate States, which were entirely void of any common sympathy with the German cause. But this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. A centre of Protestant power was established in the North--i.e., Prussia. After centuries of struggle the Germans had succeeded in driving back the Slavs, who poured in from the East, in wrestling large tracts from them, and in completely Germanizing them. This struggle, like that with the niggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, which extended its power to the coasts of the Baltic, and successfully planted Germanic culture in the far North. The German nation was finally victorious also against Swedes, who disputed the command of the Baltic. In that war the Great Elector had laid the foundations of a strong political power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into an influential force in Germany. The headship of Protestant Germany devolved more and more on this state, and a counterpoise to Catholic Austria grew up. This latter State had developed out of Germany into an independent great Power, resting its supremacy not only on a German population, but also on Hungarians and Slavs. In the Seven Years' War Prussia broke away from Catholic Austria and the Empire, and confronted France and Russia as an independent Protestant State. But yet another dark hour was in store for Germany, as she once more slowly struggled upwards. In France the Monarchy has exhausted the resources of the nation for its own selfish ends. The motto of the monarchy, _L'état c'est moi,_ carried to an extreme, provoked a tremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendous revolution of 1789, and everywhere in Europe, and more specially in Germany, shattered and swept away the obsolete remnants of medievalism. The German Empire as such disappeared; only fragmentary States survived, among which Prussia alone showed any real power. France once again under Napoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, and bore her victorious eagles to Italy, Egypt, Syria, Germany, and Spain, and even to the inhospitable plains of Russia, which by a gradual political absorption of the Slavonic East, and a slow expansion of power in wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and Prussia, had risen to an important place among the European nations. Austria, which had become more and more a congeries of different nationalities, fell before the mighty Corsican. Prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in her dream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught. But the German spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepest humiliation. The purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke of the oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in the Protestant North. The wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm, won back the possibilities of political existence for Prussia and for Germany, and paved the way for further world-wide historical developments. While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual and secular despotism had broken their chains and proclaimed their _rights,_ another quite different revolution was working in Prussia--the revolution of _duty_. The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimately to individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State. Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in opposition to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst grasped the idea of universal military service. By calling upon each individual to sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the clearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis on which the claim to individual rights might rest at the same time Stein laid the foundations of self-employed-government in Prussia. While measures of the most far-reaching historical importance were thus being adopted in the State on which the future fate of Germany was to depend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, a German Empire of the first rank, the Empire of intellect, grew up in the domain of art and science, where German character and endeavour found the deepest and fullest expression. A great change had been effected in this land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year 1750. A literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, and deeply rooted in the moral teaching of Protestantism, had raised their minds far beyond the boundaries of practical life into the sunlit heights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power and superiority of the German spirit. "Thus the new poetry and science became for many decades the most effectual bond of union for this dismembered people, and decided the victory of Protestantism in German life." [B] [Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte", i., p. 88.] Germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since she developed the root-idea of the Reformation into the right of unrestricted and unprejudiced inquiry". [C] Moral obligations, such as no nation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in the philosophy of Kant and Fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songs of her poets. The intense effect of these spiritual agencies was realized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "Thus our classical literature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal as the political work of the Prussian monarchy", [D] and of those men of action who pushed this work forward in the hour of direst ruin. [Footnote C: _Ibid.,_ i., p. 90.] [Footnote D: _Ibid._] The meeting of Napoleon and Goethe, two mighty conquerors, was an event in the world's history. On one side the scourge of God, the great annihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the last abortion of the revolution--a "Part of the power that still Produces Good, while still devising Ill"; on the other, the serenely grave Olympian who uttered the words, "Let man be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to the religious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetual change to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science; who gave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect, and all movements of the German mind, and thus roused his people to consciousness; who finally by his writings on every subject showed that the whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the German brain; a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testify to the divinity in man. The great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, to whom was to fall the victory of the future. The mightiest potentate of the Latin race faced the great Germanic who stood in the forefront of humanity. Truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradation could give birth to men like Fichte, Scharnhorst, Stein, Schiller, and Goethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars of Liberation, must be called to a mighty destiny. We must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the great struggle of those glorious days, the short-sightedness, selfishness, and weakness of its Sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbed the German people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pure enthusiasm. The deep disappointment of that generation found expression in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration of thousands to the free country of North America, where the Germans took a prominent part in the formation of a new nationality, but were lost to their mother-country. The Prussian monarchy grovelled before Austria and Russia, and seemed to have forgotten its national duties. Nevertheless in the centre of the Prussian State there was springing up from the blood of the champions of freedom a new generation that no longer wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. Two men came to the front, King William I. and the hero of the Saxon forest. Resolutely they united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them from ignorance, and broke down the selfishness and dogmatic positivism of the popular representatives. A victorious campaign settled matters with Austria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in Germany, and left the German Imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as a Great Power. France was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; the vast majority of the German peoples united under the Imperial crown which the King of Prussia wore; the old idea of the German Empire was revived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. The German idea, as Bismarck fancied it, ruled from the North Sea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a phoenix from the ashes, the German giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old German Confederation, and stretched his mighty limbs. It was an obvious and inevitable result that this awakening of Germany vitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided the economic and political power. Hostile combinations threatened us on all sides in order to check the further expansion of our power. Hemmed in between France and Russia, who allied themselves against us, we failed to gather the full fruits of our victories. The short-sightedness and party feuds of the newly-formed Reichstag--the old hereditary failings of our nation--prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. The intense love of peace, which the nation and Government felt, made us fall behind in the race with other countries. In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victorious Germany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to found the second largest colonial Empire in the world; England appropriated the most important portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed a comparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be content with some modest strips of territory. In addition to, and in connection with, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward. Under the influence of the constitutional ideas of Frederick the Great, and the crop of new ideas borne by the French Revolution, the conception of the State has completely changed since the turn of the century. The patrimonial state of the Middle Ages was the hereditary possession of the Sovereign. Hence sprung the modern State, which represents the reverse of this relation, in which the Sovereign is the first servant of the State, and the interest of the State, and not of the ruler, is the key to the policy of the Government. With this altered conception of the State the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which the tendency is as follows: Historical boundaries are to be disregarded, and the nations combined into a political whole; the State will thus acquire a uniform national character and common national interests. This new order of things entirely altered the basis of international relations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. Commerce and trade also developed on wholly new lines. After 1815 the barriers to every activity--guilds and trade restrictions--were gradually removed. Landed property ceased to be a monopoly. Commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "England introduced the universal employment of coal and iron and of machinery into industries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; by steamers and railways she brought machinery into commerce, at the same time effecting an industrial revolution by physical science and chemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton. There came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit in the widest sense, the exploitation of India, the extension of colonization over Polynesia, etc." England at the same time girdled the earth with her cables and fleets. She thus attained to a sort of world-sovereignty. She has tried to found a new universal Empire; not, indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygone days, but by the power of money, by making all material interests dependent on herself. Facing her, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, linking the West and the East, the United States of North America have risen to be an industrial and commercial power of the first rank. Supported by exceptionally abundant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushing character of her inhabitants, this mighty Empire aims at a suitable recognition of her power in the council of the nations, and is on the point of securing this by the building of a powerful navy. Russia has not only strengthened her position in Europe, but has extended her power over the entire North of Asia, and is pressing farther into the centre of that continent. She has already crossed swords with the States of the Mongolian race. This vast population, which fills the east of the Asiatic continent, has, after thousands of years of dormant civilization, at last awakened to political life, and categorically claims its share in international life. The entrance of Japan into the circle of the great World Powers means a call to arms. "Asia for the Asiatics," is the phrase which she whispers beneath her breath, trusting in the strength of her demand. The new Great Power has emerged victoriously from its first encounter with a European foe. China, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. A mighty movement is thrilling Asia--the awakening of a new epoch. Dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for the civilized countries of Europe, are threatening from Asia, the old cradle of the nations. But even in the heart of the European nations, forces which have slumbered hitherto are now awake. The persisting ideas of the French Revolution and the great industrial progress which characterized the last century, have roused the working classes of every country to a consciousness of their importance and their social power. The workers, originally concerned only in the amelioration of their material position, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern State, and seek their salvation in the revolution which they preach. They do not wish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historically recognized State, but they wish to substitute for it a new State, in which they themselves are the rulers. By this aspiration they not only perpetually menace State and society, but endanger in the separate countries the industries from which they live, since they threaten to destroy the possibility of competing in the international markets by continuous increase of wages and decrease of work. Even in Germany this movement has affected large sections of the population. Until approximately the middle of the last century, agriculture and cattle-breeding formed the chief and most important part of German industries. Since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and in connection with the rapid growth of the German merchant navy, trade has marvellously increased. Germany has become an industrial and trading nation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population finds work and employment in this sphere. Agriculture has more and more lost its leading position in the economic life of the people. The artisan class has thus become a power in our State. It is organized in trade unions, and has politically fallen under the influence of the international social democracy. It is hostile to the national class distinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power of the State. It is evident that the State cannot tolerate quietly this dangerous agitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of the anti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. The law of self-preservation demands this; but it is clear that, to a certain point, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. The citizen may fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have an opportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willingly devotes his powers. He is entitled to demand that the State should grant this claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny of capital. Two means of attaining such an object are open to the State: first, it may create opportunities of work, which secure remunerative employment to all willing hands; secondly, it may insure the workman by legislation against every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age, or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out of work, and protect him against compulsion which may hinder him from working. The economical prosperity of Germany as the visible result of three victorious campaigns created a labour market sufficiently large for present purposes, although without the conscious intention of the State. German labour, under the protection of the political power, gained a market for itself. On the other hand, the German State has intervened with legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. As Scharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights of man, so the Emperor William I. recognized the duty of the State towards those who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. The position of the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by social legislation. No excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation now existed. A vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democrats indicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of the working class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existing State and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization and progress. This task is by no means completed. The question still is, How to win back the working class to the ideals of State and country? Willing workers must be still further protected against social democratic tyranny. Germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head of all progress in culture. German science has held its place in the world. Germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the last century, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won a prominent position through the universality of her philosophy and her thorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things. The achievements of Germany in the sphere of science and literature are attested by the fact that the annual export of German books to foreign countries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as that of France, England, and America combined. It is only in the domain of the exact sciences that Germany has often been compelled to give precedence to foreign countries. German art also has failed to win a leading position. It shows, indeed, sound promise in many directions, and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of our political conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. The German Empire has politically been split up into numerous parties. Not only are the social democrats and the middle class opposed, but they, again, are divided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitter enemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquish denominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility between North and South has prevented the population from growing into a completely united body. So stands Germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full of sustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed into narrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, in her nationality, her intellectual development, in her science, industries, and trade. And now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future? What duties are enforced on us by the past? It is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which the German State answers this question, depend not only our own further development, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history of the world. CHAPTER IV GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION Let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historical development, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams of human beings, that in every age have poured forth from the Empire of Central Europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect what rich seeds of intellectual and moral development were sown by the German intellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us with irresistible power that a high, if not the highest, importance for the entire development of the human race is ascribable to this German people. This conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, on the freedom and the universality of the German spirit, which have ever and again been shown in the course of its history. There is no nation whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as the German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the intellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of free and natural development. The Germans have thus always been the standard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwark against revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. They have often been worsted in the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their best heart's blood in the cause. Intellectual compulsion has sometimes ruled the Germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of this people--the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and the political attempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenth century. But the revolutionary movement has been checked and directed into the paths of a healthy natural advancement. The inevitable need of a free intellectual self-determination has again and again disengaged itself from the inner life of the soul of the people, and broadened into world-historical importance. Thus two great movements were born from the German intellectual life, on which, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man must rest: the Reformation and the critical philosophy. The Reformation, which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked all free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason, which put a stop to the caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for the human mind the limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same time pointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. On this substructure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whose deepest significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result of free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay a foundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. Torn this way and that, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith and knowledge, mankind seems to have lost the straight road of progress. Reconciliation only appears possible when the thought of religious reformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion, and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does not attempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the results of natural philosophy. The German nation not only laid the foundations of this great struggle for an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. We are thus incurring an obligation for the future, from which we cannot shrink. We must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which is being fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human efforts. Our nation is not only bound by its past history to take part in this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its special qualities. No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it received. It has "enriched the store of traditional European culture with new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position in the great community of civilized nations which none else could fill." "Depth of conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the limits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to traverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of all nations and ages--this has at all times been the German characteristic; this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture." [A] To no nation, except the German, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self "that which is given to mankind as a whole." We often see in other nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position. [Footnote A: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 95.] There are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to discharge our highest duty. They form the necessary platform from which we can mount to the highest goal. These duties lie in the domains of science and politics, and also in that borderland where science and politics touch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the results of scientific inquiry. First and foremost it is German science which must regain its superiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicate our birthright. On the one hand, we must extend the theory of the perceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion over Nature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work more useful and remunerative. We must endeavour to find scientific solutions of the great problems which deeply concern mankind. We need not restrict ourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefit civilization by the practical results of research, and thus create conditions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life can find its expression. It is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies which exercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and condition not only our future development, but the higher life generally. These problems have occupied the minds of no people more deeply and permanently than our own. Yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of the empty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in Germany. The German nature tends towards a systematic healthy development, which works slowly in opposition to the different movements. The Germans thus seem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the great controversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them into the paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws of evolution. We have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall no doubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of the community and the working class itself. We must not spare any efforts to find other means than those already adopted to inspire the working class with healthy and patriotic ambitions. It is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty, requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposed upon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation, and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unity which is lamentably deficient to-day. No attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. The old antagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially in Germany. It will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious and political antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absolute liberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine the conflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. At present there appears small probability of attaining this end. The dogmatism of Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism of the Catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious movement can be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspect of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is rooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially all denominations enjoy equal rights, but the German State must never renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To do so would mean loss of prestige. Duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance of human civilization have thus been transmitted to the German nation, as heir of a great and glorious past. It is faced with problems of no less significance in the sphere of its international relations. These problems are of special importance, since they affect most deeply the intellectual development, and on their solution depends the position of Germany in the world. The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the Emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large number of German fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most characteristically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lie outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against the Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic waves are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism, which seems to have lost its old victorious strength. Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of living. This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and its intellectual importance. At an earlier epoch, to be sure, when Germans had in the course of centuries grown accustomed to the degradation of being robbed of all political significance, a large section of our people did not feel this insufficiency. Even during the age of our classical literature the patriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with the thought that no other people could follow the bold flights of German genius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship." [B] [Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 195.] Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines: "German majesty and honour Fall not with the princes' crown; When amid the flames of war German Empire crashes down, German greatness stands unscathed." [C] [Footnote C: Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness," published in 1905 by Bernhard Suphan.] The nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds different sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influence of the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since we must now take into consideration the immense development of Germany in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old importance of our classical literature. Again, we have learnt from the vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due measure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the political federation of our nation. The dominion of German thought can only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties towards the human race. Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guarding the territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a foot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west the ambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard to imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatched again from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerly threatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completely repulsed. They now take a very different position in European politics from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance westwards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely destroyed. On the other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regions which were once under German influence are now once more subject to Slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present Russian Baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. The German element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs; Germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonic workmen. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia. Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonic flood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely an obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of self-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determined whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It is not improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy will be once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflict grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and show less determination to protect the German soil at all costs. The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America. The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish, and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which the Government must reckon. Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative to preserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ of universal culture. Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world. Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on March 1, 1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire is already large enough and does not need expansion.... We shall have to consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future.... We have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character." [D] [Footnote D: This passage is quoted in the book of the French ex-Minister Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."] That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed. If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we must admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language. England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from the material aspect; but her work is one-sided. All the colonies which are directly subject to English rule are primarily exploited in the interest of English industries and English capital. The work of civilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, has always been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified her sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent culture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoy self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as Canada, Australia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether they will permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are not only growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the present time whether England will be able to include them permanently in the Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even to secure that the national character is English. Nevertheless, it is a great and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, and it testifies to a supreme national self-confidence. The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by them in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister, Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "Ten years ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. France has claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home in every quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to be spoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sown in all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection of Heaven." [E] [Footnote E: Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique."] The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the German policy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leading thought of Germany and her Government during the complicated disputes under which the partition of Africa and the last phase of French colonial policy were ended. We may assume that at first the adherents to Bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France embarked on distant and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of the country and its Government for long years to come. Nevertheless, it is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run, since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed, tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandoned colonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these have obtained the best shares." This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted with mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria, has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, and prides herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotte and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the Morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of France in a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy alike of the dignity and the interests of Germany. The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of attention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. In the face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of its importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place in the sun, as Prince Bülow used modestly to express it, but to aspire to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the limits of its present sphere of influence. But we can only reach this goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationality and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to them. Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a fanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity. The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of great prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widely extended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinary capacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once more brilliantly asserted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League have returned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. The increase of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly to a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative industrial occupation. There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendid development. We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the import of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the sale of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries of life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets which England possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to close their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in order to encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of other countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly depends on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a question of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shall very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population means of life other than industrial employment. It is out of the question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of population. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and home settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupation will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for the whole population, however favourable our international relations. We shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland. There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the unfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us from building a colonial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers, may keep our sea communications open. We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonial possessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and are only used for economic ends, while the owner-State does not think of colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and immoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization which retains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importance for the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which each nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It is quite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer count among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be." [F] [Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 8.] We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our requirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our growing working population, but would supply raw materials and foodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying unproductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. We find throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers, and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreign masters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged, do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany will depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the German Empire? These are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us from the entire past development of our nation, and are determined by its present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to political paralysis at the time when the great European States built themselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural development--political union, colonial possessions, naval power, international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. What we now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers. It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what paths we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our forces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from the straight road of our intended development. The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an advantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension, it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which will be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword. CHAPTER V WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, must be the basis of our future development. The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us. "The man of sense will by the forelock clutch Whatever lies within his power, Stick fast to it, and neither shirk, Nor from his enterprise be thrust, But, having once begun to work, Go working on because he must." _Faust_ (translated by Sir Theodore Martin). The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity, examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which concern us are weighed one against the other. These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must try to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of the day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion. We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and therefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad lines of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense clear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions. We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps. On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical national and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder to shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred battlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, the bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of Slavism, since numerous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories. There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime and commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react detrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel between Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policy to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered such an alliance possible. The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough to influence the political position of the Empire. Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power. That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on the Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance. The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential interests. It is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified in its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events. Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Reminiscences," pointed out that this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance. The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the encroachment of Italy into those regions. The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in the Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or, indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente,_ would probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria. Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France. England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against England _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. It is our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can. France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central European Triple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of _revanche_. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and the humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and, if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her _entente_ with England, are inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped, and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to Germany than from Russia. The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. The establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible illusion as to its extent and meaning. Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in every quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with the Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance which threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbable that she will maintain honourably and with no _arrière-pensée_ the obligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco. The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the French Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German. The French policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on the hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can be negotiated before the question between them has been once more decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but strengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the East, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others. The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the _status quo_. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with Germany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any aggressive policy on Russia's part. The ministry of Kokowzew seems likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more reason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin with its accompanying events showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture of internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable, therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose, meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and an improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, although this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions of Germany in North Persia. It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of the mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the dome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the Baltic. Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself, also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into Central Europe. Pan-Slavism is still hard at work. It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement and again tread the natural paths of her international policy. Her present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong monarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the internal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nation is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a healthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of the present Government has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed expectations. The possibility thus has always existed that, under the stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad. Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in the Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China, must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly, Turkey. Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the Franco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are not identical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. She wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed. Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with Germany or to take part in one. Of course, every further increase of the German power militates against the Russian interests. We shall therefore always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths. England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms. The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the heart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So, also, no natural community of interests exists between England and France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an Anglo--French _entente_. This union is cemented by the common hostility to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might mask the real objects. This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in order to understand the line of thought which guides the English politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the world. Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes. The keenest competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. The annexation of the Philippines by America, and England's treaty with Japan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the two nations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked, and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Union are so prodigious that a naval war with America, in view of the vast distances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a very bold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. England accordingly has always diplomatically conceded the claims of America, as quite recently in the negotiations about fortifying the Panama Canal; the object clearly is to avoid any collision with the United States, from fearing the consequences of such collision. The American competition in trade and industries, and the growth of the American navy, are tolerated as inevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. In this sense, according to the English point of view, must be understood the treaty by which a Court of Arbitration between the two countries was established. England wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with America. The natural opposition of the two rival States may, however, in the further development of things, be so accentuated that England will be forced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain an undisputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplomatic action. The relations of the two countries to Canada may easily become strained to a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the Arbitration Treaty casts a strong light on the fact that the American people does not consider that the present political relations of the two nations are permanent. There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directly threatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in India and Egypt, to the growing power of Islam, to the agitation for independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the Low-German element in South Africa. Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement. She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine the growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support, and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre in opposition to the Caliphate. The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England, so far, in accordance with the principle of _divide et impera_, has attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism, thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of Bengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very grave danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position in the world. While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and abroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together, either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto. Mr. Chamberlain's dream of the British Imperial Customs Union has definitely been abandoned. No attempt was made at the Imperial Conference in 1911 to go back to it. "A centrifugal policy predominated. .... When the question of imperial defence came up, the policy was rejected which wished to assure to Great Britain the help of the oversea dominions in every imaginable eventuality." The great self-ruled colonies represent allies, who will stand by England in the hour of need, but "allies with the reservation that they are not to be employed wrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do not approve." [A] There are clear indications that the policy of the dominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, is contemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, and Australia are developing, as mentioned in Chapter IV., into independent nations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formal independence. [Footnote A: Th. Schiemann in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of July 5, 1911.] All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of England's Empire, and these dangers largely influence England's attitude towards Germany. England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in her imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany must be stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet must not be in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must be destroyed. A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great English colonial war, which would engage England's fleets in far distant parts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities of expansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleet might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory which England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference of England to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France's capability of expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She can no longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fall victim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered. The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from the German quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer a prospect of crippling the German overseas commerce without any excessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet, contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows a correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the French fleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other contingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicable means of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for years to come, of annihilating German commerce and of checking the importance of German interests in Africa and Northern Asia. The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters. It has always been England's object to maintain a certain balance of power between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any one of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippled and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world's stage, England acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposes undisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. This policy she still continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie each other's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It follows directly from this that England's aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthen France; for Germany at the present moment is the only European State which threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her born rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the East, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thus the hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England's most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and self-evident. The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war. England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and to some extent a great benefit, to English industries. After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check the growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is building, and attack the objectionable neighbour. English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the most desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance--Germany, England, and America--has been suggested.[B] But for such a union with Germany to be possible, England must have resolved to give a free course to German development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial and industrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced her traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the Great Powers in the world. [Footnote B: "The United States and the War Cloud in Europe," by Th. Schiemann, _McClure's Magazine_, June, 1910.] It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consent to that. The continuous agitation against Germany, under the tacit approval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority of the Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements of English politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, and the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable indications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy. The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder every expansion of Germany's power were openly shown in the very recent Morocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing on the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp. A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselves with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, and Utopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alter the real basis of affairs. When the Unionists, with their greater fixity of purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a vigorous assertion of power by the island Empire. On the other hand, America, which indisputably plays a decisive part in English policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. While, on the one side, she insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out her own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her fleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, the political command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacy in the Pacific. Their interests, both economic and political, notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically with those of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this. No similar opposition to Germany, based on the nature of things, has at present arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not in the sphere of politics. So far as can be seen, an understanding with Germany ought to further the interests of America. It is unlikely that the Americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power of England. But such would be the case if Great Britain succeeded in inflicting a political and military defeat on Germany. For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotiations about Arbitration Courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany. There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us in the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock resolutely opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movement in the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the nature of things. In the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keen competition between the two countries, especially in South America; there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to political complications. Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only in her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China. In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, and seems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have to count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. Her attitude to China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions in East Asia. If the two nations joined hands--a hardly probable eventuality at present--it would become difficult for us to maintain an independent position between them. The political rivalry between the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. If they are antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to retain their possessions in Asia. While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present directly influence our policy, Turkey--the predominant Power of the Near East--is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, which threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage. Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against Russia and against England--the two States, that is, with whose hostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also to the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong to Russia or England. If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters. Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be strengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position, while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her. From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of Italy at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be. Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent importance. She has developed a certain antagonism to France by her Morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in German policy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means negligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey; Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for Germany. Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declared neutral at the Congress of Vienna on November 20, 1815, under the collective guarantee [C] of the signatory Powers; Belgium, in the Treaties of London of November 15,1831, and of April 19,1839, on the part of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself. [Footnote C: By a collective guarantee is understood the _duty_ of the contracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all agree that it is menaced. Each individual Power has the _right_ to interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced.] If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only be guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France, and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to Germany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior forces will be united against Germany and Austria. Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily difficult. We not only require for the full material development of our nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an extended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, we are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets for our growing industries. But at every step which we take in this direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes, by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further expansion of German international influence and of German maritime power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would not neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance, will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be paralyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces in the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion barred. Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where their interests clash. With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but not without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparently peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, but none the less formidable, crisis--perhaps the most momentous crisis in the history of the German nation. We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our position among the Powers of _Europe_; we now must decide whether we wish to develop into and maintain a _World Empire_, and procure for German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been hitherto withheld from them. Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to make the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower in our economic, political, and national importance? That is what is involved in our decision. "To be, or not to be," is the question which is put to us to-day, disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official peace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of history inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region of realities. There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the _status quo_, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the powers of a continuous development. We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression, and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams--spiritual and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German thought--would for long ages be lost to mankind. If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at the risk of a war with numerically superior foes. Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual incitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish population. Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our political power in other ways. In the first place, our political position would be considerably consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another _we must square our account with France_ if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path. Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and the Triple Alliance has already been discussed. Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further intervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position in Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence, in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best secured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction might eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of the political community based on it. We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our population. Very recent events have shown that, under certain circumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa by pacific negotiations. A financial or political crash in Portugal might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the Portuguese colonies. We may assume that some understanding exists between England and Germany which contemplates a division of the Portuguese colonial possessions, but has never become _publici juris_. It cannot, indeed, be certain that England, if the contingency arrives, would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actually exists. She might find ways and means to invalidate it. It has even been often said, although disputed in other quarters, that Great Britain, after coming to an agreement with Germany about the partition of the Portuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed Portugal the possession of _all_ her colonies. Other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of our African territory would be possible. These need not be discussed here more particularly. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of a successful European war. In all these possible acquisitions of territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require countries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, there are even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to the settlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our overflow population might be diverted to those parts. But, generally speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our industrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for the growth of the raw materials which our industries require. This represents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release us from the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization. A part of our surplus population, indeed--so far as present conditions point--will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of the German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least of providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture. An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity. It has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replace the want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme for the future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. This notion is only justified in a certain sense. In the first place, such a policy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflow population in a territory of our own; next, it does not guarantee the certainty of an open and unrestricted trade competition. It secures to all trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any means competition under equal conditions. On the contrary, the political power which is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in the economic relations. The principle of the open door prevails everywhere--in Egypt, Manchuria, in the Congo State, in Morocco--and everywhere the politically dominant Power controls the commerce: in Manchuria Japan, in Egypt England, in the Congo State Belgium, and in Morocco France. The reason is plain. All State concessions fall naturally to that State which is practically dominant; its products are bought by all the consumers who are any way dependent on the power of the State, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similar advantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can be evaded in various ways. A "policy of the open door" must at best be regarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of a vigorous colonial policy. The essential point is for a country to have colonies or its own and a predominant political influence in the spheres where its markets lie. Our German world policy must be guided by these considerations. The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional European policy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power in Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely disregarded. The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling that States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for the advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond the limits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays the foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence in this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory of balance of power. When it was understood that the State was a power, and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. The conviction was thus gradually established that every State had a close community of interests with the other States, with which it entered into political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort of understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of a State-system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the five Great Powers--England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866 Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power. "Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among the nations." "All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a real equilibrium--an actual equality of power--is postulated,"[D] This condition does not exist between the European nations. England by herself rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of Germans cannot allow themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of French. An attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium by special alliances. One result only has been obtained--the hindrance of the free development of the nations in general, and of Germany in particular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of power can no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existing state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of rendering the forces of the continental European States mutually ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers which stand outside that charmed circle. It has always been England's policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, and to keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in order herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and the sovereignty of the world. [Footnote D: Treitschke.] We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of a State system which has common interests in civilization must not, of course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just basis. It is now not a question of a European State system, but of one embracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium is established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase our own power. A further question, suggested by the present political position, is whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning of the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under a different conception of what constitutes a State--can, or ought to be, permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a State from which--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, has no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the neutrality of the Congo State [E] must be termed more than problematic, since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development presupposes such competition. [Footnote E: The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885.] Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and powerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interference in the internal affairs of smaller ones. We daily witness instances of such conduct. Indeed, England quite lately attempted to interfere in the private affairs of Germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, but none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval preparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of international intercourse that between the States of one and the same political system a strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. The unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to political intercourse under all conditions involves serious difficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was first preached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of Lord Palmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. Equally false is the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the States of the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles for international politics can be laid down. After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals; and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above the individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decide whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its own existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should circumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the party disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat to the existence of a State. "It can only be asserted that every State acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an interference may become." On the other hand, it must be remembered that the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international right, but simply and solely on power and expediency. I have gone closely into these questions of international policy because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and may give rise to hostile complications. Then it becomes essential that we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We must remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions possible. "No man," so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3, 1761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position." If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts. The political and national development of the German people has always, so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the hereditary defects of its character--that is, by the particularism of the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often, also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in fruitless quarrels among themselves. Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy, consistent development of our power. It must not be denied that the variety of forms of intellectual and social life arising from the like variety of the German nationality and political system offers valuable advantages. It presents countless centres for the advancement of science, art, technical skill, and a high spiritual and material way of life in a steadily increasing development. But we must resist the converse of these conditions, the transference of this richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics. Above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutions which are calculated to counteract and concentrate the centrifugal forces of the German nature--the common system of defence of our country by land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strong national empire. No people is so little qualified as the German to direct its own destinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; to no people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. A glance at the Reichstag will show how completely this conviction, which is forced on us by a study of German history, holds good to-day. The German people has always been incapable of great acts for the common interest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions, as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerful personalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, to stir the German spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality, and force conflicting aspirations into concentration and union. We must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility of acting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great ends through and for our people. Within these limits, it is in harmony with the national German character to allow personality to have a free course for the fullest development of all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific, and artistic aims. "Every extension of the activities of the State is beneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies the independence of free and reasoning men; it is evil when it kills and stunts the independence of free men." [F] This independence of the individual, within the limits marked out by the interests of the State, forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the central power, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all our social conditions. [Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik," i., Section 2.] We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense, together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourably beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that once again, as in the days of our former degradation, the poet's lament will be heard: "O Germany, thy oaks still stand, But thou art fallen, glorious land!" KÖRNER. CHAPTER VI THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING FOR WAR Germany has great national and historical duties of policy and culture to fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened by formidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it will be impossible to maintain our present position and secure our future without an appeal to arms. Knowing this, as every man must who impartially considers the political situation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possible for this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to battle. The armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-time down to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time of need. Although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required for warlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity of the situation demands. Every military proposal is bitterly contested in the Reichstag, frequently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems to understand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economic misery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and these for the most part come back again into the coffers of the country) cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand, brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact is often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our people, and improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it be ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to discharge. I propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree of preparation for war the great historical crisis through which we are passing demands from us. First, however, it will be profitable to consider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not so much from the purely military as from the social and political aspect; we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the true interests of the country better than by improving its military capabilities. Preparation for war has a double task to discharge. Firstly, it must maintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national asset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of the war and supply the requisite means. This capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value in national development. As in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves hold the field--the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, do not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty of victory--so in the rivalry of nations and States victory rests with the people able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and is capable of wielding the sword with success. Military service not only educates nations in warlike capacity, but it develops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for the occupations of peace. It educates a man to the full mastery of his body, to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mental powers, his self-reliance and readiness of decision; it accustoms him to order and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self-respect and courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work. It is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military service deprives economic life of forces which could have been more appropriately and more profitably employed elsewhere. These forces are not withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life. Military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richly repay the time spent, and have their real value in subsequent life. It is therefore the moral duty of the State to train as many of its countrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect of war, but that they may share in the benefits of military service and improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums which the State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly an outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social and educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than achievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with them a number of dangers, such as craving for pleasure and tendency to luxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations. Military service as an educational instrument stands on the same level as the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each must complete and assist the other. But a people which does not willingly bear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military service renounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble and assure the future for the sake of material advantages which are one-sided and evanescent. It is the duty, therefore, of every State, conscious of its obligations towards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to all tendencies inimical to the full development of the power of defence. The method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power can be practically carried out admits of great variety. It depends largely on the conditions of national life, on the geographical and political circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequently ranges between very wide extremes. In the Boer States, as among most uncivilized peoples, the military training was almost exclusively left to the individual. That was sufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself made them familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them to hard bodily exertions. The higher requirements of combination, subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the conduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is made to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take account of political possibilities. The great European States maintain standing armies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer or shorter period of military training. England alone keeps up a mercenary army, and by the side of it a territorial army, whose ranks are filled by volunteers. In these various ways different degrees of military efficiency are obtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough and intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the requisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualities become a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency. When criticizing the different military systems, we must remember that with growing civilization the requisite military capacities are always changing. The duties expected from the Roman legionary or the soldiers who fought in line under Frederick the Great were quite different from those of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. Not merely have the physical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities expected from the fighting man are altered. This applies to the individual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character of warfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or in the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it is quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. The preparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as military sense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilized State from those in countries, standing on a lower level of civilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and war is fought under relatively simple conditions. The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a less developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form of military efficiency. It was thus that Japan succeeded in raising herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reaps in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and educational aspects, of military efficiency. Our own country, by employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development. When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself. A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard to the immediate preparations for war. This is primarily expressed in the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other ways. We see the individual States--according to their geographical position, their relations to other States and the military strength of their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater or less importance in the political system of the world--making their military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and expenditure. When we consider the complex movements of the life of civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is everywhere affected by these considerations. War is only a _means_ of attaining political ends and of supporting moral strength. Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify her policy. If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces only with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in a continental war, the general political situation explains the reason. As a matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continental European war against her will. So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties, and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays most stress on the social importance of military service, and tries to develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the security afforded by her own mountains. The United States of America, again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval power. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any considerable forces. On the other hand, they are threatened by oversea conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has acquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possibly with their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often made concessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her position in the world. While in some States a restriction of armaments is natural and justifiable, it is easily understood that France must strain every nerve to secure her full recognition among the great military nations of Europe. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great political pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they are no longer justified by the size of her population and her international importance. France affords a conspicuous example of self-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moral duties. In the other European States, as in France, external political conditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulate the method and extent of warlike preparations, and their attitude, which necessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its own justification. A State may represent a compact unity, from the point of view of nationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge in the development of human culture, and may possess the national strength to safeguard its independence, to protect its own interests, and, under certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and political schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may be deficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elements of culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence and maintenance of its political existence single-handed in the teeth of all opposition. There is a vast difference between these two cases. A State like the latter is always more or less dependent on the friendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law as fully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by international conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a State and under what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the consequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its own sphere of power. This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a State is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary expenditure. It will certainly have to share the contest in which it is itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the largest possible military force at its disposal. But there is another aspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fighting power of such a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision will rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a real factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effective addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist. The ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondary State. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain influence on the armament of the State, in combination with the local conditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration of the country. It is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, the utmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and such is, in fact, the case. In the mountain stronghold of Switzerland, which has to reckon with the political and military circumstances of Germany, France, and Italy, preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland, situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose political independence is chiefly affected by the land forces of Germany and the navy of England. The conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly on its own power. The power of the probable antagonists and of the presumable allies will have a certain importance for it, and its Government will in its plans and military preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes; but these preparations must never be motived by such considerations alone. The necessity for a strong military force is permanent and unqualified; the political permutations and combinations are endless, and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain and shifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed. The military power of an independent State in the true sense must guarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interests of a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom of development. If from the social standpoint no sacrifice can be considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military efficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditions must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the object thereby to be gained. This object--of which each individual must be conscious--if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprises the conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future of the State as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen. A civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vital factor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all the healthy and stimulating capacities of a nation find ample scope in international competition. This is also an essential condition for the unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. Where the natural capacity for growth is permanently checked by external circumstances, nation and State are stunted and individual growth is set back. Increasing political power and the consequent multiplication of possibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for the intellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown by every phase of history. The wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itself first in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty of statesmanship is to attain, safeguard, and promote this power, by force of arms in the last resort. Thus the first and most essential duty of every great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scale commensurate with its political needs. Even the superiority of the enemy cannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. On the contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for the eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less than ever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a very important factor of the total strength. But, within certain limits, which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements of superiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to be spiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by a small, well-led and self-devoting army. The Russo-Japanese War has proved this once more. Granted that the development of military strength is the first duty of every State, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert _power_, it does not follow that the State must spend the total of its personal and financial resources solely on military strength in the narrower sense of army and navy. That is neither feasible nor profitable. The military power of a people is not exclusively determined by these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmonious development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and military elements of strength. The highest and most effective military system cannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. It needs a broad and well-constructed basis in order to be effective. In the Manchurian War at the critical moment, when the Japanese attacking strength seemed spent, the Russian military system broke down, because its foundation was unstable; the State had fallen into political and moral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas. The social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and the political necessity for so doing, determine the nature and degree of warlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard may be very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the State's duties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst out whenever the question of the organization of the military forces is brought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties of the State and of the army. It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political duties of the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. The social democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see the duty of the State in a quite different light from the political _dilettante_, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing of things clear to himself, or from the sober Statesman who looks to the welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons on the horizon of the future. Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and experienced thinkers. First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in the present political world, even though all the elements for it are present. Although the German Empire contains 65,000,000 inhabitants, compared to 40,000,000 of French, this excess in population represents merely so much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is set up for their organization. The assumption that these masses would be available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. It would not mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on active service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected from such measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the highest military values. Allusion has already been made to this at the beginning of this chapter. It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre cannon. If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been ordered long beforehand. Years will pass before the full effect of the strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the rolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr. The recruit who begins his service to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier. With the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, we merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. We must not regard the present only, but provide for the future. The same argument applies to the political conditions. The man who makes the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is sinning against his country. The moment does not decide; the great political aspirations, oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature of things--these turn the scale. When King William at the beginning of the sixties of the last century undertook the reorganization of the Prussian army, no political tension existed. The crisis of 1859 had just subsided. But the King had perceived that the Prussian armament was insufficient to meet the requirements of the future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from his people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations without which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun. In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. has powerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without being under the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerful co-operation of his people, since the reform at which he aimed was universally recognized as an indisputable need of the future, and accorded with traditional German sentiment. While the preparation for war must be completed irrespectively of the political influences of the day, the military power of the probable opponents marks a limit below which the State cannot sink without jeopardizing the national safety. Further, the State is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is an obvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations by every means which science and mechanical skill supply. Further, the army must be large enough to constitute a school for the whole nation, in which a thoroughgoing and no mere superficial military efficiency may be attained. Finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degree regulated by the political position of the State. If the State has satisfied its political ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keeping its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive character. States, on the other hand, which are still desirous of expansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, must adopt a predominantly offensive military system. Preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which are dictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a wide scope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially where the discussion includes the positive duties of the State, which may lead to an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war, and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. In this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so clearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy that the majority of the nation accept his view. There are always and everywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own, and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses. Every Englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the command of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the population in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet is too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets public opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles, feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the State, which was shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through redoubled exertions in the military sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplary unanimity. Even in neutral Switzerland the feeling that political independence rests less on international treaties than on the possibility of self-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willingly supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, it should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great duties of the State, if only our politicians, without any diplomatic evasion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people at home, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objects of our policy. To be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion, as King William I. did: for when public opinion does not stand under the control of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray too easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularly great in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as Germany. He who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger of inflicting immense harm on the interests of State and people. One of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is that permanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sake of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the taxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike specious benefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinct disadvantages. The statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor by the material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by the sacrifices required of his countrymen, must keep these objects carefully in view. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. But where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual enforcement of universal service or of the requirements on which readiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures in order to create the forces which the State needs, or will need, in order to maintain its vitality. One of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanction preparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existing conditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the military authorities--a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy, since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon. Policy and strategy touch in this sphere. Policy has a strategic duty to perform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit. It would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness to disregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the financial moans momentarily available. "No expenditure without security," runs the formula in which this policy clothes itself. It is justified only when the security is fixed by the expenditure. In a great civilized State it is the duties which must be fulfilled--as Treitschke, our great historian and national politician, tells us--that determine the expenditure, and the great Finance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by sparing the national forces, while renouncing the politically indispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that the State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. He can only attain this purpose if he works in harmony with the Ministers for Commerce, Agriculture, Industries, and Colonies, in order to break down the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of the individual, to make all dead values remunerative, and to create favourable conditions for profitable business. A great impulse must thrill the whole productive and financial circles of the State, if the duties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled. Thus the preparation for war, which, under modern conditions, calls for very considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the entire social and political life of the people and on the financial policy of the State. CHAPTER VII THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR The social necessity of maintaining the power of the nation to defend itself, the political claims which the State puts forward, the strength of the probable hostile combinations, are the chief factors which determine the conditions of preparation for war. I have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheres of policy and progress which our history and our national character impose on us. My next task is to observe the possible military combinations which we must be prepared to face. In this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and can judge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our political intentions. A thorough understanding of these hostile counter-movements will give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; and this war will decide our future. It is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of our probable antagonists, although this knowledge constitutes the necessary basis for further inquiry; but we must picture to ourselves the intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable efficiency of oar enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate is determined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitions clash, and by the opposition in national character. Our opinion as to the military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest data available. If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groups of States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results: According to the recent communications of the French Finance Minister Klotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudan), the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910 amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. This included the "Colonial Corps," stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to the field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Service auxiliaire "--that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in for service without arms. The entire war establishment, according to the information of the same Minister, including field army and reserves, consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization. A reduction from this number must be made in event of mobilization, which French sources put down at 20 per cent. The whole strength of the French field army and reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000. To this must be added, as I rather from the same source, 1,700,000 Territorials, with their "reserve," from which a reduction of 25 per cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made. If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength of separate arms, which the Budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the 2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned--to the infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a considerable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the transport service); to the artillery, about 380,000; to the pioneers, 70,000: to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical service, etc.), 90,000. No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 per cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the birth-rate is steadily sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly, it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000. Recourse already has been had to the expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves. Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians and Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army with them in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent and trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limited conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria. The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and conscription will only be enforced at a crisis. These black troops are in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops stationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlers against the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service are heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops. The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value. There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with every prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent the native and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War, Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians. An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age available for military service. The Commission appointed for the purpose reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time. They could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the formation of reserves. As regards the black troops, the matter is different. France, in her West African possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops available. As the black population numbers 10,000,000 to 12,000,000, these figures may be considerably raised. Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of Senegalese sharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912 a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese to Algeria. The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black troops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. There is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being transported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficient number of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3, stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the Senegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France. Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise a strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be available for a European war is still remote. But it cannot be questioned that they will be so some day. Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroccan troops in Europe contemplated. Morocco possesses very good native warriors, but the Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the territory termed "Morocco." There cannot be, therefore, for years to come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale. The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied in organizing a serviceable Sultan's army of 20,000 men to secure the command of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco. The annexation of Morocco may for the time being mean no great addition to military strength; but, as order is gradually established, the country will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, and France will certainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy in military matters. For the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with the reinforcements of the French European army which can be obtained from Algeria and Tunisia, so soon as the limited system of conscription is universally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120,000 men, and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who have witnessed their exploits on the battlefields of Weissenburg and Wörth. At least one strong division of Turcos is already available. Next to the French army, we are chiefly concerned with the military power of Russia. Since the peace and war establishments are not published, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics; no information is forthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service, but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. According to the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the Russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of Cossacks and Frontier Guards. Infantry and sharp-shooters are formed into 37 army corps (1 Guards, 1 Grenadiers, and 25 army corps in Europe; 3 Caucasian, 2 Turkistanian, and 5 Siberian corps). The cavalry is divided into divisions, independent brigades, and separate independent regiments. In war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures 42,000 strong; each infantry division contains 2 brigades, at a strength of 20,000. Each sharp-shooter brigade is about 9,000 strong, the cavalry divisions about 4,500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arrive at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions, sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. To this must be added unattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that the war strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2,000,000. This grand total is not all available in a European theatre of war. The Siberian and Turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they would certainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. For the maintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary to leave the troops in Finland, the Guards at St. Petersburg, at least one division at Moscow, and the Caucasian army corps in the Caucasus. This would mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546,000 men; so that we have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army, 1,454,000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments of Cossacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed at 50,000 men, and the reserve and Empire-defence formations to be set on foot in case of war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank for each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumed to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. Of course, a certain reduction must be made in these figures. Also it is not known which of these formations would be really raised in event of mobilization. In any case, there will be an enormous army ready to be put into movement for a great war. After deducting all the forces which must be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2,000,000 men could easily be organized in Europe. It cannot be stated for certain whether arms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied in sufficient quantity. But it will be best not to undervalue an Empire like Russia in this respect. Quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention to England, the third member of the Triple Entente. The British Empire is divided from the military point of view into two divisions: into the United Kingdom itself with the Colonies governed by the English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter have at their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of formation. They can be completely ignored so far as concerns any European theatre of war. The army of the parts of the Empire administered by the English Cabinet divides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, the native troops, commanded by English officers, and the Territorial army, a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended total of 300,000. It is now 270,000 strong, and is destined exclusively for home defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked very highly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. We have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army. This is some 250,000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of which seven are with the colours and five in the reserve. The annual supply of recruits is 35,000. The regular reserve is now 136,000 strong. There is also a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlisted for special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches the figure of 200,000. Of the regular English army, 134,000 men are stationed in England, 74,500 in India (where, in combination with 159,000 native troops, they form the Anglo-Indian army), and about 39,000 in different stations--Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and the other Colonies and Protectorates. In this connection the conditions in Egypt are the most interesting: 6,000 English are stationed there, while in the native Egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong) one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, in view of the great excitement in the Moslem world, the position of the English is precarious. The 11,000 troops now stationed in South Africa are to be transferred as soon as possible to Mediterranean garrisons. In event of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there. For a war in Continental Europe, we have only to take into account the regular army stationed in England. When mobilized, it forms the "regular field army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mounted brigades and army troops, and numbers 130,000 men, without columns and trains. The regular troops in the United Kingdom which do not form part of the regular field army are some 100,000 strong. They consist of a very small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers for coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, with some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the Home Army, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completing its organization. Months must certainly elapse before portions of this army can strengthen the regular field army. At the most 150,000 men may be reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force. These troops compose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in the Colonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. This constitutes the weak point in the British armament. England can employ her regular army in a Continental war so long only as all is quiet in the Colonies. This fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should war break out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, and especially in Egypt. Against the powerful hosts which the Powers of the Triple Entente can put into the field, Germany can command an active army of 589,705 men (on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about 25,500 officers; while Austria has an army which on a peace footing is 361,553 men and about 20,000 officers strong. The combined war strength of the two States may be estimated as follows: In Germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers and non-combatants, in 1892, 194,664 men; in 1909, 267,283 men; or on an average for seventeen years, 230,975 men annually. This gives a total of 3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we have 2,944,931 trained men left. By adding the peace establishment to it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the French can match with about the same figures. The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135,000. Liability to serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the Landsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives a total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent., 911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to 911,250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as Russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe. In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available for field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it would be undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available, partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion. However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the enemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligent generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even the addition of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria would not, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field. In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must be left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers [A] are already reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in the field against Italy, but consider that the entire forces of France are available against Germany. [Footnote A: Colonel Boucher, "L'offensive contre l'Allemagne."] The peace establishment of the Italian army amounts, in fact, to 250,000 men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. The infantry, in 96 regiments, numbers 140,000; there are besides 12 regiments of Bersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 Alpine regiments in 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are united in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 field artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193 field and 8 mounted batteries. Besides this there are 27 mountain batteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies. Lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regiment and an airship battalion. The Gendarmerie contains 28,000 men. On a war footing the strength of the field army is 775,000. Some 70,000 men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. The militia is some 390,000 strong. The strength of the reserves who might be mobilized is not known. The field army is divided into 3 armies of 9 army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of the Territorial army and 4 cavalry divisions. As to colonial troops, Italy can command in Benadir the services of 48 officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3,500 native soldiers; in Eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissioned officers and privates of Italian birth, and 3,800 natives. Italy thus can put a considerable army into the field; but it is questionable whether the South Italian troops have much tactical value. It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence, while the protection of Tripoli, by no means an easy task, would claim a powerful army if it is to be held against France. The Turkish military forces would be of great importance if they joined the coalition of Central European Powers or its opponents. The regular peace establishment of the Turkish army amounts to 275,000 men. In the year 1910 there were three divisions of it: I. The Active Army (Nizam): Infantry 133,000 Cavalry 26,000 Artillery 43,000 Pioneers 4,500 Special troops 7,500 Train formations 3,000 Mechanics 3,000 A total, that is, of 220,000 men. 2. The Redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25,000 men. Within this limit, according to the Redif law, men are enlisted in turns for short trainings. 3. Officers in the Nizam and Redif troops, military employés, officials, and others, more than 30,000. The entire war strength of the Turkish army amounts to 700,000 men. We need only to take into consideration the troops from Europe, Anatolia, Armenia, and Syria. All these troops even are not available in a European theatre of war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may be regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior. To raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of this militia in Europe is the simplest process. From the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, the Turkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. Turkey thus is a very valuable ally to whichever party she joins. The smaller Balkan States are also able to put considerable armies into the field. Montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, with 104 cannons and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and home duties. Servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong on a peace footing; this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. The war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000 rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4 guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and 228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formations (third line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the militia, an uncertain quantity. The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. It is not known how they are distributed among the various branches of the service. On a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves and national militia, which latter is only available for home service and comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be 400,000 strong. Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a power in herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according to their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia cavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods. In peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serving intermittently. The infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the permanent cavalry (Rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery 14,000 men with 700 officers. For war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000 men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry, 7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part of the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reserves and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. There are 650,000 trained men available for service. Although the Balkan States, from a military point of view, chiefly concern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come into relations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central European States may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, if they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a European war. Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first under consideration, and then Belgium. Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men. The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a total of 141,000 men. The Landwehr consists of 50.000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36 12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total strength of 69,000 men. The Landsturm finally has a strength of 53,000 men. The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which varies much owing to the short period of service. There are generally available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400 garrison artillery, and I,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport troops. The field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000 infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400 artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of 15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr foot artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers, including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Holder, Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Völkerack and Haringvliet there are various outworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at present unimportant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifications in the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland). Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an English landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. It would easily yield to a German invasion, if it sided against us. Belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows: 26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3,400 garrison artillery, 1,550 engineers and transport service. On a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising 74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field artillery, 1,900 engineers and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry divisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1 squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is a garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the _garde civique_, Antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded as a very strong fortress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there are the fortified towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coast fortifications. Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of great military importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strong fortress. The Army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. This State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, 2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the strength varies between 7,500 and 26.000. In war-time an army of 62,000 men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special arms. Sweden can command eight classes of the First Ban, which comprises units from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as well as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. There are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age. The eight classes of the Landsturm are 165,000 men strong. It can, accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in case of war. The entire First Ban certainly comes under this head. In Greece, which does not signify much for a European war, but might in combination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome to Turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men can be put into the field; there are besides this 83,000 men in the Landwehr and 63,000 men in the Landsturm. Spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently stationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327,000 men (140,000 active army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization is so badly organized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could at most be put into the field. As regards the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, the accompanying table, which is taken from the _Nauticus_ of 1911, affords a comparative epitome, which applies to May, 1911. It shows that, numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours. This superiority is increased if the displacements and the number of really modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only four battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable, that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be counted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in the number of battleships in May, 1911, but, from all that is hitherto known about the French fleet, it cannot be compared with the German in respect of good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an important factor if allied with the English. |Battle- |Armoured |Armoured| Armoured |Protected |Number |N S Nation. |ships |Coast |Gunboats| Cruisers |Cruisers |of |u u |above |Defence |and | | |Torpedo |m b |5,000 |Vessels |Armoured| | |Vessels |b m |Tons. |from |Ships | | | |e a | |3000 Tons|under | | | |r r | |to 5,000 |3,000 | | | | i | |Tons |Tons | | | | i +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n |No|Displ. |No|Displ.|No|Displ|No|Displ. |No|Displ. | |From|f e | | | | | | | | | | |200+|80- | s | | | | | | | | | | |Tons| 200| | | | | | | | | | | | |Tons| ---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- GERMANY: | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready |25|332,410| 5|20,600| -| --- |10|114,590|33|122,130| 117| 70| 12 Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building|12| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4| --- | 7| --- | 14| -- | -- | | | | | | | | | | | | | ENGLAND: | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready |50|793,260| -| --- | -| --- |38|484,970|66|333,540| 223| 36| 53 Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building|12|286,640| -| --- | -| --- | 6|145,320|20|101,320| 51| -- | 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | | FRANCE: | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready |22|314,930| -| --- | -| --- |22|214,670|10| 50,780| 71| 191| 52 Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 4| 93,880| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 13| -- | 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | | ITALY: | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready | 8| 96,980| -| --- | -| --- |10| 79,530| 4| 10,040| 53| 39| 7 Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 4| 84,000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 10,200| 14| 28| 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | AUSTRIA- | | | | | | | | | | | | | HUNGARY | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready |11|102,620| -| --- | -| --- | 3| 18,870| 4| 10,590| 18| 66| 7 Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 5| 94,500| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| --- | 6| -- | -- | | | | | | | | | | | | | RUSSIA: | | | | | | | | | | | | | Baltic | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready | 4| 62,300| -| --- | 1|1,760| 6| 64,950| 4| 27,270| 60| 19| 13 Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 8| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 1| -- | 1 Black Sea| | | | | | | | | | | | | Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready | 6| 72,640| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 13,620| 17| 10| 4 Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 4| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 7 Siberian | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fleet |--| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 2| 9,180| 20| 7| 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | UNITED | | | | | | | | | | | | | STATES: | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready |30|434,890| 4|13,120| -| --- |14|181,260|16| 65,270| 40| 28| 19 Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 7|190,000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 20 | | | | | | | | | | | | | JAPAN: | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready |13|194,690| 2| 8,540| -| --- |13|139,830|12| 49,170| 59| 49| 12 Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 3| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4|107,120| 3| 15,000| 2| -- | 1 ---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- Let us assume that in event of war England as well as France must leave a certain naval force in the Mediterranean, which need not be stronger than the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in event of a change in the grouping of the States; let us further assume that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-European stations--the fact, however, remains that England and France together can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships, and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be superior to us. As regards _matériel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English. Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time. If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany, we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in every case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists are very different. If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed she is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a member of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course, very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization and equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The French army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the united spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of the German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too, has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the French succeed in making a large African army available for a European theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with ours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind, for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by the exercise of extraordinary efforts. It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too high to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she has all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war, and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple Alliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon have struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland, and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, after investing Metz and Diedenhofen. [Footnote B: Written in October, 1911.] England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign. English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not coincident with those of France. The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war against us. If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England's battles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nation will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. It is very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale, held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not, according to available information, show the English army in a favourable light so far as strategical ability went. If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople, but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire. Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into an offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war. Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast Empire the social and also political education, especially among the peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the people showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day be involved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could never bring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary elements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of every weakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution in internal politics, without any regard for the interests of the community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force of arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we have already mentioned. Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks, nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia's political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her losses on another frontier. Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against Russia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coûte_. If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile forces which would cripple the conduct of the war. So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-Japanese War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggle showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest losses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong; indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above mediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and that striking personalities have come on the stage. This army must therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack. When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel successfully the attack of our opponents. In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten. The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound and the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a prey to our enemies. The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland. England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides. This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan. If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will sooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by the sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, not merely in form, but essentially so. I have already shown that this is a cause of their weakness. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct of Italy at the conference of Algeçiras sufficiently demonstrated. It even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a defensive war. The recent _rapprochement_ of Italy with France and England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were allied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interests are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria. Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements, patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration. We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own resolution for victory. Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for our political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest, since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable, then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power or downfall!" will be our rallying cry. Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident intention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to the end, come what may. We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted campaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last is won. It is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numerical equality with our opponents. On the contrary, we must strive to call up the entire forces of the nation, and prepare and arm for the great decision which impends. We must try also to gain a certain superiority over our opponents in the crucial points, so that we may hold some winning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. We must bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. Only by continually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out our preparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the future makes on us. A nation of 65,000,000 which stakes _all_ her forces on winning herself a position, and on keeping that position, cannot be conquered. But it is an evil day for her if she relies on the semblance of power, or, miscalculating her enemies' strength, is content with half-measures, and looks to luck or chance for that which can only be attained by the exertion and development of all her powers. CHAPTER VIII THE NEXT NAVAL WAR In the next European land war we shall probably face our foes with Austria at our side, and thus will be in a position to win the day against any opposing forces. In a naval war we shall be thrown on our own resources, and must protect ourselves single-handed against the superior forces which will certainly press us hard. There can be no doubt that this war will be waged with England, for, although we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attack would be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checking our political power. It will therefore, under certain conditions, attack _us_, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid France. The English have, besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them should always be held before our eyes. They talk so much of a possible German attack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the question is from the opposite point of view. Again, the preparations which they are making in the North Sea show clearly that they certainly have contemplated an attack on Germany. These preparations are like a strategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves no doubt as to their meaning. The great military harbour of Rosyth is admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany, and can mean nothing else. Harwich has also been recently made into an especially strong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in the Orkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. These are measures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demand an inquiry into the military position thus created. The English have only considered the possibility of a German war since 1902. Before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and it is therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time. This fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and the circumstance that the English preparations for war are exclusively directed against Germany. We must therefore--as the general position of the world leads us to believe--reckon on the probability of a naval war with England, and shall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority. It will be so great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take the offensive against the English fleet. But we must contemplate the possibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winning the freedom of the seas, if England attacks us. We shall now discuss this possibility. On this matter I am expressing my personal views only, which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and rest exclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposed antagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself. I shall not betray any secrets of the Admiralty, since I do not know any. But I consider it expedient that the German people should clearly understand what dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met. In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to become its master? The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack, instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the English fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective blockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable that such an attempt will be made. Such an undertaking, however, does not seem to me to promise any great success. The English have secured themselves against such attacks by comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. It seems dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings. Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects than formerly. As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the English merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. Under such circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreign service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy's warships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of these ships will certainly be a difficult task. The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizes which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing our vessels to great risks. The sharpest measures must be taken against neutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuable results can be expected from a war against England's trade. On the contrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. We must be ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. It is not England's custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests are at stake. Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to English vessels. Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they can be defended. But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has no knowledge of their existence. It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications will be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest way would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral Belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the great Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be discovered through Denmark. Our own oversea commerce would remain suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of trade. It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect of her war on our trade would be much reduced. The attempt to block these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the States in question would have to face the momentous question, whether they would conform to England's will, and thus incur Germany's enmity, or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geography dictates. They would have the choice between a naval war with England and a Continental war with their German neighbours--two possibilities, each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay much attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was at issue is hardly credible. The ultimate decision of the individual neutral States cannot be foreseen. It would probably depend on the general political position and the attitude of the other World Powers to the Anglo-German contest. The policy adopted by France and Russia would be an important factor. One can easily understand under these circumstances that the Dutch are seriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points on their coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the sea side. They are also anxious about their eastern frontier, which obviously would be threatened by a German attack so soon as they sided with our enemies. I shall not enter further into the political and military possibilities which might arise if Holland, Belgium, and Denmark were driven to a sympathetic understanding by the war. I will only point out how widespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on the Continental war and on the political relations generally. The attitude of Denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from the Baltic must mainly depend on her. It is vital to us that these communications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this. The open door through the Belt and the Sound can become highly important for the conduct of the war. Free commerce with Sweden is essential for us, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedish iron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted. It will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of the interested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded by diplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action. We cannot allow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands. Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffer greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let us assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria--a condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In any case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial products. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. They must be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of the Government must be responsible for these preparations. The Ministry of Commerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, in collaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes which our commerce must follow in case of war. There must be a sort of commercial mobilization. These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us in the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on a defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack. Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockade closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish straits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or she can seal up on the one side the Channel between England and the Continent, on the other side the open sea between the North of Scotland and Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our oversea commerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping. A close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of the English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if a blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. Since all the English naval ports are considerably farther than this from our coast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously increased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at Harwich has recently been transformed into a strong naval harbour. It is considered the best harbourage on the English coast, and is hardly 300 nautical miles from the German coast. It offers good possibilities of fortification, and safe ingress and egress in time of war. The distance from the German ports is not, however, very material for purposes of blockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless count on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the Dutch coast. Our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means. Not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such as Heligoland, Borkum, and Sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but all attempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. This task can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; by night torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still on board. Such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy, if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to the offensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gain an opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensive operations. Such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our efforts must be turned towards making the most varied use of them. We must endeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partly with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the blockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss as possible. We must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces, for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because there is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the enemy's guns. An engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end. And appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a bold attack on him is made. It is only possible under exceptionally favourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of the fortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavy losses. It might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring, to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one place or another. Blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, and the battle-fleet of the attacking party, which is supposed to lie behind the farthest lines of blockade and observation, cannot always hold the high seas in full strength. The forces of the defending party, however, lie in safe anchorages, ready to sally out and fight. Such a blockade might, after all, be very costly to the attacking party. We may therefore fairly assume that the English would decide in favour of the second kind. At all events, the harbour constructions, partly building, partly projected, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, were chosen with an eye to this line of blockade. It would entail in the north the barring of a line about 300 nautical miles long, a scheme quite feasible from the military aspect. Only a small force is required to seal up the Channel, as the navigation route is very narrow. In addition to all this, the great English naval depots--Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, and Plymouth--are situated either on the line of blockade or immediately behind it. Besides, every advance against this line from the north is flanked by Sheerness and Harwich, so that a retreat to the German coast might be barred. The conditions for the northern line of blockade will be no less favourable when the projected harbour works are finished. The blockading fleet finds, therefore, a base in the great harbour of Rosyth, while a cruiser squadron might lie in support off the Orkney Isles. Every attacking fleet from the German north coast will be unhesitatingly attacked on the flank from Rosyth and Sheerness, and cut off from its line of retreat. It is thus almost impossible, owing to the English superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockading fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the Baltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. Here we should have a tolerably secure retreat. This accentuates once more the supreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage through the Sound and the Great Belt. The command of these straits will not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading fleet. In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade offers to the English, there are two objections against it which are well worth considering from the English point of view. Firstly, it prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed by the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in the blockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two or three divisions. As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely let herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests of weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactory arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. As regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous conditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarily divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea. Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be deceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which are the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled. This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. But it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet more severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks in far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the threatened flank of our attacking fleet. After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a mere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision of the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the event of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. They could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our naval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and Kiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea. It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operate against the English attempts at landing, and that they would afford extraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, by protecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open the communications with the hinterland. The success of the English attack will much depend on the strength and armament of the coast fortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purely defensive and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn upon the impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with the fleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and should inflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strength between the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it must be remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coast fortifications hold out. No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to a defensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows. Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable moments for attack, and can give us such early information of the operative movements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measures for defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers. The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that we shall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy "scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. The importance of the air-fleet must not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel the enemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or by attacking them directly. If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, they would support our own fleet in their contest with the superior English force by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thus contribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposing forces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protected to some extent by their armour against such explosives as could be dropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from a balloon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept in mind. So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for, starting from the German coast, our airships and flying-machines would be able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfully than the English airships against our forts and vessels, since they would have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant English coast. Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, and nothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while the boldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand in hand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and the science of naval construction and fortification can supply. This is the only way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that we may in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea. In this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a World Power by the side of, and in spite of, England. This victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests of Germany. We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "This was the great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II., of France under Napoleon I., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her history; and the great Republic of the United States of North America strives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the right of nations for which every people craves." [A] [Footnote A: Schiemann.] In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which, in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy, has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the unscrupulous suppression of her rivals. If the French fleet--as we may expect--combines with the English and takes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wage than a war with England alone. France's blue-water fleet would hold our allies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all her forces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of the two Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea, since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterranean interests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successful issue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even then despair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak, on land--i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an absolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval ports and destroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the knife with France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the French position as a Great Power. If France, with her falling birth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing her place in the first rank of European nations, and sinking into permanent political subservience. Those are the stakes. The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated. That is the less dangerous, since the Russian Baltic fleet is at present still weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French. We could operate against it on the inner line--i.e., we could use the opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal; we could attack the Russian ships in vastly superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to the North Sea. For these operations it is of the first importance that the Danish straits should not be occupied by the enemy. If they fell into the hands of the English, all free operations in the Baltic would be almost impossible, and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to the passive protection of our coast batteries. CHAPTER IX THE CRUCIAL QUESTION I have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in some detail, because I thought that our general political and military position can only be properly estimated by considering the various phases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilities and dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces on our coasts and land frontiers. In this way only can the direction be decided in which our preparations for war ought to move. The considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval war with England and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shall need to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully from a hostile attack by sea. They also proved that we cannot count on an ultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. If an Anglo-French army invaded North Germany through Holland, and threatened our coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence by sea. The same argument applies to the eastern theatre. If Russian armies advance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combined fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land. We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the Continent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe before we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy based on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal in Italy there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin her triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own country. But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by the naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing with strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the land army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting the progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitally necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled. At the same time the consideration of the political position presses the conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample scope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to put aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole future of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of the broad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of the individual States showed that the position of affairs everywhere is critical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place as a World Power or our downfall. The internal disruption of the Triple Alliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey, threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period which destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. We must use it, if we wish to be mindful of the warning of the Great Elector, that we are Germans. This is the point of view from which we must carry out our preparations for war by sea and land. Thus only can we be true to our national duty. I do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculated merely for the exigencies of the moment. All that we undertake in the cause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answer the pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of the future. But we must find the danger of our position a stimulus to desperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hour something of what we have lost in the last years. Since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position on the continent of Europe, we must first of all face the serious problem of the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the great numerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority will certainly exist if Italy ceases to be an active member of the Triple Alliance, whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over to Irredentism. The preparations for the naval war are of secondary importance. The first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to make the total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educate the entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to make universal service an existing fact. The system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by a splendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, has in long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, and has brought us victory upon victory in the German wars of unification. Its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussed in a separate chapter. The German Empire would to-day have a mighty political importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which our greatness was founded. France has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; Russia in Europe, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000. Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants. But since the Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are also deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded to the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the inner line, even though England took part in the war. Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued to carry it out effectively. The country where universal service exists is now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the able-bodied are called up for training. In particular, very little use has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army. In this direction some reorganization is required which will energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army, such as we have not at the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand, we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers. Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make up our deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by 150,000 men. The necessary training staff and equipment would not be forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could not all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of an increased army only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and Landwehr is correspondingly raised. We can therefore only slowly recur to the reinforcement of universal service. The note struck by the new Five Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds. But although we wish to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the superior forces of our opponents. We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. These means can only be found in the spiritual domain. History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[A] In most cases it was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment, greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able strategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. Rome conquered the world with inferior forces; Frederick the Great with inferior forces withstood the allied armies of Europe. Recent history shows us the victory of the numerically weaker Japanese army over a crushingly superior opponent. We cannot count on seeing a great commander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear. Nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to the hostile forces. But we can try to learn what will be the decisive factors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victory or defeat. If we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, and keep the essential points of view always before us, we might create a real source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents which would be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. Should we then in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policy which results from the special nature of present-day war, it must be possible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize a considerable numerical superiority. [Footnote A: _Cf_. v. Bernhardi, "Vom heutigen Kriege," vol. i., chap. ii.] The essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, battery with battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships, and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probable opponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreast with the enemy in all material domains. This idea leads to a certain spiritual servility and inferiority. Rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on which the ultimate decision turns. The duty of our War Department is to prepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and to apply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle of superiority. This must secure for us the spiritual and so the material advantage over our enemies. Otherwise we run the danger of being crushed by their weight of numbers. We cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit by uninspired rivalry in arming. We must trace out with clear insight the probable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread new paths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. New goals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teaches us by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress, in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. The spiritual capacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must be sought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action, are the soil in which great successes ripen. It would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely the nature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideas which will prove decisive in it. These questions have been thoroughly ventilated in a book recently published by me, "Vom heutigen Kriege" ("The War of To-day"). In this place I will only condense the results of my inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further consideration of the essential questions of the future. In a future European war "masses" will be employed to an extent unprecedented in any previous one. Weapons will be used whose deadliness will exceed all previous experience. More effective and varied means of communication will be available than were known in earlier wars. These three momentous factors will mark the war of the future. "Masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they contain elements of weakness as well. The larger they are and the less they can be commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tactical efficiency diminishes. The less they are able to live on the country during war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they are therefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slower and less mobile they become. Owing to the great space which they require for their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them into effective action simultaneously. They are also far more accessible to morally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and may prove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies run short, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authority over the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions. The increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longer range, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exacting claims on the _moral_ of the soldier. The danger zone begins sooner than formerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become far wider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. The soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during which he is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under all circumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firing which the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautious movement. All branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances. Shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In short, while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demands made on them have become considerably greater. Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling and feeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and main roads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign, aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to their use, and the commanders counted upon them. The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a great superiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities and tactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists. The commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy, and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective troops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostile army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the field. Since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chiefly shown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessary conclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare. In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strength which it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action. Inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attack to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect a superior force against his surprised opponent. The initiative, which is the privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and place which is very profitable in operations and tactics. The attacked party can only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of the intentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which hold out promise of success. The more rapidly, therefore, the attacking General strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable his troops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its nature guarantees. This superiority increases with the size of the masses. If the advancing armies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, it will be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to take proper measures against a surprise attack. On the other hand, the prospects of success of the attacking General will be very favourable, especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops at his disposal. Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibility of gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and all the more so the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it is impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously and completely into action. A victory, therefore, in the decisive direction--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries of the opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, and its effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations. If the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superior numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize his numerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victory over the arithmetically stronger army. In conformity to this law, Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability and striking strength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in mere numbers. No further proof is required that the superiority of the attack increases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, and to the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility of concealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of the enemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet very appreciable. We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure the superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it is incumbent on us: First, during the period of preparation to raise the tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements and damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself to act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the manoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be superior in the decisive directions. Above all, a State which has objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. It must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods. This principle holds good pre-eminently for Germany. The points which I have tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to face the future with confidence. All our measures must be calculated to raise the efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all else must give way. We shall thus have a central point on which all our measures can be focussed. We can make them all serve one purpose, and thus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all too easily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts of a collective whole. Much of our previous omissions and commissions would have borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifying principle. The requirements which I have described as the most essential are somewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate a resolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age. The larger the armies by which one State tries to outbid another, the smaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and not merely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment as such. Huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "They will be suffocated by their own fat," said General v. Brandenstein, the great organizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation of the French. The complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to the whole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injure the tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually his own movements. The necessary attention has never been paid in the course of military training to this latter duty. Finally, the tactical efficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as it certainly will prove in the wars of the future. A mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure of public opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, have conduced to measures which inevitably result in an essential contradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained, and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. It would be illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it is recognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reached on them. This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military service. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less, and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a good trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_, which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by no means helped by the very brief training which these units at best receive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity for serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavy strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be indirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of the field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This mass would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to some degree the task of making good the losses. A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops. Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on mobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much according to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much inferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, which were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this, notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphere of activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war their duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. In fact, they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the field army. In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. By acting at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be. Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive operations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treated as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some are less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanical conception. For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks for which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, if necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever before. The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are placed at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on this principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his army by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, be employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as much as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in the numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the actual war. It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their _personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to them. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered. Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. An increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It is supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the establishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality, not quantity. Concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. If we wish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengthening the army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number of professional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. This step is the more necessary because the present available cadres are insufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to provide for their thorough training. The gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand with an increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. We shall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, the efficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can be improved by organization, equipment, and training. I must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to the questions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch of military activity, especially in the offensive, which requires prompt original action--I mean the importance of personality. From the Commander-in-Chief, who puts into execution the conceptions of his own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune, and the Brigadier, who must act independently according to a given general scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and left to his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private in the field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in the face of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any other age, personality dominates all else. The effect of mass tactics has abolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is left to himself. The direct influence of the superior has lessened. In the strategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity of that arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than before from their troop and are left to their own responsibility. Even in the artillery the importance of independent action will be more clearly emphasized than previously. The battlefields and area of operations have increased with the masses employed. The Commander-in-Chief is far less able than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of the field; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates. These conditions are very prominent in attacking operations. When on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold his ground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize the reserves. On the offensive, however, the conditions change from moment to moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannot be anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. Even the individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, now wait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often have to choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losing touch with the main body. The offensive makes very varied calls on the commander's qualities. Ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy, deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded from him. He must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. All this puts a heavy strain on personality. It is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number of self-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinct advantage. This object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve to attain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. And this object can be attained. Personality can be developed, especially in the sphere of spiritual activity. The reflective and critical powers can be improved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate the conditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element in which he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly and more easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp. Self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortune are produced by knowledge. This is shown everywhere. We see the awkward and shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the same process is often traced among the higher commands. But where the mental development is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, the personality fails at the moment of action. The elegant guardsman Bourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task of leading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. General Chanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolute determination in the midst of defeat. Thus one of the essential tasks of the preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army and thus indirectly to mould and elevate character. Especially is it essential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those in high command. In a long military life ideas all too early grow stereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thought and can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. The danger of such development cannot be shut out. The stiff and uniform composition of the army which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to a one-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness of actual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. Something akin to this was seen in Germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _en masse_. United will and action are essential to give force its greatest value. They must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritual independence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency and solving new problems by original methods. It has often been said that one man is as good as another; that personality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion is erroneous. In time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no real struggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance is enough. But in war, personality turns the scale. Responsibility and danger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as a chemical test separates the pure metal from the dross. That army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in the important posts during peace-time and has kept them there. This is the only way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and to break down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress and success. It redounds to the lasting credit of William I. that for the highest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in time of peace made his selection from among all the apparently great men around him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all opposition those who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour of need, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. This is no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy and distrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action, appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure of the stern reality of war that the truth of Goethe's lines is proved: "Folk and thrall and victor can Witness bear in every zone: Fortune's greatest gift to man Is personality alone." CHAPTER X ARMY ORGANIZATION I now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but it is not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected with this subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. I shall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, in my opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if we wish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directions which will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. It will be necessary to go into details only on points which are especially noteworthy or require some explanation. I shall obviously come into opposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is further from my purpose than to criticize them. My views are based on theoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitely presented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men and of changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and political disputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. It is, in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as something already existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequent historical verdict. But the further expansion of our army belongs to the future, and its course can be directed. It can follow well-defined lines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically most important that this object should be realized. Therefore I shall not look back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future. The guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as I have already said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and the greatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a position to carry on an offensive war successfully. What follows will, therefore, fall naturally under these two heads. Fighting strength rests partly, as already said, on the training (which will be discussed later), the arming, and the _personnel_, partly on the composition of the troops, and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chiefly have to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength of their peace establishment. It was shown in the previous chapter how essential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessary cadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branches so strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength in war-time. The efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and the non-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value of the troops. They are the professional supporters of discipline, decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of the troops, they determine their intellectual standard. The number of permanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small in proportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to the demands made of them on mobilization. If we reflect how many officers and non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferred to the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the modern tactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert his influence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing _personnel_ is clearly demonstrated. This applies mainly to the infantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, a sufficient number of efficient officers is essential. All the more important is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, on the other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers and non-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. This latter is a question of training, and does not come into the present discussion. The task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in a sense, a financial question. The amount of the pay and the prospects which the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affect the body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important to keep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniary advantages. Even for the building up of the corps of officers, the financial question is all-important. The career of the officer offers to-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency and self-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in the service, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high as they now are. The infantry officer especially must have a better position. Granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incur greater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officer has to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the most strenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. It would be, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay than the cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that arm more attractive. There is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, for which there is a plethora of candidates. These arms will always be well supplied with officers. Their greater attractiveness must be counterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service. By no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in the chief arm. If the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its composition and training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of the troops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts in action; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends on conditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numerical proportion of the arms to each other. Disregarding provisionally the cavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define the proportion which artillery must bear to infantry. With regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extent replace infantry is quite erroneous. Machine guns are primarily weapons of defence. In attack they can only be employed under very favourable conditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successful attack--the fire-strength--while they may sometimes hinder that impetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. Hence, this auxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, and employed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed into large units. Machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marching columns. The relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance. Infantry is the decisive arm. Other arms are exclusively there to smooth their road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly. This relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantry must ultimately determine the importance of all other fighting instruments in the whole army. If we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is the result. Infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing to modern weapons. The attack requires, therefore, a far greater superiority than ever before. In addition to this, the breadth of front in action has greatly increased in consequence of the former close tactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire. This refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify the conclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces as before. This assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only in a limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. The troops must therefore be placed more deeply _en échelon _than in the last wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulate the allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can be settled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with the experiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which will most probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected in the domain of military science. If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in an infantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction of artillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modern artillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we must advocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of the artillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle path between these two extremes. If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or, better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that the guns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the specially adapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, the conclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry is reduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion we must not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take into account that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. If we estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their proper strength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Such infantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the position taken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in that section of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions, requires greater numbers and depth than before. In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part of the Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchurian campaign. Some of the German infantry had in the first-named period extraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were not rare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its original strength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germans on the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not so decisive as in the first part of the war. This condition would have shown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in the contest with the loosely-compacted, raw French levies. In the former case the offensive would have been impracticable. The strong artillery, under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weak infantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, under the then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry was too weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matched enemy. This is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses of infantry were needed at Wörth and St. Privat, for instance, in spite of the support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weaker enemy of equal class. Again, in South Africa, the overwhelming superiority of the English in artillery was never able to force a victory. In Manchuria the state of things was very instructive. Numerically the Russian artillery was extraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the Russian field guns was longer than that of the Japanese; nevertheless, the Japanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also, because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unite superior forces of infantry and artillery, while the Russian artillery was scattered along the whole of their broad front. The lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of the arms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of these units must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to be appropriately determined. The requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal or superior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughly mechanical, as if in war division always fought against division and corps against corps! Superiority at the decisive point is the crucial test. This superiority is attained by means of an unexpected concentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why the superiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way. If by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combine against a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifies a superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. If it is assumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, and that in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become so slight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, then equal forces meet, and chance decides the day. Since the Japanese were tactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, they were enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisive directions, and this advantage proved far greater than the numerical superiority of the Russian army as a whole. If we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that the artillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupy within a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of a considerably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful. In this respect we have, in our present organization already exceeded the expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of the artillery. The conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within the separate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities of the army are thereby prejudiced. This is the decisive point. Any excess in artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space is restricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, then artillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid to victory. It is far more important to be able to unite superior forces for a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forces along the whole front. If we observe this principle, we shall often be weaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantage may be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such a position. It becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpowering concentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. This victory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere. The operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greater marching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working of the communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of the columns of the operating troops. Under the modern system of colossal armaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possibly live on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies from the rear. Railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies; but from the railhead the communication with the troops must be maintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which go to and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead. Since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the direct communication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draught animals, which can move independently of the roads. The waggons of provisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily, must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage of food. This is only possible if the troop column does not exceed a certain length and starts at early morning, so that the transport waggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear to the head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of the night's rest. The fitness of an army for attack can only be maintained if these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficient quantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carry with them. If the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laid down, the marches must be proportionately shortened. If unusually lengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach the troops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. Thus the capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directly dependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. A careful calculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order to average 20 to 22 kilometres a day--the minimum distance required from an army--no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25 kilometres This consideration determines the depth of the army corps on the march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battle troops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps. This calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorily affected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies and rations should be carefully organized. The restoration of any destroyed railways, the construction of light railways, the organization of columns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be prepared by every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-time the railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of the troops, and that the columns may maintain without interruption continuous communications between the troops and the railhead. In order to keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount any crisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an ample stock of tinned rations. This stock should, in consideration of the necessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. Care must be taken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock of tinned provisions can be quickly renewed. This would be best done by special light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside the organization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such a distance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front by forced or night marches. There is naturally some reluctance to increase the trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. It is further to be observed that the columns in question would not be very long, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and other provisions compressed into the smallest space. An immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps, and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern army with its millions. This is absolutely necessary, since without it the troops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. It is far more important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in any other, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at the decisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent. However careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attained if the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fed from the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out. Everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept within these limits. Our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field army corresponds roughly to this requirement. But should it be lengthened by a heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, it will considerably exceed the safe marching depth--if, that is, the necessary advance-guard distance be included. Since, also, the infantry is too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery to deploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attack and of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations to strengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of the artillery. In addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the division is very important for its tactical efficiency. This must be such as to permit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation of reserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units. This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditional organization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yet appeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the existing tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already been drawn up by competent officers. The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into two infantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. The formation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fix the centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and his own judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when a reserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers of some detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravity for the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops a wider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But this procedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible, even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where the brunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures taken by the enemy and the course of the battle. Napoleon's saying, "_Je m'engage et puis je vois,"_ finds its application, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division of cavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institution which has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized that the duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades of two regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carry these duties out. This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradicts the most generally accepted military principles. The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, as is found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separate divisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawal of a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of the subdivisions in lines _(Treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attack must not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the best formation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troops to be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive result there. A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced by the quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into action two kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. These latter can, of course, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are not always required. Their place in the organization, however, is precisely the same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employ them as their particular character demands. The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps and divisions equal, and if possible superior, to the corresponding formations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionately according to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, the undeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the orders of the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed the commanding General of the last means secured by the organization of enforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve for himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one division at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire to withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one division only, the same division must always be subjected to this reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether this result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at least worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each division. The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous question. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the whole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangement would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. They can also, however, be combined under the command of the General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The first arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the indispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives are inadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line by a night march. Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army corps temporarily. There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally used to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on the spot in every engagement. They have even been known to stray into the advance guard. I do not approve of this idea. The enemy's field artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers. It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their effectiveness doubtful. No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increased their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort to every division. The experiences of that war must not, however, be overestimated or generalized. The conditions were quite _sui generis_. The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's line in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns. It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective 12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as I can gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose duty was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden. The Japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but break through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs, the question of concentration seems to me very important for us. Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the heavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They thus best serve his scheme of offence. He can mass them at the place which he wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the army corps only dissipates their effectiveness. His heavy batteries will be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General. There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the deciding struggle of the day. Every man, down to the last private, knows that. I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. The batteries which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed under the orders of the corps commanders _(Truppenführer)_ if they are to become an organic part of the whole. At present the heavy artillery of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres. It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does not feel itself an integral part of the whole. A clear distinction between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical. This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. As the armies do not exist in peace-time, and manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. This disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned permanently to each army corps. This would not prevent it being united in war-time in the hands of the army leaders. On the contrary, they would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies. The operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far more effective if it has control of the railways and roads. That implies not merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. We were taught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railway communications hindered all operations. It is, therefore, of vital importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the discharge of these necessary functions. Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations, but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them. The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years' service. The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building, fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on fortified places. The most important part of the fortress pioneer's duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the actual storm. The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation. Starting from this point of view, General v. Beseler, the late Inspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimable service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. This follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers--a rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training for their special duties. We must continue on these lines, and develop more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better proportion to its value. In connection with the requirements already discussed, which are directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly serve the same purpose. These diminish the tactical efficiency of the enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy unawares--an important condition of successful offensive warfare. I refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet. The cavalry's duties are twofold. On the one hand, they must carry out reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must operate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt the regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility. Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned them in war, is lamentably weak. This disproportion is clearly seen if we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited efficiency. Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous, because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal. There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and 1870-71. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is misleading. On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly antiquated system. It was, consequently, not armed for independent movements. What they then did must not be compared with what will be required from them in the future. In wars in which mounted forces were really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived notions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), their employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa, notwithstanding all modern weapons. These are the wars which must be studied in order to form a fair opinion. They will convince us that an increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. It will, of course, only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate independently. The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the fulfilment of this condition. It is also imperatively necessary, when the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. This is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy's communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand, the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if cavalry and cyclists combine. Again, an increased strength of cavalry is undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of the enemy. Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists, another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful service. Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I have repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted. The brigades must in war be three regiments strong. The strength of the divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time being. Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in a high degree elastic. There can, besides, be no doubt on the point that the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue. I might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which are attached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so that the division with its three parts would have the control of three batteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to each brigade. That is an old suggestion which the Emperor William I. once made, but it has never yet been considered. It is not with cavalry usually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizing momentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together with the most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. There can obviously, therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with the artillery. Such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry when it is important to make a decisive attack. The reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completed by the air-fleet. Here we are dealing with something which does not yet exist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch of military science will play in future wars.[A] It is therefore necessary to point out in good time those aspects of it which are of special weight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar consideration from the technical side. [Footnote A: The efficiency and success of the Italian aviators in Tripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. There were no opponents in the air.] The first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity of handling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fighting strength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements of the army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attacking successfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers. The power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leading idea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at once thought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, since tactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and the technical effectiveness. These reciprocal relations must be borne in mind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over our opponents. If the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from the necessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposed changes in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improve the efficiency of our army. The whole organization must be such that the column length of the army corps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though the supplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots. In case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps as being the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartition must be observed. The infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantially strengthened. The artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible to concentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking up the units. The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so organized as to insure their efficiency in war. The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained. The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy. Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in the decisive field war. The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be carried out. It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which, without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition. The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. They comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen, although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often surpassed all expectations. But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to public opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake there is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, as unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the principles of a sound military organization. The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in various ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject, and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive consideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration. One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous intermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form in every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jäger battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the hands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carried out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within the brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividing the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more ways. The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally only be improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through the enforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade to each army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present. But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far that new army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can be taken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by this means. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if the artillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited, without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only the quantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battle should be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. All that exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariat waggons, and brought forward only on necessity--that is to say, when a battle is in prospect. The certainty of being able to feed the troops and thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important than the more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity of ammunition close at hand during the advance. The soldiers will be inclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of the fight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who can only be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will be reserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. Then, however, the required ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is brought forward by stages in good time. A suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each division had an equal number of batteries at its disposal. The light field howitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way that they may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up the formations of the division. The strength of the artillery must be regulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that the entire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. The heavy field howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under the orders of the General commanding, and in event of war be combined as "army" artillery. It would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detached from the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independent in war as "army" cavalry. The regiments necessary for service with the infantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvres with mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisional cavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. On the other hand, it is, I know, often alleged that the _Truppenführer_ are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders; but this objection does not seem very pertinent. Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under the commanding General. In event of mobilization, one regiment would be withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments strong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. The regiment intended for divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. If the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only be able to receive two squadrons. In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it; but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. The blame for such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. The whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. If it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the arm. This would have to be adapted to the new conditions. There are various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry can be guaranteed. The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make appropriate use of this important arm. Since the cyclists are restricted to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which require to be surmounted. The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of the organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. In military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual factors lead to very different results. I believe, however, that my opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect of affairs. It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by question of detail. Each special requirement must be regarded as part of that general combination of things which only really comes into view in actual warfare. The special standpoint of a particular arm must be rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced. Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient account of the spiritual and moral factors. Our age, which has made such progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort, the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which they employ. A profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality are essential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out; under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizer of victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this way or that. The only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce from a view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands the importance of the separate co-operating factors. "For he who grasps the problem as a whole Has calmed the storm that rages in his soul" CHAPTER XI TRAINING AND EDUCATION Our first object, then, must be to organize and transform the German army into the most effective tool of German policy, and into a school of health and strength for our nation. We must also try to get ahead of our rivals by superiority of training, and at the same time to do full justice to the social requirements of the army by exerting all our efforts towards raising the spiritual and moral level of the units and strengthening their loyal German feelings. Diligence and devotion to military education are no longer at the present day sufficient to make our troops superior to the enemy's, for there are men working no less devotedly in the hostile armies. If we wish to gain a start there is only one way to do it: the training must break with all that is antiquated and proceed in the spirit of the war of the future, which will impose fresh requirements on the troops as well as on the officers. It is unnecessary to go into the details about the training in the use of modern arms and technical contrivances: this follows necessarily from the introduction of these means of war. But if we survey the sphere of training as a whole, two phenomena of modern warfare will strike us as peculiarly important with regard to it: the heightened demands which will be made on individual character and the employment of "masses" to an extent hitherto unknown. The necessity for increased individualization in the case of infantry and artillery results directly from the character of the modern battle; in the case of cavalry it is due to the nature of their strategical duties and the need of sometimes fighting on foot like infantry; in the case of leaders of every grade, from the immensity of the armies, the vast extent of the spheres of operation and fields of battle, and the difficulty, inseparable from all these conditions, of giving direct orders. Wherever we turn our eyes to the wide sphere of modern warfare, we encounter the necessity of independent action--by the private soldier in the thick of the battle, or the lonely patrol in the midst of the enemy's country, as much as by the leader of an army, who handles huge hosts. In battle, as well as in operations, the requisite uniformity of action can only be attained at the present time by independent co-operation of all in accordance with a fixed general scheme. The employment of "masses" requires an entirely altered method of moving and feeding the troops. It is one thing to lead 100,000 or perhaps 200,000 men in a rich country seamed with roads, and concentrate them for a battle--it is another to manoeuvre 800,000 men on a scene of war stripped bare by the enemy, where all railroads and bridges have been destroyed by modern explosives. In the first case the military empiric may be equal to the occasion; the second case demands imperatively a scientifically educated General and a staff who have also studied and mastered for themselves the nature of modern warfare. The problems of the future must be solved in advance if a commander wishes to be able to operate in a modern theatre of war with certainty and rapid decision. The necessity of far-reaching individualization then is universally recognized. To be sure, the old traditions die slowly. Here and there an undeserved importance is still attached to the march past as a method of education, and drilling in close formation is sometimes practised more than is justified by its value. The cavalry is not yet completely awakened from its slumbers, and performs the time-honoured exercises on the parade-grounds with great strain on the horses' strength, oblivious of the existence of long-range quick-firing guns, and as if they were still the old arm which Napoleon or Frederick the Great commanded. Even the artillery is still haunted by some more or less antiquated notions; technical and stereotyped ideas still sometimes restrict the freedom of operations; in the practice of manoeuvres, artillery duels are still in vogue, while sufficient attention is not given to concentration of fire with a definite purpose, and to co-operation with the infantry. Even in theory the necessity of the artillery duel is still asserted. Many conservative notions linger on in the heavy artillery. Obsolete ideas have not yet wholly disappeared even from the new regulations and ordinances where they block the path of true progress; but, on the whole, it has been realized that greater individual responsibility and self-reliance must be encouraged. In this respect the army is on the right road, and if it continues on it and continually resists the temptation of restricting the independence of the subordinate for the sake of outward appearance, there is room for hope that gradually the highest results will be attained, provided that competent military criticism has been equally encouraged. In this direction a healthy development has started, but insufficient attention has been given to the fact that the main features of war have completely changed. Although in the next war men will have to be handled by millions, the training of our officers is still being conducted on lines which belong to a past era, and virtually ignore modern conditions. Our manoeuvres more especially follow these lines. Most of the practical training is carried out in manoeuvres of brigades and divisions--i.e., in formations which could never occur in the great decisive campaigns of the future. From time to time--financial grounds unfortunately prevent it being an annual affair--a corps manoeuvre is held, which also cannot be regarded as training for the command of "masses." Sometimes, but rarely, several army corps are assembled for combined training under veteran Generals, who soon afterwards leave the service, and so cannot give the army the benefit of any experience which they may have gained. It cannot, of course, be denied that present-day manoeuvres are extraordinarily instructive and useful, especially for the troops themselves', but they are not a direct training for the command of armies in modern warfare. Even the so-called "Imperial Manoeuvres" only correspond, to a very slight extent, to the requirements of modern war, since they never take account of the commissariat arrangements, and seldom of the arrangements for sheltering, etc., the troops which would be essential in real warfare. A glance at the Imperial Manoeuvres of 1909 is sufficient to show that many of the operations could never have been carried out had it been a question of the troops being fed under the conditions of war. It is an absolute necessity that our officers should learn to pay adequate attention to these points, which are the rule in warfare and appreciably cramp the power of operations. In theory, of course, the commissariat waggons are always taken into account; they are conscientiously mentioned in all orders, and in theory are posted as a commissariat reserve between the corps and the divisions. That they would in reality all have to circulate with a pendulum-like frequency between the troops and the magazines, that the magazines would have to be almost daily brought forward or sent farther back, that the position of the field bakeries is of extreme importance--these are all points which are inconvenient and troublesome, and so are very seldom considered. In great strategic war-games, too, even in a theatre of war selected in Russia which excludes all living upon the country, the commissariat arrangements are rarely worked out in detail; I should almost doubt whether on such occasions the possibility of exclusive "magazine feeding" has ever been entertained. Even smaller opportunities of being acquainted with these conditions are given to the officer in ordinary manoeuvres, and yet it is extremely difficult on purely theoretical lines to become familiar with the machinery for moving and feeding a large army and to master the subject efficiently. The friction and the obstacles which occur in reality cannot be brought home to the student in theory, and the routine in managing such things cannot be learnt from books. These conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations, but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of an army present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it is obviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount. When, in 1870, some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on the advance to Sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were not masters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of war and the deficient attacking powers of the French allowed the operations to succeed, although a man like Moltke was at the head of the army. All these matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our General Staff, but the theoretical labours of the General Staff are by no means the common property of the army. On all these grounds I believe that first and foremost our manoeuvres must be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely altered conditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition. The troops must be trained--as formerly--to the highest tactical efficiency, and the army must be developed into the most effective machine for carrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these two pivots. But the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on the great scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish. The paths we have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal. All methods of training and education must be in accordance with these views. I do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry and cavalry in this place, since I have already discussed the question at length in special treatises.[A] In the case of the artillery alone, some remarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this arm seem necessary. [Footnote A: v. Bernhardi: "Taktik und Ausbildung der Infanterie," 1910 "Unsere Kavallerie im nächsten Krieg," 1899; "Reiterdienst," 1910.] The demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm--as is partly expressed in the regulations--may be summed up as follows: all preconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on one side, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry or infantry at the decisive point. This principle is universally acknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice. The artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring their tactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technical requirements subservient to this idea. The ever-recurring tendency to fight chiefly the enemy's artillery must be emphatically checked. On the defensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attacking artillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the most dreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, its chief duty always is to fire upon the enemy's infantry, where possible, from masked positions. The principle of keeping the artillery divisions close together on the battlefield and combining the fire in one direction, must not be carried to an extreme. The artillery certainly must be employed on a large plan, and the chief in command must see that there is a concentration of effort at the decisive points; but in particular cases, and among the varying incidents of a battle, this idea will be carried out less effectively by uniformity of orders than by explaining the general scheme to the subordinate officers, and leaving to them the duty of carrying it out. Accordingly, it is important that the personal initiative of the subordinate officer should be recognized more fully than before; for in a crisis such independent action is indispensable. The great extent of the battlefields and the natural endeavour to select wooded and irregular ground for the attack will often force the artillery to advance in groups or in lines one behind the other, and to attempt, notwithstanding, united action against the tactically most important objective. This result is hard to attain by a centralization of command, and is best realized by the independent action of tactically trained subordinates. This is not the place to enter into technical details, and I will only mention some points which appear especially important. The Bz shell _(Granatschuss)_ should be withdrawn as unsuitable, and its use should not form part of the training. It requires, in order to attain its specific effect against rifle-pits, such accurate aiming as is very seldom possible in actual warfare. No very great value should be attached to firing with shrapnel. It seems to be retained in France and to have shown satisfactory results with us; but care must be taken not to apply the experiences of the shooting-range directly to serious warfare. No doubt its use, if successful, promises rapid results, but it may easily lead, especially in the "mass" battle, to great errors in calculation. In any case, practice with Az shot is more trustworthy, and is of the first importance. The Az fire must be reserved principally for the last stages of an offensive engagement, as was lately laid down in the regulations. Care must be taken generally not to go too far in refinements and complications of strategy and devices. Only the simplest methods can be successfully applied in battle; this fact must never be forgotten. The important point in the general training of the artillery is that text-book pedantries--for example, in the reports on shooting--should be relegated more than hitherto to the background, and that tactics should be given a more prominent position. In this way only can the artillery do really good service in action; but the technique of shooting must not be neglected in the reports. That would mean rejecting the good and the evil together, and the tendency to abolish such reports as inconvenient must be distinctly opposed. Under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvres of artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail large expenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good. They must, in my opinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since their possible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks. They lead to pronounced tactics of position _(Stellungstaktik)_ which are impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actual war--the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for a definite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country in search of suitable positions for the batteries--can never be learnt on these manoeuvres. They could be made more instructive if the tactical limits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in these manoeuvres--viz., that the artillery is regarded as the decisive arm--cannot be thus remedied. The usual result is that favourable artillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered to under some tactical pretence. After all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity may be necessary, so far as the development of the fighting _tactics_ of the various branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring them into line with modern conditions. If, however, the troops are to be educated to a higher efficiency in _operations_, completely new ground must be broken, on which, I am convinced, great results and an undoubted superiority over our opponents can be attained. Considerable difficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is to amass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficulties are not, in my opinion, insurmountable. There are two chief points: first, the practice of marching and operations in formations at war strength, fully equipped with well-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, a reorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a more thorough education of the chief commanders. As regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as I know, has never yet been attempted. But if we consider, firstly, how valuable more rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war of the future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, we shall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically for the discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantage over our supposed antagonist. The preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturally also be carried out in smaller formation. It is, moreover, very important to train large masses of troops--brigades and divisions--in long marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections in the vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of such movements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them. Training marches with full military stores, etc., in columns of 20 to 25 kilometres depth would be still more valuable, since they correspond to the daily needs of real warfare. Should it not be possible to assemble two army corps in such manoeuvres, then the necessary depth of march can be obtained by letting the separate detachments march with suitable intervals, in which case the intervals must be very strictly observed. This does not ever really reproduce the conditions of actual warfare, but it is useful as a makeshift. The waggons for the troops would have to be hired, as On manoeuvres, though only partly, in order to save expense. The supplies could be brought on army transport trains, which would represent the pioneer convoys _(Verpflegungsstaffel)_, and would regulate their pace accordingly. Marching merely for training purposes in large formations, with food supplied from the field-kitchens during the march, would also be of considerable value provided that care is taken to execute the march in the shortest possible time, and to replace the provisions consumed by bringing fresh supplies forward from the rear; this process is only properly seen when the march, with supplies as if in war, is continued for several days. It is naturally not enough to undertake these manoeuvres once in a way; they must be a permanent institution if they are intended to develop a sound knowledge of marching in the army. Finally, flank marches must be practised, sometimes in separate columns, sometimes in army formation. The flank marches of separate columns will, of course, be useful only when they are combined with practice in feeding an army as if in war, so that the commissariat columns march on the side away from the enemy, in a parallel line, and are thence brought up to the troops at the close of the march. Flank marches in army formation will have some value, even apart from any training in the commissariat system, since the simultaneous crossing of several marching columns on parallel by-roads is not an easy manoeuvre in itself. But this exercise will have its full value only when the regulation commissariat waggons are attached, which would have to move with them and furnish the supplies. I also consider that operative movements in army formation extending over several days are desirable. Practice must be given in moving backwards and forwards in the most various combinations, in flank movements, and in doubling back, the lines of communication in the rear being blocked when necessary. Then only can all the difficulties which occur on such movements be shown one by one, and it can be seen where the lever must be applied in order to remove them. In this way alone can the higher commanders gain the necessary certainty in conducting such operations, so as to be able to employ them under the pressure of a hostile attack. An army so disciplined would, I imagine, acquire a pronounced superiority over any opponent who made his first experiments in such operations in actual war. The major strategic movements on both sides in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 sufficiently showed that. I recognize naturally that all exercises on this scale would cost a great deal of money and could never all be carried out systematically one after the other. I wished, however, to ventilate the subject, firstly, in order to recommend all officers in high command to study the points of view under consideration--a thing they much neglect to do; secondly, because it might be sometimes profitable and possible to carry out in practice one or other of them--at the Imperial Manoeuvres, for example, or on some other occasion. How much could be saved in money alone and applied usefully to this purpose were the above-mentioned country manoeuvres of the artillery suspended? From reasons of economy all the commissariat waggons and columns need not actually be employed on such manoeuvres. It would be useful, however, if, in addition to one detachment equipped on a war footing, the head waggons of the other groups were present and were moved along at the proper distance from each other and from the detachment, which could mainly be fed from the kitchen waggon. It would thus be possible to get a sort of presentation of the whole course of the commissariat business and to acquire valuable experience. It is, indeed, extraordinarily difficult to arrange such manoeuvres properly, and it must be admitted that much friction and many obstacles are got rid of if only the heads of the groups are marked out, and that false ideas thus arise which may lead to erroneous conclusions; but under careful direction such manoeuvres would certainly not be wholly useless, especially if attention is mainly paid to the matters which are really essential. They would, at any rate, be far more valuable than many small manoeuvres, which can frequently be replaced by exercises on the large drill-grounds, than many expensive trainings in the country, which are of no real utility, or than many other military institutions which are only remotely connected with the object of training under active service conditions. All that does not directly promote this object must be erased from our system of education at a time when the highest values are at stake. Even then exercise in operations on a large scale cannot often be carried out, primarily because of the probable cost, and next because it is not advisable to interrupt too often the tactical training of the troops. It must be repeated in a definite cycle in each large formation, so that eventually all superior officers may have the opportunity of becoming practically acquainted with these operations, and also that the troops may become familiarized with the modern commissariat system; but since such practical exercises must always be somewhat incomplete, they must also be worked out beforehand theoretically. It is not at all sufficient that the officers on the General Staff and the Intendants have a mastery of these subjects. The rank and file must be well up in them; but especially the officers who will be employed on the supply service--that is to say, the transport officers of the standing army and those officers on the furlough establishment, who would be employed as column commanders. The practical service in the transport battalions and the duties performed by the officers of the last-mentioned category who are assigned to these battalions are insufficient to attain this object. They learn from these mainly practical duties next to nothing of the system as a whole. It would therefore be advisable that all these officers should go through a special preliminary course for this service, in which the whole machinery of the army movements would be explained to them by the officers of the General Staff and the higher transport service officers, and they would then learn by practical examples to calculate the whole movement of the columns in the most varied positions with precise regard to distances and time. This would be far more valuable for war than the many and often excessive trainings in driving, etc., on which so much time is wasted. The technical driver's duty is very simple in all columns and trains, but it is not easy to know in each position what is the crucial point, in order to be able, when occasion arises, to act independently. While, therefore, on the one hand, driving instruction must be thoroughly carried out, on the other hand, the institution of a scientific transport service course, in which, by practical examples out of military history, the importance of these matters can be explained, is under present circumstances an absolute necessity. I have shown elsewhere how necessary it is to proceed absolutely systematically in the arrangements for relays of supplies, since the operative capabilities of the army depend on this system. Its nature, however, cannot be realized by the officers concerned like a sudden inspiration when mobilization takes place; knowledge of its principles must be gained by study, and a proof of the complete misapprehension of the importance which this service has attained under modern conditions is that officers are supposed to be able to manage it successfully without having made in peace-time a profound scientific study of the matter. The transport service has advanced to a place of extraordinary importance in the general system of modern warfare. It should be appreciated accordingly. Every active transport service officer ought, after some years' service, to attend a scientific course; all the senior officers on the furlough establishment intended for transport service ought, as their first duty, to be summoned to attend such a course. If these educational courses were held in the autumn in the training camps of the troops, they would entail little extra cost, and an inestimable advantage would be gained with a very trifling outlay. The results of such a measure can only be fully realized in war, when the superior officers also thoroughly grasp these matters and do not make demands contrary to the nature of the case, and therefore impossible to be met. They should therefore be obliged to undergo a thorough education in the practical duties of the General Staff, and not merely in leading troops in action. This reflection leads to the discussion of the momentous question how, generally, the training of the superior officers for the great war should be managed, and how the manoeuvres ought to be reorganized with a view to the training. The essential contradiction between our obsolete method of training and the completely altered demands of a new era appears here with peculiar distinctness. A large part of our superior commanders pass through the General Staff, while part have attended at least the military academy; but when these men reach the higher positions what they learnt in their youth has long become out of date. The continuation school is missing. It can be replaced only by personal study; but there is generally insufficient time for this, and often a lack of interest. The daily duties of training troops claim all the officer's energy, and he needs great determination and love of hard work to continue vigorously his own scientific education. The result is, that comparatively few of our superior officers have a fairly thorough knowledge, much less an independently thought out view, of the conditions of war on the great scale. This would cost dearly in real war. Experience shows that it is not enough that the officers of the General Staff attached to the leader are competent to fill up this gap. The leader, if he cannot himself grasp the conditions, becomes the tool of his subordinates; he believes he is directing and is himself being directed. This is a far from healthy condition. Our present manoeuvres are, as already mentioned, only occasionally a school for officers in a strategical sense, and from the tactical point of view they do not meet modern requirements. The minor manoeuvres especially do not represent what is the most important feature in present-day warfare--i.e., the sudden concentration of larger forces on the one side and the impossibility, from space considerations, of timely counter-movements on the other. The minor manoeuvres are certainly useful in many respects. The commanders learn to form decisions and to give orders, and these are two important matters; but the same result would follow from manoeuvres on the grand scale, which would also to some extent reproduce the modern conditions of warfare. Brigade manoeuvres especially belong to a past generation, and merely encourage wrong ideas. All that the soldiers learn from them--that is, fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds. Divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders. The principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified in them; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are those of the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a larger scale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when the operating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelled to act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. The great art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, for only in this way can the strain of the general situation and the collective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actual warfare, be distinctly brought home. This is a most weighty consideration. The superior officers must have clearly brought before their eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modern warfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations. The requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction of small-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantly strategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less important military exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in this direction. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. If the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (a rather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range of the artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become too small) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisional manoeuvres could be carried out on them. The money saved by this change could be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. One thing is certain: a great impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre system if it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization and execution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word. It seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of training on so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient to educate serviceable commanders for the great war. The manoeuvres can only show their full value if the officers of every rank who take part in them have already had a competent training in theory. To encourage this preliminary training of the superior officers is thus one of the most serious tasks of an efficient preparation for war. These must not regard their duty as lying exclusively in the training of the troops, but must also be ever striving further to educate themselves and their subordinates for leadership in the great war. Strategic war games on a large scale, which in the army corps can be conducted by the commanding Generals, and in the army-inspections by the Inspectors, seem to me to be the only means by which this end can be attained. All superior officers must be criticized by the standard of their efficiency in superior commands. The threads of all this training will meet in the hands of the Chief of the General Army Staff as the strategically responsible authority. It seems undesirable in any case to leave it more or less to chance to decide whether those who hold high commands will be competent or not for their posts. The circumstances that a man is an energetic commander of a division, or as General in command maintains discipline in his army corps, affords no conclusive proof that he is fitted to be the leader of an army. Military history supplies many instances of this. No proof is required to show that under the conditions of modern warfare the reconnoitring and screening units require special training. The possibility and the success of all operations are in the highest degree dependent on their activity. I have for years pointed out the absolute necessity of preparing our cavalry officers scientifically for their profession, and I can only repeat the demand that our cavalry riding-schools should be organized also as places of scientific education. I will also once more declare that it is wrong that the bulk of the training of the army cavalry should consist in the divisional cavalry exercises on the military drill-grounds. These exercises do not correspond at all to actual conditions, and inculcate quite wrong notions in the officers, as every cavalry officer in high command finds out who, having been taught on the drill-ground, has to lead a cavalry division on manoeuvres. The centre of gravity of effectiveness in war rests on the directing of operations and on the skilful transition from strategical independence to combination in attack; the great difficulty of leading cavalry lies in these conditions, and this can no more be learnt on the drill-grounds than systematic screening and reconnaissance duties. The perpetual subject of practice on the drill-grounds, a cavalry engagement between two divisions in close formation, will hardly ever occur in war. Any unprejudiced examination of the present conditions must lead to this result, and counsels the cavalry arm to adopt a course which may be regarded as a serious preparation for war. It is a truly remarkable fact that the artillery, which in fact, always acts only in combination with the other arms, carries out annually extensive independent manoeuvres, as if it had by itself a definite effect on the course of the campaign, while the army cavalry, which _always_ takes the field independently, hardly ever trains by itself, but carefully practises that combination with infantry which is only rarely necessary in war. This clearly demonstrates the unsystematic and antiquated methods of all our training. Practice in reconnoitring and screening tactics, as well as raids on a large scale, are what is wanted for the training of the cavalry. Co-operation with the air-fleet will be a further development, so soon as aviation has attained such successes that it may be reckoned as an integral factor of army organization. The airship division and the cavalry have kindred duties, and must co-operate under the same command, especially for screening purposes, which are all-important. The methods for the training of pioneers which correspond fully to modern requirements have been pointed out by General v. Beseler. This arm need only be developed further in the direction which this distinguished officer has indicated in order to satisfy the needs of the next war. In the field war its chief importance will be found to be in the support of the infantry in attacks on fortified positions, and in the construction of similar positions. Tactical requirements must, however, be insisted upon in this connection. The whole training must be guided by considerations of tactics. This is the main point. As regards sieges, especial attention must be devoted to training the miners, since the object is to capture rapidly the outlying forts and to take the fortresses which can resist the attack of the artillery. The duties of the Army Service Corps[B] are clear. They must, on the one hand, be efficiently trained for the intelligence department, especially for the various duties of the telegraph branch, and be ready to give every kind of assistance to the airships; on the other hand, they must look after and maintain the strategical capacities of the army. The rapid construction of railroads, especially light railways, the speedy repair of destroyed lines, the protection of traffic on military railways, and the utilization of motors for various purposes, are the duties for which these troops must be trained. A thorough knowledge and mastery of the essential principles of operations are indispensable qualifications in their case also. They can only meet their many-sided and all-important duties by a competent acquaintance with the methods and system of army movements on every scale. It is highly important, therefore, that the officers of the Army Service Corps should be thoroughly trained in military science. [Footnote B: _Verkehrstruppen_.] Thus in every direction we see the necessity to improve the intellectual development of the army, and to educate it to an appreciation of the close connection of the multifarious duties of war. This appreciation is requisite, not merely for the leaders and special branches of the service; it must permeate the whole corps of officers, and to some degree the non-commissioned officers also. It will bear good fruit in the training of the men. The higher the stage on which the teacher stands, and the greater his intellectual grasp of the subject, the more complete will be his influence on the scholars, the more rapidly and successfully will he reach the understanding of his subordinates, and the more thoroughly will he win from them that confidence and respect which are the firmest foundations of discipline. All the means employed to improve the education of our establishment of officers in the science of war and general subjects will be richly repaid in efficient service on every other field of practical activity. Intellectual exercise gives tone to brain and character, and a really deep comprehension of war and its requirements postulates a certain philosophic mental education and bent, which makes it possible to assess the value of phenomena in their reciprocal relations, and to estimate correctly the imponderabilia. The effort to produce this higher intellectual standard in the officers' corps must be felt in their training from the military school onwards, and must find its expression in a school of military education of a higher class than exists at present. A military academy as such was contemplated by Scharnhorst. To-day it assumed rather the character of a preparatory school for the General Staff. Instruction in history and mathematics is all that remains of its former importance. The instruction in military history was entirely divested of its scientific character by the method of application employed, and became wholly subservient to tactics. In this way the meaning of the study of military history was obscured, and even to-day, so far as I know, the lectures on military history primarily serve purposes of directly professional education. I cannot say how far the language teaching imparts the spirit of foreign tongues. At any rate, it culminates in the examination for interpreterships, and thus pursues a directly practical end. This development was in a certain sense necessary. A quite specifically professional education of the officers of the General Staff is essential under present conditions. I will not decide whether it was therefore necessary to limit the broad and truly academical character of the institution. In any case, we need in the army of to-day an institution which gives opportunity for the independent study of military science from the higher standpoint, and provides at the same time a comprehensive general education. I believe that the military academy could be developed into such an institution, without any necessity of abandoning the direct preparation of the officers for service on the General Staff. By the side of the military sciences proper, which might be limited in many directions, lectures on general scientific subjects might be organized, to which admission should be free. In similar lectures the great military problems might be discussed from the standpoint of military philosophy, and the hearers might gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations to politics, the co-operation of material and imponderable forces, the importance of free personality under the pressure of necessary phenomena, sharp contradictions and violent opposition, as well as into the duties of a commander viewed from the higher standpoint. Limitation and concentration of the compulsory subjects, such as are now arranged on an educational plan in three consecutive annual courses, and the institution of free lectures on subjects of general culture, intended not only to educate officers of the General Staff, but to train men who are competent to discharge the highest military and civic duties--this is what is required for the highest military educational institution of the German army. CHAPTER XII PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR "Germany's future lies on the sea." A proud saying, which contains a great truth. If the German people wish to attain a distinguished future and fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policy and act as a World Power. This task can only be performed if they are supported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be so strong at least that a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongest opponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger his position as a World Power. Now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely on a world policy if our political and military superiority on the continent of Europe be immovably established. This goal is not yet reached, and must be our first objective. Nevertheless, we must now take steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our pretensions. It is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for the full security of our Continental position that we guard our coasts and repel oversea attacks. On the other hand, it is an absolute economic necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas--by arms if needs be--since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, and this, again, requires a large import trade. The political greatness of Germany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her oversea trade. The maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore be always before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. Our efforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse of hostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wish to follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destined ultimately to support this world policy. Unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we first ventured on the open sea. Much valuable time was wasted in striving for limited and insufficient objects. The Emperor William II. was destined to be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world's history, and to treat it accordingly. All our earlier naval activity must be set down as fruitless. We have been busied for years in building a fleet. Most varied considerations guided our policy. A clear, definite programme was first drawn up by the great Naval Act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906, and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. It is, of course, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. The needs of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standard for the naval forces which a State may require: that depends on the claims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations. At first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on the coasts on which we traded. The first duty of the fleet was to safeguard this commerce. Opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soon shown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous for Germany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of the Government, which they stigmatized as boundless. Another party was content with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought this object attained if some important points on the coast were defended by artillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places. This view was not long maintained. All discerning persons were convinced of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high seas. It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the aggressor would have them at his disposal. But this policy, it was thought, could be satisfied by half-measures. The so-called _Ausfallkorvetten_ were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies, and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank. This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a large number of torpedo-boats. These, in spite of their small fighting capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed torpedoes. It was soon realized that this theory rested on a fallacy--that a country like the German Empire, which depends on an extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and on its coasts. At last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded with actual needs. The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard for our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of our commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and supporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of such limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. A few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible, destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines is obviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the defeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count on permanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed that sufficiently. The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies. It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for defence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet our political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive, when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success; on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained in this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. We must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale. The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious that we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger, unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all circumstances. Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing reasons. If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance of victoriously repelling this attack--in other words, of inflicting such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses. This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that the English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the necessary size of our naval preparations. A war with England is probably that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of victoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principle for our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increase their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even beyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates. We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for many years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet. We may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown in the chapter on the next naval war. The enemy must be wearied out and exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast; our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. These are the lines that our preparation for war must follow. A strong coast fortress as a base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the offensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for this class of war. Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. Mines alone cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able to adopt the offensive under all circumstances. For this purpose permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow mines to be placed. I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these requirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our naval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade, although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the further development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success presupposes the existence of some such fortress. But the question must be looked at from another aspect. The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the unmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England is determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power. Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless, the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked menacing utterances from various English statesmen. If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's military preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates attacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of the English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken; the English _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the German coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and to isolate us in Europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted as a course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quite impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly well that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attempt would be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the German naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an English attack. We must make it clear to ourselves that we are not able to postpone this attack as we wish. It has been already mentioned that the recent attitude of Italy may precipitate a European crisis; we must make up our minds, then, that England will attack us on some pretext or other soon, before the existing balance of power, which is very favourable for England, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage. Especially, if the Unionist party comes into power again, must we reckon upon a strong English Imperial policy which may easily bring about war. Under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and our coast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoretical principles. On the contrary, we must strain our financial resources in order to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of our fleet, together with the fortification of our coast. It would be justifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements by loans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of the greatest moment are at stake--questions, it may fairly be said, of existence. Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or definite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the whole nation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes who live on our export trade. This consideration by itself shows the absolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination with our coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to the decisive campaign with equanimity. Even the circumstance that we cannot, perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need not check the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable to replace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case. The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance, in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all military requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of Jahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port in the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it is feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canal might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflict heavy losses upon him. As regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on the completion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line and the usual complement of large cruisers. It does not possess in its present condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. There can be no doubt on this point. Five of the ships of the line, of the Kaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the Wittelsbach class carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must be considered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. We are in a worse plight with regard to our large cruisers. The five ships of the Hansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of the Prince class (_Adalbert, Friedrich Karl, Heinrich_) fulfil their purpose neither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. Even the armoured cruisers _Fürst Bismarck, Roon, York, Gneisenau,_ and _Scharnhorst_ do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements. If we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten the time allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible these totally useless vessels--nine large cruisers and five battleships--by new and thoroughly effective ships. Anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizon will admit this necessity. The English may storm and protest ever so strongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political and all financial considerations. We must create new types of battleships, which may be superior to the English in speed and fighting qualities. That is no light task, for the most modern English ships of the line have reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest English cruisers are little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. But superiority in individual units, together with the greatest possible readiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be made to do, at any rate, what is most essential. Since the Krupp guns possess a certain advantage--which is not, in fact, very great--over the English heavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, and to equip our ships with superior attacking power. A more powerful artillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked the more it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a way that all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side or straight ahead. Besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent part in strategic offence and defence alike. The torpedo-fleet, therefore--especially having regard to the crushing superiority of England--requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because, so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor of superiority in them. In torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the high standard of training in the _personnel_ and the excellence of construction, ahead of all other navies. We must endeavour to keep this position, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according to the newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by trying to excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. We must also devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make these vessels more effective in attack. If we succeed in developing this branch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in every direction, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness with increased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results with these vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks on the enemy's squadrons. A superior efficiency in this field would be extraordinarily advantageous to us. Last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the development of aviation for naval purposes. If it were possible to make airships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that they could be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes, they might render essential services to the fleet. The air-fleet would then, as already explained in Chapter VIII., be able to report successfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by the battle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of the approach of the enemy in superior force. It would also be able to prevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thus facilitate the execution of surprise attacks. Again, it could repulse or frustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. If our airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side, could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the English coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when fighting against the superior force of the enemy. It can hardly be doubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible to perform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air-fleet over the English would contribute largely to equalize the difference in strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war. It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field because our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we can compete for the palm of victory on equal terms. Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be carefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be especially effective in a struggle against England, as that country needs imports more than any other. Consequently great results would follow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassing his navigation. The difficulties of such an undertaking have been discussed in a previous chapter. It is all the more imperative to organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended for the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activity unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. The auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice, when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so. A rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we must be ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace. History tells us what to expect from the English on this head. In the middle of peace they bombarded Copenhagen from September 2 to September 5, 1807, and carried off the Danish fleet. Four hundred houses were burnt, 2,000 damaged, 3,000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants were killed. If some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct of England is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, and in the equally ruthless acts of Napoleon, still the occurrence shows distinctly of what measures England is capable if her command of the seas is endangered. And this practice has not been forgotten. On July 11 and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, Alexandria was similarly bombarded in peace-time, and Egypt occupied by the English under the hypocritical pretext that Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of the foreigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is well not to forget them. The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also Italy, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships, suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians. Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as was adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certain conditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutal violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the above-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a course of action politically justifiable. A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack becomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions are granted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attack in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable carelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never be formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties concerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of States. But in no case can a formal rule of right in such cases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it, as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan--limit the undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from the very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia would have been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the most extreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in 1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful from the standpoint of political morality. These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right. Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the reservists. Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under all circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension. The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole _matériel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for instant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in force directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simple precept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance to the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as is done in England. When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the resources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, since the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic preparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or the self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our requirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be provisionally dropped. In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary, devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in case of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presupposition that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on us. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships. I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one hand, it is to be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war. My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid foundation without which any successful action against the superior forces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications fail to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible. It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry out _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Though this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for the navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything on strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers. Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, we must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be met by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion. The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing more and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most serious mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has, indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against numerically superior enemies. This policy somewhat resembles the supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, and thus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of North America, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed, threatens England's own position as a World Power. But the consequences of our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under her former American policy. The place of Great Britain as a Great Power is far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. It is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty, and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we might not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would have wished. This uncertainty is inseparable from every war. Neither in 1866 nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which would fall to him, but he dared to fight. The greatness of the statesman is shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best course. Just Fate decides the issue. The second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact that we started to build our fleet too late. The chief mistake which we have made is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote the Brandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period of decadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all matters concerning the fleet. We have also begun far too late to develop systematically our coast defences, so that the most essential duties which spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since we have not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it. This experience must be a lesson to us in the future. We must never let the petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad views which must determine our world policy. We must always adopt in good time those measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, even though they make heavy financial calls on our resources. This is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to our naval armament. Even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little for lost time. It will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this duty devotedly. CHAPTER XIII THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION The policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in which we can only assert our place among the Great Powers and secure the conditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure of treasure and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood. We shall be compelled, therefore, to adopt, without a moment's delay, special measures which will enable us to be more or less a match for our enemies--I mean accelerated ship-building and rapid increase of the army. We must always bear in mind in the present that we have to provide for the future. Apart from the requirements of the moment, we must never forget to develop the elements on which not only our military strength, but also the political power of the State ultimately rest. We must maintain the physical and mental health of the nation, and this can only be done if we aim at a progressive development of popular education in the widest sense, corresponding to the external changes in the conditions and demands of existence. While it is the duty of the State to guide her citizens to the highest moral and mental development, on the other hand the elements of strength, rooted in the people, react upon the efficiency of the State. Only when supported by the strong, unanimous will of the nation can the State achieve really great results; she is therefore doubly interested in promoting the physical and mental growth of the nation. Her duty and her justification consist in this endeavour, for she draws from the fulfilment of this duty the strength and capacity to be in the highest sense true to it. It is, under present conditions, expedient also from the merely military standpoint to provide not only for the healthy physical development of our growing youth, but also to raise its intellectual level. For while the demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction, the term of service has been shortened in order to make enlistment in very great numbers possible. Thus the full consummation of military training cannot be attained unless recruits enter the army well equipped physically and mentally, and bringing with them patriotic sentiments worthy of the honourable profession of arms. We have already shown in a previous chapter how important it is to raise the culture of the officers and non-commissioned officers to the best of our power, in order to secure not only a greater and more independent individual efficiency, but also a deeper and more lasting influence on the men; but this influence of the superiors must always remain limited if it cannot count on finding in the men a receptive and intelligent material. This fact is especially clear when we grasp the claims which modern war will make on the individual fighter. In order to meet these demands fully, the people must be properly educated. Each individual must, in modern warfare, display a large measure of independent judgment, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution. In the open methods of fighting, the infantryman, after his appointed duty has been assigned him, is to a great degree thrown on his own resources; he may often have to take over the command of his own section if the losses among his superiors are heavy. The artilleryman will have to work his gun single-handed when the section leaders and gun captains have fallen victims to the shrapnel fire; the patrols and despatch-riders are often left to themselves in the middle of the enemy's country; and the sapper, who is working against a counter-mine, will often find himself unexpectedly face to face with the enemy, and has no resource left beyond his own professional knowledge and determination. But not only are higher claims made on the independent responsibility of the individual in modern warfare, but the strain on the physique will probably be far greater in the future than in previous wars. This change is due partly to the large size of the armies, partly to the greater efficiency of the firearms. All movements in large masses are more exacting in themselves than similar movements in small detachments, since they are never carried out so smoothly. The shelter and food of great masses can never be so good as with smaller bodies; the depth of the marching columns, which increases with the masses, adds to the difficulties of any movements--abbreviated rest at night, irregular hours for meals, unusual times for marching, etc. The increased range of modern firearms extends the actual fighting zone, and, in combination with the larger fronts, necessitates wide détours whenever the troops attempt enveloping movements or other changes of position on the battlefield. In the face of these higher demands, the amount of work done in the army has been enormously increased. The State, however, has done little to prepare our young men better for military service, while tendencies are making themselves felt in the life of the people which exercise a very detrimental influence on their education. I specially refer to the ever-growing encroachments of a social-democratic, anti-patriotic feeling, and, hand-in-hand with this, the flocking of the population into the large towns, which is unfavourable to physical development. This result is clearly shown by the enlistment statistics. At the present day, out of all the German-born military units, over 6.14 per cent. come from the large towns, 7.37 per cent, from the medium-sized towns, 22.34 per cent. from the small or country towns, and 64.15 per cent. from the rural districts; while the distribution of the population between town and country is quite different. According to the census of 1905, the rural population amounted to 42.5 per cent., the small or country towns to 25.5 per cent., the medium-sized towns to 12.9 per cent., and the large towns to 19.1 per cent. of the entire number of inhabitants. The proportion has probably changed since that year still more unfavourably for the rural population, while the large towns have increased in population. These figures clearly show the physical deterioration of the town population, and signify a danger to our national life, not merely in respect of physique, but in the intellect and compact unity of the nation. The rural population forms part and parcel of the army. A thousand bonds unite the troops and the families of their members, so far as they come from the country; everyone who studies the inner life of our army is aware of this. The interest felt in the soldier's life is intense. It is the same spirit, transmitted from one to another. The relation of the army to the population of the great cities which send a small and ever-diminishing fraction of their sons into the army is quite different. A certain opposition exists between the population of the great cities and the country-folk, who, from a military point of view, form the backbone of the nation. Similarly, the links between the army and the large towns have loosened, and large sections of the population in the great cities are absolutely hostile to the service. It is in the direct interests of the State to raise the physical health of the town population by all imaginable means, not only in order to enable more soldiers to be enlisted, but to bring the beneficial effect of military training more extensively to bear on the town population, and so to help to make our social conditions more healthy. Nothing promotes unity of spirit and sentiment like the comradeship of military service. So far as I can judge, it is not factory work alone in itself which exercises a detrimental effect on the physical development and, owing to its monotony, on the mental development also, but the general conditions of life, inseparable from such work, are prejudicial. Apart from many forms of employment in factories which are directly injurious to health, the factors which stunt physical development may be found in the housing conditions, in the pleasure-seeking town life, and in alcoholism. This latter vice is far more prevalent in the large cities than in the rural districts, and, in combination with the other influences of the great city, produces far more harmful results. It is therefore the unmistakable duty of the State, first, to fight alcoholism with every weapon, if necessary by relentlessly taxing all kinds of alcoholic drinks, and by strictly limiting the right to sell them; secondly, most emphatic encouragement must be given to all efforts to improve the housing conditions of the working population, and to withdraw the youth of the towns from the ruinous influences of a life of amusements. In Munich, Bavarian officers have recently made a praiseworthy attempt to occupy the leisure time of the young men past the age of attendance at school with health-producing military exercises. The young men's clubs which Field-Marshal v.d. Goltz is trying to establish aim at similar objects. Such undertakings ought to be vigorously carried out in every large town, and supported by the State, from purely physical as well as social considerations. The gymnastic instruction in the schools and gymnastic clubs has an undoubtedly beneficial effect on physical development, and deserves every encouragement; finally, on these grounds, as well as all others, the system of universal service should have been made an effective reality. It is literally amazing to notice the excellent effect of military service on the physical development of the recruits. The authorities in charge of the reserves should have been instructed to make the population of the great cities serve in larger numbers than hitherto. On the other hand, a warning must, in my opinion, be issued against two tendencies: first, against the continual curtailing of the working hours for factory hands and artisans; and, secondly, against crediting sport with an exaggerated value for the national health. As already pointed out, it is usually not the work itself, but the circumstances attendant on working together in large numbers that are prejudicial. The wish to shorten the working hours on principle, except to a moderate degree, unless any exceptionally unfavourable conditions of work are present, is, in my opinion, an immoral endeavour, and a complete miscomprehension of the real value of work. It is in itself the greatest blessing which man knows, and ill betide the nation which regards it no longer as a moral duty, but as the necessary means of earning a livelihood and paying for amusements. Strenuous labour alone produces men and characters, and those nations who have been compelled to win their living in a continuous struggle against a rude climate have often achieved the greatest exploits, and shown the greatest vitality. So long as the Dutch steeled their strength by unremitting conflict with the sea, so long as they fought for religious liberty against the Spanish supremacy, they were a nation of historical importance; now, when they live mainly for money-making and enjoyment, and lead a politically neutral existence, without great ambitions or great wars, their importance has sunk low, and will not rise again until they take a part in the struggle of the civilized nations. In Germany that stock which was destined to bring back our country from degradation to historical importance did not grow up on the fertile banks of the Rhine or the Danube, but on the sterile sands of the March. We must preserve the stern, industrious, old-Prussian feeling, and carry the rest of Germany with us to Kant's conception of life; we must continuously steel our strength by great political and economic endeavours, and must not be content with what we have already attained, or abandon ourselves to the indolent pursuit of pleasure; thus only we shall remain healthy in mind and body, and able to keep our place in the world. Where Nature herself does not compel hard toil, or where with growing wealth wide sections of the people are inclined to follow a life of pleasure rather than of work, society and the State must vie in taking care that work does not become play, or play work. It is work, regarded as a duty, that forges men, not fanciful play. Sport, which is spreading more and more amongst us too, must always remain a means of recreation, not an end in itself, if it is to be justified at all. We must never forget this. Hard, laborious work has made Germany great; in England, on the contrary, sport has succeeded in maintaining the physical health of the nation; but by becoming exaggerated and by usurping the place of serious work it has greatly injured the English nation. The English nation, under the influence of growing wealth, a lower standard of labour efficiency--which, indeed, is the avowed object of the English trades unions--and of the security of its military position, has more and more become a nation of gentlemen at ease and of sportsmen, and it may well be asked whether, under these conditions, England will show herself competent for the great duties which she has taken on herself in the future. If, further, the political rivalry with the great and ambitious republic in America be removed by an Arbitration Treaty, this circumstance might easily become the boundary-stone where the roads to progress and to decadence divide, in spite of all sports which develop physique. The physical healthiness of a nation has no permanent value, unless it comes from work and goes hand-in-hand with spiritual development; while, if the latter is subordinated to material and physical considerations, the result must be injurious in the long-run. We must not therefore be content to educate up for the army a physically healthy set of young men by elevating the social conditions and the whole method of life of our people, but we must also endeavour to promote their spiritual development in every way. The means for doing so is the school. Military education under the present-day conditions, which are continually becoming more severe, can only realize its aims satisfactorily if a groundwork has been laid for it in the schools, and an improved preliminary training has been given to the raw material. The national school is not sufficient for this requirement. The general regulations which settle the national school system in Prussia date from the year 1872, and are thus forty years old, and do not take account of the modern development which has been so rapid of late years. It is only natural that a fundamental opposition exists between them and the essentials of military education. Present-day military education requires complete individualization and a conscious development of manly feeling; in the national school everything is based on teaching in classes, and there is no distinction between the sexes. This is directly prescribed by the rules. In the army the recruits are taught under the superintendence of the superiors by specially detached officers and selected experienced non-commissioned officers; and even instruction is given them in quite small sections; while each one receives individual attention from the non-commissioned officers of his section and the higher superior officers. In a school, on the contrary, the master is expected to teach as many as eighty scholars at a time; in a school with two teachers as many as 120 children are divided into two classes. A separation of the sexes is only recommended in a school of several classes. As a rule, therefore, the instruction is given in common. It is certain that, under such conditions, no insight into the personality of the individual is possible. All that is achieved is to impart more or less mechanically and inefficiently a certain amount of information in some branch of knowledge, without any consideration of the special dispositions of boys and girls, still less of individuals. Such a national school can obviously offer no preparation for a military education. The principles which regulate the teaching in the two places are quite different. That is seen in the whole tendency of the instruction. The military education aims at training the moral personality to independent thought and action, and at the same time rousing patriotic feelings among the men. Instruction in a sense of duty and in our national history thus takes a foremost place by the side of professional teaching. Great attention is given to educate each individual in logical reasoning and in the clear expression of his thoughts. In the national school these views are completely relegated to the background--not, of course, as a matter of intention and theory, but as the practical result of the conditions. The chief stress in such a school is laid on formal religious instruction, and on imparting some facility in reading, writing, and ciphering. The so-called _Realign_ (history, geography, natural history, natural science) fall quite into the background. Only six out of thirty hours of instruction weekly are devoted to all the _Realien_ in the middle and upper standards; in the lower standards they are ignored altogether, while four to five hours are assigned to religious instruction in every standard. There is no idea of any deliberate encouragement of patriotism. Not a word in the General Regulations suggests that any weight is to be attached to this; and while over two pages are filled with details of the methods of religious instruction, history, which is especially valuable for the development of patriotic sentiments, is dismissed in ten lines. As for influencing the character and the reasoning faculties of the scholars to any extent worth mentioning, the system of large classes puts it altogether out of the question. While the allotment of subjects to the hours available for instruction is thus very one-sided, the system on which instruction is given, especially in religious matters, is also unsatisfactory. Beginning with the lower standard onwards (that is to say, the children of six years), stories not only from the New Testament, but also from the Old Testament are drummed into the heads of the scholars. Similarly every Saturday the portions of Scripture appointed for the next Sunday are read out and explained to all the children. Instruction in the Catechism begins also in the lower standard, from the age of six onwards; the children must learn some twenty hymns by heart, besides various prayers. It is a significant fact that it has been found necessary expressly to forbid "the memorizing of the General Confession and other parts of the liturgical service," as "also the learning by heart of the Pericopes." On the other hand, the institution of Public Worship is to be explained to the children. This illustrates the spirit in which this instruction has to be imparted according to the regulations. It is really amazing to read these regulations. The object of Evangelical religious instruction is to introduce the children "to the comprehension of the Holy Scriptures and to the creed of the congregation," in order that they "may be enabled to read the Scriptures independently and to take an active part both in the life and the religious worship of the congregation." Requirements are laid down which entirely abandon the task of making the subject suitable to the comprehension of children from six to fourteen years of age, and presuppose a range of ideas totally beyond their age. Not a word, however, suggests that the real meaning of religion--its influence, that is, on the moral conduct of man--should be adequately brought into prominence. The teacher is not urged by a single syllable to impress religious ideas on the receptive child-mind; the whole course of instruction, in conformity with regulations, deals with a formal religiosity, which is quite out of touch with practical life, and if not deliberately, at least in result, renounces any attempt at moral influence. A real feeling for religion is seldom the fruit of such instruction; the children, as a rule, are glad after their Confirmation to have done with this unspiritual religious teaching, and so they remain, when their schooling is over, permanently strangers to the religious inner life, which the instruction never awakened in them. Nor does the instruction for Confirmation do much to alter that, for it is usually conceived in the same spirit. All other subjects which might raise heart and spirit and present to the young minds some high ideals--more especially our own country's history--are most shamefully neglected in favour of this sort of instruction; and yet a truly religious and patriotic spirit is of inestimable value for life, and, above all, for the soldier. It is the more regrettable that instruction in the national school, as fixed by the regulations, and as given in practice in a still duller form, is totally unfitted to raise such feelings, and thus to do some real service to the country. It is quite refreshing to read in the new regulations for middle schools of February 10,1910, that by religious instruction the "moral and religious tendencies of the child" should be awakened and strengthened, and that the teaching of history should aim at exciting an "intelligent appreciation of the greatness of the fatherland." The method of religious instruction which is adopted in the national school is, in my opinion, hopelessly perverted. Religious instruction can only become fruitful and profitable when a certain intellectual growth has started and the child possesses some conscious will. To make it the basis of intellectual growth, as was evidently intended in the national schools, has never been a success; for it ought not to be directed at the understanding and logical faculties, but at the mystical intuitions of the soul, and, if it is begun too early, it has a confusing effect on the development of the mental faculties. Even the missionary who wishes to achieve real results tries to educate his pupils by work and secular instruction before he attempts to impart to them subtle religious ideas. Yet every Saturday the appointed passages of Scripture (the Pericopes) are explained to six-year-old children. Religious instruction proper ought to begin in the middle standard. Up to that point the teacher should be content, from the religious standpoint, to work on the child's imagination and feelings with the simplest ideas of the Deity, but in other respects to endeavour to awaken and encourage the intellectual life, and make it able to grasp loftier conceptions. The national school stands in total contradiction to this intellectual development. This is in conformity to regulations, for the same children who read the Bible independently are only to be led to "an approximate comprehension of those phenomena which are daily around them." In the course of eight years they learn a smattering of reading, writing, and ciphering.[A] It is significant of the knowledge of our national history which the school imparts that out of sixty-three recruits of one company to whom the question was put who Bismarck was, not a single one could answer. That the scholars acquire even a general idea of their duties to the country and the State is quite out of the question. It is impossible to rouse the affection and fancy of the children by instruction in history, because the two sexes are taught in common. One thing appeals to the heart of boys, another to those of girls; and, although I consider it important that patriotic feelings should be inculcated among girls, since as mothers they will transmit them to the family, still the girls must be influenced in a different way from the boys. When the instruction is common to both, the treatment of the subject by the teacher remains neutral and colourless. It is quite incomprehensible how such great results are expected in the religious field when so little has been achieved in every other field. This pedantic school has wandered far indeed from the ideal that Frederick the Great set up. He declared that the duty of the State was "to educate the young generation to independent thinking and self-devoted love of country." [Footnote A: Recently a boy was discharged from a well-known national school as an exceptionally good scholar, and was sent as well qualified to the office of a Head Forester. He showed that he could not copy correctly, to say nothing of writing by himself.] Our national school of to-day needs, then, searching and thorough reform if it is to be a preparatory school, not only for military education, but for life generally. It sends children out into the world with undeveloped reasoning faculties, and equipped with the barest elements of knowledge, and thus makes them not only void of self-reliance, but easy victims of all the corrupting influences of social life. As a matter of fact, the mind and reasoning faculties of the national schoolboy are developed for the first time by his course of instruction as a recruit. It is obviously not my business to indicate the paths to such a reform. I will only suggest the points which seem to me the most important from the standpoint of a citizen and a soldier. First and foremost, the instruction must be more individual. The number of teachers, accordingly, must be increased, and that of scholars diminished. It is worth while considering in this connection the feasibility of beginning school instruction at the age of eight years. Then all teaching must be directed, more than at present, to the object of developing the children's minds, and formal religious instruction should only begin in due harmony with intellectual progress. Finally, the _Realien,_ especially the history of our own country, should claim more attention, and patriotic feelings should be encouraged in every way; while in religious instruction the moral influence of religion should be more prominent than the formal contents. The training of the national school teacher must be placed on a new basis. At present it absolutely corresponds to the one-sided and limited standpoint of the school itself, and does not enable the teachers to develop the minds and feelings of their pupils. It must be reckoned a distinct disadvantage for the upgrowing generation that all instruction ends at the age of fourteen, so that, precisely at the period of development in which the reasoning powers are forming, the children are thrown back on themselves and on any chance influences. In the interval between school life and military service the young people not only forget all that they learnt, perhaps with aptitude, in the national school, but they unthinkingly adopt distorted views of life, and in many ways become brutalized from a lack of counteracting ideals. A compulsory continuation school is therefore an absolute necessity of the age. It is also urgently required from the military standpoint. Such a school, to be fruitful in results, must endeavour, not only to prevent the scholar from forgetting what he once learnt, and to qualify him for a special branch of work, but, above all, to develop his patriotism and sense of citizenship. To do this, it is necessary to explain to him the relation of the State to the individual, and to explain, by reference to our national history, how the individual can only prosper by devotion to the State. The duties of the individual to the State should be placed in the foreground. This instruction must be inspired by the spirit which animated Schleiermacher's sermons in the blackest hour of Prussia, and culminated in the doctrine that all the value of the man lies in the strength and purity of his will, in his free devotion to the great whole; that property and life are only trusts, which must be employed for higher ideals; that the mind, which thinks only of itself, perishes in feeble susceptibility, but that true moral worth grows up only in the love for the fatherland and for the State, which is a haven for every faith, and a home of justice and honourable freedom of purpose. Only if national education works in this sense will it train up men to fill our armies who have been adequately prepared for the school of arms, and bring with them the true soldierly spirit from which great deeds spring. What can be effected by the spirit of a nation we have learnt from the history of the War of Liberation, that never-failing source of patriotic sentiment, which should form the backbone and centre of history-teaching in the national and the continuation schools. We can study it also by an example from most recent history, in the Russo-Japanese War. "The education of the whole Japanese people, beginning at home and continued at school, was based on a patriotic and warlike spirit. That education, combined with the rapidly acquired successes in culture and warfare, aroused in the Japanese a marvellous confidence in their own strength. They served with pride in the ranks of the army, and dreamed of heroic deeds.... All the thoughts of the nation were turned towards the coming struggle, while in the course of several years they had spent their last farthing in the creation of a powerful army and a strong fleet."[B] This was the spirit that led the Japanese to victory. "The day when the young Japanese enlisted was observed as a festival in his family."[B] In Russia, on the contrary, the idea was preached and disseminated that "Patriotism was an obsolete notion," "war was a crime and an anachronism," that "warlike deeds deserved no notice, the army was the greatest bar to progress, and military service a dishonourable trade."[B] Thus the Russian army marched to battle without any enthusiasm, or even any comprehension of the momentous importance of the great racial war, "not of free will, but from necessity." Already eaten up by the spirit of revolution and unpatriotic selfishness, without energy or initiative, a mechanical tool in the hand of uninspired leaders, it tamely let itself be beaten by a weaker opponent. [Footnote B: "The Work of the Russian General Staff," from the Russian by Freiheu v. Tettau.] I have examined these conditions closely because I attach great importance to the national school and the continuation school as a means to the military education of our people. I am convinced that only the army of a warlike and patriotic people can achieve anything really great. I understand, of course, that the school alone, however high its efficiency, could not develop that spirit in our people which we, in view of our great task in the future, must try to awaken by every means if we wish to accomplish something great. The direct influence of school ends when the young generation begins life, and its effect must at first make itself felt very gradually. Later generations will reap the fruits of its sowing. Its efficiency must be aided by other influences which will not only touch the young men now living, but persist throughout their lives. Now, there are two means available which can work upon public opinion and on the spiritual and moral education of the nation; one is the Press, the other is a policy of action. If the Government wishes to win a proper influence over the people, not in order to secure a narrow-spirited support of its momentary policy, but to further its great political, social, and moral duties, it must control a strong and national Press, through which it must present its views and aims vigorously and openly. The Government will never be able to count upon a well-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or necessity, if it calmly looks on while the warlike spirit is being systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policy preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the same note, and continually to emphasize the maintenance of peace as the object of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a military spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an imperial policy. It must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war as an indispensable agent in policy and civilization, together with the duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country. A parliamentary Government, which always represents merely a temporary majority, may leave the party Press to defend and back its views; but a Government like the German, which traces its justification to the fact that it is superior to all parties, cannot act thus. Its point of view does not coincide with that of any party; it adopts a middle course, conscious that it is watching the welfare of the whole community. It must therefore represent its attitude, on general issues as well as on particular points, independently, and must endeavour to make its aims as widely understood as possible. I regard it, therefore, as one of the most important duties of a Government like ours to use the Press freely and wisely for the enlightenment of the people. I do not mean that a few large political journals should, in the interests of the moment, be well supplied with news, but that the views of the Government should find comprehensive expression in the local Press. It would be an advantage, in my opinion, were all newspapers compelled to print certain announcements of the Government, in order that the reader might not have such a one-sided account of public affairs as the party Press supplies. It would be a measure of public moral and intellectual hygiene, as justifiable as compulsory regulations in the interests of public health. Epidemics of ideas and opinions are in our old Europe more dangerous and damaging than bodily illnesses, and it is the duty of the State to preserve the moral healthiness of the nation. More important, perhaps, than teaching and enlightenment by the Press is the _propaganda of action._ Nothing controls the spirit of the multitude so effectually as energetic, deliberate, and successful action conceived in a broad-minded, statesmanlike sense. Such education by a powerful policy is an absolute necessity for the German people. This nation possesses an excess of vigour, enterprise, idealism, and spiritual energy, which qualifies it for the highest place; but a malignant fairy laid on its cradle the most petty theoretical dogmatism. In addition to this, an unhappy historical development which shattered the national and religious unity of the nation created in the system of small States and in confessionalism a fertile soil for the natural tendency to particularism, on which it flourished luxuriantly as soon as the nation was no longer inspired with great and unifying thoughts. Yet the heart of this people can always be won for great and noble aims, even though such aims can only be attended by danger. We must not be misled in this respect by the Press, which often represents a most one-sided, self-interested view, and sometimes follows international or even Anti-German lines rather than national. The soul of our nation is not reflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on the necessity of upholding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness. On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among the Powers and for manly action fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance, every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their forces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again and again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the clamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits with him. He is no true statesman who does not reckon with these factors of national psychology; Bismarck possessed this art, and used k with a master-hand. True, he found ready to hand one idea which was common to all--the sincere wish for German unification and the German Empire; but the German nation, in its dissensions, did not know the ways which lead to the realization of this idea. Only under compulsion and after a hard struggle did it enter on the road of success; but the whole nation was fired with high enthusiasm when it finally recognized the goal to which the great statesman was so surely leading it. Success was the foundation on which Bismarck built up the mighty fabric of the German Empire. Even in the years of peace he understood how to rivet the imagination of the people by an ambitious and active policy, and how, in spite of all opposition, to gain over the masses to his views, and make them serve his own great aims. He, too, made mistakes as man and as politician, and the motto _Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto_ holds good of him; but in its broad features his policy was always imperial and of world-wide scope, and he never lost sight of the principle that no statesman can permanently achieve great results unless he commands the soul of his people. This knowledge he shared with all the great men of our past, with the Great Elector, Frederick the Incomparable, Scharnhorst and Blücher; for even that hoary marshal was a political force, the embodiment of a political idea, which, to be sure, did not come into the foreground at the Congress of Vienna. The statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all things recognize this one fact--that success is necessary to gain influence over the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained by continually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting its interest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions. Such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation to great military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards high aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to prepare their minds to it: "The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims." We may learn something from Japan on this head. Her eyes were fixed on the loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerous duties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of the whole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation of warriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material for the army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices. We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization to perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only fulfil it by the sword. Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military duty? Such a counsel is only for those who lack all feeling for the strength and honour of the German people. CHAPTER XIV FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR From the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows that the political conduct of the State, while affecting the mental attitude of the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on the preparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself. But, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual and moral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the military authorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, still further demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance of the State. In the first place, financial preparations for war must be made, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; the national finances must be so treated that the State can bear the tremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. Further, as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort of mobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insure under all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for the material and industrial needs of the country. Finally, preparations for war must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be made to bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far as possible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come. If that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, in whom confidence can be reposed should war break out. I am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on the commercial and financial side of the question. In the sphere of commercial policy especially I cannot even suggest the way in which the desired end can be obtained. Joint action on the part of the Government and the great import houses would seem to be indicated. As regards finance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one may go so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the national household in order, but to maintain the credit of the State, so that, on the outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of money required for carrying it on without too onerous conditions. The credit of State depends essentially on a regulated financial economy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by the current incomings. Other factors are the national wealth, the indebtedness of the State, and, lastly, the confidence in its productive and military capabilities. As regards the first point, I have already pointed out that in a great civilized World State the balancing of the accounts must never be brought about in the petty-State fashion by striking out expenditure for necessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the military forces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory general progress. The incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportion to the real needs. But, especially in a State which is so wholly based on war as the German Empire, the old manly principle of keeping all our forces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to the effeminate philosophy of the day. Fichte taught us that there is only one virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only one vice--to think of self. Ultimately the State is the transmitter of all culture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of the individual for itself.[A] These ideas, which led us out of the deepest gloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at an epoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years of the last century. The peace-loving contentment which then prevailed in Prussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways large sections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on the Government. Among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line of demarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nations contested the sole possession of the world," nobody gave any thought to the great change of times. In the same way many Germans to-day look contentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shut their eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great duties imposed upon us by it. Even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrial pride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which in our history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacity and energy."[B] [Footnote A: Treitschke.] [Footnote: B Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte."] Under conditions like the present the State is not only entitled, but is bound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens, since it is vital questions that are at stake. It is equally important, however, to foster by every available means the growth of the national property, and thus to improve the financial capabilities. This property is to a certain extent determined by the natural productiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. But these possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labour of all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced. Here, then, the State can profitably step in. It can protect and secure labour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labour conditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports by concluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitate German trade by vigorous political representation of German interests abroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profits from international commerce;[C] it can increase agricultural production by energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitable protective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent on foreign countries for our food. The encouragement of deep-sea fishery would add to this.[D] [Footnote: C England earns some 70 millions sterling by international commerce, Germany about 15 millions sterling.] [Footnote D: We buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish from foreign countries.] From the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increase permanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of the annual increase in population the home requirements may for some time be met to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. Home production now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95 per cent, of the meat required. To maintain this proportion, the production in the next ten years must be increased by at most two double-centners per Hectare, which is quite possible if it is considered that the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by two million tons. A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The less we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards, [E] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the State will improve. [Footnote E: We obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476,400 tons of cotton, 185,300 tons of wool, 8,500,000 tons of iron, 124,000 tons of copper, etc.] If the State can thus contribute directly to the increase of national productions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after the reduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financial position. But payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, a two-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays. The gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may very easily be lost again on the other. Even from the financial aspect it is a bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order to improve the financial position. The experiences of history leave no doubt on that point. Military power is the strongest pillar of a nation's credit. If it is weakened, financial security at once is shaken. A disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the State creditors may easily become losers by it. But a State whose army holds out prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers its creditors far better security than a weaker military power. If our credit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatened political position is chiefly to blame. If we chose to neglect our army and navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possible liquidation of our debt. We have a twofold duty before us: first to improve our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and to keep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go. The question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task. It is inconceivable that the German people has reached the limits of possible taxation. The taxes of Prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and 1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from 20.62 marks to 32.25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the same proportion may hold in the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there is a huge increase in the national wealth. This amounts, in the German Empire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5,000 to 6,000 marks per head of the population. In France the wealth, calculated on the same basis, is no higher, and yet in France annually 20 marks, in Germany only 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army and navy. In England, on the contrary, where the average wealth of the individual is some 1,000 marks higher than in Germany and France, the outlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. Thus our most probable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for their armaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal danger politically. Attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increase of wealth in Germany continues to be on an ascending scale. Trades and industries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw a setback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again. The advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of the Empire, is extraordinary. "The total of imports and exports has increased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in the year 1908, or by 232 per cent., and in value from 6 milliards to 14 1/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. Of these, the value of the imports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of the exports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards.... The value of the import of raw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in 1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export of such raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The import of made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 a value of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export of manufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. The value of the import of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3 milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of food remained at about the same figure. The mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension in Germany during the last thirty years. The amount of coal raised amounted in 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2 million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The quantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in 1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35 million to 170 million marks. The output of iron-ore has increased from 6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119 million marks.... From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany has increased by 127 per cent.; in England only by about 59 per cent. The raw iron obtained has increased in Germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172 per cent.; in England there is a rise of 27 per cent. only.[F] [Footnote F: Professor Dr. Wade, Berlin.] Similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. The financial position of the Empire has considerably improved since the Imperial Finance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the Budget may very soon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent. It was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growth of revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressive capitalization. Such a fact has been the case, and to a very marked extent. From the year 1892-1905 in Prussia alone an increase of national wealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. The number of taxpayers and of property in the Property Tax class of 6,000 to 100,000 marks has in Prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent., from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent.; in the first period, therefore, by 2 per cent., in the last years by 3 per cent. annually. In these classes, therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greater proportion in the large fortunes. In the Property Tax class of 100,000 to 500,000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent.--i.e., on an average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. annually, while in the last three years it has been 4.6 per cent. In the class of 500,000 marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 per cent. in the taxpayers and 67 per cent. in the property; and, while in the fourteen years the increase is on an average 4.5 per cent. annually, it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8.6 per cent. This means per head of the population in the schedule of 6,000 to 100,000 marks an increase of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100,000 to 500,000 marks an increase per head of 6,400 marks, and in the schedule of 500,000 marks and upwards an increase of 70,480 marks per head and per year. We see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable and annually increasing growth, which the Prussian Finance Minister has estimated for Prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next three years, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole Empire 5 milliards yearly in the same period. Wages have risen everywhere. To give some instances, I will mention that among the workmen at Krupp's factory at Essen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent., the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent., and the annual earnings in the Dortmund district of the chief mining office from 1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. This increase in earnings is also shown by the fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 has reached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower and poorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvement in prosperity is perceptible. It can also be regarded as a sign of a healthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemployment are considerably diminished in Germany. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants left our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen's unions, only 4.4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas in the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain and 10 per cent. (in France it was as much as 11.4 per cent.) of members of workmen's unions were unemployed. Against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large national debt, both in the Empire and in the separate States. The German Empire in the year 1910 had 5,016,655,500 marks debt, and in addition the national debt of the separate States on April 1, 1910, reached in-- Marks Prussia 9,421,770,800 Bavaria 2,165,942,900 Saxony 893,042,600 Würtemberg 606,042,800 Baden 557,859,000 Hesse 428,664,400 Alsace-Lorraine 31,758,100 Hamburg 684,891,200 Lübeck 666,888,400 Bremen 263,431,400 Against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains, forests, mines, and railways. The stock capital of the State railways reached, on March 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in-- Marks, Prussia (Hesse) 9,888 Bavaria 1,694 Saxony 1,035 Würtemburg 685 Baden 727 Alsace-Lorraine 724 --a grand total, including the smaller State systems, of 15,062 milliard marks. This sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of 1911 for Prussia alone 11,050 milliards. Nevertheless, the national debts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageously because these debts are almost all contracted in the country, and presses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly in debt. The debt of the Prussian towns and country communes of 10,000 inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3,000 million marks, in the whole Empire to some 5,000 million marks. This means that interest yearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that many communes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions, are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, or even 400 per cent. The taxes also are not at all equally distributed according to capacity to pay them. The main burden rests on the middle class; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. Some sources of wealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculative income not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations on the Stock Exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted into property. Nevertheless, the German nation is quite in a position to pay for the military preparations, which it certainly requires for the protection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization, so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and the opposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles on the altar of patriotism. The dispute about the so-called Imperial Finance reform has shown how party interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it was not pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to his neighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financial sacrifices. It must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will be made in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. But a considerable and rapid rise of the Imperial revenue is required if we wish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future of our country without a blow. Under these conditions I see no other effectual measure but the speedy introduction of the _Reichserbrecht_ (Imperial right of succession), in order to satisfy the urgent necessity. This source of revenue would oppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and would furnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and to diminish our burden of debt. If the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters, depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if they could only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in their favour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the State stepped in as heir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation based on official material, could be counted upon. This is not the place to examine this calculation more closely. Even if it is put at too high a figure, which I doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very large under any circumstances. Since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--that is to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in the nature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the first instance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially to paying off debts. Otherwise there would be the danger of acting like a private gentleman who lives on his capital. This idea is also to be recommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liable to fluctuations. It would be advisable to devote the proceeds principally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishing the debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremely important. This fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibility that in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to other important purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments on land and sea. There are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may be urged against this right of the State or the Empire to inherit. It is argued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth, that the State would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in course of time capital would be united in the hand of the State, that the independent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus the ideal of Socialism would be realized. Secondly, the requirement that relations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will, is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "According to our prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of his fortune must do some positive act. He must make a will, in which he bequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or to any other object. It is thus brought before his mind that his natural heirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if he wishes to exclude his legal heirs. It is impressed upon him that he is interfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things, that he is wilfully altering it. The Imperial right of succession is based on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individual than his family. This is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait. The socialistic State, which deals with a society made up of atoms, in which every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all are alike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim of this sort."[F] [Footnote F: Bolko v. Katte, in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of November 18, 1910.] Both objections are unconvincing. So long as the State uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order to liquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be met otherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the State is directly beneficial to all members of the State, because they have to pay less taxes. Legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital in the hands of the State, since, if such results followed, this right of succession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of the State be prevented in other ways. The science of finance could unquestionably arrange that. There is no necessity to push the scheme to its extreme logical conclusion. The so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. If a true sense of family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make a will, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. If such ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right of certain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloof in life. Indeed, the Crown's right of inheritance would produce probably the result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family ties would actually be strengthened. The "primitive German sense of law," which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, and is summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individual than the State, has so far borne the most mischievous results. It is the root from which the disruption of Germany, the particularism and the defective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. It is well that in the coming generation some check on this movement should be found, and that the significance of the State for the individual, no less than for the family, should be thoroughly understood. These more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weighty enough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this Imperial right of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid help and the whole future of Germany is at stake. If, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equally large revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such a law of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit our sorely-pressed country. Help is urgently needed, and there would be good prospects of such law being passed in the Reichstag if the Government does not disguise the true state of the political position. Political preparations are not less essential than financial. We see that all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves against the attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, and are winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. Efforts are also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so as to have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on which England has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her world policy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has built up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and has secured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitious careers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this English policy. We must realize to ourselves that it is guided exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill. There must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangements have only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacit reservation. Every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sic stantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contracting party, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are really benefited. This is a political principle that cannot be disputed. Nothing can compel a State to act counter to its own interests, on which those of its citizens depend. This consideration, however, imposes on the honest State the obligation of acting with the utmost caution when concluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, so as to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. Conditions may arise which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. The country's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethical sense--must then turn the scale. "Frederick the Great was all his life long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could ever induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."[A] The great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ or alliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only if he is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such an arrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. Such an alliance is, as I have shown in another place, the Austro-German. The two States, from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in the happiest way complements of each other. The German theatre of war in the east will be protected by Austria from any attempt to turn our flank on the south, while we can guard the northern frontier of Austria and outflank any Russian attack on Galicia. Alliances in which each contracting party has different interests will never hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent a permanent political system. "There is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded as effective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocal interests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and the other gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation." These are the words of Frederick the Great, our foremost political teacher _pace_ Bismarck. We must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, but must look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probable attitude of the other States by reference to their own interests. Bismarck tells us that "Illusions are the greatest danger to the diplomatist. He must take for granted that the other, like himself, seeks nothing but his own advantage." It will prove waste labour to attempt to force a great State by diplomatic arrangements to actions or an attitude which oppose its real interests. When a crisis arises, the weight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale. When Napoleon III. planned war against Prussia, he tried to effect an alliance with Austria and Italy, and Archduke Albert was actually in Paris to conclude the military negotiations.[B] These probably were going on, as the French General Lebrun was in Vienna on the same errand. Both countries left France in the lurch so soon as the first Prussian flag flew victoriously on the heights of the Geisberg. A statesman less biassed than Napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither Austria nor Italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a war under unfavourable conditions. [Footnote B: When Colonel Stoffel, the well-known French Military Attaché in Berlin, returned to Paris, and was received by the Emperor, and pointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection of Prussia's war preparations, the Emperor declared that he was better informed. He proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on the conditions of the Prussian army apparently sent to him by Archduke Albert, which came to quite different conclusions. The Emperor had made the facts therein stated the basis of his political and military calculations. (Communications of Colonel Stoffel to the former Minister of War, v. Verdy, who put them at the service of the author.)] France, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests, unscrupulously brushed aside the Conventions of Algeciras, which did not satisfy her. She will equally disregard all further diplomatic arrangements intended to safeguard Germany's commercial interests in Morocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly her interest to be undisputed master in Morocco and to exploit that country for herself. France, when she no longer fears the German arms, will not allow any official document in the world to guarantee German commerce and German enterprise any scope in Morocco; and from the French standpoint she is right. The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its own interests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the different Great Powers must be judged by that standard. There is no doubt, however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the political grouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possible only by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the State with which closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to its opponents. A policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but to further the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyone and of being left isolated in the hour of danger. A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking chances and facing risks. It must be conscious of its goal, and keep this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above all things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and take bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility of realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under favourable conditions. "The great art of policy," writes Frederick the Great, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events to one's own profit. It consists rather in deriving advantage from favourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures." Even in his Rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adhered all his life: "Wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; but boldness alone can acquire." "I give you a problem to solve," he said to his councillors when the death of Emperor Charles VI. was announced. "When you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?" Definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correct summing up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurate estimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of the interests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, and daring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great laws of political and military success. The political preparation for war is included in them. He who is blinded by the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be able to make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success. "The braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claim which swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity which shelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were more despised than by the great Prussian King," so H. v. Treitschke tells us. "Old Fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us with remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss the golden opportunity. It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatize that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist policy. That title can only be given to the policy which sets up personal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the real current of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures, as Napoleon did in Mexico, and Italy in Abyssinia. A policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing these great duties of the State, which are an historical legacy and are based on the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with the possibility of a war. This is at once apparent if one considers the result to the State when war is forced on it under disadvantageous circumstances. I need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastrophe to which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led. In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japan had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Her policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment of her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. She had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to place sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover, compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of the Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field against Japan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparations required by the political position had been made, although the conflict had long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrous retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is no doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the campaign by the offensive. England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to her aims or suited to give weight to political demands. Two points stand out clearly from this consideration. First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and political preparations for war. Proper political preparations for war are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing which he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must be developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. The obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister and the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with the all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs, and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military situation is peculiarly favourable. At the same time the Minister who conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by war. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the opponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy of compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one, but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to end in political and moral defeat. The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always creates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory, tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy, which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts favourably on the military situation. In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution join hands. If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion: the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions are to be created for the inevitably threatening war. So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was comparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of various strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive action on both sides. To-day the situation is different. We must consider England, as well as France and Russia. We must expect not only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing of English forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutch neutrality by our enemies. It is also not inconceivable that England may land troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into war with us. It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in a position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and south-east frontiers. An attack by France through Switzerland is also increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of the European States is effected. Finally, we should be seriously menaced in the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet. All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the military aspect. The military situation thus created is very unfavourable. If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the army on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet the situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure, and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must count. The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one also. A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and all necessary steps could be considered. Until that moment the troops of the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. On the same principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many different lines of march as possible. Previous arrangements for unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the most various political prospects. We should in any case be forced to adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent an invasion by one or other of our enemies. No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good prospects of success. The very bravest army must succumb if led against a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. A military investigation of the situation shows that a plan of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents, under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, and has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind. The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. On this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face. Of course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. If we attacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help, and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy to fight. Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral. This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows. If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England, that both these States would feel themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are offered both in Africa and in Europe, and anyone who has attentively studied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself on this point. In opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that we should wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force of circumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now to struggle hard for. Unfortunately such politicians always forget to state clearly and definitely what facts are really working in their own interests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. Such political wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solid foundation. We must reckon with the definitely given conditions, and realize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to great results. It is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps and measures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure a favourable political situation should the pending questions so momentous to Germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. This requires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomatic position which I do not possess. One thing only can be justly said: Beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we must keep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance as time goes on. Italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquire settlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487,000 persons emigrated from Italy in 1908), can never combine with France and England to fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in the Mediterranean, since both these States themselves claim this place. The effort to break up the Triple Alliance has momentarily favoured the Italian policy of expansion. But this incident does not alter in the least the fact that the true interest of Italy demands adherence to the Triple Alliance, which alone can procure her Tunis and Biserta. The importance of these considerations will continue to be felt. Turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with England, France, and Russia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation of present-day Turkey. Islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies in England and Russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join the Central European Alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunder of abandoning her in Morocco. There is no true community of interests between Russia and England; in Central Asia, in Persia, as in the Mediterranean, their ambitions clash in spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in Japan and China is forcing on a crisis which is vital to Russian interests and to some degree ties her hands. All these matters open out a wide vista to German statesmanship, if it is equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy than recent political events seemed to indicate. And, then, our policy can count on a factor of strength such as no other State possesses--on an army whose military efficiency, I am convinced, cannot be sufficiently valued. Not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. We have amply shown the contrary. But the spirit which animates the troops, the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongst them, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they are soon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world, provided only that they are led with skill and determination. The German nation, too--of this I am equally convinced--will rise to the height of its great duty. A mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps in its soul. Whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of this people, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes a worthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people on in united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and will achieve a truly magnificent result. In the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces, and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger, our Government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future; but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of Germany unless it wins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto the brave words of Goethe: "Bid defiance to every power! Ever valiant, never cower! To the brave soldier open flies The golden gate of Paradise." EPILOGUE After I had practically finished the preceding pages, the Franco-German convention as to Morocco and the Congo Compensation were published; the Turko-Italian War broke out; the revolution in China assumed dimensions which point to the probability of new disorders in Eastern Asia; and, lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale,_ but a real offensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between France and England. Such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanently between the two States, but clearly every possibility of war has been foreseen and provided for. I have been able to insert all the needful references to the two first occurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on the Anglo-French conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks. The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed, have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a collision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished this object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was determined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can the attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered correct. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain was resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations for war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained the concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will wait until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and Russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it can actively support the Rhine army. This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government, but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined, that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes. It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in obtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the possession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained can never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were compelled to abandon. I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from this precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be no doubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possession for France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish _enclave_ cannot be obtained. The access to the Ubangi and the Congo has at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case of war with us by a few companies of Senegalese. It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial arrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way for a better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot be assumed that France will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she has carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a moment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely because she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a desolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea, in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not, therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect, the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France. The acquisition of territory in the Congo region means at first an actual loss of power to Germany; it can only be made useful by the expenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawn from our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position. But, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, not merely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, but primarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in its entirety. From this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangement means a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainly surrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold the sovereignty of Morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violent infraction of the Algeciras convention by France, although we had weighty interests at stake. If in the text of the Morocco treaty such action was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus the notion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, such explanation is tantamount to a complete change of front. An additional political disadvantage is that our relations with Islam have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. I cannot, of course, judge whether our diplomatic relations with Turkey have suffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige in the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance for us. It is also a reasonable assumption that the Morocco convention precipitated the action of Italy in Tripoli, and thus shook profoundly the solidity of the Triple Alliance. The increase of power which France obtained through the acquisition of Morocco made the Italians realize the importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in the Mediterranean. The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep rift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and the mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the Press and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the better has followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the great disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the critical times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to ride the storm. The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to war removes all further doubt on this point. The existence of such relations between England and France confirms the view of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in the various chapters of this book. They show that we are confronted by a firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder any further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they have done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance, and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left no doubt on this point.[A] [Footnote A: Cf. speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911.] The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead in the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressive intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with England. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not altered by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new acquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every new colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They form objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clear commentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that once more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates. In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a _rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success. If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide that the hour of attack has come. We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down. All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to represent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of the people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to military and political success, without carrying still further the disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any conventional scruples distract it from this object. Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of sufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situation calls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it to the happy goal. The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever. England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of her interests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanelles question, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts of her colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in Great Britain. Attention has already been called to the significance and difficulty of her relations with North America. France also has considerable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, before it can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East will probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted German policy can utilize in order to influence the general political situation in the interests of our Fatherland. If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the future of our country and our State, we can face approaching events with confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God: "From the height of the starry sky May thy ringing sword flash bright; Let every craven cry Be silenced by thy might!" 
37470	----	produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive.) THE GREAT WAR IN ENGLAND IN 1897 _First Edition_ _July 1894._ _Second Edition_ _July 1894._ _Edition de Luxe_ _July 1894._ _Third Edition_ _August 1894._ _Fourth Edition_ _August 1894._ _Fifth Edition_ _September 1894._ _Sixth Edition_ _October 1894._ _Seventh Edition_ _November 1894._ _Eighth Edition_ _December 1894._ [Illustration: BOMBARDMENT OF LONDON: "IN LUDGATE HILL THE SCENE WAS AWFUL."] THE GREAT WAR IN ENGLAND IN 1897 BY WILLIAM LE QUEUX, F.R.G.S. AUTHOR OF "GUILTY BONDS" "STRANGE TALES OF A NIHILIST" "CONDEMNED TO SILENCE" "THE STOLEN SOUL" ETC. _ILLUSTRATED BY CAPTAIN CYRIL FIELD, R.M.L.I. AND T. S. C. CROWTHER_ ELEVENTH EDITION LONDON TOWER PUBLISHING COMPANY LIMITED 95, MINORIES, E.C. 1895 [_All Rights Reserved_] TO MY FRIEND ALFRED CHARLES HARMSWORTH A GENEROUS EDITOR AND PATRIOTIC ENGLISHMAN I INSCRIBE THIS FORECAST OF THE COMING WAR PREFACE TO NINTH EDITION In writing this book it was my endeavour to bring vividly before the public the national dangers by which we are surrounded, and the absolute necessity which lies upon England to maintain her defences in an adequate state of efficiency. That my effort has been successful, is proved alike by the fact that eight editions of the work have already been exhausted, and by the commendatory and highly gratifying terms in which it has been criticised by prominent statesmen and leading naval and military experts, including the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. Some professional critics have, it is true, questioned certain prophetic details concerning naval warfare, but I think the best possible answer to them is furnished by the results of recent battles in Chinese waters, which, it is admitted, present to us very serious object-lessons. A few passages I have revised in order to bring the events more thoroughly up to date, and in sending my forecast forth again it is accompanied by a devout hope that ere it be too late our present insecurity will be remedied, that a national disaster may thus be prevented, and that England may ever retain her supremacy upon the sea. WILLIAM LE QUEUX. LONDON, _March_ 1895. CRITICISM BY LORD ROBERTS UNITED SERVICE CLUB, PALL MALL, W. DEAR SIR,--I have read with considerable interest your vivid account of the dangers to which the loss of our naval supremacy may be expected to expose us, and the means by which you think we should be able to extricate ourselves from those dangers. I hardly like to criticise a work which, to be effective, must to a great extent be imaginative, but on one or two points I would venture to offer a few remarks:-- _First_, You refer to the assistance the Home Army might receive from India and the Colonies. I feel confident that in such an emergency as you portray, the Colonies and Dependencies of the Empire would be most anxious to assist the Mother Country; but unless our sea power were assured, it appears to me that they would be unable to do so. Until our command of the sea had been regained, we should be powerless to move a soldier either from or to the United Kingdom. _Secondly_, You very properly lay stress on the part which might be taken by the Volunteers in the defence of the United Kingdom. No one can appreciate more fully than I do the gallant and patriotic spirit which animates the Volunteer Force, and I most thoroughly agree with you as to the value it might be under such serious circumstances as you depict. In fact, the _raison d'être_ of the Force is to be able to defend the country in the event of an invasion. But to enable our Volunteers to do all that is expected of them, they must be made thoroughly efficient. Much has been done of late years to this end, but much more is required before our citizen soldiers can be depended upon to hold their own against foreign troops whose training is continually being carried on, and whose organisation is believed to be nearly perfect. It is very penny-wise and pound-foolish of us not to do all in our power to render the Volunteers the serviceable body they might be. _Thirdly_, You take but little account of the Militia, which the Duke of Wellington considered to be our mainstay in the event of a threatened invasion. The Militia would seem to be rather out of fashion at present, but still it is a very useful force, which only needs encouragement and development to convert it into a reliable fighting body, capable of reinforcing and co-operating with our small regular Army. You will gather from what I have said that, under the conditions specified by you, I should be inclined to regard your forecast of the result of the supposed conflict as being unduly favourable. I can only add that I trust such conditions may never arise, and that your estimate of the means immediately available for repelling foreign attack may be more correct than my own.--Believe me, yours very truly, ROBERTS. PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. GENERAL LORD ROBERTS, V.C., on reading this forecast of the Coming War, wrote as follows:-- Grove Park, Kingsbury, Middlesex, March 26, 1894. DEAR SIR,--I entirely concur with you in thinking it most desirable to bring home to the British public in every possible way the dangers to which the nation is exposed, unless it maintains a Navy and Army sufficiently strong and well organised to meet the defensive requirements of the Empire.--Believe me, yours faithfully, [Illustration: Signature of Roberts] Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley, K.P., in his _Life of Marlborough_, speaks plainly when he says-- The last battle fought in England was fought to secure James his crown. If through the folly and parsimony of our people we should ever see another, it will be fought in defence of London. The struggle will be, not for a dynasty, but for our own very existence as an independent nation. Are we prepared to meet it? The politician says Yes; the soldier and the sailor say No. Such outspoken expressions of opinion from two of our chief military authorities should cause the British public to pause and reflect. On all hands it is admitted by both naval and military experts, that, notwithstanding the increase of our Navy by the Spencer programme, our country is inadequately defended and totally unprepared for war. The extraordinary preparations now going forward in France and Russia are being made in view of an attack upon England, and it is ominous that the downfall of our Empire is a perpetual subject of discussion in the Paris press. Although a Briton, I have lived long enough in France to know that the French, while hating the Germans, despise the English, and are looking forward to a day not far hence when their battleships will bombard our south coast towns, and their legions advance over the Surrey Hills to London. When the Great War does come, it will come swiftly, and without warning. We are accustomed to scoff at the idea of an invasion of Britain. We feel secure in our sea-girt island home; we have confidence in our brave sailor defenders, in our gallant Army, and our enthusiastic Volunteers, and we entertain a supreme contempt for "mere foreigners." It is this national egotism, this insular conviction that foreign engines of war are inferior to our own, that may cause our ruin. Everything we possess, everything we hold dear, our position among nations, our very life, depends for its safety, firstly, upon the undoubted predominance of our Navy over any likely or possible combination of the Navies of Continental Powers; and, secondly, upon an Army properly equipped and ready to take the field on receipt of the momentous word "Mobilise"! Is our Navy, even strengthened by the recent programme, in a sufficiently efficient state to retain the supremacy of the seas? Let us face the situation boldly, and allow a well-known and distinguished officer to reply to that question. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thomas Symonds, G.C.B., writing to me, says-- Our weak Navy, with its inefficient _personnel_, has now to perform an enormously increased duty, such as defending increased commerce, food, and coals. Our guns are the worst in the world in forty-seven vessels, mounting 350 muzzleloaders, where the French and all foreign Navies use _only breechloaders_. Dimensions, expense, and very many other reasons are given for this ruinous custom, but all other Navies mount breechloaders on vessels of the same dimensions as our own. As to expenses, such economy (so-called) means the most execrable parsimony--to ruthlessly murder men and disgrace our flag and Navy. Our forty-seven feeble vessels, weak in armament, and all composing them, reduce our Navy to comparative insignificance, and are a preparation for disgrace and ruin when at war. Yet we are content to sit idly by, confident in a strength which two foreign Powers are slowly but surely undermining! Russia and France, both barely able to sustain their gigantic Armies, are to-day straining every nerve to enlarge their naval forces, preparatory to a swift descent upon our shores. This alarming fact we wilfully disregard, affecting to find humour in the Franco-Muscovite preparations. Thus, unless we maintain a Navy of sufficient strength to prevent invasion, War, with its attendant horrors, is inevitable, and the scene of battle will be England's smiling fields. Turning to our Army, what do we find? Even the civilian writer who studies it is amazed at the muddle of insufficiency in which it is steeped. Our Home Defence Scheme is a very elaborate paper problem, but as our forces have never been mobilised, its many glaring defects must, alas! remain unremedied until our highways echo to the tramp of an enemy. Upon this point a volume might be written, but a few plain facts must suffice. Military experts will, I think, agree when I assert that the 2nd Corps, as planned by this grotesque scheme, does not and cannot exist; and while the 3rd Corps may possibly stand as regards infantry, because its infantry are all Militia, yet it will have neither Regular cavalry nor guns. Every one of the staffs is a myth, and the equipment and commissariat arrangements are a complete guarantee of collapse at the outset of mobilisation. What, for instance, can be said of a system in which one unit of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade "mobilises," and obtains its "personal" and part of its "regimental" equipment at Plymouth; the other part of its regimental paraphernalia, including munitions, at Aldershot; and its horses--at Dublin? Practically, half our cavalry at home are to-day, however, incapable of mobilisation, for, according to the latest return available, I find that over six thousand cavalry men have no horses! Again, the Volunteers, upon whom we must depend for the defence of London, have no transport, and the ammunition columns for the 3rd Army Corps and the Regular cavalry do not exist. Such staggering deficits as these are in themselves sufficient to show how critical would be our position if England were invaded, and in order to give an adequate idea of what we may expect during that reign of terror, I have penned the narrative which follows. Some, no doubt, believe that our enemies will treat us with more mercy than I have shown, but I firmly anticipate that in the desperate struggle for the supremacy of the world, towns will be bombarded and international law set at naught where our invaders see a chance of success. Consequently, the ruin must be widespread, and the loss of life enormous. In the various strategical and tactical problems involved, I have received assistance from a number of well-known naval and military officers on the active list, whose names I am, however, not at liberty to divulge. Suffice it to say that, in addition to personally going over the whole of the ground where battles are fought, I have also obtained information from certain official documents not made public, and have endeavoured to bring this forecast up to date by introducing the latest inventions in guns, and showing the relative strength of Navies as they will appear in 1897. In this latter I have been compelled to bestow names upon many ships now building. To Lieut. J. G. Stevens, 17th Middlesex Rifle Volunteers, who supplied me with many details regarding the Volunteers; to Mr. Alfred C. Harmsworth, F.R.G.S., whose suggestion prompted me to write this narrative; and to Mr. Harold Harmsworth, who on several occasions assisted me, I hereby acknowledge my thanks. While many readers will no doubt regard this book chiefly as an exciting piece of fiction, I trust that no small proportion will perceive the important lesson underlying it, for the French are laughing at us, the Russians presume to imitate us, and the Day of Reckoning is hourly advancing. WILLIAM LE QUEUX. PRINCE OF WALES'S CLUB, COVENTRY STREET, W. CONTENTS _BOOK I_ THE INVASION CHAP. PAGE I. THE SHADOW OF MOLOCH 13 II. A TOTTERING EMPIRE 19 III. ARMING FOR THE STRUGGLE 23 IV. THE SPY 28 V. BOMBARDMENT OF NEWHAVEN 35 VI. LANDING OF THE FRENCH IN SUSSEX 40 VII. BOMB OUTRAGES IN LONDON 44 VIII. FATEFUL DAYS FOR THE OLD FLAG 49 IX. COUNT VON BEILSTEIN AT HOME 56 X. A DEATH DRAUGHT 61 XI. THE MASSACRE AT EASTBOURNE 65 XII. IN THE EAGLE'S TALONS 70 XIII. FIERCE FIGHTING IN THE CHANNEL 75 XIV. BATTLE OFF BEACHY HEAD 85 _BOOK II_ THE STRUGGLE XV. THE DOOM OF HULL 99 XVI. TERROR ON THE TYNE 110 XVII. HELP FROM OUR COLONIES 125 XVIII. RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE MIDLANDS 137 XIX. FALL OF BIRMINGHAM 150 XX. OUR REVENGE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 162 XXI. A NAVAL FIGHT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 174 XXII. PANIC IN LANCASHIRE 186 XXIII. THE EVE OF BATTLE 193 XXIV. MANCHESTER ATTACKED BY RUSSIANS 200 XXV. GALLANT DEEDS BY CYCLISTS 208 XXVI. GREAT BATTLE ON THE MERSEY 213 XXVII. THE FATE OF THE VANQUISHED 218 _BOOK III_ THE VICTORY XXVIII. A SHABBY WAYFARER 229 XXIX. LANDING OF THE ENEMY AT LEITH 235 XXX. ATTACK ON EDINBURGH 243 XXXI. "THE DEMON OF WAR" 248 XXXII. FRIGHTFUL SLAUGHTER OUTSIDE GLASGOW 256 XXXIII. MARCH OF THE FRENCH ON LONDON 268 XXXIV. LOOTING IN THE SUBURBS 279 XXXV. LONDON BOMBARDED 284 XXXVI. BABYLON BURNING 291 XXXVII. FIGHTING ON THE SURREY HILLS 299 XXXVIII. NAVAL BATTLE OFF DUNGENESS 304 XXXIX. THE DAY OF RECKONING 312 XL. "FOR ENGLAND!" 324 XLI. DAWN 328 _BOOK I_ _THE INVASION_ THE GREAT WAR IN ENGLAND IN 1897. CHAPTER I. THE SHADOW OF MOLOCH. War! _War in England!_ Growled by thoughtful, stern-visaged men, gasped with bated breath by pale-faced, terrified women, the startling news passed quickly round the Avenue Theatre from gallery to boxes. The crisis was swift, complete, crushing. Actors and audience were appalled. Though it was a gay comic opera that was being performed for the first time, entertainers and entertained lost all interest in each other. They were amazed, dismayed, awestricken. Amusement was nauseating; War, with all its attendant horrors, was actually upon them! The popular tenor, one of the idols of the hour, blundered over his lines and sang terribly out of tune, but the hypercritical first-night audience passed the defect unnoticed. They only thought of what might happen; of the dark cavernous future that lay before. War had been declared against Britain--Britain, the Empire that had so long rested in placid sea-girt security, confident of immunity from attack, was to be invaded! The assertion seemed preposterous. Some, after reading eagerly the newspapers still damp from the press, smiled incredulously, half inclined to regard the startling intelligence as a mere fabrication by alarmists, or a perfected phase of the periodical war-scare which sensational journalists annually launch upon the world during what is technically known as the "gooseberry" season. Other readers, however, recollecting the grave political crises on the Continent, set their teeth firmly, silent and dumfounded. Upon many merchants and City men the news fell like a thunderbolt, for financial ruin stared them in the face. Evidently a desperate attempt would be made by the enemy to land on English soil. Already the startled playgoers could hear in their excited imagination the clash of arms mingling with the triumphant yell of the victor, and the stifled, despairing cry of the hapless victim. But who, they wondered, would be the victim? Would Britannia ever fall to the dust with broken trident and shattered shield? Would her neck ever lie under the heel of the foreign invader? No, never--while Britons could fight. The theatre, in its garish blaze of electricity, and crowded with well-dressed men and women, presented a brilliant appearance, which had suddenly become strangely incongruous with the feelings of the audience. In the boxes, where youth and beauty smiled, the bouquets which had been provided by the management gave to the theatre a bright, artistic touch of colour. Yet the pungent odour they diffused had become sickening. Intermingled with other flowers there were many tuberoses. They are funereal blossoms, ineffably emblematic of the grave. There is death in their breath. When the astounding news fell upon the house the performance was drawing to a close. A moment before, every one had been silent and motionless, listening with rapt attention to the tenor's plaintive love song, and admiring the grace of the fair heroine, but as the terrible truth dawned upon them they rose, amid a scene of the wildest excitement. The few papers that had been purchased at fabulous prices at the doors were eagerly scanned, many of the sheets being torn into shreds in the mad struggle to catch a glimpse of the alarming telegrams they contained. For a few moments the agitation nearly approached a panic, while above the hum and din the hoarse, strident voices of running newsmen could be heard outside, yelling, "War declared against England! Expected landing of the enemy! Extrur-speshal!" There was a hidden terror in the word "War" that at first held the amazed playgoers breathless and thoughtful. Never before had its significance appeared so grim, so fatal, so fraught with appalling consequences. War had been actually declared! There was no averting it! It was a stern reality. No adroit diplomatic negotiations could stem the advancing hordes of foreign invaders; Ministers and ambassadors were as useless pawns, for two great nations had had the audacity to combine in the projected attack upon Great Britain. It seemed incredible, impossible. True, a Great War had long been predicted, forecasts had been given of coming conflicts, and European nations had for years been gradually strengthening their armies and perfecting their engines of war, in the expectation of being plunged into hostilities. Modern improvements in arms and ammunition had so altered the conditions of war, that there had long been a feeling of insecurity even among those Powers who, a few years before, had felt themselves strong enough to resist any attack, however violent. War-scares had been plentiful, crises in France, Germany, and Russia of frequent occurrence; still, no one dreamed that Moloch was in their midst--that the Great War, so long foreshadowed, had in reality commenced. Yet on this hot, oppressive Saturday night in August the extra-special editions of the papers contained news that startled the world. It ran as follows:-- INVASION OF ENGLAND. WAR DECLARED BY FRANCE AND RUSSIA. HOSTILE FLEETS ADVANCING. EXTRAORDINARY MANIFESTO BY THE TSAR. [REUTER'S TELEGRAMS.] St. Petersburg, _August 14th_, 4 P.M. The most intense excitement has been caused here by a totally unexpected and amazing announcement made this afternoon by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador. It appears that the Minister has addressed to the French representative a short note in which the following extraordinary passage occurs:-- "The earnest negotiations between the Imperial Government and Great Britain for a durable pacification of Bosnia not having led to the desired accord, His Majesty the Tsar, my august master, sees himself compelled, to his regret, to have recourse to force of arms. Be therefore so kind as to inform your Government that from to-day Russia considers herself in a state of war with Great Britain, and requests that France will immediately comply with the obligations of the alliance signed by President Carnot on February 23rd, 1892." A circular note has also been addressed by the Russian Foreign Office to its ambassadors at the principal Courts of Europe, stating that, for reasons assigned, the Tsar has resolved to commence hostilities against Great Britain, and has given his Armies and Navy orders to commence the invasion. This declaration has, no doubt, been contemplated by the Russian Government for several days. During the past week the French Ambassador has twice had private audience of the Tsar, and soon after 11 A.M. to-day he had a long interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is understood that the Minister of War was also present. No official notification of the Declaration of War has been given to the British Ambassador. This has created considerable surprise. 5.30 P.M. Large posters, headed "A Manifesto of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia," and addressed to his subjects, are being posted up in the Nevski Prospekt. In this document the Tsar says-- "Our faithful and beloved subjects know the strong interest which we have constantly felt in the destinies of our Empire. Our desire for the pacification of our western frontier has been shared by the whole Russian nation, which now shows itself ready to bear fresh sacrifices to alleviate the position of those oppressed by British rule. The blood and property of our faithful subjects have always been dear to us, and our whole reign attests our constant solicitude to preserve to Russia the benefits of peace. This solicitude never failed to actuate my father during events which occurred recently in Bulgaria, Austro-Hungary, and Bosnia. Our object, before all, was to effect an amelioration in the position of our people on the frontier by means of pacific negotiations, and in concert with the great European Powers, our allies and friends. Having, however, exhausted our pacific efforts, we are compelled by the haughty obstinacy of Great Britain to proceed to more decisive acts. A feeling of equity and of our own dignity enjoins it. By her recent acts Great Britain places us under the necessity of having recourse to arms. Profoundly convinced of the justice of our cause, we make known to our faithful subjects that we declare war against Great Britain. In now invoking a blessing upon our valiant armies, we give the order for an invasion of England." This manifesto has excited the greatest enthusiasm. The news has spread rapidly, and dense crowds have assembled in the Nevski, the Izak Platz, and on the English Quay, where the posters are being exhibited. The British Ambassador has not yet received any communication from the Imperial Government. Fontainebleau, _Aug. 14th_, 4.30 P.M. President Felix Faure has received a telegram from the French representative at St. Petersburg, stating that Russia has declared war against Great Britain. The President left immediately for Paris by special train. Paris, _Aug. 14th_, 4.50 P.M. An astounding piece of intelligence has this afternoon been received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is no less than a Declaration of War by Russia against Britain. The telegram containing the announcement was received at the Ministry from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg soon after three o'clock. The President was at once informed, and the Cabinet immediately summoned. A meeting is now being held for the purpose of deciding upon the course to be pursued with regard to the obligations of France contracted by the Treaty of Alliance made after the Cronstadt incident in 1891. The news of impending hostilities has just been published in a special edition of the _Soir_, and has created the wildest excitement on the Boulevards. Little doubt is entertained that France will join the invading forces, and the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet is anxiously awaited. President Felix Faure has returned from Fountainebleau. [BY TELEPHONE THROUGH DALZIEL'S AGENCY.] 6 P.M. The meeting of the Cabinet has just concluded. It has been resolved that France shall unreservedly render assistance to Russia. There is great activity at the War Office, and troops are already being ordered on active service. The excitement in the streets is increasing. [REUTER'S TELEGRAMS.] Berlin, _Aug. 14th_, 5.30 P.M. Telegrams received here from St. Petersburg report that Russia has unexpectedly declared war against Great Britain, and called upon France to aid her in a combined attack. The report is scarcely credited here, and further details are being eagerly awaited. The Emperor, who was to have left for Bremen this afternoon, has abandoned his journey, and is now in consultation with the Chancellor. Christiansand, _Aug. 14th_, 7.30 P.M. The French Channel Squadron, which has been manoeuvring for the past fortnight off the western coast of Norway, anchored outside the fjord here last night. This morning, according to rumour, the Russian Squadron arrived suddenly, and lay about thirty miles off land. Secret telegraphic orders were received at 6 P.M. by the Admirals of both fleets almost simultaneously, and the whole of the vessels left in company half an hour later. They sailed in a southerly direction, but their destination is unknown. Dieppe, _Aug. 14th_, 8 P.M. Ten transport vessels are embarking troops for England. Four regiments of cavalry, including the 4th Chasseurs and 16th Guards, are--[1] FOOTNOTE: [1] The conclusion of this message has not reached us, all the wires connecting this country with France having been cut. CHAPTER II. A TOTTERING EMPIRE. The excitement in the theatre had increased, and the curtain had been rung down. Death shadows, grimly apparent, had fallen upon the house, and the scene was an extraordinary and unprecedented one. No such wild restlessness and impetuous agitation had ever before been witnessed within those walls. Some enthusiast of the pit, springing to his feet, and drawing a large red handkerchief from his pocket, waved it, shouting-- "Three cheers for good Old England!" to which, after a moment's silence, the audience responded lustily. Then, almost before the last sound had died away, another patriot of the people mounted upon his seat, crying-- "No one need fear. The British Lion will quickly hold the French Eagle and the Russian Bear within his jaws. Let the enemy come; we will mow them down like hay." This raised a combined laugh and cheer, though it sounded forced and hollow. Immediately, however, some buoyant spirits in the gallery commenced singing "Rule, Britannia," the chorus of which was taken up vigorously, the orchestra assisting by playing the last verse. Outside, the scene in the streets was one of momentarily increasing excitement. The news had spread with marvellous rapidity, and the whole city was agog. An elbowing, waving, stormy crowd surged down the Strand to Trafalgar Square, where an impromptu demonstration was being held, the Government being denounced by its opponents, and spoken of with confidence by its supporters. The Radical, the Socialist, the Anarchist, each aired his views, and through the throng a hoarse threatening murmur condensed into three words, "Down with Russia! Down with France!" The cry, echoed by a thousand throats, mingled weirdly with the shouts of the newsmen and the snatches of patriotic songs. London was anxious, fevered, and turbulent, that hot, moonless August night. At that hour all the shops were closed, and the streets only lighted by the lamps. From the unlighted windows the indistinct shapes of heads looking out on the scene could be distinguished. On the pavements of Piccadilly and Knightsbridge knots of people stood arguing and wrangling over the probable turn of events. From uncouth Whitechapel to artistic Kensington, from sylvan Highgate to the villadom of Dulwich, the amazing intelligence had been conveyed by the presses of Fleet Street, which were still belching forth tons of damp news-sheets. At first there was confidence among the people; nevertheless little by little this confidence diminished, and curiosity gave place to surprise. But what could it be? All was shrouded in the darkest gloom. In the atmosphere was a strange and terrible oppression that seemed to weigh down men and crush them. London was, it appeared, walled in by the unknown and the unexpected. But, after all, England was strong; it was the mighty British Empire; it was the world. What was there to fear? Nothing. So the people continued to shout, "Down with France! Down with the Autocrat! Down with the Tsar!" A young man, who had been sitting alone in the stalls, had risen, electrified at the alarming news, and rushing out, hailed a passing cab, and drove rapidly away up Northumberland Avenue. This conduct was remarkable, for Geoffrey Engleheart was scarcely the man to flinch when danger threatened. He was a tall, athletic young fellow of twenty-six, with wavy brown hair, a dark, smartly-trimmed moustache, and handsome, well-cut features. He was happy and easy-going, always overflowing with genuine _bonhomie_. As the younger son of a very distinguished officer, he contrived to employ himself for a couple of hours a day at the Foreign Office, where, although a clerk, he held a very responsible position. Belonging to a rather good set, he was a member of several fashionable clubs, and lived in cosy, well-furnished chambers in St. James's Street. Driving first to the house of his _fiancée_, Violet Vayne, at Rutland Gate, he informed her family of the startling intelligence; then, re-entering the conveyance, he subsequently alighted before the door of his chambers. As he paid the cabman, an ill-clad man pushed a newspaper into his face, crying, "'Ere y'are, sir. Extrur-special edition o' the _People_. Latest details. Serious scandal at the Forrin' Office." Geoffrey started. He staggered, his heart gave a bound, and his face blanched. Thrusting half a crown into the man's dirty palm, he grasped the paper, and rushing upstairs to his sitting-room, cast himself into a chair. In breathless eagerness he glanced at the front page of the journal, and read the following:-- SCANDAL AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE. A STATE SECRET DIVULGED. An extraordinary rumour is going the round of the Service clubs to-night. It is alleged that the present Declaration of War would have been impossible but for the treachery of some person through whose hands the transcript of a secret treaty between England and Germany passed to-day. A prominent Cabinet Minister, on being questioned by our reporter on the subject, admitted that he had heard the rumour, but declined to make any definite statement whether or not it was true. There must be a good deal behind the rumour of treachery, inasmuch as none of the prominent men who have already been interviewed gave a denial to the statement. Geoffrey sat pale and motionless, with eyes fixed upon the printed words. He read and re-read them until the lines danced before his gaze, and he crushed the paper in his hands, and cast it from him. The little French clock on the mantelshelf chimed the hour of one upon its silvery bell; the lamp spluttered and burned dim. Still he did not move; he was dumfounded, rooted to the spot. Blacker and blacker grew the crowd outside. The density of the cloud that hung over all portended some direful tragedy. The impending disaster made itself felt. An alarming sense of calmness filled the streets. A silence had suddenly fallen, and was becoming complete and threatening. What was it that was about to issue from these black storm-clouds? Who could tell? CHAPTER III. ARMING FOR THE STRUGGLE. London was amazed. The provinces were awestricken, paralysed by the startling suddenness with which the appalling news of the invasion had been flashed to them. Bewildered, the people could not believe it. Only slowly did the vivid and terrible truth dawn individually upon the millions north and south, and then, during the Day of Rest, they crowded to the newspaper and telegraph offices, loudly clamouring for further details of the overwhelming catastrophe that threatened. They sought for information from London; they expected London, the mighty, all-powerful capital, to act. Through the blazing Sunday the dust rose from the impatient, perspiring crowds in towns and cities, and the cool night brought no rest from a turmoil now incessant. Never before were such scenes of intense enthusiasm witnessed in England, Wales, and Scotland, for this was the first occasion on which the public felt the presence of invaders at their very doors. A mighty force was on its way to ruin their homes, to sweep from them their hard-earned savings, to crush, to conquer--to kill them! Fierce antagonism rose spontaneously in every Briton's heart, and during that never-to-be-forgotten day, at every barracks throughout the country, recruiting-sergeants were besieged by all sorts and conditions of men eager to accept the Queen's shilling, and strike for their country's honour. Heedless of danger, of hardship, of the fickle fortune of the fight, the determination to assist in the struggle rose instantly within them. At York, Chester, Edinburgh, and Portsmouth, volunteers came forward by hundreds. All were enthusiastic, undrilled, but ready to use their guns--genuinely heroic patriots of our land, such as are included in no other nation than the British. Pluck, zeal for the public safety, and an intense partisanship towards their fellows induced thousands to join the colours--many, alas! to sink later beneath a foeman's bullet, unknown, unhonoured heroes! Already the Cabinet had held a hurried meeting, at which it had been decided to call out the whole of the Reserves. Of this the War Office and Admiralty had been notified, and the Queen had given her sanction to the necessary proclamations, with the result that telegraphic orders had been issued to general officers commanding and to officers commanding Reservists to mobilise instantly. The posters containing the proclamation, which are always kept in readiness in the hands of officers commanding Regimental Districts, were issued immediately, and exhibited on all public places throughout the kingdom. On the doors of town halls, churches, chapels, police stations, military barracks, and in the windows of post offices, these notices were posted within a few hours. Crowds everywhere collected to read them, and the greatest enthusiasm was displayed. Militia, Yeomanry, Volunteers, all were called out, and men on reading the Mobilisation Order lost no time in obtaining their accoutrements and joining their depôts. The national danger was imminent, and towards their "places of concentration" all categories of Her Majesty's forces were already moving. In every Regimental District the greatest activity was displayed. No country maintains in peace the full complement, or anything approaching the full complement of transport which its Armies require; hence vehicles and horses to complete the Army Service Corps companies, and for the supplemental service, were being immediately requisitioned from far and near. One of the many anomalies discovered during this critical period was, that while transport could thus be rapidly requisitioned, yet the impressment of civilians as drivers and caretakers of the animals was not permitted by the law; therefore on all hands the organisation of this requisitioned transport was fraught with the utmost difficulty, the majority of owners and employees refusing to come forward voluntarily. Registered horses were quickly collected, but they were far from sufficient for the requirements, and the want of animals caused loud outcries from every Regimental District. The general scheme was the constitution of a Field Army of four cavalry brigades and three army corps, with behind them a semi-mobile force made up of thirty-three Volunteer infantry brigades and eighty-four Volunteer batteries of position. The garrisons having been provided for, the four cavalry brigades and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps were to be composed entirely of Regulars, the 3rd Army Corps being made up of Regulars, Militia, and Volunteers. Organised in brigades, the Yeomanry were attached to the various infantry brigades or divisions of the Field Army, and the Regular Medical Staff Corps being much too weak, was strengthened from companies of the Volunteer Medical Staff Corps. In brief, the scheme was the formation of a composite Field Army, backed by a second line of partially trained Auxiliaries. Such a general scheme to set in battle order our land forces for home defence was, no doubt, well devised. Nevertheless, from the first moment the most glaring defects in the working out of details were everywhere manifested. Stores were badly disposed, there was a sad want of clothing, camp equipment, and arms, and the arrangements for the joining of Reservists were throughout defective. Again, the whole Reserve had been left totally untrained from the day the men left the colours; and having in view the fact that all leading authorities in Europe had, times without number, told us that the efficiency of an Army depended on drill, discipline, and shooting, what could be expected from a system which relied in great part for the safety of the country on a Reserve, the members of which were undisciplined, undrilled, and unpractised in shooting for periods ranging from nine years in the Guards to five years in the case of the Line? On the day of mobilisation not a single regiment in the United Kingdom was ready to move forward to the front as it stood on parade! Not an officer, not a man, was prepared. England had calmly slept for years, while military reforms had been effected in every other European country. Now she had been suddenly and rudely awakened! Everywhere it was commented upon that no practical peace trial of the mobilisation scheme had ever been made. Little wonder was there, then, that incomplete details hampered rapid movements, or that the carrying out of the definite and distinct programme was prevented by gaps occurring which could not be discovered until the working of the system had been tested by actual experiment. It was this past apathy of the authorities, amounting to little less than criminal negligence, that formed the text of the vehement outpourings of Anarchists, Socialists, and "No War" partisans. A practical test of the efficiency of the scheme to concentrate our forces should have taken place even at the risk of public expenditure, instead of making the experiment when the enemy were actually at our doors. Another anomaly which, in the opinion of the public, ought long ago to have been removed, was the fact that the billeting of troops on the march on the inhabitants of the United Kingdom, other than owners of hotels, inns, livery stables, and public-houses, is illegal, while troops when not on the march cannot be billeted at all! At many points of concentration this absurd and antiquated regulation, laid down by the Army Act in 1881, was severely felt. Public buildings, churches, and schools had to be hired for the accommodation of the troops, and those others who could not find private persons hospitable enough to take them in were compelled to bivouac where they could. Of tents they had scarcely any, and many regiments were thus kept homeless and badly fed several days before moving forward! Was there any wonder, then, that some men should lose heart? Did not such defects portend--nay, invite disaster? Strange though it may seem, Geoffrey Engleheart was one of but two persons in England who had on that Saturday anticipated this sudden Declaration of War. Through the hot night, without heed of the wild turbulence outside, regardless of the songs of patriots, of gleeful shouts of Anarchists, that, mingling into a dull roar, penetrated the heavy curtains before the window of his room, he sat with brows knit and gaze transfixed. Words now and then escaped his compressed lips. They were low and ominous; utterances of blank despair. CHAPTER IV. THE SPY. Count von Beilstein was a polished cosmopolitan. He was in many ways a very remarkable man. In London society he was as popular as he had previously been in Paris and in Berlin. Well-preserved and military-looking, he retained the vigour, high spirits, and spruce step of youth, spent his money freely, and led the almost idyllic life of a careless bachelor in the Albany. Since his partnership with Sir Joseph Vayne, the well-known shipowner, father of Geoffrey's _fiancée_, he had taken up a prominent position in commercial circles, was a member of the London Chamber of Commerce, took an active part in the various deliberations of that body, and in the City was considered a man of considerable importance. How we of the world, however shrewd, are deceived by outward appearances! Of the millions in London there were but two men who knew the truth; who were aware of the actual position held by this German landed proprietor. Indeed, the Count's friends little dreamed that under the outward cloak of careless ease induced by wealth there was a mind endowed with a cunning that was extraordinary, and an ingenuity that was marvellous. Truth to tell, Karl von Beilstein, who posed as the owner of the great Beilstein estates, extending along the beautiful valley of the Moselle, between Alf and Cochem, was not an aristocrat at all, and possessed no estate more tangible than the proverbial château in Spain. [Illustration: "COUNT VON BEILSTEIN WAS A SPY!"] Count von Beilstein was a _spy_! His life had been a strangely varied one; few men perhaps had seen more of the world. His biography was recorded in certain police registers. Born in the Jews' quarter at Frankfort, he had, at an early age, turned adventurer, and for some years was well known at Monte Carlo as a successful gamester. But the Fickle Goddess at last forsook him, and under another name he started a bogus loan office in Brussels. This, however, did not last long, for the police one night made a raid on the place, only to discover that Monsieur had flown. An extensive robbery of diamonds in Amsterdam, a theft of bonds while in transit between Hanover and Berlin, and the forgery of a large quantity of Russian rouble notes, were events which followed in quick succession, and in each of them the police detected the adroit hand of the man who now called himself the Count von Beilstein. At last, by sheer ill-luck, he fell into the grip of the law. He was in St. Petersburg, where he had opened an office in the Bolshaia, and started as a diamond dealer. After a few genuine transactions he obtained possession of gems worth nearly £20,000, and decamped. But the Russian police were quickly at his heels, and he was arrested in Riga, being subsequently tried and condemned by the Assize Court at St. Petersburg to twelve years' exile in Siberia. In chains, with a convoy of convicts he crossed the Urals, and tramped for weeks on the snow-covered Siberian Post Road. His name still appears on the register at the forwarding prison of Tomsk, with a note stating that he was sent on to the silver mines of Nertchinsk, the most dreaded in Asiatic Russia. Yet, strangely enough, within twelve months of his sentence he appeared at Royat-les-Bains, in Auvergne, posing as a Count, and living expensively at one of the best hotels. There was a reason for all this. The Russian Government, when he was sentenced, were well aware of his perfect training as a cosmopolitan adventurer, of his acquaintance with persons of rank, and of his cool unscrupulousness. Hence it was that one night while on the march along the Great Post Road to that bourne whence few convicts return, it was hinted to him by the captain of Cossacks, that he might obtain his liberty, and a good income in addition, if he consented to become a secret agent of the Tsar. The authorities desired him to perform a special duty; would he consent? He could exchange a life of heavy toil in the Nertchinsk mines for one of comparative idleness and ease. The offer was tempting, and he accepted. That same night it was announced to his fellow-convicts that the Tsar had pardoned him; his leg-fetters were thereupon struck off, and he started upon his return to St. Petersburg to receive instructions as to the delicate mission he was to perform. It was then, for the first time, that he became the Count von Beilstein, and his subsequent actions all betrayed the most remarkable daring, forethought, and tact. With one object in view he exercised an amount of patience that was almost incredible. One or two minor missions were entrusted to him by his official taskmasters on the banks of the Neva, and in each he acquitted himself satisfactorily. Apparently he was a thoroughly patriotic subject of the Kaiser, with tastes strongly anti-Muscovite, and after his partnership with Sir Joseph Vayne he resided in London, and mixed a good deal with military men, because he had, he said, held a commission in a Hussar regiment in the Fatherland, and took the liveliest interest in all military matters. Little did those officers dream that the information he gained about improvements in England's defences was forwarded in regular and carefully-written reports to the Russian War Office, or that the Tsar's messenger who carried weekly despatches between the Russian Ambassador in London and his Government frequently took with him a packet containing plans and tracings which bore marginal notes in the angular handwriting of the popular Count von Beilstein! Early in the morning of this memorable day when the startling news of the Declaration of War had reached England, a telegram had been handed to the Tsar's secret agent while he was still in bed. He read it through; then stared thoughtfully up at the ceiling. The message, in code, from Berlin, stated that a draft of a most important treaty between Germany and England had been despatched from the German Foreign Office, and would arrive in London that day. The message concluded with the words, "It is imperative that we should have a copy of this document, or at least a summary of its contents, immediately." Although sent from Berlin, the Count was well aware that it was an order from the Foreign Minister in St. Petersburg, the message being transmitted to Berlin first, and then retransmitted to London, in order to avoid any suspicion that might arise in the case of messages exchanged direct with the Russian capital. Having read the telegram through several times, he whistled to himself, rose quickly, dressed, and breakfasted. While having his meal, he gave some instructions to Grevel, his valet, and sent him out upon an errand, at the same time expressing his intention of waiting in until his return. "Remember," the Count said, as his man was going out, "be careful to arouse no suspicion. Simply make your inquiries in the proper quarter, and come back immediately." At half-past twelve o'clock, as Geoffrey Engleheart was busy writing alone in his room at the Foreign Office, he was interrupted by the opening of the door. "Hulloa, dear boy! I've found my way up here by myself. Busy, as usual, I see!" cried a cheery voice as the door slowly opened, and Geoffrey looking up saw it was his friend the Count, well groomed and fashionably attired in glossy silk hat, perfect-fitting frock coat, and varnished boots. He called very frequently upon Engleheart, and had long ago placed himself on excellent terms with the messengers and doorkeepers, who looked upon him as a most generous visitor. "Oh, how are you?" Engleheart exclaimed, rising and shaking his hand. "You must really forgive me, Count, but I quite forgot my appointment with you to-day." "Oh, don't let me disturb you, pray. I'll have a glance at the paper till you've finished," and casting himself into a chair near the window he took up the _Times_ and was soon absorbed in it. A quarter of an hour went by in silence, while Engleheart wrote on, calmly unconscious that there was a small rent in the newspaper the Count was reading, and that through it he could plainly see each word of the treaty as it was transcribed from the secret code and written down in plain English. "Will you excuse me for ten minutes?" Geoffrey exclaimed presently. "The Cabinet Council is sitting, and I have to run over to see Lord Stanbury for a moment. After I return I must make another copy of this paper, and then I shall be free." The Count, casting the newspaper wearily aside, glanced at his watch. "It's half-past one," he said. "You'll be another half-hour, if not more. After all, I really think, old fellow, I'll go on down to Hurlingham. I arranged to meet the Vaynes at two o'clock." "All right. I'll run down in a cab as soon as I can get away," answered Engleheart. "Good. Come on as soon as you can. Violet will be expecting you, you know." "Of course I shall," replied his unsuspicious friend, and they shook hands, after which the Count put on his hat and sauntered jauntily out. In Parliament Street he jumped into his phaeton, but instead of driving to Hurlingham gave his man orders to proceed with all speed to the General Post Office, St. Martin's-le-Grand. Within half an hour from the time he had shaken the hand of his unsuspecting friend, a message in code--to all intents and purposes a commercial despatch--was on its way to "Herr Brandt, 116 Friedrich Strasse, Berlin." That message contained an exact transcript of the secret treaty! [Illustration: THE RUSSIAN SPY'S TELEGRAM.] Almost immediately after the Count had left, Geoffrey made a discovery. From the floor he picked up a small gold pencil-case which he knew belonged to von Beilstein. Engleheart was sorely puzzled to know why the Count should require a pencil if not to write, and it momentarily flashed across his mind that he might have copied portions of the treaty. But the next minute he dismissed the suspicion as ungrounded and preposterous, and placing the pencil in his pocket went in search of Lord Stanbury. It was only the statement he read in the _People_ later, alleging treachery at the Foreign Office, that recalled the incident to his mind. Then the horrible truth dawned upon him. He saw how probable it was that he had been tricked. He knew that the mine was already laid; that the only thing that had prevented an explosion that would shake the whole world had been the absence of definite knowledge as to the exact terms of the alliance between England, Germany, Italy, and Austria. CHAPTER V. BOMBARDMENT OF NEWHAVEN. At sea the night was dark and moonless. A thick mist hung near the land. The Coastguard and Artillery on our southern and eastern shores spent a terribly anxious time, peering from their points of vantage out into the cavernous darkness where no light glimmered. The Harbour Defence Flotilla was in readiness, and under the black cliffs sentinels kept watch with every nerve strained to its highest tension, for the safety of England now depended upon their alertness. The great waves crashed and roared, and the mist, obscuring the light of vessels passing up and down the Channel, seemed to grow more dense as the hours wore on. In the midst of the feverish excitement that had spread everywhere throughout the length and breadth of the land, the troops were, a couple of hours after the receipt of the alarming news in London, already being mobilised and on their way south and east by special trains. Men, arms, ammunition, and stores were hurried forward to repel attack, and in the War Office and Admiralty, where the staffs had been suddenly called together, the greatest activity prevailed. Messages had been flashed along the wires in every direction giving orders to mobilise and concentrate at certain points, and these instructions were being obeyed with that promptness for which British soldiers and sailors are proverbial. Yet the high officials at the War Office looked grave, and although affecting unconcern, now and then whispered ominously together. They knew that the situation was critical. An immediate and adequate naval defence was just possible, but the Channel Squadron was manoeuvring off the Irish coast, and both the Coastguard Squadron and the Steam Reserve at the home ports were very weak. It was to our land army that we had to trust, and they were divided in opinion as to the possibility to mobilise a sufficient force in time to bar the advance. Military experts did not overlook the fact that to Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Fécamp, Havre, Honfleur, and Cherbourg ran excellent lines of railway, with ample rolling-stock, all Government property, and at the beck and call of the French War Minister. In the various ports there was adequate wharf accommodation and plenty of steam tonnage. From the brief official despatches received from Paris before the cutting of the wires, it was apparent that the French War Office had laid its plans with much forethought and cunning, and had provided against any _contretemps_. An army of carpenters and engineers had been put to work in the ports to alter the fittings of such of the merchant steamers as were destined to convey horses, and these fittings, prepared beforehand, were already in position. Four army corps had for several weeks been manoeuvring in Normandy, so that the Reservists had become accustomed to their work, and in excellent condition for war; therefore these facts, coupled with the strong support certain to be rendered by the warships of the Tsar, led experts to regard the outlook as exceedingly gloomy. For years military and naval men had discussed the possibilities of invasion, haggled over controversial points, but had never arrived at any definite opinion as to the possibility of an enemy's success. Now, however, the defences of the country were to be tested. Our great Empire was at stake. The power of steam to cause rapid transit by land and sea, the uncertainty of the place of disembarkment, and the great weight of modern naval artillery, combined to render the defences of England on the coast itself most uncertain and hazardous, and to cause grave doubts to arise in the minds of those who at that critical moment were directing the forward movement of the forces. The British public, whose national patriotism found vent in expressions of confidence in the Regular Army and Volunteers, were ignorant of the facts. They knew that two great Powers had combined to crush our island stronghold, and were eager that hostilities should commence in order that the enemy should be taught a severe lesson for their presumption. They, however, knew nothing of the plain truth, that although the 1st Army Corps at Aldershot would be ready to move at a few hours' notice, yet it was hopeless to try and prevent the disembarkation of the French army corps along a long line of unprotected coast by the action of a land force only one-third of their strength. So, by the water's edge, the lonely posts were kept through the night by patient, keen-sighted sentinels, ready at any moment to raise the alarm. But the dense mist that overhung everything was tantalising, hiding friend and foe alike, and no sound could be heard above the heavy roar of the waters as they rolled in over the rocks. London, infuriated, enthusiastic, turbulent, knew no sleep that night. The excitement was at fever-heat. At last, soon after daybreak, there came the first news of the enemy. A number of warships had suddenly appeared through the fog off the Sussex coast, and had lost no time in asserting their presence and demanding a large sum from the Mayor of Newhaven. The French first-class battery cruiser _Tage_, the _Dévastation_, the _Pothuau_, the _Aréthuse_ and others, finding that their demand was unheeded, at once commenced shelling the town. Although our Coastguard Squadron and first-class Steam Reserve had mobilised, yet they had received orders and sailed away no one knew whither. The forts replied vigorously, but the fire of the enemy in half an hour had wrought terrible havoc both in the town and in the forts, where several of the guns had been rendered useless and a number of men had been killed. Hostilities had commenced. Never during the century had such scenes been witnessed in the streets of London as on that memorable Sunday morning. The metropolis was thrilled. Dawn was spreading, saffron tints were in the sky heralding the sun's coming. Yet Regent Street, Piccadilly, and the Strand, usually entirely deserted at that hour on a Sabbath morning, were crowded as if it were midday. Everywhere there was excitement. Crowds waited in front of the newspaper offices in Fleet Street, boys with strident voices sold the latest editions of the papers, men continued their snatches of patriotic ballads, while women were blanched and scared, and children clung to their mothers' skirts timidly, vaguely fearing an unknown terror. The shadow of coming events was black and dim, like a funeral pall. The fate of our Empire hung upon a thread. Twenty-four hours ago England was smiling, content in the confidence of its perfect safety and immunity from invasion; yet all the horrors of war had, with a startling, appalling suddenness, fallen and bewildered it. The booming of French cannon at Newhaven formed the last salute of many a brave Briton who fell shattered and lifeless. As the sun rose crimson from the grey misty sea, the work of destruction increased in vigour. From the turrets of the floating monsters smoke and flame poured forth in continuous volume, while shot and shell were hurled into the town of Newhaven, which, it was apparent, was the centre of the enemy's attack, and where, owing to the deepening of the harbour, troops could effect a landing under cover of the fire from the ironclads. Frightful havoc was wrought by the shells among the houses of the little town, and one falling on board the Brighton Railway Company's mail steamer _Paris_, lying alongside the station quay, set her on fire. In half an hour railway station and quays were blazing furiously, while the flames leaped up about the ship, wrapping themselves about the two white funnels and darting from every porthole. The Custom House opposite quickly ignited, and the inflammable nature of its contents caused the fire to assume enormous proportions. Meanwhile the bombardment was kept up, the forts on shore still replying with regularity, steadiness, and precision, and the armoured coast train of the 1st Sussex Artillery Volunteers, under Captain Brigden, rendering excellent service. In one of the forts a man was standing in front of a small camera-obscura, on the glass of which were a number of mysterious marks. This glass reflected the water and the ships; and as he stood by calmly with his hand upon a keyboard, he watched the reflections of the hostile vessels moving backwards and forwards over the glass. Suddenly he saw a French gunboat, after a series of smartly-executed manoeuvres, steaming straight over one of the marks, and, quick as lightning, his finger pressed one of the electric keys. A terrific explosion followed, and a column of green water shot up at the same instant. The gunboat _Lavel_ had been suddenly blown almost out of the water by a submarine mine! Broken portions of her black hull turned over and sank, and mangled remains of what a second before had been a crew of enthusiastic Frenchmen floated for a few moments on the surface, then disappeared. Not a soul on board escaped. Along the telegraph line from the signal-station on Beachy Head news of the blowing up of the enemy's gunboat was flashed to London, and when, an hour later, it appeared in the newspapers, the people went half mad with excitement. Alas, how they miscalculated the relative strength of the opposing forces! They were unaware that our Channel Fleet, our Coastguard Squadron, and our Reserve were steaming away, leaving our southern shores _practically unprotected_! CHAPTER VI. LANDING OF THE FRENCH IN SUSSEX. The Briton is, alas! too prone to underrate his adversary. It is this national egotism, this fatal over-confidence, that has led to most of the reverses we have sustained in recent wars. The popular belief that one Briton is as good as half a dozen foreigners, is a fallacy which ought to be at once expunged from the minds of every one. The improved and altered conditions under which international hostilities are carried on nowadays scarcely even admit of a hand-to-hand encounter, and the engines of destruction designed by other European Powers being quite as perfect as our own, tact and cunning have now taken the place of pluck and perseverance. The strong arm avails but little in modern warfare; strategy is everything. Into Brighton, an hour after dawn, the enemy's vessels were pouring volley after volley of deadly missiles. A party had landed from the French flagship, and, summoning the Mayor, had demanded a million pounds. This not being forthcoming, they had commenced shelling the town. The fire was, for the most part, directed against the long line of shops and private residences in King's Road and at Hove, and in half an hour over a hundred houses had been demolished. The palatial Hôtel Métropole stood a great gaunt ruin. Shells had carried large portions of the noble building away, and a part of the ruin had caught fire and was burning unchecked, threatening to consume the whole. Church steeples had been knocked over like ninepins, and explosive missiles dropped in the centre of the town every moment, sweeping the streets with deadly effect. The enemy met with little or no opposition. Our first line of defence, our Navy, was missing! The Admiralty were unaware of the whereabouts of three whole Fleets that had mobilised, and the ships remaining in the Channel, exclusive of the Harbour Defence Flotilla, were practically useless. At Eastbourne, likewise, where a similar demand had been made, shot fell thick as hail, and shells played fearful havoc with the handsome boarding-houses and hotels that line the sea front. From the redoubt, the Wish Tower, and a battery on the higher ground towards Beachy Head, as well as a number of other hastily constructed earthworks, a reply was made to the enemy's fire, and the guns in the antiquated martello towers, placed at intervals along the beach, now and then sent a shot towards the vessels. But such an attempt to keep the great ironclads at bay was absurdly futile. One after another shells from the monster guns of the Russian ship _Pjotr Velikij_, and the armoured cruisers _Gerzog Edinburskij_, _Krejser_, and _Najezdnik_, crashed into these out-of-date coast defences, and effectually silenced them. In Eastbourne itself the damage wrought was enormous. Every moment shells fell and exploded in Terminus and Seaside Roads, while the aristocratic suburb of Upperton, built on the hill behind the town, was exposed to and bore the full brunt of the fray. The fine modern Queen Anne and Elizabethan residences were soon mere heaps of burning débris. Every moment houses fell, burying their occupants, and those people who rushed out into the roads for safety were, for the most part, either overwhelmed by débris, or had their limbs shattered by flying pieces of shell. The situation was awful. The incessant thunder of cannon, the screaming of shells whizzing through the air, to burst a moment later and send a dozen or more persons to an untimely grave, the crash of falling walls, the clouds of smoke and dust, and the blazing of ignited wreckage, combined to produce a scene more terrible than any witnessed in England during the present century. And all this was the outcome of one man's indiscretion and the cunning duplicity of two others! At high noon Newhaven fell into the hands of the enemy. The attack had been so entirely unexpected that the troops mobilised and sent there had arrived too late. The town was being sacked, and the harbour was in the possession of the French, who were landing their forces in great numbers. From Dieppe and Havre transports were arriving, and discharging their freights of fighting men and guns under cover of the fire from the French warships lying close in land. Notwithstanding all the steps taken during the last twenty years to improve the condition of our forces on land and sea, this outbreak of hostilities found us far from being in a state of preparedness for war. England, strangely enough, has never yet fully realised that the conditions of war have entirely changed. In days gone by, when troops and convoys could move but slowly, the difficulty of providing for armies engaged in operations necessarily limited their strength. It is now quite different. Improved communications have given to military operations astonishing rapidity, and the facilities with which large masses of troops, guns, and stores can now be transported to great distances has had the effect of proportionately increasing numbers. As a result of this, with the exception of our own island, Europe was armed to the teeth. Yet a mobilisation arrangement that was faulty and not clearly understood by officers or men, was the cause of the enemy being allowed to land. It is remarkable that the military authorities had not acted upon the one principle admitted on every side, namely, that the only effective defence consists of attack. The attack, to succeed, should have been sudden and opportune, and the Army should have been so organised that on the occurrence of war a force of adequate strength would have been at once available. In a word, we missed our chance to secure this inestimable advantage afforded by the power of striking the first blow. There was an old and true saying, that "England's best bulwarks were her wooden walls." They are no longer wooden, but it still remains an admitted fact that England's strongest bulwarks should be her Navy, and that any other nation may be possessed of an equally good one; also that our best bulwark should be equal to, or approach, the fighting power of the bulwarks owned by any two possible hostile nations. To be strong is to stave off war; to be weak is to invite attack. It was our policy of _laissez faire_, a weak Navy and an Army bound up with red tape, that caused this disastrous invasion of England. Had our Fleet been sufficient for its work, invasion would have remained a threat, and nothing more. Our Navy was not only our first, but our last line of defence from an Imperial point of view; for, as a writer in the _Army and Navy Gazette_ pointed out in 1893, it was equally manifest and unquestionable that without land forces to act as the spearhead to the Navy's over-sea shaft, the offensive tactics so essential to a thorough statesmanlike defensive policy could not be carried out. Again, the mobility and efficiency of our Regular Army should have been such that the victory of our Fleet could be speedily and vigorously followed by decisive blows on the enemy's territory. Already the news of the landing of the enemy had--besides causing a thrill such as had never before been known in our "tight little island"--produced its effect upon the price of food in London as elsewhere. In England we had only five days' bread-stuffs, and as the majority of our supplies came from Russia the price of bread trebled within twelve hours, and the ordinary necessaries of life were proportionately dearer. But the dice had been thrown, and the sixes lay with Moloch. CHAPTER VII. BOMB OUTRAGES IN LONDON. On that never-to-be-forgotten Sunday, scenes were witnessed in the metropolis which were of the most disgraceful character. The teeming city, from dawn till midnight, was in a feverish turmoil, the throngs in its streets discussing the probable turn of affairs, singing patriotic songs, and giving vent to utterances of heroic intentions interspersed with much horse play. In Trafalgar Square, the hub of London, a mass meeting of Anarchists and Socialists was held, at which the Government and military authorities were loudly denounced for what was termed their criminal apathy to the interests and welfare of the nation. The Government, it was contended, had betrayed the country by allowing the secret of the German alliance to fall into the hands of its enemies, and the Ministers, adjudged unworthy the confidence of the nation, were by the resolutions adopted called upon to resign immediately. The crisis was an excuse for Anarchism to vent its grievances against law and order, and, unshackled, it had spread with rapidity through the length and breadth of the land. In "The Square" the scarlet flag and the Cap of Liberty were everywhere in evidence, and, notwithstanding the presence of the police, the leaders of Anarchy openly advocated outrage, incendiarism, and murder. At length the police resolved to interfere, and this was the signal for a terrible uprising. The huge mob, which in the mellow sunset filled the great Square and blocked all its approaches, became a seething, surging mass of struggling humanity. The attack by the police, who were ordered to disperse them, only incensed them further against the authorities, whom they blamed for the catastrophe that had befallen our country. Angry and desperate they fought with the police, using both revolvers and knives. The scene was terrible. The scum of the metropolis had congregated to wage war against their own compatriots whom they classed among enemies, and for an hour in the precincts of the Square the struggle was for life. Dozens of constables were shot dead, hundreds of Anarchists and Socialists received wounds from batons, many succumbing to their injuries, or being trampled to death by the dense mob. It was a repetition of that historic day known as "Bloody Sunday," only the fight was more desperate and the consequences far worse, and such as would disgrace any civilised city. Before sundown the police had been vanquished; and as no soldiers could be spared, Anarchism ran riot in the Strand, Pall Mall, St. Martin's Lane, Northumberland Avenue, and Parliament Street. Pale, determined men, with faces covered with blood, and others with their clothes in shreds, shouted hoarse cries of victory, as, headed by a torn red flag, they rushed into Pall Mall and commenced breaking down the shutters of shops and looting them. Men were knocked down and murdered, and the rioters, freed from all restraint, commenced sacking all establishments where it was expected spoil could be obtained. At one bank in Pall Mall they succeeded, after some difficulty, in breaking open the strong room with explosives, and some forty or fifty of the rebels with eager greediness shared the gold and notes they stole. At the Strand corner of the Square a squad of police was being formed, in order to co-operate with some reinforcements which were arriving, when suddenly there was a terrific explosion. A bomb filled with picric acid had been thrown by an Anarchist, and when the smoke cleared, the shattered remains of thirty-four constables lay strewn upon the roadway! This was but the first of a series of dastardly outrages. The advice of the Anarchist leaders in their inflammatory speeches had been acted upon, and in half an hour a number of bomb explosions had occurred in the vicinity, each doing enormous damage, and killing numbers of innocent persons. After the petard had been thrown in Trafalgar Square a loud explosion was almost immediately afterwards heard in Parliament Street, and it was soon known that a too successful attempt had been made to blow up the Premier's official residence in Downing Street. The programme of the outrages had apparently been organised, for almost before the truth was known another even more disastrous explosion occurred in the vestibule of the War Office in Pall Mall, which wrecked the lower part of the building, and blew to atoms the sentry on duty, and killed a number of clerks who were busy at their important duties in the apartments on the ground floor. Through Pall Mall and along Whitehall the mob ran, crying "Down with the Government! Kill the traitors! Kill them!" About three thousand of the more lawless, having looted a number of shops, rushed to the Houses of Parliament, arriving there just in time to witness the frightful havoc caused by the explosion of two terribly powerful bombs that had been placed in St. Stephen's Hall and in Westminster Abbey. A section of the exultant rioters had gained access to the National Gallery, where they carried on ruthless destruction among the priceless paintings there. Dozens of beautiful works were slashed with knives, others were torn down, and many, cut from their frames, were flung to the howling crowd outside. Suddenly some one screamed, "What do we want with Art? Burn down the useless palace! Burn it! Burn it!" This cry was taken up by thousands of throats, and on every hand the rebels inside the building were urged to set fire to it. Intoxicated with success, maddened by anger at the action of the police, and confident that they had gained a signal victory over the law, they piled together a number of historic paintings in one of the rooms, and then ignited them. The flames leaped to the ceiling, spread to the woodwork, and thence, with appalling rapidity, to the other apartments. The windows cracked, and clouds of smoke and tongues of fire belched forth from them. It had now grown dusk. The furious, demoniacal rabble surging in the Square set up loud, prolonged cheering when they saw the long dark building burning. In delight they paused in their work of destruction, watching the flames growing brighter as they burst through the roof, licking the central dome; and while the timber crackled and the fire roared, casting a lurid glare upon the tall buildings round and lighting up the imposing façade of the Grand Hotel, they cheered vociferously and sang the "Marseillaise" until the smoke half choked them and their throats grew hoarse. These denizens of the slums, these criminal crusaders against the law, were not yet satiated by their wild reckless orgies. Unchecked, they had run riot up and down the Strand, and there was scarcely a man among them who had not in his pocket some of the spoils from jewellers' or from banks. In the glare of the flames the white bloodstained faces wore a determined expression as they stood collecting their energies for some other atrocious outrage against their so-called enemies, the rich. At the first menace of excesses, dwellers in the locality had left their houses and fled headlong for safety to other parts of the city. The majority escaped, but many fell into the hands of the rioters, and were treated with scant humanity. Men and women were struck down and robbed, even strangled or shot if they resisted. The scene was frightful--a terrible realisation of Anarchist prophecies that had rendered the authorities absolutely helpless. On the one hand, an enemy had landed on our shores with every chance of a successful march to London, while on the other the revolutionary spirit had broken out unmistakably among the criminal class, and lawlessness and murder were everywhere rife. The homes of the people were threatened by double disaster--by the attack of both enemy and "friend." The terrible bomb outrages and their appalling results had completely disorganised the police, and although reinforcements had been telegraphed for from every division in London, the number of men mustered at Scotland Yard was not yet sufficient to deal effectually with the irate and rapidly increasing mob. As evening wore on the scenes in the streets around the Square were terrible. Pall Mall was congested by the angry mob who were wrecking the clubs, when suddenly the exultant cries were succeeded by terrified shrieks mingled with fierce oaths. Each man fought with his neighbour, and many men and women, crushed against iron railings, stood half suffocated and helpless. The National Gallery was burning fiercely, flames from the great burning pile shot high in the air, illuminating everything with their flood of crimson light, and the wind, blowing down the crowded thoroughfare, carried smoke, sparks, and heat with it. Distant shrieks were heard in the direction of the Square, and suddenly the crowd surged wildly forward. Gaol-birds from the purlieus of Drury Lane robbed those who had valuables or money upon them, and committed brutal assaults upon the unprotected. A moment later, however, there was a flash, and the deafening sound of firearms at close quarters was followed by the horrified shrieks of the yelling mob. Again and again the sound was repeated. Around them bullets whistled, and men and women fell forward dead and wounded with terrible curses upon their lips. The 10th Hussars had just arrived from Hounslow, and having received hurried orders to clear away the rioters, were shooting them down like dogs, without mercy. On every hand cries of agony and despair rose above the tumult. Then a silence followed, for the street was thickly strewn with corpses. CHAPTER VIII. FATEFUL DAYS FOR THE OLD FLAG. A cloudy moonless night, with a gusty wind which now and then swept the tops of the forest trees, causing the leaves to surge like a summer sea. Withered branches creaked and groaned, and a dog howled dismally down in Flimwell village, half a mile away. Leaning with his back against the gnarled trunk of a giant oak on the edge of the forest, his ears alert for the slightest sound, his hand upon his loaded magazine rifle, Geoffrey Engleheart stood on outpost duty. Dressed in a rough shooting suit, with a deerstalker hat and an improvised kit strapped upon his back, he was half hidden by the tall bracken. Standing motionless in the deep shadow, with his eyes fixed upon the wide stretch of sloping meadows, he waited, ready, at the slightest appearance of the enemy's scouts, to raise the alarm and call to arms those who were sleeping in the forest after their day's march. The City Civilian Volunteer Battalion which he had joined was on its way to take part in the conflict, which every one knew would be desperate. Under the command of Major Mansford, an experienced elderly officer who had long since retired from the Lancashire Regiment, but who had at once volunteered to lead the battalion of young patriots, they had left London by train for Maidstone, whence they marched by way of Linton, Marden, and Goudhurst to Frith Wood, where they had bivouacked for the night on the Sussex border. It was known that Russian scouts had succeeded in getting as far as Wadhurst, and it was expected that one of the French reconnoitring parties must, in their circuitous survey, pass the border of the wood on their way back to their own lines. Up to the present they had been practically unmolested. The British army was now mobilised, and Kent, Sussex, and Hampshire were overrun with soldiers. Every household gave men accommodation voluntarily, every hostelry, from the aristocratic hotels of the watering-places to the unassuming Red Lions of the villages, was full of Britain's brave defenders. The echoes of old-world village streets of thatched houses with quaint gables were awakened night and day by the rumbling of heavy artillery, the shouts of the drivers as they urged along their teams, and the rattle of ammunition carts and of ambulance waggons, while on every high road leading south battalions were on the march, and eager to come within fighting range of the audacious foreigners. At first the peaceful people of the villages gazed, wondered, and admired, thinking some manoeuvres were about to take place--for military manoeuvres always improve village trade. But they were very quickly disillusioned. When they knew the truth--that the enemy was actually at their doors, that the grey-coated masses of the Russian legions were lying like packs of wolves in the undulating country between Heathfield, Etchingham, and the sea--they were panic-stricken and appalled. They watched the stream of redcoats passing their doors, cheering them, while those who were their guests were treated to the best fare their hosts could provide. Tommy Atkins was now the idol of the hour. Apparently the enemy, having established themselves, were by no means anxious to advance with undue haste. Having landed, they were, it was ascertained, awaiting the arrival of further reinforcements and armaments from both Powers; but nothing definite was known of this, except some meagre details that had filtered through the American cables, all direct telegraphic communication with the Continent having now been cut off. Alas! Moloch had grinned. He had sharpened his sickle for the terrible carnage that was to spread through Albion's peaceful land. Terrible was the panic that the invasion had produced in the North. Food had risen to exorbitant prices. In the great manufacturing centres the toiling millions were already feeling the pinch of starvation, for with bread at ninepence a small loaf, meat at a prohibitive figure, and the factories stopped, they were compelled to remain with empty stomachs and idle hands. Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle, and the larger towns presented a gloomy, sorry aspect. Business was suspended, the majority of the shops were closed, the banks barred and bolted, and the only establishments where any trade flourished were the taverns and music halls. These were crowded. Drink flowed, gold jingled, and the laughter at wild jest or the thunder of applause which greeted dancing girls and comic vocalists was still as hearty as of old. Everywhere there was a sordid craving for amusement which was a reflex of the war fever. The people made merry, for ere long they might be cut down by a foeman's steel. Restless impatience thrilled the community from castle to cottage, intensified by the vain clamourings of Anarchist mobs in the greater towns. As in London, these shock-headed agitators held high revel, protesting against everything and everybody--now railing, now threatening, but always mustering converts to their harebrained doctrines. In Manchester they were particularly strong. A number of serious riots had occurred in Deansgate and in Market Street. The mob wrecked the Queen's Hotel, smashed numbers of windows in Lewis's great emporium, looted the _Guardian_ office, and set fire to the Town Hall. A portion of the latter only was burned, the fire brigade managing to subdue the flames before any very serious damage was occasioned. Although the police made hundreds of arrests, and the stipendiary sat from early morning until late at night, Anarchist demonstrations were held every evening in the city and suburbs, always resulting in pillage, incendiarism, and not unfrequently in murder. In grey, money-making Stockport, in grimy Salford, in smoky Pendleton, and even in aristocratic Eccles, these demonstrations were held, and the self-styled "soldiers of the social revolution" marched over the granite roads, headed by a dirty scarlet flag, hounding down the Government, and crying shame upon them for the apathy with which they had regarded the presence of the bearded Caucasian Tcherkesses of the White Tsar. The kingdom was in wild turmoil, for horror heaped upon horror. Outrages that commenced in London were repeated with appalling frequency in the great towns in the provinces. An attempt had been made to assassinate the Premier while speaking in the Town Hall, Birmingham, the bomb which was thrown having killed two hard-working reporters who were writing near; but the Prime Minister, who seemed to lead a charmed existence, escaped without a scratch. In Liverpool, where feeling against the War Office ran high, there were several explosions, two of which occurred in Bold Street, and were attended by loss of life, while a number of incendiary fires occurred at the docks. At Bradford the Town Hall was blown up, and the troops were compelled to fire on a huge mob of rioters, who, having assembled at Manningham, were advancing to loot the town. The cavalry barracks at York was the scene of a terrific explosion, which killed three sentries and maimed twenty other soldiers; while at Warwick Assizes, during the hearing of a murder trial, some unknown scoundrel threw a petard at the judge, killing him instantly on the bench. These, however, were but few instances of the wild lawlessness and terrible anarchy that prevailed in Britain, for only the most flagrant cases of outrage were reported in the newspapers, their columns being filled with the latest intelligence from the seat of war. It must be said that over the border the people were more law-abiding. The Scotch, too canny to listen to the fiery declamations of hoarse and shabby agitators, preferred to trust to British pluck and the strong arm of their brawny Highlanders. In Caledonia the seeds of Anarchy fell on stony ground. In Northern and Midland towns, however, the excitement increased hourly. It extended everywhere. From Ventnor to the Pentlands, from Holyhead to the Humber, from Scilly to the Nore, every man and every woman existed in fearfulness of the crash that was impending. It was now known throughout the breadth of our land that the Government policy was faulty, that War Office and Admiralty organisation was a rotten make-believe, and, worst of all, that what critics had long ago said as to the inadequacy of our naval defence, even with the ships built under the programme of 1894, had now, alas! proved to be true. The suspense was awful. Those who were now living in the peaceful atmospheres of their homes, surrounded by neighbours and friends in the centre of a great town, and feeling a sense of security, might within a few days be shot down by French rifles, or mowed down brutally by gleaming Cossack _shushkas_. The advance of the enemy was expected daily, hourly; and the people in the North waited, staggered, breathless, and terrified. Men eagerly scanned the newspapers; women pressed their children to their breasts. In the mining districts the shock had not inspired the same amount of fear as at the ports and in the manufacturing centres. Possibly it was because work was still proceeding in the pits, and constant work prevents men from becoming restless, or troubling themselves about a nation's woes. Toilers who worked below knew that foreign invaders had landed, and that the Militia and Volunteers had been called out, but they vaguely believed that, the seat of war being away down south--a very long distance in the imagination of most of them--everything would be over before they could be called upon to take part in the struggle. In any case coal and iron must be got, they argued, and while they had work they had little time for uneasiness. Nevertheless, great numbers of stalwart young miners enrolled themselves in the local Volunteer corps, and burned to avenge the affront to their country and their sovereign. Those were indeed fateful, ever-to-be-remembered days. Amid this weary, anxious watching, this constant dread of what might next occur, an item of news was circulated which caused the greatest rejoicing everywhere. Intelligence reached New York, by cable from France, that Germany had combined with England against the Franco-Russian alliance, that her vast army had been mobilised, and that already the brave, well-drilled legions of the Emperor William had crossed the Vosges, and passed the frontier into France. A sharp battle had been fought near Givet, and that, as well as several other French frontier towns which fell in 1870, were again in the hands of the Germans. How different were German methods to those of the British! With a perfect scheme of attack, every detail of which had been long thought out, and which worked without a hitch, the Kaiser's forces were awaiting the word of command to march onward--to Paris. For years--ever since they taught France that severe lesson in the last disastrous war--it had been the ambition of every German cavalryman to clink his spurs on the asphalte of the Boulevards. Now they were actually on their way towards their goal! The papers were full of these latest unexpected developments, the details of which, necessarily meagre owing to the lack of direct communication, were eagerly discussed. It was believed that Germany would, in addition to defending her Polish frontier and attacking France, also send a naval squadron from Kiel to England. The Tsar's spy had been foiled, and Russia and France now knew they had made a false move! Russia's rapid and decisive movement was intended to prevent the signing of the secret alliance, and to bar England and Germany from joining hands. But happily the sly machinations of the Count von Beilstein, the released convict and adventurer, had in a measure failed, for Germany had considered it diplomatic to throw in her fortune with Great Britain in this desperate encounter. A feeling of thankfulness spread through the land. Nevertheless, it was plain that if Germany intended to wield the double-handled sword of conquest in France, she would have few troops to spare to send to England. But those dark days, full of agonising suspense, dragged on slowly. The French well knew the imminent danger that threatened their own country, yet they could not possibly withdraw. Mad enthusiasts always! It must be war to the death, they decided. The conflict could not be averted. So Britons unsheathed their steel, and held themselves in readiness for a fierce and desperate fray. The invasion had indeed been planned by our enemies with marvellous forethought and cunning. There was treachery in the Intelligence Department of the British Admiralty, foul treachery which placed our country at the mercy of the invader, and sacrificed thousands of lives. On the morning following the sudden Declaration of War, the officer in charge of the telegraph bureau at Whitehall, whose duty it had been to send the telegrams ordering the naval mobilisation, was found lying dead beside the telegraph instrument--stabbed to the heart! Inquiries were made, and it was found that one of the clerks, a young Frenchman who had been taken on temporarily at a low salary, was missing. It was further discovered that the murder had been committed hours before, immediately the Mobilisation Orders had been sent; further, that fictitious telegrams had been despatched cancelling them, and ordering the Channel Fleet away to the Mediterranean, the Coastguard Squadron to Land's End, and the first-class Reserve ships to proceed to the North of Scotland in search of the enemy! Thus, owing to these orders sent by the murderer, England was left unprotected. Immediately the truth was known efforts were made to cancel the forged orders. But, alas! it was too late. Our Fleets had already sailed! CHAPTER IX. COUNT VON BEILSTEIN AT HOME. Karl von Beilstein sat in his own comfortable saddlebag-chair, in his chambers in the Albany, lazily twisting a cigarette. On a table at his elbow was spread sheet 319 of the Ordnance Survey Map of England, which embraced that part of Sussex where the enemy were encamped. With red and blue pencils he had been making mystic marks upon it, and had at last laid it aside with a smile of satisfaction. "She thought she had me in her power," he muttered ominously to himself. "The wolf! If she knew everything, she could make me crave again at her feet for mercy. Happily she is in ignorance; therefore that trip to a more salubrious climate that I anticipated is for the present postponed. I have silenced her, and am still master of the situation--still the agent of the Tsar!" Uttering a low laugh, he gave his cigarette a final twist, and then regarded it critically. The door opened to admit his valet, Grevel. "A message from the Embassy. The man is waiting," he said. His master opened the note which was handed to him, read it with contracted brows, and said-- "Tell him that the matter shall be arranged as quickly as possible." "Nothing else?" "Nothing. I am leaving London, and shall not be back for a week--perhaps longer." With a slight yawn he rose and passed into his dressing-room, while his servant went to deliver his message to the man in waiting. The note had produced a marked effect upon the spy. It was an order from his taskmasters in St. Petersburg. He knew it must be obeyed. Every moment was of vital consequence in carrying out the very delicate mission intrusted to him, a mission which it would require all his tact and cunning to execute. In a quarter of an hour he emerged into his sitting-room again, so completely disguised that even his most intimate acquaintances would have failed to recognise him. Attired in rusty black, with clean shaven face and walking with a scholarly stoop, he had transformed himself from the foppish man-about-town to a needy country parson, whose cheap boots were down at heel, and in the lappel of whose coat was displayed a piece of worn and faded blue. "Listen, Pierre," he said to his man, who entered at his summons. "While I am away keep your eyes and ears open. If there is a shadow of suspicion in any quarter, burn all my papers, send me warning through the Embassy, and clear out yourself without delay. Should matters assume a really dangerous aspect, you must get down to the Russian lines, where they will pass you through, and put you on board one of our ships." "Has the Ministry at Petersburg promised us protection at last?" "Yes; we have nothing to fear. When the game is up among these lambs, we shall calmly go over to the other side and witness the fun." "In what direction are you now going?" "I don't know," replied the spy, as he unlocked a drawer in a small cabinet in a niche by the fireplace and took from it a long Circassian knife. Drawing the bright blade from its leathern sheath, he felt its keen double edge with his fingers. It was like a razor. "A desperate errand--eh?" queried the valet, with a grin, noticing how carefully the Count placed the murderous weapon in his inner pocket. "Yes," he answered. "Desperate. A word sometimes means death." And the simple rural vicar strode out and down the stairs, leaving the crafty Pierre in wonderment. "Bah!" the latter exclaimed in disgust, when the receding footsteps had died away. "So you vainly imagine, my dear Karl, that you have your heel upon my neck, do you? It is good for me that you don't give me credit for being a little more wideawake, otherwise you would see that you are raking the chestnuts from the fire for me. _Bien!_ I am silent, docile, obedient; I merely wait for you to burn your fingers, then the whole of the money will be mine to enjoy, while you will be in the only land where the Tsar does not require secret agents. Vain, avaricious fool! _You'll be in your grave!_" Von Beilstein meanwhile sped along down the Haymarket and Pall Mall to Whitehall. The clock on the stone tower of the Horse Guards showed it was one o'clock, and, with apparently aimless purpose, he lounged about on the broad pavement outside Old Scotland Yard, immediately opposite the dark façade of the Admiralty. His hawk's eye carefully scrutinised every single person of the busy throng entering or leaving the building. There was great activity at the naval headquarters, and the courtyard was crowded with persons hurrying in and out. Presently, after a short but vigilant watch, he turned quickly so as to be unobserved, and moved slowly away. The cause of this sudden manoeuvre was the appearance of a well-dressed, dark-bearded man of about forty, having the appearance of a naval officer in mufti, who emerged hastily from the building with a handbag in his hand, and crossed the courtyard to the kerb, where he stood looking up and down the thoroughfare. "My man!" exclaimed von Beilstein, under his breath. "He wants a cab. I wonder where he's going?" Five minutes later the naval officer was in a hansom, driving towards Westminster Bridge, while, at a little distance behind, the Tsar's agent was following in another conveyance. Once on the trail, the Count never left his quarry. Crossing the bridge, they drove on rapidly through the crowded, turbulent streets of South London to the Elephant and Castle, and thence down the Old Kent Road to the New Cross Station of the South-Eastern Railway. As a protest against the action of the Government, and in order to prevent the enemy from establishing direct communication with London in case of British reverses, the lines from the metropolis to the south had been wrecked by the Anarchists. On the Chatham and Dover Railway, Penge tunnel had been blown up, on the Brighton line two bridges near Croydon had been similarly treated, and on the South-Eastern four bridges in Rotherhithe and Bermondsey had been broken up and rendered impassable by dynamite, while at Haysden, outside Tunbridge, the rails had also been torn up for a considerable distance. Therefore traffic to the south from London termini had been suspended, and the few persons travelling were compelled to take train at the stations in the remoter southern suburbs. As the unsuspecting officer stepped into the booking-office, his attention was not attracted by the quiet and seedy clergyman who lounged near enough to overhear him purchase a first-class ticket for Deal. When he had descended to the platform the spy obtained a third-class ticket to the same destination, and leisurely followed him. Travelling by the same train, they were compelled to alight at Haysden and walk over the wrecked permanent way into Tunbridge, from which place they journeyed to Deal, arriving there about six o'clock. Throughout, it was apparent to the crafty watcher that the man he was following was doing his utmost to escape observation, and this surmise was strengthened by his actions on arriving at the quaint old town, now half ruined; for, instead of going to a first-class hotel, he walked on until he came to Middle Street,--a narrow little thoroughfare, redolent of fish, running parallel with the sea,--and took up quarters at the Mariners' Rest Inn. It was a low, old-fashioned little place, with sanded floors, a smoke-blackened taproom, a rickety time-mellowed bar, with a comfortable little parlour beyond. In this latter room, used in common by the guests, on the following day the visitor from London first met the shabby parson from Canterbury. The man from the Admiralty seemed in no mood for conversation; nevertheless, after a preliminary chat upon the prospect of the invasion, they exchanged cards, and the vicar gradually became confidential. With a pious air he related how he had been to Canterbury to conduct a revival mission which had turned out marvellously successful, crowds having to be turned away at every service, and how he was now enjoying a week's vacation before returning to his poor but extensive parish in Hertfordshire. "I came to this inn, because I am bound to practise a most rigid economy," he added. "I am charmed with it. One sees so much character here in these rough toilers of the sea." "Yes," replied his friend, whose card bore the words "Commander Yerbery, R.N." "Being a sailor myself, I prefer this homely little inn, with its fisher folk as customers, to a more pretentious and less comfortable establishment." "Are you remaining here long?" asked his clerical friend. "I--I really don't know," answered the officer hesitatingly. "Possibly a day or so." The spy did not pursue the subject further, but conducted himself with an amiability which caused his fellow-traveller to regard him as "a real good fellow for a parson." Together they smoked the long clays of the hostelry, they sat in the taproom of an evening and conversed with the fishermen who congregated there, and frequently strolled along by the shore to Walmer, or through the fields to Cottingham Court Farm, or Sholden. Constantly, however, Commander Yerbery kept his eyes seaward. Was he apprehensive lest Russian ironclads should return, and again bombard the little town; or was he expecting some mysterious signal from some ship in the Downs? CHAPTER X. A DEATH DRAUGHT. On several occasions the spy had, with artful ingenuity, endeavoured to discover the object of Commander Yerbery's sojourn, but upon that point he preserved a silence that was impenetrable. In their wanderings about the town they saw on every side the havoc caused by the bombardment which had taken place three days previously. Whole rows of houses facing the sea had been carried away by the enemy's shells, and the once handsome church spire was now a mere heap of smouldering débris. The barracks, which had been one of the objects of attack, had suffered most severely. Mélinite had been projected into them, exploding with devastating effect, and demolishing the buildings, which fell like packs of cards. Afterwards, the enemy had sailed away, apparently thinking the strategical position of the place worthless. And all this had been brought about by this despicable villain--the man who had now wrapped himself in the cloak of sanctity, and who, beaming with well-feigned good fellowship, walked arm-in-arm with the man upon whom he was keeping the most vigilant observation! By night sleep scarcely came to his eyes, but in his little room, with its clean old-fashioned dimity blinds and hangings, he lay awake,--scheming, planning, plotting, preparing for the master-stroke. One morning, after they had been there three days, he stood alone in his bedroom with the door closed. From his inner pocket he drew forth the keen Circassian blade that reposed there, and gazed thoughtfully upon it. "No," he muttered, suddenly rousing himself, as if a thought had suddenly occurred to him. "He is strong. He might shout, and then I should be caught like a rat in a trap." Replacing the knife in his pocket, he took from his vest a tiny phial he always carried; then, after noiselessly locking the door, he took from the same pocket a small cube of lump sugar. Standing by the window he uncorked the little bottle, and with steady hand allowed one single drop of the colourless liquid to escape and fall upon the sugar, which quickly absorbed it, leaving a small darkened stain. This sugar he placed in a locked drawer to dry, and, putting away the phial, descended to join his companion. That night they were sitting together in the private parlour behind the bar, smoking and chatting. It was an old-fashioned, smoke-begrimed room, with low oak ceiling and high wainscot,--a room in which many a seafarer had found rest and comfort after the toils and perils of the deep, a room in which many a stirring tale of the sea has been related, and in which one of our best-known nautical writers has gathered materials for his stirring ocean romances. Although next the bar, there is no entrance on that side, neither is there any glass, therefore the apartment is entirely secluded from the public portion of the inn. At midnight the hearty Boniface and his wife and servant had retired, and the place was silent, but the officer and his fellow-guest still sat with their pipes. The parson, as became one who exhibited the blue pledge of temperance in his coat, sipped his coffee, while the other had whisky, lemon, and a small jug of hot water beside him. The spy had been using the sugar, and the basin was close to his hand. His companion presently made a movement to reach it, when the pleasant-spoken vicar took up the tongs quickly, saying-- "Allow me to assist you. One lump?" "Yes, thanks," replied the other, holding his glass for the small cube to be thrown in. Then he added the lemon, whisky, and hot water. Beilstein, betraying no excitement, continued the conversation, calmly refilled his pipe, and watched his companion sip the deadly potion. Karl von Beilstein had reduced poisoning to a fine art. Not a muscle of his face contracted, though his keen eyes never left the other's countenance. They talked on, the Commander apparently unaffected by the draught; his friend smilingly complacent and confident. Suddenly, without warning, the officer's face grew ashen pale and serious. A violent tremor shook his stalwart frame. "I--I feel very strange," he cried, with difficulty. "A most curious sensation has come over me--a sensation as if--as if--ah! heavens! Help, help!--I--I can't breathe!" The mild-mannered parson jumped to his feet, and stood before his friend, watching the hideous contortions of his face. "Assistance!" his victim gasped, sinking inertly back in the high-backed Windsor arm-chair. "Fetch me a doctor--quick." But the man addressed took no heed of the appeal. He stood calmly by, contemplating with satisfaction his villainous work. "Can't you see--I'm ill?" the dying man cried in a feeble, piteous voice. "My throat and head are burning. Give me water--_water_!" Still the spy remained motionless. "You--you refuse to assist me--you scoundrel! Ah!" he cried hoarsely, in dismay. "Ah! I see it all now! _God! You've poisoned me!_" With a frantic effort he half-raised himself in his chair, but fell back in a heap; his arms hanging helplessly at his side. His breath came and went in short hard gasps; the death-rattle was already in his throat, and with one long deep-drawn sigh the last breath left the body, and the light gradually died out of the agonised face. Quick as thought the Count unbuttoned the dead man's coat, and searching his pockets took out a large white official envelope bearing in the corner the blue stamp of the Admiralty. It was addressed to "Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, Admiral commanding the Channel Squadron," and was marked "Private." "Good!" ejaculated the spy, as he tore open the envelope. "I was not mistaken, after all! He was waiting until the flagship came into the Downs to deliver it." The envelope contained a letter accompanied by a chart of the South Coast, upon which were certain marks at intervals in red with minute directions, as well as a copy of the code of secret signals in which some slight alterations had lately been made. "What fortune!" cried the Count gleefully, after reading the note. "Their plans and the secret of their signals, too, are now ours! The Embassy were correct in their surmise. With these the French and Russian ships will be able to act swiftly, and sweep the British from the sea. Now for London as quickly as possible, for the information will be absolutely invaluable." Without a final glance at the corpse, huddled up in its chair, he put on his hat, and stealing noiselessly from the house, set out in the moonlight to walk swiftly by way of Great Mongeham and Waldershare to Shepherd's Well station, whence he could get by train to London. The immense importance of these secret documents he had not overrated. Their possession would enable the Russian ships to decipher many of the hitherto mysterious British signals. The spy had accomplished his mission! CHAPTER XI. THE MASSACRE AT EASTBOURNE. Hourly the most alarming reports were being received at the War Office, and at newspaper offices throughout the country, of the rapidly-increasing forces of the invaders, who were still landing in enormous numbers. Vague rumours were also afloat of desperate encounters at sea between our Coastguard Squadron that had returned and the French and Russian ironclads. Nothing definite, however, was known. News travelled slowly, and was always unreliable. Mobilisation was being hurried forward with all possible speed. Nevertheless, so sudden had been the descent of the enemy, that Eastbourne, Newhaven, and Seaford had already fallen into their hands. Into the half-wrecked town of Eastbourne regiment after regiment of Russian infantry had been poured by the transports _Samojed_ and _Artelscik_, while two regiments of dragoons, one of Cossacks, and many machine-gun sections had also been landed, in addition to a quantity of French infantry from the other vessels. The streets of the usually clean, well-ordered town were strewn with the débris of fallen houses and shops that had been wrecked by Russian shells. The Queen's Hotel at Splash Point, with its tiers of verandahs and central spire, stood out a great gaunt blackened ruin. Along Terminus Road the grey-coated hordes of the Great White Tsar looted the shops, and showed no quarter to those who fell into their hands. The Grand Hotel, the Burlington, the Cavendish, and others, were quickly transformed into barracks, as well as the half-ruined Town Hall, and the Floral Hall at Devonshire Park. Robbery, outrage, and murder ran riot in the town, which only a few days before had been a fashionable health resort, crowded by aristocratic idlers. Hundreds of unoffending persons had been killed by the merciless fire from the enemy's battleships, and hundreds more were being shot down in the streets for attempting a feeble resistance. The inhabitants, surrounded on all sides by the enemy, were powerless. The huge guns of the _Pamyat Azova_, the _Imperator Nicolai I._, the _Pjotr Velikij_, the _Krejser_, the _Najezdnik_, and others, had belched forth their death-dealing missiles with an effect that was appalling. The thunder of cannon had ceased, but was now succeeded by the sharp cracking of Russian rifles, as those who, desperately guarding their homes and their loved ones, and making a stand against the invaders, were shot down like dogs. A crowd of townspeople collected in the open space outside the railway station, prepared to bar the advance of the Russians towards the Old Town and Upperton. Alas! it was a forlorn hope for an unarmed mob to attempt any such resistance. A Russian officer suddenly shouted a word of command that brought a company of infantry to the halt, facing the crowd. Another word and a hundred rifles were discharged. Again and again they flashed, and the volley was repeated until the streets were covered with dead and dying, and the few who were not struck turned and fled, leaving the invaders to advance unopposed. Horrible were the deeds committed that night. English homes were desecrated, ruined, and burned. Babes were murdered before the eyes of their parents, many being impaled by gleaming Russian bayonets; fathers were shot down in the presence of their wives and children, and sons were treated in a similar manner. [Illustration: LANDING OF RUSSIANS, AND MASSACRE IN TERMINUS ROAD, EASTBOURNE.] The massacre was frightful. Ruin and desolation were on every hand. The soldiers of the Tsar, savage and inhuman, showed no mercy to the weak and unprotected. They jeered and laughed at piteous appeal, and with fiendish brutality enjoyed the destruction which everywhere they wrought. Many a cold-blooded murder was committed, many a brave Englishman fell beneath the heavy whirling sabres of Circassian Cossacks, the bayonets of French infantry, or the deadly hail of machine guns. Battalion after battalion of the enemy, fierce and ruthless, clambered on over the débris in Terminus Road, enthusiastic at finding their feet upon English soil. The flames of the burning buildings in various parts of the town illuminated the place with a bright red glare that fell upon dark bearded faces, in every line of which was marked determination and fierce hostility. Landing near Langney Point, many of the battalions entered the town from the east, destroying all the property they came across on their line of advance, and, turning into Terminus Road, then continued through Upperton and out upon the road leading to Willingdon. The French forces, who came ashore close to Holywell, on the other side of the town, advanced direct over Warren Hill, and struck due north towards Sheep Lands. At about a mile from the point where the road from Eastdean crosses that to Jevington, the force encamped in a most advantageous position upon Willingdon Hill, while the Russians who advanced direct over St. Anthony's Hill, and those who marched through Eastbourne, united at a point on the Lewes Road near Park Farm, and after occupying Willingdon village, took up a position on the high ground that lies between it and Jevington. From a strategic point of view the positions of both forces were carefully chosen. The commanding officers were evidently well acquainted with the district, for while the French commanded Eastbourne and a wide stretch of the Downs, the Russians also had before them an extensive tract of country extending in the north to Polegate, in the west to the Fore Down and Lillington, and in the east beyond Willingdon over Pevensey Levels to the sea. During the night powerful search-lights from the French and Russian ships swept the coast continually, illuminating the surrounding hills and lending additional light to the ruined and burning town. Before the sun rose, however, the majority of the invading vessels had rounded Beachy Head, and had steamed away at full speed down Channel. [Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE POINTS WHERE THE INVADERS LANDED.] Daylight revealed the grim realities of war. It showed Eastbourne with its handsome buildings scorched and ruined, its streets blocked by fallen walls, and trees which had once formed shady boulevards torn up and broken, its shops looted, its tall church steeples blown away, its railway station wrecked, and its people massacred. Alas! their life-blood was wet upon the pavements. The French and Russian legions, ever increasing, covered the hills. The heavy guns of the French artillery and the lighter but more deadly machine guns of the Russians had already been placed in position, and were awaiting the order to move north and commence the assault on London. It was too late! Nothing could now be done to improve the rotten state of our defences. The invasion had begun, and Britain, handicapped alike on land and on sea, must arm and fight to the death. By Tuesday night, three days after the Declaration of War, two French and half a Russian army corps, amounting to 90,000 officers and men, with 10,000 horses and 1500 guns and waggons, had landed, in addition to which reinforcements constantly arrived from the French Channel and Russian Baltic ports, until the number of the enemy on English soil was estimated at over 300,000. The overwhelming descent on our shores had been secretly planned by the enemy with great forethought, every detail having been most carefully arranged. The steam tonnage in the French harbours was ample and to spare, for many of the vessels, being British, had been at once seized on the outbreak of hostilities. The sudden interruption of the mail and telegraphic services between the two countries left us in total ignorance of the true state of affairs. Nevertheless, for weeks an army of carpenters and engineers had been at work preparing the necessary fittings, which were afterwards placed in position on board the ships destined to convey horses and men to England. In order to deceive the other Powers, a large number of military transport vessels had been fitted out at Brest for a bogus expedition to Dahomey. These ships actually put to sea on the day previous to the Declaration of War, and on Saturday night, at the hour when the news reached Britain, they had already embarked guns, horses, and waggons at the Channel ports. Immediately after the Tsar's manifesto had been issued the Russian Volunteer Fleet was mobilised, and transports which had long been held in readiness in the Baltic harbours embarked men and guns, and, one after another, steamed away for England without the slightest confusion or any undue haste. CHAPTER XII. IN THE EAGLE'S TALONS. Many British military and naval writers had ridiculed the idea of a surprise invasion without any attempt on the part of the enemy to gain more than a partial and temporary control of the Channel. Although an attack on territory without having previously command of the sea had generally been foredoomed to failure, it had been long ago suggested by certain military officers in the course of lectures at the United Service Institution, that under certain conditions such invasion was possible, and that France might ere long be ruled by some ambitious soldier who might be tempted to try a sudden dash on _le perfide Albion_. They pointed out that at worst it would entail on France the loss of three or four army corps, a loss no greater than she would suffer in one short land campaign. But alas! at that time very little notice was taken of such criticisms and illustrations, for Britons had always been prone to cast doubts upon the power of other nations to convey troops by sea, to embark them, or to land them. Thus the many suggestions directed towards increasing the mobility and efficiency of the Army were, like other warnings, cast aside, the prevailing opinion in the country being that sudden invasion was an absolute impossibility. Predictions of prophets that had so long been scorned, derided, and disregarded by an apathetic British public were rapidly being fulfilled. Coming events had cast dark shadows that had been unheeded, and now the unexpected bursting of the war cloud produced panic through our land. General Sir Archibald Alison struck an alarming note of warning when he wrote in _Blackwood_ in December 1893: "No one can look carefully into the present state of Europe without feeling convinced that it cannot continue long in its present condition. Every country is maintaining an armed force out of all proportion to its resources and population, and the consequent strain upon its monetary system and its industrial population is ever increasing, and must sooner or later become unbearable." It had never been sufficiently impressed upon the British public, that when mobilised for war, and with all the Reserves called out, Russia had at her command 2,722,000 officers and men, while France could put 2,715,000 into the field, making a total force of the Franco-Russian Armies of 5,437,000 men, with 9920 field guns and 1,480,000 horses. This well-equipped force was almost equal to the combined Armies of the Triple Alliance, Germany possessing 2,441,000, Austria 1,590,000, and Italy 1,909,000, a total of 5,940,000 officers and men, with 8184 field guns and 813,996 horses. Beside these enormous totals, how ridiculously small appeared the British Army, with its Regular forces at home and abroad amounting to only 211,600 of all ranks, 225,400 Volunteers, and 74,000 Reserves, or 511,000 fighting men! Of these, only 63,000 Regulars remained in England and Wales, therefore our Reserves and Volunteers were the chief defenders of our homes. What a mere handful they appeared side by side with these huge European Armies! Was it not surprising that in such circumstances the constant warnings regarding the weakness of our Navy--the force upon which the very life of our Empire depended--should have been unheeded by the too confident public? When we were told plainly by a well-known authority that the number of our war vessels was miserably inadequate, that we were 10,000 men and 1000 officers short, and, among other things, that a French cruiser had, for all practical purposes, three times the fighting efficiency of an English cruiser, no one troubled. Nor was any one aroused from his foolishly apathetic confidence in British supremacy at sea. True, our Navy was strengthened to a certain extent in 1894, but hard facts, solemn warnings, gloomy forebodings, all were, alas! cast aside among the "scares" which crop up periodically in the press during a Parliamentary recess, and which, on the hearing of a murder trial, or a Society scandal, at once fizzle out and are dismissed for ever. On this rude awakening to the seriousness of the situation, Service men now remembered distinctly the prophetic words of the few students of probable invasion. Once they had regarded them as based on wild improbabilities, but now they admitted that the facts were as represented, and that critics had foreseen catastrophe. Already active steps had been taken towards the defence of London. Notwithstanding the serious defects in the mobilisation scheme, the 1st Army Corps, formed at Aldershot under Sir Evelyn Wood, and three cavalry brigades, were now in the field, while the other army corps were being rapidly conveyed southwards. Independently of the Field Army, the Volunteers had mobilised, and were occupying the lines north and south of the metropolis. This force of Volunteer infantry consisted of 108,300 officers and men, of whom 73,000, with 212 guns, were placed on the line south of the Thames. It stretched along the hills from Guildford in Surrey to Halstead in Kent, with intermediate concentration points at Box Hill and Caterham. At the latter place an efficient garrison had been established, consisting of 4603 of all ranks of the North London Brigade, 4521 of the West London, 5965 of the South London, 5439 of the Surrey, and 6132 of the Lancashire and Cheshire. This force was backed by eleven 16-pounder batteries of the 1st Norfolk from Yarmouth, the 1st Sussex from Brighton, the 1st Newcastle and the 2nd Durham from Seaham, and ten 40-pounder batteries of the 3rd and 6th Lancashire from Liverpool, the 9th Lancashire from Bolton, the 1st Cheshire from Chester, the 1st Cinque Ports from Dover, and the 2nd Cinque Ports from St. Leonards. At Halstead, on the left flank, there were massed about 20,470 Volunteer infantry, these being made up of the South Wales Brigade 4182, Welsh Border 5192, the North Midland 5225, and the South Midland 5970. The eleven 16-pounder batteries came from the Woolwich Arsenal, Monmouth, Shropshire, and Stafford Corps, and five 40-pounder batteries from the Preston Corps. To Guildford 4471 infantry in the Home Counties Brigade and 4097 in the Western Counties were assigned, while the guns consisted of four 40-pounder batteries from the York and Leeds Corps, the 16-pounder batteries of the Fife, Highland, and Midlothian Corps being unable, as yet, to get south on account of the congested state of all the northern railways. For this same reason, too, the force at Box Hill, the remaining post in the south line of defence, was a very weak one. To this the Volunteers assigned were mostly Scottish. Of the Glasgow Brigade 8000 of all ranks arrived, with 4000 from the South of Scotland Brigade; but the Highland Brigade of 4400 men, all enthusiastically patriotic, and the 16-pounder batteries from Ayr and Lanark, were compelled, to their chagrin, to wait at their headquarters for several days before the railways--every resource of which was strained to their utmost limits--could move them forward to the seat of war. The five heavy batteries of the Aberdeen and North York Corps succeeded in getting down to their place of concentration early, as likewise did the 16-pounder battery from Galloway. Volunteers also undertook the defences north of the metropolis, and a strong line, consisting of a number of provincial brigades, stretched from Tilbury to Brentwood and Epping. The British Volunteer holds no romantic notions of "death or glory," but is none the less prepared to do his duty, and is always ready "to do anything, and to go anywhere." Every officer and every man of this great force which had mounted guard north and south of the Thames was resolved to act his part bravely, and, if necessary, lay down his life for his country's honour. At their posts on the Surrey Hills, ready at any moment to go into action, and firmly determined that no invader should enter the vast Capital of the World, they impatiently awaited the development of the situation, eager to face and annihilate their foreign foe. Britannia had always been justly proud of her Volunteer forces, although their actual strength in time of invasion had never before been demonstrated. Now, however, the test which had been applied showed that, with an exception of rarest occurrence, every man had responded to this hasty call to arms, and that on active service they were as fearless and courageous as any body of Regulars ever put in the field. Every man was alive to Britain's danger; every man knew well how terrible would be the combat--the struggle that must result in either victory or death. The double-headed Eagle had set his talons in British soil! CHAPTER XIII. FIERCE FIGHTING IN THE CHANNEL. In the Channel disastrous events of a most exciting character were now rapidly occurring. Outside Seaford Bay, Pevensey Bay, and off Brighton and the Mares at Cuckmere Haven, the enemy's transports, having landed troops and stores, rode at anchor, forming a line of retreat in case of reverses, while many fast French cruisers steamed up and down, keeping a sharp lookout for any British merchant or mail steamers which, ignorant of the hostilities, entered the Channel. The officers and crews of these steamers were in most cases so utterly surprised that they fell an easy prey to the marauding vessels, many being captured and taken to French ports without a shot being fired. Other vessels, on endeavouring to escape, were either overhauled or sunk by the heavy fire of pursuing cruisers. One instance was that of the fast mail steamer _Carpathian_, belonging to the Union Steamship Company, which, entering the Channel on a voyage from Cape Town to Southampton, was attacked off the Eddystone by the Russian armoured cruiser _Gerzog Edinburskij_. The panic on board was indescribable, over a hundred steerage passengers being killed or mutilated by the shells from the bow guns of the cruiser, and the captain himself being blown to atoms by an explosion which occurred when a shot struck and carried away the forward funnel. After an exciting chase, the _Carpathian_ was sunk near Start Point, and of the five hundred passengers and crew scarcely a single person survived. This terrible work of destruction accomplished, the Russian cruiser turned westward again to await further prey. As she steamed away, however, another ship rounded the Start following at full speed in her wake. This vessel, which was flying the British flag, was the barbette-ship _Centurion_. Already her captain had witnessed the attack and sinking of the _Carpathian_, but from a distance too great to enable him to assist the defenceless liner, and he was now on his way to attack the Tsar's cruiser. Almost immediately she was noticed by the enemy. Half an hour later she drew within range, and soon the two ships were engaged in a most desperate encounter. The gunners on the _Centurion_, seeing the Russian cross flying defiantly, and knowing the frightful havoc already wrought on land by the enemy, worked with that pluck and indomitable energy characteristic of the Britisher. Shot after shot was exchanged, but hissed and splashed without effect until the ships drew nearer, and then nearly every shell struck home. The rush of flame from the quick-firing guns of the _Centurion_ was continuous, and the firing was much more accurate than that of her opponent, nevertheless the latter was manipulated with remarkable skill. The roar of the guns was deafening. Clouds of smoke rose so thickly that the vessels could scarcely distinguish each other. But the firing was almost continuous, until suddenly a shell struck the _Centurion_ abaft the funnel, and for a moment stilled her guns. This, however, was not for long, for in a few moments she recovered from the shock, and her guns were again sending forth shells with regularity and precision. Again a shell struck the _Centurion_, this time carrying away one of her funnels and killing a large number of men. The British captain, still as cool as if standing on the hearthrug of the smoking-room of the United Service Club, took his vessel closer, continuing the fire, heedless of the fact that the Russian shells striking his ship were playing such fearful havoc with it. Every preparation had been made for a desperate fight to the death, when suddenly a shot struck the vessel, causing her to reel and shiver. So well had the Russians directed their fire that the British vessel could not reply. One of her 29-tonners had been blown completely off its carriage, and lay shattered with men dead all around, while two of her quick-firing broadside guns had been rendered useless, and she had sustained other injuries of a very serious character, besides losing nearly half her men. She was silent, riding to the swell, when wild exultant shouts in Russian went up from the enemy's ship, mingling with the heavy fire they still kept up. At that moment, however, even while the victorious shouts resounded, the captain of the _Centurion_, still cool and collected, swung round his vessel, and turning, touched one of the electric knobs at his hand. As he did so a long silvery object shot noiselessly from the side of the ship, and plunged with a splash into the rising waves. Seconds seemed hours. For a whole three minutes the captain waited; then, disappointed, he turned away with an expression of impatience. The torpedo had missed its mark, and every moment lost might determine their fate. With guns still silent he again adroitly manoeuvred his ship. Once again he touched the electric knob, and again a torpedo, released from its tube, sped rapidly through the water. Suddenly a dull and muffled explosion from the Russian cruiser sounded. Above the dense smoke a flame shot high, with great columns of spray, as the guns suddenly ceased their thunder. There was a dead stillness, broken only by the wash of the sea. Then the smoke clearing showed the débris of the _Gerzog Edinburskij_ fast sinking beneath the restless waters. Some splinters precipitated into the air had fallen with loud splashes in every direction, and amid the victorious shouts of the British bluejackets the disabled ship, with its fluttering Russian cross, slowly disappeared for ever, carrying down every soul on board. The torpedo, striking her amidships, had blown an enormous hole right through her double bottom, and torn her transverse bulkheads away so much that her watertight doors were useless for keeping her afloat, even for a few minutes. Partially crippled as she was, the _Centurion_ steamed slowly westward, until at noon on the following day she fell in with a division of the Coastguard Squadron, which, acting under the fictitious telegraphic orders of the French spy, had been to Land's End, but which, now the enemy had landed, had received genuine orders from the Admiralty. Compared with the number and strength of the French and Russian vessels mustered in the Channel, this force was so small as to appear ludicrous. To send this weak defending division against the mighty power of the invaders was sheer madness, and everybody on board knew it. The vessels were weaker in every detail than those of the enemy. At full speed the British vessels steamed on throughout that day, until at 8 P.M., when about twenty miles south of Selsey Bill, they were joined by forces from the Solent. These consisted of the turret-ship _Monarch_, the turret-ram _Rupert_, the barbette-ship _Rodney_, the belted cruiser _Aurora_, and the coast defence armour-clads _Cyclops_ and _Gorgon_, together with a number of torpedo boats. The night was calm, but moonless, and without delay the vessels all continued the voyage up Channel silently, with lights extinguished. Two hours later the officers noticed that away on the horizon a light suddenly flashed twice and then disappeared. One of the enemy's ships had signalled the approach of the defenders! This caused the British Admiral to alter his course slightly, and the vessels steamed along in the direction the light had shown. In turrets and in broadside batteries there was a deep hush of expectation. Officers and men standing at their quarters scarcely spoke. All felt the fight must be most desperate. Presently, in the far distance a small patch of light in the sky showed the direction of Brighton, and almost immediately the Admiral signalled to the cruisers _Aurora_, _Galatea_, and _Narcissus_, and the new battleship _Hannibal_, built under the 1894 programme, to detach themselves with six torpedo boats, and take an easterly course, in order to carry out instructions which he gave. These tactics caused considerable comment. The orders were to make straight for Eastbourne, and to suddenly attack and destroy any of the hostile transports that were lying there, the object being twofold--firstly, to cut off the enemy's line of retreat, and secondly, to prevent the vessels from being used for the purpose of landing further reinforcements. Soon after 2 A.M. this gallant little division had, by careful manoeuvring, and assisted by a slight mist which now hung over the sea, rounded Beachy Head without being discovered, and had got outside Pevensey Bay about eight miles from land. Here a number of Russian transports and service steamers were lying, among them being the _Samojed_ and _Olaf_, _Krasnaya Gorka_ and _Vladimir_, with two smaller ones--the _Dnepr_ and the _Artelscik_. Silently, and without showing any lights, a British torpedo boat sped quickly along to where the dark outline of a ship loomed through the mist, and, having ascertained that it was the _Olaf_, drew up quickly. A few minutes elapsed, all being quiet. Then suddenly a bright flash was followed by a fearful explosion, and the bottom of the Tsar's vessel being completely ripped up by the torpedo, she commenced to settle down immediately, before any of those on board could save themselves. The enemy had scarcely recovered from their surprise and confusion when three other loud explosions occurred, and in each case transport vessels were blown up. British torpedo boats, darting hither and thither between the Russian ships, were dealing terrible blows from which no vessel could recover. So active were they, indeed, that within the space of fifteen minutes six transports had been blown up, as well as the first-class torpedo boat _Abo_. The loss of life was terrible. Simultaneously with the first explosion, the guns of the _Aurora_, _Galatea_, and _Narcissus_ thundered out a terrible salute. The bright search-lights of the Russian cruisers and of the battleship _Navarin_ immediately swept the sea, and through the mist discerned the British ships. The lights served only to show the latter the exact position of the enemy, and again our guns belched forth shot and shell with disastrous effect. Quickly, however, the Russian vessels replied. Flame flashed continuously from the turret of the _Navarin_ and the port guns of the _Opricnik_ and the _Najezdnik_, while the search-lights were at the same time shut off. At first the fire was very ineffectual, but gradually as the vessels crept closer to each other the encounter became more and more desperate. The Russian torpedo boats _Vzryv_, _Vindava_, and _Kotlinj_ were immediately active, and the _Narcissus_ had a very narrow escape, a Whitehead torpedo passing right under her bows, while one British torpedo boat, which at the same moment was endeavouring to launch its deadly projectile at the _Navarin_, was sent to the bottom by a single shot from the _Najezdnik_. The combat was desperate and terrible. That the British had been already successful in surprising and sinking a torpedo boat and six of the hostile transports was true; nevertheless the number of Russian ships lying there was much greater than the British Admiral had anticipated, and, to say the least, the four vessels now found themselves in a most critical position. The _Navarin_ alone was one of the most powerful of the Tsar's battleships, and, in addition to the seven cruisers and nine torpedo boats, comprised an overwhelming force. Yet the English warships held their own, pouring forth an incessant fire. Each gun's crew knew they were face to face with death, but, inspired by the coolness of their officers, they worked on calmly and indefatigably. Many of their shots went home with frightful effect. One shell which burst over the magazine of the _Lieut. Iljin_ ripped up her deck and caused severe loss of life, while in the course of half an hour one of the heavy turret guns of the _Navarin_ had been disabled, and two more Russian torpedo boats sunk. Our torpedo boat destroyers operating on the Channel seaboard were performing excellent work, the _Havock_, _Shark_, _Hornet_, _Dart_, _Bruiser_, _Hasty_, _Teaser_, _Janus_, _Surly_, and _Porcupine_ all being manoeuvred with splendid success. Several, however, were lost while sweeping out the enemy's torpedo boat shelters, including the _Ardent_, _Charger_, _Boxer_, and _Rocket_. [Illustration: SINKING OF H.M.S. "AURORA" BY A TORPEDO: "THE CRUISER ROSE AS IF SHE HAD RIDDEN OVER A VOLCANO."] But the British vessels were now suffering terribly, hemmed in as they were by the enemy, with shells falling upon them every moment, and their decks swept by the withering fire of machine guns. Suddenly, after a shell had burst in the stern of the _Aurora_, she ceased firing and swung round, almost colliding with the _Narcissus_. Her steam steering-gear had, alas! been broken by the shot, and for a few moments her officers lost control over her. A Russian torpedo boat in shelter behind the _Navarin_, now seeing its chance, darted out and launched its projectile. The officers of the _Aurora_, aware of their danger, seemed utterly powerless to avert it. It was a terrible moment. A few seconds later the torpedo struck, the cruiser rose as if she had ridden over a volcano, and then, as she gradually settled down, the dark sea rolled over as gallant a crew as ever sailed beneath the White Ensign. Immediately afterwards the _Navarin_ exchanged rapid signals with a number of ships which were approaching with all speed from the direction of Hastings, and the captains of the three remaining British vessels saw that they had fallen into a trap. The _Narcissus_ had been drawn between two fires. Both her funnels had been shot away, two of her broadside guns were useless, and she had sustained damage to her engines; nevertheless, her captain, with the dogged perseverance of a British sailor, continued the desperate combat. With the first flush of dawn the fog had lifted, but there was scarcely sufficient wind to spread out the British ensign, which still waved with lazy defiance. On one side of her was the ponderous _Navarin_, from the turret of which shells were projected with monotonous regularity, while on the other the British cruiser was attacked vigorously by the _Najezdnik_. The _Narcissus_, however, quickly showed the Russians what she could do against such overwhelming odds, for presently she sent a shot from one of her 20-ton guns right under the turret of the _Navarin_, causing a most disastrous explosion on board that vessel, while, at the same time, her 6-inch breechloaders pounded away at her second antagonist, and sank a torpedo boat manoeuvring near. Both the _Galatea_ and the _Hannibal_ were in an equally serious predicament. The enemy's torpedo boats swarmed around them, while the cruisers _Opricnik_, _Admiral Korniloff_, _Rynda_, and several other vessels, kept up a hot, incessant fire, which was returned energetically by the British vessels. The sight was magnificent, appalling! In the spreading dawn, the great ships manoeuvring smartly, each strove to obtain points of vantage, and vied with each other in their awful work of destruction. The activity of the British torpedo boats, darting here and there, showed that those who manned them were utterly reckless of their lives. As they sped about, it was indeed marvellous how they escaped destruction, for the Russians had more than double the number of boats, and their speed was quite equal to our own. Nevertheless the British boats followed up their successes by other brilliant deeds of daring, for one of them, with a sudden dash, took the _Rynda_ off her guard, and sent a torpedo at her with awful result, while a few moments later two terrific explosions sounded almost simultaneously above the thunder of the guns, and it was then seen that the unprotected cruiser _Asia_, and the last remaining transport the _Krasnaya Gorka_, were both sinking. It was a ghastly spectacle. Hoarse despairing shrieks went up from hundreds of Russian sailors who fought and struggled for life in the dark rolling waters, and three British torpedo boats humanely rescued a great number of them. Many, however, sank immediately with their vessels, while some strong swimmers struck out for the distant shore. Yet, without exception, all these succumbed to exhaustion ere they could reach the land, and the long waves closed over them as they threw up their arms and sank into the deep. During the first few minutes following this sudden disaster to the enemy the firing ceased, and the _Navarin_ ran up signals. This action attracted the attention of the officers of the British vessels to the approaching ships, and to their amazement and dismay they discovered that they were a squadron of the enemy who had returned unexpectedly from the direction of Dover. The British ships, in their half-crippled condition, could not possibly withstand such an onslaught as they knew was about to be made upon them, for the enemy's reinforcements consisted of the steel barbette-ships _Gangut_, _Alexander II._, and _Nicolai I._, of the Baltic Fleet, the great turret-ship _Petr Veliky_, the _Rurik_, a very powerful central-battery belted cruiser of over ten thousand tons, two new cruisers of the same type that had been recently completed, the _Enara_ and _Ischma_, with three other cruisers and a large flotilla of torpedo boats. Accompanying them were the French 10,000-ton armoured barbette-ship _Magenta_, the central-battery ship _Richelieu_, the armoured turret-ship _Tonnerre_, and the _Hoche_, one of the finest vessels of our Gallic neighbour's Navy, as well as the torpedo cruisers _Hirondelle_ and _Fleurus_, and a number of swift torpedo boats and "catchers." The captains of the British vessels saw that in the face of such a force defeat was a foregone conclusion; therefore they could do nothing but retreat hastily towards Newhaven, in the hope of finding the division of the British Coastguard Squadron which had gone there for the same purpose as they had rounded Beachy Head, namely, to destroy the enemy's transports. Without delay the three vessels swung round with all speed and were quickly headed down Channel, while the remaining attendant torpedo boats, noticing this sudden retreat, also darted away. This manoeuvre did not, of course, proceed unchecked, the enemy being determined they should not escape. Signals were immediately made by the _Alexander II._, the flagship, and the _Petr Veliky_ and _Enara_, being within range, blazed forth a storm of shell upon the fugitives. The shots, however, fell wide, and ricochetted over the water, sending up huge columns of spray; whereupon the _Narcissus_ and _Galatea_ replied steadily with their 6-inch guns, while the heavy guns of the _Hannibal_ were also quickly brought into play. In a few minutes the _Magenta_ and _Tonnerre_ with the _Alger_, _Cécille_, and _Sfax_, started in pursuit, and an intensely exciting chase commenced. The engines of the British vessels were run at the highest possible pressure, but the French ships proved several knots swifter. As they steamed at full speed around Beachy Head towards Seaford Bay the enemy gradually overhauled them. The brisk fire which was being kept up soon began to tell, for all three retreating ships had lost many men, and the scenes of bloodshed on board were frightful. Eagerly the officers swept the horizon with their glasses to discover signs of friendly aid, but none hove in sight. All three ships were weak, their guns disabled, with whole guns' crews lying dead around, and many of the officers had fallen. In strength, in speed, in armaments--in fact, in everything--they were inferior to their opponents, and they saw it was a question of sheer force, not one of courage. They would either be compelled to surrender to the Tricolor, or deliberately seek the grave. With such a force bearing down upon them, escape seemed absolutely impossible. CHAPTER XIV. BATTLE OFF BEACHY HEAD. The sun at last broke forth brilliantly, betokoning another blazing day. Having regard to the fact that both the Channel Fleet and the reserve had been sent on futile errands by our enemy's secret agent, and the superior forces against which the British had all along had to fight, they had most assuredly shown what tact and courage could effect. Opposite the Belle Tout lighthouse a disaster occurred to the _Narcissus_. During the fight one of her engines had been injured, and this being now strained to its utmost limit had suddenly broken down altogether, with the result that the vessel gradually slackened speed, and the _Sfax_ and _Alger_ bore down quickly upon her, pouring into her a heavy fire from their 5-tonners. The reply was a weak one from her quick-firing guns, her heavy arms having nearly all been disabled. Onward steamed the _Galatea_ and _Hannibal_, keeping up a running fire with the four vessels pursuing them, while the two cruisers engaging the _Narcissus_ continued their strenuous endeavours to silence her guns. The British sailors, however, still undaunted, quickly showed their opponents that all the arms workable would be brought into play by directing a most vigorous fire upon their pursuers, blowing away one of the funnels of the _Alger_, and disabling one of her large bow guns. Just then, however, while the _Narcissus_ was discharging a broadside, a torpedo boat crept under her stern and sent forth its submerged projectile. For a moment there was a hush of expectation, then a dull explosion sounded as the cruiser, apparently rent in twain, plunged stern foremost into the sea, and with her ensign still flying gradually disappeared without a soul on board being able to save himself. Meanwhile the _Galatea_ and _Hannibal_, with their torpedo boats, were sustaining serious injuries from the heavy bow fire, and there seemed every possibility that they too would share the same terrible fate as the _Narcissus_, when suddenly one of the officers of the _Galatea_ discovered three vessels approaching. The "demand" was immediately hoisted, and responded to by both vessels running up private signals. With an expression of satisfaction he directed the attention of the captain to the fact, for the flags of the first-named vessel showed her to be the British turret-ship _Monarch_, and those of the second the great barbette-ship _Rodney_, while a moment later it was discerned that the third vessel was the _Gorgon_. Even as they looked, other masts appeared upon the horizon, and then they knew relief was at hand. Both vessels ran up signals, while the men, encouraged by the knowledge that some powerful British ironclads were bearing down to their aid in indented line ahead, worked with increased vigour to keep the enemy at bay. It was a fierce, sanguinary fight. Fire vomited from all the vessels' battered works, and the scuppers ran with blood. The French vessels, having apparently also noticed the relief approaching, did not seem inclined to fight, but were nevertheless compelled, and not for a single instant did the firing from the attacked vessels cease. Their guns showed constant bursts of flame. Soon, however, the _Rodney_ drew within range. A puff of white smoke from her barbette, and the _Cécille_ received a taste of her quick-firing guns, the shots from which struck her amidships, killing a large number of her men, and tearing up her deck. This was followed by deafening discharges from the four 25-ton guns of the _Monarch_, while the _Gorgon_ and a number of other vessels as they approached all took part in the conflict, the engagement quickly becoming general. With great precision the British directed their fire, and the French vessels soon prepared to beat a retreat, when, without warning, a frightful explosion occurred on board the _Hirondelle_, and wreckage mingled with human limbs shot into the air amid a great sheet of flame. The magazine had exploded! The scene on board the doomed vessel, even as witnessed from the British ships, was awful. Terrified men left their guns, and, rushing hither and thither, sought means of escape. But the boats had already been smashed by shots from the British cruisers, and all knew that death was inevitable. The burning ship slowly foundered beneath them, and as they rushed about in despair they fell back into the roaring flames. A British torpedo boat rescued about a dozen; but presently, with a heavy list, the warship suddenly swung round, and, bow first, disappeared into the green sunlit sea, leaving only a few poor wretches, who, after struggling vainly on the surface for a few moments, also went down to the unknown. The carnage was frightful. Hundreds of men were being launched into eternity, while upon the horizon both east and west dozens of ships of both invaders and defenders were rapidly approaching, and all would, ere long, try conclusions. Before half an hour had passed, a fierce battle, as sanguinary as any in the world's history, had commenced. The cruisers, acting as satellites to the battleships forming the two opposing fighting lines, had quickly commenced a series of fierce skirmishes and duels, all the most destructive engines of modern warfare being brought into play. The division of our Channel Fleet that had at last returned consisted of the powerful battleship _Royal Sovereign_, flying the Admiral's flag; the barbette-ships _Anson_, _Howe_, _Camperdown_, and _Benbow_; the turret-ships _Thunderer_ and _Conqueror_; the cruisers _Mersey_, _Terpsichore_, _Melampus_, _Tribune_, _Latona_, _Immortalité_, and _Barham_; with the torpedo gunboats _Spanker_ and _Speedwell_, and nineteen torpedo boats. The forces of the invaders were more than double that of the British, for, in addition to the vessels already enumerated, the reinforcements consisted of the French battleships _Amiral Baudin_, _Formidable_, _Amiral Duperré_, _Brennus_, _Tréhouart_, _Jemappes_, _Terrible_, _Requin_, _Indomptable_, _Caïman_, _Courbet_, _Dévastation_, _Redoubtable_, and _Furieux_, together with nine cruisers, and thirty-eight _torpilleurs de haute mer_. From the very commencement the fighting was at close quarters, and the storm of shot and shell caused death on every hand. With such an overwhelming force at his disposal, Admiral Maigret, the French commander, had been enabled to take up a position which boded ill for the defenders, nevertheless the British Admiral on board the _Royal Sovereign_ was determined to exert every effort to repulse the enemy. In the thick of the fight the great flagship steamed along, her compartments closed, her stokeholds screwed down, her four 67-ton guns hurling great shots from her barbettes, and her smaller arms pouring out a continuous deadly fire upon the French ship _Indomptable_ on the one side, and the great Russian armoured cruiser _Nicolai I._ on the other. Upon the latter the British vessel's shells played with a terribly devastating effect, bringing down the large forward mast and the machine guns in her fighting tops, and then, while the crew worked to get the wreckage clear, the Maxim, Nordenfelt, and Hotchkiss guns of the _Royal Sovereign_ suddenly rattled out, sweeping with their metal hail her opponent's deck, and mowing down those who were cutting adrift the fallen rigging. A moment later a shell struck one of the pair of guns in the _Nicolai's_ turret, rendering it useless, and then the captain of the _Royal Sovereign_, who had been standing in the conning-tower calmly awaiting his chance, touched three electric knobs in rapid succession. The engines throbbed, the great ship moved along at increasing speed through dense clouds of stifling smoke, and as she did so the captain shouted an order which had the effect of suddenly turning the vessel, and while her great barbette guns roared, the ram of the British vessel crashed into the broadside of the Tsar's ship with a terrific impact which caused her to shiver from stem to stern. [Illustration: _Nicolai I._ _Royal Sovereign._ BATTLE OFF BEACHY HEAD: H.M.S. "ROYAL SOVEREIGN" RAMMING THE "NICOLAI I."] Then, as the big guns in her rear barbette thundered out upon the _Indomptable_, whose engines had broken down, she drew gradually back from the terrible breach her ram had made under the water-line of her opponent, and the latter at once commenced to sink. The force of the impact had been so great that the Russian's hull was absolutely broken in two, and as the iron stretched and rent like paper, she heaved slowly over, "turning turtle," and carrying down with her over three hundred officers and men. The British captain now turned his attention to the French ship, which had been joined in the attack by the _Brennus_, the fire from whose 58-ton guns at close quarters played great havoc with the British flagship's superstructure. A second later, however, the captain of the _Royal Sovereign_ caught the _Indomptable_ in an unguarded moment, and, springing towards one of the electric knobs before him, pressed it. This had the effect of ejecting a torpedo from one of the bow tubes, and so well directed was it that a few seconds later there was a deafening report, as part of the stern portion of the French ship was blown away, raising great columns of spray. The situation was awful, and the loss of life everywhere enormous. Dense, blinding smoke, and the choking fumes of mélinite, obscured the sun, and in the darkness thus caused the flames from the guns shed a lurid light upon decks strewn with dead and dying. The cruisers and scouts by which our battleships were surrounded cut off many of the French torpedo boats, but a large number got right in among the fleet, and some terrible disasters were thus caused. Once inside the circle of British cruisers, all fire directed at the boats was as dangerous to our own ships as to the enemy's boats. The superiority of the French torpedo boats was, alas! keenly felt by the British, for in the course of the first hour five of our cruisers--the _Terpsichore_, _Galatea_, _Melampus_, _Tribune_, _Mersey_, the turret-ship _Conqueror_, and the battleships _Hannibal_ and _Rodney_, had been blown up. As compared with these losses, those of the enemy were at this stage by no means small. The French had lost two cruisers and four torpedo boats, and the Russians one battleship, three cruisers, and six torpedo boats. The British, with all these fearful odds against them, still continued a galling fire. The _Camperdown_, _Anson_, and _Benbow_, steaming together in line, belched a storm of shell from their barbettes, which caused wholesale destruction among the crowd of ships engaging them. Yet the withering fire of the enemy was telling terribly upon the comparatively small force of the defenders. Upon all three battleships the casualties were frightful, and on board each one or more of the heavy guns had been disabled. Suddenly a shot, penetrating a weak point in the armour of the _Anson_, entered her engine-room, disabling a portion of her machinery, while a moment later a shell from the _Amiral Duperré_ fell close to her broadside torpedo discharge, and a fragment of the shell coming into contact with the striker of a torpedo, just as it was about to leave its tube, caused a terrific and disastrous explosion between the decks. The effect was horrifying. The torpedo contained over 70 lb. of gun-cotton, therefore the devastating nature of the explosion may be readily imagined. Over a hundred men were blown to atoms, and the whole six of the broadside guns were more or less disabled. A second later, however, a shell from the _Benbow_ struck the _Amiral Duperré_, carrying away the greater portion of her conning-tower, and killing her captain instantly, while almost at the same moment a torpedo from one of the British boats struck her bows with a frightful detonation, blowing an enormous hole in them. The catastrophe was complete. The crew of the doomed ship, panic-stricken, left their guns and commenced to launch the only two boats that remained uninjured; but ere this could be accomplished, the _Tréhouart_, which suddenly went astern, apparently to avoid a torpedo, crashed into her, with the result that she heeled right over and quickly disappeared. The _Camperdown_, fighting fiercely with the _Requin_, the _Terrible_, and the _Courbet_, was suffering terrible damage from bow to stern; nevertheless her guns kept up an incessant torrent of shot, until suddenly, just after one of her shells had struck right under the turret of the _Terrible_, there was a deafening report, the air was filled with dense smoke, and the French ship, with her engines disabled, commenced to fill and sink. A portion of the shell had penetrated to her magazine, and she had blown up, nearly half her crew being killed by the terrific force of the explosion. Many of the remaining men, however, scrambled on board the _Caïman_, which by some means had come into slight collision with her; but scarcely had the last terrified man left the sinking vessel, when the _Camperdown's_ powerful ram entered the _Caïman's_ bows, breaking her hull, and she also foundered, carrying down with her not only her own crew, but also the survivors of the _Terrible_. This success was witnessed with satisfaction by the British Admiral, who nevertheless saw how seriously weakened was his force, and how critical was the position of his few remaining ships. Yet he remained quite cool, for the heavy guns of the steel monster in whose conning-tower he stood continued thundering forth their projectiles, and the White Ensign still loomed defiantly through the dense black smoke, fluttering in the freshening breeze that was now springing up. Although a number of the enemy's vessels had been sunk, he knew the issue must be fatal to his force, for they were now surrounded by a number of ships so vastly superior to them in armament and speed, that to die fighting was their only course. Though the cockpits were full, true British indomitable courage was showing itself everywhere on board our ships. Officers by words of encouragement incited their men to splendid heroic deeds, and guns' crews, with dark determined faces, seeing only death ahead, resolved to fight and struggle to the last for the honour of the Union Jack, which should never be surmounted by the Tricolor. A moment later, the captain, standing with the Admiral, who had just entered the conning-tower of the _Royal Sovereign_, suddenly uttered a cry of dismay, and with transfixed, horrified gaze pointed with his finger to the sea. Breathlessly the Admiral looked in the direction indicated. Though one of the bravest men in the Navy, and on his breast he wore the Victoria Cross, his eyes fell upon a sight that appalled him. It was a critical moment. A small French vessel, the unarmoured cruiser _Faucon_, had crept up unnoticed. The attention of the British officers had been, until that moment, concentrated upon the three powerful battleships, the _Requin_, the _Dévastation_, and the _Jemappes_, which kept up their hot fire upon the flagship, causing terrible destruction. Now, however, the British Admiral saw himself surrounded by the enemy, and the sight which caused his heart to beat quickly was a distinct line of bubbles upon the water, advancing with terrific speed, showing that a torpedo had been ejected from the _Faucon_ directly at his ship! In the conning-tower all knew their danger, but not a man spoke. Both the Admiral and the captain at the same instant saw the death-dealing projectile advancing, and both retained their coolness and presence of mind. The captain, shouting an order, sprang back and touched one of the electric signals, which was instantly responded to. It was the work of a second. The great engines roared and throbbed, and the huge vessel, propelled backwards by its 13,000 horse-power, swung steadily round just as the torpedo glanced off her bow obliquely. The crew of the _Royal Sovereign_ had never been nearer death than at that instant. Had the ironclad not halted in her course, the striker of the torpedo would have come square upon her bows, and one of the finest vessels of the British Navy would have probably gone to the bottom. The _Faucon_ was not given an opportunity to make a second attempt. The captain of the _Anson_ had witnessed how narrowly the British flagship had escaped, and immediately turned his great guns upon the little vessel, with the result that her quick-firing guns were quickly rendered useless, her hull was torn up like paper, and she slowly sank without offering resistance. Shots came from the frowning barbettes of the _Camperdown_, _Benbow_, and the turrets of the _Monarch_ rapidly, the damage and loss of life suffered by the enemy now being enormous. The three French battleships engaging the _Royal Sovereign_ at close quarters received terrible punishment. One of the 75-ton guns of the _Requin_ had been rendered useless, her deck had been torn up, and her bulwarks had been carried away, together with her funnel and forward mast. The rear barbette gun of the _Jemappes_ had been thrown off its mounting, and a shell striking the port side battery, had burst against the forward bulkhead, and wrought horrible destruction among the guns' crews. The three powerful French vessels pouring their fire upon the British flagship, and finding themselves being raked by the heavy fire of their adversary, signalled the _Tonnerre_ and _Furieux_ to assist them. Both vessels drew nearer, and soon afterwards commenced pounding at the _Royal Sovereign_. The _Anson_, however, noticed the dangerous position of the British flagship, and, having manoeuvred adroitly, succeeded in getting under way, and with her great forward guns thundering, she crashed her ram into the _Furieux_, and sank her, while almost at the same moment a torpedo, discharged from one of the British boats, struck the _Tonnerre_ right amidships, dealing her a blow from which she could never recover. Five minutes later, the _Gangut_, fighting desperately at close quarters with the _Camperdown_, had part of her armoured casemate blown away, and the British battleship followed up this success by directing a torpedo at her in such a manner that, although she drew back quickly to avoid it, she nevertheless received it right under her stern. Some ammunition on board that vessel also exploded, and the effect was frightful, for fragments of wood, iron, and human bodies were precipitated in all directions. The loss of life, although heavy on the British side, was nevertheless far greater on board the enemy's ships. The continuity and precision of the British fire wrought awful destruction. Between the decks of many of the French and Russian ships the carnage was frightful. Among wrecked guns and mountings lay headless and armless bodies; human limbs shattered by shells were strewn in all directions upon decks slippery with blood. The shrieks of the dying were drowned by the roar and crash of the guns, the deafening explosion of shells, and the rending of iron and steel as the projectiles pierced armourplates, destroying everything with which they came in contact. The noon had passed, and as the day wore on other catastrophes occurred involving further loss of life. One of these was the accidental ramming of the _Sfax_ by the French battleship _Redoubtable_, which managed, however, to save the greater portion of the crew, although her engines broke down. During the afternoon the fire from the British ships seemed to increase rather than diminish, notwithstanding each vessel flying the White Ensign fought more than one of the enemy's ships, and in doing so constantly received shots that spread death and destruction between the decks. Still, amid the blinding smoke, the din of battle, and the constant roaring of the guns, British bluejackets with smoke-begrimed faces worked enthusiastically for the defence of Old England. Many heroic deeds were performed that memorable afternoon, and many a gallant hero was sent to an untimely grave. On board the _Royal Sovereign_ the destruction was frightful. By four o'clock many of the guns had been disabled, half the crew had perished, and the decks ran with the life-blood of Britain's gallant defenders. The captain had been struck upon the forehead by a flying fragment of shell, causing a fearful wound; yet, with his head enveloped in a hastily improvised bandage, he stuck to his post. He was engaging the _Redoubtable_ and getting the worst of it, when suddenly, having manoeuvred once or twice, he turned to his lieutenant, saying, "Lay guns, ahead full speed, and prepare to ram." The officer addressed transmitted the order, and a few moments later, as her guns thundered forth, the bows of the _Royal Sovereign_ entered the broadside of the French ship with a loud crash, ripping her almost in half. Backing again quickly as the _Redoubtable_ sank, she suddenly received a shock which made her reel and shiver. A shell from the Russian flagship had struck under her stern barbette, but, failing to penetrate the armour, glanced off into the sea. Fiercer and more fierce became the fight. A well-directed shot from one of the 67-ton guns on the _Anson's_ rear barbette struck the conning-tower of the _Magenta_, blowing it away, killing the captain and those who were directing the vessel. The sun was sinking, but the battle still raged with unabated fury. Each side struggled desperately for the mastery. The British, fighting nobly against what had all along been overwhelming odds, had succeeded in sinking some of the enemy's finest ships, and inflicting terrible loss upon the crews of the others; yet the British Admiral, on viewing the situation, was compelled to admit that he was outnumbered, and that a continuance of the struggle would inevitably result in the loss of other of his ships. There still remained three of the enemy's vessels to each one of the British. His ships were all more or less crippled, therefore a successful stand against the still overwhelming force would be sheer madness. He was not the sort of man to show the white feather; nevertheless a retreat upon Portsmouth had now become a matter of policy, and the _Royal Sovereign_ a few minutes later ran up signals intimating to the other vessels her intention. As the British Squadron moved away down Channel the hoarse exultant shouts of the enemy filled the air. But the fighting became even more desperate, and for over an hour there was a most exciting chase. The running fire did little harm to the retreating ships, but their stern guns played terrible havoc with the French and Russian torpedo boats, which were picked off one after another with remarkable rapidity. Off Littlehampton one of the Russian ships ran up signals, and immediately the enemy's ships slackened. Apparently they had no desire to follow further west, for after a few parting shots they turned and stood away up Channel again, while the surviving ships of the British Squadron steamed onward in the blood-red track of the dying day. At their head was the _Royal Sovereign_, battered, and bearing marks of the deadly strife; but bright against the clear, calm evening sky, the British flag, half of which had been shot away, still fluttered out in the cool breeze of sunset. The British Lion had shown his teeth. Alas, that our Navy should have been so weak! Several of the ships had had their engines severely damaged or broken, but our margin of additional strength was so small that we had no vessels wherewith to replace those compelled to return to port. The struggle in this, the first naval battle in the defence of our Empire, had been desperate, and the loss of life appalling. The First Act of the most sanguinary drama of modern nations had closed. What would be its _dénouement_? _BOOK II_ _THE STRUGGLE_ CHAPTER XV. THE DOOM OF HULL. In Hull forty-eight long weary hours of anxious suspense and breathless excitement had passed. The night was dark, the sky overcast, and there was in the air that oppressive sultry stillness precursory of a storm. Church clocks had chimed ten, yet most of the shops were still open, and the well-lighted streets of the drab old Yorkshire town were filled by a pale-faced, terror-stricken crowd surging down the thoroughfares towards the Victoria Pier. A panic had suddenly been created an hour before by the issue of an extra-special edition of the Hull evening paper, the _Daily News_, containing a brief telegram in large type, as follows:-- The Coastguard at Donna Nook report that a strong force of Russian war vessels, including the turret-ship _Sevastopol_ and the barbette-ships _Sinope_ and _Cizoi Veliky_, have just hove in sight and are making for the Humber. Lloyd's signal station on Spurn Point has also intimated that hostile ships coming from the south are lying-to just beyond the Lightship. The papers sold more quickly than they could be printed, a shilling each being given for copies by the excited townspeople, who now, for the first time, suddenly realised that the enemy was upon them. Men and boys with bundles of limp papers, damp from the press, rushed along Whitefriargate, away in every direction into the suburbs, shouting the appalling intelligence in hoarse, strident tones that awoke the echoes of the quieter thoroughfares. Now, even as purchasers of papers read the few lines of print under the dim uncertain light of street lamps, the dull booming of distant guns fell upon their ears, and the populace, wildly excited, made their way with one accord towards the Victoria Pier, to glean the latest news, and ascertain the true significance of the repeated firing. Was Hull in danger? Would the enemy advance up the river and bombard the town? These all-important questions were on every one's tongue, and as the thousands of all classes rushed hither and thither, wild rumours of the enemy's intentions spread and increased the horror. Within an hour of the publication of the first intimation of the presence of the invaders the excitement had become intense, and the narrow streets and narrower bridges had become congested by a terror-stricken multitude. Time after time the thunder of heavy guns shook the town, causing windows to clatter, and the people standing on the pier and along the riverside strained their eyes into the cavernous darkness towards the sea. But they could discern nothing. Across at New Holland, two miles away, lamps twinkled, but the many lights--red, white, and green--that stud the broad river for the guidance of the mariner had, since the Declaration of War, been extinguished. The familiar distant lights that had never failed to shine seaward at Salt End and Thorngumbald no longer shed their radiance, and from the revolving lights at Spurn no stream of brilliancy now flashed away upon the rolling waters of the North Sea. The buoys had been cut adrift, the Bull Lightship taken from her moorings, and the entrance to Grimsby harbour was unillumined. Not a star appeared in the sky, for all was dark, black, and threatening. Through the hot, heavy atmosphere the roar of cannon came from the direction of Spurn Point, and as the sounds of the shots fell upon the ears of the anxious watchers, they stood aghast, wondering what would be their destiny. The suspense was awful. Men, women, and children, with scared faces, stood in groups in the market-place, in Queen Street, and in High Street, discussing the situation. This question, however, was already engaging the attention of the municipal and military authorities, for on hearing the alarming news the Mayor, with shrewd promptitude, walked quickly to the Town Hall, and held a hurried informal consultation with Mr. Charles Wilson, Mr. Arthur Wilson, Mr. Richardson, Major Wellsted, Alderman Woodhouse, and a number of aldermen and councillors. All knew the town was in peril. The enemy could have but one object in entering the Humber. Yet it was agreed that no steps could be taken at such brief notice to defend the place. The guardship _Edinburgh_ had been withdrawn to form part of the squadron upon which they would be compelled to rely, with the batteries at Paull and the submarine mines. It was evident by the firing that an attack upon the British Squadron had commenced. The shadow of impending disaster had fallen. Working men, hurrying towards the pier, stopped their leader, Mr. Millington, and tried to learn what was being done, while many of the leading townsfolk were thronged around for information, and were centres of excited groups in Whitefriargate. The boatmen, sharply questioned on every hand, were as ignorant of the state of affairs as those seeking information, so nothing could be done except to wait. Women and children of the middle and upper classes, regardless of their destination, were being hurried away by anxious fathers. Every train leaving Hull was filled to overflowing by those fleeing from the advance of the Russians, and on the roads inland to Beverley, Selby, and Market Weighton crowds of every class hurried away to seek some place of safety. Suddenly, just before eleven o'clock, the thousands anxiously peering over the wide, dark waters saw away on the bank, three miles distant, two beams of white light, which slowly swept both reaches of the river. They were the search-lights of the battery at Paull. Scarcely had the bright streaks shone out and disappeared when they were followed by a terrific cannonade from the forts, and then, for the first time, those standing on the Victoria Pier could discern the enemy's ships. How many there were it was impossible at that moment to tell, but instantly their guns flashed and thundered at the forts in reply. Far away seaward could also be heard low booming. The enemy's vessels were creeping carefully up the Humber, being compelled to take constant soundings on account of the removal of the buoys, and evidently guided by foreign pilots who had for years been permitted to take vessels up and down the river. Moments dragged on like hours, each bringing the town of Hull nearer its fate. The people knew it, but were powerless. They stood awaiting the unknown. The Russian force, besides the three vessels already mentioned, included the armoured cruiser _Dimitri Donskoi_, the central-battery ship _Kniaz Pojarski_, the cruiser _Pamyat Merkuriya_, two of the new armoured cruisers, _Mezen_ and _Syzran_, of the _Rurik_ type, the corvette _Razboynik_, the torpedo gunboats _Griden_ and _Gaidamak_, and the armoured gunboat _Gremyastchy_, with several torpedo boats. The manner in which they had manoeuvred to pass Spurn Point and ascend the river was remarkable, and astounded the officers in the forts at Paull. They, however, were not aware that each captain of those vessels possessed a copy of the British secret code and other important information compiled from the documents filched from the body of the Admiralty messenger by the Count von Beilstein at the Mariners' Rest at Deal! The possession of this secret knowledge, which was, of course, unknown to our Admiralty, enabled the captains of the Russian vessels to evade sunken hulks and other obstructions, and take some of their ships slowly up the river, bearing well on the Lincolnshire coast, so as to keep, until the last moment, out of the range of the search-lights at Paull. Then, on the first attack from the batteries, they suddenly replied with such a hail of shell, that from the first moment it was clear that the strength of the fort with its obsolete guns was totally inadequate. The roar of the cannonade was incessant. Amid the deafening explosions the townspeople of Hull rushed up and down the streets screaming and terrified. Suddenly a great shell fell with a dull thud in Citadel Street, close to a crowd of excited women, and exploding a second later, blew a number of them to atoms, and wrecked the fronts of several houses. This served to increase the panic. The people were on the verge of madness with fright and despair. Thousands seized their money and jewellery and fled away upon the roads leading to the country. Others hid away their valuables, and preferred to remain; the crisis had come, and as Britons they determined to face it. While the Russian ships, lying broadside-on in positions carefully selected to avoid the electro-contact mines, poured their terrible fire upon the land battery at Paull, their torpedo boats darted hither and thither with extraordinary rapidity. Several were sunk by shots from the battery, but four piquet boats in the darkness at last managed to creep up, and after searching, seized the cable connecting the mines with the Submarine Mining Station at Paull. This was discovered just at the critical moment by means of one of the British search-lights, and upon the hostile boats a frightful cascade of projectiles was poured by the quick-firing guns of the battery. But it was, alas, too late! The cable had been cut. To the whole of the wires a small electric battery had in a moment been attached, and as the guns of the fort crashed out there were a series of dull explosions under the bed of the river across the channel from Foul Holme Sand to Killingholme Haven, and from Paull Coastguard Station to the Skitter. The dark water rose here and there. The whole of the mines had been simultaneously fired! Cheers rang out from the Russian vessels, sounding above the heavy cannonade. The destruction of this most important portion of the defences of the Humber had been accomplished by the boats just at the very instant when they were shattered by British shells, and ere the waters grew calm again the last vestige of the boats had disappeared. The officers at Paull worked on with undaunted courage, striving by every means in their power to combat with the superior forces. In a measure, too, they were successful, for such havoc did the shells play with the gunboat _Gremyastchy_ that she slowly foundered, and her crew were compelled to abandon her. A portion of the men were rescued by the _Syzran_, but two boatloads were precipitated into the water, and nearly all were drowned. Two of the big guns of the _Dimitri Donskoi_ were disabled, and the loss of life on several of the ships was considerable. Nevertheless the firing was still incessant. Time after time the 9-ton guns of the _Kniaz Pojarski_ and the four 13½-tonners of the _Mezen_ threw their terrible missiles upon the defences at Paull with frightful effect, until at length, after a most desperate, stubborn resistance on the part of the British commander of the battery, and after half the defending force had been killed, the guns suddenly ceased. Both land and sea defences had been broken down! The Russians were now free to advance upon Hull! Not a moment was lost. Ten minutes after the guns of Paull had been silenced, the enemy's ships, moving very cautiously forward, opened a withering fire upon the town. The horrors of that bombardment were frightful. At the moment of the first shots, fired almost simultaneously from the two big guns of the _Syzran_, the panic became indescribable. Both shells burst with loud detonations and frightfully devastating effect. The first, striking one of the domes of the Dock Office, carried it bodily away, at the same time killing several persons; while the other, crashing upon the Exchange, unroofed it, and blew away the colossal statue of Britannia which surmounted the parapet on the corner. Surely this was an omen of impending disaster! Ere the horrified inhabitants could again draw breath, the air was rent by a terrific crash, as simultaneously flame rushed from the guns of the _Kniaz Pojarski_, the _Pamyat Merkuriya_, and the _Mezen_, and great shells were hurled into the town in every direction. The place trembled and shook as if struck by an earthquake, and everywhere walls fell and buildings collapsed. [Illustration: MAP OF HULL AND THE HUMBER.] Long bright beams of the search-lights swept the town and neighbouring country, lighting up the turbulent streets like day, and as the crowds rushed headlong from the river, shot and shell struck in their midst, killing hundreds of starving toilers and unoffending men, women, and children. Lying off Salt End, the _Cizoi Veliky_, which had now come up the river in company with two torpedo boats, poured from her barbette a heavy fire upon the Alexandra Dock and Earle's shipbuilding yard, while the other vessels, approaching nearer, wrought terrible destruction with every shot in various other parts of the town. In the course of a quarter of an hour many streets were impassable, owing to the fallen buildings, and in dozens of places the explosion of the mélinite shells had set on fire the ruined houses. Missiles hurled from such close quarters by such heavy guns wrought the most fearful havoc. Naturally, the Russian gunners, discovering the most prominent buildings with their search-lights, aimed at them and destroyed many of the public edifices. Among the first prominent structures to topple and fall was the Wilberforce Monument, and then, in rapid succession, shots carried away another dome of the Dock Office, and the great square towers of St. John's and Holy Trinity Churches. The gaudily gilded equestrian statue of King William III. was flung from its pedestal and smashed by a heavy shot, which entered a shop opposite, completely wrecking it; and two shells, striking the handsome offices of the Hull Banking Company at the corner of Silver Street, reduced the building to a heap of ruins. Deadly shells fell in quick succession in Paragon Street, and at the North-Eastern Railway Station, where the lines and platforms were torn up, and the Station Hotel, being set on fire, was soon burning fiercely, for the flames spread unchecked here, as in every other quarter. Church spires fell crashing into neighbouring houses, whole rows of shops were demolished in Whitefriargate, High Street, and Saville Street, and roads were everywhere torn up by the enemy's exploding missiles. Not for a moment was there a pause in this awful work of destruction; not for a moment was the frightful massacre of the inhabitants suspended. The enemy's sole object was apparently to weaken the northern defences of London by drawing back the Volunteer battalions to the north. There was no reason to bombard after the fort had been silenced, yet they had decided to destroy the town and cause the most widespread desolation possible. Flame flashed from the muzzles of those great desolating guns so quickly as to appear like one brilliant, incessant light. Shells from the _Cizoi Veliky_ fell into the warehouses around the Alexandra Dock, and these, with the fine new grain warehouses on each side of the river Hull, were blazing furiously with a terrible roar. High into the air great tongues of flame leaped, their volume increased by the crowd of ships in the dock also igniting in rapid succession, shedding a lurid glare over the terrible scene, and lighting up the red, angry sky. The long range of warehouses, filled with inflammable goods, at the edge of the Albert and William Wright Docks, were on fire, while the warehouses of the Railway Dock, together with a large number of Messrs. Thomas Wilson's fine steamers, were also in flames. Such a hold had the flames obtained that no power could arrest them, and as the glare increased it was seen by those flying for their lives that the whole of the port was now involved. The great petroleum stores of the Anglo-American Company, struck by a shell, exploded a few moments later with a most terrific and frightful detonation which shook the town. For a moment it seemed as if both town and river were enveloped in one great sheet of flame, then, as blazing oil ran down the gutters on every side, fierce fires showed, and whole streets were alight from end to end. Hundreds of persons perished in the flames, hundreds were shot down by the fragments of flying missiles, and hundreds more were buried under falling ruins. Everywhere the roar of flames mingled with the shrieks of the dying. Shells striking the Royal Infirmary burst in the wards, killing many patients in their beds, and setting fire to the building, while others, crashing through the roof of the Theatre Royal, carried away one of the walls and caused the place to ignite. One shot from the 13-ton gun of the _Syzran_ tore its way into the nave of Holy Trinity Church, and, exploding, blew out the three beautiful windows and wrecked the interior, while another from the same gun demolished one of the corner buildings of the new Market Hall. The handsome tower of the Town Hall, struck by a shell just under the dial, came down with a frightful crash, completely blocking Lowgate with its débris, and almost at the same instant a shot came through the dome of the Council Chamber, totally destroying the apartment. The Mariners' Hospital and Trinity House suffered terribly, many of the inmates of the former being blown to pieces. One shot completely demolished the Savings Bank at the corner of George Street, and a shell exploding under the portico of the Great Thornton Street Chapel blew out the whole of its dark façade. Another, striking the extensive premises of a firm of lead merchants at the corner of Brook and Paragon Streets, swept away the range of buildings like grass before the scythe. In the Queen's, Humber, Victoria, and Prince's Docks the congested crowd of idle merchant ships were enveloped in flames that wrapped themselves about the rigging, and, crackling, leaped skyward. The Orphanage at Spring Bank, the Artillery Barracks, and Wilberforce House were all burning; in fact, in the course of the two hours during which the bombardment lasted hardly a building of note escaped. The houses of the wealthy residents far away up Spring Bank, Anlaby and Beverley Roads, and around Pearson's Park, had been shattered and demolished; the shops in Saville Street had without exception been destroyed, and both the Cannon Street and Pier Stations had been completely wrecked and unroofed. Soon after two o'clock in the morning, when the Russian war vessels ceased their thunder, the whole town was as one huge furnace, the intense heat and suffocating smoke from which caused the Russian Admiral to move his vessels towards the sea as quickly as the necessary soundings allowed. The glare lit the sky for many miles around. The immense area of great burning buildings presented a magnificent, appalling spectacle. It was a terrible national disaster--a frightful holocaust, in which thousands of lives, with property worth millions, had been wantonly destroyed by a ruthless enemy which Britain's defective and obsolete defences were too weak to keep at bay--a devastating catastrophe, swift, complete, awful. CHAPTER XVI. TERROR ON THE TYNE. England was thrilled, dismayed, petrified. The wholesale massacre at Eastbourne and the terrible details of the bombardment of Hull had spread increased horror everywhere throughout the land. Terror reigned on the Tyneside. Hospitals, asylums, and public institutions, crowded with affrighted inmates, had no food to distribute. In Newcastle, in Shields, in Jarrow, and in Gateshead the poor were idle and hungry, while the wealthy were feverishly apprehensive. A Sabbath quiet had fallen on the great silent highway of the Tyne. In those blazing days and breathless nights there was an unbroken stillness that portended dire disaster. In the enormous crowded districts on each side of the river the gaunt spectre Starvation stalked through the cheerless homes of once industrious toilers, and the inmates pined and died. So terrible was the distress already, that domestic pets were being killed and eaten, dogs and cats being no uncommon dish, the very offal thrown aside being greedily devoured by those slowly succumbing to a horrible death. Awful scenes of suffering and blank despair were being witnessed on every side. Three days after the enemy had ascended the Humber and dealt such a decisive blow at Hull, the port of South Shields was suddenly alarmed by information telegraphed from the Coastguard on Harton Down Hill, about a mile south of the town, to the effect that they had sighted a number of French and Russian ships. Panic at once ensued. The broad market-place was filled by a terror-stricken crowd of townspeople, while the seafaring population surged down King Street and Ocean Road, across the park to the long South Pier at the entrance to the Tyne, eager to reassure themselves that the enemy had no designs upon their town. In the dull red afterglow that lit up the broad bay of golden sand between Trow Point and the pier, a huge vessel suddenly loomed dark upon the sky line, and, as she approached, those watching anxiously through glasses made her out as the great steel turret-ship _Lazare Carnot_, flying the French Tricolor. Immediately following her came a number of cruisers, gunboats, and torpedo boats. They included the _Dimitri Donskoi_, the _Kniaz Pojarski_, the _Pamyat Merkuriya_, the _Mezen_, the _Syzran_, the _Griden_, and the _Gaidamak_, all of which had taken part in the attack on Hull, while they had now been joined by the French battleships _Masséna_ and _Neptune_, the small cruisers _Cosamo_, _Desaix_, _D'Estaing_, _Coetlogon_, and _Lalande_, the torpedo gunboats _Iberville_, _Lance_, _Léger_, and _Fléche_, and the gun-vessels _Etoile_, _Fulton_, _Gabes_, _Sagittaire_, and _Vipère_, with a large number of torpedo boats and "catchers," in addition to those which were at Hull. As the vessels steamed onward at full speed, the people rushed from the pier back again into the town in wild disorder, while the Coastguard at Spanish Battery on the north shore of the estuary, having now discovered the presence of the menacing ships, at once telegraphed the intelligence up to Newcastle, where the most profound sensation was immediately caused. The news spread everywhere, and the people on the Tyneside knew that the hand of the oppressor was upon them. Suddenly, without warning, smoke tumbled over the bows of the _Lazare Carnot_. There was a low boom, and one of the ponderous guns in her turret sent forth an enormous shell, which struck the battery at Trow Point, blowing away a portion of a wall. A moment later the battery replied with their 9-tonners, sending forth shot after shot, most of which, however, ricochetted away over the glassy sea. It was the signal for a fight which quickly became desperate. In a few moments half a dozen of the ships lay broadside on, and the great guns of the _Masséna_ and _Neptune_, with those of four other vessels, opened a terrible fire upon the fort, casting their shells upon the British gunners with frightful effect. In the battery the Armstrong disappearing guns were worked to their utmost capacity, and the shots of the defenders played havoc with the smaller craft, three torpedo boats and a "catcher" being sunk in as many minutes. Meanwhile the _Active_, _Bonaventure_, _Cambrian_, _Canada_, and _Archer_ of the Reserve Squadron, now on its way from the north of Scotland in consequence of orders from the Admiralty having reached it, rounded Sharpness Point, and steamed full upon the enemy's ships. The conflict was fierce, but quickly ended. Heavy fire was kept up from the fort at Tynemouth, from Spanish Battery, from Trow Battery, and from several new batteries with disappearing guns between the Groyne and the quarry at Trow, that had been constructed and manned since the mobilisation by Volunteers, consisting of the 1st Newcastle Volunteer Engineers, the 3rd Durham Volunteer Artillery, and the 4th Durham Light Infantry from Newcastle. Nevertheless the assistance received by the British ships from the land was of but little avail, for a Russian torpedo boat sent forth its messenger of death at the third-class cruiser _Canada_, blowing her up, while the engines of both the _Active_ and _Bonaventure_ were so seriously damaged as to be practically useless. Rapid signalling by the semaphore at Spanish Battery had placed the defenders on the alert, and although the British were suffering so heavily on account of their minority, still the enemy were everywhere feeling the effect of the hot and unexpected reception. Before half an hour had passed two Russian gunboats had been torpedoed, and the French cruiser _D'Estaing_, having caught fire, was burning furiously, many of her crew perishing at their guns. [Illustration: MAP OF THE TYNE DISTRICT.] The _Lazare Carnot_ and the _Masséna_, heedless of the fire from the shore, steamed at half speed across the estuary until they were opposite the Tynemouth Battery, when they suddenly opened fire, being quickly joined by six French and Russian cruisers. In the meantime the contact mines were being blown up by piquet boats, who, although suffering heavily from the fire from the shore, nevertheless continued their task. It was then seen how utterly inadequate were the defences of the Tyne, and what negligence had been displayed on the part of the War Office in not providing at Tynemouth adequate means of warding off or successfully coping with an attack. From behind the tall grey lighthouse a few guns were thundering, but in face of the overwhelming force at sea it was but a sorry attempt. One shot from the battery severely damaged the superstructure of the _Lazare Carnot_, another cut through the funnel of the _Neptune_, carrying it away, and a third entering the magazine of one of the small cruisers caused it to explode with serious loss of life. Yet the devastating effect of the enemy's shells on the obsolete defences of Tynemouth was appalling. Enclosed in the fortifications were the crumbling ruins of the ancient Priory, with its restored chapel, a graveyard, and an old Castle that had been converted into artillery barracks. As flame and smoke rushed continuously from the barbettes, turrets, and broadsides of the hostile ships, the shots brought down the bare, dark old walls of the Priory, and, crashing into the Castle, played havoc with the building. The lantern of the lighthouse, too, was carried away, probably by a shot flying accidentally wide, and every moment death and desolation was being spread throughout the fort. Such a magnificent natural position, commanding as it did the whole estuary of the Tyne, should have been rendered impregnable, yet, as it remained in 1894, so it stood on this fatal day, a typical example of War Office apathy and shortsightedness. Its guns were a mere make-believe, that gave the place an appearance of strength that it did not possess. In the North Battery, on the left side, commanding a broad sweep of sea beyond Sharpness, only one gun, a 64-pounder, was mounted, the remaining five rotting platforms being unoccupied! At the extreme point, to command the mouth of the river, a single 5-tonner was placed well forward with great ostentation, its weight, calibre, and other details having been painted up in conspicuous white letters, for the delectation of an admiring public admitted to view the Priory. The South Battery, a trifle stronger, was, nevertheless, a sheer burlesque, its weakness being a disgrace to the British nation. In fact, in the whole of the battery the upper defences had long been known to experts to be obsolete, and the lower ones totally inadequate for the resistance they should have been able to offer. Was it any wonder, then, that the shells of the enemy should cause such frightful destruction? Among the British artillerymen there was no lack of courage, for they exerted every muscle in their gallant efforts to repulse the foe. Yet, handicapped as they were by lack of efficient arms and properly constructed fortifications, their heroic struggles were futile, and they sacrificed their lives to no purpose. The deadly hail from the floating monsters swept away the whole of the ancient Priory walls, demolishing the old red brick barracks, blowing up the Castle gateway, wrecking the guardroom, and igniting the Priory Chapel. The loss of life was terrible, the whole of the men manning the 5-ton gun pointing seaward having been killed by a single shell that burst among them, while everywhere else men of the Royal Artillery, and those of the Tynemouth Volunteer Artillery, who were assisting, were killed or maimed by the incessant rain of projectiles. Night clouds gathered black and threatening, and it appeared as if the enemy were carrying all before them. The French battleship _Neptune_, seeing the guns of all three batteries had been considerably weakened, was steaming slowly into the mouth of the Tyne, followed by the Russian cruiser _Syzran_, when suddenly two terrific explosions occurred, shaking both North and South Shields to their very foundations. High into the air the water rose, and it was then seen that two submarine mines had been exploded simultaneously by electric current from the Tynemouth Battery, and that both vessels had been completely blown up. Such was the force of the explosion, that the hull of the _Neptune_, a great armour-clad of over ten thousand tons, had been ripped up like paper, and of her crew scarcely a man escaped, while the cruiser had been completely broken in half, and many of her crew blown to atoms. Scarcely had this success of the defenders been realised when it was followed by another, for a second later a British torpedo boat succeeded in blowing up with all hands the French torpedo gunboat _Lance_. These reverses, however, caused but little dismay among the invaders, for ere long the British cruisers had been driven off, the guns at Trow had been silenced, while those at Spanish Battery and Tynemouth could only keep up a desultory fire. Then, in the falling gloom, ship after ship, guided by foreign pilots, and carefully evading a number of hulks that had been placed near the estuary, entered the Tyne, pouring forth their heavy monotonous fire into North Shields and South Shields. Skilfully as the despairing defenders managed their submarine mines, they only succeeded in destroying three more of the enemy's ships, the French torpedo gunboats _Iberville_ and _Cassini_ and the cruiser _Desaix_, the crews perishing. Not for a moment was there a cessation of the cannonade as the smaller ships of the enemy advanced up the river, and the damage wrought by their shells was enormous. Tynemouth had already suffered heavily, many of the streets being in flames. The tower of St. Saviour's Church had fallen, the conspicuous spire of the Congregational Chapel had been shot away, the Piers Office had been reduced to ruins, and the long building of the Royal Hotel completely wrecked. The houses facing Percy Park had in many cases been shattered, a shell exploding under the archway of the Bath Hotel had demolished it, and the handsome clock tower at the end of the road had been hurled down and scattered. Slackening opposite the Scarp, the gunboats and cruisers belched forth shot and shell upon North Shields, aiming first at the more conspicuous objects, such as the Sailors' Home, the Custom House, the tall tower of Christ Church, and the Harbour Master's office, either totally destroying them or injuring them irreparably, while the houses on Union Quay and those in Dockway Square and in adjoining streets, from the gasometers down to the Town Hall, were also swept by shells. Resistance was made from Fort Clifford on the one side of the town, from a position occupied by a battery of the Durham Volunteer Artillery, who had mounted guns on the hill behind Smith's Yard, and also by the submarine mines of the Tyne Division Volunteer Miners; but it was most ineffectual, and, when night fell, hundreds of terror-stricken persons had been killed, and the town was on fire in dozens of places, the flames illuminating the sky with their lurid brilliancy. In South Shields tragic scenes were being enacted. Shells flying about the town from the river on the one side and the sea on the other exploded in the streets, blowing unfortunate men, women, and children into atoms, wrecking public buildings, and setting fire to the cherished homes of the toilers. The congested blocks of buildings around Panash Point were one huge furnace; the Custom House, the River Police Station, and the Plate Glass Works were wrecked, while a shell exploding in one of the petroleum tanks on the Commissioners' Wharf caused it to burst with fearful effect. The queer old turret of St. Hilda's fell with a crash, the Church of St. Stephen was practically demolished, and the school in the vicinity unroofed. The dome of the Marine School was carried bodily away; nothing remained standing of the Wouldhave Memorial Clock but a few feet of the square lower structure, and the Ingham Infirmary being set on fire, several of the patients lost their lives. Amid this frightful panic, Lieut.-Col. Gowans and Major Carr of the 3rd Durham Artillery, the Mayor, Mr. Readhead, Alderman Rennoldson, Councillors Lisle, Marshall, and Stainton, the Town Clerk, Mr. Hayton, and the Rev. H. E. Savage, were all conspicuous for the coolness they displayed. Courage, however, was unavailing, for South Shields was at the mercy of the invaders, and all defence was feeble and futile. Hundreds of the townspeople were killed by flying fragments of shells, hundreds more were buried in the débris of tottering buildings, while those who survived fled horror-stricken with their valuables away into the country, beyond the range of the enemy's fire. The horrors of Hull were being repeated. The streets ran with the life-blood of unoffending British citizens. As evening wore on, the invaders came slowly up the Tyne, heedless of the strenuous opposition with which they were met by Volunteer Artillery, who, having established batteries on various positions between Shields and Newcastle, poured a hot fire upon them. Advancing, their terrible guns spread death and destruction on either bank. The crowds of idle shipping in the great Tyne Dock at South Shields, and those in the Albert Edward and Northumberland Docks on the north bank, together with the staiths, warehouses, and offices, were blazing furiously, while the Tyne Commissioners' great workshops, Edwards' Shipbuilding Yard, and many other factories and shipbuilding yards, were either set on fire or seriously damaged. Many of the affrighted inhabitants of North Shields sought refuge in the railway tunnel, and so escaped, but hundreds lost their lives in the neighbourhood of Wallsend and Percy Main. Shells fell in Swinburne's brass foundry at Carville, destroying the buildings, together with the Carville Hotel and the railway viaduct between that place and Howdon. The Wallsend Railway Station and the Theatre of Varieties were blown to atoms, and the houses both at High and Low Walker suffered severely, while opposite at Jarrow enormous damage was everywhere caused. At the latter place the 1st Durham Volunteer Engineers rendered excellent defensive service under Lieut.-Col. Price and Major Forneaux, and the Mayor was most energetic in his efforts to insure the safety of the people. A submarine mine had been laid opposite Hebburn, and, being successfully exploded, blew to atoms the French gunboat _Gabes_, and at the same time seriously injured the propeller of the cruiser _Cosamo_. This vessel subsequently broke down, and a second mine fired from the shore destroyed her also. Nevertheless the invaders steadily advanced up the broad river, blowing up obstacles, dealing decisive blows, and destroying human life and valuable property with every shot from their merciless weapons. The panic that night in Newcastle was terrible. The streets were in a turmoil of excitement, for the reports from Tynemouth had produced the most intense alarm and dismay. On receipt of the first intelligence the Free Library Committee of the City Council happened to be sitting, and the chairman, Alderman H. W. Newton, the popular representative of All Saints' North, formally announced it to his colleagues, among whom was the Mayor. The committee broke up in confusion, and an excited consultation followed, in which Councillors Durnford, Fitzgerald, and Flowers, with Alderman Sutton, took part. Capt. Nicholls, the Chief Constable, Major A. M. Potter of the 1st Northumberland Artillery, Lieut.-Col. Angus of the 1st Newcastle Volunteer Artillery, Lieut.-Col. Palmer and Major Emley of the Volunteer Engineers, Mr. Hill Motum, and Mr. Joseph Cowen also entered the room and engaged in the discussion. At such a hasty informal meeting, nothing, however, could be done. The Mayor and Councillors were assured by the Volunteer officers that everything possible under the circumstances had been arranged for the defence of the Tyne. Property worth millions was at stake, and now that the news had spread from mouth to mouth the streets around the Town Hall were filled with crowds of excited, breathless citizens, anxious to know what steps were being taken to insure their protection. So loudly did they demand information, that the Mayor was compelled to appear for a moment and address a few words to them, assuring them that arrangements had been made which he hoped would be found adequate to repel the foe. This appeased them in a measure, and the crowd dispersed; but in the other thoroughfares the excitement was intensified, and famished thousands rushed aimlessly about, many going out upon the High Level and Low Level Bridges and straining their eyes down the river in endeavour to catch a glimpse of the enemy. Heavy and continuous firing could be heard as the dark evening dragged on, and presently, just before nine o'clock, the anxious ones upon the bridges saw the flash of guns as the invading vessels rounded the sharp bend of the river at the ferry beyond Rotterdam Wharf. The sight caused the people to rush panic-stricken up into the higher parts of Newcastle or across the bridges into Gateshead, and from both towns a rapid exodus was taking place, thousands fleeing into the country. From gun-vessels, torpedo gunboats, and cruisers, shot and shell poured in continuous streams into the wharves, shipping, and congested masses of houses on either bank. The houses along City Road, St. Lawrence Road, Quality Row, and Byker Bank, on the outskirts of Newcastle, suffered severely, while shots damaged the great Ouseburn Viaduct, wrecked St. Dominic's Roman Catholic Chapel, and blew away the roof of the new Board School, a prominent feature of the landscape. Several shells fell and exploded in Jesmond Vale. One burst and set fire to the Sandyford Brewery, and one or two falling in Portland Road caused widespread destruction and terrible loss of life. The London and Hamburg Wharves, with the shipping lying near, were soon blazing furiously, and all along Quay Side, right up to the Guildhall, shops and offices were every moment being destroyed and swept away. New Greenwich and South Shore on the Gateshead side were vigorously attacked, and many shots fired over the Salt Marshes fell in the narrow thoroughfares that lie between Sunderland Road and Brunswick Street. Upon the enemy's ships the Volunteer batteries on the commanding positions on either side of the high banks poured a galling fire, one battery at the foot of the Swing Bridge on the Gateshead side effecting terrible execution. Their guns had been well laid, and the salvoes of shell played about the French gun-vessels and torpedo boats, causing frightful destruction among the crews. Both Newcastle and Gateshead, lying so much higher than the river, were in a certain measure protected, and the high banks afforded a wide command over the waterway. At various points, including the entrances to the High Level Bridge, at the Side, the Close, New Chatham, and the Rabbit Banks, the Volunteers had opened fire, and were keeping up a terrible cannonade. The dark river reflected the red light which flashed forth every moment from gun muzzles, while search-lights from both ships and shore were constantly streaming forth, and the thunder of war shook the tall factory chimneys to their very foundations. Heedless of the strenuous opposition, the invading ships kept up a vigorous fire, which, aimed high, fell in the centre of Newcastle with most appalling effect. In the midst of the crowds in Newgate and Pilgrim Streets shells exploded, blowing dozens of British citizens to atoms and tearing out the fronts of shops. One projectile, aimed at the strangely shaped tower of St. Nicholas' Cathedral, struck it, and swept away the thin upper portion, and another, crashing into the sloping roof of the grim, time-mellowed relic Black Gate, shattered it, and tore away part of the walls. The old castle and the railway bridge were also blown up in the earlier stages of the bombardment, and the square tower of St. John's fell with a sudden crash right across the street, completely blocking it. From end to end Grainger Street was swept by French mélinite shells, which, bursting in rapid succession, filled the air with tiny flying fragments, each as fatal as a bullet fired from a rifle. The French shell is much more formidable than ours, for, while the latter breaks into large pieces, the former is broken up into tiny and exceedingly destructive fragments. In the midst of this terrible panic a shot cut its way through the Earl Grey Monument, causing it to fall, many persons being crushed to death beneath the stones, while both the Central Exchange and the Theatre Royal were now alight, shedding a brilliant glare skyward. At this time, too, the whole of Quay Side was a mass of roaring, crackling flames, the thin spire of St. Mary's Roman Catholic Cathedral had been shot away, Bainbridge's great emporium was blazing furiously, and the Art Club premises had taken fire. One shot had fallen at the back of the Town Hall, and torn an enormous hole in the wall, while another, entering the first floor of the County Hotel, had burst with awful force, and carried away the greater part of its gloomy façade. In the Central Station opposite, dozens of shells had exploded, and it was now on fire, hopelessly involved together with the adjoining Station Hotel. The grey front of the imposing _Chronicle_ building had been wrecked by a shell that had descended upon the roof, and a row of dark old-fashioned houses in Eldon Square had been demolished. The same fate had been shared by the Co-operative Wholesale Society's warehouse, the Fish Market, the _Journal_ office, and both the Crown and Métropole Hotels at the bottom of Clayton Street. Yet the firing continued; the terrified citizens were granted no quarter. The Royal Arcade was blown to atoms, the new red brick buildings of the Prudential Assurance Company were set on fire, and were blazing with increasing fury. The building of the North British and Mercantile Assurance Company, the Savings Bank at the corner of Newgate Street, and the Empire Theatre were wrecked. Along New Bridge Street dozens of houses were blown to pieces, several fine residences in Ellison Place were utterly demolished and blocked the roadway with their débris, and the whole city, from the river up to Brandling Village, was swept time after time by salvoes of devastating shots. Rows of houses fell, and in hundreds the terrified people were massacred. Away over the Nun's Moor shells were hurled and burst, and others were precipitated into the great Armstrong works at Elswick. Suddenly, in the midst of the incessant thunder, a series of terrific explosions occurred, and the great High Level Bridge collapsed, and fell with an awful crash into the Tyne. The enemy had placed dynamite under the huge brick supports, and blown them up simultaneously. A few moments later the Swing Bridge was treated in similar manner; but the enemy, under the galling fire from the Volunteer batteries, were now losing frightfully. Many of the new guns at the Elswick works were brought into action, and several ironclads in the course of construction afforded cover to those desperately defending their homes. But this blow of the invaders had been struck at a most inopportune moment, and was evidently the result of an order that had been imperfectly understood. It caused them to suffer a greater disaster than they had anticipated. Six torpedo boats and two gun-vessels had passed under the bridge, and, lying off the Haughs, were firing into the Elswick works at the moment when the bridges were demolished, and the débris, falling across the stream, cut off all means of escape. [Illustration: NEWCASTLE BOMBARDED: BLOWING UP OF THE HIGH LEVEL BRIDGE.] The defenders, noticing this, worked on, pounding away at the hostile craft with merciless monotony, until one after another the French and Russians were blown to atoms, and their vessels sank beneath them into the dark, swirling waters. While this was proceeding, two mines, one opposite Hill Gate, at Gateshead, and the other near the Rotterdam Wharf, on the Newcastle side, were fired by the Volunteer Engineers, who thus succeeded in blowing up two more French gunboats, while the battery at the foot of the Swing Bridge sank two more torpedo boats, and that in front of the Chemical Works at Gateshead sent a shell into the "vitals" of one of the most powerful torpedo gunboats, with the result that she blew up. Everywhere the enemy were being cut to pieces. Seeing the trap into which their vessels had fallen above the ruined bridges, and feeling that they had caused sufficient damage, they turned, and with their guns still belching forth flame, steamed at half speed back again towards the sea. But they were not allowed to escape so easily, for the mines recently laid by the Volunteers were now brought into vigorous play, and in the long reach of the river between High Walker and Wallsend no fewer than six more of the enemy's gun and torpedo boats had their bottoms blown out, and their crews torn limb from limb. Flashed throughout the land, the news of the enemy's repulse, though gained at such enormous loss, excited a feeling of profound satisfaction. The injury inflicted on the invaders had been terrible, and from that attack upon the Tyne they had been hurled reeling back the poorer by the loss of a whole fleet of torpedo and gun boats, one of the most effective arms of their squadrons, while the sea had closed over one of France's proudest battleships, the _Neptune_, and no fewer than four of her cruisers. The surviving vessels, which retreated round the Black Middens and gained the open sea, all more or less had their engines crippled, and not half the men that had manned them escaped alive. They had wrought incalculable damage, it is true, for part of Newcastle was burning, and the loss of life had been terrible; yet they were driven back by the Volunteers' desperately vigorous fire, and the lives of many thousands in Newcastle and Gateshead had thus been saved at the eleventh hour by British patriots. Alas, it was a black day in England's history! Was this to be a turning-point in the wave of disaster which had swept so suddenly upon our land? CHAPTER XVII. HELP FROM OUR COLONIES. Days passed--dark, dismal, dispiriting. Grim-visaged War had crushed all joy and gaiety from British hearts, and fierce patriotism and determination to fight on until the bitter end mingled everywhere with hunger, sadness, and despair. British homes had been desecrated, British lives had been sacrificed, and through the land the invaders rushed ravaging with fire and sword. Whole towns had been overwhelmed and shattered, great tracts of rich land in Sussex and Hampshire had been laid waste, and the people, powerless against the enormous forces sweeping down upon them, had been mercilessly mowed down and butchered by Cossacks, whose brutality was fiendish. Everywhere there were reports of horrible atrocities, of heartless murders, and wholesale slaughter of the helpless and unoffending. The situation, both in Great Britain and on the Continent, was most critical. The sudden declaration of hostilities by France and Russia had resulted in a great war in which nearly all European nations were involved. Germany had sent her enormous land forces over her frontiers east and west, successfully driving back the French along the Vosges, and occupying Dijon, Chalons-sur-Saône, and Lyons. Valmy, Nancy, and Metz had again been the scenes of sanguinary encounters, and Chaumont and Troyes had both fallen into the hands of the Kaiser's legions. In Poland, however, neither Germans nor Austrians had met with such success. A fierce battle had been fought at Thorn between the Tsar's forces and the Germans, and the former, after a desperate stand, were defeated, and the Uhlans, dragoons, and infantry of the Fatherland had swept onward up the valley of the Vistula to Warsaw. Here the resistance offered by General Bodisco was very formidable, but the city was besieged, while fierce fighting was taking place all across the level country that lay between the Polish capital and the Prussian frontier. Austrians and Hungarians fought fiercely, the Tyrolese Jägers displaying conspicuous bravery at Brody, Cracow, Jaroslav, and along the banks of the San, and they had succeeded up to the present in preventing the Cossacks and Russian infantry from reaching the Carpathians, although an Austrian army corps advancing into Russia along the Styr had been severely cut up and forced to retreat back to Lemberg. Italy had burst her bonds. Her Bersaglieri, cuirassiers, Piedmontese cavalry, and carabiniers had marched along the Corniche road into Provence, and, having occupied Nice, Cannes, and Draguigan, were on their way to attack Marseilles, while the Alpine infantry, taking the road over Mont Cenis, had, after very severe fighting in the beautiful valley between Susa and Bardonnechia, at last occupied Modane and Chambéry, and now intended joining hands with the Germans at Lyons. France was now receiving greater punishment than she had anticipated, and even those members of the Cabinet and Deputies who were responsible for the sudden invasion of England were compelled to admit that they had made a false move. The frontiers were being ravaged, and although the territorial regiments remaining were considered sufficient to repel attack, yet the Army of the Saône had already been cut to pieces. In these circumstances, France, knowing the great peril she ran in prolonging the invasion of Britain, was desperately anxious to make the British sue for peace, so that she could turn her attention to events at home, and therefore, although in a measure contravening International Law, she had instructed her Admirals to bombard British seaports and partially-defended towns. Although the guns of the hostile fleet had wrought such appalling havoc on the Humber, on the Tyne, and along the coast of Kent and Sussex, nevertheless the enemy had only secured a qualified success. The cause of all the disasters that had befallen us, of the many catastrophes on land and sea, was due to the wretchedly inadequate state of our Navy, although the seven new battleships and six cruisers commenced in 1894 were now complete and afloat. Had we possessed an efficient Navy the enemy could never have approached our shores. We had not a sufficient number of ships to replace casualties. Years behind in nearly every essential point, Britain had failed to give her cruisers either speed or guns equal in strength to those of other nations. Our guns were the worst in the world, no fewer than 47 vessels still mounting 350 old muzzleloaders, weapons discarded by every other European Navy. For years it had been a race between the hare and the tortoise. We had remained in dreamy unconsciousness of danger, while other nations had quickly taken advantage of all the newly-discovered modes of destruction that make modern warfare so terrible. Notwithstanding the odds against us in nearly every particular, the British losses had been nothing as compared with those of the enemy. This spoke much for British pluck and pertinacity. With a force against them of treble their strength, British bluejackets had succeeded in sinking a number of the finest and most powerful ships of France and Russia. France had lost the _Amiral Duperré_, a magnificent steel vessel of eleven thousand tons; the _Neptune_ and _Redoutable_, a trifle smaller; the _Tonnerre_, the _Terrible_, the _Furieux_, the _Indomptable_, the _Caïman_, all armoured ships, had been lost; while the cruisers _D'Estaing_, _Sfax_, _Desaix_, _Cosamo_, _Faucon_, the despatch-vessel _Hirondelle_, the gunboats _Iberville_, _Gabes_, and _Lance_, and eleven others, together with sixteen torpedo boats and numbers of transports, had been either blown up, burned, or otherwise destroyed. The losses the Russians had sustained, in addition to the many transports and general service steamers, included the great steel cruiser _Nicolai I._, the vessels _Gerzog Edinburgskij_, _Syzran_, _Rynda_, _Asia_, _Gangut_, _Kranaya Gorka_, _Olaf_, and the torpedo boat _Abo_, with eight others. The destruction of this enormous force had, of course, not been effected without an infliction of loss upon the defenders, yet the British casualties bore no comparison to those of the enemy. True, the armoured turret-ship _Conqueror_ had, alas! been sacrificed; the fine barbette-ships _Centurion_ and _Rodney_ had gone to the bottom; the splendid first-class cruiser _Aurora_ and the cruiser _Narcissus_ had been blown up; while the cruisers _Terpsichore_, _Melampus_, _Tribune_, _Galatea_, and _Canada_, with a number of torpedo boats and "catchers," had also been destroyed, yet not before every crew had performed heroic deeds worthy of record in the world's history, and every vessel had shown the French and Russians what genuine British courage could effect. Still the invaders were striking swift, terrible blows. On the Humber and the Tyne the loss of life had been appalling. The bombardment of Brighton, the sack of Eastbourne, and the occupation of the Downs by the land forces, had been effected only by wholesale rapine and awful bloodshed, and Britain waited breathlessly, wondering in what direction the next catastrophe would occur. Such newspapers as in these dark days continued to appear reported how great mass meetings were being held all over the United States, denouncing the action of the Franco-Russian forces. In New York, Chicago, Washington, Philadelphia, Boston, San Francisco, and other cities, resolutions were passed at enormous demonstrations by the enthusiastic public, demanding that the United States Government should give an immediate ultimatum to France that unless she withdrew her troops from British soil, war would be declared against her. Special sittings of Congress were being held daily at Washington for the purpose of discussing the advisability of such a step; influential deputations waited upon the President, and all the prominent statesmen were interviewed by the various enterprising New York journals, the result showing a great preponderance of feeling that such a measure should be at once taken. In British colonies throughout the world the greatest indignation and most intense excitement prevailed. Already bodies of Volunteers were on their way from Australia and Cape Town, many of the latter, under Major Scott, having already been in England and shot as competitors at Bisley. From India a number of native regiments had embarked for Southampton, but the Northern frontier stations had been strengthened in anticipation of a movement south by Russia, and the French Indian possessions, Pondichéry and Karikal, were occupied by British troops. An expedition from Burmah had crossed the Shan States into Tonquin, and with the assistance of the British Squadron on the China Station had, after hard fighting, occupied a portion of the country, while part of the force had gone farther south and commenced operations in French Cochin-China by a vigorous attack on Saigon. Armed British forces had also landed in Guadaloupe and Martinique, two of the most fertile of the West Indian Islands, and St. Bartholomew had also been occupied by West Indian regiments. On the outbreak of hostilities intense patriotism spread through Canada, and from the shores of Lake Superior away to far Vancouver a movement was at once made to assist the Mother Country. In Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and Kingston mass meetings were held, urging the Dominion Government to allow a force of Volunteers to go to England without delay; and this universal demand was the more gratifying when it was remembered that more than a quarter of the population were themselves French. Nevertheless the knowledge that Britain was in danger was sufficient to arouse patriotism everywhere, and within a few days 20,000 Volunteers were enrolled, and these, before a fortnight had passed, were on their way to Liverpool. Great was the enthusiasm when, a few days later, to the strains of "Rule, Britannia," the first detachment landed in the Mersey, and as they marched through the crowded streets, the people, delighted at this practical demonstration of sympathy, wrung the hands of the patriots of the West. Vessel after vessel, escorted by British cruisers, arrived at the landing-stage, and discharged their regiments of men to whom the knowledge of Britain's danger had been sufficient incentive to induce them to act their part as Britons. Then, when the last vessel had arrived, they were formed into a brigade, and set out to march south in the direction of Birmingham. Meanwhile a great loan was being floated in Australia and the United States. The former colony had but recently passed through a serious financial crisis, but in America a sum of no less than £200,000,000 was taken up, although the issue only continued a few days. In Wall Street the excitement was intense, and the struggle to invest was desperate. No such scenes had ever been witnessed within the memory of the oldest member of the Stock Exchange, for financiers were determined to assist the greatest Power on earth; indeed, apart from the sound security offered, they felt it their duty to do so. Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, and Calcutta all contributed in more or less degree, and the loan immediately proved the most successful ever floated. To Britain on every side a helping hand was outstretched, and, irrespective of politics and party bickerings, assistance was rendered in order that she might crush her enemies. Britannia gathered her strength, and armed herself for the fierce combat which she knew must decide the destiny of her glorious Empire. London, starving, terror-stricken, and haunted continually by apprehensions of an unknown doom, was in a state of restlessness both night and day. Food supplies had failed, the cheapest bread was sold at 3s. 8d. a small loaf, and neither fish nor meat could be purchased. In the City the panic was frightful. Business was paralysed, hundreds were being ruined daily, and after the first sensation and headlong rush on the Stock Exchange, transactions remained at a standstill. Then suddenly, when the seriousness of the situation was fully understood, there was a run on the banks. Crowds, eager and clamouring, surrounded the Bank of England, and establishments in Lombard Street and elsewhere, with cheques in their hands, demanding their deposits in gold. Although weak and half-starved, they desired their money in order to flee and take with them all they possessed before the enemy swept down upon London. Day and night in all the City banks the cashiers were kept paying out thousands upon thousands in hard shining gold. The clink of coin, the jingle of scales, and the eager shouts of those feverishly anxious for their turn, and fearing the resources would not hold out, formed a loud incessant din. As the days passed, and the run on the banks continued, one after another of the establishments, both in the City and the West End, unable to withstand the heavy withdrawals, were compelled to close their doors. Many were banks of such high reputation that the very fact of being a depositor was a hall-mark of a man's prosperity, while others were minor establishments, whose business was mainly with small accounts and middle-class customers. One by one they failed to fulfil their obligations, and closed; and the unfortunate ones, including many women who had not been able to struggle successfully to get inside, turned away absolutely ruined! In the West End the starving poor had formed processions, and marched through Mayfair and Belgravia demanding bread, while Anarchists held council in front of the blackened ruins of the National Gallery, and the Unemployed continued their declamatory oratory on Tower Hill. The starving thousands from the East End ran riot in the aristocratic thoroughfares of Kensington, and, heedless of the police,--who were, in fact, powerless before such superior numbers,--residences of the rich were entered and searched for food, and various acts of violence ensued. The cellars of clubs, hotels, and private houses were broken open and sacked, granaries were emptied, wholesale grocery warehouses were looted, and flour mills searched from roof to basement. If they could not obtain food, they said, they would drink. A desperate starving crowd then forced an entry to the wine vaults at the Docks, and swallowed priceless vintages from pewter pots. Hogsheads of port and sherry were carried up into the streets, and amid scenes of wild disorder were tapped and drunk by the excited and already half-intoxicated multitude. For days London remained at the mercy of a drunken, frenzied rabble. Murder and incendiarism were committed in every quarter, and many serious and desperate conflicts occurred between the rioters and the law-abiding patriotic citizens. Enthusiasm was displayed by even the latter, when an infuriated mob one night surrounded Albert Gate House, the French Embassy, and, breaking open the door, entered it, and flung the handsome furniture from the windows. Those below made a huge pile in the street, and when the whole of the movable effects had been got out, the crowd set fire to them, and also to the great mansion, at the same time cheering lustily, and singing "Rule, Britannia," as they watched the flames leap up and consume both house and furniture. The servants of the Embassy had fortunately escaped, otherwise they would no doubt have fared badly at the hands of the lawless assembly. When the fire had burned itself out, however, a suggestion was spread, and the mob with one accord rushed to the Russian Embassy in Chesham Place. This house was also entered, and the furniture flung pell-mell from the windows, that too large to pass through being broken up in the rooms, and the fragments thrown to the shouting crowd below. Chairs, tables, ornaments, mirrors, bedding, kitchen utensils, and crockery were thrown out, carpets were taken up, and curtains and cornices torn down by ruthless denizens of Whitechapel and Shoreditch, who, maddened by drink, were determined to destroy everything belonging to the countries which had brought disaster upon them. Presently, when nearly all the furniture had been removed, some man, wild-haired and excited, emerged into the street, with a great flag he had discovered in one of the attics. With a shout of delight he unfurled it. It was a large yellow one, upon which was depicted a huge black double eagle; the flag that had been hoisted at the Embassy on various State occasions. Its appearance was greeted by a fearful howl of rage, and the infuriated people, falling upon the man who waved it, tore it into shreds, which they afterwards cast into the bonfire they had made for the Ambassador's furniture. From the archives the secret papers and reports of spies were taken, and, being torn into fragments, were scattered from an upper window to the winds, until at last, men, snatching up flaring brands from the huge bonfire, rushed into the dismantled mansion, and, having poured petroleum in many of the apartments, ignited them. Flames quickly spread through the house, belching forth from the windows, and, ascending, had soon burst through the roof, illuminating the neighbourhood with a bright, fitful glare. The mob, as the flames leaped up and crackled, screamed with fiendish delight. From thousands of hoarse throats there went up loud cries of "Down with the Tsar! Down with Russia!" And as the great bonfire died down, and the roof of the Embassy collapsed with a crash, causing the flames to shoot higher and roar more vigorously, they sang with one accord, led by a man who had mounted some railings, the stirring British song, "The Union Jack of Old England." Although the colonies had shown how zealously they were prepared to guard the interests of the Mother Country, their public spirit was eclipsed by the spontaneous outburst of patriotism which occurred in Ireland. Mass meetings were being held in Belfast, Dublin, Cork, Waterford, Limerick, Londonderry, Sligo, Armagh, Dundalk, Newry, and dozens of other places, at which men of all grades of society unanimously decided by resolution to raise Volunteer regiments to take arms against the foe. The knowledge of Britain's danger had aroused the patriotic feelings of the people, and they were determined to give their sovereign a proof of their allegiance, cost what it might. The movement was a general one. Nationalists and Unionists vied in their eagerness to demonstrate their love for the Empire, and that part of it which was now in danger. Already the Irish Reserve forces had been mobilised and sent to their allotted stations. The 3rd Irish Rifles from Newtownards, the 5th Battalion from Downpatrick, and the 6th from Dundalk, were at Belfast under arms; the Donegal Artillery from Letterkenny had already gone to Harwich to assist in the defence of the east coast; and both the Londonderry and Sligo Artillery had gone to Portsmouth; while the 3rd Irish Fusiliers from Armagh were at Plymouth, and the 4th Battalion from Cavan had left to assist in the defence of the Severn. Whatever differences of political opinion had previously existed between them on the question of Home Rule, were forgotten by the people in the face of the great danger which threatened the Empire to which they belonged. The national peril welded the people together, and shoulder to shoulder they marched to lay down their lives, if necessary, in the work of driving back the invader. Within six days of this spontaneous outburst of patriotism, 25,000 Irishmen of all creeds and political opinions were on their way to assist their English comrades. As might have been expected, the greater number of these Volunteers came from the North of Ireland, but every district sent its sons, eager to take part in the great struggle. At the great meetings held at Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Limerick, Wexford, Waterford, Strabane, Newtown-Stewart, Downpatrick, Ballymena, and dozens of other places all over the country, from the Giant's Causeway to Cape Clear, and from Dublin to Galway Bay, the most intense enthusiasm was shown, and men signed their names to the roll in hundreds, many subscribing large sums to defray the cost of equipment and other expenses. Each passenger or mail boat from Larne to Stranraer, from Dublin to Holyhead, every steamer from Belfast to Whitehaven and Liverpool, brought over well-armed contingents of stalwart men, who, after receiving hearty receptions of the most enthusiastic and flattering description, were moved south to Stamford in Lincolnshire as quickly as the disorganised railway service would allow. The object of the military authorities in concentrating them at this point was to strengthen the great force of defenders now marching south. Detraining at Stamford, the commanding officer had orders to march to Oundle, by way of King's Cliffe and Fotheringhay, and there remain until joined by a brigade of infantry with the Canadians coming from Leicestershire. The great body of men at length mustered, answered the roll, and marched through the quiet old-world streets of Stamford, and out upon the broad highway to King's Cliffe on the first stage of their journey. It was early morning. In the sunlight the dew still glistened like diamonds on the wayside, as regiment after regiment, with firm, steady step, and shouldering their rifles, bravely passed away through the fields of ripe uncut corn, eager to unite with a force of Regulars, and strike their first blow for their country's liberty. Sturdy fishermen from the rough shores of Donegal marched side by side with townsmen and artisans from Dublin, Belfast, and Limerick; sons of wealthy manufacturers in Antrim and Down bore arms with stalwart peasantry from Kerry and Tipperary; while men whose poor but cherished cabins overlooked Carlingford Lough, united with fearless patriots from Carlow, Wexford, and Waterford. Since they landed on English soil, they had met with a boundless welcome. In the rural districts the distress was not yet so great as in the larger towns; consequently at King's Cliffe, when the first detachment halted for rest in the long straggling street of the typical English village, the bells of the quaint old church were rung, and villagers gave their defenders bread, cheese, and draughts of ale. While the men were standing at ease and eating heartily, two officers entered Bailey's, the village grocery store, which served as post office, and received a cipher telegraphic despatch. They emerged into the roadway immediately, and their faces showed that some unforeseen event had occurred. A third officer was summoned, and a hurried and secret consultation took place as they stood together opposite the Cross Keys Inn. "But can we do it?" queried the youngest of the trio, aloud, pulling on his gloves, and settling the hang of his sword. The grave elder man, commander of the brigade, glanced quickly at his watch, with knit brows. "Do it?" he replied, with a marked Irish accent. "We must. It'll be a dash for life; but the boys are fresh, and as duty calls, we must push onward, even though we may be marching to our doom. Go," he said to the youngest of his two companions, "tell them we are moving, and that our advance guard will reach them at the earliest possible moment." The young lieutenant hurried over to the little shop, and as he did so the colonel gave an order, and a bugle awoke the echoes of the village. Quick words of command sounded down the quaint, ancient street, followed by the sharp click of arms. Again officers' voices sounded loud and brief, and at the word "March!" the great body of stern loyalists moved onward over the bridge, and up the School Hill on to the long winding road which led away through Apesthorpe and historic Fotheringhay to Oundle. The message from the front had been immediately responded to, for a few minutes later the excited villagers stood watching the rearguard disappearing in the cloud of dust raised by the heavy tread of the thousand feet upon the white highway. [Illustration: IRISH VOLUNTEERS HALTING IN KING'S CLIFFE.] CHAPTER XVIII. RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE MIDLANDS. Through the land the grey-coated hordes of the White Tsar spread like locusts--their track marked by death and desolation. Both French and Russian troops had taken up carefully selected positions on the Downs, and, backed by the enormous reinforcements now landed, were slowly advancing. Every detail of the surprise invasion had apparently been carefully considered, for immediately after the fierce battle off Beachy Head a number of French and Russian cruisers were despatched to the Channel ports in order to threaten them, so as to prevent many of the troops in Hampshire, Dorset, and Devon from moving to their place of assembly. Consequently large bodies of British troops were compelled to remain inactive, awaiting probable local attacks. Meanwhile the invaders lost no time in extending their flanks preparatory to a general advance, and very quickly they were in possession of all the high ground from Polegate to Steyning Down, while Cossack patrols were out on the roads towards Cuckfield and West Grinstead, and demonstrations were made in the direction of Horsham, where a strong force of British troops had hastily collected. As the long hot days passed, the Volunteers forming the line of defence south of London had not been idle. A brigade of infantry had been pushed forward to Balcombe, and with this the British were now watching the high ground that stretched across to Horsham. The advance of the enemy had not, of course, been accomplished without terrible bloodshed. A division of the Regulars from Parkhurst, Portsmouth, and Winchester, which had been hurried down to Arundel to occupy a strong defensive position near that town, had come into contact with the enemy, and some desperate fighting ensued. Outposts had been thrown across the river Arun, and about midnight a patrol of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade from Petersfield, supported by infantry, had been suddenly attacked close to Ashington village. Under a vigorous fire they were unfortunately compelled to fall back fighting, and were almost annihilated, for it was only then ascertained that the enemy were moving in great force, evidently with the intention of obtaining possession of the heights as far as Cocking, West Dean, and Chichester, and so threaten Portsmouth from the land. The survivors of this cavalry patrol succeeded in recrossing the Arun, but their losses were exceedingly heavy. At daybreak the enemy were visible from Arundel, and shot and shell were poured into them from the batteries established along the hills to Houghton. So heavy was the British fire that the Russians were compelled to seek cover, and their advance in this direction was, for this time, checked. The defenders, although occupying an excellent position, were, however, not sufficiently strong to successfully cope with the onward rush of invaders, and could do little else beyond watching them. On the other hand, the Russians, displaying great tactical skill, and led by men who had thoroughly studied the geography of the South of England, had gained a distinct advantage, for they had secured their left flank from attack, so that they could now advance northward to Horsham and Balcombe practically unmolested. The first general movement commenced at noon, when an advance was made by two enormous columns of the enemy, one of which proceeded by way of Henfield and Partridge Green and the other by Cooksbridge and Keynes, the third column remaining in Sussex to protect the base of operations. Meanwhile, Horsham had been occupied by a portion of the 2nd division of the 1st Army Corps with a 12-pounder, a 9-pounder field battery, and a field company of the Royal Engineers, and had been placed in a state of hasty defence. Walls had been loopholed, fences had been cut down, and various preparations made for holding the town. Our forces were, nevertheless, sadly lacking in numbers. A cavalry patrol of one of our flying columns was captured by Cossacks at Cowfold, and the neglect on the part of the commander of this column to send out his advance guard sufficiently far, resulted in it being hurled back upon the main body in great disorder. Then, seeing the success everywhere attending their operations, the invaders turned their attention to the British line of communication between Horsham and Arundel, and succeeded in breaking it at Billinghurst and at Petworth. Fierce fighting spread all over Sussex, and everywhere many lives were being sacrificed for Britain. The defenders, alas! with their weak and totally inadequate forces, could make but a sorry stand against the overwhelming masses of French and Russians, yet they acted with conspicuous bravery to sustain the honour of their native land. Villages and towns were devastated, rural homes were sacked and burned, and everywhere quiet, unoffending, but starving Britons were being put to the sword. Over Sussex the reign of terror was awful. The pastures were stained by Britons' life-blood, and in all directions our forces, though displaying their characteristic courage, were being routed. At Horsham they were utterly defeated after a fierce and bloody encounter, in which the enemy also lost very heavily; yet the cause of the British reverse was due solely to a defective administration. Hurriedly massed in the town from Aldershot by way of Guildford, they had, owing to the short-sighted policy of the War Office, arrived without a sufficient supply of either transport or ammunition. Night was falling as they detrained, and in the hopeless confusion battalion commanders could not find their brigade headquarters, and brigadiers could not find their staff. This extraordinary muddle resulted in the fresh troops, instead of being sent forward to reinforce the outposts, being kept in town, while the jaded, ill-fed men, who had already been on the alert many hours, were utterly unable to resist the organised attack which was made before daybreak. Though they made a gallant stand and fought on with desperate determination, yet at last the whole of them were driven back in confusion, and with appalling loss, upon their supports, and the latter, who held out bravely, were at last also compelled to fall back upon their reserves. The latter, which included half a battery of artillery stationed at Wood's Farm and Toll Bar, held the enemy in temporary check; but when the heavy French artillery was at length brought up, the invaders were enabled to cut the railway, destroy the half battery at Wood's Farm, turn the British right flank, and compel them to retreat hastily from Horsham and fly to defensive positions at Guildford and Dorking. By this adroit manoeuvre the enemy succeeded in taking over two hundred prisoners, capturing the guns of the 12-pounder field battery,--which had not been brought into play for the simple reason that only ammunition for 9-pounders had been collected in the town,--and seizing a large quantity of stores and ammunition of various kinds. This success gave the enemy the key to the situation. As on sea, so on land, our blundering defensive policy had resulted in awful disaster. Sufficient attention had never been paid to detail, and the firm-rooted idea that Britain could never be invaded had caused careless indifference to minor matters of vital importance to the stability of our Empire. The contrast between the combined tactics of the enemy and those of our forces was especially noticeable when the cavalry patrol of the British flying column was captured on the Cowfield road and the column defeated. The commander of the column, a well-known officer, unfortunately, like many others, had had very little experience of combined tactics, and looked upon cavalry not merely as "the eyes and ears of an army," but as the army itself. It was this defect that was disastrous. For many years past it had never appeared quite clear whether British cavalry were intended to act _en masse_ in warfare, or simply as scouts or mounted infantry, therefore their training had been uncertain. The Home establishment of our cavalry was supposed to be about 12,000 men, but owing to a parsimonious administration only about half that number had horses, and in some corps less than a half. Another glaring defect was the division of many regiments into detachments stationed in various towns, the inevitable result of this being that many such detachments were without regimental practice for months, and there were many who had not manoeuvred with a force of all arms _for years_! Army organisation proved a miserable failure. The supply of ammunition was totally inadequate, and a disgrace to a nation which held its head above all others. It was true that depôts had been established at various centres, yet with strange oversight no provision had been made for the work of ammunition trains. Originally it had been intended that men for this most important duty should be found by the Reserves, and that the horses should be those privately registered; nevertheless it was found necessary at the very last moment to weaken our artillery by detailing experienced men for duty with the ammunition column. Many of the horses which were registered for service were found to be totally unfit, and very few of the remainder had been previously trained. In the case of those which were required for the cavalry regiments--nearly six thousand--the best men in the regiments had to be told off at the very beginning of the invasion to hurriedly train and prepare these animals for service, when they should have been available to proceed to any part of the kingdom at twenty-four hours' notice. By such defects mobilisation was foredoomed to failure. The scheme, instead of being so arranged as to be carried out without confusion, resulted in muddle and farcical humiliation. Again, the infantry, owing to the recent departure of the Indian drafts, had been considerably weakened, many battalions being found on mobilisation very disorganised and inefficient. As an instance, out of one battalion at Aldershot, which was on paper 1000 strong, 200 had been sent away to India, while of the remainder more than half had only seen twelve months' service, and a large percentage were either under eighteen years of age or were "special enlistments," namely, below the minimum standard of height. Such a battalion compared very unfavourably with the majority of Volunteer regiments,--those of the Stafford Brigade, for instance,--the average service of the men in those regiments being over five years, and the average age twenty-seven years. British officers had long ago foreseen all these defects, and many others, yet they had preserved an enforced silence. They themselves were very inefficiently trained in manoeuvring, for, with one or two exceptions, there were no stations in the kingdom where forces were sufficiently numerous to give the majority of the superior officers practice in handling combined bodies of troops. Thus in practical experience in the field they were far behind both French and Russians, and it was this very serious deficiency that now became everywhere apparent. British troops, fighting valiantly, struggled to protect their native land, which they determined should never fall under the thrall of the invader. But alas! their resistance, though stubborn and formidable, was nevertheless futile. Time after time the lines of defence were broken. The Russian Eagle spread his black wings to the sun, and with joyous shouts the dense grey white masses of the enemy marched on over the dusty Sussex roads northward towards the Thames. After the battle of Horsham, the gigantic right column of the invaders, consisting mostly of French troops, followed up the defenders to Guildford and Dorking, preparatory to an attack upon London; while the left column, numbering 150,000 French and Russians of all arms, pushed on through Alfold to Haslemere, then through Farnham and Odiham to Swallowfield, all of which towns they sacked and burned, the terrified inhabitants being treated with scant mercy. As the majority of the defenders were massed in Kent, South Surrey, and Sussex, the enemy advanced practically unmolested, and at sunrise one morning a terrible panic was created in Reading by the sudden descent upon the town of a great advance guard of 10,000 Russians. The people were appalled. They could offer no resistance against the cavalry, who, tearing along the straight high road from Swallowfield, swept down upon them. Along this road the whole gigantic force was moving, and the Cossack skirmishers, spurring on across the town, passed away through the Railway Works, and halted at the bridge that spans the Thames at Caversham. They occupied it at once, in order to prevent it being blown up before the main body arrived, and a brisk fight ensued with the small body of defenders that had still remained at the Brigade depôt on the Purley Road. Meanwhile, as the French and Russian advance guard came along, they devastated the land with fire and sword. The farms along the road were searched, and afterwards set on fire, while not a house at Three Mile Cross escaped. Entering the town from Whitley Hill, the great mass of troops, working in extended order, came slowly on, and, followed by 140,000 of the main body and 1000 guns, carried everything before them. No power could stem the advancing tide of the Muscovite legions, and as they poured into the town in dense compact bodies, hundreds of townspeople were shot down ruthlessly, merely because they attempted to defend their homes. From the Avenue Works away to the Cemetery, and from the Railway Station to Leighton Park, the streets swarmed with soldiers of the Tsar, who entered almost every house in search of plunder, and fired out of sheer delight in bloodshed upon hundreds who were flying for their lives. Men, women, even children, were slaughtered. The massacre was frightful. Neither life nor property was respected; in every thoroughfare brutal outrages and murders were committed, and English homes were rendered desolate. Almost the first buildings attacked were the great factories of Messrs. Huntley & Palmer, whose 3000 hands were now, alas! idle owing to the famine. The stores were searched for biscuits, and afterwards the whole factory was promptly set on fire. The Great Western, Queen's, and George Hotels were searched from garret to cellar, and the wines and beer found in the latter were drunk in the streets. With the scant provisions found, several of the regiments made merry during the morning, while others pursued their devastating work. The banks were looted, St. Mary's, Greyfriars', and St. Lawrence's Churches were burned, and Sutton & Sons' buildings and the Railway Works shared the same fate, while out in the direction of Prospect Hill Park all the houses were sacked, and those occupants who remained to guard their household treasures were put to the sword. Everywhere the invaders displayed the most fiendish brutality, and the small force of British troops who had engaged the Russian advance guard were, after a most fiercely contested struggle, completely annihilated, not, however, before they had successfully placed charges of gun-cotton under the bridge and blown it up, together with a number of Cossacks who had taken possession of it. This, however, only checked the enemy's progress temporarily, for the right flank crossed at Sonning, and as the main body had with them several pontoon sections, by noon the pontoons were in position, and the long line of cavalry, infantry, artillery, and engineers, leaving behind Reading, now in flames, crossed the Thames and wound away along the road to Banbury, which quaint old town, immortalised in nursery rhyme, they sacked and burned, destroying the historic Cross, and regaling themselves upon the ale found in the cellars of the inns, the Red and White Lions. This done, they again continued their march, practically unmolested; while Oxford was also entered and sacked. True, scouts reported strong forces of the defenders advancing across from Market Harborough, Kettering, and Oundle, and once or twice British outposts had sharp encounters with the Russians along the hills between Ladbrooke and Daventry, resulting in serious losses on both sides; nevertheless the gigantic force of Russians still proceeded, sweeping away every obstacle from their path. On leaving Banbury, the enemy, marching in column of route, took the road through Stratford-on-Avon to Wootton Wawen, where a halt for twenty-four hours was made in order to mature plans for an organised attack on Birmingham. Wootton Hall, after being looted, was made the headquarters, and from thence was issued an order on the following day which caused Warwick and Leamington to be swept and burned by the invaders, who afterwards broke into two divisions. One body, consisting of 50,000 men, including an advance guard of 5000, took the right-hand road from Wootton to Birmingham, through Sparkbrook; while the remaining 100,000 bore away to the left through Ullenhall and Holt End to the extremity of the Hagley Hills, intending to occupy them. They had already been informed that strong defences had been established at King's Norton, in the immediate vicinity, and knew that severe fighting must inevitably ensue; therefore they lost no time in establishing themselves along the high ground between Redditch and Barnt Green, in a position commanding the two main roads south from Dudley and Birmingham. That a most desperate stand would be made for the defence of the Metropolis of the Midlands the Russian commander was well aware. After the long march his troops were jaded, so, bivouacing in Hewell Park, he awaited for nearly two days the reports of his spies. These were not so reassuring as he had anticipated, for it appeared that the high ground south of the city, notably at King's Norton, Northfield, Harborne, Edgbaston, and along the Hagley Road, was occupied by strong bodies of troops and a large number of guns, and that every preparation had been made for a stubborn resistance. It also appeared that at the entrance to the city at Sparkbrook, which road had been taken by the right column, very little resistance was likely to be offered. That the positions occupied by the defenders had been very carefully chosen as the most advantageous the Russian commander was bound to admit, and although he possessed such a large body of men it would require considerable tactical skill to dislodge the defenders in order to prevent them covering with their guns the country over which the Russian division, taking the right-hand roads, must travel. [Illustration: THE BATTLEFIELD OF BIRMINGHAM.] During that day an encounter of a most fierce description occurred between hostile reconnoitring parties on the road between Bromsgrove Lickey and Northfield. The road gradually ascended with a walled-in plantation on either side, and the enemy were proceeding at a comfortable pace when suddenly a number of rifles rattled out simultaneously, and then it was discovered that the wall had been loopholed, and that the British were pouring upon them a deadly hail from which there was no shelter. The walls bristled with rifles, and from them came a storm of bullets that killed and wounded dozens of the invaders. The latter, however, showed considerable daring, for while the magazine rifles poured forth their deadly shower, they rallied and charged up the hill in the face of the fearful odds against them. For ten minutes or perhaps a quarter of an hour the fighting was a desperate hand-to-hand one, the enemy entering the plantation with a dash that surprised the defenders. Gradually, although outnumbered by the Russians, the British at length, by dint of the most strenuous effort and hard fighting, succeeded in inflicting frightful loss upon the invaders, and the latter, after a most desperate stand, eventually retreated in confusion down into the valley, leaving nearly two-thirds of the party dead or dying. The British, whose losses were very small, had shown the invaders that they meant to defend Birmingham, and that every inch of ground they gained would have to be won by sheer fighting. An hour later another fierce encounter occurred in the same neighbourhood, and of the 4000 Russians who had advanced along that road not 900 returned to the main body, such havoc the British Maxims caused; while at the same time a further disaster occurred to the enemy in another direction, for away at Tanworth their outposts had been completely annihilated, those who were not killed being taken prisoners by the 3rd South Staffordshire Volunteers, who, under Colonel E. Nayler, acted with conspicuous bravery. In every direction the enemy's outposts and advance guards were being harassed, cut up, and hurled back in disorder with heavy loss, therefore the Russian commander decided that a sudden and rapid movement forward in order to effect a junction with his right column was the only means by which the position could be carried. In the meantime events were occurring rapidly all over the country south of the city. The commander of the Russian left column, deciding to commence the attack forthwith, moved on his forces just before midnight in order to commence the onslaught before daybreak, knowing the British forces always relieve their outposts at that time. Again, it was necessary to advance under cover of darkness in order to prevent the defenders' artillery, which now commanded the road between Alcester and Moseley, firing upon them. Having received a message from the right column stating that their advance guard had pushed on to Olton End with outposts at Sheldon and Yardley, and announcing their intention of advancing through Sparkbrook upon the city before dawn, the commanding officer, leaving some artillery at Barnt Green, and sending on cavalry to Stourbridge and Cradley to turn the English flank at Halesowen, manoeuvred rapidly, bringing the main body of cavalry and infantry back to Alvechurch, thence across to Weatheroak, and then striking due north, again marched by the three roads leading to King's Norton. The high ground here he knew was strongly defended, and it was about a quarter to two o'clock when the British, by means of their search-lights, discovered the great dark masses advancing upon them. Quickly their guns opened fire, and the sullen booming of cannon was answered by the Russian battery near Barnt Green. Over Birmingham the noise was heard, and had volumes of terrible significance for the turbulent crowds who filled the broad thoroughfares. The search-lights used by both invaders and defenders turned night into day, and the battle proceeded. The enemy had carefully prepared their plans, for almost at the same moment that they assaulted the position at King's Norton, a battery of Russian artillery opened a terrible fire from the hill at Tanner's Green, while the attacking column extended their right across to Colebrook Hall, with intent to push across to Moseley Station, and thus gain the top of the ridge of the ground in the rear of the British positions, and so hem in the British force and allow the right column to advance through Small Heath and Sparkbrook unchecked. These simultaneous attacks met in the valley separating the parallel ridges held by the Russians and British, and the fighting became at once fierce and stubborn. A furious infantry fire raged for over an hour in the valley between the excellent position held by the defenders at King's Norton and the lower wooded ridge occupied by the Russians, who had succeeded in capturing half a British battery who held it. Owing to the bareness of the slope, the Russians went down into battle without cover, cut up terribly by the British infantry fire, and by the shell fire from the King's Norton batteries. From the British trenches between Broad Meadow and Moundsley Hall a galling fire was poured, and Russian infantry fell in hundreds over the undulating fields between the high road to Alcester and the Blithe River. From a ridge on the Stratford Road, near Monkspath Street, heavy Russian artillery opened fire just before dawn, and played terrible havoc with the British guns, which on the sky-line opposite afforded a mark. As time crept on there was no cessation in the thunder on either side, while away along the valleys a most bloody encounter was in progress. The whole stretch of country was one huge battlefield. British and Russians fell in hundreds, nay, in thousands. The losses on every side were appalling; the fortune of war trembled in the balance. CHAPTER XIX. FALL OF BIRMINGHAM. The battle outside Birmingham was long, fierce, and furious. No more desperately contested engagement had ever occurred in the history of the British Empire. From the very first moment of the fight it was apparent that the struggle would be a fearful one, both sides possessing advantages; the British by reason of the magnificent defensive positions they occupied, and the Russians by reason of their overwhelming numbers. Against a defending force of 50,000 of all arms, 150,000 invaders--the majority of whom were Russians--were now fighting, and the combat was necessarily long and deadly. British Volunteers were conspicuous everywhere by their bravery; the Canadians rendered most valuable assistance, firing from time to time with excellent precision, and holding their position with splendid courage; while the Irish Brigade, who had moved rapidly from King's Cliffe by train and road, and had arrived in time, now held their own in a position close to Kingsheath House. Many of the principal buildings in Birmingham had during the past day or two been converted into hospitals, amongst others the Post Office, where the trained nurses received very valuable assistance from the female clerks. A train full of British wounded was captured early in the evening at Barnt Green. It contained regular troops and civilians from the Stratford force which had fallen back to Alcester, and the train had been sent on from there in the hope that it would get through before the enemy were able to cut the line. This, however, was not accomplished, for the Russians inhumanely turned out the wounded and filled the train with their own troops and ammunition. Then, under the guidance of a Birmingham railway man of French nationality who had been acting as spy, the train proceeded to New Street Station. It was impossible for the officials at the station to cope with the enemy, for they had only expected their own wounded, or they would, of course, have wrecked the train by altering the points before it arrived in the station. The Russians therefore detrained, and, led by their spy, made a dash along the subway leading to the lifts ascending to the Post Office. These were secured, and the Office was soon captured by the Russians, who not only thereby obtained a footing in the very centre of the town from which there was not much chance of dislodging them before Birmingham fell, but they had also obtained possession of the most important telegraph centre for the North and Midland districts of England. Before the first flush of dawn the whole of the country from Kings Norton right across to Solihull was one huge battlefield, and when the sun rose, bright and glorious, its rays were obscured by the clouds of smoke which hung like a funeral pall over hill and dale. For a long period the principal Russian battery on the Stratford Road was short of ammunition, and, seeing this, the strong British battery at Northfield moved quickly up into a commanding position at Drake's Cross, not, however, before it had been considerably weakened by the Russian fire from Bromsgrove Lickey. During this time, however, detachments of Canadian marksmen had been detailed with no other purpose than to sweep the Russian road at the exposed points of its course, and to fire at everything and everybody exposed on the ridge. This was most effective, and for quite half an hour prevented any supply of ammunition reaching the enemy, thus giving the British battery an opportunity to establish itself. At length, however, both batteries of defenders opened fire simultaneously upon the Russian guns, and so thickly fell the shots, that although ammunition had by this time been brought up, the enemy's power in that quarter was completely broken. From that time the fierce struggle was confined to cavalry and infantry. Troops of Cossacks, sweeping up the banks of the Arrow, encountered British Hussars and cut into them with frightful effect. The defenders, fighting hard as the day wore on, hindered the enemy from gaining any material advantage, though the latter forced the outer line of the British shelter trenches on the slopes below the position of King's Norton. The Canadians had laid mines in front of their trenches, which were exploded just as the head of the Russian assaulting parties were massed above them, and large numbers of the Tsar's infantry were blown into atoms. Bullets were singing along the valleys like swarms of angry wasps, and the Russian losses in every direction were enormous. Hour after hour the fighting continued. The British held good positions, with an inner line of defence across from Selly Oak, Harborne, and Edgbaston, to the high crest on the Hagley Road, close to the Fountain, while the Russians swarmed over the country in overwhelming numbers. The frightful losses the latter were sustaining by reason of the defenders' artillery fire did not, however, disconcert them. But for the huge right column of invaders advancing on Birmingham by way of Acock's Green, it seemed an even match, yet as afternoon passed the firing in the valley swelled in volume, and the mad clamour of battle still surged up into the blue cloudless heavens. The enemy could see on the sky-line the British reinforcements as they came up from Halesowen by the road close to their battery on the bare spot near the edge of their right flank, and it was decided at four o'clock to deliver a counter flank attack on the left edge of the British position, simultaneously with a renewed strenuous assault by the tirailleurs from below. Soon this desperate manoeuvre was commenced, and although the marching ground was good, the British guns swept them with their terrible fire, and hundreds of the Tsar's soldiers dyed the meadows with their blood. It was a fierce, mad dash. The British attacked vigorously on every side, fought bravely, straining every nerve to repulse their foe. The battle had been the most fiercely contested of any during the struggle, and in this desperate assault on King's Norton the Russians had suffered appalling losses. The valleys and slopes were strewn with dead and dying, and a bullet had struck the British commander, mortally wounding him. As he was borne away to the ambulance waggon, the last words on that noble soldier's lips were a fervent wish for good fortune to the arms of the Queen he had served so well. But the British were, alas! outnumbered, and at last retreating in disorder, were followed over the hills to Halesowen and utterly routed, while the main body of the enemy marching up the Bristol and Pershore Roads, extended their left across to Harborne and Edgbaston. Meanwhile, however, the guns placed on the edge of the city along the Hagley Road near the Fountain, and in Beech Lane close to the Talbot Inn, as well as the Volunteer batteries near St. Augustine's Church and Westfield Road, opened fire upon the advancing legions. The two lower roads taken by the enemy were well commanded by the British guns, and the Volunteers, with the Canadians and Irish, again rendered most valuable assistance, everywhere displaying cool and conspicuous courage. The walls of the new villas along the Hagley Road, Portland Road, and Beech Lane had been placed in a state of hasty defence, and rifles bristled everywhere, but as the sun sank behind the long range of purple hills the fight was in the balance. The British, as they stood, could almost keep back the foe, but, alas! not quite. There was soon a concentric rush for the hill, and as the cannons thundered and rifles rattled, hundreds of the grey-coats fell back and rolled down the steep slope dead and dying, but the others pushed on in face of the frowning defences, used their bayonets with desperate energy, and a few minutes later loud shouts in Russian told that the ridge had been cleared and the position won. The battle had been long and terrible; the carnage awful! The British, making a last desperate stand, fought a fierce hand-to-hand struggle, but ere long half their number lay helpless in the newly-made suburban roads, and the remainder were compelled to leave their guns in possession of the enemy and fly north to Sandwell to save themselves. Then, as they fled, the Russians turned the British guns near St. Augustine's upon them, causing havoc in their rear. The shattered left column of the enemy, having at length broken down the British defences, raised loud victorious yells, and, after reorganising, marched down the Hagley Road upon the city, fighting from house to house the whole way. The gardens in front of these houses, however, aided the defenders greatly in checking the advance. The sacrifice of human life during those hours from daybreak to sundown had been frightful. The whole country, from Great Packington to Halesowen, was strewn with blood-smeared corpses. Having regard to the fact that the defending force consisted of only 50,000 men against 100,000 Russians, the losses inflicted upon the latter spoke volumes for British pluck and military skill. Upon the field 10,000 Russians lay dead, 30,000 were wounded, and 2000 were prisoners, while the defenders' total loss in killed and wounded only amounted to 20,000. Indeed, had it not been for the reinforcements, numbering 50,000, from the right column, which were by this time coming up with all speed from Acock's Green, the Russians, in their terribly jaded and demoralised state, could not have marched upon the city. As it was, however, the occupation commenced as night drew on; the fighting that followed being principally done by the reinforcements. Leaving no fewer than 42,000 men dead, wounded, and captured, the invaders pushed on into Birmingham. Though the citizens' losses had already been terrific, nevertheless they found that they were still determined to hold out. In all the principal roads leading into the city barricades had been formed, and behind them were bands of desperate men, well equipped, and prepared to fight on to the bitter end. The first of these in the Hagley Road had been constructed at the junction of Monument Road, and as the skirmishers and advance guard approached, offered a most desperate resistance. In addition to a vigorous rifle fire that poured from the improvised defences, three Maxims were brought into play from the roofs of large houses, and these, commanding the whole road as far as its junction with Beech Lane, literally mowed down the enemy as they approached. Time after time the Russians rushed upon the defenders' position, only to be hurled back again by the leaden hail, which fell so thickly that it was impossible for any body of troops to withstand it. By this the invaders' advance was temporarily checked, but it was not long before they established a battery at the corner of Norfolk Road, and poured shell upon the barricade with frightful effect. Quickly the guns were silenced, and the Russians at last breaking down the barrier, engaged in a conflict at close quarters with the defenders. The road along to Five Ways was desperately contested. The slaughter on both sides was awful, for a detachment of Russians coming up the Harborne Road had been utterly annihilated and swept away by the rifle fire of defenders concealed behind loopholed walls. At Five Ways the entrance to each of the five broad converging thoroughfares had been strongly barricaded, and as the enemy pressed forward the British machine guns established there caused terrible havoc. Behind those barricades men of Birmingham of every class, armed with all sorts of guns, hastily obtained from Kynoch's and other factories, struggled for the defence of their homes and loved ones, working with a dash and energy that greatly disconcerted the enemy, who had imagined that, in view of their victory in the battle, little resistance would be offered. In the darkness that had now fallen the scenes in the streets were frightful. The only light was the flash from gun-muzzles and the glare of flames consuming private houses and public buildings. The civilian defenders, reinforced by Regular soldiers, Militia, and Volunteers, had made such excellent preparations for defence, and offered such strenuous opposition, that almost every foot the Russians gained in the direction of the centre of the city was fought for hand to hand. Both right and left Russian columns were now advancing up the Coventry, Stratford, Moseley, Pershore, and Bristol Roads, and in each of those thoroughfares the barricades were strongly constructed, and, being armed with Maxims, wrought frightful execution. Gradually, however, one after another of these defences fell by reason of the organised attacks by such superior numbers, and the Russians marched on, killing with bayonet and sword. In the city, as the night passed, the fighting in the streets everywhere was of the fiercest and most sanguinary description. In Corporation Street a huge barricade with machine guns had been constructed opposite the Victoria Law Courts, and, assisted by 200 Volunteers, who, inside the latter building, fired from the windows, the enemy were held in check for several hours. Time after time shells fell from the Russian guns in the midst of the defenders, and, bursting, decimated them in a horrible manner; yet through the long close night there was never a lack of brave men to step into the breach and take up the arms of their dead comrades. Indeed, it was only when the enemy succeeded in setting fire to the Courts, and compelling the defenders to cease their vigorous rifle fire from the windows, that the position was won; and not until hundreds of Russians lay dead or dying in the street. In New Street the Irish Volunteers distinguished themselves conspicuously. After the retreat they had been withdrawn with the Canadians into the city, and, waiting in the side thoroughfares at the opposite end of New Street, held themselves in readiness. Suddenly, as the enemy rushed along in their direction, an order was given, and they formed up, and stretching across the street, met them with volley after volley of steady firing; then, rushing onward with fixed bayonets, charged almost before the Russians were aware of their presence. Without a thought of his own personal safety, every Irishman cast himself into the thick of the fray, and, backed by a strong body of Canadians and fusiliers, they succeeded in cutting their way completely into the invaders, and driving them back into Corporation Street, where they were forced right under the fire of four Maxims that had just at that moment been brought into position outside the Exchange. Suddenly these guns rattled out simultaneously, and the Russians, unable to advance, and standing at the head of the long broad thoroughfare, were swept down with awful swiftness and with scarcely any resistance. So sudden had been their fate, that of a force over two thousand strong, not more than a dozen escaped, although the defenders were taken in rear by the force of 500 Russians who had occupied the Post Office on the previous night. From Corporation Street a brilliant, ruddy glow suffused the sky, as both the Law Courts and the Grand Theatre were in flames, while St. Mary's Church and the Market Hall had also been fired by incendiaries. In the panic and confusion, conflagrations were breaking out everywhere, flames bursting forth from several fine shops in New Street which had already been sacked and wrecked. Maddened by their success, by the thirst for the blood of their enemies, and the rash deeds of incendiaries, the Muscovite legions spread over the whole city, and outrage and murder were common everywhere. Away up Great Hampton Street and Hockley Hill the jewellery factories were looted, and hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of gems and gold were carried off, while the Mint was entered, afterwards being burned because only copper coins were found there, and the pictures in the Art Gallery were wantonly slashed by sabres and bayonets. The scenes on that memorable night were awful. Birmingham, one of the most wealthy cities in the kingdom, fell at last, after a most stubborn resistance, for just before day broke the overwhelming forces of Russia occupying the streets commenced to drive out the defenders, and shoot down those who turned to resist. From Bordesley to Handsworth, and from Smethwick to Aston, the city was in the hands of the enemy. The banks in New Street were broken open, and the gold stuffed into the pockets of the uncouth dwellers on the Don and the Volga, Chamberlain's Memorial was wrecked, and Queen's College occupied by infantry. Cossack officers established themselves in the Grand and Queen's Hotels, and their men were billeted at the Midland, Union, Conservative, and other Clubs, and at many minor hotels and buildings. Before the dawn had spread, whole rows of shops were burning, their brilliant glare illuminating the streets that ran with blood. It was a fearful scene of death and desolation. The majority of the citizens had fled, leaving everything in the hands of the enemy, who still continued their work of pillage. In the streets the bodies of 10,000 Russians and 3000 British lay unheeded, while no fewer than 9000 of the enemy's infantry had been wounded. The headquarters of the Russian army had at last been established in a British city, for over the great Council House there now lazily flapped in the fresh morning breeze the great yellow-and-black flag of the Tsar Alexander. And the Russian General, finding he had lost the enormous force of 61,000 men, spent the grey hours of dawn in nervous anxiousness, pacing the room in which he had installed himself, contemplating the frightful disaster, and undecided how next to act. An incident illustrative of the fierceness of the fight outside the city was published in the _Times_ several days later. It was an extract from a private letter written by Lieut. J. G. Morris of the 3rd Battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment, and was as follows:-- "The sun that day was blazing and merciless. Throughout the morning our battalion had lost heavily in the valley, when suddenly at about twelve o'clock the enemy apparently received reinforcements, and we were then driven back upon Weatheroak by sheer force of numbers, and afterwards again fell further back towards our position on the high ground in Hagley Road. [Illustration: BIRMINGHAM OCCUPIED BY THE RUSSIANS.] "In this hasty retreat I found myself with a sergeant and eighteen men pursued by a large skirmishing party of Russians. All we could do was to fly before them. This we did, until at length, turning into Beech Lane, we found ourselves before a small, low-built ancient hostelry, the King's Head Inn, with a dilapidated and somewhat crude counterfeit presentment of King George II. outside. The place was unoccupied, and I decided immediately to enter it. I could count on every one of my men; therefore very soon we were inside, and had barricaded the little place. Scarcely had we accomplished this when the first shots rang out, and in a few moments the space outside where the cross-roads meet literally swarmed with Russians, who quickly extended, and, seeking cover at the junction of each of the five roads, commenced a terrific fusillade. The windows from which we fired were smashed, the woodwork splintered everywhere, and so thickly came the bullets that my men had to exercise the utmost caution in concealing themselves while firing. "In a quarter of an hour one man had been struck and lay dead by my side, while at the same time the terrible truth suddenly dawned upon me that our ammunition could not last out. Regulating the firing, I rushed to one of the back windows that commanded the valley down to Harborne, and saw advancing along the road in our direction, and raising a cloud of dust, about a thousand Russian cavalry and infantry. "Back again to the front room I dashed, just in time to witness the enemy make a wild rush towards us. Our slackened fire had deceived them, and as the storming party dashed forward, they were met by vigorous volleys from our magazine rifles, which knocked over dozens, and compelled the remainder to again retire. "Again the enemy made a desperate onslaught, and again we succeeded in hurling them back, and stretching dead a dozen or more. Meanwhile the great force of Russians was moving slowly up the hill, and I knew that to hold the place much longer would be impossible. From the rear of the building a vigorous attack had now commenced, and moving more men round to the rear, so that our fire would command the sloping approach to the house, I gave an order to fire steadily. A moment later my sergeant and two other men had been severely wounded, and although the former had had his arm broken, and was near fainting from loss of blood, nevertheless he kept up, resting his rifle-barrel upon the shattered window-ledge, and pouring out the deadly contents of his magazine. "A few minutes afterwards a bullet shattered my left hand, and the man who crouched next to me under the window was a second later shot through the heart, and fell back dead among the disordered furniture. "Still not a man hesitated, not a word of despair was uttered. We all knew that death stared us in the face, and that to face it bravely was a Briton's duty. Only once I shouted above the din: 'Do your best, boys! Remember we we are all Britons, and those vermin outside have wrecked our homes and killed those we love. Let's have our revenge, even if we die for it!' "'We'll stick to 'em till the very last, sir, never fear,' cheerily replied one young fellow as he reloaded his gun; but alas! ere he could raise it to fire, a bullet struck him in the throat. He staggered back, and a few moments later was a corpse. "Undaunted, however, my men determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible, and continued their fire, time after time repelling the attack, and sweeping away the grey-coats as they emerged from behind the low walls. "Three more men had fallen in as many seconds, and another, staggering back against the wall, held his hand to his breast, where he had received a terrible and mortal wound. Our situation at that moment was most critical. Only two rounds remained to each of my nine brave fellows, yet not a man wavered. "Looking, I saw in the fading twilight the dark masses of the enemy moving up the steep road, and at that moment a round was fired with effect upon those who had surrounded us. One more round only remained. Then we meant to die fighting. Blinding smoke suddenly filled the half-wrecked room, and we knew that the enemy had succeeded in setting fire to the taproom underneath! "I stepped forward, and shouted for the last time the order to my brave comrades to fire. Nine rifles rang out simultaneously; but I had, I suppose, showed myself imprudently, for at the same second I felt a sharp twinge in the shoulder, and knew that I had been struck. The rest was all a blank. "When I regained my senses I found myself lying in Sandwell Hall, with doctors bandaging my wounds, and then I learned that we had been rescued just in time, and that my nine comrades had all escaped the fate they had faced with dogged disregard for their own safety, and such noble devotion to their Queen." It was a black day for Britain. During the long hours of that fierce, mad struggle many Victoria Crosses were earned, but the majority of those who performed deeds worthy of such decoration, alas! fell to the earth, dead. CHAPTER XX. OUR REVENGE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. Many important events had occurred in the Mediterranean since the outbreak of hostilities. At the moment of the sudden Declaration of War, the ships forming the British Mediterranean Squadron were at Larnaka, Cyprus, and on receipt of the alarming intelligence, the Admiral sailed immediately for Malta. On arrival there, he heard that a strong force of French vessels had been despatched to Gibraltar for the purpose of preventing any British ships from getting out of the Mediterranean in order to strengthen the Channel Squadron. Nevertheless he waited for some days at Malta, in hourly expectation of instructions, which came at length about two o'clock one morning, and an hour later the Squadron sailed westward for an unknown destination. Our Fleet in those waters was notoriously inadequate in comparison with those of France and Russia. It consisted of three of the battleships constructed under the 1894 programme, the _Jupiter_, _Cæsar_, and _Victorious_, with the cruisers _Diana_ and _Dido_; the ironclads _Collingwood_, _Dreadnought_, _Hood_, _Inflexible_, _Nile_, _Ramillies_, _Repulse_, _Sans Pareil_, _Trafalgar_, _Magnificent_, _Empress of India_, and _Revenge_; the cruisers _Arethusa_, _Edgar_, _Fearless_, _Hawke_, _Scout_, _Orlando_, _Undaunted_; the torpedo ram _Polyphemus_; the torpedo gun-vessel _Sandfly_; the sloops _Dolphin_, _Gannet_, _Melita_, and _Bramble_; and the despatch vessel _Surprise_, with twenty-two torpedo boats and six destroyers. The information received by our Fleet at Malta was to the effect that the French force at Gibraltar was so strong that a successful attack was out of the question; while the Russian Mediterranean and Black Sea Fleets, the strength of which was considerable, were also known to be approaching for the purpose of co-operating with the French. Notwithstanding the addition of three new battleships and two new cruisers to our force in the Mediterranean, the utter inadequacy of our Navy was still very apparent. For years the British public had demanded that a dozen more new battleships should be constructed in case of casualties, but these demands were unheeded, and during the three years that had passed we had lost our naval supremacy, for France and Russia combined were now considerably stronger. France alone had 150 fighting pennants available along her southern shores, against our 59; and the Tsar's ships were all strong, well-equipped, and armed with guns of the latest type. As was feared from the outset, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had struck for the Suez Canal, England's highway to the East. Egypt, the Bosphorus, Gibraltar, and Tripoli in the grasp of the enemy, meant supremacy in the East, and a situation that would not be tolerated by either Italy or Austria. Therefore the British Admiral, recognising the seriousness of the situation, and having received instructions to return home and assist in the defence of Britain, mustered his forces and cleared for action. The events that occurred immediately afterwards are best related in the graphic and interesting narrative which was subsequently written to a friend by Captain Neville Reed of the great steel battleship _Ramillies_, and afterwards published, together with the accompanying sketch, in the _Illustrated London News_, as follows:-- "After leaving Malta, we rounded the Adventure Bank off the Sicilian coast, and headed due north past Elba and on to the Gulf of Genoa. From Spezia we received despatches, and after anchoring for twelve hours,--during which time we were busy completing our preparations,--sailed at midnight westward. Off St. Tropez, near the Hyères Islands, in obedience to signals from the flagship, the _Empress of India_, the ironclads _Jupiter_, _Sans Pareil_, _Repulse_, with the cruisers _Edgar_, _Dido_, _Diana_, _Orlando_, _Undaunted_, and _Scout_, the sloop _Gannet_, and five torpedo boats, detached themselves from the Squadron, and after exchanging further signals, bore away due south. Giving the shore a wide offing, we steamed along throughout the afternoon. The Mediterranean had not yet been the scene of any bloody or fatal conflict, but as we cut our way through the calm sunlit waters with a brilliant cerulean sky above, the contrast between our bright and lovely surroundings and the terrible realities of the situation during those breathless hours of suspense still dwells distinctly in my memory. "It was our duty to fight the enemy, to beat him, and to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar and help our comrades at home. Every man, although totally unaware of his present destination, felt that at last the moment had come when the supreme ambition of his life was to be realised, and he was to strike a blow for his country's honour. "Apparently our Admiral was in no hurry. He no doubt was awaiting events, for at sunset we lay-to about thirty miles south of La Ciotat, and spent the calm bright night restlessly anxious and keeping a sharp lookout for the enemy. There was a hush of expectation over the ship, and scarcely a sound broke the quiet save the lapping of the water against the smooth sides of the ironclad, and no sign of force except the swish of the waves falling on either side of the formidable and deadly ram. "Just after seven bells in the morning watch, however, we resumed our voyage, and turning, went north again. Then, for the first time, we knew the Admiral's intentions. An ultimatum had already been given. _We were to bombard Marseilles!_ "Three hours later we came within view of the city. Seen from the sea it has a certain amount of picturesqueness. In the foreground there is the harbour, with a barren group of islands at its entrance, and behind masses of yellow houses covering an extensive valley, and white villas dotted over a semicircle of green hills stretching in the rear. Prominent in the landscape is the church of Nôtre Dame de la Garde, perched on the eminence on the right; while on the left there stands on an island the Château d'If, rendered immortal by the adventures of Monte Cristo; and behind, on the broad Quai de la Joliette, rises the fine Cathedral, built in alternate courses of black and white stone. It is a handsome and wealthy city, with its fine shady boulevard, the Cannebière running through its centre from the Arc de Triomphe right down to the old port whence the mail steamers depart. This city, teeming with life, it was our duty to lay in ruins! "Knowing how strongly fortified it was, that upon each of those hills were great batteries ready at a given signal to pour out their deadly hail, and that under the blue waters were mines which might be exploded from the shore at any moment, we made preparations for counter-mining, and then cautiously approached within range. Suddenly, however, having got into position and laid our guns, we received the anxiously expected order, and a few moments later opened a terrific and almost simultaneous fire. "Through my glass I could clearly distinguish the terrible confusion being caused in the streets as our shells fell and burst on the Quai de la Joliette, in the Cannebière, and the Boulevard de l'Empéreur. "The first taste of our guns had produced a terrible panic, for a shell from the _Dreadnought_, lying next to us, had struck the tower of the Cathedral and brought down a great quantity of masonry, while another shell from one of our 67-ton guns, bursting in the Palais de Justice with terrible effect, had ignited it. "It was our first shot, and the gun had been well sighted; but ere we fired again such a storm of shell burst upon us that I confess for a moment I stood in my conning-tower motionless in surprise. On all sides the French had apparently established batteries. From the great Fort St. Jean at the entrance to the port, and from the Batterie du Phare on the opposite side, flame and smoke belched from heavy guns continuously. From a small battery in the Château d'If, from another on the rocky promontory on the right known as the Edoume, from a number of smaller ones established on the hills of l'Oriol and the Citadel, as well as from the great fortress of Nôtre Dame de la Garde on the highest hill, a little to the right of the city, there came an incessant thunder, and dozens of shots ricochetted over the placid water towards us. "In a few moments, however, my 67-tonners were again adding to the deafening roar, my ten 6-inch quick-firing guns were sending out their messengers of death, and my smaller arms, consisting of 3 and 16-pounders, were acting their part in the sudden outburst. We had attacked the town without intention of investment, but simply to destroy it, and as the minutes slipped by, and I peered through my glass, I could see how devastating were our enormous modern shells. "All our guns were now trained upon the forts, and the bombardment was most vigorous. The six coast-defence ships, which endeavoured to drive us off, we quickly put out of action, capturing one, torpedoing two, and disabling the three others; while up to the present, although a number of shots from the land batteries had struck us, we sustained no serious damage. "We were avenging Hull and Newcastle. Into the panic-stricken town we were pouring an unceasing storm of shell, which swept away whole streets of handsome buildings, and killed hundreds of those flying for safety into the country. Watching, I saw one shot from one of my bow barbette guns crash into the roof of the fine new Hôtel du Louvre, in the Cannebière. The French Tricolor on the flagstaff toppled over into the street, and a second later the clouds of smoke and the débris which shot up showed plainly the awful results of the bursting shell. "Time after time my 67-tonners crashed and roared, time after time I pressed my fingers upon the little knobs in the conning-tower, and huge projectiles were discharged right into the forts. In conjunction with the never-ceasing fire of companion ships, we rained iron in a continuous stream that wrought havoc in the defences and destroyed all the buildings that offered targets. In an hour the Arsenal behind the Palais de Justice was laid in ruins, the fine Hôtel de Ville was a mere heap of smouldering débris, the Bourse, and the great Library in the Boulevard du Musée were half wrecked by shells, and the Custom House, the Gendarmerie, and the Prefecture were burning furiously. The Château du Phare on the headland at the entrance to the fort was suffering frightfully, and the shells that had struck the Citadel and the fort of Nôtre Dame had been terribly effective. Every part of the city from the Promenade du Prado to the Botanical Gardens was being swept continuously by our fire, and from the black smoke curling upward in the sunlight we knew that many broad handsome streets were in flames. Excited over their work of revenge, my guns' crews worked on with a contemptuous disregard for the withering fire being poured upon us from the land. They meant, they said, to teach the Frenchmen a lesson, and they certainly did. Around us shots from the batteries fell thickly, sending up huge columns of water. Suddenly a shell struck the _Ramillies_ forward in front of the barbette, and burst like the rending of a thundercloud. The deck was torn up, a dozen men were maimed or killed, poor fellows! but the solid face of the barbette held its own, and the muzzles of our two great guns remained untouched. "Several shots from the Nôtre Dame Fort and the Endoume Battery then struck us in quick succession. One was particularly disastrous, for, crashing into the battery on the port side, it burst, disabling one of the 6-inch guns, and killing the whole gun's crew in an instant. The effect was frightful, for the whole space around was wrecked, and not a man escaped. "Such are the fortunes of war! A few moments later we turned our heavy guns upon the Endoume Battery, perched up upon the rocky headland, and together with the _Empress of India_ and the _Victorious_ thundered forth our great projectiles upon it in a manner which must have been terribly disconcerting. The battery replied vigorously at first, but the _Nile_, noticing the direction in which we had turned our attention, trained her guns upon the same fort, and let loose a perfect hail of devastating shell. Without ceasing for a second, we played upon it, and could distinguish even with the naked eye how completely we were destroying it, until half an hour later we found that the Frenchmen had ceased to reply. We had silenced their guns, and, in fact, totally wrecked the fort. "Several of our vessels were, however, severely feeling the fire from the Nôtre Dame Fortress and that of St. Jean. Nearly one hundred men on board the _Trafalgar_ had been killed; while two shots, entering one of the broadside batteries of the flagship, had caused frightful havoc, and had blown to atoms over forty men and three officers. A torpedo boat that had approached the French coast-defence ship just before she was captured had been sunk by a shot, but the crew were fortunately all rescued, after much difficulty, by the sloop _Dolphin_, which had severely suffered herself from the vigorous fire from the Batterie du Phare. The funnel of the _Nile_ had been carried away by a shot from the Citadel, while among the more conspicuous British losses was a serious catastrophe which had occurred on board the _Hood_ by the premature explosion of a torpedo, by which a sub-lieutenant and thirty-three men were launched into eternity, and sixteen men very severely wounded. The engines of the _Arethusa_ were also broken. "The smoke rising from the bombarded city increased every moment in density, and even in the daylight we could distinguish the flames. The centre of Marseilles was burning furiously, and the fire was now spreading unchecked. One of our objects had been to destroy the immense quantity of war stores, and in this we were entirely successful. We had turned our united efforts upon the Fort St. Jean down at the harbour entrance and that of Nôtre Dame high on the hill. Pounding away at these, time slipped by until the sun sank in a blaze of crimson and gold. Both forts made a gallant defence, but each of our shots went home, and through my glasses I watched the awful result. Suddenly a terrific report caused the whole city to tremble. One of our shots had apparently entered the powder magazine in the Fort St. Jean, and it had blown up, producing an appalling catastrophe from which the fortress could never recover. [Illustration: BOMBARDMENT OF MARSEILLES BY THE BRITISH: "ONE OF OUR SHELLS HAD ENTERED THE POWDER MAGAZINE OF FORT ST. JEAN."] "By this time the whole of the shipping in the docks was burning furiously, and the congested part of the city lying between the port and the Lyons Railway Station was like a huge furnace. The sight was one of terrible grandeur. "Presently, just as the sun sank behind the grey night clouds, we ceased fire, and then gazed with calm satisfaction upon the result of our bombardment. We had treated a French city in the same manner as the French and Russians had treated our own homes, and we could look upon this scene of destruction and death without a pang of remorse. But that was not all. When our guns were silent we could distinctly hear vigorous rifle firing at the back of the city. Then we knew the truth. "While we had been attacking Marseilles from the sea, the Italians, who a week before had crossed the frontier, and with the Germans occupied Lyons, had co-operated with us on land, and the terror-stricken Marseillais, hemmed in by fire and bullets on either side, had been swept away in thousands. "The scenes in the streets were, we afterwards learnt, awful; and although the garrison offered a desperate resistance to the Italians along the valley near the Château des Fleurs, most of them were killed, and nearly three thousand of their number taken prisoners. But the Italians were unable to enter Marseilles themselves, as, long before they had succeeded in breaking up the land defences, we had set the place on fire, and now, as night fell, the great city was one mass of flames, the lurid light from which illuminated sky and sea with a bright red glare." * * * * * The blazing African sun was fading, flooding the calm sapphire Mediterranean with its blood-red afterglow. The air was oppressive, the wind blew hot from the desert, and shoals of tiny green birds were chattering before roosting in the oasis of tall date palms that cast long shadows over the sun-baked stones of the Place du Gouvernement at Algiers. Everything was of a dazzling whiteness, relieved only by the blue sky and sea. The broad, handsome Square was almost deserted, the jalousies of the European houses were still closed, and although a few people were sipping absinthe at the cafés, the siesta was not yet over. At one corner of the Square the Mosque of Djama-el-Djedid, with its dome and minarets, stood out intensely white against the bright, cloudless sky, its spotless cleanliness causing the white-washed houses of Europeans to appear yellow and dingy; and as the _mueddin_ stood on one of the minarets with arms uplifted, calling the Faithful to prayer, idle Moors and Arabs, who had been lying asleep in the shadow during the afternoon, rose quickly, rearranged their burnouses, and entered the Mosque in order to render thanks to Allah. Darkness crept on after a brief twilight. Moorish women, wrapped in their white _haicks_, wearing their ugly baggy trousers, and veiled to the eyes, waddled along slowly and noiselessly among the palms, and gradually a gay cosmopolitan crowd assembled in the Place to enjoy the _bel fresco_ after the terrible heat of the day, and to listen to the fine band of the 1st Zouaves, which had already taken up its stand in the centre of the Square, and was now playing one of Strauss's dreamy waltzes. The night was bright and starlit, one of those calm, mystic evenings peculiar to North Africa. All was peaceful, but no moon had yet risen. The city wore its gay air of carelessness. White-robed Moors and red-fezzed Arabs, negroes from the Soudan, and Biskris in their blue burnouses, lounged, chattered, and promenaded, while the cafés and bazaars around were full of life, and the warm, balmy air was laden with the scent of flowers. Suddenly, without warning, the whole place was illuminated by a brilliant light from the sea. Slowly it swept the town, and a few seconds later other bright beams shot forth, lighting up the quays, the terraces of white, flat-roofed houses, and the Moorish city on the hill. Then, before the promenaders could realise the cause, a loud booming was heard at sea, and almost at the same moment a shell fell, and, exploding in the midst of them, blew a dozen Moors and Arabs into atoms. In a few seconds the cannonade increased, and the battery in the centre of the harbour replied. Then firing seemed to proceed from all quarters, and a storm of shell suddenly crashed upon the town with the most appalling effect. British war-vessels had crept up within range, and were pouring the vials of Britain's wrath upon the ancient city of the Deys! The detachment of vessels which, led by the new battleship _Jupiter_, went south from St. Tropez, had received instructions to destroy Algiers and return with all speed to Cagliari, in Sardinia, to await further instructions. The bombardment of the two cities simultaneously was in order to draw off the French Squadron from the position it had taken up near Gibraltar, so that the British could fight and then run past them into the Atlantic. How far the manoeuvre succeeded is shown in the few interesting details of the bombardment given in the course of an interview which a reporter of the _Daily Telegraph_ had with Lieut. George Ingleton, of the first-class cruiser _Edgar_. The officer said:-- "We arrived off Algiers two hours after sundown, and after an inspection with search-lights, began to let fly with our big guns. In a few minutes the Al-Djefna Battery in the centre of the harbour replied, and a moment later a very rigorous fire was poured forth from Fort Neuf on the right and Forts Bab-Azzoun and Conde on the left. All four were very strong, and in conjunction with coast-defence vessels offered a most vigorous resistance. So suddenly did we fire upon the town, that a frightful panic must have been caused. Before we had fired half a dozen times, a shot from one of our 22-tonners crashed into the dome of the Mosque and totally demolished it, while another particularly well-aimed shell struck the Mairie, a big handsome building on the Boulevard de la République, facing the sea, tearing out a portion of the front. Then, turning our guns upon the long row of shops, banks, and hotels which formed the Boulevard, we pounded away most effectively, while several of our other vessels attended to the forts. "During the first half-hour the four warships of the enemy gave us considerable trouble, but very soon our torpedoes had sunk two of them, and the other two were quickly captured. "Meanwhile, under the hot fire from the forts, the bombardment grew exciting. Shells were ricochetting on the water all round us, but our search-lights being now shut off, we offered a very indistinct target to the enemy. On nearly all our ships, however, there were some slight casualties. A shell severely damaged the superstructure of the _Jupiter_, while others rendered useless several of her machine guns. A shell penetrated the _Gannet_, unfortunately killing fourteen bluejackets; and had it not been that the deck of the _Edgar_ was protected throughout, the consequences to us would also have been very serious. Nevertheless, our two 22-ton guns rendered valuable service, and contributed in no small measure to the demolition of the town. "From the outset we could see that Algiers was totally unprepared for attack, and, continuing our fire calmly and regularly, we watched the flames bursting forth in every part of the town and leaping skyward. On shore the guns kept up their roaring thunder, although by aid of glasses we could detect how effectual were our shells in wrecking the fortifications and laying in ruins the European quarter. Every moment we were dealing terrible blows which shook the city to its foundations. The formidable city walls availed them nothing, for we could drop our shells anywhere we pleased, either on the hill at Mustapha or upon the pretty Moorish villas that lined the shore at St. Eugène. "Blazing away at long range upon the town, we spread destruction everywhere. Houses toppled like packs of cards, mosques were blown into the air, and public buildings swept away like grains of sand before the sirocco. Under such a fire thousands of natives and Europeans must have perished, for we were determined to carry out our intentions, and teach the invaders a lesson they were not likely to easily forget. Time after time our heavy guns crashed, while our 6-inch quick-firers kept up their roar, and our machine guns rattled continuously. As the hours went by, and we continued our work of merciless destruction, we were hit once or twice, but beyond the loss of two men and some unimportant damage we escaped further punishment. "The roar of our guns was deafening, and the smoke hung over the calm sea like a storm-cloud. Still we kept on in the face of the galling fire from the shore, and before midnight had the satisfaction of witnessing a magnificent spectacle, for the isolated conflagrations gradually united and the whole town was in flames. "We had accomplished our work, so with cheers for Old England we gave a parting shot, and turning were soon steaming away towards the Sicilian coast, leaving Algiers a mass of roaring flame. "The journey was uneventful until just before noon on the following day. I was at that time on duty, and suddenly, to my surprise, detected a number of ships. By the aid of our glasses, the captain and I found to our dismay that a number of the most powerful vessels of the Russian Fleet were bearing down upon us! All our other vessels had made the same discovery, and I must confess that the meeting was somewhat disconcerting. The strength of the Russian ironclads was such as to cause our hearts to beat more quickly. To engage that great force meant certain defeat, while it was necessary that our Admiral off Marseilles should know of the whereabouts of this hostile squadron, therefore we resolved to get away. But although we altered our course and put on all speed, we were, alas! unsuccessful. At last we determined at all hazards to stick to our guns so long as we were afloat, and as the first of the Tsar's ironclads drew within range, one of our 22-tonners thundered. The white smoke, driven forward, tumbled over our bows. We had spoken the first word of battle!" CHAPTER XXI. A NAVAL FIGHT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. "The great naval force of the Tsar, with which we were now face to face," continued Lieutenant Ingleton in his narrative, "consisted of the new battleship _Petropavlovsk_ of 10,960 tons, with a speed of 17 knots; the great turret-ship _Dvenadsat Apostoloff_ of 8076 tons; the two new barbette-ships _Kama_ and _Vologda_ of the _Cizoi Veliky_ type; the _Tchesmé_ of 10,181 tons, the _Gheorghy Pobyednosets_ of 10,280 tons, and the powerful _Tria Sviatitelia_ of 12,480 tons; the two enormous new cruisers _Tiumen_ and _Minsk_, both of 17,000 tons, and running at 20 knots; the _Vladimir Monomach_ of 5754 tons; the armoured gunboat _Otvazny_, and the new rams _Admiral Seniavine_ and _Admiral Uschakoff_, with thirty torpedo boats, including the _Kodor_, _Reni_, _Anakria_, and _Adler_, the latter being able to run at 27·4 knots. "Against such a gigantic force as this our small force of vessels and torpedo boats presented but a sorry appearance. Nevertheless we had fired the first shot, and were now determined to die rather than haul down our colours. As our guns thundered, those of the _Jupiter_, _Repulse_, _Sans Pareil_, _Undaunted_, _Orlando_, _Diana_, _Scout_, and _Gannet_ joined in noisy chorus. The 12-inch guns in the turrets of the _Petropavlovsk_ and the four big guns in the barbettes of the _Tria Sviatitelia_ crashed out together, and almost immediately afterwards we found ourselves being swept from stem to stern by the enemy's shells. The Russian battleships were all well armoured, and had a much heavier shell fire than the vessels of either France or Britain. We were both in columns of divisions in line ahead, but from the first moment of the engagement our position was critical. "A terrific and deadly storm burst upon us from the enemy's tops, while his heavy guns kept up an incessant thunder. With such an enormous force against us, it was apparent to every man on board that disaster was imminent. It had, alas! never been graven sufficiently deep upon the public mind how absurdly weak we were in the Mediterranean. Here, as in all other squadrons, every grade of officer from commander downwards was deficient in numbers, and the ships in commission had for years been so much below their complement that the work had only been carried on with great difficulty. Other ships at home had been obliged to wait until a sufficient number of merchant seamen and half-trained engine-room staff could be scraped together to provide the semblance of a crew. In fact, successive British Governments of both parties had subordinated national necessities to a desire to evade a material increase in taxation, and now at last our Mediterranean Squadron were compelled to face the inevitable. "The insidious cunning and patient methods to which the Russians resort in order to attain their aims and break their boundaries had once more been illustrated. They had, by dint of extraordinary chicanery, secured absolute possession of the small Turkish peninsula known as Mount Athos. Situated near the entrance of the Gulf of Salonica, it was a paramount strategical position, and its possessor was now enabled to keep watch upon Macedonia, and in the meantime be very near the Dardanelles, and also Asia Minor. The possession was accomplished in a curiously secret manner, showing to what extent Russian foresight and artifice is carried. For years past the _Société Slav de Bienfaisance_ had been sending, through a bank in Salonica, large sums of money to further the aim. To the casual observer there was nothing extraordinary about this, for the Russians had established on the lofty heights several monasteries, converting the place into a clerical settlement. This fact was pointed out by the _Pall Mall Gazette_ as far back as 1893, but the British public at that time failed to detect any Russian intrigue. "Gradually, however, Muscovite roubles purchased the surrounding property, and Greek convents were reduced to poverty while Russian institutions flourished and increased. But, strangely enough, the inmates of these monasteries were suddenly discovered to be mock clerics, and then it was disclosed that under the cover of monastic garments and robes were to be found the Tsar's soldiers, performing a three years' special and specific military service! "Yet, owing to the Sultan's weakness, to the almighty backsheesh, and to the shortsightedness of Turkish statesmen, the Russians were not dislodged, but the position was actually ceded to them, with the result that they had now firmly established themselves where they were enabled to counteract British action and influence. A naval station had been established for their Mediterranean Squadron at Poros, off the eastern coast of the Peloponnesus, some fifteen miles due south of the island of Ægina. Here there were three miles of deep water safe from sea attack, with an arsenal and dockyard, on the very weakest point along the line of our highway between England and India! Such was the manner in which our power in the Mediterranean had been undermined! "There was, however, no time for reflection amid the deafening roar. This Black Sea Fleet that had burst its bonds and passed through the Dardanelles intended to sweep us from the sea. Yet, notwithstanding the terrible fire pouring upon us from these great and powerful ships, each fully equipped with the latest and most improved arms, fully manned by well-trained men, and fresh for the fray, we held our quarters, determined to show the forces of the Tsar defiance. Even though every man of us might be sent to an untimely grave, the Russian flag should never surmount the White Ensign of Britain. We were determined, so we set our teeth, and showed a firm and vigorous front to the foe. "Our two 22-tonners rendered admirable service, and the cannonade kept up from our 3 and 6-pounder quick-firing guns was playing havoc with the Russian belted cruiser _Vladimir Monomach_ lying on our port quarter. The vessel was slightly larger than ourselves, carrying much heavier armaments, including four 13-ton guns, and twelve 4-tonners. She was indeed a very formidable opponent, nevertheless we did our best, and, blazing away at close quarters, soon succeeded in silencing the starboard 13-tonner nearest us. "Just at this moment I found we were being attacked on the port bow by the enormous new turret-ship _Petropavlovsk_ and the _Dvenadsat Apostoloff_. Two of the heavy 12-inch guns of the former thundered almost simultaneously, and both shells striking us almost amidships, caused us such a shock that for a second I stood breathless. "In a few moments, however, it was reported that our 'vitals' had fortunately escaped, and we continued firing as if no catastrophe had occurred. As a matter of fact, the damage caused by those two shells was appalling. "The _Jupiter_, steaming about two miles away on our starboard quarter, was apparently holding her own against the barbette-ships _Tchesmé_ and _Gheorghy Pobyednosets_, the cruiser _Tiumen_, one of the largest in the world, and the new ram _Admiral Seniavine_. The four attacking vessels, as seen through the dense smoke, were pouring into the British ship a deadly fire; yet, judging from the fallen tops and disabled engines of the _Gheorghy Pobyednosets_ and the wrecked superstructure of the _Tchesmé_, the _Jupiter's_ heavy armaments were executing good work, notwithstanding the strength of the _Tchesmé's_ six 50-ton guns, admirably arranged in pairs in the centre of the vessel. "The _Diana_ and _Sans Pareil_, lying near to one another, were desperately resisting the vigorous attack made by the _Admiral Uschakoff_, _Minsk_, _Otvazny_, _Kama_, and _Vologda_; and here again, amid smoke and flying débris, I could distinguish that the 67-tonners of the _Repulse_, in co-operation with the lighter weapons of the _Undaunted_, were giving the enemy a taste of what British courage could accomplish. "The sea around us simply swarmed with Russian torpedo boats, and it required all our vigilance to evade their continued attacks. Before an hour had passed we had succeeded in sinking two by shots from our 6-inch guns, and several more were sent to the bottom by well-aimed projectiles from the _Dido_ and _Jupiter_. "As for ourselves, projectiles were sweeping across our deck like hail, and under the incessant and fearful fire we were suffering frightfully. Over sixty of our men and a sub-lieutenant had been killed, while forty-nine were severely wounded. Once I had occasion to go below, and between decks the sight that met my gaze was awful. "Around two of the quick-firing guns on our port quarter lay the guns' crews, mutilated by shells from the _Vladimir Monomach_. They had been killed almost instantly while standing bravely at their posts. The scene was appalling. The mangled masses of humanity amid which the surgeons were at work were awful to look upon, and I rushed up again with the terrible scene photographed indelibly upon my memory. "Meanwhile the ship was in the greatest peril. The continual bursting of shells upon her shook and shattered her, and she trembled violently as, time after time, her own guns uttered their thundering reply to her enemies. Heeling now this way, now that, as the helm was put hard over to avoid a blow, the situation on board was intensely exciting. "Those were terrible moments. The captain suddenly noticed the movements of the _Vladimir Monomach_, and divined her intentions. She had ceased firing, and by a neatly executed manoeuvre was preparing to ram us. In a moment our helm was put over again, and the _Edgar_ answered to it immediately. "'Ready bow tube!' I heard the captain shout hoarsely. He waited a few moments, allowing the Russian ironclad to partially perform her evolution, then just as she came almost into collision with us he shrieked 'Fire bow tube!' at the same time bringing us over further to port. "The seconds seemed hours. Suddenly there was a loud explosion, a great column of water rose under the Russian's bow, and we knew the torpedo had struck. At that moment, too, even while the water was still in the air, one of our torpedo boats which had crept up under the _Vladimir Monomach's_ stern sent another torpedo at her, which also hit its mark and ripped her up. Turning our guns upon the armoured cruiser, we poured volley after volley into her, but she did not reply, for her men were panic-stricken, and she was sinking fast. "The _Petropavlovsk_, leaving us, endeavoured to rescue her crew, but ere a dozen men were saved, she settled down bow foremost, and disappeared into the deep, carrying down with her nearly five hundred officers and men. "The _Dvenadsat Apostoloff_ kept up her fire upon us, and a few moments later I witnessed another disaster, for a shot from one of her bow guns struck the torpedo boat that had just assisted us, and sank it. A few minutes later a loud explosion in the direction of the _Sans Pareil_ attracted my attention, and, turning, I saw amid the smoke-clouds débris precipitated high into the air. A shot from one of her 111-ton guns had penetrated to the magazine of the _Admiral Seniavine_, which had exploded, causing a frightful disaster on board that vessel, and just at the same moment a cheer from the crew of one of our 6-inch guns prompted me to look for the cause, which I found in the fact that they had shot the Russian colours completely away from the _Dvenadsat Apostoloff_. "Again another frightful explosion sounded loud above the incessant din, and to my satisfaction I saw a great column of water rise around the _Admiral Uschakoff_, which, fighting at close quarters with the _Dido_, had apparently been torpedoed. Not satisfied with this, the captain of the _Dido_, keeping his machine guns going, turned his vessel and discharged a second Whitehead, which also struck with such terrible effect that the Russian ship began at once to sink, and in a few minutes the blue waves closed for ever over her tops, ere a score or so out of her crew of 300 could be rescued. "It was nearly three bells, and the sun was setting. A galling fire from the machine guns in the foretop of the _Dvenadsat Apostoloff_ suddenly swept our deck, killing a dozen poor fellows who were at work clearing away some débris, and at the same moment a shot from one of her 52-ton guns crashed into our port quarter, and must have caused terrible havoc among the guns' crews. A moment later we were dismayed by the report that our steering-gear had been broken. For a few seconds we were helplessly swinging round under the awful fire which was now pouring from the great guns of the Russian ironclad, and our captain was making strenuous efforts to recover control of the ship, when I saw the torpedo boat _Anakria_ shoot suddenly across our bows, then quickly slacken as she got to starboard of us. "A second later I realised her intention, and shouted frantically. A line of bubbles had appeared on the surface advancing swiftly towards us. She had ejected a torpedo straight at us, and I stood petrified, not daring to breathe. "A moment later there came a terrific explosion right underneath us, followed by a harsh tearing sound as iron plates were torn asunder like tinfoil, and the ship's side was ripped completely up. The _Edgar_ heaved high and plunged heavily, a great column of water rose high above her masts, and the air seemed filled with flying fragments of iron and wood. The vessel rocked and swayed so that we could not keep our feet, and then gradually heeling over, causing her guns to shift, she went down before a soul on board could launch a boat. "At the moment of the explosion I felt a sharp twinge in the back, and found that I had been struck by a flying splinter of steel. The strain of those hours had been terrible, and of the events that followed I can only recollect two things. I remember finding myself struggling alone in the water with a shower of bullets from the _Dvenadsat Apostoloff's_ tops sending up little splashes about me. Then I felt my strength failing, my limbs seemed paralysed, and I could no longer strike out to save myself. Abandoning all hope, I was sinking, when suddenly a rope was flung to me. I remember how frantically I clutched it, and that a few moments later I was hauled aboard a torpedo boat; but for days afterwards I lay hovering 'twixt life and death, oblivious to all. I was one of the thirteen only who were saved out of a crew of 327 brave officers and men." Such a ghastly disaster could only produce profound dismay among those who manned the remaining British vessels. Straining every nerve to uphold the honour of Britain, the guns' crews of the _Jupiter_, _Sans Pareil_, _Repulse_, and _Undaunted_, with smoke-begrimed hands and faces, worked on with that indomitable energy begotten of despair. Regardless of the awful rain of shot and shell, they reloaded and fired with calm, dogged self-possession, the officers on all four vessels inspiring their men by various deeds of valour, and preserving such discipline under fire as none but British sailors could. The British naval officer is full of undaunted defiance and contempt for his foes; but, above all, he is a strict disciplinarian, and to this our country in a great measure owes the supremacy our Navy has hitherto enjoyed upon the seas. During the fight the vessels had been moving in a north-easterly direction, and although the Russians were unaware of the fact, Her Majesty's ships had therefore continued in their course. Hence, just as a cool breeze sprang up at sundown, soon after the _Edgar_ had sunk, a line of low dark cliffs was sighted ahead. The officers of the _Diana_, watching anxiously through their glasses, distinguished the distant crest of Mount Genargentu gradually appearing against the clear evening sky, and then they knew that they were off Sardinia, outside the Gulf of Oristano. Altering their course, they headed due north, still keeping up a running fire, but the Russians prevented them making headway. All our vessels were suffering frightfully, when there was a sudden explosion, and, to the Englishmen's dismay, it was seen that a torpedo had struck the _Undaunted_ nearly amidships. Still the doomed vessel managed to evade a second attack, and by a desperate manoeuvre the captain succeeded in turning and heading for land. The remaining ships, in their terribly crippled condition, would, the Russians anticipated, soon fall an easy prey. Nevertheless, with their crews decimated, their guns disabled, and their machinery damaged, the British vessels still continued firing, the men resolved to go down at their quarters. They knew that escape was hopeless, and every moment they saw their comrades being swept away by the great exploding projectiles of the Tsar's heavy guns. But they were not dismayed. To do their utmost for the defence of Britain, to keep afloat as long as possible, and to die like Britons with faces towards the foe, was their duty. Pale and desperate, they were fighting for their country and their Queen, knowing that only a grave in the deep and the honour of those at home would be the reward of their bravery--that at any moment they might be launched into the unknown. Suddenly there was a loud shouting on board the _Jupiter_, and signals were, a moment later, run up to her half-wrecked top. The captain of the _Dido_, noticing this, looked to ascertain the cause, and saw away on the horizon to the north, whence the dark night clouds were rising, a number of strange craft. Snatching up his glass, he directed it on the strangers, and discovered that they were Italian warships, and were exchanging rapid signals with the captain. They were promising assistance! Cheers rang loudly through the British vessels, when, a few minutes later, the truth became known, and the guns' crews worked with redoubled energy, while the Russians, noticing the approaching ships, were apparently undecided how to act. They were given but little time for reflection, however, for within half an hour the first of the great Italian ironclads, the _Lepanto_, opened fire upon the _Petropavlovsk_, and was quickly followed by others, until the action became general all round. Aid had arrived just in time, and the British vessels, with engines broken, stood away at some distance, leaving matters for the nonce to the powerful Italian Squadron. It was indeed a very formidable one, and its appearance caused the Russian Admiral such misgivings that he gave orders to retreat, a manoeuvre attempted unsuccessfully. The Italian Fleet, as it loomed up in the falling gloom, included no fewer than twenty-six warships and forty-three torpedo boats. The vessels consisted of the barbette-ship _Lepanto_ of 15,000 tons; the _Sardegna_, _Sicilia_, and _Re Umberto_ of 13,000 tons; the _Andrea Doria_, _Francesca Morosini_, and _Ruggiero di Lauria_ of 11,000 tons; the turret-ships _Dandolo_ and _Duilio_ of the same size; the _Ammeraglio di St. Bon_ of 9800 tons; the armoured cruisers _Ancona_, _Castelfidardo_, and _Maria Pia_, and the _San Martino_, each of about 4500 tons; the gun-vessels _Andrea Provana_, _Cariddi_, _Castore_, _Curtatone_; the torpedo gunboats _Aretusa_, _Atlante_, _Euridice_, _Iride_, _Montebello_, and _Monzambano_; the despatch vessels _Galileo_ and _Vedetta_; and the first-class torpedo vessels _Aquila_, _Avvoltoio_, _Falco_, _Nibbio_, and _Sparviero_, and thirty-eight others. With such a force descending upon the Russian ships, which had already been very severely punished by the vigorous fire of the British, there was little wonder that the Tsar's vessels should endeavour to escape. The Italian Fleet had already bombarded and destroyed Ajaccio two days ago, and, steaming south from the Corsican capital, had anchored for twenty-four hours off Cape della Caccia, near Alghero, in the north of Sardinia. Then again taking a southerly course in the expectation of joining hands with the British Mediterranean Squadron, which was on its way from Marseilles to Cagliari, they had fallen in with the three crippled ships. Without hesitation the powerful Italian ironclads, several of which were among the finest in the world, opened a terrific fire upon the Russian ships, and as darkness fell the sight was one of appalling grandeur. From all sides flame rushed from turrets and barbettes in vivid flashes, while the Maxims in the tops poured out their deadly showers of bullets. The ponderous 105-ton guns of the _Andrea Doria_, _Francesca Morosini_, and _Ruggiero di Lauria_ crashed and roared time after time, their great shots causing frightful havoc among the Russian ships, the four 100-tonners of the _Lepanto_ and the 67-tonners of the _Re Umberto_, _Sardegna_, and _Sicilia_ simply knocking to pieces the _Petropavlovsk_. The Russian ships were receiving terrible blows on every hand. With their search-lights beaming forth in all directions, the ships were fighting fiercely, pounding away at each other with deafening din. It was not long, however, before this vigorous attack of the Italians began to tell, for within an hour of the first shot from the _Lepanto_ the fine Russian battleship _Gheorghy Pobyednosets_ and the great new cruiser _Minsk_ of 17,000 tons had been rammed and sunk, the former by the _Duilio_, and the latter by the _Re Umberto_, while the _Tchesmé_ and the gunboat _Otvazny_ had been torpedoed, and scarcely a soul saved out of 1500 men who were on board. Explosions were occurring in quick succession, and red glares flashed momentarily over the sea. Hither and thither as the Italian torpedo boats darted they ejected their missiles, and the rapid and terrible fire from the leviathans of Italy, pouring into every one of the remaining ships of the Tsar, killed hundreds who were striving to defend themselves. Suddenly the _Sicilia_, which had been fighting the Russian flagship, the _Tria Sviatitelia_, at close quarters, and had blown away her conning-tower and greater portion of her superstructure, performed a neat evolution, and crashed her ram right into her opponent's broadside, breaking her almost in half. A few moments later there was a terrific explosion on board, and then the doomed vessel sank into the dark rolling sea, carrying with her the Russian Admiral and all hands. Quickly this success was followed by others--the blowing up of the monster new cruiser _Tiumen_, the sinking of the _Adler_ and four other Russian torpedo boats, occurring in rapid succession. Seeing with what rapidity and irresistible force they were being swept from the sea, the remainder of the Tsar's shattered fleet struck their flags and called for quarter, not, however, before the torpedo boat _Kodor_ had been sunk. The Russians thus captured were the battleships _Petropavlovsk_ of 10,960 tons, the _Dvenadsat Apostoloff_ of 8076 tons, the two new barbette-ships, _Kama_ and _Vologda_, both of whose engines had broken down, and fifteen torpedo boats. [Illustration: _Ruggiero di Lauria._ _Re Umberto._ _Duilio._ _Tchesmé._ _Dvenadsat Apostoloff._ _H.M.S. Edgar._ HELP FROM ITALY: "WITH THEIR SEARCH-LIGHTS BEAMING FORTH IN ALL DIRECTIONS, THE SHIPS WERE FIGHTING FIERCELY, POUNDING AWAY AT EACH OTHER WITH DEAFENING DIN."] At dawn most of the latter were manned by Italians, while the captured ships, with the Italian colours flying and bearing evidence of the terrible conflict, were on their way due north to Genoa, accompanied by the battered British vessels. The strongest division of Russia's Fleet had been totally destroyed, and the Tsar's power in the Mediterranean was broken. CHAPTER XXII. PANIC IN LANCASHIRE. The Russians were within gunshot of Manchester! A profound sensation was caused in that city about eight o'clock on the evening of September 6th, by an announcement made by the _Evening News_--which still appeared in fitful editions--that a Cossack patrol had been seen on the road between Macclesfield and Alderley, and that it was evident, from the manner of the Russian advance, that they meant to attack the city almost immediately. The utmost alarm was caused, and the streets were everywhere crowded by anxious, starving throngs, eager to ascertain fuller details, but unable to gather anything further beyond the wild conjectures of idle gossip. The great city which, on the outbreak of war, was one of the most prosperous in the world, was now but a sorry semblance of its former self. Heated, excited, turbulent, its streets echoed with the heartrending wails of despairing crowds, its factories were idle, its shops closed, and its people were succumbing to the horrible, lingering death which is the result of starvation. Wealth availed them naught. Long ago the last loaf had been devoured, the last sack of flour had been divided, and the rich living in the suburbs now felt the pinch of hunger quite as acutely as factory operatives, who lounged, hands in pockets, about the streets. Manchester, like most other towns in England, had come to the end of her supplies, and death and disease now decimated the more populous districts, while those who had left the city and tramped north had fared no better, and hundreds dropped and died by the roadside. The situation in Lancashire was terrible. At Liverpool a few vessels were arriving from America, under escort of British cruisers, bringing supplies, but these were mostly purchased at enormously high rates, and sent to London by way of Manchester and Sheffield, railway communication by that route being still open. This fact becoming known in Manchester caused the greatest indignation, and the people, rendered desperate by hunger, succeeded on several occasions in stopping the trains, and appropriating the food they carried. The situation in Manchester was one of constant excitement, and fear that the enemy should repeat the success they had achieved at Birmingham. The hundreds of thousands of hungry ones who flocked Manchester streets and the grimy thoroughfares of Stockport, Ashton, Oldham, Bolton, and other great towns in the vicinity, feared that they, like the people of Birmingham, would be put to the sword by the ruthless invaders. The week that had elapsed had been an eventful one, fraught with many horrors. After the success of the Russians at Birmingham, the British troops, both Regulars, Volunteers, and improvised, fell back and formed up north of the city, being practically nothing more than a strong line of outposts without reserves, extending from Dudley, through West Bromwich and Sutton Park, to Tamworth. This scheme, however, was ill-devised, for the defenders, in order to act successfully, should have fallen back much further, and concentrated their forces at one or two strategical points on the line to Manchester, as it had been ascertained from spies that a swift and vigorous attack on that city was meditated. The day following the taking of Birmingham was devoted by the enemy to the reorganisation of their forces, and the rearrangement of their transport and ammunition train. Large quantities of waggons and war stores of all kinds had been found in the town and annexed by the victors, and at Kynoch's Factory at Aston some hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition had been seized. These had been made for a foreign government, and fitted both rifles and machine guns of the Russians. Having thus reorganised, the Russians, leaving 10,000 men in Birmingham as a base, resumed their march north on the third day. The left flank, consisting of 2000 cavalry and 12,000 infantry, took the road through West Bromwich to Wednesbury and Bilston, but quickly found themselves entrapped, for on account of the many canals their cavalry were unable to act, and their transport was cut off. The miners and factory men had armed themselves, and, acting in conjunction with the British troops from Dudley and Great Barr, succeeded, after some hard fighting around Tipton and Coseley, in completely annihilating the enemy, taking 5000 prisoners and killing the remaining 9000. Meanwhile the right flank had passed out of Birmingham by way of Castle Bromwich, and had advanced without opposition through Wishaw and Tamworth to Lichfield, driving the defenders before them. The Russian main column, however, were not allowed to go north without a most desperate endeavour on the part of our men to hold them in check. Indeed, if ever British courage showed itself it was during those dark days. Advancing through Aston and Perry to Sutton along the ancient highway, Icknield Street, the Russians sent a large force through the woods to the high ground between Wild Green and Maney. Here the British had established strong batteries, but after some desperate fighting these were at length captured, the enemy losing heavily. At the same time, fierce fighting occurred in Sutton Park and across at Aldridge, the defenders making the most strenuous efforts to break the force of the invaders. All was, alas! to no purpose. The British, outnumbered as before, were compelled to fall back fighting, with the result that the enemy's main column, pushing on, effected a junction with its right flank, which had bivouaced on Wittington Heath, near Lichfield, and occupied the barracks there. On the day following the invaders broke into two columns and marched again north, practically in battle formation, the right column continuing along Icknield Street, through Burton, Derby, Bakewell, and Marple, driving back the defenders, while the left column took a route that lay through the hilly and wooded country near Cannock Chase. Both columns, advancing in échelon of division, with cavalry on their flanks, were constantly harassed in the rear by the British, and in their advance lost numbers of waggons and a large quantity of ammunition; but they succeeded in travelling so quickly north that they were actually marching on Manchester before the people in that city could realise it. Signal acts of bravery were being everywhere reported, but what could individual heroism effect against the fearful odds we had to face? Thousands of men in Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Wigan, Rochdale, and other neighbouring towns had already armed themselves, and, on hearing that Manchester was threatened, poured into the city to act their part bravely in its defence. It must be admitted that the British General commanding had, on gaining knowledge of the intentions of the Russians, taken every precaution in his power to prevent an advance on Manchester. Our troops which had been defeated and driven back from Birmingham, had at once retreated north to the Peak district, and about one-quarter of the number had taken up excellent defensive positions there, while the remainder, with small reinforcements of Regulars drawn from Lancaster, Warrington, Bury, Chester, Wrexham, Burnley, Ashton-under-Lyne, York, Halifax, and as far distant as Carlisle, had, in addition to those from Manchester, been massed along the north bank of the Mersey from Stockport to Flixton, with a line of communication stretching across to Woodley Junction, and thence over Glossop Dale to the Peak. Thus Manchester was defended by a force of 38,000 cavalry, infantry, Volunteers, and colonials, against the Russian army, consisting of the remaining 65,000 of the force which attacked Birmingham, and reinforcements of 10,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry that had been pushed rapidly forward from Sussex over the ground that the main body had travelled. The total force of Russians was therefore 80,000. From Stockport, the north bank of the Mersey to its confluence with the Irwell past Flixton was well guarded. Earthworks had been raised, trenches dug, walls had been loopholed, and houses placed in a state of hasty defence. Among the reinforcements now under arms were several portions of battalions of Lancashire Volunteer Artillery who had not gone south to their allotted positions in the defence of London, and five companies of the 1st Cheshire and Carnarvonshire Artillery under Col. H. T. Brown, V.D., together with the Cheshire Yeomanry under Col. P. E. Warburton. The Manchester Brigade was a strong one, consisting of six Volunteer battalions of the Manchester Regiment, the 1st under the Earl of Crawford, V.D., the 2nd under Col. Bridgford, V.D., the 3rd under Col. Eaton, V.D., the 4th under Col. Lynde, V.D., the 5th under Col. Rocca, V.D., and the 6th under Col. Lees; the Cheshire and Lancashire Brigades included three Volunteer battalions of the Lancashire Fusiliers under Colonels Young, Philippi, and Haworth, and two battalions of the South Lancashire Regiment; while the Northern Counties Brigade, composed of one Volunteer battalion of the Royal Lancaster Regiment under Col. Strongitharm, two battalions of the East Lancashire Regiment under Col. A. I. Robinson, V.D., and Col. T. Mitchell, V.D., and two of the Loyal North Lancashire under Col. Widdows and Col. Ormrod, also mustered their forces and performed excellent defensive work. It was here, too, that the Volunteer cyclists were found of the utmost value in scouting and carrying despatches. The excitement in Manchester on that memorable September night was intense. That a desperate and bloody fray was imminent, every one knew, and the people were trusting to the defensive line on the river bank to protect them from the foreign destroyer. Would they be strong enough to effectively resist? Would they be able to drive back the Russians and defeat them? The people of Lancashire who condemned our military administration did not do so without cause. It had been claimed by many that England could never be invaded; nevertheless our course should have been to prepare for possible events. Our Army, being small, should have been better equipped and armed, as well as trained to balance weakness in numbers. Again, there had always existed a hideous hindrance to the efficiency of the Auxiliaries--the arms. Many of the Martini-Henrys carried by the Volunteers bore date of a quarter of a century ago, and their barrels were so worn they could not be fired accurately; while others possessed the Snider, which was practically a smoothbore from wear. What was the use of weapons surpassed in power by those of other nations? It was an unpalatable truth that had now at last dawned upon Britain, that in arming her soldiers she was far behind the rest of the world. While Manchester spent the sultry night in feverish excitement at the knowledge that the enemy had advanced almost to their doors, the British outposts were being harassed by the enemy, who, flushed with success, were advancing gradually onward towards the line of defence. The Russian front had been suddenly widely extended, evidently aiming at a concentric attack on Manchester, and an attempt to wholly envelop the defenders' position by cavalry operating on both flanks. Some terribly desperate encounters took place during a frightful thunderstorm which lasted a portion of the night, and many a brave Briton fell while performing valiant deeds for the honour of his country. The anxiety within the British lines that hot night was intense. Reports coming in told of fierce fighting all along the line. Soon after midnight a British patrol, supported by cavalry, that had been sent out from Northenden to Baguley, was suddenly attacked by a party of Russians, who lay in ambush close to Wythenshaw Hall. A short but fierce fight ensued, but the British, knowing that part of the country well, succeeded in totally annihilating their antagonists. The firing, however, attracted attention in the Russian lines, with the result that a second attack was quickly made upon them, compelling them to retire up the hill at Lawton Moor, where they dashed into a small wood, closely pressed by the enemy. The attack was desperate. There is something terrible in a fight in a wood at night. The combatants could see nothing save an occasional flash in the impenetrable darkness, and hoarse cries went up from the mysterious inferno. Neither invader nor defender could distinguish each other, and in the half-hour that followed, many a Russian shot his comrade in mistake for his foe. At last the defenders, finding that the slightest rustling of boughs brought down a volley from magazine rifles, stood motionless, scarcely daring to breathe, and waited anxiously, until at last the enemy, seeing that their efforts to drive them out were useless, withdrew, and went off towards Baguley. In another direction, close to Henbury, near Macclesfield, a squadron of British cavalry surprised a small outpost camp of Russians, and cut it up terribly, killing half the number; but pushing on to Marthall, six miles across country, they came into collision with a body of Russian dragoons, and after a very fierce encounter were compelled to fall back again after considerable loss. On the outskirts of Northwich, and on the borders of Delamere Forest, skirmishes occurred, resulting in serious loss on both sides. A reconnoitring party of Russians was totally swept away and every man killed, by a British party who were concealed in an old farm building close to Alderley village; while another engaged in surveying the roads to Altrincham had been forced to retreat, leaving half their number dead or wounded on the edge of Tatton Park. CHAPTER XXIII. THE EVE OF BATTLE. Some idea of the gallant conduct of our Volunteers during the night may be gathered from the following extract from a letter by Lieutenant John Rowling of the 2nd Volunteer Battalion of the East Lancashire Regiment, to a friend a few days afterwards. He wrote-- "You will no doubt have heard something about the warm work we had on the night before the Battle of Manchester. The city, as you know, was covered on the south by a long straggling line of outposts, extending practically from Stockport to Altrincham. Late in the afternoon of September 6th we received an order to proceed to Mere, about four miles from Altrincham, having been detailed to form the section of the outposts from New Tatton to Goodier's Green, and on arrival at Mere half of our force of 600 was left in reserve there; the supports were moved about half a mile down Watling Street, and the remainder was divided into three piquets, No. 1 at Bentley Hurst Farm, No. 2 at Moss Cottage, and No. 3 near Mereplatt Farm, with four double sentry posts out in front of each piquet. "I was in command of No. 2 picket, with Anderson and Wishton as subs, and as soon as I returned to the piquet, after posting the sentries, I sent the former with two sections to form a detached post at Over Tabley, and instructed him to send a reconnoitring patrol as far down Watling Street as he might consider consistent with safety. Anderson posted his men, and returned to me about ten o'clock with a corporal and two men, bringing in a man who had been pointed out to him at Over Tabley as a suspicious character--in fact, he was said to be a spy. He had been staying at an inn there for two or three days, and had very little luggage. Anderson had examined his portmanteau, but found nothing there; and as the man refused to give any account of himself, he made him a prisoner. Fresh fires were continually breaking out, therefore I thought it best to waste no time questioning him, but took him into a room at Moss Cottage, where he was thoroughly searched. Notes were found upon him from which it was evident that he had been obtaining information for the enemy for some time, and, better still, particulars of their proposed operations for the investment of Manchester, showing that they were advancing in our direction along the old Watling Street. "I sent the prisoner under escort to the commander of the outposts, and at the same time sent word to Nos. 1 and 3 piquets, after which Anderson and I went down to Over Tabley, leaving Wishton in charge of No. 2. The machine gun that had been allotted to my piquet I also ordered to Over Tabley, and on arrival there we threw up barricades, hastily constructed of barrels, doors, and logs, banked with earth, across the road between the Vicarage and the church. A quantity of barbed wire was found in the village, and this came in very useful, for we stretched several lengths of it across the roads on the off-side of the barricade. "There were under thirty of us, but every man was determined to do his duty unflinchingly. By this time it was past eleven, and very dark, yet there was just light enough to train the gun on to the centre of the cross-roads by Dairyhouse Farm. Very soon we could hear the enemy approaching, and as their spy had not met them outside, they evidently concluded that the village was unoccupied, and advanced in comparatively close order, Cossacks leading, and the infantry so close that there was practically no division between their vanguard and mainguard. The first section of Cossacks very soon found our first wire, and the whole of their horses came to grief. Those in the rear, thinking probably that there was no other obstruction in the way, spurred their horses and galloped over their friends, only to meet with a similar fate further on. "The pioneers doubled up, and began to cut the wires, and fearing that the infantry in the rear would soon deploy, I gave the order for independent firing. The Russians stood it for some minutes, and attempted to reply, but not a man of ours was visible, and they soon retreated to Tabley Hall, where I had no means of following them. "It must be remembered that we were all Volunteers, the Regulars being on the Stockport flank of the outpost line. My men behaved splendidly, and the firing was excellent from first to last." About the same time as the unsuccessful attack was made on the outposts at Mere, the British line was broken through at Heald Green and Appletree. A cavalry patrol, supported by infantry, was feeling its way along the road to Wilmslow, and had passed Willow Farm, at which point the road runs beside the railway embankment. The storm had burst, the thunder rolled incessantly, rain fell in torrents, and the lightning played about them, causing their arms to gleam in its vivid flashes. Slowly, and without undue noise, the patrol was wending its way up the hill towards Finney Green, when suddenly there was a terrific rattle of musketry, and they discovered to their surprise that the enemy, who were occupying the embankment of the North-Western Railway on their left, were pouring upon them a fire sufficient to blanch the cheek of the bravest among them. Along the embankment for a mile or more were stationed infantry with magazine rifles, and in addition they had brought two machine guns into play with appalling effect. So sudden did this galling fire open upon them, that men and horses fell without being able to fire a shot in return. British infantry, however, stood their ground, and as the lightning flashed, disclosing the position of the enemy, every Russian who dared to stand up or show himself was promptly picked off. But against the awful rain of deadly bullets ejected from the machine guns, at the rate of 600 a minute, no force could make a successful defence. Many British heroes fell pierced by a dozen bullets; still their comrades, seeking what shelter they could, continued the defensive. Meanwhile over the dismal muddy road the survivors of the cavalry galloped back, and quickly reported to the commander of the piquet at Appletree that the enemy were in strong force on the other side of the embankment between Oaklands and Wilmslow Park, and as they had heard a train run into Wilmslow Station and stop, it was evident that the enemy had reopened the line from Crewe, and intended concentrating part of their reinforcements to the general advance. The facts that the enemy had succeeded in cutting all the telegraph lines in the district, and had now obtained complete control over the railway, were most alarming, and the outlook of the defenders was rendered doubly serious by the large force they were compelled to keep east of Stockport, and in the Peak district, to prevent the invaders getting round to attack Manchester from the north. On receipt of the news of the disaster to the patrol, the commander of the piquet at Appletree immediately sent information to the commander of the piquet posted at the railway station at Cheadle Hulme; but by a strange oversight, due no doubt to the excitement of the moment, sent no report to the commander of the outposts. The infantry engaging the Russians on the embankment, though exhibiting most gallant courage, were so exposed that it was little wonder they were soon completely annihilated, only half a dozen escaping. The enemy must have detrained a large number of troops at Wilmslow, for the British cavalry scouts were quickly followed up by Cossacks and the Tsar's Dragoons. Quickly the sentries between Heald Green and Appletree were driven back on their piquets, the latter extending in skirmishing order. Such a manoeuvre, however, proved fatal in the darkness and on the heavy ploughed land over which they were fighting. Alas! very few succeeded in reaching the supports, and when they did, they all fell back hurriedly on the reserves at Pimgate. [Illustration: THE BATTLEFIELD OF MANCHESTER.] Then the commander of the piquet at Cheadle Hulme Station, finding that he must inevitably be attacked by road and rail, set the station on fire, and with the assistance of the railway officials blew up a large portion of the permanent way with dynamite, thus cutting off the enemy's means of communication. This accomplished, he fell back upon his supports at Adswood, and they, at about 2 A.M., retreated with the reserves to the embankment of the North-Western Railway which carries the line from Stockport to Whaley Bridge, and took up a strong position to assist in the defence of Stockport. The latter town was defended on three sides by railway embankments, which were now occupied by strong bodies of Regulars, with several Maxims. One embankment ran from the west boundary of the town to Middlewood Junction, another from Middlewood to Marple, and a third from Marple to Mayercroft. Throughout the night the defenders were in hourly expectation that an attack would be made upon their positions, with the object of investing Stockport as a preliminary to the assault on the defensive lines north of the Mersey; but the enemy apparently had other objects, and the disaster to the British cavalry patrol on the Wilmslow road was, unfortunately, followed by a second and more serious one. The Cossacks and Dragoons that followed the British cavalry scouts overtook them just as they had joined their reserves, a short distance beyond Pimgate, about half-past two. A fierce fight ensued, and the force of British cavalry and infantry was gradually drawn into a cunningly-devised trap, and then there suddenly appeared a great force of Russians, who simply swept down upon them, slaughtering the whole of them with brutal ferocity, not, however, before they had fought desperately, and inflicted enormous loss upon the enemy. Having totally annihilated that detachment of defenders, the Russians marched into Cheadle, and, after sacking the little town, burned it, together with the Grange, the Print Works, the railway station, St. Mary's Church, and a number of large mills. The great army of the Tsar had bivouaced, reserving its strength for a desperate dash upon Manchester. But the British outposts stood wakeful and vigilant, ready at any moment to sound the alarm. To those entrenched beyond the winding Mersey, soaked by the heavy rain, and spending the dark hours in anxiety, there came over the dismal country the sound of distant rifle-firing mingling with the roll of the thunder. Ere long they knew that every man would be fighting for his life against the great hordes of invaders who would descend upon them swiftly and mercilessly. Across the country from the Peak away to Chester, the Briton bravely faced his foe, anxious and vigilant, awaiting breathlessly the progress of events. Thus passed the stormy, oppressive night, till the grey dawn of a fateful day. CHAPTER XXIV. MANCHESTER ATTACKED BY RUSSIANS. With the first streak of daylight the anxious, excited crowds of men and women, surging up and down the principal streets of Manchester, were alarmed by the sounds of heavy firing. A terrible panic instantly ensued. The battle had actually commenced! Half-starved operatives, with pale, wan faces, stood in groups in Deansgate, Market Street, Piccadilly, and London Road, while men, armed with any weapons they could obtain, rushed out along the main roads to the south of the city to assist in its defence. Lancashire men exhibited commendable patriotism, even though they had not hesitated to criticise the administration of our War Department; for now at the critical hour not a man flinched from his duty, both old and young taking up arms for their country's honour. During the eventful night at all approaches to the city from the south the roads had been thrown into a state of hasty defence. A formidable barricade had been constructed at a point in the Stretford Road close to the Botanical Gardens to prevent the enemy from advancing up the Chester or Stretford New Roads; another was thrown up at the junction of Chorlton Road, Withington Road, Upper Chorlton Road, and Moss Lane West; a third opposite Rusholme Hall prevented any march up the Wilmslow Road; while others of minor strength blocked the Anson Road close to the Elms, the London Road at Longsight, the Hyde Road opposite Belle Vue Prison, and at Ivy Place in the Ashton Old Road. These had all been raised out of any materials that came to hand. Barrels, brick rubbish, planks, doors, flooring of houses hastily torn up, and scaffold poles lashed together; in fact, the barriers were huge piles of miscellaneous and portable articles, even furniture from neighbouring houses being utilised, while lengths of iron railings and wire torn from fences played an important part in these hastily-built defences. Behind them, armed with rifles, shot-guns, pistols, knives, and any other weapon that came handiest, the men of Manchester waited, breathlessly impatient in the expectation of attack. As dawn spread bright and rosy, and the mist cleared from the low meadows beside the Mersey, the distant firing was continuous, and the one or two shells that fell and burst in the centre of the city were precursory of an awful sanguinary struggle. Scarcely a person in that densely populated area had slept that night, and the streets were everywhere full, the most exciting and heartrending scenes being witnessed. A great crowd that assembled in Albert Square was addressed by the Mayor from the steps of the Town Hall, and urged to strain every muscle to drive back the invaders, in order that the disaster at Birmingham should not be repeated. Even as he spoke, in the interval of wild cheering and the energetic singing of the National Anthem and "Rule, Britannia," the distant crackling of rifles and the low booming of field guns could be heard. It was the din of battle--the catastrophe caused by the cunning spy Von Beilstein, who was still living in luxury in London, and who still posed as the friend of Geoffrey Engleheart and Violet Vayne! Geoffrey was still with the Volunteers assisting in the defence of London, but the French spy who had sent the forged orders to our Navy had apparently made good his escape. Here, in Manchester, the sound of the guns aroused that patriotic enthusiasm latent in the heart of every Briton. True, they were weary, famished, ill from lack of food, yet they were fiercely determined that the invader should never tread their streets, nor should incendiaries burn or Russian artillery destroy their handsome buildings--monuments of England's wealth and greatness. In St. Peter's Square, at a mass meeting attended by nearly twelve thousand people, a demonstration was made against the enemy, and it was resolved that every man should act his part in the struggle, and that no quarter should be shown the legions of the Tsar; while at another impromptu meeting held in Piccadilly, in the open space opposite the Infirmary, the conduct of the Russians before Birmingham was denounced; and some speakers, using violent language, lashed their hearers into a frenzy of mad excitement, causing an eager rush to the barricades in readiness for the terrible fray. As the sun shone out pale and yellow in the stormy sky, the fighting spread quickly down the Mersey banks from Haughton away to Flixton. It became fiercest around Stockport, and over the level pastures the white smoke of rifles puffed from every bush, wall, and fence. The Russians were the superior force, for, while all were trained soldiers, not more than a third of the defenders had taken the Queen's shilling, and not more than half of them had ever had an hour's drill in their lives. They were simply volunteers who had found their own arms and banded for the defence of their homes. The soldiers of the Tsar, trained under the most rigorous discipline, had considerably improved in tactics, in drill, and in munitions of war since the Crimea,--a fact overlooked by the majority of Britons,--and they had now taken possession of every strategical position where batteries might be established. After fierce fighting over Lyme Park across to Norbury Hall, in which the Russians lost very heavily owing to the British gun fire from the railway embankment, a great charge was made by an enormous body of infantry, who succeeded, after several futile attempts, in carrying the position, and driving the British artillerymen back to the road which runs from Stockport to Marple. The embankment which thus fell into the hands of the Muscovite infantry formed one of the strongest defences of Stockport, therefore they at once moved the guns up towards Davenport Station, and commenced shelling the city with the defenders' own guns! The panic caused in Stockport was awful, when without warning shells commenced to explode in the crowded barricaded streets, but the Russians were not allowed to have things their own way for long. The British batteries on the opposite railway embankment between Heaton Norris and New Mills formed up at the junction almost opposite Davenport, and opened a terrific fire upon the captured guns. For half an hour this continued, and the Russians, standing in an exposed position right on the sky-line, were being swept away by British shells, when suddenly the enemy were joined by reinforcements, whereupon a small force of British infantry, who had been brought quickly along, unperceived by the enemy from Marple, suddenly swarmed up the embankment at Norbury, and, charging along to the Russian position, added a strong rifle fire to that of their artillery. The officer commanding the British batteries watched the infantry advance through his field glass, and in a few minutes suddenly ceased his fire, so as to allow the infantry to make the dash for which they were preparing. A heliograph signal was flashed from the batteries, and then, without hesitation, the order was given to charge. It was a terribly exciting moment. If they succeeded they would in all probability save Stockport. If they were driven back the town was doomed. With admirable pluck the British rushed upon the guns, and for a few minutes there was a fierce struggle hand to hand. Russians, although making a most desperate stand, were every moment being impaled on British bayonets, or, pierced by bullets, they rolled down the slopes into ditches covered in stagnant slime. Hacked to pieces by the small but gallant force of Britons, the enemy were forced at last to give in and retire, leaving more than half their number killed; but with admirable tact, the fugitives were forced down the bank nearest the British batteries. Thus they fell into a trap, for as soon as they attempted to recover themselves, and make a dash to reorganise their line of communications, two British Maxims uttered their sharp rattle, and the whole force were simply mowed down where they stood. The fight had been a most desperate one, but, thanks to the heroic charge of the British infantry, Stockport was again safe, and the guns once more in the hands of her defenders. Meanwhile, fighting of the fiercest possible description was taking place across the meadows lying between Norbury and Bramhall, and the Russians, unable to withstand the withering British fire, were gradually forced back to Cheadle Hulme, where they were surprised by the defenders and utterly routed. So great was the slaughter, that it is estimated that in this engagement alone, after the recapture of the guns by the British, over 4000 Russians were shot down and 3000 taken prisoners! The Russians, finding how desperate was the resistance, and how heavily they were losing, quickly brought up strong reinforcements upon Cheadle, and, after a fiercely-contested conflict, succeeded in driving back the small British force, they being compelled to retreat back over the Mersey to Parr's Wood and Didsbury, afterwards blowing up the bridges, and keeping up a hot fire from the bank, where a large body of Volunteers were already entrenched. By this means, although they were unable to save Cheadle from being burned, they succeeded, by reason of the excellence of their position and the admirable tactics they displayed, in mowing down another 2000 of the Tsar's soldiers. In this instance the laurels remained with a portion of the Manchester Volunteer Brigade, the effect of whose rifle fire was appalling. It was now about ten o'clock, and the sky had cleared for a brilliant day. At Chapel-en-le-Frith a large detachment of Cossacks had been swept away by a body of British Hussars who had suddenly descended upon Whitehough, while almost at the same moment a British battery that had been hastily established on Chinley Churn succeeded in wiping out a body of infantry that was advancing with all speed in the neighbourhood of Yeardsley Hall. But one of the most sanguinary portions of the battle was the conflict which spread westward from Cheadle across to Altrincham, Lymm, and Warrington. Already Altrincham had fallen. The fine villas of wealthy Manchester tradesmen and manufacturers, deserted by their owners, had been entered by the uncouth Muscovites and sacked. Every nook and corner had been searched for plate, jewellery, and money, paintings had been ruthlessly torn down, furniture broken and burned, and Russian troopers had made merry in many a handsome drawing-room. Old Field Hall and Timperly Hall had both been ransacked and set on fire with petroleum, while every house at Dunham Massey had been destroyed by incendiaries. Elated over their successes, the Russians were collecting their forces preparatory to a decisive rush over the Mersey to Stretford, intending to take that place, and advance by that route upon Manchester. The defenders, who had been warned of this through spies, awaited their chance, and suddenly, when the Russians least expected an attack, a body of British cavalry, backed by infantry, crossed the Mersey, and sweeping down the level turnpike road to Sale, came upon their opponents before they were aware of their presence. The effect of this was frightful. A small body of British Hussars, with some Lancashire Yeomanry, made a splendid charge, exhibiting magnificent courage, and cut their way clean through the Russian lines with irresistible force; while the infantry, advancing cautiously, and taking every advantage of the small cover afforded on that level country, poured forth a deadly rifle fire. Indeed, so gallant was this charge, that the Tsar's forces were almost annihilated. They endeavoured to make a stand near the cross-roads leading from Carrington Moss, but the rifle fire of the defenders was so heavy that they dropped by hundreds under the deadly rain of British bullets. The disaster to the Russians being signalled back by them to their reserves at Tatton Park and around Knutsford, had the effect of bringing up an enormous force of infantry. Signallers were at work in all directions, and those who watched the progress of the action found the next two hours full of exciting moments. It was apparent at once that the Russians had marked out Stretford as the gate by which they intended to enter Manchester, but they must have been misled by their spies as to the strength of the defenders in this direction. Indeed, if they had surveyed the whole of the southern line defending the city, they could not have discovered a point more strongly fortified; therefore it was a somewhat curious fact that they should have concentrated their forces upon that part. Possibly it was because they had formed an opinion by studying their Ordnance Maps--so generously provided for them by the British Department of Agriculture at a cost of one shilling each--that, if they succeeded in breaking the defence at Stretford, they would also secure the road running in a circular direction up to Barton, by which means they could enter Manchester by way of Eccles, Pendleton, and Salford at the same time as the march through Trafford. Such a design was, of course, cleverly planned. It must be admitted that, from a strategical point of view, the taking of Stretford would mean the fall of Manchester, a fact which the Russian commanding officer had not overlooked. But the soldiers of the Tsar had reckoned without their hosts. They only saw along the Mersey a thin and apparently weak line of defence, a massing of defenders without undue ostentation and without any particular show of strength. A balloon sent up by the Russians to reconnoitre from Sale had been fired at and brought down by the defenders, but with this exception scarcely a shot had been fired north of the Mersey. Britons were watching and waiting. Their foe, ridiculing the idea that a town like Manchester, almost utterly devoid of positions whereon batteries might be established, could be successfully defended, therefore kept up a desultory fire upon the British detachment that had swept away their advance guard, in the meantime covering the massing of their enormous force. This latter consisted of Cossacks, guards, infantry, artillery, and two companies of engineers, with pontoon sections, as well as a ballooning party and two field hospitals. The British detachment that had crossed the river were, however, unaware of the enemy's intention until too late. The manoeuvres of the Russians were being watched by a British balloon sent up from Old Trafford, but the signals made by the aëronaut were unfortunately unobserved by the party, so desperately were they fighting; otherwise a disaster which befell them on the sudden rush of the enemy towards the river might possibly have been averted. However, no blame could be attached to the officer in charge of the detachment. The men acted their part bravely, and displayed that courage of which the Briton speaks with justifiable pride, even though, alas! they fell, every one of them fighting till the last, their bodies being afterwards frightfully mangled by horses' hoofs, as hundreds of Cossacks rode over them. Not a man of that party escaped, but each one had once more shown the world what pluck and courage could accomplish, and had gone to his grave as a sacrifice for his country and his Queen. CHAPTER XXV. GALLANT DEEDS BY CYCLISTS. Noon came and went. The fighting grew fiercer around Manchester, and the excitement more intense within the barricaded, starving city. Through the wildly agitated crowds of women of all classes, from manufacturers' wives to factory girls, who moved up and down Deansgate, Market Street, and many other principal thoroughfares, feverishly anxious for the safety of their husbands and brothers manning the improvised defences, rumours of terrible disaster spread like wildfire, and caused loud wailing and lamentation. Now rumour told of huge British successes away beyond the Mersey, a report which elated the pale-faced hungry ones, but this being followed quickly by a further report that a force of the defenders had been cut up and utterly annihilated outside Eccles, the cheering died away, and give place to deep, long-drawn sighs and murmurings of despair. Upon the dusty, perspiring throngs the hot noonday sun beat down mercilessly, the low rumbling of artillery sounded gradually closer and more distinct, and the smoke of burning buildings in Sale and Altrincham slowly ascending hung in the clear sky a black ominous cloud. By about two o'clock the line of defence south of the Mersey had been nearly all withdrawn, leaving, however, the defending line running south-east of Stockport to Buxton and the Peak. Although Cheadle had fallen into the enemy's hands, an English battery, established near the railway at Bamford, commanded the road from Cheadle to Stockport, and British infantry, supported by artillery, were strongly entrenched from Bramhall Moor through Norbury, Poynton, Wardsend, Booth Green, and Bollington, then turning east through Macclesfield Forest to Buxton. This line was being hourly strengthened, and although not strong enough to take the offensive, it was too strong for the Russians to attack. [Illustration: GALLANT STAND BY CYCLISTS IN PARR WOOD.] All the bridges over the Mersey, from Glazebrook to Stockport, had been prepared for demolition, but it was not intended to carry this out except as a last resource. Cavalry and cyclist scouts who were left on the south of the Mersey had withdrawn across the bridges, after exchanging shots with the skirmishers of the advance guards of the enemy who quickly lined the banks. The bridges north of Cheadle were then blown up, and the defenders were well posted in Parr Wood, near where it was believed the enemy would attempt to ford the river. The Russians contented themselves with exchanging a few shots with the defenders until half an hour later, when some of their batteries had been established, and then the passage of the Mersey at Northenden was commenced, under cover of the guns of the Russians near the Convalescent Hospital, north of Cheadle. As soon as the Russian scouts approached the river three British outposts could be seen in the wood. They were, however, driven in by some Cossacks, who forded the river and attempted to enter the wood, but were all immediately killed by hidden skirmishers. The Russian engineers were meanwhile busy building a pontoon bridge, which they soon completed, and they then crossed after a short opposition, rapidly deploying to right and left in order to surround Didsbury. This, the first force to cross the Mersey, consisted of two battalions of the Kazan Regiment and two battalions of the Vladimir, with two 9-pounder and one 6-pounder field batteries and 100 cavalry. Didsbury had been put in a state of hasty defence, and was held by two battalions of the defenders, who also established a Volunteer battery at Bank Hall, and lined the railway embankment in force as far as Chorlton-with-Hardy. The enemy's battery at the Convalescent Home had rendered the wood almost untenable, but it was soon silenced by the well-directed fire of the British Volunteer battery, and the wood was then re-entered by the defenders. By this time, however, a large number of the enemy had taken up positions in it, and the British were once more gradually driven back. One section, consisting of six cyclists, with a light machine gun mounted on a double cycle, was told off under Sergeant Irons of the Royal Lancaster, to defend a junction of two paths about half-way through the dense wood, and as the latter was still occupied by the defenders, the enemy could only make slow progress, and the cavalry could only move by the paths. Irons, taking advantage of a bend in the path, dismounted his men, who, having drawn up their cycles under cover, were formed up each side of the road to support the gun. About thirty Russian dragoons, with their infantry, who were working through the wood, were soon upon them, and, seeing such a small force barring the way, the cavalry charged. They, however, met with such a terribly hot reception that only two reached the guns, and these were immediately shot. The stand made by these seven men was a most noteworthy instance of the indomitable courage of the defenders. In those critical moments they remained calm and collected, obeying the orders of their sergeant as coolly as if they had been drilling in the barrack square. But their position was one of momentarily increasing peril, for bullets whistled about them, and the force against them was an overwhelming one. The Russian horses and men who had fallen blocked the road, and Irons therefore gave the order to fall in, as the sound of firing had now drawn many of the enemy's skirmishers towards the spot. Irons then re-formed his squad, one of whom had been shot and another wounded, and, taking the wounded man with them, retired. Just as they were moving off the corporal was wounded in the shoulder, and Irons himself received a bullet in the left arm. About two hundred yards nearer Didsbury there was a clearing, with farm buildings on both sides of the road, and these had been loopholed and occupied by a small force of Volunteers. Irons, sending the wounded man on to Didsbury, remained here with his gun, and a few minutes later the position was vigorously attacked. The conflict which ensued was of the fiercest description. The mere handful of defenders fought with such desperate courage that the great body of Russians which surrounded them were from the first moment gradually swept away by the steady and precise fire from the farm. Around the buildings the enemy swarmed in overwhelming numbers, but every man who showed himself was promptly picked off by Britons shooting almost as coolly as if they were competing for prizes at Bisley. Sergeant Irons' small machine gun, with its single barrel, rattled out continuously, shedding its rain of lead in all directions, while from muzzles of Martini rifles peeping over walls and from windows there came a continuous stream of bullets, which played frightful havoc with the foe. Within the first ten minutes two men of the defending force had been shot dead and one wounded; still, their comrades never lost heart, for they were determined that their position should never fall into the enemy's hands. The Russian officer who was directing the operations of the attacking party rose and shouted in Russian to encourage his men, but in a moment an English bullet struck him, and, with a loud cry, he fell forward over the body of a dragoon, shot through the heart. The stand the cyclists and their companions made was unparalleled. They fought on heroically, knowing the importance of the position they held, and how, if it were taken, other and more serious British casualties must follow. Firing steadily and with caution, they displayed such bravery that even the Russians themselves were compelled to secretly admire them; and at last, after nearly half an hour's desperate fighting, the Tsar's soldiers found themselves so terribly cut up that they were forced to retire, leaving more than half their number dead and many wounded. While this had been in progress, the British battery had totally destroyed the Russian pontoon, and thus all means of retreat for this portion of the invading force were cut off. About ten thousand men had crossed the river at this point, and although they had deployed at first, they had all been gradually driven into the wood by the fire from the railway embankment. As soon as the pontoon was destroyed, the British commenced to advance through the wood, slowly driving back the Russians, who then endeavoured to make for Stretford along the north bank of the river; but on seeing their intention a brigade of defenders was immediately pushed along the railway, and two regiments of cavalry were hurried down the road to Chorlton. These succeeded in heading the enemy, and, suddenly swooping down, they destroyed the rest of the Cossacks who had escaped from the wood, as well as the remainder of the force who had attacked the farm. Another British battery was then hurried forward, and after a stubborn fight the remainder of the invaders who had crossed surrendered. In this attack alone the Russians lost in killed and wounded 200 cavalry and nearly 2000 infantry and artillery, while Stretford and Stockport still remained safe. But along the long line east and west the battle raged with increasing fierceness. The conflict was a terrible one on every hand. The town of Lymm had been sacked, and was now burning, while hundreds of unoffending men, women, and children living in the quiet Cheshire villages had been wantonly massacred by the Muscovites. The latter were, however, now suffering well-merited punishment, for in this bloody battle they were falling dead in hundreds. The Russian Eagle was at last being forced to bite the dust! CHAPTER XXVI. GREAT BATTLE ON THE MERSEY. The long blazing day was one of many battles and much toilsome combat. Fighting spread over a front of nearly nine miles, and during the engagement one wing of the Russians was swung across three miles. Hour after hour the tremendous warfare raged between the armies of Queen Victoria and the Tsar, and the bloodshed was everywhere terrible. Small parties of the Russian Telegraph Corps had ferried over the Ship Canal and the Mersey near Latchford, and wires were run out, and posts established connecting the headquarters at Altrincham, on the south of the river, with the well-advanced guard stations on the Liverpool Road towards Manchester at Woolstone, Hollinfare, and Lower Irlam. Sending forth a huge division of infantry upon his left, and three brigades of cavalry in the centre, the Russian General struck hard at the British line between Stretford and Chorlton-with-Hardy. Meanwhile, beyond Ashton-on-Mersey the battle was also growing in intensity, and rifle and cannon were noisily engaged. A strong force of Russian infantry was at once pushed across to Partington, where they succeeded in crossing the Ship Canal and the Mersey, subsequently joining their advance guard at Lower Irlam. The British reserves at Newton-in-Makerfield, however, swept down upon them, and a terrible fight quickly ensued. The defenders advanced very steadily by section rushes, keeping under good firing discipline as they went, and the enemy were driven on towards Flixton, where they were simply swept away by the 12-pounder batteries established there, while at the same time their wires crossing the Mersey were cut, and communication with their headquarters thus interrupted. While this was in progress, another and more important attack was being made on Stretford. The heavy artillery fire and the affairs of outposts in the earlier stages of the battle had been followed by a carefully-regulated long-range fire of infantry on both sides. The tactics the Russians had displayed were as follows:--They had gradually developed their infantry in front of the Stretford position, and brought their pontoons in readiness for a dash over the river. Then, after some tentative movements, designed to feel the strength of our forces massed at this important point, they apparently determined to carry it at any cost. On their right flank the enemy were losing very heavily. A telegraphic message received at Altrincham gave the headquarters alarming news of constant reverses. A strong force of infantry marching along the banks of the Etherow from Compstall, intending to get to Hyde by way of Mottram and Godley Junction, had been attacked by British infantry and a couple of 9-pounders, and totally annihilated; while at the same time, about a thousand men attacking a British battery on the hill at Charlesworth had been cut up and forced to retreat, being followed by some Lancers right down to Ludworth Houses, where they were nearly all killed or wounded. Indeed, times without number during that memorable day the Russians made fierce attacks upon our positions on the edge of the Peak district, but on each occasion they were hurled back with fearful loss by the thin line of defenders holding the high ground. A battery we had established on the crown of the hill at Werneth was charged again and again by Cossacks and Dragoons, but our men, displaying cool courage at the critical moments, fought desperately, and mowed down the foe in a manner that was remarkable. The Russians, having decided to carry Stretford, were making vigorous demonstrations towards the Peak, and in the direction of Flixton, in order to distract our attention. They occupied us at many points in the vast semicircle, and by thus engaging us all along the line, endeavoured apparently to prevent us from reinforcing the point at Stretford which they intended gaining. Both invaders and defenders gradually extended in order to meet outflanking movements, and this was the cause of another sudden British success. It was a foregone conclusion that such an extension would exceed the limits of defensive power on one side or the other, and then blows would be struck with the object of breaking the too extended line. What occurred is, perhaps, best related by one of the special correspondents of the _Daily News_, who, in his account of the battle, published two days later, said-- "About three o'clock I was at Barton with the force of infantry who were holding the road to Warrington, when we unexpectedly received telegraphic information from headquarters of a rapid extension of the enemy's left flank. A brigade which I accompanied was pushed on at once down to Hollinfare, where we reinforced those who had been so successful in cutting up the enemy at Lower Irlam half an hour before. We then extended along the Liverpool Road, past Warrington, as far as Widnes. I remained with a small detachment at Hollinfare awaiting developments, when suddenly we were informed that the enemy had thrown a pontoon bridge over the Mersey at its confluence with the Bollin, and that a great body of infantry, with machine guns, had left Lymm, where they had been lying inactive, and were already crossing. There were not more than one hundred of us, mostly men of the Loyal Lancashire from Preston and a few of the Manchester Regiment; but at the word of command we dashed down the road for nearly a mile, and then leaving it, doubled across the fields to Rixton Old Hall, where we obtained cover. "The Russians had chosen the most advantageous spot they could find to cross, for on the opposite bank there was a small thick wood, and in this they remained quite concealed until they suddenly dashed out and got across. Numbers had already reached our side and were deploying, when our rifles spoke out sharply, and, judging from the manner in which the enemy were exposed, our fire was quite unexpected. About thirty of our men, kneeling behind a wall, kept up a vigorous fire, emptying their magazines with excellent effect upon the grey-coats swarming over the improvised bridge. "Still it was impossible to keep them back, for the force effecting a passage was very much larger than we had anticipated. "A few minutes later, having ascertained the extent of the attack, our signallers opened communication with Higher Irlam, and the information was conveyed on to Barton, whence the heliograph flashed the news down to Stretford. "Suddenly, however, in the midst of a shady clump of trees there was a loud rattle and continuous flashing. The enemy had brought a 10-barrelled Nordenfelt into play, and it was raining bullets upon us at the rate of a thousand a minute! "The wall behind which I was crouching was struck by a perfect hail of lead, and there was a loud whistling about my ears that was particularly disconcerting. Nevertheless our men had in their sudden dash for the defence secured an excellent position, and only three were killed and five wounded by this sudden outburst. "The struggle during the next few minutes was the most desperate I have ever witnessed. At the moment of peril our men displayed magnificent pluck. They seemed utterly unconcerned at their imminent danger, and lay or crouched, firing independently with calm precision. A dozen or so fell wounded, however, and a sergeant who knelt next to me, and who was shooting through a hole in the wall, was shot through the heart, and fell dead while in the act of making an observation to me. "The men who had attacked us were a fierce-looking set, mostly composed of Tchuwakes and Mordwa from the central district of the Volga, and renowned as among the best infantry that the Tsar can command. "Rifles bristled from every bit of cover around us, and it was really marvellous that we scored such success. Indeed, it was only by reason of the courageous conduct of every individual man that the successful stand was made against such overwhelming numbers. We knew that if the enemy forced the passage and annihilated us, they would then be enabled to outflank our force, and get round to Eccles and Pendlebury--a disaster which might result in the rapid investment of Manchester. Therefore we fought on, determined to do our very utmost to stem the advancing tide of destroyers. "Time after time our rifles rattled, and time after time the deadly Nordenfelt sent its hail of bullets around us. Presently, however, we heard increased firing on our right, and then welcome signals reached us from Martinscroft Green. We greeted them with loud cheering, for a force of our infantry and cavalry had returned along the road from Warrington, and, working in extended order, were bearing down upon the foe. "We ceased firing in that direction, and ere long we had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy's pontoon blown up, and then, with their retreat cut off, they became demoralised, and were driven into the open, where we picked them off so rapidly that scarcely one man of the 1500 who had set his foot upon the Lancashire bank survived. "From first to last our men fought magnificently. The whole engagement was a brilliant and almost unequalled display of genuine British bravery, and all I can hope is that the defenders of London will act their part with equal courage when the decisive struggle comes." CHAPTER XXVII. THE FATE OF THE VANQUISHED. While this vigorous attack on the right flank was in progress, the enemy made a sudden dash upon Stretford. The edge of the town itself--or rather suburb--lies but a short distance from the Mersey, and the turnpike road runs straight away over the river through Sale and Altrincham to Northwich. At the end of the town nearest the river a road leading down from Barton joins the main road, and at the junction is a large red-brick modern hotel, the Old Cock, while adjoining is the Manchester Tramway Company's stable and terminus. At a little distance behind lies a high embankment, which carries the railway from Manchester to Liverpool, while the Mersey itself, though not wide, has steep banks with earthworks thrown up to prevent floods. Hence the force holding this position found ready-made defences which were now of the utmost value. The defenders here included three batteries of Royal Artillery, one battalion of the Manchester Regiment, the 2nd Volunteer Battalion of the same regiment, and one of the Lancashire Fusiliers, a field company of Engineers, half the 14th (King's) Hussars with their machine gun section, and a company of signallers. Trenches had been dug at various points, and earthworks thrown up all along the line from Chorlton over to Flixton. Across the junction of the two roads opposite the Old Cock a great barricade had been constructed, and behind this was a powerful battery that commanded the level country away towards Altrincham. The bridges carrying the road and railway over the river had both been demolished by engineers, and many other precautions had been taken to prevent the enemy forcing a passage across. At last, with a swiftness that was surprising, the expected assault was made. Its strength was terrific, and the carnage on both sides appalling. The first dash across was effected by the Russians from the rifle range near Old Hall, and this was rapidly followed by another from the bank opposite the battery at Stretford, while further down a third attack was made near Mersey House, close to Ashton. Of the three, the strongest, of course, was that upon Stretford. The enemy had, by a good deal of neat manoeuvring, brought their main body within the triangle bounded on the one side by the road from Cheadle to Altrincham, on the second by the road from the latter place to the river, and the third by the river itself. Pontoons were floated at many points, and while some cavalry forded the river, infantry and artillery rapidly crossed in the face of a terrific fire which was pouring upon them. Smokeless powder being used, the positions of the invaders were not obscured, and it could be seen that the British were effecting terrible execution. Hundreds of the foe who were in the act of crossing were picked off, and shells falling upon the pontoons destroyed them. The latter, however, were quickly replaced, and the force of the Tsar, by reason of the overwhelming numbers that had hurled themselves upon Stretford, succeeded, after a desperately-contested fight, in breaking the line of defence between Chorlton-with-Hardy and Fallowfield, and advancing by short rushes upon Manchester. But the British infantry in their trenches behaved splendidly, and made the roads from Old Hall at Sale right along to Partington quite untenable, so the continuous advance of the enemy cost them very dearly. Russian shells bursting in Stretford killed and injured large numbers of the defenders. Two of them struck the Old Cock in rapid succession, almost completely demolishing it, but the débris was quickly manned, and rifles soon spoke from its ruined walls. Again, a shell exploding in the large tram stables, set a hay store on fire, and this burned furiously, while away in the centre of the town the Public Library and a number of shops in the vicinity had also been ignited in a similar manner. At last the thousands of grey-coats swarming over the country fell in such enormous numbers upon the British rifle pits on the Mersey bank, that the first line of defence was at length utterly broken down; but in doing this the enemy's front had become much exposed, whereupon the Maxims on the railway embankment between the river and Barton suddenly burst forth a perfect hail of bullets, and in a short time a whole division of Russian infantry, cavalry, and artillery had been literally swept out of existence. The batteries down in the Stretford Road, combined with those on the embankment, had up to this moment played greater havoc with the foe than any other. The men of the Manchester Regiment, both Regulars and Volunteers, were displaying the greatest coolness; but unfortunately the Lancashire Fusiliers and the Loyal North Lancashire, who had manned the trenches, had been partially annihilated, the majority lying dead, their bodies scattered over the level fields and roads. Yet, notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of the British batteries at this point, the Russians were bringing up huge reinforcements from Altrincham, Cheadle, and Northenden, and by establishing strong batteries commanding Stretford, they at last, about five o'clock, succeeded in killing nearly half the gallant defenders, and driving back the survivors up the Barton Road. The tide of grey-coats rushing onward, captured the British guns, and although the batteries on the railway embankment still held out, and the enemy suffered heavily from their Maxims, yet they pressed on into Stretford town, and commenced to sack it. Messrs. Williams, Deacon's Bank, was entered, the safes blown open, and large sums in gold and notes abstracted, shops were entered and looted, and houses ransacked for jewellery. Thus Stretford fell. Its streets ran with blood; and on, over the bodies of its brave defenders, the hordes of the Great White Tsar marched towards Manchester. Meanwhile the British batteries on the railway embankment had also fallen into the hands of the Russians, who were now driving the survivors over towards Barton. They did not, however, retreat without a most desperate resistance. A row of thatched and white-washed cottages at the bend of the road they held for a long time, emptying their magazine rifles with deadly effect upon their pursuers, but at last they were driven north, and half an hour later joined their comrades who had massed at Barton, but who had been attacked in great force and fallen back in good order to Pendleton. By this time the enemy, having pierced the line of outposts, had occupied Barton and Eccles. At the former place they had set on fire a number of factories, and out of mere desire to cause as much damage to property as possible, they had blown up both the bridge that carried the road over the Ship Canal, and also destroyed the magnificent swinging aqueduct which carried the Bridgewater Canal over the other. This great triumph of engineering--one of the most successful feats of the decade--was blown into the air by charges of gun-cotton, and now lay across the Ship Canal a heap of fallen masonry and twisted iron cantilevers, while the water from the Bridgewater Canal was pouring out in thousands of tons, threatening to flood the surrounding district, and the church opposite had been wrecked by the terrific force of the explosion. A frightful panic had been caused in Manchester by these reverses. The scenes in the streets were indescribable. At the barricades, however, the enemy met with a desperate resistance. Three great columns were marching on Manchester at that moment. The first, having broken the line of defence near Fallowfield, divided into two divisions; one, advancing up the Wilmslow Road, stormed the great barricade opposite Rusholme Hall, while the other appeared on the Withington Road, and commenced to engage the defences that had been thrown across Moss Lane and Chorlton Road. The second column advanced to where Eccles Old Road joins Broad Street at Pendleton; and the third, sweeping along up the Stretford Road, met with a terrific resistance at the Botanic Gardens at Trafford, the walls of which, on either side of the road, were loopholed and manned by infantry and artillery; while opposite, the Blind Asylum was held by a regiment of infantry, and a strong barricade, with a battery of 12-pounders, had been established a little further towards the city, at the junction of the Chester and Stretford New Roads. The enemy advanced here in enormous force; but, seeing the formidable defences, a number of cavalry and infantry turned off along the Trafford Road, blew up the bridge of the Ship Canal in order to prevent a pursuing force of British cavalry from following, and after setting fire to the great dock warehouses and crowd of idle ships, continued along to Eccles New Road, where, however, they were met by another force of our Hussars, and totally routed and cut up. From this point the tide of battle turned. It was already half-past five, and the sun was sinking when the Russian forces prepared for their final onslaught. Cossacks and Dragoons charged again and again, and infantry with bayonets fixed rushed onward to the barricades in huge grey legions, only to be met by a sweeping rain of British bullets, which filled the roads with great heaps of dead. In these defences, rendered doubly strong by the patriotic action of the stalwart civilians of Manchester, the invaders could make no breach, and before every one of them they fell in thousands. The men in the entrenchments saw the foe were falling back, and found the attack growing weaker. Then signals were made, and they raised a long hearty cheer when the truth was flashed to them. [Illustration: RUSSIANS ATTACKING THE BARRICADE IN STRETFORD ROAD, MANCHESTER.] The news was inspiriting, and they fought on with redoubled energy, for they knew that the great body of reserves from Ashton-under-Lyne, Hyde, and Compstall, as well as those who had been occupying the hills on the edge of the Peak, had been pushed right past Stretford to Barton, and were now advancing like a huge fan, outflanking the Russians and attacking them in their rear. The British tactics were excellent, for while the invaders were attacked by cavalry and infantry on the one side, the defenders manning the barricades made a sudden sortie, cutting their way into them with bayonet rushes which they could not withstand, and which had a terribly fatal effect. The Tsar's forces, unable to advance or retreat, and being thus completely surrounded, still fought on, and as they refused to surrender, were literally massacred by thousands by British troops, while many guns and horses were captured, thousands of rounds of ammunition seized, and many men taken prisoners. The fight in that evening hour was the most fiercely contested of any during that day. The fate of Manchester was in the hands of our gallant soldiers, who, although necessarily losing heavily before such an enormous army, behaved with a courage that was magnificent, and which was deserving the highest commendation that could be bestowed. As dusk gathered into darkness, the enemy were being forced back towards the Mersey over the roads they had so recently travelled, but still fighting, selling their lives dearly. The highways and fields were strewn with their dead and dying, for while infantry fired into their front from the cover of houses and walls, our cavalry, with whirling sabres, fell upon them and hacked them to pieces. Neither Cossacks nor Dragoons proved a match for our Hussars, Lancers, and Yeomanry, and even in face of the machine guns which the Russians brought into play in an endeavour to break the line and escape, our infantry dashed on with grand and magnificent charges, quickly seizing the Nordenfelts, turning their own guns against them, and letting loose a fire that mowed down hundreds. Across the neighbouring country our forces swept in good attack formation, and all along that great line, nearly six miles in length, the slaughter of Russians was frightful. In the falling gloom fire flashed from the muzzles of rifles, cannon, and machine guns, and far above the terrible din sounded shrill cries of pain and hoarse shouts of despair as the great Army that had devastated our beloved country with fire and sword was gradually annihilated. In those roads in the south of the city the scenes of bloodshed were awful, as a force of over 20,000 Russians were slaughtered because they would not yield up their arms. Outside Stretford a last desperate stand was made, but ere long some British cavalry came thundering along, and cut them down in a frightful manner, while about the same time a Russian flying column was annihilated over at Davy-Hulme; away at Carrington a retreating brigade of infantry which had escaped over the river was suddenly pounced upon by the defenders and slaughtered; and at Altrincham the enemy's headquarters were occupied, and the staff taken prisoners. Ere the Russian General could be forced to surrender, however, he placed a revolver to his head, and in full view of a number of his officers, blew his brains out. Then, when the moon shone out from behind a dark bank of cloud just before midnight, she shed her pale light upon the wide battlefield on both sides of the Mersey, whereon lay the bodies of no fewer than 30,000 Russians and 12,000 British, while 40,000 Russians and 16,000 British lay wounded, nearly 10,000 Russians having been disarmed and marched into the centre of the city as prisoners. The victory had only been achieved at the eleventh hour by dint of great courage and forethought, and being so swift and effectual it was magnificent. Manchester was safe, and the public rejoicings throughout that night were unbounded. The loss of life was too awful for reflection, for 12,000 of Britain's heroes--men who had won the battle--were lying with their white lifeless faces upturned to the twinkling stars. _BOOK III_ _THE VICTORY_ CHAPTER XXVIII. A SHABBY WAYFARER. In Sussex the situation was now most critical. The struggle between the French invaders and the line of Volunteers defending London was long and desperate, but our civilian soldiers were bearing their part bravely, showing how Britons could fight, and day after day repelling the repeated assaults with a vigour that at once proved their efficiency. Three days after the battle at Manchester had been fought and won, a man with slouching gait and woeful countenance, attired in a cheap suit of shabby grey, stood on the steps of the Granton Hotel, at Granton, and with his hands thrust into his pockets gazed thoughtfully out over the broad waters of the Firth of Forth, to where the Fifeshire hills loomed dark upon the horizon. Slowly his keen eyes wandered away eastward to the open sea, an extensive view of which he obtained from the flight of steps whereon he stood, and then with a sigh of disappointment he buttoned his coat, and, grasping his stick, descended, and walked at a leisurely pace along the road through Newhaven to Leith. "To-night. To-night at sundown!" he muttered to himself, as he bent his head to the wind. Involuntarily he placed his hand to his hip to reassure himself that a letter he carried was still safe. "Bah!" he continued, "I declare I feel quite timid to-night. Everything is so quiet here; the houses look deserted, and everybody seems to have left the place. Surely they can have no suspicion, and--and if they had? What does it matter?--eh, what?" Quickening his pace, he passed down the long, quaint street of Newhaven, lined on each side by ancient fishermen's cottages, and then, crossing the railway, passed under the wall of Leith Fort, whereon a couple of sentries were pacing. Glancing up at the two artillerymen, with the half-dozen obsolete guns behind them, and their background of grass-grown mounds and buildings, the wayfarer smiled. He was thinking how different would be the scene at this spot ere long. Leith Fort was a sort of fortified back-garden. The railway ran close to the sea, parallel with which was the highway, and upon higher ground at the back was a block of buildings, before which a few black old cannon were placed in formidable array, and in such a position as to be fully exposed to any destructive projectiles fired from the sea. On went the down-at-heel wayfarer, his shifty eyes ever on the alert, viewing with suspicion the one or two persons he met. Apparently he was expecting the arrival of some craft, for his gaze was constantly turned towards the wide expanse of grey water, eager to detect the smallest speck upon the horizon. Any one who regarded him critically might have noticed something remarkable about his appearance, yet not even his most intimate friends would have recognised in this broken-down, half-starved clerk, who had arrived at Granton that morning, after tramping over from Glasgow, the popular man-about-town, the Count von Beilstein! "Those fools will soon be swept away into eternity," he muttered to himself, as he glanced back in the direction of the fort. "They will have an opportunity of tasting Russian lead, and of practising with their guns, which are only fit for a museum. They mount guard to defend an attack! Bah! They seek their own destruction, for no force can withstand that which will presently appear to give them a sudden rousing. They will be elevated--blown into the air, together with their miserable guns, their barracks, and the whole of their antiquated paraphernalia. And to me the world owes this national catastrophe! I am the looker-on. These British have a proverb that the looker-on sees most of the game. _Bien! that is full of truth._" And he chuckled to himself, pursuing his way at the same pace, now and then glancing back as if to assure himself that no one dogged his footsteps. Darkness had crept on quickly as he passed along through the open country at Fillyside and entered Portobello, the little watering-place so popular with holiday makers from Edinburgh during the summer. Along the deserted promenade he strolled leisurely from end to end, and passing out of the town through Joppa, came at length to that rugged shore between the Salt Pans and Eastfield. The tide was out, so, leaving the road, he walked on in the darkness over the shingles until he came to a small cove, and a moment later two men confronted him. A few sentences in Russian were rapidly exchanged between the spy and the men, and then the latter at once guided him to where a boat lay in readiness, but concealed. Five minutes later the Count was being rowed swiftly but silently away into the darkness by six stalwart men belonging to one of the Tsar's battleships. The oars dipped regularly as the boat glided onwards, but no word was exchanged, until about twenty minutes later the men suddenly stopped pulling, a rope thrown by a mysterious but vigilant hand whistled over their heads and fell across them, and then they found themselves under the dark side of a huge ironclad. It was the new battleship, _Admiral Orlovski_, which had only just left the Baltic for the first time. Without delay the spy climbed on board, and was conducted at once by a young officer into the Admiral's private cabin. A bearded, middle-aged man, in handsome naval uniform, who was poring over a chart, rose as he entered. The spy, bowing, said briefly in Russian-- "I desire to see Prince Feodor Mazaroff, Admiral of the Fleet." "I am at your service, m'sieur," the other replied in French, motioning him to a chair. The Count, seating himself, tossed his hat carelessly upon the table, explaining that he had been sent by the Russian Intelligence Department as bearer of certain important documents which would materially assist him in his operations. "Yes," observed the Prince, "I received a telegram from the Ministry at Petersburg before I left Christiansand, telling me to await you here, and that you would furnish various information." "That I am ready to do as far as lies in my power," replied the Count, taking from his hip pocket a bulky packet, sealed with three great daubs of black wax. This he handed to the Prince, saying, "It contains maps of the country between Edinburgh and Glasgow, specially prepared by our Secret Service, together with a marked chart of the Firth of Forth, and full detailed information regarding the troops remaining to defend this district." The Admiral broke the seals, and glanced eagerly through the contents, with evident satisfaction. "Now, what is the general condition of the south of Scotland?" the Prince asked, lounging back, twirling his moustache with a self-satisfied air. "Totally unprepared. It is not believed that any attack will be made. The military left north of the Cheviots after mobilisation were sent south to assist in the defence of Manchester." "Let us hope our expedition to-night will meet with success. We are now one mile east of Craig Waugh, and in an hour our big guns will arouse Leith from its lethargy. You will be able to watch the fun from deck, and give us the benefit of your knowledge of the district. Is the fort at Leith likely to offer any formidable resistance?" continued the Admiral. "I see the information here is somewhat vague upon that point." "The place is useless," replied the spy, as he stretched out his hand and took a pencil and paper from the Prince's writing-table. "See! I will sketch it for you. In the character of a starving workman who desired to volunteer I called there, and succeeded in obtaining a good view of the interior. They have a few modern guns, but the remainder are old muzzleloaders, which against such guns as you have on board here will be worse than useless." And as he spoke he rapidly sketched a plan of the defences in a neat and accurate manner, acquired by long practice. "The most serious resistance will, however, be offered from Inchkeith Island, four miles off Leith. There has lately been established there a new fort, containing guns of the latest type. A plan of the place, which I succeeded in obtaining a few days ago, is, you will find, pinned to the chart of the Firth of Forth." The Admiral opened out the document indicated, and closely examined the little sketch plan appended. On the chart were a number of small squares marked in scarlet, surrounded by a blue circle to distinguish them more readily from the dots of red which pointed out the position of the lights. These squares, prepared with the utmost care by von Beilstein, showed the position of certain submarine mines, a plan of which he had succeeded in obtaining by one of his marvellous master-strokes of finesse. "Thanks to you, Count, our preparations are now complete," observed the Prince, offering the spy a cigarette from his silver case, and taking one himself. "Our transports, with three army corps, numbering nearly 60,000 men and 200 guns, are at the present moment lying 12 miles north of the Bass Rock, awaiting orders to enter the Firth, therefore I think when we land we shall"-- A ray of brilliant white light streamed for a moment through the port of the cabin, and then disappeared. The Prince, jumping to his feet, looked out into the darkness, and saw the long beam sweeping slowly round over the water, lighting up the ships of his squadron in rapid succession. "The search-lights of Inchkeith!" he gasped, with an imprecation. "I had no idea we were within their range, but now they have discovered us there's no time to be lost. For the present I must leave you. You will, of course, remain on board, and land with us"; and a moment later he rushed on deck, and shouted an order which was promptly obeyed. Suddenly there was a low booming, and in another second a column of dark water rose as the first shot ricochetted about five hundred yards from their bows. Orders shouted in Russian echoed through the ship, numbers of signals were exchanged rapidly with the other vessels, and the sea suddenly became alive with torpedo boats. Time after time the British guns sounded like distant thunder, and shots fell in the vicinity of the Russian ships. Suddenly, as soon as the men were at their quarters, electric signals rang from the conning-tower of the _Admiral Orlovski_, and one of her 56-tonners crashed and roared from her turret, and a shot sped away towards where the light showed. The noise immediately became deafening as the guns from nine other ships thundered almost simultaneously, sending a perfect hail of shell upon the island fort. In the darkness the scene was one of most intense excitement. For the first time the spy found himself amidst the din of battle, and perhaps for the first time in his life his nerves were somewhat shaken as he stood in a convenient corner watching the working of one of the great guns in the turret, which regularly ran out and added its voice to the incessant thunder. CHAPTER XXIX. LANDING OF THE ENEMY AT LEITH. All the vessels were now under steam and approaching Inchkeith, when suddenly two shells struck the _Admiral Orlovski_ amidships, carrying away a portion of her superstructure. Several of the other vessels were also hit almost at the same moment, and shortly afterwards a torpedo boat under the stern of the flagship was struck by a shell, and sank with all hands. Time after time the Russian vessels poured out their storm of shell upon the fort, now only about a mile and a half distant; but the British fire still continued as vigorous and more effective than at first. Again the flagship was struck, this time on the port quarter, but the shot glanced off her armour into the sea; while a moment later another shell struck one of her fighting tops, and, bursting, wrecked two of the machine guns, and killed half a dozen unfortunate fellows who had manned them. The débris fell heavily upon the deck, and the disaster, being witnessed by the spy, caused him considerable anxiety for his own safety. Even as he looked he suddenly noticed a brilliant flash from one of the cruisers lying a little distance away. There was a terrific report, and amid flame and smoke wreckage shot high into the air. An explosion had occurred in the magazine, and it was apparent the ship was doomed! Other disasters to the Russians followed in quick succession. A cruiser which was lying near the Herwit light-buoy blazing away upon the fort, suddenly rolled heavily and gradually heeled over, the water around her being thrown into the air by an explosion beneath the surface. A contact mine had been fired, and the bottom of the ship had been practically blown out, for a few minutes later she went down with nearly every soul on board. At the moment this disaster occurred, the _Admiral Orlovski_, still discharging her heavy guns, was about half-way between the Briggs and the Pallas Rock, when a search-light illuminated her from the land, and a heavy fire was suddenly opened upon her from Leith Fort. This was at once replied to, and while five of the vessels kept up their fire upon Inchkeith, the three others turned their attention towards Leith, and commenced to bombard it with common shell. How effectual were their efforts the spy could at once see, for in the course of a quarter of an hour, notwithstanding the defence offered by Leith Fort and several batteries on Arthur's Seat, at Granton Point, Wardie Bush, and at Seaside Meadows, near Portobello, fires were breaking out in various quarters of the town, and factories and buildings were now burning with increasing fury. The great paraffin refinery had been set on fire, and the flames, leaping high into the air, shed a lurid glare far away over the sea. Shells, striking the Corn Exchange, wrecked it, and one, flying away over the fort, burst in the Leith Distillery, with the result that the place was set on fire, and soon burned with almost equal fierceness with the paraffin works. The shipping in the Edinburgh, Albert, and Victoria Docks was ablaze, and the drill vessel H.M.S. _Durham_ had been shattered and was burning. A great row of houses in Lindsay Road had fallen prey to the flames, while among the other large buildings on fire were the Baltic Hotel, the great goods station of the North British Railway, and the National Bank of Scotland. In addition to being attacked from the forts on the island, and on land, the Russians were now being vigorously fired upon by the British Coastguard ship _Impérieuse_, which, with the cruiser _Active_, and the gunboat cruisers _Cockchafer_, _Firm_, and _Watchful_, had now come within range. Soon, however, the enemy were reinforced by several powerful vessels, and in the fierce battle that ensued the British ships were driven off. Then by reason of the reinforcements which the Russians brought up, and the great number of transports which were now arriving, the defence, desperate though it had been, alas! broke down, and before midnight the invader set his foot upon Scottish soil. [Illustration: POSITIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF EDINBURGH.] Ere the sun rose, a huge force of 60,000 men had commenced a march upon Edinburgh and Glasgow! Events on shore during that never-to-be-forgotten night were well described by Captain Tiller of the Royal Artillery, stationed at Leith Fort, who, in a letter written to his young wife at Carlisle, on the following day, gave the following narrative:-- "Disaster has fallen upon us. The Russians have landed in Scotland, and the remnant of our force which was at Leith has fallen back inland. On Friday, just after nightfall, we were first apprised of our danger by hearing heavy firing from the sea in the direction of Inchkeith Fort, and all civilians were sent on inland, while we prepared for the fight. "Very soon a number of ships were visible, some of them being evidently transports, and as they were observed taking soundings, it was clear that an immediate landing was intended. Fortunately it was a light night, and while two Volunteer field batteries were sent out along the coast west to Cramond and east to Fisherrow, we completed our arrangements in the fort. With such antiquated weapons as were at our disposal defeat was a foregone conclusion, and we knew that to annoy the enemy and delay their landing would be the extent of our resistance. Some of our guns were, of course, of comparatively recent date, and our supply of ammunition was fair, but the Volunteer guns were antiquated 40-pounder muzzleloaders, which ought to have been withdrawn years ago, and the gunners had had very little field training. The arrangements for horsing the guns were also very inefficient, and they had no waggons or transport. Most of our forces having been drawn south, the only infantry available was a battalion and a half--really a provisional battalion, for it was composed of portions of two Volunteer rifle regiments, with a detachment of Regulars. Our Regular artillery detachment was, unfortunately, very inadequate, for although the armament of the fort had been recently strengthened, the force had been weakened just before the outbreak of war by the despatch of an Indian draft. "It was apparent that the enemy would not attempt to destroy our position, but land and carry it by assault; therefore, while the Inchkeith guns kept them at bay, we undermined our fort, opened our magazines, and got ready for a little target practice. "The Volunteer batteries sent eastward had been ordered to do what execution they could, and then, in the case of a reverse, to retire through Portobello and Duddingston to Edinburgh, and those on the west were to go inland to Ratho; while we were resolved to hold the fort as long as possible, and if at last we were compelled to retire we intended to blow up the place before leaving. "As soon as we found the Russian flagship within range, we opened fire upon her, and this action caused a perfect storm of projectiles to be directed upon us. The town was soon in flames, the shipping in the harbour sank, and the martello tower was blown to pieces. Our search-light was very soon brought into requisition, and by its aid some of the boats of the enemy's transports were sunk, while others came to grief on the Black Rocks. "By this time the enemy had turned their search-lights in every direction where they could see firing, and very soon our Volunteer batteries were silenced, and then Granton harbour fell into the hands of the enemy's landing parties. Having first rendered their guns useless, the survivors fell back to Corstorphine Hill, outside Edinburgh, and we soon afterwards received intelligence that the Russians were landing at Granton in thousands. Meanwhile, although our garrison was so weak and inexperienced, we nevertheless kept up a vigorous fire. "We saw how Inchkeith Fort had been silenced, and how our Volunteer batteries had been destroyed, and knew that sooner or later we must share the same fate, and abandon our position. As boatload after boatload of Russians attempted to land, we either sank them by shots from our guns or swept them with a salvo of bullets from our Maxims; yet as soon as we had hurled back one landing party others took its place. "Many were the heroic deeds our gunners performed that night, as hand to hand they fought, and annihilated the Russians who succeeded in landing; but in this frightful struggle we lost heavily, and at length, when all hope of an effective defence had been abandoned, we placed electric wires in the magazine, and the order was given to retire. This we did, leaving our search-light in position in order to deceive the enemy. "Half our number had been killed, and we sped across to Bonnington, running out a wire along the ground as we went. The Russians, now landing rapidly in great force, swarmed into the fort and captured the guns and ammunition, while a party of infantry pursued us. But we kept them back for fully a quarter of an hour, until we knew that the fort would be well garrisoned by the invaders; then we sent a current through the wire. "The explosion that ensued was deafening, and its effect appalling. Never have I witnessed a more awful sight. Hundreds of tons of all sorts of explosives and ammunition were fired simultaneously by the electric spark, and the whole fort, with nearly six hundred of the enemy, who were busy establishing their headquarters, were in an instant blown into the air. For several moments the space around us where we stood seemed filled with flying débris, and the mangled remains of those who a second before had been elated beyond measure by their success. "Those were terribly exciting moments, and for a few seconds there was a cessation of the firing. Quickly, however, the bombardment was resumed, and although we totally annihilated the force pursuing us, we fell back to Restalrig, and at length gained the battery that had been established on Arthur's Seat, and which was now keeping up a heavy fire upon the Russian transports lying out in the Narrow Deep. Subsequently we went on to Dalkeith. Our situation is most critical in every respect, but we are expecting reinforcements, and a terrible battle is imminent." * * * * * Thus the Russians landed three corps of 20,000 each where they were least expected, and at once prepared to invest Edinburgh and Glasgow. Three of the boats which came ashore at Leith that night, after the blowing up of the fort, brought several large mysterious-looking black boxes, which were handled with infinite care by the specially selected detachment of men who had been told off to take charge of them. Upon the locks were the official seals of the Russian War Office; and even the men themselves, unaware of their contents, looked upon them with a certain amount of suspicion, handling them very gingerly, and placing them in waggons which they seized from a builder's yard on the outskirts of the town. The officers alone knew the character of these mysterious consignments, and as they superintended the landing, whispered together excitedly. The news of the invasion, already telegraphed throughout Scotland from end to end, caused the utmost alarm; but had the people known what those black boxes, the secret of which was so carefully guarded, contained, they would have been dismayed and appalled. Truth to tell, the Russians were about to try a method of wholesale and awful destruction, which, although vaguely suggested in time of peace, had never yet been tested in the field. If successful, they knew it would cause death and desolation over an inconceivably wide area, and prove at once a most extraordinary and startling development of modern warfare. The faces of a whole army, however brave, would blanch before its terrific power, and war in every branch, on land and on sea, would become revolutionised. But the boxes remained locked and guarded. The secret was to be kept until the morrow, when the first trial was ordered to be made, and the officers in charge expressed an opinion between themselves that a blow would then be struck that would at once startle and terrify the whole world. CHAPTER XXX. ATTACK ON EDINBURGH. In attacking Edinburgh the besiegers at once discovered they had a much more difficult task than they had anticipated. The Russian onslaught had been carefully planned. Landing just before dawn, the 1st Corps, consisting of about twenty thousand men, marched direct to Glasgow by way of South Queensferry and Kirkliston, and through Linlithgow, sacking and burning all three towns in the advance. The 3rd Army Corps succeeded, after some very sharp skirmishing, in occupying the Pentland Hills, in order to protect the flanks of the first force, while a strong detachment was left behind to guard the base at Leith. The 2nd Corps meanwhile marched direct upon Edinburgh. The defenders, consisting of Militia, Infantry, Artillery, the local Volunteers left behind during the mobilisation, and a large number of civilians from the neighbouring towns, who had hastily armed on hearing the alarming news, were quickly massed in three divisions on the Lammermuir Hills, along the hills near Peebles, and on Tinto Hill, near Lanark. The Russian army corps which marched from Leith upon Edinburgh about seven o'clock on the following morning met with a most desperate resistance. On Arthur's Seat a strong battery had been established by the City of Edinburgh Artillery, under Col. J. F. Mackay, and the 1st Berwickshire, under Col. A. Johnston; and on the higher parts of the Queen's Drive, overlooking the crooked little village of Duddingston, guns of the 1st Forfarshire, under Col. Stewart-Sandeman, V.D., flashed and shed forth torrents of bullets and shell, which played havoc with the enemy's infantry coming up the Portobello and Musselburgh roads. Batteries on the Braid and Blackford Hills commanded the southern portion of the city; while to the west, the battery on Corstorphine Hill prevented the enemy from pushing along up the high road from Granton. Between Jock's Lodge and Duddingston Mills the Russians, finding cover, commenced a sharp attack about nine o'clock; but discovering, after an hour's hard fighting, that to attempt to carry the defenders' position was futile, they made a sudden retreat towards Niddry House. The British commander, observing this, and suspecting their intention to make a circuit and enter the city by way of Newington, immediately set his field telegraph to work, and sent news on to the infantry brigade at Blackford. This consisted mainly of the Queen's Volunteer Rifle Brigade (Royal Scots), under Col. T. W. Jones, V.D.; the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Volunteer Battalions of the Royal Scots, under Col. W. U. Martin, V.D., Col. W. I. Macadam, Col. Sir G. D. Clerk, Col. P. Dods, and Col. G. F. Melville respectively, with a company of engineers. The intelligence they received placed them on the alert, and ere long the enemy extended his flank in an endeavour to enter Newington. The bridges already prepared for demolition by the defenders were now promptly blown up, and in the sharp fight that ensued the enemy were repulsed with heavy loss. Meanwhile the formidable division of the 3rd Russian Army Corps guarding the base at Leith had attacked the Corstorphine position, finding their headquarters untenable under its fire, and although losing several guns and a large number of men, they succeeded, after about an hour's hard fighting, in storming the hill and sweeping away the small but gallant band of defenders. The fight was long. It was a struggle to the death. Over the whole historic battle-ground from the Tweed to the Forth, fighting spread, and everywhere the loss of life was terrible. The long autumn day passed slowly, yet hostilities continued as vigorous and sanguinary as they had begun. Before the sun sank many a brave Briton lay dead or dying, but many more Muscovites had been sent to that bourne whence none return. As it was, the British line of communications was broken between Temple and Eddleston, the outposts at the latter place having been surprised and slaughtered. But although the enemy strove hard to break down the lines of defence and invest Edinburgh, yet time after time they were hurled back with fearful loss. Colinton and Liberton were sacked and burned by the Tsar's forces. On every hand the Russians spread death and destruction; still the defenders held their own, and when the fighting ceased after nightfall Edinburgh was still safe. Strong barricades manned by civilians had been hastily thrown up near the station in Leith Walk, in London Road opposite the Abbey Church, in Inverleith Row, in Clerk Street and Montague Street, while all the bridges over the Water of Leith had been blown up with gun-cotton; quick-firing guns had been posted on Calton Hill and at the Castle, while in St. Andrew's Square a battery had been established by the 1st Haddington Volunteer Artillery, under Major J. J. Kelly, who had arrived in haste from Dunbar, and this excellent position commanded a wide stretch of country away towards Granton. At dead of night, under the calm, bright stars, a strange scene might have been witnessed. In the deep shadow cast by the wall of an old and tumble-down barn near the cross-roads at Niddry, about three miles from Edinburgh, two Russian infantry officers were in earnest conversation. They stood leaning upon a broken fence, talking in a half-whisper in French, so that the half-dozen privates might not understand what they said. The six men were busy unpacking several strange black cases, handling the contents with infinite care. Apparently three of the boxes contained a quantity of fine silk, carefully folded, while another contained a number of square, dark-looking packages, which, when taken out, were packed in order upon a strong net which was first spread upon the grass. Ropes were strewn over the ground in various directions, the silk was unfolded, and presently, when all the contents had been minutely inspected by the two officers with lanterns, a small tube was taken from a box that had remained undisturbed, and fastened into an object shaped like a bellows. Then, when all preparations were satisfactorily completed, the six men threw themselves upon the grass to snatch an hour's repose, while the officers returned to their previous positions, leaning against the broken fence, and gravely discussing their proposals for the morrow's gigantic sensation. The elder of the two was explaining to his companion the nature of the _coup_ which they intended to deliver, and the mode in which it would be made. So engrossed were they in the contemplation of the appalling results that would accrue, they did not observe that they were standing beneath a small square hole in the wall of the barn; neither did they notice that from this aperture a dark head protruded for a second and then quick as lightning withdrew. It was only like a shadow, and disappeared instantly! Ten minutes later a mysterious figure was creeping cautiously along under the hedge of the high road to Newington in the direction of the British lines. Crawling along the grass, and pausing now and then with his ear to the ground, listening, he advanced by short, silent stages, exercising the greatest caution, well aware that death would be his fate should he be discovered. In wading the Braid Burn he almost betrayed himself to a Russian sentry; but at last, after travelling for over an hour, risking discovery at any moment, he at length passed the British outposts beyond Liberton, and ascended the Braid Hills to the headquarters. The story he told the General commanding was at first looked upon as ludicrous. In the dim candlelight in the General's tent he certainly looked a disreputable derelict, his old and tattered clothes wet through, his hands cut by stones and bleeding, and his face half covered with mud. The three officers who were with the General laughed when he dashed in excitedly, and related the conversation he had overheard; yet when he subsequently went on to describe in detail what he had witnessed, and when they remembered that this tramp was an artilleryman who had long ago been conspicuous by his bravery at El Teb, and an ingenious inventor, their expression of amusement gave way to one of alarm. The General, who had been writing, thoughtfully tapped the little camp table before him with his pen. "So they intend to destroy us and wreck the city by that means, now that their legitimate tactics have failed! I can scarcely credit that such is their intention; yet if they should be successful--if"-- "But they will not be successful, sir. If you will send some one to assist me, and allow me to act as I think fit, I will frustrate their dastardly design, and the city shall be saved." "You are at liberty to act as you please. You know their plans, and I have perfect confidence in you, Mackenzie," replied the officer. "Do not, however, mention a word of the enemy's intention to any one. It would terrify the men; and although I do not doubt their bravery, yet the knowledge of such a horrible fate hanging over them must necessarily increase their anxiety, and thus prevent them from doing their best. We are weak, but remember we are all Britons. Now come," he added, "sit there, upon that box, and explain at once what is your scheme of defence against this extraordinary attack." And the fearless man to whom the General had entrusted the defence of Edinburgh obeyed, and commenced to explain what means he intended to take--a desperate but well-devised plan, which drew forth words of the highest commendation from the commanding officer and those with him. They knew that the fate of Edinburgh hung in the balance, and that if the city were taken it would be the first step towards their downfall. CHAPTER XXXI. "THE DEMON OF WAR." Two hours later, just before the break of day, British bugles sounded, and the camp on the Braid Hills was immediately astir. That the enemy were about to test the efficiency of a new gigantic engine of war was unknown except to the officers and the brave man who had risked his life in order to obtain the secret of the foeman's plans. To him the British General was trusting, and as with knit brows and anxious face the grey-haired officer stood at the door of his tent gazing across the burn to Blackford Hill, he was wondering whether he had yet obtained his coign of vantage. From the case slung round his shoulder he drew his field glasses and turned them upon a clump of trees near the top of the hill, straining his eyes to discover any movement. On the crest of the hill two Volunteer artillery batteries were actively preparing for the coming fray, but as yet it was too dark to discern anything among the distant clump of trees; so, replacing his glasses, the commanding officer re-entered his tent and bent for a long time over the Ordnance Map under the glimmering, uncertain light of a guttering candle. Meanwhile the Russians were busily completing their arrangements for striking an appalling blow. Concealed by a line of trees and a number of farm buildings, the little section of the enemy had worked indefatigably for the past two hours, and now in the grey dawn the contents of the mysterious boxes, a long dark monster, lay upon the grass, moving restlessly, trying to free itself from its trammels. It was a huge and curiously-shaped air-ship, and was to be used for dropping great charges of mélinite and steel bombs filled with picric acid into the handsome historic city of Edinburgh! Some of the shells were filled with sulphurous acid, carbon dioxide, and other deadly compounds, the intent being to cause suffocation over wide areas by the volatilisation of liquid gases! This controllable electric balloon, a perfection of M. Gaston Tissandier's invention a few years before, was, as it lay upon the grass, nearly inflated and ready to ascend, elongated in form, and filled with hydrogen. It was about 140 feet long, 63 feet in diameter through the middle, and the envelope was of fine cloth coated with an impermeable varnish. On either side were horizontal shafts of flexible walnut laths, fastened with silk belts along the centre, and over the balloon a netting of ribbons was placed, and to this the car was connected. On each of the four sides was a screw propeller 12 feet in diameter, driven by bichromate of potassium batteries and a dynamo-electric motor. The propellers were so arranged that the balloon could keep head to a hurricane, and when proceeding with the wind would deviate immediately from its course by the mere pulling of a lever by the aëronaut. Carefully packed in the car were large numbers of the most powerful infernal machines, ingeniously designed to effect the most awful destruction if hurled into a thickly-populated centre. Piled in the smallest possible compass were square steel boxes, some filled with mélinite, dynamite, and an explosive strongly resembling cordite, only possessing twice its strength, each with fulminating compounds, while others contained picric acid fitted with glass detonating tubes. Indeed, this gigantic engine, which might totally wreck a city and kill every inhabitant in half an hour while at an altitude of 6½ miles, had rightly been named by the Pole who had perfected Tissandier's invention--"The Demon of War." While the two officers of the Russian balloon section, both experienced aëronauts, were finally examining minutely every rope, ascertaining that all was ready for the ascent, away on Blackford Hill one man, pale and determined, with coat and vest thrown aside, was preparing a counterblast to the forthcoming attack. Under cover of the clump of trees, but with its muzzle pointing towards Bridgend, a long, thin gun of an altogether strange type had been brought into position. It was about four times the size of a Maxim, which it resembled somewhat in shape, only the barrel was much longer, the store of ammunition being contained in a large steel receptacle at the side, wherein also was some marvellously-contrived mechanism. The six gunners who were assisting Mackenzie at length completed their work, and the gun having been carefully examined by the gallant man in charge and two of the officers who had been in the tent with the General during the midnight consultation, Mackenzie, with a glance in the yet hazy distance where the enemy had bivouaced, pulled over a small lever, which immediately started a dynamo. "In three minutes we shall be ready for action," he said, glancing at his watch; and then, turning a small wheel which raised the muzzle of the gun so as to point it at a higher angle in the direction of the sky, he waited until the space of time he had mentioned had elapsed. The officers stood aside conversing in an undertone. This man Mackenzie had invented this strange-looking weapon, and only one had been made. It had some months before been submitted to the War Office, but they had declined to take it up, believing that a patent they already possessed was superior to it; yet Mackenzie had nevertheless thrown his whole soul into his work, and meant now to show his superiors its penetrative powers, and put its capabilities to practical test. Again he glanced at his watch, and quickly pulled back another lever, which caused the motor to revolve at twice the speed, and the gun to emit a low hissing sound, like escaping steam. Then he stepped back to the officers, saying-- "I am now prepared. It will go up as straight and quickly as a rocket, but we must catch it before it ascends two miles, for the clouds hang low, and we may lose it more quickly than we imagine." The gunners stood in readiness, and the two officers looked away over Craigmillar towards the grey distant sea. Dawn was spreading now, and the haze was gradually clearing. They all knew the attempt would be made ere long, before it grew much lighter, so they stood at their posts in readiness, Mackenzie with his hand upon the lever which would regulate the discharge. They were moments of breathless expectancy. Minute after minute went by, but not a word was spoken, for every eye was turned upon the crest of a certain ridge nearly three miles away, at a point where the country was well wooded. A quarter of an hour had thus elapsed, when Mackenzie suddenly shouted, "Look, lads! _There she goes!_ Now, let's teach 'em what Scots can do." As he spoke there rose from behind the ridge a great dark mass, looking almost spectral in the thin morning mist. For a moment it seemed to poise and swing as if uncertain in its flight, then quickly it shot straight up towards the sky. "Ready?" shouted Mackenzie, his momentary excitement having given place to great coolness. The men at their posts all answered in the affirmative. Mackenzie bent and waited for a few seconds sighting the gun, while the motor hummed with terrific speed. Then shouting "Fire!" he drew back the lever. The gun discharged, but there was no report, only a sharp hiss as the compressed air released commenced to send charge after charge of dynamite automatically away into space in rapid succession! None dared to breathe. The excitement was intense. They watched the effect upon the Russian balloon, but to their dismay saw it still rapidly ascending and unharmed! It had altered its course, and instead of drifting away seaward was now travelling towards Duddingston, and making straight for Edinburgh, passing above the Russian camp. "Missed! _missed!_" Mackenzie shrieked, turning back the lever and arresting the discharge. "It's four miles off now, and we can carry seven and three-quarters to hit a fixed object. Remember, lads, the fate of Auld Reekie is now in your hands! Ready?" Again he bent and sighted the gun, raising the muzzle higher than the balloon so as to catch it on the ascent. The motor hummed louder and louder, the escaping air hissed and turned into liquid by the enormous pressure, then with a glance at the gauge he yelled "Fire!" and pulled back the lever. Dynamite shells, ejected at the rate of 50 a minute, rushed from the muzzle, and sped away. But the Demon of War, with its whirling propellers, continued on its swift, silent mission of destruction. "Missed again!" cried one of the men, in despair. "See! it's gone! We've--good heavens!--_why, we've lost it--lost it!_" Mackenzie, who had been glancing that moment at the gauges, gazed eagerly up, and staggered back as if he had received a blow. "It's disappeared!" he gasped. "_They've outwitted us, the brutes, and nothing now can save Edinburgh from destruction!_" Officers and men stood aghast, with blanched faces, scarce knowing how to act. The destructive forces in that controllable balloon were more than sufficient to lay the whole of Edinburgh in ruins; and then, no doubt, the enemy would attempt by the same means to destroy the British batteries on the neighbouring hills. Already, along the valleys fighting had begun, for rapid firing could be heard in the direction of Gilmerton, and now and then the British guns on the Braid Hills behind spoke out sharply to the Russians who had occupied Loanhead, and the distant booming of cannon could be heard incessantly from Corstorphine. Suddenly a loud, exultant cry from Mackenzie caused his companions to strain their eyes away to Duddingston, and there they saw high in the air the monster aërial machine gradually looming through the mist, a vague and shadowy outline. It had passed through a bank of cloud, and was gradually reappearing. "Quick! There's not a moment to lose!" shrieked Mackenzie, springing to the lever with redoubled enthusiasm, an example followed by the others. The motor revolved so rapidly that it roared, the gauges ran high, the escaping air hissed so loudly that Mackenzie was compelled to shout at the top of his voice "Ready?" as for a third time he took careful aim at the misty object now six miles distant. The War Demon was still over the Russian camp, and in a few moments, travelling at that high rate of speed, it would pass over Arthur's Seat, and be enabled to drop its deadly compounds in Princes Street. But Mackenzie set his teeth, and muttered something under his breath. "_Now!_" he ejaculated, as he suddenly pulled the lever, and for the last time sent forth the automatic shower of destructive shells. A second later there was a bright flash from above as if the sun itself had burst, and then came a most terrific explosion, which caused the earth to tremble where they stood. The clouds were rent asunder by the frightful detonation, and down upon the Russian camp the débris of their ingenious invention fell in a terrible death-dealing shower. The annihilation of the dastardly plot to wreck the city was complete. Small dynamite shells from Mackenzie's pneumatic gun had struck the car of the balloon, and by the firing of half a ton of explosives the enemy was in an instant hoist with his own petard. As the débris fell within the Russian lines, some fifty or sixty picric-acid bombs--awful engines of destruction--which had not been exploded in mid-air, crashed into the Muscovite ranks, and, bursting, killed and wounded hundreds of infantrymen and half a regiment of Cossacks. One, bursting in the enemy's headquarters, seriously injured several members of the staff; while another, falling among the Engineers' transport, exploded a great quantity of gun-cotton, which in its turn killed a number of men and horses. The disaster was awful in its suddenness, appalling in its completeness. The aëronauts, totally unprepared for such an attack, had been blown to atoms just when within an ace of success. Fortune had favoured Britain, and, thanks to Mackenzie's vigilance and his pneumatic dynamite gun, which the Government had rejected as a worthless weapon, the grey old city of Edinburgh was still safe. But both Russians and Britons had now mustered their forces, and this, the first note sounded of a second terrific and desperately-fought battle, portended success for Britain's gallant army. Yet notwithstanding the disaster the enemy sustained by the blowing up of their balloon, their 2nd Army Corps, together with the portion of the 3rd Army Corps operating from their base at Leith, succeeded, after terribly hard fighting and heavy losses, in at length forcing back the defenders from the Braid and Blackford Hills, and the Corstorphine position having already been occupied, they were then enabled to invest Edinburgh. That evening fierce sanguinary fights took place in the streets, for the people held the barricades until the last moment, and the batteries on Calton Hill, in St. Andrew's Square, and at the Castle effected terrible execution in conjunction with those on Arthur's Seat. Still the enemy by their overwhelming numbers gradually broke down these defences, and, after appalling slaughter on both sides, occupied the city. The fighting was fiercest along Princes Street, Lothian Road, and in the neighbourhood of Scotland Street Station, while along Cumberland and Great King Streets the enemy were swept away in hundreds by British Maxims brought to bear from Drummond Place. Along Canongate from Holyrood to Moray House, and in Lauriston Place and the Grassmarket, hand-to-hand struggles took place between the patriotic civilians and the foe. From behind their barricades men of Edinburgh fought valiantly, and everywhere inflicted heavy loss; still the enemy, pressing onward, set fire to a number of public buildings, including the Register Office, the Royal Exchange, the University, the Liberal and New Clubs, and Palace Hotel, with many other buildings in Princes Street. The fires, which broke out rapidly in succession, were caused for the purpose of producing a panic, and in this the enemy were successful, for the city was quickly looted, and the scenes of ruin, death, and desolation that occurred in its streets that night were awful. [Illustration: "IN EDINBURGH THE FIGHTING WAS FIERCEST ALONG PRINCES STREET."] In every quarter the homes of loyal Scotsmen were entered by the ruthless invader, who wrecked the cherished household gods, and carried away all the valuables that were portable. Outrage and murder were rife everywhere, and no quarter was shown the weak or unprotected. Through the streets the invader rushed with sword and firebrand, causing destruction, suffering, and death. The defenders, though straining every nerve to stem the advancing tide, had, alas! been unsuccessful, and ere midnight Edinburgh, one of the proudest and most historic cities in the world, had fallen, and the British standard floating over the Castle was, alas! replaced by the Eagle of the Russian Autocrat. CHAPTER XXXII. FRIGHTFUL SLAUGHTER OUTSIDE GLASGOW. It was a sad misfortune, a national calamity; yet our troops did not lose heart. Commanded as they were by Britons, astute, loyal, and fearless, they, after fighting hard, fell back from Edinburgh in order, and husbanded their force for the morrow. Indeed, soon after dawn the Russians found themselves severely attacked. Exultant over their success, they had, while sacking Edinburgh, left their base at Leith very inadequately protected, with the result that the defenders, swooping suddenly down upon the town, succeeded, with the assistance of four coast-defence ships and a number of torpedo boats, in blowing up most of the Russian transports, and seizing their ammunition and provisions. Such an attack was, of course, very vigorously defended, but it was a smart manoeuvre on the part of the British General, and enabled him, after cutting off the enemy's line of retreat, to turn suddenly and attack the Russians who were continuing their destructive campaign through the streets of Edinburgh. This bold move on the part of the defenders was totally unexpected by the foe, which accounted for the frightful loss of life that was sustained on the Russian side, and the subsequent clever tactics which resulted in the driving out of the invaders from Edinburgh, and British troops reoccupying that city. [Illustration: MAP OF THE BATTLEFIELD OUTSIDE GLASGOW.] Meanwhile the 1st Russian Army Corps, which on landing had at once set out towards Glasgow, had marched on in a great extended line, sacking the various towns through which they passed. As they advanced from Linlithgow, Airdrie, and Coatbridge were looted and burned, while further south, Motherwell, Hamilton, and Bothwell shared the same fate. About 20,000 men, together with 11,000 who had been forced to evacuate Edinburgh, had at length advanced a little beyond Coatbridge, and, in preparation for a vigorous siege of Glasgow, halted within seven miles of the city, with flanks extended away south to Motherwell and on to Wishaw, and north as far as Chryston and Kirkintilloch. In Glasgow the excitement was intense, and surging crowds filled the streets night and day. The fall of Edinburgh had produced the greatest sensation, and the meagre news of the disaster telegraphed had scarcely been supplemented when the report of the retaking of "Auld Reekie" came to hand, causing great rejoicing. Nevertheless, it was known that over thirty thousand trained soldiers were on their way to the banks of the Clyde, and Glasgow was fevered and turbulent. The scanty business that had lately been done was now at a standstill, and the meagre supplies that reached there from America not being half sufficient for the enormous population, the city was already starving. But, as in other towns, great barricades had been thrown up, and those in Gallowgate and Duke Street, thoroughfares by which Glasgow might be entered by way of Parkhead and Dennistoun, were soon manned by loyal and patriotic bands of civilians. Other barriers were constructed at St. Rollox Station, in Canning Street, in Monteith Row, and in Great Western, Dumbarton, and Govan Roads. South of the river, Eglinton Street and the roads at Crosshill were barricaded, and in New City and Garscube Roads in the north there were also strong defences. All were held by enthusiastic bodies of men who had hastily armed themselves, confident in the belief that our Volunteers and the small body of Regulars would not allow the invader to march in force upon their city without a most determined resistance. Now, however, the alarming news reached Glasgow that the enemy had actually sacked and burned Coatbridge. In an hour they could commence looting the shops in Gallowgate, and their heavy tramp would be heard on the granite of Trongate and Argyle Street! Throughout the city the feeling of insecurity increased, and hourly the panic assumed greater proportions. The sun that day was obscured by dark thunder-clouds, the swirling Clyde flowed on black beneath its many bridges, and the outlook was everywhere gloomy and ominous. Still, away on the hills to southward, our small force of soldiers and Volunteers had narrowly watched the onward tide of destroyers, and carefully laid their plans. The manner in which the defensive operations were conducted is perhaps best related in a letter written by Captain Boyd Drummond of the 1st Battalion Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland) Highlanders, to a friend in London, and which was published with the accompanying sketch in the _Daily Graphic_. He wrote as follows:--"On the second day after the Russians had landed, Colonel Cumberland of 'Ours' received orders to move us from Lanark, and reconnoitre as far as possible along the Carluke road, with a view to taking up a position to cover the advance of the division, which had during the morning been considerably reinforced by nearly half the centre division from Peebles. In addition to our battalion with two machine guns, Colonel Cumberland was in command of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Volunteer Battalions from Greenock, Paisley, Pollokshaws, and Stirling respectively, the 1st Dumbarton from Helensburgh, the Highland Borderers, and the Renfrew Militia, together with a section of field artillery, a field company of Royal Engineers, and about forty cavalry and cyclists. Arriving at Carluke early in the afternoon, we awaited the return of scouts, who had been pushed on in advance to beyond Wishaw, in the direction of the enemy. They having reported that the Russians had withdrawn from Wishaw, we at once moved on to Law Junction, about a mile from that town, and finally took up a position for the night near Waterloo, commanding Wishaw and Overtown. "Beyond the junction, towards Glasgow, the railway, which the enemy evidently did not intend to use, had been destroyed, but scouts from Morningside reported that the line to Edinburgh had not been cut, and that the permanent way remained uninjured. Colonel Cumberland therefore told off the right half battalion, with a machine gun, a section of Engineers, and six cyclists, to take up a position near the road between Newmains and Morningside, with instructions to form piquets and patrol the roads north and east. I was with No. 1 Company, but, being senior captain present, the chief gave me command of this detachment. It was the first time such a responsibility had been conferred upon me; therefore I was determined not to be caught napping. "As soon as we arrived at our ground, I sent two cyclists out to Newmains and two to Morningside, with orders to glean what information they could, and to wait in the villages until further orders, unless they sighted the enemy's outposts, or discovered anything important. As soon as I had sent out my piquets, I took my own company and six of the Engineers down to Morningside. Some of the villagers, who had escaped when a portion of the invaders passed through on the previous night, had returned, and the cyclists gathered from them that we were close upon the heels of the Russian rearguard. "As the railway had not been destroyed, I thought that possibly the invaders intended to use the line _viâ_ Mid-Calder, and therefore examined the station closely. While engaged in this, one of the Engineers suddenly discovered a wire very carefully concealed along the line, and as we followed it up 500 yards each way, and could find no connection with the instrument at the station office, I at once concluded that it was the enemy's field telegraph, forming means of communication between their headquarters at Airdrie and the division that still remained in the Pentlands. "Cutting the wire, and attaching the ends to the instrument in the station, I left three Engineers, all expert telegraphists, to tap the wire, and they, with the right half company, under Lieutenant Compton, formed a detached post at this point. I also left the cyclists to convey to me any messages which might be received on the instrument, and then proceeded to Newmains. The place was now a mere heap of smouldering ruins; but, as at Morningside, some of the terrified villagers had returned, and they stated that early in the morning they had seen small detachments of Russian cavalry pass through from Bankle, and proceed north along the Cleland road. "Leaving the left half company here with the other Engineers and the two cyclists, under Lieutenant Planck, with orders to block the road and railway bridge, I returned to my piquet line. A few minutes later, however, a cyclist rode up with a copy of a message which had been sent from the Russian headquarters on the Pentlands to the Glasgow investing force. The message was in cipher, but, thanks to the information furnished by the spy who was captured near Manchester, we were now aware of some of the codes used by the invaders, and I sent the messenger on to the Colonel at once. One of his staff was able to transcribe it sufficiently to show that some disaster had occurred to the enemy on the Pentlands, for it concluded with an order withdrawing the troops from Glasgow, in order to reinforce the 3rd Army Corps in the fierce battle that was now proceeding. It was also stated in the message that despatches followed, so at once we were all on the alert. "Almost immediately afterwards news was received over our own telegraph from Carstairs, stating that a terrific battle had been fought along the valleys between Leadburn, Linton, and Dolphinton, in which we had suffered very severely, but we had nevertheless gained a decisive victory, for from dawn until the time of telegraphing it was estimated that no fewer than 12,000 Russians had been killed or wounded. "It appeared that our forces on the Lammermuirs had moved quickly, and, extending along the ridges, through Tynehead, and thence to Heriot, and on to Peebles, joined hands with the division at that place before dawn, and, when it grew light, had made a sudden and desperate attack. The enemy, who had imagined himself in a safe position, was unprepared, and from the first moment of the attack the slaughter was awful. As noon wore on the battle had increased, until now the invaders had been outflanked, and mowed down in such a frightful manner, that the survivors, numbering nearly six thousand of all ranks, had, finding their urgent appeal to their forces at Airdrie met with no response, and imagining that they too had been defeated, at last surrendered, and were taken prisoners. "On receipt of this intelligence, Colonel Cumberland executed a manoeuvre that was a marvel of forethought and smartness. The appeal to Airdrie for help had, of course, not been received, but in its place he ordered a message in Russian to be sent along the enemy's field telegraph to the force advancing on Glasgow in the following words: 'Remain at Airdrie. Do not advance on Glasgow before we join you. The defenders are defeated with heavy losses everywhere. Our advance guard will be with you in twenty-four hours. Signed--Drukovitch.' "This having been despatched, he reported by telegraph to the headquarters at Carstairs what he had done, and then our whole force immediately moved as far as Bellshill, in the direction of Glasgow. Here we came across the Russian outposts, and a sharp fight ensued. After half an hour, however, we succeeded in cutting them off and totally annihilating them, afterwards establishing ourselves in Bellshill until reinforcements could arrive. We were now only six miles from the Russian headquarters at Airdrie, and they, on receipt of our fictitious message, had withdrawn from the Clyde bank, and extended farther north over the hills as far as Milngavie. "We were thus enabled to watch and wait in Bellshill undisturbed throughout the night; and while the enemy were eagerly expecting their legions of infantry who were to swoop down and conquer Glasgow, we remained content in the knowledge that the hour of conquest was close at hand. "A short, hasty rest, and we were astir again long before the dawn. Just at daybreak, however, the advance guard of our force from Carstairs, which had been on the march during the night, came into touch with us, and in an hour the combined right and centre divisions of the British had opened the battle. "Our fighting front extended from Wishaw right across to Condorrat, with batteries on Torrance and the hill at New Monkland, while another strong line was pushed across from Cambuslang to Parkhead, and thence to Millerston, for the protection of Glasgow. "Thus, almost before our guns uttered their voice of defiance, we had surrounded the enemy, and throughout the morning the fighting was most sanguinary and desperate. Our batteries did excellent service; still, it must be remembered we had attacked a well-trained force of over thirty thousand men, and they had many more guns than we possessed. No doubt the fictitious despatch we had sent had prevented the Russian commander from advancing on Glasgow during the night, as he had intended; and now, finding himself so vigorously attacked by two divisions which he believed had been cut up and annihilated, all his calculations were completely upset. "It was well for us that this was so, otherwise we might have fared much worse than we did. As it was, Cossacks and Dragoons wrought frightful havoc among our infantry; while, on the other hand, the fire discipline of the latter was magnificent. Every bit of cover on the hills seem to bristle with hidden rifles, that emptied their magazines without smoke and with fatal effect. Many a gallant dash was made by our men, the Volunteers especially displaying conspicuous courage. The 1st Dumbartonshire Volunteers, under Col. Thomson, V.D., the 1st Renfrewshire, under Col. Lamont, V.D., and the 4th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, under Col. D. M'Fayden, V.D., operated together with magnificent success, for they completely cut up a strong Russian detachment on the Glasgow road beyond Uddingston, driving them out of the wood near Daldowie, and there annihilating them, and afterwards holding their own on the banks of the North Calder without suffering very much loss. They handled their Maxims as smartly as any body of Regulars; and indeed, throughout the day their performances everywhere were marked by steady discipline and cool courage that was in the highest degree commendable. "About two o'clock in the afternoon the battle was at its height. Under the blazing sun that beat down upon us mercilessly, my battalion fought on, feeling confident that the enemy were gradually being defeated. The slaughter everywhere was frightful, and the green hillsides and fields were covered with dead and dying soldiers of the Tsar. The grey coats were soaked with blood, and dark, ugly stains dyed the grass of the fertile meadows beside the winding Clyde. Since their sudden landing in Scotland, the enemy's early successes had been followed by defeat after defeat. Their transports had been destroyed, their ammunition and stores seized, both their 2nd and 3rd Army Corps had been totally annihilated, leaving nearly twelve thousand men in our hands as prisoners, and now the defeat of this force of picked regiments, who had, on landing, immediately marched straight across Scotland, would effect a crushing and decisive blow. "But the struggle was terrific, the din deafening, the wholesale butchery appalling. Our men knew they were fighting for Caledonia and their Queen, and their conduct, from the first moment of hostilities, until stray bullets laid them low one after another, was magnificent; they were splendid examples of the true, loyal, and fearless Briton, who will fight on even while his life-blood ebbs. "Evening fell, but the continuous firing did not cease. The sun sank red and angry into dark storm-clouds behind the long range of purple hills beyond the Clyde, but the clash of arms continued over hill and dale on the east of Glasgow, and we, exerting every effort in our successful attempt to hold the five converging roads near Broomhouse, knew not which side were victors. "Suddenly I received orders to send over a small detachment to block the two roads at Baillieston, the one a main road leading up from Coatbridge, and the other from the hilly country around Old Monkland, where the struggle was fiercest. Sending Lieutenant Planck over immediately with a detachment and several cyclists, I followed as soon as possible, and found he had blocked both roads in the centre of the little Scotch village, and had occupied the inn situated between the two roads, leaving just sufficient space for his cyclists to pass. Looking towards the city we could see that the hills on our left were occupied by British redcoats. In the village the quaint little low-built cottages, with their stairs outside, were all closed and deserted, and the place seemed strangely quiet after the exciting scenes and ceaseless deafening din. "Taking six of Planck's men and the cyclists about a mile towards Coatbridge, I posted them at the cross-roads beyond Rhind House, sending the cyclists out along the valley to Dikehead. All was quiet in our immediate vicinity for some time, until suddenly we discerned the cyclists coming back. They reported that they had seen cavalry. This, then, must be a detachment of the enemy, who in all probability were retreating. I at once sent the cyclists back to inform Planck, and to tell him we should not take a hand in the game until we had allowed them to pass and they had discovered his barricade. In a few minutes we could distinctly hear them approaching. We were all well under cover, but I was surprised to find that it was only an escort. "They were galloping, and had evidently come a long distance by some circuitous route, and had not taken part in the fighting. I counted five--two Cossacks in advance, then about forty yards behind a shabbily-dressed civilian on horseback, and about forty yards behind him two more Cossacks. They appeared to expect no interruption, and it occurred to me that the Cossacks were escorting the civilian over to the Russian position away beyond Hogganfield Loch. As soon as they were clear, I formed my men up on each side of the road to await events. "We had no occasion to remain long in expectation, for soon afterwards the stillness was broken by shouts and a few rapid shots, and then we could hear two horses galloping back. One was riderless, and a corporal who attempted to stop it was knocked down and seriously injured; but the other had a rider, and as he neared us I could see he was the civilian. I knew I must stop him at all costs. "So, ordering the men on the opposite side of the road to lie down, we gave him a section volley from one side as he rushed past. The horse was badly hit, and stumbled, throwing its rider, who was at once secured. To prevent him from disposing of anything, we bound him securely. Two of the Cossacks had been shot and the other two captured. Upon the civilian, and in his saddle-bags, we found a number of cipher despatches, elaborate plans showing how Glasgow was defended, and an autograph letter from the Russian General Drukovitch, giving him instructions to enter Glasgow alone by way of Partick, and to await him there until the city fell. "But the city was never invested. An hour after we had sent this mysterious civilian--who spoke English with a foreign accent--over to the Colonel, our onslaught became doubly desperate. In the dusk, regiment after regiment of Russians were simply swept away by the cool and deliberate fire of the British, who, being reinforced by my battalion and others, wrought splendid execution in the enemy's main body, forced back upon us at Baillieston. "Then, as night fell, a report was spread that General Drukovitch had surrendered. This proved true. With his 2nd and 3rd Army Corps annihilated, and his transports and base in our hands, he was compelled to acknowledge himself vanquished; therefore, by nine o'clock hostilities had ceased, and during that night nearly six thousand survivors of the 1st Russian Army Corps were taken prisoners, and marched in triumph into Glasgow amid the wildest excitement of the populace. This desperate attempt to invest Glasgow had cost the Russians no fewer than 25,000 men in killed and wounded. "The capture we effected near Baillieston turned out to be of a most important character. When searched at headquarters, a visiting-card was found concealed upon the man, and this gave our Colonel a clue. The man has since been identified by one of his intimate friends as a person well known in London society, who poses as a wealthy German, the Count von Beilstein! It is alleged that he has for several years been living in the metropolis and acting as an expert spy in the Secret Service of the Tsar. He was sent handcuffed, under a strong escort, to London a few days after the battle, and if all I hear be true, some highly sensational disclosures will be made regarding his adventurous career. [Illustration: DEFEAT OF THE RUSSIANS AT BAILLIESTON, NEAR GLASGOW.] "But throughout Caledonia there is now unbounded joy. Our beloved country is safe; for, thanks to the gallant heroism of our Volunteers, the Muscovite invaders have been completely wiped out, and Scotland again proudly rears her head." CHAPTER XXXIII. MARCH OF THE FRENCH ON LONDON. South of the Thames, where the gigantic force of French and Russians, numbering nearly two hundred thousand of all arms, had been prevented from attacking London by our Volunteers and Regulars massed along the Surrey Hills, the slaughter on both sides had been frightful. The struggle was indeed not for a dynasty, but for the very existence of Britain as an independent nation. Sussex had been devastated, but Kent still held out, and Chatham remained in the possession of the defenders. The rout of the British at Horsham prior to the march of the left column of invaders to Birmingham was succeeded by defeat after defeat, the engagements each day illustrating painfully that by force of overwhelming numbers the invaders were gradually nearing their goal--the mighty Capital of our Empire. Gallant stands were made by our Regulars at East Grinstead, Crawley, Alfold, and from Haslemere across Hind Head Common to Frensham. At each of these places, long, desperately-fought battles with the French had taken place through the hot September days,--our Regular forces confident in the stubborn resistance that would be offered by the long unbroken line of Volunteers occupying the range of hills behind. Our signallers had formed a long line of stations from Reculvers and Star Hill, south of the Medway Fortress, to Blue Bell Hill, between Chatham and Maidstone, thence through Snodland, Wrotham, Westerham, and Limpsfield to Caterham, and from there on through Reigate Park, Boxhill, St. Martha's, and over the Hog's Back to Aldershot. With flags in day and lamps by night messages constantly passed, and communication was thus maintained by this means as well as by the field telegraph, which, however, on several occasions had been cut by the enemy. Yet although our soldiers fought day after day with that pluck characteristic of the true Briton, fortune nevertheless seemed to have forsaken us, and even although we inflicted frightful losses upon the French all round, still they gradually forced back the defenders over the Surrey border. Terror, ruin, and death had been spread by the invading Gauls. English homes were sacked, French soldiers bivouaced in Sussex pastures, and the ripening corn was trodden down and stained with blood. The white dusty highways leading from London to the sea were piled with unheeded corpses that were fearful to gaze upon, yet Britannia toiled on undaunted in this desperate struggle for the retention of her Empire. After our defeat at Horsham, the Russians had contented themselves by merely driving back the defenders to a line of resistance from Aldershot to the north of Bagshot, and then they had marched onward to Birmingham. From Horsham, however, two columns of the invaders, mostly French, and numbering over twenty thousand each, had advanced on Guildford and Dorking. At the same time, a strong demonstration was made by the enemy in the country north of Eastbourne and Hailsham, by which the whole of the district in the triangle from Bexhill to Heathfield, and thence to Cuckfield and Steyning, fell into their hands. The British, however, had massed a strong force to prevent the enemy making their way into West Kent, and still held their own along the hills stretching from Crowborough to Ticehurst, and from Etchingham, through Brightling and Ashburnham, down to Battle and Hastings. The north of London had during the weeks of hostilities been strongly guarded by Volunteers and Regulars, for information of a contemplated landing in Essex had been received; and although the defenders had not yet fired a shot, they were eagerly looking forward to a chance of proving their worth, as their comrades in other parts of England had already done. At first the tactics of the invaders could not be understood, for it had been concluded that they would naturally follow up their successes on landing with a rapid advance on London. It was, of course, evident that the vigorous demonstrations made in the North and other parts of Britain were intended with a view to drawing as many troops as possible from the defence of London, and dispose of them in detail before surrounding the capital. Yet, to the dismay of the enemy, no blow they delivered in other parts of our country had had the desired effect of weakening the defensive lines around London. At the opening of the campaign it had been the enemy's intention to reduce London by a blockade, which could perhaps have been successfully carried out had they landed a strong force in Essex. The troops who were intended to land there were, however, sent to Scotland instead, and the fact that they had been annihilated outside Glasgow resulted in a decision to march at once upon the metropolis. Advancing from Horsham, the French right column, numbering 20,000 men with about 70 guns, had, after desperate fighting, at last reached Leatherhead, having left a battalion in support at Dorking. The British had resolutely contested every step the French had advanced, and the slaughter around Dorking had been awful, while the fighting across Fetcham Downs and around Ockley and Bear Green had resulted in frightful loss on both sides. Our Regulars and Volunteers, notwithstanding their gallantry, were, alas! gradually driven back by the enormous numbers that had commenced the onslaught, and were at last thrown back westward in disorder, halting at Ripley. Here the survivors snatched a hasty rest, and they were during the night reinforced by a contingent of Regulars who had come over from Windsor and Hounslow. On the arrival of these reinforcements, the Colonel, well knowing how serious was the situation now our first line of defence had been broken, sent out a flying column from Ripley, while the main body marched to Great Bookham, with the result that Leatherhead, now in the occupation of the French, was from both sides vigorously attacked. The British flying column threatening the enemy from the north was, however, quickly checked by the French guns, and in the transmission of an order a most serious blunder occurred, leading to the impossibility of a retreat upon Ripley, for unfortunately the order, wrongly given, resulted in the blowing up by mistake of the bridges over the river Mole by which they had crossed, and which they wanted to use again. Thus it was that for a time this force was compelled to remain, at terrible cost, right under the fire of the French entrenched position at Leatherhead; but the enemy were fortunately not strong enough to follow up this advantage, and as they occupied a strong strategical position they were content to await the arrival of their huge main body, now on the move, and which they expected would reach Leatherhead during that night. After more fierce fighting, lasting one whole breathless day, the defenders were annihilated, while their main body approaching from the south also fell into a trap. For several hours a fierce battle also raged between Dorking and Mickleham. The British battery on Box Hill wrought awful havoc in the French lines, yet gradually the enemy silenced our guns and cut up our forces. The invaders were now advancing in open order over the whole of Sussex and the west of Kent, and on the same day as the battle was fought at Leatherhead, the high ground south of Sevenoaks, extending from Wimlet Hill to Chart Common, fell into their hands, the British suffering severely; while two of our Volunteer batteries in the vicinity were surprised and seized by a French flying column. In the meantime, another French column, numbering nearly twenty thousand infantry and cavalry, had advanced from Alfold, burning Ewhurst and Cranley, and after a desperately-contested engagement they captured the British batteries on the hills at Hascombe and Hambledon. On the same day the French advance guard, though suffering terrible loss, successfully attacked the battery of Regulars on the hill at Wonersh, and Godalming having been invested, they commenced another vigorous attack upon the strong line of British Regulars and Volunteers at Guildford, where about fourteen thousand men were massed. On the hills from Gomshall to Seale our brave civilian defenders had remained throughout the hostilities ready to repel any attack. Indeed, as the days passed, and no demonstration had been made in their direction, they had grown impatient, until at length this sudden and ferocious onslaught had been made, and they found themselves face to face with an advancing army of almost thrice their strength. Among the Volunteer battalions holding the position were the 1st Bucks, under Lord Addington, V.D.; the 2nd Oxfordshire Light Infantry, under Col. H. S. Hall; the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bedfordshire Regiment, under Col. A. M. Blake, Lieut.-Col. Rumball, and Col. J. T. Green, V.D.; the 1st Royal Berkshire, under Col. J. C. Carter; the 1st Somersetshire Light Infantry, under Col. H. M. Skrine, V.D.; and the 1st and 2nd Wiltshire, under the Earl of Pembroke, V.D., and Col. E. B. Merriman, V.D. Strong batteries had been established between Guildford and Seale by the 1st Fifeshire Artillery, under Col. J. W. Johnston, V.D., and the Highland Artillery, under Col. W. Fraser, V.D.; while batteries on the left were held by the 1st Midlothian, under Col. Kinnear, V.D.; the 1st East Riding, under Col. R. G. Smith, V.D.; and the 1st West Riding, under Col. T. W. Harding, V.D. Commencing before dawn, the battle was fierce and sanguinary almost from the time the first shots were exchanged. The eight 60-pounder guns in the new fort at the top of Pewley Hill, manned by the Royal Artillery, commanded the valleys lying away to the south, and effected splendid defensive work. [Illustration: BRITISH VOLUNTEER POSITIONS ON THE SURREY HILLS.] Indeed, it was this redoubt, with three new ones between Guildford and Gomshall, and another on the Hog's Back, which held the enemy in check for a considerable time; and had there been a larger number of a similar strength, it is doubtful whether the French would ever have accomplished their design upon Guildford. The Pewley Fort, built in the solid chalk, and surrounded by a wide ditch, kept up a continuous fire upon the dense masses of the enemy, and swept away hundreds of unfortunate fellows as they rushed madly onward; while the Volunteer batteries and the Maxims of the infantry battalions poured upon the invaders a devastating hail of lead. From Farnham, the line through Odiham and Aldershot was held by a force increasing hourly in strength; therefore the enemy were unable to get over to Farnborough to outflank the defenders. Through that brilliant, sunny September day the slaughter was terrible in every part of the enemy's column, and it was about noon believed that they would find their positions at Wonersh and Godalming untenable. Nevertheless, with a dogged persistency unusual to our Gallic neighbours, they continued to fight with unquelled vigour. The 2nd Oxfordshire Light Infantry and the 1st and 2nd Wiltshire, holding very important ground over against Puttenham, bore their part with magnificent courage, but were at length cut up in a most horrible manner; while the 1st Bedfordshire, who, with a body of Regulars valiantly held the road running over the hills from Gomshall to Merrow, fought splendidly; but they too were, alas! subsequently annihilated. Over hill and dale, stretching away to the Sussex border, the rattle and din of war sounded incessantly, and as hour after hour passed, hundreds of Britons and Frenchmen dyed the brown, sun-baked grass with their blood. The struggle was frightful. Volunteer battalions who had manoeuvred over that ground at many an Eastertide had little dreamed that they would have one day to raise their rifles in earnest for the defence of their home and Queen. Yet the practice they had had now served them well, for in one instance the 1st Berkshire succeeded by a very smart manoeuvre in totally sweeping away several troops of Cuirassiers, while a quarter of an hour later half an infantry battalion of Regulars attacked a large force of Zouaves on the Compton Road, and fought them successfully almost hand to hand. Through the long, toilsome day the battle continued with unabated fury, and as the sun went down there was no cessation of hostilities. A force of our Regulars, extending from Farnham over Hind Head Common, fell suddenly upon a large body of French infantry, and, outflanking them, managed--after a most frightful encounter, in which they lost nearly half their men--to totally annihilate them. In connection with this incident, a squadron of the 5th Dragoon Guards made a magnificent charge up a steep hill literally to the muzzles of the guns of a French battery, and by their magnificent pluck captured it. Still, notwithstanding the bravery of our defenders, and their fierce determination to sweep away their foe, it seemed when the sun finally disappeared that the fortunes of war were once more against us, for the French had now received huge reinforcements, and Dorking and Leatherhead having already passed into their hands two days previously, they were enabled to make their final assault a most savage and terrific one. It was frightful; it crushed us! In the falling gloom our men fought desperately for their lives, but, alas! one after another our positions were carried by the invaders literally at the point of the bayonet, and ere the moon rose Guildford had fallen into the enemy's hands, and our depleted battalions had been compelled to retire in disorder east to Effingham and west to Farnham. Those who went to Effingham joined at midnight the column who had made an unsuccessful effort to recover Leatherhead, and then bivouaced in Oldlands Copse. The number of wounded in the battles of Guildford and Leatherhead was enormous. At Mickleham the British hospital flag floated over St. Michael's Church, the Priory at Cherkley, Chapel Farm, and on Mickleham Hall, a portion of which still remained intact, although the building had been looted by Zouaves. In Leatherhead the French had established hospitals at Givons Grove, Vale Lodge, Elmbank, and in the Church of St. Mary and the parish church at Fetcham. At Guildford, in addition to the field hospitals on Albury Downs and behind St. Catherine's Hill, Holden, Warren, and Tyting Farms, Sutton Place and Loseley were filled with wounded French infantrymen and British prisoners, and many schools and buildings, including the Guildhall in Guildford town, bore the red cross. At two most important strategic points the first line defending London had now been broken, and the British officers knew that it would require every effort on our part to recover our lost advantages. The metropolis was now seriously threatened; for soon after dawn on the following day two great French columns, one from Guildford and the other from Leatherhead, were advancing north towards the Thames! The enemy had established telegraphic communication between the two towns, and balloons that had been sent up from Guildford and Ashstead to reconnoitre had reported that the second line of the British defence had been formed from Kingston, through Wimbledon, Tooting, Streatham, and Upper Norwood, and thence across _viâ_ Sydenham to Lewisham and Greenwich. It was upon this second line of defence that the French, with their enormous force of artillery, now marched. The Leatherhead column, with their main body about one day's march behind, took the route through Epsom to Mitcham, while the troops from Guildford pushed on through Ripley, Cobham, and Esher. This advance occupied a day, and when a halt was made for the night the enemy's front extended from Walton to Thames Ditton, thence across Kingston Common and Malden to Mitcham. Bivouacing, they faced the British second line of defence, and waited for the morrow to commence their onslaught. In London the alarming news of the enemy's success caused a panic such as had never before been experienced in the metropolis. During the long anxious weeks that the enemy had been held within bounds by our Volunteers, London had never fully realised what bombardment would mean. While the French were beyond the Surrey Hills, Londoners felt secure; and the intelligence received of the enemy's utter rout at Newcastle, Manchester, Edinburgh, and Glasgow added considerably to this sense of security. London, alas! was starving. Business was suspended; trains no longer left the termini; omnibuses, trams, and cabs had ceased running, the horses having been pressed into military service, and those which had not had been killed and eaten. The outlook everywhere, even during those blazing sunny days and clear moonlit nights, was cheerless and dispiriting. The bright sun seemed strangely incongruous with the black war-clouds that overhung the gigantic city, with its helpless, starving, breathless millions. In the sun-baked, dusty streets the roar of traffic no longer sounded, but up and down the principal thoroughfares of the City and the West End the people prowled, lean and hungry--emaciated victims of this awful struggle between nations--seeking vainly for food to satisfy the terrible pangs consuming them. The hollow cheek, the thin, sharp nose, the dark-ringed glassy eye of one and all, told too plainly of the widespread suffering, and little surprise was felt at the great mortality in every quarter. In Kensington and Belgravia the distress was quite as keen as in Whitechapel and Hackney, and both rich and poor mingled in the gloomy, dismal streets, wandering aimlessly over the great Modern Babylon, which the enemy were now plotting to destroy. The horrors of those intensely anxious days of terror were unspeakable. The whole machinery of life in the Great City had been disorganised, and now London lay like an octopus, with her long arms extended in every direction, north and south of the Thames, inert, helpless, trembling. Over the gigantic Capital of the World hung the dark Shadow of Death. By day and by night its ghastly presence could be felt; its hideous realities crushed the heart from those who would face the situation with smiling countenance. London's wealth availed her not in this critical hour. Grim, spectral, unseen, the Destroying Angel held the sword over her, ready to strike! CHAPTER XXXIV. LOOTING IN THE SUBURBS. While famished men crept into Hyde Park and Kensington Gardens and there expired under the trees of absolute hunger, and starving women with babes at their breasts sank upon doorsteps and died, the more robust Londoners had, on hearing of the enemy's march on the metropolis, gone south to augment the second line of defence. For several weeks huge barricades had been thrown up in the principal roads approaching London from the south. The strongest of these were opposite the Convalescent Home on Kingston Hill, in Coombe Lane close to Raynes Park Station, in the Morden Road at Merton Abbey, opposite Lynwood in the Tooting Road; while nearer London, on the same road, there was a strong one with machine guns on the crest of Balham Hill, and another in Clapham Road. At Streatham Hill, about one hundred yards from the hospital, earthworks had been thrown up, and several guns brought into position; while at Beulah Hill, Norwood, opposite the Post Office at Upper Sydenham, at the Half Moon at Herne Hill, and in many of the roads between Honor Oak and Denmark Hill, barricades had been constructed and banked up with bags and baskets filled with earth. Though these defences were held by enthusiastic civilians of all classes,--professional men, artisans, and tradesmen,--yet our second line of defence, distinct, of course, from the local barricades, was a very weak one. We had relied upon our magnificent strategic positions on the Surrey Hills, and had not made sufficient provision in case of a sudden reverse. Our second line, stretching from Croydon up to South Norwood, thence to Streatham and along the railway line to Wimbledon and Kingston, was composed of a few battalions of Volunteers, detachments of Metropolitan police, Berks and Bucks constabulary, London firemen and postmen, the Corps of Commissionaires--in fact, every body of drilled men who could be requisitioned to handle revolver or rifle. These were backed by great bodies of civilians, and behind stood the barricades with their insignificant-looking but terribly deadly machine guns. The railways had, on the first news of the enemy's success at Leatherhead and Guildford, all been cut up, and in each of the many bridges spanning the Thames between Kingston and the Tower great charges of gun-cotton had been placed, so that they might be blown up at any instant, and thus prevent the enemy from investing the city. Day dawned again at last--dull and grey. It had rained during the night, and the roads, wet and muddy, were unutterably gloomy as our civilian defenders looked out upon them, well knowing that ere long a fierce attack would be made. In the night the enemy had been busy laying a field telegraph from Mitcham to Kingston, through which messages were now being continually flashed. Suddenly, just as the British outposts were being relieved, the French commenced a vigorous attack, and in a quarter of an hour fighting extended along the whole line. Volunteers, firemen, policemen, Commissionaires, and civilians all fought bravely, trusting to one hope, namely, that before they were defeated the enemy would be outflanked and attacked in their rear by a British force from the Surrey Hills. They well knew that to effectually bar the advance of this great body of French was out of all question, yet they fought on with creditable tact, and in many instances inflicted serious loss upon the enemy's infantry. Soon, however, French field guns were trained upon them, and amid the roar of artillery line after line of heroic Britons fell shattered to earth. Amid the rattle of musketry, the crackling of the machine guns, and the booming of 16-pounders, brave Londoners struggled valiantly against the masses of wildly excited Frenchmen; yet every moment the line became slowly weakened, and the defenders were gradually forced back upon their barricades. The resistance which the French met with was much more determined than they had anticipated; in fact, a small force of Volunteers holding the Mitcham Road, at Streatham, fought with such splendid bravery, that they succeeded alone and unaided in completely wiping out a battalion of French infantry, and capturing two field guns and a quantity of ammunition. For this success, however, they, alas! paid dearly, for a quarter of an hour later a large body of cavalry and infantry coming over from Woodlands descended upon them and totally annihilated them, with the result that Streatham fell into the hands of the French, and a few guns placed in the high road soon made short work of the earthworks near the hospital. Under the thick hail of bursting shells the brave band who manned the guns were at last compelled to abandon them, and the enemy were soon marching unchecked into Stockwell and Brixton, extending their right, with the majority of their artillery, across Herne Hill, Dulwich, and Honor Oak. In the meantime a desperate battle was being fought around Kingston. The barricade on Kingston Hill held out for nearly three hours, but was at last captured by the invaders, and of those who had manned it not a man survived. Mitcham and Tooting had fallen in the first hour of the engagement, the barricade at Lynwood had been taken, and hundreds of the houses in Balham had been looted by the enemy in their advance into Clapham. Nearly the whole morning it rained in torrents, and both invaders and defenders were wet to the skin, and covered with blood and mud. Everywhere British pluck showed itself in this desperate resistance on the part of these partially-trained defenders. At the smaller barricades in the suburban jerry-built streets, Britons held their own and checked the advance with remarkable coolness; yet, as the dark, stormy day wore on, the street defences were one after another broken down and destroyed. Indeed, by three o'clock that afternoon the enemy ran riot through the whole district, from Lower Sydenham to Kingston. Around the larger houses on Sydenham Hill one of the fiercest fights occurred, but at length the defenders were driven down into Lordship Lane, and the houses on the hill were sacked, and some of them burned. While this was proceeding, a great force of French artillery came over from Streatham, and before dusk five great batteries had been established along the Parade in front of the Crystal Palace, and on Sydenham Hill and One Tree Hill; while other smaller batteries were brought into position at Forest Hill, Gipsy Hill, Tulse Hill, Streatham Hill, and Herne Hill; and further towards London about twenty French 12-pounders and a number of new quick-firing weapons of long range and a very destructive character were placed along the top of Camberwell Grove and Denmark Hill. The defences of London had been broken. The track of the invaders was marked by ruined homes and heaps of corpses, and London's millions knew on this eventful night that the enemy were now actually at their doors. In Fleet Street, in the Strand, in Piccadilly, the news spread from mouth to mouth as darkness fell that the enemy were preparing to launch their deadly shells into the City. This increased the panic. The people were in a mad frenzy of excitement, and the scenes everywhere were terrible. Women wept and wailed, men uttered words of blank despair, and children screamed at an unknown terror. The situation was terrible. From the Embankment away on the Surrey side could be seen a lurid glare in the sky. It was the reflection of a great fire in Vassall Road, Brixton, the whole street being burned by the enemy, together with the great block of houses lying between the Cowley and Brixton Roads. London waited. Dark storm-clouds scudded across the moon. The chill wind swept up the river, and moaned mournfully in doors and chimneys. At last, without warning, just as Big Ben had boomed forth one o'clock, the thunder of artillery shook the windows, and startled the excited crowds. Great shells crashed into the streets, remained for a second, and then burst with deafening report and appalling effect. In Trafalgar Square, Fleet Street, and the Strand the deadly projectiles commenced to fall thickly, wrecking the shops, playing havoc with the public buildings, and sweeping hundreds of men and women into eternity. Nothing could withstand their awful force, and the people, rushing madly about like frightened sheep, felt that this was indeed their last hour. In Ludgate Hill the scene was awful. Shots fell with monotonous regularity, bursting everywhere, and blowing buildings and men into atoms. The French shells were terribly devastating; the reek of mélinite poisoned the air. Shells striking St. Paul's Cathedral brought down the right-hand tower, and crashed into the dome; while others set on fire a long range of huge drapery warehouses behind it, the glare of the roaring flames causing the great black Cathedral to stand out in bold relief. The bombardment had actually commenced! London, the proud Capital of the World, was threatened with destruction! CHAPTER XXXV. LONDON BOMBARDED. The Hand of the Destroyer had reached England's mighty metropolis. The lurid scene was appalling. In the stormy sky the red glare from hundreds of burning buildings grew brighter, and in every quarter flames leaped up and black smoke curled slowly away in increasing volume. The people were unaware of the events that had occurred in Surrey that day. Exhausted, emaciated, and ashen pale, the hungry people had endured every torture. Panic-stricken, they rushed hither and thither in thousands up and down the principal thoroughfares, and as they tore headlong away in this _sauve qui peut_ to the northern suburbs, the weaker fell and were trodden under foot. Men fought for their wives and families, dragging them away out of the range of the enemy's fire, which apparently did not extend beyond the line formed by the Hackney Road, City Road, Pentonville Road, Euston Road, and Westbourne Park. But in that terrible rush to escape many delicate ladies were crushed to death, and numbers of others, with their children, sank exhausted, and perished beneath the feet of the fleeing millions. Never before had such alarm been spread through London; never before had such awful scenes of destruction been witnessed. The French Commander-in-chief, who was senior to his Russian colleague, had been killed, and his successor being unwilling to act in concert with the Muscovite staff, a quarrel ensued. It was this quarrel which caused the bombardment of London, totally against the instructions of their respective Governments. The bombardment was, in fact, wholly unnecessary, and was in a great measure due to some confused orders received by the French General from his Commander-in-chief. Into the midst of the surging, terrified crowds that congested the streets on each side of the Thames, shells filled with mélinite dropped, and, bursting, blew hundreds of despairing Londoners to atoms. Houses were shattered and fell, public buildings were demolished, factories were set alight, and the powerful exploding projectiles caused the Great City to reel and quake. Above the constant crash of bursting shells, the dull roar of the flames, and the crackling of burning timbers, terrific detonations now and then were heard, as buildings, filled with combustibles, were struck by shots, and, exploding, spread death and ruin over wide areas. The centre of commerce, of wealth, of intellectual and moral life was being ruthlessly wrecked, and its inhabitants massacred. Apparently it was not the intention of the enemy to invest the city at present, fearing perhaps that the force that had penetrated the defences was not sufficiently large to accomplish such a gigantic task; therefore they had commenced this terrible bombardment as a preliminary measure. Through the streets of South London the people rushed along, all footsteps being bent towards the bridges; but on every one of them the crush was frightful--indeed, so great was it that in several instances the stone balustrades were broken, and many helpless, shrieking persons were forced over into the dark swirling waters below. The booming of the batteries was continuous, the bursting of the shells was deafening, and every moment was one of increasing horror. Men saw their homes swept away, and trembling women clung to their husbands, speechless with fear. In the City, in the Strand, in Westminster, and West End streets the ruin was even greater, and the destruction of property enormous. Westward, both great stations at Victoria, with the adjoining furniture repositories and the Grosvenor Hotel, were burning fiercely; while the Wellington Barracks had been partially demolished, and the roof of St. Peter's Church blown away. Two shells falling in the quadrangle of Buckingham Palace had smashed every window and wrecked some of the ground-floor apartments, but nevertheless upon the flagstaff, amidst the dense smoke and showers of sparks flying upward, there still floated the Royal Standard. St. James's Palace, Marlborough House, Stafford House, and Clarence House, standing in exposed positions, were being all more or less damaged; several houses in Carlton House Terrace had been partially demolished, and a shell striking the Duke of York's Column soon after the commencement of the bombardment, caused it to fall, blocking Waterloo Place. Time after time shells whistled above and fell with a crash and explosion, some in the centre of the road, tearing up the paving, and others striking the clubs in Pall Mall, blowing out many of those noble time-mellowed walls. The portico of the Athenæum had been torn away like pasteboard, the rear premises of the War Office had been pulverised, and the Carlton, Reform, and United Service Clubs suffered terrible damage. Two shells striking the Junior Carlton crashed through the roof, and exploding almost simultaneously, brought down an enormous heap of masonry, which fell across the roadway, making an effectual barricade; while at the same moment shells began to fall thickly in Grosvenor Place and Belgrave Square, igniting many houses, and killing some of those who remained in their homes petrified by fear. Up Regent Street shells were sweeping with frightful effect. The Café Monico and the whole block of buildings surrounding it was burning, and the flames leaping high, presented a magnificent though appalling spectacle. The front of the London Pavilion had been partially blown away, and of the two uniform rows of shops forming the Quadrant many had been wrecked. From Air Street to Oxford Circus, and along Piccadilly to Knightsbridge, there fell a perfect hail of shell and bullets. Devonshire House had been wrecked, and the Burlington Arcade destroyed. The thin pointed spire of St. James's Church had fallen, every window in the Albany was shattered, several houses in Grosvenor Place had suffered considerably, and a shell that struck the southern side of St. George's Hospital had ignited it, and now at 2 A.M., in the midst of this awful scene of destruction and disaster, the helpless sick were being removed into the open streets, where bullets whistled about them and fragments of explosive shells whizzed past. As the night wore on London trembled and fell. Once Mistress of the World, she was now, alas! sinking under the iron hand of the invader. Upon her there poured a rain of deadly missiles that caused appalling slaughter and desolation. The newly introduced long-range guns, and the terrific power of the explosives with which the French shells were charged, added to the horrors of the bombardment; for although the batteries were so far away as to be out of sight, yet the unfortunate people, overtaken by their doom, were torn limb from limb by the bursting bombs. Over the roads lay men of London, poor and rich, weltering in their blood, their lower limbs shattered or blown completely away. With wide-open haggard eyes, in their death agony they gazed around at the burning buildings, at the falling débris, and upward at the brilliantly-illumined sky. With their last breath they gasped prayers for those they loved, and sank to the grave, hapless victims of Babylon's downfall. Every moment the Great City was being devastated, every moment the catastrophe was more complete, more awful. In the poorer quarters of South London whole streets were swept away, and families overwhelmed by their own demolished homes. Along the principal thoroughfares shop fronts were shivered, and the goods displayed in the windows strewn about the roadway. About half-past three a frightful disaster occurred at Battersea. Very few shells had dropped in that district, when suddenly one fell right in the very centre of a great petroleum store. The effect was frightful. With a noise that was heard for twenty miles around, the whole of the great store of oil exploded, blowing the stores themselves high into the air, and levelling all the buildings in the vicinity. In every direction burning oil was projected over the roofs of neighbouring houses, dozens of which at once caught fire, while down the streets there ran great streams of blazing oil, which spread the conflagration in every direction. Showers of sparks flew upwards, the flames roared and crackled, and soon fires were breaking out in all quarters. Just as the clocks were striking a quarter to four, a great shell struck the Victoria Tower of the Houses of Parliament, bringing it down with a terrific crash. This disaster was quickly followed by a series of others. A shell fell through the roof of Westminster Abbey, setting the grand old historic building on fire; another tore away the columns from the front of the Royal Exchange; and a third carried away one of the square twin towers of St. Mary Woolnoth, at the corner of Lombard Street. Along this latter thoroughfare banks were wrecked, and offices set on fire; while opposite, in the thick walls of the Bank of England, great breaches were being made. The Mansion House escaped any very serious injury, but the dome of the Stock Exchange was carried away; and in Queen Victoria Street, from end to end, enormous damage was caused to the rows of fine business premises; while further east the Monument, broken in half, came down with a noise like thunder, demolishing many houses on Fish Street Hill. The great drapery warehouses in Wood Street, Bread Street, Friday Street, Foster Lane, and St. Paul's Churchyard suffered more or less. Ryland's, Morley's, and Cook's were all alight and burning fiercely; while others were wrecked and shattered, and their contents blown out into the streets. The quaint spire of St. Bride's had fallen, and its bells lay among the débris in the adjoining courts; both the half-wrecked offices of the _Daily Telegraph_ and the _Daily Chronicle_ were being consumed. The great clock-tower of the Law Courts fell about four o'clock with a terrific crash, completely blocking the Strand at Temple Bar, and demolishing the much-abused Griffin Memorial; while at the same moment two large holes were torn in the roof of the Great Hall, the small black turret above fell, and the whole of the glass in the building was shivered into fragments. It was amazing how widespread was the ruin caused by each of the explosive missiles. Considering the number of guns employed by the French in this cruel and wanton destruction of property, the desolation they were causing was enormous. This was owing to the rapid extension of their batteries over the high ground from One Tree Hill through Peckham to Greenwich, and more especially to the wide ranges of their guns and the terrific power of their shells. In addition to the ordinary projectiles filled with mélinite, charges of that extremely powerful substance lignine dynamite were hurled into the city, and, exploded by a detonator, swept away whole streets, and laid many great public buildings in ruins; while steel shells, filled with some arrangement of liquid oxygen and blasting gelatine, produced frightful effects, for nothing could withstand them. One of these, discharged from the battery on Denmark Hill, fell in the quadrangle behind Burlington House, and levelled the Royal Academy and the surrounding buildings. Again a terrific explosion sounded, and as the smoke cleared it was seen that a gelatine shell had fallen among the many turrets of the Natural History Museum, and the front of the building fell out with a deafening crash, completely blocking the Cromwell Road. London lay at the mercy of the invaders. So swiftly had the enemy cut their way through the defences and opened their hail of destroying missiles, that the excited, starving populace were unaware of what had occurred until dynamite began to rain upon them. Newspapers had ceased to appear; and although telegraphic communication was kept up with the defenders on the Surrey Hills by the War Office, yet no details of the events occurring there had been made public for fear of spies. Londoners had remained in ignorance, and, alas! had awaited their doom. Through the long sultry night the situation was one of indescribable panic and disaster. The sky had grown a brighter red, and the streets within the range of the enemy's guns, now deserted, were in most cases blocked by burning ruins and fallen telegraph wires; while about the roadways lay the shattered corpses of men, women, and children, upon whom the shells had wrought their frightful work. The bodies, mutilated, torn limb from limb, were sickening to gaze upon. CHAPTER XXXVI. BABYLON BURNING. Dynamite had shattered Charing Cross Station and the Hotel, for its smoke-begrimed façade had been torn out, and the station yard was filled with a huge pile of smouldering débris. On either side of the Strand from Villiers Street to Temple Bar scarcely a window had been left intact, and the roadway itself was quite impassable, for dozens of buildings had been overthrown by shells, and what in many cases had been handsome shops were now heaps of bricks, slates, furniture, and twisted girders. The rain of fire continued. Dense black smoke rising in a huge column from St. Martin's Church showed plainly what was the fate of that noble edifice, while fire had now broken out at the Tivoli Music Hall, and the clubs on Adelphi Terrace were also falling a prey to the flames. The burning of Babylon was a sight of awful, appalling grandeur. The few people remaining in the vicinity of the Strand who escaped the flying missiles and falling buildings, sought what shelter they could, and stood petrified by terror, knowing that every moment might be their last, not daring to fly into the streets leading to Holborn, where they could see the enemy's shells were still falling with unabated regularity and frightful result, their courses marked by crashing buildings and blazing ruins. Looking from Charing Cross, the Strand seemed one huge glaring furnace. Flames belched from windows on either side, and, bursting through roofs, great tongues of fire shot upwards; blazing timbers fell into the street; and as the buildings became gutted, and the fury of the devouring element was spent, shattered walls tottered and fell into the roadway. The terrific heat, the roar of the flames, the blinding smoke, the stifling fumes of dynamite, the pungent, poisonous odour of mélinite, the clouds of dust, the splinters of stone and steel, and the constant bursting of shells, combined to render the scene the most awful ever witnessed in a single thoroughfare during the history of the world. From Kensington to Bow, from Camberwell to Somers Town, from Clapham to Deptford, the vast area of congested houses and tortuous streets was being swept continually. South of the Thames the loss of life was enormous, for thousands were unable to get beyond the zone of fire, and many in Brixton, Clapham, Camberwell, and Kennington were either maimed by flying fragments of shell, buried in the débris of their homes, or burned to death. The disasters wrought by the Frenchmen's improved long-range weapons were frightful. London, the all-powerful metropolis, which had egotistically considered herself the impregnable Citadel of the World, fell to pieces and was consumed. She was frozen by terror, and lifeless. Her ancient monuments were swept away, her wealth melted in her coffers, her priceless objects of art were torn up and broken, and her streets ran with the blood of her starving toilers. Day dawned grey, with stormlight gloom. Rain-clouds scudded swiftly across the leaden sky. Along the road in front of the Crystal Palace, where the French batteries were established, the deafening discharges that had continued incessantly during the night, and had smashed nearly all the glass in the sides and roof of the Palace, suddenly ceased. The officers were holding a consultation over despatches received from the batteries at Tulse Hill, Streatham, Red Post Hill, One Tree Hill, and Greenwich, all of which stated that ammunition had run short, and they were therefore unable to continue the bombardment. [Illustration: THE FRENCH BOMBARDING LONDON FROM THE CRYSTAL PALACE PARADE.] Neither of the ammunition trains of the two columns of the enemy had arrived, for, although the bombarding batteries were unaware of it, both had been captured and blown up by British Volunteers. It was owing to this that the hostile guns were at last compelled to cease their thunder, and to this fact also was due the fortunes of the defenders in the events immediately following. Our Volunteers occupying the line of defence north of London, through Epping and Brentwood to Tilbury, had for the past three weeks been in daily expectation of an attempt on the part of the invaders to land in Essex, and were amazed at witnessing this sudden bombardment. From their positions on the northern heights they could distinctly see how disastrous was the enemy's fire, and although they had been informed by telegraph of the reverses we had sustained at Guildford and Leatherhead, yet they had no idea that the actual attack on the metropolis would be made so swiftly. However, they lost not a moment. It was evident that the enemy had no intention of effecting a landing in Essex; therefore, with commendable promptitude, they decided to move across the Thames immediately, to reinforce their comrades in Surrey. Leaving the 2nd and 4th West Riding Artillery, under Col. Hoffmann and Col. N. Creswick, V.D., at Tilbury, and the Lincolnshire, Essex, and Worcestershire Volunteer Artillery, under Col. G. M. Hutton, V.D., Col. S. L. Howard, V.D., and Col. W. Ottley, the greater part of the Norfolk, Staffordshire, Tay, Aberdeen, Manchester, and Northern Counties Field Brigades moved south with all possible speed. From Brentwood, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Volunteer Battalions of the Norfolk Regiment, under Col. A. C. Dawson, Col. E. H. H. Combe, Col. H. E. Hyde, V.D., and Col. C. W. J. Unthank, V.D.; the 1st and 2nd North Staffordshire, under Col. W. H. Dutton, V.D., and Col. F. D. Mort, V.D.; and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd South Staffordshire, under Col. J. B. Cochrane, V.D., Col. T. T. Fisher, V.D., and Col. E. Nayler, V.D.; the 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Royal Highlanders, under Col. W. A. Gordon, V.D., Col. Sir R. D. Moncreiffe, Col. Sir R. Menzies, V.D., and Col. Erskine; the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, under Col. J. Porteous, V.D.; the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Gordon Highlanders, under Col. A. D. Fordyce, Col. G. Jackson, V.D., and Col. J. Johnston--were, as early as 2 A.M., on their way to London. At this critical hour the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps rendered invaluable services. Under the direction of Col. William Birt, trains held in readiness by the Great Eastern Railway brought the brigades rapidly to Liverpool Street, whence they marched by a circuitous route beyond the zone of fire by way of Marylebone, Paddington, Kensington Gardens, Walham Green, and across Wandsworth Bridge, thence to Upper Tooting, where they fell in with a large force of our Regular infantry and cavalry, who were on their way to outflank the enemy. Attacking a detachment of the French at Tooting, they captured several guns, destroyed the enemy's field telegraph, and proceeded at once to Streatham, where the most desperate resistance was offered. A fierce fight occurred across Streatham Common, and over to Lower Norwood and Gipsy Hill, in which both sides lost very heavily. Nevertheless our Volunteers from Essex, although they had been on the march the greater part of the night, fought bravely, and inflicted terrible punishment upon their foe. The 3rd and 4th Volunteer Battalions of the Gordon Highlanders and the 1st Norfolk, attacking a French position near the mouth of the railway tunnel, displayed conspicuous bravery, and succeeded in completely annihilating their opponents; while in an opposite direction, towards Tooting, several troops of French cavalry were cut up and taken prisoners by two battalions of Royal Highlanders. The batteries on Streatham Hill having been assaulted and taken, the force of defenders pushed quickly onward to Upper Norwood, where our cavalry, sweeping along Westow Hill and Church Street, fell upon the battery in front of the Crystal Palace. The enemy, owing to the interruption of their field telegraph, were unaware of their presence, and were completely surprised. Nevertheless French infantrymen rushed into the Crystal Palace Hotel, the White Swan, Stanton Harcourt, the Knoll, Rocklands, and other houses at both ends of the Parade, and from the windows poured forth withering volleys from their Lebels. Our cavalry, riding down the broad Parade, used their sabres upon the artillerymen, and the whole of the French troops were quickly in a confused mass, unable to act with effect, and suffering appallingly from the steady fire of our Volunteers, who very soon cleared the enemy from the White Swan, and, having been drawn up outside, poured forth a galling rifle fire right along the enemy's position. Suddenly there was loud shouting, and the British "Cease fire" sounded. The French, though fighting hard, were falling back gradually down the hill towards Sydenham Station, when suddenly shots were heard, and turbaned cavalry came riding into them at a terrific pace from the rear. The British officers recognised the new-comers as a squadron of Bengal Lancers! At last India had sent us help, and our men sent up a loud cheer. A large force of cavalry and infantry, together with two regiments of Goorkas, had, it appeared, been landed at Sheerness. They had contemplated landing in Hampshire, but, more unfortunate than some of their compatriots who had effected a landing near Southampton, they were driven through the Straits of Dover by the enemy's cruisers. Marching north in company with a force from Chatham, they had earlier that morning attacked and routed the enemy's right flank at Blackheath, and, after capturing the battery of the foe at Greenwich, greater part of the escort of which had been sent over to Lewisham an hour before, they slaughtered a battalion of Zouaves, and had then extended across to Denmark Hill, where a sanguinary struggle occurred. The French on Dog Kennel, Red Post, Herne, and Tulse Hills turned their deadly machine guns upon them, and for a long time all the positions held out. At length, however, by reason of a splendid charge made by the Bengal Lancers, the battery at Red Post Hill was taken and the enemy slaughtered. During the next half-hour a fierce hand-to-hand struggle took place up Dog Kennel Hill from St. Saviour's Infirmary, and presently, when the defenders gained the spur of the hill, they fought the enemy gallantly in Grove Lane, Private Road, Bromar Road, Camberwell Grove, and adjoining roads. Time after time the Indian cavalry charged, and the Goorkas, with their keen knives, hacked their way into those of the enemy who rallied. For nearly an hour the struggle continued desperately, showers of bullets from magazine rifles sweeping along the usually quiet suburban thoroughfares, until the roads were heaped with dead and dying, and the houses on either side bore evidence of the bloody fray. Then at last the guns placed along the hills all fell into our hands, and the French were almost completely swept out of existence. Many were the terrible scenes witnessed in the gardens of the quaint last-century houses on Denmark Hill. Around those old-world residences, standing along the road leading down to Half Moon Lane, time-mellowed relics of an age bygone, Indians fought with Zouaves, and British Volunteers struggled fiercely hand to hand with French infantrymen. The quiet old-fashioned quarter, that was an aristocratic retreat when Camberwell was but a sylvan village with an old toll gate, when cows chewed the cud upon Walworth Common, and when the Walworth Road had not a house in the whole of it, was now the scene of a frightful massacre. The deafening explosions of cordite from magazine rifles, the exultant shouts of the victors and the hoarse shrieks of the dying, awakened the echoes in those quaint old gardens, with their Dutch-cut zigzag walks, enclosed by ancient red brick walls, moss-grown, lichen covered, and half hidden by ivy, honeysuckle, and creepers. Those spacious grounds, where men were now being mercilessly slaughtered, had been the scene of many a brilliant _fête champêtre_, where splendid satin-coated _beaux_, all smiles and _ailes de pigeon_, whispered scandal behind the fans of dainty dames in high-dressed wigs and patches, or, clad as Watteau shepherds, had danced the _al fresco_ minuet with similarly attired shepherdesses, and later on played _piquet_ and drank champagne till dawn. [Illustration: GOORKAS SLAUGHTERING THE FRENCH ARTILLERY AT GREENWICH OBSERVATORY.] In the good old Georgian days, when Johnson walked daily under the trees in Gough Square, when Macklin was playing the "Man of the World," and when traitors' heads blackened on Temple Bar, this colony was one of the most rural, exclusive, and gay in the vicinity of London. Alas, how it has decayed! Cheap "desirable residences" have sprung up around it, the hand of the jerry-building Vandal has touched it, the sound of traffic roars about it; yet still there is a charm in those quaint old gardens of a forgotten era. From under the dark yew hedges the jonquils still peep out early--the flowers themselves are those old-fashioned sweet ones beloved of our grandmothers--and the tea roses still blossom on the crumbling walls and fill the air with their fragrance. But in this terrible struggle the walls were used as defences, the bushes were torn down and trampled under foot, and the flowers hung broken on their stalks, bespattered with men's blood! Proceeding south again, the defenders successfully attacked the strong batteries on One Tree Hill at Honor Oak, and on Sydenham Hill and Forest Hill, and then extending across to the Crystal Palace, had joined hands with our Volunteers from Essex, where they were now wreaking vengeance for the ruthless destruction caused in London. The bloodshed along the Crystal Palace Parade was fearful. The French infantry and artillery, overwhelmed by the onward rush of the defenders, and now under the British crossfire, fell in hundreds. Dark-faced Bengal Lancers and Goorkas, with British Hussars and Volunteers, descended upon them with appalling swiftness; and so complete was the slaughter, that of the whole force that had effected that terribly effectual bombardment from Sydenham, not more than a dozen survived. By noon many of the shops on Westow Hill and private residences on College Hill and Sydenham Hill had been wantonly ignited by the enemy; but when the firing ceased some hours later, the roads were heaped with the corpses of those whose mission it had been to destroy London. Of all those batteries which had caused such frightful desolation and loss of life during the night, not one now remained. The two French columns had been swiftly wiped out of existence; and although our forces had suffered very considerably, they nevertheless were able to go south to Croydon later that afternoon, in order to take part in resisting the vigorous and desperate attack which they knew would sooner or later be made by the whole French army massed beyond the Surrey Hills. The sun was on the horizon, and the shadows were already deepening. Assistance had arrived tardily, for the damage to property in London during the night had been enormous; nevertheless at this the eleventh hour we had inflicted upon the French a crushing defeat, and now England waited, trembling and breathless, wondering what would be the final outcome of this fierce, bloody struggle for our national existence. CHAPTER XXXVII. FIGHTING ON THE SURREY HILLS. Our valiant defenders were striking swift, decisive blows for England's honour. The French, demoralised by their severe defeat in the south of London, and suffering considerable loss in every other direction, fought desperately during the two days following the disastrous bombardment. In darkness and sunlight fierce contests took place along the Surrey Hills, where our Volunteers, under Major-Gen. Lord Methuen, were still entrenched. Every copse bristled with rifles; red coats gleamed among the foliage, and winding highways were, alas! strewn with corpses. Guildford had again been reoccupied by our Regulars, who were reorganising; and Leatherhead, holding out for another day, was retaken, after a terribly hard-fought battle, by the Highland, South of Scotland, and Glasgow Brigades, with the 1st Ayrshire and Galloway Artillery, under Col. J. G. Sturrock, V.D.; 1st Lanarkshire, under Col. R. J. Bennett, V.D.; 1st Aberdeenshire, under Col. J. Ogston, V.D.; and 1st North Riding Yorkshire Volunteer Artillery, under Major C. L. Bell. In such a splendid and gallant manner had our comparatively small force manoeuvred, that on the second night following the bombardment the whole of the invaders who had penetrated beyond our line of defence towards the metropolis had been completely wiped out, in addition to which the breach in our line had been filled up by strong reinforcements, and the enemy driven from the high ground between Box Hill and Guildford. The invaders, finding how vigorously we repelled any attack, made terrific onslaughts on our position at various points they believed were vulnerable, but everywhere they were hurled back with appalling slaughter. Volunteers from Australia and the Cape, in addition to the other contingent of 10,000 Indian native troops, had been landed near Southampton, and had advanced to assist in this terrific struggle, upon the result of which the future of our Empire depended. Among these Colonials were 500 Victorian Rangers, 900 Victoria Mounted Rifles, and seven companies of Queensland Mounted Infantry, with two ambulance corps. The Indians landed in splendid form, having brought their full war equipment with them without any contribution whatever from the Home Government, as it will be remembered they did when they landed at Malta during Lord Beaconsfield's administration. Having received intelligence of the movements of the two columns of the enemy that had gone to London after taking Leatherhead and Guildford, they pushed on to Petworth. By the time they arrived there, however, both towns had been recaptured by the British, who were then being severely harassed by the enemy massed along the south side of our defensive line. Although numerically inferior to the enemy occupying that part of the country, the Indians were already well accustomed to actual warfare, the majority having been engaged in operations against the hill tribes; therefore the commander decided to push on at once, and endeavour to outflank the large French force who with some Russian infantry had again attacked Guildford, and the manner in which this was accomplished was a single illustration of the valuable assistance the Indians rendered us in these days of bloodshed and despair. One of the native officers of a Sikh regiment, the Subadar Banerji Singh, having served with Sir Peter Lumsden's expeditionary force some years before, had frequently come into contact with the Russians, and could speak Russian better than some of the soldiers of the Tsar's Asiatic corps. The commander of the Indian force, determined that his men should strike their blow and sustain their reputation, advanced with great caution from Petworth, and late in the afternoon of the second evening after the bombardment of London, two Sikhs scouting in front of the advance guard sighted a Russian bivouac on the road on the other side of the Wye Canal beyond Loxwood Bridge, which latter had been demolished. The Indians were thereupon halted on the road which runs through the wood near Plaistow, and the officers held council. Their information was unfortunately very meagre and their knowledge of the country necessarily vague; but the Subadar Banerji Singh, who was of unusually fair complexion, volunteered to don a Russian uniform, which had been taken with other property from a dead officer found upon the road, and endeavour in that disguise to penetrate the enemy's lines. Towards dusk he set out on his perilous journey, and, on arriving at the wrecked bridge, shouted over to two Russian sentries, explaining that he had been wounded and left behind after the fight at Haslemere, and requesting their assistance to enable him to cross. Believing him to be one of their infantry officers, they told him there were no means of crossing unless he could swim, as their engineers had sounded the canal before blowing up the bridge, and had found it twenty feet deep. Banerji Singh questioned them artfully as to the position of their column, which they said intended, in co-operation with a great force of French cavalry and infantry, to again attack Guildford at dawn; and further, they told him in confidence that the rearguard to which they belonged only numbered about two thousand men, who had halted for the night with the transport waggons on the Guildford road, about two miles north of Alfold. Then, after further confidences, they suggested that he should continue along the canal bank for about a mile and a half, where there was a bridge still intact, and near which he would find the rearguard. Thanking them, he withdrew into the falling gloom, and a quarter of an hour later entered the presence of his commanding officer, who, of course, was delighted with the information thus elicited. The Subadar had carefully noted all the features of the canal bank and broken bridge, and the valuable knowledge he had obtained was at once put to account, and the General at once formed his force into two divisions. Then, after issuing instructions for the following day, he gave orders for a bivouac for the night. The pioneers, however, were far from idle. During the night they worked with unflagging energy, quietly preparing a position for the guns to cover the contemplated passage at Loxwood Bridge, and before day broke the guns were mounted, and the Engineers were ready for action. As soon as there was sufficient light the laying of the pontoon commenced, but was at once noticed by the Russians, who opened fire, and very soon it was evident that information had been conveyed to the enemy's rearguard, and that they were returning to contest the passage. In the meantime one division of the Indians, setting out before daybreak, had been cautiously working round to the main road crossing the canal north of Alfold, and succeeded in getting over soon after the majority of the Russian rearguard had left for the assistance of the detachment at Loxwood Bridge, and, after a sharp, decisive fight, succeeded in capturing the whole of the transport waggons. The Engineers, with the Indians, had in the meantime succeeded in completing their pontoon under cover of the guns, and the second division of the Indians, dark-faced, daring fellows, rushed across to the opposite bank, and descended upon the enemy with frightful effect. In the hot engagement that followed, the Russians, now attacked in both front and rear, were totally annihilated, and thus the whole of the reserve ammunition of the force assaulting Guildford fell into our hands. This victory on the enemy's left flank caused the tide of events to turn in our favour, for the huge Russian and French columns that intended to again carry the hills from Dorking to Guildford were hampered by want of ammunition, and so vigorously did our Volunteers along the hills defend the repeated attacks, that the invaders were again driven back. Then, as they drew south to recover themselves, they were attacked on their left by a large body of our Regulars, and in the rear by the Indians and Australians. Over the country stretching across from Cranley through Ewhurst, Ockley, Capel, and Newdigate to Horley, the fighting spread, as each side struggled desperately for the mastery. The fate of England, nay, of our vast British Empire, was in the hands of those of her stalwart sons of many races who were now wielding valiantly the rifle and the sword. Through that blazing September day, while the people of London wailed among the ruins of their homes, and, breathlessly anxious, awaited news of their victory or their doom, the whole of East Kent, the southern portion of Surrey and northern Sussex, became one huge battlefield. Of the vast bodies of troops massed over hill and dale every regiment became engaged. The butchery was awful. CHAPTER XXXVIII. NAVAL BATTLE OFF DUNGENESS. On sea England was now showing the world how she still could fight. Following the desperate struggle off Sardinia, in which Italy had rendered us such valuable help, our Mediterranean Squadron attacked the French Fleet off Cape Tresforcas, on the coast of Morocco, and after a terrific battle, extending over two days, defeated them with heavy loss, several of the enemy's vessels being torpedoed and sunk, two of them rammed, and one so badly damaged that her captain ran her ashore on Alboran Island. After this hard-earned victory, our Squadron passed out of the Mediterranean, and, returning home, had joined hands with the battered remnant of our Channel Fleet, now reinforced by several vessels recalled from foreign stations. Therefore, while the enemy marched upon London, we had collected our naval strength on the south coast, and at length made a final descent upon the enemy in British waters. The British vessels that passed Beachy Head coming up Channel on the night of the bombardment of London included the _Empress of India_, _Inflexible_, _Nile_, _Trafalgar_, _Magnificent_, _Hood_, _Warspite_, _Dreadnought_, _Camperdown_, _Blenheim_, _Barham_, _Benbow_, _Monarch_, _Anson_, _Immortalité_, and _Royal Sovereign_, with four of the new cruisers built under the Spencer programme, viz. the _Terrible_, _Powerful_, _Doris_, and _Isis_, and a number of smaller vessels, torpedo boats, and "destroyers." At the same hour that our vessels were passing Beachy Head, the Coastguard at Sandwich Battery were suddenly alarmed by electric signals being flashed from a number of warships that were slowly passing the Gull Stream revolving light towards the Downs. The sensation these lights caused among the Coastguard and Artillery was immediately dispelled when it was discovered that the warships were not hostile, but friendly; that the Kaiser had sent a German Squadron, in two divisions, to assist us, and that these vessels were on their way to unite with our own Fleet. The first division, it was ascertained, consisted of the _Baden_, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Koester; the _Sachen_, commanded by Prince Henry of Prussia; the _Würtemberg_, and the _Bayern_--all of 7400 tons, and each carrying 18 guns and nearly 400 men; while the despatch boat _Pfeil_, the new dynamite cruiser _Trier_, and a number of torpedo boats, accompanied them. The second division, under Rear-Admiral von Diederichs on board the _König Wilhelm_, consisted of the _Brandenburg_, _Kürfurst Friedrich Wilhelm_, and _Woerth_, each of 10,300 tons, and carrying 32 guns; the _Deutschland_ and the _Friedrich der Grosse_, with the despatch vessel _Wacht_, and several torpedo gunboats and other craft. Before dawn, the British and German Fleets united near South Sand Head light, off the South Foreland, and it was decided to commence the attack without delay. Turning west again, the British ships, accompanied by those of the Emperor William, proceeded slowly down Channel in search of the enemy, which they were informed by signal had been sighted by the Coastguard at East Wear, near Folkestone, earlier in the night. Just as day broke, however, when the defenders were opposite Dymchurch, about eight miles from land, the enemy were discovered in force. Apparently the French and Russian Fleets had combined, and were preparing for a final descent upon Dover, or an assault upon the Thames defences; and it could be seen that, with both forces so strong, the fight would inevitably be one to the death. Little time was occupied in preliminaries. Soon our ships were within range in fighting formation in single column in line abreast, while the French, under Admiral le Bourgeois, advanced in single column in line ahead. The French flagship, leading, was within 2000 yards of the British line, and had not disclosed the nature of her attack. The enemy's Admiral had signalled to the ships astern of him to follow his motions together, as nearly as possible to concentrate their guns at point blank, right ahead, and to pour their shot on the instant of passing our ships. He had but three minutes to decide upon the attack, and as he apparently elected to pierce the centre of our line, the British had no time to counteract him. The French Admiral therefore continued his course, and as he passed between the _Camperdown_ and _Blenheim_, he discharged his guns, receiving the British broadsides and bow fire at the same time. In a few minutes, however, it was seen that the French attack had been frustrated, and as dawn spread the fighting increased, and the lines became broken. The ponderous guns of the battleships thundered, and ere long the whole of the great naval force was engaged in this final struggle for England's freedom. The three powerful French battleships, _Jauréguiberry_, _Jemappes_, and _Dévastation_, and the submarine torpedo boat _Gustave Zédé_, fiercely attacked the _Brandenburg_ and the _König Wilhelm_; while the _Camperdown_, _Anson_, _Dreadnought_, and _Warspite_ fought desperately with half a dozen of the enemy's battleships, all of which suffered considerably. Our torpedo boats, darting swiftly hither and thither, performed much effective service, and many smart manoeuvres were carried out by astute officers in command of those wasps of the sea. In one instance a torpedo boat, which had designs upon a Russian ironclad, obtained cover by sending in front of her a gunboat which emitted an immense quantity of dense smoke. This of course obscured from view the torpedo boat under the gunboat's stern, and those on board the Tsar's battleship pounded away at the gunboat, unconscious of the presence of the dangerous little craft. Just as the gunboat got level with the battleship, however, the torpedo boat emerged from the cloud of smoke, and, darting along, ejected its Whitehead with such precision that five minutes later the Russian leviathan sank beneath the dark green waters. Almost at the same moment, the new German dynamite cruiser destroyed a French cruiser, and a fierce and sanguinary encounter took place between the _Immortalité_ and the _Tréhouart_. The former's pair of 22-tonners, in combination with her ten 6-inch guns, wrought awful havoc on board the French vessel; nevertheless, from the turret of her opponent there came a deadly fire which spread death and destruction through the ship. Suddenly the Frenchman swung round, and with her quick-firing guns shedding a deadly storm of projectiles, came full upon the British vessel. The impact and the angle at which she was struck was not, however, sufficient to ram her, consequently the two vessels became entangled, and amid the rain of bullets the Frenchmen made a desperate attempt to board our ship. A few who managed to spring upon the _Immortalité's_ deck were cut down instantly, but a couple of hundred fully armed men were preparing to make a rush to overpower our bluejackets. On board the British cruiser, however, the enemy's intentions had been divined, and certain precautions taken. The _Fusiliers Marins_, armed with Lebels and cutlasses, suddenly made a desperate, headlong rush upon the British cruiser's deck, but just as fifty of them gained their goal, a great hose attached to one of the boilers was brought into play, and scalding water poured upon the enemy. This, in addition to some hand charges at that moment thrown, proved successful in repelling the attack; but just as the survivors retreated in disorder there was a dull explosion, and then it was evident, from the confusion on board the French ship, that she had been torpedoed by a German boat, and was sinking. Humanely, our vessel, the _Immortalité_ rescued the whole of her opponent's men ere she sank; but it was found that in the engagement her captain and half her crew had been killed. On every hand the fight continued with unabated fierceness; every gun was worked to its utmost capacity, and amid the smoke and din every vessel was swept from stem to stern. As morning wore on, the enemy met with one or two successes. Our two new cruisers _Terrible_ and _Powerful_ had been sunk by French torpedoes; the _Hood_ had been rammed by the _Amiral Baudin_, and gone to the bottom with nearly every soul on board; while the German despatch boat _Wacht_ had been captured, and seven of our torpedo boats had been destroyed. During the progress of the fight, the vessels came gradually nearer Dungeness, and at eleven o'clock they were still firing at each other, with appalling results on either side. At such close quarters did this great battle occur, that the loss of life was awful, and throughout the ships the destruction was widespread and frightful. About noon the enemy experienced two reverses. The French battleship _Formidable_ blew up with a terrific report, filling the air with débris, her magazine having exploded; while just at that moment the _Courbet_, whose 48-tonners had caused serious damage to the _Warspite_, was suddenly rammed and sunk by the _Empress of India_. This, the decisive battle, was the most vigorously contested naval fight during the whole of the hostilities. The scene was terrible. The steel leviathans of the sea were being rent asunder and pulverised by the terribly destructive modern arms, and amid the roar and crashing of the guns, shells were bursting everywhere, carrying away funnels, fighting tops, and superstructures, and wrecking the crowded spaces between the decks. Turrets and barbettes were torn away, guns dismounted by the enormous shells from heavy guns; steel armour was torn up and thrown aside like paper, and many shots entering broadsides, passed clean through and out at the other side. Whitehead torpedoes, carrying heavy charges of gun-cotton, exploded now and then under the enemy's ships; while both British and French torpedo boat "destroyers," running at the speed of an ordinary train, were sinking or capturing where they could. Through the dull, gloomy afternoon the battle continued. Time after time our ships met with serious reverses, for the _Anson_ was sunk by the Russian flagship _Alexander II._, assisted by two French cruisers, and this catastrophe was followed almost immediately by the torpedoing of the new British cruiser _Doris_, and the capture of the new German dynamite cruiser _Trier_. [Illustration: _H.M.S. Royal Sovereign._ _H.M.S. Camperdown._ _Amiral Baudin._ _Russian flagship blown up._ _H.M.S. Warspite._ _Cécille._ FINAL BATTLE OFF DUNGENESS: "THE SCENE OF DESTRUCTION WAS APPALLING."] By this time, however, the vessels had approached within three miles of Dungeness, and the _Camperdown_, _Empress of India_, _Royal Sovereign_, _Inflexible_, and _Warspite_, lying near one another, fought nine of the enemy's vessels, inflicting upon them terrible punishment. Shots from the 67-tonners of the _Empress of India_, _Royal Sovereign_, and _Camperdown_, combined with those from the 22-tonners of the _Warspite_, swept the enemy's vessels with devastating effect, and during the three-quarters of an hour that the fight between these vessels lasted, the scene of destruction was appalling. Suddenly, with a brilliant flash and deafening detonation, the Russian flagship _Alexander II._, one of the vessels now engaging the five British ships, blew up and sank, and ere the enemy could recover from the surprise this disaster caused them, the _Camperdown_ rammed the _Amiral Baudin_, while the _Warspite_ sank the French cruiser _Cécille_, the submarine boat _Gustave Zédé_, and afterwards captured the torpedo gunboat _Bombe_. This rapid series of terrible disasters apparently demoralised the enemy. They fought recklessly, and amid the din and confusion two Russian vessels collided, and were so seriously damaged that both settled down, their crews being rescued by British torpedo boats. Immediately afterwards, however, a frightful explosion rent the air with a deafening sound that dwarfed into insignificance the roar of the heavy guns, and the French battleship _Jauréguiberry_ was completely broken into fragments, scarcely any of her hull remaining. The enemy were amazed. A few moments later another explosion occurred, even louder than the first. For a second the French battleship _Dévastation_, which had been engaging the _Royal Sovereign_, was obscured by a brilliant flash, then, as fragments of steel and human limbs were precipitated on every side, it was seen that that vessel also had been completely blown out of the water! The enemy stood appalled. The defenders themselves were at first dumfounded. A few moments later, however, it became known throughout the British ships that the battery at Dungeness, two miles and a half distant, were rendering assistance with the new pneumatic gun, the secret of which the Government had guarded so long and so well. Five years before, this frightfully deadly weapon had been tested, and proved so successful that the one gun made was broken up and the plans preserved with the utmost secrecy in a safe at the War Office. Now, however, several of the weapons had been constructed, and one of them had been placed in the battery at Dungeness. The British vessels drew off to watch the awful effect of the fire from these marvellous and terribly destructive engines of modern warfare. The enemy would not surrender, so time after time the deafening explosions sounded, and time after time the hostile ships were shattered into fragments. Each shot fired by this new pneumatic gun contained 900 lbs. of dynamite, which could strike effectively at four miles! The result of such a charge exploding on a ship was appalling; the force was terrific, and could not be withstood by the strongest vessel ever constructed. Indeed, the great armoured vessels were being pulverised as easily as glass balls struck by bullets, and every moment hundreds of poor fellows were being hurled into eternity. At last the enemy discovered the distant source of the fire, and prepared to escape beyond range; but in this they were unsuccessful, for, after a renewed and terrific fight, in which three French ironclads were sunk and two of our cruisers were torpedoed, our force and our allies the Germans succeeded in capturing the remainder of the hostile ships and torpedo boats. The struggle had been frightful, but the victory was magnificent. That same night the British ships steamed along the Sussex coast and captured the whole of the French and Russian transports, the majority of which were British vessels that had been seized while lying in French and Russian ports at the time war was declared. The vessels were lying between Beachy Head and Selsey Bill, and by their capture the enemy's means of retreat were at once totally cut off. Thus, at the eleventh hour, the British Navy had shown itself worthy of its reputation, and England regained the supremacy of the seas. CHAPTER XXXIX. THE DAY OF RECKONING. The Day of Reckoning dawned. On land the battle was terrific; the struggle was the most fierce and bloody of any during the invasion. The British Regulars holding the high ground along from Crowborough to Ticehurst, and from Etchingham, through Brightling and Ashburnham, down to Battle, advanced in a huge fighting line upon the enemy's base around Eastbourne. The onslaught was vigorously repelled, and the battle across the Sussex Downs quickly became a most wild and sanguinary one; but as the day passed, although the defenders were numerically very weak, they nevertheless gradually effected terrible slaughter, capturing the whole of the enemy's stores, and taking nearly five thousand prisoners. In Kent the French had advanced from East Grinstead through Edenbridge, extending along the hills south of Westerham, and in consequence of these rapid successes the depôt of stores and ammunition which had been maintained at Sevenoaks was being removed to Bromley by rail; but as the officer commanding the British troops at Eynsford could see that it would most probably be impossible to get them all away before Sevenoaks was attacked, orders were issued that at a certain hour the remainder should be destroyed. The force covering the removal only consisted of two battalions of the Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex) Regiment and half a squadron of the 9th Lancers; but the hills north of Sevenoaks from Luddesdown through Stanstead, Otford, Shoreham, Halstead, Farnborough, and Keston were still held by our Volunteers. These infantry battalions included the 1st and 2nd Derbyshire Regiment (Sherwood Foresters), under Col. A. Buchanan, V.D., and Col. E. Hall, V.D.; the 1st Nottinghamshire, under Col. A. Cantrell-Hubbersty; the 4th Derbyshire, under Lord Newark; the 1st and 2nd Lincolnshire, under Col. J. G. Williams, V.D., and Col. R. G. Ellison; the 1st Leicestershire, under Col. S. Davis, V.D.; the 1st Northamptonshire, under Col. T. J. Walker, V.D.; the 1st and 2nd Shropshire Light Infantry, under Col. J. A. Anstice, V.D., and Col. R. T. Masefield; the 1st Herefordshire, under Col. T. H. Purser, V.D.; the 1st, 3rd, and 4th South Wales Borderers, under Col. T. Wood, Col. J. A. Bradney, and Col. H. Burton, V.D.; the 1st and 2nd Warwickshire, under Col. W. S. Jervis and Col. L. V. Loyd; the 1st and 2nd Welsh Fusiliers, under Col. C. S. Mainwaring and Col. B. G. D. Cooke, V.D.; the 2nd Welsh Regiment, under Col. A. P. Vivian, V.D.; the 3rd Glamorganshire, under Col. J. C. Richardson, V.D.; and the 1st Worcestershire, under Col. W. H. Talbot, V.D.; while the artillery consisted of the 3rd Kent, under Col. Hozier; the 1st Monmouthshire, under Col. C. T. Wallis; the 1st Shropshire and Staffordshire, under Col. J. Strick, V.D.; and the 5th Lancashire, under Col. W. H. Hunt. The events which occurred outside Sevenoaks are perhaps best described by Capt. A. E. Brown, of the 4th V.B. West Surrey Regiment, who was acting as one of the special correspondents of the _Standard_. He wrote-- "I was in command of a piquet consisting of fifty men of my regiment at Turvan's Farm, and about three hours before the time to destroy the remainder of the stores at Sevenoaks my sentries were suddenly driven in by the enemy, who were advancing from the direction of Froghall. As I had orders to hold the farm at any cost, we immediately prepared for action. Fortunately we had a fair supply of provisions and plenty of ammunition, for since War had broken out the place had been utilised as a kind of outlying fort, although at this time only my force occupied it. Our equipment included two machine guns, and it was mainly by the aid of these we were saved. "The strength of the attacking force appeared to be about four battalions of French infantry and a battalion of Zouaves, with two squadrons of Cuirassiers. Their intention was, no doubt, to cut the railway line near Twitton, and thus prevent the removal of the Sevenoaks stores. As soon as the cavalry scouts came within range we gave them a few sharp volleys, and those who were able immediately retired in disorder. Soon afterwards, however, the farm was surrounded, but I had previously sent information to our reserves, and suggested that a sharp watch should be kept upon the line from Twitton to Sevenoaks, for of course I could do nothing with my small force. Dusk was now creeping on, and as the enemy remained quiet for a short time it seemed as though they intended to assault our position when it grew dark. "Before night set in, however, my messenger, who had managed to elude the vigilance of the enemy, returned, with a letter from a brother officer stating that a great naval battle had been fought in the Channel; and further, that the enemy's retreat had been cut off, and that the Kentish defenders had already retaken the invaders' base at Eastbourne. If we could, therefore, still hold the Surrey Hills, there was yet a chance of thoroughly defeating the French and Russians, even though one strong body was reported as having taken Guildford and Leatherhead, and was now marching upon London. "As evening drew on we could hear heavy firing in the direction of Sevenoaks, but as we also heard a train running it became evident that we still held the station. Nevertheless, soon after dark there was a brilliant flash which for a second lit up the country around like day, and a terrific report followed. We knew the remainder of our stores and ammunition had been demolished in order that it should not fall into the enemy's hands! "Shortly afterwards we were vigorously attacked, and our position quickly became almost untenable by the dozens of bullets projected in every direction where the flash of our rifles could be seen. Very soon some of the farm outbuildings fell into the hands of the Frenchmen, and they set them on fire, together with a number of haystacks, in order to burn us out. This move, however, proved pretty disastrous to them, for the leaping flames quickly rendered it light as day, and showed them up, while at the same time flashes from our muzzles were almost invisible to them. Thus we were enabled to bring our two machine guns into action, and break up every party of Frenchmen who showed themselves. Away over Sevenoaks there was a glare in the sky, for the enemy were looting and burning the town. Meanwhile, however, our men who had been defending the place had retreated to Dunton Green after blowing up the stores, and there they re-formed and were quickly moving off in the direction of Twitton. Fortunately they had heard the commencement of the attack on us, and the commander, halting his force, had sent out scouts towards Chevening, and it appeared they reached us just at the moment the enemy had fired the stacks. They worked splendidly, and, after going nearly all round the enemy's position, returned and reported to their Colonel, who at once resolved to relieve us. "As may be imagined, we were in a most critical position by this time, especially as we were unaware that assistance was so near. We had been ordered to hold the farm, and we meant to do it as long as breath remained in our bodies. All my men worked magnificently, and displayed remarkable coolness, even at the moment when death stared us in the face. The reports of the scouts enabled their Colonel to make his disposition very carefully, and it was not long before the enemy were almost completely surrounded. We afterwards learnt that our reserves at Stockholm Wood had sent out a battalion, which fortunately came in touch with the survivors of the Sevenoaks force just as they opened a desperate onslaught upon the enemy. "With the fierce flames and blinding smoke from the burning stacks belching in our faces, we fought on with fire around us on every side. As the fire drew nearer to us the heat became intense, the showers of sparks galled us almost as much as the enemy's bullets, and some of us had our eyebrows and hair singed by the fierce flames. Indeed, it was as much as we could do to keep our ammunition from exploding; nevertheless we kept up our stream of lead, pouring volley after volley upon those who had attacked us. Nevertheless, with such a barrier of flame and obscuring smoke between us we could see but little in the darkness beyond, and we all knew that if we emerged from cover we should be picked off easily and not a man would survive. The odds were against us. More than twenty of my brave fellows had fired their last shot, and now lay with their dead upturned faces looking ghastly in the brilliant glare, while a number of others had sunk back wounded. The heat was frightful, the smoke stifling, and I had just given up all hope of relief, and had set my teeth, determined to die like an Englishman should, when we heard a terrific volley of musketry at close quarters, and immediately afterwards a dozen British bugles sounded the charge. The scene of carnage that followed was terrible. Our comrades gave one volley from their magazines rifles, and then charged with the bayonet, taking the enemy completely by surprise. "The Frenchmen tried to rally, but in vain, and among those huge burning barns and blazing ricks they all fell or were captured. Dozens of them struggled valiantly till the last; but, refusing to surrender, they were slaughtered amid a most frightful scene of blood and fire. The events of that night were horrible, and the true extent of the losses on both sides was only revealed when the flames died down and the parting clouds above heralded another grey and toilsome day." Late on the previous evening the advance guard of the enemy proceeding north towards Caterham came in touch with the defenders north of Godstone. The French cavalry had seized Red Hill Junction Station at sundown, and some of their scouts suddenly came upon a detached post of the 17th Middlesex Volunteers at Tyler's Green, close to Godstone. A very sharp skirmish ensued, but the Volunteers, although suffering severe losses, held their own, and the cavalry went off along the Oxted Road. This being reported to the British General, special orders were at once sent to Col. Trotter, the commander of this section of the outpost line. From the reports of the inhabitants and of scouts sent out in plain clothes, it was believed that the French intended massing near Tandridge, and that they would therefore wait for supports before attempting to break through our outpost line, which still remained intact from the high ground east of Leatherhead to the hills north of Sevenoaks. During the night Oxted and Godstone were occupied by the enemy, and early in the morning their advance guard, consisting of four battalions of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, a battalion of Zouaves, and a section of field artillery, proceeded north in two columns, one along the Roman road leading past Rook's Nest, and the other past Flinthall Farm. At the latter place the sentries of the 17th Middlesex fell back upon their piquets, and both columns of the enemy came into action simultaneously. The French infantry on the high road soon succeeded in driving back the Volunteer piquet upon the supports, under Lieut. Michaelis, stationed at the junction of the Roman road with that leading to Godstone Quarry. A strong barricade with two deep trenches in front had here been constructed, and as soon as the survivors of the piquet got under cover, two of the defenders' machine guns opened fire from behind the barricade, assisted at the same moment by a battery on Gravelly Hill. The French artillery had gone on towards Flinthall Farm, but in passing the north edge of Rook's Nest Park their horses were shot by some Inniskilling Fusiliers lying in ambush, and by these two reverses, combined with the deadly fire from the two machine guns at the farm, the column was very quickly thrown into confusion. It was then decided to make a counter attack, and the available companies at this section of the outpost line, under Col. Brown and Col. Roche, succeeded, after nearly two hours' hard fighting, in retaking Godstone and Oxted, compelling the few survivors of the enemy's advance guard to fall back to Blindley Heath. [Illustration: THE BATTLE OF CATERHAM: PLAN OF THE BRITISH POSITIONS.] In the meantime our troops occupying the line from Halstead to Chatham and Maidstone went down into battle, attacking the French right wing at the same time as the Indians were attacking their left, while the Volunteers from the Surrey Hills engaged the main body. The day was blazing hot, the roads dusty, and there was scarce a breath of wind. So hot, indeed, was it, that many on both sides fell from hunger, thirst, and sheer starvation. Yet, although the force of the invaders was nearly twice the numerical strength of the defenders, the latter fought on with undaunted courage, striking their swift, decisive blows for England and their Queen. The enemy, now driven into a triangle, fought with demoniacal strength, and that frenzied courage begotten of despair. On the hills around Sevenoaks and across to the valley at Otford, the slaughter of the French was fearful. Britons fighting for their homes and their country were determined that Britannia should still be Ruler of the World. From Wimlet Hill the enemy were by noon totally cut up and routed by the 12th Middlesex (Civil Service), under Lord Bury; the 25th (Bank), under Capt. W. J. Coe, V.D.; the 13th (Queen's), under Col. J. W. Comerford; the 21st Middlesex, under Col. H. B. Deane, V.D.; and the 22nd, under Col. W. J. Alt, V.D. Over at Oxted, however, they rallied, and some brilliant charges by Cossacks, the slaughter of a portion of our advance guard, and the capture of one of our Volunteer batteries on Botley Hill, checked our advance. The French, finding their right flank being so terribly cut up, had suddenly altered their tactics, and were now concentrating their forces upon the Volunteer position at Caterham in an endeavour to break through our defensive line. But the hills about that position held by the North London, West London, South London, Surrey, and Cheshire Brigades were well defended, and the General had his finger upon the pulse of his command. Most of the positions had been excellently chosen. Strong batteries were established at Gravelly Hill by the 9th Lancashire Volunteer Artillery, under Col. F. Ainsworth, V.D.; at Harestone Farm by the 1st Cinque Ports, under Col. P. S. Court, V.D.; at White Hill by the 1st Northumberland and the 1st Norfolk, under Col. P. Watts and Col. T. Wilson, V.D.; at Botley Hill by the 6th Lancashire, under Col. H. J. Robinson, V.D.; at Tandridge Hill by the 3rd Lancashire, under Col. R. W. Thom, V.D.; at Chaldon by the 1st Newcastle, under Col. W. M. Angus, V.D., who had come south after the victory at the Tyneside; at Warlingham village by the 1st Cheshire, commanded by Col. H. T. Brown, V.D.; at Warlingham Court by the 2nd Durham, under Col. J. B. Eminson, V.D.; on the Sanderstead road, near King's Wood, by the 2nd Cinque Ports, under Col. W. Taylor, V.D.; and on the railway near Woldingham the 1st Sussex had stationed their armoured train with 40-pounder breech-loading Armstrongs, which they fired very effectively from the permanent way. Through Limpsfield, Oxted, Godstone, Bletchingley, and Nutsfield, towards Reigate, Frenchmen and Britons fought almost hand to hand. The defenders suffered severely, owing to the repeated charges of the French Dragoons along the highway between Oxted and Godstone, nevertheless the batteries of the 6th Lancashire on Tandridge Hill, which commanded a wide area of country occupied by the enemy, wrought frightful execution in their ranks. In this they were assisted by the 17th Middlesex, under Col. W. J. Brown, V.D., who with four Maxims at one period of the fight surprised and practically annihilated a whole battalion of French infantry. But into this attack on Caterham the enemy put his whole strength, and from noon until four o'clock the fighting along the valley was a fierce combat to the death. With every bit of cover bristling with magazine rifles, and every available artillery position shedding forth a storm of bullets and shell, the loss of life was awful. Invaders and defenders fell in hundreds, and with burning brow and dry parched throat expired in agony. The London Irish, under Col. J. Ward, V.D.; the Post Office Corps, under Col. J. Du Plat Taylor, V.D., and Col. S. R. Thompson, V.D.; the Inns of Court, under Col. C. H. Russell, V.D.; and the Cyclists, led by Major T. De B. Holmes, performed many gallant deeds, and served their country well. The long, dusty highways were quickly covered with the bodies of the unfortunate victims, who lay with blanched, bloodless faces and sightless eyes turned upward to the burning sun. On over them rode madly French cavalry and Cossacks, cutting their way into the British infantry, never to return. Just, however, as they prepared for another terrific onslaught, the guns of the 1st Cheshire battery at Warlingham village thundered, and with smart section volleys added by detachments of the London Scottish, under Major W. Brodie, V.D., and the Artists, under Capt. W. L. Duffield and Lieut. Pott, the road was in a few minutes strewn with horses and men dead and dying. Still onward there rushed along the valley great masses of French infantry, but the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Volunteer Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, under Col. G. C. Clark, V.D., Col. A. L. Keller, and Col. L. Whewell respectively; the 2nd V. B. Middlesex Regiment, under Col. G. Brodie Clark, V.D.; the 3rd Middlesex, under Col. R Hennell, D.S.O., late of the Indian Army; and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th West Surrey, under Col. J. Freeland, V.D., Col. G. Drewitt, V.D., Col. S. B. Bevington, V.D., and Col. F. W. Haddan, V.D., engaged them, and by dint of desperate effort, losing heavily all the time, they defeated them, drove them back, and slaughtered them in a manner that to a non-combatant was horrible and appalling. Time after time, the enemy, still being harassed by the British Regulars on their right, charged up the valley, in order to take the battery at Harestone Farm; but on each occasion few of those who dashed forward survived. The dusty roads, the grassy slopes, and the ploughed lands were covered with corpses, and blood draining into the springs and rivulets tinged their crystal waters. As afternoon passed and the battle continued, it was by no means certain that success in this fierce final struggle would lie with us. Having regard to the enormous body of invaders now concentrated on the Surrey border, and striving by every device to force a passage through our lines, our forces, spread over such a wide area and outflanking them, were necessarily weak. It was therefore only by the excellent tactics displayed by our officers, and the magnificent courage of the men themselves, that we had been enabled to hold back these overwhelming masses, which had already desolated Sussex with fire and sword. Our Regulars operating along the old Roman highway through Blindley Heath--where the invaders were making a desperate stand--and over to Lingfield, succeeded, after very hard fighting, in clearing the enemy off the railway embankment from Crowhurst along to South Park Farm, and following them up, annihilated them. Gradually, just at sundown, a strong division of the enemy were outflanked at Godstone, and, refusing to lay down their arms, were simply swept out of existence, scarcely a single man escaping. Thus forced back from, perhaps, the most vulnerable point in our defences, the main body of the enemy were then driven away upon Redhill, still fighting fiercely. Over Redstone Hill, through Mead Vale, and across Reigate Park to the Heath, the enemy were shot down in hundreds by our Regulars; while our Volunteers, whose courage never deserted them, engaged the French in hand-to-hand encounters through the streets of Redhill and Reigate, as far as Underhill Park. In Hartswood a company of the 4th East Surrey Rifles, under Major S. B. Wheaton, V.D., were lying in ambush, when suddenly among the trees they caught glimpses of red, baggy trousers, and scarlet, black-tasselled fezes, and a few seconds later they found that a large force of Zouaves were working through the wood. A few moments elapsed, and the combat commenced. The Algerians fought like demons, and with bullet and bayonet inflicted terrible punishment upon us; but as they emerged into the road preparatory to firing a volley into the thickets, they were surprised by a company of the 2nd Volunteer Battalion of the East Surrey Regiment, under Capt. Pott, who killed and wounded half their number, and took the remainder prisoners. Gradually our Volunteer brigades occupying the long range of hills united with our Regulars still on the enemy's right from Reigate to Crawley, and closed down upon the foe, slowly narrowing the sphere of their operations, and by degrees forcing them back due westward. Russians and French, who had attacked Dorking, had by this time been defeated with heavy loss, and by dusk the main body had been thrown back to Newdigate, where in Reffold's Copse one or two very sanguinary encounters occurred. These, however, were not always in our favour, for the Civil Service Volunteers here sustained very heavy losses. On the railway embankment, and on the road running along the crest of the hill to Dorking, the French made a stand, and there wrought frightful execution among our men with their machine guns. Around Beare Green, Trout's Farm, and behind the "White Hart" at Holmwood, the enemy rapidly brought their guns into play, and occupied such strong strategic positions that as night drew on it became evident that they intended to remain there until the morrow. The defenders had but little cover, and consequently felt the withering fire of the French very severely. The latter had entrenched themselves, and now in the darkness it was difficult for our men to discern their exact position. Indeed, the situation of our forces became very serious and unsafe as night proceeded; but at length, about ten o'clock, a strong force of British Regulars, including the Sikhs and a detachment of Australians, swept along the road from Dorking, and came suddenly upon the French patrols. These were slaughtered with little resistance, and almost before the enemy were aware of it, the whole position was completely surrounded. Our men then used their field search-lights with very great advantage; for, as the enemy were driven out into the open, they were blinded by the glare, and fell an easy prey to British rifles; while the Frenchmen's own machine guns were turned upon them with frightful effect, their battalions being literally mowed down by the awful hail of bullets. CHAPTER XL. "FOR ENGLAND!" Through the whole night the battle still raged furiously. The enemy fought on with reckless, unparalleled daring. Chasseurs and Zouaves, Cuirassiers, Dragoons, and infantry from the Loire and the Rhone struggled desperately, contesting every step, and confident of ultimate victory. But the enemy had at last, by the splendid tactics of the defenders, been forced into a gradually contracting square, bounded by Dorking and Guildford in the north, and Horsham and Billinghurst in the south, and soon after midnight, with a concentric movement from each of the four corners, British Regulars and Volunteers advanced steadily upon the foe, surrounding and slaughtering them. The horrors of that night were frightful; the loss of life on every hand enormous. Britannia had husbanded her full strength until this critical moment; for now, when the fate of her Empire hung upon a single thread, she sent forth her valiant sons, who fell upon those who had desecrated and destroyed their homes, and wreaked a terrible vengeance. Through the dark, sultry hours this awful destruction of life continued with unabated fury, and many a Briton closed with his foe in death embrace, or fell forward mortally wounded. Of British heroes there were many that night, for true pluck showed itself everywhere, and Englishmen performed many deeds worthy their traditions as the most courageous and undaunted among nations. [Illustration: BRITISH BLUEJACKETS MARCHING THROUGH THE STRAND AFTER THE VICTORY.] Although the French Commander-in-chief had been killed, yet the enemy still fought on tenaciously, holding their ground on Leith Hill and through Pasture Wood to Wotton and Abinger, until at length, when the saffron streak in the sky heralded another blazing day, the straggling, exhausted remnant of the once-powerful legions of France and Russia, perspiring, dust-covered, and bloodstained, finding they stood alone, and that the whole of Sussex and Surrey had been swept and their comrades slaughtered, laid down their arms and eventually surrendered. After these three breathless days of butchery and bloodshed England was at last victorious! In this final struggle for Britain's freedom the invader had been crushed and his power broken; for, thanks to our gallant citizen soldiers, the enemy that had for weeks overrun our smiling land like packs of hungry wolves, wantonly burning our homes and massacring the innocent and unprotected, had at length met with their well-merited deserts, and now lay spread over the miles of pastures, cornfields, and forests, stark, cold, and dead. Britain had at last vanquished the two powerful nations that had sought by ingenious conspiracy to accomplish her downfall. Thousands of her brave sons had, alas! fallen while fighting under the British flag. Many of the principal streets of her gigantic capital were only parallel lines of gaunt, blackened ruins, and many of her finest cities lay wrecked, shattered, and desolate; yet this terrible ordeal had happily not weakened her power one iota, nor had she been ousted from her proud position as chief among the mighty Empires of the world. Three days after the great and decisive battle of Caterham, the British troops, with their compatriots from the Cape, Australia, Canada, and India, entered London triumphantly, bringing with them some thousands of French and Russian prisoners. In the streets, as, ragged and dusty, Britain's defenders passed through on their way to a great Open-Air Thanksgiving Service in Hyde Park, there were scenes of the wildest enthusiasm. With heartfelt gratitude, the people, scrambling over the débris heaped each side of the streets, cheered themselves hoarse; the men grasping the hands of Volunteers and veterans, and the women, weeping for joy, raising the soldiers' hands to their lips. The glad tidings of victory caused rejoicings everywhere. England, feeling herself free, breathed again. In every church and chapel through the United Kingdom special Services of Thanksgiving for deliverance from the invaders' thrall were held, while in every town popular fêtes were organised, and delighted Britons gaily celebrated their magnificent and overwhelming triumph. In this disastrous struggle between nations France had suffered frightfully. Paris, bombarded and burning, capitulated on the day following the battle of Caterham, and the legions of the Kaiser marched up the Boulevards with their brilliant cavalry uniforms flashing in the sun. Over the Hotel de Ville, the Government buildings on the Quai d'Orsay, and the Ministries of War and Marine, the German flag was hoisted, and waved lazily in the autumn breeze, while the Emperor William himself had an interview with the French President at the Elysée. That evening all France knew that Paris had fallen. In a few days England was already shipping back to Dieppe and Riga her prisoners of war, and negotiations for peace had commenced. As security against any further attempts on England, Italian troops were occupying the whole of Southern France from Grenoble to Bordeaux; and the Germans, in addition to occupying Paris, had established their headquarters in Moghilev, and driven back the Army of the Tsar far beyond the Dnieper. From both France and Russia, Germany demanded huge indemnities, as well as a large tract of territory in Poland, and the whole of the vast Champagne country from Givet, on the Belgian frontier, down to the Sâone. Ten days later France was forced to accept the preliminaries of a treaty which we proposed. This included the cession to us of Algiers, with its docks and harbour, so that we might establish another naval station in the Mediterranean, and the payment of an indemnity of £250,000,000. Our demands upon Russia at the same time were that she should withdraw all her troops from Bokhara, and should cede to us the whole of that portion of the Trans-Caspian territory lying between the mouths of the Oxus and Kizil Arvat, thence along the Persian frontier to Zulfikai, along the Afghan frontier to Karki, and from there up the bank of the Oxus to the Aral Sea. This vast area of land included the cities of Khiva and Merv, the many towns around Kara Khum, the country of the Kara Turkomans, the Tekeh and the Yomuts, and the annexation of it by Britain would effectually prevent the Russians ever advancing upon India. Upon these huge demands, in addition to the smaller ones by Italy and Austria, a Peace Conference was opened at Brussels without delay, and at length France and her Muscovite ally, both vanquished and ruined, were compelled to accept the proposals of Britain and Germany. Hence, on November 16th, 1897, the Treaty of Peace was signed, and eight days later was ratified. Then the huge forces of the Kaiser gradually withdrew into Germany, and the soldiers of King Humbert recrossed the Alps, while we shipped back the remainder of our prisoners, reopened our trade routes, and commenced rebuilding our shattered cities. CHAPTER XLI. DAWN. A raw, cold December morning in London. With the exception of a statuesque sentry on the Horse Guards' Parade, the wide open space was deserted. It had not long been light, and a heavy yellow mist still hung over the grass in St. James's Park. A bell clanged mournfully. Big Ben chimed the hour, and then boomed forth eight o'clock. An icy wind swept across the gravelled square. The bare, black branches of the stunted trees creaked and groaned, and the lonely sentry standing at ease before his box rubbed his hands and shivered. Suddenly a side door opened, and there emerged a small procession. Slowly there walked in front a clergyman bare-headed, reciting with solemn intonation the Burial Service. Behind him, with unsteady step and bent shoulders, a trembling man with blanched, haggard face, and a wild look of terror in his dark, deep-sunken eyes. He wore a shabby morning-coat tightly buttoned, and his hands in bracelets of steel were behind his back. Glancing furtively around at the grey dismal landscape, he shuddered. Beside and behind him soldiers tramped on in silence. The officer's sword grated along the gravel. Suddenly a word of command caused them to halt against a wall, and a sergeant, stepping forward, took a handkerchief and tied it over the eyes of the quivering culprit, who now stood with his back against the wall. Another word from the officer, and the party receded some distance, leaving the man alone. The monotonous nasal utterances of the chaplain still sounded as four privates advanced, and, halting, stood in single rank before the prisoner. [Illustration: EXECUTION OF VON BEILSTEIN ON THE HORSE GUARDS' PARADE.] They raised their rifles. There was a momentary pause. In the distance a dog howled dismally. A sharp word of command broke the quiet. Then, a second later, as four rifles rang out simultaneously, the condemned man tottered forward and fell heavily on the gravel, shot through the heart. It was the spy and murderer, Karl von Beilstein! He had been brought from Glasgow to London in order that certain information might be elicited from him, and after his actions had been thoroughly investigated by a military court, he had been sentenced to death. The whole of his past was revealed by his valet Grevel, and it was proved that, in addition to bringing the great disaster upon England, he had also betrayed the country whose roubles purchased his cunningly-obtained secrets. Geoffrey Engleheart, although gallantly assisting in the fight outside Leatherhead, and subsequently showing conspicuous bravery during the Battle of Caterham, fortunately escaped with nothing more severe than a bullet wound in the arm. During the searching private inquiry held at the Foreign Office after peace was restored, he explained the whole of the circumstances, and was severely reprimanded for his indiscretion; but as no suspicion of von Beilstein's real motive had been aroused prior to the Declaration of War, and as it was proved that Geoffrey was entirely innocent of any complicity in the affair, he was, at the urgent request of Lord Stanbury, allowed to resume his duties. Shortly afterwards he was married to Violet Vayne, and Sir Joseph, having recovered those of his ships that had been seized by the Russian Government, was thereby enabled to give his daughter a handsome dowry. The young French clerk who had been engaged at the Admiralty, and who had committed murder for gold, escaped to Spain, and, after being hunted by English and Spanish detectives for many weeks, he became apparently overwhelmed by remorse. Not daring to show himself by day, nor to claim the money that had been promised him, he had tramped on through the snow from village to village in the unfrequented valleys of Lerida, while his description was being circulated throughout the Continent. Cold, weary, and hungry, he one night entered the Posada de las Pijorras at the little town of Oliana, at the foot of the Sierra del Cadi. Calling for wine, he took up a dirty crumpled copy of the Madrid _Globo_, three days old. A paragraph, headed "The Missing Spy," caught his eyes, and, reading eagerly, he found to his dismay that the police were aware that he had been in Huesca a week before, and were now using bloodhounds to track him! The paper fell from his nerveless grasp. The wine at his elbow he swallowed at one gulp, and, tossing down his last real upon the table, he rose and stumbled away blindly into the darkness. When the wintry dawn spread in that silent, distant valley, it showed a corpse lying in the snow with face upturned. In the white wrinkled brow was a small dark-blue hole from which blood had oozed over the pallid cheek, leaving an ugly stain. The staring eyes were wide open, with a look of unutterable horror in them, and beside the thin clenched hand lay a revolver, one chamber of which had been discharged! * * * * * The dreary gloom of winter passed, and there dawned a new era of prosperity for England. Dark days were succeeded by a period of happiness and rejoicing, and Britannia, grasping her trident again, seated herself on her shield beside the sea, Ruler of the Waves, Queen of Nations, and Empress of the World. THE END. MORRISON AND GIBB, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH. _Ready shortly, price 6s._ Demy 8vo, handsomely bound in cloth gilt. ZORAIDA. _A ROMANCE OF THE HAREM AND THE DESERT._ BY WILLIAM LE QUEUX, F.R.G.S., AUTHOR OF "THE GREAT WAR IN 1897." _PROFUSELY ILLUSTRATED BY H. PIFFARD._ * * * * * _Ready shortly, price 6s._ THE TOWER ROMANCE LIBRARY. VOL. I. A TORQUAY MARRIAGE. A NEW MODERN NOVEL OF TO-DAY. BY G. RAYLEIGH VICARS AND EDITH VICARS. * * * * * _Ready shortly, price 6s._ VOL. II. IN QUEST OF A NAME. BY MRS. HENRY WYLDE. * * * * * _Ready shortly._ Demy 8vo, handsomely bound in cloth, price 6s. _With numerous Illustrations by E. S. Hope._ THE OUTLAWS OF THE AIR. BY GEORGE GRIFFITH, AUTHOR OF "THE ANGEL OF THE REVOLUTION," "OLGA ROMANOFF," ETC. * * * * * _Now ready. Picture Cover. Price 1s._ BLOOD IS THICKER THAN WATER. _A POLITICAL DREAM._ BY GEOFFREY DANYERS. A Vision of the Reunited Anglo-Saxondom asserting the Dominion of the Sea. _Now ready. Eleventh Edition. Price 6s._ THE GREAT WAR IN ENGLAND IN 1897. BY WILLIAM LE QUEUX, F.R.G.S. _With Numerous Illustrations by T. S. Crowther and Captain C. Field, and Nine Military Maps._ * * * * * The Opinions of some Great Authorities. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, writing to the Author, says: "Such books cannot fail to have a good effect in inducing people to think more seriously of the necessity which lies upon the whole country to always be prepared, and to be more openhanded in giving money for the means of defence." FIELD MARSHAL LORD WOLSELEY says: "A pleasure to peruse it." THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY says: "It is very realistic and interesting." LORD GEORGE HAMILTON says: "It is very striking and original." SIR C. DILKE says: "I think it is most valuable as tending to make people realise how little we are prepared for war." * * * * * Opinions of the London Press. _The Times_ says: "Everything that can spice a sensational volume." _The Morning Post_ says: "Few works can compare in stirring incidents or careful elaboration of detail.... A great deal of what he forecasts would be very likely to occur if once England were in the clutches of a strong enemy, and in the matter of description wherein the tumult and carnage is brought vividly before the reader.... A clever and exciting book." _The Standard_ says: "Full of excitement and realism." _The Globe_ says: "It is vigorous and rousing.... Will do a public service." _The Sun_ says: "Mr. Le Queux' narrative is well and spiritedly written." _The Evening News_ says: "Mr. Le Queux has succeeded in a very difficult task. He has brought home to us the dangers we expose ourselves if we neglect to maintain our Army and Navy in an adequate state of efficiency." _The Daily Graphic_ says: "Various essays have been made to forecast the next great European war, but Mr. William Le Queux' volume is certainly the most comprehensive and thrilling of anything yet attempted. Regarded simply as a work of fiction, it is exciting enough to satisfy the most enthusiastic lover of 'blood and thunder' literature. In its more serious aspect--and it is this aspect, of course, which the author desires for it--this book certainly evidences serious thought.... It is all very graphic and very thrilling, especially the bombardment of London by the Russians, and the author has not scrupled to avail himself of the latest, even of the future, resources of science." _Naval and Military Record_ says: "Mr. Le Queux has special qualifications for the task. He knows a great deal of our Army and Navy, and he is familiar with continental systems and sentiment. The narrative is lively and spirited, and the author writes with an air of conviction which is calculated to carry the reader on from beginning to end." _Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette_ says: "Mr. Le Queux is a vivid writer, and his work gives evidence of care and thoroughness. The chapter dealing with the march of the French on London is particularly fine. The author's production is the best of the kind we have come across for some time. It should emphasise our old contention as to the unreadiness for active service on a prolonged campaign of the sea and land forces of the Empire." _Army and Navy Gazette_ says: "The story is a capital one, full of interest and incident, well sustained and well told." _The Idler_ says: "Mr. Le Queux writes brilliantly, sensibly, and with a thorough mastery of his subject." _The Sketch_ says: "No novel of the day comes up to Mr. Le Queux' 'Great War in England in 1897' for excitement. From the preface to the last paragraph he has kept up his prophetic heroics in magnificent style, and if his patriotism does not scatter our indifference to our insular defences, why, then, nothing will. It is really a terrifying book. Mr. Le Queux has power to shake one's nerves as he foretells fights and slaughters in peaceful suburbs." _The World_ says: "It serves to bring home in a very realistic fashion the horrors of a war brought into our very midst." _To-Day_ says: "A mastery of military and naval details is displayed with conception and execution." _The Review of Reviews_ says: "The story is useful as a warning, and is worked out with much knowledge." _The Gentlewoman_ says: "Once having started, I couldn't lay it down till I had made an end thereto." _The Literary World_ says: "It is undoubtedly one of the books of the year. It is so ingenious and so exciting, it is at once extremely technical and extremely readable. The book is a great book, and one that no Englishman could read without a thrill." _The Publishers' Circular_ says: "Mr. Le Queux shows us what will happen if we do not better prepare ourselves." * * * * * Read what the Country Press say. _Manchester Evening News_ says: "Lovers of exciting literature will be satisfied to the full with the graphic story." _Liverpool Daily Mercury_ says: "Extremely interesting, and well worth reading." _Liverpool Daily Chronicle_ says:--"The story is full of stirring episode." _Birmingham Daily Post_ says: "The scenes are marked with real and affecting power." _Sheffield Daily Telegraph_ says: "We offer criticism in no carping spirit, but as part of our grateful acknowledgment for a brilliant, patriotic, and useful work." _Yorkshire Post_ says: "Well calculated to make the nervous tremble at every rumour of foreign complications." _The Scotsman_ says: "Strategical and other problems are elaborately worked out.... Amusing, entertaining, and exciting." _The North British Mail_ says: "It is a very powerful work." _Glasgow Herald_ says: "One of the best books we have read on a subject on which it is only too easy to be tiresome." _Glasgow Evening News_ says: "Whether as a romance or as a prophecy it is highly interesting." _The Western Morning News_ says: "Very exciting reading. Of real literary merit." _Bradford Daily Argus_ says: "Full of interesting and exciting reading." * * * * * Read what the Foreign and Colonial Press say. _Sydney Daily Telegraph_ says: "The writer's capability to speak regarding his subject is displayed on every page of the book. It is splendidly written." _The Belgian News_ says: "The book is a remarkable and a phenomenal success." The _Palladium_ (Newhaven, Conn.) says: "One of the most successful books of the season." "Il Capitano Nemo," the well-known Italian naval writer, in _L'Opinione_ of Rome, says that the problems put forward by Mr. Le Queux should secure the serious consideration of European Governments. "It is unquestionably a most important book," he says; "it is of interest to everyone, and the minuteness of its detail is astonishing. I can recommend it to the Italian public as a very startling yet highly instructive book." _The Italia Marinara_ says: "It is not a mere fantastic romance; it is a book to study seriously, and we recommend it to the Army and Navy of Italy, for it contains many valuable hints." _Il Secolo_ says: "A very remarkable and important work. There is genius in every line. The descriptions are most realistic, and it is of interest to everybody." _The China Telegraph_ says it is "of really intense and thrilling interest." _Now ready. Sixth Edition. Price 6s._ Demy 8vo, handsomely bound in cloth gilt. THE CAPTAIN OF THE MARY ROSE. _A TALE OF TO-MORROW._ BY W. LAIRD CLOWES, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE. With 60 Illustrations by the Chevalier de Martino and Fred. T. Jane. * * * * * This work has been truly described by the public press as an intensely realistic and stirring romance of the near future. It describes the wonderful adventures of an armour-clad cruiser, built on the Tyne, which takes part in a great Naval War that suddenly breaks out between France and Great Britain. The dashing way in which the vessel is handled, her narrow escapes, the boldness of her successful attacks upon the enemy, and the heroic conduct of her commander and crew, form altogether a narrative of most absorbing interest, and full of exciting scenes and situations. * * * * * THE FOLLOWING ARE A FEW PRESS OPINIONS. "Deserves something more than a mere passing notice."--_The Times._ "Full of exciting situations.... Has manifold attractions for all sorts of readers."--_Army and Navy Gazette._ "The most notable book of the season."--_The Standard._ "A clever book. Mr. Clowes is pre-eminent for literary touch and practical knowledge of naval affairs."--_Daily Chronicle._ "Mr. W. Laird Clowes' exciting story."--_Daily Telegraph._ "We read 'The Captain of the Mary Rose' at a sitting."--_The Pall Mall Gazette._ "Written with no little spirit and imagination.... A stirring romance of the future."--_Manchester Guardian._ "Is of a realistic and exciting character.... Designed to show what the naval warfare of the future may be."--_Glasgow Herald._ "One of the most interesting volumes of the year."--_Liverpool Journal of Commerce._ "It is well told and magnificently illustrated."--_United Service Magazine._ "Full of absorbing interest."--_Engineers Gazette._ "Is intensely realistic, so much so that after commencing the story every one will be anxious to read to the end."--_Dundee Advertiser._ "The book is splendidly illustrated."--_Northern Whig._ _Ninth Edition, Price 6s._ Demy 8vo, handsomely bound in cloth gilt. _Uniform with "The Captain of the Mary Rose," with numerous Illustrations by Fred T. Jane and Edwin S. Hope._ THE ANGEL OF THE REVOLUTION. A TALE OF THE COMING TERROR. BY GEORGE GRIFFITH. * * * * * In this Romance of Love, War, and Revolution, the action takes place ten years hence, and turns upon the solution of the problem of aerial navigation, which enables a vast Secret Society to decide the issue of the coming world-war, for which the great nations of the earth are now preparing. Battles such as have hitherto only been vaguely dreamed of are fought on land and sea and in the air. Aerial navies engage armies and fleets and fortresses, and fight with each other in an unsparing warfare, which has for its prize the empire of the world. Unlike all other essays in prophetic fiction, it deals with the events of to-morrow, and with characters familiar in the eyes of living men. It marks an entirely new departure in fiction, and opens up possibilities which may become stupendous and appalling realities before the present generation of men has passed away. * * * * * _A FEW PRESS OPINIONS._ "Since the days of the Arabian Nights' Entertainments, we know of no writer who 'takes the cake' like Mr. George Griffith."--_Daily Chronicle._ "A really exciting and sensational romance."--_Literary World._ "As a work of imagination it takes high rank."--_Belfast News Letter._ "Full of absorbing interest."--_Barrow Herald._ "This powerful story."--_Liverpool Mercury._ "An entirely new departure in fiction."--_Reynolds' Newspaper._ "Of exceptional brilliancy and power."--_Western Figaro._ "This remarkable story."--_Weekly Times and Echo._ "There is a fascination about his book that few will be able to resist."--_Birmingham Gazette._ "This exciting romance."--_Licensing World._ "A work of strong imaginative power."--_Dundee Courier._ "We must congratulate the author upon the vividness and reality with which he draws his unprecedented pictures."--_Bristol Mercury._ "Is quite enthralling."--_Glasgow Herald._ "A striking and fascinating novel."--_Hampshire Telegraph._ Demy 8vo, handsomely bound in cloth, price 6s. _With Frontispiece by Edwin S. Hope._ OLGA ROMANOFF; Or, The Syren of the Skies. BY GEORGE GRIFFITH, AUTHOR OF "THE ANGEL OF THE REVOLUTION," "THE OUTLAWS OF THE AIR." * * * * * Dedicated to Mr. HIRAM S. MAXIM. * * * * * A sequel to the author's striking and successful romance. _The Angel of the Revolution_, describing the efforts of a beautiful daughter of the House of Romanoff to restore the throne of her ancestors destroyed in the World-War of 1904, and presenting to the reader the spectacle of a world transformed into a wonderland of art and science, yet trembling on the brink of a catastrophe, in comparison with which even the tremendous climax of _The Angel_ sinks almost into insignificance. * * * * * SOME PRESS OPINIONS. "Mr. George Griffith has made himself a high reputation as an imaginative novelist by his brilliant romances, _The Angel of the Revolution_ and _The Syren of the Skies_."--_Sketch._ "This is quite as imaginative, as clever, and as enthralling a book as its predecessor."--_Glasgow Herald._ "The book is a wild one, but its wildness and imaginative boldness make it uncommonly interesting."--_Scotsman._ "The flights of fancy and imagination displayed by the author show a most marvellous power and conception."--_Aberdeen Free Press._ "An entrancing book."--_Birmingham Post._ "Full of originality in its rendition.... A marvel of imaginative strength and picturesque pen painting."--_European Mail._ "On the whole Mr. Griffith has published a work which to our mind is the most suggestive of its kind that has been published for many years."--_Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette._ "The work hardly lends itself to critical remark other than the expression of one's appreciation of an imaginative and glowing style likely to add to the pleasure of those who enjoy purely speculative fiction. These pictures have a weird splendour in keeping with the theme, but it is natural to desire a better future for the human race than the one here prophesied."--_Morning Post._ "His theme is a more tremendous one, and the incidents of his story tenfold more terrible than even those awful battles in the former volume. There is the same swift succession of awful calamities, the same sustained interest from title page to cover, and the same thread of human love running through the narrative which lent its chief charm to the 'Angel of the Revolution.'"--_Weekly Times and Echo._ "By lovers of sensational writing, in which the scientific discoveries of the future are forecast, and intrigue and warfare related in realistic manner under conditions which now exist but in prophetic imagination, it will be warmly welcomed.... The book must be read to be appreciated. Description is impossible."--_Bradford Daily Argus._ * * * * * Transcriber's Notes Obvious punctuation errors repaired. Hyphens removed: muzzle[-]loaders (p. 127), look[-]out (p. 164), short[-]sightedness (p. 176), blood[-]stained (p. 325). p. 67: "Termius" changed to "Terminus" (over the débris in Terminus Road). p. 72: "Halsted" changed to "Halstead" (Surrey to Halstead in Kent). p. 92: "crusier" changed to "cruiser" (the unarmoured cruiser _Faucon_). p. 119: "thousand" changed to "thousands" (thousands fleeing into the country). p. 159: "fusilade" changed to "fusillade" (commenced a terrific fusillade). p. 160: "momemt" changed to "moment" (Our situation at that moment). p. 240: "Hundred" changed to "Hundreds" (Hundreds of tons). p. 257: "evacute" changed to "evacuate" (to evacuate Edinburgh). p. 316: "detatched" changed to "detached" (came upon a detached post). 
36155	----	Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this file which includes the original illustrations. See 36155-h.htm or 36155-h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/36155/36155-h/36155-h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/36155/36155-h.zip) Transcriber's note: Text enclosed by equal signs was in bold face in the original (=bold=). Characters enclosed by curly braces after a carat character were superscripted in the original (example: 13^{th}). [Illustration: THE GREAT FIGHT.] THE INVASION by WM. LE QUEUX LONDON: GEORGE NEWNES, LTD. PREFACE. "I sometimes despair of the country ever becoming alive to the danger of the unpreparedness of our present position until too late to prevent some fatal catastrophe." This was the keynote of a solemn warning made in the House of Lords by Earl Roberts. His lordship, whilst drawing attention to our present inadequate forces, strongly urged that action should be taken in accordance with the recommendations of the Elgin Commission that "no military system could be considered satisfactory which did not contain powers of expansion outside the limit of the regular forces of the Crown." "The lessons of the late war appear to have been forgotten. The one prevailing idea seems to be," said Earl Roberts, "to cut down our military expenditure without reference to our increased responsibilities and our largely augmented revenue. History tells us in the plainest terms that an Empire which cannot defend its own possessions must inevitably perish." And with this view both Lord Milner and the Marquis of Lansdowne concurred. But surely this is not enough. If we are to retain our position as the first nation of the world we must be prepared to defend any raid made upon our shores. The object of this book is to illustrate our utter unpreparedness for war from a military standpoint; to show how, under certain conditions which may easily occur, England can be successfully invaded by Germany; and to present a picture of the ruin which must inevitably fall upon us on the evening of that not far-distant day. Ever since Lord Roberts formulated his plans for the establishment of rifle-clubs I have been deeply interested in the movement: and after a conversation with that distinguished soldier the idea occurred to me to write a forecast, based upon all the available military knowledge--which would bring home to the British public vividly and forcibly what really would occur were an enemy suddenly to appear in our midst. At the outset it was declared by the strategists I consulted to be impossible. No such book could ever be written, for, according to them, the mass of technical detail was far too great to digest and present in an intelligible manner to the public. Lord Roberts, however, gave me encouragement. The skeleton scheme of the manner in which England could be invaded by Germany was submitted to a number of the highest authorities on strategy, whose names, however, I am not permitted to divulge, and after many consultations, much criticism, and considerable difference of opinion, the "general idea," with amendment after amendment, was finally adopted. That, however, was only a mere preliminary. Upon questions of tactics each tactician consulted held a different view, and each criticised adversely the other's suggestions. One way alone remained open--namely, to take the facts exactly as they stood, add the additional strength of the opposing nations as they at present are, and then draw logical conclusions. This, aided by experts, was done: and after many days of argument with the various authorities, we succeeded in getting them in accord as to the general practicability of an invasion. Before putting pen to paper it was necessary to reconnoitre carefully the whole of England from the Thames to the Tyne. This I did by means of a motor-car, travelling 10,000 miles of all kinds of roads, and making a tour extending over four months. Each town, all the points of vantage, military positions, all the available landing places on the coast, all railway connections, and telephone and telegraph communications, were carefully noted for future reference. With the assistance of certain well-known military experts, the battlefields were carefully gone over and the positions marked upon the Ordnance map. Thus, through four months we pushed on day by day collecting information and material, sometimes in the big cities, sometimes in the quietest and remotest hamlets, all of which was carefully tabulated for use. Whatever critics may say, and however their opinions may differ, it can only be pointed out, first, that the "general idea" of the scheme is in accordance with the expressed and published opinions of the first strategists of to-day, and that, as far as the forecast of events is concerned, it has been written from a first-hand knowledge of the local colour of each of the scenes described. The enemy's Proclamations reproduced are practically copies of those issued by the Germans during the war of 1870. That the experts and myself will probably be condemned as alarmists and denounced for revealing information likely to be of assistance to an enemy goes without saying. Indeed, an attempt was made in the House of Commons to suppress its publication altogether. Mr. R. C. Lehmann, who asked a question of the Prime Minister, declared that it was "calculated to prejudice our relations with the other Powers," while the late Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, in a subsequent letter apologising to me for condemning in the House a work he had not read, repeated that it was likely to "produce irritation abroad and might conceivably alarm the more ignorant public at home." Such a reflection, cast by the late Prime Minister upon the British nation was, to say the least, curious, yet it only confirmed the truth that the Government are strenuously seeking to conceal from our people the appalling military weakness and the consequent danger to which the country is constantly open. To be weak is to invite war: to be strong is to prevent it. To arouse our country to a sense of its own lamentable insecurity is the object of this volume, which is somewhat compressed from the form in which it originally appeared, and that other nations besides ourselves are interested in England's grave peril is proved by the fact that it has already been published in the German, French, Spanish, Danish, Russian, Italian, and even Japanese languages. WILLIAM LE QUEUX. Speaking in the House of Lords on the 10th July 1905, I said:--"It is to the people of the country I appeal to take up the question of the Army in a sensible practical manner. For the sake of all they hold dear, let them bring home to themselves what would be the condition of Great Britain if it were to lose its wealth, its power, its position." The catastrophe that may happen if we still remain in our present state of unpreparedness is visibly and forcibly illustrated in Mr. Le Queux's new book which I recommend to the perusal of every one who has the welfare of the British Empire at heart. 29. Nov. 1905 Roberts, FM THE INVASION. BOOK I. THE ATTACK. CHAPTER I. THE SURPRISE. Two of the myriad of London's nightworkers were walking down Fleet Street together soon after dawn on Sunday morning, 2nd September. The sun had not yet risen. That main artery of London traffic, with its irregular rows of closed shops and newspaper offices, was quiet and pleasant in the calm, mystic light before the falling of the smoke-pall. Only at early morning does the dear old City look its best; in that one quiet, sweet hour when the night's toil has ended and the day's has not yet begun. Only in that brief interval at the birth of day, when the rose tints of the sky glow slowly into gold, does the giant metropolis repose--at least, as far as its business streets are concerned--for at five o'clock the toiling millions begin to again pour in from all points of the compass, and the stress and storm of London at once recommences. And in that hour of silent charm the two grey-bearded sub-editors, though engaged in offices of rival newspapers were making their way homeward to Dulwich to spend Sunday in a well-earned rest, and were chatting "shop," as Press men do. "I suppose you had the same trouble to get that Yarmouth story through?" asked Fergusson, the news-editor of the "Dispatch," as they crossed Whitefriars Street. "We got about half a column, and then the wire shut down." "Telegraph or telephone?" inquired Baines, who was four or five years younger than his friend. "We were using both--to make sure." "So were we. It was a rattling good story--the robbery was mysterious, to say the least--but we didn't get more than half of it. Something's wrong with the line, evidently," Baines said. "If it were not such a perfect autumn morning, I should be inclined to think there'd been a storm somewhere." "Yes--funny, wasn't it?" remarked the other. "A shame we haven't the whole story, for it was a first-class one, and we wanted something. Did you put it on the contents-bill?" "No, because we couldn't get the finish. I tried in every way--rang up the Central News, P.A., Exchange Telegraph Company, tried to get through to Yarmouth on the trunk, and spent half an hour or so pottering about, but the reply from all the agencies, from everywhere, in fact, was the same--the line was interrupted." "Just our case. I telephoned to the Post Office, but the reply came back that the lines were evidently down." "Well, it certainly looks as though there'd been a storm, but----" and Baines glanced at the bright, clear sky overhead, just flushed by the bursting sun--"there are certainly no traces of it." "There's often a storm on the coast when it's quite still in London, my dear fellow," remarked his friend wisely. "That's all very well. But when all communication with a big place like Yarmouth is suddenly cut off, as it has been, I can't help suspecting that something has happened which we ought to know." "You're perhaps right, after all," Fergusson said. "I wonder if anything has happened. We don't want to be called back to the office, either of us. My assistant, Henderson, whom I've left in charge, rings me up over any mare's nest. The trunk telephones all come into the Post Office Exchange up in Carter Lane. Why not look in there before we go home? It won't take us a quarter of an hour, and we have several trains home from Ludgate Hill." Baines looked at his watch. Like his companion, he had no desire to be called back to his office after getting out to Dulwich, and yet he was in no mood to go making reporter's inquiries. "I don't think I'll go. It's sure to be nothing, my dear fellow," he said. "Besides, I have a beastly headache. I had a heavy night's work. One of my men is away ill." "Well, at any rate, I think I'll go," Fergusson said. "Don't blame me if you get called back for a special edition with a terrible storm, great loss of life, and all that sort of thing. So long." And, smiling, he waved his hand and parted from his friend in the booking office of Ludgate Hill Station. Quickening his pace, he hurried through the office, and, passing out by the back, ascended the steep, narrow street until he reached the Post Office Telephone Exchange in Carter Lane, where, presenting his card, he asked to see the superintendent-in-charge. Without much delay he was shown upstairs into a small private office, into which came a short, dapper, fair-moustached man with the bustle of a man in a great hurry. "I've called," the sub-editor explained, "to know whether you can tell me anything regarding the cause of the interruption of the line to Yarmouth a short time ago. We had some important news coming through, but were cut off just in the midst of it, and then we received information that all the telephone and telegraph lines to Yarmouth were interrupted." "Well, that's just the very point which is puzzling us at this moment," was the night-superintendent's reply. "It is quite unaccountable. Our trunk going to Yarmouth seems to be down, as well as the telegraphs. Yarmouth, Lowestoft, and beyond Beccles seem all to have been suddenly cut off. About eighteen minutes to four the operators noticed something wrong, switched the trunks through to the testers, and the latter reported to me in due course." "That's strange! Did they all break down together?" "No. The first that failed was the one that runs through Chelmsford, Colchester, and Ipswich up to Lowestoft and Yarmouth. The operator found that he could get through to Ipswich and Beccles. Ipswich knew nothing, except that something was wrong. They could still ring up Beccles, but not beyond." As they were speaking, there was a tap at the door, and the assistant night-superintendent entered, saying: "The Norwich line through Scole and Long Stratton has now failed, sir. About half-past four Norwich reported a fault somewhere north, between there and Cromer. But the operator now says that the line is apparently broken, and so are all the telegraphs from there to Cromer, Sheringham, and Holt." "Another line has gone, then!" exclaimed the superintendent-in-charge, utterly astounded. "Have you tried to get on to Cromer by the other routes--through Nottingham and King's Lynn, or through Cambridge?" "The testers have tried every route, but there's no response." "You could get through to some of the places--Yarmouth, for instance--by telegraphing to the Continent, I suppose?" asked Fergusson. "We are already trying," responded the assistant superintendent. "What cables run out from the east coast in that neighbourhood?" inquired the sub-editor quickly. "There are five between Southwold and Cromer--three run to Germany, and two to Holland," replied the assistant. "There's the cable from Yarmouth to Barkum, in the Frisian Islands; from Happisburg, near Mundesley, to Barkum; from Yarmouth to Emden; from Lowestoft to Haarlem, and from Kessingland, near Southwold, to Zandyport." "And you are trying all the routes?" asked his superior. "I spoke to Paris myself an hour ago and asked them to cable by all five routes to Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Kessingland, and Happisburg," was the assistant's reply. "I also asked Liverpool Street Station and King's Cross to wire down to some of their stations on the coast, but the reply was that they were in the same predicament as ourselves--their lines were down north of Beccles, Wymondham, East Dereham, and also south of Lynn. I'll just run along and see if there's any reply from Paris. They ought to be through by this time, as it's Sunday morning, and no traffic." And he went out hurriedly. "There's certainly something very peculiar," remarked the superintendent-in-charge to the sub-editor. "If there's been an earthquake or an electrical disturbance, then it is a most extraordinary one. Every single line reaching to the coast seems interrupted." "Yes. It's uncommonly funny," Fergusson remarked. "I wonder what could have happened. You've never had a complete breakdown like this before?" "Never. But I think----" The sentence remained unfinished, for his assistant returned with a slip of paper in his hand, saying: "This message has just come in from Paris, I'll read it. 'Superintendent Telephones, Paris, to Superintendent Telephones, London.--Have obtained direct telegraphic communication with operators of all five cables to England. Haarlem, Zandyport, Barkum, and Emden all report that cables are interrupted. They can get no reply from England, and tests show that cables are damaged somewhere near English shore.'" "Is that all?" asked Fergusson. "That's all. Paris knows no more than we do," was the assistant's response. "Then the Norfolk and Suffolk coasts are completely isolated--cut off from post office, railways, telephones, and cables!" exclaimed the superintendent. "It's mysterious--most mysterious!" And, taking up the instrument upon his table, he placed a plug in one of the holes down the front of the table itself, and a moment later was in conversation with the official in charge of the traffic at Liverpool Street, repeating the report from Paris, and urging him to send light engines north from Wymondham or Beccles into the zone of the mystery. The reply came back that he had already done so, but a telegram had reached him from Wymondham to the effect that the road-bridges between Kimberley and Hardingham had apparently fallen in, and the line was blocked by débris. Interruption was also reported beyond Swaffham, at a place called Little Dunham. "Then even the railways themselves are broken!" cried Fergusson. "Is it possible that there has been a great earthquake?" "An earthquake couldn't very well destroy all five cables from the Continent," remarked the superintendent gravely. The latter had scarcely placed the receiver upon the hook when a third man entered--an operator who, addressing him, said: "Will you please come to the switchboard, sir? There's a man in the Ipswich call office who has just told me a most extraordinary story. He says that he started in his motor-car alone from Lowestoft to London at half-past three this morning, and just as it was getting light he was passing along the edge of Henham Park, between Wangford village and Blythburgh, when he saw three men apparently repairing the telegraph wires. One was up the pole, and the other two were standing below. As he passed he saw a flash, for, to his surprise, one of the men fired point-blank at him with a revolver. Fortunately, the shot went wide, and he at once put on a move and got down into Blythburgh village, even though one of his tyres went down. It had probably been pierced by the bullet fired at him, as the puncture was unlike any he had ever had before. At Blythburgh he informed the police of the outrage, and the constable, in turn, woke up the postmaster, who tried to telegraph back to the police at Wrentham, but found that the line was interrupted. Was it possible that the men were cutting the wires, instead of repairing them? He says that after repairing the puncture he took the village constable and three other men on his car and went back to the spot, where, although the trio had escaped, they saw that wholesale havoc had been wrought with the telegraphs. The lines had been severed in four or five places, and whole lengths tangled up into great masses. A number of poles had been sawn down, and were lying about the roadside. Seeing that nothing could be done, the gentleman remounted his car, came on to Ipswich, and reported the damage at our call office." "And is he still there?" exclaimed the superintendent quickly, amazed at the motorist's statement. "Yes. I asked him to wait for a few moments in order to speak to you, sir." "Good. I'll go at once. Perhaps you'd like to come also, Mr. Fergusson?" And all three ran up to the gallery, where the huge switchboards were ranged around, and where the night operators, with the receivers attached to one ear, were still at work. In a moment the superintendent had taken the operator's seat, adjusted the ear-piece, and was in conversation with Ipswich. A second later he was speaking with the man who had actually witnessed the cutting of the trunk line. While he was thus engaged an operator at the farther end of the switchboard suddenly gave vent to a cry of surprise and disbelief. "What do you say, Beccles? Repeat it," he asked excitedly. Then a moment later he shouted aloud: "Beccles says that German soldiers--hundreds of them--are pouring into the place! The Germans have landed at Lowestoft, they think." All who heard those ominous words sprang up dumbfounded, staring at each other. The assistant-superintendent dashed to the operator's side and seized his apparatus. "Halloa--halloa, Beccles! Halloa--halloa--halloa!" The response was some gruff words in German, and the sound of scuffling could distinctly be heard. Then all was silent. Time after time he rang up the small Suffolk town, but in vain. Then he switched through to the testers, and quickly the truth was plain. The second trunk line to Norwich, running from Ipswich by Harleston and Beccles, had been cut farther towards London. But what held everyone breathless in the trunk telephone headquarters was that the Germans had actually effected the surprise landing that had so often in recent years been predicted by military critics; that England on that quiet September Sunday morning had been attacked. England was actually invaded. It was incredible! Yet London's millions in their Sunday morning lethargy were in utter ignorance of the grim disaster that had suddenly fallen upon the land. Fergusson was for rushing at once back to the "Dispatch" office to get out an extraordinary edition, but the superintendent, who was still in conversation with the motorist, urged judicious forethought. "For the present, let us wait. Don't let us alarm the public unnecessarily. We want corroboration. Let us have the motorist up here," he suggested. "Yes," cried the sub-editor. "Let me speak to him." Over the wire Fergusson begged the stranger to come at once to London and give his story, declaring that the military authorities would require it. Then, just as the man who had been shot at by German advance spies--for such they had undoubtedly been--in order to prevent the truth leaking out, gave his promise to come to town at once, there came over the line from the coastguard at Southwold a vague, incoherent telephone message regarding strange ships having been seen to the northward, and asking for connection with Harwich; while King's Cross and Liverpool Street Stations both rang up almost simultaneously, reporting the receipt of extraordinary messages from King's Lynn, Diss, Harleston, Halesworth, and other places. All declared that German soldiers were swarming over the north, that Lowestoft and Beccles had been seized, and that Yarmouth and Cromer were isolated. Various stationmasters reported that the enemy had blown up bridges, taken up rails, and effectually blocked all communication with the coast. Certain important junctions were already held by the enemy's outposts. Such was the amazing news received in that high-up room in Carter Lane, City, on that sweet, sunny morning when all the great world of London was at peace, either still slumbering or week-ending. Fergusson remained for a full hour and a half at the Telephone Exchange, anxiously awaiting any further corroboration. Many wild stories came over the wires telling how panic-stricken people were fleeing inland away from the enemy's outposts. Then he took a hansom to the "Dispatch" office, and proceeded to prepare a special edition of his paper--an edition containing surely the most amazing news that had ever startled London. Fearing to create undue panic, he decided not to go to press until the arrival of the motorist from Ipswich. He wanted the story of the man who had actually seen the cutting of the wires. He paced his room excitedly, wondering what effect the news would have upon the world. In the rival newspaper offices the report was, as yet, unknown. With journalistic forethought he had arranged that at present the bewildering truth should not leak out to his rivals, either from the railway termini or from the telephone exchange. His only fear was that some local correspondent might telegraph from some village or town nearer the metropolis which was still in communication with the central office. Time passed very slowly. Each moment increased his anxiety. He had sent out the one reporter who remained on duty to the house of Colonel Sir James Taylor, the Permanent Under-Secretary for War. Halting before the open window, he looked up and down the street for the arriving motor-car. But all was quiet. Eight o'clock had just boomed from Big Ben, and London still remained in her Sunday morning peace. The street, bright in the warm sunshine, was quite empty, save for a couple of motor-omnibuses and a sprinkling of gaily dressed holiday-makers on their way to the day excursion trains. In that centre of London--the hub of the world--all was comparatively silent, the welcome rest after the busy turmoil that through six days in the week is unceasing, that fevered throbbing of the heart of the world's great capital. Of a sudden, however, came the whirr-r of an approaching car, as a thin-faced, travel-stained man tore along from the direction of the Strand and pulled up before the office. The fine car, a six-cylinder "Napier," was grey with the mud of country roads, while the motorist himself was smothered until his goggles had been almost entirely covered. Fergusson rushed out to him, and a few moments later the pair were in the upstairs room, the sub-editor swiftly taking down the motorist's story, which differed very little from what he had already spoken over the telephone. Then, just as Big Ben chimed the half-hour, the echoes of the half-deserted Strand were suddenly awakened by the loud, strident voices of the newsboys shouting: "'Dispatch,' spe-shall! Invasion of England this morning! Germans in Suffolk! Terrible panic! Spe-shall! 'Dispatch,' Spe-shall!" As soon as the paper had gone to press Fergusson urged the motorist--whose name was Horton, and who lived at Richmond--to go with him to the War Office and report. Therefore, both men entered the car, and as they did so a man jumped from a hansom in breathless haste. He was the reporter whom Fergusson had sent out to Sir James Taylor's house in Cleveland Square, Hyde Park. "They thought Sir James spent the night with his brother up at Hampstead," he exclaimed. "I've been there, but find that he's away for the week-end at Chilham Hall, near Buckden." "Buckden! That's on the Great North Road!" cried Horton, "We'll go at once and find him. Sixty miles from London. We can be there under two hours!" And a few minutes later the pair were tearing due north, turning at last into the handsome lodge-gates of Chilham Park, and running up the great elm avenue, drew up before the main door of the ancient hall, a quaint many-gabled old place of grey stone. A few moments later the breathless journalist faced the Permanent Under-Secretary with the news that England was invaded--that the Germans had actually effected a surprise landing on the east coast. Sir James and his host stood speechless. Like others, they at first believed the pale-faced, bearded sub-editor to be a lunatic, but a few moments later, when Horton briefly repeated the story, they saw that, whatever might have occurred, the two men were at least in deadly earnest. "Impossible!" cried Sir James. "We should surely have heard something of it if such were actually the case. The coastguard would have telephoned the news instantly. Besides, where is our fleet?" "The Germans evidently laid their plans with great cleverness. Their spies, already in England, cut the wires at a pre-arranged hour last night," declared Fergusson. "They sought to prevent this gentleman from giving the alarm by shooting him. All the railways to London are already either cut or held by the enemy. One thing, however, is clear--fleet or no fleet, the east coast is entirely at their mercy." Host and guest exchanged dark glances. "Well, if what you say is the actual truth," exclaimed Sir James, "to-day is surely the blackest day that England has ever known." "Yes, they should have listened to Lord Roberts," snapped his lordship. "I suppose you'll go at once, Taylor, and make inquiries?" "Of course," responded the Permanent Secretary. And a quarter of an hour later, accepting Horton's offer, he was sitting in the car as it headed back towards London. Could the journalist's story be true? As he sat there, with his head bent against the wind and the mud splashing into his face, Sir James recollected too well the repeated warnings of the past five years, serious warnings by men who knew our shortcomings, but to which no attention had been paid. Both the Government and the public had remained apathetic, the idea of peril had been laughed to scorn, and the country had, ostrich-like, buried its head in the sand, and allowed Continental nations to supersede us in business, in armaments, in everything. The danger of invasion had always been ridiculed as a mere alarmist's fiction; those responsible for the defence of the country had smiled, the Navy had been reduced, and the Army had remained in contented inefficiency. If the blow had really been struck by Germany? If she had risked three or four, out of her twenty-three, army corps, and had aimed at the heart of the British Empire? What then? Ay! what then? As the car glided down Regent Street into Pall Mall and towards Whitehall, Sir James saw on every side crowds discussing the vague but astounding reports now published in special editions of all the Sunday papers, and shouted wildly everywhere. Boys bearing sheets fresh from the Fleet Street presses were seized, and bundles torn from them by excited Londoners eager to learn the latest intelligence. Around both War Office and Admiralty great surging crowds were clamouring loudly for the truth. Was it the truth, or was it only a hoax? Half London disbelieved it. Yet from every quarter, from the north and from across the bridges, thousands were pouring in to ascertain what had really occurred, and the police had the greatest difficulty in keeping order. In Trafalgar Square, where the fountains were plashing so calmly in the autumn sunlight, a shock-headed man mounted the back of one of the lions and harangued the crowd with much gesticulation, denouncing the Government in the most violent terms; but the orator was ruthlessly pulled down by the police in the midst of his fierce attack. It was half-past two o'clock in the afternoon. The Germans had already been on English soil ten hours, yet London was in ignorance of where they had actually landed, and utterly helpless. CHAPTER II. EFFECT IN THE CITY. Monday, 3rd September, 1910, was indeed Black Monday for London. By midnight on Sunday the appalling news had spread everywhere. Though the full details of the terrible naval disasters were not yet to hand, yet it was vaguely known that our ships had been defeated in the North Sea, and many of them sunk. Before 7 a.m. on Monday, however, telegrams reaching London by the subterranean lines from the north gave thrilling stories of frightful disasters we had, while all unconscious, suffered at the hands of the German fleet. With London, the great cities of the north, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, and Birmingham, awoke utterly dazed. It seemed incredible. And yet the enemy had, by his sudden and stealthy blow, secured command of the sea and actually landed. The public wondered why a formal declaration of war had not previously been made, ignorant of the fact that the declaration preceding the Franco-German War was the first made by any civilised nation prior to the commencement of hostilities for one hundred and seventy years. The peril of the nation was now recognised on every hand. Eager millions poured into the City by every train from the suburbs and towns in the vicinity of the Metropolis, anxious to ascertain the truth for themselves, pale with terror, wild with excitement, indignant that our land forces were not already mobilised and ready to move eastward to meet the invader. As soon as the banks were opened there was a run on them, but by noon the Bank of England had suspended all specie payments. The other banks, being thus unable to meet their engagements, simply closed the doors, bringing business to an abrupt standstill. Consols stood at 90 on Saturday, but by noon on Monday were down to 42--lower even than they were in 1798, when they stood at 47-1/4. Numbers of foreigners tried to speculate heavily, but were unable to do so, for banking being suspended they could not obtain transfers. On the Stock Exchange the panic in the afternoon was indescribable. Securities of every sort went entirely to pieces, and there were no buyers. Financiers were surprised that no warning in London had betrayed the position of affairs, London being the money centre of the world. Prior to 1870 Paris shared with London the honour of being the pivot of the money market, but on the suspension of cash payments by the Bank of France during the Franco-German War, Paris lost that position. Had it not been that the milliards comprising the French War indemnity were intact in golden louis in the fortress of Spandau, Germany could never have hoped to wage sudden war with Great Britain before she had made Berlin independent of London in a money sense, or, at any rate, to accumulate sufficient gold to carry on the war for at least twelve months. The only way in which she could have done this was to raise her rate so as to offer better terms than London. Yet directly the Bank of England discovered the rate of exchange going against her, and her stock of gold diminishing, she would have responded by raising the English bank-rate in order to check the flow. Thus competition would have gone on until the rates became so high that all business would be checked, and people would have realised their securities to obtain the necessary money to carry on their affairs. Thus, no doubt, the coming war would have been forecasted had it not been for Germany's already prepared war-chest, which the majority of persons have nowadays overlooked. Its possession had enabled Germany to strike her sudden blow, and now the Bank of England, which is the final reserve of gold in the United Kingdom, found that as notes were cashed so the stock of gold diminished until it was in a few hours compelled to obtain from the Government suspension of the Bank charter. This enabled the Bank to suspend cash payment, and issue notes without a corresponding deposit of the equivalent in gold. The suspension, contrary to increasing the panic, had, curiously enough the immediate effect of somewhat allaying it. Plenty of people in the City were confident that the blow aimed could not prove an effective one, and that the Germans, however many might have landed, would quickly be sent back again. Thus many level-headed business men regarded the position calmly, believing that when our command of the sea was again re-established, as it must be in a day or two, the enemy would soon be non-existent. Business outside the money market was, of course, utterly demoralised. The buying of necessities was now uppermost in everyone's mind. Excited crowds in the streets caused most of the shops in the City and West End to close, while around the Admiralty were great crowds of eager men and women of all classes, tearful wives of bluejackets jostling with officers' ladies from Mayfair and Belgravia, demanding news of their loved ones--inquiries which, alas! the casualty office were unable to satisfy. The scene of grief, terror, and suspense was heartrending. Certain ships were known to have been sunk with all on board after making a gallant fight, and those who had husbands, brothers, lovers, or fathers on board wept loudly, calling upon the Government to avenge the ruthless murder of their loved ones. In Manchester, in Liverpool, indeed, all through the great manufacturing centres of the north, the excitement of London was reflected. In Manchester there was a panic "on 'Change," and the crowd in Deansgate coming into collision with a force of mounted police, some rioting occurred, and a number of shop windows broken, while several agitators who attempted to speak in front of the infirmary were at once arrested. Liverpool was the scene of intense anxiety and excitement, when a report was spread that German cruisers were about the estuary of the Mersey. It was known that the coal staithes, cranes, and petroleum tanks at Penarth, Cardiff, Barry, and Llanelly had been destroyed; that Aberdeen had been bombarded; and there were rumours that, notwithstanding the mines and defences of the Mersey, the city of Liverpool, with all its crowd of valuable shipping, was to share the same fate. The whole place was in a ferment. By eleven o'clock the stations were crowded by women and children sent by the men away into the country--anywhere from the doomed and defenceless city. The Lord Mayor vainly endeavoured to inspire confidence, but telegrams from London, announcing the complete financial collapse, only increased the panic. In London all through the morning, amid the chaos of business in the City, the excitement had been steadily growing, until shortly after three o'clock the "Daily Mail" issued a special edition containing a copy of a German proclamation which, it was said, was now posted everywhere in East Norfolk, East Suffolk, and in Maldon in Essex, already occupied by the enemy. The original proclamation had been found pasted by some unknown hand upon a barn door near the town of Billericay, and had been detached and brought to London in a motor-car by a correspondent. It showed plainly the German intention was to deal a hard and crushing blow, and it struck terror into the heart of London, for it read as will be seen on next page. Upon the walls of the Mansion House, the Guildhall, outside the Bank of England, the Royal Exchange, upon the various public buildings within the city wards, and westward beyond Temple Bar, proclamations were being posted. Indeed, upon all the hoardings in Greater London appeared various broadsheets side by side. One by the Chief Commissioner of Police, regulating the traffic in the streets, and appealing to the public to assist in the preservation of order; and a Royal Proclamation, brief but noble, urging every Briton to do his duty, to take his part in the defence of King and country, and to unfurl the banner of the British Empire that had hitherto carried peace and civilisation in every quarter of the world. Germany, whose independence had been respected, had attacked us without provocation; therefore hostilities were, alas, inevitable. When the great poster printed in big capitals and headed by the Royal Arms made its appearance it was greeted with wild cheering. It was a message of love from King to people--a message to the highest and to the lowest. Posted in Whitechapel at the same hour as in Whitehall, the throngs crowded eagerly about it and sang "God Save our Gracious King," for if they had but little confidence in the War Office and Admiralty, they placed their trust in their Sovereign, the first diplomat in Europe. Therefore the loyalty was spontaneous, as it always is. They read the royal message, and cheered and cheered again. As evening closed in yet another poster made its appearance in every city, town, and village in the country, a poster issued by military and police officers, and naval officers in charge of dockyards--the order for mobilisation. PROCLAMATION. WE, GENERAL COMMANDING THE 3rd GERMAN ARMY, HAVING SEEN the proclamation of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor William, King of Prussia, Chief of the Army, which authorises the generals commanding the different German Army Corps to establish special measures against all municipalities and persons acting in contradiction to the usages of war, and to take what steps they consider necessary for the well-being of the troops. HEREBY GIVE PUBLIC NOTICE: (1) THE MILITARY JURISDICTION is hereby established. It applies to all territory of Great Britain occupied by the German Army, and to every action endangering the security of the troops by rendering assistance to the enemy. The Military Jurisdiction will be announced and placed vigorously in force in every parish by the issue of this present proclamation. (2) ANY PERSON OR PERSONS NOT BEING BRITISH SOLDIERS, or not showing by their dress that they are soldiers: (a) SERVING THE ENEMY as spies; (b) MISLEADING THE GERMAN TROOPS when charged to serve as guides; (c) SHOOTING, INJURING, OR ROBBING any person belonging to the German Army, or forming part of its personnel; (d) DESTROYING BRIDGES OR CANALS, damaging telegraphs, telephones, electric light wires, gasometers, or railways, interfering with roads, setting fire to munitions of war, provisions, or quarters established by German troops; (e) TAKING ARMS against the German troops, =WILL BE PUNISHED BY DEATH.= IN EACH CASE the officer presiding at the Council of War will be charged with the trial, and pronounce judgment. Councils of War may not pronounce ANY OTHER CONDEMNATION SAVE THAT OF DEATH. THE JUDGMENT WILL BE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED. (3) TOWNS OR VILLAGES in the territory in which the contravention takes place will be compelled to pay indemnity equal to one year's revenue. (4) THE INHABITANTS MUST FURNISH necessaries for the German troops daily as follows:-- 1 lb. 10 oz. bread. 13 oz. meat. 3 lb. potatoes. 1 oz. tea. 1-1/2 oz. tobacco or 5 cigars. 1/2 pint wine. 1-1/2 pints beer, or 1 wine-glassful of brandy or whisky. The ration for each horse:-- 13 lb. oats. 3 lb. 6 oz. hay. 3 lb. 6 oz. straw. (ALL PERSONS WHO PREFER to pay an indemnity in money may do so at the rate of 2s. per day per man.) (5) COMMANDERS OF DETACHED corps have the right to requisition all that they consider necessary for the well-being of their men, and will deliver to the inhabitants official receipts for goods so supplied. WE HOPE IN CONSEQUENCE that the inhabitants of Great Britain will make no difficulty in furnishing all that may be considered necessary. (6) AS REGARDS the individual transactions between the troops and the inhabitants, we give notice that one German mark shall be considered the equivalent to one English shilling. =The General Commanding the Ninth German Army Corps, VON KRONHELM.= Beccles, _September the Third, 1910_. [Illustration: THE ENEMY'S FAMOUS PROCLAMATION.] The public, however, little dreamed of the hopeless confusion in the War Office, in the various regimental depôts throughout the country, at headquarters everywhere, and in every barracks in the kingdom. The armed forces of England were passing from a peace to a war footing; but the mobilisation of the various units--namely, its completion in men, horses, and material--was utterly impossible in the face of the extraordinary regulations which, kept a strict secret by the Council of Defence until this moment, revealed a hopeless state of things. The disorder was frightful. Not a regiment was found fully equipped and ready to march. There was a dearth of officers, equipment, horses, provisions--of, indeed, everything. Men had guns without ammunition; cavalry and artillery were without horses; engineers only half equipped; volunteers with no transport whatever; balloon sections without balloons, and searchlight units vainly trying to obtain the necessary instruments. Horses were being requisitioned everywhere. The few horses that, in the age of motor-cars, now remained on the roads in London were quickly taken for draught, and all horses fit to ride were commandeered for the cavalry. During the turmoil daring German spies were actively at work south of London. The Southampton line of the London and South-Western Railway was destroyed--with explosives placed by unknown hands--by the bridge over the Wey, near Weybridge, being blown up; and again that over the Mole, between Walton and Esher, while the Reading line was cut by the great bridge over the Thames at Staines being destroyed. The line, too, between Guildford and Waterloo, was also rendered impassable by the wreck of the midnight train, which was blown up half-way between Wansborough and Guildford, while in several other places nearer London bridges were rendered unstable by dynamite, the favourite method apparently being to blow the crown out of an arch. The well-laid plans of the enemy were thus quickly revealed. Among the thousands of Germans working in London, the hundred or so spies, all trusted soldiers, had passed unnoticed but, working in unison, each little group of two or three had been allotted its task, and had previously thoroughly reconnoitred the position and studied the most rapid or effective means. The railways to the east and north-east coasts all reported wholesale damage done on Sunday night by the advance agents of the enemy, and now this was continued on the night of Monday in the south, the objective being to hinder troops from moving north from Aldershot. This was, indeed, effectual, for only by a long _détour_ could the troops be moved to the northern defences of London, and while many were on Tuesday entrained, others were conveyed to London by the motor omnibuses sent down for that purpose. Everywhere through London and its vicinity, as well as Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, Coventry, Leeds, and Liverpool, motor-cars and motor-omnibuses from dealers and private owners were being requisitioned by the military authorities, for they would, it was believed, replace cavalry to a very large extent. Wild and extraordinary reports were circulated regarding the disasters in the north. Hull, Newcastle, Gateshead, and Tynemouth had, it was believed, been bombarded and sacked. The shipping in the Tyne was burning, and the Elswick works were held by the enemy. Details were, however, very vague, as the Germans were taking every precaution to prevent information reaching London. CHAPTER III. NEWS OF THE ENEMY. Terror and excitement reigned everywhere. The wildest rumours were hourly afloat. London was a seething stream of breathless multitudes of every class. On Monday morning the newspapers throughout the kingdom had devoted greater part of their space to the extraordinary intelligence from Norfolk and Suffolk, and Essex, and other places. Only the slow, old-fashioned "Globe" remained asleep, or pretended to know nothing of what was in progress. That we were actually invaded was plain, but most of the newspapers happily preserved a calm, dignified tone, and made no attempt at sensationalism. The situation was far too serious. Like the public, however, the Press had been taken entirely by surprise. The blow had been so sudden and so staggering that half the alarming reports were discredited. In addition to the details of the enemy's operations, as far as could as yet be ascertained, the "Morning Post" on Monday contained an account of a mysterious occurrence at Chatham, which read as follows: "CHATHAM, _Sept. 1_ (11.30 P.M.). "An extraordinary accident took place on the Medway about eight o'clock this evening. The steamer 'Pole Star,' 1,200 tons register, with a cargo of cement from Frindsbury, was leaving for Hamburg, and came into collision with the 'Frauenlob,' of Bremen, a somewhat larger boat, which was inward bound, in a narrow part of the channel about half-way between Chatham and Sheerness. Various accounts of the mishap are current, but whichever of the vessels was responsible for the bad steering or neglect of the ordinary rules of the road, it is certain that the 'Frauenlob' was cut into by the stem of the 'Pole Star' on her port bow, and sank almost across the channel. The 'Pole Star' swung alongside her after the collision, and very soon afterwards sank in an almost parallel position. Tugs and steamboats carrying a number of naval officers and the port authorities are about to proceed to the scene of the accident, and if, as seems probable, there is no chance of raising the vessels, steps will be at once taken to blow them up. In the present state of our foreign relations such an obstruction directly across the entrance to one of our principal war-ports is a national danger, and will not be allowed to remain a moment longer than can be helped." "_Sept. 2._ "An extraordinary _dénouement_ has followed the collision in the Medway reported in my telegram of last night, which renders it impossible to draw any other conclusion than that the affair is anything but an accident. Everything now goes to prove that the whole business was premeditated and was the result of an organised plot with the object of 'bottling up' the numerous men-of-war that are now being hurriedly equipped for service in Chatham Dockyard. In the words of Scripture, 'An enemy hath done this,' and there can be very little doubt as to the quarter from which the outrage was engineered. It is nothing less than an outrage to perpetrate what is in reality an overt act of hostility in a time of profound peace, however much the political horizon may be darkened by lowering war-clouds. We are living under a Government whose leader lost no time in announcing that no fear of being sneered at as a 'Little Englander' would deter him from seeking peace and ensuring it by a reduction of our naval and military armaments, even at that time known to be inadequate to the demands likely to be made upon them if our Empire is to be maintained. We trust, however, that even this parochially-minded statesman will lose no time in probing the conspiracy to its depths, and in seeking instant satisfaction from those personages, however highly placed and powerful, who have committed this outrage on the laws of civilisation. "As soon as the news of the collision reached the dockyard the senior officer at Kethole Reach was ordered by wire to take steps to prevent any vessel from going up the river, and he at once despatched several picket-boats to the entrance to warn in-coming ships of the blocking of the channel, while a couple of other boats were sent up to within a short distance of the obstruction to make assurance doubly sure. The harbour signals ordering 'suspension of all movings' were also hoisted at Garrison Point. "Among other ships which were stopped in consequence of these measures was the 'Van Gysen,' a big steamer hailing from Rotterdam, laden, it was stated, with steel rails for the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway, which were to be landed at Port Victoria. She was accordingly allowed to proceed, and anchored, or appeared to anchor, just off the railway pier at that place. Ten minutes later the officer of the watch on board H.M.S. 'Medici' reported that he thought she was getting under way again. It was then pretty dark. An electric searchlight being switched on, the 'Van Gysen' was discovered steaming up the river at a considerable speed. The 'Medici' flashed the news to the flagship, which at once fired a gun, hoisted the recall and the 'Van Gysen's' number in the international code, and despatched her steam pinnace, with orders to overhaul the Dutchman and stop him at whatever cost. A number of the marines on guard were sent in her with their rifles. "The 'Van Gysen' seemed well acquainted with the channel, and continually increased her speed as she went up the river, so that she was within half a mile of the scene of the accident before the steamboat came up with her. The officer in charge called to the skipper through the megaphone to stop his engines and to throw him a rope, as he wanted to come on board. After pretending for some time not to understand him, the skipper slowed his engines and said, 'Ver vel, come 'longside gangway.' As the pinnace hooked on at the gangway, a heavy iron cylinder cover was dropped into her from the height of the 'Van Gysen's' deck. It knocked the bowman overboard and crashed into the fore part of the boat, knocking a big hole in the port side forward. She swung off at an angle and stopped to pick up the man overboard. Her crew succeeded in rescuing him, but she was making water fast, and there was nothing for it but to run her into the bank. The lieutenant in charge ordered a rifle to be fired at the 'Van Gysen' to bring her to, but she paid not the smallest attention, as might have been expected, and went on her way with gathering speed. "The report, however, served to attract the attention of the two picket-boats which were patrolling up the river. As she turned a bend in the stream they both shot up alongside out of the darkness, and ordered her peremptorily to stop. But the only answer they received was the sudden extinction of all lights in the steamer. They kept alongside, or rather one of them did, but they were quite helpless to stay the progress of the big wall-sided steamer. The faster of the picket-boats shot ahead with the object of warning those who were busy examining the wrecks. But the 'Van Gysen,' going all she knew, was close behind, an indistinguishable black blur in the darkness, and hardly had the officer in the picket-boat delivered his warning before she was heard close at hand. Within a couple of hundred yards of the two wrecks she slowed down, for fear of running right over them. On she came, inevitable as Fate. There was a crash as she came into collision with the central deckhouses of the 'Frauenlob' and as her bows scraped past the funnel of the 'Pole Star.' Then followed no fewer than half a dozen muffled reports. Her engines went astern for a moment, and down she settled athwart the other two steamers, heeling over to port as she did so. All was turmoil and confusion. None of the dockyard and naval craft present were equipped with searchlights. The harbour-master, the captain of the yard, even the admiral superintendent, who had just come down in his steam launch, all bawled out orders. "Lights were flashed and lanterns swung up and down in the vain endeavour to see more of what had happened. Two simultaneous shouts of 'Man overboard!' came from tugs and boats at opposite sides of the river. When a certain amount of order was restored it was discovered that a big dockyard tug was settling down by the head. It seems she had been grazed by the 'Van Gysen' as she came over the obstruction, and forced against some portion of one of the foundered vessels, which had pierced a hole in her below the water-line. "In the general excitement the damage had not been discovered, and now she was sinking fast. Hawsers were made fast to her with the utmost expedition possible in order to tow her clear of the piled-up wreckage, but it was too late. There was only just time to rescue her crew before she too added herself to the underwater barricade. As for the crew of the 'Van Gysen,' it is thought that all must have gone down in her, as no trace of them has as yet been discovered, despite a most diligent search, for it was considered that, in an affair which had been so carefully planned as this certainly must have been, some provision must surely have been made for the escape of the crew. Those who have been down at the scene of the disaster report that it will be impossible to clear the channel in less than a week or ten days, using every resource of the dockyard. "A little later I thought I would go down to the dockyard on the off-chance of picking up any further information. The Metropolitan policeman at the gate would on no account allow me to pass at that hour, and I was just turning away when, by a great piece of good fortune, I ran up against Commander Shelley. "I was on board his ship as correspondent during the manoeuvres of the year before last. 'And what are you doing down here?' was his very natural inquiry after we had shaken hands. I told him that I had been down in Chatham for a week past as special correspondent, reporting on the half-hearted preparations being made for the possible mobilisation, and took the opportunity of asking him if he could give me any further information about the collision between the three steamers in the Medway. 'Well,' said he, 'the best thing you can do is to come right along with me. I have just been hawked out of bed to superintend the diving operations, which will begin the moment there is a gleam of daylight.' Needless to say, this just suited me, and I hastened to thank him and to accept his kind offer. 'All right,' he said, 'but I shall have to make one small condition.' "'And that is?' I queried. "'Merely to let me "censor" your telegrams before you send them,' he returned. 'You see, the Admiralty might not like to have too much said about this business, and I don't want to find myself in the dirt-tub.' "The stipulation was a most reasonable one, and however I disliked the notion of having probably my best paragraphs eliminated, I could not but assent to my friend's proposition. So away we marched down the echoing spaces of the almost deserted dockyard till we arrived at the 'Thunderbolt' pontoon. Here lay a pinnace with steam up, and lighted down the sloping side of the old ironclad by the lantern of the policeman on duty, we stepped on board and shot out into the centre of the stream. We blew our whistles and the coxswain waved a lantern, whereupon a small tug that had a couple of dockyard lighters attached gave a hoarse 'toot' in response, and followed us down the river. We sped along in the darkness against a strong tide that was making upstream, past Upnor Castle, that quaint old Tudor fortress with its long line of modern powder magazines, and along under the deeper shadows beneath Hoo Woods till we came abreast of the medley of mud flats and grass-grown islets just beyond them. Here above the thud of the engines and the plash of the water, a thin, long-drawn-out cry wavered through the night. 'Some one hailing the boat, sir,' reported the lookout forward. We had all heard it. 'Ease down,' ordered Shelley, and hardly moving against the rushing tideway we listened for its repetition. Again the voice was raised in quavering supplication. 'What the dickens does he say?' queried the commander. 'It's German,' I answered. 'I know that language well. I think he's asking for help. May I answer him?' "'By all means. Perhaps he belongs to one of those steamers.' The same thought was in my own mind. I hailed in return, asking where he was and what he wanted. The answer came back that he was a shipwrecked seaman, who was cold, wet, and miserable, and implored to be taken off from the islet where he found himself, cut off from everywhere by water and darkness. We ran the boat's nose into the bank, and presently succeeded in hauling aboard a miserable object, wet through, and plastered from head to foot with black Medway mud. The broken remains of a cork life-belt hung from his shoulders. A dram of whisky somewhat revived him. 'And now,' said Shelley, 'you'd better cross-examine him. We may get something out of the fellow.' The foreigner, crouched down shivering in the stern-sheets half covered with a yellow oilskin that some charitable bluejacket had thrown over him, appeared to me in the light of the lantern that stood on the deck before him to be not only suffering from cold, but from terror. A few moments' conversation with him confirmed my suspicions. I turned to Shelley and exclaimed, 'He says he'll tell us everything if we spare his life,' I explained. 'I'm sure I don't want to shoot the chap,' replied the commander. 'I suppose he's implicated in this "bottling up" affair. If he is, he jolly well deserves it, but I don't suppose anything will be done to him. Anyway, his information may be valuable, and so you may tell him that he is all right as far as I'm concerned, and I will do my best for him with the Admiral. I daresay that will satisfy him. If not, you might threaten him a bit. Tell him anything you like if you think it will make him speak.' To cut a long story short, I found the damp Dutchman amenable to reason, and the following is the substance of what I elicited from him. "He had been a deck hand on board the 'Van Gysen.' When she left Rotterdam he did not know that the trip was anything out of the way. There was a new skipper whom he had not seen before, and there were also two new mates with a new chief engineer. Another steamer followed them all the way till they arrived at the Nore. On the way over he and several other seamen were sent for by the captain, and asked if they would volunteer for a dangerous job, promising them £50 a-piece if it came off all right. He and five others agreed, as did two or three stokers, and were then ordered to remain aft and not communicate with any others of the crew. Off the Nore all the remainder were transferred to the following steamer, which steamed off to the eastward. After they were gone the selected men were told that the officers all belonged to the Imperial German Navy, and by orders of the Kaiser were about to attempt to block up the Medway. "A collision between two other ships had been arranged for, one of which was loaded with a mass of old steel rails into which liquid cement had been run, so that her hold contained a solid impenetrable block. The 'Van Gysen' carried a similar cargo, and was provided with an arrangement for blowing holes in her bottom. The crew were provided with life-belts, and the half of the money promised, and all except the captain, the engineer, and the two mates dropped overboard just before arriving at the sunken vessels. They were advised to make their way to Gravesend, and then to shift for themselves as best they could. He had found himself on a small island, and could not muster up courage to plunge into the cold water again in the darkness. "'By Jove! This means war with Germany, man!--War!' was Shelley's comment. At two o'clock this afternoon we knew that it did, for the news of the enemy's landing in Norfolk was signalled down from the dockyard. We also knew from the divers that the cargo of the sunken steamers was what the rescued seamen had stated it to be. Our bottle has been fairly well corked." This amazing revelation showed how cleverly contrived was the German plan of hostilities. All our splendid ships at Chatham had, in that brief half-hour, been bottled up and rendered utterly useless. Yet the authorities were not blameless in the matter, for in November, 1905, a foreign warship actually came up the Medway in broad daylight, and was not noticed until she began to bang away her salutes, much to the utter consternation of every one. This incident, however, was but one of the many illustrations of German's craft and cunning. The whole scheme had been years in careful preparation. She intended to invade us, and regarded every stratagem as allowable in her sudden dash upon England, an expedition which promised to result in the most desperate war of modern times. At that moment the "Globe," at last aroused from its long and peaceful sleep, reproduced those plain, prophetic words of Lord Overstone, written some years before to the Royal Defence Commission: "Negligence alone can bring about the calamity under discussion. Unless we suffer ourselves to be surprised we cannot be invaded with success. It is useless to discuss what will occur or what can be done after London has fallen into the hands of an invading foe. The apathy which may render the occurrence of such a catastrophe possible will not afterwards enable the country, enfeebled, dispirited, and disorganised by the loss of its capital, to redeem the fatal error." Was that prophecy to be fulfilled? Some highly interesting information was given by the Ipswich correspondent of the Central News. Repeated briefly, it was as follows:-- "Shortly before three o'clock on Sunday morning the coastguard at Lowestoft, Corton, and Beach End discovered that their telephonic communication was interrupted, and half an hour later, to the surprise of every one a miscellaneous collection of mysterious craft were seen approaching the harbour: and within an hour many of them were high and dry on the beach, while others were lashed alongside the old dock, the new fish-docks of the Great Eastern Railway, and the wharves, disembarking a huge force of German infantry, cavalry, motor-infantry, and artillery. The town, awakened from its slumbers, was utterly paralysed, the more so when it was discovered that the railway to London was already interrupted, and the telegraph lines all cut. On landing, the enemy commandeered all provisions, including all motor-cars they could discover, horses and forage, while the banks were seized, and the infantry, falling in marched up Old Nelson Street into High Street, and out upon the Beccles Road. The first care of the invaders was to prevent the people of Lowestoft damaging the Swing Bridge, a strong guard being instantly mounted upon it, and so quietly and orderly was the landing effected that it was plain the German plans of invasion were absolutely perfect in every detail. "Few hitches seemed to occur. The mayor was summoned at six o'clock by General von Kronhelm, the generalissimo of the German Army, and briefly informed that the town of Lowestoft was occupied, and that all armed resistance would be punished by death. Then, ten minutes later, when the German war-flag was flying from several flagstaffs in various parts of the town, the people realised their utter helplessness. "The Germans, of course, knew that, irrespective of the weather, a landing could be effected at Lowestoft, where the fish-docks and wharves, with their many cranes, were capable of dealing with a large amount of stores. The Denes, that flat, sandy plain between the upper town and the sea, they turned into a camping-ground, and large numbers were billeted in various quarters of the town itself. "The people were terror-stricken. To appeal to London for help was impossible, as the place had been cut entirely off, and around it a strong chain of outposts had already been thrown, preventing any one from escaping. The town had, in a moment, as it seemed, fallen at the mercy of the foreigners. Even the important-looking police constables of Lowestoft, with their little canes, were crestfallen, sullen, and inactive. "While the landing was continuing during all Sunday the advance guard moved rapidly over Mutford Bridge, along the Beccles Road, occupying a strong position on the west side of the high ground east of Lowestoft. Beccles, where von Kronhelm established his headquarters, resting as it does on the River Waveney, is strongly held. The enemy's main position appears to run from Windle Hill, one mile north-east of Gillingham, thence north-west through Bull's Green, Herringfleet Hill, over to Grove Farm and Hill House to Raveningham, whence it turns easterly to Haddiscoe, which is at present its northern limit. The total front from Beccles Bridge north is about five miles, and commands the whole of the flat plain west towards Norwich. It has its south flank resting on the River Waveney, and to the north on Thorpe Marshes. The chief artillery position is at Toft Monks--the highest point. Upon the high tower of Beccles Church is established a signal station, communication being made constantly with Lowestoft by helio by day, and acetylene lamps by night. "The enemy's position has been most carefully chosen, for it is naturally strong, and, being well held to protect Lowestoft from any attack from the west, the landing can continue uninterruptedly, for Lowestoft beach and docks are now entirely out of the line of any British fire. PROCLAMATION. CITIZENS OF LONDON. THE NEWS OF THE BOMBARDMENT of the City of Newcastle and the landing of the German Army at Hull, Weybourne, Yarmouth, and other places along the East Coast is unfortunately confirmed. THE ENEMY'S INTENTION is to march upon the City of London, which must be resolutely defended. THE BRITISH NATION and the Citizens of London, in face of these great events, must be energetic in order to vanquish the invader. The ADVANCE must be CHALLENGED FOOT BY FOOT. The people must fight for King and Country. Great Britain is not yet dead, for indeed, the more serious her danger, the stronger will be her unanimous patriotism. =GOD SAVE THE KING.= HARRISON, _Lord Mayor_. MANSION HOUSE, LONDON, _September 3rd, 1910_. [Illustration: THE LORD MAYOR'S APPEAL TO LONDON.] "March outposts are at Blythburgh, Wenhaston, Holton, Halesworth, Wissett, Rumburgh, Homersfield, and Bungay, and then north to Haddiscoe, while cavalry patrols watch by day, the line roughly being from Leiston through Saxmundham, Framlingham, and Tannington, to Hoxne. "The estimate, gleaned from various sources in Lowestoft and Beccles, is that up to Monday at midday nearly a whole Army Corps, with stores, guns, ammunition, etc., had already landed, while there are also reports of a further landing at Yarmouth, and at a spot still farther north, but at present there are no details. "The enemy," he concluded, "are at present in a position of absolute security." CHAPTER IV. A PROPHECY FULFILLED. This authentic news of the position of the enemy, combined with the vague rumours of other landings at Yarmouth, along the coast at some unknown point north of Cromer, at King's Lynn, and other places, produced an enormous sensation in London, while the Central News account, circulated to all the papers in the Midlands and Lancashire, increased the panic in the manufacturing districts. The special edition of the "Evening Star," issued about six o'clock on Tuesday evening, contained another remarkable story which threw some further light upon the German movements. It was, of course, known that practically the whole of the Norfolk and Suffolk coast was already held by the enemy, but with the exception of the fact that the enemy's cavalry vedettes and reconnoitring patrols were out everywhere at a distance about twenty miles from the shore, England was entirely in the dark as to what had occurred anywhere else but at Lowestoft. Attempts had been made to penetrate the cavalry screen at various points, but in vain. What was in progress was carefully kept a secret by the enemy. The veil was, however, now lifted. The story which the "Evening Star" had obtained exclusively, and which was eagerly read everywhere, had been related by a man named Scotney, a lobster-fisherman, of Sheringham, in Norfolk, who had made the following statement to the chief officer of coastguard at Wainfleet, in Lincolnshire: "Just before dawn on Sunday morning I was in the boat with my son Ted off the Robin Friend, taking up the lobster pots, when we suddenly saw about three miles off shore a mixed lot of curious-looking craft strung out right across the horizon, and heading apparently for Cromer. There were steamers big and little, many of them towing queer flat-bottomed kind of boats, lighters, and barges, which, on approaching nearer, we could distinctly see were filled to their utmost capacity with men and horses. "Both Ted and I stood staring at the unusual sight, wondering whatever it meant. They came on very quickly, however--so quickly, indeed, that we thought it best to move on. The biggest ships went along to Weybourne Gap, where they moored in the twenty-five feet of water that runs in close to the shore, while some smaller steamers and the flats were run high and dry on the hard shingle. Before this I noticed that there were quite a number of foreign warships in the offing, with several destroyers far away in the distance both to east and west. "From the larger steamships all sorts of boats were lowered, including apparently many collapsible whaleboats, and into these, in a most orderly manner, from every gangway and accommodation-ladder, troops--Germans we afterwards discovered them to be, to our utter astonishment--began to descend. "These boats were at once taken charge of by steam pinnaces and cutters and towed to the beach. When we saw this we were utterly dumbfounded. Indeed, at first I believed it to be a dream, for ever since I was a lad I had heard the ancient rhyme my old father was so fond of repeating: "'He who would Old England win, Must at Weybourne Hoop begin.' "As everybody knows, nature has provided at that lonely spot every advantage for the landing of hostile forces, and when the Spanish Armada was expected, and again when Napoleon threatened an invasion, the place was constantly watched. Yet nowadays, except for the coastguard, it has been utterly unprotected and neglected. "The very first soldiers who landed formed up quickly, and under the charge of an officer ran up the low hill to the coastguard station, I suppose in order to prevent them signalling a warning. The funny thing was, however, that the coastguards had already been held up by several well-dressed men--spies of the Germans, I suppose. I could distinctly see one man holding one of the guards with his back to the wall, and threatening him with a revolver. "Ted and I had somehow been surrounded by the crowd of odd craft which dodged about everywhere, and the foreigners now and then shouted to me words that unfortunately I could not understand. "Meanwhile, from all the boats strung out along the beach, from Sheringham right across to the Rocket House at Salthouse, swarms of drab-coated soldiers were disembarking, the boats immediately returning to the steamers for more. They must have been packed as tightly as herrings in a barrel; but they all seemed to know where to go to, because all along at various places little flags were held by men, and each regiment appeared to march across and assemble at its own flag. "Ted and I sat there as if we were watching a play. Suddenly we saw from some of the ships and bigger barges horses being lowered into the water and allowed to swim ashore. Hundreds seemed to gain the beach even as we were looking at them. Then, after the first lot of horses had gone, boats full of saddles followed them. It seemed as though the foreigners were too busy to notice us, and we--not wanting to share the fate of Mr. Gunter, the coastguard, and his mates--just sat tight and watched. "From the steamers there continued to pour hundreds upon hundreds of soldiers, who were towed to land, and then formed up in solid squares, which got bigger and bigger. Horses innumerable--quite a thousand, I should reckon--were slung overboard from some of the smaller steamers which had been run high and dry on the beach, and as the tide had now begun to run down, they landed only knee-deep in water. Those steamers, it seemed to me, had big bilge keels, for as the tide ebbed they did not heel over. They had, no doubt, been specially fitted for the purpose. Out of some they began to hoist all sorts of things, wagons, guns, motor-cars, large bales of fodder, clothing, ambulances with big red crosses on them, flat-looking boats--pontoons I think they call them--and great piles of cooking pots and pans, square boxes of stores, or perhaps ammunition, and as soon as anything was landed it was hauled up above high-water mark. "In the meantime lots of men had mounted on horseback and ridden off up the lane which leads into Weybourne village. At first half a dozen started at a time; then, as far as I could judge, about fifty more started. Then larger bodies went forward, but more and more horses kept going ashore, as though their number was never-ending. They must have been stowed mighty close, and many of the ships must have been specially fitted up for them. "Very soon I saw cavalry swarming up over Muckleburgh, Warborough, and Telegraph Hills, while a good many trotted away in the direction of Runton and Sheringham. Then, soon after they had gone--that is, in about an hour and a half from their first arrival--the infantry began to move off, and as far as I could see, they marched inland by every road, some in the direction of Kelling Street and Holt, others over Weybourne Heath towards Bodham, and still others skirting the woods over to Upper Sheringham. Large masses of infantry marched along the Sheringham Road, and seemed to have a lot of officers on horseback with them, while up on Muckleburgh Hill I saw frantic signalling in progress. "By this time they had a quantity of carts and wagons landed, and a large number of motor-cars. The latter were soon started, and, manned by infantry, moved swiftly in procession after the troops. The great idea of the Germans was apparently to get the beach clear of everything as soon as landed, for all stores, equipment, and other tackle were pushed inland as soon as disembarked. "The enemy kept on landing. Thousands of soldiers got ashore without any check, and all proceeding orderly and without the slightest confusion, as though the plans were absolutely perfect. Everybody seemed to know exactly what to do. From where we were we could see the coastguards held prisoners in their station, with German sentries mounted around; and as the tide was now setting strong to the westward, Ted and I just let our anchor off the ground and allowed ourselves to drift. It occurred to me that perhaps I might be able give the alarm at some other coastguard station if I could only drift away unnoticed in the busy scene now in progress. "That the Germans had actually landed in England now apparent; yet we wondered what our own fleet could be doing, and pictured to ourselves the jolly good drubbing that our cruisers would give the audacious foreigner when they did haul in sight. It was for us, at all costs, to give the alarm, so gradually we drifted off to the nor'-westward, in fear every moment lest we should be noticed and fired at. At last we got around Blakeney Point successfully, and breathed more freely; then hoisting our sail, we headed for Hunstanton, but seeing numbers of ships entering the Wash, and believing them to be also Germans, we put our helm down and ran across into Wainfleet Swatchway to Gibraltar Point, where I saw the chief officer of coastguards and told him all the extraordinary events of that memorable morning." The report added that the officer of coastguard in question had, three hours before, noticed strange vessels coming up the Wash, and had already tried to report by telegraph to his divisional inspecting officer at Harwich, but could obtain no communication. An hour later, however, it had become apparent that a still further landing was being effected on the south side of the Wash, in all probability at King's Lynn. The fisherman Scotney's statement had been sent by special messenger from Wainfleet on Sunday evening, but owing to the dislocation of the railway traffic north of London, the messenger was unable to reach the offices of the coastguard in Victoria Street, Westminster, until Monday. The report received by the Admiralty had been treated as confidential until corroborated, lest undue public alarm should be caused. It had then been given to the Press as revealing the truth of what had actually happened. The enemy had entered by the back door of England, and the sensation it caused everywhere was little short of panic. Some further very valuable information was also received by the Intelligence Department of the War Office, revealing the military position of the invaders who had landed at Weybourne Hoop. The whole of the IVth German Army Corps, about 38,000 men, had been landed at Weybourne, Sheringham, and Cromer. It consisted of the 7th and 8th Divisions complete, commanded respectively by Major-General Dickmann and Lieutenant-General von Mirbach. The 7th Division comprised the 13th and 14th Infantry Brigades, consisting of Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau's 1st Magdeburg Regiment, the 3rd Magdeburg Infantry Regiment, Prince Louis Ferdinand von Preussen's 2nd Magdeburg Regiment, and the 5th Hanover Infantry Regiment. Attached to this division were the Magdeburg Hussars No. 10, and the Uhlan Regiment of Altmärk No. 16. In the 8th Division were the 15th and 16th Brigades, comprising a Magdeburg Fusilier Regiment, an Anhalt Infantry Regiment, the 4th and 8th Thuringen Infantry, with the Magdeburg Cuirassiers, and a regiment of Thuringen Hussars. The cavalry were commanded by Colonel Frölich, while General von Kleppen was in supreme command of the whole corps. Careful reconnaissance of the occupied area showed that immediately on landing, the German position extended from the little town of Holt, on the west, eastward, along the main Cromer road, as far as Gibbet Lane, slightly south of Cromer, a distance of about five miles. This constituted a naturally strong position; indeed, nature seemed to have provided it specially to suit the necessities of a foreign invader. The ground for miles to the south sloped gently away down to the plain, while the rear was completely protected, so that the landing could proceed until every detail had been completed. _Berlin um Eins!_ _Berlin um Eins!_ Das Kleine Journal Mittags Ausgabe. Berlin, Montag, den 3 September 1910 Triumph der Deutschen Waffen. Vernichtung der Englischen Flotte. Von Kronhelm Auf Dem Vormarsche Nach London. [Illustration: THE FIRST NEWS IN BERLIN OF THE GERMAN VICTORY.] Artillery were massed on both flanks, namely, at Holt and on the high ground near Felbrigg, immediately south of Cromer. This last-named artillery was adequately supported by the detached infantry close at hand. The whole force was covered by a strong line of outposts. Their advanced sentries were to be found along a line starting from Thornage village, through Hunworth, Edgefield, Barningham Green, Squallham, Aldborough, Hanworth, to Roughton. In rear of them lay their pickets, which were disposed in advantageous situations. The general line of these latter were at North Street, Pondhills to Plumstead, thence over to Matlash Hall, Aldborough Hall, and the rising ground north of Hanworth. These, in their turn, were adequately supplemented by the supports, which were near Hempstead Green, Baconsthorpe, North Narningham, Bessingham, Sustead, and Melton. In case of sudden attack, reserves were at Bodham, West Beckham, East Beckham, and Aylmerton, but orders had been issued by Von Kleppen, who had established his headquarters at Upper Sheringham, that the line of resistance was to be as already indicated--namely, that having the Holt-Cromer Road for its crest. Cuirassiers, Hussars, and some motorists--commanded by Colonel von Dorndorf--were acting independently some fifteen miles to the south scouring the whole country, terrifying the villagers, commandeering all supplies, and posting Von Kronhelm's proclamation, which has already been reproduced. From inquiries it was shown that on the night of the invasion six men, now known to have been advance agents of the enemy, arrived at the Ship Inn, at Weybourne. Three of them took accommodation for the night, while their companions slept elsewhere. At two o'clock the trio let themselves out quietly, were joined by six other men, and just as the enemy's ships hove in sight nine of them seized the coastguards and cut the wires, while the other three broke into the Weybourne Stores, and, drawing revolvers, obtained possession of the telegraph instrument to Sheringham and Cromer until they could hand it over to the Germans. That the Fourth German Army Corps were in a position as strong as those who landed at Lowestoft could not be denied, and the military authorities could not disguise from themselves the extreme gravity of the situation. CHAPTER V. STATE OF SIEGE DECLARED. That our fleet had been taken unawares was apparent. There were all sorts of vague rumours of a sudden attack upon the North Sea Fleet at Rosyth, and a fierce cruiser battle, in which we had been badly beaten by Germany. It is, however, the land campaign which we have here to record. The authentic account of a further landing in Essex--somewhere near Maldon--was now published. The statement had been dictated by Mr. Henry Alexander, J.P.,--the Mayor of Maldon, who had succeeded in escaping from the town,--to Captain Wilfred Quare, of the Intelligence Department of the War Office. This Department had, in turn, given it to the newspapers for publication. It read as follows:-- "On Sunday morning, September 2, I had arranged to play a round of golf with my friend Somers, of Beeleigh, before church. I met him at the Golf Hut about 8.30. We played one round, and were at the last hole but three in a second round when we both thought we heard the sound of shots fired somewhere in the town. We couldn't make anything at all of it, and as we had so nearly finished the round, we thought we would do so before going to inquire about it. I was making my approach to the final hole when an exclamation from Somers spoilt my stroke. I felt annoyed, but as I looked around--doubtless somewhat irritably--my eyes turned in the direction in which I now saw my friend was pointing with every expression of astonishment in his countenance. "'Who on earth are those fellows?' he asked. As for me, I was too dumbfounded to reply. Galloping over the links from the direction of the town came three men in uniform--soldiers, evidently. I had often been in Germany, and recognised the squat pickelhaubes and general get-up of the rapidly approaching horsemen at a glance. "They were upon us almost as he spoke, pulling up their horses with a great spattering up of grass and mud, quite ruining one of our best greens. All three of them pointed big, ugly repeating pistols at us, and the leader, a conceited-looking ass in staff uniform, required us to 'surrender' in quite a pompous manner, but in very good English. BY THE KING, PROCLAMATION FOR CALLING OUT THE ARMY RESERVE. EDWARD R. WHEREAS by the Reserve Forces Act, 1882, it is amongst other things enacted that in case of imminent national danger or of great emergency, it shall be lawful for Us, by Proclamation, the occasion being declared in Council and notified by the Proclamation, if Parliament be not then sitting, to order that the Army Reserve shall be called out on permanent service; and by any such Proclamation to order a Secretary of State from time to time to give, and when given, to revoke or vary such directions as may seem necessary or proper for calling out the forces or force mentioned in the Proclamation, or all or any of the men belonging thereto: AND WHEREAS Parliament is not sitting, and whereas WE have declared in Council and hereby notify the present state of Public Affairs and the extent of the demands on Our Military Forces for the protection of the interests of the Empire constitute a case of great emergency within the meaning of the said Act: NOW THEREFORE We do in pursuance of the said Act hereby order that Our Army Reserve be called out on permanent service, and We do hereby order the Right Honourable Charles Leonard Spencer Cotterell, one of our Principal Secretaries of State, from time to time to give, and when given, to revoke or vary such directions as may seem necessary or proper for calling out Our Army Reserve, or all or any of the men belonging thereto, and such men shall proceed to and attend at such places and at such times as may be respectively appointed by him to serve as part of Our Army until their services are no longer required. Given at Our Court at James', this fourth day of September, in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and ten, and in the tenth year of Our Reign. =GOD SAVE THE KING.= "'Do we look so very dangerous, Herr Lieutenant?' inquired I in German. "He dropped a little of his frills when he heard me speak in his native language, asked which of us was the Mayor, and condescended to explain that I was required in Maldon by the officer at present in command of his Imperial Majesty the Kaiser's forces occupying that place. "I looked at my captor in complete bewilderment. Could he be some fellow trying to take a rise out of me by masquerading as a German officer? But no, I recognised at once that he was the genuine article. "He demanded my parole, which I made no difficulty about giving, since I did not see any way of escape, and in any case was only too anxious to get back to town to see how things were. "'But you don't want my friend, do you--he lives out the other way?' I queried. "'I don't want him, but he will have to come all the same,' rejoined the German. 'It isn't likely we're going to let him get away to give the alarm in Colchester, is it?' "Obviously it was not, and without more ado we started off at a sharp walk, holding on to the stirrup leathers of the horsemen. "As we entered the town there was on the bridge over the river, a small picket of blue-coated German infantry. The whole thing was a perfect nightmare. It was past belief. "'How on earth did you get here?' I couldn't help asking. "'By water,' he answered shortly, pointing down the river as he spoke, where I was still further astonished--if it were possible after such a morning--to see several steam pinnaces and boats flying the black and white German ensign. "I was conducted straight to the Moot Hall. There I found a grizzled veteran waiting on the steps, who turned round and entered the building as we came up. We followed him inside, and I was introduced to him. He appeared to be a truculent old ruffian. "'Well, Mr. Mayor,' he said, pulling viciously at his white moustache, 'do you know that I've a great mind to take you out into the street and have you shot?' "I was not at all inclined to be browbeated. "'Indeed, Herr Hauptman?' I answered. 'And may I inquire in what way I have incurred the displeasure of the Hochwohlgeboren officer?' "'Don't trifle with me, sir. Why do you allow your miserable Volunteers to come out and shoot my men?' "'My Volunteers? I am afraid I don't understand what you mean,' I said. 'I'm not a Volunteer officer. Even if I were, I should have no cognisance of anything that has happened within the last two hours, as I have been down on the golf course. This officer will bear me out,' I added, turning to my captor. He admitted that he had found me there. "'But, anyway, you are the Mayor,' persisted my interrogator. 'Why did you allow the Volunteers to come out?' "'If you had been good enough to inform us of your visit, we might have made better arrangements.' I answered; 'but in any case you must understand that a mayor has little or no authority in this country. His job is to head subscription-lists, eat a dinner or two, and make speeches on public occasions.' "He seemed to have some difficulty in swallowing this, but as another officer who was there, writing at a table, and who, it appears, had lived at some period in England, corroborated my statement, the choleric colonel seemed to be a little mollified, and contented himself with demanding my parole not to leave Maldon until he had reported the matter to the General for decision. I gave it without more ado, and then asked if he would be good enough to tell me what had happened. From what he told me, and what I heard afterwards, it seems that the Germans must have landed a few of their men about half an hour before I left home, down near the Marine Lake. They had not entered the town at once, as their object was to work round outside and occupy all entrances, to prevent anyone getting away with the news of their presence. They had not noticed the little lane leading to the golf course, and so I had gone down without meeting any of them, although they had actually got a picket just beyond the railway arch at that time. They had completed their cordon before there was any general alarm in the town, but at the first reliable rumour it seems that young Shand, of the Essex Volunteers, had contrived to get together twenty or thirty of his men in their uniforms and foolishly opened fire on a German picket down by St. Mary's Church. They fell back, but were almost instantly reinforced by a whole company that had just landed, and our men, rushing forward, had been ridden into by some cavalry that came up a side street. They were dispersed, a couple of them were killed, and several wounded, among them poor Shand, who was hit in the right lung. They had bagged four Germans, however, and their commanding officer was furious. It was a pity that it happened, as it could not possibly have been of any use. But it seems that Shand had no idea that it was more than a very small detachment that had landed from a gun-boat that some one said they had seen down the river. Some of the Volunteers were captured afterwards and sent off as prisoners, and the Germans posted up a notice that all Volunteers were forthwith to surrender either themselves or their arms and uniforms, under pain of death. Most of them did the latter. They could do nothing after it was found that the Germans had a perfect army somewhere between Maldon and the sea, and were pouring troops into the town as fast as they could. "That very morning a Saxon rifle battalion arrived from the direction of Mundon, and just afterwards a lot spike-helmeted gentlemen came in by train from Wickford way. So it went on all day, until the whole town was in a perfect uproar. The infantry were billeted in the town, but the cavalry and guns crossed the river and canal at Heybridge, and went off in the direction of Witham. "Maldon is built on a hill that slopes gradually towards the east and south, but rises somewhat abruptly on the west and north, humping up a shoulder, as it were, to the north-west. At this corner they started to dig entrenchments just after one o'clock, and soon officers and orderlies were busy all round the town, plotting, measuring, and setting up marks of one kind and another. Other troops appeared to be busy down in Heybridge, but what they were doing I could not tell, as no one was allowed to cross the bridge over the river. "The German officer who had surprised me down on the golf course did not turn out to be a bad kind of youth on further acquaintance. He was a Captain von Hildebrandt, of the Guard Fusilier Regiment, who was employed on the Staff, though in what capacity he did not say. Thinking it was just as well to make the best of a bad job, I invited him to lunch. He said he had to be off. He, however, introduced me to three friends of his in the 101st Grenadiers, who, he suggested, should be billeted on me. I thought the idea a fairly good one, and Von Hildebrandt, having apparently arranged this with the billeting officer without any difficulty, I took them home with me to lunch. "I found my wife and family in a great state of mind, both on account of the untoward happenings of the morning and my non-return from golf at the expected time. They had imagined all sorts of things which might have befallen me, but luckily seemed not to have heard of my adventure with the choleric colonel. Our three foreigners soon made themselves very much at home, but as they were undeniably gentlemen, they contrived to be about as agreeable as could be expected under the circumstances. Indeed, their presence was to a great extent a safeguard against annoyance, as the stable and back premises were stuffed full of soldiers, who might have been very troublesome had they not been there to keep them in order. "Of what was happening up in London we knew nothing. Being Sunday, all the shops were shut; but I went out and contrived to lay in a considerable stock of provisions one way and another, and it was just as well I did, for I only just anticipated the Germans, who commandeered everything in the town, and put everybody on an allowance of rations. They paid for them with bills on the British Government, which were by no means acceptable to the shopkeepers. However, it was 'Hobson's choice'--that or nothing. The Germans soothed them by saying that the British Army would be smashed in a couple of weeks, and the defrayment of such bills would be among the conditions of peace. The troops generally seemed to be well-behaved, and treated those inhabitants with whom they came in contact in an unexceptionable manner. They did not see very much of them, however, as they were kept hard at work all day with their entrenchments and were not allowed out of their billets after eight o'clock that evening. No one, in fact, was allowed to be about the streets after that hour. Two or three people were shot by the sentries as they tried to break out in one direction or the other. These affairs produced a feeling of horror and indignation in the town, as Englishmen, having such a long experience of peace in their own country, have always refused to realise what war really means. "The German fortifications went on at a rapid rate. Trenches were dug all round the northern and western sides of the town before dark on the first evening, and the following morning I woke up to find three huge gun-pits yawning in my garden, which looked to the northward. During breakfast there was a great rattling and rumbling in the street without, and presently three big field howitzers were dragged in and planted in the pits. There they stood, their ugly snouts pointing skyward in the midst of the wreck of flowers and fruit. "Afterwards I went out and found that other guns and howitzers were being put in position all along the north side of Beeleigh Road, and round the corner by the Old Barracks. The high tower of the disused Church of St. Peter's, now utilised for the safe custody of Dr. Plume's library, had been equipped as a lookout and signal station." Such was the condition of affairs in the town of Maldon on Monday morning. * * * * * The excitement in London, and indeed all over the country, on Tuesday night was intense. Scotney's story of the landing at Weybourne was eagerly read everywhere. As the sun sank blood-red into the smoke haze behind Nelson's Monument in Trafalgar Square, it was an ominous sign to the panic-stricken crowds that day and night were now assembled there. The bronze lions facing the four points of the compass were now mere mocking emblems of England's departed greatness. The mobilisation muddle was known; for, according to the papers, hardly any troops had as yet assembled at their places of concentration. The whole of the east of England was helplessly in the invader's hands. From Newcastle had come terrible reports of the bombardment. Half the city was in flames, the Elswick works were held by the enemy, and whole streets in Newcastle, Gateshead, Sunderland, and Tynemouth were still burning fiercely. The Tynemouth fort had proved of little or no use against the enemy's guns. The Germans had, it appeared, used petrol bombs with appalling results, spreading fire, disaster, and death everywhere. The inhabitants, compelled to fly with only the clothes they wore, had scattered all over Northumberland and Durham, while the enemy had seized a quantity of valuable shipping that had been in the Tyne, hoisted the German flag, and converted the vessels to their own uses. Many had already been sent across to Wilhelmshaven, Emden, Bremerhaven, and other places to act as transports, while the Elswick works--which surely ought to have been properly protected--supplied the Germans with quantities of valuable material. Panic and confusion were everywhere. All over the country the railway system was utterly disorganised, business everywhere was at a complete deadlock, for in every town and city all over the kingdom the banks were closed. Lombard Street, Lothbury, and other banking centres in the City had all day on Monday been the scene of absolute panic. There, as well as at every branch bank all over the metropolis, had occurred a wild rush to withdraw deposits by people who foresaw disaster. Many, indeed, intended to fly with their families away from the country. The price of the necessities of life had risen further, and in the East End and poorer districts of Southwark the whole population were already in a state of semi-starvation. But worst of all, the awful truth with which London was now face to face was that the metropolis was absolutely defenceless. Every hour the papers were appearing with fresh details of the invasion, for reports were so rapidly coming in from every hand that the Press had difficulty in dealing with them. Hull and Goole were known to be in the hands of the invaders, and Grimsby, where the Mayor had been unable to pay the indemnity demanded, had been sacked. But details were not yet forthcoming. Londoners, however, learnt late that night more authentic news from the invaded zone, of which Beccles was the centre, and it was to the effect that those who had landed at Lowestoft were the IXth German Army Corps, with General von Kronhelm, the Generalissimo of the German Army. This Army Corps, consisting of about 40,000 men, was divided into the 17th Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Hocker, and the 18th by Lieutenant-General von Rauch. The cavalry was under the command of Major-General von Heyden, and the motor-infantry under Colonel Reichardt. NOTICE. TO ALL GERMAN SUBJECTS RESIDENT IN ENGLAND. WILHELM. To all OUR LOYAL SUBJECTS, GREETING. We hereby COMMAND and enjoin that all persons born within the German Empire, or being German subjects, whether liable to military service or not, shall join our arms at any headquarters of either of our Army Corps in England within 24 hours of the date of this proclamation. Any German subject failing to obey this our Command will be treated as an enemy. By the EMPEROR'S Command. Given at Beccles, Sept. 3rd, 1910. =VON KRONHELM=, Commanding the Imperial German Army in England. [Illustration: FACSIMILE OF A PROCLAMATION POSTED BY UNKNOWN HANDS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY.] According to official information which had reached the War Office and been given to the Press, the 17th Division was made up of the Bremen and Hamburg Infantry Regiments, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Grenadiers, the Grand Duke's Fusiliers, the Lübeck Regiment No. 162, the Schleswig-Holstein Regiment No. 163, while the cavalry brigade consisted of the 17th and 18th Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Dragoons. The 18th Division consisted of the Schleswig Regiment No. 84 and the Schleswig Fusiliers No. 86, the Thuringen Regiment, and the Duke of Holstein's Regiment, the two latter regiments being billeted in Lowestoft, while the cavalry brigade forming the screen across from Leiston by Wilby to Castle Hill were Queen Wilhelmina's Hanover Hussars and the Emperor of Austria's Schleswig-Holstein Hussars No. 16. These, with the smart motor infantry, held every communication in the direction of London. As far as could be gathered, the German commander had established his headquarters in Beccles, and had not moved. It now became apparent that the telegraph cables between the East coast and Holland and Germany, already described in the first chapter, had never been cut at all. They had simply been held by the enemy's advance agents until the landing had been effected. And now Von Kronhelm had actually established direct communication between Beccles and Emden, and on to Berlin. Reports from the North Sea spoke of the enemy's transports returning to the German coast, escorted by cruisers; therefore the plan was undoubtedly not to move until a very much larger force had been landed. Could England regain her command of the sea in time to prevent the completion of the blow? That night the London streets presented a scene of panic indescribable. The theatres opened, but closed their doors again, as nobody would see plays while in that excited state. Every shop was closed, and every railway station was filled to overflowing with the exodus of terrified people fleeing to the country westward, or reserves on their way to join the colours. The incredulous manner in which the country first received the news had now been succeeded by wild terror and despair. On that bright Sunday afternoon they laughed at the report as a mere journalistic sensation, but ere the sun set the hard, terrible truth was forced upon them, and now, on Tuesday night, the whole country, from Brighton to Carlisle, from Yarmouth to Aberystwyth, was utterly disorganised and in a state of terrified anxiety. The eastern counties were already beneath the iron heel of the invader, whose objective was the world's great capital--London. Would they reach it? That was the serious question upon every one's tongue that fevered, breathless night. CHAPTER VI. HOW THE ENEMY DEALT THE BLOW. Meanwhile, at the regimental depôts feverish excitement prevailed on Wednesday, September 5, now that every man was ordered on active service. All officers and men who had been on leave were recalled, and medical inspection of all ranks at once commenced. Rations and bedding, stores and equipment were drawn, but there was a great lack of uniforms. Unlike the German Army, where every soldier's equipment is complete even to the last button on the proverbial gaiter, and stowed away where the owner knows where to obtain it, our officers commanding depôts commenced indenting for clothing on the Royal Army Clothing Department and the Army Corps Clothing Department. A large percentage of men were, of course, found medically unfit to serve, and were discharged to swell the mobs of hungry idlers. The plain clothes of the reservists coming in were disposed of, no man daring to appear in the ranks unless in uniform. Von Kronhelm's proclamation having forbidden the tactics of the Boers of putting mere armed citizens into the field. Horse-collecting parties went out all over the country, taking with them head-collars, head-ropes, bits, reins, surcingles, numnahs, horse-blankets, and nose-bags. These scoured every county in search of likely animals, every farm, every livery stable, every hunting-box, all hound-kennels and private stables were visited, and a choice made. All this, however, took time. Precious hours were thus being wasted while the enemy were calmly completing their arrangements for the long-contemplated blow at the heart of the British Empire. While the War Office refused any information, special editions of the papers during Wednesday printed sensational reports of the ruthless completion of the impenetrable screen covering the operations of the enemy on the whole of the East Coast. News had, by some means, filtered through from Yarmouth that a similar landing to those at Lowestoft and Weybourne had been effected. Protected as such an operation was by its flanks being supported by the IVth and IXth Army Corps landing on either side, the Xth Army Corps, under General von Wilburg, had seized Yarmouth, with its many miles of wharves and docks, which were now crowded by the lighters' craft of flotilla from the Frisian Islands. It was known that the landing had been effected simultaneously with that at Lowestoft. The large number of cranes at the fish-docks were of invaluable use to the enemy, for there they landed guns, animals, and stores, while the provisions they found at the various ship's chandlers, and in such shops as Blagg's, and the International Stores in King Street, Peter Brown's, Doughty's, Lipton's, Penny's and Barnes's, were at once commandeered. Great stores of flour were seized in Clarke's and Press's mills, while the horse-provender mills in the vicinity supplied them with valuable forage. Beyond these few details, as far as regarded the fate of Yarmouth, nothing further was at present known. The British division at Colchester, which comprised all the regular troops north of the Thames in the eastern command, was, no doubt, in a critical position, threatened so closely north and south by the enemy. None of the regiments--the Norfolks, the Leicestershire, and the King's Own Scottish Borderers of the 11th Infantry Brigade--were up to their strength. The 12th Infantry Brigade, which also belonged to the division, possessed only skeleton regiments stationed at Hounslow and Warley. Of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, some were at Norwich, the 21st Lancers were at Hounslow, while only the 16th Lancers were at Colchester. Other cavalry regiments were as far away as Canterbury, Shorncliffe, and Brighton, and although there were three batteries of artillery at Colchester, some were at Ipswich, others at Shorncliffe, and others at Woolwich. Therefore it was quite evident to the authorities in London that unless both Colchester and Norwich were instantly strongly supported, they would soon be simply swept out of existence by the enormous masses of German troops now dominating the whole eastern coast, bent upon occupying London. Helpless though they felt themselves to be, the garrison at Colchester did all they could. All available cavalry had been pushed out past Ipswich, north to Wickham Market, Stowmarket, and across to Bury St. Edmunds, only to find on Wednesday morning that they were covering the hasty retreat of the small body of cavalry who had been stationed at Norwich. They, gallantly led by their officers, had done everything possible to reconnoitre and attempt to pierce the enemy's huge cavalry screen, but in every instance entirely in vain. They had been outnumbered by the squadrons of independent cavalry operating in front of the Germans, and had, alas! left numbers of their gallant comrades upon the roads, killed and wounded. Norwich had, therefore, on Wednesday morning fallen into the hands of the German cavalry, utterly defenceless. From the Castle the German flag was now flying, the Britannia Barracks were being used by the enemy, food had all been seized, the streets were in a state of chaos, and a complete reign of terror had been created when a company of British Infantry, having fired at some Uhlans, were ruthlessly shot down in the street close by the Maid's Head. In addition to this, the Mayor of Norwich was taken prisoner, lodged in the Castle, and held as surety for the well-behaviour of the town. Everywhere Von Kronhelm's famous proclamation was posted, and as the invaders poured into the city the inhabitants looked on in sullen silence, knowing that they were now under German military discipline, the most rigorous and drastic in the whole world. A special issue of the "Times" in the evening of the 3rd September contained the following vivid account--the first published--of the happenings in the town of Goole, in Yorkshire: "GOOLE, _September 3_. "Shortly before five o'clock on Sunday morning the night operator of the telephone call-office here discovered an interruption on the trunk-line, and on trying the telegraphs was surprised to find that there was no communication in any direction. The railway station, being rung up, replied that their wires were also down. "Almost immediately afterwards a well-known North Sea pilot rushed into the post office and breathlessly asked that he might telephone to Lloyd's. When told that all communication was cut off he wildly shouted that a most extraordinary sight was to be seen in the River Ouse, up which was approaching a continuous procession of tugs, towing flats, and barges filled with German soldiers. "This was proved to be an actual fact, and the inhabitants of Goole, awakened from their Sunday morning slumbers by the shouts of alarm in the streets, found, to their abject amazement, foreign soldiers swarming everywhere. On the quay they found activity everywhere, German being spoken on all hands. They watched a body of cavalry, consisting of the 1st Westphalian Hussars, the Westphalian Cuirassiers, land with order and ease at the Victoria Pier, whence, after being formed up on the quay, they advanced at a sharp trot up Victoria Street, Ouse Street, and North Street to the railway stations, where, as is generally known, there are large sidings of the North-East Lancashire and Yorkshire lines in direct communication both with London and the great cities of the north. The enemy here found great quantities of engines and rolling stock, all of which was at once seized, together with huge stacks of coal at the new sidings. "Before long the first of the infantry of the 13th Division, which was commanded by Lieutenant-General Doppschutz, marched up to the stations. They consisted of the 13th and 56th Westphalian Regiments, and the cavalry on being relieved advanced out of the town, crossing the Dutch River by the railway bridge, and pushed on as far as Thorne and Hensall, near which they at once strongly held the several important railway junctions. "Meanwhile cavalry of the 14th Brigade, consisting of Westphalian Hussars and Uhlans, were rapidly disembarking at Old Goole, and, advancing southwards over the open country of Goole Moors and Thorne Waste, occupied Crowle. Both cavalry brigades were acting independently of the main body, and by their vigorous action both south and west they were entirely screening what was happening in the port of Goole. CITY OF NORWICH. =CITIZENS--= AS IS WELL KNOWN, a hostile army has landed upon the coast of Norfolk, and has already occupied Yarmouth and Lowestoft, establishing their headquarters at Beccles. IN THESE GRAVE CIRCUMSTANCES our only thought is for England, and our duty as citizens and officials is to remain at our post and bear our part in the defence of Norwich, our capital now threatened. YOUR PATRIOTISM, of which you have on so many occasions in recent wars given proof, will, I have no doubt, again be shown. By your resistance you will obtain the honour and respect of your enemies, and by the individual energy of each one of you the honour and glory of England may be saved. CITIZENS OF NORWICH, I appeal to you to view the catastrophe calmly, and bear your part bravely in the coming struggle. =CHARLES CARRINGTON=, _Mayor_. NORWICH, _September 4, 1910_. [Illustration: APPEAL ISSUED BY THE MAYOR OF NORWICH] "Infantry continued to pour into the town from flats and barges, arriving in endless procession. Doppschutz's Division landed at Aldan Dock, Railway Dock, and Ship Dock; the 14th Division at the Jetty and Basin, also in the Barge Dock and at the mouth of the Dutch River; while some, following the cavalry brigade, landed at Old Goole and Swinefleet. "As far as can be ascertained, the whole of the VIIth German Army Corps have landed, at any rate as far as the men are concerned. The troops, who are under the supreme command of General Baron von Bistram, appear to consist almost entirely of Westphalians, and include Prince Frederick of the Netherlands' 2nd Westphalians; Count Bulow von Dennewitz's 6th Westphalians; but one infantry brigade, the 79th, consisted of men from Lorraine. "Through the whole day the disembarkation proceeded, the townsmen standing there helpless to lift a finger and watching the enemy's arrival. The Victoria Pleasure Grounds were occupied by parked artillery, which towards afternoon began to rumble through the streets. The German gunners, with folded arms, sat unconcernedly upon the ammunition boxes as the guns were drawn up to their positions. Horses were seized wherever found, the proclamation of Von Kronhelm was nailed upon the church doors, and the terrified populace read the grim threat of the German field-marshal. "The wagons, of which there were hundreds, were put ashore mostly at Goole, but others up the river at Hook and Swinefleet. When the cavalry advance was complete, as it was soon after midday, and when reports had come in to Von Bistram that the country was clear of the British, the German infantry advance began. By nightfall they had pushed forward, some by road, some by rail, and others in the numerous motor-wagons that had accompanied the force, until march-outposts were established, south of Thorne, Askern, and Crowle, straddling the main road at Bawtry. These places, including Fishlake and the country between them, were at once strongly held, while ammunition and stores were pushed up by railway to both Thorne and Askern. "The independent cavalry advance continued through Doncaster until dusk, when Rotherham was reached, during which advance scattered bodies of British Imperial Yeomanry were met and compelled to retreat, a dozen or so lives being lost. It appears that late in the afternoon of Sunday news was brought into Sheffield of what was in progress, and a squadron of Yeomanry donned their uniforms and rode forward to reconnoitre, with the disastrous results already mentioned. "The sensation caused in Sheffield when it became known that German cavalry were so close as Rotherham was enormous, and the scenes in the streets soon approached a panic; for it was wildly declared that that night the enemy intended to occupy the town. The Mayor telegraphed to the War Office, appealing for additional defensive force, but no response was received to the telegram. The small force of military in the town, which consisted of the 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Light Infantry, some Royal Artillery, and the local Volunteers, were soon assembled, and going out occupied the strong position above Sheffield between Catcliffe and Tinsley, overlooking the valley of the Rother to the east. "The expectation that the Germans intended an immediate descent on Sheffield was not realised, because the German tactics were merely to reconnoitre and report on the defences of Sheffield, if any existed. This they did by remaining to the eastward of the river Rother, whence the high ground rising before Sheffield could be easily observed. "Before dusk one or two squadrons of Cuirassiers were seen to be examining the river to find fords and ascertain the capacity of the bridges, while others appeared to be comparing the natural features of the ground with the maps with which they all appeared to be provided. "As night fell, however, the cavalry retired towards Doncaster, which town was occupied, the Angel being the cavalry headquarters. The reason the Germans could not advance at once upon Sheffield was that the cavalry was not strongly supported by infantry from their base, the distance from Goole being too great to be covered in a single day. That the arrangements for landing were in every detail perfect could not be doubted, but owing to the narrow channel of the Ouse time was necessary, and it is considered probable that fully three days must elapse from Sunday before the Germans are absolutely established. "An attempt has been made by the Yorkshire Light Infantry and the York and Lancaster Regiment, with three battalions of Volunteers stationed at Pontefract, to discover the enemy's strength and position between Askern and Snaith, but so far without avail, the cavalry screen across the whole country being impenetrable. GOD SAVE THE KING. PROCLAMATION. TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN. In regard to the Decree of September 3rd of the present year, declaring a state of siege in the Counties of Norfolk and Suffolk. In regard to the Decree of August 10th, 1906, regulating the public administration of all theatres of war and military servitude; Upon the proposition of the Commander-in-Chief IT IS DECREED AS FOLLOWS: (1) There are in a state of war: 1st. In the Eastern Command, the counties of Northamptonshire, Rutlandshire, Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Huntingdonshire, Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, and Middlesex (except that portion included in the London Military District). 2nd. In the Northern Command, the counties of Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland, and Yorkshire, with the southern shore of the estuary of the Humber. (2) I, Charles Leonard Spencer Cotterell, his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for War, am charged with the execution of this Decree. WAR OFFICE, WHITEHALL, _September the Fourth, 1910_. [Illustration: This Proclamation was posted outside the War Office in London at noon on Wednesday, and was read by thousands. It was also posted upon the Town Hall of every city and town throughout the Country.] "The people of the West Riding, and especially the inhabitants of Sheffield, are stupefied that they have received no assistance--not even a reply to the Mayor's telegram. This fact has leaked out, and has caused the greatest dissatisfaction. An enemy is upon us, yet we are in ignorance of what step, if any, the authorities are taking for our protection. "There are wild rumours here that the enemy have burned Grimsby, but these are generally discredited, for telegraphic and telephonic communication has been cut off, and at present we are completely isolated. It has been gathered from the invaders that the VIIIth Army Corps of the Germans have landed and seized Hull, but at present this is not confirmed. There is, alas! no communication with the place, therefore, the report may possibly be true. "Dewsbury, Huddersfield, Wakefield, and Selby are all intensely excited over the sudden appearance of German soldiers, and were at first inclined to unite to stem their progress. But the German proclamation, showing the individual peril of any citizen taking arms against the invaders, having been posted everywhere, has held every one scared and in silent inactivity. "'Where is our Army?' every one is asking. The whole country has run riot in a single hour, now that the Germans are upon us. On every hand it is asked: 'What will London do?'" Reports now reached London that the VIIth German Army Corps had landed at Hull and Goole, and taking possession of these towns, were moving upon Sheffield in order to paralyse our trade in the Midlands. Hull had been bombarded, and was in flames! Terrible scenes were taking place at that port. On that memorable Sunday, when a descent had been made upon our shores, there were in German ports on the North Sea nearly a million tons gross of German shipping. Normally, in peace time, half a million tons is always to be found there, the second half having been quietly collected by ships putting in unobserved into such ports as Emden, Bremen, Bremerhaven, and Geestemunde, where there are at least ten miles of deep-sea wharves, with ample railway access. The arrival of these crafts caused no particular comment, but they had already been secretly prepared for the transport of men and horses while at sea. Under the cover of the Frisian Islands, from every canal, river, and creek had been assembled a huge multitude of flats and barges, ready to be towed by tugs alongside the wharves and filled with troops. Of a sudden, in a single hour it seemed, Hamburg, Altona, Cuxhaven, and Wilhelmshaven were in excited activity, and almost before the inhabitants themselves realised what was really in progress, the embarkation had well commenced. At Emden, with its direct cable to the theatre of war in England, was concentrated the brain of the whole movement. Beneath the lee of the covering screen of Frisian Islands, Borkum, Juist, Norderney, Langebog, and the others, the preparations for the descent upon England rapidly matured. Troop-trains from every part of the Fatherland arrived with the punctuality of clockwork. From Düsseldorf came the VIIth Army Corps, the VIIIth from Coblenz, the IXth were already assembled at their headquarters at Altona, while many of them being stationed at Bremen embarked from there; the Xth came up from Hanover, the XIVth from Magdeburg, and the Corps of German Guards, the pride and flower of the Kaiser's troops, arrived eagerly at Hamburg from Berlin and Potsdam, among the first to embark. Each army corps consisted of about 38,000 officers and men, 11,000 horses, 144 guns, and about 2,000 motor-cars, wagons, and carts. But for this campaign--which was more of the nature of a raid than of any protracted campaign--the supply of wheeled transport, with the exception of motor-cars, had been somewhat reduced. Each cavalry brigade attached to an army corps consisted of 1,400 horses and men, with some thirty-five light machine guns and wagons. The German calculation--which proved pretty correct--was that each army corps could come over to England in 100,000 tons gross of shipping, bringing with them supplies for twenty-seven days in another 3,000 tons gross. Therefore about 618,000 tons gross conveyed the whole of the six corps, leaving an ample margin still in German ports for any emergencies. Half this tonnage consisted of about 100 steamers, averaging 3,000 tons each, the remainder being the boats, flats, lighters, barges, and tugs previously alluded to. [Illustration: GERMANY'S POINTS OF EMBARKATION] The Saxons who, disregarding the neutrality of Belgium, had embarked at Antwerp, had seized the whole of the flat-bottomed craft in the Scheldt and the numerous canals, as well as the merchant ships in the port, finding no difficulty in commandeering the amount of tonnage necessary to convey them to the Blackwater and the Crouch. As hour succeeded hour the panic increased. It was now also known that, in addition to the various corps who had effected a landing, the German Guards had, by a sudden swoop into the Wash, got ashore at King's Lynn, seized the town, and united their forces with Von Kleppen's corps, who, having landed at Weybourne, were now spread right across Norfolk. This picked corps of Guards was under the command of that distinguished officer, the Duke of Mannheim, while the infantry divisions were under Lieutenant-Generals von Castein and Von Der Decken. The landing at King's Lynn on Sunday morning had been quite a simple affair. There was nothing whatever to repel them, and they disembarked on the quays and in the docks, watched by the astonished populace. All provisions were seized at shops, while headquarters were established at the municipal buildings, and the German flag hoisted upon the old church, the tower of which was at once used as a signal station. Old-fashioned people of Lynn peered out of their quiet respectable houses in King Street in utter amazement; but soon, when the German proclamation was posted, the terrible truth was plain. In half an hour, even before they could realise it, they had been transferred from the protection of the British flag to the militarism of the German. Ere sundown on Sunday, stalwart grey-coated sentries of the Guards Fusiliers from Potsdam, and the Grenadiers from Berlin were holding the roads at Gayton, East Walton, Narborough, Markham, Fincham, Stradsett, and Stow Bardolph. Therefore on Sunday night, from Spalding on the east, Peterborough, Chatteris, Littleport, Thetford, Diss, and Halesworth, were faced by a huge cavalry screen protecting the landing and repose of the great German Army behind it. Slowly but carefully the enemy were maturing their plans for the defeat of our defenders and the sack of London. CHAPTER VII. DESPERATE FIGHTING IN ESSEX. London was at a standstill. Trade was entirely stopped. Shopkeepers feared to open their doors on account of the fierce, hungry mobs parading the street. Orators were haranguing the crowds in almost every open space. The police were either powerless, or feared to come into collision with the assembled populace. Terror and blank despair were everywhere. There was unrest night and day. The banks, head offices, and branches, unable to withstand the run upon them when every one demanded to be paid in gold, had, by mutual arrangement, shut their doors, leaving excited and furious crowds of customers outside unpaid. Financial ruin stared every one in the face. Those who were fortunate enough to realise their securities on Monday were fleeing from London south and westward. Day and night the most extraordinary scenes of frantic fear were witnessed at Paddington, Victoria, Waterloo, and London Bridge. The southern railways were badly disorganised by the cutting of the lines by the enemy, but the Great Western system was, up to the present, intact, and carried thousands upon thousands to Wales, to Devonshire, and to Cornwall. In those three hot, breathless days the Red Hand of Ruin spread out upon London. The starving East met the terrified West, but in those moments the bonds of terror united class with mass. Restaurants and theatres were closed; there was but little vehicular traffic in the streets, for of horses there were none, while the majority of the motor 'buses had been requisitioned, and the transit of goods had been abandoned. "The City," that great army of daily workers, both male and female, was out of employment, and swelled the idlers and gossips, whose temper and opinion were swayed each half-hour by the papers now constantly appearing night and day without cessation. Cabinet Councils had been held every day, but their decisions, of course, never leaked out to the public. The King also held Privy Councils, and various measures were decided upon. Parliament, which had been hurriedly summoned, was due to meet, and every one speculated as to the political crisis that must now ensue. In St. James's Park, in Hyde Park, in Victoria Park, on Hampstead Heath, in Greenwich Park--in fact, in each of the "lungs of London,"--great mass meetings were held, at which resolutions were passed condemning the Administration and eulogising those who, at the first alarm, had so gallantly died in defence of their country. It was declared that by the culpable negligence of the War Office and the National Defence Committee we had laid ourselves open to complete ruin, both financially and as a nation. The man-in-the-street already felt the strain, for the lack of employment and the sudden rise in the price of everything had brought him up short. Wives and families were crying for food, and those without savings and with only a few pounds put by looked grimly into the future and at the mystery it presented. Most of the papers published the continuation of the important story of Mr. Alexander, the Mayor of Maldon, which revealed the extent of the enemy's operations in Essex and the strong position they occupied. It ran as below: "Of the events of the early hours of the morning I have no very clear recollection. I was bewildered, staggered, dumbfounded by the sights and sounds which beset me. Of what modern war meant I had till then truly but a very faint idea. To witness its horrid realities enacted in this quiet, out-of-the-way spot where I had pitched my tent for so many years, brought them home to me literally as well as metaphorically. "I had run down Cromwell Hill, and seeing the flames of Heybridge, was impelled to get nearer, if possible, to discover more particularly the state of affairs in that direction. But I was reckoning without the Germans. When I got to the bridge over the river at the foot of the hill, the officer in charge there absolutely prevented my crossing. Beyond the soldiers standing or kneeling behind whatever cover was offered by the walls and buildings abutting on the riverside, and a couple of machine guns placed so as to command the bridge and the road beyond, there was nothing much to see. A number of Germans were, however, very busy in the big mill just across the river, but what they were doing I could not make out. As I turned to retrace my step the glare of the conflagration grew suddenly more and more intense. A mass of dark figures came running down the brightly illuminated road towards the bridge, while the rifle fire became louder, nearer, and heavier than ever. Every now and again the air became alive with, as it were, the hiss and buzz of flying insects. The English must have fought their way through Heybridge, and these must be the bullets from their rifles. It was dangerous to stay down there any longer, so I took to my heels. As I ran I heard a thundering explosion behind me, the shock of which nearly threw me to the ground. Looking over my shoulder, I saw that the Germans had blown up the mill at the farther end of the bridge, and were now pushing carts from either side in order to barricade it. The two Maxims, too, began to pump lead with their hammering reports, and the men near them commenced to fall in twos and threes. I made off to the left, and passed into High Street by the end of St. Peter's Church, now disused. At the corner I ran against Mr. Clydesdale, the optician, who looks after the library which now occupies the old building. He pointed to the tower, which stood darkly up against the blood-red sky. "'Look at those infernal Germans!' he said. 'They can't even keep out of that old place. I wish we could have got the books out before they came.' "I could not see any of our invaders where he was pointing, but presently I became aware of a little winking, blinking light at the very summit of the tower. "'That's them,' said Clydesdale. 'They're making signals, I think. My boy says he saw the same thing on Purleigh Church tower last night. I wish it would come down with them, that I do. It's pretty shaky, anyway.' "The street was fairly full of people. The Germans, it is true, had ordered that no one should be out of doors between eight in the evening and six in the morning; but just now they appeared to have their hands pretty full elsewhere, and if any of the few soldiers that were about knew of or thought anything of the interdiction, they said nothing. "The crash of a salvo of heavy guns from the direction of my own house interrupted him. "'That'll be the guns in my garden,' I said. "'Yes, sir, and they've got three monstrous great ones in the opening between the houses just behind the church there,' said Clydesdale. "As he spoke, the guns in question bellowed out, one after the other. "'Look--look at the tower!' I cried. "The light at the top had disappeared and the lofty edifice was swaying slowly, slowly, over to the left. "'She's gone at last!' exclaimed Clydesdale. "It was true. Down came the old steeple that had pointed heavenward for so many generations, with a mighty crash and concussion that swallowed up even the noise of the battle, though cannon of all sorts and sizes were now joining in the hellish concert, and shell from the English batteries began to roar over the town. The vibration and shock of the heavy guns had been too much for the old tower, which, for years in a tottery condition, had been patched up so often. "As soon as the cloud of dust cleared off we ran towards the huge pile of débris that filled the little churchyard. Several other people followed. It was very dark down there, in the shadow of the trees and houses, despite the fire-light overhead, and we began striking matches as we looked about among the heaps of bricks and beams to see if there were any of the German signal party among them. Why we should have taken the trouble under the circumstances I do not quite know. It was an instinctive movement of humanity on my part, and that of most of the others, I suppose. "I caught sight of an arm in a light blue sleeve protruding from the débris, and took hold of it in a futile attempt to remove some of the bricks and rubbish which I thought were covering the body of its owner. To my horror, it came away in my hand. The body to which it belonged might be buried yards away in the immense heap of ruins. I dropped it with a cry, and fled from the spot. "Dawn was now breaking. I do not exactly remember where I wandered to after the fall of St. Peter's Tower, but it must have been between half-past five and six when I found myself on the high ground at the north-western corner of the town, overlooking the golf links, where I had spent so many pleasant hours in that recent past that now seemed so far away. All around me were batteries, trenches, and gun-pits. But though the firing was still going on somewhere away to the right, where Heybridge poured black smoke skyward like a volcano, gun and howitzer were silent, and their attendant artillerymen, instead of being in cover behind their earthen parapets, were clustered on the top, watching intently something that was passing in the valley below them. So absorbed were they that I was able to creep up behind them, and also get a sight of what was taking place. And this is what I saw: "Over the railway bridge which spanned the river a little to the left were hurrying battalion after battalion of green and blue clad German infantry. They moved down the embankment after crossing, and continued their march behind it. Where the railway curved to the right and left, about half a mile beyond the bridge, the top of the embankment was lined with dark figures lying down and apparently firing, while over the golf course from the direction of Beeleigh trotted squadron after squadron of sky-blue riders, their green and white lance pennons fluttering in the breeze. They crossed the Blackwater and Chelmer Canal, and cantered off in the direction of Langford Rectory. "At the same time I saw line after line of the Germans massed behind the embankment spring over it and advance rapidly towards the lower portion of the town, just across the river. Hundreds fell under the fire from the houses, which must have been full of Englishmen, but one line after another reached the buildings. The firing was now heavier than ever--absolutely incessant and continuous--though, except for an occasional discharge from beyond Heybridge, the artillery was silent. "I have but little knowledge of military matters, but it was abundantly evident, even to me, that what I had just seen was a very formidable counter-attack on the part of the Germans, who had brought up fresh troops either from the rear of the town or from farther inland, and launched them against the English under cover of the railway embankment. I was not able to see the end of the encounter, but bad news flies apace, and it soon became common knowledge in the town that our troops from Colchester had not only failed to cross the river at any point, but had been driven helter-skelter out of the lower town near the station and from the smoking ruins of Heybridge with great loss, and were now in full retreat. "Indeed, some hundreds of our khaki-clad fellow-countrymen were marched through the town an hour or two later as prisoners, to say nothing of the numbers of wounded, who, together with those belonging to the Germans, soon began to crowd every available building suitable for use as an hospital. The wounded prisoners with their escort went off towards Mundon, and are reported to have gone in the direction of Steeple. It was altogether a disastrous day, and our hopes, which had begun to rise when the British had penetrated into the northern part of the town, now fell below zero. "It was a black day for us, and for England. During the morning the same officer who had captured me on the golf course came whirling into Maldon on a 24-h.p. Mercedes car. He drove straight up to my house, and informed me that he had orders to conduct me to Prince Henry, who was to be at Purleigh early in the afternoon. "'Was it in connection with the skirmish with the Volunteers?' I asked. "'I don't know,' was the reply. 'But I don't fancy so. In the meantime, could I write here for an hour or two?' he asked politely. 'I have much to write to my friends in Germany, and have not had a minute up to now.' "I was very glad to be able to oblige the young man in such a small way, and left him in my study till midday, very busy with pens, ink, and paper. "After a makeshift of a lunch, the car came round, and we got into the back seat. In front sat his orderly and the chauffeur, a fierce-looking personage in a semi-military uniform. We ran swiftly down the High Street, and in a few minutes were spinning along the Purleigh Road, where I saw much that amazed me. I then for the first time realised how absolutely complete were the German plans." "TUESDAY, _September 4_. "About six o'clock this morning I awoke rather suddenly. The wind had gone round to the northward, and I was certain that heavy firing was going on somewhere in that direction. I opened the window and looked out. The 'thud' and rumble of a cannonade, with the accompaniment of an occasional burst of musketry, came clearly and loudly on the wind from the hills by Wickham Bishops village. The church spire was in plain view, and little faint puffs and rings of grey smoke were just visible in its vicinity every now and again, sometimes high up in the air, at others among the trees at its base. They were exploding shells; I had no doubt of that. What was going on it was impossible to say, but I conjectured that some of our troops from Colchester had come into collision with the Germans, who had gone out in that direction the day of their arrival. The firing continued for about an hour, and then died away. "Soon after eight, Count von Ohrendorff, the general officer commanding the 32nd Division, who appeared to be the supreme authority here, sent for me, and suggested that I should take steps to arrange for the manufacture of lint and bandages by the ladies living in the town. I could see no reason for objecting to this, and so promised to carry out his suggestion. I set about the matter at once, and, with the assistance of my wife, soon had a couple of score of more or less willing workers busily engaged in the National Schoolroom. In the meantime the roll of a terrible cannonade had burst forth again from Wickham Bishops. It seemed louder and more insistent than ever. As soon as I got away from the schools I hurried home and climbed out on the roof. The top of the Moot Hall and other coigns of vantage had all been occupied by the Germans. However, with the aid of a pair of field-glasses I was able to see a good bit. Black smoke was now pouring from Wickham Bishops in clouds, and every now and again I fancied I could see the forked tongues of flame shooting up above the surrounding trees. A series of scattered black dots now came out on the open ground to the south of the church. The trees of Eastland Wood soon hid them from my sight, but others followed, mingled with little moving black blocks which I took to be formed bodies of troops. After them came four or five guns, driven at breakneck pace towards the road that passes between Eastland and Captain's Woods, then more black dots, also in a desperate hurry. Several of these last tumbled, and lay still here and there all over the slope. "Other dots followed at their heels. They were not quite so distinct. I looked harder. Hurrah! They were men in khaki. We were hustling these Germans at last. They also disappeared behind the woods. Then from the fringe of trees about Wickham half a dozen big brilliant flashes, followed after an interval by the loud detonation of heavy cannon. I could not distinguish much more, though the rattle of battle went on for some time longer. Soon after eleven four German guns galloped in from Heybridge. These were followed by a procession of maimed and limping humanity. Some managed to get along unaided, though with considerable difficulty. Others were supported by a comrade, some carried between two men, and others borne along on stretchers. A couple of ambulance carts trotted out and picked up more wounded. Our bandages and lint had not long to wait before being required. After this there was a cessation of firing. "About one o'clock the German general sent word to me that he thought an attack quite possible during the afternoon, and that he strongly advised me to get all the women and children out of the town--for the time being at any rate. This was evidently well meant, but it was a pretty difficult matter to arrange for, to say nothing of raising a panic among the inhabitants. However, in an hour and a half's time I had contrived to marshal several hundred of them together, and to get them out on the road to Mundon. The weather was warm for the time of the year, and I thought, if the worst came to the worst, they could spend the night in the old church. I left the sad little column of exiles--old, bent women helped along by their daughters, tiny children dragged along through the dust, clutching their mothers' skirts; infants in arms; and other older and sturdier children staggering beneath the weight of the most precious home adornments--and made the best of my way back to arrange for the forwarding to them of their rations. "At every step on my homeward way I expected to hear the cannonade begin again. But beyond the twittering of the birds in the trees and hedgerows, the creak and rumble of a passing cart, and the rush of a train along the railway on my left--just the usual sounds of the countryside--nothing broke the stillness. As I stepped out on the familiar highway, I could almost bring myself to believe that the events of the past twenty-four hours were but the phantasmagoria of a dream. After interviewing some of the town councillors who were going to undertake the transport of provisions to the women and children at Mundon, I walked round to my own house. "My wife and family had driven over to Purleigh on the first alarm, and had arranged to stay the night with some friends, on whatever shake-downs could be improvised, since every house in the peninsula harboured some of the ubiquitous German officers and men. I wandered through the familiar rooms, and came out into the garden, or rather, what had been the garden. There I saw that the Saxon gunners were all standing to their pieces, and one of my none too welcome guests accosted me as I left the house. "'If you'll take my advice, sare, you'll get away out of this,' he said in broken English. "'What! are you going to fire?' I asked. "'I don't fancy so. It wouldn't hurt you if we were. But I think your English friends from Colchester are about to see if they can draw us.' "As he spoke I became aware of a sharp, hissing noise like a train letting off steam. It grew louder and nearer, passed over our heads, and was almost instantly followed by a terrible crash somewhere behind the house. A deeper and more muffled report came up from the valley beyond Heybridge. "'Well, they've begun now, and the best thing you can do is to get down into that gun epaulment there,' said the German officer. "I thought his advice was good, and I lost no time in following it. "'Here comes another!' cried he, as he jumped down into the pit beside me. 'We'll have plenty of them now.' "So we did. Shell after shell came hissing and screaming at us over the tree-tops in the gardens lower down the hill. Each one of them sounded to me as if it were coming directly at my head, but one after another passed over us to burst beyond. The gunners all crouched close to the earthen parapet--and so did I. I am not ashamed to say so. My German officer, however, occasionally climbed to the top of the embankment and studied the prospect through his field-glasses. At length there was a loud detonation, and a column of dirt and smoke in the garden next below us. Then two shells struck the parapet of the gun-pit on our left almost simultaneously. Their explosion was deafening, and we were covered with the dust and stones they threw up. "Immediately afterwards another shell passed so close over our heads that I felt my hair lift. It just cleared the parapet and plunged into the side of my house. A big hole appeared just to the right of the dining-room window, and through it came instantaneously the loud bang of the explosion. The glass was shattered in all the windows, and thick smoke, white and black, came curling from every one of them. "'The house is on fire!' I shouted, and sprang madly from the pit. Heedless of the bombardment, I rushed into the building. Another crash sounded overhead as I entered, and a blaze of light shone down the stairway for an instant. Another projectile had found a billet in my home. I tried to make my way to my study, but found the passage blocked with fallen beams and ceiling. What with the smoke and dust, and the blocking of some of the windows, it was very dark in the hall, and I got quite a shock when, as I looked about me to find my way, I saw two red, glittering specks shining over the top of a heap of débris. But the howl that followed told me that they were nothing but the eyes of miserable Tim, the cat, who, left behind, had been nearly frightened out of his senses by the noise and concussion of the bursting shell. As I gazed at him another projectile struck the house quite close to us. Tim was simply smashed by a flying fragment. I was thrown down, and half-buried under a shower of bricks and mortar. I think that I must have lost consciousness for a time. "The next thing I recollect was being dragged out into the garden by a couple of Saxons. I had a splitting headache, and was very glad of a glass of water that one of them handed to me. Their officer, who appeared to be quite a decent fellow, offered me his flask. "'The house is all right,' he said, with his strong accent. 'It caught fire once, but we managed to get it under. Your friends have cleared off--at any rate for the present. They got too bold at last, and pushed their guns down till they got taken in the flank by the warship in the river. They had two of their pieces knocked to bits, and then cleared out. Best thing you can do is to do the same.' "I was in two minds. I could not save the house by staying, and might just as well join my people at Purleigh Rectory. On the other hand, I felt that it would better become me, as Mayor, to stick to the town. Duty triumphed, and I decided to remain where I was--at least for the present. All was now quiet, and after an early supper I turned in, and, despite the excitement of the day and my aching head, was asleep the moment I touched the pillow." "WEDNESDAY, _September 5_. "It must have been about three in the morning when I awoke. My head was much better, and for a minute or two I lay comfortably in the darkness, without any recollection of the events of the preceding day. Then I saw a bright reflection pass rapidly over the ceiling. I wondered vaguely what it was. Presently it came back again, paused a moment, and disappeared. By this time I was wide awake. I went to the window and looked out. It was quite dark, but from somewhere over beyond Heybridge a long white ray was sweeping all along this side of Maldon. Now the foliage of a tree in the garden below would stand out in pale green radiance against the blackness; now the wall of a house half a mile away would reflect back the moving beam, shining white as a sheet of notepaper. "Presently another ray shone out, and the two of them, moving backwards and forwards, made the whole of our hillside caper in a dizzy dance. From somewhere far away to my right another stronger beam now streamed through the obscurity, directed apparently at the sources of the other two, and almost simultaneously came the crack of a rifle from the direction of Heybridge, sharp and ominous in the quiet darkness of the night. Half a dozen scattered shots followed; then a faint cheer. More and more rifles joined in, and presently the burring tap-tap-tap of a Maxim. I hurried on my clothes. The firing increased in volume and rapidity; bugles rang out here, there, and everywhere through the sleeping town, and above the rolling, rattling clamour of the drums I could distinguish the hurried tramp of hundreds of feet. "I cast one glance from the window as I quitted the room. The electric searchlights had increased to at least half a dozen. Some reached out long, steady fingers into the vague spaces of the night, while others wandered restlessly up and down, hither and thither. Low down over the trees of the garden a dull red glare slowly increased in extent and intensity. The rattle of musketry was now absolutely continuous. As I ran out of the house into the street, I was nearly carried off my feet by the rush of a battalion that was pouring down Cromwell Hill at the double. Hardly knowing what I did, I followed in their wake. The glare in front got brighter and brighter. A few steps, and I could see the cause of it. The whole of Heybridge appeared to be on fire, the flames roaring skywards from a dozen different conflagrations." England halted breathless. Fighting had commenced in real earnest. The greatest consternation was caused by the publication in the "Times" of the description of the operations in Essex, written by Mr. Henry Bentley, the distinguished war correspondent, who had served that journal in every campaign since Kitchener had entered Khartum. All other papers, without exception, contained various accounts of the British defence at the point nearest London, but they were mostly of the scrappy and sensational order, based more on report than upon actual fact. The "Times" account, however, had been written with calm impartiality by one of the most experienced correspondents at the front. Whether he had been afforded any special facilities was not apparent, but, in any case, it was the most complete and truthful account of the gallant attempt on the part of our soldiers to check the advance from Essex westward. During the whole of that hot, stifling day it was known that a battle was raging, and the excitement everywhere was intense. The public were in anxious terror as the hours crept by, until the first authentic news of the result of the operations was printed in a special evening edition of the "Times," as follows: "(From our War Correspondent.) "DANBURY, ESSEX, _September 8_. "To-day has been a momentous one for England. The great battle has raged since dawn, and though just at present there seems to be a lull, during which the opposing forces are, so to speak, regaining their breath, it can be by no means over. "Dead and living alike will lie out on the battlefield the whole night through, for we must hold on to the positions so hardly won, and be ready to press forward at the first glimmer of daylight. Our gallant troops, Regular and Volunteers alike, have nobly vindicated the traditions of our race, and have fought as desperately as ever did their forebears at Agincourt, Albuera, or Waterloo. But while a considerable success--paid for, alas! by the loss of thousands of gallant lives--has been achieved, it will take at least another day's hard fighting before victory is in our grasp. Nowadays a soldier need not expect to be either victorious or finally defeated by nightfall, and although this battle, fought as it is between much smaller forces, and extending over a much more limited area, than the great engagement between the Russians and Japanese at Liaoyang, will not take quite so long a time to decide, the end is not yet in sight. I wrote this after a hard day's travelling backwards and forwards behind our advancing line of battle. "I took my cycle with me in my motor-car, and whenever opportunity offered mounted it, and pushed forward as near to the fighting as I could get. Frequently I had to leave the cycle also, and crawl forward on hands and knees, sheltering in some depression in the ground, while the enemy's bullets whined and whistled overhead. As reported in a previous issue, the Army which had assembled at Brentwood moved forward on the 5th. "During the afternoon the advanced troops succeeded in driving the enemy out of South Hanningfield, and before sundown they were also in full retreat from the positions they had held at East Hanningfield and Danbury. There was some stiff fighting at the latter place, but after a pounding from the artillery, who brought several batteries into action on the high ground north-west of East Hanningfield, the Germans were unable to withstand the attack of the Argyll and Sutherlands and the London Scottish, who worked their way through Danbury Park and Hall Wood right into their position, driving them from their entrenchments by a dashing bayonet charge. Everything north and east of the enemy's main position, which is now known to lie north and south, between Maldon and the river Crouch, was now in our hands, but his troops still showed a stout front at Wickford, and were also reported to be at Rayleigh, Hockley, and Canewdon, several miles to the eastward. All preparations were made to assault the German position at Wickford at daybreak to-day, but our scouts found that the place had been evacuated. The news that Rayleigh and Hockley had also been abandoned by the enemy came in shortly afterwards. The German invaders had evidently completed their arrangements for the defence of their main position, and now said, in effect, 'Come on, and turn us out if you can.' "It was no easy task that lay before our gallant defenders. Maldon, perched on a high knoll, with a network of river and canal protecting it from assault from the northward, fairly bristles with guns, many of them heavy field howitzers, and has, as we know to our cost, already repulsed one attack by our troops. Farther south there are said to be many guns on the knolls about Purleigh. Great Canney Hill, standing boldly up like an immense redoubt, is reported to be seamed with entrenchments mounting many heavy guns. The railway embankment south of Maldon forms a perfect natural rampart along part of the enemy's position, while the woods and enclosures south-west of Great Canney conceal thousands of sharpshooters. A sort of advanced position was occupied by the enemy at Edwin Hall, a mile east of Woodham Ferrers, where a pair of high kopjes a quarter of a mile apart offered command and cover to some of their field batteries. "Our scouts have discovered also that an elaborate system of wire entanglements and other military obstacles protects almost the whole front of the somewhat extensive German position. On its extreme left their line is said to be thrown back at an angle, so that any attempt to outflank it would not only entail crossing the river Crouch, but would come under the fire of batteries placed on the high ground overlooking it. Altogether, it is a very tough nut to crack, and the force at our disposal none too strong for the work that lies before it. "Further detail regarding our strength would be inadvisable for obvious reasons, but when I point out that the Germans are supposed to be between thirty and forty thousand strong, and that it is laid down by competent military authorities that to attack troops in an entrenched position a superiority of six to one is advisable, my readers can draw their own conclusions. "The repairs to the railway line between Brentwood and Chelmsford, that had been damaged by the enemy's cavalry on their first landing, were completed yesterday, and all night reinforcements had been coming in by way of Chelmsford and Billericay. The general headquarters had been established at Danbury, and, thither I made my way as fast as my car could get along the roads, blocked as they were by marching horse, foot, and artillery. I had spent the night at South Hanningfield, so as to be on the spot for the expected attack on Wickford; but as soon as I found it was not to come off, I considered that at Danbury would be the best chance of finding out what our next move was to be. "Nor was I mistaken. As I ran up to the village I found the roads full of troops under arms, and everything denoted action of some kind. I was lucky enough to come across a friend of mine on the staff--Captain B----, I will call him--who spared a moment to give me the tip that a general move forward was commencing, and that a big battle was imminent. Danbury is situated on the highest ground for many miles round, and as it bid fair to be a fine, clear day, I thought I could not do better than try and get a general look round from the summit of the church tower before proceeding farther. But I was informed that the General was up there with some of his staff and a signalling party, so that I could not ascend. "My pass, however, eventually procured me admission to the little platform, which, by the way, the General left a moment after my arrival. It was now eight o'clock, the sun was fairly high in the heavens, and the light mists that hung about the low ground in the vicinity of Maldon were fast fading into nothingness. The old town was plainly distinguishable as a dark silhouette against the morning light, which, while it illumined the panorama spread out before me, yet rendered observation somewhat difficult, since it shone almost directly into my eyes. However, by the aid of my glasses I was able to see something of the first moves on the fatal chess-board where so many thousands of lives are staked on the bloody game of war. "I noticed among other things that the lessons of the recent war in the East had not passed unobserved, for in all the open spaces on the eastern slope of the hill, where the roads were not screened by trees or coppices, lofty erections of hurdles and greenery had been placed overnight to hide the preliminary movements of our troops from the glasses of the enemy. Under cover of these, regiment after regiment of khaki-clad soldiers, batteries of artillery and ammunition carts, were proceeding to their allotted posts down the network of roads and lanes leading to the lower ground towards the south-east. Two battalions stood in quarter column behind Thrift Wood. They were kilted corps, probably the Argylls and the London Scottish. Several field batteries moved off to the left towards Woodham Walter. Other battalions took up their position behind Hyde Woods, farther away to the right, the last of them, the Grenadier Guards, I fancy, passing behind them and marching still farther southward. "Finally, two strong battalions, easily recognised as marines by their blue war-kit, marched rapidly down the main road and halted presently behind Woodham Mortimer Place. All this time there was neither sight nor sound of the enemy. The birds carolled gaily in the old elms round my eyrie, the sparrows and martins piped and twittered in the eaves of the old church, and the sun shone genially on hill and valley, field and wood. To all appearance, peace reigned over the countryside, though the dun masses of troops in the shadows of the woodlands were suggestive of the autumn manoeuvres. But for all this the 'Real Thing' was upon us. As I looked, first one, then another long and widely scattered line of crouching men in khaki issued from the cover of Hyde Woods and began slowly to move away towards the east. Then, and not till then, a vivid violet-white flash blazed out on the dim grey upland five miles away to the south-east, which had been pointed out to me as Great Canney, and almost at once a spout of earth and smoke sprang up a little way ahead of the advancing British. A dull boom floated up on the breeze, but was drowned in an ear-splitting crash somewhere close to me. I felt the old tower rock under the concussion, which I presently discovered came from a battery of at least six big 4·7 guns established just outside the churchyard. "They were manned by a party of bluejackets, who had brought them over from Chatham. The movement I saw developing below me was the first step towards what I eventually discovered was our main objective--Purleigh. "Could we succeed in establishing ourselves there, we should be beyond effective range from Maldon, and should also take Great Canney in reverse, as well as the positions on the refused left flank of the enemy. Maldon, too, would be isolated. Purleigh, therefore, was the key of the position. Our first move was in this direction. The scouts were picked men from the Line battalions, but the firing lines were composed of Volunteers and, in some cases, Militiamen. It was considered more politic to reserve the Regulars for the later stages of the attack. The firing from Canney, and afterwards from Purleigh, was at first at rather too long a range to be effective, even from the heavy guns that were in use, and later on the heavy long-range fire from 'Bloody Mary' and her sisters at Danbury, and other heavy guns and howitzers in the neighbourhood of East Hanningfield, kept it down considerably, although the big, high-explosive shells were now and again most terribly destructive to the advancing British. "When, however, the firing line--which as yet had not been near enough to fire a shot in reply--arrived in the neighbourhood of Loddard's Hill, its left came under a terrible rifle fire from Hazeleigh Wood, while its right and centre were all but destroyed by a tornado of shrapnel from some German field batteries to the north of Purleigh. Though dazed and staggered under the appalling sleet of projectiles, the Volunteers stuck doggedly to their ground, though unable to advance. Line after line was pushed forward, the men stumbling and falling over the thickly-scattered bodies of their fallen comrades. "It was a perfect holocaust. Some other card must be played at once, or the attack must fail." The second of Mr. Henry Bentley's descriptive articles in the "Times" told a terrible truth, and was as follows: "(From our War Correspondent.) "CHELMSFORD, _September 7_. "When I sent off my despatch by motor-car last night, it was with very different feelings to those with which I take my pen in hand this evening, in the Saracen's Head Hotel, which is the headquarters of my colleagues, the correspondents. "Last night, despite the hard fighting and the heavy losses we had sustained, the promise of the morrow was distinctly a good one. But now I have little heart with which to commence the difficult and unpleasant task of chronicling the downfall of all our high hopes, the repulse--ay, and the defeat--it is no use mincing matters--of our heroic and sorely tried Army. "Yes, our gallant soldiers have sustained a reverse which, but for their stubborn fighting qualities and a somewhat inexplicable holding back on the part of the Germans, might very easily have culminated in disaster. Defeat although it undoubtedly is, the darkness of the gloomy outlook is illuminated by the brilliancy of the conduct of our troops. "From General down to the youngest Volunteer drummer boy, our brave soldiers did all, and more, than could be humanly expected of them, and on none of them can be laid the blame of our ill-success. The plan of attack is agreed on all hands to have been as good a one as could have been evolved; the officers led well, their men fought well, and there was no running short of ammunition at any period of the engagement. "'Who, then, was responsible?' it may well be asked. The answer is simple. The British public, which, in its apathetic attitude towards military efficiency, aided and abetted by the soothing theories of the extremists of the 'Blue Water' school, had, as usual, neglected to provide an Army fitted to cope in numbers and efficiency with those of our Continental neighbours. Had we had a sufficiency of troops, more especially of regular troops, there is not the slightest doubt that the victory would have been ours. As it was, our General was obliged to attack the enemy's position with a force whose numbers, even if they had been all regular soldiers, were below those judged necessary by military experts for the task in hand. "Having broken through the German lines, success was in his grasp had he had sufficient reinforcements to have established him in the position he had won, and to beat back the inevitable counter-attack. But it is best that I should continue my account of the fighting from the point at which I closed my letter of yesterday. I had arrived at the checking of our advance near Loddard's Hill by the blast of shrapnel from the German field batteries. It was plain that the Volunteer Brigade, though it held its ground, could not advance farther. But, unnoticed by them, the General had been preparing for this eventuality. "On the left the two battalions of Marines that I noticed drawn up behind Woodham Mortimer Place suddenly debouched on Loddard's Hill, and, carrying forward with them the débris of the Volunteer firing line, hurled themselves into Hazeleigh Wood. There was a sanguinary hand-to-hand struggle on the wire-entangled border, but the newcomers were not to be denied, and, after a quarter of an hour's desperate mêlée, which filled the sylvan glades with moaning and writhing wounded and stark dead bodies, we remained masters of the wood, and even obtained a footing on the railway line where it adjoins it. "Simultaneously a long line of our field batteries came into action near Woodham Mortimer, some trying to beat down the fire of the German guns opposite, while others replied to a battery which had been established near West Maldon Station to flank the railway, and which was now beginning to open on Hazeleigh Wood. The latter were assisted by a battery of 4·7 guns manned by Volunteers, which took up a position behind Woodham Walter. The firing on Great Canney from our batteries at East Hanningfield redoubled, the whole summit of the hill being at times obscured by the clouds of smoke and débris from the explosions of the big, high-explosive projectiles. "The main firing line, continually fed from the rear, now began slowly to gain ground, and when the Grenadiers and the Irish Guards, who had managed to work up through the series of plantations that run eastwards for nearly two miles from Woodham Hall without drawing any particular attention from the busily engaged enemy, came into action on the right, there was a distinct move forward. But the defence was too stubborn, and about midday the whole line again came to a standstill, its left still in Hazeleigh Wood, its right at Prentice Farm. Orders were passed that the men should try to entrench themselves as best they could, and spades and other tools were sent forward to those corps who were not provided with them already. "Here we must leave the main attack to notice what was going on elsewhere. On the north the Colchester Garrison again brought their heavy artillery into action on the slopes south of Wickham Bishops, while others of our troops made a show of advancing against Maldon from the west. These movements were, however, merely intended to keep the German garrison occupied. But on the right a rather important flanking movement was in progress. "We had a considerable body of troops at East Hanningfield, which lies in a hollow between two little ridges, both running from south-west to north-east, and about a mile apart. The most easterly ridge is very narrow for the most part, and behind it were stationed several batteries of our field howitzers, which fired over it at Great Canney at a range of about 5,000 yards. A number of 4·7-inch guns, scattered over the western hill, were also concentrated on the same target. Although the range was an extremely long one, there is no doubt that they made a certain number of effective hits, since Great Canney offered a conspicuous and considerable target. But beyond this the flashes of their discharges drew off all attention from the howitzer batteries in front of them, and served to conceal their presence from the enemy. Otherwise, although invisible, their presence would have been guessed at. As it was, not a single German projectile came anywhere near them. "When the fighting began, those troops who were not intended to be held in reserve or to co-operate with the right of the main attack moved off in the direction of Woodham Ferrers, and made a feint of attacking the German position astride the two kopjes at Edwin's Hall, their field guns coming into action on the high ground north of Rettendon, and engaging those of the enemy at long range. But the real attack on this salient of the German position came from a very different quarter. "The troops detailed for this movement were those who had advanced against Wickford at daybreak, and had found it abandoned by the enemy. They consisted of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, the Honourable Artillery Company, and the Inns of Court Volunteers, together with their own and three or four other machine-gun detachments, their Maxims being mounted on detachable legs instead of carriages. Co-operating with them were the Essex and the East Kent Yeomanry, who were scouting in the direction of Hockley. "The troops had a long, wearisome march before them, the design being to take advantage of the time of low tide, and to move along out of sight of the enemy behind the northern bank of the river Crouch, as it had been discovered that the German line of defence turned back to the eastward at a mile or two north of the river at the point aimed at. Its guns still commanded it, and might be trusted to render abortive any attempt to throw a bridge across it. The Yeomanry had the task of occupying the attention of the enemy at Canewdon, and of preventing the passage of boats from the German warships. This part of our operations succeeded admirably. The long creeping lines of the Oxfordshires and the machine-gun detachments in their khaki uniforms were almost indistinguishable against the steep mud banks at any distance, and they escaped observation both from the German main lines and from their outpost at Canewdon until they had reached the entrances of the two branch creeks for which they were making. "Then, and not till then, came the sound of artillery from the left rear of the German position. But it was too late. The Oxford companies pushed forward at the double. Five companies lined the embankments of Stow Creek, the easternmost of the two, while the remainder, ensconced in Clementsgreen Creek, aligned the whole of their machine-guns on the southern of the two kopjes against which the manoeuvre had been directed. Their fire, which, coming from a little to the rear of the left flank of the southern kopje, completely enfiladed it, created such slaughter and confusion that the Honourable Artillery Company and the Inns of Court, who had been working up the railway line from Battle Bridge, had little difficulty in establishing themselves at Woodham Ferrers Station and in an adjacent farm. Being almost immediately afterwards reinforced by the arrival of two regular battalions who had been pushed forward from Rettendon, a determined assault was made on the southern kopje. Its defenders, demoralised by the pelting shower of lead from the machine-gun battery, and threatened also by the advance from Woodham Ferrers village, gave way, and our people, forcing their way over every obstacle, seized the position amid frantic cheering. "Meanwhile the Oxfordshires had been subjected to a determined counter-attack from North Frambridge. Preceded by a pounding from the guns on Kit's Hill, but aided by the fire of the Yeomanry on the south bank of the river, who galloped up and lined the embankment, thus flanking the defenders of Stow Creek, it was beaten back with considerable loss. The machine-guns were transferred to the neighbourhood of South Kopje, and used with such effect that its defenders, after repulsing several counter-attacks from the adjoining German entrenchment, were able to make themselves masters of the North Kopje also. "Elsewhere the fighting still continued strenuous and deadly. The main attack had contrived to make some little shelter for itself; but though three several attempts were made to advance from this, all ended in failure, one nearly in disaster. This was the last of the three, when the advancing line was charged by a mass of cavalry which suddenly appeared from behind Great Canney Hill. I myself was a witness of this attack, the most picturesque incident of the day's fighting. "I was watching the progress of the engagement through my glasses from the high ground about Wickham's Farm, when I saw line after line of the German horsemen in their sky-blue tunics and glittering helmets trot out into the open, canter, and one after another break into a mad gallop, as they bore down upon the advancing lines of our citizen soldiers. Staunchly as these had withstood the murderous fire which for hours had been directed upon them, this whirlwind of lance and sabre, the thunder of thousands of hoofs, and the hoarse cries of the riders, were rather more than such partially trained soldiers could stand. A scattering discharge from their rifles was followed by something very much approaching a _sauve qui peut_. "A large number of Volunteers, however, sought shelter among the ruined houses of Cock Clarke's hamlet, from whence they opened a heavy fire on the adventurous horsemen. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who were by this time in Mosklyns Copse, and the Guards and other troops on the right, also opened a rapid and sustained fire on the German cavalry, which seconded by the shrapnel from our guns on Loddard's Hill, caused them to turn and ride back for their lives. There was a tremendous outburst of firing from both sides after this, followed by quite a lull. One could well imagine that all the combatants were exhausted by the prolonged effort of the day. It was now between five and six in the evening. It was at this time that the news of the capture of the two kopjes reached me, and I made for Danbury to write my despatches. "Shortly after my arrival I heard of the capture of Spar Hill, a detached knoll about 1,200 yards to the north-west of Purleigh. The Marines from Hazeleigh Wood and the Highlanders from Mosklyns Copse had suddenly and simultaneously assaulted it from opposite sides, and were now entrenching themselves upon it. What wonder, then, that I reported satisfactory progress, and reckoned--too confidently, as it proved--on a victory for the morrow? "I spent a great part of that night under the stars on the hilltop near East Hanningfield, watching the weird play of the searchlights which swept over the country from a score of different positions, and listening to the crash of artillery and clatter of rifle fire which now and again told of some attempted movement under cover of the darkness. Just before daylight the continuous roar of battle began again, and when light dawned I found that our troops had cut right through the German lines, and had penetrated as far as Cop Kitchen's Farm, on the Maldon-Mundon road. Reinforcements were being hurried up, and an attack was being pushed towards the rear of Purleigh and Great Canney, which was being heavily bombarded by some of our large guns, which had been mounted during the night on the two kopjes. "But the reinforcements were not enough. The Germans held fast to Purleigh and to some reserve positions they had established about Mundon. After two or three hours of desperate effort, costing the lives of thousands, our attack was at a standstill. At this critical moment a powerful counter-attack was made from Maldon, and, outnumbered and almost surrounded, our gallant warriors had to give ground. But they fell back as doggedly as they had advanced, the Argylls, Marines, and Grenadiers covering the retreat on Danbury. "The guns at East Hanningfield and the two kopjes checked the pursuit to a great extent, and the Germans seemed unwilling to go far from their works. The kopjes had to be abandoned later in the day, and we now occupy our former line from Danbury to Billericay, and are busily engaged in entrenching ourselves." CHAPTER VIII. DEFENCE AT LAST. Late on Wednesday night came tardy news of the measures we were taking to mobilise. The Aldershot Army Corps, so complete in the "Army List," consisted, as all the world knew, of three divisions, but of these only two existed, the other being found to be on paper. The division in question, located at Bordon, was to be formed on mobilisation, and this measure was now being proceeded with. The train service was practically suspended, owing to the damage done to the various lines south of London by the enemy's emissaries. Several of these men had been detected, and, being in plain clothes, were promptly shot out of hand. However, their work had, unfortunately for us, been accomplished, and trains could only run as far as the destroyed bridges, so men on their way to join their respective corps were greatly delayed in consequence. All was confusion at Bordon, where men were arriving in hundreds on foot and by the service of motor omnibuses, which the War Office had on the day before established between Charing Cross and Aldershot. Perspiring staff officers strove diligently, without much avail, to sort out into their respective units this ever-increasing mass of reservists. There was perfect chaos. Before the chief constituent parts of the division--that is to say, regiments who were stationed elsewhere--had arrived little could be done with the reservists. The regiments in question were in many cases stationed at considerable distance, and although they had received orders to start, were prevented from arriving owing to the universal interruptions of the railway traffic south. By this, whole valuable days were lost--days when at any hour the invaders might make a sudden swoop on London. Reports were alarming and conflicting. Some said that the enemy meant to strike a blow upon the capital just as suddenly as they had landed, while others reassured the alarmists that the German plans were not yet complete, and that they had not sufficient stores to pursue the campaign. Reservists, with starvation staring them in the face, went eagerly south to join their regiments, knowing that at least they would be fed with regularity; while, in addition, the true patriotic spirit of the Englishman had been roused against the aggressive Teuton, and everyone, officer and man, was eager to bear his part in driving the invader into the sea. The public were held breathless. What would happen? Arrivals at Aldershot, however, found the whole arrangements in such a complete muddle that Army Service Corps men, who ought to have been at Woolwich, were presenting themselves for enrolment at Bordon, and infantry of the line were conducted into the camp of the Dragoons. The Motor Volunteer Corps were at this moment of very great use. The cars were filled with staff officers and other exalted officials, who were settling themselves in various offices, and passing out again to make necessary arrangements for dealing with such a large influx of men. There were activity and excitement everywhere. Men were rapidly drawing their clothing, or as much of it as they could get, and civilians were quickly becoming soldiers on every hand. Officers of the Reserve were driving up in motor-cars and cabs, many of them with their old battered uniform cases, that had seen service in the field in distant parts of the globe. Men from the "Junior" and the "Senior" wrung each other's hands on returning to active duty with their old regiments, and at once settled down into the routine work they knew so well. The rumour, however, had now got about that a position in the neighbourhood of Cambridge had been selected by the General Staff as being the most suitable theatre of action where an effective stand could, with any hope of success, be made. It was evident that the German tactics were to strike a swift and rapid blow at London. Indeed, nothing at present stood in their way except the gallant little garrison at Colchester, who had been so constantly driven back by the enemy's cavalry on attempting to make any reconnaissance, and who might be swept out of existence at any hour. * * * * * During Tuesday and Wednesday large gangs of workmen had been busy repairing the damaged lines. The first regiment complete for the field was the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Fusiliers, who carried upon their colours the names of a score of battles, ranging from Corunna and Badajoz, all through the Peninsula, Afghanistan, and Egypt, down to the Modder River. This regiment left by train for London on Tuesday evening, and was that same night followed by the 2nd Battalion King's Liverpool Regiment and the 1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry, while the Manchester Regiment got away soon after midnight. These formed the second infantry brigade of the 1st Division, and were commanded by Brigadier-General Sir John Money. They were several hours getting up to London, whence from Clapham Junction their trains circled London on to the Great Eastern system to Braintree, where the Horn Hotel was made the headquarters. By other trains in the small hours of the morning the last of the Guards Brigade under Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Lord Wansford departed, and duly arrived at Saffron Walden, to join their comrades on the line of defence. The divisional troops were also on the move early on Wednesday. Six batteries of artillery and the field company of Royal Engineers left by road. There was a balloon section accompanying this, and searchlights, wireless instruments, and cables for field-telegraphy were carried in the waggons. The 2nd Division, under Lieutenant-General Morgan, C.B., was also active. The 3rd Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General Fortescue, composed of 2nd Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, the 2nd Bedfordshire, the 1st Princess of Wales' Own, and the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, were preparing, but had not yet moved. The 4th Infantry Brigade of the same division, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Battalions King's Royal Rifle Corps, the 2nd Sherwood Foresters, and the 2nd South Lancashire, with the usual smartness of those distinguished regiments, were quick and ready, now as ever, to go to the front. They were entrained to Baldock, slightly east of Hitchin, where they marched out on the Icknield Way. These were followed by Fortescue's Brigade, who were also bound for Baldock and the neighbourhood. The bulk of the cavalry and field artillery of both divisions, together with the divisional troops, were compelled to set out by march-route from Aldershot for the line of defences. The single and all-sufficient reason of this delay in sending out the cavalry and artillery was owing to the totally inadequate accommodation on the railways for the transport of so many horses and guns. The troop-trains, which were of course, necessary to transport the infantry, were not forthcoming in sufficient numbers, this owing to the fact that at several points the lines to London were still interrupted. The orders to the cavalry who went by march-route were to get up to the line proposed to be taken up by the infantry as quickly as possible, and to operate in front of it to the east and north-east in screening and reconnoitring duties. The temporary deficiency of cavalry, who ought, of course, to have been the first to arrive at the scene, was made good as far as possible by the general employment of hordes of motor-cyclists, who scoured the country in large armed groups, in order to ascertain, if possible, the dispositions of the enemy. This they did, and very soon after their arrival reported the result of their investigations to the general officers commanding the 1st and 2nd Divisions. Meanwhile both cavalry and artillery in great bodies, and strings of motor omnibuses filled with troops, were upon the white, dusty roads passing through Staines to Hounslow and Brentford, thence to London, St. Albans, _en route_ to their respective divisions. Roughly, the distance was over fifty miles, therefore those marching were compelled to halt the night on the way, while those in the motor omnibuses got through to their destination. The sight of British troops hurrying to the front swelled the hearts of the villagers and townsfolk with renewed patriotism, and everywhere, through the blazing, dusty day, the men were offered refreshment by even the poorest and humblest cottagers. In Bagshot, in Staines, and in Hounslow the people went frantic with excitement, as squadron after squadron rapidly passed along, with its guns, waggons, and ambulances rumbling noisily over the stones in the rear. Following these came pontoon troops with their long grey waggons and mysterious-looking bridging apparatus, telegraph troops, balloon sections, supply columns, field bakery, and field hospitals, the last-named packed in waggons marked with the well-known red cross of the Geneva Convention. No sooner was Aldershot denuded of its army corps, however, than battalions began to arrive from Portsmouth on their way north, while troops from the great camp on Salisbury Plain were rapidly being pushed to the front, which, roughly speaking, extended through Hitchin, Royston, to Saffron Walden, across to Braintree, and also the high ground commanding the valley of the Colne to Colchester. The line chosen by the General Staff was the natural chain of hills which presented the first obstacle to the enemy advancing on London from the wide plain stretching eastward beyond Cambridge to the sea. If this could be held strongly, as was intended, by practically the whole of the British forces located in the South of England, including the Yeomanry, Militia, and Volunteers--who were now all massing in every direction--then the deadly peril threatening England might be averted. But could it be held? This was the appalling question on every one's tongue all over the country, for it now became generally known that upon this line of defence four complete and perfectly equipped German army corps were ready to advance at any moment, in addition to the right flank being exposed to the attack of the XIIth Saxon Corps, entrenched on the Essex coast. It was estimated that no fewer than two hundred thousand Germans were already upon English soil! The outlook grew blacker every hour. London was in a state of absolute stagnation and chaos. In the City, business was now at an entire standstill. The credit system had received a fatal blow, and nobody wanted to buy securities. Had people kept level heads in the crisis there would have been a moratorium, but, as it was, a panic had been created that nothing could allay. Even Consols were now unsaleable. Some of the smaller banks were known to have failed, and traders and manufacturers all over the country had been ruined on account of credit, the foundation of all trade, having been swept away. Only persons of the highest financial standing could have dealt with the banks, even if they had remained open. The opinion held in banking circles was that if the invasion should unfortunately prove disastrous to England, and Germany demand a huge indemnity, there was still hope, however small. The experience of the Franco-German war had proved that, though in such circumstances the Bank, for a considerable period, might not be able to resume cash payments, yet, with sound finance, there was no reason that the currency should greatly depreciate. During the period of suspension of cash payments by the Bank of France, the premium on gold never went above 1·5 per cent., and during most of the period was 5, 4, or even less per mille. Therefore what the French by sound banking had been able to do, there was no reason why English bankers could not also do. WE, WILHELM, GIVE NOTICE to the inhabitants of those provinces occupied by the German Imperial Army, that-- I MAKE WAR upon the soldiers, and not upon English citizens. Consequently, it is my wish to give the latter and their property entire security, and as long as they do not embark upon hostile enterprise against the German troops they have a right to my protection. GENERALS COMMANDING the various corps in the various districts in England are ordered to place before the public the stringent measures which I have ordered to be adopted against towns, villages, and persons who act in contradiction to the usages of war. They are to regulate in the same manner all the operations necessary for the well-being of our troops, to fix the difference between the English and German rate of exchange, and to facilitate in every manner possible the individual transactions between our Army and the inhabitants of England. =WILHELM.= Given at POTSDAM, _September 4th, 1910_. [Illustration: The above is a copy of the German Imperial Decree, printed in English, which was posted by unknown German agents in London, and which appeared everywhere throughout East Anglia and in that portion of the Midlands held by the enemy.] At the outbreak of the war of 1870, on August 1, French Three per Cent. Rentes were at 60·85, and Four and a Half per Cent. at 98. On the memorable day of Sedan, September 2, they were at 50·80 and 88·50 respectively, and on January 2, 1871, Three per Cents. were down to 50·95. At the commencement of the Commune, on March 18, they were at 51·50 and 76·25, and on the 30th of that month down to 50·60 and 76·25 respectively. With so little money in England as there now was, securities had fallen to the value at which holders would as soon not sell as sell at such a great discount. High rates and the heavy fall in the value of securities had brought business in every quarter all over London to a standstill. Firms all over the country were now hard put to in order to find the necessary money to carry on their various trades. Instantly after the report of the reverse at Sheffield, there was a wild rush to obtain gold, and securities dropped even a few more points. Therefore there was little or nothing for the banks to do, and Lombard Street, Lothbury, and the other banking centres were closed, as though it had been Sunday or Bank Holiday. Despair was, alas! everywhere, and the streets presented strange scenes. Most of the motor omnibuses had been taken off the road and pressed into the service of the military. The walls bore a dozen different broadsides and proclamations, which were read by the gaping, hungry crowds. The Royal Standard was flying from St. Stephen's Tower, for Parliament had now met, and all members who were not abroad for their summer vacation had taken their places at the heated debates now hourly in progress. Over Buckingham Palace the Royal Standard also flew proudly, while upon every public building was displayed a Union Jack or a white ensign, many of which had done duty at the coronation of His Majesty King Edward. The Admiralty flew its own flag, and upon the War Office, the India Office, the Foreign Office, and all the dark, sombre Government buildings in Whitehall was bunting displayed. The wild enthusiasm of Sunday and Monday, however, had given place to a dark, hopeless apprehension. The great mobs now thronging all the principal thoroughfares in London were already half-famished. Food was daily rising in price, and the East End was already starving. Bands of lawless men and women from the slums of Whitechapel were parading the West End streets and squares, and were camping out in Hyde Park and St. James's Park. The days were stifling, for it was an unusually hot September following upon a blazing August, and as each breathless evening the sun sank, it shed its blood-red afterglow over the giant metropolis, grimly precursory of the ruin so surely imminent. Supplies were still reaching London from the country, but there had been immediate panic in the corn and provision markets, with the result that prices had instantly jumped up beyond the means of the average Londoner. The poorer ones were eagerly collecting the refuse in Covent Garden Market and boiling it down to make soup in lieu of anything else, while wise fathers of families went to the shops themselves and made meagre purchases daily of just sufficient food to keep body and soul together. For the present there was no fear of London being absolutely starved, at least the middle class and wealthier portion of it. At present it was the poor--the toiling millions now unemployed--who were the first to feel the pinch of hunger and its consequent despair. They filled the main arteries of London--Holborn, Oxford Street, the Strand, Regent Street, Piccadilly, the Haymarket, St. James's Street, Park Lane, Victoria Street, and Knightsbridge, overflowing northward into Grosvenor, Berkeley, Portman, and Cavendish Squares, Portland Place, and to the terraces around Regent's Park. The centre of London became congested. Day and night it was the same. There was no sleep. From across the river and from the East End the famished poor came in their bewildering thousands, the majority of them honest workers, indignant that by the foolish policy of the Government they now found themselves breadless. Before the Houses of Parliament, before the fine new War Office and the Admiralty, before Downing Street, and before the houses of known members of the Government, constant demonstrations were being made, the hungry crowds groaning at the authorities, and singing "God Save the King." Though starving and in despair, they were nevertheless loyal, still confident that by the personal effort of His Majesty some amicable arrangement would be arrived at. The French _entente cordiale_ was remembered, and our Sovereign had long ago been declared to be the first diplomat in Europe. Every Londoner believed in him, and loved him. Many houses of the wealthy, especially those of foreigners, had their windows broken. In Park Lane, in Piccadilly, and in Grosvenor Square more particularly, the houses seemed to excite the ire of the crowds, who, notwithstanding special constables having been sworn in, were now quite beyond the control of the police. The German Ambassador had presented his letters of recall on Sunday evening, and together with the whole staff had been accorded a safe conduct to Dover, whence they had left for the Continent. The Embassy in Carlton House Terrace, and also the Consulate-General in Finsbury Square, had, however, suffered severely at the hands of the angry crowd, notwithstanding that both premises were under police protection. All the German waiters employed at the Cecil, the Savoy, the Carlton, the Métropole, the Victoria, the Grand, and the other big London hotels, had already fled for their lives out into the country, anywhere from the vengeance of the London mob. Hundreds of them were trying to make their way within the German lines in Essex and Suffolk, and it was believed that many had succeeded--those, most probably, who had previously acted as spies. Others, it was reported, had been set upon by the excited populace, and more than one had lost his life. Pandemonium reigned in London. Every class and every person in every walk of life was affected. German interests were being looked after by the Russian Ambassador, and this very fact caused a serious demonstration before Chesham House, the big mansion where lives the representative of the Czar. Audacious spies had, in secret, in the night actually posted copies of Von Kronhelm's proclamation upon the Griffin at Temple Bar, upon the Marble Arch, and upon the Mansion House. But these had been quickly torn down, and if the hand that had placed them there had been known, it would certainly have meant death to the one who had thus insulted the citizens of London. Yet the truth was, alas! too plain. Spread out across Essex and Suffolk, making leisurely preparations and laughing at our futile defence, lay over one hundred thousand well-equipped, well-fed Germans, ready, when their plans were completed, to advance upon and crush the complex city which is the pride and home of every Englishman--London. On Friday night an official communication from the War Office was issued to the Press, showing the exact position of the invaders. It was roughly this: "The IXth German Corps, which had effected a landing at Lowestoft, had, after moving along the most easterly route, including the road through Saxmundham and Ipswich, at length arrived at a position where their infantry outposts had occupied the higher slopes of the rising ground overlooking the river Stour, near Manningtree, which town, as well as Ipswich, was held by them. "The left flank of this corps rested on the river Stour itself, so that it was secure from any turning movement. Its front was opposed to and directly threatened Colchester, while its outposts, to say nothing of its independent cavalry, reached out in a northerly direction towards Stowmarket, where they joined hands with the left flank of the Xth Corps--those under Von Wilburg, who had landed at Yarmouth--whose headquarters were now at Bury St. Edmunds, their outposts being disposed south, overlooking the valley of the upper reaches of the Stour." Nor was this all. From Newmarket there came information that the enemy who had landed at Weybourne and Cromer--viz., the IVth Corps under Von Kleppen--were now encamping on the racecourse and being billeted in the town and villages about, including Exning, Ashley, Moulton, and Kentford. Frölich's cavalry brigade had penetrated south, covering the advance, and had now scoured the country, sweeping away the futile resistance of the British Yeomanry, and scattering cavalry squadrons which they found opposed to them, all the time maintaining communication with the Xth Corps on their left, and the flower of the German Army, the Guards Corps, from King's Lynn, on their right. Throughout the advance from Holt, Von Dorndorf's motorists had been of the greatest utility. They had taken constantly companies of infantry hither and thither. At any threatened point, so soon as the sound of firing was heard in any cavalry skirmish or little engagement of outposts, the smart motor infantry were on the spot with the promptness of a fire brigade proceeding to a call. For this reason the field artillery, who were largely armed with quick-firing guns, capable of pouring in a hail of shrapnel on any exposed point, were enabled to push on much further than would have been otherwise possible. They were always adequately supported by a sufficient escort of these up-to-date troops, who, although infantry, moved with greater rapidity than cavalry itself, and who, moreover, brought with them their Maxims, which dealt havoc far and near. The magnificent troops of the Duke of Mannheim, in their service uniforms, who had landed at King's Lynn, had come across the wide, level roads, some by way of Downham Market, Littleport, and Ely, and arrived at Cambridge. The 2nd Division, under Lieutenant-General von Kasten, protecting the exposed flanks, had marched _viâ_ Wisbech, March, Chatteris, and St. Ives, while the masses of the cavalry of the Guard, including the famous White Cuirassiers, had been acting independently around the flat fen country, Spalding and Peterborough, and away to quaint old Huntingdon, striking terror into the inhabitants, and effectively checking any possible offensive movement of the British that might have been directed upon the great German Army during its ruthless advance. Beyond this, worse remained. It was known that the VIIth Corps, under Von Bristram, had landed at Goole, and that General Graf Haeseler had landed at Hull, New Holland, and Grimsby. This revealed what the real strategy of the Generalissimo had been. Their function seemed twofold. First and foremost their presence, as a glance at the map will show, effectually prevented any attack from the British troops gathered from the north and elsewhere, and who were, as shown, concentrated near Sheffield and Birmingham, until these two corps had themselves been attacked and repulsed, which we were, alas! utterly unable to accomplish. These were two fine German army corps, complete to the proverbial last button, splendidly equipped, well fed, and led by officers who had had life-long training and were perfectly well acquainted with every mile of the country they occupied, by reason of years of careful study given to maps of England. It was now entirely plain that the function of these two corps was to paralyse our trade in Yorkshire and Lancashire, to commit havoc in the big cities, to terrify the people, and to strike a crushing blow at our industrial centres, leaving the siege of London to the four other corps now so rapidly advancing upon the metropolis. Events meanwhile were marching quickly in the North. The town of Sheffield throughout Tuesday and Wednesday was the scene of the greatest activity. Day and night the streets were filled with an excited populace, and hour by hour the terror increased. Every train arriving from the North was crowded with Volunteers and troops of the line from all stations in the Northern Command. The 1st Battalion West Riding Regiment had joined the Yorkshire Light Infantry, who were already stationed in Sheffield, as had also the 19th Hussars, and from every regimental district and depôt came battalions of Militia and Volunteers. From Carlisle came the Reservists of the Border Regiment, from Richmond those of the Yorkshire Regiment, from Newcastle came what was left of the Reservists of the Durham Light Infantry, and the Northumberland Fusiliers, from Lancaster the Royal Lancashires, while field artillery came from Seaforth and Preston, and small bodies of Reservists of the Liverpool and the South Lancashire Regiments came from Warrington. Contingents of the East and North Lancashire Regiments arrived from Preston. The Militia, including battalions of the Liverpool Regiment, the South Lancashire Regiment, the Lancashire Fusiliers, and other regiments in the command, were hurried to the scene of action outside Sheffield. From every big town in the whole of the North of England and South of Scotland came straggling units of Volunteers. The mounted troops were almost entirely Yeomanry, and included the Duke of Lancaster's Own Imperial Yeomanry, the East Riding of Yorks, the Lancashire Hussars, Northumberland Yeomanry, Westmorland and Cumberland Yeomanry, the Queen's Own Yorkshire Dragoons, and the York Hussars. These troops, with their ambulances, their baggage, and all their impedimenta, created the utmost confusion at both railway stations. The great concourse of idlers cheered and cheered again, the utmost enthusiasm being displayed when each battalion forming up was marched away out of the town to the position chosen for the defence, which now reached from Woodhouse on the south, overlooking and commanding the whole valley of the river Rother, through Catcliffe, Brinsworth, and Tinsley, previously alluded to, skirting Greasborough to the high ground north of Wentworth, also commanding the river Don and all approaches to it through Mexborough, and over the various bridges which spanned this stream--a total of about eight miles. The south flank was thrown back another four miles to Norton, in an endeavour to prevent the whole position being turned, should the Germans elect to deliver their threatened blow from a more southerly point than was anticipated. The total line, then, to be occupied by the defenders was about twelve miles, and into this front was crowded the heterogeneous mass of troops of all arms. The post of honour was at Catcliffe, the dominating key to the whole position, which was occupied by the sturdy soldiers of the 1st Battalion West Riding Regiment and the 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Light Infantry, while commanding every bridge crossing the rivers which lay between Sheffield and the invaders were concentrated the guns of the 7th Brigade Royal Horse Artillery, and of the Field Artillery, the 2nd, the 30th, the 37th, and 38th Brigades, the latter having hurriedly arrived from Bradford. All along the crests of these slopes which formed the defence of Sheffield, rising steeply from the river at times up to five hundred feet, were assembled the Volunteers, all now by daybreak on Thursday morning busily engaged in throwing up shelter-trenches and making hasty earthwork defences for the guns. The superintendence of this force had merged itself into that of the Northern Command, which nominally had its headquarters in York, but which had now been transferred to Sheffield itself, for the best of reasons--that it was of no value at York, and was badly wanted farther south. General Sir George Woolmer, who so distinguished himself in South Africa, had therefore shifted his headquarters to the Town Hall in Sheffield, but as soon as he had begun to get the line of defence completed, he, with his staff, moved on to Handsworth, which was centrally situated. In the command were to be found roughly twenty-three battalions of Militia and forty-eight of Volunteers; but, owing to the supineness and neglect of the Government, the former regiments now found themselves, at the moment when wanted, greatly denuded of officers, and, owing to any lack of encouragement to enlist, largely depleted in men. As regards the Volunteers, matters were even worse, only about fifteen thousand having responded to the call to arms. And upon these heroic men, utterly insufficient in point of numbers, Sheffield had to rely for its defence. Away to the eastward of Sheffield--exactly where was yet unknown--sixty thousand perfectly equipped and thoroughly trained German horse, foot, and artillery, were ready at any moment to advance westward into our manufacturing districts! CHAPTER IX. BRITISH SUCCESS AT ROYSTON. Arrests of alleged spies were reported from Manchester and other large towns. Most of the prisoners were, however, able to prove themselves naturalised British subjects; but several were detained pending investigation and examination of correspondence found at their homes. In Manchester, where there are always a number of Germans, it is known that many slipped away on Sunday night after the publication of the news of the invasion. In most of the larger Midland towns notices had been issued by the mayors deprecating hostility towards residents of foreign origin, and stating that all suspicious cases were already receiving the attention of the police. In Stafford the boot factories were idle. In the Potteries all work was at a standstill. At Stoke-on-Trent, at Hanley, at Burslem, Tunstall, and Congleton all was chaos, and thousands upon thousands were already wanting bread. The silk-thread industry at Leek was ruined, so was the silk industry at Macclesfield; the great breweries at Burton were idle, while the hosiery factories of Leicester and the boot factories of Northampton were all shut. With the German troops threatening Sheffield, Nottingham was in a state of intense alarm. The lace and hosiery factories had with one accord closed on Tuesday, and the great Market Place was now filled day and night by thousands upon thousands of unemployed mill-hands of both sexes. On Friday, however, came the news of how Sheffield had built barricades against the enemy, and there ensued a frantic attempt at defence on the part of thousands of terrified and hungry men and women. In their frenzy they sacked houses in order to obtain material to construct the barricades, which were, however, built just where the fancy took the crowd. The white, interminable North Road, that runs so straight from London through York and Berwick to Edinburgh, was, with its by-roads in the Midlands, now being patrolled by British cavalry, and here and there telegraphists around a telegraph post showed that those many wires at the roadside were being used for military communication. At several points along the road between Wansford Bridge and Retford the wires had been cut and tangled by the enemy's agents, but by Friday all had been restored again. In one spot, between Weston and Sutton-on-Trent, eight miles south of Newark, a trench had actually been dug during the night, the tube containing the subterranean telegraph lines discovered, and the whole system to the North disorganised. Similar damage had been done by German spies to the line between London and Birmingham, two miles south of Shipston-on-Stour; and again the line between Loughborough and Nottingham had been similarly destroyed. The Post Office linesmen had, however, quickly made good the damage everywhere in the country not already occupied by the enemy, and telegraph and telephone communication North and South was now practically again in its normal state. Through Lincolnshire the enemy's advance patrols had spread South over every road between the Humber and the Wash, and in the city of Lincoln itself a tremendous sensation was caused when on Wednesday, market-day, several bodies of German motor-cyclists swept into the Stonebow and dismounted at the Saracen's Head, amid the crowd of farmers and dealers who had assembled there, not, alas! to do business, but to discuss the situation. In a moment the city was panic-stricken. From mouth to mouth the dread truth spread, that the Germans were upon them, and people ran indoors and barricaded themselves within their houses. A body of Uhlans came galloping proudly through the Stonebow a quarter of an hour later, and halted in High Street as though awaiting orders. Then in rapid succession troops seemed to arrive from all quarters, many halting in the Cathedral Close and by Exchequer Gate, and others riding through the streets in order to terrify the inhabitants. Von Kronhelm's famous proclamation was posted by German soldiers upon the police station, upon the Stonebow, and upon the door of the grand old Cathedral itself, and before noon a German officer accompanied by his staff called upon the Mayor, and warned him that Lincoln was occupied by the German troops, and that any armed resistance would be punished by death, as the Generalissimo's proclamation stated. An indemnity was demanded, and then the powerless people saw upon the Cathedral and upon several of the public buildings the German flag rise and float out upon the summer wind. Boston was full of German infantry, and officers had taken up temporary quarters in the Peacock and other hotels in the market-place, while upon the "Stump" the enemy's colours were flying. No news came from London. People in Norwich, Ipswich, Yarmouth, and other places heard vaguely of the invasion in the North, and of fighting in which the Germans were careful to report that they were always successful. They saw the magnificently equipped army of the Kaiser, and, comparing it with our mere apology for military force, regarded the issue as hopeless from the very first. In every town the German colours were displayed, and all kinds of placards in German and in English made their appearance. * * * * * The "Daily Chronicle," on September 10, published the following despatch from one of its war correspondents: "ROYSTON, _September_ 9. "Victory at last. A victory due not only to the bravery and exertion of our troops, regular and auxiliary, but also to the genius of Field-Marshal Lord Byfield, our Commander-in-Chief, ably seconded by the energy and resource with which Sir William Packington, in command of the IVth Army Corps at Baldock, carried out that part of the programme entrusted to him. "But though in this success we may hope that we are seeing the first glimmerings of dawn--of deliverance from the nightmare of German invasion that is now oppressing our dear old England--we must not be led into foolishly sanguine hopes. The snake has been scotched, and pretty badly into the bargain, but he is far from being killed. The German IVth Army Corps, under the famous General Von Kleppen, their magnificent Garde Corps commanded by the Duke of Mannheim, and Frölich's fine Cavalry Division, have been repulsed in their attack on our positions near Royston and Saffron Walden, and driven back with great loss and confusion. But we are too weak to follow up our victory as it should be followed up. "The menace of the IXth and Xth Corps on our right flank ties us to our selected position, and the bulk of our forces being composed of indifferently trained Volunteers and Militia, is much more formidable behind entrenchments than when attempting to manoeuvre in a difficult and intricate country such as it is about here. But, on the other hand, we have given pause to the invaders, and have certainly gained a few days' time, which will be invaluable to us. "We shall be able to get on with the line of fortifications that are being constructed to bar the approaches to London, and behind which it will be necessary for us to make our final stand. I do not conceive that it is possible for such an agglomeration of amateur troops as ours are in the main to defeat in the open field such formidable and well-trained forces as the Germans have succeeded in throwing into this country. But when our Navy has regained command of the sea, we hope that we may, before very long, place our unwelcome visitors 'between the devil and the deep sea'--the part of the devil being played by our brave troops finally concentrated behind the strong defences of the metropolis. In short, that the Germans may run out of ammunition and provisions. For if communication with the Fatherland is effectively cut, they must starve, unless they have previously compelled our submission; for it is impossible for an army of the size that has invaded us to live on the country. "No doubt hundreds, nay thousands, of our non-militant countrymen--and, alas! women and children--will starve before the German troops are conquered by famine, that most terrible of enemies; but this issue seems to be the only possible one that will save the country. "But enough of these considerations of the future. It is time that I should relate what I can of the glorious victory which our gallant defenders have torn from the enemy. I do not think that I am giving any information away if I state that the British position lay mainly between Saffron Walden and Royston, the headquarters respectively of the IInd and IIIrd Army Corps. The IVth Corps was at Baldock, thrown back to cover the left flank and protect our communications by the Great Northern Railway. A detached force, from what command supplied it is not necessary or advisable to say, was strongly entrenched on the high ground north-west of Helions Bumpstead, serving to strengthen our right. Our main line of defence--very thinly held in some parts--began a little to the south-east of Saffron Walden, and ran westwards along a range of high ground through Elmdon and Chrishall to Heydon. Here it turned south through Great Chrishall to Little Chrishall, where it again turned west, and occupied the high range south of Royston on which stands the village of Therfield. "The night before the battle we knew that the greater portion of the German IVth and Garde Corps were concentrated, the former at Newmarket, the 1st Division of the latter at Cambridge, the 2nd on this side of St. Ives, while Frölich's Cavalry Division had been in constant contact with our outposts the greater part of the day previous. The Garde Cavalry Brigade was reported to be well away to the westward towards Kettering, as we suppose, on account of the reports which have been going about of a concentration of Yeomanry and Militia in the hilly country near Northampton. Our Intelligence Department, which appears to have been very well served by its spies, obtained early knowledge of the intention of the Germans to make an attack on our position. In fact, they talked openly of it, and stated at Cambridge and Newmarket that they would not manoeuvre at all, and only hoped that we should hold on long enough to our position to enable them to smash up our IInd and IIIrd Corps by a frontal attack, and so clear the road to London. The main roads lent themselves admirably to such strategy, which rendered the reports of their intentions the more probable, for they all converged on our position from their main points of concentration. "The letter 'W' will exactly serve to show the positions of the contending forces. St. Ives is at the top of the first stroke, Cambridge at the junction of the two shorter centre ones, Newmarket at the top of the last stroke, while the British positions at Royston and Saffron Walden are at the junctions of all four strokes at the bottom of the letter. The strokes also represent the roads, except that from Cambridge three good roads lead towards each of the British positions. The prisoners taken from the Germans in the various preliminary skirmishes also made no bones of boasting that a direct attack was imminent, and our Commander-in-Chief eventually, and rightly as it proved, determined to take the risk of all this information having been specially promulgated by the German Staff to cover totally different intentions, as was indeed quite probable, and to accept it as true. Having made up his mind, he lost no time in taking action. He ordered the IVth Corps under Sir William Packington to move on Potton, twelve miles to the north-west, as soon as it was dark. As many cavalry and mounted infantry as could possibly be spared from Royston were placed at his disposal. "It ought to be stated that while the auxiliary troops had been busily employed ever since their arrival in entrenching the British position, the greater part of the regular troops had been occupying an advanced line two or three miles to the northward on the lower spurs of the hills, and every possible indication of a determination to hold this as long as possible was afforded to the German reconnoitrers. During the night these troops fell back to the position which had been prepared, the outposts following just before daylight. About 6 a.m. the enemy were reported to be advancing in force along the Icknield Way from Newmarket, and also by the roads running on either bank of the river Cam. Twenty minutes later considerable bodies of German troops were reported at Fowlmere and Melbourn on the two parallel Royston-Cambridge roads. They must have followed very close on the heels of our retiring outposts. It was a very misty morning--down in the low ground over which the enemy were advancing especially so--but about seven a gust of wind from the westward dispelled the white fog-wreaths that hung about our left front, and enabled our lookouts to get a glimpse along the famous Ermine Street, which runs straight as an arrow from Royston for twenty or thirty miles to the N.N.W. "Along this ancient Roman way, far as the eye could reach, poured a steady stream of marching men, horse, foot, and artillery. The wind dropped, the mists gathered again, and once more enveloped the invaders in an impenetrable screen. But by this time the whole British line was on the _qui vive_. Regulars, Militia, and Volunteers were marching down to their chin-deep trenches, while those who were already there busied themselves in improving their loopholes and strengthening their head cover. Behind the ridges of the hills the gunners stood grouped about their 'Long Toms' and heavy howitzers, while the field batteries waited, ready horsed, for orders to gallop under cover of the ridge to whichever set of emplacements should first require to be manned and armed. We had not enough to distribute before the movements of the enemy should, to a certain extent, show his hand. "About seven o'clock a series of crackling reports from the outskirts of Royston announced that the detachment of Mounted Infantry, who now alone held it, was exchanging shots with the advancing enemy, and in a few minutes, as the morning mistiness cleared off, the General and his staff, who were established at the northern edge of the village of Therfield, three or four hundred feet higher up than the German skirmishers, were able to see the opening of the battle spread like a panorama before them. A thick firing line of drab-costumed Germans extended right across from Holland Hall to the Coach and Horses on the Fowlmere Road. On their left moved two or three compact masses of cavalry, while the infantry reserves were easily apparent in front of the village of Melbourn. Our Mounted Infantry in the village were indistinguishable, but away on the spur to the north-east of Royston a couple of batteries of Horse Artillery were unlimbered and were pushing their guns up to the brow of the hill by hand. In two minutes they were in action, and hard at work. "Through the glasses the shrapnel could be seen bursting, half a dozen together, in front of the advancing Germans, who began to fall fast. But almost at once came an overwhelming reply from somewhere out of sight behind Melbourn. The whole hilltop around our guns was like a spouting volcano. Evidently big high-explosive shells were being fired from the German field-howitzers. In accordance with previous orders, our horse-gunners at once ran down their guns, limbered up, and started to gallop back towards our main position. Simultaneously a mass of German cavalry deployed into attack formation near the Coach and Horses, and swept down in their direction with the evident intention of cutting off and capturing them. But they reckoned without their escort of Mounted Infantry, who had been lying low behind the long, narrow line of copse north of Lowerfield Farm. Safely ensconced behind this--to cavalry--impassable barrier, the company, all good shots, opened a terrible magazine fire on the charging squadrons as they passed at close range. A Maxim they had with them also swept horses and men away in swathes. The charge was checked, and the guns saved, but we had not finished with the German reiters. Away to the north-east a battery of our 4·7 guns opened on the disorganised cavalry, firing at a range of four thousand yards. Their big shells turned the momentary check into a rout, both the attacking cavalry and their supports galloping towards Fowlmere to get out of range. We had scored the first trick! "The attacking lines of German Infantry still pressed on, however, and after a final discharge the Mounted Infantry in Royston sprang on their horses and galloped back over Whitely Hill, leaving the town to be occupied by the enemy. To the eastward the thunder of heavy cannon, gradually growing in intensity, proclaimed that the IInd Corps was heavily attacked. Covered by a long strip of plantation, the German IVth Corps contrived to mass an enormous number of guns on a hill about two miles north of the village of Elmdon, and a terrific artillery duel began between them and our artillery entrenched along the Elmdon-Heydon ridge. Under cover of this the enemy began to work his infantry up towards Elmdon, obtaining a certain amount of shelter from the spurs which ran out towards the north-east of our line. Other German troops with guns put in an appearance on the high ground to the north-east of Saffron Walden, near Chesterton Park. "To describe the fortunes of this fiercely contested battle, which spread along a front of nearly twenty miles, counting from the detached garrison of the hill at Helions Bumpstead--which, by the way, succeeded in holding its ground all day, despite two or three most determined assaults by the enemy--to Kelshall on the left of the British position, would be an impossibility in the space at my disposal. The whole morning it raged all along the northern slopes of the upland held by our gallant troops. The fiercest fighting was, perhaps, in the neighbourhood of Elmdon, where our trenches were more than once captured by the Magdeburg battalions, only to be themselves hurled out again by the rush of the 1st Coldstream Guards, who had been held in reserve near the threatened point. By noon the magnificent old palace at Audley End was in flames. Art treasures which were of inestimable value and absolutely unreplaceable perished in this shocking conflagration. Desperate fighting was going on in the streets of the little town of Saffron Walden, where a mingled mass of Volunteers and Militia strove hard to arrest the advance of a portion of the German Army which was endeavouring to work round the right of our position. "On our left the Foot Guards and Fusiliers of the 1st German Guard Division, after receiving a terrible pounding from our guns when they poured into Royston at the heels of our Mounted Infantry, had fought their way up the heights to within fifteen hundred yards of our trenches on the upper slopes of the ridge. Farther than that they had been unable to advance. Their close formations offered an excellent target to the rifles of the Volunteers and Militia lining our entrenchments. The attackers had lost men in thousands, and were now endeavouring to dig themselves in as best they could under the hail of projectiles that continually swept the hillside. About noon, too, the 2nd Division of the Garde Corps, after some skirmishing with the Mounted Infantry away on our left front, got into attack formation along the line of the Hitchin and Cambridge Railway, and after pouring a deluge of projectiles from field guns and howitzers upon our position, advanced upon Therfield with the greatest bravery and determination. They had succeeded by 2 p.m. in driving our men from the end of the spur running northward near Therfield Heath, and managed to get a number of their howitzers up there, and at once opened fire from the cover afforded by several copses out of which our men had been driven. "In short, things were beginning to look very bad for Old England, and the watchers on the Therfield heights turned their glasses anxiously northward in search of General Sir William Packington's force from Potton. They had not long to wait. At 2.15 the winking flash of a heliograph away near Wendy Place, about eight miles up Ermine Street, announced that the advance guard, consisting of the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, was already at Bassingbourn, and that the main body was close behind, having escaped detection by all the enemy's patrols and flank guards. They were now directly in the rear of the right of the German reserves, who had been pushed forward into the neighbourhood of Royston to support the attack of their main body on the British position. A few minutes later it was evident that the enemy had also become aware of their advent. Two or three regiments hurriedly issued from Royston and deployed to the north-west. But the guns of the Baldock Corps turned such a 'rafale' fire upon them that they hesitated and were lost. "Every long-range gun in the British entrenchments that would bear was also turned upon them, leaving the infantry and field guns to deal with the troops assaulting their position. The three battalions, as well as a fourth that was sent to their assistance, were simply swept out of existence by this terrible cross-fire. Their remnants streamed away, a disorganised crowd of scattered stragglers, towards Melbourn; while, still holding on to Bassingbourn, the Baldock force moved down on Royston, driving everything before it. "The most advanced German troops made a final effort to capture our position when they saw what was going on behind them, but it was half-hearted; they were brought to a standstill, and our men, fixing bayonets, sprang from their trenches and charged down upon them with cheers, which were taken up all along the line for miles. The Germans here and there made a partial stand, but in half an hour they were down on the low ground, falling back towards the north-east in the greatest confusion, losing men in thousands from the converging fire of our guns. Their cavalry made a gallant attempt to save the day by charging our troops to the north of Royston. It was a magnificent sight to see their enormous masses sweeping over the ground with an impetus which looked capable of carrying everything before it, but our men, clustering behind the hedges of Ermine Street, mowed them down squadrons at a time. Not one of them reached the roadway. The magnificent Garde Corps was routed. [Illustration: BATTLE OF ROYSTON SUNDAY SEPT. 9TH.] "The combined IIIrd and IVth Corps now advanced on the exposed right flank of the German IVth Corps, which, fighting gallantly, fell back, doing its best to cover the retreat of its comrades, who, on their part, very much hampered its movements. By nightfall there was no unwounded German south of Whittlesford, except as a prisoner. By this time, too, we were falling back on our original position." CHAPTER X. BRITISH ABANDON COLCHESTER. On Tuesday, 10th September, the "Daily News" published the following telegram from its war correspondent, Mr. Edgar Hamilton: "CHELMSFORD, _Monday, Sept._ 9. "I sit down, after a sleepless night, to indite the account of our latest move. We hear that Sheffield has fallen, and our troops are in flight. As, by the time this appears in print, the enemy will of necessity be aware of our abandonment of Colchester, the censor will not, I imagine, prevent the despatch of my letter. "For our move has been made one of a retrograde nature, and I do not doubt that the cavalry of the German IXth Corps are close behind us and in touch with our own. But I must not, in using the word 'retrograde,' be supposed to criticise in any way the strategy of our generals. For every one here is, I am sure, fully persuaded of the wisdom of the step. Colchester, with its plucky little garrison, was altogether too much 'in the air,' and stood a great risk of being isolated by a converging advance of the IXth and Xth Corps of the German invaders, to say nothing of the XIIth (Saxon) Corps at Maldon, which since the unfortunate battle of Purleigh has shown itself very active to the north and east. "The Saxons have refrained from attacking our Vth Corps since its repulse, and it has been left almost in peace to entrench its position from Danbury to the southward; but, on the other hand, while not neglecting to further strengthen their already formidable defences between the Blackwater and the Crouch, their cavalry have scoured the country up to the very gates of Colchester. Yesterday morning the 16th Lancers and the 17th Hussars--who had fallen back from Norwich--together with some of the local Yeomanry, moved out by the Tolleshunt d'Arcy and Great Totham roads, and drove in their patrols with some loss. At Tiptree Heath there was a sharp cavalry engagement between our red Lancers and several squadrons of a sky-blue hussar regiment. Our people routed them, but in the pursuit that followed would have fared badly, as they fell in with the four remaining squadrons supported by another complete regiment, had it not been for the opportune arrival of the Household Cavalry Brigade, which had moved north-east from Danbury to co-operate. This completely changed the aspect of affairs. The Germans were soundly beaten, with the loss of a large number of prisoners, and galloped back to Maldon in confusion. In the meantime, the 2nd King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment and the 5th Battery R.F. Artillery had been sent down to Witham by train, whence they marched up to the high ground near Wickham Bishops. They and the Yeomanry were left there in a position to cover the main London Road and the Great Eastern Railway, and at the same time threaten any movement of the enemy by the Great Totham Road. When the news of our success reached Colchester, soon after midday, we were all very jubilant. In fact, I fear that a great many people spent the afternoon in a species of fool's paradise. And when towards the evening the announcement of our splendid victory at Royston was posted up on the red walls of the fine town hall, and outside the Cups, there was an incipient outbreak of that un-English excitement known as 'Mafficking.' "But this exultation was fated to be but short-lived, even though the Mayor appeared on the balcony of the Town Hall and addressed the crowd, while the latest news was posted outside the offices of the 'Essex Telegraph,' opposite the post office. The wind was in the north, and about 5.45 in the afternoon the sound of a heavy explosion was heard from the direction of Manningtree. I was in the Cups Hotel at the time arranging for an early dinner, and ran out into the street. As I emerged from the archway of the hotel I distinctly heard a second detonation from the same direction. A sudden silence, ominous and unnatural, seemed to fall on the yelping jingoes in the street, in the midst of which the rumble of yet another explosion rolled down on the wind, this time from a more westerly direction. Men asked their neighbours breathlessly as to what all this portended. I myself knew no more than the most ignorant of the crowd, till in an officer who rushed hastily by me in Head Street, on his way into the hotel, I recognised my friend Captain Burton, of the Artillery. "I buttonholed him at once. "'Do I know what those explosions were?' repeated he in answer to my inquiry. 'Well, I don't know, but I'm open to bet you five to one that it's the sappers blowing up the bridges over the Stour at Manningtree and Stratford St. Mary.' "'Then the Germans will have arrived there?' I queried. "'Most probably. And look here,' he continued, taking me aside by the arm, and lowering his voice, 'you take my tip. We shall be out of this to-night. So you'd best pack up your traps and get into marching order.' "'Do you know this?' said I. "'Not officially, or I shouldn't tell you anything about it. But I can put two and two together. We all knew that the General wouldn't be fool enough to try and defend an open town of this size with such a small garrison against a whole army corps, or perhaps more. It would serve no good purpose, and expose the place to destruction and bring all sorts of disaster on the civil population. You could have seen that for yourself, for no attempt whatever has been made to erect defences of any kind, neither have we received any reinforcements at all. If they had meant to defend it they could certainly have contrived to send us some Volunteers and guns at any rate. No, the few troops we have here have done their best in assisting the Danbury Force against the Saxons, and are much too valuable to be left here to be cut off without being able to do much to check the advance of the enemy. If we had been going to try anything of that kind, we should have now been holding the line of the river Stour; but I know we have only small detachments at the various bridges, sufficient only to drive off the enemy's cavalry patrols. By now, having blown up the bridges, I expect they are falling back as fast as they can get. Besides, look here,' he added, 'what do you think that battalion was sent to Wickham Bishops for this morning?' "I told him my theories as set forth above. "'Oh, yes, that's all right,' he answered. 'But you may bet your boots that there's more in it than that. In my opinion, the General has had orders to clear out as soon as the enemy are preparing to cross the Stour, and the Lancasters are planted there to protect our left flank from an attack from Maldon while we are retreating on Chelmsford.' "'But we might fall back on Braintree?' I hazarded. "'Don't you believe it. We're not wanted there--at least, I mean, not so much as elsewhere. Where we shall come in is to help to fill the gap between Braintree and Danbury. I think, myself, we might just as well have done it before. We have been sending back stores by rail for the last two days. Well, good-bye,' he said, holding out his hand. 'Keep all this to yourself, and mark my words, we'll be off at dusk.' "Away he went, and convinced that his prognostications were correct--as, indeed, in the main they proved--I hastened to eat my dinner, pay my bill, and get my portmanteau packed and stowed away in my motor. As soon as the evening began to close in I started and made for the barracks, going easy. The streets were still full of people, but they were very quiet, and mostly talking together in scattered groups. A shadow seemed to have fallen on the jubilant crowd of the afternoon, though, as far as I could ascertain, there were no definite rumours of the departure of the troops and the close advent of the enemy. "When I arrived at the barracks, I saw at once that there was something in the wind, and pulled up alongside the barrack railings, determined to watch the progress of events. I had not long to wait. In about ten minutes a bugle sounded, and the scattered assemblage of men on the barrack-square closed together and solidified into a series of quarter columns. At the same time the Volunteer battalion moved across from the other side of the road and joined the Regular troops. I heard a sharp clatter and jingling behind me, and, looking round, saw the General and his staff with a squad of cavalry canter up the road. They turned into the barrack gate, greeted by a sharp word of command and the rattle of arms from the assembled battalions. As far as I could make out, the General made them some kind of address, after which I heard another word of command, upon which the regiment nearest to the gate formed fours and marched out. "It was the 2nd Dorsetshire. I watched anxiously to see which way they turned. As I more than expected, they turned in the direction of the London Road. My friend had been right so far, but till the troops arrived at Mark's Tey, where the road forked, I could not be certain whether they were going towards Braintree or Chelmsford. The Volunteers followed; then the Leicestershires, then a long train of artillery, field batteries, big 4·7 guns, and howitzers. The King's Own Scottish Borderers formed the rearguard. With them marched the General and his staff; I saw no cavalry. I discovered afterwards that the General, foreseeing that a retirement was imminent, had ordered the 16th Lancers and the 7th Hussars, after their successful morning performance, to remain till further orders at Kelvedon and Tiptree respectively, so that their horses were resting during the afternoon. "During the night march the former came back and formed a screen behind the retiring column, while the latter were in a position to observe and check any movement northwards that might be made by the Saxons, at the same time protecting its flank and rear from a possible advance by the cavalry of Von Kronhelm's Army, should they succeed in crossing the river Stour soon enough to be able to press after us in pursuit by either of the two eastern roads leading from Colchester to Maldon. After the last of the departing soldiers had tramped away into the gathering darkness through the mud, which after yesterday's downpour still lay thick upon the roads, I bethought me that I might as well run down to the railway station to see if anything was going on there. I was just in time. "The electric light disclosed a bustling scene as the last of the ammunition and a certain proportion of stores were being hurried into a long train that stood with steam up ready to be off. The police allowed none of the general public to enter the station, but my correspondent's pass obtained me admission to the departure platform. There I saw several detachments of the Royal Engineers, the Mounted Infantry--minus their horses, which had been already sent on--and some of the Leicestershire Regiment. Many of the men had their arms, legs, or heads bandaged, and bore evident traces of having been in action. I got into conversation with a colour-sergeant of the Engineers, and learned these were the detachments who had been stationed at the bridges over the Stour. It appears there was some sharp skirmishing with the German advance troops before the officers in command had decided that they were in sufficient force to justify them in blowing up the bridges. In fact, at the one at which my informant was stationed, and that the most important one of all, over which the main road from Ipswich passed at Stratford St. Mary, the officer in charge delayed just too long, so that a party of the enemy's cavalry actually secured the bridge, and succeeded in cutting the wires leading to the charges which had been placed in readiness to blow it up. Luckily, the various detachments present rose like one man to the occasion, and, despite a heavy fire, hurled themselves upon the intruders with the bayonet with such determination and impetus, that the bridge was swept clear in a moment. The wires were reconnected, and the bridge cleared of our men just as the Germans, reinforced by several of their supporting squadrons, who had come up at a gallop, dashed upon it in pursuit. The firing key was pressed at this critical moment, and, with a stunning report, a whole troop was blown into the air, the remaining horses, mad with fright, stampeding despite all that their riders could do. The road was cut, and the German advance temporarily checked, while the British detachment made off as fast as it could for Colchester. "I asked the sergeant how long he thought it would be before the Germans succeeded in crossing it. 'Bless you, sir, I expect they're over by now,' he answered. 'They would be sure to have their bridging companies somewhere close up, and it would not take them more than an hour or two to throw a bridge over that place.' The bridges at Boxted Mill and Nayland had been destroyed previously. "The railway bridge and the other one at Manningtree were blown up before the Germans could get a footing, and their defenders had come in by rail. But my conversation was cut short, the whistle sounded, the men were hustled on board the train, and it moved slowly out of the station. As for me, I hurried out to my car, and, putting on speed, was soon clear of the town, and spinning along for Mark's Tey. It is about five miles, and shortly before I got there I overtook the marching column. The men were halted, and in the act of putting on their greatcoats. I was stopped here by the rearguard, who took charge of me, and would not let me proceed until permission was obtained from the General. "Eventually this officer ordered me to be brought to him, I presented my pass; but he said, 'I am afraid that I shall have to ask you either to turn back or to slow down and keep pace with us. In fact, you had better do the latter. I might, indeed, have to exercise my powers and impress your motor, should the exigencies of the Service require it.' I saw that it was best to make virtue of necessity, and replied that it was very much at his service, and that I was very well content to accompany the column. In point of fact, the latter was strictly true, for I wanted to see what was to be seen, and there were no points about going along with no definite idea of where I wanted to get to, with a possible chance of falling into the hands of the Saxons into the bargain. So a Staff officer, who was suffering from a slight wound, was placed alongside me, and the column, having muffled itself in its greatcoats, once more began to plug along through the thickening mire. My position was just in front of the guns, which kept up a monotonous rumble behind me. My companion was talkative, and afforded me a good deal of incidental and welcome information. Thus, just after we started, and were turning to the left at Mark's Tey, a bright glare followed by a loudish report came from the right of the road. 'What's that?' I naturally ejaculated. 'Oh, that will be the sappers destroying the junction with the Sudbury line,' he replied. 'There's the train waiting for them just beyond.' "So it was. The train that I had seen leaving had evidently stopped after passing the junction, while the line was broken behind it. 'They will do the same after passing the cross line at Witham,' volunteered he. "A mile or two further on we passed between two lines of horsemen, their faces set northwards and muffled to the eyes in their long cloaks. 'That's some of the 16th,' he said, 'going to cover our rear.' "So we moved on all night through the darkness and rain, and with the first glimmer of dawn halted at Witham. We had about nine miles still to go to reach Chelmsford, which I learned was our immediate destination, and it was decided to rest here for an hour, while the men made the best breakfast they could from the contents of their haversacks. But the villagers brought out hot tea and coffee, and did the best they could for us, so we did not fare so badly after all. As for me, I got permission to go on, taking with me my friend the Staff officer, who had despatches to forward from Chelmsford. I pushed on at full speed. We were there in a very short space of time, and during the morning I learned that the Braintree Army was falling back on Dunmow, and that the Colchester garrison was to assist in holding the line of the river Chelmer." NOTICE. CONCERNING WOUNDED BRITISH SOLDIERS. In compliance with an order of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial Army, the Governor-General of East Anglia decrees as follows:-- (1) Every inhabitant of the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Cambridge, Lincolnshire, Yorkshire, Nottingham, Derby, Leicester, Northampton, Rutland, Huntingdon, and Hertford, who gives asylum to or lodges one or more ill or wounded British soldier, is obliged to make a declaration to the mayor of the town or to the local police within 24 hours, stating name, grade, place of birth, and nature of illness or injury. Every change of domicile of the wounded is also to be notified within 24 hours. In absence of masters, servants are ordered to make the necessary declarations. The same order applies to the directors of hospitals, surgeries, or ambulance stations, who receive the British wounded within our jurisdiction. (2) All mayors are ordered to prepare lists of the British wounded, showing the number, with their names, grade, and place of birth in each district. (3) The mayor, or the superintendent of police, must send on the 1st and 15th of each month a copy of his lists to the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. The first list must be sent on the 15th September. (4) Any person failing to comply with this order will, in addition to being placed under arrest for harbouring British troops, be fined a sum not exceeding £20. (5) This decree is to be published in all towns and villages in the Province of East Anglia. =Count VON SCHONBURG-WALDENBURG, Lieutenant-General, Governor of German East Anglia.= IPSWICH, _September_ 6, 1910. [Illustration: COPY OF ONE OF THE ENEMY'S PROCLAMATIONS.] CHAPTER XI. FIERCE FIGHTING AT CHELMSFORD. A despatch from Mr. Edgar Hamilton to the "Daily News," as follows, was published on Saturday, 15th September: "At Little Waltham I found myself close to the scene of action. About a mile ahead of me the hamlet of Howe Street was in flames and burning furiously. I could see the shells bursting in and all over it in perfect coveys. I could not make out where they were coming from, but an officer I met said he thought the enemy must have several batteries in action on the high ground about Littley Green, a mile and a half to the north on the opposite side of the river. I crossed over myself, and got up on the knoll where the Leicestershires and Dorsets had been stationed, together with a number of the 4·7-inch guns brought from Colchester. "This piece of elevated ground is about two miles long, running almost north and south, and at the top of it I got an extensive view to the eastward right away to beyond Witham, as the ground fell all the way. The country was well wooded, and a perfect maze of trees and hedgerows. If there were any Germans down there in this plain they were lying very low indeed, for my glasses did not discover the least indication of their presence. Due east my view was bounded by the high wooded ground about Wickham Bishops and Tiptree Heath, which lay a long blue hummock on the horizon, while to the south-east Danbury Hill, with our big war-balloon floating overhead, was plainly discernible. "While I gazed on the apparently peaceful landscape I was startled by a nasty, sharp hissing sound, which came momentarily nearer. It seemed to pass over my head, and was followed by a loud bang in the air, where now hung a ring of white smoke. It was a shell from the enemy. Just ahead of me was a somewhat extensive wood; and, urged by some insane impulse of seeking shelter, I left the car, which I ordered my chauffeur to take back for a mile and wait, and made for the close-standing trees. If I had stopped to think I should have realised that the wood gave me actually no protection whatever, and I had not gone far when the crashing of timber and noise of the bursting projectiles overhead and in the undergrowth around made me understand clearly that the Germans were making a special target of the wood, which, I imagine, they thought might conceal some of our troops. I wished heartily that I was seated beside my chauffeur in his fast-receding car. "However, my first object was to get clear of the wood again, and after some little time I emerged on the west side, right in the middle of a dressing station for the wounded, which had been established in a little hollow. Two surgeons, with their assistants, were already busily engaged with a number of wounded men, most of whom were badly hit by shrapnel bullets about the upper part of the body. I gathered from one or two of the few most slightly wounded men that our people had been, and were, very hardly put to it to hold their own. 'I reckon,' said one of them, a bombardier of artillery, 'that the enemy must have got more than a hundred guns firing at us, and at Howe Street village. If we could only make out where the foreign devils were,' continued my informant, 'our chaps could have knocked a good many of them out with our four-point-sevens, especially if we could have got a go at them before they got within range themselves. But they must have somehow contrived to get them into position during the night, for we saw nothing of them coming up. They are somewhere about Chatley, Fairstead Lodge, and Little Leighs, but as we can't locate them exactly, and only have ten guns up here, it don't give us much chance, does it?' Later I saw an officer of the Dorsets, who confirmed the gunner's story, but added that our people were well entrenched and the guns well concealed, so that none of the latter had been put out of action, and he thought we should be able to hold on to the hill all right. I regained my car without further adventure, bar several narrow escapes from stray shell, and made my way back as quickly as possible to Chelmsford. "The firing went on all day, not only to the northward, but also away to the southward, where the Saxons, while not making any determined attack, kept the Vth Corps continually on the alert, and there was an almost continuous duel between the heavy pieces. As it appeared certain that the knoll I had visited in the forenoon was the main objective of the enemy's attack, reinforcements had been more than once sent up there, but the German shell fire was so heavy that they found it almost impossible to construct the additional cover required. Several batteries of artillery were despatched to Pleshy and Rolphy Green to keep down, if possible, the fire of the Germans, but it seemed to increase rather than diminish. They must have had more guns in action than they had at first. Just at dusk their infantry had made the first openly offensive movement. "Several lines of skirmishers suddenly appeared in the valley between Little Leighs and Chatley, and advanced towards Lyonshall Wood, at the north end of the knoll east of Little Waltham. They were at first invisible from the British gun positions on the other side of the Chelmer, and when they cleared the spur on which Hyde Hall stands they were hardly discernible in the gathering darkness. The Dorsetshire and the other battalions garrisoning the knoll manned their breastworks as they got within rifle range, and opened fire, but they were still subjected to the infernal rafale from the Hanoverian guns on the hills to the northward, and to make matters worse at this critical moment the Xth Corps brought a long line of guns into action between Flacks Green and Great Leighs Wood, in which position none of the British guns except a few on the knoll itself could reach them. Under this cross hurricane of projectiles the British fire was quite beaten down, and the Germans followed up their skirmishers by almost solid masses, which advanced with all but impunity save for the fire of the few British long-range guns at Pleshy Mount. There they were firing almost at random, as the gunners could not be certain of the exact whereabouts of their objectives. There was a searchlight on the knoll, but at the first sweep of its ray it was absolutely demolished by a blizzard of shrapnel. Every German gun was turned upon it. The Hanoverian battalions now swarmed to the assault, disregarding the gaps made in their ranks by the magazine fire of the defenders as soon as their close advance masked the fire of their own cannon. [Illustration: BATTLE OF CHELMSFORD. Position on the Evening of September 11.] "The British fought desperately. Three several times they hurled back at the attackers, but, alas! we were overborne by sheer weight of numbers. Reinforcements summoned by telephone, as soon as the determined nature of the attack was apparent, were hurried up from every available source, but they only arrived in time to be carried down the hill again in the rush of its defeated defenders, and to share with them the storm of projectiles from the quick-firers of General von Kronhelm's artillery, which had been pushed forward during the assault. It was with the greatest difficulty that the shattered and disorganised troops were got over the river at Little Waltham. As it was, hundreds were drowned in the little stream, and hundreds of others killed and wounded by the fire of the Germans. They had won the first trick. This was indisputable, and as ill news travels apace, a feeling of gloom fell upon our whole force, for it was realised that the possession of the captured knoll would enable the enemy to mass troops almost within effective rifle range of our river line of defence. I believe that it was proposed by some officers on the staff that we should wheel back our left and take up a fresh position during the night. This was overruled, as it was recognised that to do so would enable the enemy to push in between the Dunmow force and our own, and so cut our general line in half. All that could be done was to get up every available gun and bombard the hill during the night in order to hamper the enemy in his preparations for further forward movement and in his entrenching operations. "Had we more men at our disposal I suppose there is little doubt that a strong counter-attack would have been made on the knoll almost immediately; but in the face of the enormous numbers opposed to us, I imagine that General Blennerhasset did not feel justified in denuding any portion of our position of its defenders. So all through the dark hours the thunder of the great guns went on. In spite of the cannonade the Germans turned on no less than three searchlights from the southern end of the knoll about midnight. Two were at once put out by our fire, but the third managed to exist for over half an hour, and enabled the Germans to see how hard we were working to improve our defences along the river bank. I am afraid that they were by this means able to make themselves acquainted with the positions of a great number of our trenches. During the night our patrols reported being unable to penetrate beyond Pratt's Farm, Mount Maskell, and Porter's Farm on the Colchester Road. Everywhere they were forced back by superior numbers. The enemy were fast closing in upon us. It was a terrible night in Chelmsford. "There was panic on every hand. A man mounted the Tindal statue and harangued the crowd, urging the people to rise and compel the Government to stop the war. A few young men endeavoured to load the old Crimean cannon in front of the Shire Hall, but found it clogged with rust and useless. People fled from the villa residences in Brentwood Road into the town for safety, now that the enemy were upon them. The banks in High Street were being barricaded, and the stores still remaining in the various grocers' shops, Luckin Smith's, Martin's, Cramphorn's, and Pearke's, were rapidly being concealed from the invaders. All the ambulance waggons entering the town were filled with wounded, although as many as possible were sent south by train. By one o'clock in the morning, however, most of the civilian inhabitants had fled. The streets were empty, but for the bivouacking troops and the never-ending procession of wounded men. The General and his staff were deliberating to a late hour in the Shire Hall, at which he had established his headquarters. The booming of the guns waxed and waned till dawn, when a furious outburst announced that the second act of the tragedy was about to open. DECREE CONCERNING THE POWER OF COUNCILS OF WAR. WE, GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF EAST ANGLIA, in virtue of the powers conferred upon us by His Imperial Majesty the German Emperor, Commander-in-Chief of the German Armies, order, for the maintenance of the internal and external security of the counties of the Government-General:-- ARTICLE I.--Any individual guilty of incendiarism or of wilful inundation, of attack, or of resistance with violence against the Government-General or the agents of the civil or military authorities, of sedition, of pillage, of theft with violence, of assisting prisoners to escape, or of exciting soldiers to treasonable acts, shall be PUNISHED BY DEATH. In the case of any extenuating circumstances, the culprit may be sent to penal servitude with hard labour for twenty years. ARTICLE II.--Any person provoking or inciting an individual to commit the crimes mentioned in Article I. will be sent to penal servitude with hard labour for ten years. ARTICLE III.--Any person propagating false reports relative to the operations of war or political events will be imprisoned for one year, and fined up to £100. In any case where the affirmation or propagation may cause prejudice against the German Army, or against any authorities or functionaries established by it, the culprit will be sent to hard labour for ten years. ARTICLE IV.--Any person usurping a public office, or who commits any act or issues any order in the name of a public functionary, will be imprisoned for five years, and fined £150. ARTICLE V.--Any person who voluntarily destroys or abstracts any documents, registers, archives, or public documents deposited in public offices, or passing through their hands in virtue of their functions as government or civic officials, will be imprisoned for two years, and fined £150. ARTICLE VI.--Any person obliterating, damaging, or tearing down official notices, orders, or proclamations of any sort issued by the German authorities will be imprisoned for six months, and fined £80. ARTICLE VII.--Any resistance or disobedience of any order given in the interests of public security by military commanders and other authorities, or any provocation or incitement to commit such disobedience, will be punished by one year's imprisonment, or a fine of not less than £150. ARTICLE VIII.--All offences enumerated in Articles I.--VII. are within the jurisdiction of the Councils of War. ARTICLE IX.--It is within the competence of Councils of War to adjudicate upon all other crimes and offences against the internal and external security of the English provinces occupied by the German Army, and also upon all crimes against the military or civil authorities, or their agents, as well as murder, the fabrication of false money, of blackmail, and all other serious offences. Article X.--Independent of the above, the military jurisdiction already proclaimed will remain in force regarding all actions tending to imperil the security of the German troops, to damage their interests, or to render assistance to the Army of the British Government. Consequently, there will be PUNISHED BY DEATH, and we expressly repeat this, all persons who are not British soldiers and-- (a) Who serve the British Army or the Government as spies, or receive British spies, or give them assistance or asylum. (b) Who serve as guides to British troops, or mislead the German troops when charged to act as guides. (c) Who shoot, injure, or assault any German soldier or officer. (d) Who destroy bridges or canals, interrupt railways or telegraph lines, render roads impassable, burn munitions of war, provisions, or quarters of the troops. (e) Who take arms against the German troops. ARTICLE XI.--The organisation of Councils of War mentioned in Articles VIII. and IX. of the Law of May 2, 1870, and their procedure are regulated by special laws which are the same as the summary jurisdiction of military tribunals. In the case of Article X. there remains in force the Law of July 21, 1867, concerning the military jurisdiction applicable to foreigners. ARTICLE XII.--The present order is proclaimed and put into execution on the morrow of the day upon which it is affixed in the public places of each town and village, The Governor-General of East Anglia, =COUNT VON SCHONBURG-WALDENBERG, Lieutenant-General.= NORWICH, _September 7th_, 1910. "I had betaken myself at once to the round tower of the church, next the Stone Bridge, from which I had an excellent view both east and north. The first thing that attracted my eye was the myriad flashings of rifle fire in the dimness of the breaking day. They reached in a continuous line of coruscations from Boreham Hall, opposite my right hand, to the knoll by Little Waltham, a distance of three or four miles, I should say. The enemy were driving in all our outlying and advanced troops by sheer weight of numbers. Presently the heavy batteries at Danbury began pitching shell over in the direction of the firing, but as the German line still advanced, it had not apparently any very great effect. The next thing that happened was a determined attack on the village of Howe Street made from the direction of Hyde Hall. This is about two miles north of Little Waltham. In spite of our incessant fire, the Germans had contrived to mass a tremendous number of guns and howitzers on and behind the knoll they captured last night, and there was any quantity more on the ridge above Hyde Hall. All these terrible weapons concentrated their fire for a few moments on the blackened ruins of Howe Street. Not a mouse could have lived there. The little place was simply pulverised. "Our guns at Pleshy Mount and Rolphy Green, aided by a number of field batteries, in vain endeavoured to make head against them. They were outnumbered by six to one. Under cover of this tornado of iron and fire, the enemy pushed several battalions over the river, making use of the ruins of the many bridges about there which had been hastily destroyed, and which they repaired with planks and other materials they brought along with them. They lost a large number of men in the process, but they persevered, and by ten o'clock were in complete possession of Howe Street, Langley's Park, and Great Waltham, and moving in fighting formation against Pleshy Mount and Rolphy Green, their guns covering their advance with a perfectly awful discharge of shrapnel. Our cannon on the ridge at Partridge Green took the attackers in flank, and for a time checked their advance, but, drawing upon themselves the attention of the German artillery, on the south end of the knoll, were all but silenced. "As soon as this was effected another strong column of Germans followed in the footsteps of the first, and deploying to the left, secured the bridge at Little Waltham, and advanced against the gun positions on Partridge Green. This move turned all our river bank entrenchments right down to Chelmsford. Their defenders were now treated to the enfilade fire of a number of Hanoverian batteries that galloped down to Little Waltham. They stuck to their trenches gallantly, but presently when the enemy obtained a footing on Partridge Green they were taken in reverse, and compelled to fall back, suffering terrible losses as they did so. The whole of the infantry of the Xth Corps, supported--as we understand--by a division which had joined them from Maldon, now moved down on Chelmsford. In fact, there was a general advance of the three combined armies stretching from Partridge Green on the west to the railway line on the east. The defenders of the trenches facing east were hastily withdrawn, and thrown back on Writtle. The Germans followed closely with both infantry and guns, though they were for a time checked near Scot's Green by a dashing charge of our cavalry brigade, consisting of the 16th Lancers and the 7th, 14th, and 20th Hussars, and the Essex and Middlesex Yeomanry. We saw nothing of their cavalry, for a reason that will be apparent later. By one o'clock fierce fighting was going on all round the town, the German hordes enveloping it on all sides but one. We had lost a great number of our guns, or at any rate had been cut off from them by the German successes around Pleshy Mount, and in all their assaults on the town they had been careful to keep out of effective range of the heavy batteries on Danbury Hill. These, by the way, had their own work cut out for them, as the Saxon artillery were heavily bombarding the hill with their howitzers. The British forces were in a critical situation. Reinforcements--such as could be spared--were hurried up from the Vth Army Corps, but they were not very many in numbers, as it was necessary to provide against an attack by the Saxon Corps. By three o'clock the greater part of the town was in the hands of the Germans, despite the gallant way in which our men fought them from street to street, and house to house. A dozen fires were spreading in every direction, and fierce fighting was going on at Writtle. The overpowering numbers of the Germans, combined with their better organisation, and the number of properly trained officers at their disposal, bore the British mixed Regular and Irregular forces back, and back again. "Fearful of being cut off from his line of retreat, General Blennerhasset, on hearing from Writtle soon after three that the Hanoverians were pressing his left very hard, and endeavouring to work round it, reluctantly gave orders for the troops in Chelmsford to fall back on Widford and Moulsham. There was a lull in the fighting for about half an hour, though firing was going on both at Writtle and Danbury. Soon after four a terrible rumour spread consternation on every side. According to this, an enormous force of cavalry and motor infantry was about to attack us in the rear. What had actually happened was not quite so bad as this, but quite bad enough. It seems, according to our latest information, that almost the whole of the cavalry belonging to the three German Army Corps with whom we were engaged--something like a dozen regiments, with a proportion of horse artillery and all available motorists, having with them several of the new armoured motors carrying light, quick-firing and machine guns--had been massed during the last thirty-six hours behind the Saxon lines extending from Maldon to the River Crouch. During the day they had worked round to the southward, and at the time the rumour reached us were actually attacking Billericay, which was held by a portion of the reserves of our Vth Corps. By the time this news was confirmed the Germans were assaulting Great Baddow, and moving on Danbury from east, north, and west, at the same time resuming the offensive all along the line. The troops at Danbury must be withdrawn or they would be isolated. This difficult manoeuvre was executed by way of West Hanningfield. The rest of the Vth Corps conformed to the movement, the Guards Brigade at East Hanningfield forming the rearguard, and fighting fiercely all night through with the Saxon troops, who moved out on the left flank of our retreat. The wreck of the first Corps and the Colchester garrison was now also in full retirement. Ten miles lay between it and the lines at Brentwood, and had the Germans been able to employ cavalry in pursuit, this retreat would have been even more like a rout than it was. Luckily for us the Billericay troops mauled the German cavalry pretty severely, and they were beset in the close country in that neighbourhood by Volunteers, motorists, and every one that the officer commanding at Brentwood could get together in this emergency. "Some of them actually got upon our line of retreat, but were driven off by our advance guard; others came across the head of the retiring Vth Corps, but the terrain was all against cavalry, and after nightfall most of them had lost their way in the maze of lanes and hedgerows that covered the countryside. Had it not been for this we should probably have been absolutely smashed. As it was, rather more than half our original numbers of men and guns crawled into Brentwood in the early morning, worn out and dead-beat." Reports from Sheffield also showed the position to be critical. BOOK II. THE SIEGE OF LONDON. CHAPTER I. THE LINES OF LONDON. The German successes were continued in the North and Midlands, and notwithstanding the gallant defence of Sir George Woolmer before Manchester and Sir Henry Hibbard before Birmingham, both cities were captured and occupied by the enemy after terrible losses. London, however, was the chief objective of Von Kronhelm, and towards the Metropolis he now turned his attention. After the defeat of the British at Chelmsford on that fateful Wednesday, Lord Byfield decided to evacuate his position at Royston and fall back on the northern section of the London defence line, which had been under construction for the last ten days. These hasty entrenchments, which would have been impossible to construct but for the ready assistance of thousands of all classes of the citizens of London and the suburbs, extended from Tilbury on the east to Bushey on the west, passing by the Laindon Hills, Brentwood, Kelvedon, North Weald, Epping, Waltham Abbey, Cheshunt, Enfield Chase, Chipping Barnet, and Elstree. They were more or less continuous, consisting for the most part of trenches for infantry, generally following the lines of existing hedgerows or banks, which often required but little improvement to transform them into well-protected and formidable cover for the defending troops. Where it was necessary to cross open ground they were dug deep and winding, after the fashion adopted by the Boers in the South African War, so that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to enfilade them. Special bomb-proof covers for the local reserves were also constructed at various points, and the ground in front ruthlessly cleared of houses, barns, trees, hedges, and everything that might afford shelter to an advancing enemy. Every possible military obstacle was placed in front of the lines that time permitted, abattis, military pits, wire entanglements, and small ground mines. At the more important points along the fifty miles of entrenchments, field works and redoubts for infantry were built, most of them being armed with 4·7 or even 6 and 7·5 in. guns, which had been brought from Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, and mounted on whatever carriages could be adapted or improvised for the occasion. The preparation of the London lines was a stupendous undertaking, but the growing scarceness and dearness of provisions assisted in a degree, as no free rations were issued to any able-bodied man unless he went out to work at the fortifications. All workers were placed under military law. There were any number of willing workers who proffered their services in this time of peril. Thousands of men came forward asking to be enlisted and armed. The difficulty was to find enough weapons and ammunition for them, to say nothing of the question of uniform and equipment, which loomed very large indeed. The attitude of the Germans, as set forth in Von Kronhelm's proclamations, precluded the employment of fighting men dressed in civilian garb, and their attitude was a perfectly natural and justifiable one by all the laws and customs of war. It became necessary, therefore, that all men sent to the front should be dressed as soldiers in some way or another. In addition to that splendid corps, the Legion of Frontiersmen, many new armed organisations had sprung into being, some bearing the most fantastic names, such as the "Whitechapel War-to-the-Knives," the "Kensington Cowboys," the "Bayswater Braves," and the "Southwark Scalphunters." All the available khaki and blue serge was used up in no time; even though those who were already in possession of ordinary lounge suits of the latter material were encouraged to have them altered into uniforms by the addition of stand-up collars and facings of various colours, according to their regiments and corps. Only the time during which these men were waiting for their uniforms was spent in drill in the open spaces of the Metropolis. As soon as they were clothed, they were despatched to that portion of the entrenchments to which their corps had been allocated, and there, in the intervals of their clearing and digging operations, they were hustled through a brief musketry course, which consisted for the most part in firing. The question of the provision of officers and N.C.O.'s was an almost insuperable one. Retired men came forward on every side, but the supply was by no means equal to the demand, and they themselves in many instances were absolutely out of date as far as knowledge of modern arms and conditions were concerned. However, every one, with but very few exceptions, did his utmost, and by the 11th or 12th of the month the entrenchments were practically completed, and manned by upwards of 150,000 "men with muskets" of stout heart and full of patriotism, but in reality nothing but an army _pour rire_ so far as efficiency was concerned. The greater part of the guns were also placed in position, especially on the north and eastern portions of the lines, and the remainder were being mounted as fast as it was practicable. They were well manned by Volunteer and Militia Artillerymen, drawn from every district which the invaders had left accessible. By the 13th the eastern section of the fortifications was strengthened by the arrival of the remnants of the Ist and Vth Army Corps, which had been so badly defeated at Chelmsford, and no time was lost in reorganising them and distributing them along the lines, thereby, to a certain extent, leavening the unbaked mass of their improvised defenders. It was generally expected that the enemy would follow up the success by an immediate attack on Brentwood, the main barrier between Von Kronhelm and his objective--our great Metropolis. But, as it turned out, he had a totally different scheme in hand. The orders to Lord Byfield to evacuate the position he had maintained with such credit against the German Garde and IVth Corps have already been referred to. Their reason was obvious. Now that there was no organised resistance on his right, he stood in danger of being cut off from London, the defences of which were now in pressing need of his men. A large amount of rolling stock was at once despatched to Saffron Walden and Buntingford by the G.E.R. and to Baldock by the G.N.R., to facilitate the withdrawal of his troops and stores, and he was given an absolutely free hand as to how these were to be used, all lines being kept clear and additional trains kept at his disposal at their London termini. [Illustration: THE LINES OF LONDON Rough sketch showing approximately the lines of entrenchments constructed for the defence of the Metropolis.] September 13 proved a memorable date in the history of England. The evacuation of the Baldock-Saffron Walden position could not possibly have been carried out in good order on such short notice, had not Lord Byfield previously worked the whole thing out in readiness. He could not help feeling that, despite his glorious victory on the ninth, a turn of Fortune's wheel might necessitate a retirement on London sooner or later, and, like the good General that he was, he made every preparation both for this, and other eventualities. Among other details, he had arranged that the mounted infantry should be provided with plenty of strong light wire. This was intended for the express benefit of Frölich's formidable cavalry brigade, which he foresaw would be most dangerous to his command in the event of a retreat. As soon, therefore, as the retrograde movement commenced, the mounted infantry began to stretch their wires across every road, lane and byway leading to the north and north-east. Some wires were laid low, within a foot of the ground, others high up, where they could catch a rider about the neck or breast. This operation they carried out again and again, after the troops had passed, at various points on the route of the retreat. Thanks to the darkness, this device well fulfilled its purpose. Frölich's brigade was on the heels of the retreating British soon after midnight, but as it was impossible for them to move over the enclosed country at night, his riders were confined to the roads, and the accidents and delays occasioned by the wires were so numerous and disconcerting that their advance had to be conducted with such caution that as a pursuit it was of no use at all. Even the infantry and heavy guns of the retiring British got over the ground nearly twice as fast. After two or three hours of this, only varied by occasional volleys from detachments of our mounted infantry, who sometimes waited in rear of their snares to let fly at the German cavalry before galloping back to lay others, the enemy recognised the fact, and, withdrawing their cavalry till daylight, replaced them by infantry, but so much time had been lost, that the British had got several miles' start. As has been elsewhere chronicled, the brigade of four regular battalions with their guns, and a company of Engineers which were to secure the passage of the Stort and protect the left flank of the retirement, left Saffron Walden somewhere about 10.30 p.m. The line was clear, and they arrived at Sawbridgeworth in four long trains in a little under an hour. Their advent did not arouse the sleeping village, as the station lies nearly three-quarters of a mile distant on the further side of the river. It may be noted in passing that while the Stort is but a small stream, easily fordable in most places, yet it was important, if possible, to secure the bridges to prevent delay in getting over the heavy guns and waggons of the retiring British. A delay and congestion at the points selected for passage might, with a close pursuit, easily lead to disaster. Moreover, the Great Eastern Railway crossed the river by a wooden bridge just north of the village of Sawbridgeworth, and it was necessary to ensure the safe passage of the last trains over it before destroying it to preclude the use of the railway by the enemy. There were two road bridges on the Great Eastern Railway near the village of Sawbridgeworth, which might be required by the Dunmow force, which was detailed to protect the same flank rather more to the northward. The most important bridge, that over which the main body of the Saffron Walden force was to retire, with all the impedimenta it had had time to bring away with it, was between Sawbridgeworth and Harlow, about a mile north of the latter village, but much nearer its station. Thither, then, proceeded the leading train with the Grenadiers, four 4·7 guns, and half a company of Royal Engineers with bridging materials. Their task was to construct a second bridge to relieve the traffic over the permanent one. The Grenadiers left one company at the railway station, two in Harlow village, which they at once commenced to place in a state of defence, much to the consternation of the villagers, who had not realised how close to them were trending the red footsteps of war. The remaining five companies with the other four guns turned northward, and after marching another mile or so occupied the enclosures round Durrington House and the higher ground to its north. Here the guns were halted on the road. It was too dark to select the best position for them, for it was now only about half an hour after midnight. The three other regiments which detrained at Sawbridgeworth were disposed as follows, continuing the line of the Grenadiers to the northward. The Rifles occupied Hyde Hall, formerly the seat of the Earls of Roden, covering the operations of the Engineers, who were preparing the railway bridge for destruction, and the copses about Little Hyde Hall on the higher ground to the eastward. The Scots Guards with four guns were between them and the Grenadiers, and distributed between Sheering village and Gladwyns House, from the neighbourhood of which it was expected that the guns would be able to command the Chelmsford Road for a considerable distance. The Seaforth Highlanders for the time being were stationed on a road running parallel to the railway, from which branch roads led to both the right, left, and centre of the position. An advanced party of the Rifle Brigade was pushed forward to Hatfield Heath with instructions to patrol towards the front and flanks, and, if possible, establish communication with the troops expected from Dunmow. By the time all this was completed it was getting on for 3 a.m. on the 13th. At this hour the advanced guard of the Germans coming from Chelmsford was midway between Leaden Roding and White Roding, while the main body was crossing the small River Roding by the shallow ford near the latter village. Their few cavalry scouts were, however, exploring the roads and lanes some little way ahead. A collision was imminent. The Dunmow force had not been able to move before midnight, and, with the exception of one regular battalion, the 1st Leinsters, which was left behind to the last and crowded into the only train available, had only just arrived at the northern edge of Hatfield Forest, some four miles directly north of Hatfield Heath. The Leinsters, who left Dunmow by train half an hour later, had detrained at this point at one o'clock, and just about three had met the patrols of the Rifles. A Yeomanry corps from Dunmow was also not far off, as it turned to its left at the cross-roads east of Takely, and was by this time in the neighbourhood of Hatfield Broad Oak. In short, all three forces were converging, but the bulk of the Dunmow force was four miles away from the point of convergence. It was still profoundly dark when the Rifles at Hatfield Heath heard a dozen shots cracking through the darkness to their left front. Almost immediately other reports resounded from due east. Nothing could be seen beyond a very few yards, and the men of the advanced company drawn up at the cross-roads in front of the village inn fancied they now and again saw figures dodging about in obscurity, but were cautioned not to fire till their patrols had come in, for it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe. Shots still rattled out here and there to the front. About ten minutes later the captain in command, having got in his patrols, gave the order to fire at a black blur that seemed to be moving towards them on the Chelmsford Road. There was no mistake this time. The momentary glare of the discharge flashed on the shiny "pickel-haubes" of a detachment of German infantry, who charged forward with a loud "Hoch!" The Riflemen, who already had their bayonets fixed, rushed to meet them, and for a few moments there was a fierce stabbing affray in the blackness of the night. The Germans, who were but few in number, were overpowered, and beat a retreat, having lost several of their men. The Rifles, according to their orders, having made sure of the immediate proximity of the enemy, now fell back to the rest of their battalion at Little Hyde Hall, and all along the banks and hedges which covered the British front, our men, rifle in hand, peered eagerly into the darkness ahead of them. Nothing happened for quite half an hour, and the anxious watchers were losing some of their alertness, when a heavy outburst of firing re-echoed from Hatfield Heath. To explain this we must return to the Germans. Von der Rudesheim, on obtaining touch with the British, at once reinforced his advanced troops, and they, a whole battalion strong, advanced into the hamlet meeting with no resistance. Almost simultaneously two companies of the Leinsters entered it from the northward. There was a sudden and unexpected collision on the open green, and a terrible fire was exchanged at close quarters, both sides losing very heavily. The British, however, were borne back by sheer weight of numbers, and, through one of those unfortunate mistakes that insist on occurring in warfare, were charged as they fell back by the leading squadrons of the Yeomanry who were coming up from Hatfield Broad Oak. The officer commanding the Leinsters decided to wait till it was a little lighter before again attacking the village. He considered that, as he had no idea of the strength of the enemy, he had best wait till the arrival of the troops now marching through Hatfield Forest. Von der Rudesheim, on his part, mindful of his instructions, determined to try to hold the few scattered houses on the north side of the heath which constituted the village, with the battalion already in it, and push forward with the remainder of his force towards Harlow. His first essay along the direct road _viâ_ Sheering was repulsed by the fire of the Scots Guards lining the copses about Gladwyns. He now began to have some idea of the British position, and made his preparations to assault it at daybreak. To this end he sent forward two of his batteries into Hatfield Heath, cautiously moved the rest of his force away to the left, arranged his battalions in the valley of the Pincey Brook ready for attacking Sheering and Gladwyns, placed one battalion in reserve at Down Hall, and stationed his remaining battery near Newman's End. By this time there was beginning to be a faint glimmer of daylight in the east, and, as the growing dawn began to render vague outlines of the nearer objects dimly discernible, hell broke loose along the peaceful countryside. A star shell fired from the battery at Newman's End burst and hung out a brilliant white blaze that fell slowly over Sheering village, lighting up its walls and roofs and the hedges along which lay its defenders, was the signal for the Devil's Dance to begin. Twelve guns opened with a crash from Hatfield Heath, raking the Gladwyns enclosures and the end of Sheering village with a deluge of shrapnel, whilst an almost solid firing line advanced rapidly against it, firing heavily. [Illustration: BATTLE OF HARLOW 1^{ST} PHASE about 5 a m Sept 13^{th}] The British replied lustily with gun, rifle, and maxim, the big high-explosive shells bursting amid the advancing Germans and among the houses of Hatfield Heath with telling effect. But the German assaulting lines had but six or seven hundred yards to go. They had been trained above all things to ignore losses and to push on at all hazards. The necessity for this had not been confused in their minds by maxims about the importance of cover, so the south side of the village street was taken at a rush. Von der Rudesheim continued to pile on his men, and, fighting desperately, the Guardsmen were driven from house to house and from fence to fence. All this time the German battery at Newman's End continued to fire star shells with rhythmical regularity, lighting up the inflamed countenances of the living combatants, and the pale up-turned faces of the dead turned to heaven as if calling for vengeance on their slayers. In the midst of this desperate fighting the Leinsters, supported by a Volunteer and a Militia regiment, which had just come up, assaulted Hatfield Heath. The Germans were driven out of it with the loss of a couple of their guns, but hung on to the little church, around which such a desperate conflict was waged that the dead above ground in that diminutive God's acre outnumbered the "rude forefathers of the hamlet" who slept below. It was now past five o'clock in the morning, and by this time strong reinforcements might have been expected from Dunmow, but, with the exception of the Militia and Volunteer battalions just referred to, who had pushed on at the sound of the firing, none were seen coming up. The fact was that they had been told off to certain positions in the line of defence they had been ordered to take up, and had been slowly and carefully installing themselves therein. Their commanding officer, Sir Jacob Stellenbosch, thought that he must carry out the exact letter of the orders he had received from Lord Byfield, and paid little attention to the firing except to hustle his battalion commanders, to try to get them into their places as soon as possible. He was a pig-headed man into the bargain, and would listen to no remonstrance. The two battalions which had arrived so opportunely had been at the head of the column, and had pushed forward "on their own" before he could prevent them. At this time the position was as follows: One German battalion was hanging obstinately on to the outskirts of Hatfield Heath; two were in possession of the copses about Gladwyns; two were in Sheering village, or close up to it, and the sixth was still in reserve at Down Hall. On the British side the Rifles were in their original position at Little Hyde Hall where also were three guns, which had been got away from Gladwyns. The Seaforths had come up, and were now firing from about Quickbury, while the Scots Guards, after suffering fearful losses, were scattered, some with the Highlanders, others with the five companies of the Grenadiers, who with their four guns still fought gallantly on between Sheering and Durrington House. CHAPTER II. REPULSE OF THE GERMANS. The terrible fire of the swarms of Germans who now lined the edges of Sheering village became too much for the four 4·7 guns on the open ground to the south. Their gunners were shot down as fast as they touched their weapons, and when the German field battery at Newman's End, which had been advanced several hundred yards, suddenly opened a flanking fire of shrapnel upon them, it was found absolutely impossible to serve them. A gallant attempt was made to withdraw them by the Harlow Road, but their teams were shot down as soon as they appeared. This enfilade fire, too, decimated the Grenadiers and the remnant of the Scots, though they fought on to the death, and a converging attack of a battalion from Down Hall and another from Sheering drove them down into the grounds of Durrington House, where fighting still went on savagely for some time afterwards. Von der Rudesheim had all but attained a portion of his object, which was to establish his guns in such a position that they could fire on the main body of the British troops when they entered Sawbridgeworth by the Cambridge Road. The place where the four guns with the Grenadiers had been stationed was within 3,000 yards of any part of that road between Harlow and Sawbridgeworth. But this spot was still exposed to the rifle fire of the Seaforths who held Quickbury. Von der Rudesheim therefore determined to swing forward his left, and either drive them back down the hill towards the river, or at least to so occupy them that he could bring up his field-guns to their chosen position without losing too many of his gunners. By six o'clock, thanks to his enormous local superiority in numbers, he had contrived to do this, and now the opposing forces with the exception of the British Grenadiers, who still fought with a German battalion between Durrington House and Harlow, faced each other north and south, instead of east and west, as they were at the beginning of the fight. Brigadier-General Lane-Edgeworth, who was in command of the British, had been sending urgent messages for reinforcements to the Dunmow Force, but when its commanding officer finally decided to turn his full strength in the direction of the firing, it took so long to assemble and form up the Volunteer regiments who composed the bulk of his command, that it was past seven before the leading battalion had deployed to assist in the attack which it was decided to make against the German right. Meantime, other important events had transpired. Von der Rudesheim had found that the battalion which was engaged with the Grenadiers could not get near Harlow village, or either the river or railway bridge at that place, both of which he wished to destroy. But his scouts had reported a lock and wooden footbridge immediately to the westward between Harlow and Sawbridgeworth, just abreast of the large wooded park surrounding Pishobury House on the farther side. He determined to send two companies over by this, their movements being hidden from the English by the trees. After crossing, they found themselves confronted by a backwater, but, trained in crossing rivers, they managed to ford and swim over, and advanced through the park towards Harlow Bridge. While this was in progress, a large force was reported marching south on the Cambridge Road. While Von der Rudesheim, who was at the western end of Sheering hamlet, was looking through his glasses at the new arrivals on the scene of action--who were without doubt the main body of the Royston command, which was retiring under the personal supervision of Lord Byfield--a puff of white smoke rose above the trees about Hyde Hall, and at top speed four heavily loaded trains shot into sight going south. These were the same ones that had brought down the Regular British troops, with whom he was now engaged. They had gone north again, and picked up a number of Volunteer battalions belonging to the retreating force just beyond Bishop's Stortford. But so long a time had been taken in entraining the troops in the darkness and confusion of the retreat, that their comrades who had kept to the road, arrived almost simultaneously. Von der Rudesheim signalled, and sent urgent orders for his guns to be brought up to open fire on them, but by the time the first team had reached him the last of the trains had disappeared from sight into the cutting at Harlow Station. But even now it was not too late to open fire on the troops entering Sawbridgeworth. Things were beginning to look somewhat bad for Von der Rudesheim's little force. The pressure from the north was increasing every moment, his attack on the retreating troops had failed, he had not so far been able to destroy the bridges at Harlow, and every minute the likelihood of his being able to do so grew more remote. To crown all, word was brought him that the trains which had just slipped by were disgorging men in hundreds along the railway west of Harlow Station, and that these troops were beginning to move forward as if to support the British Grenadiers, who had been driven back towards Harlow. In fact, he saw that there was even a possibility of his being surrounded. But he had no intention of discontinuing the fight. He knew he could rely on the discipline and mobility of his well-trained men under almost any conditions, and he trusted, moreover, that the promised reinforcements would not be very long in turning up. But he could not hold on just where he was. He accordingly, by various adroit manoeuvres, threw back his right to Down Hall, whose copses and plantations afforded a good deal of cover, and, using this as a pivot, gradually wheeled back his left till he had taken up a position running north and south from Down Hall to Matching Tye. He had not effected this difficult manoeuvre without considerable loss, but he experienced less difficulty in extricating his left than he had anticipated, since the newly arrived British troops at Harlow, instead of pressing forward against him, had been engaged in moving into a position between Harlow and the hamlet of Foster Street, on the somewhat elevated ground to the south of Matching, which would enable them to cover the further march of the main body of the retreating troops to Epping. But he had totally lost the two companies he had sent across the river to attack Harlow Bridge. Unfortunately for them, their arrival on the Harlow-Sawbridgeworth Road synchronised with that of the advanced guard of Lord Byfield's command. Some hot skirmishing took place in and out among the trees of Pishobury, and finally the Germans were driven to earth in the big square block of the red-brick mansion itself. Here they made a desperate stand, fighting hard as they were driven from one storey to another. The staircases ran with blood, the woodwork smouldered and threatened to burst into flame in a dozen places. At length the arrival of a battery of field guns, which unlimbered at close range, induced the survivors to surrender, and they were disarmed and carried off as prisoners with the retreating army. * * * * * By the time Von der Rudesheim had succeeded in taking up his new position it was past ten o'clock, and he had been informed by despatches carried by motor-cyclists that he might expect assistance in another hour and a half. The right column, consisting of the 39th Infantry Brigade of five battalions, six batteries, and a squadron of Dragoons, came into collision with the left flank of the Dunmow force, which was engaged in attacking Von der Rudesheim's right at Down Hall, and endeavouring to surround it. Sir Jacob Stellenbosch, who was in command, in vain tried to change front to meet the advancing enemy. His troops were nearly all Volunteers, who were incapable of quickly manoeuvring under difficult circumstances; they were crumpled up and driven back in confusion towards Hatfield Heath. Had Von Kronhelm been able to get in the bulk of his cavalry from their luckless pursuit of the Ist and Vth British Army Corps, who had been driven back on Brentwood the evening previous, and so send a proportion with the 20th Division, few would have escaped to tell the tale. As it was, the unfortunate volunteers were shot down in scores by the "feu d'enfer" with which the artillery followed them up, and lay in twos and threes and larger groups all over the fields, victims of a selfish nation that accepted these poor fellows' gratuitous services merely in order that its citizens should not be obliged to carry out what in every other European country was regarded as the first duty of citizenship--that of learning to bear arms in the defence of the Fatherland. By this time the greater portion of the retreating British Army, with all its baggage, guns and impedimenta, was crawling slowly along the road from Harlow to Epping. Unaccustomed as they were to marching, the poor Volunteers who had already covered eighteen or twenty miles of road, were now toiling slowly and painfully along the highway. The regular troops, who had been engaged since early morning, and who were now mostly in the neighbourhood of Moor Hall, east of Harlow, firing at long ranges on Von der Rudesheim's men to keep them in their places while Sir Jacob Stellenbosch attacked their right, were now hurriedly withdrawn and started to march south by a track running parallel to the main Epping Road, between it and that along which the covering force of Volunteers, who had come in by train, were now established in position. The 1st and 2nd Coldstreamers, who had formed Lord Byfield's rearguard during the night, were halted in Harlow village. Immediately upon the success obtained by his right column, General Richel von Sieberg, who commanded the 20th Hanoverian Division, ordered his two centre and left columns, consisting respectively of the three battalions 77th Infantry and two batteries of Horse Artillery, then at Matching Green, and the three battalions 92nd Infantry, 10th Pioneer Battalion, and five batteries Field Artillery, then between High Laver and Tilegate Green, to turn to their left and advance in fighting formation in a south-westerly direction, with the object of attacking the sorely-harassed troops of Lord Byfield on their way to Epping. * * * * * The final phase of this memorable retreat is best told in the words of the special war correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," who arrived on the scene at about one o'clock in the afternoon: "EPPING, 5 P.M., _September 9_. "Thanks to the secrecy preserved by the military authorities, it was not known that Lord Byfield was falling back from the Royston-Saffron Walden position till seven this morning. By eight, I was off in my car for the scene of action, for rumours of fighting near Harlow had already begun to come in. I started out by way of Tottenham and Edmonton, expecting to reach Harlow by 9.30 or 10. But I reckoned without the numerous military officials with whom I came in contact, who constantly stopped me and sent me out of my way on one pretext or another. I am sure I hope that the nation has benefited by their proceedings. In the end it was close on one before I pulled up at the Cock Inn, Epping, in search of additional information, because for some time I had been aware of the rumbling growl of heavy artillery from the eastward, and wondered what it might portend. I found that General Sir Stapleton Forsyth, who commanded the Northern section of the defences, had made the inn his headquarters, and there was a constant coming and going of orderlies and staff-officers at its portals. Opposite, the men of one of the new irregular corps, dressed in dark green corduroy, blue flannel cricketing caps, and red cummerbunds, sat or reclined in two long lines on either side of their piled arms on the left of the wide street. On inquiry I heard that the enemy were said to be bombarding Kelvedon Hatch, and also that the head of our retreating columns was only three or four miles distant. "I pushed on, and, after the usual interrogations from an officer in charge of a picket, where the road ran through the entrenchments about a mile farther on, found myself spinning along through the country in the direction of Harlow. As I began to ascend the rising ground towards Potter Street I could hear a continuous roll of artillery away to my right. I could not distinguish anything except the smoke of shells bursting here and there in the distance, on account of the scattered trees which lined the maze of hedgerows on every side. Close to Potter Street I met the head of the retreating army. Very tired, heated and footsore looked the hundreds of poor fellows as they dragged themselves along through the heat. It was a sultry afternoon, and the roads inches deep in dust. "Turning to the right of Harlow Common, I met another column of men. I noticed that these were all Regulars, Grenadiers, Scots Guards, a battalion of Highlanders, another of Riflemen, and, lastly, two battalions of the Coldstreamers. These troops stepped along with rather more life than the citizen soldiers I had met previously, but still showed traces of their hard marching and fighting. Many of them were wearing bandages, but all the more seriously wounded had been left behind to be looked after by the Germans. All this time the firing was still resounding heavy and constant from the north-east, and from one person and another whom I questioned I ascertained that the enemy were advancing upon us from that direction. Half a mile farther on I ran into the middle of the fighting. The road ran along the top of a kind of flat ridge or upland, whence I could see to a considerable distance on either hand. "Partially sheltered from the view by its hedges and the scattered cottages forming the hamlet of Foster Street was a long, irregular line of guns facing nearly east. Beyond them were yet others directed north. There were field batteries and big 4·7's. All were hard at work, their gunners working like men possessed, and the crash of their constant discharge was ear-splitting. I had hardly taken this in when 'Bang! Bang! Bang! Bang!'--four dazzling flashes opened in the air overhead, and shrapnel bullets rattled on earth, walls, and roofs with a sound as of handfuls of pebbles thrown on a marble pavement. But the hardness with which they struck was beyond anything in my experience. "It was not pleasant to be here, but I ran my car behind a little public-house that stood by the wayside, and, dismounting, unslung my glasses and determined to get what view of the proceedings I could from the corner of the house. All around khaki-clad Volunteers lined every hedge and sheltered behind every cottage, while farther off, in the lower ground, from a mile to a mile and a half away I could distinguish the closely-packed firing lines of the Germans advancing slowly but steadily, despite the gaps made in their ranks by the fire of our guns. Their own guns, I fancied, I could make out near Tilegate Green to the north-east. Neither side had as yet opened rifle fire. Getting into my car I motored back to the main road, but it was so blocked by the procession of waggons and troops of the retreating army that I could not turn into it. Wheeling round I made my way back to a parallel lane I had noticed, and turning to the left again at a smithy, found myself in a road bordered by cottages and enclosures. Here I found the Regular troops I had lately met lining every hedgerow and fence, while I could see others on a knoll further to their left. There was a little church here, and, mounting to the roof, I got a comparatively extensive view. To my right the long dusty column of men and waggons still toiled along the Epping Road. In front, nearly three miles off, an apparently solid line of woods stretched along the horizon, surmounting a long, gradual and open slope. This was the position of our lines near Epping, and the haven for which Lord Byfield's tired soldiery were making. To the left the serried masses of drab-clad German infantry still pushed aggressively forward, their guns firing heavily over their heads. [Illustration: BATTLE OF HARLOW FINAL PHASE] "As I watched them three tremendous explosions took place in their midst, killing dozens of them. Fire, smoke, and dust rose up twenty feet in the air, while three ear-splitting reports rose even above the rolling thunder of the gunfire. More followed. I looked again towards the woodland. Here I saw blaze after blaze of fire among the dark masses of trees. Our big guns in the fortifications had got to work, and were punishing the Germans most severely, taking their attack in flank with the big 6-inch and 7·5-inch projectiles. Cheers arose all along our lines, as shell after shell, fired by gunners who knew to an inch the distances to every house and conspicuous tree, burst among the German ranks, killing and maiming the invaders by hundreds. The advance paused, faltered and, being hurriedly reinforced from the rear, once more went forward. "But the big high explosive projectiles continued to fall with such accuracy and persistence that the attackers fell sullenly back, losing heavily as they did so. The enemy's artillery now came in for attention, and also was driven out of range with loss. The last stage in the retreat of Lord Byfield's command was now secured. The extended troops and guns gradually drew off from their positions, still keeping a watchful eye on the foe, and by 4.30 all were within the Epping entrenchments. All, that is to say, but the numerous killed and wounded during the running fight that had extended along the last seven or eight miles of the retreat, and the bulk of the Dunmow force under Sir Jacob Stellenbosch, which with its commander, had, it was believed, been made prisoners. They had been caught between the 39th German Infantry Brigade and several regiments of cavalry, that it was said had arrived from the northward soon after they were beaten at Hatfield Heath. Probably these were the advanced troops of General Frölich's Cavalry Brigade." CHAPTER III. BATTLE OF EPPING. The following is extracted from the "Times" of 15th September: "EPPING, _14th September_, _Evening_. "I have spent a busy day, but have no very important news to record. After the repulse of the German troops attacking Lord Byfield's retreating army and the arrival of our sorely harassed troops behind the Epping entrenchments, we saw no more of the enemy that evening. All through the night, however, there was the sound of occasional heavy gun firing from the eastward. I have taken up my quarters at the Bell, an inn at the south end of the village, from the back of which I can get a good view to the north-west for from two to four miles. Beyond that distance the high ridge known as Epping Upland limits the prospect. The whole terrain is cut up into fields of various sizes and dotted all over with trees. Close by is a lofty red brick water-tower, which has been utilised by Sir Stapleton Forsyth as a signal station. Away about a mile to my left front as I look from the back of the Bell a big block of buildings stands prominently out on a grassy spur of high ground. This is Copped Hall and Little Copped Hall. "Both mansions have been transformed into fortresses, which, while offering little or no resistance to artillery fire, will yet form a tough nut for the Germans to crack, should they succeed in getting through our entrenchments at that point. Beyond, I can just see a corner of a big earthwork that has been built to strengthen the defence line, and which has been christened Fort Obelisk from a farm of that name, near which it is situated. There is another smaller redoubt on the slope just below this hostelry, and I can see the gunners busy about the three big khaki-painted guns which are mounted in it. There are a 6-inch and two 4·7-inch guns I believe. This morning our cavalry, consisting of a regiment of yeomanry and some mounted infantry, who had formed a portion of Lord Byfield's force, went out to reconnoitre towards the north and east. They were not away long, as they were driven back in every direction in which they attempted to advance, by superior forces of the enemy's cavalry, who seemed to swarm everywhere. "Later on, I believe, some of the German reiters became so venturesome that several squadrons exposed themselves to the fire of the big guns in the fort at Skip's Corner, and suffered pretty severely for their temerity. The firing continued throughout the morning away to eastward. At noon I thought I would run down and see if I could find anything out about it. I therefore mounted my car and ran off in that direction. I found that there was a regular duel going on between our guns at Kelvedon Hatch and some heavy siege guns or howitzers that the enemy had got in the neighbourhood of the high ground about Norton Heath, only about 3,000 yards distant from our entrenchments. They did not appear to have done us much damage, but neither, in all probability, did we hurt them very much, since our gunners were unable to exactly locate the hostile guns. "When I got back to Epping, about three o'clock, I found the wide single street full of troops. They were those who had come in the previous afternoon with Lord Byfield, and who, having been allowed to rest till midday after their long fighting march, were now being told off to their various sections of the defence line. The Guard regiments were allocated to the northernmost position between Fort Royston and Fort Skips. The rifles were to go to Copped Hall, and the Seaforths to form the nucleus of a central reserve of Militia and Volunteers, which was being established just north of Gaynes Park. Epping itself and the contiguous entrenchments were confided to the Leinster Regiment, which alone of Sir Jacob Stellenbosch's brigade had escaped capture, supported by two Militia battalions. The field batteries were distributed under shelter of the woods on the south, east, and north-east of the town. "During the afternoon the welcome news arrived that the remainder of Lord Byfield's command from Baldock, Royston, and Elmdon had safely arrived within our entrenchments at Enfield and New Barnet. We may now hope that what with Regulars, Militia, Volunteers, and the new levies, our lines are fully and effectively manned, and will suffice to stay the further advance of even such a formidable host as is that at the disposal of the renowned Von Kronhelm. It is reported too, from Brentwood, that great progress has already been made in reorganising and distributing the broken remnants of the 1st and 5th Armies that got back to that town after the great and disastrous battle of Chelmsford. Victorious as they were, the Germans must also have suffered severely, which may give us some breathing time before their next onslaught." * * * * * The following are extracts from the diary picked up by a "Daily Telegraph" correspondent, lying near the body of a German officer after the fighting in the neighbourhood of Enfield Chase. It is presumed that the officer in question was Major Splittberger, of the Kaiser Franz Garde Grenadier Regiment, since that was the name written inside the cover of the diary. From enquiries that have since been instituted, it is probable that the deceased officer was employed on the staff of the General commanding the IVth Corps of the invading Army, though it would seem from the contents of his diary that he saw also a good deal of the operations of the Xth Corps. Our readers will be able to gather from it the general course of the enemy's strategy and tactics during the time immediately preceding the most recent disasters which have befallen our brave defenders. The first extract is dated September 15, and was written somewhere north of Epping: "_Sept. 15._--So far the bold strategy of our Commander-in-Chief, in pushing the greater part of the Xth Corps directly to the west immediately after our victory at Chelmsford, has been amply justified by results. Although we just missed cutting off Lord Byfield and a large portion of his command at Harlow, we gained a good foothold inside the British defences north of Epping, and I don't think it will be long before we have very much improved our position here. The IVth Corps arrived at Harlow about midday yesterday in splendid condition, after their long march from Newmarket, and the residue of the Xth joined us at about the same time. As there is nothing like keeping the enemy on the move, no time was lost in preparing to attack him at the very earliest opportunity. As soon as it was dark the IVth Corps got its heavy guns and howitzers into position along the ridge above Epping Upland, and sent the greater portion of its field batteries forward to a position from which they were within effective range of the British fortifications at Skip's Corner. "The IXth Corps, which had arrived from Chelmsford that evening, also placed its field artillery in a similar position, from which its fire crossed that of the IVth Corps. This Corps also provided the assaulting troops. The Xth Corps, which had been engaged all day on Thursday, was held in reserve. The howitzers on Epping Upland opened fire with petrol shell on the belt of woods that lies immediately in rear of the position to be attacked, and with the assistance of a strong westerly wind succeeded in setting them on fire and cutting off the most northerly section of the British defences from reinforcement. This was soon after midnight. The conflagration not only did us this service, but it is supposed so attracted the attention of the partially-trained soldiers of the enemy that they did not observe the IXth Corps massing for the assault. "We then plastered their trenches with shrapnel to such an extent that they did not dare to show a finger above them, and finally carried the northern corner by assault. To give the enemy their due, they fought well, but we outnumbered them five to one, and it was impossible for them to resist the onslaught of our well-trained soldiers. News came to-day that the Saxons have been making a demonstration before Brentwood with a view of keeping the British employed down there so that they cannot send any reinforcements up here. At the same time they have been steadily bombarding Kelvedon Hatch from Norton Heath. "We hear, too, that the Garde Corps have got down south, and that their front stretches from Broxbourne to Little Berkhamsted, while Frölich's Cavalry Division is in front of them, spread all over the country, from the River Lea away to the westward, having driven the whole of the British outlying troops and patrols under the shelter of their entrenchments. Once we succeed in rolling up the enemy's troops in this quarter, it will not be long before we are entering London." "_Sept. 16._--Fighting went on all yesterday in the neighbourhood of Skip's Corner. We have taken the redoubt at North Weald Basset and driven the English back into the belt of burnt woodland, which they now hold along its northern edge. All day long, too, our big guns, hidden away behind the groves and woods above Epping Upland, poured their heavy projectiles on Epping and its defences. We set the village on fire three times, but the British contrived to extinguish the blaze on each occasion. "I fancy Epping itself will be our next point of attack." "_Sept. 17._--We are still progressing, fighting is now all but continuous. How long it may last I have no idea. Probably there will be no suspension of the struggle until we are actually masters of the Metropolis. We took advantage of the darkness to push forward our men to within three thousand yards of the enemy's line, placing them as far as possible under cover of the numerous copses, plantations, and hedgerows which cover the face of this fertile country. At 4 a.m. the General ordered his staff to assemble at Latton Park, where he had established his headquarters. He unfolded to us the general outline of the attack, which, he now announced, was to commence at six precisely. "I thought myself that it was a somewhat inopportune time, as we should have the rising sun right in our eyes; but I imagine that the idea was to have as much daylight as possible before us. For although we had employed a night attack against Skip's Corner, and successfully too, yet the general feeling in our Army has always been opposed to operations of this kind. The possible gain is, I think, in no way commensurable with the probable risks of panic and disorder. The principal objective was the village of Epping itself; but simultaneous attacks were to be carried out against Copped Hall, Fort Obelisk, to the west of it, and Fort Royston, about a mile north of the village. The IXth Corps was to co-operate by a determined attempt to break through the English lining the burnt strip of woodland and to assault the latter fort in rear. It was necessary to carry out both these flanking attacks in order to prevent the main attack from being enfiladed from right and left. At 5.30 we mounted, and rode off to Rye Hill about a couple of miles distant, from which the General intended to watch the progress of the operations. The first rays of the rising sun were filling the eastern sky with a pale light as we cantered off, the long wooded ridge on which the enemy had his position standing up in a misty silhouette against the growing day. [Illustration: GERMAN ATTACK ON THE LINES OF LONDON] "As we topped Rye Hill I could see the thickly-massed lines of our infantry crouching behind every hedge, bank, or ridge, their rifle-barrels here and there twinkling in the feeble rays of the early sun, their shadows long and attenuated behind them. Epping with its lofty red water-tower was distinctly visible on the opposite side of the valley, and it is probable that the movement of the General's cavalcade of officers, with the escort, attracted the attention of the enemy's lookouts, for half-way down the hillside on their side of the valley a blinding violet-white flash blazed out, and a big shell came screaming along just over our heads, the loud boom of a heavy gun following fast on its heels. Almost simultaneously another big projectile hurtled up from the direction of Fort Obelisk, and burst among our escort of Uhlans with a deluge of livid flame and thick volumes of greenish brown smoke. It was a telling shot, for no fewer than six horses and their riders lay in a shattered heap on the ground. "At six precisely our guns fired a salvo directed on Epping village. This was the preconcerted signal for attack, and before the echoes of the thunderous discharge had finished reverberating over the hills and forest, our front lines had sprung to their feet and were moving at a racing pace towards the enemy. For a moment the British seemed stupefied by the suddenness of the advance. A few rifle shots crackled out here and there, but our men had thrown themselves to the ground after their first rush before the enemy seemed to wake up. But there was no mistake about it when they did. Seldom have I seen such a concentrated fire. Gun, pom-pom, machine gun, and rifle blazed out from right to left along more than three miles of entrenchments. A continuous lightning-like line of fire poured forth from the British trenches, which still lay in shadow. I could see the bullets raising perfect sand-storms in places, the little pom-pom shells sparkling about all over our prostrate men, and the shrapnel bursting all along their front, producing perfect swathes of white smoke, which hung low down in the still air in the valley. "But our artillery was not idle. The field guns, pushed well forward, showered shrapnel upon the British position, the howitzer shells hurtled over our heads on their way to the enemy in constantly increasing numbers as the ranges were verified by the trial shots, while a terrible and unceasing reverberation from the north-east told of the supporting attack made by the IXth and Xth Corps upon the blackened woods held by the English. The concussion of the terrific cannonade that now resounded from every quarter was deafening; the air seemed to pulse within one's ears, and it was difficult to hear one's nearest neighbour speak. Down in the valley our men appeared to be suffering severely. Every forward move of the attacking lines left a perfect litter of prostrate forms behind it, and for some time I felt very doubtful in my own mind if the attack would succeed. Glancing to the right, however, I was encouraged to see the progress that had been made by the troops detailed for the assault on Copped Hall and Obelisk Fort, and seeing this, it occurred to me that it was not intended to push the central attack on Epping home before its flank had been secured from molestation from this direction. Copped Hall itself stood out on a bare down almost like some mediæval castle, backed by the dark masses of forest, while to the west of it the slopes of Fort Obelisk could barely be distinguished, so flat were they and so well screened by greenery. "But its position was clearly defined by the clouds of dust, smoke, and débris constantly thrown up by our heavy high-explosive shells, while ever and anon there came a dazzling flash from it, followed by a detonation that made itself heard even above the rolling of the cannonade, as one of its big 7·5 guns was discharged. The roar of their huge projectiles, too, as they tore through the air, was easily distinguishable. None of our epaulments were proof against them, and they did our heavy batteries a great deal of damage before they could be silenced. "To cut a long story short, we captured Epping after a tough fight, and by noon were in possession of everything north of the Forest, including the war-scarred ruins that now represented the mansion of Copped Hall, and from which our pom-poms and machine guns were firing into Fort Obelisk. But our losses had been awful. As for the enemy, they could hardly have suffered less severely, for though partially protected by their entrenchments, our artillery fire must have been utterly annihilating." "_Sept. 18._--Fighting went on all last night, the English holding desperately on to the edge of the Forest, our people pressing them close, and working round their right flank. When day broke the general situation was pretty much like this. On our left the IXth Corps were in possession of the Fort at Toothill, and a redoubt that lay between it and Skip's Fort. Two batteries were bombarding a redoubt lower down in the direction of Stanford Rivers, which was also subjected to a cross fire from their howitzers near Ongar. "As for the English, their position was an unenviable one. From Copped Hall--as soon as we have cleared the edge of the Forest of the enemy's sharpshooters--we shall be able to take their entrenchments in reverse all the way to Waltham Abbey. They have, on the other hand, an outlying fort about a mile or two north of the latter place, which gave us some trouble with its heavy guns yesterday, and which it is most important that we should gain possession of before we advance further. The Garde Corps on the western side of the River Lea is now, I hear, in sight of the enemy's lines, and is keeping them busily employed, though without pushing its attack home for the present. "At daybreak this morning I was in Epping and saw the beginning of the attack on the Forest. It is rumoured that large reinforcements have reached the enemy from London, but as these must be merely scratch soldiers they will do them more harm than good in their cramped position. The Xth Corps had got a dozen batteries in position a little to the eastward of the village, and at six o'clock these guns opened a tremendous fire upon the north-east corner of the Forest, under cover of which their infantry deployed down in the low ground about Coopersale, and advanced to the attack. Petrol shells were not used against the Forest, as Von Kronhelm had given orders that it was not to be burned if it could possibly be avoided. The shrapnel was very successful in keeping down the fire from the edge of the trees, but our troops received a good deal of damage from infantry and guns that were posted to the east of the Forest on a hill near Theydon Bois. But about seven o'clock these troops were driven from their position by a sudden flank attack made by the IXth Corps from Theydon Mount. Von Kleppen followed this up by putting some of his own guns up there, which were able to fire on the edge of the Forest after those of the Xth Corps had been masked by the close advance of their infantry. To make a long story short, by ten the whole of the Forest, east of the London Road, as far south as the cross roads near Jack's Hill, was in our hands. In the meantime the IVth Corps had made itself master of Fort Obelisk, and our gunners were hard at work mounting guns in it with which to fire on the outlying fort at Monkham's Hall. Von Kleppen was at Copped Hall about this time, and with him I found General Von Wilberg, commanding the Xth Corps, in close consultation. The once fine mansion had been almost completely shot away down to its lower storey. A large portion of this, however, was still fairly intact, having been protected to a certain extent by the masses of masonry that had fallen all around it, and also by the thick ramparts of earth that the English had built up against its exposed side. "Our men were still firing from its loopholes at the edge of the woods, which were only about 1,200 yards distant, and from which bullets were continually whistling in by every window. Two of our battalions had dug themselves in in the wooded park surrounding the house, and were also exchanging fire with the English at comparatively close ranges. They had, I was told, made more than one attempt to rush the edge of the Forest, but had been repulsed by rifle fire on each occasion. Away to the west I could see for miles, and even distinguish our shells bursting all over the enemy's fort at Monkham's Hall, which was being subjected to a heavy bombardment by our guns on the high ground to the north of it. About eleven Frölich's Cavalry Brigade, whose presence was no longer required in front of the Garde Corps, passed through Epping, going south-east. It is generally supposed that it is either to attack the British at Brentwood in the rear, or, which I think is more probable, to intimidate the raw levies by its presence between them and London, and to attack them in flank should they attempt to retreat. "Just after eleven another battalion arrived at Copped Hall from Epping, and orders were given that the English position along the edge of the Forest was to be taken at all cost. Just before the attack began there was a great deal of firing somewhere in the interior of the Forest, presumably between the British and the advanced troops of the Xth Corps. However this may have been, it was evident that the enemy were holding our part of the Forest much less strongly and our assault was entirely successful, with but small loss of men. Once in the woods, the superior training and discipline of our men told heavily in their favour. While the mingled mass of Volunteers and raw free-shooters, of which the bulk of their garrison was composed, got utterly disorganised and out of hand under the severe strain on them that was imposed by the difficulties of wood fighting, and hindered and broke up the regular units, our people were easily kept well in hand, and drove the enemy steadily before them without a single check. The rattle of rifle and machine gun was continuous through all the leafy dells and glades of the wood, but by two o'clock practically the whole Forest was in the hands of our Xth Corps. It was then the turn of the IVth Corps, who in the meantime, far from being idle, had massed a large number of their guns at Copped Hall, from which, aided by the fire from Fort Obelisk, the enemy's lines were subjected to a bombardment that rendered them absolutely untenable, and we could see company after company making their way to Waltham Abbey. "At three the order for a general advance on Waltham Abbey was issued. As the enemy seemed to have few, if any, guns at this place, it was determined to make use of some of the new armoured motors that accompanied the Army. Von Kronhelm, who was personally directing the operations from Copped Hall, had caused each Corps to send its own motors to Epping, so that we had something like thirty at our disposal. These quaint, grey monsters came down through the Forest and advanced on Epping by two parallel roads, one passing by the south of Warlies Park, the other being the main road from Epping. It was a weird sight to see these shore-going armour-clads flying down upon the enemy. They got within 800 yards of the houses, but the enemy contrived to block their further advance by various obstacles which they placed on the roads. "There was about an hour's desperate fighting in the village. The old Abbey Church was set on fire by a stray shell, the conflagration spreading to the neighbouring houses, and both British and Germans being too busy killing each other to put it out, the whole village was shortly in flames. The British were finally driven out of it, and across the river by five o'clock. In the meantime every heavy gun that could be got to bear was directed on the fort at Monkham's Hall, which, during the afternoon, was also made the target for the guns of the Garde Corps, which co-operated with us by attacking the lines at Cheshunt, and assisting us with its artillery fire from the opposite side of the river. By nightfall the fort was a mass of smoking earth, over which fluttered our black cross flag, and the front of the IVth Corps stretched from this to Gillwell Park, four miles nearer London. "The Xth Corps was in support in the Forest behind us, and forming also a front to cover our flank, reaching from Chingford to Buckhurst Hill. The enemy was quite demoralised in this direction, and showed no indication of resuming the engagement. As for the IXth Corps, its advanced troops were at Lamboume End, in close communication with General Frölich, who had established his headquarters at Havering-atte-Bower. We have driven a formidable wedge right into the middle of the carefully elaborated system of defence arranged by the English generals, and it will now be a miracle if they can prevent our entry into the capital. "We had not, of course, effected this without great loss in killed and wounded, but you can't make puddings without breaking eggs, and in the end a bold and forward policy is more economical of life and limb than attempting to avoid necessary losses, as our present opponents did in South Africa, thereby prolonging the war to an almost indefinite period, and losing many more men by sickness and in driblets than would have been the case if they had followed a more determined line in their strategy and tactics. Just before the sun sank behind the masses of new houses which the monster city spreads out to the northward I got orders to carry a despatch to General von Wilberg, who was stated to be at Chingford, on our extreme left. I went by the Forest road, as the parallel one near the river was in most parts under fire from the opposite bank. "He had established his headquarters at the Foresters' Inn, which stands high up on a wooded mound, and from which he could see a considerable distance and keep in touch with his various signal stations. He took my despatch, telling me that I should have a reply to take back later on. 'In the meanwhile,' said he, 'if you will fall in with my staff you will have an opportunity of seeing the first shots fired into the biggest city in the world.' So saying, he went out to his horse, which was waiting outside, and we started off down the hill with a great clatter. After winding about through a somewhat intricate network of roads and by-lanes we arrived at Old Chingford Church, which stands upon a species of headland, rising boldly up above the flat and, in some places, marshy land to the westward. "Close to the church was a battery of four big howitzers, the gunners grouped around them silhouetted darkly against the blood-red sky. From up here the vast city, spreading out to the south and west, lay like a grey, sprawling octopus spreading out ray-like to the northward, every rise and ridge being topped with a bristle of spires and chimney-pots. An ominous silence seemed to brood over the teeming landscape, broken only at intervals by the dull booming of guns from the northward. Long swathes of cloud and smoke lay athwart the dull, furnace-like glow of the sunset, and lights were beginning to sparkle out all over the vast expanse which lay before us mirrored here and there in the canals and rivers that ran almost at our feet. 'Now,' said Von Wilberg at length, 'commence fire.' One of the big guns gave tongue with a roar that seemed to make the church tower quiver above us. Another and another followed in succession, their big projectiles hurtling and humming through the quiet evening air on their errands of death and destruction in I know not what quarter of the crowded suburbs. It seemed to me a cruel and needless thing to do, but I am told that it was done with the set purpose of arousing such a feeling of alarm and insecurity in the East End that the mob might try to interfere with any further measures for defence that the British military authorities might undertake. I got my despatch soon afterwards and returned with it to the General, who was spending the night at Copped Hall. There, too, I got myself a shakedown and slumbered soundly till the morning." "_Sept. 19._--To-day we have, I think, finally broken down all organised military opposition in the field, though we may expect a considerable amount of street fighting before reaping the whole fruits of our victories. At daybreak we began by turning a heavy fire from every possible quarter on the wooded island formed by the river and various back-waters just north of Waltham Abbey. The poplar-clad islet, which was full of the enemy's troops, became absolutely untenable under this concentrated fire, and they were compelled to fall back over the river. Our Engineers soon began their bridging operations behind the wood, and our infantry, crossing over, got close up to a redoubt on the further side and took it by storm. Again we were able to take a considerable section of the enemy's lines in reverse, and as they were driven out by our fire, against which they had no protection, the Garde Corps advanced, and by ten were in possession of Cheshunt. "In the meanwhile, covered by the fire of the guns belonging to the IXth and Xth Corps, other bridges had been thrown across the Lea at various points between Waltham and Chingford, and in another hour the crossing began. The enemy had no good positions for his guns, and seemed to have very few of them. He had pinned his faith upon the big weapons he had placed in his entrenchments, and those were now of no further use to him. He had lost a number of his field guns, either from damage or capture, and with our more numerous artillery firing from the high ground on the eastern bank of the river we were always able to beat down any attempt he made to reply to their fire. "We had a day of fierce fighting before us. There was no manoeuvring. We were in a wilderness of scattered houses and occasional streets, in which the enemy contested our progress foot by foot. Edmonton, Enfield Wash, and Waltham Cross were quickly captured; our artillery commanded them too well to allow the British to make a successful defence; but Enfield itself, lying along a steepish ridge, on which the British had assembled what artillery they could scrape together, cost us dearly. The streets of this not too lovely suburban town literally ran with blood when at last we made our way into it. A large part of it was burnt to ashes, including unfortunately the ancient palace of Queen Elizabeth, and the venerable and enormous cedar-tree that overhung it. "The British fell back to a second position they had apparently prepared along a parallel ridge farther to the westward, their left being between us and New Barnet and their right at Southgate. "We did not attempt to advance farther to-day, but contented ourselves in reorganising our forces and preparing against a possible counter-attack, by barricading and entrenching the farther edge of Enfield Ridge." "_Sept. 20._--We are falling in immediately, as it has been decided to attack the British position at once. Already the artillery duel is in progress. I must continue to-night, as my horse is at the door." The writer, however, never lived to complete his diary, having been shot half-way up the green slope he had observed the day previous. CHAPTER IV. BOMBARDMENT OF LONDON. Day broke. The faint flush of violet away eastward beyond Temple Bar gradually turned rose, heralding the sun's coming, and by degrees the streets, filled by excited Londoners, grew lighter with the dawn. Fevered night thus gave place to day--a day that was, alas! destined to be one of bitter memory for the British Empire. Alarming news had spread that Uhlans had been seen reconnoitring in Snaresbrook and Wanstead, had ridden along Forest Road and Ferry Lane at Walthamstow, through Tottenham High Cross, up High Street, Hornsey, Priory Road, and Muswell Hill. The Germans were actually upon London! The northern suburbs were staggered. In Fortis Green, North End, Highgate, Crouch End, Hampstead, Stamford Hill, and Leyton the quiet suburban houses were threatened, and many people, in fear of their lives, had now fled southward into central London. Thus the huge population of greater London was practically huddled together in the comparatively small area from Kensington to Fleet Street, and from Oxford Street to the Thames Embankment. People of Fulham, Putney, Walham Green, Hammersmith, and Kew had, for the most part, fled away to the open country across Hounslow Heath to Bedfont and Staines; while Tooting, Balham, Dulwich, Streatham, Norwood, and Catford had retreated farther south into Surrey and Kent. For the past three days thousands of willing helpers had followed the example of Sheffield and Birmingham, and constructed enormous barricades, obstructing at various points the chief roads leading from the north and east into London. Detachments of Engineers had blown up several of the bridges carrying the main roads out eastwards--for instance, the bridge at the end of Commercial Road, East, crossing the Limehouse Canal, while the six other smaller bridges spanning the canal between that point and the Bow Road were also destroyed. The bridge at the end of Bow Road itself was shattered, and those over the Hackney Cut at Marshall Hill and Hackney Wick were also rendered impassable. Most of the bridges across the Regent's Canal were also destroyed, notably those in Mare Street, Hackney, the Kingsland Road, and New North Road, while a similar demolition took place in Edgware Road and the Harrow Road. Londoners were frantic, now that the enemy were really upon them. The accounts of the battles in the newspapers had, of course, been merely fragmentary, and they had not yet realised what war actually meant. They knew that all business was at a standstill, that the City was in an uproar, that there was no work, and that food was at famine prices. But not until German cavalry were actually seen scouring the northern suburbs did it become impressed upon them that they were really helpless and defenceless. London was to be besieged! This report having got about, the people began building barricades in many of the principal thoroughfares north of the Thames. One huge obstruction, built mostly of paving stones from the footways, overturned tramcars, waggons, railway trollies, and barbed wire, rose in the Holloway Road, just beyond Highbury Station. Another blocked the Caledonian Road a few yards north of the police-station, while another very large and strong pile of miscellaneous goods, bales of wool and cotton stuffs, building material, and stones brought from the Great Northern Railway depôt, obstructed the Camden Road at the south corner of Hilldrop Crescent. Across High Street, Camden Town, at the junction of the Kentish Town and other roads, five hundred men worked with a will, piling together every kind of ponderous object they could pillage from the neighbouring shops--pianos, iron bedsteads, wardrobes, pieces of calico and flannel, dress stuffs, rolls of carpets, floorboards, even the very doors wrenched from their hinges--until, when it reached to the second storey window and was considered of sufficient height, a pole was planted on top, and from it hung limply a small Union Jack. The Finchley Road, opposite Swiss Cottage Station; in Shoot Up-hill, where Mill Lane runs into it; across Willesden Lane where it joins the High Road in Kilburn; the Harrow Road close to Willesden Junction Station; at the junction of the Goldhawk and Uxbridge roads; across the Hammersmith Road in front of the Hospital, other similar obstructions were placed with a view to preventing the enemy from entering London. At a hundred other points, in the narrower and more obscure thoroughfares, all along the north of London, busy workers were constructing similar defences, houses and shops being ruthlessly broken open and cleared of their contents by the frantic and terrified populace. London was in a ferment. Almost without exception the gunmakers' shops had been pillaged, and every rifle, sporting gun, and revolver seized. The armouries at the Tower of London, at the various barracks, and the factory out at Enfield had long ago all been cleared of their contents; for now, in this last stand, every one was desperate, and all who could obtain a gun did so. Many, however, had guns but no ammunition; others had sporting ammunition for service rifles, and others cartridges, but no gun. Those, however, who had guns and ammunition complete mounted guard at the barricades, being assisted at some points by Volunteers who had been driven in from Essex. Upon more than one barricade in North London a Maxim had been mounted, and was now pointed, ready to sweep away the enemy should they advance. Other thoroughfares barricaded, beside those mentioned, were the Stroud Green Road, where it joins Hanley Road; the railway bridge in the Oakfield Road in the same neighbourhood; the Wightman Road, opposite Harringay Station, the junction of Archway Road and Highgate Hill; the High Road, Tottenham, at its junction with West Green Road, and various roads around the New River reservoirs, which were believed to be one of the objectives of the enemy. These latter were very strongly held by thousands of brave and patriotic citizens, though the East London reservoirs across at Walthamstow could not be defended, situated so openly as they were. The people of Leytonstone threw up a barricade opposite the schools in the High Road, while in Wanstead a hastily-constructed, but perfectly useless, obstruction was piled across Cambridge Park, where it joins the Blake Road. Of course, all the women and children in the northern suburbs had now been sent south. Half the houses in those quiet, newly-built roads were locked up, and their owners gone; for as soon as the report spread of the result of the final battle before London, and our crushing defeat, people living in Highgate, Hampstead, Crouch End, Hornsey, Tottenham, Finsbury Park, Muswell Hill, Hendon, and Hampstead saw that they must fly southward, now the Germans were upon them. Think what it meant to those suburban families of City men! The ruthless destruction of their pretty, long-cherished homes, flight into the turbulent, noisy, distracted, hungry city, and the loss of everything they possessed. In most cases the husband was already bearing his part in the defence of the Metropolis with gun or with spade, or helping to move heavy masses of material for the construction of the barricades. The wife, however, was compelled to take a last look at all those possessions that she had so fondly called "home," lock her front door, and, with her children, join in those long mournful processions moving ever southward into London, tramping on and on--whither she knew not where. Touching sights were to be seen everywhere in the streets that day. Homeless women, many of them with two or three little ones, were wandering through the less frequented streets, avoiding the main roads with all their crush, excitement, and barricade-building, but making their way westward, beyond Kensington and Hammersmith, which was now become the outlet of the Metropolis. All trains from Charing Cross, Waterloo, London Bridge, Victoria, and Paddington had for the past three days been crowded to excess. Anxious fathers struggled fiercely to obtain places for their wives, mothers, and daughters--sending them away anywhere out of the city which must in a few hours be crushed beneath the iron heel. The South Western and Great Western systems carried thousands upon thousands of the wealthier away to Devonshire and Cornwall--as far as possible from the theatre of war; the South Eastern and Chatham took people into the already crowded Kentish towns and villages, and the Brighton line carried others into rural Sussex. London overflowed southward and westward until every village and every town within fifty miles was so full that beds were at a premium, and in various places, notably at Chartham, near Canterbury, at Willesborough, near Ashford, at Lewes, at Robertsbridge, at Goodwood Park, and at Horsham, huge camps were formed, shelter being afforded by poles and rick cloths. Every house, every barn, every school, indeed every place where people could obtain shelter for the night, was crowded to excess, mostly by women and children sent south, away from the horrors that it was known must come. Central London grew more turbulent with each hour that passed. There were all sorts of wild rumours, but, fortunately, the Press still preserved a dignified calm. The Cabinet were holding a meeting at Bristol, whither the Houses of Commons and Lords had moved, and all depended upon its issue. It was said that Ministers were divided in their opinions whether we should sue for an ignominious peace, or whether the conflict should be continued to the bitter end. Disaster had followed disaster, and iron-throated orators in Hyde and St. James's Parks were now shouting "Stop the war! Stop the war!" The cry was taken up but faintly, however, for the blood of Londoners, slow to rise, had now been stirred by seeing their country slowly yet completely crushed by Germany. All the patriotism latent within them was now displayed. The national flag was shown everywhere, and at every point one heard "God save the King" sung lustily. Two gunmakers' shops in the Strand, which had hitherto escaped notice, were shortly after noon broken open, and every available arm and all the ammunition seized. One man, unable to obtain a revolver, snatched half a dozen pairs of steel handcuffs, and cried with grim humour as he held them up: "If I can't shoot any of the sausage-eaters, I can at least bag a prisoner or two!" The banks, the great jewellers, the diamond merchants, the safe-deposit offices, and all who had valuables in their keeping, were extremely anxious as to what might happen. Below those dark buildings in Lothbury and Lombard Street, behind the black walls of the Bank of England, and below every branch bank all over London, were millions in gold and notes, the wealth of the greatest city the world has ever known. The strong rooms were, for the most part, the strongest that modern engineering could devise, some with various arrangements by which all access was debarred by an inrush of water, but, alas! dynamite is a great leveller, and it was felt that not a single strong room in the whole of London could withstand an organised attack by German engineers. A single charge of dynamite would certainly make a breach in concrete upon which a thief might hammer and chip day and night for a month without making much impression. Steel doors must give to blasting force, while the strongest and most complicated locks would also fly to pieces. The directors of most of the banks had met and an endeavour had been made to co-operate and form a corps of special guards for the principal offices. In fact, a small armed corps was formed, and were on duty day and night in Lothbury, Lombard Street, and the vicinity. Yet what could they do if the Germans swept into London? There was but little to fear from the excited populace themselves, because matters had assumed such a crisis that money was of little use, as there was practically very little to buy. But little food was reaching London from the open ports on the west. It was the enemy that the banks feared, for they knew that the Germans intended to enter and sack the Metropolis, just as they had sacked the other towns that had refused to pay the indemnity demanded. Small jewellers had, days ago, removed their stock from their windows and carried it away in unsuspicious-looking bags to safe hiding in the southern and western suburbs, where people for the most part hid their valuable plate, jewellery, etc., beneath a floor-board, or buried them in some marked spot in their small gardens. The hospitals were already full of wounded from the various engagements of the past week. The London, St. Thomas', Charing Cross, St. George's, Guy's, and Bartholomew's were overflowing; and the surgeons, with patriotic self-denial, were working day and night in an endeavour to cope with the ever-arriving crowd of suffering humanity. The field hospitals away to the northward were also reported full. The exact whereabouts of the enemy was not known. They were, it seemed, everywhere. They had practically over-run the whole country, and the reports from the Midlands and the North showed that the majority of the principal towns had now been occupied. The latest reverses outside London, full and graphic details of which were now being published hourly by the papers, had created an immense sensation. Everywhere people were regretting that Lord Roberts' solemn warnings in 1906 had been unheeded, for had we adopted his scheme for universal service such dire catastrophe could never have occurred. Many had, alas! declared it to be synonymous with conscription, which it certainly was not, and by that foolish argument had prevented the public at large from accepting it as the only means for our salvation as a nation. The repeated warnings had been disregarded, and we had, unhappily, lived in a fool's paradise, in the self-satisfied belief that England could not be successfully invaded. Now, alas! the country had realised the truth when too late. That memorable day, September 20, witnessed exasperated struggles in the northern suburbs of London, passionate and bloody collisions, an infantry fire of the defenders overwhelming every attempted assault; and a decisive action of the artillery, with regard to which arm the superiority of the Germans, due to their perfect training, was apparent. A last desperate stand had, it appears, been made by the defenders on the high ridge north-west of New Barnet, from Southgate to near Potter's Bar, where a terrible fight had taken place. But from the very first it was utterly hopeless. The British had fought valiantly in defence of London, but here again they were outnumbered, and after one of the most desperate conflicts in the whole campaign--in which our losses were terrible--the Germans at length had succeeded in entering Chipping Barnet. It was a difficult movement, and a fierce contest, rendered the more terrible by the burning houses, ensued in the streets and away across the low hills southward--a struggle full of vicissitudes and alternating successes, until at last the fire of the defenders was silenced, and hundreds of prisoners fell into the German hands. Thus the last organised defence of London had been broken, and the barricades alone remained. The work of the German troops on the lines of communication in Essex had for the past week been fraught with danger. Through want of cavalry the British had been unable to make cavalry raids; but, on the other hand, the difficulty was enhanced by the bands of sharpshooters--men of all classes from London who possessed a gun and who could shoot. In one or two of the London clubs the suggestion had first been mooted a couple of days after the outbreak of hostilities, and it had been quickly taken up by men who were in the habit of shooting game, but had not had a military training. Within three days about two thousand men had formed themselves into bands to take part in the struggle and assist in the defence of London. They were practically similar to the Francs-tireurs of the Franco-German War, for they went forth in companies and waged a guerilla warfare, partly before the front and at the flanks of the different armies, and partly at the communications at the rear of the Germans. Their position was one of constant peril in face of Von Kronhelm's proclamation, yet the work they did was excellent, and only proved that if Lord Roberts' scheme for universal training had been adopted the enemy would never have reached the gates of London with success. These brave adventurous spirits, together with "The Legion of Frontiersmen," made their attacks by surprise from hiding-places or from ambushes. Their adventures were constantly thrilling ones. Scattered all over the theatre of war in Essex and Suffolk, and all along the German lines of communication, the "Frontiersmen" rarely ventured on an open conflict, and frequently changed scene and point of attack. Within one week their numbers rose to over 8,000, and, being well served by the villagers, who acted as scouts and spies for them, the Germans found them very difficult to get at. Usually they kept their arms concealed in thickets and woods, where they would lie in wait for the Germans. They never came to close quarters, but fired at a distance. Many a smart Uhlan fell by their bullets, and many a sentry dropped, shot by an unknown hand. Thus they harassed the enemy everywhere. At need they concealed their arms and assumed the appearance of inoffensive non-combatants. But when caught red-handed the Germans gave them "short shrift," as the bodies now swinging from telegraph poles on various high-roads in Essex testified. In an attempt to put a stop to the daring actions of the "Frontiersmen," the German authorities and troops along the lines of communication punished the parishes where German soldiers were shot, or where the destruction of railways and telegraphs had occurred, by levying money contributions, or by burning the villages. The guerilla war was especially fierce along from Edgware up to Hertford, and from Chelmsford down to the Thames. In fact, once commenced, it never ceased. Attacks were always being made upon small patrols, travelling detachments, mails of the field post-office, posts or patrols at stations on the lines of communication, while field-telegraphs, telephones, and railways were everywhere destroyed. In consequence of the railway being cut at Pitsea, the villages of Pitsea, Bowers Gifford, and Vange had been burned. Because a German patrol had been attacked and destroyed near Orsett, the parish was compelled to pay a heavy indemnity. Upminster, near Romford, Theydon Bois, and Fyfield, near High Ongar, had all been burned by the Germans for the same reason; while at the Cherrytree Inn, near Rainham, five "Frontiersmen" being discovered by Uhlans in a hayloft asleep, were locked in and there burned alive. Dozens were, of course, shot at sight, and dozens more hanged without trial. But they were not to be deterred. They were fighting in defence of London, and around the northern suburbs the patriotic members of the "Legion" were specially active, though they never showed themselves in large bands. Within London every man who could shoot game was now anxious to join in the fray, and on the day that the news of the last disaster reached the Metropolis, hundreds left for the open country out beyond Hendon. The enemy having broken down the defence at Enfield and cleared the defenders out of the fortified houses, had advanced and occupied the northern ridges of London in a line stretching roughly from Pole Hill, a little to the north of Chingford, across Upper Edmonton, through Tottenham, Hornsey, Highgate, Hampstead, and Willesden, to Twyford Abbey. All the positions had been well reconnoitred, for at grey of dawn the rumbling of artillery had been heard in the streets of those places already mentioned, and soon after sunrise strong batteries were established upon all the available points commanding London. These were at Chingford Green, on the left-hand side of the road opposite the inn at Chingford; on Devonshire Hill, Tottenham; on the hill at Wood Green; in the grounds of the Alexandra Palace; on the high ground about Churchyard Bottom Wood; on the edge of Bishop's Wood, Highgate; on Parliament Hill, at a spot close to the Oaks on the Hendon road; at Dollis Hill, and at a point a little north of Wormwood Scrubs, and at Neasden, near the railway works. The enemy's chief object was to establish their artillery as near London as possible, for it was known that the range of their guns even from Hampstead--the highest point, 441 feet above London--would not reach into the actual city itself. Meanwhile, at dawn, the German cavalry, infantry, motor-infantry, and armoured motor-cars--the latter mostly 35-40 h.p. Opel-Darracqs, with three quick-firing guns mounted in each, and bearing the Imperial German arms in black--advanced up the various roads leading into London from the north, being met, of course, with a desperate resistance at the barricades. [Illustration: THE BOMBARDMENT and DEFENCES of LONDON on Sept. 20^{th} & 21^{st}] On Haverstock Hill, the three Maxims, mounted upon the huge construction across the road, played havoc with the Germans, who were at once compelled to fall back, leaving piles of dead and dying in the roadway, for the terrible hail of lead poured out upon the invaders could not be withstood. Two of the German armoured motor-cars were presently brought into action by the Germans, who replied with a rapid fire, this being continued for a full quarter of an hour without result on either side. Then the Germans, finding the defence too strong, again retired into Hampstead, amid the ringing cheers of the valiant men holding that gate of London. The losses of the enemy had been serious, for the whole roadway was now strewn with dead; while behind the huge wall of paving-stones, overturned carts, and furniture, only two men had been killed and one wounded. Across in the Finchley Road a struggle equally as fierce was in progress; but a detachment of the enemy, evidently led by some German who had knowledge of the intricate side-roads, suddenly appeared in the rear of the barricade, and a fierce and bloody hand-to-hand conflict ensued. The defenders, however, stood their ground, and with the aid of some petrol bombs which they held in readiness, they destroyed the venturesome detachment almost to a man, though a number of houses in the vicinity were set on fire, causing a huge conflagration. In Highgate Road the attack was a desperate one, the enraged Londoners fighting valiantly, the men with arms being assisted by the populace themselves. Here again deadly petrol bombs had been distributed, and men and women hurled them against the Germans. Petrol was actually poured from windows upon the heads of the enemy, and tow soaked in paraffin and lit flung in among them, when in an instant whole areas of the streets were ablaze, and the soldiers of the Fatherland perished in the roaring flames. Every device to drive back the invader was tried. Though thousands upon thousands had left the northern suburbs, many thousands still remained bent on defending their homes as long as they had breath. The crackle of rifles was incessant, and ever and anon the dull roar of a heavy field gun and the sharp rattle of a Maxim mingled with the cheers, yells, and shrieks of victors and vanquished. The scene on every side was awful. Men were fighting for their lives in desperation. Around the barricade in Holloway Road the street ran with blood; while in Kingsland, in Clapton, in West Ham, and Canning Town the enemy were making an equally desperate attack, and were being repulsed everywhere. London's enraged millions, the Germans were well aware, constituted a grave danger. Any detachments who carried a barricade by assault--as, for instance, they did one in the Hornsey Road near the station--were quickly set upon by the angry mob and simply wiped out of existence. Until nearly noon desperate conflicts at the barricades continued. The defence was even more effectual than was expected; yet, had it not been that Von Kronhelm, the German generalissimo, had given orders that the troops were not to attempt to advance into London before the populace were cowed, there was no doubt that each barricade could have been taken in the rear by companies avoiding the main roads and proceeding by the side streets. Just before noon, however, it was apparent to Von Kronhelm that to storm the barricades would entail enormous losses, so strong were they. The men holding them had now been reinforced in many cases by regular troops, who had come in in flight, and a good many guns were now manned by artillerymen. Von Kronhelm had established his headquarters at Jack Straw's Castle, from which he could survey the giant city through his field-glasses. Below lay the great plain of roofs, spires, and domes, stretching away into the grey mystic distance, where afar rose the twin towers and double arches of the Crystal Palace roof. London--the great London--the capital of the world--lay at his mercy at his feet. The tall, thin-faced General, with the grizzled moustache and the glittering cross at his throat, standing apart from his staff, gazed away in silence and in thought. It was his first sight of London, and its gigantic proportions amazed even him. Again he swept the horizon with his glass, and knit his grey brows. He remembered the parting words of his Emperor as he backed out of that plainly-furnished little private cabinet at Potsdam-- "You must bombard London and sack it. The pride of those English must be broken at all costs. Go, Kronhelm--go--and may the best of fortune go with you!" The sun was at the noon causing the glass roof of the distant Crystal Palace to gleam. Far down in the grey haze stood Big Ben, the Campanile, and a thousand church spires, all tiny and, from that distance, insignificant. From where he stood the sound of crackling fire at the barricades reached him, and a little behind him a member of his staff was kneeling on the grass with his ear bent to the field telephone. Reports were coming in fast of the desperate resistance in the streets, and these were duly handed to him. He glanced at them, gave a final look at the outstretched city that was the metropolis of the world, and then gave rapid orders for the withdrawal of the troops from the assault of the barricades, and the bombardment of London. In a moment the field-telegraphs were clicking, the telephone bell was ringing, orders were shouted in German in all directions, and next second, with a deafening roar, one of the howitzers of the battery in the close vicinity to him gave tongue and threw its deadly shell somewhere into St. John's Wood. The rain of death had opened! London was surrounded by a semi-circle of fire. The great gun was followed by a hundred others as, at all the batteries along the northern heights, the orders were received. Then in a few minutes, from the whole line from Chingford to Willesden, roughly about twelve miles, came a hail of the most deadly of modern projectiles directed upon the most populous parts of the metropolis. Though the Germans trained their guns to carry as far as was possible, the zone of fire did not at first it seemed extend farther south than a line roughly taken from Notting Hill through Bayswater, past Paddington Station, along the Marylebone and Euston Roads, then up to Highbury, Stoke Newington, Stamford Hill and Walthamstow. When, however, the great shells began to burst in Holloway, Kentish Town, Camden Town, Kilburn, Kensal Green, and other places lying within the area under fire, a frightful panic ensued. Whole streets were shattered by explosions, and fires were breaking out, the dark clouds of smoke obscuring the sunlit sky. Roaring flame shot up everywhere, unfortunate men, women, and children were being blown to atoms by the awful projectiles, while others distracted, sought shelter in any cellar or underground place they could find, while their houses fell about them like packs of cards. The scenes within that zone of terror were indescribable. When Paris had been bombarded years ago, artillery was not at the perfection it now was, and there had been no such high explosive known as in the present day. The great shells that were falling everywhere, on bursting filled the air with poisonous fumes, as well as with deadly fragments. One bursting in a street would wreck the rows of houses on either side, and tear a great hole in the ground at the same moment. The fronts of the houses were torn out like paper, the iron railings twisted as though they were wire, and paving-stones hurled into the air like straws. Anything and everything offering a mark to the enemy's guns was shattered. St. John's Wood and the houses about Regent's Park suffered seriously. A shell from Hampstead, falling into the roof of one of the houses near the centre of Sussex Place, burst and shattered nearly all the houses in the row; while another fell in Cumberland Terrace and wrecked a dozen houses in the vicinity. In both cases the houses were mostly empty, for owners and servants had fled southward across the river as soon as it became apparent that the Germans actually intended to bombard. At many parts in Maida Vale shells burst with appalling effect. Several of the houses in Elgin Avenue had their fronts torn out, and in one, a block of flats, there was considerable loss of life in the fire that broke out, escape being cut off owing to the stairs having been demolished by the explosion. Abbey Road, St. John's Wood Road, Acacia Road, and Wellington Road, were quickly wrecked. In Chalk Farm Road, near the Adelaide, a terrified woman was dashing across the street to seek shelter with a neighbour, when a shell burst right in front of her, blowing her to fragments; while in the early stage of the bombardment a shell bursting in the Midland Hotel at St. Pancras caused a fire which in half an hour resulted in the whole hotel and railway terminus being a veritable furnace of flame. Through the roof of King's Cross Station several shells fell, and burst close to the departure platform. The whole glass roof was shattered, but beyond that little other material damage resulted. Shots were now falling everywhere, and Londoners were staggered. In dense, excited crowds they were flying southwards towards the Thames. Some were caught in the streets in their flight, and were flung down, maimed and dying. The most awful sights were to be witnessed in the open streets; men and women blown out of recognition, with their clothes singed and torn to shreds, and helpless, innocent children lying white and dead, their limbs torn away and missing. Euston Station had shared the same fate as St. Pancras, and was blazing furiously, sending up a great column of black smoke that could be seen by all London. So many were the conflagrations now breaking out that it seemed as though the enemy were sending into London shells filled with petrol, in order to set the streets aflame. This, indeed, was proved by an eye-witness, who saw a shell fall in Liverpool Road, close to the Angel. It burst with a bright red flash, and next second the whole of the roadway and neighbouring houses were blazing furiously. Thus the air became black with smoke and dust, and the light of day obscured in Northern London. And through that obscurity came those whizzing shells in an incessant hissing stream, each one, bursting in these narrow, thickly populated streets, causing havoc indescribable, and a loss of life impossible to accurately calculate. Hundreds of people were blown to pieces in the open but hundreds more were buried beneath the _débris_ of their own cherished homes, now being so ruthlessly destroyed and demolished. On every side was heard the cry: "Stop the war--stop the war!" But it was, alas! too late--too late. Never in the history of the civilised world were there such scenes of reckless slaughter of the innocent and peace-loving as on that never-to-be-forgotten day when Von Kronhelm carried out the orders of his Imperial master, and struck terror into the heart of London's millions. CHAPTER V. THE RAIN OF DEATH. Through the whole afternoon the heavy German artillery roared, belching forth their fiery vengeance upon London. Hour after hour they pounded away, until St. Pancras Church was a heap of ruins and the Foundling Hospital a veritable furnace, as well as the Parcel Post Offices and the University College in Gower Street. In Hampstead Road many of the shops were shattered, and in Tottenham Court Road both Maple's and Shoolbred's suffered severely, for shells bursting in the centre of the roadway had smashed every pane of glass in the fronts of both buildings. The quiet squares of Bloomsbury were in some cases great yawning ruins--houses with their fronts torn out revealing the shattered furniture within. Streets were indeed, filled with tiles, chimney pots, fallen telegraph wires, and _débris_ of furniture, stone steps, paving stones, and fallen masonry. Many of the thoroughfares, such as the Pentonville Road, Copenhagen Street, and Holloway Road, were, at points, quite impassable on account of the ruins that blocked them. Into the Northern Hospital, in the Holloway Road, a shell fell, shattering one of the wards, and killing or maiming every one of the patients in the ward in question, while the church in Tufnell Park Road was burning fiercely. Upper Holloway, Stoke Newington, Highbury, Kingsland, Dalston, Hackney, Clapton, and Stamford Hill were being swept at long range by the guns on Muswell Hill and Churchyard Bottom Hill, and the terror caused in those densely populated districts was awful. Hundreds upon hundreds lost their lives, or else had a hand, an arm, a leg blown away, as those fatal shells fell in never-ceasing monotony, especially in Stoke Newington and Kingsland. The many side roads lying between Holloway Road and Finsbury Park, such as Hornsey Road, Tollington Park, Andover, Durham, Palmerston, Campbell, and Forthill Roads, Seven Sisters Road, and Isledon Road were all devastated, for the guns for a full hour seemed to be trained upon them. The German gunners in all probability neither knew nor cared where their shells fell. From their position, now that the smoke of the hundreds of fires was now rising, they could probably discern but little. Therefore the batteries at Hampstead Heath, Muswell Hill, Wood Green, Cricklewood, and other places simply sent their shells as far distant south as possible into the panic-stricken city below. In Mountgrove and Riversdale Roads, Highbury Vale, a number of people were killed, while a frightful disaster occurred in the church at the corner of Park Lane and Milton Road, Stoke Newington. Here a number of people had entered, attending a special service for the success of the British arms, when a shell exploded on the roof, bringing it down upon them and killing over fifty of the congregation, mostly women. The air, poisoned by the fumes of the deadly explosives and full of smoke from the burning buildings, was ever and anon rent by explosions as projectiles frequently burst in mid-air. The distant roar was incessant, like the noise of thunder, while on every hand could be heard the shrieks of defenceless women and children, or the muttered curses of some man who saw his home and all he possessed swept away with a flash and a cloud of dust. Nothing could withstand that awful cannonade. Walthamstow had been rendered untenable in the first half-hour of the bombardment, while in Tottenham the loss of life had been very enormous, the German gunners at Wood Green having apparently turned their first attention upon that place. Churches, the larger buildings, the railway station, in fact, anything offering a mark, was promptly shattered, being assisted by the converging fire from the batteries at Chingford. On the opposite side of London, Notting Hill, Shepherd's Bush, and Starch Green, were being reduced to ruins by the heavy batteries above Park Royal Station, which, firing across Wormwood Scrubs, put their shots into Notting Hill, and especially into Holland Park, where widespread damage was quickly wrought. A couple of shells falling into the generating station of the Central London Railway, or "Tube," as Londoners usually call it, unfortunately caused a disaster and loss of life which were appalling. At the first sign of the bombardment many thousands of people descended into the "Tube" as a safe hiding-place from the rain of shell. At first the railway officials closed the doors to prevent the inrush, but the terrified populace in Shepherd's Bush, Bayswater, Oxford Street, and Holborn, in fact, all along the subterranean line, broke open the doors and descending by the lifts and stairs found themselves in a place which at least gave them security against the enemy's fire. The trains had long ago ceased running, and every station was crowded to excess, while many were forced upon the line itself, and actually into the tunnels. For hours they waited there in eager breathlessness, longing to be able to ascend and find the conflict over. Men and women in all stations of life were huddled together, while children clung to their parents in wonder; yet as hour after hour went by, the report from above was still the same--the Germans had not ceased. Of a sudden, however, the light failed. The electric current had been cut off by the explosion of the shells in the generating station at Shepherd's Bush, and the lifts were useless! The thousands who, in defiance of the orders of the company, had gone below at Shepherd's Bush for shelter, found themselves caught like rats in a hole. True, there was the faint glimmer of an oil light here and there, but, alas! that did not prevent an awful panic. Somebody shouted that the Germans were above and had put out the lights, and when it was found that the lifts were useless a panic ensued that was indescribable. The people could not ascend the stairs, as they were blocked by the dense crowd, therefore they pressed into the narrow semi-circular tunnels in an eager endeavour to reach the next station, where they hoped they might escape; but once in there women and children were quickly crushed to death, or thrown down and trampled upon by the press behind. In the darkness they fought with each other, pressing on and becoming jammed so tightly that many were held against the sloping walls until life was extinct. Between Shepherd's Bush and Holland Park Stations the loss of life was worst, for being within the zone of the German fire the people had crushed in frantically in thousands, and with one accord a move had unfortunately been made into the tunnels, on account of the foolish cry that the German were waiting above. The railway officials were powerless. They had done their best to prevent any one going below, but the public had insisted, therefore no blame could be laid upon them for the catastrophe. At Marble Arch, Oxford Circus, and Tottenham Court Road Stations, a similar scene was enacted, and dozens upon dozens, alas! lost their lives in the panic. Ladies and gentlemen from Park Lane, Grosvenor Square, and Mayfair had sought shelter at the Marble Arch Station, rubbing shoulders with labourers' wives and costerwomen from the back streets of Marylebone. When the lights failed, a rush had been made into the tunnel to reach Oxford Circus, all exit by the stairs being blocked, as at Shepherd's Bush, on account of the hundreds struggling to get down. As at Holland Park, the terrified crowd fighting with each other became jammed and suffocated in the narrow space. The catastrophe was a frightful one, for it was afterwards proved that over four hundred and twenty persons, mostly weak women and children, lost their lives in those twenty minutes of darkness before the mains at the generating station, wrecked by the explosions, could be repaired. Then, when the current came up again, the lights revealed the frightful mishap, and people struggled to emerge from the burrows wherein they had so narrowly escaped death. Upon the Baker Street and Waterloo and other "Tubes," every station had also been besieged. The whole of the first-mentioned line from north to south was the refuge of thousands, who saw in it a safe place for retreat. The tunnels of the District Railway, too, were filled with terror-stricken multitudes, who descended at every station and walked away into a subterranean place of safety. No trains had been running for several days, therefore there was no danger from that cause. Meanwhile the bombardment continued with unceasing activity. The Marylebone Station of the Great Central Railway, and the Great Central Hotel, which seemed to be only just within the line of fire, were wrecked, and about four o'clock it was seen that the hotel, like that at St. Pancras, was well alight, though no effort could be made to save it. At the first two or three alarms of fire the Metropolitan Fire Brigade had turned out, but now that fresh alarms were reaching the chief station every moment, the brigade saw themselves utterly powerless to even attempt to save the hundred buildings, great and small, now furiously blazing. Gasometers, especially those of the Gas Light and Coke Company at Kensal Green, were marked by the German gunners, who sent them into the air; while a well-directed petrol bomb at Wormwood Scrubs Prison set one great wing of the place alight, and the prisoners were therefore released. The rear of Kensington Palace, and the fronts of a number of houses in Kensington Palace Gardens were badly damaged, while in the dome of the Albert Hall was a great, ugly hole. Shortly after five o'clock occurred a disaster which was of national consequence. It could only have been a mishap on the part of the Germans, for they would certainly never have done such irreparable damage willingly, as they destroyed what would otherwise have been most valuable of loot. Shots suddenly began to fall fast in Bloomsbury, several of them badly damaging the Hotel Russell and the houses near, and it was therefore apparent that one of the batteries which had been firing from near Jack Straw's Castle had been moved across to Parliament Hill, or even to some point south of it, which gave a wider range to the fire. Presently a shell came high through the air and fell full upon the British Museum, striking it nearly in the centre of the front, and in exploding carried away the Grecian-Ionic ornament, and shattered a number of the fine stone columns of the dark façade. Ere people in the vicinity had realised that the national collection of antiques was within range of the enemy's destructive projectiles, a second shell crashed into the rear of the building, making a great gap in the walls. Then, as though all the guns of that particular battery had converged in order to destroy our treasure-house of art and antiquity, shell after shell crashed into the place in rapid succession. Before ten minutes had passed, grey smoke began to roll out from beneath the long colonnade in front, and growing denser, told its own tale. The British Museum was on fire. Nor was that all. As though to complete the disaster--although it was certain that the Germans were in ignorance--there came one of those terrible shells filled with petrol, which, bursting inside the manuscript room, set the whole place ablaze. In a dozen different places the building seemed to be now alight, especially the library, and thus the finest collection of books, manuscripts, Greek and Roman and Egyptian antiques, coins, medals, and prehistoric relics, lay at the mercy of the flames. The fire brigade was at once alarmed, and at imminent risk of their lives, for shells were still falling in the vicinity, they, with the Salvage Corps and the assistance of many willing helpers--some of whom, unfortunately, lost their lives in the flames--saved whatever could be saved, throwing the objects out into the railed-off quadrangle in front. The left wing of the Museum, however, could not be entered, although, after most valiant efforts on the part of the firemen, the conflagrations that had broken out in other parts of the building were at length subdued. The damage was, however, irreparable, for many unique collections, including all the prints and drawings, and many of the mediæval and historic manuscripts had already been consumed. Shots now began to fall as far south as Oxford Street, and all along that thoroughfare from Holborn as far as Oxford Circus, widespread havoc was being wrought. People fled for their lives back towards Charing Cross and the Strand. The Oxford Music Hall was a hopeless ruin, while a shell crashing through the roof of Frascati's restaurant carried away a portion of the gallery and utterly wrecked the whole place. Many of the shops in Oxford Street had their roofs damaged or their fronts blown out, while a huge block of flats in Great Russell Street was practically demolished by three shells striking in rapid succession. Then, to the alarm of all who realised it, shots were seen to be passing high over Bloomsbury, south towards the Thames. The range had been increased, for, as was afterwards known, some heavier guns had now been mounted upon Muswell Hill and Hampstead Heath, which, carrying to a distance of from six to seven miles, placed the City, the Strand, and Westminster within the zone of fire. The zone in question stretched roughly from Victoria Park through Bethnal Green and Whitechapel, across to Southwark, the Borough, Lambeth, and Westminster to Kensington, and while the fire upon the northern suburbs slackened, great shells now came flying through the air into the very heart of London. The German gunners at Muswell Hill took the dome of St. Paul's as a mark, for shells fell constantly in Ludgate Hill, in Cheapside, in Newgate Street, and in the Churchyard itself. One falling upon the steps of the Cathedral tore out two of the columns of the front, while another, striking the clock tower just below the face, brought down much of the masonry and one of the huge bells, with a deafening crash, blocking the road with _débris_. Time after time the great shells went over the splendid Cathedral, which the enemy seemed bent upon destroying, but the dome remained uninjured, though about ten feet of the top of the second tower was carried away. On the Cannon Street side of St. Paul's a great block of drapery warehouses had caught fire, and was burning fiercely, while the drapers and other shops on the Paternoster Row side all had their windows shattered by the constant detonations. Within the Cathedral two shells that had fallen through the roof had wrought havoc with the beautiful reredos and the choir-stalls, many of the fine windows being also wrecked by the explosions. Whole rows of houses in Cheapside suffered, while both the Mansion House, where the London flag was flying, and the Royal Exchange were severely damaged by a number of shells which fell in the vicinity. The equestrian statue in front of the Exchange had been overturned, while the Exchange itself showed a great yawning hole in the corner of the façade next Cornhill. At the Bank of England a fire had occurred, but had fortunately been extinguished by the strong force of Guards in charge, though they gallantly risked their lives in so doing. Lothbury, Gresham Street, Old Broad Street, Lombard Street, Gracechurch Street, and Leadenhall Street were all more or less scenes of fire, havoc, and destruction. The loss of life was not great in this neighbourhood, for most people had crossed the river or gone westward, but the high explosives used by the Germans were falling upon shops and warehouses with appalling effect. Masonry was torn about like paper, ironwork twisted like wax, woodwork shattered to a thousand splinters as, time after time, a great projectile hissed in the air and effected its errand of destruction. A number of the wharves on each side of the river were soon alight, and both Upper and Lower Thames Streets were soon impassable on account of huge conflagrations. A few shells fell in Shoreditch, Houndsditch, and Whitechapel, and these, in most cases, caused loss of life in those densely populated districts. Westward, however, as the hours went on, the howitzers at Hampstead began to drop high explosive shells into the Strand, around Charing Cross, and in Westminster. This weapon had a calibre of 4.14 inches, and threw a projectile of 35 lbs. The tower of St. Clement Dane's Church crashed to the ground and blocked the roadway opposite Milford Lane; the pointed roof of the clock-tower of the Law Courts was blown away, and the granite fronts of the two banks opposite the Law Courts entrance were torn out by a shell which exploded in the footpath before them. Shells fell time after time, in and about the Law Courts themselves, committing immense damage to the interior, while a shell bursting upon the roof of Charing Cross Station, rendered it a ruin as picturesque as it had been in December, 1905. The National Liberal Club was burning furiously; the Hotel Cecil and the Savoy did not escape, but no material damage was done to them. The Garrick Theatre had caught fire; a shot carried away the globe above the Coliseum, and the Shot Tower beside the Thames crashed into the river. The front of the Grand Hotel in Trafalgar Square showed, in several places, great holes where the shell had struck, and a shell bursting at the foot of Nelson's Monument turned over one of the lions--overthrowing the emblem of Britain's might! The clubs in Pall Mall were, in one or two instances, wrecked, notably the Reform, the Junior Carlton, and the Athenæum, into each of which shells fell through the roof and exploded within. From the number of projectiles that fell in the vicinity of the Houses of Parliament, it was apparent that the German gunners could see the Royal Standard flying from the Victoria Tower, and were making it their mark. In the west front of Westminster Abbey several shots crashed, doing enormous damage to the grand old pile. The hospital opposite was set alight, while the Westminster Palace Hotel was severely damaged, and two shells falling into St. Thomas's Hospital created a scene of indescribable terror in one of the overcrowded casualty wards. Suddenly one of the German high explosive shells burst on the top of the Victoria Tower, blowing away all four of the pinnacles, and bringing down the flagstaff. Big Ben served as another mark for the artillery at Muswell Hill and several shots struck it, tearing out one of the huge clock faces and blowing away the pointed apex of the tower. Suddenly, however, two great shells struck it right in the centre, almost simultaneously, near the base, and made such a hole in the huge pile of masonry that it was soon seen to have been rendered unsafe, though it did not fall. Shot after shot struck other portions of the Houses of Parliament, breaking the windows and carrying away pinnacles. One of the twin towers of Westminster Abbey fell a few moments later, and another shell, crashing into the choir, completely wrecked Edward the Confessor's shrine, the Coronation Chair, and all the objects of antiquity in the vicinity. The old Horse Guards escaped injury, but one of the cupolas of the new War Office opposite was blown away, while shortly afterwards a fire broke out in the new Local Government Board and Education Offices. Number 10, Downing Street, the chief centre of the Government, had its windows all blown in--a grim accident, no doubt--the same explosion shattering several windows in the Foreign Office. Many shells fell in St. James's and Hyde Parks, exploding harmlessly, but others, passing across St. James's Park, crashed into that high building, Queen Anne's Mansions, causing fearful havoc. Somerset House, Covent Garden Market, Drury Lane Theatre, and the Gaiety Theatre and Restaurant all suffered more or less, and two of the bronze footguards guarding the Wellington Statue at Hyde Park Corner were blown many yards away. Around Holborn Circus immense damage was being caused, and several shells bursting on the Viaduct itself blew great holes in the bridge. So widespread, indeed, was the havoc, that it is impossible to give a detailed account of the day's terrors. If the public buildings suffered, the damage to property of householders and the ruthless wrecking of quiet English homes may well be imagined. The people had been driven out from the zone of fire, and had left their possessions to the mercy of the invaders. South of the Thames very little damage was done. The German howitzers and long-range guns could not reach so far. One or two shots fell in York Road, Lambeth, and in the Waterloo and Westminster Bridge Roads, but they did little damage beyond breaking all the windows in the vicinity. When would it end? Where would it end? Half the population of London had fled across the bridges, and from Denmark Hill, Champion Hill, Norwood, and the Crystal Palace they could see the smoke issuing from the hundred fires. London was cowed. These northern barricades, still held by bodies of valiant men, were making a last desperate stand, though the streets ran with blood. Every man fought well and bravely for his country, though he went to his death. A thousand acts of gallant heroism on the part of Englishmen were done that day, but alas! all to no purpose. The Germans were at our gates, and were not to be denied. As daylight commenced to fade the dust and smoke became suffocating. And yet the guns pounded away with a monotonous regularity that appalled the helpless populace. Overhead there was a quick whizzing in the air, a deafening explosion, and as the masonry came crashing down the atmosphere was filled with poisonous fumes that half asphyxiated all those in the vicinity. Hitherto the enemy had treated us, on the whole, humanely, but finding that desperate resistance in the northern suburbs, Von Kronhelm was carrying out the Emperor's parting injunction. He was breaking the pride of our own dear London, even at the sacrifice of thousands of innocent lives. The scenes in the streets within that zone of awful fire baffled description. They were too sudden, too dramatic, too appalling. Death and destruction were everywhere, and the people of London now realised for the first time what the horrors of war really meant. Dusk was falling. Above the pall of smoke from burning buildings the sun was setting with a blood-red light. From the London streets, however, this evening sky was darkened by the clouds of smoke and dust. Yet the cannonade continued, each shell that came hurtling through the air exploding with deadly effect and spreading destruction on all hands. Meanwhile the barricades at the north had not escaped Von Kronhelm's attention. About four o'clock he gave orders by field telegraph for certain batteries to move down and attack them. This was done soon after five o'clock, and when the German guns began to pour their deadly rain of shell into those hastily improvised defences there commenced a slaughter of the gallant defenders that was horrible. At each of the barricades shell after shell was directed, and very quickly breaches were made. Then upon the defenders themselves the fire was directed--a withering, awful fire from quick-firing guns which none could withstand. The streets, with their barricades swept away, were strewn with mutilated corpses. Hundreds upon hundreds had attempted to make a last stand, rallied by the Union Jack they waved above, but a shell exploding in their midst had sent them to instant eternity. Many a gallant deed was done that day by patriotic Londoners in defence of their homes and loved ones--many a deed that should have earned the V.C.--but in nearly all cases the patriot who had stood up and faced the foe had gone to straight and certain death. Till seven o'clock the dull roar of the guns in the north continued, and people across the Thames knew that London was still being destroyed, nay, pulverised. Then with accord came a silence--the first silence since the hot noon. Von Kronhelm's field telegraph at Jack Straw's Castle had ticked the order to cease firing. All the barricades had been broken. London lay burning--at the mercy of the German eagle. And as the darkness fell the German Commander-in-Chief looked again through his glasses, and saw the red flames leaping up in dozens of places, where whole blocks of shops and buildings, public institutions, whole streets in some cases, were being consumed. London--the proud capital of the world, the "home" of the Englishman--was at last ground beneath the iron heel of Germany! And all, alas! due to one cause alone--the careless insular apathy of the Englishman himself! CHAPTER VI. FALL OF LONDON. Outside London the September night had settled down on the blood-stained field of battle. With a pale light the moon had risen, partly hidden by chasing clouds, her white rays mingling with the lurid glare of the fires down in the great terrified Metropolis below. Northward, from Hampstead across to Barnet--indeed, over that wide district where the final battle had been so hotly fought--the moonbeams shone upon the pallid faces of the fallen. Along the German line of investment there had now followed upon the roar of battle an uncanny silence. Away to the west, however, there was still heard the growling of distant conflict, now mounting into a low crackling of musketry fire, and again dying away in muffled sounds. The last remnant of the British Army was being hotly pursued in the direction of Staines. London was invested and bombarded, but not yet taken. For a long time the German Field Marshal had stood alone upon Hampstead Heath apart from his staff, watching the great tongues of flame leaping up here and there in the distant darkness. His grey, shaggy brows were contracted, his thin aquiline face thoughtful, his hard mouth twitching nervously, unable to fully conceal the strain of his own feelings as conqueror of the English. Von Kronhelm's taciturnity had long ago been proverbial. The Kaiser had likened him to Moltke, and had declared that "he could be silent in seven languages." His gaze was one of musing, and yet he was the most active of men, and perhaps the cleverest strategist in all Europe. Often during the campaign he had astonished his aides-de-camp by his untiring energy, for sometimes he would even visit the outposts in person. On many occasions he had actually crept up to the most advanced posts at great personal risk to himself, so anxious had he been to see with his own eyes. Such visits from the Field Marshal himself were not always welcome to the German outposts, who, as soon as they showed the least sign of commotion consequent upon the visit, were at once swept by a withering English fire. Yet he now stood there the conqueror. And while many of his officers were installing themselves in comfortable quarters in houses about North End, North Hill, South Hill, Muswell Hill, Roslyn Hill, Fitzjohn's Avenue, Netherhall, and Maresfield Gardens, and other roads in that vicinity, the great Commander was still alone upon the Heath, having taken nothing save a nip from his flask since his coffee at dawn. Time after time telegraphic despatches were handed to him from Germany, and telephonic reports from his various positions around London, but he received them all without comment. He read, he listened, but he said nothing. For a full hour he remained there, strolling up and down alone in quick impatience. Then, as though suddenly making up his mind, he called three members of his staff, and gave orders for an entry into London. This, as he knew, was the signal for a terrible and bloody encounter. Bugles sounded. Men and officers, who had believed that the storm and stress of the day were over, and that they were entitled to rest, found themselves called upon to fight their way into the city that they knew would be defended by an irate and antagonistic populace. Still, the order had been given, and it must be obeyed. They had expected that the advance would be at least made at dawn, but evidently Von Kronhelm feared that six hours' delay might necessitate more desperate fighting. He intended, now that London was cowed, that she should be entirely crushed. The orders of his master the Kaiser were to that effect. Therefore, shortly before nine o'clock the first detachments of German infantry marched along Spaniards Road, and down Roslyn Hill to Haverstock Hill, where they were at once fired upon from behind the _débris_ of the great barricade across the junction of Prince of Wales Road and Haverstock Hill. This place was held strongly by British Infantry, many members of the Legion of Frontiersmen--distinguished only by the little bronze badge in their buttonholes--and also by hundreds of citizens armed with rifles. Twenty Germans dropped at the first volley, and next instant a Maxim, concealed in the first floor of a neighbouring house, spat forth its fire upon the invaders with deadly effect. The German bugle sounded the "Advance rapidly," and the men emulously ran forward, shouting loud hurrahs. Major van Wittich, who had distinguished himself very conspicuously in the fighting round Enfield Chase, fell, being shot through the lung when just within a few yards of the half-ruined barricade. Londoners were fighting desperately, shouting and cheering. The standard-bearer of the 4th Battalion of the Brunswick Infantry Regiment, No. 92, fell severely wounded, and the standard was instantly snatched from him in the awful hand-to-hand fighting which that moment ensued. Five minutes later the streets were running with blood, for hundreds, both Germans and British, lay dead and dying. Every Londoner struggled valiantly until shot down; yet the enemy, always reinforced, pressed forward, until ten minutes later, the defenders were driven out of their position, and the house from which the Maxim was sending forth its deadly hail had been entered and the gun captured. Volley after volley was still, however, poured out on the heads of the storming party, but already the pioneers were at work clearing a way for the advance, and very soon the Germans had surmounted the obstruction and were within London. For a short time the Germans halted, then, at a signal from their officers, they moved along both roads, again being fired upon from every house in the vicinity, many of the defenders having retired to continue their defence from the windows. The enemy therefore turned their attention to these houses, and after desperate struggles house after house was taken, those of the defenders not wearing uniform being shot down without mercy. To such no quarter was given. The contest now became a most furious one. Britons and Germans fought hand to hand. A battalion of the Brunswick Infantry with some riflemen of the Guard took several houses by rush in Chalk Farm Road; but in many cases the Germans were shot by their own comrades. Quite a number of the enemy's officers were picked off by the Frontiersmen, those brave fellows who had seen service in every corner of the world, and who were now in the windows and upon roofs. Thus the furious fight from house to house proceeded. This exciting conflict was practically characteristic of what was at that moment happening in fifty other spots along the suburbs of North London. The obstinate resistance which we made against the Germans was met with equally obstinate aggression. There was no surrender. Londoners fell and died fighting to the very last. Against those well-trained Teutons in such overwhelming masses we, however, could have no hope of success. The rushes of the infantry and rifles of the Guards were made skilfully, and slowly but surely broke down all opposition. The barricade in the Kentish Town Road was defended with valiant heroism. The Germans were, as in Chalk Farm Road, compelled to fight their way foot by foot, losing heavily all the time. But here, at length, as at other points, the barricade was taken, and the defenders chased, and either taken prisoner or else ruthlessly shot down. A body of citizens armed with rifles were, after the storming of the barricades in question, driven back into Park Street, and there, being caught between two bodies of Germans, slaughtered to a man. Through those unlit side streets between the Kentish Town and Camden Roads--namely, the Lawford, Bartholomew, Rochester, Caversham, and Leighton Roads--there was much skirmishing, and many on both sides fell in the bloody encounter. A thousand deeds of bravery were done that night, but were unrecorded. Before the barricade in Holloway Road--which had been strongly repaired after the breach made in it by the German shells--the enemy lost very heavily, for the three Maxims which had there been mounted did awful execution. The invaders, however, seeing the strong defence, fell back for full twenty minutes, and then, making another rush, hurled petrol bombs into the midst of our men. A frightful holocaust was the result. Fully a hundred of the poor fellows were literally burned alive; while the neighbouring houses, being set in flames, compelled the citizen free-shooters to quickly evacuate their position. Against such terrible missiles even the best trained troops cannot stand, therefore no wonder that all opposition at that point was soon afterwards swept away, and the pioneers quickly opened the road for the victorious legions of the Kaiser. And so in that prosaic thoroughfare, the Holloway Road, brave men fought gallantly and died, while a Scotch piper paced the pavement sharply, backwards and forwards, with his colours flying. Then, alas! came the red flash, the loud explosions in rapid succession, and the next instant the whole street burst into a veritable sea of flame. High Street, Kingsland, was also the scene of several fierce conflicts; but here the Germans decidedly got the worst of it. The whole infuriated population seemed to emerge suddenly from the side streets of the Kingsland Road on the appearance of the detachment of the enemy, and the latter were practically overwhelmed, notwithstanding the desperate fight they made. Then ringing cheers went up from the defenders. The Germans were given no quarter by the populace, all of whom were armed with knives or guns, the women mostly with hatchets, crowbars, or edged tools. Many of the Germans fled through the side streets towards Mare Street, and were hotly pursued, the majority of them being done to death by the maddened mob. The streets in this vicinity were literally a slaughterhouse. The barricades in Finchley Road, and in High Road, Kilburn, were also very strongly held, and at the first-named it was quite an hour before the enemy's pioneers were able to make a breach. Indeed, then only after a most hotly contested conflict, in which there were frightful losses on both sides. Petrol bombs were here also used by the enemy with appalling effect, the road being afterwards cleared by a couple of Maxims. Farther towards Regent's Park the houses were, however, full of sharpshooters, and before these could be dislodged the enemy had again suffered severely. The entry into London was both difficult and perilous, and the enemy suffered great losses everywhere. After the breaking down of the defences in High Road, Kilburn, the men who had held them retired to the Town Hall, opposite Kilburn Station, and from the windows fired at the passing battalions, doing much execution. All efforts to dislodge them proved unavailing, until the place was taken by storm, and a fearful hand to hand fight was the outcome. Eventually the Town Hall was taken, after a most desperate resistance, and ten minutes later wilfully set fire to and burned. In the Harrow Road and those cross streets between Kensal Green and Maida Vale the advancing Germans shared much the same fate as about Hackney. Surrounded by the armed populace, hundreds upon hundreds of them were killed, struck down by hatchets, stabbed by knives, or shot with revolvers, the crowd shouting, "Down with the Germans! Kill them! Kill them!" Many of the London women now became perfect furies. So incensed were they at the wreck of their homes and the death of their loved ones that they rushed wildly into the fray with no thought of peril, only of bitter revenge. A German whenever caught was at once killed. In those bloody street fights the Teutons got separated from their comrades and were quickly surrounded and done to death. [Illustration: LONDON AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.] Across the whole of the northern suburbs the scenes of bloodshed that night were full of horror, as men fought in the ruined streets, climbing over the smouldering _débris_, over the bodies of their comrades, and shooting from behind ruined walls. As Von Kronhelm had anticipated, his Army was compelled to fight its way into London. The streets all along the line of the enemy's advance were now strewn with dead and dying. London was doomed. The Germans now coming on in increasing, nay, unceasing numbers, were leaving behind them everywhere the trail of blood. Shattered London stood staggered. Though the resistance had been long and desperate, the enemy had again triumphed by reason of his sheer weight of numbers. Yet, even though he were actually in our own dear London, our people did not mean that he should establish himself without any further opposition. Therefore, though the barricades had been taken, the Germans found in every unexpected corner men who shot at them, and Maxims which spat forth their leaden showers beneath which hundreds upon hundreds of Teutons fell. Yet they advanced, still fighting. The scenes of carnage were awful and indescribable, no quarter being given to any armed citizens not in uniform, be they men, women, or children. The German Army was carrying out the famous proclamation of Field Marshal von Kronhelm to the letter! They were marching on to the sack of the wealthiest city of the world. It wanted still an hour of midnight. London was a city of shadow, of fire, of death. The silent streets, whence all the inhabitants had fled in panic, echoed to the heavy tread of German infantry, the clank of arms, and the ominous rumble of guns. Ever and anon an order was shouted in German as the Kaiser's legions went forward to occupy the proud capital of the world. The enemy's plans appeared to have been carefully prepared. The majority of the troops coming from the direction of Hampstead and Finchley entered Regent's Park, whence preparations were at once commenced for encampment; while the remainder, together with those who came down the Camden, Caledonian, and Holloway Roads, turned along Euston Road and Oxford Street to Hyde Park, where a huge camp was formed, stretching from the Marble Arch right along the Park Lane side away to Knightsbridge. Officers were very soon billeted in the best houses in Park Lane and about Mayfair--houses full of works of art and other valuables that had only that morning been left to the mercy of the invaders. From the windows and balconies of their quarters in Park Lane they could overlook the encampment--a position which had evidently been purposely chosen. Other troops who came in never-ending procession by the Bow Road, Roman Road, East India Dock Road, Victoria Park Road, Mare Street, and Kingsland Road all converged into the City itself, except those who had come from Edmonton down the Kingsland Road, and who, passing along Old Street and Clerkenwell, occupied the Charing Cross and Westminster districts. At midnight a dramatic scene was enacted when, in the blood-red glare of some blazing buildings in the vicinity, a large body of Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia's 2nd Magdeburg Regiment suddenly swept up Threadneedle Street into the great open space before the Mansion House, whereon the London flag was still flying aloft in the smoke-laden air. They halted across the junction of Cheapside with Queen Victoria Street when, at the same moment, another huge body of the Uhlans of Altmark and Magdeburg Hussars came clattering along Cornhill, followed a moment later by battalion after battalion of the 4th and 8th Thuringen Infantry out of Moorgate Street, whose uniforms showed plain traces of the desperate encounters of the past week. The great body of Germans had halted before the Mansion House, when General von Kleppen, the commander of the IVth Army Corps--who, it will be remembered, had landed at Weybourne--accompanied by Lieutenant-General von Mirbach, of the 8th Division, and Frölich, commander of the cavalry brigade, ascended the steps of the Mansion House and entered. Within, Sir Claude Harrison, the Lord Mayor, who wore his robes and jewel of office, received them in that great, sombre room wherein so many momentous questions concerning the welfare of the British Empire had been discussed. The representative of the City of London, a short, stout, gray-haired man, was pale and agitated. He bowed, but he could not speak. Von Kleppen, however, a smart, soldierly figure in his service uniform and many ribbons, bowed in response, and in very fair English said:-- "I regret, my Lord Mayor, that it is necessary for us to thus disturb you, but as you are aware, the British Army has been defeated, and the German Army has entered London. I have orders from Field Marshal von Kronhelm to place you under arrest, and to hold you as hostage for the good behaviour of the City during the progress of the negotiations for peace." "Arrest!" gasped the Lord Mayor. "You intend to arrest me?" "It will not be irksome, I assure you," smiled the German commander grimly. "At least, we shall make it as comfortable as possible. I shall place a guard here, and the only restriction I place upon you is that you shall neither go out nor hold any communication with any one outside these walls." "But my wife?" "If her ladyship is here I would advise that she leave the place. It is better that, for the present, she should be out of London." The civic officials, who had all assembled for the dramatic ceremonial, looked at each other in blank amazement. The Lord Mayor was a prisoner! Sir Claude divested himself of his jewel of office, and handed it to his servant to replace in safe keeping. Then he took off his robe, and having done so, advanced closer to the German officers, who, treating him with every courtesy, consulted with him, expressing regret at the terrible loss of life that had been occasioned by the gallant defence of the barricades. Von Kleppen gave the Lord Mayor a message from Von Kronhelm, and urged him to issue a proclamation forbidding any further opposition on the part of the populace of London. With the three officers Sir Claude talked for a quarter of an hour, while into the Mansion House there entered a strong guard of men of the 2nd Magdeburg, who quickly established themselves in the most comfortable quarters. German double sentries stood at every exit and in every corridor, and when a few minutes later the flag was hauled down and the German Imperial Standard run up, wild shouts of triumph rang from every throat of the densely packed body of troops assembled outside. The joyous "hurrahs!" reached the Lord Mayor, still in conversation with Von Kleppen, Von Mirbach, and Frölich, and in an instant he knew the truth. The Teutons were saluting their own standard. The civic flag had, either accidentally or purposely, been flung down into the roadway below, and was trampled in the dust. A hundred enthusiastic Germans, disregarding the shouts of their officers, fought for the flag, and it was instantly torn to shreds, and little pieces preserved as souvenirs. Shout after shout in German went up from the wildly excited troops of the Kaiser when the light wind caused their own flag to flutter out, and then, as with one voice, the whole body of troops united in singing the German National Hymn. The scene was weird and most impressive. London had fallen. Around were the wrecked buildings, some still smouldering, some emitting flame. Behind lay the Bank of England with untold wealth locked within: to the right the damaged façade of the Royal Exchange was illuminated by a flickering light, which also shone upon the piled arms of the enemy's troops, causing them to flash and gleam. In those silent, narrow City streets not an Englishman was to be seen. Every one save the Lord Mayor and his official attendants had fled. The Government Offices in Whitehall were all in the hands of the enemy. In the Foreign Office, the India Office, the War Office, the Colonial Office, the Admiralty, and other minor offices were German guards. Sentries stood at the shattered door of the famous No. 10, Downing Street, and all up Whitehall was lined with infantry. German officers were in charge of all our public offices, and all officials who had remained on duty were firmly requested to leave. Sentries were stationed to guard the archives of every department, and precautions were taken to guard against any further outbreaks of fire. Across at the Houses of Parliament, with their damaged towers, the whole great pile of buildings was surrounded by triumphant troops, while across at the fine old Abbey of Westminster was, alas! a different scene. The interior had been turned into a temporary hospital, and upon mattresses placed upon the floor were hundreds of poor maimed creatures, some groaning, some ghastly pale in the last moments of agony, some silent, their white lips moving in prayer. On one side in the dim light lay the men, some in uniform, others inoffensive citizens, who had been struck by cruel shells or falling _débris_; on the other side lay the women, some mere girls, and even children. Flitting everywhere in the half light were nurses, charitable ladies, and female helpers, with numbers of doctors, all doing their best to alleviate the terrible sufferings of that crowded place, the walls of which showed plain traces of the severe bombardment. In places the roof was open to the angry sky, while many of the windows were gaunt and shattered. A clergyman's voice somewhere was repeating a prayer in a low, distinct voice, so that all could hear, yet above all were the sighs and groans of the sufferers, and as one walked through that prostrate assembly of victims more than one was seen to have already gone to that land that lies beyond the human ken. The horrors of war were never more forcibly illustrated than in Westminster Abbey that night, for the grim hand of death was there, and men and women lying with their faces to the roof looked into Eternity. Every hospital in London was full, therefore the overflow had been placed in the various churches. From the battlefields along the northern defences, Epping, Edmonton, Barnet, Enfield, and other places where the last desperate stand had been made, and from the barricades in the northern suburbs ambulance waggons were continually arriving full of wounded, all of whom were placed in the churches and in any large public buildings which had remained undamaged by the bombardment. St. George's, Hanover Square, once the scene of many smart weddings, was now packed with unfortunate wounded soldiers, British and German lying side by side, while in the Westminster Cathedral and the Oratory at Brompton the Roman Catholic priests made hundreds of poor fellows as comfortable as they could, many members of the religious sisterhoods acting as nurses. St. James's Church in Piccadilly, St. Pancras Church, Shoreditch Church, and St. Mary Abbotts', Kensington, were all improvised hospitals, and many grim and terrible scenes of agony were witnessed during that long eventful night. The light was dim everywhere, for there were only paraffin lamps, and by their feeble illumination many a difficult operation had to be performed by those London surgeons who one and all had come forward, and were now working unceasingly. Renowned specialists from Harley Street, Cavendish Square, Queen Ann Street, and the vicinity were directing the work in all the improvised hospitals, men whose names were world-famous kneeling and performing operations upon poor unfortunate private soldiers or upon some labourer who had taken up a gun in defence of his home. Of lady helpers there were hundreds. From Mayfair and Belgravia, from Kensington and Bayswater, ladies had come forward offering their services, and their devotion to the wounded was everywhere apparent. In St. Andrew's, Wells Street, St. Peter's, Eaton Square, in the Scottish Church in Crown Court, Covent Garden, in the Temple Church, in the Union Chapel in Upper Street, in the Chapel Royal, Savoy, in St. Clement Danes in the Strand, and in St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, there were wounded in greater or less numbers, but the difficulties of treating them were enormous owing to the lack of necessaries for the performance of operations. Weird and striking were the scenes within those hallowed places, as, in the half darkness with the long, deep shadows, men struggled for life or gave to the women kneeling at their side their name, their address, or a last dying message to one they loved. London that night was a city of shattered homes, of shattered hopes, of shattered lives. The silence of death had fallen everywhere. The only sounds that broke the quiet within those churches were the sighs, groans, and faint murmurings of the dying. CHAPTER VII. GERMANS SACKING THE BANKS. Day dawned dismally and wet on September the 21st. Over London the sky was still obscured by the smoke-pall, though as the night passed many of the raging fires had spent themselves. Trafalgar Square was filled with troops who had piled arms and were standing at their ease. The men were laughing and smoking, enjoying a rest after the last forward movement and the street fighting of that night of horrors. The losses on both sides during the past three days had been enormous; of the number of London citizens killed and wounded it was impossible to calculate. There had, in the northern suburbs, been wholesale butchery everywhere, so gallantly had the barricades been defended. Great camps had now been formed in Hyde Park, in the Green Park between Constitution Hill and Piccadilly, and in St. James's Park. The Magdeburg Fusiliers were being formed up on the Horse Guards Parade, and from the flagstaff there now fluttered the ensign of the commander of an army corps, in place of the British flag. A large number of Uhlans and Cuirassiers were encamped at the west end of the Park, opposite Buckingham Palace, and both the Wellington Barracks and the Cavalry Barracks at Knightsbridge were occupied by Germans. Many officers were already billeted in the Savoy, the Cecil, the Carlton, the Grand, and Victoria hotels, while the British Museum, the National Gallery, the South Kensington Museum, the Tower, and a number of other collections of pictures and antiques were all guarded strongly by German sentries. The enemy had thus seized our national treasures. London awoke to find herself a German city. In the streets lounging groups of travel-worn sons of the Fatherland were everywhere, and German was heard on every hand. Every ounce of foodstuff was being rapidly commandeered by hundreds of foraging parties, who went to each grocer's, baker's, or provision shop in the various districts, seized all they could find, valued it, and gave official receipts for it. The price of food in London that morning was absolutely prohibitive, as much as two shillings being asked for a twopenny loaf. The Germans had, it was afterwards discovered, been all the time, since the Sunday when they landed, running over large cargoes of supplies of all sorts to the Essex, Lincolnshire, and Norfolk coasts, where they had established huge supply bases, well knowing that there was not sufficient food in the country to feed their armed hordes in addition to the population. Shops in Tottenham Court Road, Holborn, Edgware Road, Oxford Street, Camden Road, and Harrow Road were systematically visited by the foraging parties, who commenced their work at dawn. Those places that were closed and their owners absent were at once broken open, and everything seized and carted to either Hyde Park or St. James's Park, for though Londoners might starve, the Kaiser's troops intended to be fed. In some cases a patriotic shopkeeper attempted to resist. Indeed, in more than one case a tradesman wilfully set his shop on fire rather than its contents should fall into the enemy's hands. In other cases the tradesmen who received the official German receipts burned them in contempt before the officer's eyes. The guidance of these foraging parties was, in very many cases, in the hands of Germans in civilian clothes, and it was now seen how complete and helpful the enemy's system of espionage had been in London. Most of these men were Germans who, having served in the army, had come over to England and obtained employment as waiters, clerks, bakers, hairdressers, and private servants, and being bound by their oath to the Fatherland had served their country as spies. Each man, when obeying the Imperial command to join the German arms, had placed in the lapel of his coat a button of a peculiar shape, with which he had long ago been provided, and by which he was instantly recognised as a loyal subject of the Kaiser. This huge body of German soldiers, who for years had passed in England as civilians, was, of course, of enormous use to Von Kronhelm, for they acted as guides not only on the march and during the entry to London, but materially assisted in the victorious advance in the Midlands. Indeed, the Germans had for years kept a civilian army in England, and yet we had, ostrich-like, buried our heads in the sand, and refused to turn our eyes to the grave peril that had for so long threatened. Systematically, the Germans were visiting every shop and warehouse in the shopping districts, and seizing everything eatable they could discover. The enemy were taking the food from the mouths of the poor in East and South London, and as they went southward across the river, so the populace retired, leaving their homes at the mercy of the ruthless invader. Upon all the bridges across the Thames stood German guards, and none were allowed to cross without permits. Soon after dawn Von Kronhelm and his staff rode down Haverstock Hill with a large body of cavalry, and made his formal entry into London, first having an interview with the Lord Mayor, and an hour afterwards establishing his headquarters at the new War Office in Whitehall, over which he hoisted his special flag as Commander-in-Chief. It was found that, though a good deal of damage had been done externally to the building, the interior had practically escaped, save one or two rooms. Therefore the Field Marshal installed himself in the private room of the War Minister, and telegraphic and telephonic communication was quickly established, while a wireless telegraph apparatus was placed upon the ruined summit of Big Ben for the purpose of communicating with Germany, in case the cables were interrupted by being cut at sea. The day after the landing a similar apparatus had been erected on the Monument at Yarmouth, and it had been daily in communication with the one at Bremen. The German left nothing to chance. The clubs in Pall Mall were now being used by German officers, who lounged in easy chairs, smoking and taking their ease, German soldiers being on guard outside. North of the Thames seemed practically deserted, save for the invaders who swarmed everywhere. South of the Thames the cowed and terrified populace were asking what the end was to be. What was the Government doing? It had fled to Bristol and left London to its fate, they complained. What the German demands were was not known until the "Daily Telegraph" published an interview with Sir Claude Harrison, the Lord Mayor, which gave authentic details of them. They were as follows:-- 1. Indemnity of £300,000,000, paid in ten annual instalments. 2. Until this indemnity is paid in full, German troops to occupy Edinburgh, Rosyth, Chatham, Dover, Portsmouth, Devonport, Pembroke, Yarmouth, Hull. 3. Cession to Germany of the Shetlands, Orkneys, Bantry Bay, Malta, Gibraltar, and Tasmania. 4. India, north of a line drawn from Calcutta to Baroda, to be ceded to Russia. 5. The independence of Ireland to be recognised. Of the claim of £300,000,000, fifty millions was demanded from London, the sum in question to be paid within twelve hours. The Lord Mayor had, it appeared, sent his secretary to the Prime Minister at Bristol bearing the original document in the handwriting of Von Kronhelm. The Prime Minister had acknowledged its receipt by telegraph both to the Lord Mayor and to the German Field Marshal, but there the matter had ended. The twelve hours' grace was nearly up, and the German Commander, seated in Whitehall, had received no reply. In the corner of the large, pleasant, well-carpeted room sat a German telegraph engineer with a portable instrument, in direct communication with the Emperor's private cabinet at Potsdam, and over that wire messages were continually passing and repassing. The grizzled old soldier paced the room impatiently. His Emperor had only an hour ago sent him a message of warm congratulation, and had privately informed him of the high honours he intended to bestow upon him. The German Eagle was victorious, and London--the great unconquerable London--lay crushed, torn, and broken. The marble clock upon the mantelpiece shelf chimed eleven upon its silvery bells, causing Von Kronhelm to turn from the window to glance at his own watch. "Tell His Majesty that it is eleven o'clock, and that there is no reply to hand," he said sharply in German to the man in uniform seated at the table in the corner. The instrument clicked rapidly, and a silence followed. The German Commander waited anxiously. He stood bending slightly over the green tape in order to read the Imperial order the instant it flashed from beneath the sea. Five minutes--ten minutes passed. The shouting of military commands in German came up from Whitehall below. Nothing else broke the quiet. Von Kronhelm, his face more furrowed and more serious, again paced the carpet. Suddenly the little instrument whirred, and clicked as its thin green tape rolled out. In an instant the Generalissimo of the Kaiser's army sprang to the telegraphist's side and read the Imperial command. For a moment he held the piece of tape between his fingers, then crushed it in his hand and stood motionless. He had received orders which, though against his desire, he was compelled to obey. Summoning several members of his staff who had installed themselves in other comfortable rooms in the vicinity, he held a long consultation with them. In the meantime telegraphic despatches were received from Sheffield, Manchester, Birmingham, and other German headquarters, all telling the same story--the complete investment and occupation of the big cities and the pacification of the inhabitants. One hour's grace was, however, allowed to London--till noon. Then orders were issued, bugles rang out across the parks, and in the main thoroughfares, where arms were piled, causing the troops to fall in, and within a quarter of an hour large bodies of infantry and engineers were moving along the Strand, in the direction of the City. At first the reason of all this was a mystery, but very shortly it was realised what was intended when a detachment of the 5th Hanover Regiment advanced to the gate of the Bank of England opposite the Exchange, and, after some difficulty, broke it open and entered, followed by some engineers of Von Mirbach's Division. The building was very soon occupied, and, under the direction of General Von Kleppen himself, an attempt was made to open the strong rooms, wherein was stored that vast hoard of England's wealth. What actually occurred at that spot can only be imagined, as the commander of the IVth Army Corps and one or two officers and men were the only persons present. It is surmised, however, that the strength of the vaults was far greater than they had imagined, and that, though they worked for hours, all was in vain. While this was in progress, however, parties of engineers were making organised raids upon the banks in Lombard Street, Lothbury, Moorgate Street, and Broad Street, as well as upon branch banks in Oxford Street, the Strand, and other places in the West End. At one bank on the left-hand side of Lombard Street, dynamite being used to force the strong room, the first bullion was seized, while at nearly all the banks sooner or later the vaults were opened, and great bags and boxes of gold coin were taken out and conveyed in carefully guarded carts to the Bank of England, now in the possession of Germany. In some banks--those of more modern construction--the greatest resistance was offered by the huge steel doors and concrete and steel walls and other devices for security. But nothing could, alas! resist the high explosives used, and in the end breaches were made, in all cases, and wealth uncounted and untold extracted and conveyed to Threadneedle Street for safe keeping. Engineers and infantry handled those heavy boxes and those big bundles of securities gleefully, officers carefully counting each box or bag or packet as it was taken out to be carted or carried away by hand. German soldiers under guard struggled along Lothbury beneath great burdens of gold, and carts, requisitioned out of the East End, rumbled heavily all the afternoon, escorted by soldiers. Hammersmith, Camberwell, Hampstead, and Willesden yielded up their quota of the great wealth of London; but though soon after four o'clock a breach was made in the strong rooms of the Bank of England by means of explosives, nothing in the vaults was touched. The Germans simply entered there and formally took possession. The coin collected from other banks was carefully kept, each separate from another, and placed in various rooms under strong guards, for it seemed to be their intention simply to hold London's wealth as security. That afternoon very few banks--except the German ones--escaped notice. Of course, there were a few small branches in the suburbs which remained unvisited, yet by six o'clock Von Kronhelm was in possession of enormous quantities of gold. In one or two quarters there had been opposition on the part of the armed guards established by the banks at the first news of the invasion. But any such resistance had, of course, been futile, and the man who had dared to fire upon the German soldiers had in every case been shot down. Thus, when darkness fell, Von Kronhelm, from the corner of his room in the War Office, was able to report to his Imperial Master that not only had he occupied London, but that, receiving no reply to his demand for indemnity, he had sacked it and taken possession not only of the Bank of England, but of the cash deposits in most of the other banks in the metropolis. That night the evening papers described the wild happenings of the afternoon, and London saw herself not only shattered, but ruined. The frightened populace across the river stood breathless. What was now to happen? Though London lay crushed and occupied by the enemy, though the Lord Mayor was a prisoner of war and the banks in the hands of the Germans, though the metropolis had been wrecked and more than half its inhabitants had fled southward and westward into the country, yet the enemy received no reply to their demand for an indemnity and the cession of British territory. Von Kronhelm, ignorant of what had occurred in the House of Commons at Bristol, sat in Whitehall and wondered. He knew well that the English were no fools, and their silence, therefore, caused him considerable uneasiness. He had lost in the various engagements over 50,000 men, yet nearly 200,000 still remained. His army of invasion was a no mean responsibility, especially when at any moment the British might regain command of the sea. His supplies and reinforcements would then be at once cut off. It was impossible for him to live upon the country, and his food bases in Suffolk and Essex were not sufficiently extensive to enable him to make a prolonged campaign. Indeed, the whole scheme of operations which had been so long discussed and perfected in secret in Berlin was more of the nature of a raid than a prolonged siege. CITY OF LONDON. CITIZENS OF LONDON. WE, the GENERAL COMMANDING the German Imperial Army occupying London, give notice that: (1) THE STATE OF WAR AND OF SIEGE continues to exist, and all categories of crime, more especially the contravention of all orders already issued, will be judged by Councils of War, and punished in conformity with martial law. (2) THE INHABITANTS OF LONDON and its suburbs are ordered to instantly deliver up all arms and ammunition of whatever kind they possess. The term arms includes firearms, sabres, swords, daggers, revolvers, and sword-canes. Landlords and occupiers of houses are charged to see that this order is carried out, but in the case of their absence the municipal authorities and officials of the London County Council are charged to make domiciliary visits, minute and searching, being accompanied by a military guard. (3) ALL NEWSPAPERS, JOURNALS, GAZETTES, AND PROCLAMATIONS, of whatever description, are hereby prohibited, and until further notice nothing further must be printed, except documents issued publicly by the military commander. (4) ANY PRIVATE PERSON OR PERSONS taking arms against the German troops after this notice will be EXECUTED. (5) ON THE CONTRARY, the Imperial German troops will respect private property, and no requisition will be allowed to be made unless it bears the authorisation of the Commander-in-Chief. (6) ALL PUBLIC PLACES are to be closed at 8 P.M. All persons found in the streets of London after 8 P.M. will be arrested by the patrols. There is no exception to this rule except in the case of German Officers, and also in the case of doctors visiting their patients. Municipal officials will also be allowed out, providing they obtain a permit from the German headquarters. (7) MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES MUST provide for the lighting of the streets. In cases where this is impossible, each householder must hang a lantern outside his house from nightfall until 8 A.M. (8) AFTER TO-MORROW morning, at 10 o'clock, the women and children of the population of London will be allowed to pass without hindrance. (9) MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES MUST, with as little delay as possible, provide accommodation for the German troops in private dwellings, in fire-stations, barracks, hotels, and houses that are still habitable. =VON KRONHELM, Commander-in-Chief.= GERMAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, WHITEHALL, LONDON, _September_ 21, 1910. [Illustration: VON KRONHELM'S PROCLAMATION TO THE CITIZENS OF LONDON.] The German Field Marshal sat alone and reflected. Had he been aware of the true state of affairs he would certainly have had considerable cause for alarm. True, though Lord Byfield had made such a magnificent stand, considering the weakness of the force at his disposal, and London was occupied, yet England was not conquered. No news had leaked out from Bristol. Indeed, Parliament had taken every precaution that its deliberations were in secret. The truth, however, may be briefly related. On the previous day the House had met at noon in the Colston Hall--a memorable sitting, indeed. The Secretary of State for War had, after prayers, risen in the hall and read an official despatch he had just received from Lord Byfield, giving the news of the last stand made by the British north of Enfield, and the utter hopelessness of the situation. It was received by the assembled House in ominous silence. During the past week through that great hall the Minister's deep voice, shaken by emotion, had been daily heard as he was compelled to report defeat after defeat of the British arms. Both sides of the House had, after the first few days, been forced to recognise Germany's superiority in numbers, in training, in organisation--in fact in everything appertaining to military power. Von Kronhelm's strategy had been perfect. He knew more of Eastern England than the British Commander himself, and his marvellous system of spies and advance agents--Germans who had lived for years in England--had assisted him forward, until he had now occupied London, the city declared to be impregnable. Through the whole of September 20 the Minister constantly received despatches from the British Field Marshal and from London itself, yet each telegram communicated to the House seemed more hopeless than its predecessor. The debate, however, proceeded through the afternoon. The Opposition were bitterly attacking the Government and the Blue Water School for its gross negligence in the past, and demanding to know the whereabouts of the remnant of the British Navy. The First Lord of the Admiralty flatly refused to make any statement. The whereabouts of our Navy at that moment was, he said, a secret, which must, at all hazards, be withheld from our enemy. The Admiralty were not asleep, as the country believed, but were fully alive to the seriousness of the crisis. He urged the House to remain patient, saying that as soon as he dared he would make a statement. This was greeted by loud jeers from the Opposition, from whose benches, members, one after another, rose, and, using hard epithets, blamed the Government for the terrible disaster. The cutting down of our defences, the meagre naval programmes, the discouragement of the Volunteers and of recruiting, and the disregard of Lord Roberts' scheme in 1906 for universal military training were, they declared, responsible for what had occurred. The Government had been culpably negligent, and Mr. Haldane's scheme had been all insufficient. Indeed, it had been nothing short of criminal to mislead the Empire into a false sense of security which did not exist. For the past three years Germany, while sapping our industries, had sent spies into our midst, and laughed at us for our foolish insular superiority. She had turned her attention from France to ourselves, notwithstanding the _entente cordiale_. She remembered how the much-talked-of Franco-Russian alliance had fallen to pieces, and relied upon a similar outcome of the friendship between France and Great Britain. The aspect of the House, too, was strange; the Speaker in his robes looked out of place in his big uncomfortable chair, and members sat on cane-bottomed chairs instead of their comfortable benches at Westminster. As far as possible the usual arrangement of the House was adhered to, except that the Press were now excluded, official reports being furnished to them at midnight. The clerks' table was a large plain one of stained wood, but upon it was the usual array of despatches, while the Serjeant-at-Arms, in his picturesque dress, was still one of the most prominent figures. The lack of committee rooms, of an adequate lobby, and of a refreshment department caused much inconvenience, though a temporary post and telegraph office had been established within the building, and a separate line connected the Prime Minister's room with Downing Street. If the Government were denounced in unmeasured terms, its defence was equally vigorous. Thus, through that never-to-be-forgotten afternoon the sitting continued past the dinner hour on to late in the evening. Time after time the despatches from London were placed in the hands of the War Minister, but, contrary to the expectation of the House, he vouchsafed no further statement. It was noticed that just before ten o'clock he consulted in an earnest undertone with the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Home Secretary, and that a quarter of an hour later all four went out and were closeted in one of the smaller rooms with other members of the Cabinet for nearly half an hour. Then the Secretary of State for War re-entered the House and resumed his seat in silence. A few minutes afterwards Mr. Thomas Askern, member of one of the Metropolitan boroughs, and a well-known newspaper proprietor, who had himself received several private despatches, rose and received leave to put a question to the War Minister. "I would like to ask the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for War," he said, "whether it is not a fact that soon after noon to-day the enemy, having moved his heavy artillery to certain positions commanding North London, and finding the capital strongly barricaded, proceeded to bombard it? Whether that bombardment, according to the latest despatches, is not still continuing at this moment; whether it is not a fact that enormous damage has already been done to many of the principal buildings of the metropolis, including the Government Offices at Whitehall, and whether great loss of life has not been occasioned?" The question produced the utmost sensation. The House during the whole afternoon had been in breathless anxiety as to what was actually happening in London; but the Government held the telegraphs and telephone, and the only private despatches that had come to Bristol were the two received by some roundabout route known only to the ingenious journalists who had despatched them. Indeed, the despatches had been conveyed the greater portion of the way by motor-car. A complete silence fell. Every face was turned towards the War Minister, who, seated with outstretched legs, was holding a fresh despatch he had just received. He rose, and, in his deep bass voice, said:-- "In reply to the honourable member for South-East Brixton, the statement he makes appears, from information which has just reached me, to be correct. The Germans are, unfortunately, bombarding London. Von Kronhelm, it is reported, is at Hampstead, and the zone of the enemy's artillery reaches, in some cases, as far south as the Thames itself. It is true, as the honourable member asserts, an enormous amount of damage has already been done to various buildings, and there has undoubtedly been great loss of life. My latest information is that the non-combatant inhabitants--old persons, women, and children--are in flight across the Thames, and that the barricades in the principal roads leading in from the north are held strongly by the armed populace, driven back into London." He sat down without further word. A tall, thin, white-moustached man rose at that moment from the Opposition side of the House. Colonel Farquhar, late of the Royal Marines, was a well-known military critic, and represented West Bude. "And this," he said, "is the only hope of England! The defence of London by an armed mob, pitted against the most perfectly equipped and armed force in the world! Londoners are patriotic, I grant. They will die fighting for their homes, as every Englishman will when the moment comes; yet, what can we hope, when patriotism is ranged against modern military science? There surely is patriotism in the savage negro races of Central Africa, a love of country perhaps as deep as in the white man's heart; yet a little strategy, a few Maxims, and all defence is quickly at an end. And so it must inevitably be with London. I contend, Mr. Speaker," he went on, "that by the ill-advised action of the Government from the first hour of their coming into power, we now find ourselves conquered. It only remains for them now to make terms of peace as honourable to themselves as the unfortunate circumstances will admit. Let the country itself judge their actions in the light of events of to-day, and let the blood of the poor murdered women and children of London be upon their heads. (Shame.) To resist further is useless. Our military organisation is in chaos, our miserably weak army is defeated and in flight. I declare to this House that we should sue at this very moment for peace--a dishonourable peace though it be; but the bitter truth is too plain--England is conquered!" As he sat down amid the "hear, hears," and the loud applause of the Opposition there rose a keen-faced, dark-haired, clean-shaven man of thirty-seven or so. He was Gerald Graham, younger son of an aristocratic house, the Yorkshire Grahams, who sat for North-East Rutland. He was a man of brilliant attainments at Oxford, a splendid orator, a distinguished writer and traveller, whose keen brown eye, lithe upright figure, quick activity, and smart appearance, rendered him a born leader of men. For the past five years he had been marked out as a "coming man." As a soldier he had seen hard service in the Boer War, being mentioned twice in despatches; as an explorer he had led a party through the heart of the Congo and fought his way back to civilisation through an unexplored land with valiant bravery that had saved the lives of his companions. He was a man who never sought notoriety. He hated to be lionised in society, refused the shoals of cards of invitation which poured in upon him, and stuck to his Parliamentary duties, and keeping faith with his constituents to the very letter. As he stood up silent for a moment, gazing around him fearlessly, he presented a striking figure and in his navy serge suit he possessed the unmistakable cut of the smart, well-groomed Englishman who was also a man of note. The House always listened to him, for he never spoke without he had something of importance to say. And the instant he was up a silence fell. "Mr. Speaker," he said, in a clear, ringing voice, "I entirely disagree with my honourable friend the member for West Bude. England is not conquered! She is not beaten!" The great hall rang with loud and vociferous cheers. "London may be invested and bombarded. She may even be sacked, but Englishmen will still fight for their homes and fight valiantly. If we have a demand for indemnity let us refuse to pay it. Let us civilians--let the civilians in every corner of England--arm themselves and unite to drive out the invader! (Loud cheers.) I contend, Mr. Speaker, that there are millions of able-bodied men in this country who, if properly organised, will be able to gradually exterminate the enemy. Organisation is all that is required. Our vast population will rise against the Germans, and before the tide of popular indignation and desperate resistance the power of the invader must soon be swept away. Do not let us sit calmly here in security, and acknowledge that we are beaten. Remember, we have at this moment to uphold the ancient tradition of the British race, the honour of our forefathers, who have never been conquered. Shall we acknowledge ourselves conquered in this the twentieth century?" "No!" rose from hundreds of voices, for the House was now carried away by young Graham's enthusiasm. "Then let us organise!" he urged. "Let us fight on. Let every man who can use a sword or gun come forward, and we will commence hostilities against the Kaiser's forces that shall either result in their total extermination or in the power of England being extinguished. Englishmen will die hard. I myself will, with the consent of this House, head the movement, for I know that in the country we have millions who will follow me and will be equally ready to die for our country if necessary. Let us withdraw this statement that we are conquered. The real, earnest fight is now to commence," he shouted, his voice ringing clearly through the hall. "Let us bear our part, each one of us. If we organise and unite, we shall drive the Kaiser's hordes into the sea. They shall sue us for peace, and be made to pay us an indemnity, instead of us paying one to them. I will lead!" he shouted; "who will follow me?" In London the Lord Mayor's patriotic proclamations were now obliterated by a huge bill bearing the German Imperial arms, the text of which told its own grim tale. In the meantime the news of the fall of London was being circulated by the Germans to every town throughout the kingdom, their despatches being embellished by lurid descriptions of the appalling losses inflicted upon the English. In Manchester, a great poster, headed by the German Imperial arms, was posted up on the Town Hall, the exchange, and other places, in which Von Kronhelm announced the occupation of London; while in Leeds, Bradford, Stockport, and Sheffield similarly worded official announcements were also posted. The Press in all towns occupied by the Germans had been suppressed, papers only appearing in order to publish the enemy's orders. Therefore this official intelligence was circulated by proclamation, calculated to impress upon the inhabitants of the country how utterly powerless they were. NOTICE AND ADVICE. TO THE CITIZENS OF LONDON. I ADDRESS YOU SERIOUSLY. We are neighbours, and in time of peace cordial relations have always existed between us. I therefore address you from my heart in the cause of humanity. Germany is at war with England. We have been forced to penetrate into your country. But each human life spared, and all property saved, we regard as in the interests of both religion and humanity. We are at war, and both sides have fought a loyal fight. Our desire is, however, to spare disarmed citizens and the inhabitants of all towns and villages. We maintain a severe discipline, and we wish to have it known that punishment of the severest character will be inflicted upon any who are guilty of hostility to the Imperial German arms, either open or in secret. To our regret any incitements, cruelties, or brutalities we must judge with equal severity. I therefore call upon all local mayors, magistrates, clergy, and schoolmasters to urge upon the populace, and upon the heads of families, to urge upon those under their protection, and upon their domestics, to refrain from committing any act of hostility whatsoever against my soldiers. All misery avoided is a good work in the eye of our Sovereign Judge, who sees all men. I earnestly urge you to heed this advice, and I trust in you. Take notice! =VON KRONHELM, Commanding the Imperial German Army.= GERMAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, WHITEHALL, LONDON, _September_ 20, 1910. While Von Kronhelm sat in that large sombre room in the War Office, with his telegraph instrument to Potsdam ever ticking, and the wireless telegraphy constantly in operation, he wondered, and still wondered, why the English made no response to his demands. He was in London. He had carried out his Emperor's instructions to the letter, he had received the Imperial thanks, and he held all the gold coin he could discover in London as security. Yet, without some reply from the British Government, his position was an insecure one. Even his thousand and one spies who had served him so well ever since he had placed foot upon English soil could tell him nothing. The deliberations of the House of Commons at Bristol were a secret. In Bristol the hot, fevered night had given place to a gloriously sunny morning with a blue and cloudless sky. Above Leigh Woods the lark rose high in the sky, trilling his song, and the bells of Bristol rang out as merrily as they ever did, and above the Colston Hall still floated the Royal Standard--a sign that the House had not yet adjourned. While Von Kronhelm held London, Lord Byfield and the remnant of the British Army, who had suffered such defeat in Essex and north of London, had, four days later, retreated to Chichester and Salisbury, where reorganisation was in rapid progress. One division of the defeated troops had encamped at Horsham. The survivors of those who had fought the battle of Charnwood Forest, and had acted so gallantly in the defence of Birmingham, were now encamped on the Malvern Hills, while the defenders of Manchester were at Shrewsbury. Speaking roughly, therefore, our vanquished troops were massing at four points, in an endeavour to make a last attack upon the invader. The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Byfield, was near Salisbury, and at any hour he knew that the German legions might push westward from London to meet him and to complete the _coup_. The League of Defenders formed by Gerald Graham and his friends was, however, working independently. The wealthier classes, who, driven out of London, were now living in cottages and tents in various parts of Berks, Wilts, and Hants, worked unceasingly on behalf of the League, while into Plymouth, Exmouth, Swanage, Bristol, and Southampton more than one ship had already managed to enter laden with arms and ammunition of all kinds, sent across by the agents of the League in France. The cargoes were of a very miscellaneous character, from modern Maxims to old-fashioned rifles that had seen service in the war of 1870. There were hundreds of modern rifles, sporting guns, revolvers, swords--in fact, every weapon imaginable, modern and old-fashioned. These were at once taken charge of by the local branches of the League, and to those men who presented their tickets of identification the arms were served out, and practice conducted in the open fields. Three shiploads of rifles were known to have been captured by German warships, one off Start Point, another a few miles outside Padstow, and a third within sight of the coastguard at Selsey Bill. Two other ships were blown up in the Channel by drifting mines. The running of arms across from France and Spain was a very risky proceeding; yet the British skipper is nothing if not patriotic, and every man who crossed the Channel on those dangerous errands took his life in his hand. Into Liverpool, Whitehaven, and Milford weapons were also coming over from Ireland, even though several German cruisers, who had been up to Lamlash to cripple the Glasgow trade, had now come south, and were believed still to be in the Irish Sea. CHAPTER VIII. DEFENCES OF SOUTH LONDON. Preparations were being continued night and day to place the working-class districts in Southwark and Lambeth in a state of strong defence, and the constant meetings convened in public halls and chapels by the newly-formed League of Defenders incited the people to their work. Everybody lent a willing hand, rich and poor alike. People who had hitherto lived in comfort in Regent's Park, Hampstead, or one or other of the better-class northern suburbs, now found themselves herded among all sorts and conditions of men and women, and living as best they could in those dull, drab streets of Lambeth, Walworth, Battersea, and Kennington. It was, indeed, a strange experience for them. In the sudden flight from the north, parents had become separated from their children and husbands from their wives, so that in many cases haggard and forlorn mothers were in frantic search of their little ones, fearing that they might have already died of starvation or been trampled underfoot by the panic-stricken multitudes. The dense population of South London had already been trebled. They were penned in by the barricades in many instances, for each district seemed to be now placing itself in a state of defence, independent of any other. [Illustration: THE DEFENCES OF SOUTH LONDON on Sept 26^{th} ] Kennington, for instance, was practically surrounded by barricades, tons upon tons of earth being dug from the "Oval" and the "Park." Besides the barricades in Harleyford Road and Kennington Lane, all the streets converging on the "Oval" were blocked up, a huge defence arm just being completed across the junction of Kennington and Kennington Park Roads, and all the streets running into the latter thoroughfare from that point to the big obstruction at the "Elephant" were blocked by paving-stones, bags of sand, barrels of cement, bricks, and such-like odds and ends impervious to bullets. In addition to this, there was a double fortification in Lambeth Road--a veritable redoubt--as well as the barricade at Lambeth Bridge, while all the roads leading from Kennington into the Lambeth Road, such as St. George's Road, Kennington Road, High Street, and the rest, had been rendered impassable and the neighbouring houses placed in a state of defence. Thus the whole district of Kennington became therefore a fortress in itself. This was only a typical instance of the scientific methods of defence now resorted to. Mistakes made in North London were not now repeated. Day and night every able-bodied man, and woman too, worked on with increasing zeal and patriotism. The defences in Haverstock Hill, Holloway Road, and Edgware Road, which had been composed of overturned tramcars, motor 'buses, household furniture, etc., had been riddled by the enemy's bullets. The lesson had been heeded, and now earth, sand, tiles, paving-stones, and bricks were used. From nearly all the principal thoroughfares south of the river the paving-stones were being rapidly torn up by great gangs of men, and whenever the artillery brought up a fresh Maxim or field-gun the wildest demonstrations were made. The clergy held special services in churches and chapels, and prayer meetings for the emancipation of London were held twice daily in the Metropolitan Tabernacle at Newington. In Kennington Park, Camberwell Green, the Oval, Vauxhall Park, Lambeth Palace Gardens, Camberwell Park, Peckham Rye and Southwark Park a division of Lord Byfield's army was encamped. They held the Waterloo terminus of the South-Western Railway strongly, the Chatham Railway from the Borough Road Station--now the terminus--the South-Eastern from Bricklayers' Arms, which had been converted into another terminus, as well as the Brighton line, at Battersea Park and York Road. The lines destroyed by the enemy's spies in the early moments of the invasion had long ago been repaired, and up to the present railway and telegraphic communication south and west remained uninterrupted. The "Daily Telegraph" had managed to transfer some of its staff to the offices of a certain printer's in Southwark, and there, under difficulties, published several editions daily despite the German censorship. While northern London was without any news except that supplied from German sources, South London was still open to the world, the cables from the south coast being, as yet, in the hands of the British, and the telegraphs intact to Bristol and to all places in the West. Thus, during those stifling and exciting days following the occupation, while London was preparing for its great uprising, the "South London Mirror," though a queer, unusual-looking sheet, still continued to appear, and was read with avidity by the gallant men at the barricades. Contrary to expectation, Von Kronhelm was leaving South London severely alone. He was, no doubt, wise. Full well he knew that his men, once within those narrow, tortuous streets beyond the river, would have no opportunity to manoeuvre, and would, as in the case of the assault of Waterloo Bridge, be slaughtered to a man. His spies reported that each hour that passed rendered the populace the stronger, yet he did nothing, devoting his whole time, energy, and attention to matters in that half of London he was now occupying. Everywhere the walls of South London were placarded with manifestoes of the League of Defenders. Day after day fresh posters appeared, urging patience and courage, and reporting upon the progress of the League. The name of Graham was now upon every one's lips. He had, it seemed, arisen as saviour of our beloved country. Every word of his inspired enthusiasm, and this was well illustrated at the mass meeting on Peckham Rye, when, beneath the huge flag of St. George, the white banner with the red cross--the ancient standard of England--which the League had adopted as theirs, he made a brilliant and impassioned appeal to every Londoner and every Englishman. Report had it that the Germans had set a price upon his head, and that he was pursued everywhere by German spies--mercenaries who would kill him in secret if they could. Therefore he was compelled to go about with an armed police guard, who arrested any suspected person in his vicinity. The Government, who had at first laughed Graham's enthusiasm to scorn, now believed in him. Even Lord Byfield, after a long council, declared that his efforts to inspire enthusiasm had been amazingly successful, and it was now well known that the "Defenders" and the Army had agreed to act in unison towards one common end--the emancipation of England from the German thraldom. Some men of the Osnabrück Regiment, holding Canning Town and Limehouse, managed one night, by strategy, to force their way through the Blackwall Tunnel and break down its defences on the Surrey side in an attempt to blow up the South Metropolitan Gas Works. The men holding the tunnel were completely overwhelmed by the number that pressed on, and were compelled to fall back, twenty of their number being killed. The assault was a victorious one, and it was seen that the enemy were pouring out, when, of a sudden, there was a dull, heavy roar, followed by wild shouts and terrified screams, as there rose from the centre of the river a great column of water, and next instant the tunnel was flooded, hundreds of the enemy being drowned like rats in a hole. The men of the Royal Engineers had, on the very day previous, made preparations for destroying the tunnel if necessary, and had done so ere the Germans were aware of their intention. The exact loss of life is unknown, but it is estimated that over 400 men must have perished in that single instant, while those who had made the sudden dash towards the Gas Works were all taken prisoners, and their explosives confiscated. The evident intention of the enemy being thus seen, General Sir Francis Bamford, from his headquarters at the Crystal Palace, gave orders for the tunnels at Rotherhithe and that across Greenwich Reach, as well as the several "tube" tunnels and subways, to be destroyed, a work which was executed without delay, and was witnessed by thousands, who watched for the great disturbances and upheavals in the bed of the river. In the Old Kent Road the bridge over the canal, as well as the bridges in Wells Street, Sumner Road, Glengall Road, and Canterbury Road, were all prepared for demolition in case of necessity, the canal from the Camberwell Road to the Surrey Dock forming a moat behind which the defenders might, if necessary, retire. Clapham Common and Brockwell Park were covered with tents, for General Bamford's force, consisting mostly of auxiliaries, were daily awaiting reinforcements. Lord Byfield, now at Windsor, was in constant communication by wireless telegraphy with the London headquarters at the Crystal Palace, as well as with Hibbard on the Malvern Hills and Woolmer at Shrewsbury. To General Bamford at Sydenham came constant news of the rapid spread of the national movement of defiance, and Lord Byfield, as was afterwards known, urged the London commander to remain patient, and invite no attack until the League were strong enough to act on the offensive. Affairs of outpost were, of course, constantly recurring along the river bank between Windsor and Egham, and the British Free-shooters and Frontiersmen were ever harassing the Saxons. Very soon Von Kronhelm became aware of Lord Byfield's intentions, but his weakness was apparent when he made no counter-move. The fact was that the various great cities he now held required all his attention and all his troops. From Manchester, from Birmingham, from Leeds, Bradford, Sheffield, and Hull came similar replies. Any withdrawal of troops from either city would be the signal for a general rising of the inhabitants. Therefore, having gained possession, he could only now sit tight and watch. From all over Middlesex, and more especially from the London area, came sensational reports of the drastic measures adopted by the Germans to repress any sign of revolt. In secret, the agents of the League of Defenders were at work, going from house to house, enrolling men, arranging for secret meeting-places, and explaining in confidence the programme as put forward by the Bristol committee. Now and then, however, these agents were betrayed, and their betrayal was in every case followed by a court-martial at Bow Street, death outside in the yard of the police station, and the publication in the papers of their names, their offence, and the hour of the execution. Yet, undaunted and defiantly, the giant organisation grew as no other society had ever grown, and its agents and members quickly developed into fearless patriots. It being reported that the Saxons were facing Lord Byfield with the Thames between them, the people of West London began in frantic haste to construct barricades. The building of obstructions had, indeed, now become a mania north of the river as well as south. The people, fearing that there was to be more fighting in the streets of London, began to build huge defences all across West London. The chief were across King Street, Hammersmith, where it joins Goldhawk Road, across the junction of Goldhawk and Uxbridge Roads, in the Harrow Road where it joins Admiral Road, and Willesden Lane, close to the Paddington Cemetery, and the Latimer Road opposite St. Quintin Park Station. All the side streets leading into the Goldhawk Road, Latimer Road, and Ladbroke Grove Road were also blocked up, and hundreds of houses placed in a state of strong defence. With all this Von Kronhelm did not interfere. The building of such obstructions acted as a safety-valve to the excited populace, therefore he rather encouraged than discountenanced it. The barricades might, he thought, be of service to his army if Lord Byfield really risked an attack upon London from that direction. Crafty and cunning though he was, he was entirely unaware that those barricades were being constructed at the secret orders of the League of Defenders, and he never dreamed that they had actually been instigated by the British Commander-in-Chief himself. Thus the Day of Reckoning hourly approached, and London, though crushed and starving, waited in patient vigilance. At Enfield Chase was a great camp of British prisoners in the hands of the Germans, amounting to several thousands. Contrary to report, both officers and men were fairly well treated by the Germans, though with his limited supplies Von Kronhelm was already beginning to contemplate releasing them. Many of the higher-grade officers who had fallen into the hands of the enemy, together with the Lord Mayor of London, the Mayors of Hull, Goole, Lincoln, Norwich, Ipswich, and the Lord Mayors of Manchester and Birmingham, had been sent across to Germany, where, according to their own reports, they were being detained in Hamburg and treated with every consideration. Nevertheless, all this greatly incensed Englishmen. Lord Byfield, with Hibbard and Woolmer, was leaving no stone unturned in order to reform our shattered Army, and again oppose the invaders. All three gallant officers had been to Bristol, where they held long consultation with the members of the Cabinet, with the result that the Government still refused to entertain any idea of paying the indemnity. The Admiralty were confident now that the command of the sea had been regained, and in Parliament itself a little confidence was also restored. Yet we had to face the hard facts that nearly two hundred thousand Germans were upon British soil, and that London was held by them. Already parties of German commissioners had visited the National Gallery, the Wallace Collection, the Tate Gallery, and the British and South Kensington Museums, deciding upon and placing aside certain art treasures and priceless antiques ready for shipment to Germany. The Raphaels, the Titians, the Rubenses, the Fra Angelicos, the Velasquezes, the Elgin Marbles, the best of the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Roman antiques, the Rosetta Stone, the early Biblical and classical manuscripts, the historic charters of England, and such-like treasures which could never be replaced, were all catalogued and prepared for removal. The people of London knew this; for though there had been no newspapers, information ran rapidly from mouth to mouth. German sentries guarded our world-famous collections, which were now indeed entirely in the enemy's hands, and which the Kaiser intended should enrich the German galleries and museums. One vessel flying the British flag had left the Thames laden with spoil, in an endeavour to reach Hamburg, but off Harwich she had been sighted and overhauled by a British cruiser, with the result that she had been steered to Dover. Therefore our cruisers and destroyers, having thus obtained knowledge of the enemy's intentions, were keeping a sharp lookout about the coast for any vessels attempting to leave for German ports. Accounts of fierce engagements in the Channel between British and German ships went the rounds, but all were vague and unconvincing. The only solid facts were that the Germans held the great cities of England, and that the millions of Great Britain were slowly but surely preparing to rise in an attempt to burst asunder the fetters that now held them. Government, Army, Navy, and Parliament had all proved rotten reeds. It was now every man for himself--to free himself and his loved ones--or to die in the attempt. Through the south and west of England Graham's clear, manly voice was raised everywhere, and the whole population were now fast assembling beneath the banner of the Defenders, in readiness to bear their part in the most bloody and desperate encounter of the whole war. The swift and secret death being meted out to the German sentries--or, in fact, to any German caught alone in a side street--having been reported to Von Kronhelm, he issued another of his now famous proclamations, which was posted upon half the hoardings in London; but the populace at once amused themselves by tearing it down wherever it was discovered. Von Kronhelm was the arch-enemy of London, and it is believed that there were at that moment no fewer than five separate conspiracies to encompass his death. Londoners detested the Germans, but with a hatred twenty times the more intense did they regard those men who, having engaged in commercial pursuits in England, had joined the colours and were now acting as spies. CHAPTER IX. REVOLTS IN SHOREDITCH AND ISLINGTON. On the night of September 27, a very serious conflict, entailing much loss of life on both the London civilian and German side, occurred at the point where Kingsland Road joins Old Street, Hackney Road, and High Street. Across both Hackney and Kingsland Roads the barricades built before the bombardment still remained in a half-ruined state, any attempt at clearing them away being repulsed by the angry inhabitants. Dalston, Kingsland, Bethnal Green, and Shoreditch were notably antagonistic to the invaders, and several sharp encounters had taken place. Indeed, those districts were discovered by the enemy to be very unsafe. The conflict in question, however, commenced at the corner of Old Street at about 9.30 in the evening, by three German tailors from Cambridge Road being insulted by two men, English labourers. The tailors appealed in German to four Westphalian infantrymen who chanced to be passing, and who subsequently fired and killed one of the Englishmen. This was the signal for a local uprising. The alarm given, hundreds of men and women rushed from their houses, many of them armed with rifles and knives, and, taking cover behind the ruined barricades, opened fire upon a body of fifty Germans, who very quickly ran up. The fire was returned, when from the neighbouring houses a perfect hail of lead was suddenly rained upon the Germans, who were then forced to retire down High Street towards Liverpool Street Station, leaving many dead. Very quickly news was sent over the telephone, which the Germans had now established in many quarters of London, and large reinforcements were soon upon the scene. The men of Shoreditch had, however, obtained two Maxim guns, which had been secreted ever since the entry of the Germans into the Metropolis, and as the enemy endeavoured to storm their position they swept the street with a deadly fire. Quickly the situation became desperate, but the fight lasted over an hour. The sound of firing brought hundreds upon hundreds of Londoners upon the scene. All these took arms against the Germans, who, after many fruitless attempts to storm the defences, and being fired upon from every side, were compelled to fall back again. They were followed along High Street into Bethnal Green Road, up Great Eastern Street into Hoxton Square and Pitfield Street, and there cut up, being given no quarter at the hands of the furious populace. In those narrow thoroughfares they were powerless, and were therefore simply exterminated. The victory for the men of Shoreditch was complete, over three hundred and fifty Germans being killed, while our losses were only about fifty. The conflict was at once reported to Von Kronhelm, and the very fact that he did not send exemplary punishment into that quarter was sufficient to show that he feared to arouse further the hornets' nest in which he was living, and more especially that portion of the populace north of the City. News of the attack, quickly spreading, inspired courage in every other part of the oppressed Metropolis. The successful uprising against the Germans in Shoreditch incited Londoners to rebel, and in various other parts of the Metropolis there occurred outbreaks. Von Kronhelm had found to his cost that London was not to be so easily cowed after all. The size and population of the Metropolis had not been sufficiently calculated upon. It was as a country in itself, while the intricacies of its by-ways formed a refuge for the conspirators, who were gradually completing their preparations to rise _en masse_ and strike down the Germans wherever found. In the open country his great army could march, manoeuvre, and use strategy, but here in the maze of narrow London streets it was impossible to know in one thoroughfare what was taking place in the next. Supplies, too, were now running very short. The distress among our vanquished populace was most severe; while Von Kronhelm's own army was put on meagre rations. The increasing price of food and consequent starvation had not served to improve the relations between the invaders and the citizens of London, who, though they were assured by various proclamations that they would be happier and more prosperous under German rule, now discovered that they were being slowly starved to death. Their only hope, therefore, was in the efforts of that now gigantic organisation, the League of Defenders. A revolt occurred in Pentonville Road, opposite King's Cross Underground Station, which ended in a fierce and terrible fray. A company of the Bremen Infantry Regiment No. 75, belonging to the IXth Corps, were marching from the City Road towards Regent's Park, when several shots were fired at them from windows of shops almost opposite the station. Five Germans fell dead, including one lieutenant, a very gorgeous person who wore a monocle. Another volley rang out before the infantrymen could realise what was happening, and then it was seen that the half-ruined shops had been placed in such a state of defence as to constitute a veritable fortress. The fire was returned, but a few moments later a Maxim spat its deadly fire from a small hole in a wall, and a couple of dozen of the enemy fell upon the granite setts of the thoroughfare. The rattle of musketry quickly brought forth the whole of that populous neighbourhood--or all, indeed, that remained of them--the working-class district between Pentonville Road and Copenhagen Street. Quickly the fight became general. The men of Bremen endeavoured to take the place by assault, but found that it was impossible. The strength of the defences was amazing, and showed only too plainly that Londoners were in secret preparing for the great uprising that was being planned. In such a position were the houses held by the Londoners, that their fire commanded both the Pentonville and King's Cross Roads; but very soon the Germans were reinforced by another company of the same regiment, and these being attacked in the rear from Rodney Street, Cumming Street, Weston Street, York Street, Winchester Street, and other narrow turnings leading into the Pentonville Road, the fighting quickly became general. The populace came forth in swarms, men and women, armed with any weapon or article upon which they could lay their hands, and all fired with the same desire. Hundreds of men who came forth were armed with rifles which had been carefully secreted on the entry of the enemy into the Metropolis. The greater part of those men, indeed, had fought at the barricades in North London, and had subsequently taken part in the street fighting as the enemy advanced. Some of the arms had come from the League of Defenders, smuggled into the Metropolis nobody exactly knew how. Up and down the King's Cross, Pentonville, and Caledonian Roads the crowd swayed and fought. The Germans against that overwhelming mass of angry civilians seemed powerless. Small bodies of the troops were cornered in the narrow by-streets, and then given no quarter. Brave-hearted Londoners, though they knew well what dire punishment they must inevitably draw upon themselves, had taken the law into their own hands, and were shooting or stabbing every German who fell into their hands. The scene of carnage in that hour of fighting was awful. The "Daily Chronicle" described it as one of the most fiercely contested encounters in the whole history of the siege. Shoreditch had given courage to King's Cross, for, unknown to Von Kronhelm, houses in all quarters were being put in a state of defence, their position being carefully chosen by those directing the secret operations of the League of Defenders. For over an hour the houses in question gallantly held out, sweeping the streets constantly with their Maxim. Presently, however, on further reinforcements arriving, the German colonel directed his men to enter the houses opposite. In an instant a door was broken in, and presently glass came tumbling down as muzzles of rifles were poked through the panes, and soon sharp crackling showed that the Germans had settled down to their work. The defence of the Londoners was most obstinate. In the streets, Londoners attacked the enemy with utter disregard for the risks they ran. Women, among them many young girls, joined in the fray, armed with pistols and knives. After a while a great body of reinforcements appeared in the Euston Road, having been sent hurriedly along from Regent's Park. Then the option was given to those occupying the fortified house to surrender, the colonel promising to spare their lives. The Londoners peremptorily refused. Everywhere the fighting became more desperate and spread all through the streets leading out of St. Pancras, York, and Caledonian Roads, until the whole of that great neighbourhood became the scene of a fierce conflict, in which both sides lost heavily. Right across Islington the street fighting spread, and many were the fatal traps set for the unwary German who found himself cut off in that maze of narrow streets between York Road and the Angel. The enemy, on the other hand, were shooting down women and girls as well as the men, even the non-combatants--those who came out of their homes to ascertain what was going on--being promptly fired at and killed. In the midst of all this somebody ignited some petrol in a house a few doors from the chapel in Pentonville Road, and in a few moments the whole row of buildings were blazing furiously, belching forth black smoke and adding to the terror and confusion of those exciting moments. Even that large body of Germans now upon the scene were experiencing great difficulty in defending themselves. A perfect rain of bullets seemed directed upon them on every hand, and to-day's experience certainly proves that Londoners are patriotic and brave, and in their own districts they possess a superiority over the trained troops of the Kaiser. At length, after a most sanguinary struggle, the Londoners' position was carried, the houses were entered, and twenty-two brave patriots, mostly of the working-class, taken prisoners. The populace now realising that the Germans had, after all, overpowered their comrades, in their fortress, fell back; but being pursued northward towards the railway line between Highbury and Barnsbury stations, many of them were despatched on the spot. What followed was indeed terrible. The anger of the Germans now became uncontrollable. Having in view Von Kronhelm's proclamation--which sentenced to death all who, not being in uniform, fired upon German troops--they decided to teach the unfortunate populace a lesson. As a matter of fact, they feared that such revolts might be repeated in other quarters. So they seized dozens of prisoners, men and women, and shot them down. Many of these summary executions took place against the wall of the St. Pancras Station at the corner of Euston Road. Men and women were pitilessly sent to death. Wives, daughters, fathers, sons were ranged up against that wall, and, at signal from the colonel, fell forward with bullets through them. Of the men who so gallantly held the fortified house not a single one escaped. Strings of men and women were hurried to their doom in one day, for the troops were savage with the lust of blood, and Von Kronhelm, though he was aware of it by telephone, lifted not a finger to stop those arbitrary executions. But enough of such details. Suffice it to say that the stones of Islington were stained with the blood of innocent Londoners, and that those who survived took a fierce vow of vengeance. Von Kronhelm's legions had the upper hand for the moment, yet the conflict and its bloody sequel had the effect of arousing the fiercest anger within the heart of every Briton in the metropolis. What was in store for us none could tell. We were conquered, oppressed, starved; yet hope was still within us. The League of Defenders were not idle, while South London was hourly completing her strength. It seems that after quelling the revolt at King's Cross wholesale arrests were made in Islington. The guilt or innocence of the prisoners did not seem to matter. Von Kronhelm dealing out to them summary punishment. Terror reigns in London. One newspaper correspondent--whose account is published this morning in South London, having been sent across the Thames by carrier pigeon, many of which were now being employed by the newspapers--had an opportunity of witnessing the wholesale executions which took place yesterday afternoon outside Dorchester House, where Von Kleppen has established his quarters. Von Kleppen seems to be the most pitiless of the superior officers. The prisoners, ranged up for inspection in front of the big mansion, were mostly men from Islington, all of whom knew only too well the fate in store for them. Walking slowly along and eyeing the ranks of these unfortunate wretches, the German General stopped here and there, tapping a man on the shoulder or beckoning him out of the rear ranks. In most cases, without further word, the individual thus selected was marched into the Park at Stanhope Gate, where a small supplementary column was soon formed. LEAGUE OF DEFENDERS DAILY BULLETIN The League of Defenders of the British Empire publicly announce to Englishmen, although the North of London is held by the enemy: (1) That England will soon entirely regain command of the sea, and that a rigorous blockade of the German ports will be established. (2) That three of the vessels of the North German Lloyd Transatlantic passenger service have been captured, together with a number of minor German ships in the Channel and Mediterranean. (3) That four German cruisers and two destroyers have fallen into the hands of the British. (4) That ENGLAND'S MILLIONS ARE READY TO RISE! Therefore WE ARE NOT YET BEATEN! BE PREPARED, AND WAIT. League of Defenders. Central Office: Bristol. [Illustration: COPY OF THE "DAILY BULLETIN" OF THE LEAGUE OF DEFENDERS.] Those chosen knew that their last hour had come. Some clasped their hands and fell upon their knees, imploring pity, while others remained silent and stubborn patriots. One man, his face covered with blood and his arm broken, sat down and howled in anguish, and others wept in silence. Some women--wives and daughters of the condemned men--tried to get within the Park to bid them adieu and to urge courage, but the soldiers beat them back with their rifles. Some of the men laughed defiantly, others met death with a stony stare. The eye-witness saw the newly-dug pit that served as common grave, and he stood by and saw them shot and their corpses afterwards flung into it. One young fair-haired woman, condemned by Von Kleppen, rushed forward to that officer, threw herself upon her knees, imploring mercy, and protested her innocence wildly. But the officer, callous and pitiless, simply motioned to a couple of soldiers to take her within the Park, where she shared the same fate as the men. How long will this awful state of affairs last? We must die, or conquer. London is in the hands of a legion of assassins--Bavarians, Saxons, Würtembergers, Hessians, Badeners--all now bent upon prolonging the reign of terror, and thus preventing the uprising that they know is, sooner or later, inevitable. Terrible accounts are reaching us of how the Germans are treating their prisoners on Hounslow Heath, at Enfield, and other places; of the awful sufferings of the poor unfortunate fellows, of hunger, of thirst, and of inhuman disregard for either their comfort or their lives. At present we are powerless, hemmed in by our barricades. Behind us, upon Sydenham Hill, General Bamford is in a strong position, and his great batteries are already defending any attack upon London from the south. From the terrace in front of the Crystal Palace his guns can sweep the whole range of southern suburbs. Through Dulwich, Herne Hill, Champion Hill, and Denmark Hill are riding British cavalry, all of whom show evident traces of the hard and fierce campaign. We see from Sydenham constant messages being heliographed, for General Bamford and Lord Byfield are in hourly communication by wireless telegraphy or by other means. What is transpiring at Windsor is not known, save that every night there are affairs of outposts with the Saxons, who on several occasions have attempted to cross the river by pontoons, and have on each occasion been driven back. It was reported to Parliament at its sitting at Bristol yesterday that the Cabinet had refused to entertain any idea of paying the indemnity demanded by Germany, and that their reply to Von Kronhelm is one of open defiance. The brief summary of the speeches published shows that the Government are hopeful, notwithstanding the present black outlook. They believe that when the hour comes for the revenge, London will rise as a man, and that Socialists, Nonconformists, Labour agitators, Anarchists, and demagogues will unite with us in one great national patriotic effort to exterminate our conquerors as we would exterminate vermin. Mr. Gerald Graham has made another great speech in the House, in which he reported the progress of the League of Defenders and its wide-spread ramifications. He told the Government that there were over seven millions of able-bodied men in the country ready to revolt the instant the word went forth. That there would be terrible bloodshed he warned them, but that the British would eventually prove the victors he was assured. He gave no details of the organisation, for to a great measure it was a secret one, and Von Kronhelm was already taking active steps to combat its intentions; but he declared that there was still a strong spirit of patriotism in the country, and explained how sturdy Scots were daily making their way south, and how men from Wales were already massing in Oxford. The speech was received on both sides of the House with ringing cheers when, in conclusion, he promised them that, within a few days, the fiat would go forth, and the enemy would find himself crushed and powerless. "South London," he declared, "is our stronghold, our fortress. To-day it is impregnable, defended by a million British patriots, and I defy Von Kronhelm--indeed, I dare him to attack it!" Von Kronhelm was, of course, well aware of the formation of the Defenders, but treated the League with contempt. If there was any attempt at a rising, he would shoot down the people like dogs. He declared this openly and publicly, and he also issued a warning to the English people in the German official "Gazette," a daily periodical printed in one of the newspaper offices in Fleet Street in both German and English. The German commander fully believed that England was crushed; yet, as the days went on, he was puzzled that he received no response to his demand for indemnity. Twice he had sent special despatch-bearers to Bristol, but on both occasions the result was the same. Diplomatic representations had been made in Berlin through the Russian Ambassador, who was now in charge of British interests in Germany, but all to no purpose. Our Foreign Minister simply acknowledged receipt of the various despatches. On the Continent the keenest interest was manifested at what was apparently a deadlock. The British had, it was known, regained command of the sea. Von Kronhelm's supplies were already cut off. The cables in direct communication between England and Germany had been severed, and the Continental Press, especially the Paris journals, gleefully recounted how two large Hamburg-American liners attempting to reach Hamburg by passing north of Scotland had been captured by British cruisers. =ENGLISHMEN!= Your Homes are Desecrated! Your Children are Starving! Your Loved Ones are Dead! WILL YOU REMAIN IN COWARDLY INACTIVITY? The German Eagle flies over London. Hull, Newcastle and Birmingham are in ruins. Manchester is a German City. Norfolk, Essex, and Suffolk form a German colony. The Kaiser's troops have brought death, ruin, and starvation upon you. WILL YOU BECOME GERMANS? =NO!= Join THE DEFENDERS and fight for England. You have England's Millions beside you. =LET US RISE!= Let us drive back the Kaiser's men. Let us shoot them at sight. Let us exterminate every single man who has desecrated English soil. Join the New League of Defenders. Fight for your homes. Fight for your wives. Fight for England. FIGHT FOR YOUR KING! The National League of Defenders' Head Offices. Bristol, September 21st, 1910. [Illustration: A COPY OF THE MANIFESTO OF THE LEAGUE OF DEFENDERS ISSUED ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1910.] In the Channel, too, a number of German vessels had been seized, and one that showed fight off the North Foreland was fired upon and sunk. The public at home, however, were more interested in supremacy on land. It was all very well to have command of the sea, they argued, but it did not appear to alleviate perceptibly the hunger and privations on land. The Germans occupied London, and while they did so all freedom in England was at an end. A great poster headed "Englishmen," here reproduced, was seen everywhere. The whole country was flooded with it, and thousands upon thousands of heroic Britons, from the poorest to the wealthiest, clamoured to enrol themselves. The movement was an absolutely national one in every sense of the word. The name of Gerald Graham, the new champion of England's power, was upon every one's tongue. Daily he spoke in the various towns in the West of England, in Plymouth, Taunton, Cardiff, Portsmouth, and Southampton, and, assisted by the influential committee among whom were many brilliant speakers and men whose names were as household words, he aroused the country to the highest pitch of hatred against the enemy. The defenders, as they drilled in various centres through the whole of the West of England, were a strange and incongruous body. Grey-bearded Army pensioners ranged side by side with keen, enthusiastic youths, advised them and gave them the benefit of their expert knowledge. Volunteer officers in many cases assumed command, together with retired drill sergeants. The digging of trenches and the making of fortifications were assigned to navvies, bricklayers, platelayers, and agricultural labourers, large bodies of whom were under railway gangers, and were ready to perform any excavation work. The Maxims and other machine guns were mostly manned by Volunteer artillery; but instruction in the working of the Maxim was given to select classes in Plymouth, Bristol, Portsmouth, and Cardiff. Time was of utmost value, therefore the drilling was pushed forward day and night. It was known that Von Kronhelm was already watchful of the movements of the League, and was aware daily of its growth. In London, with the greatest secrecy, the defenders were banding together. In face of the German proclamation posted upon the walls, Londoners were holding meetings in secret and enrolling themselves. Though the German eagle flew in Whitehall and from the summit of St. Stephen's Tower, and though the heavy tramp of German sentries echoed in Trafalgar Square, in the quiet, trafficless streets in the vicinity, England was not yet vanquished. The valiant men of London were still determined to sell their liberty dearly, and to lay down their lives for the freedom of their country and honour of their King. BOOK III. THE REVENGE. CHAPTER I. A BLOW FOR FREEDOM. "'DAILY TELEGRAPH' OFFICE. "_Oct._ 1, 2 P.M. "Three days have passed since the revolt at King's Cross, and each day, both on the Horse Guards' Parade and in the Park, opposite Dorchester House, there have been summary executions. Von Kronhelm is in evident fear of the excited London populace, and is endeavouring to cow them by his plain-spoken and threatening proclamations, and by these wholesale executions of any person found with arms in his or her possession. But the word of command does not abolish the responsibility of conscience, and we are now awaiting breathlessly for the word to strike the blow in revenge. "The other newspapers are reappearing, but all that is printed each morning is first subjected to a rigorous censorship, and nothing is allowed to be printed before it is passed and initialled by the two gold-spectacled censors who sit and smoke their pipes in an office to themselves. Below, we have German sentries on guard, for our journal is one of the official organs of Von Kronhelm, and what now appears in it is surely sufficient to cause our blood to boil." "To-day, there are everywhere signs of rapidly increasing unrest. Londoners are starving, and are now refusing to remain patient any longer. The "Daily Bulletin" of the League of Defenders, though the posting of it is punishable by imprisonment, and it is everywhere torn down where discovered by the Germans, still gives daily brief news of what is in progress, and still urges the people to wait in patience, for 'the action of the Government,' as it is sarcastically put. "Soon after eleven o'clock this morning a sudden and clearly premeditated attack was made upon a body of the Bremen infantry, who were passing along Oxford Street from Holborn to the Marble Arch. The soldiers were suddenly fired upon from windows of a row of shops between Newman Street and Rathbone Place, and before they could halt and return the fire they found themselves surrounded by a great armed rabble, who were emerging from all the streets leading into Oxford Street. "While the Germans were manoeuvring, some unknown hand launched from a window a bomb into the centre of them. Next second there was a red flash, a loud report, and twenty-five of the enemy were blown to atoms. For a few moments the soldiers were demoralised, but orders were shouted loudly by their officers, and they began a most vigorous defence. In a few seconds the fight was as fierce as that at King's Cross; for out of every street in that working-class district lying between the Tottenham Court Road and Great Portland Street on the north, and out of Soho on the South, poured thousands upon thousands of fierce Londoners, all bent upon doing their utmost to kill their oppressors. From almost every window along Oxford Street a rain of lead was now being poured upon the troops, who vainly strove to keep their ground. Gradually, however, they were, by slow degrees, forced back into the narrow side-turnings up Newman Street, and Rathbone Place into Mortimer Street, Foley Street, Goodge Street, and Charlotte Street; and there they were slaughtered almost to a man. "Two officers were captured by the armed mob in Tottenham Street and, after being beaten, were stood up and shot in cold blood as vengeance for those shot during the past three days at Von Kleppen's orders at Dorchester House. "The fierce fight lasted quite an hour; and though reinforcements were sent for, yet curiously none arrived. "The great mob, however, were well aware that very soon the iron hand of Germany would fall heavily upon them; therefore, in frantic haste, they began soon after noon to build barricades and block up the narrow streets in every direction. At the end of Rathbone Place, Newman Street, Berners Street, Wells Street, and Great Tichfield Street, huge obstructions soon appeared, while on the east all by-streets leading into Tottenham Court Road were blocked up, and the same on the west in Great Portland Street, and on the north where the district was flanked by the Euston Road. So that by two o'clock the populous neighbourhood bounded by the four great thoroughfares was rendered a fortress in itself. "Within that area were thousands of armed men and women from Soho, Bloomsbury, Marylebone, and even from Camden Town. There they remained in defiance of Von Kronhelm's newest proclamation, which stared one in the face from every wall." "_Later._ "The enemy were unaware of the grave significance of the position of affairs, because Londoners betrayed no outward sign of the truth. Now, however, nearly every man and woman wore pinned upon their breasts a small piece of silk about two inches square, printed as a miniature Union Jack--the badge adopted by the League of Defenders. Though Von Kronhelm was unaware of it, Lord Byfield, in council with Greatorex and Bamford, had decided that, in order to demoralise the enemy and give him plenty of work to do, a number of local uprisings should take place north of the Thames. These would occupy Von Kronhelm, who would experience great difficulty in quelling them, and would no doubt eventually recall the Saxons from West Middlesex to assist. If the latter retired upon London they would find the barricades held by Londoners in their rear and Lord Byfield in their front, and be thus caught between two fires. "In each district of London there is a chief of the Defenders, and to each chief these orders had been conveyed in strictest confidence. Therefore, to-day, while the outbreak occurred in Oxford Street, there were fully a dozen others in various parts of the metropolis, each of a more or less serious character. Every district has already prepared its own secret defences, its fortified houses, and its barricades in hidden by-ways. Besides the quantity of arms smuggled into London, every dead German has had his rifle, pistol, and ammunition stolen from him. Hundreds of the enemy have been surreptitiously killed for that very reason. Lawlessness is everywhere, Government and Army have failed them, and Londoners are now taking the law into their own hands. "In King Street, Hammersmith; in Notting Dale, in Forest Road, Dalston; in Wick Road, Hackney; in Commercial Road East, near Stepney Station; and in Prince of Wales Road, Kentish Town, the League of Defenders this morning--at about the same hour--first made their organisation public by displaying our national emblem, together with the white flags, with the scarlet St. George's Cross, the ancient battle flag of England. "For that reason, then, no reinforcements were sent to Oxford Street. Von Kronhelm was far too busy in other quarters. In Kentish Town, it is reported, the Germans gained a complete and decisive victory, for the people had not barricaded themselves strongly; besides, there were large reinforcements of Germans ready in Regent's Park, and these came upon the scene before the Defenders were sufficiently prepared. The flag was captured from the barricade in Prince of Wales Road, and the men of Kentish Town lost over four hundred killed and wounded. "At Stepney, the result was the reverse. The enemy, believing it to be a mere local disturbance and easily quelled, sent but a small body of men to suppress it. But very quickly, in the intricate by-streets off Commercial Road, these were wiped out, not one single man surviving. A second and third body were sent, but so fiercely was the ground contested that they were at length compelled to fall back and leave the men of Stepney masters of their own district. In Hammersmith and in Notting Dale the enemy also lost heavily, though in Hackney they were successful after hard fighting. "Every one declares that this secret order issued by the League means that England is again prepared to give battle, and that London is commencing by her strategic movement of local rebellions. The gravity of the situation cannot now, for one moment, be concealed. London north of the Thames is destined to be the scene of the fiercest and most bloody warfare ever known in the history of the civilised world. The Germans will, of course, fight for their lives, while we shall fight for our homes and for our liberty. But right is on our side, and right will win. "Reports from all over the metropolis tell the same tale. London is alert and impatient. At a word she will rise to a man, and then woe betide the invader! Surely Von Kronhelm's position is not a very enviable one. Our two censors in the office are smoking their pipes very gravely. Not a word of the street fighting is to be published. They will write their own account of it. "10 P.M. "There has been a most frightful encounter at the Oxford Street and Tottenham Court Road barricades--a most stubborn resistance and gallant defence on the part of the men of Marylebone and Bloomsbury. "From the lips of one of our correspondents who was within the barricade I have just learned the details. It appears that just about four o'clock General Von Wilberg sent from the City a large force of the 19th Division under Lieutenant General Frankenfeld, and part of these, advancing through the squares of Bloomsbury into Gower Street, attacked the Defenders' position from the Tottenham Court Road, while others coming up Holborn and New Oxford Street entered Soho from Charing Cross Road and threw up counter-barricades at the end of Dean Street, Wardour Street, Berwick, Poland, Argyll, and the other streets, all of which were opposite the defences of the populace. In Great Portland Street, too, they adopted a similar line, and without much ado the fight, commenced in a desultory fashion, soon became a battle. "Within the barricades was a dense body of armed and angry citizens, each with his little badge, and every single one of them was ready to fight to the death. There is no false patriotism now, no mere bravado. Men make declarations, and carry them out. The gallant Londoners, with their several Maxims, wrought havoc among the invaders, especially in the Tottenham Court Road, where hundreds were maimed or killed. "In Oxford Street, the enemy being under cover of their counter-barricades, little damage could be done on either side. The wide, open, deserted thoroughfare was every moment swept by a hail of bullets, but no one was injured. On the Great Portland Street side the populace made a feint of giving way at the Mortimer Street barricade, and a body of the enemy rushed in, taking the obstruction by storm. But next moment they regretted it, for they were set upon by a thousand armed men and wild haired women, so that every man paid for his courage with his life. The women, seizing the weapons and ammunition of the dead Germans, now returned to the barricade to use them. "The Mortimer Street defences were at once repaired, and it was resolved to relay the fatal trap at some other point. Indeed, it was repeated at the end of Percy Street, where about fifty more Germans, who thought themselves victorious, were set upon and exterminated. "Until dusk the fight lasted. The Germans, finding their attack futile, began to hurl petrol bombs over the barricades and these caused frightful destruction among our gallant men, several houses in the vicinity being set on fire. Fortunately, there was still water in the street hydrants, and two fire engines had already been brought within the beleaguered area in case of necessity. "At last, about seven o'clock, the enemy, having lost very heavily in attempting to take the well-chosen position by storm, brought down several light field-guns from Regent's Park; and, placing them at their counter-barricades--where, by the way, they had lost many men in the earlier part of the conflict while piling up their shelters--suddenly opened fire with shell at the huge obstructions before them. "At first they made but little impression upon the flagstones, etc., of which the barricades were mainly composed. But before long their bombardment began to tell; for slowly, here and there, exploding shells made great breaches in the defences that had been so heroically manned. More than once a high explosive shell burst right among the crowd of riflemen behind a barricade, sweeping dozens into eternity in a single instant. Against the fortified houses each side of the barricades the German artillery trained their guns, and very quickly reduced many of those buildings to ruins. The air now became thick with dust and smoke; and mingled with the roar of artillery at such close quarters came the screams of the injured and the groans of the dying. The picture drawn by the eye-witness who described this was a truly appalling one. Gradually the Londoners were being overwhelmed, but they were selling their lives dearly, fully proving themselves worthy sons of grand old England. "At last the fire from the Newman Street barricade of the Defenders was silenced, and ten minutes later, a rush being made across from Dean Street, it was taken by storm. Then ensued fierce and bloody hand-to-hand fighting right up to Cleveland Street, while almost at the same moment the enemy broke in from Great Portland Street. "A scene followed that is impossible to describe. Through all those narrow, crooked streets the fighting became general, and on either side hundreds fell. The Defenders in places cornered the Germans, cut them off, and killed them. Though it was felt that now the barricades had been broken the day was lost, yet every man kept courage, and fought with all his strength. "For half an hour the Germans met with no success. On the contrary, they found themselves entrapped amid thousands of furious citizens, all wearing their silken badges, and all sworn to fight to the death. "While the Defenders still struggled on, loud and ringing cheers were suddenly raised from Tottenham Court Road. The people from Clerkenwell, joined by those in Bloomsbury, had arrived to assist them. They had risen, and were attacking the Germans in the rear. "Fighting was now general right across from Tottenham Court Road to Gray's Inn Road, and by nine o'clock, though Von Wilberg sent reinforcements, a victory was gained by the Defenders. Over two thousand Germans are lying dead and wounded about the streets and squares of Bloomsbury and Marylebone. The League had struck its first blow for Freedom. "What will the morrow bring us? Dire punishment--or desperate victory?" "'DAILY CHRONICLE' OFFICE, "_Oct._ 4, 6 P.M. "The final struggle for the possession of London is about to commence. Through all last night there were desultory conflicts between the soldiers and the people, in which many lives have, alas! been sacrificed. "Von Wilberg still holds the City proper, with the Mansion House as his headquarters. Within the area already shown upon the map there are no English, all the inhabitants having been long ago expelled. The great wealth of London is in German hands, it is true, but it is Dead Sea fruit. They are unable either to make use of it or to deport it to Germany. Much has been taken away to the base at Southminster and other bases in Essex, but the greater part of the bullion still remains in the Bank of England. "The most exciting stories have been reaching us during the last twenty-four hours, none of which, however, have passed the censor. For that reason I, one of the sub-editors, am keeping this diary, as a brief record of events during the present dreadful times. "After the terrific struggle in Marylebone three days ago, Von Kronhelm saw plainly that if London were to rise _en masse_ she would at once assume the upper hand. The German Commander-in-Chief had far too many points to guard. On the west of London he was threatened by Lord Byfield and hosts of auxiliaries, mostly sworn members of the National League of Defenders; on the south, across the river, Southwark, Lambeth, and Battersea formed an impregnable fortress, containing over a million eager patriots ready to burst forth and sweep away the vain, victorious army; while within central London itself the people were ready to rise. =LEAGUE OF DEFENDERS.= CITIZENS OF LONDON AND LOYAL PATRIOTS. The hour has come to show your strength, and to wreak your vengeance. TO-NIGHT, OCT. 4, AT 10 P.M., rise, and strike your blow for freedom. A MILLION MEN are with Lord Byfield, already within striking distance of London; a million follow them, and yet another million are ready in South London. RISE, FEARLESS AND STERN. Let "England for Englishmen" be your battle-cry, and avenge the blood of your wives and your children. AVENGE THIS INSULT TO YOUR NATION. REMEMBER: TEN O'CLOCK TO-NIGHT! "Reports reaching us to-day from Lord Byfield's headquarters at Windsor are numerous, but conflicting. As far as can be gathered, the authentic facts are as follows: Great bodies of the Defenders, including many women, all armed, are massing at Reading, Sonning, Wokingham, and Maidenhead. Thousands have arrived, and are hourly arriving by train, from Portsmouth, Plymouth, Exeter, Bristol, Gloucester, and, in fact, all the chief centres of the West of England, where Gerald Graham's campaign has been so marvellously successful. Sturdy Welsh colliers are marching shoulder to shoulder with agricultural labourers from Dorset and Devon, and clerks and citizens from the towns of Somerset, Cornwall, Gloucestershire, and Oxfordshire are taking arms beside the riff-raff of their own neighbourhoods. Peer and peasant, professional man and pauper, all are now united with one common object--to drive back the invader, and to save our dear old England. "Oxford has, it seems, been one of the chief points of concentration, and the undergraduates who re-assembled there to defend their colleges now form an advance-guard of a huge body of Defenders on the march, by way of Henley and Maidenhead, to follow in the rear of Lord Byfield. The latter holds Eton and the country across to High Wycombe, while the Saxon headquarters are still at Staines. Frölich's Cavalry Division are holding the country across from Pinner through Stanmore and Chipping Barnet to the prison camp at Enfield Chase. These are the only German troops outside West London, the Saxons being now barred from entering by the huge barricades which the populace of West London have during the past few days been constructing. Every road leading into London from West Middlesex is now either strongly barricaded or entirely blocked up. Kew, Richmond, and Kingston Bridges have been destroyed, and Lord Byfield, with General Bamford at the Crystal Palace, remains practically in possession of the whole of the south of the Thames. "The conflict which is now about to begin will be one to the death. While, on the one hand, the Germans are bottled up among us, the fact must not be overlooked that their arms are superior, and that they are trained soldiers. Yet the two or three local risings of yesterday and the day previous have given us courage, for they show that the enemy cannot manoeuvre in the narrow streets, and soon become demoralised. In London we fail because we have so few riflemen. If every man who now carries a gun could shoot, we could compel the Germans to fly a flag of truce within twenty-four hours. Indeed, if Lord Roberts' scheme of universal training in 1906 had been adopted, the enemy would certainly never have been suffered to approach our capital. "Alas! apathy has resulted in this terrible and crushing disaster, and we have only now to bear our part, each one of us, in the blow to avenge this desecration of our homes and the massacre of our loved ones. "To-day I have seen the white banners with the red cross--the ensign of the Defenders--everywhere. Till yesterday it was not openly displayed, but to-day it is actually hung from windows or flown defiantly from flagstaffs in full view of the Germans. "In Kilburn, or, to be more exact, in the district lying between the Harrow Road and the High Road, Kilburn, there was another conflict this morning between some of the German Garde Corps and the populace. The outbreak commenced by the arrest of some men who were found practising with rifles in Paddington Recreation Ground. One man who resisted was shot on the spot, whereupon the crowd who assembled attacked the German picket, and eventually killed them to a man. This was the signal for a general outbreak in the neighbourhood, and half an hour later, when a force was sent to quell the revolt, fierce fighting became general all through the narrow streets of Kensal Green, especially at the big barricade that blocks the Harrow Road where it is joined by Admiral Road. Here the bridges over the Grand Junction Canal have already been destroyed, for the barricades and defences have been scientifically constructed under the instruction of military engineers. "From an early hour to-day it has been apparent that all these risings were purposely ordered by the League of Defenders to cause Von Kronhelm's confusion. Indeed, while the outbreak at Kensal Green was in progress, we had another reported from Dalston, a third from Limehouse, and a fourth from Homerton. Therefore, it is quite certain that the various centres of the League are acting in unison upon secret orders from headquarters. "Indeed, South London also took part in the fray this morning, for the Defenders at the barricade at London Bridge have now mounted several field guns, and have started shelling Von Wilberg's position in the City. It is said that the Mansion House, where the General had usurped the apartments of the deported Lord Mayor, has already been half reduced to ruins. This action is, no doubt, only to harass the enemy, for surely General Bamford has no desire to destroy the City proper any more than it has already been destroyed. Lower Thames Street, King William Street, Gracechurch Street, and Cannon Street have at any rate, been found untenable by the enemy, upon whom some losses have been inflicted. "South London is every moment anxious to know the truth. Two days after the bombardment we succeeded at night in sinking a light telegraph cable in the river across from the Embankment at the bottom of Temple Avenue, and are in communication with our temporary office in Southwark Street. "An hour ago there came, through secret sources, information of another naval victory to our credit, several German warships being sunk and captured. Here we dare not print it, so I have just wired it across to the other side, where they are issuing a special edition. "Almost simultaneously with the report of the British victory, namely, at five o'clock, the truth--the great and all-important truth--became revealed. The mandate has gone forth from the headquarters of the League of Defenders that London is to rise in her might at ten o'clock to-night, and that a million men are ready to assist us. Placards and bills on red paper are everywhere. "Frantic efforts are being made by the Germans all over London to suppress both posters and handbills. "It is now six o'clock. In four hours it is believed that London will be one huge seething conflict. Night has been chosen, I suppose, in order to give the populace the advantage. The by-streets are for the most part still unlit, save for oil-lamps, for neither gas nor electric light are yet in proper working order after the terrible dislocation of everything. The scheme of the Defenders is, as already proved, to lure the Germans into the narrower thoroughfares, and then exterminate them. Surely in the history of the world there has never been such a bitter vengeance as that which is now inevitable. London, the greatest city ever known, is about to rise! "_Midnight._ "London has risen! How can I describe the awful scenes of panic, bloodshed, patriotism, brutality, and vengeance that are at this moment in progress? As I write, through the open window I can hear the roar of voices, the continual crackling of rifles, and the heavy booming of guns. I walked along Fleet Street at nine o'clock, and I found, utterly disregarding the order that no unauthorised persons are to be abroad after nightfall, hundreds upon hundreds of all classes, all wearing their little silk Union Jack badges pinned to their coats, on the way to join in their particular districts. Some carried rifles, others revolvers, while others were unarmed. Yet not a German did I see in the streets. It seemed as though, for the moment, the enemy had vanished. There was only the strong cordon across the bottom of Ludgate Hill, men who looked on in wonder, but without bestirring themselves. "Is it possible that Von Kronhelm's strategy is to remain inactive, and refuse to fight? "The first shot I heard fired, just after ten o'clock, was at the Strand end of Fleet Street, at the corner of Chancery Lane. There, I afterwards discovered, a party of forty German infantrymen had been attacked, and all of them killed. Quickly following this, I heard the distant booming of artillery, and then the rattle of musketry and pom-poms became general, but not in the neighbourhood where I was. For nearly half an hour I remained at the corner of Aldwych; then, on going farther along the Strand, I found that the defenders from the Waterloo Road had made a wild sortie into the Strand, but could find no Germans there. "The men who had for a fortnight held that barricade at the bridge were more like demons than human beings; therefore I retired, and in the crush made my way back to the office to await reports. "They were not long in arriving. I can only give a very brief _résumé_ at the moment, for they are so numerous as to be bewildering. "Speaking generally, the whole of London has obeyed the mandate of the League, and, rising, are attacking the Germans at every point. In the majority of cases, however, the enemy hold strong positions, and are defending themselves, inflicting terrible losses upon the unorganised populace. Every Londoner is fighting for himself, without regard for orders or consequences. In Bethnal Green the Germans, lured into the maze of by-streets, have suffered great losses, and again in Clerkenwell, St. Luke's, Kingsland, Hackney and Old Ford. Whitechapel too, devoid of its alien population, who have escaped into Essex, has held its own, and the enemy have had some great losses in the streets off Cable and Leman Streets. "With the exception of the sortie across Waterloo Bridge, South London is, as yet, remaining in patience, acting under the orders of General Bamford. "News has come in ten minutes ago of a fierce and sudden attack upon the Saxons by Lord Byfield from Windsor, but there are, as yet, no details. "From the office across the river I am being constantly asked for details of the fight, and how it is progressing. In Southwark the excitement is evidently most intense, and it requires all the energy of the local commanders of the Defenders to repress another sortie across that bridge. "There has just occurred an explosion so terrific that the whole of this building has been shaken as though by an earthquake. "London has struck her first blow of revenge. What will be its sequel?" CHAPTER II. SCENES AT WATERLOO BRIDGE. The following is the personal narrative of a young chauffeur named John Burgess, who assisted in the defence of the barricade at Waterloo Bridge. The statement was made to a reporter at noon on October 5, while he was lying on a mattress in the Church of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, so badly wounded in the chest that the surgeons had given him up. He related his story in the form of a farewell letter to his sister. The reporter chanced to be passing, and, hearing him asking for some one to write for him, volunteered to do so. "We all did our best," he said, "every one of us. Myself, I was at the barricade for thirteen days--thirteen days of semi-starvation, sleeplessness, and constant tension, for we knew not, from one moment to another, when a sudden attack might be made upon us. At first our obstruction was a mere ill-built pile of miscellaneous articles, half of which would not stop bullets; but on the third day our men, superintended by several non-commissioned officers in uniform, began to put the position in a proper state of defence, to mount Maxims in the neighbouring houses, and to place explosives in the crown of two of the arches of the bridge, so that we could instantly demolish it if necessity arose. "Fully a thousand men were holding the position, but unfortunately few of them had ever handled a rifle. As regards myself, I had learned to shoot rooks when a boy in Shropshire, and now that I had obtained a gun I was anxious to try my skill. When the League of Defenders was started, and a local secretary came to us, we all eagerly joined, each receiving, after he had taken his oath and signed his name, a small silk Union Jack, the badge of the League, not to be worn till the word went forth to rise. "Then came a period--long, dreary, shadeless days of waiting--when the sun beat down upon us mercilessly and our vigilance was required to be constant both night and day. So uncertain were the movements of the enemy opposite us that we scarcely dared to leave our positions for a moment. Night after night I spent sleeping in a neighbouring doorway, with an occasional stretch upon somebody's bed in some house in the vicinity. Now and then, whenever we saw Germans moving in Wellington Street, we sent a volley into them, in return receiving a sharp reply from their pom-poms. Constantly our sentries were on the alert along the wharves, and in the riverside warehouses, watching for the approach of the enemy's spies in boats. Almost nightly some adventurous spirits among the Germans would try and cross. On one occasion, while doing sentry duty in a warehouse backing on Commercial Road, I was sitting with a comrade at a window overlooking the river. The moon was shining, for the night was a balmy and beautiful one, and all was quiet. It was about two o'clock in the morning, and as we sat smoking our pipes, with our eyes fixed upon the glittering water, we suddenly saw a small boat containing three men stealing slowly along in the shadow. "For a moment the rowers rested upon their oars, as if undecided, then pulled forward again in search of a landing-place. As they passed below our window I shouted a challenge. At first there was no response. Again I repeated it, when I heard a muttered imprecation in German. "'Spies!' I cried to my comrade, and with one accord we raised our rifles and fired. Ere the echo of the first shot had died away I saw one man fall into the water, while at the next shot a second man half rose from his seat, threw up his hands, and staggered back wounded. "The firing gave the alarm at the barricade, and ere the boat could approach the bridge, though the survivor pulled for dear life, a Maxim spat forth its red fire, and both boat and oarsman were literally riddled. "Almost every night similar incidents were reported. The enemy were doing all in their power to learn the exact strength of our defences, but I do not think their efforts were very successful. The surface of the river, every inch of it, was under the careful scrutiny of a thousand watchful eyes. "Each day the 'Bulletin' of our national association brought us tidings of what was happening outside. "At last, however, the welcome word came to us on the morning of October 4, that at ten that night we were to make a concerted attack upon the Germans. A scarlet bill was thrust into my hand, and as soon as the report was known we were all highly excited, and through the day prepared ourselves for the struggle. "A gun sounded from the direction of Westminster. We looked at our watches, and found it was ten o'clock. Our bugles sounded and we sprang to our positions, as we had done dozens, nay, hundreds of times before. I felt faint, for I had only had half a pint of weak soup all day, for the bread did not go round. Nevertheless, the knowledge that we were about to strike the blow inspired me with fresh life and strength. Our officer shouted a brief word of command, and next moment we opened a withering fire upon the enemy's barricade in Wellington Street. "In a moment a hundred rifles and several Maxims spat their red fire at us, but as usual the bullets flattened themselves harmlessly before us. Then the battery of artillery which Sir Francis Bamford had sent us three days before got into position, and in a few moments began hurling great shells upon the German defences. "Behind us was a great armed multitude ready and eager to get at the foe, a huge, unorganised body of fierce, irate Londoners, determined upon having blood for blood. From over the river the sound of battle was rising, a great roaring like the sound of a distant sea, with ever and anon the crackling of rifles and the boom of guns, while above the night sky grew a dark blood-red with the glare of a distant conflagration. "For half an hour we pounded away at the barricade in Wellington Street with our siege guns, Maxims, and rifles, until a well-directed shell exploded beneath the centre of the obstruction, blowing open a great gap and sending fragments high into the air. Then it seemed that all resistance suddenly ceased. At first we were surprised at this; but on further scrutiny we found that it was not our fire that had routed the enemy, but that they were being attacked in their rear by hosts of armed citizens surging down from Kingsway and the Strand. "We could plainly discern that the Germans were fighting for their lives. Into the midst of them we sent one or two shells; but fearing to cause casualties among our own comrades, we were compelled to cease firing. "The armed crowd behind us, finding that we were again inactive, at once demanded that our barricade should be opened, so that they might cross the bridge and assist their comrades by taking the Germans in the rear. For ten minutes our officer in charge refused, for the order of General Greatorex, Commander-in-Chief of the League, was that no sortie was to be made at present. However, the South Londoners became so infuriated that our commander was absolutely forced to give way, though he knew not into what trap we might fall, as he had no idea of the strength of the enemy in the neighbourhood of the Strand. A way was quickly opened in the obstruction, and two minutes later we were pouring across Waterloo Bridge in thousands, shouting and yelling in triumph as we passed the ruins of the enemy's barricade, and fell upon him with merciless revenge. With us were many women, who were, perhaps, fiercer and more unrelenting than the men. Indeed, many a woman that night killed a German with her own hands, firing revolvers in their faces, striking with knives, or even blinding them with vitriol. "The scene was both exciting and ghastly. At the spot where I first fought--on the pavement outside the Savoy--we simply slaughtered the Germans in cold blood. Men cried for mercy, but we gave them no quarter. London had risen in its might, and as our comrades fought all along the Strand and around Aldwych, we gradually exterminated every man in German uniform. Soon the roadways of the Strand, Wellington Street, Aldwych, Burleigh Street, Southampton Street, Bedford Street, and right along to Trafalgar Square, were covered with dead and dying. The wounded of both nationalities were trodden underfoot and killed by the swaying, struggling thousands. The enemy's loss must have been severe in our particular quarter, for of the great body of men from Hamburg and Lübeck holding their end of Waterloo Bridge I do not believe a single one was spared, even though they fought for their lives like veritable devils. "Our success intoxicated us, I think. That we were victorious at that point cannot be doubted, but with foolish disregard for our own safety, we pressed forward into Trafalgar Square, in the belief that our comrades were similarly making an attack upon the enemy there. The error was, alas! a fatal one for many of us. To fight an organised force in narrow streets is one thing, but to meet him in a large open space with many inlets, like Trafalgar Square, is another. "The enemy were no doubt awaiting us, for as we poured out from the Strand at Charing Cross we were met with a devastating fire from German Maxims on the opposite side of the square. They were holding Whitehall--to protect Von Kronhelm's headquarters--the entrances to Spring Gardens, Cockspur Street, and Pall Mall East, and their fire was converged upon the great armed multitude which, being pressed on from behind, came out into the open square only to fall in heaps beneath the sweeping hail of German lead. "The error was one that could not be rectified. We all saw it when too late. There was no turning back now, I struggled to get into the small side-street that runs down by the bar of the Grand Hotel, but it was blocked with people already in refuge there. "Another instant and I was lifted from my legs by the great throng going to their doom, and carried right in the forefront to the square. Women screamed when they found themselves facing the enemy's fire. "The scene was awful--a massacre, nothing more or less. For every German's life we had taken, a dozen of our own were now being sacrificed. "A woman was pushed close to me, her grey hair streaming down her back, her eyes starting wildly from her head, her bony hands smeared with blood. Suddenly she realised that right before her red fire was spitting from the German guns. "Screaming in despair, she clung frantically to me. "I felt next second a sharp burning pain in my chest.... We fell forward together upon the bodies of our comrades.... When I came to myself I found myself here, in this church, close to where I fell." * * * * * On that same night desperate sorties were made from the London, Southwark, and Blackfriars Bridges, and terrible havoc was committed by the Defenders. The German losses were enormous, for the South Londoners fought like demons and gave no quarter. CHAPTER III. GREAT BRITISH VICTORY. The following despatch from the war correspondent of the "Times" with Lord Byfield was received on the morning of October 5, but was not published in that journal till some days later, owing to the German censorship, which necessitated its being kept secret:-- "WILLESDEN, _October_ 4 (Evening). "After a bloody but successful combat lasting from early dawn till late in the afternoon, the country to the immediate west of the metropolis has been swept clear of the hated invaders, and the masses of the 'League of Defenders' can be poured into the West of London without let or hindrance. In the desperate street fighting which is now going on they will be much more formidable than they were ever likely to be in the open field, where they were absolutely incapable of manoeuvring. As for the Saxons--what is left of them--and Frölich's Cavalry Division, with whom we have been engaged all day, they have now fallen back on Harrow and Hendon, it is said; but it is currently reported that a constant movement towards the high ground near Hampstead is going on. These rumours come by way of London, since the enemy's enormous force of cavalry is still strong enough to prevent us getting any first-hand intelligence of his movements. "As has been previously reported, the XIIth Saxon Corps, under the command of Prince Henry of Würtemberg, had taken up a position intended to cover the metropolis from the hordes of 'Defenders' which, supported by a small leaven of Regulars, with a proportion of cavalry and guns, were known to be slowly rolling up from the west and south. Their front, facing west, extended from Staines on the south, to Pinner on the north, passing through Stanwell, West Drayton, and Uxbridge. In addition they had a strong reserve in the neighbourhood of Hounslow, whose business it was to cover their left flank by keeping watch along the line of the Thames. They had destroyed all bridges over the river between Staines and Hammersmith. Putney Bridge, however, was still intact, as all attacks on it had been repulsed by the British holding it on the south side. Such was the general state of affairs when Lord Byfield, who had established his headquarters at Windsor, formed his plan of attack. "As far as I have been able to ascertain, its general idea was to hold the Saxons to their position by the threat of 300,000 Defenders that were assembled and were continually increasing along a roughly parallel line to that occupied by the enemy at about ten miles' distance from it, while he attacked their left flank with what Regular and Militia regiments he could rapidly get together near Esher and Kingston. By this time the southern lines in the neighbourhood of London were all in working order, the damage that had been done here and there by small parties of the enemy who had made raids across the river having been repaired. It was, therefore, not a very difficult matter to assemble troops from Windsor and various points on the South of London at very short notice. "General Bamford, to whom had been entrusted the defence of South London, and who had established his headquarters at the Crystal Palace, also contributed every man he could spare from the remnant of the Regular troops under his command. "It was considered quite safe now that the Germans in the City were so hardly pressed to leave the defence of the Thames bridges to the masses of Irregulars who had all along formed the bulk of their defenders. The risk that Prince Henry of Würtemberg would take the bull by the horns, and by a sudden forward move attack and scatter the inert and invertebrate mass of 'Defenders' who were in his immediate front had, of course, to be taken; but it was considered that in the present state of affairs in London he would hardly dare to increase the distance between the Saxon Corps and the rest of the German Army. Events proved the correctness of this surmise; but owing to unforeseen circumstances, the course of the battle was somewhat different from that which had been anticipated. "Despite the vigilance of the German spies our plans were kept secret till the very end, and it is believed that the great convergence of Regular troops that began as soon as it was dark from Windsor and from along the line occupied by the Army of the League on the west, right round to Greenwich on the east, went on without any news of the movement being carried to the enemy. "Before dawn this morning every unit was in the position to which it had been previously detailed, and, everything being in readiness, the Royal Engineers began to throw a pontoon bridge over the Thames at the point where it makes a bend to the south just above the site of Walton Bridge. The enemy's patrols and pickets in the immediate neighbourhood at once opened a heavy fire on the workers, but it was beaten down by that which was poured upon them from the houses in Walton-on-Thames, which had been quietly occupied during the night. The enemy in vain tried to reinforce them, but in order to do this their troops had to advance into a narrow peninsula which was swept by a cross-fire of shells from batteries which had been placed in position on the south side of the river for this very purpose. "By seven o'clock the bridge was completed, and the troops were beginning to cross over covered by the fire of the artillery and by an advance guard which had been pushed over in boats. Simultaneously very much the same thing had been going on at Long Ditton, and fierce fighting was going on in the avenues and gardens round Hampton Court. Success here, too, attended the British arms. As a matter of fact, a determined attempt to cross the river in force had not at all been anticipated by the Germans. They had not credited their opponents with the power of so rapidly assembling an army and assuming an effective and vigorous offensive so soon after their terrible series of disasters. "What they had probably looked for was an attempt to overwhelm them by sheer force of numbers. They doubtless calculated that Lord Byfield would stiffen his flabby masses of 'Defenders' with what trained troops he could muster, and endeavour to attack their lines along their whole length, overlapping them on the flank. "They realised that to do this he would have to sacrifice his men in thousands upon thousands, but they knew that to do so would be his only possible chance of success in this eventuality, since the bulk of his men could neither manoeuvre nor deploy. Still they reckoned that in the desperate situation of the British, he would make up his mind to do this. "On their part, although they fully realised the possibility of being overwhelmed by such tactics, they felt pretty confident that, posted as they were behind a perfect network of small rivers and streams which ran down to join the Thames, they would at least succeed in beating off the attack with heavy loss, and stood no bad chance of turning the repulse into a rout by skilful use of Frölich's Cavalry Division, which would be irresistible when attacking totally untrained troops after they had been shattered and disorganised by artillery fire. This, at least, is the view of those experts with whom I have spoken. "What, perhaps, tended rather to confirm them in their theories as to the action of the British was the rifle firing that went on along the whole of their front all night through. The officers in charge of the various units which conglomerated together formed the forces facing the Saxons, had picked out the few men under their command who really had some little idea of using a rifle, and, supplied with plenty of ammunition, had sent them forward in numerous small parties with general orders to approach as near the enemy's picket line as possible, and as soon as fired on to lie down and open fire in return. So a species of sniping engagement went on from dark to dawn. Several parties got captured or cut up by the German outlying troops and many others got shot by neighbouring parties of snipers. But, although they did not in all probability do the enemy much damage, yet they kept them on the alert all night, and led them to expect an attack in the morning. One way and another luck was entirely on the side of the patriots that morning. "When daylight came the British massed to the westward of Staines had such a threatening appearance from their immense numbers, and their fire from their batteries of heavy guns and howitzers on the south side of the river, which took the German left flank in, was so heavy that Prince Henry, who was there in person, judged an attack to be imminent, and would not spare a man to reinforce his troops at Shepperton and Halliford, who were, numerically, totally inadequate to resist the advance of the British once they got across the river. "He turned a deaf ear to the most imploring requests for assistance, but ordered the officer in command at Hounslow to move down at once and drive the British into the river. So it has been reported by our prisoners. Unluckily for him this officer had his hands quite full enough at this time; for the British, who had crossed at Long Ditton, had now made themselves masters of everything east of the Thames Valley branch of the London and South-Western Railway, were being continually reinforced, and were fast pushing their right along the western bank of the river. "Their left was reported to be at Kempton Park, where they joined hands with those who had effected a crossing near Walton-on-Thames. More bridges were being built at Platt's Eyot, Tagg's Eyot, and Sunbury Lock, while boats and wherries in shoals appeared from all creeks and backwaters and hiding-places as soon as both banks were in the hands of the British. "Regulars, Militia, and, lastly, Volunteers, were now pouring across in thousands. Forward was still the word. About noon a strong force of Saxons was reported to be retreating along the road from Staines to Brentford. They had guns with them, which engaged the field batteries which were at once pushed forward by the British to attack them. These troops, eventually joining hands with those at Hounslow, opposed a more determined resistance to our advance than we had hitherto encountered. "According to what we learned subsequently from prisoners and others, they were commanded by Prince Henry of Würtemberg in person. He had quitted his position at Staines, leaving only a single battalion and a few guns as a rearguard to oppose the masses of the 'Defenders' who threatened him in that direction, and had placed his troops in the best position he could to cover the retreat of the rest of his corps from the line they had been occupying. He had, it would appear, soon after the fighting began, received the most urgent orders from Von Kronhelm to fall back on London and assist him in the street fighting that had now been going on without intermission for the best part of two days. Von Kronhelm probably thought that he would be able to draw off some of his numerous foes to the westward. But the message was received too late. Prince Henry did his best to obey it, but by this time the very existence of the XIIth Corps was at stake on account of the totally unexpected attack on his left rear by the British regular troops. "He opposed such a stout resistance with the troops under his immediate command that he brought the British advance to a temporary standstill, while in his rear every road leading Londonward was crowded with the rest of his army as they fell back from West Drayton, Uxbridge, Ruislip and Pinner. Had they been facing trained soldiers they would have found it most difficult, if not impossible, to do this; but as it was the undisciplined and untrained masses of the League of Defenders lost a long time in advancing, and still longer in getting over a series of streams and dykes that lay between them and the abandoned Saxon position. "They lost heavily, too, from the fire of the small rearguards that had been left at the most likely crossing-places. The Saxons were therefore able to get quite well away from them, and when some attempt was being made to form up the thousands of men who presently found themselves congregated on the heath east of Uxbridge, before advancing farther, a whole brigade of Frölich's heavy cavalry suddenly swept down upon them from behind Ickenham village. The _débâcle_ that followed was frightful. The unwieldy mass of 'Leaguers' swayed this way and that for a moment in the panic occasioned by the sudden apparition of the serried masses of charging cavalry that were rushing down on them with a thunder of hoofs that shook the earth. A few scattered shots were fired, without any perceptible effect, and before they could either form up or fly the German Reiters were upon them. It was a perfect massacre. The 'Leaguers' could oppose no resistance whatever. They were ridden down and slaughtered with no more difficulty than if they had been a flock of sheep. Swinging their long, straight swords, the cavalrymen cut them down in hundreds and drove thousands into the river. The 'Defenders' were absolutely pulverised and fled westwards in a huge scattered crowd. But if the Germans had the satisfaction of scoring a local victory in this quarter, things were by no means rosy for them elsewhere. Prince Henry, by desperate efforts, contrived to hold on long enough in his covering position to enable the Saxons from the central portion of his abandoned line to pass through Hounslow and move along the London road, through Brentford. "Here disaster befell them. A battery of 4.7 guns was suddenly unmasked on Richmond Hill, and, firing at a range of 5,000 yards, played havoc with the marching column. The head of it also suffered severe loss from riflemen concealed in Kew Gardens, and the whole force had to extend and fall back for some distance in a northerly direction. Near Ealing they met the Uxbridge brigade, and a certain delay and confusion occurred. However, trained soldiers such as these are not difficult to reorganise, and while the latter continued its march along the main road the remainder moved in several small parallel columns through Acton and Turnham Green. Before another half-hour had elapsed there came a sound of firing from the advanced guard. Orders to halt followed, then orders to send forward reinforcements. "During all this time the rattle of rifle fire waxed heavier and heavier. It soon became apparent that every road and street leading into London was barricaded and that the houses on either side were crammed with riflemen. Before any set plan of action could be determined on, the retiring Saxons found themselves committed to a very nasty bout of street fighting. Their guns were almost useless, since they could not be placed in positions from which they could fire on the barricades except so close as to be under effective rifle fire. They made several desperate assaults, most of which were repulsed. In Goldhawk Road a Jäegar battalion contrived to rush a big rampart of paving-stones which had been improvised by the British; but, once over, they were decimated by the fire from the houses on either side of the street. Big high explosive shells from Richmond Hill, too, began to drop among the Saxons. Though the range was long, the gunners were evidently well informed of the whereabouts of the Saxon troops and made wonderfully lucky shooting. "For some time the distant rumble of the firing to the south-west had been growing more distinct in their ears, and about four o'clock it suddenly broke out comparatively near by. Then came an order from Prince Henry to fall back on Ealing at once. What had happened? It will not take long to relate this. Prince Henry's covering position had lain roughly between East Bedfont and Hounslow, facing south-east. He had contrived to hold on to the latter place long enough to allow his right to pivot on it and fall back to Cranford Bridge. Here they were, to a certain extent, relieved from the close pressure they had been subjected to by the constantly advancing British troops, by the able and determined action of Frölich's Cavalry Brigade. "But in the meantime his enemies on the left, constantly reinforced from across the river--while never desisting from their so far unsuccessful attack on Hounslow--worked round through Twickenham and Isleworth till they began to menace his rear. He must abandon Hounslow, or be cut off. With consummate generalship he withdrew his left along the line of the Metropolitan and District Railway, and sent word to the troops on his right to retire and take up a second position at Southall Green. Unluckily for him, there was a delay in transmission, resulting in a considerable number of these troops being cut off and captured. Frölich's cavalry were unable to aid them at this juncture, having their attention drawn away by the masses of 'Leaguers' who had managed to get over the Colne and were congregating near Harmondsworth. "They cut these up and dispersed them, but afterwards found that they were separated from the Saxons by a strong force of British regular troops who occupied Harlington and opened a fire on the Reiters that emptied numerous saddles. They, therefore, made off to the northward. From this forward nothing could check the steady advance of the English, though fierce fighting went on till dark all through Hanwell, Ealing, Perivale, and Wembley, the Saxons struggling gamely to the last, but getting more and more disorganised. Had it not been for Frölich's division on their right they would have been surrounded. As it was, they must have lost half their strength in casualties and prisoners. "At dark, however, Lord Byfield ordered a general halt of his tired though triumphant troops, and bivouacked and billeted them along a line reaching from Willesden on the right through Wembley to Greenford. He established his headquarters at Wembley. "I have heard some critics say that he ought to have pushed on his freshest troops towards Hendon to prevent the remnant of our opponents from re-entering London; but others, with reason, urge that he is right to let them into the metropolis, which they will now find to be merely a trap." * * * * * Extracts from the diary of General Von Kleppen, Commander of the IVth German Army Corps, occupying London:-- "DORCHESTER HOUSE, PARK LANE, _Oct._ 6. "We are completely deceived. Our position, much as we are attempting to conceal it, is a very grave one. We believed that if we reached London the British spirit would be broken. Yet the more drastic our rule, the fiercer becomes the opposition. How it will end I fear to contemplate. The British are dull and apathetic, but, once roused, they fight like fiends. "Last night we had an example of it. This League of Defenders, which Von Kronhelm has always treated with ridicule, is, we have discovered too late, practically the whole of England. Von Bistram, commanding the VIIth Corps, and Von Haeslen, of the VIIIth Corps, have constantly been reporting its spread through Manchester, Leeds, Bradford, Sheffield, Birmingham and the other great towns we now occupy; but our Commander-in-Chief has treated the matter lightly, declaring it to be a kind of offshoot of some organisation they have in England, called the Primrose League.... "Yesterday, at the Council of War, however, he was compelled to acknowledge his error when I handed him a scarlet handbill calling upon the British to make a concerted attack upon us at ten o'clock. Fortunately, we were prepared for the assault, otherwise I verily believe that the honours would have rested with the populace in London. As it is, we suffered considerable reverses in various districts, where our men were lured into the narrow side-streets and cut up. I confess I am greatly surprised at the valiant stand made everywhere by the Londoners. Last night they fought to the very end. A disaster to our arms in the Strand was followed by a victory in Trafalgar Square, where Von Wilberg had established defences for the purpose of preventing the joining of the people of the East End with those of the West...." CHAPTER IV. MASSACRE OF GERMANS IN LONDON. "'DAILY TELEGRAPH' OFFICE, "_Oct._ 12, 6 P.M. "Through the whole of last week the Germans occupying London suffered great losses. They are now hemmed in on every side. "At three o'clock this morning, Von Kronhelm, having withdrawn the greater part of the troops from the defence of the bridges, in an attempt to occupy defensive positions in North London, the South Londoners, impatient with long waiting, broke forth and came across the river in enormous multitudes, every man bent upon killing a German wherever seen. "The night air was rent everywhere by the hoarse, exultant shouts as London--the giant, all-powerful city--fell upon the audacious invader. Through our office windows came the dull roar of London's millions swelled by the 'Defenders' from the west and south of England, and by the gallant men from Canada, India, the Cape, and other British colonies who had come forward to fight for the Mother Country as soon as her position was known to be critical. "In the streets are to be seen Colonial uniforms side by side with the costermonger from Whitechapel or Walworth, and dark-faced Indians in turbans are fighting out in Fleet Street and the Strand. In the great struggle now taking place many of our reporters and correspondents have unfortunately been wounded, and, alas! four of them killed. "In these terrible days a man's life is not safe from one moment to another. Both sides seem to have now lost their heads completely. Among the Germans all semblance of order has apparently been thrown to the winds. It is known that London has risen to a man, and the enemy are therefore fully aware of their imminent peril. Already they are beaten. True, Von Kronhelm still sits in the War Office directing operations--operations he knows too well are foredoomed to failure. "The Germans have, it must be admitted, carried on the war in a chivalrous spirit, until those drastic executions exasperated the people. Then neither side gave quarter, and now to-day, all through Islington, Hoxton, Kingsland, and Dalston, right out eastwards to Homerton, a perfect massacre of Germans is in progress. "Lord Byfield has issued two urgent proclamations, threatening the people of London with all sorts of penalties if they kill instead of taking an enemy prisoner, but they seem to have no effect. London is starved and angered to such a pitch, that her hatred knows no bounds, and only blood will atone for the wholesale slaughter of the innocent since the bombardment of the metropolis began. "The Kaiser has, we hear, left the 'Belvedere,' at Scarborough, where he has been living incognito. A confidential report, apparently well founded, has reached us that he embarked upon the steam-trawler _Morning Star_ at Scarborough yesterday, and set out across the Dogger, with Germany, of course, as his destination. Surely he must now regret his ill-advised policy of making an attack upon England. He had gauged our military weakness very accurately, but he had not counted upon the patriotic spirit of our Empire. It may be that he has already given orders to Von Kronhelm, but it is nevertheless a very significant fact that the German wireless telegraph apparatus on the summit of Big Ben is in constant use by the German Commander-in-Chief. He is probably in hourly communication with Bremen, or with the Emperor himself upon the trawler _Morning Star_. "Near Highbury Fields about noon to-day some British cavalry surprised a party of Germans, and attempted to take them prisoners. The latter showed fight, whereupon they were shot down to a man. The British held as prisoners by the Germans near Enfield have now been released, and are rejoining their comrades along the northern heights. Many believe that another and final battle will be fought north of London, but military men declare that the German power is already broken. Whether Von Kronhelm will still continue to lose his men at the rate he is now doing, or whether he will sue for peace, is an open question. Personally, he was against the bombardment of London from the very first, yet he was compelled to carry out the orders of his Imperial master. The invasion, the landing, and the successes in the north were, in his opinion, quite sufficient to have paralysed British trade and caused such panic that an indemnity would have been paid. To attack London was, in his opinion, a proceeding far too dangerous, and his estimate is now proved to have been the correct one. Now that they have lost command of the sea, and are cut off from their bases in Essex, the enemy's situation is hopeless. They may struggle on, but assuredly the end can only be an ignominious one. "Yet the German eagle still flies proudly over the War Office, over St. Stephen's, and upon many other public buildings, while upon others British Royal Standards and Union Jacks are commencing to appear, each one being cheered by the excited Londoners, whose hearts are now full of hope. Germany shall be made to bite the dust. That is the war-cry everywhere. Many a proud Uhlan and Cuirassier has to-day ridden to his death amid the dense mobs, mad with the lust of blood. Some of the more unfortunate of the enemy have been lynched, and torn limb from limb, while others have died deaths too horrible to here describe in detail. "Each hour brings to us further news showing how, by slow degrees, the German army of occupation is being wiped out. People are jeering at the audacious claim for indemnity presented to the British Government when the enemy entered London, and are asking whether we will not now present a claim to Germany. Von Kronhelm is not blamed so much as his Emperor. He has been the cat's paw, and has burned his fingers in endeavouring to snatch the chestnuts from the fire. "As a commander, he has acted justly, fully observing the international laws concerning war. It was only when faced by the problem of a national uprising that he countenanced anything bordering upon capital punishment. An hour ago our censors were withdrawn. They came and shook hands with many members of the staff, and retired. This surely is a significant fact that Von Kronhelm hopes to regain the confidence of London by appearing to treat her with a fatherly solicitude. Or is it that he intends to sue for peace at any price? "An hour ago another desperate attempt was made on the part of the men of South London, aided by a large body of British regulars, to regain possession of the War Office. Whitehall was once more the scene of a bloody fight, but so strongly does Von Kronhelm hold the place and all the adjacent thoroughfares--he apparently regarding it as his own fortress--that the attack was repulsed with heavy loss on our side. "All the bridges are now open, the barricades are in most cases being blown up, and people are passing and repassing freely for the first time since the day following the memorable bombardment. London streets are, however, in a most deplorable condition. On every hand is ruin and devastation. Whole streets of houses rendered gaunt and windowless by the now spent fires meet the eye everywhere. In certain places the ruins were still smouldering, and in one or two districts the conflagrations spread over an enormous area. Even if peace be declared, can London ever recover from this present wreck? Paris recovered, and quickly too. Therefore we place our faith in British wealth, British industry, and British patriotism. "Yes. The tide has turned. The great revenge now in progress is truly a mad and bloody one. In Kilburn this afternoon there was a wholesale killing of a company of German infantry, who, while marching along the High Road, were set upon by the armed mob, and practically exterminated. The smaller thoroughfares, Brondesbury Road, Victoria Road, Glendall Road, and Priory Park Road, across to Paddington Cemetery, were the scene of a frightful slaughter. The Germans died hard, but in the end were completely wiped out. German-baiting is now, indeed, the Londoner's pastime, and on this dark and rainy afternoon hundreds of men of the Fatherland have died upon the wet roads. "Sitting here, in a newspaper office, as we do, and having fresh reports constantly before us, we are able to review the whole situation impartially. Every moment, through the various news-agencies and our own correspondents and contributors, we are receiving fresh facts--facts which all combine to show that Von Kronhelm cannot hold out much longer. Surely the Commander-in-Chief of a civilised army will not allow his men to be massacred as they are now being! The enemy's troops, mixed up in the maze of London streets as they are, are utterly unable to cope with the oncoming multitudes, some armed with rifles, and others with anything they can lay their hands upon. "Women--wild, infuriated women--have now made their reappearance north of the Thames. In more than one instance, where German soldiers have attempted to take refuge in houses, these women have obtained petrol, and, with screams of fiendish delight, set the houses in question on fire. Awful dramas are being enacted in every part of the metropolis. The history of to-day is written in German blood. "Lord Byfield has established temporary headquarters at Jack Straw's Castle, where Von Kronhelm was during the bombardment, and last night we could see the signals exchanged between Hampstead and Sydenham Hill, from whence General Bamford has not yet moved. Our cavalry in Essex are, it is said, doing excellent work. Lord Byfield has also sent a body of troops across from Gravesend to Tilbury, and these have regained Maldon and Southminster after some hard fighting. Advices from Gravesend state that further reinforcements are being sent across the river to operate against the East of London and hem in the Germans on that side. "So confident is London of success that several of the railways are commencing to reorganise their traffic. A train left Willesden this afternoon for Birmingham, the first since the bombardment--while another has left Finsbury Park for Peterborough, to continue to York if possible. So wrecked are the London termini, however, that it must be some weeks before trains can arrive or be despatched from either Euston, King's Cross, Paddington, Marylebone, or St. Pancras. In many instances the line just north of the terminus is interrupted by a blown-up tunnel or a fallen bridge, therefore the termination of traffic must, for the present, be at some distance north on the outskirts of London. "Shops are also opening in South London, though they have but little to sell. Nevertheless, this may be regarded as a sign of renewed confidence. Besides, supplies of provisions are now arriving, and the London County Council and the Salvation Army are distributing free soup and food in the lower-class districts. Private charity, everywhere abundant during the trying days of dark despair, is doing inestimable good among every class. The hard, grasping employer and the smug financier, who had hitherto kept scrupulous accounts, and have been noteworthy on account of their uncharitableness, have now, in the hour of need, come forward and subscribed liberally to the great Mansion House Fund, opened yesterday by the Deputy Lord Mayor of London. The subscription list occupies six columns of the issue of to-morrow's paper, and this, in itself, speaks well for the openheartedness of the moneyed classes of Great Britain. "No movement has yet been made in the financial world. Bankers still remain with closed doors. The bullion seized at Southminster and other places is now under strong British guard, and will, it is supposed, be returned to the Bank immediately. Only a comparatively small sum has yet been sent across to Germany. Therefore all Von Kronhelm's strategy has utterly failed. By the invasion, Germany has, up to the present moment, gained nothing. She has made huge demands at which we can afford to jeer. True, she has wrecked London, but have we not sent the greater part of her fleet to the bottom of the North Sea, and have we not created havoc in German ports? "The leave-taking of our two gold-spectacled censors was almost pathetic. We had come to regard them as necessities to puzzle and to play practical jokes of language upon. To-day for the first time we have received none of those official notices in German, with English translations, which of late have appeared so prominently in our columns. The German Eagle is gradually disentangling his talons from London, and means to escape us--if he can." * * * * * 10.30 P.M. "Private information has just reached us from a most reliable source that a conference has been arranged between Von Kronhelm and Lord Byfield. This evening the German Field Marshal sent a messenger to the British headquarters at Hampstead under a flag of truce. He bore a despatch from the German Commander asking that hostilities should be suspended for twenty-four hours, and that they should make an appointment for a meeting during that period. "Von Kronhelm has left the time and place of meeting to Lord Byfield, and has informed the British Commander that he has sent telegraphic instruction to the German military governors of Birmingham, Sheffield, Manchester, Bradford, Leeds, Northampton, Stafford, Oldham, Wigan, Bolton, and other places, giving notice of his suggestion to the British, and ordering that for the present hostilities on the part of the Germans shall be suspended. "It seems more than likely that the German Field Marshal has received these very definite instructions by wireless telegraph from the Emperor at Bremen or Potsdam. "We understand that Lord Byfield, after a brief consultation by telegraph with the Government at Bristol, has sent a reply. Of its nature, however, nothing is known, and at the moment of writing hostilities are still in progress. "In an hour's time we shall probably know whether the war is to continue, or a truce is to be proclaimed." "Midnight. "Lord Byfield has granted a truce, and hostilities have now been suspended. "London has gone mad with delight, for the German yoke is cast off. Further information which has just reached us from private sources states that thousands of prisoners have been taken by Lord Byfield to-day, and that Von Kronhelm has acknowledged his position to be absolutely hopeless. "The great German Army has been defeated by our British patriots, who have fought so valiantly and so well. It is not likely that the war will be resumed. Von Kronhelm received a number of British officers at the War Office half an hour ago, and it is said that he is already making preparations to vacate the post he has usurped. "Lord Byfield has issued a reassuring message to London, which we have just received with instructions to print. It declares that although for the moment only a truce is proclaimed, yet this means the absolute cessation of all hostilities. "The naval news of the past few days may be briefly summarised. The British main fleet entered the North Sea, and our submarines did most excellent work in the neighbourhood of the Maas Lightship. Prince Stahlberger had concentrated practically the whole of his naval force off Lowestoft, but a desperate battle was fought about seventy miles from the Texel, full details of which are not yet to hand. All that is known is that, having now regained command of the sea, we were enabled to inflict a crushing defeat upon the Germans, in which the German flagship was sunk. In the end sixty-one British ships were concentrated against seventeen German, with the result that the German fleet has practically been wiped out, there being 19,000 of the enemy's officers and men on the casualty list, the greatest recorded in any naval battle. "Whatever may be the demands for indemnity on either side, one thing is absolutely certain, namely, that the invincible German Army and Navy are completely vanquished. The Eagle's wings are trailing in the dust." CHAPTER V. HOW THE WAR ENDED. Days passed--weary, waiting, anxious days. A whole month went by. What had really happened at sea was unknown. After the truce, London very gradually began to resume her normal life, though the gaunt state of the streets was indescribably weird. Shops began to open, and as each day passed, food became more plentiful and consequently less dear. The truce meant the end of the war, therefore thanksgiving services were held in every town and village throughout the country. There were great prison-camps of Germans at Hounslow, Brentwood, and Barnet, while Von Kronhelm and his chief officers were also held as prisoners until some decision through diplomatic channels could be arrived at. Meanwhile a little business began to be done; thousands began to resume their employment, bankers reopened their doors, and within a week the distress and suffering of the poor became perceptibly alleviated. The task of burying the dead after the terrible massacre of the Germans in the London streets had been a stupendous one, but so quickly had it been accomplished that an epidemic was happily averted. Parliament moved back to Westminster, and daily meetings of the Cabinet were being held in Downing Street. These resulted in the resignation of the Ministry, and with a fresh Cabinet, in which Mr. Gerald Graham, the organiser of the Defenders, was given a seat, a settlement was at last arrived at. To further describe the chaotic state of England occasioned by the terrible and bloody war would serve no purpose. The loss and suffering which it had caused the country had been incalculable; statisticians estimated that in one month of hostilities it had amounted to £500,000,000, a part of which represented money transferred from British pockets to German, as the enemy had carried off some of the securities upon which the German troops had laid their hands in London. Let us for a moment take a retrospective glance. Consols were at 50; bread was still 1_s._ 6_d._ per loaf; and the ravages of the German commerce-destroyers had sent up the cost of insurance on British shipping sky-high. Money was almost unprocurable; except for the manufacture of war material, there was no industry; and the suffering and distress among the poor could not be exaggerated. In all directions men, women, and children had been starving. The mercantile community were loud in their outcry for "peace at any price," and the pro-German and Stop-the-War Party were equally vehement in demanding a cessation of the war. They found excuses for the enemy, and forgot the frightful devastation and loss which the invasion had caused to the country. They insisted that the working class gained nothing, even though the British fleet was closely blockading the German coast, and their outcry was strengthened when a few days after the blockade of the Elbe had begun, two British battleships were so unfortunate as to strike German mines, and sink with a large part of their crews. The difficulty of borrowing money for the prosecution of the war was a grave obstacle in the way of the party of action, and preyed upon the mind of the British Government. Socialism, with its creed of "Thou shalt have no other god but Thyself," and its doctrine, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," had replaced the religious beliefs of a generation of Englishmen taught to suffer and to die sooner than surrender to wrong. In the hour of trial, amidst smoking ruins, among the holocausts of dead which marked the prolonged, bloody, and terrible battles on land and at sea, the spirit of the nation quailed, and there was really no great leader to recall it to ways of honour and duty. The wholesale destruction of food, and particularly of wheat and meat, removed from the world's market a large part of its supplies, and had immediately sent up the cost of food everywhere, outside the United Kingdom as well as in it. At the same time, the attacks upon shipping laden with food increased the cost of insurance to prohibitive prices upon vessels freighted for the United Kingdom. The underwriters after the first few captures by the enemy would not insure at all except for fabulous rates. The withdrawal of all the larger British cruisers for the purpose of defeating the main German fleets in the North Sea left the commerce-destroyers a free hand, and there was no force to meet them. The British liners commissioned as commerce-protectors were too few and too slow to be able to hold their adversaries in check. Neutral shipping was molested by the German cruisers. Whenever raw cotton or food of any kind was discovered upon a neutral vessel bound for British ports, the vessel was seized and sent into one or other of the German harbours on the West Coast of Africa. The United Kingdom, indeed, might have been reduced to absolute starvation had it not been for the fact that the Canadian Government interfered in Canada to prevent similar German tactics from succeeding, and held the German contracts for the cornering of Canadian wheat, contrary to public policy. The want of food, the high price of bread and meat in England, and the greatly increased cost of the supplies of raw material sent up the expenditure upon poor relief to enormous figures. Millions of men were out of employment, and in need of assistance. Mills and factories in all directions had closed down, either because of the military danger from the operations of the German armies, or because of the want of orders, or, again, because raw materials were not procurable. Unfortunately, when the invasion began, many rich foreigners who had lived in England collected what portable property they possessed and retired abroad to Switzerland, Italy, and the United States. Their example was followed by large numbers of British subjects who had invested abroad, and now, in the hour of distress, were able to place their securities in a handbag and withdraw them to happier countries. They may justly be blamed for this want of patriotism, but their reply was that they had been unjustly and mercilessly taxed by men who derided patriotism, misused power, and neglected the real interests of the nation in the desire to pander to the mob. Moreover, with the income-tax at 3_s._ 6_d._ in the pound, and with the cost of living enormously enhanced, they declared that it was a positive impossibility to live in England, while into the bargain their lives were exposed to danger from the enemy. As a result of this wholesale emigration, in London and the country the number of empty houses inordinately increased, and there were few well-to-do people left to pay the rates and taxes. The fearful burden of the extravagant debts which the British municipalities had heaped up was cruelly felt, since the nation had to repudiate the responsibility which it had incurred for the payment of interest on the local debts. The Socialist dream, in fact, might almost be said to have been realised. There were few rich left, but the consequences to the poor, instead of being beneficial, were utterly disastrous. Under the pressure of public opinion, constrained by hunger and financial necessities, and with thousands of German prisoners in their hands, the British Government acceded to the suggested conference to secure peace. * * * * * Peace was finally signed on January 13, 1911. The British Empire emerged from the conflict outwardly intact, but internally so weakened that only the most resolute reforms accomplished by the ablest and boldest statesmen, could have restored it to its old position. Germany, on the other hand, emerged with an additional 21,000 miles of European territory, with an extended seaboard on the North Sea, fronting the United Kingdom at Rotterdam and the Texel, and, it was calculated, with a slight pecuniary advantage. Practically the entire cost of the war had been borne by England. As is always the case, the poor suffered most. The Socialists, who had declared against armaments, were faithless friends of those whom they professed to champion. Their dream of a golden age proved utterly delusive. But the true authors of England's misfortunes escaped blame for the moment, and the Army and Navy were made the scapegoats of the great catastrophe. When success did come, it came too late, and could not be utilised without a great British Army capable of carrying the war into the enemy's country, and thus compelling a satisfactory peace. THE END. PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES. * * * * * Transcriber's note Obvious punctuation errors were corrected. Hyphens removed: "hill[-]side" (page 152), "look[-]out" (page 221), "mid[-]day" (page 149), "night[-]fall" (page 157), "rear[-]guard" (page 142), "sharp[-]shooters" (page 191), "wide[-]spread (page 230). Hyphen added: "by[-]ways" (page 224). The following words appear both with and without hyphens and have not been changed: "back[-]waters", "motor[-]omnibuses", "pickel[-]haubes". Page 43: the double quotation mark after "Well, Mr. Mayor," was changed to a single quotation mark. Page 50: "communciation" changed to "communication" (established direct communication). Page 60: "to" changed to "the" (came the VIIth Army Corps). Page 76: "thei" changed to "their" (some of their field batteries). Page 85: "Aryglls" changed to "Argylls". Page 89: "squardon" changed to "squadron" (squadron after squadron). Page 143: "fellow" changed to "fellows" (hundreds of poor fellows). Page 166: "fo" changed to "for" (for our salvation). Page 178: "Shepheard's Bush" changed to "Shepherd's Bush". Page 187: "Rosyln Hill" changed to "Roslyn Hill". Page 253: added "as" (and as soon as fired on). 
36778	----	TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE RIFLE BRIGADE. BY THE LATE WILLIAM SURTEES, QUARTERMASTER. WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH; AND T. CADELL, STRAND, LONDON. MDCCCXXXIII. EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY BALLANTYNE AND COMPANY, PAUL'S WORK, CANONGATE. TO MAJOR-GEN. SIR ANDREW F. BARNARD, K.C.B. and K.C.H. AND THE OFFICERS OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE, THESE REMAINS OF MY DECEASED BROTHER ARE MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, BY THEIR OBLIGED AND MOST OBEDIENT SERVANT, JOHN SURTEES. PREFATORY NOTICE. The Author of the following Narrative entered the Army in early life. He commenced his military career in 1795, as a private soldier in the Northumberland Militia; and in the following year he volunteered into the Pompadours. In this regiment he first faced the enemy, during the expedition to Holland under the Duke of York. On getting his discharge from the Pompadours, in 1802, he again entered the service as a private in the Rifle Brigade, to which he was attached for a period of twenty-five years. From his steady conduct, and ardent love for his profession, he was soon advanced from the ranks, and, after various intermediate steps, was appointed Quartermaster; a situation which he held as long as he continued in the corps, enjoying the respect and esteem of his brother officers of all ranks, as is amply testified by the letters which form the Appendix to this volume. Though, as Quartermaster, the Author was not called by duty to join in battle, yet he lost no opportunity of entering the scene of action, or of placing himself in a favourable situation for observing what was passing. It is unnecessary to enumerate the arduous services of the Rifle Brigade from 1802 to 1815. During the whole of that period the Author was actively engaged with his corps. The Narrative is faithfully--indeed literally--printed from the Author's MS. as he left it at his death. The critical reader may therefore detect various inaccuracies which, had life been spared to the Author, would probably have been corrected; but he will find much to approve, and, hackneyed as Narratives of the Peninsular War have become, he will also find much that is new. There is no embellishment in the style of the Author's composition, but there is a quiet Defoe-like sincerity and simplicity characteristic of his pages, and a strain of unaffected piety, that is very pleasing; and the scenes and descriptions which he gives, though sometimes singularly chosen, and reported quite with a manner of his own, are on the whole portrayed with strong graphic effect. One word, however, before closing,--our Author is never vulgar. A severe pulmonary affection compelled him to quit his corps in 1826. He retired to Corbridge, his native village, where he arrived on the 24th of October in that year, and continued there, respected and beloved, and constantly engaged in acts of benevolence, till the period of his death, 28th May, 1830. _November 23, 1832._ CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. PAGE. Birth and Parentage--Enters the Militia--Volunteers into the Line--Joins the army destined for Holland--The troops embark at Deal--Land at the Helder--Laxity of discipline--March for Schagen--Detachment under Sir Ralph Abercromby sent to surprise Hoorne--Hoorne surrenders, 1 CHAPTER II. The Russian Allies carry Bergen--Allow themselves to be surprised, and the whole army forced to retire to their former position--Skirmishing in the vicinity of Old Patten--The Russians endeavour to force their way back to Bergen--The Russian and British forces joined--The enemy forced to abandon Egmont-op-Zee--Alkmaar surrenders--The troops advance to Egmont Binnen--Skirmishing--General engagement--The Enemy repulsed--The Forces retire to Zaand Wyck--Armistice concluded--Return to England, 13 CHAPTER III. Arrive in England--The Pompadours embark for Ireland--Arrive at Kinsale--Privations in Ireland in 1800--Peace concluded--Our Author resolves to return home, but ultimately volunteers into the Rifle Corps or 95th--Embarks for England, and joins his Regiment at Sussex--Is promoted, 35 CHAPTER IV. Made Pay-sergeant--Moral Reflections--Wreck of a Dutch East Indiaman--Reduced Officers--War with France in 1803--Encampment at Thorncliffe under the command of General Sir John Moore--Encampment broke up, November 1804--Embark for Germany, October 1805--Vicissitudes at Sea--Land at Cuxhaven--March to Bremen--Outposts established--Retrograde movements, in consequence of the defeat of the Allied Forces at Austerlitz--The Allied Forces evacuate Germany--Re-embarkation of the troops--The Rifle Corps, or 95th, land at Yarmouth, 45 CHAPTER IV.* Our Author made Quartermaster-Sergeant of the 2d battalion, which he joins at Feversham, Kent--Expedition to Denmark--Embark at Deal--Land at Vedbeck, Zealand--Partial Engagements--Siege of Copenhagen--A division under Sir Arthur Wellesley advance to Kioge--Copenhagen capitulates--Amnesty between the Danish forces in the Island of Zealand, and the British--The British evacuate Denmark--Embark at Copenhagen--Arrive in the Downs--Land at Deal, 59 CHAPTER V. Our Author marries--The Battalion to which he belongs ordered to join the Expedition fitting out for Corunna--Movements of the Army in Spain--Return to England, 73 CHAPTER VI. Volunteering--Farther Promotion--Embarks for Portugal, with two Companies of the Second Battalion--Debark at Cadiz--Advance to the Isla--The French occupy all the adjacent Towns, except Cadiz and Isla--Cannonading--Spanish Army--Detachment of the Allied Army sent round by Gibraltar and Chiclana, to take the Enemy in the rear of his works, and compel him either to fight or abandon them--Come up with a portion of the Enemy in the vicinity of Veger--Bravery of the British--The Enemy repulsed with great loss, but, from the apathy and misconduct of General La Pena, and the Spaniards under his command, the French are allowed to retain their Works in the vicinity of Cadiz, 99 CHAPTER VII. The 2d Battalion of the Pompadours ordered to proceed to Portugal--Our Author visits England--Returns to Portugal, and joins his Regiment at Rodrigo--The Army move towards Badajos--Siege of Badajos--Badajos surrenders--Insubordination among the Troops--Quelled by the prompt measures of Lord Wellington, 128 CHAPTER VIII. The Army leave Badajos on the 11th of April, and move into quarters near the river Agueda, where they remain, till the 11th of June--Advance towards Salamanca, which, with the exception of three Forts, the enemy had evacuated--The Forts invested--The main bodies of both armies bivouack within a mile and a half of each other, in the vicinity of Monte Rubio and Morisco--The Forts of Salamanca surrender--The main body of the Enemy retire to Tordesillas--Movements of the Army, 153 CHAPTER IX. Preparations for the Field--Amusements in winter quarters--Grand Review--Advance of the Army in pursuit of the Enemy--Come up with their rearguard in the vicinity of Hornilla de Camino--Skirmishing--Encounter with the 1st Brigade of the Enemy, who are beaten, and forced to retreat--Our Army advance in pursuit--An affair between the rearguard of the Enemy and our 4th Brigade--Vittoria--General Engagement--The Enemy defeated--Remarks, 185 CHAPTER X. Advance in pursuit of the Enemy--Our Forces retreat, in order to counteract Soult's movements for the succour of Pamplona--Total defeat of Soult in the several Actions near Pamplona--Our Forces again advance--Come up with the retreating Enemy at the Bridge of Yanzi--The Enemy take up a position, behind Vera--A considerable body of the Enemy attached at the Pass of Echallar, and forced to retreat, 214 CHAPTER XI. The Author, from a mistake, loses his Servants for a few days--A Feast of Death--A Feast of Life--Fighting near St Sebastian--Singular instance of Spanish Bravery--St Sebastian is captured, but no Details given, the Author not having been present--Attack of the Pass of Vera, 232 CHAPTER XII. The British Army advance farther into France--Pass the Nive--Soult's Plans baffled--Two or three battalions of the Nassau and Frankfort regiments come over from the French--French Politesse--Threatened Attack by the French--Battle of the Nive--Account of the Basques, 253 CHAPTER XIII. The Author's Battalion quartered in Aurantz on 3d January 1814--The cantonments at Aurantz broke up on the 16th February, and the Campaign of 1814 commenced--Farther Advance into France--Skirmishing with the Enemy--Military Manoeuvres--Battle of Orthes--Defeat and Pursuit of the Enemy--Succession of Attacks on them--They are driven from their Position in and near Tarbes--Skirmishing at Tournefoile--The Enemy retire towards Toulouse, 269 CHAPTER XIV. The British Army cross the Garonne--Advance on Toulouse--Prepare for the Attack--The Attack--Spaniards driven back--Battle very hot--French completely defeated--Soult evacuates Toulouse, and tardily adheres to the Bourbons, 295 CHAPTER XV. Author's happy state during 1813 and 1814--Character of the veritable French--British distributed over the Country--Civility of the Inhabitants of Grissolles--Amusements in quarters--The British prepare to quit France, 308 CHAPTER XVI. Author's Battalion embark for England--Land at Plymouth--Expect to be again ordered on Foreign Service--Order received--Embark, with other Troops, for America--Land at Pine Island, 322 CHAPTER XVII. Proceed to attack the Enemy, and capture one of their picquets--Advance in search of a Bivouack--Alarmed by shots in front--Fired on by an American schooner--Captain Hallen severely attacked--Manoeuvres on both sides--Ruse of the Enemy--Fighting continues--Enemy repulsed at all points--Courage of the British--Battery brought into play--Activity of the Enemy, 339 CHAPTER XVIII. British Army told off into Brigades--Advance, and are hotly received--Heroism of a young Artillery Officer--We take up a fresh position--The Enemy work incessantly in raising an extensive breastwork--Two Batteries erected, from which our heavy Ship Artillery are brought to bear against it, but without effect--The Enemy also place their Ship Guns on Batteries--Colonel Lambert arrives with the 7th and 43d regiments--Preparations for a grand attack on the Enemy's lines, which entirely fails, and the British are repulsed with great loss, 357 CHAPTER XIX. Bravery and Success of Colonel Thornton--Negotiation for leave to transport the Wounded across the River--Insult offered to the British--They retreat--Our Army embark, and determine to make an Attack upon Mobile--Proceed in the direction of Mobile Bay--A Brigade detached to reduce Fort Boyer--The Fort surrenders, the garrison becoming Prisoners of War--Intelligence of a Treaty of Peace being concluded at Ghent--Cessation of Hostilities, 378 CHAPTER XX. Ratification of the Treaty of Peace--Exchange of Prisoners--Our Troops Embark for England--When off the coast of Ireland, receive Intelligence of Bonaparte's escape from Elba--The Author and his Battalion reach the Downs, and proceed to Thorncliffe--Embark for France--Arrive at Paris, and occupy the Champs Elysées--Review of the Russian Guards--Russian Discipline--British Troops reviewed--Accident to Prince Blucher--Amusements in Paris--The Allied Forces, except the Army of Occupation, leave Paris--The Author's Battalion embark for England--Reach Dover, and return to Thorncliffe--He obtains leave of absence, and visits his Family--His Battalion ordered to Ireland--Sets out to join it, accompanied by his Wife, who dies three days after they reach Dublin--His Battalion reduced--Joins the first Battalion at Gosport, which is ordered to Scotland--Arrive at Leith, and march to Glasgow--The Author returns home in ill health--His Father dies--Joins his Battalion again--Winters at home--His Battalion ordered to Ireland--Joins it at Belfast--They occupy different stations during the Whiteboy Insurrection--Six companies of his Battalion ordered to Nova Scotia, but the Author remains with the other four companies--He is shortly ordered to proceed to Nova Scotia--His health declines--Returns home in consequence, takes advantage of Lord Palmerston's Bill, and retires on full pay, 401 APPENDIX.--TESTIMONIALS.--No. 1. From Lieutenant-Colonel Duffy--No. 2. From Major Travers--No. 3. From Officers of the 2d Battalion--No. 4. From Lieut.-Colonel Ross, C.B.--No. 5. From Lieut.-Col. Smith, C.B.--No. 6. From Officers of the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade--No. 7. From Colonel Norcott, C.B.--No. 8. From Lieut.-Col. Fullarton, C.B.--No. 9. From Lieut.-Col. Balvaird--No. 10. From Major-General Sir A. F. Barnard, K.C.B.--No. 11. From Major Logan--No. 12. From Lieut.-Col. Beckwith, C.B.--No. 13. From Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Wm. Stewart, G.C.B.--No. 14. From Major Eeles--No. 15. From Major-General Sir T. S. Beckwith, K.C.B., 425 TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE RIFLE BRIGADE. CHAPTER I. Birth and Parentage--Enters the Militia--Volunteers into the Line--Joins the Army destined for Holland--The Troops embark at Deal--Land at the Helder--Laxity of discipline--March for Schagen--Detachment under Sir Ralph Abercromby sent to surprise Hoorne--Hoorne surrenders. I was born on the 4th of August, 1781, in the village of Corbridge, in the county of Northumberland; of parents who may be said to have been among the middle classes, my father being a tradesman. They gave me such an education as was customary with people of their station in life; viz. reading, writing, and arithmetic. My mother having sprung from a pious race, was the first to implant in my mind any sense of religion; indeed, it is to the spiritual seed sown in my heart by her during my youth, that I am indebted, under God, for having been brought, many years afterwards, to consider my ways, and to turn to Him. Nevertheless, being naturally of a sensual and wicked disposition, I, as might be expected, spent a dissolute youth, which often caused great pain and uneasiness to my good and pious mother. But I did not continue long under the paternal roof; for, having from my infancy a great predilection for a military life, I embraced almost the first opportunity that offered, after I became sufficiently grown, to enter into the militia of my native county. I enlisted on the 15th of November, 1798, being then little more than seventeen years of age. I entered this service with the determination that, should I not like a soldier's life, I would then, after remaining a few years in it, return home; but, if I did like it, to volunteer into the line, and make that my occupation for life. It will readily be believed that this undutiful step affected deeply my excellent parents; for though my father was not _then_ a religious man, he had a heart susceptible of the tenderest feelings; and I really believe that no parents ever felt more deeply the combined emotions of tender regret at my leaving them so young, and for such a purpose, and at the disgrace which my wayward conduct had, as they imagined, brought upon myself. But though evil in itself, God overruled it for good to me, and, I trust, to them also. I would here remark that the life of a soldier was by no means considered in my native village, at that time, as at all creditable; and when I sometimes in my boyhood used to exhibit symptoms of a military inclination, I was often taunted with the then opprobrious expression, "Ay, thou likes the smell of poother," intimating thereby that I was likely to disgrace myself by going for a soldier. I left my family in much grief in the beginning of 1799, and marched with several other recruits to join my regiment at Chelmsford in Essex, where we arrived in about a month, and where I began my military career. I always liked a soldier's life, consequently I did not suffer from many of those parts of it which are so unpleasant to those of a contrary disposition; and, as I took pleasure in it, I of course made more progress in acquiring a knowledge of my duty than some others who set out with me. I was early placed in the first squad, an honour which I considered no trifling one in those days,--but none of us finished our drill; for, in July of the same year, an order was issued, permitting such men as chose to extend their services, to volunteer into the line, in order to recruit the army then destined for Holland. We had previously marched from Chelmsford to Colchester, a distance of twenty-one miles, which march was to me, I think, the severest I ever underwent; for being young, and totally unaccustomed to any thing like it, the weight of the musket, bayonet, accoutrements, and knapsack, appeared, towards the latter end of the march, to be almost intolerable; but I kept up, although excessively tired. This will show how necessary it is at all times to accustom troops, destined for service, to move in such order as they will be expected to do when they take the field--for, if unaccustomed to the carriage of the knapsack, and to frequent marches with it for exercise, they will be utterly unable to perform any movement against, or in the face of an enemy, with that celerity necessary to ensure success. I volunteered, with several of my comrades, into the 56th regiment, or Pompadours, so called from their facings being Madame Pompadour's favourite colour, and we set off (carried in waggons to accelerate our movements) for Canterbury, which we reached in two days and one night, having travelled without making a halt; and there we joined the skeleton of our regiment, just then returned from the West Indies, where twice, during the war, it had been nearly exterminated by disease. In a few days after our arrival, a selection was made throughout the volunteers for fit subjects for the light company, when, fortunately, both myself and William Sutherland (who had been in the same company with me in the militia, and who, from our names and size being so nearly similar, had always stood next me in the ranks) were chosen for this, in my mind, honourable service. I felt not a little proud at my advancement, as I considered it, (and as I believe the generality of soldiers consider it,) to be made a light-bob. The regiment had not at this time either arms, appointments, or clothing; but, being in a few days sent off to Barham Downs, where the army for Holland was assembled and encamped, we soon after were supplied with the necessary equipment, and commenced without delay to drill and get the men in readiness for embarkation. At this time the flank companies of all those regiments destined for Holland were separated from their battalions, and formed into what are termed flank battalions. That in which my company was placed consisted of eleven light companies, the command of which was given to Lieut.-Col. Sharpe, of the 9th regiment, an experienced and gallant veteran, who had commanded a similar battalion in the eastern district, under the Earl of Chatham. The grenadier battalion was composed of an equal number of grenadier companies, and belonged to the same regiments to which ours belonged. Before our arrival on Barham Downs, the first division of the expedition, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, had sailed; and we soon after were called out to fire a _feu de joie_ for their capture of the Dutch fleet, and their having effected a landing and gained a victory near the Helder. Nothing could be more brilliant than our display upon this occasion appeared to me--we were nearly 20,000 strong, I imagine, and, being formed in one extensive line, the firing of the _feu de joie_ produced a fine effect. To my non-military readers, perhaps, it will be necessary to explain what is termed a _feu de joie_. The usual mode is, when formed in line, for the fire to commence by signal with the right file of the whole, and each of those on their left take it up rapidly in succession, so that, to a looker-on, it has the appearance of a wild-fire running along the line; but on this occasion we heightened the effect, by beginning with the right of the front rank only, and when it had passed along by the front, the left-hand man of the rear rank took it up, and so it passed along by the rear to the right again. It appeared to me, at that time, certainly the finest sight I had ever witnessed. Every heart present was elated with joy, and beat high to be led on to share in those glorious achievements which we were then celebrating; but, alas! we were then ignorant that we were as unfit at that time to suffer the toils and privations of a campaign, as if we had never seen a soldier; we were all young, and inexperienced in the highest degree, and our discipline, as might be naturally expected, was far from good; for, being an army hastily collected from every regiment of militia in the kingdom, the officers of course neither had that knowledge of the characters of their men, which is so essential, nor had the latter that confidence in their officers, which only a service together for some length of time can engender, and which is absolutely necessary to secure an unreserved and active obedience to their commands. But the period of our embarkation fast approached; previously to which, we were reviewed by his Royal Highness the Duke of York, (who was destined to command us,) accompanied by several others of the Royal Family, and by General Sir Charles Grey, my countryman. I believe they all expressed themselves highly satisfied with our appearance and movements, and hoped that we would shortly add fresh laurels to those already gained by our forerunners. As it was expected to be a service of only a short duration, it was determined that the men should embark in what is called "light marching" or "service order," that is, with only about half the usual complement of necessaries, consequently every soldier had to leave a considerable portion of his things behind him; and, in order to deposit them safely, empty casks were procured for each company, into which every man was ordered to stow his extra things, after being properly packed and labelled with his name, &c. This rather grieved me, for I had brought with me from home as good a kit (as the soldiers term it) as any in the army. My dear mother had prepared me shirts fine enough for any officer, and abundance of them, but of those thus left I never saw one afterwards. During our stay in this camp, I never enjoyed better health or greater lightness of spirits, forgetful or heedless of the deep and lasting anguish which my late rash step must naturally inflict upon the hearts of my tender and affectionate parents; but I was no doubt stimulated to this thoughtless forgetfulness of them, by witnessing the animating scenes around me, where all was bustle and high anticipation of more glorious doings. We marched from this camp to Deal, where we embarked in transports already prepared to receive us. As soon as we arrived we were instantly put on board, but never shall I forget the effect which the sight of the sea, and such a number of ships of various sizes and descriptions, had upon me; for before this I had never been near the sea, although I had marched from the north to the south of England. But, to add to all the strange things which then met my view, we were instantly on marching down put into a large boat that lay high upon the beach; which, when filled with troops, they run down into the sea with astonishing rapidity, turning my stomach, as we entered the water, completely topsy-turvy. The effect of all this can better be conceived than described; we were immediately rowed off to, and put on board our transport, which happened to be a brig called the Zephyr of Shields. Here also every thing was quite new to me; but all was met and performed with the highest spirits, so far as sea-sickness permitted. We remained on board two or three days before the fleet was ready for sea; but at length we sailed with a favourable breeze, and in two or three days more we made the coast of Holland, and soon afterwards came to anchor within the Texel. Every thing being ready for landing, and the Helder being in our possession, we disembarked there on the 15th of September, 1799, having been just one week on board. We were formed on landing near the town, and waited till some others had disembarked, before we moved off. Among those regiments which landed, I remember the 35th was one. This regiment, after coming on shore, was drawn up close to us; they had not been long landed before the men began with their knives to cut off each other's hair, which then was worn in the shape of a club; this was done without any orders from their officers, and appeared to me, I confess, such a breach of discipline, as I could not have anticipated; for though on the whole it was an improvement, as later usage has shown, yet I apprehend for a body of soldiers, without any permission from higher authority, to take upon them to break through the long-established custom of the service, was such an utter renunciation of all obedience to authority, as directly to threaten with destruction the best interests of the army to which they belonged; however, at such a time it would perhaps have been attended with still worse consequences to have made an example of the offenders, although, had stricter discipline been enforced from the outset, I feel assured the army in general would have benefited by it. Towards evening, we moved forward through the town of Helder, and proceeded on our route towards Schagen, and halted for the night on the road, and where such as could find houses, of which there were a few straggling ones in the neighbourhood, got into them. I awoke in the night, and still fancied myself on board ship; for the wind and rain were beating violently against the little hovel into which a few of us had crept, and I imagined it was the dashing of the sea against the bow of the vessel. Indeed so strong was this imagination, that when I got up, I literally could not stand steady, not having been long enough on board, to acquire what is termed my "sea legs;" that is, I had not learned the art of standing steady when the vessel heeled; and, strange as it may appear to a person who has never been at sea, I believe most landsmen have the same feeling for some short time after being put on shore. We had each man been supplied with a blanket while in camp on Barham Downs, but had no proper or uniform mode of carrying them; we had no great-coats, but made use of the blanket sometimes as a substitute in the morning, when we turned out to proceed on our march. We certainly made a strange appearance. Some had their blankets thrown around them, others had them twisted up like a horse collar, and tied over their shoulders in the manner of a plaid; while some had them stuffed into, and others tied on to the top of their knapsack; in short, we appeared like any thing but _regular_ troops. We moved forward as soon as we were formed, and early in the day reached Schagen-bruck, where his Royal Highness stood to inspect us as we marched past. Near this place we fell in with some of the Russian regiments, they having landed nearly at the same time, and of which nation there were, I believe, about 20,000 troops expected to join our army. But if we appeared irregular and grotesque, I know not well how to describe them; their riflemen were shod with boots very much resembling those of our fishermen, coming up considerably higher than the knee; thus rendering them, I should imagine, incapable of celerity of movement, one of the chief requisites in a rifle corps; they also wore large cocked hats and long green coats. Their grenadiers were dressed more apropos, having high sugar-loaf shaped caps, mounted with a great deal of brass, and projecting forward at the top, with long coats, and gaiters reaching above the knee. Their regular infantry were nearly similar to the grenadiers, only they wore cocked hats instead of caps. The regiment which we saw on this occasion had with it, I should think, full half as many followers as soldiers, some of whom carried immensely large copper kettles; others the provisions, and others the officers' baggage; in short, these were the scullions, the cooks, and, as it were, the beasts of burden of the regiment; but this was a bad system, for it increased by one half the number of mouths to fill, and must have been attended with the worst consequences when provisions were scarce. The officers, I remember, carried what was formerly used in our service, a long sort of pole, with a head like a halberd, and called, I believe, a "spontoon." This, on passing a general at a review, the officer twists and twirls around his head, precisely as a drum-major in our service does his cane. When we had passed his Royal Highness at the bridge, we moved forward to the town of Schagen, and took up our quarters in the church. I thought this extremely odd, as I had been accustomed to view so sacred an edifice with more reverence than to suppose they would quarter soldiers in it; but we were stowed in it as thick as we could well be, and made the best of our quarters; some taking the chancel, others the vestry, and some the body of the church; nay, some even took up their lodging in the reading-desk and pulpit. We could contrive to make out the Lord's prayer in Dutch, but could not well proceed further, although there is much similarity between that language and the English of my native county. Here, for the first time, we learnt that our brigade was what was called the _reserve_, and commanded by Colonel M'Donald of the 55th regiment; but on this occasion and in Egypt, the reserve was not what is generally understood by that term, for in both places it was composed of some of the best troops in the expedition, and was generally first called into action. On this occasion, the reserve consisted of the 23d Welsh fusileers, the 55th regiment, the grenadier battalion before mentioned, and our light battalion. We remained here till the 18th, when towards evening we were ordered under arms, having been previously supplied with provisions; and, after every preliminary was adjusted, we set forward on our march towards the city of Hoorne, situated on the Zuyder Zee. Of our destination, the men, of course, were totally ignorant, but no doubt the officers knew. It turned out that about 8000 troops had been appointed for this service, the execution of which was intrusted to that gallant old veteran, and hitherto successful general, Sir Ralph Abercromby. The intention was to make a rapid and extensive flank movement during the night, and surprise and capture the said city, while his Royal Highness was to attack the enemy in front. We moved off as it became dark, but such was the state of the roads that it became the most trying and distressing march that I believe ever troops undertook; the roads were literally knee deep in mud in most places, while every now and then they were rendered nearly impassable, both by the enemy having broken down the bridges over the innumerable canals and dikes which intersect this country, and these canals in many places having overflowed their banks. None but those who have experienced this or something similar, can form an idea of the fatigue attending a night march in such a country, where the column is large. We marched, I think, in sections of about eight file, that is, with eight men abreast in the front rank, and the like number in the rear rank covering them. Conceive, then, your arriving at an obstacle which the darkness of the night multiplies a hundred-fold. Not more than one man will attempt to pass this obstacle at the same time, and he has to grope his way; consequently all the other fifteen men must stand still, or nearly so, till he is over, before they each move on in turn. Multiply this by the 300 sections behind, and you will have a halt for the rear of probably an hour or more; standing all this while nearly up to the knees in mire; or, what is worse, as each regiment has accomplished the task of getting over, this of course causes the others in the rear to be drawing up towards it by degrees, so that probably you are compelled to stand (or, if you choose, you may lie down in the mud) for a quarter of an hour, or more perhaps; and then move on again for the space of a few hundred yards, and then another halt; so that could you lie down to enjoy a little rest, the constant cry of "forward" resounding in your ears, just as you begin to close your eyes, renders it the most tiresome and trying situation that I know of. It is true, the head of the column does not suffer in an equal proportion with those in the rear, or a night march in an enemy's country would be a dangerous operation. During this march, I remember, when the road was extremely deep, some one on the right of my section called out that there was an excellent path a little beyond him; when one poor fellow moved in that direction, but had not made many steps, till souse he went into a deep canal. Whether the man who called out had been actually deceived by the smooth surface of the water, which appeared in the dark like a nice level road; or whether he did it through mischief, I know not, but the poor simpleton who followed his advice paid dearly for his curiosity, being with some difficulty extricated from his uncomfortable situation. I may observe that these canals or dikes skirt both sides of every road in this part of Holland, and are even made use of as fences for the fields, there not being any hedges or walls that I remember to have seen. About break of day we reached the city, which at once surrendered; but just before daylight, I became so excessively weary that I could not continue in the ranks any longer; indeed men had been dropping out for some hours before, so that, I suppose, when the head of the column reached Hoorne, one half the number had fallen out; for it was beyond the powers of human nature to sustain such excessive fatigue. I, with two or three others, got behind a house that stood by the roadside, and laid ourselves down on a paved footpath which led from the back-door. Never in my life did I experience a greater luxury than this appeared to be, where something hard, and that would keep me out of the deep and filthy mire, could be found to rest upon. I laid me down and slept as soundly as ever I did in my life for about an hour, which quite refreshed me. We then got up and set off with all despatch to overtake the column, which we came up with and joined just as they halted after reaching the city. None of the troops entered the place, I believe; but my battalion being towards the rear of the column, was at a considerable distance from it. All now lay down to rest, and such as had houses near them occupied them; but those who had not, chose the driest parts of the canal bank or road, and all were soon buried in profound sleep, excepting those who were placed on guard. CHAPTER II. The Russian Allies carry Bergen--Allow themselves to be surprised, and the whole Army forced to retire to their former position--Skirmishing in the vicinity of Old Patten--The Russians endeavour to force their way back to Bergen--The Russian and British Forces joined--The Enemy forced to abandon Egmont-op-Zee--Alkmaar surrenders--The Troops advance to Egmont Binnen--Skirmishing--General Engagement--The Enemy repulsed--The Forces retire to Zaand Wyck--Armistice concluded--Return to England. From daylight we had heard a heavy and constant cannonade towards our right and rear. His Royal Highness, with the remainder of the army, as was before intimated, had moved forward and attacked the main body of the enemy; but as I did not witness this action, I forbear to relate what I heard concerning it, further than this, that the Russians who attacked the enemy posted in the neighbourhood of Bergen, having by some mismanagement allowed themselves to be surprised after having carried that village, the whole army had been obliged to retire to their former position. In consequence of this failure, I believe, we were ordered towards evening to fall in, and (what appeared annoying in the extreme) to retrace our weary footsteps by the same dirty road by which we had advanced. Nearly the same fatigue and misery were endured as in our advance; but the column did not keep so much together as before, the men falling out by hundreds, so that the stoppages were not quite so great. We did not return to Schagen after our retreat, but were cantoned in some villages in front of that town; and a few days afterwards we were moved to the right of Schagen, through Schagen-bruck, to a farm hamlet called Zaand Wyck. Here we remained till the 1st of October; but I should not omit to mention, that we had, during the intervening period, several marches, all of which were made by night, and in which similar sufferings and fatigue were endured as in the march to Hoorne. This, it may probably be remembered, was one of the wettest autumns almost upon record; and in these marches we generally had the full benefit of the torrents which fell in this naturally wet country. I have actually seen the water running out at the bottom of the men's trowsers like that from the gutter which carries the rain from the roof of a house. When we had not a night march, we invariably had to be at our alarm post an hour before daybreak,--and that being about four miles distant from our quarter at this time, we never had what may be called a full night's rest. Military men will know that the custom of being at the alarm post before daybreak is almost universal; for, that being the usual time of attack, it behoves those who are apprehensive of a visit from the enemy to be on the look-out, and to be prepared to receive them when they come--here they remain, till, as the vulgar phrase goes, "You can see a white horse a mile off," that is, till it is clear daylight, and they have ascertained that no enemy is in the neighbourhood; after which, if all be quiet, they retire to their quarters. Our accommodations at Zaand Wyck may be said to have been good, for our officers had a farm-house to live in, and we had a good dry barn and other outhouses to lie down in; and in which I enjoyed some comfortable nights' lodgings. But on the 1st of October, in the afternoon, we were ordered to fall in, it having been previously intimated to us that we might probably have a brush with the enemy. We were, of course, all life and glee on receiving the information, and the usual quantity of provisions having been issued, and every other preparation made in the night, we moved off by the same road by which we had usually advanced to our alarm post. This we passed, and then entered a most unpleasant country to march through; it being nearer the enemy, of course all bridges and other communications had been destroyed. As we moved on, a little after daylight we were overtaken by the 11th light dragoons, on which we were ordered to open to the right and left to let them pass us. They seemed in high spirits, and some of them cried out, as they passed us, "Go on, my lads, lather them well, and we'll come up and shave them." Sir Walter Scott mentions this saying as made use of by some of the cavalry at Waterloo, as if it were at that time new; but I can assure him it is as old as 1799, if not much older, for I certainly heard it used on this occasion, and I know not but it may have been said long before. The cavalry inclined, after passing us, to their left, while we kept down towards the sea; and soon after, on ascending a small eminence, we got a view of the village of Old Patten, where we discovered about 10,000 or 12,000 of our army drawn up near the sea-beach. We passed them, and moved forward in the direction of a high range of sand-hills, which commenced about a mile beyond the village, and which overlooked all the plain below. Here the enemy was posted, and I was told that they began as soon as we were within reach to cannonade us; but from the heads of the men in front, I could not perceive any appearance of such cannonade, nor do I believe that any of their shot reached us. A little farther on, however, we met a Russian yager, or rifleman, coming back and holding out his hand, which had been wounded, and from which the blood was flowing pretty copiously. This was the first blood that I had ever seen as drawn in hostile conflict, and it certainly produced a somewhat strange effect upon me; it showed plainly that we were in the immediate vicinity of that enemy we had so often talked about, and whom we hoped to conquer; that now the time had arrived which would infallibly prove what every man, boaster or not, was made of; and that it might happen that it was my lot to fall. Having reflected (rather confusedly I own) on the passing scene before me, and offered up an occasional prayer to Him who alone can cover the head in the day of battle, we now approached the bottom of this sandy eminence, when my company was ordered to unfix bayonets, (for we had previously primed and loaded,) and dash on at double quick time till we came in contact with the enemy. No time was left for reflection now, the immediate duty we had to perform occupied all our attention fully; we soon got into a smart fire from the enemy's riflemen, which we found was the only description of troops, except a few artillery, that we had to contend with, their main bodies of heavy infantry being on the right and left of this sandy range, which in some places was about a mile in breadth, in others more or less. After the fight had fairly commenced, we kept but little order, owing partly to the want of discipline and experience in our people, and partly to the nature of the ground, which was rugged and uneven in the extreme, being one continued range of sand-hills, with hollows more or less deep between them; and partly it may be attributed to the ardour of our young men, who pressed on perhaps too rapidly. We continued to advance, and never once made a retrograde movement, the enemy regularly retiring from height to height on our approach; but they had greatly the advantage over us in point of shooting, their balls doing much more execution than ours; indeed it cannot be wondered at, for they were all riflemen, trained to fire with precision, and armed with a weapon which seldom fails its object if truly pointed; while we were (what shall I say) totally ignorant of that most essential part of a soldier's duty. They consequently suffered little from our fire; but we could not believe this, and tried to persuade ourselves they had either buried their dead in the sand before we came up to them, or carried them off as they retreated; but experience has since taught me to know that we then must have done them little harm. About the middle of the day, as I and a young man of the name of Thomas Bambrough (a countryman of my own, and who had volunteered with me,) were moving on in company, in passing through one of the valleys to an opposite height, we were assailed by a little volley from a group of the enemy which we discovered on a hill in front of us; one of which shots took effect in poor Bambrough's thigh just about the ham; he instantly fell, and roared out most piteously; I laid down my musket and endeavoured to hoist him on my back, in order to take him out of the fire, which they now poured in without intermission; but in this I failed, for he was so completely disabled by the wound, as to be rendered totally helpless, and it was so extremely painful that he could not bear the least movement. I felt constrained to leave him, although I did so with reluctance, telling him that I would push on to the height we had first in view, to which I then perceived some more of our men had advanced, and would drive the enemy from their position; of course all this was not literally told him, but something to that effect was said; and I found that the moment I left him they ceased to fire on him; and, as I promised, we did drive off the enemy. Shortly after, some of our own people came up to where poor Bambrough lay, and carried him off to the rear; he was sent to an hospital, where he soon after died, they not being able, I understand, to extract the ball. Soon after this, there were some tremendous volleys of musketry heard on our left, apparently down in the plain below us. I, with one or two others, now inclined a little towards the left, in order to have a peep at the troops there, so hotly opposed to each other, in doing which, we still kept our line in front of the enemy's skirmishers. We found it was the Russian army endeavouring to force their way towards the village of Bergen, the scene of their former disaster; but they were most distressingly retarded by the innumerable canals or ditches, by which the country was so intersected, and which were generally impassable by fording. On some occasions I could perceive, when they had found an entrance into an enclosure, and had fought their way to the farther side of it, they were obliged to retrace their steps, and get out by the same way by which they had entered, the enemy all this while pouring into them a close and destructive fire. This appeared to me to be most trying to their patience, and very disheartening; but they bore it with great steadiness. Meantime, our own heavy troops were advancing on the right by the sea-beach, where was a plain of sand, of perhaps from 100 to 200 yards in breadth; the sand-hills between the two wings, as I said before, being swept by us, assisted by a small corps of Russian riflemen. We moved on till we got a little in advance of the Russian army, (which, from the obstacles they had to contend with, did not make very rapid progress,) and immediately over the village of Bergen, which stood on the plain, close under the sand-hills. Here, the enemy being in possession of considerable field-works, plied us pretty plenteously with shells from their howitzers, (their guns they could not elevate sufficiently to reach us,) but from which we suffered very little; for our people being much extended, and the sand being deep, the bursting of the shells was attended with very little mischief. Indeed, for a long time, I did not know what they were; for, having several times heard a loud explosion pretty near, I actually looked round to see the gun, which I imagined had fired, but could perceive nothing but a cloud of smoke rising from the spot, and the small bushes and herbs about it on fire. I thought it strange, and it was not till it was several times repeated, that we discovered what it really was, for my comrades were equally ignorant with myself. At length, towards the close of the afternoon, a loud and heavy fire of musketry broke out on our right, which continued for a considerable time, and then ceased. This was our heavy infantry, who had advanced by the sea-shore, and who had now approached the village of Egmont-op-Zee, where the enemy made a most determined stand, but at last were driven back with great slaughter, and our people took possession of the town. From this place the battle derives its name. A little after dark, the enemy abandoned Bergen also, so that we ceased any longer to be annoyed by their shells, which they continued to throw while they held possession of the place. But a short while before they retired, one was thrown, which pitched just close over my company, (for we had then been collected, and were formed in close order immediately above the town,) and where Colonel Sharpe and another officer were walking; it lay for a second or two hissing and burning, and might be expected every moment to explode. Their road lay close past it; the veteran however took no notice of it, but continued his walk and conversation the same as if nothing had occurred, and without going an inch out of his way. It burst with a tremendous report, but fortunately without doing either of them the least injury. I confess I thought it rather _too brave_; for it appeared to me that he might have walked a little farther from it, or stopped for a moment or two without any imputation on his courage; but people do not all see things exactly alike. Our loss in this action was but trifling, considering the extent of the operations. We had in my company only about fourteen or fifteen men killed and wounded; among the latter were my two countrymen, Bambrough, as before noticed, and Sutherland. One man of our company, I was told, in charging a fieldpiece, was struck down by the wind of the ball, and which, although it did not touch him, brought blood from his mouth, nose, and ears; he never after thoroughly recovered the effects of it. I do not remember ever to have felt more fatigued than I did after this day's work. We had marched before commencing the action, I should think, twelve miles or more. We had been kept upon the run the greater part of the day, and had fought over nearly as much more ground, through loose sand, sometimes nearly up to the middle of the leg, and over ground so extremely uneven, that a few miles of leisurely walking on such, would be more than I should be able to accomplish now; and we had been nearly all the day deprived of every sort of liquid, for our canteens were soon emptied of what little they contained in the morning, and having myself fired nearly 150 rounds of ammunition, the powder of which, in biting off the ends of the cartridges, had nearly choked me. What would I not have given for a good drink? I felt completely exhausted, and laid me down with the others with great good-will on the top of one of the sand-hills. But the night proved extremely wet, so that every one of us was very soon as completely soaked as if he had been dragged through a river; and, to crown my misfortunes, I was without a blanket. Here I must confess my folly, that others similarly situated may profit by my experience. Soon after the commencement of the action a rumour was spread along the line of skirmishers, that the Duke, seeing the very arduous duty we had to perform, had said, "Never mind, my lads, if your knapsacks are any encumbrance to you, and impede your running, throw them off, and I will take care you shall be furnished with others." No sooner did this silly report reach my ears, than I, with many others, equally simple, believed it, without taking time to consider that if even it were true, a knapsack and a blanket, (for they were together,) to be useful should be at hand when wanted. But, simpleton like, away went knapsack and blanket, and I felt greatly relieved in getting rid of such a burden, and now pushed on after the enemy with increased vigour, trying at the same time to persuade myself the report was true; although I own I occasionally had my doubts on the subject. But night came on, as I have said, and such a one as I have seldom seen for wet, and then I plainly perceived that I had played the young soldier. An officer of ours of the name of Lacy, who had formerly been the captain of the Northumberland light company, and who volunteered with us, offered any man half a guinea for the use of a blanket for that night only, but without being able to obtain one: this will give some idea of the kind of night it was. I had nothing for it, but just to put the cock of my musket between my knees, to keep it as dry as possible, and lay myself down as I was. I endeavoured to get as close as I could to one who had a blanket, and lay down with my head at his feet, which he had covered up very comfortably with his blanket. The rain pelted so heavily and so incessantly on my face, that I ventured after a while to pull a little corner of this man's blanket just to cover my cheek from the pitiless storm, and in this situation snatched a comfortable nap; but he awakening in the night, and finding that I had made free with the corner of his blanket, rudely pulled it from off my face, and rolled it round his feet again. I was fain to lie still and let it pelt away, and even in this exposed situation I got some sleep, so completely were the powers of nature exhausted by fatigue. At length morning arose and showed us to ourselves, and such a group of sweeps we had seldom seen. Our clothing was literally all filth and dirt; our arms the colour of our coats with rust; and our faces as black as if we had come out of a coal-pit. In biting off the ends of the cartridges, there are generally a few grains of powder left sticking on the lips and about the mouth; these, accumulated as they must have been by the great quantity of ammunition each of us had fired, and with the profuse perspiration we were in during the heat of the day, added to the wet which fell upon us during the night, had caused the powder to run all over our faces; so that in the morning we cut the most ludicrous figure imaginable. However we immediately set about getting our arms again in trim, for though the enemy had left us masters of the field of action, they were not far distant from us. We soon got our firelocks again in fighting order; that is, they would go off, though the brightness, on which a clean soldier piques himself, was gone past recovery at this time. I now felt rather sore from firing my piece so often; the recoil against my shoulder and breast had blackened them, and rendered them rather painful, and the middle finger of my right hand was completely blackened and swoln from the same cause. At this time it was reported that a sad accident had occurred in our battalion; a soldier of one of our companies, in cleaning his musket, had by some awkwardness allowed it to go off, and an officer being immediately in front of where he was standing, the ball had taken effect upon him, and killed him on the spot. After getting ourselves brushed up a little, the whole battalion was brought together, and moved to the right into the town of Egmont-op-Zee, where the guards and some other regiments had been since the evening before, after beating the enemy out of it, as I before mentioned. We remained here for that day, during which Alkmaar surrendered, and then advanced to the village of Egmont Binnen, or Egmont-op-Hoof, I am not certain which it is called, a few miles in front, and close by the sea. I omitted to mention, that our fight of the 2d took place over the ground from which Lord Duncan's victory derived its name, _i. e._ Camperdown. This headland, I fancy, we must have passed during that day's operations--But to return. We remained in Egmont Binnen till the morning of the 6th, when my battalion was ordered to fall in and march towards the outposts, a few miles in front, in order, as we understood, to relieve our grenadier battalion, which had been out since the day before. We advanced by the sea-shore, but had not gone far before we saw and heard unequivocal signs that we should have something more than outpost duty to perform; the fact is, the enemy was rapidly advancing, their force in front having been greatly augmented by reinforcements; but when about two miles from the village, we met a soldier of the 11th light dragoons bringing in a French officer, whom he had taken prisoner. He belonged to the chasseurs-à-cheval, a sort of mounted light troops, who can act either as infantry or cavalry, as occasion may require. When we met them, and while they stood talking for a moment, I could not help thinking it would have made a fine subject for a painting; for the officer was most superbly dressed in dark green, with a richly embroidered pouch-belt over his shoulder, and with a deep cut across his cheek, from which the blood was streaming over an extremely handsome face; indeed he was altogether a most interesting figure, and, contrasted with the rough features and haughty bearing of the proud trooper who had taken him, produced a fine effect. The fellow gave his horse a slap over the flank with the flat of his sword, and set off with his prisoner, crying out, that there were plenty more of them to take, and that he would soon return and bring in another. As we advanced, we could plainly perceive the enemy in front, skirmishing with our grenadiers, and we also saw that they possessed a pretty strong body of cavalry--a species of troops we had not encountered on the 2d. We could distinctly perceive the cavalry wading into the sea as far as their horses could go, in order, as we imagined, to see past the point of a projecting sand-hill, which obstructed their view of the beach beyond it; but when they perceived that the force which was advancing against them was not great, they attacked our grenadiers with increased vivacity, and we soon after came in contact with them, for they were advancing with as great rapidity as if no force was in front to oppose them. We soon perceived that they were nearly four times our numbers, and were obliged to adopt such a _ruse de guerre_ as is frequently practised by the weaker party, but which had no effect, I am sorry to say, on this occasion,--that is, while one part of our force was skirmishing, the remainder got behind sand-hills a little in rear, and letting the men's heads just show over their tops, as if standing in columns of battalions, tried to induce the enemy to believe that each separate body which appeared was of that force; but no, Johnny (as the soldiers sometimes call the French) was not so easily gulled, for they had previously ascertained pretty accurately the strength of our force in front of them, by the operation of the cavalry before mentioned. They therefore pressed on us with the most desperate fury, and in overwhelming numbers. We maintained the action as well as our limited means permitted, and for a while kept tolerable order; but as the fight became hotter, and the disparity of force more apparent, I regret to say, our young troops fell into considerable disorder and confusion. This giving the enemy greater confidence, of course he availed himself of it, and attacked us with redoubled impetuosity; and, I lament to say, our dismayed and disheartened young soldiers fell from one degree of confusion to another, till at length all order seemed entirely lost amongst us; and what was at first a rather regular retreat, became at last a disorderly flight; for wherever an attempt was made to check the ardour of the enemy, the immense inequality of force they possessed soon completely overthrew the few that stood; and many were the brave fellows, both officers and men, who fell in this unequal contest, without their having the slightest chance of successfully opposing our impetuous foe. The flight now became more like a race than any thing else, and I imagine they drove us not less than three or four miles without giving us time to breathe; but when we had reached within about a mile of the village we had left in the morning, we perceived some regiments advancing to our succour; among them was the 23d, which advanced in line, and showed so good and steady a front as quite delighted us. We could also perceive to our left, that the Russians had become engaged with the force in front of them, and were holding it at bay; indeed by this time the action had extended considerably into the country, and some others of the British troops, I understand, were soon engaged. On the coming up of the reinforcement, the 23d in particular, our straggling and broken troops, which had been so wofully beaten, now united, and again advanced upon the enemy; and when the 23d had given them a volley or two, the French gave way and retreated with as great precipitation as they had advanced. In short the tables were turned upon them, and the pursuit of them now was equally rapid with our retreat before them a short while previously; and before the action ceased, we had driven them considerably beyond where we encountered them in the morning. Night scarcely put an end to the action, for the firing continued long after dark, each party being directed by the fire from the arms of their opponents; the unwillingness to desist on our part, I attribute to a desire of revenge for the disgrace they had inflicted on us in the morning. Towards the evening it came on exceedingly wet. Nothing could surpass the steadiness and fine appearance of the 23d, on entering into action; but they were all old soldiers, while our two battalions were composed altogether, I may say, of volunteers from the militia, who had as little idea of service in the field, as if newly taken from the plough. I would just remark here, that from what I have witnessed upon different occasions, I should never be inclined to put very much confidence in raw troops of whatever nation, or of what stuff soever they may be composed, for it is certain, that without being at all deficient in point of courage, they have not that confidence in their own powers which soldiers who are inured to service possess; and if hastily or hotly set upon, while without the aid and example of others more experienced than themselves, it is many chances to one I think that they will give way. So it was on this occasion. Nothing could exceed the materials of which these two battalions were composed, had they had the advantage of a little more experience; and no troops could fight better than they did, after gaining the support and countenance of the old regiments which were sent to reinforce them. But I confess with shame, we showed a great want of nerve in the early part of the day, although to any troops the occasion must have been one of severe trial. When the retreat had degenerated into a flight, and every one seemed intent only on making the best of his way to the rear, I, with some others who were among the hills, imagined we could get on faster if we took to the sea-beach, which, although it also was composed of deep sand, yet was level, and could not be so very fatiguing as climbing the innumerable hills over which we had to retreat. Away we accordingly set for the beach; but we had forgotten to calculate that if the beach would facilitate our retreat, it also would the enemy's advance. This we soon discovered, for we had scarcely descended from the hills when we found ourselves almost surrounded by the enemy; and it was not without the utmost exertion in our power that we were enabled to effect our escape, the balls flying thicker about us during our short stay here than they had done all the day before. My haversack was a great encumbrance to me on this occasion, for, having lost my knapsack as before related, I was obliged to stuff every thing I possessed into this inconvenient bag; which, hanging so low as to knock against my thighs, greatly impeded my progress to the rear, and had nigh got me lodged in a French prison. A girl, who had followed a grenadier belonging to my regiment when he volunteered out of the militia, accompanied her protector during the whole of this day's operations, and shared equally with him every danger and fatigue to which he was exposed, and no argument could prevail upon her to leave him till the whole business was over, and till the battalion to which her sweetheart belonged was sent to the rear at night. I am not certain whether it was his Royal Highness's intention to have fought this day, or whether the action was brought on fortuitously; but certainly, although we began the fight under very unfavourable circumstances, and things looked rather awkward at one part of the day, no army ever got a more complete drubbing than the French did before the business terminated. I have since learnt that the action became general along the whole line towards the close of the day. Thus ended the last affair between the British and French troops during that unfortunate expedition. The next day we fell back upon Egmont Binnen, leaving sufficiently strong outposts to occupy the ground we had taken, and this day I was fortunate enough to pick up the shell of an artilleryman's knapsack who had been killed in one of the late fights; but for necessaries I was totally destitute, and began soon after to feel the effects of my folly in throwing away my own. A little before midnight of the evening of the 7th, we were again ordered under arms with all dispatch and without noise, and had no doubt it was for the purpose of advancing as before, so as to reach the enemy's line by daylight next morning. How great then was our surprise and disappointment, when we turned our faces towards the rear, and filed out of the village by the road leading towards our old quarters! We moved on in silence till we reached Egmont-op-Zee, where the flashes from a large coal fire erected by way of lighthouse, shed a melancholy gleam over our columns as we passed beneath the hill on which it was erected. Here also by the sea lay innumerable dead bodies, both of men and horses, together with broken tumbrils and other sad emblems of the devastation which a few days previously had been made on this very ground; for here it was that the heat and principal part of the action of the 2d took place, when the heavy columns of the opposing armies came in contact with each other. It would not be easy to describe our feelings as we moved sadly and silently along, knowing, as we now did, that we were for ever abandoning all the advantages that we had hitherto gained, after so much toil, privations, and loss as we had suffered; but it was useless to repine. Our leaders must know better than we could possibly do, what state the army was in, and what likelihood remained of effecting the object for which we came into the country; our duty therefore was to obey, without questioning the propriety of our present movement, however unpleasant it might be to our feelings. We passed by Old Patten, near to which the action of the 2d commenced, and finally returned to our old quarters at Zaand Wyck, which we reached some time next day, and where I found my comrade Sutherland, who had been here for some days; his wound, which was through the shoulder, not having disabled him from making his way thus far. He had some mutton already cooked, of which I partook with great relish, for I needed refreshment much; and after taking a swig out of his canteen, I laid me down and slept most soundly, rejoiced and thankful that I had so comfortable a home to return to. We remained in this quarter only a day or two, and then our brigade was removed towards the left of the line, which, as well as I remember, rested upon Kolhorn. My battalion occupied the village of Basingohorn, to which we had retired on a former occasion; I mean on our retreat from Hoorne. This was one of the villages farthest in advance, consequently it became an outpost. A night or two passed quietly, but on the second or third night, a firing commenced from the advanced sentries all along the line. Whether the enemy had merely been making a reconnoissance, or whether they had intended to advance in force, and our discovering them altered their plan, I know not, but think the former the more probable; but be as it may, it had the effect of turning out our whole line of outposts, which, as might be expected, prepared to give them the best reception we were able. I remember on this occasion putting in two balls when we were ordered to load, as I was determined not to spare them, for I (with all my comrades I believe) felt sore at having been obliged to yield up all the advantages we had gained, to an enemy which we certainly did not consider as having fairly won them from us in action, but who were more indebted to the severity of the weather, producing such disastrous consequences on our young army, than to their prowess in the field. They retired, however, without giving us an opportunity of welcoming them in the manner we intended. A few days after this, on the 19th October, it came to my turn to be one of the advanced sentries. About break of day, while musing of many things, of home with all its comforts, and contrasting it with my then rather uncomfortable situation, I was suddenly aroused from my reverie by the beating of drums and sounding of trumpets and music, &c., all along the French line. I could not conjecture the cause of all this, for although it is customary to sound and beat the réveille at this hour, yet never having heard the French do so before, I concluded something more than ordinary had occurred to cause them to do so on this occasion, and I need hardly inform my reader that I kept a good look-out, in order that they should not catch us napping. In a short while, however, the mystery was cleared up; for an officer of ours came round all the advanced sentries to tell us, that, as an armistice had been concluded, we were not any longer to prevent the country-people from passing and repassing, as we had formerly had orders to do. I imagine the festive noises which I heard arose from this circumstance having taken place, for I believe the French were tired enough of the business, although they had now become in some measure the assailants; or else the cessation of hostilities allowed them to resume their wonted custom of beating the réveille in the morning. Seeing we had failed in our attempt to wrest the country from the French, and that no hope now remained of our ever being in a condition to effect it, the prospect of returning home once more became a pleasing consideration, and I fully gave way to it. My comrades also now began to turn their thoughts homeward, and cheerfulness once more beamed on countenances which for some days past had been rather gloomy. But by this time the dysentery had made sad ravages among our young and inexperienced soldiery, for on a day soon after this, we could in my company muster on parade only eighteen men out of one hundred, of which it was composed at the outset. This inefficiency was caused principally by disease, although we had certainly lost a fair proportion in the field. It was therefore well that our removal to a more favourable soil was about speedily to take place; and wisely had his Royal Highness acted in agreeing to evacuate a country, the climate of which had been so extremely prejudicial to his army. About this time also, I began to have my personal trials and sufferings; for now I began to feel the full effect of my folly on the 2d inst., in throwing away my knapsack, for I had not a change of any description, and the consequence may be easily conjectured. Filth and vermin now began to add poignancy to my other sufferings, but I bore up against them all as well as I was able; and I have reason to thank God, that the strength of a good constitution enabled me to continue my duty without yielding for one day to the accumulated effects of these disagreeables. Soon after this also, the good people of England, commiserating our uncomfortable situation, sent out presents of flannel shirts and shoes, which arrived most opportunely. I was not fortunate enough to obtain one of the former necessary articles, but my sergeant kindly put me down for a pair of shoes, of which I stood in great need, and now beg to return my best thanks to the kind friends who sent them, although at the time we expected we should have to pay for them. In a short while after this, the grenadiers and light battalions were broken up, and each company returned and joined its own proper regiment. We joined ours (the 56th) at a weeshaus (or poorhouse), situated on the great canal which connects this part of Holland with Alkmaer, and not far from Schagen-bruck. Here we were occupied for a few days in putting things in the best order we could, previous to our embarkation. About the 3d November we marched for the Helder, from whence we went on board. On our way down, one of my comrades, who was not over scrupulous in expressing his sentiments, was railing bitterly against the mismanagement (as he imagined) of the expedition, and saying, "he hoped the next time we came to that country, should we ever come again, that we would leave it under more favourable circumstances." General Manners (to whose brigade we now belonged) was riding close behind, unknown to this complainer, and overheard every word he said. When the soldier had finished, the General most good-naturedly rode up to him, and began to argue the matter with him. "Why," says he, "although we are leaving the country, it is not from the enemy having compelled us to do so from his superior bravery or success in the field, for we have fought only five actions since landing, and in four of these we have been the conquerors; it is owing solely to the great sickness and consequent inefficiency of the army that we have been compelled to this measure." I could not but admire the affability and kindness of the General, and was fully satisfied myself, and so were all who heard him, of, I believe, the justness of the remarks he made. We reached the Helder the same day, where we remained doing duty till the 10th November, on which we embarked on board his Majesty's ship Romney, of fifty guns, commanded by Captain Lawford, (afterwards by Sir Home Popham.) She was only a small vessel of her class, and yet our whole regiment was put on board her; we indeed were not very strong, but she was crowded beyond measure, for many, nay, most of the troops had not literally lying room, each company having barely the space between two guns, which, I should think, is not more than twelve feet at the utmost, and even here the sailors, whether with or without orders I know not, slung their hammocks over us. I particularly remember this being the case, for I had the second night, by way of securing room to stretch myself, lain down between decks early in the evening, and had had some little repose, when a sailor, whose hammock was slung right over me, and while standing and making it, put his foot right on my cheek, and stood there till he had finished. I know not whether he knew that it was a human head he was treading on, but I judged it best to be as quiet as possible; preferring the pain of bearing his weight on my head, rather than, by moving or crying out, to incur the risk of his foot slipping, and peeling the skin off my face. The voyage was fortunately short, for in seven days we landed at Yarmouth, glad and rejoiced that this unpleasant and ill-fated expedition was terminated. I know not whether my reader is old enough to remember the autumn of which I have been speaking, but to me it appeared one of the wettest and most uncomfortable that I ever remember; and it was here, while exposed to its effects, that were laid, most probably, the seeds of that severe pulmonic affection from which I have since suffered so much. CHAPTER III. Arrive in England--The Pompadours embark for Ireland--Arrive at Kinsale--Privations in Ireland in 1800--Peace concluded--Our Author resolves to return home, but ultimately volunteers into the Rifle Corps or 95th--Embarks for England, and joins his Regiment at Sussex--Is promoted. We landed at Yarmouth on the 17th November, and the next day marched to Norwich, where we remained a few days, and where we found the people remarkably kind and attentive to our comforts; and, indeed, we now cut a most sorry figure, being literally nothing but rags and dirt; it was certainly a sad tax on the good landlords on whom we were billeted, to be compelled to find us lodgings, for we never left the beds unoccupied by some of the uncomfortable companions of our travels when we arose in the morning. I here began to find myself very unwell, for though I had borne up against sickness in the field, I could not now receive my food without feeling the most afflicting nausea, my stomach being completely out of order; and it was no wonder, for we had been compelled for several weeks past to drink the brackish water of the ditches of Holland, no springs (that ever I saw) being there to be found, and the little water in their wells, when we arrived in the country, being speedily exhausted. We had also been deprived of salt nearly all the time of our sojourn in that country, one of the greatest privations that I know of. Through the nursing of my kind landlady, however, I gradually regained my appetite, and with it my health, for which I have reason to be truly thankful to Him who has ever dealt so mercifully with me. In a few days we left Norwich on our route to Chelmsford, and on our way passed through Bury St Edmunds, where my late regiment, the Northumberland militia, was quartered; they vied with each other in showing us kind attentions, but our miserable appearance put the soldiers of this regiment sadly out of love with the regular service. We did not remain at Chelmsford long, but marched again for Horsham in Sussex, on which occasion I for the first time had a view of the metropolis, as we passed through it, by way of Whitechapel and London Bridge, &c. At Horsham we were quartered during the remainder of this winter. About the 10th or 12th of February 1800, we marched for Portsmouth, where we embarked for Ireland on the 14th. On this occasion the regiment was put on board two first-rate frigates; the Endymion was that on which the left wing went on board, but I do not recollect the name of the other. An agreement was entered into between the two captains, I understood, to sail for fifty guineas, they both being considered fast vessels; our destination was Cork; they were to start together, and the first there of course to be the winner. We sailed with a favourable breeze, and got on most delightfully, having, soon after sailing, parted from our antagonist, and passing, if I recollect right, inside the Isles of Scilly, we in a few days drew near our destined port. But on the 19th, as we were pushing on with all our might, having every stitch of sail set, a squall came on so suddenly, that, before she could be stripped of her superfluous clothing, she was actually running bows under water, the sea entering the bow-ports, and making its way along between decks, like to wash every thing away before it. At this time the log was hove, and we were going at the (I believe) unparalleled rate of fifteen knots an hour. But unfortunately for our captain, the vessel was completely driven out of her course, and towards evening we entered the harbour of Kinsale, thus losing the fifty guineas, although we were no doubt the better sailer. This was the first gale I had experienced, and I did not relish it; but when we entered the harbour, where the water was quite smooth, the sensation I felt was most delightful, after having been buffeted most violently by the sea without. The next day we landed, and were billeted in Kinsale, and here I had the first view of Irishmen and Irish manners. I need not attempt to describe them; for could I, so many have done it before me, that the subject is almost exhausted. In a day or two after landing, we marched to Cork, where the right wing had been landed, and with which we of course formed a junction. We remained in Ireland from this time till the peace of 1802 was concluded, and were quartered successively in the towns of Cork, Kilkenny, Clonmel, Fermoy, and Kinsale; but as there was nothing which could interest a reader that occurred to me during this period, I shall pass it over in silence, save mentioning the following:--In the year 1800, it is well known the utmost distress was experienced by the poor of both countries, a scarcity, the effects of the wet harvest of 1799, having grievously afflicted all the British dominions. But in Ireland, the sufferings of the poor were great, beyond the conception of an Englishman who has not witnessed them, and many hundreds of them, I believe, actually perished of want. But my tale relates more immediately to my own sufferings and those of my comrades; for we had then but what was termed a "black shilling a day," that is twelve pence Irish, an English or white shilling, or Hog, going in that country for thirteen pence; we had not then any beer money either, but had solely this black shilling to subsist on. Meat at this time was no less than 10d. per lb., of which each man received half a pound; bread was 5d. per lb., of which we also got half a pound. This half pound of bread, and half pound of meat, and that not of the best, was all we had to live on, and do our duty, which was not always of the easiest description. The remainder of our shilling was taken to furnish necessaries, washing, pipeclay, &c., for I do not remember that we ever laid in any sort of vegetables for the pot. Potatoes were out of the question, for they were no less than three shillings a stone of fourteen pounds. Although we did not absolutely suffer want, the reader will perceive that we were but sparely dieted; the consequence was, innumerable robberies of potato fields, and gardens, &c., in the neighbourhood of our quarters; and many were the men that got punished for this crime, but it could not be put a stop to, for hunger is not easily borne. Indeed, on one occasion, I myself was seduced, by the persuasion of my comrades and by the cravings of hunger, into the commission of this crime. I remember well I was on what was termed the Commissariat guard, a short distance from the town of Fermoy, when my companions, thinking it a favourable opportunity for procuring something to eat, prevailed upon me to accompany them to a garden near the bridge, into which we entered, and each of us returned loaded with a fine cabbage, and which afforded us an excellent meal after our relief from guard. It is impossible to justify such an act, but the reader will be convinced, I trust, that sheer hunger alone urged me to the perpetration of this crime. Others, I have no doubt, were equally ill off, who did not resort to such disgraceful means of satisfying their hunger, but bore it with patient resignation. I believe that such was the case, and take shame to myself for yielding either to the calls of nature or the solicitations of my companions, some others of whom were not so scrupulous. During this distressing season I sold a watch which had formerly been my father's, and with which I felt extremely loath to part. I also received a little money from home, all, or nearly all, of which was expended in procuring food. The hedges and fields, &c. in the vicinity, were ransacked in all directions, for the purpose of procuring bramble-berries, nettles, &c. &c.; in short, for any thing that was eatable. Such was our situation during several months, while under the command of Lieut.-Col. Skinner, who, although an excellent officer, had little idea of disposing of a soldier's pay to the best advantage; but latterly we were commanded by Major Keating, who, making the comfort of the soldiers under his command his continual study and delight, soon adopted a system which secured to us plenty in comparison of our former state. He left off the meat and bread save occasionally, and procured for us plenty of oatmeal and milk, by which means our wasted bodies began shortly after to resume quite another appearance. We were quartered at Lap's Island, in Cork, when the news arrived of peace having been concluded; and as the bulk of the regiment had volunteered from the militia for five years, or during the war, measures were taken for discharging all those who did not re-enlist either into their own or other regiments. My mind was fully made up to return home; for although, as I said before, I never repented of having entered the regular service, yet I knew that the anxiety of my dear parents for my return was so great, that I had settled it fully in my own mind to leave the army. Another reason operated with me partly in forming this resolution--I had persuaded myself that I ought to have been promoted--for I judged myself fully capable of conducting the duties of a non-commissioned officer, and I flattered myself my conduct had been generally unexceptionable; but I was disappointed, for the great numbers in my company, who were judged both more deserving and better qualified, and withal better-looking soldiers, put it out of the question for me to look forward to promotion. I was in this state when an officer and a party of the Rifle corps arrived at Cork, to receive such of the men of the different regiments then about to be discharged, as chose to volunteer, for this novel, and, as some thought, dangerous service. I cannot account for the impulse with which I was urged on, from the moment I had seen one of the men, to enter this corps. Something strange seemed to push me on, contrary to the full determination to return home, which had possessed me an hour before. I will not attempt to account for it, but such was the fact. I immediately, with some others of my regiment, gave in my name as a volunteer for the Rifle corps, and was in consequence in a day or two sworn into that corps, in which I have ever considered it an honour to serve, and which I have reason to thank a kind and overruling Providence I ever entered. No news of course could be so afflictive to my dear parents, as to hear of the last rash and irretrievable step which I had taken. It had wellnigh broken their hearts, for they fully calculated on my returning home, as I had written to that effect. Judge then of their surprise and sorrow, when they learnt that I had entered, what was deemed by some, a condemned corps, and that for life--and that the West Indies would no doubt soon be my grave. On my leaving the 56th, the officers of my company expressed their regret that I should quit the regiment, and told me, that although the mode hitherto pursued of keeping all the best-looking men in the light company had kept many from obtaining promotion, who otherwise would have been made non-commissioned officers, yet that mode was no longer to be adhered to, and that I might shortly expect to be promoted into another company, if I would consent to remain. I thanked them, and told them I had made up my mind, on which they each gave me a certificate as to character, &c., recommending me to the officers of my new corps, and which were of service to me afterwards. The sergeant who had been sent to receive us, at once became my stanch friend, and employed me, as the party was now become pretty strong, to act as a non-commissioned officer. Every thing went on quite smoothly, and I felt happy in my new corps, and in my new employment. We marched soon after to Waterford, and thence to Passage, and there embarked for the Isle of Wight, and without encountering any remarkable event arrived at Cowes on the 27th June, 1802; here we remained a day or two, and then marched for the regiment in Sussex. We found them at East Bourne, although Blatchington was their quarter, but they had been sent out of it on account of the assizes or election, I do not remember which. We immediately commenced our light drill, in which I took great delight; but most of all I liked the shooting at the target. As recruits, we were first drilled at what is termed the horse, _i. e._ a machine to assist young riflemen in taking aim. At this I pleased my commanding-officer so much the first time I tried, that he ordered me to the front, and told me to load, and fire at the target. I did, and made a pretty good shot, hitting pretty near the bull's eye; on which he made me load again and fire, and hitting that also, he made me go on till I had fired ten rounds, all of which hit the target, and two of which had struck the bull's eye. The distance indeed was only fifty yards, but for a recruit, that is, a person unaccustomed to rifle-shooting, he called it a wonderful exhibition, and in consequence he gave me sixpence out of his pocket, and ordered me home. I thought the reward quite inadequate, so natural is it for us to overrate our own deservings. This officer (Major Wade) was one of the best shots himself that I have almost ever seen. I have known him, and a soldier of the name of Smeaton, hold the target for each other at the distance of 150 yards, while the other fired at it, so steady and so accurate was both their shooting. I continued to maintain my character as a good shot, which in a rifle corps is a great recommendation, and proceeded in acquiring a knowledge of my other duties with such steadiness as obtained the approbation of my officers. We soon after marched to Chatham--and while there, several non-commissioned officers being employed on the recruiting service, I was employed in doing the duty of one, having been appointed what is termed a "chosen man." I must record the manner of my appointment. An acting-sergeant was doing the duty of pay-sergeant of our company, but he took it into his head to go all wrong, spending the money intrusted to him for the payment of the men. He of course was deprived of the situation; and on this occasion it was, that the officer commanding the company came to me one day, and said to me, "Surtees, I shall be _forced_ to make you a chosen man." I thanked him, but could not help reflecting on the strange mode of expressing himself which he had adopted. The fact is, I believe, without thinking about the opinion I must form of the compliment he was paying me, he had been indeed forced to it, for he had no one to pay the company besides; and as I was not yet dismissed from the drill, it was an unprecedented measure. But he need not have told the _whole_ truth on this occasion, for I should have been no worse a non-commissioned officer, had he been more complimentary; but he was a _plain_ man, and not much given to compliment. On our march hither, some of the men broke into the plate chest of the officers' mess, while the baggage stopped in Maidstone; one man was discovered, and tried for it, and sentenced to receive 800 lashes, all of which he took at one standing, and that without evincing much suffering; this was the most I ever saw inflicted at one time. We marched again from Chatham in September, and on the 2d of October arrived at Thorncliffe. While here, my parents interested Mr Beaumont, M.P. for my native county, to solicit my discharge from the Honourable Colonel Stewart, my then commanding-officer, they paying the regulated sum to the government. The colonel sent for me, and talked with me on the subject, and argued most forcibly in favour of my remaining in the regiment, saying he had intended to promote me the first vacancy; and that he had no doubt whatever of seeing me one day an officer. I own my views were not so sanguine; but his reasoning prevailed, and I consented to remain. Soon after, an opportunity offering, I was appointed corporal on the 24th of the same month. Here again I had disappointed my beloved and tender parents, for it was not without considerable trouble and difficulty they obtained the interference of Mr Beaumont, and now I had again thrown cold water on all their endeavours to obtain my discharge. I fear I have much to answer for, as respects my conduct towards them. May God forgive me! CHAPTER IV. Made Pay-sergeant--Moral Reflections--Wreck of a Dutch East Indiaman--Reduced Officers--War with France in 1803--Encampment at Thorncliffe under the command of General Sir John Moore--Encampment broke up, November, 1804--Embark for Germany, October, 1805--Vicissitudes at Sea--Land at Cuxhaven--March to Bremen--Outposts established--Retrograde movements, in consequence of the defeat of the Allied Forces at Austerlitz--The Allied Forces evacuate Germany--Re-embarkation of the troops--The Rifle Corps, or 95th, land at Yarmouth. Having given satisfaction as a corporal, I was shortly after appointed acting-sergeant; and in that capacity also, having pleased my officers, I was, on a vacancy occurring on the 19th of February following, appointed sergeant, and given the payment of a company. My head was almost turned by such rapid promotion, and I began in earnest to contemplate the possibility of my colonel's predictions being one day verified. Kind Providence watched over me, however, and kept me from being too much elated, and of committing myself as I otherwise might have done. Indeed I many times did commit things which, if strictly searched into, would have brought censure upon me, and lowered the high opinion that both myself and others entertained of me; but nothing that openly violated the law by which I was then governed (although many of God's laws I daily transgressed) was done by me. I was at this time, although careful to secure the good opinion of my officers, little solicitous to please Him who had alone lavished all this bounty upon me. Indeed I believe I was as ungodly at this time as I ever remember to have been, and yet He caused me to prosper. Oh! how I ought to feel shame and confusion of face at the recollection of such abused goodness and mercy! May He pardon me for Christ's sake! A short while before my appointment as sergeant, a most melancholy occurrence took place in the neighbourhood of our cantonment. A large Dutch East Indiaman, outward bound to Batavia, and full of troops, in passing down channel, mistook, I understand, the light at Dungeness for one on the French coast, and in consequence stood in towards Dymchurch wall instead of keeping out to sea. As might be expected, she was not long in striking on the wall, running with her bow quite close under the road, and in an instant, almost, went to pieces; and although numbers of people were early at the spot, and some, I believe, at the very moment she struck, they could render the unfortunate sufferers no effectual aid, although only a few yards distant from them. Out of about 800 persons on board, only seven men were saved. Many poor fellows, I understand, attempted to swim on shore, some on planks, and others without any aid; but such was the tremendous swell, and the general destruction of the ship so rapid, that only those seven before mentioned succeeded; and they not without being all more or less injured by pieces of the wreck. An admiral, I understood, was on board, and perished; several beautiful females were afterwards cast ashore among the dead, the wives or daughters, no doubt, of some on board; they were for the most part nearly naked, so that it is conjectured they had been in bed. As might be expected, the allurement to plunder so valuable a wreck was not resisted by the natives of this part of the coast, but Colonel Stewart humanely placed strong bodies of the regiment at different points where the wreck had drifted, to secure as much of the property as he could for the Dutch government, and also to collect and bring in the numerous dead bodies which floated along the shore; all of which he had decently interred in the churchyard at Thorncliffe, and had the poor wounded survivors taken into hospital, where every care was taken of them. Indeed nothing could exceed the unremitting attention which he paid both to the dead and living on this most melancholy occasion, and for which he received, as he well merited, the thanks of the Dutch government. About this period we had several individuals serving in the corps as soldiers, who had been officers in the army during the late war, but who, from different causes, had been reduced to the necessity of enlisting as private soldiers. The first that I remember was a person of the name of Conway Welch, who, I understood, had been an officer, and I think the Adjutant of the Surrey Rangers. He got on to the rank of Corporal, but, being excessively wild, I believe he never attained a higher rank. I do not remember what became of him. The second was called Hughes; he was, I believe, when he enlisted, actually in the receipt of half-pay as a lieutenant of the line. He was a person of good conduct, and was soon promoted to the rank of corporal, and the colonel took him for his own private clerk, or secretary, as he was denominated; but he did not remain long in this situation, for he was shortly after called upon full pay of his rank in the army. I believe his case was a singular one. The third unfortunate individual was of the name of Tait. He had been a captain in the Caithness Legion, but reduced when the regiment was broken up at the peace. He conducted himself extremely well for some time after he came into the regiment, and got on so far as to become pay-sergeant of a company. But in this situation, having considerable sums at his command, he became involved through his dissipation, and being unable to extricate himself from his difficulties, he adopted the fatal resolution of committing suicide, and accordingly, when quartered at Woodbridge, he one day retired to his room, loaded his rifle, and blew out his brains. The story of the fourth individual is a scarcely less melancholy one. His name was M'Laughlan. I had known him while serving in my late regiment, as he had been an officer in the light company of the 35th regiment, and stood next in the light battalion to the company to which I belonged. He, shortly before our embarkation for Holland, got involved, through a gambling transaction I heard, and was in consequence obliged to dispose of his commission, which, it would appear from this, he had originally purchased. But interest was made in his behalf, and he was permitted to accompany his regiment to Holland in the capacity of a volunteer, and he accordingly assumed the firelock and bayonet in place of his former weapon, the sword. He was fortunate enough to obtain another commission before the return of the troops to England, but how he became deprived of that I have been unable to learn. But about the latter end of 1803, he enlisted as a private in my corps. His conduct here was far from good, and he consequently never rose higher, for he was continually in scrapes from his dissipated habits; and becoming tired of the restraint laid upon him by the strict discipline which our excellent commanding-officer enforced, he one day made an attempt to desert and join the French at Boulogne, and was picked up by one of our cruisers in endeavouring to cross the channel in an open boat. He was brought back handcuffed, and lodged in the guard-house one day when I happened to be sergeant commanding the guard. As I looked on him, I could not help reflecting on the strange vicissitudes which attend some men in their passage through life. Here was a person whom I had known only a few years before while encamped on Barham Downs, a gay and handsome young officer, moving in the circle of men of gallantry and honour; and now behold him a wretched culprit, stretched on the wooden guard-bed, manacled like a felon. In contrasting his miserable situation with my own so much happier lot, what ample cause had I for gratitude to that kind and indulgent Providence, which had preserved me from those excesses, which entailed so much misery on others. He was shortly after tried by a general court-martial, and transported as a felon for life. I understand a sister of his was at Thorncliffe at the time of his trial, &c., the wife of a brevet lieutenant-colonel in the 4th regiment. What must she have felt! It will be recollected that, in 1803, war again broke out between this country and France, as my preceding story had intimated. The army was consequently augmented again, and my corps, till now called the "Rifle Corps," was made the 95th. This year a camp was formed on Thorncliffe, under the command of that able general and excellent man Sir John Moore. This was termed by some the "Vanguard of England," for here it was that the then threatened invasion of this country by Bonaparte must most likely have taken place, it being immediately opposite to the grand camp then forming at Boulogne. Daily rencontres took place between our cruisers and his far-famed flotilla; and on one occasion, the belief that he was sending forth his invincible host was so great, that our camp was struck, the troops turned out, and received each man his sixty rounds of ammunition; the waggons and carts were all put in immediate requisition, and the inhabitants were flying in all directions. But to our disappointment, I will not say whether disagreeable or otherwise, it all ended in smoke; it happened to have been some of his flotilla making a movement along the coast, which had been set on by our cruisers and pretty roughly handled. We remained in this camp till the 24th of November, I think, having occasionally before this period had our tents blown from over our heads by the autumnal gales. The next year a more formidable camp was formed on the same ground, the force having been augmented by a second line, composed of regiments of militia. This year also, like the last, passed over without witnessing the long-threatened invasion of Old England, although Bonaparte, in the pride of his heart and the vanity of his mind, had begun to erect a monument near Boulogne, to commemorate that glorious achievement. My regiment, on the breaking up of the camp, marched into Hythe Barracks, where we remained till the month of April, 1805. In the spring of this year another volunteering from the militia into regiments of the line was ordered, on which occasion I was selected by my commanding-officer, Lieut.-Colonel Beckwith, to accompany Lieutenant Evans, of the regiment, down to my native county, to receive such men of the militia regiments there as chose to enter the 95th. On this occasion we were very successful, having obtained between seventy and eighty men from the different regiments in the north. It was on this occasion that I had the first opportunity, since I became a soldier, of visiting my native village, and my greatly-distressed parents and family. I need not describe the meeting that took place between us, on my first seeing them--it will be better conceived than told;--suffice it to say, joy and sorrow were strangely mingled together--joy to see me once more safe and sound--but sorrow that the line of life I had adopted should so soon, so very soon, call upon me to part from them again. In fact, I could only remain with them three days, at the end of which, I had orders to join my party at Morpeth. With this respectable batch of volunteers we marched, and joined the regiment at Canterbury, whither it had been removed during our absence, and, on our arrival, received the thanks of our commanding-officer for our exertions. Here, and at this time, a second battalion to the 95th was formed, the sergeant-majorship of which I was in hopes of obtaining; but in this I was disappointed, for a sergeant, who was both much older than me, and had much stronger claims than I could pretend to, was selected for the situation; and although he did not turn out so well afterwards as was expected, yet these circumstances ought to have satisfied me at the time that no injustice was done me by bestowing it upon him. But such was my folly, and the over-high opinion I entertained of my own merits, that I could not quietly acquiesce in this most just arrangement; and foolishly imagining myself ill-used, the chagrin of which drove me to the adoption of one of the worst expedients possible, I immediately took to drinking and to the neglect of my proper duties, thinking, like an ass as I was, that I should thus revenge myself for my supposed ill-usage, forgetting that it was only on myself that this revenge could ultimately fall. However, the same good Providence which has mercifully and so continually watched over me, stepped in to my aid in this my most dangerous situation; for one day my captain, who had always been my friend, sent for me, and urged upon me the folly and the baseness of my present conduct, and the unhappy consequences to myself that were likely to result from persisting in a course so absurd and blame-worthy. This, with my own reasoning on the subject, brought me at length to a better disposition of mind, and induced me once more to resume my duties with cheerfulness and alacrity. I have mentioned this circumstance, because I believe I was nearer at this time to falling into my original nothingness, than I ever have been, either before or since; and I have no doubt that many an excellent non-commissioned officer and soldier have been involved in the like error, who have not been so fortunate as I was in escaping its consequences. From Canterbury we marched to Brabourn Lees Barracks, in the same county, where we remained till some time in October, when we were called upon to embark for Lower Germany. During our stay at Brabourn Lees, a circumstance occurred which called forth an exhibition of as great magnanimity, on the part of Colonel Beckwith, as I almost ever remember to have witnessed: We had received about 200 Irish volunteers, who were wild and ungovernable in the extreme; a party of these, in strolling about one day, had fallen in with Mrs Beckwith, with her maid and child, taking a walk along the Ashford road. Not knowing, I imagine, who the lady and her maid were, they set on and assaulted them in the most violent and outrageous manner, proceeding to such lengths as perhaps delicacy forbids to mention. It was, I believe, discovered who they were. Accordingly, the next day, the Colonel formed the battalion into a square, and proceeded to relate the circumstance to the regiment; "But," says he, "although I know who the ruffians are, I will not proceed any farther in the business, because it was _my own wife_ that they attacked; but, had it been the wife of the meanest soldier in the regiment, I solemnly declare I would have given you every lash which a court-martial might have sentenced you." Such a trait of generous forbearance is not often met with; but by this, and similar instances of liberal feeling, he completely gained the heart of every soldier in the battalion, a thing not always attainable by very excellent commanding-officers. About the latter end of October, 1805, we marched to Ramsgate, and there embarked, as before noticed, for Germany. It was my lot, on this occasion, to be put on board a small and ill-shaped collier brig, called the Jane of Shields, but the master I have forgot. She was a most miserable sailer, making on a wind almost as much lee as head-way, and in every respect ill adapted for the transport service. We had not been many days at sea before we lost the fleet, and in our endeavours to find it again were at one time on the coast of Jutland. All this time we had been beating against a contrary wind; but while here, the wind became favourable, and we appeared to have nothing to do but to bear away for the mouth of the Elbe, which river it was our destination to enter; but unfortunately, by some mismanagement, we fell quite away to leeward of it, and got entangled between the mainland and the Island of Wangeroog, not far from the mouth of Jade River, instead of the Elbe. While in this uncomfortable situation, it came on to blow a tremendous gale, which rendered our position not only most unpleasant, but extremely perilous, for we were embayed, and the wind blowing on a lee shore, and the vessel became almost unmanageable, her bad sailing becoming distressingly more apparent the more she was put on her mettle. In the midst of the confusion attendant on such circumstances, the master (with what intention I know not, whether to drown dull care, or to fortify him against his exposure to the watery element) went down below, and swallowed the best part of a bottle of brandy. In doing which, his corner cupboard, with all its contents, came rattling down about his ears. He would fain have had me to pledge him, but I begged to be excused. The consequence was, he became quite drunk at the time when all his abilities as a seaman were likely to be called into operation; but he probably saw things clearest after having his eye wet. My commanding-officer now became quite alarmed for the safety of the troops, seeing the master had incapacitated himself, as he conceived, for the management of the vessel; and, after a consultation among our officers, an attempt was made to deprive him of the command, and intrust it to the mate, who had in this case, in order to save as many of the troops as possible, determined on running the vessel high and dry, as he termed it, on the sandy beach, near the Jade River. At this proposal, however, the master stormed and blasphemed like a madman, swearing there was neither soldier nor sailor on board the ship but himself. He went so far, and became so outrageous, that our commanding-officer talked of hanging him up at the yard-arm; but it being a ticklish thing to take the command of a ship from the person legally authorized to exercise it, the major did not enforce the wishes of the officers. The poor mate sat down on the companion and cried like a child, partly owing to the abuse the captain gave him, and partly, I imagine, from the hopelessness of our situation. The captain, in his refusal to yield up the command, told the major he had been several times wrecked, and had been, I know not how many times, exposed for a considerable length of time in the water; and that he was not afraid to encounter it again. This, however, was but poor consolation to landsmen, who had not been accustomed to such duckings. A desperate case requires a desperate remedy--so our captain thought--for he instantly clapped on the vessel the square mainsail, which every moment threatened to carry away the mast, and in which case, nothing could have prevented our destruction; however, Providence so ordered it, that she bore it through the gale, and he, after putting her on the outward tack, continued to stand from the land till he imagined he had completely weathered Wangeroog; but at midnight, when he ordered to put about the ship, had it not been for the cabin-boy providentially seeing close to leeward of us the light of Wangeroog, we should instantly have been upon the rocks. This will show either what a bad sailer the vessel was, or how far the master had miscalculated the distance; for he imagined himself by this time to be quite clear of all the land, and considerably out to sea. He continued, after this providential escape, to stand on the same tack, and just cleared the island; and in the morning, the wind having somewhat abated, and shifted a little in our favour, we were enabled, soon after, to lay our course. We arrived in the Elbe, and landed at Cuxhaven on the 18th of November, 1805, the day on which our fleet there was celebrating the victory of Trafalgar--clouded indeed it was by the death of the hero who fell while achieving it--yet glorious to the nation to which that fleet belonged. We, immediately after landing, marched for Dorum, a village twelve or fourteen miles distant, and from thence by Osterholtz and Bremer Lehe to the city of Bremen. On our arrival there, (my battalion forming the advanced guard,) we found the gates were shut against us; a Prussian garrison was in the town, the commandant of which seemingly did not know how to act, whether to admit us as allies, or not, the policy of his government at that time being so extremely ambiguous. Colonel Beckwith, who commanded the advance, was not however easily to be deterred from executing his orders, and he hesitated not to tell them, that if they did not choose to admit us peaceably, force should be resorted to to gain an entrance. This had the desired effect, for the gate was soon after thrown open, and we were received by the authorities of the town, and by the inhabitants in general, with the warmest expressions of friendship and cordial attachment; the Prussian officers, all the while looking on, apparently not over-well pleased with the conduct of their hosts; they were soon afterwards, however, withdrawn from the territory, and we then remained sole occupiers of this part of the country. Our army assembled in this city in considerable force, when it becoming necessary to establish outposts in advance, my battalion was sent out first to the town of Delmenhorst, and subsequently a part of it to the city of Oldenburg, and the remainder to the town of Wildishausen; to this latter place two companies were detached, under the command of Major Travers, and to which he appointed me to act as sergeant-major. We did not remain long in this situation, but were again recalled from Wildishausen to Delmenhorst, and afterwards sent to join the other companies at Oldenburg. Here we staid some time, during which we experienced the most unbounded hospitality and kindness from the whole of the inhabitants, but more particularly from the Duke. He actually did not know how sufficiently to express his friendly disposition towards our officers in general,--his kindness also extended to the soldiers,--for when we afterwards received an order to retrograde again to Delmenhorst, he sent forward to the half-way house refreshments of every description, for both officers and men; and the night before we left this hospitable city, he gave a splendid ball in honour of the officers of our corps, to which, of course, every inhabitant of a suitable rank was invited. Nay, I heard, and have no reason to doubt the correctness of the report, that he wrote to the burgomaster of Bremen, to which city we again retired, to endeavour, if possible, to have us quartered in his immediate neighbourhood, in the best part of the town, for that not only the officers, but the soldiers of the corps, were perfect gentlemen; indeed, the conduct of the battalion at this time, under its kind and excellent commanding-officer, was such as to entitle it to the highest praise. Our retreat on this occasion, I understood, was rendered necessary, in consequence of the defeat of the allied forces at Austerlitz, and of the fatal termination by that sanguinary action of the campaign in that part of Germany. Although I am no prophet, I predicted at this period what the result would be to the King of Prussia, whose hesitating and equivocal conduct kept him aloof from taking an active part, when his co-operation might have been of the utmost advantage to the general cause. It required no second sight to perceive, that when Bonaparte could clear his hands of his present antagonists, he would not hesitate for a moment to turn his arms against a monarch on whom he could not cordially rely, and whose dominions offered such a strong temptation to an ambitious and aspiring mind like his. We continued to occupy Bremen till towards the beginning of February 1806, when the whole army gradually drew down towards our place of embarkation, for the purpose of evacuating the country, our stay now having been rendered useless by the unsuccessful and unfortunate turn which the allied affairs had taken. My battalion covered the retreat of the army; but as great numbers of the German Legion, which formed part of the British force in this country, were deserting and returning to their homes, we were sent away into the interior to endeavour to intercept such of them as might pass by the villages we occupied, and restore them to the army. We took some, but not many; and soon after we also retired, and went on board at Cuxhaven, and again returned to England, landing at Yarmouth on the 19th of the same month. During the whole of my military career, I never witnessed so cordial an attachment to the British name and character, as was manifested during this service, by the good people among whom we had been residing. Nothing was too good for us--and nothing was left undone by them to render us comfortable and happy. It is true they have their vices like other people; but barring one or two peculiar to continental nations, I believe them to be, generally speaking, as moral as any people among whom it has been my lot to sojourn. But, oh! with what shame and sorrow do I look back on the part I acted at this period--how profligate and abandoned was my conduct at the very time that a kind and gracious Providence was showering its choicest blessings upon me! but, alas, I paid no regard to the remonstrances of conscience, which I endeavoured and succeeded in drowning in debauchery and intemperance. CHAPTER IV.* Our Author made Quartermaster-Sergeant of the 2d battalion, which he joins at Feversham, Kent--Expedition to Denmark--Embark at Deal--Land at Vedbeck, Zealand--Partial Engagements--Siege of Copenhagen--A Division under Sir Arthur Wellesley advance to Kioge--Copenhagen capitulates--Amnesty between the Danish Forces in the Island of Zealand, and the British--The British evacuate Denmark--Embark at Copenhagen--Arrive in the Downs--Land at Deal. We landed, as I before stated, at Yarmouth, and proceeded by way of Lowestoft to Woodbridge, in Suffolk, in the barracks of which my battalion was quartered. Here also was the 23d regiment, that which I had seen act so nobly in Holland: and as it was determined by its commanding-officer to give the regiment some idea of light movements, I was selected for the purpose of instructing their non-commissioned officers. But I did not long continue to instruct them, for in the May following, an offer was made me by Colonel Beckwith of the situation of sergeant-major in the Cornwall Miners, a regiment of militia, with the prospect, he told me, of shortly becoming adjutant. This, however, after due consideration, I declined accepting--preferring to remain in a regiment and service which I liked so well, and in which I hoped one day to rise to something higher than my present situation. I believe my conduct on this occasion was approved, for not long after, it was intimated to me, that the offer I had refused, had been made to the quartermaster-sergeant of our second battalion, and that he had, after some hesitation, accepted it, thus leaving his situation open for me. Accordingly, I departed for the purpose of joining that battalion, and entering on my new duties. I joined it at Feversham, in Kent. My means increasing, the sinfulness of my course of life was increased in proportion. It is true, I generally performed my various military duties to the satisfaction of my superiors; but could not at all times please my present commanding-officer, against whose wish and inclination I had been appointed to my present situation; he naturally wishing to have a person of his own selection. Soon after this, an expedition being ordered for South America, of which three companies of my present battalion were to form a part, I waited on him, and requested him to permit me to accompany them in the capacity of acting quartermaster. He said no; but if I chose to resign my present situation, and go as a sergeant, he would permit me. This I of course declined, as it would have been paying a bad compliment indeed to my benefactor, Colonel Beckwith, thus to give up for nothing what he had been at pains to procure for me. This, and some other little things which occurred about the same time, proved to me that I was no favourite with my new lieutenant-colonel, and that it behoved me to be very guarded in my conduct. We were, after this, removed to Brabourn Lees again, and remained there, without any occurrence arising, till we were summoned to take part in the expedition fitting out for Denmark. We accordingly repaired to Deal, where we embarked on the 26th of July, 1807, and shortly after sailed for our destination. We arrived in the Sound about the 10th of August, where the whole fleet was assembled; one of the largest I had yet seen. On the 16th, every thing having been previously got ready, we landed at the village of Vedbeck, in the island of Zealand, about ten or twelve miles below Copenhagen. It was a most beautiful and glorious sight to witness the debarkation of the first division, or advanced guard, to which my battalion belonged. The most perfect arrangements had been made by Sir Home Popham, who superintended the landing of the troops; and nothing could exceed the beauty and regularity in which the different divisions of boats approached the shore, covered by some small brigs and bombs, which had orders to clear the beach by grape shot, of any enemy that might appear. Some light artillery also landed with us, prepared for immediate action, for it was not known but the Danes might attempt to oppose our landing, they having rejected every overture on the part of our commanders for the delivery of their fleet. After landing, mine and the first battalion of my regiment were sent forward in the direction of Copenhagen; and on this occasion, I for the first time saw the illustrious General, who has since made the world resound with his exploits. He commanded us, who formed the advance, and directed our two battalions during the operations of the day. But we met with no force of the enemy, save a small patrol of cavalry, which passed in front of us, and then retired towards the city; this showed that they were observing our movements. We halted for the night at a village called, I think, Lingbye, on the great road from Copenhagen towards Elsineur. We rested on our arms all night, and early in the morning moved forward on the Copenhagen road, and about mid-day took up cantonments within a long gun-shot of the city, and began to invest the place. All was quiet till about three o'clock in the afternoon, when a general cry of turn out, set the whole of our people in motion. A considerable body of the enemy were advancing from the town, and by this time had attacked the advanced picquets on our left, towards the sea-shore; but instant succour being sent, they maintained their ground. The force opposed to the enemy was but small, consisting of two companies of the 4th regiment, four of the 23d, and four of my battalion, with two light fieldpieces; in all not more than 1000 men, while the Danes were near 3000. Nevertheless, the moment the armies came in contact, they instantly gave way, leaving a considerable number of killed and wounded behind them, and retreated into the town. On this occasion, I attached myself to my commanding-officer, who, with the surgeon, and some others of the staff, advanced with one of the guns on the great road, having some of our companies on each flank. He gave me his glass to take care of, with which I soon after busied myself in watching the motions of the enemy. I discovered at a short distance to our left and front, a considerable body of troops, dressed in long red coats, which I knew could not be British, for that description of dress had long been laid aside by us; I accordingly began, pointing them out as an excellent mark for the artillery, which was then with us; but I had scarcely spoken, when an officer present, cried out, after looking, did I wish the artillery to fire on our own people? The colonel also made some severe and reproachful remarks, telling me, if I would fight, to go and take a rifle. I said nothing; but he had scarcely finished his harangue, when a round shot came directly from this body of supposed British troops, which nigh carried away one of the legs of the first officer who spoke. The enemy were soon repulsed, and the troops retired again to their former cantonments. After their troops retreated, a body of their gun-boats advanced against some of our small craft which happened to be rather close in shore, but their attack occasioned little injury, the distance being considerable. The next morning the enemy opened a heavy and rather destructive fire of artillery upon our outposts, by which we lost an officer of artillery and several men; their fire was chiefly directed against what was called the windmill battery, which was our farthest advance at this time. On the 19th, my battalion was moved farther to the right, and nearer the town; there was constant firing between the advanced posts of the two armies, and this continued for several days, during which the investment of the city was proceeding with, and batteries, &c. marked out for the purpose of bombarding it. All kinds of ordnance stores were at the same time disembarked, and sent off to the army with the utmost dispatch. In short, nothing could exceed the vigour with which the siege was now prosecuted, after the final rejection of pacific overtures by the Danish general. On the 24th, we were ordered under arms at two o'clock in the morning, and immediately advanced, driving in the enemy's outposts, with the view of carrying our works nearer the town. In this movement we experienced considerable opposition and suffered some loss, from their guns on the town walls, and from musketry from the windows. We this day established two strong and well advanced batteries, and at night set fire to a windmill in their possession, which obstructed our view of some of their works. During the whole of the 25th, there was a constant fire both of artillery and fire-arms, by which one of the light battalions of the German Legion suffered rather severely. My battalion relieved them at the outposts a little before dark, and was fortunate enough not to lose a man, where they had lost considerable numbers. On the 26th, a corps or division of the army was assembled, and placed under the immediate orders of Sir Arthur Wellesley. It consisted of the following regiments, viz. 43d, 52d, 92d, 95th, and 6th Battalion King's German Legion, with six squadrons of German cavalry, and some artillery, and was destined to advance against a body of the enemy composed principally of militia, which had been for some time past collecting in the neighbourhood of Kioge. At three o'clock P.M., we started from the neighbourhood of Copenhagen, the troops making their way through the country to the left of the great road to Roskild. I had charge of the baggage, which was carried on light German waggons, the bodies of which are formed chiefly of wicker-work, and are so light and easy of draught that the natives travel in them in the same manner nearly of our coaches--they going sometimes at a considerable rate. I found it impracticable to continue in the same direction the troops had gone, for they presently left all traces of a road, and struck right across the country--and as I knew I should be expected to have the baggage with them that night if possible, I determined to run all hazards, and proceed along the great high-road in hopes of afterwards being enabled to find them out--accordingly I moved forward, and presently passed the outposts of the German cavalry stationed in the direction of Roskild; the men, I doubt not, wondering at my temerity in pushing on with a few baggage waggons, where they were all on the alert with swords drawn, and with carbines and pistols loaded. I own it was a hazardous undertaking, for a very small party of the enemy would easily have captured both me and my baggage; but I knew my commanding-officer to be such a person as to pay little attention to excuses of any kind when he wished a thing to be done, and withal he loved his comforts, and would not have been easily pacified had he been deprived of them. Fortunately, after advancing for some miles beyond the outposts of our army before mentioned, I fell in with a road branching off towards the left, apparently in the very direction the troops had taken. Till I reached this point, I had advanced with considerable caution, and slowly; determined, if any enemy should appear in front, to endeavour to effect a retreat. But now, having left the great road, and taken that which I judged would bring me to the neighbourhood of those I was seeking, I accordingly ordered all my guards to mount, and set off at a brisk trot, keeping a good look-out to my right flank, for fear of surprise, and fortunately fell in with the division at the very moment it was entering the road by which I had come. I received great credit for my generalship, and was complimented by the officers of my corps, they being the only people in the division, I believe, who had the comfort of their baggage that night. The name of the village where we halted is Caughstrup. The next day we continued to advance in the direction of Kioge, and in the afternoon we reached a village which I forget the name of, and where evident traces appeared of the enemy having shortly left it; indeed, we found two or three stragglers in the village, who were of course made prisoners. We halted outside the village for the night. A short while before we reached this village, I saw a body of troops dressed in red, marching on our right flank, at right angles to the road by which we were advancing, and which I instantly concluded must be a part of the enemy's force, as we had no troops in that direction. But remembering the rebuke I received on the 17th for interfering with concerns that did not belong to me, I shut my mouth in silence, and did not, I believe, mention the matter. It is evident it was a part of the enemy's force, for the General's information led him to take that very same direction the next day; and that being towards Roskild, we set out and reached that city in the afternoon, but found the enemy had again given us the slip, and doubled back to nearly the same place from whence we had started. The next morning about three o'clock we left Roskild, and took the road for Kioge, near which it was now ascertained the enemy had come to a resolution to make a stand. I forgot to mention that previous to this our force had been divided and formed into two brigades; the 52d, 92d, our 1st battalion, and some cavalry and artillery, remaining under the command of Sir Arthur; while the 43d, the 6th German Legion, and our five companies, with the remainder of the cavalry, were put under the command of Baron Linsengen, one of the generals of the German Legion. Sir Arthur's people had not been with us for a day or two back, but where I do not exactly know. But this morning it was arranged that his brigade was to march directly upon Kioge and attack it in front, while we fetched a circuit behind, and came upon a part of their force stationed in a forest or wood behind the town--and thus cut off their retreat. But the poor creatures were unable to stand above a round or two, and almost immediately broke and fled in all directions. As we approached the wood we were destined to attack, the appearance was certainly rather formidable; for from the immense cloud of dust they raised in performing their movements, we calculated on meeting with a considerable body of troops; and indeed, just as we approached the wood, our cavalry laid hold of an officer of their horse, dressed partly in uniform and partly as a civilian. From him we obtained information that they had in the field 12,000 men; 5000 of which were armed with pikes, 1000 cavalry, and the remainder consisted of artillery and infantry. He must, I think, have overrated their numbers, or surely they might have made some sort of a stand against 5500 men, the strength of our division. On Sir Arthur attacking them in the town of Kioge, they stood, as before said, only for a round or two, and fled, many of them coming in contact afterwards with our brigade; but from the extent of (and intricate roads through) the wood, very few of them were made prisoners; till towards evening, when a company of my battalion, with some of the German cavalry, overtook a considerable body in the village of Herfolge, apparently the rearguard of the enemy. In this village they made a stand, getting into the churchyard, which afforded an excellent position, it being considerably higher than any other part of the village. Here also they soon began to waver, and after a few shots from our people, they all laid down their arms and became prisoners of war. Their numbers were 1550 men, with 56 officers, and Major-General Oxholm, the second in command of this part of the Danish army. A considerable quantity of artillery, small arms, baggage, and provisions, &c., with two stands of colours, fell into the hands of the captors on this occasion. These poor creatures were instantly sent off as prisoners, and put on board our ships at Copenhagen; many of them apparently quite glad that they had done with fighting. Great numbers of them had nothing better by way of shoeing than wooden clogs--a very inconvenient kind I should imagine for a rapid retreat. The loss of the British during this day's operations was, as might be expected, quite trifling. I had this day followed the ill-natured advice of my commanding-officer on a former occasion, and had taken a rifle, but had little opportunity of using it, not having fired more than eight or ten shots. My battalion halted in the village of Herfolge for the night, and the next morning moved forward towards the town of Kingsted, that being the direction in which the broken fragments of the Danish army had retired. Our two battalions had been employed all the day of the 29th, after the first onset, in scouring the woods from Kioge to Herfolge. We continued this service on the 30th also, and took numbers of poor creatures who had been engaged in yesterday's operations, but who had not yet been able totally to divest themselves of their military habiliments, although apparently anxious to do so. We reached Kingsted on the 31st, and finding that the only regular part of the late army had retired into one of the islands in the Great Belt, and that the militia portion had totally disbanded itself, we halted here till the fall of Copenhagen, which took place on the 7th of September. But to prevent surprise from any lurking parties of the enemy, which might still have kept together, and to deprive them of the means of injuring us, strong detachments were sent out to scour the country, and to bring in all the military arms they could discover. A party of this description, consisting of 100 cavalry, and 100 of my battalion mounted on light waggons, traversed the country for a considerable distance, and returned after having discovered and taken possession of ten pieces of ordnance of small calibre, and forty rifles belonging to the Kallundburg rifle company, with several muskets. They also gained correct information respecting the regular troops that had been lately opposed to us, and found they had retired into the islands of Falstar and Meon. On the capitulation of Copenhagen, terms of amity and peace were entered into between the Danish forces in the island of Zealand and the British; but these did not extend to the islands before mentioned, nor to the other parts of his Danish Majesty's dominions; consequently, we still remained at war with such of his forces as were not included in the capitulation; and he might at any time have collected an army, had he been able, and attacked us without any infringement of those terms. It behoved our generals, therefore, to watch against any attempt of this nature; and accordingly strong outposts were established all along the Belt, composed principally of the men of our two battalions. The 1st battalion occupied Kallundburg, Slagelse, Korsoer, and Skielskiore; whilst the following towns and ports were occupied by my battalion, viz. Mestyed, Lundbye, Wordingburg and Prestoe; thus forming a complete chain of posts around the west and south coasts of the island. We remained so posted till the 15th of October, by which time the greater part of the naval stores taken in the dockyard having been taken on board, and the period fast approaching for our evacuation of the country, we began to retire towards Copenhagen, which we reached on the 17th, and immediately embarked on board the Princess Caroline, a Danish seventy-four which had been surrendered with the others of that fleet, and which are mentioned below.[1] We remained in the roads till the 20th, when the fleet dropped down towards the Sound; and on the 21st the whole passed the Castle of Elsineur, with a favourable and pleasant breeze, the British ensign waving proudly from the lofty masts of their late gallant fleet; it must have been an extremely galling sight for them (the Danes) to witness, and I dare say they did not pray for many benedictions on our heads; I pitied them from the bottom of my heart. On taking leave of this country, I could not help remarking on the great similarity between its inhabitants and the Germans about Bremen--kind-hearted, hospitable, and inoffensive in the highest degree; and although suffering at that time so severely from the policy of our country, they were high in our praises as individuals and as a nation. I have great cause to speak well of those innocent and worthy people, for I have seldom experienced more kindness and attention than was shown me by them whenever circumstances rendered such kindness and attention suitable, particularly at Nestyde, where I met a young man who had formerly been in the West Indies, where he had learnt to speak a little English, (for of Danish I could not understand a word.) He introduced me to one worthy man, who had been an officer, and fought in the famous action of Kioge above narrated. Poor fellow, he felt heartily ashamed of the sorry attempt they had made to act the part of an army, and I daresay would gladly have blotted from his memory for ever the recollection of the ridiculous part they had acted. I was not aware of this circumstance at first, and when it was brought upon the tapis in the course of conversation, (my young friend being interpreter,) I unluckily said, that "any man armed with a bludgeon only, could easily beat three such soldiers." I felt quite ashamed of myself afterwards, when I discovered that he, poor man, had made one in that memorable action; but he took it all in good part, apparently conscious of the justness of my remark. Indeed, I was partly led on to use such expressions by the young fellow condemning so bitterly their conduct, and which I afterwards would have given something to have unsaid. He, however, bore no resentment, and kindly took me home and introduced me to his wife, and requested me to salute her with a kiss. I hesitated, thinking that I could not have understood him right, and feeling awkward in such a situation; but my young friend assured me it was the custom there to do so, on which I of course complied. They are, in my opinion, an extremely moral race of people, no vices that I know of being practised by them, save occasionally a little drunkenness by some few individuals. I heartily wish them well. We sailed, as I said before, on the 21st of October, and had fine weather till we arrived in Yarmouth Roads. We passed one Sunday on our voyage home, at a certain hour of which our pious naval commander (Lord Gambier) made signal for the whole fleet to lay to, and have divine service, that is, in such ships as there were chaplains on board of. This caused the irreligious and profligate part of our people on board the Princess Caroline to blaspheme and storm at a terrible rate, for being so long detained when the wind was so fair. It happened, when we arrived in the Roads at Yarmouth, or near there, I think it was on the Galloper Sand, that a tremendous gale began to blow, which baffled all exertions to withstand it. We cast out the anchors, but without effect, for we ran away with them both, and in the endeavour to vere out cable, or rather by the rapidity with which it was dragged out of the ship by the force of the wind, our bits caught fire, which with considerable difficulty were got extinguished after great exertions. During the gale, I understand a sailor was blown off the foreyard; and nearly at the same moment a woman, one of our corporals' wives, fell down the hatches into the hold, and broke her back, of which, indeed, she afterwards recovered, but never after regained her upright posture. Those scoffing gentlemen before mentioned, attributed the whole of our misfortunes to the delay occasioned by the divine service before adverted to, and were not sparing of invective against the individual who caused its performance, forgetful, it would seem, that _He_, whom that commander invoked on that day, holds the winds in His hand, and can at pleasure let them loose upon an ungodly fleet, whether for correction or judgment, at what time, and in what manner, best pleases him. I doubt not the excellent commander alluded to has been a blessing to many. May he long continue to ornament the exalted station he fills! We weighed again after the storm abated, and proceeded round to the Downs, and the next day, the 16th of November, landed at Deal, and from thence marched to our old quarters at Hythe Barracks. FOOTNOTE: [1] List of Ships and Vessels captured at Copenhagen, 7th September, 1807. Guns. Christian the Seventh, 98 Neptune, 84 Waldemer, 84 Princess Sophia Fredrica, 84 Justice, 74 Heir Apparent Frederick, 74 Crown Prince Frederick, 74 Frien, 74 Oden, 74 Three Crowns, 74 Shield, 74 Crown Princess Maria, 74 Denmark, 74 Norway, 74 Princess Caroline, 74 Conqueror, 64 Norge, 74 Dalmakin, 64 Pirle, 44 Wory Wife, 44 Liberty, 44 Iris, 44 Rotar, 44 Denry, 44 Mayed, 36 Triton, 28 Fredrington, 28 Kline Belt, 28 St Thomas, 22 Tylto, 24 Elbe, 20 Eydeman, 20 Gluckstadt, 20 Sarp, 18 Glowman, 18 Nid Elvin, 18 Dolphin, 18 Marcur, 18 Cousier, 14 Flying Fish, 14 Total, 40 Together with eleven gun boats, with two guns each in the bow, and fourteen do with one gun in the bow and one astern. CHAPTER V. Our Author marries--The Battalion to which he belongs ordered to join the Expedition fitting out for Corunna--Movements of the Army in Spain--Return to England. Some little time after our return from the Baltic, I obtained a short leave of absence, for the purpose of visiting my parents, and the other members of my family; and, during my stay in my native village, contracted a marriage with a young woman whom I had known from my boyhood, she having been one of my earliest schoolfellows. I cannot say that I enjoyed in the marriage state that happiness which I expected from it, partly owing to the frequent and long separations which my calling rendered unavoidable, and partly from other causes which have no connexion with my narrative. I believe, during the eight years which my wife lived after our union, I spent more than six of these in absence from her. At the expiration of my leave, we set off to join the regiment, which still remained at Hythe, where we remained till the beginning of September following, when my battalion having again been ordered for foreign service in the expedition fitting out for Corunna, it became indispensable that my poor wife should return to Northumberland, and remain under the protection of her parents, till my return, should it please God to spare me. This, no doubt, was a severe trial to us both, but particularly to her, who had such a journey to undertake, alone and unprotected, and she at the time far advanced in pregnancy; but, however distressing, it must be undertaken, and I unfortunately could not be spared from the regiment, for our orders were to proceed immediately to Ramsgate, for embarkation. We parted, after I had accompanied her as far as I was able, and seeing her safely stowed in the coach. It may be supposed that a new-married pair, under such circumstances, would part with heavy and afflicted hearts. My battalion embarked at Ramsgate on the 10th of September. On this occasion, I was very fortunate in getting on board an excellent transport, called the Nautilus, of Shields, commanded by Captain Watson (my wife's maiden name), and the steward, a native of the Hermitage, a place within four miles of my home. Of course, we were mutually glad to meet each other, and often talked over old Northumbrian stories, which recalled delightful recollections of our younger years. The fleet in which we sailed rendezvoused at Falmouth, whence we took our departure, and arrived at Corunna on the 26th of October. On our passage, when we made Cape Ortegal, a pilot-boat came off, in which were the first Spaniards I remember to have seen; certainly, they did not prepossess me greatly in favour of their countrymen, but they are now so well known in England, that a description of those I here saw, would be only to repeat what has been so often and so much better told by others. We landed at Corunna, as before said, on the 26th, and a day or two after, proceeded up the country, halting for the first night at Betanzos. Our force consisted of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in all, about 10,000 men, and was commanded by General Sir David Baird, and intended to co-operate, or form a junction, with that under Sir John Moore, then in Portugal, and who was then advancing into Spain. My battalion, and some companies of the first battalion of my regiment, formed the advanced guard, a situation which I consider the most enviable of any in the army--for here all is untried, and, as it were, unbroken ground; every thing is fresh, and although attended sometimes with a little more danger of being cut off while separated from the main body, yet possessing so many countervailing advantages, that I hesitate not to say it is the most desirable post of any in an army. At Betanzos, we began to experience the great defectiveness of our commissariat department, at this period of our history; for the gentleman sent forward to provide our two battalions with food, was so utterly unacquainted with his business, that he was actually afraid to make an attempt to issue provisions. Although bread had been baked by order of the Spanish authorities, he not understanding, as he said, the Spanish weights and measures, durst not issue any thing without his own, which were behind; but it was evident the troops could not remain without provisions. We were here, as in most of the towns we afterwards passed through, lodged in convents, the officers generally either being quartered on the inhabitants of the town, or lodged by the monks in their cells. On these occasions the men occupied only the corridors, into which straw was generally put by the authorities of the place, the men lying as close as pigs in a sty, which indeed was necessary to keep each other warm; but these lodgings were not to be complained of, as clean straw, and shelter overhead in that country, are no contemptible quarters. We moved forward by fair and easy stages, by way of Lugo, Villa Franca, Cacabelos, and Astorga; this latter place we reached on the 19th November, but during the march, we had experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining supplies both of provisions and the means of transport. This is a considerable town, containing probably about 5000 inhabitants. Both it and Lugo are surrounded by old Moorish walls, which may formerly have been considered strong, but which, according to the present mode of warfare, would offer but a feeble resistance to a besieging army. It contains a number of convents, both in the town and suburbs, and, of course, a proportionate number of idle monks, &c. Here, as in many towns in Spain, they have a curious mode of keeping out of their houses unwelcome visiters; for the doors being all made remarkably strong, and kept constantly shut, you cannot enter till the inmates have first reconnoitred you through an aperture above the door, made for the purpose; and it is not till they are satisfied who you are, and with your business, that they will open the door, which they generally do by a cord communicating with the latch from their peep-hole above. Here we were pretty plentifully supplied with provisions, and rested for some days, my battalion having been pushed forward to a village called Zalada, about a league in front of the town. After having been refreshed by a few days' rest, my battalion was again pushed forward, and occupied the town of Labeneza, about four leagues in front of Astorga, while the main body of the army assembled in and around that town; but we had not remained more than a few days in Labeneza, before a report arrived of the enemy being in our front, and advancing in force; and we were consequently recalled to Zalada, in order to form a junction with our main body. Not long after this, about the latter end of November, orders were received from Sir John Moore, for our division to retreat and fall back upon Corunna. This measure, I understand, was rendered necessary, in consequence of the Spanish armies having been completely beaten and dispersed, so that nothing remained to oppose an overwhelming French force, which it was ascertained had entered Spain, but the few British troops comprising the armies under Sir John Moore, and ours. We accordingly set to the right-about, and fell back as far as Cacabelos, the main body occupying Villa Franca and its neighbourhood. This movement was not by any means liked by any of us; for, independent of its being so uncongenial to the spirit of Britons to turn their backs upon an enemy, we felt disappointed at what we saw and heard of the celebrated Spanish patriots. We had been given to understand that the whole nation was up in arms against the French, and that we should have been received, on entering their country, as liberators, and treated as brethren, but in both these points we were miserably disappointed; for, instead of a hearty welcome on our arrival, we could with great difficulty obtain leave to land, and still more to obtain the necessary supplies of carriages and provisions to enable us to come forward; and with regard to the patriotism of the people, whatever might have been their good-will to act in defence of their beloved country and Ferdinand, they appeared as little likely as any people I had ever seen, to effect any thing against such an enemy as the French. In fact, those of them who formed their armies, at least of those straggling parties we so often met, could be called nothing better than mere rabble--no organization, no subordination, but every one evidently pursued that plan which seemed right in his own eyes. While we remained at Cacabelos, (a place famous for good wine,) many were the schemes adopted by some of our bibbers, to obtain a sufficient quantum of this excellent beverage. I understand they occasionally borrowed each other's clothes; that is, a 43d man would borrow a rifleman's green jacket, and _vice versa_, and go and steal, or in some other illegal mode obtain, a camp-kettle full or two; and when the owner came to point out the person who had robbed him, of course he could not be found. We had not remained above a day or two in our new quarters, before an express arrived from Sir John Moore, with orders for us to advance again immediately; and which, notwithstanding we had little or no prospect of assistance and co-operation from the Patriots, was cheerfully complied with. We retraced our former steps, passing through Astorga and Labeneza, and reached Benevente on the 15th December. Our cavalry, consisting of the 7th, 10th, and 15th hussars, under Lord Paget, had by this time come up from Corunna, and had been pushed forward to join Sir John Moore's force; they fell in with a party of the French cavalry at the town of Rueda, not far from Tordesillas, and of which they either killed, or took prisoners, nearly the whole; in fact, through the whole of this service, nothing could exceed the gallantry and intrepid conduct of our cavalry under his lordship. At this town, as well as at Astorga and Villa Franca, depots of provisions began to be formed soon after our arrival. On the 17th December, we again advanced from Benevente, in order to form a junction with Sir John Moore's army, and passing through Valderas, Majorga, and Sahagun, we reached the convent of Trianon, about a league in front of the latter place. On the 20th, here the two forces were united, and a fresh distribution into brigades took place. Ours, under Brigadier-general Crawford, was termed the Light Brigade, and consisted of the 1st battalion 43d, 2d battalion 52d, and the 2d battalion of my regiment. The whole army was assembled in this neighbourhood, and consisted of about 26,000 men, the whole _now_ under the command of Sir John Moore. Previous to our arrival at Sahagun, Lord Paget, with a part of the 10th and 15th hussars, discovered that a considerable body of the enemy's cavalry occupied that town. He therefore detached the 10th by a circuitous road, while he with the 15th approached it by the more direct one. They were, however, discovered by the French before reaching the town, which gave the enemy time to turn out and form to receive the attack. His lordship, when a favourable opportunity offered, charged the French, who were greatly superior in numbers, and completely overthrew them, taking two colonels, eleven other officers, and about 150 men. On the evening of the 23d, the whole army was put in motion, with an intention, it was said, of attacking Marshal Soult, who, with a corps of about 16 or 18,000 men, was posted behind the River Carrion, his head-quarters being at Saldanha. The Spanish General Romana, was to take a part in this movement; his small and sadly inefficient force had approached the left of our army, or rather we had drawn towards his position, and he was, I believe, perfectly willing to lend all the assistance in his power, in the contemplated attack; but our General, I fancy, did not calculate upon any material help, from a force so greatly out of order as his was said to be. Soon after dark, the troops fell in; and as it was understood an attack was going to be made on the enemy, every pulse beat high, in expectation of soon congratulating each other on a victory. All was life and animation; and the necessary preparations, by the light of our blazing fires, for such an event as a battle, after the many long and harassing marches we had had, gave an interesting appearance to the scene. When all was ready, the troops moved forward. It was a cold and bitter night, and there were some small brooks on the road. An officer of my battalion, who was not very well, when he came to one of those, instead of marching straight through, as it appears had been ordered, went a little way round by the bridge, although not off the road. A certain general officer, who happened to be there at the time, observed it, and getting into a great rage at the officer leaving his section, made him turn back, and march through and through repeatedly, by way of punishment. Such a mode of treating an officer, certainly appeared rather harsh; but this general piqued himself on his being able to make his brigade better marchers than any other troops in the army; and in this he certainly succeeded, although it was not without frequent exhibitions, such as the above. Our people had not gone far, however, till they were countermanded, and returned back to our convent. I rather think the main body of the army had not moved out of their cantonments; but ours being the advanced brigade, it was necessary we should move before the others. It appears Sir John Moore, just before he intended to set out, had received information, not only of Soult having been greatly reinforced, but that several strong corps of the French army were marching directly upon us, by which, should he delay only a few days, we should be completely surrounded, and cut off from a retreat. This was most distressing information, for never was an army more eager to come in contact with the enemy than ours was at this moment, and never was there a fairer prospect of success, had things remained as they were; but now, instead of honour and glory being acquired, by showing the French what British troops could do in the field, it was evident nothing remained but to commence a retrograde movement, the worst and most unpleasant, in a British soldier's view, of any other. Winter had now completely set in; the face of the country being covered with deep snow, the weather was unusually severe. Our prospect, therefore, was by no means a pleasant one. To commence a retreat in front of a greatly superior force, and with the probability that other French armies might be before us, and intercept our retreat upon the sea, which was distant from us nearly 250 miles, with the country in our rear being already exhausted of every thing that could contribute to our support, and with such excessively bad weather to perform the retreat in, rendered it, I may say, as unpleasant a situation as troops could well be placed in. Added to which, our commissariat was by no means so efficient in those days as they have latterly become; and our troops in general being young, and unaccustomed to privation, it was but too obvious, that should the retreat continue long, many would be the disasters attending it. On Christmas day, our brigade, as the rear of the infantry, commenced its uncomfortable retreat, and continued marching till late at night, when we reached a convent near Majorga. The next day, although we started early, we only reached the village of St Miguel about midnight. Here I had considerable difficulty with the baggage. I had had charge of it all day, my guard being composed of officers' servants, &c., who, the moment they got into the village, set off to their masters, and left me alone with the mules, the troops having, by the time I got in, all lain down to sleep. Several of the muleteers had been pressed into the service against their wills, and of course would have made their escape whenever an opportunity offered. I was therefore compelled to drive them all into the churchyard, and watch them myself, till luckily, after waiting in this situation a considerable time, without daring to go to sleep after the fatigues of such a day, some men happened to wander in that direction in search of meat, by whom I sent to our quartermaster to request he would send a guard, which he did soon after, and I had the happiness to be allowed to throw myself down and take some rest. This day Lord Paget had another brush with the French cavalry, who, being apprized of our retreat, had advanced to Majorga. He attacked them with that gallantry which shone so conspicuously in the cavalry during the whole of this service, and completely overthrew them, killing and wounding many, and taking a number prisoners; in this affair the 10th hussars were engaged, and behaved nobly. The next day we reached Castro Gonzales, and Castro Pipa. At the latter village, my battalion halted for the night and the next day. These two villages command the passage over the river Eslar, they being about equidistant from the bridge, and something more than a mile apart on high ground over the river, which runs about a league in front of Benevente. Here we were obliged to remain during the time mentioned, in order that the heavy divisions of the army might get sufficiently forward before we moved. I had still the charge of the baggage, and not knowing where my battalion was to be quartered for the night, I had crossed the Eslar to the Benevente side, till I learnt long after dark that Castro Pipa was its quarters. I consequently turned back and recrossed the river, and just as I reached the end of the bridge, I heard a shot immediately in my front. The 43d regiment guarded the bridge. It turned out to be a patrol of the enemy's cavalry who had come close to the top of the slope leading down to the bridge, and where a double sentry of the 43d was posted. By some accident these two men were not loaded; the French dragoons were consequently permitted to come close up to them without their being able to give any alarm. One of them, however, run his bayonet into one of the Frenchmen's horses, and retreated, but the other was not only cut down with the sabre, but had a pistol fired at him, which was the report I had just heard. I saw the wounded man, who was severely hurt, but whether he survived or not I know not. When I reached Castro Pipa, my commanding-officer would scarcely credit the report I gave him, conceiving it impossible the French could be such near neighbours. I was a good deal chagrined at his suspecting my veracity, but he had never been what I may call a friendly commanding-officer to me, as the story of the rifle at Copenhagen will prove; indeed, as I had been put into the situation I held contrary to his wish, it was hardly to be expected that he would show himself very friendly. During the night, however, our quarters were beat up, not indeed by the enemy, but by our brigadier, who was not sparing of his censure for our want of alertness in turning out. Indeed, we neither had so good a look-out as we ought to have kept, nor did we get under arms with that promptitude which was desirable, and from the cause before assigned; that is, that our commandant did not believe the enemy was so near. I own I was not sorry that the General paid us such a visit, as it not only put us more upon our guard, a thing so indispensably necessary in the presence of an enemy, but it gave me some satisfaction for the dishonour put upon me by disbelieving my information. The enemy did not disturb us during the remainder of the night, and next morning the brigade was assembled on the height above, and in front of the bridge; considerable bodies of the enemy's cavalry appearing in the plain before us. Some skirmishing between our people and the enemy took place, but nothing of any importance occurred. Our brigade was left in this position to cover the working party who were preparing to blow up the bridge, at which they worked all day; during the night our people were withdrawn from the farther side, and the explosion soon after took place, but the destruction of the bridge was by no means so effectual as was wished and expected. When we turned out in the morning to move towards the bridge, I (still having charge of my battalion's baggage) discovered that a vast quantity of excellent biscuit was stored up in an empty house in the village, which, no doubt, had been baked for the purpose of supplying the magazine at Benevente; and as our people had been but very indifferently supplied with bread since we commenced the retreat, I determined to load a bullock-cart with it, and try to get it to a place of safety, where I hoped to be able to issue it to them. I accordingly took a cart and two bullocks, there being plenty in the village, and apparently without owners, for the inhabitants had mostly either abandoned the place on the appearance of the French, or had hid themselves. I loaded the cart, but still I wanted a person to drive it; and although I used both promises and threats, I could not prevail upon any person to go with me. I therefore mounted the cart myself, and using my sword by way of a goad, I entered the river at a place which looked like a ford, and had the good fortune to reach the other side in safety. I mention this to show that so much importance need not have been attached to the destruction of the bridge, as both here, and near Castro Gonzales, the river was perfectly fordable, for near the latter place the French cavalry forded it on the following morning. I now made my way to Benevente, where I remained during the day of the 28th; and at night, as before hinted, the troops which had been guarding the bridge arrived, leaving cavalry piquets on the plain between the town and the river. The next morning our people left Benevente, and as I was a little behind them with the baggage, on my reaching a height in rear of the town, I observed in the plain in front a considerable body of the enemy's cavalry, who had, as before stated, crossed the river near Castro Gonzales, and were advancing towards the town, opposed, though feebly at first, by the few of our cavalry left there on piquet; but the cavalry regiments which were in town quickly turning out to their support, they were at length completely able to oppose, and finally overthrow them. During the time I remained here, I saw our brave dragoons make three most gallant and successful charges against superior numbers of the enemy, completely breaking and dispersing the different bodies against which the charges were made. The enemy appeared to be drawn up in different lines, the front one of which was that always charged; and I observed, that as our people advanced upon them, they were always received with a fire either from the carbines or pistols of the enemy, but this never appeared in the least to check the ardour of the charge, for in a minute or two after I observed the French troops retired in confusion, and formed behind the other lines. At length they were completely driven back to the ford by which they had crossed; and in a charge now made upon them, General le Febvre, with about seventy men, fell into our people's hands. These troops were a part of Bonaparte's Imperial Guard, and the flower of his army, being fine-looking men, dressed in dark-green long coats, with high bear-skin caps, and mustaches, which gave them a formidable appearance. It was said that Bonaparte was looking on at this affair, and witnessed the defeat of his hitherto invincible Old Guard; it is certain that he slept the night before at Villalpando, a place only four leagues distant from the field. I now set off and overtook the baggage and the bullock cart, not having had an opportunity of issuing the biscuit; but before I had proceeded above a few miles, the bullocks knocked up, and notwithstanding every exertion I found it impossible to get them any farther. Thus was I reluctantly compelled to abandon a cart-load of excellent biscuit, after having had so much trouble with it, at the time when I knew it was greatly needed by my hungry fellow soldiers, and to whom it would have been a most welcome offering. On this day's march, a most lamentable number of stragglers were overtaken by us, we being in rear of all the infantry; they had either fallen out from excessive fatigue, or from having (as in too many instances) drunk too much; indeed, the destruction of the magazine of provisions at the place we had left, enabled too many of them to obtain by one means or other considerable quantities of spirits, and which, of course, rendered them incapable of marching. This was a long and wearisome day's journey of nearly thirty miles; we did not reach Labeneza till late at night, where a considerable quantity of ammunition was obliged to be destroyed, the animals failing which drew it. The next day we reached our old quarters at Zalada, a league in front of Astorga, where we halted for the night, the remainder of the brigade going into the town. It was to this village, it may be remembered, that we were sent on our first advance, and subsequently after our first retreat from Labeneza; but besides these movements from the village and back again, during the time we remained in it, we almost every morning had orders to pack up and move a short distance out of the place. This was done no doubt to accustom us to a ready turning out, as till this period our baggage had been transported on bullock-carts; but now we had mules, and it was necessary to accustom those whose duty it was, to load the mules with dispatch. But on every occasion of this kind, the inhabitants always imagined we were actually going to leave them, and the moment we were clean gone, as they thought, they set to work and rung the church bell with all their might. This was either to testify their regret at losing our company, or to evince their gratitude to Heaven for having got rid of such a band of heretics, by which their most pure and holy dwellings had been defiled; it was laughable to see the long faces they put on when we, so contrary to their hopes and expectations, always returned to our wretched and uncomfortable quarters. During the whole of the time we remained in this village, I, as a staff-sergeant, could find no better lodgings than a dirty open shed; the reader will therefore judge how ill the privates must have been off. Our fellows began about this time to pick up little bits of Spanish, and would often exercise their ability to converse in the native tongue, by telling the inhabitants that we were certainly going to "_marcha manana_", that is, to march to-morrow, so that it became quite a by-word, which annoyed our hosts not a little. If I mistake not, the Padre of this village was a great knave, and did not scruple to help himself to such things as he had a mind for, belonging to our officers, whenever a fit opportunity presented itself. The next day, the 31st, we moved into Astorga, where we halted for an hour or two, till the destruction of the magazine there was completed, although nothing but rum remained; and here I witnessed such a brutal and swinish eagerness for drink as was quite disgusting. The rum casks were ordered to be staved, and to let the contents run out on the street, that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy: thus the rum which had cost so much trouble in bringing up all the way from Corunna was about to be lost for ever; a thing most heart-rending to the numerous soldiers looking on, who loved it so dearly. However, they were determined not to lose all, for when the heads of the casks were knocked in, and their contents permitted to run in streams down the gutters, some of those brutes deliberately took off their greasy caps, and laving up the rum and the mud together, drank, or rather ate, the swinish mixture. What noble soldiers would our country produce, were not that detestable vice of drunkenness so common among us; but to it how many have I seen deliberately sacrifice their own and country's honour, nay their very life itself, rather than forego the beastly gratification! All this morning we had been told to keep a sharp look-out on the Leon side of Astorga, for the enemy was every moment expected to make his appearance from that quarter; however, we were not disturbed during the short time we remained. We here fell in with a considerable body of Romana's army, apparently all confusion, and destitute of every thing. We understood that they were not to be marched in the same line we were taking, but that it had been concerted between the two generals that our route should be kept free; however, here, and for several days afterwards, we suffered greatly from their contiguity. We continued our march from Astorga the same day, and reached at night the village of Foncevadon, about twenty miles distant. Here we pigged in as well as we were able, there being only five or six houses; but as we had a few tents with us, we managed not amiss. Till now our brigade had formed the rear of the infantry, there being some cavalry in rear of us; but it was now determined that ours and the Light German Brigade under Brigadier-general Charles Alten, should strike off from the great road, and take the route for Orense and Vigo. This was done, I understand, with a view to secure a passage across the Minho at the former place, should Sir John, with the main army, be compelled to retreat in that direction, and probably with the view also of drawing off a part of the enemy's overwhelming force from the pursuit of that body, and to induce them to follow us into the mountains. Notwithstanding this, they continued to pursue Sir John on the great road, whilst they left us free altogether. I beg to notice here, that both Mr Gifford and Mr Moore (Sir John's brother), have fallen into a trifling error respecting the period of our separation from the main body, they both making us be detached before our arrival at Astorga, whereas it was not till we had passed a day's march beyond it that we were sent off. The thing is of no consequence, only it is as well to be correct. The next day, the 1st of January 1809, we marched by a most difficult road through the mountains, to Ponferrada, situated about a league to the left of the great road to Corunna, on which the main army was retreating. When we got in, our commissary immediately made a requisition to the Alcalde of the town, to provide bread for the two brigades, as we began to be in most fearful want. He promised to set the bakers to work immediately, and in a few hours, he said, the bread would be ready. We called on him repeatedly, without obtaining any, he still alleging it was not yet quite ready, and putting us off from time to time, till midnight, when the patience of our commissary being fairly worn out, he yielded to the anger so naturally inspired by such shuffling conduct, and used some strong language to the Alcalde. Whereupon, we discovered at once that he had been only amusing us with promises he did not intend to fulfil; and told the commissary that he did not fear any of his threats, for that, as Romana's army had now also entered the town, he had no doubt they would protect him, and revenge any insult offered to him. The commissary had indeed talked about hanging him for his double-dealing, and leaving the troops utterly starving; but if he could have got any bread ready, it is most natural to suppose he would prefer letting his own countrymen have it; this, however, as might be expected, had a most pernicious effect upon our suffering soldiers, for when provisions could not be procured in the regular and ordinary mode, it is evident they would take them wherever they were to be found--for hunger is not easily borne, accompanied by incessant fatigue. In the morning, when we turned out to continue our march towards Orense, we heard a heavy firing towards our right and front, and this proved to be an attack made by the enemy's light troops upon our first battalion, who, with some cavalry, had been left in Cacabelos as a rearguard. Our first battalion gained great credit for their conduct on this occasion. The force of the enemy greatly exceeded ours, yet our people drove them back with great loss, killing General Colbert, who commanded the advance. This was done by a noted pickle of the name of Tom Plunkett, who, fearless of all danger to himself, got sufficiently nigh to make sure of his mark, and shot him, which, with the fire of the others, caused great havoc in the enemy's ranks, and set them flying to the rear much faster than they advanced. Our situation was thus, in a manner, in rear of the enemy's advance guard, yet they did not turn in our direction. Cacabelos was distant from us only about a league. Our road this day lay over high and almost inaccessible mountains, deeply covered with snow. On the top of one of these, as our General was passing the column, a cry was passed from the rear to open out to allow him to pass, the road being very narrow. One of our men, as the General came near, happened to say, loud enough for him to hear, that "he had more need to give us some bread," or words to that effect, which so exasperated the General, that he instantly halted the whole brigade, ordered the man to be tried by a drum-head court-martial, and flogged him on the spot. It was a severe, but perhaps necessary discipline, in order to check in the bud the seeds of murmuring and insubordination, although I own it appeared harsh. Our march was a long and toilsome one indeed, and did not terminate till about ten at night, when we reached St Domingo-Flores, where nothing could be procured but a very small quantity of black bread, the village being quite small. Tired with the journey, we felt rather inclined to sleep than eat; and, wet and dirty as we were, we laid ourselves down till dawn, when we commenced another such day's march, and reached at night the village of La Rua. During these two days, want and fatigue had compelled many to fall out, some of whom, no doubt, perished in the snow on the bleak mountains, over which our road, or rather path, had lain; others fell into the hands of the enemy, and some few rejoined us after having obtained some little refreshment from the natives. It would but be a repetition of the privations and fatigues we underwent, to notice all that befell us on our way thence to Orense, which place we reached on the 7th of January, having previously pushed on, by double forced marches, a few hundred men, to take possession of the bridge over the Minho at this place. Here we remained a day, and obtained provisions, then much needed by us all, for the men had been literally starving for several days past. We had time and opportunity here also to strip and change our linen, that is, those who had a change; the others washed the shirt they took off, sitting without one till it was dry. Indeed, by this time we were in a most miserable plight; our shoes, of course, were nearly all worn out, and many travelling barefoot; and our clothes, as might be expected, were ragged and filthy in the extreme; indeed they could not be otherwise, for I suppose none of us had put any thing off since we commenced the retreat. This day's rest, however, refreshed us greatly, and enabled us to perform the remainder of our toilsome journey with more comfort; indeed, since we had secured the passage of the Minho, and thus prevented the enemy from getting in before us, our minds were more at ease, for strong apprehensions were entertained that the French would have detached a corps from their main body to seize this pass, and thus cut off our retreat to Vigo. A part of Romana's army entered Orense before we left it, worse, if possible, in point of appearance than ourselves; but they, in their best days, are more like an armed mob than regularly organized soldiers. It is a pity that Romana did not adopt the plan pointed out to him by Sir John Moore, either to retire into the Asturias with his army unbroken, or hang upon the flanks of the enemy as he passed through the mountains; and which he could have done with ease and safety, for these fellows could live where regular troops would starve, and there was no doubt but the peasantry would have assisted their countrymen with all their means. This would have in some measure retarded the too rapid progress of the French, and probably been the means of saving to our country one of its bravest and most skilful generals. Some of our men who had been compelled to stop behind from fatigue and starvation, rejoined us here, having generally been assisted by the peasantry, who gave them food, and helped them forward. On the 9th, in the morning, we left Orense, crossing the Minho to the north side of that river, and continued our march to the town of Ribadavia, situated at the junction of the rivers Avia and Minho, both of which, from the melting of the snow, and the immense quantities of rain that had fallen, were greatly swollen. So much so, that when I approached the town with the baggage, (the troops having gone on before,) and which I did not reach till near midnight, I found the road completely overflowed with water; and being without a guide, I could not of course in the night be certain where the road lay, the whole bank of the river being completely under water. We were in consequence obliged to climb the mountains to our left, and proceed in the best manner we were able with the loaded mules; but so precipitous were they in one place, that a load of ammunition slid off the mule's back, and the casks rolled rapidly down the hill towards the river. I durst not venture to leave them, although my chance of finding them in such a situation appeared small indeed; however, we halted the remainder of the mules, while a few of us set off down the steep in the direction we had seen them go, and after a long and anxious groping in every hollow of the rocky mountain, succeeded in recovering them; but the powder in them, and indeed nearly all the ammunition we had, was rendered completely useless, from the constant heavy rain that had fallen. I am almost astonished that no accident happened to either man or beast in this perilous journey, for our feet literally "stumbled upon the dark mountains," without either guide or path, and where the ground was most uneven and dangerous. We however at length reached our destination, wet and weary enough, and, just as we entered the town, were informed that the corridor of one of the convents where two of our companies were sleeping, had just fallen to the ground with a tremendous crash, and that several men had had their limbs broken by the fall; I do not remember that any were killed. It being so late, I could not procure any kind of quarter, so I was fain to sit down by the side of a fire kindled in the yard of this convent for the remainder of the night. We next morning resumed our journey, and in three days more from this place we reached Vigo. On this last day's march we had a pretty high eminence to ascend at some distance from the town, from which the view of the town, the shipping, and the sea, broke all at once upon us. It was a most delightful prospect, and it was highly amusing to observe the joy which seemed to animate the woe-worn countenances of our ragged and dirty soldiers. Fellows without a shoe or a stocking, and who before were shuffling along with sore and lacerated feet like so many lame ducks, now made an attempt to dance for joy; laughter and mirth, and the joke, now succeeded to the gloomy silence with which they had in general prosecuted their wearisome journey for several days past, as the friendly element before them promised shortly to put a period to long and toilsome wanderings. Indeed, although I am a bad sailor, and suffer always severely when at sea, I do not remember ever to have witnessed a sight which inspired me with greater pleasure than the shipping and the sea did on this occasion. The fleet of transports for the army under Sir John Moore, was just clearing the bay as we came in sight, but we observed that a sufficient number remained at Vigo to transport us to our native land, a place we sorely longed for, as we had often contrasted the happiness and security and comfort of our friends at home, with the poverty and misery we had lately witnessed in the country we were leaving; and this no doubt increased our anxiety for the change. We marched into Vigo, and were soon after put on board the vessels destined to receive us. It was my fortune to be sent on board the Alfred, 74, with two of our companies; a great number of men were still behind, for even the few last days' marches had deprived us of many who till then had braved the toils and privations of the journey, but who now had fairly sunk under exhaustion. The Commodore, therefore, remained as long in the bay as it was safe, sending the stragglers as they arrived on board the different ships; but within a few days after our arrival, the enemy entered the town, which of course precluded all hope of more escaping. We consequently weighed and stood out towards the outer bay, where we again came to anchor. A Russian ship-of-war was in a small harbour in this bay, which it was intended to board and cut out. As we were then, I believe, on rather bad terms with that nation, never did I witness such alacrity and delight as our tars on board the Alfred manifested when buckling on their cutlasses for the occasion, and I feel certain that if confidence in themselves would tend to insure the victory, no men had a better chance of succeeding; but from some cause or other with which I am unacquainted, the enterprise was abandoned. On the 21st January we weighed and stood out to sea; but a gale coming on we were obliged to come to anchor again under the shelter of the Isle of Bagona. We did not get to sea till the 24th, but on the 25th we spoke a frigate going out to Lisbon with General Dyatt on board, who informed us of the fatal business at Corunna. Indeed the people on board this ship had, from vague reports, greatly magnified our loss on that occasion, telling us that the whole army had been nearly cut to pieces, and that very few indeed had been able to effect their escape. We each, of course, mourned for his particular friends, not doubting but they had fallen among the rest. I think it was the same night on which we saw this ship, a fatal accident had very nigh taken place. Our captain was the Commodore, and the captain of the Hindostan store-ship had charge of the rear of the fleet; his place was consequently always behind all the other vessels. Some time after dark, however, our look-out people gave notice of a large vessel on our starboard quarter. We shortened sail and let her come up pretty close to us, and made the private signal, but no answer was returned. At length, when near enough, we hailed her, but still no answer. An order was now given to stand to quarters and prepare for action, not doubting she was an enemy which had got among the fleet. The guns were accordingly run out, the matches lit, and every thing prepared for action. She appeared a large ship, but of what force they could not guess. Again she was hailed, and again she disregarded it. Our first lieutenant was now fully convinced she was an enemy, and pleaded hard with the captain to give the word fire, but the captain said he would hail her once more, and if she did not answer he would fire. Providentially they heard us this time, and answered it was the Hindostan. What they had been about I know not, for we were quite near each other; and had she received our broadside, as was the intention had she not then answered, it is most probable she would have gone down; at all events the consequences must have been awful, for she had the whole of the 43d regiment on board, besides her own crew. Our captain certainly censured him in no very mild terms for leaving his station in the rear, and getting to the very head of the fleet. She was a very lofty ship, and carried forty-four guns I believe, and had not less than 1000 men on board, many of whom must have suffered had we fired upon her. A few days after this we encountered a most tremendous gale, and came in sight of the English coast, somewhere near the Lizard or the Start; but our master not knowing exactly where he was, we stood off again towards the French coast. The next day the gale was if possible more severe, and the ship rolled so much that they were afraid her guns would break loose from their lashings, in consequence of which large spikes were driven in behind the wheels of each gun-carriage to prevent such an accident. In this situation, I know not whether I did not almost wish myself on the snowy mountains of Galicia again, rather than where I was, so miserable a sailor am I, and so much do I suffer from sea-sickness. The fleet was by this time completely scattered, every one making the best shift he could for himself; some got into Plymouth, some reached Portsmouth, and some, I believe, foundered in the gale, among which, if I mistake not, was a brig, on board of which my two companies had been first embarked, but were subsequently removed to the Alfred, and some of the German Legion, I think, put on board her. At length we made the Isle of Wight, and subsequently Spithead, which we reached on the 31st, and the next day landed once more on the happy shore of our native Britain. Thankful indeed I ought to have been for the ever watchful care of an indulgent and kind Providence, who had brought me safely through the toils and sufferings under which so many more robust and hardy than myself had sunk; but, alas! I had then no sense of the gratitude due for such unmerited favours, and instead of rendering thanks to Him who had thus preserved me, I entered, with all the eagerness of a person devoid of reason and religion, into every vice and sensuality that presented itself. I here learnt with sorrow the great loss which my friends in the first battalion had sustained, but glad nevertheless that it was not to the extent we apprehended, and that none of my particular friends had fallen. We left Portsmouth, and returned to our old quarters at Hythe, in Kent, passing again on the road my native county militia at Battle, in Sussex, as I did at Bury, on my return from Holland; and truly our appearance on this occasion was, if possible, more deplorable than on the former. However, our tattered and worn-out habiliments had the effect of inspiring some of my countrymen in that regiment with a desire of sharing in the glory, as they termed it, of suffering so much in the defence of our beloved country; and they accordingly made up their minds to volunteer into our corps the first opportunity that offered, and which they put in execution that same year, as will be told hereafter. We took up our abode in the comfortable barracks at Hythe, and immediately set about putting every thing in order, and truly much was wanting to fit us again for duty as soldiers. CHAPTER VI. Volunteering--Farther Promotion--Embarks for Portugal, with two Companies of the Second Battalion--Debark at Cadiz--Advance to the Isla--The French occupy all the adjacent Towns, except Cadiz and the Isla--Cannonading--Spanish Army--Detachment of the Allied Army sent Around by Gibraltar and Chiclana, to take the Enemy in the rear of his works, and compel him either to fight or abandon them--Come up with a portion of the Enemy in the vicinity of Veger--Bravery of the British--The Enemy repulsed with great Loss, but, from the apathy and misconduct of General La Pena, and the Spaniards under his command, the French are allowed to retain their Works in the vicinity of Cadiz. In April of this year, an order was issued to allow the militia regiments to volunteer, for the purpose of filling up the regiments of the line; and I was sent by Colonel Beckwith (our two battalions being then both at Hythe) to receive those who chose to volunteer from the Northumberland militia before-mentioned, which had now been removed to Ipswich. Lieutenant Beckwith had the charge of our party, but proceeded _incog._ to Ipswich, the general orders not permitting officers of the line to be seen in the quarters of the militia. On our arrival at Ipswich, I had the pleasure of obtaining the names of thirty fine young fellows, among whom the patriots formerly mentioned of course were included. Several other militia regiments in this district also gave volunteers to us, so that in three days, from the commencement of the volunteering, we obtained upwards of 1100 men; and had we not, by an order from the Horse-Guards, been precluded from taking any more, I doubt not we should have obtained several hundreds besides, for our regiment alone had near eighty names down for us, who were not allowed to enter from the above cause. Indeed the Commander-in-Chief, Sir David Dundas, (afterwards our Colonel,) appeared quite astonished, and not well pleased, that we had run away with so many men when others wanted them so much. He was obliged, however, to grant us a 3d battalion, as we had so many more men than were required to fill up the 1st and 2d; and our respected Colonel, Major-general Coote Manningham, dying about this time of the fatigue he had undergone in Spain, Sir David took us to himself, and became our Colonel-in-Chief, giving the command of the 3d battalion to my respected (and now lamented) friend and benefactor, Major-general the Honourable William Stewart. The Lieutenant-colonelcy was given to Major Norman M'Leod, our senior Major, and only two or three other steps were given to the officers of the regiment, although it was alone owing to their exertions in obtaining men, and to the high character the regiment had acquired, that such numbers had volunteered into it. It becomes not me to censure or criticise the measures of government, but I cannot help thinking that more favour was certainly due to the corps as a body. For myself, I ought and must speak with gratitude, not of them, but of that kind Providence which has favoured me so far, so very far, beyond my deserts, for, on the 8th of June following, I was appointed Quartermaster of the 3d battalion. Our 1st battalion was again sent out to join the army in Portugal, while mine was sent to Brabournlees to equip and drill our new levies. Every exertion was made to this effect, and the battalion was soon completed and rendered fit for service. Here my wife joined me again, the child to which she gave birth in my absence having died when six weeks old. This was the only child she ever had, and it was perhaps a providential dispensation, for she was extremely delicate, and by no means a healthy person, and it is not unlikely her offspring might have inherited her disease, that is, an affection of the chest. We had only lived a few months together, till another call for service separated us again. In June 1810, we received orders to send out to Cadiz two companies of my battalion, together with the commanding-officer and staff, three others having been already sent thither in the spring. The melancholy business of parting with my wife was again to be gone through; but on this occasion I was favoured by being permitted to accompany her to London, where, parting from her with a heavy heart, I took my place for Chichester, at which place my detachment would be quartered next day, on their way to Portsmouth. I omitted to mention, that Lieutenant-colonel Barnard of the 1st or Royals, had exchanged with Lieutenant-colonel M'Leod some time previous, and he consequently was now going out as my commanding-officer. We embarked at Portsmouth on the 11th July, on board the Mercury frigate, armed _en flute_, and commanded by Captain Tancock. We had a favourable passage, and landed at Cadiz on the 29th of that month. This city, it may be remembered, was besieged at this time by a French army under Marshal Victor; consequently, when we arrived, we were amused by seeing immense shells flying from one party to the other, but without doing any serious injury to either, the distance being too great to produce any effect of moment. As we came in sight of Cadiz, the view was most enchanting, for the city appeared as if composed of lofty and elegant snow-white buildings, apparently rising from the bosom of the ocean, for the land on which it is built cannot be seen at a distance; added to which, the numerous and beautiful towns about the bay, and a little beyond it, rendered it a most delightful scene. On the right was Cadiz, with its lofty lighthouse, and its strong sea-walls rising out of the water; on the left was Rota, an apparently neat little town. Farther up the bay, on the same side, was Port St Mary's, and beyond that Porto Real, both considerable towns. In the centre rises the Isla de Leon, now called St Ferdinand; beyond that Chiclana, composed of the elegant country residences of the more wealthy Cadiz merchants; and, in the distance, towering on the mountains behind, the dazzling white town of Medina Sidonia shining in the sun; indeed altogether imagination can scarcely picture to itself a more interesting _coup-d'oeil_, the scene being closed by the lofty snow-clad mountains of Ronda. We landed at Cadiz, and remained for the night in the barracks situated in the barrier, on the land-side of the town, and which is remarkably strong, the fortifications being composed of solid masonry, and the barracks all bomb-proof. I suffered dreadfully from the myriads of fleas which preyed upon me during the night, and was glad when morning appeared. We marched next day to the Isla, (be it observed the town is called by that name as well as the island on which it and Cadiz are situated,) distant from Cadiz about seven miles; the island is of a most singular form, being about ten miles broad at the end next the continent, from which it is separated by the river Santi Petri; immediately below the town of Isla it begins to narrow very rapidly, forming from thence to Cadiz nothing more than a narrow sand-bank, in some places not more than a hundred yards across, and on which a causeway has been built to connect the two places. We took up our abode in the Isla, where the Spanish government, such as it was, at this time resided; and here I witnessed the first opening of the Spanish Cortes in 1810, which was attended with all the pomp and show of a truly Roman Catholic people. _Te Deums_ and other pompous and brilliant ceremonies marked the event; indeed, here we had an opportunity of seeing a great number of the grandees of the Spanish nation, for, as I said before, the government had retired to this place from Madrid, and most of the courtiers and others attached to the government had assembled here, together with the deputies from the different provinces; altogether the scenes we witnessed here were sometimes very imposing. The French occupied all the towns before named save Cadiz and Isla, their advanced piquets being thrown forward to near the river Santi Petri, except near the Bridge of Luaza, which is the only communication across from the island to the mainland; here our pickets were advanced a considerable distance beyond the bridge upon a causeway on which is the road leading to Seville, through a broad salt marsh on the banks of the river; it is here about two miles wide, and utterly impassable, except to those who know the footpaths across it, being intersected at every few paces by deep salt-pits or pans. The enemy, as mentioned before, had their sentries at some parts pretty far into the centre of this marsh, and there were some fellows in the Spanish service called by the name of "creepers," they obtaining their livelihood by killing sea-fowl and other animals in this marsh; and so dexterous were they at this _creeping_, that they could steal upon the birds unperceived, which enabled them to get them with ease. Sometimes a fellow of this calling would set off on a _creeping_ excursion, and instead of bagging a wild-duck, or some other such bird, would plunge his stiletto into the heart of an unsuspecting French sentry, and leave him weltering in his gore. This was a noble exploit in their estimation, and marks strongly the character of the Spaniard, who, inured to blood by the frequency of their bull-fights and other similar exhibitions, hesitates not a moment at assassination if urged on by what he deems his own or country's wrongs; this inhuman act, of course, was perpetrated in the dark. I may mention, in connexion with this, that on the Christmas of 1810, it was reported that sixteen people had been assassinated in Isla alone, on the evening or night before; it is probable the number may have been exaggerated, but the thing was such an almost everyday occurrence that it appeared not to excite the least horror at its atrocity. I had occasion to go down the town during the Christmas day, and I saw still lying at the corner of one of the most frequented streets, one of the unhappy beings who had thus fallen. No one seemed inclined to own him; and his body, foul with blood and dust, was thus permitted to remain in the public streets without any enquiry being made with respect to the perpetrator of so foul a deed. In truth they are, as it were, trained up to this recklessness of human life from their infancy, for in the town of Isla there was a sort of naval academy, where a number of boys, from perhaps eight to twelve years of age, were educated; these urchins were permitted to wear swords, and it is really astonishing how desirous they appeared to make use of them, for they could scarcely ever pass along the streets without trying the sharpness of their points upon the backs of pigs or dogs, or any other unfortunate animal that came in their way. The French also occupied a long low tongue of land which stretches out into the Bay of Cadiz, taking its rise from between Port St Mary's and Porto Real, and extending to within about two and a half miles of Cadiz, and about one from Puntalis, a fort erected on the island opposite the extremity of this low tongue; this is called the Trocadero, since become famous as the field on which the Duke D'Angouleme, and Prince Carignan of Naples, gained so many honours. On the point of this tongue the enemy's principal batteries were erected, and from thence they contrived occasionally, but not often, and never with any great effect, to throw shells into the town of Cadiz. The mortar now in St James' Park, called the "Prince Regent's bomb," was cast at Seville on purpose to enable them to reach the town, no ordnance of common dimensions being capable of throwing a shell so far; but it did not answer the end proposed, or at least the effect expected from it, for it was imagined by them, that if they could once succeed in throwing shells into the city, the inhabitants would become so alarmed that they would compel the military to surrender. This, however, was far from being realized, although they did throw a few in; but the distance being so great, they were necessarily thrown much at random, some of them falling short of the town, others flying completely over into the bay near the lighthouse on the other side, and some few, as I said, falling in the city, but from which very few casualties occurred.[2] I am told they were obliged to have the mortar slung in chains at the time of firing it, the concussion being so great as to destroy the bed in which it was fixed. As may be supposed, there was constant war between our fort Puntalis, before mentioned, and the enemy's batteries on this point; in fact our people had orders to throw a thirteen-inch shell every quarter of an hour, besides the occasional firing from the guns and other mortars when any thing appeared on the opposite side; and you may be certain the French were not behind us in the expenditure of ammunition; they were remarkably fond of firing what are termed salvos, that is, volleys of artillery. On one occasion I happened to be looking out from a high tower near Isla, called the Tore Alto, and while all was deep and profound silence, and I happened to be looking towards the point of Trocadero, in a moment the smoke rose from at least 100 pieces of artillery, fired by signal, and the noise they made was tremendous. Our poor little fort of Puntalis appeared almost enveloped in the dust raised by the striking of the shot, and the smoke from them which fell about it, and seemed as if almost deprived of power by so sudden and unexpected a salute; but she began at length to return the compliment, although feebly in comparison of the tremendous volley she had received. This and such like were of frequent occurrence, scarcely a day passing without something interesting taking place. To enable us to cope in some measure with the French, a large double fortified sea-mortar was brought from Gibraltar, which threw thirteen-inch shells. It was brought up to the back of the town of Isla, near some powder magazines, and an attempt made there to throw some shells over to the Trocadero. The first trial, an empty shell was put in, with not less than thirty-two pounds of powder in the chamber. On firing it, the shell flew all to atoms, from the violent shock occasioned by so great a quantity of powder; and the shell being too weak for that description of mortar, another was tried filled with sand, to give it more weight and solidity; this answered the purpose, for it fell on the land on the opposite coast, but still, from the great range, much uncertainty must naturally attend the practice, and it was eventually given up. The next day, however, we were saluted from the opposite side with both shot and shell, the French thus showing us that they were better able to play at long bowls than we were; neither, however, did their practice continue, for there was nothing at the point where their shot and shells fell to be injured by them, the magazines before noticed being now empty. On another occasion an attack was made by our people on the Trocadero itself, where it was reported the French had got a considerable number of boats, &c., laid up on shore, about half-way between the point and Porto Real; our folks took gun-boats and boats with rockets, the intention being to set fire to the enemy's craft. They accordingly advanced in good style, keeping as far, however, as possible out of the range of the French batteries at the point, which, as they were directed towards Cadiz and Puntalis, could not easily bring their artillery to bear upon our boats. They reached the place where it was said the French craft was lying, and fired a considerable number of rockets, but without being able to effect any thing farther than burning one boat, I believe. As they were returning, however, they met the French commander, who had been down to the point in a light boat, and he, like a brave fellow, determined to run completely the gauntlet rather than return, keeping as close in shore, however, as possible. The whole of our gun-boats fired at him as he passed, and knocked the water up about him in all directions without ever once touching him, although, to look at him, one would have imagined it impossible he could escape; but here the old soldier's adage was verified, for there was still more room to miss than to hit him, and he accordingly escaped scot-free. While here, I had a most ample opportunity of closely viewing the Spanish army, great numbers being stationed in and about the Isla, and great numbers constantly coming into and going out of the place, after receiving such equipment as the government was able to provide for them. Nothing could exceed the hardy and robust appearance of the men in general; and had they been clothed, appointed, and disciplined like either their enemies or their allies, there could not have been a finer soldiery. I cannot, however, say so much for their officers; most of them appeared to be utterly unfit and unable to command their men. Those who had the means, seemed to think of nothing else but dressing like apes or mountebanks, and intriguing with the women. It was really absurd and ludicrous to see the strange figures they generally made themselves. In one regiment alone you might have observed more different uniforms than both we and the French have in all our armies. One would have had on a blue coat turned up with red, with a chaco and a straight sword, the uniform prescribed for officers of the infantry, I believe; the next would have most likely had on a hussar dress, with an enormous sabre dangling by his side; another would have had a red coat, a fourth yellow, a fifth white, and so on. In short, all the colours of the rainbow were generally exhibited in the uniforms of one regiment's officers; and every one of them appeared to vie with the other who could make the greatest harlequin of himself, whilst those of them who were mounted would caper and prance about the streets like so many fools, riding with their legs at full stretch, and the toe of the boot (if they had one) just touching the stirrup, and drawing the reins continually through the fingers of their right hand; and if by any chance an ape of this kind came near the window of his dulcinea, and thought there was a likelihood of her seeing him, I pitied the poor foot-passengers who might happen to be near him, for he would make his unfortunate Rosinante prance and caper by the immense long bit in its mouth, and the pieces of iron in the shape of spurs on his (shoes perhaps), till the poor animal was like to fall under him. In short, they had all the pride, arrogance, and self-sufficiency of the best officers in the world, with the very least of all pretension to have an high opinion of themselves; it is true they were not all alike, but the majority of them were the most haughty, and at the same time the most contemptible creatures in the shape of officers, that I ever beheld. It was, therefore, not to be expected that the soldiers would or could look upon them with that degree of respect and reverence so essential to a due maintenance of subordination in an army. About the month of February 1811, it was concerted between the Spanish government and General Graham, who commanded us, to undertake an expedition which should land in the vicinity of Gibraltar; and being there reinforced by some troops from that fortress, the whole should move forward in the direction of Chiclana, and, taking the enemy in the rear of his works, compel him either to abandon them or fight a battle. Accordingly, on the 18th of that month, we embarked on board some small vessels that had been fitted up for the occasion in the bay of Cadiz, and, sailing soon after, we reached Algeziras, ten miles on this side of Gibraltar, and landed there on the 24th. Our force consisted of a brigade of artillery, with ten guns; two battalions of Foot Guards; the 28th, 67th, and 87th regiments; a battalion composed of flank companies from Gibraltar; two companies of the 47th regiment, and two of the 20th Portuguese regiment, with six companies of our corps and one squadron of cavalry,--in all about 4500 men. The Spanish army, under the command of General La Pena, (who, being senior officer, directed the whole,) consisted of two divisions,--in all from ten to eleven thousand. We were not allowed to take any baggage with us, consequently we could not expect much comfort during the service, which was expected to be short. The day we landed we bivouacked on a height near Algeziras, and the next morning moved on towards Tarifa, where we remained for that day and the next, to allow time to get the artillery and cavalry horses on shore. Here I observed a strange custom among the females of this place, the remains, I apprehend, of the Moorish fashion, (which no doubt would continue longer in this place than others, it being immediately opposite to and in sight of Africa.) The Spanish women all wear what they term a mantilla, that is, a kind of scarf made of cloth, generally black, which they throw over their heads lengthwise, letting the two ends come over their shoulders, and meeting and crossing on the breast, it forms a sort of head-dress which shows only the face, and keeps them close and snug about the head; but here, they bring it so far forward as to completely cover the face, leaving nothing but a very small hole in front of their left eye (I think it is), at which they peep out, without showing any part of the face. Colonel Brown of the 28th, who was then a most wild and eccentric character, although now I understand completely altered, could not relish this hiding of their beauty by the modest dames of Tarifa. All, therefore, that he met in the streets he stopped, and made them open the mantilla, that he might have a fair peep at them, to the great scandal of the good ladies of this still Moorish town, and which, had it been on any other occasion, might have been attended with unpleasant consequences to himself. When every thing was ready we moved forward from Tarifa, and halted for the night on a height about twelve miles distant. The next day we reached Casas Vejas, or "Old Houses," where we bivouacked on a scrubby hill, the weather being very bitter, which we felt in all its force, having no covering whatever. Next day we had to cross a considerable lake of fresh water, by a sort of ford which crossed it about the middle. We had started before daylight, and, through some mismanagement, did not reach this lake till near mid-day, although it was only a few miles distant from our last night's quarters. One division of the Spaniards led the column, and another was behind us, we being thus in the centre, as being the least thought of probably by our Spanish Commander-in-Chief; for indeed we had often heard it said in and about Isla, "what fine-looking and well-disciplined soldiers the British are!--what a pity they cannot fight!" So thought La Pena, probably; but by two o'clock the first division of Spaniards had not near got over the lake, at which the patience of our General was so completely exhausted, that he requested the Spanish General to allow him to bring forward the British troops, to show him the way how he and they would act. My battalion led the van, and were ordered to march straight through it without any picking of steps, and to go forward in regular sections, one man supporting another. They went in and marched right through it, as if it had been plain ground, the water taking them generally about mid-deep. The rest of the British army followed, and were all through in less than half an hour; a one-horse cart, indeed, stuck fast in the middle of it, from the wheels having got entangled between the large stones at the bottom. General Graham seeing this, instantly dismounted, and, plunging in, set his shoulder to the wheel, and fairly lifted it clear of the obstruction. La Pena, and those about him, after witnessing the example set them by our General and his troops, seemed really ashamed of their former conduct, and, setting to in good earnest, they contrived to urge their soldiers and officers to take the water with more freedom, and before dark the whole army had got over. While we were so long detained by the first division of Spaniards getting across, I, with several other mounted people, rode forward to the ford, to ascertain the cause of our stoppage for so long a time. The Spaniards were going into the water one at a time,--here one, and there one,--while the creatures of officers were making the men carry them on their backs. Had the whole army acted thus, we should not have got over before daylight next morning. When all were across, and the columns formed, we moved forward, and reached the neighbourhood of Veger, which stands on a high hill not far distant from the memorable Cape Trafalgar. We halted in an olive-grove below the town, and bivouacked for the night; it was bitter cold, and the troops could find but little wood for firing, which they much needed, from having got so completely wet in crossing the lake. We remained at Veger all the next day, and a little after dark commenced our march. We being now in the neighbourhood of the enemy, it became necessary to conceal our movements as much as possible. During the night we passed the fishing town of Conil, and, keeping near the coast, we arrived the next morning on the plain of Chiclana. I quote from our General's dispatch, as it states the thing in a much more clear and satisfactory manner than I could do. He says,--"After a night march of sixteen hours from the camp (bivouack) near Veger, we arrived on the morning of the 5th on the low ridge of Barossa, about four miles from the Santi Petri river. This height extends inland about a mile and a half, continuing on the north the extensive heathy plain of Chiclana. A great pine-forest skirts the plain, and circles round the height at some distance, terminating down towards Santi Petri, the intermediate space between the north side of the height and the forest being uneven and broken." The two Spanish divisions had preceded us, who, after having rested a while on the plain, moved down towards the Santi Petri, where a bridge was to be thrown over by the troops in the Isla de Leon, and thus open a communication between the two armies, that is, between those inside the island and us. The General goes on to say,--"A well-conducted and successful attack on the rear of the enemy's lines, near Santi Petri, by the vanguard of the Spanish army under Brigadier-general Ladrizabel, having opened the communication with the Isla de Leon, I received General La Pena's directions to move down from the position of Barossa to that of the Torre de Bermesa, about half-way to the Santi Petri river, over which a bridge had been lately established. This latter position occupies a narrow woody ridge, the right on the sea-cliff, and the left falling down to the Almanza creek, on the edge of the marsh; a hard sandy beach gives an easy communication between the western points of these two positions. "My division being halted on the eastern slope of the Barossa height, was marched about twelve o'clock through the wood towards Bermesa, (cavalry patrols having previously been sent towards Chiclana, without meeting with the enemy.) On the march I received notice that the enemy had appeared in force on the plain, and was advancing towards the heights of Barossa. As I considered that position as the key of Santi Petri, I immediately countermarched, in order to support the troops left for its defence; and the alacrity with which this manoeuvre was executed, served as a favourable omen. It was, however, impossible, in such intricate and difficult ground, to preserve order in the columns, and there never was time to restore it entirely. But before we could get ourselves quite disentangled from the wood, the troops on the Barossa hill were seen returning from it, while the enemy's left wing was rapidly ascending. At the same time his right wing stood on the plain, on the edge of the wood, within cannon-shot. A retreat in the face of such an enemy, already within reach of the easy communication by the sea-beach, must have involved the whole allied army in all the danger of being attacked during the unavoidable confusion of the different corps arriving on the narrow ridge of Bermesa nearly at the same time. "Trusting to the known heroism of British troops, regardless of the numbers and position of the enemy, an immediate attack was determined on. Major Duncan soon opened a powerful battery of ten guns in the centre. Brigadier-general Dilkes, with the brigade of Guards, Lieutenant-colonel Brown's (of the 28th) flank battalion, Lieutenant-colonel Norcott's two companies of the 2d rifle corps, and Major Acheson, with a part of the 67th, (separated from the regiment in the wood,) formed on the right. "Colonel Wheately's brigade, (consisting of the 28th, 67th, and 87th,) with three companies of the Coldstream Guards, under Lieutenant-colonel Jackson (separated likewise from his battalion in the wood), and Lieutenant-colonel Barnard's flank battalion (being two companies 47th, two ditto 20th Portuguese, and four of third battalion 95th) formed on the left. As soon as the infantry was thus hastily got together, the guns advanced to a more favourable position, and kept up a destructive fire. The right wing proceeded to the attack of General Ruffin's division on the hill, while Lieutenant-colonel Barnard's flank battalion, and Lieutenant-colonel Bush's detachment of the 20th Portuguese, were warmly engaged with the enemy's tirailleurs on our left. "General Laval's division, notwithstanding the havoc made by Major Duncan's battery, continued to advance in very imposing masses, opening his fire of musketry, and was only checked by that of the left wing. The left wing now advanced firing. A most destructive charge, by the three companies of the Guards and the 87th regiment, supported by all the remainder of the wing, decided the defeat of General Laval's division. "The eagle of the 8th regiment of light infantry, which suffered immensely, and a howitzer, rewarded this charge, and remained in possession of Major Gough of the 87th regiment. These attacks were zealously supported by Colonel Bilson with the 28th regiment, and Lieutenant-colonel Prevost with a part of the 67th. A reserve, formed beyond the narrow valley, across which the enemy was closely pursued, next shared the same fate, and was routed by the same means. "Meanwhile, the right wing was not less successful. The enemy, confident of success, met General Dilkes on the ascent of the hill, and the contest was sanguinary; but the undaunted perseverance of the brigade of Guards, of Lieutenant-colonel Brown's battalion, and of Lieutenant-colonel Norcott's and Major Acheson's detachments, overcame every obstacle, and General Ruffin's division was driven from the heights in confusion, leaving two pieces of cannon. "No expressions of mine could do justice to the conduct of the troops throughout--nothing less than the almost unparalleled exertions of every officer, the invincible bravery of every soldier, and the most determined devotion of the honour of his Majesty's arms in all, could have achieved this brilliant success against such a formidable enemy, so posted. In less than an hour and a half from the commencement of the action, the enemy was in full retreat. The retiring divisions met, halted, and seemed inclined to form; a new and more advanced position of our artillery quickly dispersed them. The exhausted state of the troops made pursuit impossible. A position was taken up on the eastern side of the hill; and we were strengthened on our right by the return of two Spanish regiments, that had been attached before to my division, but which I had left on the hill, and which had been ordered to retire. "An eagle, six pieces of cannon, the General of Division Ruffin, and the General of Brigade Rousseau, wounded and taken; the Chief of the Staff, General Bellegarde, and aide-de-camp of Marshal Victor, and the colonel of the 8th regiment, with many other officers killed, and several wounded and taken prisoners, the field covered with the dead bodies of the enemy, attest that my confidence in this division was nobly repaid. The animated charges of the 87th regiment were most conspicuous. Lieutenant-colonel Barnard, (twice wounded,) and the officers of his flank-battalion, executed the duty of skirmishing in advance with the enemy in a masterly manner; and were ably seconded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bush, of the 20th Portuguese, who (likewise twice wounded) fell into the enemy's hands, but was afterwards rescued." The dispatch contains many more acknowledgments, which, as they have no connexion with my narrative, I have omitted. I beg now to make such remarks and observations as may tend to throw light upon the different parts of the foregoing dispatch. The two Spanish battalions attached to our division, together with Lieutenant-colonel Brown's flank-battalion, were left upon the height of Barossa, when we moved down into the wood, in order to secure that position till we had possessed ourselves of the height of Bermesa; but we had not left the plain more than half an hour, I think, and descended into the wood, till an officer came galloping after us, saying the French had debouched from the wood, and were moving on to the high ground in our rear, and had attacked the troops left there for its defence. Orders were instantly given us to countermarch, and to get on to the plain and into action as soon as possible. In coming about, one of the guns got entangled with a pine-tree; there was no time to disengage it, and setting to with the whip, they pushed the horses forward, and tore up the tree completely by the roots, although one of considerable size. I thought (as our General says) it appeared a good omen, and that a trifling obstacle would not be allowed to impede their career. When we reached the plain, and perceived the enemy, never did a finer sight present itself. They were manoeuvring on the high ground before us; and as Home says, "The hill they gained, and moving on its top, Of more than mortal size, towering, they seemed An host angelic, clad in burning arms." Those immediately in front of my battalion were the famed 8th regiment, and consisted of two battalions of 700 men each; one was composed of grenadiers, and the other of voltigeurs, or light infantry. The grenadiers had long waving red plumes in their caps, at least a foot in length; while the light infantry had feathers of the same length and make, but green, with yellow tops. The whole of the French army had on their best or holyday suits of clothing, with their arms as bright as silver, and glancing in the sun as they moved in column, gave them really a noble and martial appearance. We had no sooner cleared the wood than we inclined to our left, and went immediately at them. Major Duncan's guns commenced playing upon their column the moment he could get a clear piece of ground. The two companies of the 47th, attached to my battalion, were taken to cover and remain with the guns. Our people extended as we went up the hill, the Portuguese supporting us in the rear; and in a very short time we were hotly engaged with the fellows with the beautiful green feathers, many of which fell on the ground in a short time. As we advanced, the battalions to our right and in rear of us got formed in line, and moving forward in fine style, took up stronger ground in advance; the guns in the centre also moving onward, and causing dreadful havoc in the enemy's ranks. Early in the action my horse was killed, being shot in the head, which ball, had his head not stopped it, would in all probability have entered my body. He fell like a stone. I then went on and joined the ranks, and finding a rifle of a man that had just fallen, (poor little Croudace's servant, who afterwards fell himself,) I took a few shots at them in revenge for my horse. At this time the grenadier battalion of the 8th, with their waving red plumes, began to advance in close column, the drums beating all the time the _pas de charge_. They were supported by other columns in their rear, together with one, the French 54th, which they sent into the wood to try to turn our left. The 8th advanced, notwithstanding the galling fire kept up by our people and the Portuguese, every shot almost of which must have told, as they were in a solid body, not more than from 100 to 150 yards' distance. Our people were of course compelled to give way to this imposing column, when the regiments on our right and in our rear, opening out upon them a destructive fire, and the 87th and Guards immediately after attacking them with the bayonet, their rout and discomfiture was complete. The 8th, which suffered most, and from whom the eagle was taken, never yet got into line--nor did they intend, I believe--but advanced as a solid body, (occasionally firing from their front,) till, coming in contact with the regiments above mentioned, and in this state receiving the charge, their loss was excessive, for they could not get away. I understand, when the 87th charged, Ensign Keogh of that regiment made the first attempt to wrench the eagle from the officer who carried it; but in so doing he was run through by several of those who supported it, and fell lifeless to the ground. Sergeant Masterson of that regiment then dashed at it, and was more fortunate, he succeeding in securing it. I understand there was some dispute between them and the Guards, who charged at the same time with the 87th, to whom it properly belonged; but I imagine the 87th must have been the captors, for Sergeant Masterson soon after received a commission for his gallantry, and is now a captain in that regiment. The 54th, the French regiment, which had been sent into the wood to turn our left flank, by some means got entangled; for, except their light company, no part of the regiment ever got into action again; and when their columns were routed, they found some difficulty in effecting their retreat. There is something rather extraordinary and very interesting in the story of the eagle and the 8th regiment, if it be true, and which I see no reason to doubt. They were one of the regiments, it is said, which were engaged at Talavera, and were particularly distinguished; and it is further said, that the 87th was one of the regiments opposed to them, and over which they gained some advantage; that is, the French troops caused the British brigade, in which the 87th was serving, to retire with considerable loss; and that it was for their conduct in this action that Bonaparte had placed a golden wreath of laurel round the neck of the regimental eagle with his own hand. If such was the case, it is most remarkable that the very regiment by whom they should have obtained this honour, should be the regiment that deprived them of their eagle, which had been so highly honoured. But here, poor fellows, although they did not lose their honour, they lost very nearly the whole regiment; for out of 1400 which entered the field, not more than 200 of them entered Chiclana after the action. Indeed I never witnessed any field so thickly strewed with dead as this plain was after the action; and I feel confident, and all accounts agree in confirming the opinion, that the loss of the French on this occasion was little short of 3000 men; ours was about 1250. Here then we have a loss of 4000 men in about an hour and a half, out of about 12,000 which composed the two armies. In this action, Colonel Bush was almost absurdly brave and conspicuous. As soon as he got his Portuguese fairly into action, he rode slowly backward and forward among them, with his spectacles on, crying out as the balls whistled past him, "Que bella musica!" what delightful music! Poor fellow, he did not ride there many minutes; for, being within a very short distance of the enemy's tirailleurs so conspicuous an object, it was not to be expected he could escape. He died a few days after the action. Colonel Barnard, my commandant, (now Sir Andrew,) about the middle of the action, received a severe wound, and was borne away to the rear. Whilst the surgeon was dressing him, another shot struck him, and inflicted, I believe, a worse wound than the former. The horses of my battalion suffered greatly in proportion to their numbers. We had only four in the field, two of which, Major Ross's and my own, were killed, and Colonel Barnard's wounded; only the adjutant's escaped with a whole skin. Indeed there was scarcely an officer or soldier in the action that had not marks of shot about him. The caps of the tall guardsmen were riddled as it were; while the greater part of the enemy's shot passed over our little fellows, who were both too near them, and too low for their fire. I may remark on this subject that the French generally fire high, but here I think unusually so; for, after a considerable quantity of ammunition had been expended by my battalion, it became my duty to look out for a fresh supply. I accordingly posted off to the rear, where I expected to have found some mules which had been attached to us, with ammunition on their backs; but on my way thither, the ground was actually ploughing up on all sides by the enemy's large shot, and their musket-balls falling very thick; so much so, that some of our mules far to the rear had been wounded, and the others had dispersed. Hence also the second wound which my gallant commander received, where he ought to have been completely out of danger. Some ammunition for our rifles was, however, found in a one-horse cart belonging to the artillery, and out of it those whose ammunition was expended were replenished. But during my absence to the rear, the gallant and decisive charge had been made; and when I again reached the front, I perceived the enemy's columns in full retreat, covered by the remainder of their light troops, closely followed by some of my people. The retreat was accordingly sounded to recall them from the pursuit, and our brave and victorious little army cheered the enemy as his beaten and disheartened columns left the field. Immediately after our army began to move off towards the Isla, our General being, as I understood, so much exasperated with the apathy evinced by the Spanish General, that he would no longer co-operate with him, and consequently drew off our troops into the Isle of Leon. My battalion, however, was destined to remain on the field all night to protect the numerous wounded from any marauders, or small parties and cavalry patrols of the enemy, which might happen to return. However, not a Frenchman made his appearance there again that night. When it was determined to withdraw the British army, Major Duncan, with great humanity, (approved of course by our excellent General,) cast off from the artillery-carriages all the spare ammunition, in order to make room for as many of our wounded officers and soldiers as those carriages could accommodate, and thus a considerable number of them were carried from the field immediately. After they had left us, and my battalion was still standing in front of the position last occupied by our troops, all having retired but ourselves, and it now began to draw towards night, and we were preparing to move off, an unfortunate French sergeant attracted our notice. Poor fellow, he had been shot in the small of the back, and (on our surgeon examining him) pronounced to be mortally. He appeared to be a man above forty, and apparently a veteran, who had fought many a hard field; and was, I think, one of the most respectable-looking men of his class that I have seen. When he saw us preparing to leave him to his fate, the expression of his countenance became the most piteous and beseeching imaginable; imploring us in French not to leave him there to perish. My heart bled for him; but unhappily we had no means of removing him, had there even been a hope of his recovery. When he saw that his fate was inevitable, he crawled in the best manner he was able to a broken ammunition-box, and raising himself on his knees, supported by it, besought that Being who never casts out the cry of the unfortunate, and who, I sincerely hope, imparted to him that strength and comfort which his unhappy circumstances so greatly required. I doubt not he was a sincere Christian; never shall I forget the impression his unhappy fate made on my mind. To be left in solitude and darkness on this blood-stained heath, with the prospect of his own certain death before his eyes, and without any to comfort him in his last agony, must indeed have been a severe trial to his fortitude. Would to God I could have relieved him! His case was not singular, it is true; but none ever presented itself to my view under such truly affecting circumstances as this unhappy veteran's did. After dark, my battalion retired over the field where the thickest of the dead and wounded were strewed, and many were the dying groans which struck upon our ears, as we traversed this bloody field; but, except these groans, no sound was heard, where lately the din of arms had been loud and fierce, and where war had raged in all its fury; till coming to the house upon the sea-beach, where many of the wounded had been collected, we were formed into square on a sand-hill near it, and in this position rested on our arms for the remainder of the night. On our way from the front, we passed not far from where my horse had fallen; and as saddlery was scarce at Cadiz, I thought it would be prudent to try to recover that on which I had been riding. I found it; but my horse having fallen with his back inclined to the front, it was perforated by shot in five places, and the tree was broken. However, I disengaged it, and giving it to one of the men, whose rifle I carried in return, I got it safely into Isla. About twelve at night, poor General Rousseau died, a cannon-shot having carried away the greater part of the flesh of one of his thighs; and as no other troops were near, the task of paying him the last sad duty devolved upon me. I went to the house aforesaid, and procured a shovel or a spade, and digging a hole in the sand by the light of the moon, his body was deposited, where it in all probability will remain till the last trumpet shall summon it to rise. Poor drunken Gilles, one of the men I had employed on the occasion, pronounced the only service as he was committed to the dust, which was, "God rest his soul!" I indeed sincerely hope so. Poor Rousseau had been a noble soldier; in his pocket was found a leave which he had obtained to return to France on account of ill health; but in the prospect of the approaching action he had delayed his departure, and thus fell a victim as it were to his patriotism and his sense of honour. He was military governor of Xeres de la Frontera, from whence we have our wine called Sherry, a corruption of Xeres. He was a small slender person, and apparently had suffered greatly from ill health. During the night some Spaniards were sent into the field to look for and bring off the guns we had taken, which they did. As it approached towards morning, Major Ross, seeing all was quiet, moved us off by the beach towards our former quarters; and passing over the position of Bermesa, which the Spaniards still occupied, and crossing the Santi Petri by the lately erected bridge, we returned weary and hungry to La Isla, and where our friends received us once again with great cordiality. If my reader is not tired of the subject, I would just beg to draw his attention for a moment to the circumstances attending this action. The French troops were at least 7500 (some say 8000) strong, well clothed and appointed, and apparently well fed, and fresh from their cantonments, none of them probably having marched more than four miles. They were some of the best in the French service, and commanded by one of Bonaparte's ablest generals, a marshal of France, Victor, Duke of Belluno. They occupied a fine position, having the ground completely at their choice; while we did not muster more than 4500 at most. We had been marching for sixteen hours successively through the night over bad roads; and being taken in a manner by surprise, we came out of the wood _beneath_ the enemy, broken and disjointed, and were instantly hurried into action. The French fought desperately; for when their marauding columns came down upon us with an intrepidity seldom seen in the French army, and opening out their heavy and destructive fire, my heart quaked within me for the safety of our little army, and the honour of our country, for I thought it would be impossible to resist them. However, the steady valour of our troops repelled the assailants, and, taking advantage of their proximity, charged as before stated, and completely overthrew them. It is certain, as General Graham says, that _all_ must have done their duty on this occasion; notwithstanding, we may sing with great propriety, "Non nobis, Domine"--"Not unto us, O Lord, but unto thy name be the praise;" for it is certain we must have been specially favoured by a kind Providence, or it is impossible we could have gained _such_ a victory under so many and so great disadvantages; for never was victory more complete. In less than three hours from the first glimpse we had of them as we debouched from the wood, a Frenchman was not to be seen in all the field, save the numerous killed and wounded. Although our General did not say any thing in his public dispatch of the abominable conduct of La Pena, no doubt he stated truly in his private information how ill that General had behaved; for he and the 10,000 or 11,000 Spaniards he had with him remained within two miles of the field of action, quiet and passive spectators of the scene, without making one effort to support us had we been beaten, or to take advantage of the victory should we gain it; and the consequence was, the French retained their ground and works by which they invested Cadiz and La Isla, whereas, had he made the slightest movement during or after the fight, they would have all gone off, and the siege would have been raised, for it is evident they contemplated and were prepared for this, the soldiers having each three or four days' bread in his possession. A considerable number of other officers besides Generals Ruffin and Rousseau were taken. Ruffin was wounded in the neck by a rifle-shot, which touched the spinal marrow, depriving him of the use of his limbs. He was soon after embarked for England, but died as he came within sight of the Isle of Wight. He was an immense and a fine-looking man, about six feet two inches or six feet three inches high, and ate enormously. He every day received a mess from our General's table. The other officers also were treated with the greatest politeness and attention, dining first at one regimental mess, and then at another. They were fully sensible of the kindness shown them, and expressed themselves very grateful. They were afterwards sent to England. I cannot omit here noticing the high estimation in which General Graham was held by every officer and soldier of this little army. I may truly say, he lived in their affections; they not only looked up to him with confidence as their commander, but they esteemed and respected him as their firm friend and protector, which indeed he always showed himself to be. In all my fighting I never was in an action where the chances of death were so numerous as in this; and I may say, I never was in an action where I was less prepared to die. It is therefore of the Lord's mercies that he spared me--I hope, for good at last. FOOTNOTE: [2] The distance to which the French threw these shells is truly amazing. The longest range of heavy iron sea mortars is only about 4200 yards, whereas the distance from the French batteries on the Trocadero to the nearest point of Cadiz was, I believe, 4500 or more; but they exceeded this considerably, for, as I said above, some of their shells fell in the sea beyond the town, near the lighthouse, a distance of at least 500 or 600 yards farther. The shells were always half filled with lead, to increase their flight, so that when they burst the mischief they occasioned was never extensive; I believe not more than about half-a-dozen individuals suffered from them in all. CHAPTER VII. The 2d Battalion of the 95th Rifles ordered to proceed to Portugal--Our Author visits England--Returns to Portugal, and joins his Regiment at Rodrigo--The Army move towards Badajos--Siege of Badajos--Badajos surrenders--Insubordination among the Troops--Quelled by the prompt measures of Lord Wellington. We remained at Isla till June, without any thing of importance occurring, but at this time I was brought nigh to death's door by the bursting of a bloodvessel in the lungs. I was so ill that it was deemed necessary to send me home for change of air, it being exceedingly hot at this time at Isla. I was accordingly removed to Cadiz to wait for the first ship returning to England, and while there I suffered greatly, not being able to lie down in bed. However, before a vessel could be had, an order was received for my battalion to proceed to Portugal, and our esteemed commander was likewise ordered to proceed to that country. As I felt myself somewhat better, I obtained permission to accompany my battalion to Portugal, and I accordingly embarked with it at Cadiz on the 30th of that month, on board a transport, the name of which I forget. General Graham intended to have gone in a 50 gun ship that was leaving that port for England, he being to be left at Lisbon in passing. He sent an aide-de-camp on board to prepare for his reception; but he met with such treatment while on board, as induced the General to alter his plan and go in a frigate, on board which some of our people were embarked. It is said, that after the aide-de-camp had been shown the accommodation, the captain intimated to him, that it was expected the military officers would always keep on the leeward side of the quarter-deck. The windward side on board a man-of-war is considered the most honourable, therefore this was in fact putting the General beneath himself. He suffered, however, for his ill-timed assumption of supremacy, for there was a quantity of specie at Cadiz which was to be transported at the same time for the use of the army in Portugal, and which was intended to have gone in the ship with the General; but after this reception of his aide-de-camp, and the imperious condition attached to his going in this ship, he went on board the frigate with his suite, and took the money with him, thus depriving him of a considerable premium for its transport, to which he would have been entitled had the General gone with him. He, however, being the senior officer, we were all put under his charge, save the frigate before mentioned, and we were greatly annoyed by him during our passage, which our master said he prolonged in looking out for American merchantmen, there being then an appearance of war between the two countries. They said he actually detained one or two which left Cadiz when we did, and that he fired small arms into them to bring them to, although war had not been declared. One day during the passage he made a signal to the transports which we did not immediately perceive. We were astonished at the report of a gun, and at the same time a cannon-shot whizzed past our rigging. This is not, I believe, customary, a blank gun being generally fired first, and when nothing else will do, a shot a-head of the vessel, but he appeared not to stand on any ceremony. We were glad when the voyage was over, it continuing from the 30th June to the 19th July, although three or four days only is the usual time. We landed at Lisbon, and immediately set about preparing for our journey up the country to join the army; but Colonel Barnard having received letters respecting the settlement of our late Colonel (General Manningham's) affairs, which could not be easily arranged without my presence, determined to send me home for the purpose, with a promise, however, that I should immediately come out again. I accordingly embarked on board the same transport with a ship full of all kinds and descriptions of people, sick and wounded, and lame and lazy; such a motley group I have seldom seen. Our paymaster also returned home with me, and besides him I did not know a person on board. We had a long and tedious passage, not reaching Portsmouth till the 27th August, although we embarked on the 1st of that month. When we entered the chops of the Channel, there was a considerable swell in the sea. Our master, for some purpose or other, had got up from the hold a small quantity of ballast (gravel), which was laid upon the quarter-deck. A fine stout young Irishman, an officer on board, came up the companion, and seeing the ballast lying there, asked where it came from. "Why, don't you see," says the master, "how rough the sea is? it has been washed up from the bottom and thrown upon the deck." The Hibernian seemed quite astonished at the effect of the swell, but believed the story with all the simple-hearted credulity of a Johnny-raw, as the soldiers term a young and inexperienced soldier. Our paymaster was a little of a gourmand, and having for some time been deprived of luxuries, determined to indulge a little now we had come to the land of plenty. On our road, therefore, to London, (he and another officer and myself posting it,) we stopped at Godalming for dinner; he would needs have a carp, which he happened to see in a pond in the garden, made ready for our dinner. It was prepared according to his request, and with it and other good things we contrived to fare pretty well; although, according to my taste, a fresh herring would have been preferable. But lo, and behold! when the bill was called for, the awful sum of _half a guinea_ for the carp was added to the other items of the dinner, which amounted to quite enough without it. To remonstrate would have been useless; we therefore paid the bill and set off, determined to be more economical in future. I passed through London, and reached the depôt of my battalion, then stationed at Ashford in Kent, where, after having arranged the business for which I had been sent home, I obtained a three months' leave of absence to visit my native place, where I arrived, thank God, in a much improved state of health, and where I found all my friends and connexions as well as could be expected, and no doubt happy to see me. About the middle of November of the same year, I started once more for foreign service, and embarked at Portsmouth for Lisbon on the 22d of that month, on board a small brig heavily laden with corn for the army in Portugal. We remained some time wind-bound, but at length got to sea and proceeded on our voyage, but shortly after the wind headed us and began to blow very fresh. We were therefore compelled to run for the Race of Portland, where we came to anchor. But the wind coming more favourable in a day or two, we weighed again, and got as far on our voyage as opposite Torbay; but here again the wind coming foul, we were obliged to enter the bay and drop anchor again. We were detained here a good many days, during which I went ashore with another officer, who was on board with me, and indulged in some Devonshire clotted cream at Brixham. In about a week we again started, and got about half way across the Bay of Biscay, when a heavy gale overtook us, and in which we lost a considerable portion of our quarter-bulwarks (I think they are called). Indeed, from the brig being so heavily laden, the water being within a very little of her gunwale, she did not weather the heavy seas which struck her very well, for during the night one came clean over her, partly filling the cabin where we lay with water; and I own I had considerable apprehension for our safety, which I believe was pretty universal on board. It pleased Him, however, who ruleth over all things, to bring us through the gale without further injury, although we appeared next morning in a very shattered condition, and after a few more days' sailing, we reached the Tagus, and landed at Lisbon about the middle of January 1812, and immediately commenced equipping for a campaign with the army which was at this time besieging Ciudad Rodrigo. I had to purchase a riding-horse and a mule to carry my baggage, and a great deal more of essential requisites to enable me to do my duty in the field; and to say truth, I had not, by any means, sufficient funds to meet these considerable expenses, and was consequently forced to borrow, and glad enough to find a friend who could and would lend me enough for the occasion. And here I cannot but remark, that it seemed peculiarly hard on junior officers, on their taking the field, to be compelled to furnish all this equipment at their own expense. I have known several who did not recover from the debt they thus incurred (could they find a friend, as I did, to lend them what they wanted) for a considerable time after they had joined the army; nay, I believe some never recovered it, and the persons who were kind enough to oblige them lost several large sums in this manner. In my own case, I know, I was most wofully put to it to raise a sufficiency for this purpose; and many, I know, have been compelled to take the field without the necessary equipment to render them efficient. They were thus of little service to the army for a considerable time after joining, and many of them were obliged to leave it again, after striving to do their duty, inadequately provided with the conveniences and comforts requisite to enable a man to bear up against the fatigues he had to encounter. It struck me as but just, and in this opinion I am not singular, that all officers who have not sufficient pay and allowances to enable them to provide themselves with the means of transport, ought to be furnished in the first instance at the public expense, and then be afterwards obliged to keep them in a fit state for service at their own. I set out from Lisbon soon after, and joined my regiment, which was one of those that formed the light division, and found them cantoned in the neighbourhood of Rodrigo, that fortress having fallen some days previous to my arrival. I had not been many days with the regiment till the division was assembled at a village called Ituera, on the banks of the Azava, to carry into execution the sentence of a general court-martial, before which seven men of the division had been arraigned for desertion to the enemy, they having been taken in Rodrigo at the capture of that place. They were of course all found guilty, as they were taken as it were out of the enemy's ranks, and never attempted to plead not guilty; but they had said in palliation of their heinous crime, that they were forced to desert from want of food and clothing; indeed the army had not been so well supplied for a short while previously, as they had been accustomed to, but there never was any thing like want. I understood the clothing also was getting bad, but the men could not be got up the country for want of transport, and they were no worse off than their comrades. Indeed, from all I could learn, they had acted in a most diabolical manner; for at the attack of the breaches in assaulting the place, they were distinctly heard crying out to one another, "Now here comes the light division; let us give it them, the rascals," or something to that effect, and had, it is said, done more injury to the assailing party than twice their number of Frenchmen. Death of course was their sentence, and now the wretched victims of delusion were to atone with their lives for one of the greatest crimes known in the criminal code of the army. The division was formed into three sides square, on a plain in front of the village, the graves of the hapless beings occupying a part of the fourth face of the square. When all was ready, and a firing party from each regiment had been formed in the centre, the provost-marshal went to the guard-tent, where the prisoners were in waiting, to conduct them to the place of execution. They soon after appeared, poor wretches, moving towards the square, with faces pale and wan, and with all the dejection such a situation is calculated to produce. Their arms had been pinioned one by one as they came out from the guard-tent, and all being ready, the melancholy procession advanced towards the centre of the square. The proceedings of the court which tried them, together with the sentence, and the approval of the Commander of the Forces, was read by the Assistant Adjutant-general, in the hearing of the whole division; which concluded, the prisoners were marched round in front of every regiment, that all might see and avoid their unhappy fate. They were then moved towards their graves. I ought to observe that the chaplain of the division had been with them in the guard-tent some little time previously to their leaving it, and when they quitted as above described, he followed them at a considerable distance, apparently ashamed of his peculiar calling, and the duty incumbent on him in such a conjuncture. They were led, as I said before, towards their graves; and when they reached the bank of earth in front of each, they were made to kneel down with their faces fronting the square, and then being one after another blindfolded, and left for a few moments to their own reflections or their prayers, the provost-marshal proceeded to the firing party, who had been previously loaded, and directing the men of each regiment to fire at their own prisoner, he advanced them to within about ten or twelve paces of the wretched men, and giving the signals by motion for their making ready and firing, the whole fired at once, and plunged the unhappy criminals into eternity. There was, indeed, one melancholy exception to this. One of the prisoners belonged to the troop of horse artillery attached to the division, and it seems the provost, in giving his orders for the soldiers of each regiment to fire at their own man, had not recollected that the artillery had no men there to fire. He was thus left sitting on his knees, when the others had fallen all around him. What his feelings must have been it is in vain to guess; but, poor fellow, he was not suffered long to remain in suspense, for a reserve party immediately approaching, they fired and stretched him also along with his companions in crime and misery; and in such of the others as they perceived life still remaining, they also immediately put an end to their sufferings, by placing their muskets close to their body, and firing into them. One poor man, when he received his death wound, sprung to a considerable height, and giving a loud shriek, he fell, and instantly expired. When all was finished, the division was formed into column, and marched round in front of the bodies, where each soldier might distinctly perceive the sad and melancholy effects of such a fatal dereliction of duty. They were then, without more ado, thrown into their graves, which were filled up without delay, and the division separating, each regiment marched to its quarters. I cannot describe the uncomfortable feelings this spectacle produced in my mind--nay, not only there, but in my body also--for I felt sick at heart; a sort of loathing ensued; and from the recollection of what I then suffered, I could not easily be persuaded to witness such another scene, if I had the option of staying away. Death in the hundred shapes it assumes on the field of battle seems honourable, and not near so revolting to the feelings, and withal comes suddenly; but to witness the slow and melancholy preparations for an execution such as this, is productive, in any heart that can feel, of the most unpleasant sensations, I think, imaginable. One of the poor wretches was the little shoemaker of our Highland company, by name M'Guiniss, whom I had known for many years, and who formerly bore an excellent character; but he had most likely been seduced by some of his companions to commit this heinous crime. Not many days after this, the whole army began to move towards Badajos. On the 26th of February we left our cantonments, and passing by way of Castello Branca and Villa Velha, we reached a village not far from Niza, called Povo das Meadas, where my battalion took up its quarters for a time. From hence I was dispatched to Lisbon for the regimental clothing, which had then arrived at that port; but being unable to procure the means of transport, I was obliged to return without it. I rejoined them in the camp before Badajos about the 25th of March, and witnessed the siege of that fortress from this period to its fall on the 6th of April. The breaches having been reported practicable by the engineers on the 5th, in the evening the army was assembled for the assault, and was disposed as follows: the 3d division under General Picton was ordered to attack the citadel, and to endeavour to establish himself there by escalade; the 4th and light divisions, the former under General Colville, and the latter commanded by Colonel Barnard, were destined for the breaches; the 5th division, which had not co-operated hitherto in the siege, but brought this evening into the neighbourhood, was ordered to occupy the ground in front of the town by way of reserve. One brigade of that division was ordered to make a false attack on a work called the Pardeleras, which was connected with the town, although not actually belonging to it. Another brigade of the same division was ordered to make another false attack round towards the gate near the river Guadiana, which latter was to be turned into a real attack, if circumstances permitted General Walker, who commanded it, to do so. There was also a brigade of Portuguese, which was ordered to attack St Cristoval, a fort on the other side of the river. Every thing was arranged in the clearest and most satisfactory manner; all knew what they had to do, the point they were to occupy in the attack having been pointed out to most of them the day before. Soon after dark, the different divisions began to move towards their destined posts, all elated with the certainty of success. I was then in the mess of the senior captain of my battalion, who commanded it on this occasion; and my other messmates were poor little Croudace and Cary, both lieutenants, the latter acting adjutant, and another. We had taken a farewell glass before we got up from dinner, not knowing which of them would survive the bloody fray that was likely soon to commence. Poor Croudace, a native of the county of Durham, and consequently a near countryman, put into my hand a small leather purse, containing half a doubloon, and requested me to take care of it for him, as he did not know whose fate it might be to fall or to survive. I took it according to his wish, and put it into my pocket, and, after a little more conversation, and another glass, for the poor little fellow liked his wine, we parted, and they moved off. Although I had thus, as it were, settled it in my mind that I would not go with them on this occasion, for my services could have been of but very little utility, yet, when they went away, I felt as if I was left desolate as it were, and was quite uneasy at parting from my beloved comrades, whom I had always accompanied hitherto. I therefore slung over my back my haversack, containing my pistol and a few other things, and moved forward, to try if I could find them; but falling in with some of my friends, staff-officers of the 43d, who were in the same brigade, they strongly dissuaded me from it, representing to me the folly of uselessly exposing myself, and the little service I could render there; and one of them requested me to accompany him to a hill immediately in front of the breaches, where we could see the business as it proceeded. We waited till about ten o'clock, when the fire first commenced from the castle upon the 3d division, as they approached it; but the fire from thence did not appear very heavy. Not long after it opened out at the breaches, and was most awfully severe; indeed it was so heavy and so incessant, that it appeared like one continued sheet of fire along the ramparts near the breaches, and we could distinctly see the faces of the French troops, although the distance was near a mile. All sorts of arms, &c. were playing at once, guns, mortars, musketry, grenades, and shells thrown from the walls, while every few minutes explosions from mines were taking place. The firing too appeared to have such a strange deathlike sound, quite different from all I had ever heard before. This was occasioned by the muzzles being pointed downwards into the ditch, which gave the report an unusual and appalling effect. This continued without a moment's cessation, or without any apparent advantage being gained by our struggling but awfully circumstanced comrades. Lord Wellington had also taken his stand upon this hill, and appeared quite uneasy at the troops seeming to make no progress, and often asked, or rather repeated to himself, "What can be the matter?" The enemy had adopted an excellent plan to ascertain where our columns were posted; they threw an immense number of light balls on all sides of the town, and when they found out where there was a large body, a rocket was fired in the direction of where it stood, and instantly every gun, mortar, and howitzer, not previously engaged, was turned in that direction, and grievous was the destruction their shot made in the ranks of these columns. Still our people at the breaches did not get forward, although we distinctly heard, with emotion, the bugles of our division sounding the advance. His lordship seemed now to lose all patience, and aides-de-camp were sent to ascertain the cause of the delay. They flew like lightning, while the whole rampart round the town seemed enveloped in one flame of fire. Our brave but unsuccessful comrades were heard cheering every now and then; but still the fire at the breaches did not slacken. At length a dispatch arrived from General Picton, stating, that he had established himself in the castle. This was cheering news to his lordship, who expressed very strongly the gratitude he felt for that gallant General. During the reading of the dispatch, which was done by torchlight, the enemy, perceiving the light, and that a number of people had assembled on the hill, directed a shell in that direction; but it fell short, and did us no injury. His lordship now rode off, and ordered our people at the breaches to retire, as the town was now perfectly secure. I also set off to inform my people of the happy circumstance. I found them drawn off from the glacis a few hundred yards; but, oh! what a difference in their appearance now from what they were previous to the attack! The whole division scarcely mustered at this time 2000 men, so many had been killed and wounded, and many had been sent to the rear with the latter. I informed them that General Picton had got possession of the castle, but my story appeared to them an incredible tale; for it was actually impossible, they thought; and although they made me repeat it over and over again, they could scarcely bring their minds to credit such unexpected news. It was now dawn of day, and the firing had ceased at every point. Here I learnt the fate of my two beloved friends and messmates: Croudace had been shot through the body, and carried to the rear; Cary had fallen, but they could not tell what had become of him. I now went forward towards the breaches, where I found that several men of both the 4th and light divisions had remained; and when General Picton moved from the castle towards that point, which I believe he stated in his dispatch to be his intention, the enemy, finding themselves attacked in rear, began to abandon the defence of the breaches, and our people were then enabled to enter. Never did I witness any thing like the artificial impediments which the enemy had here thrown up, which, added to the natural ones, that is, to the breaches not having been so perfectly practicable as was desirable, rendered it next to impossible to enter, even after all opposition on their part had ceased. In one breach (the large one) this was literally the case; for at the top of it was fixed a chevaux-de-frize extending the whole width of the breach, and composed of a strong beam of wood, with sharp-pointed sword-blades fixed in every direction, they being generally about three quarters of a yard long, and so closely set together, that it was impossible either to leap over them or penetrate between them, and the whole so firmly fixed to the works at the top, that it could not be moved. In addition, they had fitted a number of long and thick planks, with spikes about an inch or more in length, and laid them all down the breach, but fixed at the top, so that it was impossible for any one to get up without falling on these. Beyond the chevaux-de-frize several ditches had been cut, into which those must have fallen who surmounted the obstacles on the breach; but I believe none did, although I saw one Portuguese lying dead upon the ramparts; but I imagine he must either have been thrown up there by some explosion, or been one of those of the 3d division who came from the castle. In addition to all the above, from the covered way down into the ditch was, I should imagine, at least thirty feet; our people had descended by ladders, and, I doubt not, in the dark, and, in the hurry and confusion of the moment, many were thrown down and killed. In the middle of the large ditch a smaller one had been cut, which was filled with water, and in which, added to the inundation close to the right of the breaches, (which had been caused by bringing the river partly into the ditch,) numbers were drowned. Small mines had been constructed all along in the ditch, which were exploded when it was filled with people, and which produced infinite mischief. On the top of the ramparts the enemy had a considerable number of shells of the largest size, ready filled and fused; and when our people had filled the ditch below, these were lighted, and thrown over on their heads, each shell being capable of destroying from twelve to twenty men or more. They had beams of wood also laid on the ramparts, with old carriage-wheels, and every sort of missile imaginable, which were poured upon the unfortunate people below. When these things are taken into consideration, added to the incessant and destructive fire of from 3000 to 4000 men, all emulous to do their duty, at the short distance of perhaps twenty yards, with the ditch as full as it could possibly stow, the reader will be able to form some idea of the destruction that must naturally ensue: and awful indeed it was, for, within the space of less than an acre of ground, I should imagine not less than from 1200 to 1500 men were lying: it was a heart-rending sight. I learnt afterwards that many were the desperate efforts that had been made to ascend the breaches, but all in vain; that many had nearly reached the top, but they being either shot or blown up, the others were forced down again. Another and another trial still was made, but each succeeding party shared the fate of their predecessors. At last the bottoms of the breaches were nearly blocked up with the bodies of those who fell. By this time, General Philippon, the French governor, had surrendered. When he found the 3d division had got possession of the castle, and were preparing to move down to second the attack of the breaches by taking the enemy in rear, and that General Walker, with a part of the 5th division, had escaladed, and established themselves at the other end of the town, he deemed further resistance useless, and retired, with the garrison, to St Cristoval, on the opposite side of the river; and shortly after the whole surrendered prisoners of war, the troops, after being stripped of their arms and accoutrements, being marched along in the ditch to one of the gates, from whence they were escorted on their way to Elvas. They passed near the breaches while I was there, and I had a full view of them as they moved along. I thought they seemed under great apprehension for their safety, as they appeared quite downcast and dejected, which is not generally the case with French prisoners, who will shrug their shoulders, and tell you it is the fortune of war; but these poor fellows, who certainly had made a noble defence, seemed low-spirited and timid to a degree. Certainly by the rules of war, I believe, they might have been put to death, for having stood an assault of the place; but a British general does not resort to the same measures which their Marshal Suchet did at Tarragona, when he put all, both soldiers and inhabitants, to the sword. Soon after daylight, the remaining men of attacking divisions began to rush into the town, in hopes of sharing, with those who had already entered, the plunder they imagined it would afford; and though every thing was done by Colonel Barnard, aided by the other officers, to keep out those of the light division, it was useless, although he even risked his life to prevent their entering. He had bravely, during the attack, repeatedly ascended the breach, in hopes of overcoming the obstacles which presented themselves, but he had always been driven back, although he escaped unhurt where all was death around him; and now his life nearly fell a sacrifice, in endeavouring to restore that discipline in his division which this unfortunate and unsuccessful assault had considerably impaired. He opposed his personal and bodily strength to the entrance of the plunderers, but in vain. They rushed in, in spite of all opposition; and in wrenching a musket from one of the soldiers of the 52d, who was forcing past him, he fell, and was nigh precipitated into the ditch. He, however, finding resistance here in vain, set off, accompanied by several other officers, into the town, to endeavour to restrain, as much as lay in his power, the licentiousness of those inside, whose bad passions, it was but too evident, would be let loose upon the defenceless inhabitants. I had been in company with Captain Percival, my commanding-officer before alluded to, from the time of my first coming down to the division before daylight; and now he and I, hearing the heart-piercing and afflicting groans which arose from the numbers of wounded still lying in the ditch, set to work to get as many of these poor fellows removed as was in our power. This we found a most arduous and difficult undertaking, as we could not do it without the aid of a considerable number of men; and it was a work of danger to attempt to force the now lawless soldiers to obey, and stop with us till this work of necessity and humanity was accomplished. All thought of what they owed their wounded comrades, and of the probability that ere long a similar fate might be their own, was swallowed up in their abominable rage for drink and plunder; however, by perseverance, and by occasionally using his stick, my commandant at length compelled a few fellows to lend their assistance in removing what we could into the town, where it was intended that hospitals should be established. But this was a most heart-rending duty, for, from the innumerable cries of,--"Oh! for God's sake, come and remove me!" it was difficult to select the most proper objects for such care. Those who appeared likely to die, of course it would have been but cruelty to put them to the pain of a removal; and many who, from the nature of their wounds, required great care and attention in carrying them, the half-drunken brutes whom we were forced to employ exceedingly tortured and injured; nay, in carrying one man out of the ditch they very frequently kicked or trode upon several others, whom to touch was like death to them, and which produced the most agonizing cries imaginable. I remember at this time Colonel (the late Sir Niel) Campbell passed out at the breach, and, as he had formerly been a Captain in our regiment, many of the poor fellows who lay there knew him, and beseeched him in the most piteous manner to have them removed. He came to me, and urged upon me in the strongest manner to use every exertion to get the poor fellows away. This evinced he had a feeling heart; but he was not probably aware, that for that very purpose both my commanding-officer and myself had been labouring for hours; but it soon began to grow excessively hot, and what with the toil and the heat of the sun, and the very unpleasant effluvia which now arose from the numerous dead and wounded, we were both compelled, about mid-day, to desist from our distressing though gratifying labours. It was now between twelve and one o'clock, and though we had had a great many removed, a much greater number lay groaning in the ditch; but our strength was exhausted, for he was lame and unable to move much, and I had been obliged to assist in carrying many myself, the drunken scoundrels whom we had pressed into the service seldom making more than one or two trips till they deserted us. But my lamented friend and messmate, poor Cary, was still to search for, and, after a considerable time, he was found beneath one of the ladders by which they had descended into the ditch. He was shot through the head, and I doubt not received his death-wound on the ladder, from which in all probability he fell. He was stripped completely naked, save a flannel waistcoat which he wore next his skin. I had him taken up and placed upon a shutter, (he still breathed a little, though quite insensible,) and carried him to the camp. A sergeant and some men, whom we had pressed to carry him, were so drunk that they let him fall from off their shoulders, and his body fell with great force to the ground. I shuddered, but poor Cary, I believe, was past all feeling, or the fall would have greatly injured him. We laid him in bed in his tent, but it was not long ere my kind, esteemed, and lamented friend breathed his last. Poor Croudace had also died immediately after reaching the hospital, whither he had been carried when he was shot. Thus I lost two of my most particular and intimate acquaintances, from both of whom I had received many acts of kindness and friendship. They will long live in my memory. Cary was buried next day behind our tents, one of the officers (my other messmate) reading the funeral service. I cannot help adverting to some of the scenes which I witnessed in the ditch, while employed there as above noticed. One of the first strange sights that attracted our notice, was soon after our arrival. An officer with yellow facings came out of the town with a frail fair one leaning on his arm, and carrying in her other hand a cage with a bird in it; and she tripped it over the bodies of the dead and dying with all the ease and indifference of a person moving in a ball-room,--no more concern being evinced by either of them, than if nothing extraordinary had occurred. It was really lamentable to see such an utter absence of all right feeling. Soon after this the men began to come out with their plunder. Some of them had dressed themselves in priests' or friars' garments--some appeared in female dresses, as nuns, &c.; and, in short, all the whimsical and fantastical figures imaginable almost were to be seen coming reeling out of the town, for by this time they were nearly all drunk. I penetrated no farther into the town that day than to a house a little beyond the breach, where I had deposited the wounded; but I saw enough in this short trip to disgust me with the doings in Badajos at this time. I learnt that no house, church, or convent, was held sacred by the infuriated and now ungovernable soldiery, but that priests or nuns, and common people, all shared alike, and that any who showed the least resistance were instantly sacrificed to their fury. They had a method of firing through the lock of any door that happened to be shut against them, which almost invariably had the effect of forcing it open; and such scenes were witnessed in the streets as baffle description. One man of our first battalion, I am told, had got a hogshead of brandy into the streets, and, getting his mess-tin, and filling it from the cask, and seating himself astride like Bacchus, swore that every person who came past should drink, be who he may. His commanding-officer happened to be one who came that way, and he was compelled to take the tin and drink, for, had he refused, it is not improbable the wretch would have shot him, for his rifle was loaded by his side, and the soldiers had by this time become quite past all control. Another, who had been fortunate enough to obtain a considerable quantity of doubloons, put them in his haversack, and was making his way out of the town, but was induced, before he left it, to drink more than he could carry. He laid him down somewhere to take a nap, and awoke soon after without even his shoes, and not only were the doubloons gone, but all his own necessaries also. In, short, a thousand of the most tragi-comical spectacles that can possibly be imagined, might be witnessed in this devoted city. The officers did all they could to repress these outrages, but the soldiers were now so completely dispersed that one quarter of them could not be found; and indeed the only benefit almost that the officers could render was, by each placing himself in a house, which generally secured it from being broken open and plundered. The different camps of our army were for several days after more like rag-fairs than military encampments, such quantities of wearing-apparel of all kinds were disposing of by one set of plunderers to the other. But they were not content with what they had brought out of Badajos; they had now got such relish for plunder, that they could not leave it off when driven out of the town. A night or two after the surrender of the place, they stole no less than eight horses and mules belonging to my battalion, and took them to some of the other divisions, where they sold them as animals captured from the enemy. I lost on this occasion an excellent little mule, worth at least L.20, and for which I of course never obtained a farthing. We used every exertion to discover both the perpetrators and the animals, but without success. An English army is perhaps, generally speaking, under stricter discipline than any other in the world; but in proportion as they are held tight while they are in hand, if circumstances occur to give them liberty, I know of no army more difficult to restrain when once broke loose. A reason may perhaps be assigned for it in part. On such occasions as this siege, where they were long and much exposed to fatigue almost insupportable, to the most trying scenes of difficulty and danger, which were generally borne with cheerfulness and alacrity, they perhaps reasoned with themselves and one another in this manner,--that as they had borne so much and so patiently to get possession of the place, it was but fair that they should have some indulgence when their work and trials were crowned with success, especially as the armies of other powers make it a rule generally to give an assaulted fortress up to plunder. They had also become quite reckless of life from so long exposure to death; but an English army cannot plunder like the French. The latter keep themselves more sober, and look more to the solid and substantial benefit to be derived from it, while the former sacrifice every thing to drink; and when once in a state of intoxication, with all the bad passions set loose at the same time, I know not what they will hesitate to perpetrate. The reader will judge of the state of our soldiers who had been engaged in the siege, when Lord Wellington found it absolutely necessary to order in a Portuguese brigade to force the stragglers out of the town at the point of the bayonet. At this time I think I was fairly tired of life, so disgusting and so sickening were the scenes the few last days had presented. I had also lost two of those for whom I had a great regard, together with several others of my brother officers, all excellent young men, with still a greater number wounded,--in all, in our fifteen companies, to the amount of twenty-six,--and men in equal proportion. It was indeed a trying time. Notwithstanding what has been said above of the bad conduct of the British troops on this occasion, I am fully persuaded there is more humanity and generosity to be found in the breast of an English soldier than in any other in the world, for, except when inflamed by drink, I am confident it would be most revolting to his feelings to be ordered to proceed with cool deliberation to the execution of such horrid butcheries as we read of in the armies of other nations.--No! When calm and sober, no man acts with more tenderness towards those in his power than an English soldier. Bonaparte would not have found in them the willing actors in his political tragedy in Egypt, when he coolly fusiladed several thousands of his unfortunate Turkish prisoners, as related by Sir R. Wilson. If I may be permitted to make a few remarks on the taking of this strong fortress, and of the conduct of the besiegers, I would say that never in the annals of military warfare was greater devotion shown by those of all ranks, from the General to the common soldier. The arduous and dangerous service of the trenches was cheerfully performed by every individual whose duty called him there; but the most conspicuous gallantry was manifested in the assault. Conceive of the heroic Picton and his brave division escalading a wall probably forty feet high, built on the summit of an almost inaccessible rock, and with troops at the top of all to oppose them as they reached its summit. It is true the enemy were not numerous here, having only about 200 men in the castle, but still one man in this situation was able to destroy probably twenty of the assailants, by throwing down a ladder after it had been set up; most of those ascending would be crushed to death by the fall over such a precipice. But he carried every thing before him, and after establishing his own division in this commanding situation, he either actually did, or prepared to move upon the body of the enemy, who were defending the breaches. General Walker also, who commanded a part of the 5th division, bravely forced an entrance into the town at the opposite side, overcoming every one of the numerous barriers and obstacles which presented themselves; and where he himself, in the act, I believe, of mounting the rampart, received a most desperate wound. It was said, but I know not how truly, that when he fell, the French soldier who wounded him was about to repeat the blow, which in all probability would have deprived him of life, but that the General, whether intentionally or not it is not said, made the masonic sign, which was understood by one of the Frenchmen, and that he instantly interfered in his behalf and stopped the blow. They say the General some time after found out that his brave deliverer had been sent to Scotland with his fellow-prisoners, and that he had him searched for and handsomely rewarded, and, I believe, procured him his liberty. It is well known, I believe, to be the rule in all services like the assault of fortresses, &c., that those, both officers and men, who form the forlorn hope and the storming party, are volunteers, these being services of extreme danger, and which generally procure for the officers who survive a step of promotion; but it might as well have gone (in the light division at least) as a tour of duty, for on all occasions of this nature, with only one or two exceptions, the senior officers of each rank insisted upon being sent on that duty. Nay, in one instance this heroic feeling was carried to an almost censurable excess. Lieutenant Harvest of the 43d having been some time the senior of his rank in that regiment, and there being a vacancy for a captain, he had been recommended for the company; and although he had not been gazetted, yet it had been intimated to him through his commanding-officer that his name should shortly appear as captain. Thus his promotion was perfectly secure; notwithstanding, when volunteers were called for for the storming party, he insisted on his right of going as senior lieutenant; so over scrupulous was he that his permitting a junior officer to occupy this post might be construed to the detriment of his honour. He went, and fell; and thus not only lost his company but his life, and by his too refined sense of honour deprived another officer, probably, of that promotion which would have been the consequence of going on this duty had he survived. Among the men also the same noble enthusiasm prevailed, for he who was selected for this dangerous service out of the superabundant numbers who always volunteered, was envied by his comrades as truly fortunate. In fact, it required a character for good conduct to entitle a man to this honourable employment. Whatever, therefore, their other faults might be, a want of bravery was not one of them. CHAPTER VIII. The army leave Badajos on the 11th of April, and move into quarters near the river Agueda, where they remain till the 11th of June--Advance towards Salamanca, which, with the exception of three forts, the enemy had evacuated--The forts invested--The main bodies of both armies bivouack within a mile and a half of each other, in the vicinity of Monte Rubio and Morisco--The forts of Salamanca surrender--The main body of the enemy retire to Tordesillas--Movements of the army. On the 11th April we left Badajos to return again to the neighbourhood of Rodrigo, the French having, during the absence of our army from that frontier, made an irruption into Portugal, and penetrated as far down as below Castello Branca, completely ravaging the country. Our first march was to Campa Mayor, where we were quartered in the town. We next day reached Arronches, where we bivouacked in a wood near it. The following day we marched into Portalegre, and on the 14th, Niza; the 15th we crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, and moved on to Larnadas. Here we began to perceive some of the effects of the recent visit from the French; but at Castello Branca, which we reached next day, the devastation they had caused was truly deplorable. We halted here one day to refresh the troops and get forward our supplies, and the next day reached Escallas da Cima. Here we began to get very close upon the rear of the enemy; it therefore became us to move forward with circumspection, for our force on this side the Tagus was yet but small. We advanced, however, and occupied successively St Miguel d'Arch, Penamacor, and St Bartholomo, near Sabugal, which last town we passed through on the 23d, and bivouacked that night at Alfyates. The utter desolation of Sabugal was beyond conception; filth and misery presented themselves in every direction. It had been made a depot for provisions by the French, I imagine, for on all sides the entrails and other offal of bullocks and sheep polluted the atmosphere by the abominable stench they caused, and had attracted multitudes of vultures and other birds of prey, who had by this time become horribly tame and familiar: one vulture sat so long upon a dead horse as I was riding along the road, that he allowed me to come near enough to make a cut at him with my sword, as he stretched his enormous wings to mount up from his prey. On the 24th we reached Ituera, where we halted for two days. We had now entered Spain, and it not being intended as yet to commence another active campaign, we moved into quarters near the river Agueda, my battalion and the 43d occupying the village of La Encina, or "The Oak." Here it was necessary that every exertion should be used to re-equip and prepare the troops for service, as it was intimated that another campaign would speedily commence. All the winter and spring hitherto had been spent in active service, consequently much required putting to rights before we again took the field; all hands were therefore employed to patch up and repair our clothing and shoes, and to get every thing in good order when our services were again to be called for. While we were here, I began to experience some of the ill effects of a deep-rooted enmity which one of my brother officers had conceived against me, though till now partly concealed. I was unconscious of having given him any cause for this; but he, without ever giving me any opportunity for explanation, used all his influence in endeavouring to injure me in the opinion of two of my superior officers, who had hitherto been friendly to me; and not only with them, but, I have reason to believe, with our acting brigadier, whose mind, with the others also, he completely estranged from me for a time. But though he misled them then, they did not retain the ill opinion of me which his misrepresentations had produced, for there are testimonials from all three at the end of this volume. I was not so fully aware of his dislike of me, till one day I was dining at the table of our acting brigadier, when he and one of those before noticed were also guests. I overheard him telling this officer, (with an intention, I almost imagine, that I should hear,) that I must be a bad man, for that I was sitting silent when all the rest were talking, in order that I might listen to their conversation. But I was the junior officer there, and it did not become me to be talkative; besides, I never was loquacious. I said nothing, (although some may blame me for it, but I loved peace,) trusting that one day such forbearance would not be forgotten; but I felt it deeply, and mourned over it in secret with great bitterness of spirit. In this place also I began to receive very pressing letters from the merchants in England, from whom I had purchased a quantity of goods when last at home, but which, for want of transport, could not be got up to the army in order to their being disposed of; and, in short, scarcely a post arrived that did not bring some unwelcome and distressing tidings. I had purchased a fine mule in place of that stolen from me at Badajos, for which I had given about £30. I sent him down to Lisbon with my batman, to bring up as many of the goods as the mule could carry; but he had not been long gone till I had the mortification to learn that this mule also was lost. The man said he had been stolen, but I had every reason afterwards to believe that he had sold him. Be it observed, I could but very ill afford losses of this extent out of my pay and scanty allowances; but I endeavoured to bear up as well as I could against these misfortunes, although it is certain I was not able to bring religion to my aid at this time of trial, for I had lived hitherto in total neglect of that most momentous of all concerns, and, although I endeavoured to amuse myself occasionally by fishing in the Agueda, my mind began to be greatly depressed. About this time an order was issued for each British regiment in the Peninsula to endeavour to enlist fifty Spaniards to be incorporated in the regiment. I was sent in company with another officer into the mountains of Gata, not far from the city of Placentia. We were not successful, for although we obtained the names of some who promised they would follow us to La Encina, they never made their appearance. However, the beauty and magnificence of the mountain scenery amply repaid us for our trouble. From this village also I had the pleasure of visiting, for the first time, the lately captured fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, and some of my brother officers who had shared in the toils and dangers of the siege, pointed out to me the most remarkable scenes about it. Like Badajos, it had been battered till practicable breaches were made to admit the besiegers, and then stormed in the same manner, but its defence was feeble compared with Badajos; and yet, to look over the ground in the neighbourhood of the trenches, one would imagine it impossible for troops to have lived, so completely was it ploughed up with shot and shells, each of the latter generally making an excavation sufficiently large in which to bury a horse. Whilst we remained in these cantonments, the officers of the division once or twice got up a sort of "pic-nic," every one contributing something towards the feast, which was held in a large wood in the neighbourhood of Ituera. On our way from La Encina to this assembly, we passed over the ground where the 5th and 77th regiments had so distinguished themselves in September 1811, against a very superior force of the enemy's cavalry. The bones of the combatants lay bleaching upon the plain, the flesh having been very soon devoured by the innumerable birds of prey, which appeared as if collected from every part of the Peninsula. Indeed so numerous were the battles and skirmishes which took place along this frontier, together with the offal from the animals killed for the use of the armies, that they were no doubt better fed than they had in general been accustomed to. But the period of our stay in this vicinity drew to a close, and on the 11th June we broke up from our cantonments, and passing the Agueda, the division assembled in a wood about a mile or two in front of Rodrigo. While we were here a rather remarkable phenomenon appeared about mid-day, or soon after; the sun, which shone most brightly, and the moon, with several stars, appeared all at the same time, the latter being distinctly visible. This of course attracted great numbers, and many were the sage remarks that were made, some believing it ominous of disastrous events; and indeed very shortly afterwards a circumstance occurred which in some degree confirmed their prediction. A grenadier of the 88th regiment (I think it was) had come over from his own division, to endeavour to prevail upon his wife, who had deserted him and taken up with a sergeant of our first battalion, to return with him, she having, as I understand, left him with one or more children, the first of their marriage, which he was anxious she should come and take care of. They had often, I fancy, quarrelled, and he had probably used her ill, but he was now desirous of a reconciliation, and entreated her to return with him to his regiment. He prevailed upon her to accompany him to some distance from the bivouack, that they might the more freely discuss the subject, for she had hitherto refused to agree to his request, being probably better provided for by the sergeant than she had been with him. While walking in a field close to the wood in which the bivouack was situated, and arguing the point with some heat, and she still persisting in remaining where she was, he became so exasperated at her continued refusal, that he, in a rage of jealousy and anger, drew his bayonet and plunged it in her bosom. Her cries soon brought people to the spot, who at once secured him, and he was instantly committed to the provost prison tent, and her body of course brought in and buried. Poor creature! she was one of the gayest of the females which graced our rural balls near Ituera only a short while previous, and had often danced with old General Vandaleur on those occasions. I believe he was not brought to trial for it, as her ill conduct probably had been considered as in some measure palliating what he did, and that he might be supposed to have been irritated to a degree of madness when he perpetrated the fatal act. I subsequently learnt that he was a brave soldier, and that he afterwards fell in the hard-fought battle of the Pyrenees. We moved forward the next day in the direction of Salamanca, halting on the 13th at Alba de Yeltes, on the 14th at Sancho Bueno, the 15th at Matillo, in a large plain in front of which we bivouacked, where were the most luxuriant meadows I think I ever saw, the horses on our arrival being literally up to their bellies in fine rich grass. What a pity the natives know nothing of hay-making! This fine herbage is permitted to stand there till it perishes, and yet in the winter they are frequently very ill off for provender for their cattle; indeed I do not exactly know how they contrive to feed them in that season, but I know we were always greatly put to our shifts to procure any sort of long forage for our animals, being generally compelled by necessity to resort to this grass, rotten and dead as it was. I believe they use a considerable quantity of straw, which they chop very short, and which in truth is no bad substitute for hay; but when it is so very plentiful and so good, common sense, one would imagine, would induce them to preserve it. Lord Wellington in the following season caused a considerable quantity of hay to be made in Portugal, getting scythes, &c. out from England, but we never returned that way afterwards to reap the benefit of it. All this immensely rich and extensive plain is in a complete state of nature--no enclosures to mark the different boundaries of the proprietors, should it have any, but where there are "landmarks," the mode of ancient days is resorted to. On the 16th we moved forward to within about five miles of Salamanca, and bivouacked near a range of low hills extending from the Rio Valmuso (which we had just crossed) to the city. In front of this place our cavalry fell in with that of the enemy, with whom they had a _petit affaire_, and had captured a few of them, who, in the afternoon, passed our bivouack, on their way to the rear. We observed as they passed that they wore long queues, which had an odd appearance in our eyes, the British army having for so many years left them off. Next morning we advanced towards the city. We had gone, I think, about three miles, when ascending one of those heights over which the road passes, we had a most interesting view of this beautiful place. It seemed thickly studded with elegant and highly ornamented spires, springing from the numerous cathedrals and colleges, &c. which it contained; but what heightened the effect was an immense column of smoke rising from some magazines which the enemy (not having time to carry off) had set on fire. We feared it was but the prelude to the whole city sharing the same fate, for their barbarous conduct in Portugal during Massena's retreat, rendered it but too doubtful they were resorting to the same mode of warfare here. They still retained possession of a portion of the town, in which they had constructed three forts; one very strong, and capable of containing about 500 or 600 men; the other two were smaller, to cover and act as supports to the principal one. In constructing these works they had destroyed the greater part of the colleges, and a considerable number of other public buildings, besides several extensive streets which Salamanca had formerly contained; but even now it was still a beautiful and interesting city. One of these works commanded the bridge, which rendered our crossing the Tormes here impracticable. We were in consequence moved about a league higher up the river, where we crossed by a rather deep ford. However, all got safely over, and we halted for the night on a small plain, a short distance from the ford, the main body of the enemy having retired and left 800 men in the forts before mentioned. These occupied but about one-third of the town, of course the remainder was open and free, and, as might be expected, every one was anxious to have a peep at this famous university. Consequently away a number of us scampered, and soon entered the city, the inhabitants of which were overjoyed to see us. The nuns were seen waving white handkerchiefs out of their iron-grated windows, and the Padres and other respectable inhabitants welcomed us with a thousand vivas, embracing us, and using every means of testifying their joy at our arrival. I need not attempt to describe the place, for I am not able, and it has so often been described that my reader will not be disappointed at my declining to do it here; suffice it to say, the buildings in general, and the religious edifices in particular, were most superb; but the Goths had destroyed the finest portion of the city. The forts were immediately invested, and we went and had a look also at them. They seemed remarkably strong, having been constructed principally of hewn stones, taken from the buildings they had destroyed; and on all sides of them a space of perhaps two hundred yards or more was cleared away to make room for the play of their artillery, and to prevent a lodgement being made by the besiegers. We next day moved from our bivouack near the ford, and marched to the village of Aldea Secco, in front of which our cavalry and the enemy had a rencontre, after which the latter retired: this was about a league and a half in front of Salamanca. Next day we were suddenly assembled in consequence of the enemy, in great force, making his appearance at some distance in front of our bivouack. We were then removed from the plain, and took up a position on a height called Monte Rubio, or Red Hill, a little to the right. Soon after, also, the other divisions of our army began to assemble on the height, and our Chief arriving on the spot, every thing had the appearance of something serious being about to take place. Here also, for the first time, I saw Don Carlos de Espagna with his few followers. These were better clothed and equipped than almost any other Spanish troops that I had seen. The day passed over, however, without the French making any attack, and without any movement being made on our side, farther than putting the different divisions into position as they arrived on the ground. The French were continually receiving reinforcements, or rather their different divisions were rapidly arriving in succession, when they all bivouacked in the plain in front of us, at perhaps a mile and a half distance, and near to the village of Morisco. This they very soon gutted of every portable article, whether it was food, clothes, furniture, or whatever they could carry off; nay, they unroofed the greater part of the houses for fuel for the troops, but this latter proceeding could not be avoided, there being no wood near them. Englishmen may well feel thankful that their dwellings have not been exposed to such visitors, who, in half an hour, will convert a comfortable and smiling village into a heap of ruins. We remained in this position for some days, the two armies, like two experienced pugilists, each waiting for the other to strike the first blow, by which he would in some measure lay himself open. It was not, however, Lord Wellington's game to commence operations, seeing a part of our army was then employed in the siege of the forts in Salamanca; besides, it is said, when some one ventured to hint that we should attack the enemy, that his lordship judged it would make a difference of 3000 men less on the side of the attacking army. I know not if this story be true, but certainly great prudence was displayed on both sides. However, the enemy had occasionally cannonaded us a little from the first; but about three days after their arrival, they made a very brisk and vigorous attack upon a conical hill immediately in front of our position, and a little to the right of Morisco. It was defended by the seventh division, which repelled the attack with great gallantry, driving the enemy down the hill again with great precipitation. The 68th regiment distinguished itself greatly, but in their pursuit of the beaten enemy, they advanced too far into the plain, and which the French observing, a forward movement was made again by them, and before our people could recover the high ground, Captain M'Kay and Lieutenant M'Donald, with a considerable number of their men, were made prisoners. Poor M'Kay received I know not how many bayonet wounds on this occasion, I believe not less than ten or twelve, but none of them very serious of course, or he could not have survived. He, with the others, were taken into the French lines, but he was so ill when they retired a few days after, that they were obliged to leave him in Morisco. The enemy's artillery played upon our line during the greater part of this attack, and caused us some loss, but not of any consequence, the horses appearing to have suffered more than the troops. The French seemed disappointed and annoyed at our sticking so pertinaciously to the hills on this occasion, and told M'Donald (from whom I afterwards had this information) that it was only when we had every advantage on our side that we durst give them battle. Our armies were, I think, pretty nearly equal, each having perhaps about 40,000, but they were, I believe, superior in cavalry, and of course the plain was the very ground for them. Marmont seeing himself thus foiled, withdrew from before us, and made a movement to his left, crossing the Tormes with a considerable part of his force, and advanced on the other side of the river towards Salamanca. Our heavy German cavalry, under General Baron Back, opposed them here, and greatly distinguished themselves, driving the enemy's cavalry from the field. Our army made corresponding movements with the enemy, changing in parts our position. Meantime the siege of the forts had been proceeding with from the first day of our arrival, and as the distance from Monte Rubio to the town was not great, several of us rode in to see how the siege was progressing, as the Americans have it. An attempt had been made to carry them by escalade, but it had failed; General Bowes, who led the attacking party, with several officers and men, having fallen in the attempt. His lordship now deemed it necessary to batter them regularly previous to another assault being made upon them. Heavy ordnance was therefore got into battery, which not only effected a breach in the smaller fort nearest the principal one, but which also threw a considerable quantity of hot shot into a building in the centre of it, which served as a barrack to the troops, the roof of which was presently set on fire, and the only shelter they had was thus destroyed. They thus were compelled on the 27th to surrender prisoners of war. It is not easy to describe the effect produced on those inhabitants who lived nearest to the forts while the siege was going forward. Just as I entered one of our batteries, which had been established close behind a street, still occupied by the people, one of our artillerymen was carried out shot by a musket ball in the breast, and dead; the poor people when he was brought out into the street assembled round his body, and set up the most piteous lamentations imaginable. This impressed me with the good feeling which must have existed in their minds towards the English, for they are not a people, as the reader will be aware, who are very susceptible of horror at the sight of blood. A few hours after these forts surrendered, I went to visit the principal one--the devastation caused by our hot shot on the house before mentioned was awful. They had been obliged to make this their hospital also as well as barrack, and it was really lamentable to see the poor wounded Frenchmen lying there in a house that was literally falling about their ears, the roof having been completely fired, while burning beams and rafters were continually dropping upon these poor helpless beings. A French surgeon was still in charge of these men, and he had the politeness to show us all over the fort. As it had appeared from the outside, it was in reality remarkably strong, and the place where our people had made an attempt to escalade it, was pointed out to us; he said it was heavily mined, and that if our people had carried it by escalade, the mines would most likely have been sprung. There was fixed immediately opposite the gate a beam of wood, with holes bored in it, and about twenty musket barrels fitted into them, so as to command the entrance. These, I imagine, it was intended to have fired by a train, as our people forced the gate, and it would have been like a little volley, which must have swept away the first of the assailants. The inhabitants seemed greatly rejoiced when this business was concluded, and peace once more established in their city, and they vied with each other in showing us every mark of attention and kindness, looking upon us as their deliverers. If I am not mistaken, it was here where our illustrious Chief played off a sort of innocent _ruse_ upon some of the Padres of the place. Soon after our arrival, and before the attempt upon the forts had failed, he went to visit some of the principal cathedrals, &c. which remained entire; the priests of course were proud to show their churches on such an occasion. He admired them greatly, and praised them much; but what seemed particularly to attract his attention was the extreme whiteness and cleanness of their walls and ceilings, although they were so very lofty. He enquired how they managed to get up to them to keep them so; and the unsuspecting Padre, without hesitation, led him to where they kept the immensely long ladders by which they ascended. This was just the very thing he wanted in his meditated attempt upon the forts, and of course they, with others of a similar description, were procured for that service. I will not vouch for the truth of the above, although I heard it, and I think it was not unlikely to have taken place. Indeed had he made a formal demand for such things, it is not improbable they might have denied they had them; but his having seen them himself precluded this. The forts surrendered on the 27th, and on the 28th the enemy's main body retired altogether; for they soon learned the fate of the besieged, as they had occasionally communicated in some measure by rockets thrown up, and answered. On the same day, our division moved forward to Castilbanos; and the day following to Parada de Rubiallis. On the 30th, we reached Castrillo de Aguerino; and on the 1st of July, the town of Ravel-del-Rey. The next day, we moved on towards Rueda, a considerable town. Here we found the French in some force, their main body having retired across the Duero to Tordesillas. The force in and about Rueda consisted of both cavalry and infantry, and seemed to act as a rearguard till the enemy's columns had time to file over the bridge at Tordesillas. I was at some distance in front of our division, the cavalry having preceded it, with whom I went forward. As we approached the place, a pretty large column of the enemy's infantry left it, and moved in the direction of the bridge. Some of our horse-artillery at this time came up, and fired Shrapnel shells into it, which did considerable execution; one shell particularly having killed and wounded great numbers, among whom was an officer, I think one of the handsomest men I had almost ever seen. Our cavalry had a little brush with some squadrons of the enemy a little further on in the plain, and captured a few prisoners. One of these was the sergeant-major of one of their hussar regiments, and of all the men I ever saw taken, this man evinced the greatest trepidation and alarm. He was absolutely like to sink to the earth, either from fear of what awaited himself, or from the effects of the contest in which he had been engaged. He had lost his cap in the fray, and seemed like a person deprived of his senses. He must, notwithstanding, have been looked upon by the French as a good soldier, and a valuable non-commissioned officer; for I learned afterwards that they sent in a request that he might be exchanged for one of our sergeants whom they had captured, as it was intended immediately to promote him to the adjutancy of his regiment; of course this was immediately complied with. The enemy retired to Tordesillas, and we bivouacked near Rueda, a part of the officers being permitted to go into houses in the town during the day. In this situation we remained for a day and a night; but the sun being so powerful, the troops began to feel the ill effects of the heat. They were accordingly brought into the town and quartered in the houses. Here I experienced more of that hostility before spoken of, on the following occasion. In the number of houses allotted to my battalion, there happened to be some of the best of them without stables; but as there was not time to examine farther than their outward appearance, this could not be known by me. I therefore marked off the houses according to custom, giving the best, in point of appearance, to the senior officers in succession, and so on till all were served. It so happened that the house allotted to this officer, who had nearly the best in the battalion given him, had no stable. This I was, from the fore-mentioned cause, totally ignorant of. Neither had I any stable in the house I occupied, but, after some trouble, I had found one in a house occupied by some of the men, where I had put up my horses and mules, and went about the other duties of my station. In the evening I was informed by my servant that my animals had been turned out by this officer, and his own put in, in their stead; and that mine were running loose in a yard, he not caring what became of them. My saddlery, and all the mule-apparatus, (precious articles in this country,) had also been cast out. He was my _senior_ officer, and I was consequently obliged to bear this ill-treatment. I mention this little circumstance, because it will show with what determined and unrelenting hostility he pursued me. Indeed it might not have been so trifling an affair, for had I not heard of it in time, I might have lost every horse and mule I possessed, which would have been one of the most serious disasters that could have befallen me. I could obtain no redress, for the captain before mentioned, who commanded the battalion, and this officer, being on rather unfriendly terms, he felt delicate in interfering in my behalf. Indeed I have some reason to believe, that it was partly on account of his enmity to this captain (with whom I still messed) that he so persecuted me. I own I was on this occasion strongly tempted to demand that satisfaction which the rules of honour (as they are termed) dictate, for I then had not a Christian feeling on this subject; but after consideration and consultation with some friends, it was feared he might take advantage of his superior rank, not only to decline giving me that satisfaction, but to report me, and thus destroy my prospects for life, for he would have been compelled to the latter step had he not acceded to my demand; and from the feeling he displayed towards me, there is not the least doubt he would have rejoiced at such an opportunity of ruining me. At this time, also, I had very few _real_ friends who would have stood by me; for his secret machinations, and his having the ear of our brigadier, tended greatly to estrange my former friends from me. All this, as might be expected, tended powerfully to depress my spirits, and to cast a gloom over a mind but too susceptible of impressions of that nature; for there is not any thing almost I would not do or submit to, to live on good terms with those I associate with, and indeed with all men. My mind was also much harassed at this time by receiving very unpleasant letters from England on the subject of the goods I before mentioned, and which had not yet reached any farther than Abrantes; and as the men began to be ill off for want of clothing, I obtained leave to proceed forthwith to Abrantes, to endeavour to get both the clothing and goods brought up to the regiment. I therefore set off, accompanied by one servant on a mule, leaving the other animals with the battalion, and proceeded on the 16th on my journey, and passing through Ravel-del-Rey, I halted for the night in a village where the seventh division was quartered. As I knew some of the officers of the 51st, I took up my abode with them for the night, and they indeed received me very kindly. My friends spent the evening very merrily; but, about midnight, they were called out and put under arms, expecting shortly to turn in again, as they told me; but they were marched off, and left the place entirely, leaving only my servant and myself in occupation of the town. It seems that Marmont, with his whole force, had moved from Tordesillas, and had threatened Lord Wellington's communication with Salamanca. In order, then, to keep up a corresponding movement, and be ready to take advantage of any false step the enemy might make, his lordship withdrew his whole force, and began to retire as Marmont advanced. Thus, in the morning, to my surprise, all the army had left the neighbourhood, and as I was not certain who the next visitors might be, I quickly decamped from a village now left open to the enemy. I got on at a considerable pace, as both my servant and myself were riding, and on the 19th I reached Salamanca. During yesterday's march I heard a considerable cannonade to my right and rear, and I afterwards learnt that the two armies had come nearly in contact with each other, and some skirmishing and exchange of shots had taken place. I did not stop in Salamanca longer than to draw rations for ourselves and animals, being anxious to get on as fast as possible, to try to get up the supplies while the army remained near the frontiers, for it was still expected they would advance into the heart of Spain, notwithstanding the present partial retreat. I accordingly moved on that evening to Matilla, and continued thus making stages of thirty or forty miles a-day, and on the 25th I reached Abrantes; but on the preceding day I was overtaken by Lord Clinton, going home with the dispatches relative to the glorious and decisive battle of Salamanca, which took place on the 22d. His lordship was nearly worn out, being actually asleep on his horse as he rode past me, for he had never once stopped from the time he first set out. I learnt the news from the person who accompanied him. It is impossible to describe the joy this information created among the Portuguese inhabitants of the village. I stopped for the night at Gaviæ. I found at Abrantes a detachment of our second battalion proceeding to join the army; but, to my sorrow, learnt there was no chance of procuring transports for the clothing, &c., for months to come. This was distressing information to me, and of course added to the despondency already preying upon my spirits; for the merchants' letters I was continually receiving began to be most importunate, and indeed attributing the non-remittal of their money to a want of principle, and talked of reporting my conduct to the Commander-in-Chief. Want of a proper religious feeling, under such circumstances, as might be expected, laid me open to great temptations. I therefore, to drown sorrow, and because I had always been too much addicted to it, began to give way to intemperance, and, falling in with a number of officers of very dissipated habits, I was led on to indulge in the most vile and abominable of all vices, _drunkenness_, to an excess almost incredible. But the gloom still seemed to thicken, and a dark cloud seemed impending over me, of which I was fully aware, and wrote home to my friends to that effect. At length my birthday, the 4th of August, arrived, and which must, as my unhappy companions in sin urged on me, be kept with all due jollity. Accordingly, a dozen of strong port-wine was procured, and we boozed away most joyfully, the whole being drank by about four or five of us. This produced constipation in the bowels, and had nigh brought me to my end; but my mind was more affected, if possible, than my body. About two days after this debauch, on my retiring to bed at night, I felt an unusual inclination to rise up and fall down on my knees, to offer up my evening prayer; for, notwithstanding all my wickedness and forgetfulness of God, I had not altogether abandoned the _form_ of _saying_ my prayers at night, but it was always after I lay down. I resisted this impulse, however, to rise and pray, and, after mumbling over my _form_ without the _spirit_, I endeavoured to compose myself to sleep. I did sleep for a while, during which I was troubled with some confused and incoherent dreams; but soon after awaking, gracious God! what were my feelings then? Despair, black despair, had seized upon me. I rushed out of bed, and rolled upon the floor like one distracted, as indeed I was. Oh! what would I then have given that I had never been born, or that I could cease to exist! Had it been possible, by throwing my body into the flames, to annihilate for ever my consciousness of being, how gladly would I have done it! But no--the terrors of the Lord were upon me, and drank up my spirits; and no one who has not been in a similar situation can form the most distant idea of the misery which preyed upon me. The pains of hell got hold upon me, and hope seemed for ever to be shut out from my mind. I believed I had sinned past all redemption; that the mercy of God could not possibly be extended to me; and of the efficacy of the Redeemer's blood I knew nothing. Oh! this was a time much to be remembered by me, for none but He who afflicted me, and my soul which bore the affliction, knows what I then suffered! At length the morning came, but with it no comfort for me. One of my sinful and dissolute companions came to see me, but he seemed greatly shocked at the recital of my woful tale, and I believe then formed for himself resolutions of amendment, which I fear, poor fellow, he never was able to fulfil. He did not long survive, but was shortly after called to his awful account, whilst I am spared,--a monument of the long-suffering mercy of God. Amongst all my companions in error and wickedness, I could not procure a Bible, and, as a proof of the ungodly state I was then in, I had not one myself. This poor friend, however, had a Prayer-book, which he lent me, and out of which I eagerly sought for comfort and hope, but in vain, for all was against me. Yes--and all who make God their enemy, will find in the hour of need, that every other creature and thing will fail to yield them comfort; but I had sinned too deeply and too perseveringly to find peace speedily. Oh! in what black array did the sins of my whole life pass before me, and how did I sigh for annihilation; or, if I could in any way atone for my wickedness, if I could but go and bury myself in a cave or den of the earth, and forego for ever all intercourse with mankind, how easily and how cheaply did I then conceive I should purchase pardon and peace! But, alas! I knew nothing of the way of reconciliation with an offended God, although I had been duly instructed in my youth. I was in such agony of mind that I scarcely heeded my body, but was prevailed upon to have a surgeon, who administered what he considered necessary, but without effect. My bowels had ceased to perform their functions, and this no doubt would greatly affect my head; still, although this, as a _second_ cause of the distraction of my mind, was easily discoverable, yet the _great first cause_, not only of my disorder, but of all its effects, was the God against whom I had so grievously sinned, and from whom alone I could hope for the removal of my present sufferings. But hope was at this time banished from my breast, and I gave myself up to all the agonies of a soul that is lost for ever; but still I could not _rest_ in this sad situation. I therefore now determined to set off for Lisbon, in hopes that I might obtain from the chaplain, who was stationed there, some slight alleviation of my misery, for none but Roman Catholic priests were to be found where I then was. I accordingly set off, accompanied by my servant, but in such a hurry, and so utterly regardless of all worldly concerns, that I left my baggage in my quarters, which was taken care of by the friend before mentioned. I started in the afternoon of the second day after my attack. The sun was scorching hot above my head, but I regarded it not, seeing there was a hotter fire within me; indeed I believed I could not mortify my flesh sufficiently, so blind was I at this time of the nature of atonement. My feeling was, that I had an Almighty enemy over me; that His eye was upon me for evil, let me go where I would; and that I could not possibly escape from the destruction which He would shortly inflict upon my soul. How gladly, as I rode along, would I have solicited the rocks and mountains to fall upon me, and hide me from His sight, did I believe they could have availed for this purpose! But no--I felt it was impossible, and that I must endure for a short while longer the lighter punishment he had then laid upon me; and by and by I must drink to the dregs the cup of His everlasting indignation. O, sinners! be persuaded to flee from the wrath to come, for indeed one of the slightest terrors of the Almighty is enough to drive to distraction the strongest mind, and to appal the stoutest heart! I arrived at Galigao, the place of my intended rest for the night--and here I was attacked with ague and fever in addition to my other disorder--this was the effect of my exposure to the sun in so weak a state. But I cared not for my body. I knew that would return to the dust from whence it was taken. But oh! the never-dying soul--to think that it should endure eternal and omnipotent wrath, overwhelmed me with dread indescribable. My mind, it is true, was affected by my disorder; but it could not be termed insanity or madness, for I even now remember with great distinctness the feelings I then experienced, and those feelings remained with me for a considerable time afterwards. Here I felt myself extremely ill, and believed I could not survive till morning. I consequently got my servant to make down my bed in a corner of the room I occupied, with his own near it, and told him to leave the candle burning, for that my time could not be long. I was compelled to submit, and quietly lay myself down, in dreadful expectation of the fatal hour, and when, as I imagined, the infernal fiend would be commissioned to seize and carry off my soul to its abode of everlasting misery. I could not pray, nor had I any the most distant hope that my sentence could be reversed, for I fully believed it had been finally pronounced by Him who changeth not. During this woful night, I appeared to possess a sort of second self, a being which existed and thought and reasoned quite distinct from that _me_ who was stretched upon the floor, and which appeared to upbraid me with the misery it was then suffering, and was still to suffer, for the sins of my past abandoned life. I know not whether any other person in despair ever experienced this feeling; but to me it was quite obvious, for I remember distinctly the sin to which it more particularly drew my guilty attention. Was not this the soul which will exist when the body is dissolved, and may not such an upbraiding take place between the body and the soul when the former shall be raised to join the latter in the judgment? But the fact is, my soul was that night as it were on the point of taking its departure from the tenement of clay, and seemed strong to endure the everlasting wrath of God. I do not know whether I slept any during this dreadful night; but morning came, and with it a certainty that I was still in this world, but without the hope that this might have been expected to produce. I felt as in a fire, yet I scarcely durst put my burning hands into the water my servant brought me. I felt convinced that I had forfeited all claim to any thing like blessings, and that curses, both in body and soul, were alone my due. Ill as I was, however, I proceeded on my melancholy journey, not with any hope that a minister of religion could give _me_ any relief, but a drowning man will catch at a straw. Oh! how strong, how awfully strong, did my soul appear at this time, to endure the tremendous wrath of Omnipotence, whilst my body seemed fast sinking into its original element! I reached Lisbon in two days from this time, having taken a boat at Santarem. I ate nothing, with a trifling exception. I had no inclination for food, nor did I think I ought, for the reason before given; my only sustenance was a little water which I kept in a bottle, and with which I now and then moistened my parched lips. I arrived at Lisbon about daybreak in the morning, and proceeded as well as I was able to a friend's house, and knocked at the door; but shocked indeed were he and his wife, when they saw me standing below, more like a ghost than an inhabitant of this world. Indeed it is not easy to describe my looks at this time; there must have been much of that spiritual misery depicted in them which a confirmed despair no doubt produces. They took me in, and after hearing my woful tale, prepared to do for me the best that lay in their power; they gave me their own bed, taking a pallet for themselves, and treated me as if I had been their brother. He, poor fellow, is no more, but his beloved and kind partner still lives, and may she always enjoy that happiness she seemed so desirous of contributing to on this occasion, and everlasting happiness hereafter! As soon as it could be conveniently done, the clergyman was sent for, and also a medical officer, although from neither had I any hope. But, alas! from the former, although a kind and sympathizing man, I derived but little benefit. He did not direct me to the only source of a sin-sick being's hopes, the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the world. He made my hopes to centre too much in my own resolutions and after-doings. No doubt, as my sins had been enormous and flagrant, my repentance ought to be proportioned; but when he saw me bowed down under an indescribable sense of guilt, oh! had he, like Paul to the jailer, pointed me to the Saviour, how unutterably precious and acceptable would it have been to my soul! I do not remember that any one character in scripture is described as having felt more fully and more keenly the sinfulness of sin, and of its consequent danger to the soul, than I did at this time. How thankfully would I have accepted the mode of salvation pointed out in the gospel; for indeed I was but too much (as all natural men are) inclined to expect pardon and happiness from the things which, if God spared me, I intended to perform. But He only knows best. This kind gentleman wrote me out prayers, and seemed much interested in my welfare; notwithstanding, the gloom of despair still hung heavy on me, and at length; and when the kind medical friend was enabled, after repeated efforts, to procure me some relief, I felt as if it was only the prolonging of my existence, in order that I might fill up the measure of my iniquity. This, I am now fully persuaded, was a suggestion of the Father of Lies, in hopes probably of prevailing upon me to adopt the awful and miserable resolution of Judas to get rid of life. I thank God this was the only temptation of that nature which he permitted me to be exercised with; for I felt no inclination even in my darkest hours to commit suicide, fully believing that the utmost of my sufferings here could bear no proportion to those of the damned in hell. I consequently had no inclination to hasten them by rushing into eternity; this, it is evident, was of the merciful goodness of the Lord, and for which I am bound to be truly thankful. I continued in this state of mind for several months, and could not, with all my reading, praying, and doing, find peace. My reading and praying seemed to me more like an irksome task, than an exercise in which I took delight. I had formed a resolution from the first to retire from the service, where it appeared to me I was exposed to so many temptations; but here the experienced Christian will perceive how erroneous were my views, and I think feel pleased that I never fully effected my purpose, although I made preparations for it. Indeed I could not well feel _certain_ that I should act right by retiring from the post to which God's providence had appointed me, although my firm determination was to live devoted to Him. But, alas! how wofully have I failed of maintaining that resolution! My health now gradually improved, under the kind and fostering attentions of my warm-hearted host and hostess, and it became necessary that I should resume my station at Abrantes, which I did, in hopes of being able to obtain transport from thence, although the army was at this time in the neighbourhood of Madrid. But after returning to Abrantes I suffered a relapse, and was again brought to the borders of the grave, my mind still deeply impressed with my former ill forebodings, although not quite so distressing as before. I got my servant to read to me while I lay groaning on the floor, for I could not bear to sleep in a bed at this time, but felt little comfort from his endeavours, the Scriptures being at this time "a sealed book" to me; so true is it that till the grace of God dispels our darkness we have no light in us. I think it is probable that some of my readers, on perusing this part of my narrative, will be inclined to say, "surely this man must have been an uncommon and atrocious sinner, above all others, or he never would have suffered thus." I acknowledge with shame that I have been a most abominable and vile sinner, deserving of all the Lord laid upon me, and much more, for I was, and am, fully deserving of hell fire; and should that be my portion (as, through the merits and sufferings of my Saviour, I have a humble hope it will not be), I must acknowledge the kindness and justice of God, although I perish for ever. But I would say to such readers, as our Saviour said to the Jews, that "except _ye_ repent, _ye_ shall likewise perish." Others may be inclined, on the contrary, to say, that all this was merely the effect of disease, and not at all to be resolved into God's hatred of sin and punishment of it in this instance. I acknowledge that it was the effect of disease. But when God laid that disease upon me, He knew what effect it would produce upon my mind; consequently, both disease and mental agony came from Him; and, because I knew it came from Him, "I held my tongue and said nothing." And I have now, and I hope shall have for ever, the greatest cause to bless His holy name for this, as one of the greatest mercies He ever showed me, for having thus taught me to know how evil and bitter a thing sin is, and to set a juster estimate upon his favour. He thus taught me also to value and love the Saviour, who alone can deliver me from the punishment, the power, the pollution, and the love of sin, and to make me happy for ever. Blessed be His holy name, for He has done to me all things well, and I humbly hope to enjoy His favour for ever. During my stay at Lisbon, my batman, whom I before mentioned as having lost, or rather sold, my mule, and who had here rejoined me to take care of the horse and mule I had with me, either from remorse, or some other cause, made an attempt to cut his throat, and succeeded so far as to sever the windpipe, I believe, but did not quite effect his purpose. He was found in a field near Lisbon bleeding nearly to death, and brought into the hospital, where, with great care, and after some time, he recovered. Indeed 1812 was a sickly year, and many were affected strongly in the mind, several having committed suicide, I believe. While I lay here ill the second time, I received a letter from the regiment telling me that the paymastership had become vacant, the poor old gentleman with whom I returned to England last year, having come out again to the Peninsula, and got as far as Rodrigo on his way to the regiment, and there, being attacked with the same disease I had suffered so much from, died; and that as General Stewart, our colonel, had arrived at Lisbon, I was to go and wait upon him, and that letters would be written from the regiment requesting him to recommend me for the situation. I with great difficulty again reached Lisbon, and waited upon the general, but to my great mortification I found the promised letters from the regiment had never been received, and that another person had, in consequence, been recommended, he being the son of the late paymaster, and had applied some time before. My disappointment did not prey upon my mind, for at this time I set very light indeed by the good things of this world, and felt conscious that I already possessed much more than I deserved. I was compelled through illness to remain again in Lisbon some time, but found great difficulty to obtain permission from the commandant for so doing. My general, however, procured me leave to stay till I should be able to resume my post at Abrantes. Here, not only myself, but all the officers who were then in Lisbon, and also at the army, suffered much from the want of subsistence. I had at this period seven months' pay due me, and could not obtain a dollar from the public chest, although I wrote a note to the commandant showing him how I was suffering from want of money. The army had in the meantime pursued the French, as before noticed, on one side to Madrid, and on the other to Burgos; but the attempt to take the latter by storm having failed, and the enemy having been able to assemble a more numerous force than Lord Wellington had before it, he was obliged to retire from both those places to the frontiers of Portugal. The division from Cadiz, the siege of which having been raised by our forward movement in summer, had joined the army at Madrid. Much was suffered, I understand, during this retreat, the troops having been exposed to great privations, and the weather being exceedingly wet and unpleasant. My division, after the retreat, took up its quarters again in the villages on the Portuguese side of Rodrigo--my battalion being stationed at the village of Espeja. The army, as might be expected from the late severe and harassing service they had been engaged in, began to be extremely ill off indeed for want of clothing, many of the men being nearly quite naked; in consequence, the most pressing orders were sent from head-quarters to use every means possible to have the supplies immediately forwarded, for Abrantes at this time contained stores belonging to almost every regiment in the army. My health having been considerably improved, I again returned to that depot, and, after waiting a few weeks, the means of transport were at last given me by the commissary there. I need not say with what alacrity I prepared for and commenced my long wished for journey. I had got a sufficient escort assigned me, from a detachment of our men being about to join the regiment. We started about the beginning of January 1813, and proceeded on our route by way of Niza, &c. I had been obliged to buy another horse from some cause which I do not now recollect, but when we were leaving the town just named, I found, on turning out to move off, that a large nail had been driven right up into the centre of one of his feet. Whether this was done accidentally, or by design, I never could learn, but the consequence was the loss of the horse. I had great trouble also to keep the convoy, which consisted of about a dozen bullock carts, with as many soldiers as an escort, together; the drivers, if they were not strictly guarded, very often made their escape, taking their bullocks with them during the night, and leaving the cart in our possession, glad, I dare say, that they got off so cheaply, for they seemed to have a great antipathy to go with us. I was therefore compelled to collect them all together near Castello Branco, and making the soldiers load their rifles before them, told them as well as I was able that they had orders to shoot the first who attempted to desert with his bullocks. This had a good effect, for I believe we lost no more till we reached the regiment; but, as we approached the frontiers of Spain, several of the drivers ran away without their cattle, preferring the loss of both bullocks, cart, and payment, rather than enter that country, of which the peasantry in general seemed to have a great dread. Those who stuck by us to the last, were rewarded with the bullocks and carts of the deserters; but I think we did not take more than two or three out of the twelve to the regiment, the rest had all made their escape. Nothing can be conceived more tiresome than travelling with such a convoy. The carts are all constructed upon the principle of the Irish car; that is, the axle rolls round with the wheels, they being firmly united; consequently the creaking noise created by the friction is loud and most unpleasant, and they have no idea of grease or tar to diminish this, but believe in many parts, if not in all, the noise to be a sort of holy noise, which keeps the devil from them. I found, in removing these stores, that great robberies had taken place upon them, several of the bales having been opened while on board ship, great quantities of goods taken out, and their place filled up with old transport bedding, &c. I found it necessary, however, to endeavour to bear up against all this, for my mind would not suffer me to dwell too much upon such misfortunes. At length I arrived at the regiment, where indeed I was a welcome guest, for they were greatly in need of all kinds of equipment. The officer who had rendered my life so unhappy before, had left the regiment, and gone into another far distant from my present place of abode, for which I was truly thankful, and his absence I found produced a great change in my favour; for every one seemed glad to see me, and sympathized with me in my late alarming illness; in fact, the face of things was entirely changed for the better. I myself had benefited much by my late chastisement. I had learned to think meanly of myself, and to be kind and submissive to all to whom I owed submission; a virtue which, I fear, I was but too deficient in before. All things now went well with me. The goods, which before had been such a source of uneasiness and trouble, were rapidly disposing of, and thus the prospect of my soon being able to pay my creditors became every day brighter. But, in the mean time, what I had hinted at before took place: one of the merchants had actually reported me to his Royal Highness the Duke of York. This might, indeed, have deprived me of my commission, had his Royal Highness been harsh with me; but he caused a letter to be written to my commanding-officer, (now Sir Andrew Barnard,) to call on me to explain why I had not remitted the merchant what I owed him, and to account for my not answering his letters, which he said I had failed to do for several months. My answer was very simple, as the reader is aware; but, with respect to the letters, I showed the colonel one, in which the merchant acknowledged having received one from me a short time previously. This also was satisfactory, and I had moreover remitted him a short while before L.300 of the money I owed him. The colonel was fully satisfied, and wrote off to his Royal Highness accordingly, and I heard no more of the business. Soon after the captain, who had been acting as paymaster, was obliged to return to England, on account of ill health. After some necessary steps I was appointed to this duty, it being an addition of 10s. per diem to my pay. According to the army regulations, a person in my situation could not be appointed acting paymaster; but a committee of three captains was formed, who took all the responsibility of my transactions upon themselves, giving me, as before said, the whole 10s. per diem. This showed, at least, that they were not afraid to trust themselves in my hands; for I might have involved them deeply. In short, whatever I did (almost) prospered, and a kind Providence seemed to smile upon me; and I believe that from this to the close of the Peninsular campaigns was the happiest part of my life. I have reason, therefore, to bless God for his unbounded goodness to me. CHAPTER IX. Preparations for the Field--Amusements in winter quarters--Grand Review--Advance of the Army in pursuit of the Enemy--Come up with their rearguard in the vicinity of Hornilla de Camino--Skirmishing--Encounter with the 1st brigade of the Enemy, who are beaten, and forced to retreat--Our Army advance in pursuit--An affair between the rearguard of the Enemy and our 4th Brigade--Vittoria--General Engagement--The Enemy defeated--Remarks. I begin this chapter, through the mercy and goodness of God, with brighter prospects than any I have written hitherto; for though I was still ignorant of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, I believed God was at peace with me, and, from my late dreadful sufferings for sin, I certainly walked very circumspectly, and I believe I had also more of the genuine feelings of a Christian, though not the knowledge; for I was lowly in my own eyes, and loved all mankind. In me was fully verified at this time that sublime, but seemingly ill understood, saying of our Saviour's, "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." I now was meek and lowly, and I had friends in abundance, and may truly be said to have possessed or inherited the earth, for I had plenty of every necessary good, and, withal, peace and contentment. I could not enjoy more had I been in possession of more. Alas! how lamentable is it that chastisement should produce a better effect upon me, than love and gratitude to God is capable of doing; for, to my shame be it spoken, pride and selfishness now prevail much more in my heart than they were able to do then; and I find it much more difficult now to bring my mind down to that lowly and contrite feeling which with God is so acceptable, and with the possession of which only He promises to dwell. As the officer whom I have had occasion so often to mention owed me a trifle of money, I wrote to him, in as friendly a manner as I could, hoping, now we were separated, that his enmity would cease, and I was desirous of being at peace with all mankind; for, as I said before, I never yet knew why he was my enemy. He wrote back, with an order for the money, telling me, he hoped never to hear from me again, for that he was anxious to forget that such a person had ever existed in the world. This, as might be supposed, wounded my feelings deeply, but I remembered that I had myself sinned as deeply against God, and that He might raise up such instruments for my correction as seemed good to Him. My feelings, therefore, towards this person were more of regret and pity than of resentment, and I think I did not forget to pray to God for him. Poor fellow, he has a good while since been called to his account, and that in rather an awful manner; he fell in a duel, but which (from all I could learn) he was engaged in from the best motives, that of endeavouring to prevent the seduction of a young female belonging to his regiment. I hope he is at peace. During our stay in winter-quarters every exertion was made to put the troops in a proper state to take the field again, so soon as the season was sufficiently advanced. While we remained here also every sort of innocent amusement, at least generally innocent, was had recourse to, both by officers and men, not only to pass the time of inactivity with pleasure, but to keep up that readiness for action always so necessary in a state of warfare. We accordingly had races, balls, plays, and every other description of pastime our situation admitted of. We in Espija established what was termed a _trigger_ club, each one in turn giving an entertainment at his house, and at which, as the name would imply, as much game was produced as our sportsmen could procure. The plays were generally held at Gallegos, the quarter of the 43d, and which were indeed got up in a surprising style, considering the means of doing so. A _walking_ club was established in our 1st battalion, which was quartered at Alamada; we were of course frequently favoured with the company of its members, for they thought nothing of setting out, each with a long pole in his hand, and walking twenty or more miles to dinner. Thus harmony and a brotherly feeling was promoted amongst the officers of the division,--a thing of great moment where regiments have to act together, as well as pleasant to all parties. Some of our people also occasionally had a wolf-hunt, for these animals were quite numerous in this part of the country; nay, so bold were they when pressed with hunger, that they did not scruple sometimes to enter our villages, and devour whatever fell in their way that they could master. An officer of ours had an ass or a mule torn to pieces one night while standing in the yard behind his house. The mode of hunting them was, to have a certain number with arms stationed at the different passes in the wood, whilst a large party of drivers scoured the wood in line, driving every thing before them, when the animals, coming upon the armed people, were shot; but I do not think they were at all successful: it requires people accustomed to the business to enable them to kill many. There is a premium given for every wolf's head, but I forget how much it is. I sometimes took a trip to the Azava, or the Agueda, on a fishing excursion; but I was ill off for fishing tackle: the hooks the Spaniards make are the clumsiest things imaginable, and would not, I am persuaded, be made with less dexterity by the natives of New Zealand. Those which we were forced to use for fly-hooks had a hole or eye at the top, like the crook which you will sometimes see in a butcher's shop, intended to be hung upon another, which was formed by turning the wire down again, and through this they run their line; besides, they almost invariably broke, and I have been wofully tantalized sometimes by having the hook break off the only fly that the fish were taking; notwithstanding, I caught some very fine trout in the Agueda, this river abounding with them. I sometimes also caught barbel in that river; but it was literally swarming with a sort of roach, or what some of our people called rock-fish: they generally feed from some stuff they find on the large stones. But as the season approached which was to call us to the field, a review of the whole division was ordered to take place on the plain of Espija, and which, I think, was as brilliant a spectacle of that description as it was possible for 5000 men to make. Every regiment was in high and complete order, the whole having by this time been fully equipped for the campaign: the movements, too, were beautiful, and executed with great precision and promptitude, and, as might be anticipated, called forth the unqualified approbation of our illustrious Chief. A new and different arrangement was made this campaign with respect to both officers and men in their field-equipment. Experience had proved that constant bivouacking injured the men's health, as the mode they had adopted last year, though very ingenious, was not calculated to protect them sufficiently from exposure to the weather. They had last campaign been ordered each man to have loops sewed on at the corner of his blanket; thus, when in the field, two of these were united, and spread over two stand of arms set up at the ends for poles, and being fastened down at the other corners with bayonets, they formed a sort of tent, into which perhaps four men might creep; but then they had thus only two blankets to serve as a bed for the whole four men; consequently they would, in cold weather, be much exposed. This campaign each company received four tents; thus allowing about twenty men for each, and the officers of each company had one among them, and the field and staff officers in like proportion. These were carried on mules, which before had carried the camp-kettles; but these being exchanged for smaller ones, the men carried them in turns upon their knapsacks. Thus it rarely happened that the tents were not on the ground nearly as soon as the men; but strict orders were given always to encamp out of sight of the enemy, if practicable, that they might not be able to calculate our numbers. How very different from the ancient mode of encamping! each of which being more like a town laid out with regular streets, &c. &c. But war was a very different thing in those days, and could Marlborough have risen to see one of our straggling and irregular mountain camps, I know not what his feelings would have been: he would, I fear, have thought we had sadly degenerated. All being now ready for opening the campaign, a part of the army, under Sir Thomas Graham, crossed the Douro low down in Portugal, and proceeded up the right bank, while we, with Sir Rowland Hill's corps, moved forward in the direction of Salamanca and Toro. On the 21st of May, our division broke up from its cantonments, and assembled at the village of St Felices el Chico, a few miles below Ciudad Rodrigo, each regiment having had the Agueda to ford in its march to this camp. Our division at this time consisted of the following corps:--viz. the 1st brigade, under General Kempt, was composed of the 43d regiment, 17th Portuguese, and the 1st and 3d battalions of my regiment; the 2d brigade, under General Skerrit, contained the 52d regiment, 1st and 3d Portuguese caçadores, and the 2d battalion of my regiment; one troop of horse artillery, under Colonel Ross, was attached to the division; the whole being under the command of General Charles Alten. On the 22d, we moved on to Martin del Rey, near the river Yeltes, by the side of which we encamped. On the 23d, we marched to and encamped near San Munoz, where the division had, I understand, suffered considerably during the retreat of last year, from the French having gained ground upon them, and severely cannonaded them from a height near this village. On the 25th, we moved on to Robliza, having halted the day before to enable the other division to come up with us. We next morning moved forward to the little river Valmuzo, a few miles on the Portugal side of Salamanca, and alluded to in my former advance. Here we halted for three hours during mid-day and cooked, and in the afternoon advanced to the ford of El Canto, on the river Tormes, and about two leagues below Salamanca. Here we encamped for the night, and remained next day also. Lord Wellington, with some cavalry we understood, had entered Salamanca, where only a small force of the enemy's cavalry had been found, and which retired immediately; but I believe some little skirmishing took place between the parties. On the morning of the 28th we forded the Tormes, and advanced towards Aldea Nueva de Figuera, which we reached late in the day, the distance being about twenty-four miles. While we lay at El Canto, a few of our officers visited Salamanca, in hopes of meeting some of their old friends of last year; but not a _viva_ greeted their ears on entering the city; a sort of suspicious look of recognition was all they could obtain from those people, who had received us only last summer with such extravagant demonstrations of joy. No doubt they had been made to suffer for their former expressions of attachment to us, for the French had in almost every place their partisans, who doubtless would not fail to give them, on their return, an account of the manner in which the English had been received, and the contributions would be laid on accordingly. We remained at Aldea from the 28th May to the 2d of June, waiting for information from the corps under Sir Thomas Graham, it being intended to form a junction at or about Toro, where it was expected the enemy had a considerable force; this was distant from us about thirty miles. While we continued here, I took a trip to Sir Rowland Hill's division, where I had a townsman, an officer in the 28th, but had not the satisfaction of seeing him. I had other friends in that division, however, with whom I and my companions spent the day in great harmony and satisfaction, and at evening returned to our camp, about four miles distant, highly gratified. On the 2d of June, we set off early in the morning, and arrived at Villa Buena about mid-day, where we halted for three hours to cook and refresh, after which we continued our march towards Toro, which we reached in the evening, but the enemy having destroyed the bridge across the Douro at this place, we encamped for the night in some fields on the left bank of the river. We learnt here that the hussars attached to Sir Thomas Graham's division had attacked a corps of French cavalry soon after their having quitted Toro, and with whom a very smart affair had taken place, the enemy being completely routed, and about 150 prisoners taken from them. Our cavalry, I believe, lost an officer on this occasion, who fell into the hands of the enemy. Nothing could exceed the miserable appearance of the horses taken from the French on this occasion; they appeared really half starved, although at this season there was plenty of green forage to be had; they must either have been sadly neglected, or have been doing exceeding hard duty. The bridge having been rendered passable for the men, the division crossed on the following morning, the horses and mules fording the river. We left Toro immediately, and moved on in pursuit of the enemy, and encamped that night at Terra Buena. On the 4th, we reached the convent of Espinar, and encamped on a height just over it. It was a most picturesque and beautiful piece of country around this convent, but itself appeared to have been lately rendered uninhabitable. I believe the monks had been driven away by the French, but not a soul remained to enquire of; all about the building was desolation. We next day advanced to the village of Muderra, and on the 6th to Amperdia, and on the 7th we marched through the city of Palentia, and encamped outside the walls, on the banks of the river Carrion. Here the inhabitants evinced the same degree of enthusiasm on our entrance as we had been accustomed to witness in other large towns, till the French had taught them a little more circumspection, and which the good people of Palentia would have been most probably fully taught, had these good friends of theirs ever got possession of their city again. Some time after we had pitched our camp, and were strolling about the city, the lifeguards entered, and were of course saluted with repeated vivas. One of the men, a rather country-looking young fellow, cried out, "Ay, the folks be always glad to see we lifeguards," happily supposing, no doubt, that they were intended as a particular compliment to his corps alone. All the country through which we had marched for several days past, was one continued plain of waving corn, mostly wheat of the very finest description. There are no hedges or dikes, but, as before noticed, only landmarks to divide the different fields, so that its appearance is like an immense sea, stretching as far as the eye can reach, the long corn undulating with the wind as the waves in the ocean. On the 8th we marched forward and encamped at the village of Tamara, the weather having, from being exceedingly fine, and indeed rather hot, set in extremely wet and cold, and thus rendered marching very unpleasant. We next day reached La Peña, (the name, it may be remembered, of the Barossa Spanish hero,) the weather continuing very coarse and stormy. On the 10th we continued to advance, and marching through the village of Framosa, and passing over a canal which crosses here, we halted for the night on the right bank of the river Pisuerga, near the village of Lantadilla. In all these late movements, we had experienced a great deficiency of fuel for cooking and drying our clothes when wet, neither forest nor bush-wood being to be seen for days together, and indeed scarcely one solitary tree to be met with--nothing but corn; so that we were occasionally compelled to resort to the cruel and unchristianlike expedient of pulling down houses to obtain the timber with which they were built for the purpose of cooking, or we must have eaten our food raw. This, however, was done in a regular and systematic order, the Alcalde of the village pointing out such of the houses as were to be doomed to the fire, and the troops taking no more than was absolutely necessary. It is astonishing to me how the natives themselves exist for want of this article of first necessity. From this village we moved forward on the 11th, and crossing the Pisuerga, marched on the town of Pallacio, which we passed, and reached the village of Landrino, near which we encamped for the night. From the time we left Toro, the enemy had been gradually retiring before us, having withdrawn his forces from all the strong places on the Douro, and seemed concentrating somewhere in the direction of Burgos or Vittoria. Excepting our cavalry, no part of our forces ever had the satisfaction of seeing a Frenchman hitherto during the whole of this long and rapid march; but on the morning of the 12th, as we now approached Burgos, it was fully expected that we should be able to get a sight of the fugitives; and accordingly, after we had left our last night's quarters, and marched a few miles in the direction of the city, a pretty strong body of the enemy's cavalry was seen drawn out on a high plain, a little above the village of Hornilla de Camiño. These were supported by a division of infantry formed in square, and occupying the outer edge of the high plain facing the way we advanced, and apparently observing our motions. On discovering this force, our division was halted to give the cavalry attached to us time to ride forward to reconnoitre, and ascertain more exactly the force before us, than could be done while we were on the low ground. I rode forward with our cavalry, which, passing by the enemy's square of infantry, approached the main body of their cavalry. It not being, however, the intention of the French to fight here, they slowly and orderly retired before us across the plain; but as we had left the square of infantry nearly behind us, the guns attached to our cavalry turned in that direction, for this body seemed indifferent about the movements of our cavalry, and it was not till our division began to ascend the hill that they evinced the slightest intention of stirring. On seeing them, however, they quickly decamped, and as they had to pass within 150 yards of the position our guns had taken up, I imagined considerable execution must have been done upon them before they got out of our reach. But, strange to say, I believe only one single man was knocked down by the great numbers of shot fired at them. It must have been owing to the relative situations of the two parties; they passed down a hollow way which led from the high plain in the direction of the Burgos road, and which covered them completely till they came immediately below our guns, when it became a difficult matter to depress them so as to bear upon the enemy's square as they passed us. However the whole turned round and gave us a regular volley, for, as we were so much above them, there was no danger from their firing in square; but this, although the shots flew pretty thick about us, was not productive of any mischief that I remember. They retired across the plain below us, pursued by another division of ours which had advanced on our right, and between whom and the French a pretty smart skirmish took place. So soon as their infantry were clear from us, their guns opened out from the opposite side of the river upon us on the height, but, the distance being considerable, their shot did little execution. It was evident this force was only left here as a rearguard, to ascertain our movements and force, &c. We encamped for the night near the road by which we had ascended the high plain; but were awoke early next morning by a tremendous explosion which shook the earth beneath us, although at the distance of 6 or 7 miles from Burgos, the castle of which the enemy had blown up, and retired altogether. We soon after commenced our march, and, leaving that city to our right, made a long march in the direction of the Ebro, and halted for the night near the village of Tovar. The next day we moved on to Quintanajar, and on the 15th, after a long march, we reached the Ebro, and halted at the village of Puente Arrenas, situated in the delightful valley of Veras. This is one of the most picturesque and beautiful valleys in Europe, I dare say. When you arrive at the brow of the high ground over the Ebro, a sight breaks upon you all at once which is indescribably grand and beautiful;--a large river rolling under you, beyond which a rich and fertile valley, laden with the fruits of a hundred orchards, with charming villas and farm-houses dispersed through all the lawn; a stupendous bridge, of I know not how many arches, leading you across this magnificent river; and the whole closed by high and beetling rocks jutting out of the high woody bank on the opposite side. It really appeared like enchantment when we first arrived within sight of it, from the long dreary plains we had been so long traversing. Here, for the first time since we entered Spain, did we meet with "manteca de vaca," or "cow butter," all the other we had been compelled to use hitherto for want of better, was what they call "manteca de puerco," or "hog's-lard." The women who brought it wore a quite different dress from those we had seen in the parts we had passed through; the women had on generally yellow stockings, with abundance of petticoats of red, yellow, green, &c. &c., and were all very stout-made; they were, I believe, from Asturias. Poor creatures, many of them followed us with loads of butter, wine, cheese, &c. &c., even into France, so pleased were they with the excellent prices their merchandise brought amongst us; indeed, we had been so long debarred the enjoyment of butter and cheese, that we would have given almost any price to get them sweet and good. They carried their loads (and tremendous ones they were) as the flesh-wives in Newcastle carry theirs, that is, by passing a broad leather belt across the forehead and over the shoulders, and so underneath the heavy load upon their back. They were a civil and obliging race of beings, and apparently much more industrious and cleanly than the rest of their country people. We left this delightful spot on the morning of the 16th, following the course of the river upwards for about a league, then turning short to the right, passed through an enclosed country, and halted for the night at the town of Medina del Pomar. This is a considerable-sized place, in which was a nunnery, the inmates of which greeted us with hearty welcomes and vivas, with waving of handkerchiefs, &c., through their strongly iron-grated windows, where they more resembled criminals of the worst description shut up in a strong prison, poor things, than people who had devoted themselves to the service of their Maker. Next morning, we moved forward through a country almost without roads; we were, in fact, crossing the country in order to get nearer to the great road leading from Madrid to Vittoria, and on which the enemy's army was then retiring. We encamped for the night, after a fatiguing day's march, on a woody height near the little river Loza. We took the high ground on this occasion for our encampment, although extremely inconvenient and uncomfortable, being among stumps and brushwood, where there was scarcely room to pitch our tents; this was in consequence of being in the neighbourhood of a considerable force of the enemy, which was retreating, as before noticed, along the great road. The next morning, the 18th of June, we started pretty early, and calculating that we should this day come in contact with the above force, we marched in such a manner as to be ready, when that event took place, to take advantage of any favourable circumstances that might offer. We had in our front a squadron of Hussars belonging to the German Legion, and which were generally attached to our division. About mid-day the squadron in front of us reached the village of San Millan, where the road on which we were then marching, and the great road on which the enemy was retreating, unite; the latter descending from a high tableland just above the village, and passing a narrow defile between two high rocks. Our cavalry, on reaching this village, descried the advance of the French, composed also of cavalry; and what was not a little singular, they also were Germans in the French service. Our brave Hussars instantly charged those of the enemy, and immediately overthrew the body opposed to them, and in the charge captured several men and horses, which they brought in prisoners. By this time the head of the division had reached the spot, (my 1st battalion leading,) which in a few minutes got warmly engaged with the enemy's voltigeurs, a considerable number of whom had advanced to oppose us, in order that the main body of their division might be enabled, under cover of their fire, to pass through the village on the way towards Vittoria. Our people, however, pressed them so hard, that the whole of their leading brigade was obliged to join in the action. At this moment our illustrious Chief came galloping up; for, whenever any thing was to be done, he was always present. He had also taken care to have our 4th division moved so as to arrive at the village of Espija, a town about a league in front of us on the great road, nearly about the same time, so that, should the French contrive to get away from us, they might fall into their hands. He immediately sent me off to the leading company of our people who were engaged, for the guide they had had with them, in order that he might conduct his lordship to Espija; but that was no place for a Spanish peasant who had neither honour nor glory to gain, and he had accordingly made his escape the moment our folks got into action. His lordship instantly dashed off without a guide, while our two battalions, that is, the 1st and 3d of my regiment, kept advancing upon the enemy, and fairly drove them through the village, being supported by the other regiments of the brigade, but who had not any occasion to come into action. The first brigade of the enemy being thus beaten, retreated along the great road in the direction of Espija, leaving their second brigade and all their baggage to their fate. These latter being pressed by our second or rear brigade, and seeing us in possession of the village, and the road they had to pass, immediately broke in all directions, and dispersed themselves in the mountains over the village, each man making the best of his way. This their baggage could not do, and it consequently fell into the hands of the captors, an easy and valuable booty; but although my brigade, by beating and dispersing the enemy at the village, had been the principal cause of its capture, yet those whose hands it fell into had not the generosity to offer the least share of it to us, but divided it amongst themselves. During the skirmish in the village, a French hussar chased one of our officers several times round one of the trees growing by the side of the road, and repeatedly cut at him with his sabre, and it is likely would have cut him down at last, had not the officer seen a rifle lying near, belonging to a man just killed; and luckily it was loaded when he picked it up. He waited for the Frenchman, and coolly shot him through the body, and instantly seized his horse as lawful prize; had the rifle missed fire he was gone. We had not rested long after this brush till we heard a firing in our front, where indeed it was expected. The troops which had just left us, I imagine, had been attacked by the 4th division, and we, the 1st brigade, were instantly ordered to their support should they need it; but before we reached Espija, the enemy was completely beaten, and had retired in the direction of Vittoria. We had to retrace our steps and join our other brigade, and encamped for the night in the neighbourhood of San Millan. Our loss on this occasion was but trifling, considering the smartness of the affair. An officer of my regiment, of the name of Haggup, a countryman of my own, received a most dangerous wound in the abdomen, of which it was feared he would die, but he soon after completely recovered. An aide-de-camp of the French General was wounded, and taken prisoner, but he soon after died, poor fellow. Along with the captured baggage were a number of Spanish ladies, who had been attached to the French officers to whom it belonged, but they did not appear over faithful to their protectors, for most of them, I believe, preferred remaining in the hands of their captors, to being forwarded after their beaten and now ill-provided former companions; such is generally the fidelity to be expected from that sort of people. On the 19th we advanced by the same road the French had retired, till we reached the town of Salinas, where there were very extensive salt-works, as the name of the place denotes. We encamped for the night near the village of Pobes, on a small rivulet named Bayas, I believe. Near the end of our march to-day we had a view of the enemy's rearguard, as they rounded the end of a mountain, which lay immediately before us, and over which the road to Vittoria passes. After rounding the mountain, this part of the enemy's force fell in with our 4th division again, which had been moved forward from Espija by another road. A very smart skirmish was the consequence, which we distinctly heard, and in which a good number fell on both sides. The French retired from hence into their position in front of Vittoria. During the next day, while we halted here, it began to be whispered that the enemy had concentrated his forces in and around Vittoria, which was distant from us perhaps about ten or a dozen miles, and that the divisions of our own army had that day approached nearer together, which indicated a determination on the part of our Chief to try his hand with King Joseph, should he be bold enough to stay where he then was. Many, of course, and various would be the reflections which occupied the minds of the different individuals composing the two armies; but I can speak from experience, that those are of a much more pleasing nature which a consciousness of superiority and a good prospect of success inspires, than those which a retreating army are compelled to entertain. Pretty early in the morning of the 21st, we fell in and moved forward by the way the French rearguard before-mentioned had taken, and after having passed the end of the mountain and descended into the valley on the other side, we saw evident proofs that the affair between our 4th division and the French, above alluded to, must have been pretty warm. We continued to advance on the road to Vittoria, till, on ascending a rising ground, the French army appeared in position immediately in front of us. It was a noble and animating sight, for they appeared as numerous almost as grashoppers, and were posted as nearly as I can recollect in the following order. Immediately before us ran the river Zadora, passing from our left and front to our right and rear. In the centre of an extensive plain rose a pretty lofty conical hill, from which extended to their left a sloping plain, through which the great road lay, and terminated by a long range of mountains, stretching from Puebla de Arlanzon, just above the river, to a considerable distance beyond Vittoria. The city was shut out of our view by the conical hill before mentioned, and was distant from it about four or five miles; to the right of this hill, along the bank of the river, it appeared broken, and not easily approachable. On the face of the conical hill, and to its very summit, it appeared as thickly set with troops as if they had been bees clustering together; it was also thickly studded with batteries and other field-works. On the plain between that and the long range of mountains, the troops appeared to stand so thick that you might imagine you could walk on their heads. There did not appear any great force on the mountains to their left, and what they had to the right of the conical hill and towards Vittoria we could not discern, but it turned out they had a strong force there. There were several small villages in the plain and on the side of the mountains; the largest stood rather to the right of the plain, with a wood immediately behind it; this, I believe, is called Subijana de Alva. On the bank of the river also were three or four villages, most of them on our side, with a bridge at each village. The French army did not extend immediately to the river bank, but was placed at some little distance beyond it. The river was easily fordable. Our army began to arrive by divisions, and was posted as follows--General Hill with the 2d division, consisting of about 12,000 men, was on our extreme right, except about 3000 or 4000 Spaniards under General Morillo, who were still more to the right, and facing the long range of mountains before mentioned. In the centre was his lordship with the 3d, 4th, 7th, and light divisions, perhaps 25,000 strong, with the main force of artillery and cavalry. Sir Thomas Graham had been early detached to our left with the 1st and 5th divisions and some Portuguese, about 12,000 in all, to turn the enemy's right flank, and to try to cut him off from the great road leading from Vittoria to France, which ran in that direction. Whilst this movement was executing, and the different divisions were getting into their several stations, we, who had arrived first, were allowed to pile our arms and sit down. His lordship, with a numerous staff, went down a little nearer to the river to reconnoitre the enemy's position. I wandered down with them, and got as near as I could in order to ascertain the opinion of the big-wigs as to the business about to take place. One staff-officer, after carefully examining the position of the enemy through his glass, gave it as his opinion, that we should scarcely be able to make any impression upon so numerous an army, and so very strongly posted; but this opinion must have been dictated, I think, by his rather desponding temperament, for I believe it was entirely singular. The enemy, however, did not fail to notice this movement of our General and his staff, and instantly detached a corps of voltigeurs, who, rushing down to the river, dashed across the bridge at the village of Villoses, and immediately took possession of a small woody height on our side of the river, from whence they opened a fire on his lordship and those that were with him. This of course could not be borne; and as my battalion was the leading battalion of the column and nearest at hand, we were ordered (with two companies of our 1st battalion, which stood next to us) to take our arms, and drive those fellows across the river again. Thus we had, I believe, the high honour of commencing the action on that memorable day. We soon chased the voltigeurs from the woody height, down through the village, and over the bridge, where they took post and remained, we not having orders to pursue them any farther. We took possession of the village, and continued skirmishing with the enemy, a good many men falling on both sides, as the river was not more probably than thirty or forty yards wide, and a constant fire was kept up by both parties till the French were afterwards driven away by our divisions crossing lower down the river. After we had chased the enemy along the bridge, and they were fairly clear of the village, a French battery, situated a little above the river towards the conical hill, opened its fire upon us, from which we suffered a good deal, one shot having taken our people, who were lining a garden wall, in flank, and swept away five or six at a stroke; after this we kept more under cover. Almost the first person who fell on our side was a lieutenant of the name of Campbell. He had, I am sure, a strong presentiment of his death, for he had, I believe, made his will the evening before; and when we first came in sight of the French army, and the others were all animated with life and glee at the prospect of gaining laurels in abundance, he, poor fellow, sat down by himself quite pensive, and seemed lost in thought. He received a shot in the forehead which terminated his career in a moment as it were, and plunged him into an eternity of bliss or woe. I hope he was prepared, but scarcely dare say I believe he was. Our duty having been accomplished by taking possession of this village, and keeping the French from coming over, we had now leisure to look round us and see what was going forward; and we had certainly a noble field for observation. My commanding-officer, with the rest of the staff-officers and myself, together with half a company of men, took up our station at the church, which, standing high, gave us a fine opportunity of witnessing the movements of both armies. A short while after we had taken post here, we observed the smoke to arise in dense columns in the direction which Sir Thomas Graham had taken, which showed he had commenced the attack on that flank of the enemy, and this was the signal for commencing operations on our right and centre. Sir Rowland Hill's people, with the Spaniards, instantly forded the river, and advanced along the top and side of the mountains before mentioned; and as this was done in considerable force, it seemed to disconcert King Joseph a good deal, for instantly his aides-de-camp were seen galloping in every direction, and the troops which stood upon the plain began to move in that direction, while those upon the conical hill began to descend in great numbers into the plain. This was precisely what our Chief had calculated upon; and now, by a rapid movement, he threw the centre divisions across the river, by the bridges of Trespuentes and Nanclara, a little below our village, and attacking the remaining troops upon the conical hill, they were overthrown as fast as our divisions reached them. The 2d, Sir Thomas Picton's division, here particularly distinguished itself. General Hill's people were by this time very warmly engaged, for the enemy having, as stated above, strongly reinforced that point, they made a rather obstinate defence, particularly at the village and wood of Subijana de Alva, which latter was filled with their light troops, and where our 28th regiment, which was opposed to them, suffered considerably, and were not able to make much impression. The action had now become general, and our people on every side advancing; at this moment old Douro, who never failed to inspire confidence wherever he appeared, came dashing down into our village, and seeing the light troops which had been opposed to us had retired, instantly ordered us to advance, and join our division on the other side of the river. We accordingly moved forward, and marched with all expedition to reach our point; but the French had now begun to retire, and our people to follow them, so that we found it difficult to overtake them, and did not do so till they had passed the conical hill. When we came near that eminence, I rode up to have a peep at the field before us, and never did I witness a more interesting and magnificent sight. A beautiful and extensive plain lay before me, covered with the cavalry, infantry, and artillery of the contending armies; while the noise and din, occasioned by repeated volleys and rolls of fire from the infantry, with the rattle of upwards of 200 pieces of artillery, almost stunned the ear. Near the end of this plain, and to the left, arose the lofty spires of Vittoria; and beyond that again, the smoke arising from the attack of Sir Thomas Graham's people added animation to the scene. I had not contemplated the scene before me above a minute or two, till a howitzer-shell from the French fell close at my feet. My horse's bridle was hooked on my arm, and I was standing looking through my glass; but when this unwelcome visiter descended so near me, I thought it high time to be packing. My horse, however, not having the same fear of the consequences that I had, would not move but at a snail's pace. I was, therefore, constrained to leave him to take his chance, and get myself out of the way. It burst, but providentially without injuring either horse or man, but in the scramble I lost the top of my glass, which I could not afterwards find. I got down the hill, and joined my people, who had by this time passed it; and just at this juncture I observed a body of troops a little to our right, moving in the same direction we were. They were dressed in blue, and had caps covered with white canvass. I took them for Spaniards; but upon consideration that no Spaniards ought to be there, and a closer inspection, I found they were a battalion of French, and most likely those who had been so warmly engaged with the 28th at the village of Subijana, and who having stood perhaps too long, and afterwards having the wood to traverse, they had been detained considerably behind the rest of the army; for by this time our advance, and consequently the French rear, could not be less than half a mile in front of us. I pointed them out to one of our lieutenant-colonels; but as we had received orders to push on with all haste, and he not liking to disobey his orders, and withal a ravine being between them and us, which would have prevented our closing with them, they were allowed to move quietly off, which they did with a pretty quick but steady pace. Before we reached our division, we had to pass a village, over against which was a very strong French battery, and where they peppered us considerably, but without doing much harm, I believe. We here joined our brigade. Immediately in front of this village the enemy made one of his longest stands. Our brigade now formed lines of battalions, and lay down in some ploughed fields, while their artillery kept playing upon us. On our left the 3d division was warmly engaged. In about half an hour we moved in that direction. The 45th we found posted behind a thin thorn hedge, with its commanding-officer poor Colonel Ridewood, whom I had known before, lying on its right, gasping in the agonies of death. A great many men of this regiment had fallen here. We passed them, and continued to advance along the plain by brigades and battalions; but we found the ground much intersected with ditches, which would have retarded us had we wished to advance rapidly; but from some cause or other, which we could not then comprehend, we never pressed upon the enemy closely, but gave them time to get quietly away. We were still, however, in expectation of their making their final stand; for at every short interval a beautiful little position presented itself, which the French invariably occupied in the finest style possible, forming their lines on these little eminences with the greatest precision, and in beautiful order; but they never stood to let us get at them, for the moment we began to come within musket-shot, they instantly began to retire to another, which they took and abandoned in like manner. All this time, indeed, there was continual skirmishing going on between the light troops of the two armies, and a constant cannonade, and occasionally the heavy lines came in contact; but their infantry appeared to us to leave the field in the main unbroken. We continued these movements till near dark, by which time we had considerably passed Vittoria, and the enemy's artillery had nearly ceased. Our cavalry now got at them; and although, from the nature of the ground, their movements were greatly cramped, yet they continued to charge, and nearly captured King Joseph. We halted when we had got about four miles beyond Vittoria, which we passed on the left hand. We thought we had indeed gained a victory, but it appeared to us to be a most barren and useless one; and many were not over well pleased that the enemy had been allowed to get off so easily. But our noble Chief knew well what he was about, for he reaped all the fruits from this that could have been possibly gained from the most bloody battle. Indeed it was far from being a bloodless victory, but he certainly did not sacrifice one half the men that some in the action would have done; they thought we should have pressed the enemy far more, and brought him to closer action. After we halted, I (being the only quartermaster present) was sent in search of the baggage belonging to the division, and which had followed as far as they could along the great road. I passed through Vittoria on my way to the rear in search of it, and saw as I entered it several of Morillo's men, who had descended from the mountains and come into the town. From the vivas and other marks of gratulation which some of the inhabitants were rendering these ragged ruffians, a stranger would have thought that Don Morillo, with his 3000 or 4000 Spaniards, had achieved the whole victory themselves. It is certain they are a vainglorious people. I passed through the town, and, taking the great road, I soon had ocular proofs of the value of our day's work; the road being literally blocked up with every description of carriage-guns, tumbrils, waggons, &c. &c. which filled the great high-road for nearly two miles to the rear of Vittoria. I found it difficult to make my way through them, but at last fell in with the baggage; I could not, however, get it through, and was obliged to leave it, after giving directions where to find the division in the morning. I again passed through Vittoria in returning to the division; but oh, what scenes had I now to witness! The followers of an army are sometimes very numerous, and here they were abundantly so; muleteers, Portuguese and Spanish concubines, with every description of vagabond you can imagine. These were by this time all labouring hard in their avocation of breaking open and plundering the carriages and waggons, &c. that had been left by the enemy. Among these were hundreds of soldiers, who were now beginning to feel the effects of the wine, &c. which they had found in the enemy's baggage; and such a Babel was here to be witnessed as is not easy to conceive. I had some difficulty in forcing my way through the town, at the end of which I was accosted by five or six soldiers' wives, belonging to one of our light cavalry regiments, who wished to accompany me, in order that they might find their husbands, as that regiment was attached in some measure to our division. Of course it would have been cruel to refuse them; and as they were all mounted, away we posted, but had great difficulty to make out where the division now was. Many were the waggons and other carriages we passed on the road, either broken down, upset, or with people plundering them; and I did not reach the division till 10 o'clock at night. I was very glad when I found them, being then excessively fatigued and hungry; and just as I reached my people, I found the mess to which I belonged cooking a piece of thin mutton, which they had cut off from a sheep that had been taken from the enemy. This was all the plunder I got that memorable day, although, had I done as many others did, I might have obtained a great deal both of money and other valuables; for, as I said before, the numerous carriages I passed gave me an opportunity which many would have rejoiced at of possessing myself of immense wealth; but plundering never was my forte. One officer whom I knew got, I believe, near L.1000 worth of money, and other valuable property; and innumerable others got considerable sums, more or less. I am glad now that I refrained from what _might_ have been accomplished with ease and safety, but what also _might_ have entailed upon me disgrace and ruin. One officer I heard of, who, while in the rear, where he ought not to have been, found a box full of money, most likely silver, but very heavy. A German dragoon coming up at the same moment laid claim to half of it, and when this officer took hold of it to remove it, the German also laid hold to prevent him. A sort of scuffle ensued, when the German made use of most abusive and mutinous language, with threats, which the officer was obliged to submit to, knowing, as both of them did, how far he had descended from his station, thus putting it in the power of the soldier to treat him as a brother plunderer. Surely the mention of such an occurrence is enough to deter any man who possesses the least spark of honour from ever putting it in the power of a soldier to treat him so. Besides, if an officer plunders before his men, what may not soldiers be expected to do? In looking back upon the events of this day, I cannot help being struck with the bad generalship of those who commanded the French army. Marshal Jourdan, I understand, was Joseph's adviser on this occasion. He had always borne the character of an able General, but here he showed but little ability. Why did he so much weaken his force on the conical hill to support his left? Had he maintained his ground there, which is strong by nature, and they had rendered it stronger by art, he might have completely checked us on the right; for if we had advanced too far on that side, our wings would have been separated, which would have been a dangerous experiment; and I think Lord Wellington would not have hazarded it. And after leaving his first position, why did he not fight at every one of the beautiful little positions which he afterwards took up but never defended? This conduct is most unaccountable, for had he made a longer stand, even although he should be beaten, which no doubt he would have ultimately been, yet, by making this stand, he might have got off the greater part of his materiél, instead of which he carried off with him one gun and one howitzer only, leaving upwards of 250 pieces of ordnance in our hands. Most of his infantry left the field apparently unbroken; for only here and there they had stood to let our people get at them. It is true Sir Thomas Graham early cut off their retreat by the great road to France; but what then? This ought to have made them fight the more desperately, to enable them to get off the better by the Pamplona road. The infantry should have stood till the last, and not retired till fairly beaten out of the field. Nothing could be finer than the movements of our army. Every thing our Chief attempted succeeded to a tittle. The only thing I did not like was the delay we occasionally made in following up the enemy; but I could not, of course, comprehend the general movements, from seeing only a small part of them, and I believe the victory would not have been more decisive by being more bloody. We lost in the village, where we first began the fight, nearly thirty men, with the officer before mentioned as killed, and a considerable number wounded. There was something remarkable in the fate of one of the men who were killed by the cannon-shot I before noticed. This man was remarkably averse to fighting, and had shown, on all occasions, a disposition to leave that kind of work as soon as practicable. Poor fellow! his failing was known to all; and on this occasion those about him had orders to watch him, and keep him to his duty. They had not been in the village many minutes when this fatal shot swept him and about five others into eternity in a moment. It has often been remarked, that this description of people are generally the first to fall. It may not be generally known, perhaps, that a battle was fought on the 3d April 1367, a little higher up this river, near the village of Novarete, between our Edward the Black Prince, and Henry the Bastard, who had usurped the throne of Don Pedro, King of Castile. The history of it is given by Froissart, who says, "a little before the two armies met, the Prince of Wales, with eyes and hands uplifted towards heaven, exclaimed, 'God of truth, the Father of Jesus Christ, who hast made and fashioned me, grant, through thy benign grace, that the success of this battle may be for me and my army; for thou knowest that in truth I have been emboldened to undertake it in the support of justice and reason, to reinstate the king upon his throne, who has been disinherited and driven from it, as well as from his country.'" This zealous prayer was immediately followed by the onset, the Prince crying aloud, "Advance banners, in the name of God and St George!" "At the commencement," says Froissart, "the French and Arragonese made a desperate resistance, and gave the good knights of England much trouble; but at last, when all the divisions of the Prince were formed into one large body, the enemy could no longer keep their ground, but began to fly in great disorder; and Henry, the usurper, perceiving his army defeated, without hope of recovery, called for his horse, mounted it, and galloped off among the crowd of runaways. The English pursued them through the town of Najara, where they gained considerable plunder; for King Henry and his army had come thither with much splendour, and after the defeat they had not leisure to return to place in security what they had left behind them in the morning." There is a striking coincidence in many parts of the two actions and their consequences, which the reader cannot fail to notice. The most material difference, I think, in the two stories is, the offering up of the prayer by the Prince, and the modern practice of not recognising, publicly at least, the hand of God at all in any of our victories. This is to be lamented. CHAPTER X. Advance in pursuit of the Enemy--Our Forces retreat, in order to counteract Soult's movements for the succour of Pamplona--Total defeat of Soult in the several Actions near Pamplona--Our Forces again advance--Come up with the retreating Enemy at the Bridge of Yanzi--The Enemy take up a position behind Vera--A considerable body of the Enemy attacked at the Pass of Eschallar, and forced to retreat. We remained in bivouack all night where the battle had terminated; and did not begin to move till near mid-day on the 22d, when we set off in the track of the enemy, and at night reached Salvatiera, where King Joseph had slept the night after the action. The poor beaten French must have had a long march after the fight, for this was probably sixteen or eighteen miles from Vittoria. We started early on the morning of the 23d, and very soon began to overtake the rear of the enemy. They now resorted to a system of retarding our march, at once both cruel and cowardly; every village they passed through they set on fire. Of course this caused us some delay, as the road generally ran through the middle of the village, and the country on each side was enclosed, but still nothing could justify such barbarity to the unoffending natives, who were thus deprived of house and home, and probably all they possessed in the world. We overtook their rearguard near a village about two leagues from Salvatiera. They attempted to make a stand while the village was in flames, but a shrapnell shell from our horse artillery set them instantly in motion. We came upon a considerable body of them again near the village of La Cunca, where we again cannonaded them, and where our people had some slight skirmishing with their rear. We encamped for the night near this village, and again started after them in the morning early. My battalion led the column to-day, the post of honour. We had marched, I think, about eight or ten miles without overtaking any of the flying foe before us, but at last we came to an open country, that which we had traversed being pretty thickly enclosed, with bad roads and wet weather, which rendered marching very uncomfortable. Here a halt was ordered, as the enemy was in front in some force; here for the first time we got upon the great road leading from Pamplona towards Bayonne; and here, where it turned the corner of a mountain, forming a pretty acute angle, they had the only gun and howitzer they had saved from the fight in position, and ready to receive us. The men of my battalion, and a part of our 1st battalion, were ordered to put their knapsacks up behind the hussars of the German Legion, as it was not expected they would be wanted, and it thus rendered our people better able to run. The enemy appeared to have two battalions here, one of which remained on the great road near the two pieces of artillery, while the other moved off more to our right, down a valley which they imagined would, at the other end, let them out into the great road again. We now began to move forward, and as I happened to be the first mounted person who left the enclosed road we had been in, I was honoured with the first shot from their gun, which, although a good shot, did me no injury. Our people now pushed on at them pretty smartly, which caused them, after firing a round or two more, to limber up and retire with their artillery, though they of course retired as leisurely as possible, to give time for their troops, whom they were covering, to get away. The skirmishing between them and our people continued for about two miles, they gradually retiring before us; but when they came to a sort of pass in the road, formed by two rocks nearly meeting in the middle, their bugles or trumpets sounded first the halt to their troops, and afterwards the advance upon us. We could not comprehend the meaning of this, till in a few minutes the battalion which we had observed go down towards the right, suddenly made its appearance out of a wood among our skirmishers. Of course a sharp contest now took place, and the firing on both sides became more brisk; this battalion, it appears, had miscalculated on getting out of the valley, down which it had retired, and had been compelled, at whatever risk, to make the great road again before they passed the rocks before mentioned; and in order to let it do so, the other skirmishers had advanced to cover its movement. This battalion suffered considerably before it reached the road, and we did not get off scot-free, having lost out of our five companies about twenty-four men. Our artillery being pretty near at hand, Colonel Ross brought up two guns, and fired into their retreating column, doing considerable execution. We now moved forward in close pursuit of the enemy for about two miles farther, when a shot from Colonel Ross's guns having struck one of the leaders in their gun, and our people at this time pressing them so closely as not to give time to disentangle the dead horse, they unwillingly were compelled to throw their only gun into the ditch, and there abandon it. We continued the pursuit till we drove them under the walls of Pamplona, which I understand, poor wretches, they were not allowed to enter, on account of the scarcity of provisions in that fortress, and which after events proved was the case. We retired to the village of Aldava and others in the neighbourhood, where we remained for the night. On the morning of the 25th, we advanced on the road to Pamplona, the enemy having all retired towards France, till we came within about one mile and a half of it, when we branched off to the left, and moved along a range of hills at about a mile distant from the works of the place, till we reached the town of Villaba, on the mountain-road from Pamplona to France; thus cutting off all retreat from the garrison, and thus in fact investing the place. During our movements to-day, my people being in the rear of the 17th Portuguese regiment, I was riding in company with my commanding-officer at the head of the battalion, when the horse of the Portuguese major threw out with both his hind feet with all his might, and struck me with one foot on my thigh, and the other on the calf of the leg. The blow was so severe that I nearly fainted, and was obliged to dismount and throw myself on the ground; but as no bones were broken, I gathered myself up again, and mounted and set off after the troops. We encamped on the Pamplona side of Villaba, distant from the former about one mile and a half. The captain in whose mess I was, with his company, was that night ordered on picquet within about three quarters of a mile of the city. I went there to get my dinner, during which several poor people, who had made their escape from the place, came and welcomed us in the name of the people, telling us they were heartily tired of their present lodgers; of course there would be different opinions among them, but I believe the generality at that time hated the French most cordially. There was a division of the French army under General Clausel, which had not partaken of the flight at Vittoria, being then stationed at Logrona, and he having learnt the fate of his companions in arms, and their retreat into France, was moving through the country to our right, in order to effect his retreat also. Next morning, therefore, the 3d and our divisions were despatched in pursuit of this French corps. We marched that day to near Taffala, and halted at the village of Muro, at the junction of the great road from Logrona with that we now occupied, but we learnt that Clausel had kept more to his right, and was directing his course towards the mountain-road, which passes near Caceda and Languessa, into France. We accordingly passed through Taffala and Olite, and encamped for the night. Next day we started early, and moved on till mid-day, when we halted for an hour or two to cook and refresh near the village of Murillo del Fruto. We here came upon the river Arragon. This had been already a long day's march, and the greater part of the division were ready to lie down now, but a much longer portion still remained to be accomplished. Accordingly, we set off after a short rest, and traversed the right bank of this river for about ten hours longer. Night marches at all times are unpleasant, but much more so on such a road or path as this was, and every one so nearly tired before beginning it. We crossed the Arragon at the village of Galla Pienzo, and lay down in a field not far from the village of Caseda. Very few of the division reached this place until daylight next morning. But when I got in I unfortunately lay down on a ridge immediately behind our column, and where, had I given it a thought, I was continually liable to be disturbed. And indeed I was most wofully disturbed, for every fresh batch that came in tumbled themselves down upon me, or in blundering about in the dark were sure to stumble over me. It must be observed that my leg by this time, instead of getting better, had begun to swell dreadfully and to suppurate, consequently I was in a high state of fever; and to the thumps and kicks which I received in the dark during this uncomfortable night, I cannot but attribute much of my subsequent suffering. Next morning we discovered that all our labour had been in vain, for Clausel had got the start of us, and had got off by another road into France. We next day moved into Languessa, from which we were not far distant, but I could no longer accompany or precede the troops, my leg was now so bad. I was therefore obliged to get a pillow laid on my holsters, and then ride with my leg resting upon it, (a most uncomfortable position, could I have found a better,) while one of my men led my horse, and thus follow them as well as I was able. We rested in Languessa all the 30th and 1st July; and on the 2d reached Deriza, having passed through Monreal. Here I was obliged to be lifted off my horse, and put to bed. I was almost stupid from the pain I suffered; for my leg was now swoln as large as my thigh. We next day moved into Villaba, from whence we had started in pursuit of Clausel, and thence into some villages on the plain, close to Pamplona. Here I believe some works were thrown up to shelter the troops, either against the shot from the fortress, or a sally from the garrison. This continued all next day. I remained very ill in bed. On the 5th, the division left this quarter, and set off on the road towards France; but I could not follow them. I got with great difficulty from my present station, which was now occupied by other troops, and stopped at a village, the name of which I forget, just over the ridge where I received my hurt, and a few miles distant from Villaba. Here I found out that Dr Jones of the 40th regiment was in the latter town; and, as he had formerly been in our regiment, I took the liberty of requesting he would come and see me. This I found out by my servant going in for provisions. He very kindly came, and gave me the best advice he could. By this time my leg had burst, and had discharged a prodigious quantity of matter. I remained in this village till about the 10th, during which time a priest had shown himself remarkably kind and attentive; there were very few inhabitants remaining besides him. He told me in one of the conversations that I had with him, that, from the first entry of the French troops into this country, one million had passed out of France into Spain, for he had had good opportunities of making a just calculation; and that, out of that vast number, not more than 200,000 had returned, thus proving that the enemy had lost in that country 800,000 men. And this is not to be wondered at, for nearly the whole population during that time had been in arms against them; and, although not acting as soldiers in the field, they never failed to assassinate the French wherever they could accomplish it. He said, moreover, that Mina, with his little band, could produce documents to prove that he had destroyed 40,000 Frenchmen. About the 10th, I set off from this village, as my leg had by this time become somewhat easier; and, passing through Lantz, Elizonda, and St Estevan, arrived at Sumbilla on the 13th, still obliged to ride sideways with my leg over the pillow and holster. Here I found my division; and, as this journey had again brought my leg to nearly as bad a state as before, I was obliged to have it opened in two places, but without reaching the matter, as nothing but blood was discharged. On the 15th, my division moved forward to the town of Vera, the last town on the Spanish frontier. Here the enemy had taken up a strong position, both in front and rear of the town; the front position was on Santa Barbara, an exceeding high and almost inaccessible mountain. They were dislodged from the position before the town by my brigade, and retired into the Puerta, or Pass of Vera. I was not present on this occasion, having been again compelled to stay behind on account of my leg. While I remained at Sumbilla, I had been obliged to have my horse shod by a Spanish blacksmith, who drove a nail right into the quick. This I did not discover till several days after, when I found my horse quite lame. On the 18th, I again crept on after my people, whom I found encamped on the height of Santa Barbara, from which I before said they had driven the enemy. Here we remained till the 26th, During this time my horse's foot had also suppurated, and he was quite unable to move. My leg also was daily discharging a vast quantity of matter, so that I felt at this time very uncomfortable; particularly as very stormy weather came on while we were here, which killed a great number of our animals, horses and mules, I believe not fewer than seven or eight in one night. It will be known to the reader, perhaps, that on the 25th, Soult (who had now been appointed to the command of the French army) made an attack upon our posts at Roncesvalles and Maya, and had driven the divisions stationed there from their posts. He moved on towards Pamplona, in hopes either of beating back our army to Vittoria, (as he vainly talked,) or of being able to supply Pamplona with provisions, which it greatly needed. In consequence of this movement of the enemy, we also were compelled to fall back, although the troops in front of us made no demonstration of advancing. Accordingly, on the 26th, we began our retrograde movement, being myself at that time in as pitiable a plight as can well be conceived. My horse was so utterly lame, that he could scarcely hop on three legs, while I was totally unable to walk a step. My kind friend Captain Perceval, with whom I had long messed, helped me out of my trouble, by dividing the load of one of his baggage-ponies among the other animals, and lending it me to ride upon. We retired from the height, and crossed the river Bidassoa, near Lizacca, through which we passed, and kept along the mountains on the left bank of that river till we reached a height opposite Sumbilla, where we pitched our tents, and remained for the night. We did not move all next day; but just as night set in, we were ordered under arms, and continued our retreat. This was a still more distressing night-march than any I had previously witnessed. We were now, it may be noticed, in the midst of the mountains of the Pyrenees, where precipices abound; consequently the precaution to avoid falling over them would be doubled. One little streamlet, I well remember, delayed the division probably two hours. It came down from the sides of the mountain which overhung the road, and crossed it at a very dark and ugly-looking place, making a considerable noise as it fell from rock to rock. This of course made every one extremely cautious; and in consequence a poor good-natured corporal, who was killed soon after, got himself into the middle of the streamlet, and took hold of every person's hand as he passed, conducting him safely to the other side. Poor fellow, he was extremely anxious to help me and my miserable little pony safely over. This and a few other places, something similar, prevented us reaching our destination till an hour after daylight next morning, although the whole distance was not more than ten miles. We arrived at Zubietta in the morning. This place is about a league to the right of St Estevan, more into the mountains. Here we remained that day, and the next day moved higher up the mountain, behind the town, where we encamped, and remained till evening, when we again commenced our retreat. We had not quite so bad a march of it this night, the road being much more even, although, just at the outset, our adjutant, in riding along, had his cap pulled off by the bough of a tree, and in endeavouring to save it from falling, he pulled his horse right over a small precipice, which the two rolled down together. Luckily it was not a deep ravine into which he fell, or he would not have escaped so well: neither man nor horse were much hurt. We reached the village of Saldias in the morning, where we remained for the day. Last night my servant told me he had been obliged to leave my little horse behind, as he could not get him to hop any farther. I felt grieved at this, for he had brought me all the way from Lisbon, and shared both my good and bad fortune; however, it was no use to fret, for that would not improve my situation, which indeed was not an enviable one, my leg all this time being extremely painful. On the 30th, we made an excessively long march, (by day,) and at night reached Lecumberg, where we encamped. During the latter part of this day's march, we had heard an incessant cannonade and firing of musketry in the direction of Pamplona, from which we were apprehensive that Soult had penetrated too far; but as it did not appear to recede, we believed our people had been able to hold him in check at least. We were now on the great road from Bayonne to Pamplona, in order to keep up the communication between our right, where the fighting was now going on, and Sir Thomas Graham, who was besieging St Sebastian. We were here also to intercept any of the enemy's columns that might either advance or retreat by this road. Towards evening of the 31st, an aide-de-camp arrived from Lord Wellington, more dead than alive from the excessive fatigue which he had undergone for the last three or four days, with news of the total defeat of Soult in the several actions near Pamplona, termed the Battle of the Pyrenees, and ordering us to retrace our steps, and again advance. We set off in the evening, and reached Larissa, where we halted for the night. It was whispered that it was expected we should have gone much farther this night, but I am not certain whether it is true; but certainly we might have proceeded to Saldias, if absolutely necessary. On the morning of the 1st of August, we again started pretty early. It was again reported this morning that another dispatch had been received during the night, directing us to proceed with all haste, as the enemy were retreating by St Estevan, and that we were to attack them wherever we met them. We now of course stepped out very freely, and presently gained Zubietta. Here I had ridden forward to get a shoe fastened on, my horse having cast one in coming over the mountains; during which time the quartermaster had been called for some purpose or other, as I was not there. My General was not well satisfied: he saw me in this village, and asked me why I had not been present when I was wanted. I told him the cause, but he still did not appear satisfied, and, by way of punishment, directed me to remain in the village till the baggage came up, and show them the way the division had gone. I may here observe, that it was a little unreasonable in my General to find any fault with me on this occasion; for, had I not got the shoe put on my horse, I could not have been of any use at all as a quartermaster. My punishment indeed was slight, and I rather think he was glad to find any excuse to delay me for the purpose for which I was left. I am confident the officers of the infantry suffered more anxiety and even loss on account of the great want of farriers or horse-shoers in their regiments, than from almost any other cause. Without the officer was pretty high in rank, he had not only to pay most exorbitantly for any thing of this kind which he got done, but to beg and pray, and to look upon it as a favour conferred on him. Most of the good shoers were taken by the staff or general officers, consequently only the inferior ones were left for the regimental officers, and in several cases none at all. The consequence of all this was, the loss of several valuable animals, both horses and mules; besides, in some cases, the officers being rendered incapable of performing their duty as they otherwise would have done. To this I attribute a considerable loss in animals during this service. It might easily be remedied by each infantry regiment having a proper establishment of farriers, (say two,) with tools, &c. in proportion, and the means of carrying them; and then every officer, whose duty requires him to be mounted, might be served. I myself bought tools to the amount of L.4, and never had but one horse shod with them. I could not get a man to do it. As soon as I saw the baggage on the right way, I pushed forward, and joined the division again. We were literally at this time climbing up a mountain, where I could not ride, but was obliged to crawl up, and pull my horse after me. My leg by this time had much improved. We followed the road by which we had retreated a few days before, and at length came to the rivulet that had so alarmed us all on our night-march. It was really surprising that we should have been stopped so long by such a trifle; but in such a situation, and at such a time, things of that kind are magnified a thousandfold by the imagination. We passed our old camp ground opposite to Sumbilla, and here we came in view of the enemy's columns retreating along the road on the opposite bank of the Bidassoa. This gave our men new life; but here the 52d and other regiments of the 2d brigade were obliged to halt: they could proceed no farther. We had marched by this time to-day two and a half of the stages we made in retreating; but the 2d brigade had been in the rear of the column all day, and had consequently suffered much from stoppages, &c. My battalion, our 1st battalion, and the 43d regiment, continued to move on, and as they approached, the enemy seemed to acquire fresh vigour. At length we reached the point of attack,--the bridge of Yanzi,--and here the 1st battalion turning down towards the river, at once left the wood and ground above the bridge to be occupied by us. The enemy sent a pretty strong corps of light troops across, which got engaged with our people; but we soon drove down through the wood again towards the bridge. At length, we got two companies posted just over the bridge, in front of which all the rear of the French column had to pass. Poor creatures! they became so alarmed, that they instantly began to cut away, and cast off, all the loads of baggage, and both cavalry and infantry, &c. to make the best of their way. But the mountain on their right was inaccessible; consequently they had all, as it were, to run the gauntlet. Great was the execution done amongst the enemy at this bridge, and many were the schemes they tried to avoid passing. At length they got a battalion up behind a stone wall above the road, on the opposite side, from whose fire we received some damage; consequently those poor people who had afterwards to pass were not so much exposed. Just about the close of the business, my kind friend, Captain Perceval, received a shot through his right wrist. His left hand had been closed for a length of time before, in consequence of a wound through that wrist, which had contracted his fingers, besides being lame from a wound in the hip. Now he was rendered completely useless. Towards dusk I went with him a little to the rear, and got his tent pitched, and made as comfortable as circumstances would admit. I pitied the French on this occasion, they seemed so much alarmed. The whole of their baggage fell into the hands of our 4th division, who were closely following them up on their side of the Bidassoa. In this affair, the French were reduced to a dreadful dilemma; great numbers of their wounded had been brought off from the battles of the 28th, 29th, and 30th, near Pamplona, which were carried on biers or stretches by men of this division. When they saw us in front of them, where they had to pass, as it were, immediately under the muzzles of our pieces, they were compelled to adopt the cruel alternative of either throwing their wounded men down to perish, or run the risk of being shot or taken themselves. I believe the former, shocking as it seems, was generally adopted; and I have reason to believe that the greater part of them were thrown into the river; for, from the point where we first came in view of them to near where this affair took place, the Bidassoa was literally filled with the dead bodies of Frenchmen, and they could have come into it in no other way. We lost only a very few men on this occasion, not more than six or eight, while that of the enemy must have been extremely severe. Here the effects of rifle-shooting were plainly visible. In remarking on this affair, I beg to draw the reader's attention to the following circumstances; viz. probably never troops made such a march over such a country before. We travelled at least thirty-two miles over mountains such as I before described, where you were sometimes nearly obliged to scramble upon your hands and knees. The day was exceedingly hot, and occasionally there was a great want of water. I am told that one of the regiments in our 2d brigade, which, it may be remembered, were obliged to halt, as they could go no farther, had no less than 200 men fell out, unable to keep up, and that some of them actually died of fatigue. I heard of one poor fellow, who, when he came to water and had drunk, lost his senses, fell to the ground, and shortly after expired. I have reason to be proud of my battalion on this occasion, which, when the roll was called, just before the action commenced, had only nine men fallen out; but they had been in the front all day, a great advantage in marching, particularly over a mountainous country. This day's work gave me a higher idea of the powers of human nature, when properly trained, than ever I possessed before; for when you consider that each of those soldiers carried a weight of not less probably than forty or fifty lbs. and some much more, it cannot but be surprising that men should be able to sustain such fatigue for such a length of time--at the end of which to fight, and gain a victory. Next morning were clearly observable the effects of the evening's work. In the house, the yard, and on the road opposite the bridge, were a great number of dead Frenchmen; and to the rear, by the way they had advanced, the road was literally strewed with baggage, and equipments of every description. Some of our people picked up a number of visiting cards, with General Vandermason on them, very elegant; so that his baggage, no doubt, had been cast off, as well as that of inferior people. Soon after daylight, we were ordered to fall in, and move forward towards Vera. Just as we cleared the bridge, old Douro, with his staff, came riding up, who, when he saw how we had handled the enemy the night before, gave his head a significant nod, and smiled, which conveyed most intelligibly his approbation. We soon reached the neighbourhood of Vera, behind which, in the pass of that name, as before stated, the enemy took up a strong position, from which their picquets had never yet been driven. We were ordered to encamp a little below the bridge leading to Lezacca, between that and Vera, while the other regiments were intended to occupy the heights of Santa Barbara, from which we had before retreated. But towards mid-day it was discovered that the enemy still had a considerable body of troops in and about the pass of Echallar, a few miles to our right. Our brigade was therefore ordered again under arms, with the intention of co-operating with the 7th division in an attack upon those people. It was a thick mist, so that we could scarcely see twenty yards before us; but when we reached the bottom of an immensely high hill, on which the enemy were posted, we presently discovered whereabouts we had them. Our 1st battalion extended to the right, and my battalion moved straight forward up the hill. For a considerable time the enemy's fire did us no injury, being deceived, I imagine, by the denseness of the fog. They fired almost always over our heads, some of which shots struck the men of the 43d, a considerable way below us. At length we began to approach the summit of the mountain, where the enemy were of course much more condensed, the ground they had to occupy being much smaller. Our people were advancing regularly up the hill, when we run right up against a rock, on the top of which was collected an immense body of the French, and from whom our people received a most destructive fire, knocking down fourteen men in an instant. This unlooked-for circumstance checked our people, and made some of them retire for an instant behind a broken part in the mountain, from which they kept up the best fire they could. During this transaction, the French, who were not more than ten or twelve yards distant, were calling out to us in Spanish to advance, and abusing us most lustily. A Spaniard (one of the recruits I formerly mentioned) was so much annoyed, that he began in his turn to abuse the French; and, as if words were not enough, accompanying them with the best shot he could give them. Poor fellow, he was instantly shot through the body, and fell to rise no more. They now began to get courage, and made a show of advancing upon us: they did do so on the right against our 1st battalion, but my commanding-officer calling out to cheer our people, set up a shout, which had the effect of intimidating them, and they did not dare to advance. I was now sent away by Colonel Barnard to request the 43d (who were behind us) to send a company to support our 1st battalion, which they instantly did; and just as I returned, I found the French had evacuated the rock from which they had annoyed us, on the top of which we found a great number of caps and pouches, &c., belonging to men who had fallen there. We followed them over the hill, but they now gave us leg-bail, posting down into the valley towards France with all expedition. The 7th division had some pretty sharp work before they dislodged the people in front of them, and had suffered very severely in effecting their object. When every thing was settled, one of our men thought he saw a man hiding behind a tree just below us: he went to see what it was, and dragged out by the neck a French soldier of the 2d light infantry. Poor fellow, he came out shrugging his shoulders, and, putting on a most beseeching look, begged we would spare him, as he was only a "pauvre Italien." Of course no injury was done him, only the soldier who took him claiming and taking from him his knapsack, which appeared a fine full one, and which he appropriated to himself. I thought it cruel, and would have prevented it, had my voice been of any weight; and yet, had it not been taken from him now, it would very soon after, when he became a prisoner. One battalion was ordered to remain and occupy this hill, which dreadfully alarmed me, lest it should be ours, for it was bitter, bleak, and cold. Luckily a Portuguese battalion was ordered up, and we returned to our snug camp by the river side; and here, as if to crown our good fortune, one of our men, who had been left behind in charge of the tents, had got some meat roasted for our mess, of which we all partook with great delight and thankfulness. A friend of mine of our 1st battalion, during the advance the French had made upon that battalion, was nigh falling into their hands. They rushed at him, but he perceiving, and endeavouring to avoid them, fell into a bush, which scratched him most wofully, and in the fray lost his cap and sword. They grasped at the latter, (which was not drawn,) but which luckily broke loose from the belt, or they would have had him. This hill was always known afterwards by the name of Barnard's Hill, in honour of Colonel Barnard, who commanded on the occasion. CHAPTER XI. The Author, from a mistake, loses his Servants for a few days--A Feast of Death--A Feast of Life--Fighting near St Sebastian--Singular instance of Spanish Bravery--St Sebastian is captured, but no Details given, the Author not having been present--Attack of the Pass of Vera. We remained at rest here for some time, during which I, as acting paymaster, had several trips to Tolosa, a considerable town on the great road from Bayonne to Madrid, where the paymaster-general had taken up his residence with the military chest. In one of them I went and had a peep at St Sebastian, the siege of which was then going on. While here, I received directions from General Sir William Stewart to attend him at Villaba, where he lay wounded, he having received two balls in the late actions. I set off, directing my servants with my baggage to follow close after me: by some means they were delayed a few minutes, and, supposing I was going again to the paymaster-general at Tolosa, went off in that direction, without asking any questions. I imagined they knew very well where I was going, and still went on slowly, every now and then looking back to see if I could descry them coming; but although there was no appearance of them, I simply enough continued my route till I reached St Estevan; and here I put up for the night, thinking, of course, they would come by and by. In the morning, I was fully convinced they must have gone some other road, and as all my books, &c., from which I wanted information, were in my baggage, I thought it useless to proceed any farther. In retracing my steps, which I did leisurely, I had an opportunity of seeing the great number of bodies which the French had thrown into the river, the road running close by its brink nearly all the way. It was really shocking to behold such numerous wrecks of mortality, with the disgusting appearance which most of them had assumed; many of them were half eaten by the fish, and of others the flesh was hanging in rags, and bleaching in the stream. Of course I returned home, but did not see my servants again for several days, as it took three or four to accomplish the journey to Tolosa and back, and they had waited there a day for me. On the day that I was absent, all the officers of my corps had had a sumptuous and splendid entertainment, it being the 25th August, the anniversary of the regiment's first formation. They had dug a ditch in an oblong shape in the middle of a field, the centre of which served for a table, while they sat with their feet in the ditch. I am told the French, who were just above, and overlooked them from the heights behind the town, assembled and viewed them, as if in astonishment to see them regaling themselves with so much glee in the midst of the wild Pyrenean mountains. No doubt the wine went merrily round, and many were the toasts which were drunk with three-times-three. During this interval, I often amused myself with fishing in the Bidassoa, in which there were many excellent trout, and I was pretty successful, for I had got some tackle from one of our captains, which he had brought from England. On one of these occasions, while I was wading in a pool, I spied a fine salmon laying just below me; I threw in and brought my flies right over him, at which he instantly rose, but I missed him. I tried again, and hooked him, but in a moment he plunged right across the river, carrying with him all my flies and part of my line, for I had no reel. I might have calculated upon this, if I had thought for a moment; but the opportunity was so tempting, that I could not resist it. At length the 31st of August arrived, the day on which St Sebastian was to be stormed. We knew this, for we had furnished a number of volunteers, both officers and men, to take part in the assault; many of our higher officers had gone to witness the glorious spectacle. But early in the morning, we were all astonished at the bugle sounding through the camp the alarm, or assembly, and instantly orders were given for the tents to be struck, the baggage to be packed, and to set off with it to the rear without a moment's delay, for the French were advancing; of course all this was done in as short a time as possible, and the troops were ordered to move on to a hill just over the bridge of Vera. A detachment of ours had joined the evening before, and it cannot easily be conceived the strange effect this sudden alarm had on some of them. One of them, a lieutenant, was all in a bustle getting his pistols put in fighting order, and came to me begging I would take some money to keep for him. I told him that it was likely to be in as much danger with me as with himself, and of course declined. The old hands, on the contrary, were as cool and quiet about it as if it was an everyday occurrence. We moved to the height before mentioned, and saw a cloud of fellows with white caps coming down to the left of the town, and of course prepared to give them the best reception we could. I was sent with orders to my commanding-officer from the General, 'that he was, when pressed, to retire till he got on the ridge just over his house, (which was on the road a little to the rear of where we then were,) and that he was to stand there as long as it was possible.' I thought something very warm was going to occur, seeing such a cloud of Frenchmen were then approaching us, but we were all disappointed; they went quickly to their right after descending from the heights, and forded the river below the town, setting their faces towards St Sebastian. All this was effected under a cannonade from the heights. Our 1st brigade (except my battalion) was then ordered to cross the river by the Lezacca bridge a little behind us, and to move parallel to the enemy along the ridge above that town, which had all along been Lord Wellington's head-quarters. As soon as they got across, they sent a body of troops to the bridge of Vera, close to which some of our people were stationed, and from thence they kept firing on us all day from some small mountain guns, which they had brought down with them, and occasionally with musketry. We were now somewhat curiously situated. The French position was on the side we occupied, while the other side of the bridge had been fortified by the Spanish General Longa, to protect himself during the last excursion of the French towards Pamplona; but now they occupied the side on which the intrenchments had been thrown up, and turned them against us of course; they did little execution by their fire. Lord Wellington, seeing the intention of the enemy, assembled all the British troops he could easily collect, and brought them in rear of a corps of Spaniards, which met the French in this direction; and finding this a fair opportunity of seeing what the Don could do, withheld the British, and let the Spaniards attack them by themselves. They had now the best chance of showing their valour that ever had or might present itself; they had the high ground, and the enemy had to climb up on their hands and knees to get at them; besides, they had behind them backers that would not see them get foul play. So away they set at them, and indeed they did tumble the French down in good style, upsetting them in all directions; so that our English division had nothing to do but to look on. This was the only time I ever knew the Spaniards act in a body like good soldiers. The enemy, being beaten, were obliged of course to retrograde; but it came on one of the bitterest nights I have almost ever witnessed; the rain fell in torrents, and the lightning was very vivid. The French endeavoured to retrace their steps during the night, fording the river where they had crossed it in the morning; but the heavy rain had so swoln the river by midnight, that they could not continue any longer to wade it. A considerable number of them still remained on the other side, and no way presented itself of extricating themselves, but by forcing their passage across the bridge, near which a company of our 2d battalion, under Captain Cadoux, was posted, with one of ours, a short distance in the rear, to support him. Captain Cadoux's people were stationed in houses about thirty yards from the bridge, and had a double sentry on the bridge. The enemy's column approached very quietly, and then made a rush; but the rain having wet the priming of the sentries' rifles, they could not get them to go off to give the necessary alarm, and were in a moment driven from their post. The French then, seeing they had effected a passage, set up a shout, and rushed towards the houses where Cadoux's people were, who turned out at once, and with the supporting company, opened a deadly fire upon the enemy's column; but poor Cadoux fell instantly almost, as he had imprudently mounted his horse on the first alarm; his lieutenant also was severely wounded. The firing of course soon brought the whole brigade to the spot, which kept up a constant and well-directed fire during the whole of their progress along the little plain towards Vera. The enemy suffered dreadfully on this occasion, leaving the ground literally strewed with their dead, who, like the others before mentioned, were next morning thrown into the river; so that the fish had ample feeding for some time after. Some people afterwards reflected upon General Skerrott, who commanded here, for not posting a stronger force at the bridge, and for not blocking it up with an abbatis; the former he might and ought to have done; but the latter was impracticable, from the enemy holding the breastwork at the other end of the bridge, which was not more than about thirty yards long. Had a battalion been posted there, it is probable the French, who were compelled to have recourse to this daring attempt, might have been induced to surrender; but I believe the General never imagined they had need to make such an attempt. Our loss on this occasion was rather severe also. A great many of Captain Cadoux's men fell; Lieutenant Travers, who commanded the company of my battalion, was wounded, and a considerable number of men were killed and wounded; among the former, some of the poor fellows who had joined from England only the day before. Thus was Soult's second attempt frustrated, and St Sebastian fell into our hands. As I was not present at that glorious exhibition of British valour and prowess, I cannot take upon me to give any account of its capture. The volunteers who went from our division to assist in the storm or assault, sustained their full share in the casualties attendant thereon. The field-officer, Colonel Hunt of the 52d, was severely wounded; a lieutenant of the 43d, brother to Mr O'Connell, the famous Roman Catholic advocate, was killed; two lieutenants of our first battalion, named Percival and Hamilton, were severely wounded. The latter, I believe, was a volunteer on the occasion, not being entitled, from his standing, to take it as a tour of duty. He was conspicuously brave, and received two severe wounds, from which it would scarcely be imagined possible any one could recover. A few days after the surrender of St Sebastian, I had again occasion to go to Tolosa for money, and took the road by Passages, the port where we now received all our supplies from England; and also to see the ruins of that late formidable fortress. When I reached it, the houses were still on fire, and not I believe half-a-dozen in the whole town that remained habitable, or the inhabitants had quite deserted it. I went up to the citadel and examined it, and I believe this, with proper casemates or bomb-proofs, might be rendered one of the strongest places in Spain, next to Gibraltar; but the French had suffered dreadfully from our shells, which had literally ploughed the ground on the top of this naturally strong height, and from which cause they had been compelled to surrender. St Sebastian was indeed a melancholy spectacle at this time. I returned from Tolosa by a part of the road which we had traversed in our late retreat and advance again, as I now began to hope I might perhaps recover my little horse, for I suspected from some cause that my servant, instead of having been obliged to abandon him, because of his lameness, as he told me, had sold him at that time; and this I actually found had been the case. I compelled him to tell me where he had disposed of him, and, with my broken Spanish, traced him from thence for near twenty miles farther into the mountains, where I found him in a village, the name of which I do not recollect, but where a squadron of our German hussars were quartered. I of course claimed and took possession of the horse, giving the person the amount he had paid for him; but he being still lame, the commanding-officer of the hussars kindly permitted me to leave him with his farrier till he got well. He afterwards sent him to me, and would not even allow the farrier to receive any remuneration for his trouble, so kindly and politely did he behave. September passed away without any thing remarkable occurring. My friend Captain (now Major) Perceval had been obliged to return to England, and Captain Balvaird succeeded him as senior captain of my battalion. I still continued in that company's mess. At length it was determined to attack the Puerta, or Pass of Vera, which the enemy had rendered exceedingly strong. The left of our army, under Sir Thomas Graham, were ordered to attack in their front, and force the passage of the Bidassoa, and establish themselves in France. We were merely to drive them from the heights above the town of Vera, taking possession of all the strong ground between that and France. The fourth division was brought up to support our attack, and formed immediately in rear of the town. One of the captains who formed the Committee of Paymastership, and who, it may be remembered, were held responsible for my accounts, and the due appropriation of all public money which might come into my hands, took a fancy that I exposed myself too much, and requested the commanding-officer, Colonel Ross, to prohibit my again entering into action, except for the purpose of bringing ammunition, &c., when my duty required me; in consequence of which the adjutant was sent to me this morning, previous to the operations commencing, with an order for me not to accompany the battalion. It may seem to the reader perhaps like affectation when I tell him I felt hurt at this order, and determined not very strictly to comply with it, for I believed that my respected commanding-officer had no objection that I should accompany him, did not this untoward circumstance interfere with my so doing. Accordingly I remained a looker-on among the fourth division. My battalion was destined to commence this attack by driving the enemy from a high and rugged hill on the right of the Pass, which was a necessary operation before the Pass itself could be attacked. Accordingly he extended the battalion, and encircled its base on the side next to Vera; and I believe, without firing a shot almost, he marched right up to the top of the hill, notwithstanding the sturdy resistance made by the enemy, and in a very short space of time completely cleared this formidable height. This operation was the admiration of the whole fourth division, (for it was clearly observable by every one,) and they were most lavish of their praises for such a workmanlike movement. When my people approached the top of the hill, I felt alarmed for their safety and their honour, for the French commander closed all his force to one point, and, forming them into line, made them fix bayonets, apparently with a determination to charge them down the hill again; and I saw that my people, for they could not perceive what the French were doing, were likely to be taken by surprise. Whether the Frenchman's heart failed him I know not, but when Colonel Ross reached the top of the hill, the enemy went to the right about, and instantly retired. I felt proud of belonging to that corps, and happy at such a termination of this dangerous operation, and feeling a desire I could no longer resist, I set off to join them. By the time I reached the height just mentioned, the attack of the Puerta was going on, and a most arduous undertaking it was. My brigade attacked the right or strongest pass, which they carried in fine style, without much loss, although the enemy had a breastwork at every available point of ground. Our 2d brigade did not attack the left Pass quite so soon as the other, and when they had got about half way up they encountered the most formidable opposition. A redoubt which the enemy possessed was filled with men, who waited till our battalion came within a few yards of them, and then poured in the most destructive fire imaginable, making the battalion recoil, and leaving one-third of its numbers on the ensanguined ground. But the 52d regiment being close behind, promptly supported them when rushing on together to the charge, and the French, after some hard fighting, were finally driven from this stronghold. After this they never made any obstinate stand, although there was occasional fighting all the way from the Pass down into the plain below, where some of our people followed them; but it not being intended to quit for the present this high and formidable barrier, they were afterwards recalled. The boundary lines passed along this ridge. We lost a few men on ascending the first hill, and a few in skirmishing afterwards, but our loss was not severe. But that of the 2d battalion, before noticed, was awful; several of that battalion who fell in this action had only a few days before joined from England, and this was their first action. On looking at the ground on which this affair took place, one would imagine it almost impossible that any army could force a passage through such innumerable difficulties. The hill itself was nearly impassable, and with the numerous redoubts and breastworks, with which it was literally covered, no troops in the world, I think, but British, would have dared to attempt it. We found that the French, who occupied this station, had rendered themselves extremely comfortable, considering the kind of country and ground where they were posted. They had been at great pains in building very convenient and substantial huts in lines and streets, the same as an encampment, and which were indeed remarkably clean and neat. They had even built arm-racks at the end of each line, where their arms were stowed away most securely, and where they were preserved from the effects of the bad weather. Indeed, from the pains they had taken to render themselves comfortable here, it would appear as if they had not expected to be driven from it so soon. The left of our army, under Sir Thomas Graham, also established themselves within the French territory. A corps of Spaniards on our left, between us and Sir Thomas, had likewise made a forward movement corresponding with the British. Some Spaniards were on the right of our division also, and were destined to drive the French from La Rhune, an exceeding high rock, which overlooks all the other mountains, as well as the plain below. This they failed to accomplish, the enemy keeping possession all that night, and the skirmishing between the two forces continuing till after dark. My battalion was sent on the outpost duty in the evening down into the French plain below, and relieved the Spanish General Longa, whose corps, with our 2d brigade, were ordered to assist in the morning in dislodging the enemy from La Rhune. I will not say whether the sight of the red-coats coming against them the next morning had the effect of alarming them, but they certainly evacuated that exceedingly strong post without much farther opposition, and established themselves on a similar rock, but lower, on the French side, and called by them Petit or Little Rhune. But the possession of this lofty peak gave us the power of overlooking all their movements for miles around us, as well as of surveying La Belle France as far as the eye could see, and indeed, compared with the bleak and barren mountains in which we had so long been residing, it did appear a beautiful country, although, in reality, it is far from being such. But we gazed upon it with strange and mingled emotions, hardly believing it possible that we had now reached and entered the territory of that once formidable nation whose victorious armies had penetrated to the farthest confines of Europe, who had overrun and subdued some of the most warlike nations of the continent, and who had so often threatened, and as often alarmed, the inhabitants of England with the invasion of that sacred soil, on which never yet a Frenchman has dared, in hostile array, to set his foot since the days of the Norman William, but who met there either with a prison or a grave. We now pitched our camps by battalions, each occupying a post more or less important, and the enemy began again to construct their huts, and make themselves as comfortable as their circumstances would admit; Soult, no doubt, being mightily chagrined that we had now fairly beat them out of Spain, when he (as we now learnt) had promised his followers that he would soon lead them again to the plains of Vittoria, where they might again retrieve their lost honours, and at which city they would celebrate the Emperor's birthday. He thus boasted, and no doubt would have effected his purpose, had he not been so promptly met near Pamplona by his never-to-be outmanoeuvred antagonist. We now began to suffer greatly from the severity of the weather. It became exceedingly wet and stormy; and not infrequently the tents were blown away from over our heads, or the pole was forced up through the top, letting the wet canvass fall comfortably down about our ears while we were perhaps in a sound sleep. I had two streams flowing past my head, one went round the trench outside my tent, while the other I was fain to let pass through it; their murmurs lulled me to sleep, and I do not remember that ever I slept sounder than I did here, having made my couch comfortable by gathering dry fern, and spreading my mattress upon it. Whilst we remained here, a few officers were appointed to watch the motions of the enemy from an old work which we understood had been constructed by the Spaniards and emigrant French against their revolutionary neighbours, whom they endeavoured to keep from entering Spain; and, of course, this was the daily lounge of those who had no better employment, not only that they might themselves see, but hear also from others what of importance was passing. On one of these occasions, a vessel was descried (for the sea was not more than five or six miles from us) making for the harbour of Bayonne, or St Jean de Luz, with a small schooner following her in chase, and every now and then giving her a shot. The vessel, (which turned out to be a French brig going with provisions for the few Frenchmen who still retained the castle of Santona,) seeing she could not get clear of her unwelcome neighbours, her crew set her on fire, and taking to their boats, abandoned her, and escaped on shore--she soon after blew up with a tremendous explosion. On the 31st of this month Pamplona surrendered, the garrison, consisting of 4000 men, under Major-general Cassan, the governor, becoming prisoners of war. They had been compelled to adopt this measure from sheer starvation, of which they, I understand, had suffered dreadfully. I happened to be at Passages on the day they reached that port, where they embarked, on their way to England. The General was a stout, handsome, and intelligent-looking man, and such a one as I should imagine would make a noble officer. The soldiers seemed quite unconcerned about their fate; whether from the change being actually an improvement of their condition, or from the lightness and gaiety of their natural temper, I know not, but they were jesting and making as merry as if nothing had happened. During the time we lay on these mountains, I regret to state my gallant and respected commanding-officer, Colonel Ross, suffered so much from rheumatism, that he was compelled to leave the regiment, and take up his abode at Rentaria, a village near to Passages. It was reported that Lord Wellington intended attacking the enemy along his whole line, early in November, but the weather having rendered the roads impassable, it was postponed. On the day previous to the intended attack, the commanding-officers had been taken up to La Rhune, and the post that each corps had to occupy, with the movements they were intended to make, were clearly pointed out to them; an excellent plan, when practicable, as it leaves no one any excuse for mistakes or blunders during the action. At length, on the 10th of that month, I believe, it was settled to take place; but on the 9th I was ordered to set off with the mules of the battalion, to fetch corn from Passages, a distance of about thirty miles. I suspected this was a scheme of the captain I before mentioned, as one of the committee of paymastership, in order the more effectually to keep me out of danger, for certainly had any thing serious happened me, they would have had some difficulty in rendering their accounts. It was not quite certain the attack was to take place next day, although it had been so rumoured; however, I was determined to try and reach the division as early as possible on that day. I accordingly got my business done in Passages as early as I could get the commissary to work; and having got the corn, and come on to Rentaria, which I reached about mid-day, I took the liberty of leaving the animals in the charge of the non-commissioned officer who had accompanied me; and calling on Colonel Ross, obtained his permission to let the sergeant proceed in charge of them to the regiment, while I might, if I chose, push on at a quicker rate. I had heard by this time, that the action had commenced by daylight that morning. I accordingly set off at as quick a pace as my starved animal could carry me; and passing Irun, and crossing the Bidassoa, and keeping along the great road for a considerable distance, I then inclined to my right, and skirted the Pyrenees along the whole plain. I had thus an opportunity of witnessing the conflict carrying on by the left wing of our army, as I passed along towards La Rhune, but with every exertion of myself and my poor jaded horse, night closed in upon me before I had nearly reached the station of the light division. I was compelled to work my way through a country which I had not hitherto passed, and which having been the scene of a sanguinary combat, presented no very pleasing aspect. At last I heard some strange and foreign voices before me, for it was now quite dark, on which I turned into a field, and waited till they passed, by which I learned they were Spaniards. I was apprehensive I might have kept too far to the left, and had got into the French lines, which would not have been so comfortable; but after finding them to be men of General Frere's Spanish division, I then had hopes of shortly meeting with my own people. Directed by those good Spaniards, I at last reached Petit La Rhune, the late formidable position of the enemy, on which the blazes from a thousand of their huts were rising to the clouds, and enlightening the atmosphere around. But it being now ten o'clock, I found myself incapable of proceeding farther, more particularly as the Portuguese, among whom I now found myself, could not give me any certain directions which way my division had gone. I was fain therefore to take up my abode, and gladly did so, in a cottage with Colonel St Clair and several other officers of the sixth Caçadores. Let it not be supposed that a fighting disposition induced me to use so much exertion to reach my division on this occasion--no; but as I considered that a sort of trick had been played off upon me, I did what I could to render it nugatory; no man liking, as I imagine, to be the dupe of any other party's manoeuvres, with whatever friendly intention these may have been put in operation. I arose next morning early, and hastened to the point where I expected to meet my brave comrades, anxious to learn the fate of all I loved amongst them. I saw them and the third division at a considerable distance, each on a height in front, appearing like flocks of sheep huddled together as close as possible. I soon reached them, and learned with sorrow, that the brave Colonel Barnard was, as they supposed, mortally wounded, the ball having passed through the chest, and that little Lieutenant Doyle was killed. This was a most stupendous action; the scene of operations extending from right to left, embracing, I imagine, not less than thirty miles of country. The centre had fallen to the share of my division, which, in the eyes of the best judges, was the strongest part of the enemy's line, for it had been fortified with the most consummate skill, and no labour had been spared to render it impregnable, as the enemy had been busily employed in the construction of forts, redoubts, and other field-works of every denomination, from the day we drove them from the Pass of Vera; one in particular, a stone built fort, in the shape of a star, was exceedingly strong, and which was attacked and carried in the finest style possible, I understand, by the 43d regiment; the 52d also surrounded a fort in which the French 88th regiment was posted, the brave commander of which not having received any orders to evacuate it, remained till the retreat of the French left him no other alternative than to surrender at discretion. The part my battalion had to play, was to cross the valley separating the two La Rhunes in double quick time, and attack the French rock by a gorge, which allowed a passage from that valley into their position. This was to be in conjunction with the attack of the Star Fort by the 43d, as it in some measure took that work in reverse. In short, every corps in the division, and I believe in the army, had a most arduous duty to perform, and most nobly did they execute it. The left of our army, under Sir Thomas Graham, did not succeed in driving the enemy from his innumerable works which covered St Jean de Luz, and which he retained possession of till the next morning; when the centre, that is the 3d and light divisions, together with the Spaniards on our right and left centre, made a movement in advance, and crossed the Nivelle river, from which this action derives its name. Our movement, which threatened to separate the wings of the French army, caused the enemy to abandon his strong position in front of St Jean de Luz, as well as that town, on which occasion he attempted, and partly succeeded in destroying the bridge over the Nivelle at that place; but it being soon after repaired, Sir Thomas Graham's corps took up their quarters in the town. We encamped for the night in front of the village of Serres, or Sarre, or Zarre. It had rained hard all the day of the 11th, and it continued almost without intermission till our camp was literally swimming. I remember perfectly that the water in my tent was several inches deep; and when I awoke in the morning, I found a Portuguese boy (who had followed us, and had attached himself to our mess as a sort of servant) was sitting holding by the tent-pole, that being the only place where he could find rest for the sole of his foot. In short, we were as wet, clothes and beds and all, as if we had been dragged through a river. The evening before, I well remember, we had been highly amused by my Scotch quartermaster-sergeant and his friends, who had taken up their abode close by, singing, till they rather grew tiresome, "We are nae fou', we're nae that fou', But just a drappie in our e'e." This of course was done to drive away dull care, and to make the best of an uncomfortable situation. The next day towards afternoon, a considerable firing was heard on our right, which had continued but a short while, till our gallant and unwearied Chief came galloping up, with some few of his staff following, who could with difficulty keep pace with him, and asking most anxiously whereabouts and what the firing was. We could only point out the direction in which we heard it, but could give him no account as to its cause. Away he galloped in the direction we pointed out, and no doubt soon reached the spot. I forgot to mention, that a man of the Brunswick Oels corps had been hung the day before for plundering by the Provost Marshal, no doubt in compliance with superior orders. It was necessary thus to give the army an example of severity, in order to deter them from committing those acts to which all armies are but too prone. We found indeed very little to plunder, had we been so inclined; for the greater part of the inhabitants had left their houses, taking every thing portable with them. This they had been induced to do from the false statements which Soult had set forth in some proclamations he issued about this time, in which he described the English as savages, nay, even as cannibals, who would not scruple to commit the most monstrous atrocities; so ignorant were the generality of these poor peasants, that many of them implicitly believed his representations. This, no doubt, was done with the view of raising the whole population in arms against us, in order to defend their homes against such a set of wretches as he made it appear we were; but, although many of the natives joined the French army at this time, with which they were incorporated and led to battle, the result of his famous proclamations was not equal to his expectations; for a great part of them declined warlike proceedings, and retired into the interior of the country with their families, leaving only a very small proportion indeed who remained in their houses. As might be expected, the empty houses suffered dreadfully; every piece of furniture almost being destroyed, either for fire-wood, or in seeking for valuables; while the houses of those who remained in general escaped. General Harispe, being a Basque himself, had the organizing of the new levies now raised; indeed, many of these had taken a part in the irruption into Spain on the 25th July for the relief of Pamplona, and many of them fell on that occasion. We were not so fully aware of the extent of the misrepresentation to which Soult had gone in these proclamations, till some time after we had entered France, and had penetrated considerably into the interior, when some of our officers, either during or after a march, entered the cottage of a peasant who had not left his home, to get a little milk. The poor woman was remarkably civil, offering them any thing the house afforded. They got some milk, for which they offered her money, but which she declined. Her child was running about the house at this time, which, coming near one of the officers, he took it between his knees, and patted it on the head, with which the child seemed very well pleased; but the poor mother, standing at a little distance, and eyeing most intently every motion of the officer, was like to swoon with fear and agitation. But as the mother had declined receiving any thing for the milk, the officer who had the child gave it some small coin, and letting it go, it ran to its mother, who snatched it up into her arms with the utmost joy, and altering her look, began to say, she thought they had been deceived; for that they had been led to believe from the proclamations of Soult, that we were such barbarians that we would not scruple to kill and eat their children, and which was the cause of her late fear and anxiety, as she expected the officer had taken the child for that purpose; but now she found we were not such people as she had been led to believe. Of course the officer laughed most heartily at having been suspected of a man-eating propensity, and soon convinced the poor woman that the English were not quite such barbarians as that, whatever she might have heard to the contrary. CHAPTER XII. The British Army advance farther into France--Pass the Nive--Soult's Plans baffled--Two or three battalions of the Nassau and Frankfort regiments come over from the French--French Politesse--Threatened Attack by the French--Battle of the Nive--Account of the Basques. We left our wet camp on the 15th, and advanced to the village of Arbonne, where, for the first time during the campaign, we were quartered in houses, except once or twice. During our stay in the camp at Serres, or Zarre, we sent our baggage animals to Passages for corn, on which occasion I lost another horse, the batman pretending it had been stolen, but which, no doubt, he sold, as that trick had often been resorted to by this time, and there was no detecting it. On the 17th we left Arbonne, and advanced to Arcangues, sending forward picquets to the village of Bassozari, about half a mile in front. My battalion took up into quarters in some straggling houses in front of the church of Arcangues, while our first battalion occupied the chateau and outhouses of Arcangues, about a quarter of a mile to the right and front of the church. The enemy's picquets were close to Bassozari, so that in some places scarcely a quarter of a mile intervened between our quarters and their outposts. They allowed us to take up our outposts very quietly, they being now established in their intrenched camp in front of Bayonne, and which was not far distant from our advance. There were some houses in the line of posts occupied by the French, which, if in our possession, would add greatly both to our security and convenience, and which it was determined to wrest from them if practicable. Accordingly, on the 23d the division was put under arms, and our brigade, being in front, had this task assigned to them. The 43d, not having had so much work during the campaign as our two battalions had, was selected for the purpose of driving in the enemy's picquets, whilst we supported them. They accordingly attacked and carried the houses without a moment's delay; but unfortunately, Captain Hobkirk of that regiment, advancing with his company beyond the line at which it was intended to halt, got immediately in front of some of their intrenchments, from which he could not extricate himself, in consequence of which our first battalion was ordered to advance to cover his retreat; but he had by this time fallen into the hands of the enemy, with a considerable number of his men: his lieutenant was killed, and altogether the company suffered great loss. The remainder retreated, our first battalion people holding the houses it was intended to occupy. This occurred on the left of the ridge. On the right, and adjoining a marsh which separated us from some high ground near the river Nive, and which was occupied by another division of our army, were two or three houses also which it was intended to take, as their possession secured us a passage across this marsh by a causeway, which connected two eminences, that on which we stood, and that occupied by the other division, the principal object upon the latter being a large chateau called Garratt's House. One company of the 43d also took those houses, supported by some more of that regiment and my battalion; but after they were taken, from what cause I know not, an order was sent to evacuate them, on which the 43d retired. Soon after, they were again ordered to be re-occupied, when a company of ours advanced, and took possession, but had not been there many minutes till another order was sent for them to be evacuated. This order, however, had scarcely reached them, when a charge was made on them by a body of French cavalry, supported by a strong column of infantry. The officer who commanded the company, either from the order he had received, or from want of presence of mind, called to his men to run to the rear when the cavalry charged him, by which he did not suffer much in point of losing men, for only one was wounded by the cavalry; but it had a bad appearance to run away from cavalry, a description of force which we had learnt by this time almost to despise, especially as, from his post, he might have knocked down great numbers of them, and finally have repulsed them, had he allowed his men to fire. The houses were, however, eventually taken possession of by another company of our battalion the next day, which retained them in despite of the enemy. The man who was wounded by the cavalry was shot in the head by a pistol ball: he came to the surgeon, where the main body of the battalion was standing, to be dressed; while this was doing, and the orderly man holding a tin-full of water near, from which the surgeon was sponging and cleaning the wound, a ball came, and, striking the tin, carried it right out from between the hands of the orderly. I was standing close by, and shall not easily forget the blank look which, as might be expected, the poor orderly put on. There was a good deal of firing all day, which, except what the 43d suffered, as before noticed, did little damage to the brigade. On the occasion of our company taking these houses the next day, a very young officer, who happened to command it, evinced great fortitude and presence of mind. He advanced on the enemy, who, being then rather inclined to quietness, retreated gradually before him; but after reaching the hedge, just beyond the principal house, told him (for they were quite near enough to speak) that he must not advance any farther, or they would be compelled to fire on him. The young fellow, solicitous about nothing but obeying his orders, told them that he was determined to have the house, and immediately putting his men under the best cover he could, called out that they might begin to fire whenever they pleased, he was ready for them. This young officer (whose name was Cary, and brother to my friend who fell at Badajos) spoke excellent French, so that the enemy understood him perfectly. The enemy did not contend any longer for the post, but planted their sentries within about thirty yards of ours. These sentries, indeed, were still so posted as to prevent a passage across by the causeway, had they been so inclined; but the next day I went with another officer across by this road, on which occasion we actually passed to the rear of the French sentries. A disposition had for some time been gaining ground with both armies, to mitigate the miseries of warfare, as much as was consistent with each doing their duty to their country; and it had by this time proceeded to such an extent, as to allow us to place that confidence in them that they would not molest us even if we passed their outposts for the purpose I have mentioned. And this mutual confidence in each other was productive of the most comfortable results to both parties. We could move about at any time, and almost in any place, shooting or otherwise amusing ourselves, without the dread of falling in with an enemy's patrol, or of getting among their sentries. They never molested us from this time, except when we either advanced upon them, or they upon us, in hostile array. Our division had two main picquets; all this took place at the right picquet. A few days after I happened to be at the advanced post on the left, commanded by one of my battalion, when the French officers beckoned to us. We, to show we were peaceably inclined, pulled off our swords, and advanced to meet them. A number of inhabitants, who had left their houses on our first entering the country, having heard that we were not what we had been represented, were desirous of returning to their homes, and the officers wished us to admit them, and see them safe through the advanced posts. This of course we gladly promised, and the poor people were quite overjoyed at being permitted to visit their dwelling-places once again; but, poor creatures, I fear they would find little there except the bare walls, if indeed these remained entire, for, from the reasons before assigned, it could scarcely be expected that houses without inhabitants, in the midst of an invading army, would be much respected. Each individual among them, old and young, carried heavy bundles on their heads, no doubt they having removed every thing that was valuable, if portable. The French officers were extremely polite, and asked us many questions of the news of the day, &c.; but the commander-in-chief, hearing of the familiarity which subsisted between the two armies, issued an order, prohibiting British officers from holding conversations with the enemy; for as all these conversations were necessarily conducted in French, (very few indeed of their officers being able to speak English,) he was apprehensive they might gain such information from our people, from their imperfect knowledge of the French language, as might materially injure our future proceedings. Before this order was issued, the most unbounded confidence subsisted between us, and which it was a pity to put a stop to, except for such weighty reasons. They used to get us such things as we wanted from Bayonne, particularly brandy, which was cheap and plentiful, and we in return gave them occasionally a little tea, of which some of them had learnt to be fond. Some of them also, who had been prisoners of war in England, sent letters through our army-post to their sweethearts in England, our people receiving the letters and forwarding them. They told us also how Hobkirk was situated, and were astonished at the extent and splendour of his equipage, (for he was a great dandy,) and could scarcely be persuaded he was only a captain. My present commanding-officer, who was the senior captain, and in whose mess I then was, had sent to England, and got out from thence two immense pies, weighing nearly a hundred-weight each, and packed in tin cases. They were composed of every kind of game, and the best description of fowls, such as turkeys, &c., with the bones taken out, and the meat baked till it became like brawn when cut in slices. They were most excellent. One of these he had made a present of to our Major-general, and the other we were eating in the mess. We had also at this time a considerable quantity of good wine, which, by some accident, we had got hold of. We also had bought a pig and killed it, both living quite sumptuously at present, and having a good stock for future use. But while we ourselves fared so well, our poor horses and mules were literally starving. There was no kind of forage for them, except what they could pick up in the now completely exhausted fields around us. We had nothing else to give them. In this way we were going on, when, on the 9th of December, Lord Wellington, determining on passing the Nive, preparatory to future operations, ordered our division and all the left, under Sir John Hope, who had now succeeded Sir Thomas Graham, to make a movement in advance, in order that the enemy's attention might be attracted to this point, while he threw over some divisions to the right bank of that river. My battalion had to advance along the ridge by which I had formerly passed in peace, to meet the returning inhabitants, as may be recollected; but now the face of affairs was completely altered;--a heavy fire was kept up by the French picquets from the moment they saw us advance in arms, but we soon drove them from their advanced works, and they were obliged to take shelter in their intrenched camp, which was remarkably strong, and which it was not intended we should attack. We accordingly halted on the brow of the ridge, while they kept up an incessant fire, both from their guns and infantry, but which, considering its extent and duration, was not by any means a destructive fire. Sir John Hope had a more laborious task to perform, or else his troops went beyond the point intended, for they continued the fight nearly all day, and at one time were considerably in advance, but afterwards recalled. The passage of the Nive was completely effected, and in the evening we returned to our comfortable houses, a short distance in the rear, and went to bed as usual. Next morning, however, very early, orders were given to turn out immediately, and stand to our arms, for the enemy was advancing; and indeed, when I came to the door, I heard a good deal of firing. The troops turned out at once, but the mules were to get, and the baggage to pack, and send away to the rear, or it might be lost; so I set myself about this with all dispatch; but before any of it was put up, I saw posting by me, with all expedition, a civil officer, who had only a short while joined us, and who, in his hurry, had put up all he could scrape together on his horse, on which he himself was riding. His boots, tied together, were slung over the horse's neck, and in short he looked more like a bagman than an officer, from the number of things he had hanging about him. It was most laughable to see him. I called out and asked him why he was in such a hurry, but he did not stop to give me an answer. I got up our baggage very well, but what to do with the pie, the pig, and the wine, I knew not, so was constrained to leave them as they were, hoping we might not allow the enemy to penetrate so far. I then moved off the baggage, and, directing the servants who had charge of it to proceed up a lane which carried them towards the rear, I moved on and joined the battalion. Just as I reached the plateau, or high ground in front of the church of Arcangues, I met an officer of ours to whom I had lately lent a fine young mare, for which I had not food sufficient; and he having no horse himself, I thought he would take care of her; but here I met him going into the fight riding on the poor animal, although scarcely able to drag one leg behind the other. I remonstrated with him, but he did not mind me. The result was as might have been anticipated--she soon after dropped down, unable to move farther, and died; thus I lost L.35 more, which she had cost me. By this time the enemy had driven in the regiment which had been on picquet, and one or two of our companies were sent forward to cover their retreat to the church behind us, where they were ordered to take post, it being a high and fine position, and had by this time been partly fortified. My people retired gradually before the enemy, who now advanced in great numbers. Our 1st battalion were not so fortunate in effecting their retreat. An officer and some men having got into a hollow way, were surrounded by the enemy and taken; another was killed; and another, with his section, had to force their way through a strong body which had got in his rear. My battalion did not fall into any scrape of that nature, but sustained a considerable loss in killed and wounded, from the vast superiority of the enemy in point of numbers, who, no doubt, did not escape with impunity. We held our ground at the bottom of the hill on which the church is built, the French not being able to force us farther back; the 1st battalion, at the same time, holding the fence and ditch in front of the Chateau, as well as that building itself. But a rather unpleasant occurrence took place at this time. When the enemy appeared on the plateau before mentioned, a regiment behind us, without orders, I believe, opened a heavy fire upon them, several shots of which struck among our men. One of them went in at the back of one of our soldiers, and killed him on the spot; another penetrated the back window of a house into which a party of ours had entered for defence, and very near struck an officer, who was in the room at the time. These shots must have been fired either by young soldiers, who scarcely knew how they pointed their muskets, or they must have taken our people for the enemy, from which, indeed, they were not far distant. I am confident it was purely accidental, for no two corps could be on better terms than that regiment and ours always were. The skirmishing continued till dark. This was one of a series of masterly movements between the two contending generals. Lord Wellington having sent a pretty strong force across the Nive, as before mentioned, Soult imagined he had so weakened his force on the left, as to render it probable he might penetrate it, and thus cause his lordship to withdraw his troops again from the right bank of the Nive; but he was anticipated; for Lord Wellington had no sooner established himself on the other side of the Nive, than he brought one of the supporting divisions of that movement to support us at the church of Arcangues, it being an important post to hold; so that, when we looked behind us, after we retired into position, we saw innumerable bayonets glistening in the sun, and ready to move forward whenever they should be required; but they never were wanted here, the light division being quite sufficient to sustain any attack the enemy had yet made on them. This, however, showed the provident care of his lordship, and how completely he had penetrated Soult's design. This night two or three battalions of the Nassau and Frankfort regiments came over and left the French. They had heard that the Dutch had declared against Bonaparte, and wished to be transported to Holland, with all their arms and appointments, which they brought with them. We remained in bivouack on the ridge extending between the church and chateau of Arcangues all night, our picquets remaining in possession of the houses and hedges at the bottom of the hill, where we stopped the French in the morning. I visited the picquets at night, in company with my commanding-officer, where we found all well, and alert. The next day, there being no firing between us and those in our front, three French officers, seemingly anxious to prove how far politeness and good breeding could be carried between the two nations, when war did not compel them to be unfriendly, took a table and some chairs out of a house which was immediately in our front, and one which we had lately occupied as a barrack; and bringing them down into the middle of the field, which separated the advance of the two armies, sat down within 100 yards of our picquet, and drank wine, holding up their glasses, as much as to say your health, every time they drank. Of course we did not molest them, but allowed them to have their frolic out. During the day, also, we saw soldiers of the three nations, viz. English, Portuguese, and French, all plundering at the same time in one unfortunate house, where our pie, our pig, and wine had been left. It stood about 150 or 200 yards below the church, on a sort of neutral ground between the two armies; hence the assemblage at the same moment of such a group of these motley marauders. They plundered in perfect harmony, no one disturbing the other on account of his nation or colour. There were a great number of apples in it at the time we left it, belonging to the owner of the house, but when we returned, two or three days afterwards, the desolation was complete. Our once comfortable quarter contained nothing now but filth and dirt. One poor girl had remained in it all the while, but she could not save one article; indeed, in such a case it would have been a service of danger to attempt it. At night one of our sergeants played the French a trick. He took with him a few men, and, knowing the ground well, they passed the French sentry unobserved, having reached the house at the top of the field out of which they had brought the table, &c., where their picquet was stationed. He made a rush at their arms, which he found piled in front of the house, and set to work and broke them before the French had time to recover from the consternation into which they were thrown by so unexpected an assault. He and his party then came running off without sustaining any injury. He was a most determined brave soldier this, but afterwards lost an arm at Toulouse, and was of course discharged with a pension. On the 12th, the enemy made a mighty show of attacking our position, having greatly increased their force in front of us, and had, some way or other, found the means of spreading a report in our lines that 1800 grenadiers had been chosen to lead on the attack. They also traced out batteries, and cut embrasures, apparently with the intention of burning or knocking down the chateau of Arcangues, the owner of which remained in it all this time, and was rather suspected of holding correspondence with his countrymen. It is not unlikely it was by his means the report above alluded to was propagated. Every thing now wore a serious aspect, and of course every thing was done to render their attack abortive. All were animated with the best disposition to defend the post to the last extremity; but while the generality believed all these preparations were serious, there were others who thought it only a _ruse de guerre_; indeed, had our friends, the German hussars, (with whom we had often acted in concert,) been here at this time, it is more than probable they would have been strongly inclined to the latter opinion, for they scarcely ever saw the French make a great bustle and noise, as if about immediately to advance and attack, but they would coolly say, after eyeing them awhile, "Oh, he not come to-day!" "He go away!" and were generally certain of being right. So full of trick and artifice are our French antagonists, that they generally act in quite a contrary manner to what appearances indicate. But they began to be known; hence the scepticism of some of our people on the present occasion. Accordingly, about midnight, when the attack was to have been made, away they went, and retired nearly into their lines, leaving only a few to keep the ground. At daylight next morning we again moved forward, on which there was a good deal of firing between the Portuguese battalion that had followed them and their rearguard; but when our people advanced to our old post on the ridge, I, happening to be first, took off my cap, and, putting it on the top of my sword, held it up, which the French taking for a signal of peace, as it was intended, the firing on both sides ceased, each party taking up the post they held previous to the late movements. We wondered why the French had retired, but presently heard a tremendously heavy firing in the direction of the Nive. Soult, it seems, had withdrawn nearly all his troops from our flank, and marching rapidly through Bayonne, had attacked General Hill, who commanded on the other side of the Nive, with great impetuosity, thinking Lord Wellington had weakened that force to strengthen us; but here again Soult was outwitted, for he found on that side quite sufficient to give him as sound a drubbing as he ever got; the Portuguese on this occasion, I understand, performing wonders. These five days' fighting (for on every day there was firing, more or less, in one part or other of the line) were called the Battle of the Nive. We had had three days' work of it--they on our right two--and Sir John Hope's people, on our left, four, I believe, and they not trifling ones. In every thing Soult undertook, he was completely foiled--all his schemes having been clearly seen through by his more sagacious opponent. Indeed he had inflicted a heavy loss on our left wing, commanded by Sir John Hope, where the fighting had been most severe, but no doubt he suffered equally, if not more severely than they did. I am told that the enemy's light troops were most insolent and annoying to our heavy regiments on the left, on this occasion. What a pity that they could not have been opposed by troops of a similar description! It may be remembered the civil officer of whom I made mention, as having rode away with the greater part of his wardrobe hanging about his horse; he was more fortunate than we were, for the things which he left, his kind landlady took care of, and hid in some snug corner till the business was over, and on his return restored them all to him. He said the cause of his going off in such a hurry arose from a cannon-shot having struck the lintel of the door or window of his house while he was in the act of shaving, on which he bundled out with whatever he could scrape together, and set off. I verily believe it must have been the effect of imagination, for I remained behind him at least a quarter of an hour, and although our houses were close together, I did not either hear or see a shot fired in that direction till we had reached the hill, nearly an hour after; but he constantly maintained that it was so. We again took up our old quarters in front of the church; but oh, how changed were they now from what they had formerly been in point of comfort! nevertheless, they still afforded us shelter from the inclemency of the weather. Soon after dark on this evening, a rather unpleasant affair occurred at the left advanced post of our division. An officer and two men coming from the French advance, with what intention is not known, were observed by the corporal who was stationed at our abatis, who immediately took out his rifle and shot the officer through the body, on which his two men lifted him up and carried him into their picquet-house. We were apprehensive this would put an end to that good understanding which had hitherto subsisted between the picquets of the two nations, and much regretted the circumstance. It is more than probable the officer was coming as a sort of patrol, to ascertain whether or not we had left the post, which, being a military undertaking, subjected him to all the chances of war attendant thereon. This is the more probable from his having two soldiers with him armed, as I understand they were; but if it was meant as a friendly visit, as formerly sometimes took place, it was greatly to be lamented; however, they did not, on account of this occurrence, manifest any soreness or ill-will afterwards, and the mutual good understanding continued to subsist between us. While we remain at rest here a short space, I will endeavour to put the reader in possession of the character of the inhabitants, among whom we have been sojourning for a few months past--I mean the Biscayans. From the time we crossed the Ebro, a wonderful change took place in the appearance of the natives; and I believe the same description of people extend considerably into France, although under another government; they, I understand, still retain their ancient customs, dress, and language; they are denominated Basques, from the name of the province, I apprehend, which is called Biscay. They speak a different language from either the Spaniards, who border them on one side, or the French, on the other; and some of our officers who spoke Welsh, said they could understand a few of their words; it is denominated the Basque language. They generally wear cloth of their own manufacture, which is commonly blue, in some parts red or brown; in the neighbourhood of Pamplona, almost always the latter. The men wear a sort of Scotch bonnet, with a short jacket and trowsers, and are an amazingly athletic and active people. The women wear a short jacket also, of the same colour with their petticoat; and with their hair, which they encourage to grow to a great length, plaited in one large plait, and tied with a small piece of ribbon; it is allowed to hang down their back, and almost in all cases reaches to, or below their middle. They wear a handkerchief tastefully disposed upon their head. They are a fine, tall, and handsome race of women; but they have a custom of compressing their breasts, so that they appear as flat in the bosom as the men, which, to an English eye, is not becoming. The women do the same kind of work as the men, that is, they plough, and labour at all sorts of husbandry; but what seemed most remarkable to us, was their sole management of the ferry-boats about Passages and St Sebastian; they row as well as any men, being amazingly strong and active; they seem content with their lot, and always appeared cheerful and happy. I believe they are strictly virtuous; and although very handsome in general, they did not seem so fond of admiration as the females of many other countries are; upon the whole, I think they resemble the Welsh more than any other people with whom I am acquainted; their countries are exceedingly similar, being mountainous, and in general not over fruitful, so that constant labour seems to be rendered absolutely necessary to insure to them the means of subsistence; hence they are industrious and frugal, and, upon the whole, an interesting and moral people. CHAPTER XIII. The Author's Battalion quartered in Aurantz on 3d January, 1814--The Cantonments at Aurantz broke up on 16th February, and the Campaign of 1814 commenced--Farther Advance into France--Skirmishing with the Enemy--Military Manoeuvres--Battle of Orthes--Defeat and Pursuit of the Enemy--Succession of Attacks on them--They are driven from their Position in and near Tarbes--Skirmishing at Tournefoile--The Enemy retire towards Toulouse. On the 3d of January 1814, we were ordered to quit a part of the country, which, from the various occurrences that had taken place since we first arrived in it, had, in some measure, rendered it interesting to us. We moved a little to the right, and crossed the Nive, and again moved in advance about a league or more. This movement was made in support of some operations which Lord Wellington was conducting in the direction of the Adour, which being completed, we returned to the Nive, and took up our cantonments in the villages of Ustaritz and Aurantz. About this time, nearly the whole of the peasantry, who had fled on our entering France, were now returning to their habitations, all fear that we should murder them, and eat their children, having by this time been completely dissipated. Indeed we were often told after this, that they would much prefer having a British army among them, to their own people, for they were always haughty, they said, and overbearing, and never scrupled to take whatever they had a mind for, while we were orderly and quiet, and never took an article without amply repaying the owner for it. Indeed I am well convinced the change the poor people had made in their lodgers was greatly for the better to them. My battalion was quartered in the village of Aurantz, from which we often took a stroll, to look at the scene of our late operations. The French having, in consequence of Lord Wellington's movements near the Adour, strengthened their army in that direction, which of course rendered it necessary they should contract the limits of their front on the side towards Spain, they had consequently withdrawn their advance considerably within their former lines. We now also had plenty of opportunity for shooting, but were but ill supplied with fowling-pieces, or we might have killed an abundance of woodcocks, every thicket in the neighbourhood being filled with them. The weather now was extremely bad, and the roads impassable, except by yourself wading up to the knees, or having your horse almost continually nearly up to his belly. In consequence of the difficulty of communicating by dragoons, on account of the roads, telegraphs were established all along from the right of the army, on the banks of the Adour, to St Jean de Luz on our left, the head-quarters of the army. While in these cantonments, an account arrived of our gallant Major-general (Kempt) having been appointed to the colonelcy of the 8th battalion of the 60th regiment, which had just been raised. At the recommendation of my commanding-officer, now Major Balvaird, the general kindly transmitted my name to the War Office for the appointment of paymaster of his battalion; but unfortunately for me, before my name arrived, his late Royal Highness the Duke of York, as Colonel-in-chief of the regiment, had nominated another person to the situation. It had always hitherto been customary for Colonels-commandant, and not the Colonel-in-chief, to nominate their own staff, but on this occasion another rule was adopted, which, of course, was a great disappointment to me, as I had, with considerable trouble, got all my sureties, &c. prepared, although they were now not needed. I had, during our stay here, one or more trips to the paymaster-general for money, for although the paymaster of the battalion had by this time arrived, I had several months' pay still to draw, the army being considerably in arrear in their pay. I had thus an opportunity of visiting St Jean de Luz, and all the enemy's late fortifications and position in that neighbourhood, and amazingly strong they had indeed rendered the ground in front of that town. It was a considerable and well-built town, partaking a good deal of both the Spanish and French character of course, it being the first French town next to the frontier; and, as I said before, there being very little difference between the Basques on either side of the Bidassoa, the change of countries in respect to inhabitants was not very observable except among the better orders. On the 16th of February we broke up from our cantonments in Aurantz, and commenced the campaign of 1814, crossing the Nive at Ustaritz, and moving on in the direction of La Bastide de Clarence. We encamped on a wild heath, without any village or town being near us, and again the next morning continued our route to the place above-named, which we reached about noon, and encamped on a hill beyond it. On the 22d we advanced to St Palais, having passed other villages, the names of which I have forgot, in the intermediate days. Nothing, however, of any note occurred in that period. On the 23d we encamped near La Chere and Charrette; on the 24th we crossed two rapid and deep streams of the Bidowse. The first we got over with considerable ease,--it was the Gave de Mauleon, which we crossed at Nabes; but the second, the Gave d'Oleron, was not only both deeper and more rapid than the other, but the passage seemed intended to be disputed with us; some French cavalry having made their appearance on the opposite bank, as we approached the river. The resistance they could offer, however, seemed very trifling, for, on our bringing up some guns to the bank, and a few shots having been fired from them, and from a company of our second battalion, they withdrew. We now prepared to go over; accordingly, every man was ordered to take off his pouch and buckle it on the top of his knapsack, the ford being so deep as to take the men up to or above the middle. On this occasion I had I know not how many of the poor men hanging about me and my horse. Some were holding by the stirrup, some by the tail, and others by the mane, or wherever they could lay hold, for the stream was so rapid as to nearly sweep them off their legs. Indeed I understand several of those who followed us were actually swept down, and perished. On reaching the farther bank, we found the French had endeavoured to render it impassable, by throwing harrows, &c., with their spikes upmost, in the only places where you could ascend from the river. I believe a trumpeter of the French was all who fell on this day. We passed through Ville Neuve, and formed in a field beyond the village, till the whole division had got over. It was in this village where the scene between the mother, the child, and some of our officers, took place. When joined and formed, we moved on to a high and ugly common, not far in rear of the village of Orion, where we bivouacked for the night. It was most uncomfortable. Before we reached our ground this evening, we observed, at a short distance to our left, a body of about 200 French infantry moving on parallel to us, but apparently making all haste to get away in front of us. Some suggested the idea of attacking and taking them prisoners; but as they were rather before us, it could not have been done without setting one of the battalions at them in double-quick time, and which would not have been an easy operation, after a long and fatiguing march, and fording two rivers. Besides, as our Quartermaster-general said, it was certain they could not be far from their support; consequently it would only bring on an affair, which it was not the General's wish to do at that time, for there was none near to support us should the enemy send a force against us. This day General Picton's division had a sharp affair at Navarreins, where they forced the passage of the Gave we had crossed. On the 25th, we moved forward early in the morning, and on reaching the village of Orion, we found that Soult had had his head-quarters the night before, with a considerable portion of his army, in and around the village; it was therefore fortunate we did not attack the French detachment before mentioned, for we should certainly have had Soult, with all his people, upon our single division. A French band had remained in this village till our arrival, having deserted in a body from the regiment to which they belonged, or they, seeing they could not make their escape, pretended to desert and join our army. We bent our course towards Orthes, which was now only a few leagues in front of us. A man brought a cask of excellent wine to the roadside, with the intention of giving every man of the division a drink, but we could not wait, and were consequently obliged to leave the good man's gift. It showed that either good-will or fear had prompted him to this act. I rather think the former was the cause, as he lived some distance from the road. We had not continued long on the march, till we heard a loud and thundering explosion in front of us, which, as it was expected, turned out to be the bridge of Orthes, which the enemy had blown up. A short while after we came in sight of the town, and one of our Portuguese Caçadore regiments being sent forward, a smart skirmish commenced between them and the French, who had been left on and about the bridge to prevent our repairing it. I foolishly went down to see what was going on, and had nigh paid for my curiosity. We took up our ground behind a height which overlooked the town, through which the enemy were passing in large columns. In consequence of this, we got some guns into a field in front of our hill, and commenced a cannonade upon them, which, we could observe, made them hurry their pace considerably. They also brought some heavy field-guns to bear upon us, and fired some shots, but without doing us much injury. Throughout the whole of the road by which the French had come before us, desolation and misery marked their footsteps; and in the village of Orion, where Soult himself had slept the night before, nothing could exceed the despair and misery of the few remaining inhabitants, who told us they had been literally stripped of their all; indeed, they appeared most forlorn and wretched beings, and, as might be expected, poured out the most heavy and bitter complaints, not unmingled with imprecations, on the heads of their plundering countrymen. I went into a poor weaver's house here, where, if I mistake not greatly, the marauders had actually cut the web he was weaving out of the loom, and carried it off with them. We remained on this ground all night, and the next morning his lordship was intently occupied for a considerable time in reconnoitring the enemy's position. At length, as if he had fully made up his mind how to act, he ordered our division to fall in, which was promptly obeyed; then, sending his staff with directions, we were ordered to file to the right, and to move down towards the river, apparently with the intention of crossing a little above the bridge, which had been destroyed. On the other side, immediately opposite what appeared to be the ford, were large bodies of infantry, together with a great quantity of artillery. I recollect my battalion was leading the division, and it appeared at this moment as if we were going to be engaged in a most arduous and hazardous undertaking; for the enemy's artillery would have swept us off the face of the earth before we could possibly have reached the farther bank; however, this was only a _ruse de guerre_, and a most deep-planned and well-executed one it was; for while we were moving down towards the river, a staff-officer came riding, and ordered us all to hide as much as possible from the view of the enemy, by crouching down, &c. as we moved along. It may seem rather paradoxical to be ordered thus to act, at the same time that we wished the enemy to observe our movement; but the fact is, there were probably a thousand eyes fixed on us all the time we lay here, and who watched most closely our every movement; consequently, we could not stir without the enemy being aware of it; and if on this occasion we had made a show and a parade of our movement, it would have been suspected as only a feint at once, as the French themselves, from often practising this stratagem, would have penetrated immediately our object. But our Chief went a step too deep for them, adepts as they are in all the arts of this kind; for he made a pretence of hiding from them his movement, knowing well that we were observed; and this completely deceived them. This threat of crossing here was made in order to favour the construction of a bridge about eight or ten miles down the river, and the crossing there by another division, as they were thus enabled to guess where the principal force for opposition would be required. I believe a better planned or more successful stratagem was never practised. But I own, when we were marching down to the river to cross in front of the immense masses which we saw ready to oppose us, I believed that few would survive to tell the tale hereafter. The moment when we were just opening from the covered ground to plunge into the river, we were instantly countermarched with all expedition, and moved down the river at a quick pace till we reached the pontoon bridge which had been so successfully constructed and thrown over at the village of Sala. This being now perfectly safe, we encamped at the village for the night. On the morning of the 27th, we early crossed the river called the Gave de Pau, and moved forward in the direction of the town of Orthes by the great road. On the right bank of that river, when we came within about two miles of the town, we were moved more to our left, ascending the high ridge which runs parallel with the river, and on which the French had taken up a strong position, and were said to be between 30,000 and 40,000 strong. One division had been ordered to move along the summit of this ridge, on which ran the great road to Peyrehourade, and to attack the enemy on that flank, while our division communicated with that and the 3d division to our right. When the action was commenced, the 2d division had been directed to ford above the bridge, where our feint had been made the day before, and passing through the town, to attack on the opposite flank, and thus cut off their retreat towards the Pau. The enemy's position proved to be exceedingly strong, and difficult of access by us. The action commenced by the 4th division attacking on the road leading along the ridge, where an obstinate and bloody conflict took place, without our people being able to make any impression. The attack of the 3d division, on our right, also commenced immediately after; but such was the nature of the ground on this side, being mostly in long pointed ridges, running out like the rays of a star, and which were exceedingly strong, that no efforts were able to force them from this ground. General Hill had by this time got over the river, and was approaching the position. My division, having been deprived of two of its regiments, which had been sent, previous to the commencement of our operations this spring, to receive their clothing at St Jean de Luz, being rendered weak in consequence, it was kept in reserve, as I before mentioned. During this unsuccessful attack, our gallant Chief was for a considerable time immediately in front of us, watching with the most anxious care every motion of both armies. He appeared to me to be extremely thoughtful and serious on the occasion, as our troops did not succeed in forcing this stronghold of the enemy. The firing at this time was extremely animated, particularly on the ridge to our left, where great slaughter was made on both sides. And the French having discovered where he and his staff were assembled, opened a smart cannonade on the group, but without doing any mischief, I believe, and without being noticed by him. Their shots generally fell about our division, which was formed immediately behind the hill on which he stood. At length, whether from the request of Colonel Barnard, who was at this time by his lordship's side, or whether by his own direction, I know not, but the Colonel was ordered to take on the 52d and 1st Portuguese belonging to the Caçadores, our 2d brigade, and endeavour to force a passage through the French line, by the gorge of the valley, which lay immediately in his front, and they would thus, if successful, penetrate into the centre of the enemy's position. They accordingly moved up the valley in column of companies, sustaining all the time the most galling and destructive fire, for the enemy were thus on each of their flanks, as well as in front. When they reached within a short distance of the centre height, they formed line, and moving on at a brisk pace and carrying every thing before them, they drove the enemy from the plateau, and thus penetrated into the very heart of their army. This was a most daring and intrepid movement, for although assailed by ten times their force, and nearly surrounded by the enemy, these gallant corps hesitated not to push on, although the very elements seemed as it were to fight against them; for on the brow of the enemy's position the fire had been so heavy and so incessant, that the very furze bushes and herbs of all kinds were in a blaze along the front, through which, with innumerable foes behind it, these gallant men forced a passage at the point of the bayonet. This movement had the effect of at once deciding the fate of the day, for Soult seeing his very centre and strongest position carried, which separated between his wings, at once ordered a retreat of his whole force. The remainder of our division were now despatched with all speed in pursuit of the flying enemy, but they never attempted after this to make a stand, and nothing was left for us to perform but to give chase to the fugitives. When we reached the enemy's centre position, we found that every thing had been cleared away which could in the least impede his movements; every hedge and ditch had been completely levelled, so that nothing remained but a beautiful plain on the top of the ridge, except where works of defence had been thrown up. We were not successful in capturing any of the enemy, except the wounded, who had necessarily been left on the field, and we did not lay hold of any of his materiél, except a few guns which he had been obliged to abandon in a swamp below the position. I have related only such things as fell within my own observation, but no doubt many were the heroic and gallant deeds that were performed in this hard contested battle, besides what I have detailed. As might be expected, the gallant 52d and its supporting corps, the 1st Portuguese Caçadores, suffered dreadfully, leaving probably one-fourth of their numbers on the field. But I must not omit mentioning one trait of gallantry which attracted the admiration of the whole army. Lord March (now the Duke of Richmond) had for some time been on the personal staff of Lord Wellington, where his services had been most efficient. He also was at this time a captain in the 52d regiment, but from his high civil rank had never served as an infantry officer with his regiment. He was determined to know and practice his duty in every situation, and therefore requested leave from his lordship to be permitted to join his corps as a captain, which was granted of course, and this was his first debut in the character of an officer of foot. It was no doubt a sharp trial; and poor fellow, while bravely leading on the company which his Majesty had intrusted to his command, he fell dangerously (then supposed mortally) wounded. This was a noble example to set our young nobility, and they cannot do better than to follow such a precedent. I understand he has been heard to say, "that the chance of a staff-officer being hit in action, is not near so great as that of an officer of infantry, who must quietly brave all that comes against him, while a staff-officer, being well mounted, can quickly get out of danger; and that if a gentleman wishes truly to learn his profession as an officer, he ought to serve for a time in the infantry whilst engaged in operations in the field." This was a most decided, but withal an unfruitful victory, and only tended to establish more firmly the superior skill of our commander, and the superior bravery of the British army. We had heard of the proceedings of the allies in the north, and of a number of the French generals having deserted the cause of their once potent, but now fallen master. And I verily believed that Soult had collected his whole force together here for the express purpose of either allowing himself to be surrounded, and thus make a show of being compelled to surrender, or of inducing his whole army to come over at once to the side of the Bourbons, but in all these conjectures I was completely mistaken; for whatever may have been Soult's faults as a man, he has always shown himself a consistent and an able defender of the cause he first espoused, and as such is certainly respectable. We pursued the flying columns of the enemy for about two leagues beyond the field of action, crossing in our pursuit the river Luy de Bearne, and at night took up our abode in bivouack, near the village of Bonne Garde. The night proved extremely cold and frosty, for in the morning when I intended to arise, I found my cloak frozen to the ground. We had no kind of covering. My commanding-officer had taken up his abode in a cottage close by, where there was no bed but what the people occupied. He therefore got into the kneading-trough, in which he slept very comfortably; but in the morning I remember he turned out like a miller. We started soon after daybreak, and continued our march, crossing the small river Luy de France. Here I remember our assistant Quartermaster-general told us what great difficulty he found in obtaining information from the inhabitants as to the by-roads which run parallel to the great road from Orthes; for these good people could not conceive why he should be hunting after by-roads of this description, which were generally very bad, while the great road, which was always good, lay so near the line by which he wished to move, not knowing perhaps, or not understanding, that other divisions of the army were moving on the high-road, while we wished to make a corresponding movement on their flank. They would always, however, after directing him how to proceed for a while, bring him again on to the great road, which he wished to avoid for the reason before given. The comfort, and the efficiency of an army in the field depends more, I am persuaded, on the abilities and zeal of officers in the Quartermaster-general's department, than on any other branch of the service; for if they are remiss or unacquainted with their duty, the marches and counter-marches, the halts, and the changes of direction, are so numerous and annoying, that the spirits and strength of the troops are soon worn out, and of course dissatisfaction and inefficiency soon follow. But to the credit of the officers of this department at the period of which I am writing, I believe never army possessed more able, more zealous, or more active staff-officers, than we did, and that principally owing to the excellent example set them by the head of this department, than whom a more able conductor of an army does not exist. On one of these occasions when our assistant Quartermaster-general had occasion to wait upon the authorities of a village, he jokingly asked them for passports, as is customary in France, to proceed into the country. "Ma foi," says the worthy Mayor, "you obtained your passports at Vittoria, you need no others now." We halted for the night near the village of Duerse. In the morning, we forded the Adour near a small village, the name of which I forget, and making a long and rapid march, we took possession of the city of Mont de Marsan, where we found immense magazines of provisions, which had been collected by the enemy. This was the most valuable capture that had been made by the British army since its arrival in the Peninsula; for although a great deal of treasure was obtained at Vittoria, yet a considerable portion of that fell into the hands of individuals; but this was secured for the benefit of the whole army. The enemy had abandoned the city previous to our arrival, consequently it was a bloodless conquest, which rendered it the more valuable. Mont de Marsan is what may be termed a fine and an extensive city, containing about 3000 inhabitants. The people received us kindly upon the whole, and showed us great attention. Here we had superb quarters, and the change from what we had lately been accustomed to, produced a rather uncomfortable feeling; for our clothes and all our equipments so little corresponded with the magnificence around us, that we should have preferred less stately mansions, if comfortable, as more congenial with our respective establishments. But we did not long enjoy our splendid lodgings; for, having secured the booty, we left the city, and returned to the banks of the Adour. The march both to and from this city had been along straight flat roads, cut through an immense pine forest, with which this department is almost completely covered. The roads had been for some time much traversed, and having a sandy bottom, were consequently very bad at this season of the year; added to which, a violent storm of snow and sleet assailed us all the march of this day, which made it a rather uncomfortable business. We halted for the night in a village named, I think, St Maurice, and the next day were moved into St Sever, a considerable town on the left bank of the Adour, in which Lord Wellington had taken up his head-quarters. Here we remained some days, doing duty over his lordship, when we crossed to the right bank, and moved up the river, halting at the town of Grenade. We next morning continued our route up that bank till we reached Barcelonne, a considerable town some little distance from the river, and nearly opposite Aire, a large town on the left bank, and near which General the Hon. Wm. Stewart, with the 2d division, had had a smart brush with the enemy on the day we captured Mont de Marsan. On the evening of the 10th we halted at the village of Arblade, and, on the 11th, entered Tarsac, where we remained for the night. We were next morning pushed on to a village in front, about a league distant, but were allowed to remain there only for one night, for the enemy now began to appear in our front in considerable force. We were consequently withdrawn, and, passing through Tarsac, the division formed in a wood about half-way between that and Aire. We expected something serious was about to occur, but, from what cause I know not, the enemy again retreated, leaving a body of cavalry on the road about half-a-league beyond Tarsac, to which we again returned and took up our quarters. On the 16th, as these fellows still continued so near us, although evidently without any infantry to support them, it was determined either to drive them away or take them prisoners. I must observe, our 15th hussars were at this time occupying Tarsac with ourselves, and one squadron of them were selected for this service. The advance of the French consisted only of one squadron, the remainder of their regiment being at some distance in rear as supports; consequently it was but fair that an equal force should attack them. Captain Hancox's squadron (in which was Captain Booth, with his troop) was pitched upon for this affair. The remainder of the 15th were drawn out to support them, if needed, but were not to take any part in the combat. Every one of course went out to see the fight. Accordingly this squadron moved on to the front, and steadily advanced upon the enemy, who seemed determined to stand the charge, as they put every thing ready to receive our gallant dragoons. When within a proper distance the word "trot" was given, and soon after "gallop," and then "charge," when our fellows dashed in among the French, upsetting them in all directions, and cutting many of them down to the ground. In a few minutes the business was settled, for our people returned, bringing in with them the captain commanding, (and who, I believe, had been personally engaged with Captain Hancox,) with about twenty-five men, prisoners. The rest made their escape. The French captain, and the greater part of the twenty-five men, were wounded, and some were left dead on the road. I shall not soon forget the little wounded captain. He, I believe, was either a native of Tarsac, or somewhere near, and had been determined to show his valour to the utmost; hence his standing, when he ought to have retired; but all the way, as they were bringing him along into the village, and after he reached the house where he directed them to take him, he kept crying out, "I'm as brave as a lion!--I'm as brave as the devil!" and could scarcely be got to hold his peace while the surgeon was dressing him. Most piteous moaning was made by many of the inhabitants, to whom it seems he was well known. We understood afterwards that this regiment, the 13th French hussars, had fallen rather under the displeasure of Soult, for some ill conduct on a former occasion, and that they were thus determined to wipe off the stain and retrieve their character; but they would have shown more sense, and have rendered more service to their country, had they retired when they saw it was determined to drive them away. On the 18th, we again advanced by the road the French had taken, and, crossing the Adour at the bridge and village of La Row or Arros, we pursued our route till we reached the town of St Germain's, where we halted for a short space; and thence to Plaisance, a good town, where we remained for the night. An unfortunate circumstance occurred in or near this town, which might have produced the most disastrous consequences:--A man, who most likely had been resisting the plundering of his house, was basely murdered by some soldier or soldiers of the division; but although every endeavour was made to discover the perpetrators of this vile act, they could not be found out; but a subscription was set on foot among the officers of the division, and 100 guineas were collected and paid to the unfortunate widow, who, though grieved for the loss of her husband, was thankful for the money. I strongly suspect my friends the Portuguese were the culprits on this occasion. On the 19th we again moved forward, and, passing Obrigort, halted for the night at the village of Aget. Towards the close of this day's march, we both heard and saw smart skirmishing, down on the great road which runs parallel to the ridge on which we were, and from Auch to Tarbes, along the plain on our right, and passes through Vic Bigore. Near this town the firing was very brisk. We understood it was Picton's division driving the French before them. The next morning we started early, and, continuing our march along the ridge of the height on which our last night's quarters were situated, we reached pretty soon the town of Rabasteins, where we learnt that the enemy had taken up a position in and near the town of Tarbes. We, accordingly, changing our direction, moved to our right, down the road leading from the former to the latter place. We passed on this road the sixth division, which, it seems, was ordered to keep on the flank of the enemy, which, should he make a stand, this division was to turn. When we got within about a mile and a half of Tarbes, we discovered the enemy posted on a strong woody height on the left of the road, with a windmill on its highest and most distant point. The whole of our 95th people were accordingly ordered forward, to endeavour to drive them from this position. My battalion formed the right, the 2d battalion the centre, and the 1st battalion the left of our line of skirmishers. We found them covered in front with a great number of light troops, which occupied us some time in driving in, and in which service we suffered considerably, for they occupied the hedges and dikes on the high ground, from which it was necessary we should dislodge them. We had also a considerably-sized brushwood to pass through before we could get at them. At length, after much smart skirmishing, we gained the height, but found the whole of their heavy infantry drawn up on a steep acclivity, near the windmill, which allowed them to have line behind line, all of which could fire at the same time over each other's heads, like the tiers of guns in a three-decker. We continued, however, to advance upon them, till we got within a hundred paces of this formidable body, the firing from which was the hottest I had ever been in, except perhaps Barossa. At this moment I received a shot through my right shoulder, which compelled me for a moment to retire; but meeting the main support of my battalion advancing with Colonel Ross at its head, and finding my wound had not disabled me, I again advanced with him, until we got close under the enemy's line, and took post behind a hillock, which protected us from their fire. We here found Colonel Norcott, who then belonged to the 2d battalion, riding about on his large black mare; but he had not ridden long till he also was wounded through the shoulder, from which he still suffers. While we were in this situation, a shot struck a captain of ours in the side where he had his drinking-horn slung; in fact it struck both the horn and his side; but, from some cause, it did not penetrate the flesh, but bruised it sore, which is generally painful. The captain, and those about him, thought he was shot through the body; they accordingly picked him up, and were carrying him off to the rear, when he cried, "Stop, let me feel," and putting his hand down to the place, and finding no wound, he sprung out of their arms, and, with the most ludicrous appearance possible, returned to his post again. No one present could refrain from laughing at the ridiculousness of this occurrence, although at the moment the men were falling fast around us. At this time also, a spent shot, one which I imagine had first hit the ground, struck me on the left arm, but did not injure me. I now thought it better to go to the rear to get my shoulder dressed, immediately after which I became quite faint from loss of blood. The firing still continued most animated on both sides; but before an hour had elapsed, the French were driven completely from every position they held on this very strong hill; and as I returned, (after having been dressed, and having swallowed some spirits to remove the faintness,) I found them posting away with all expedition to the plain below, some guns, which had just arrived, giving them an occasional shot, but from which they did not suffer much, they marched with such rapidity. We immediately followed them down to the plain, on reaching which, we perceived a body of French troops coming apparently from the town of Tarbes, pursued by the 3d division, with whom they had been engaged, and which, with some exertion, we thought we could intercept and cut off; but they, perceiving our intention, inclined considerably to the right, and marching with all speed, they got away before us. The enemy now having all retired across the plain, began to take up a strong position on a height at its extremity, towards which we continued to advance; but Lord Wellington having expected that the 6th division would by this time have reached their position, and, attacking in flank, have rendered our attack in front more likely to succeed, and they not making their appearance, although it was now nigh dusk, he ordered the divisions here to halt, and bivouack for the night on the plain. I never saw any one more disappointed, or apparently more annoyed by this last order, than our Adjutant-general, the lamented Sir Edward Packenham; he was for attacking them at once; but this could not have been done without a great sacrifice of excellent troops, as all those were who now filled the ranks of the British army, having by this time been completely seasoned, and become almost invaluable. In reviewing the operations of this day, I need say little, as facts speak for themselves. The enemy had on the Windmill hill, as it was vulgarly called, or more properly the hill of Oleac, I believe a whole division, consisting of at least 5000 or 6000 men, while not a shot was fired by any but by the sixteen companies of my regiment, amounting probably to 1000 or 1100 men; it is true the other regiments of the division were drawn up in rear of us, and would have supported us had we been repulsed. But it is not so much to the driving away of this so much stronger force, that I would draw the reader's attention, as to the great loss the enemy sustained, and solely from our fire. I believe I shall not be far from the truth, if I state their loss in killed and wounded as equal to the whole strength of our sixteen companies. Lord Wellington, in his dispatch, mentions the destruction caused in the enemy's ranks as unusually severe; hence the advantage of rifles over the common musket, or else the superior mode of using our arms beyond what is practised in the line. The Americans tauntingly tell us, our soldiers do not know how to use the weapons that are put into their hands; and, truly, if we are to judge by the awful destruction which they have occasionally inflicted upon our brave soldiers, we should be led to suspect that they understand this science much better than ourselves. It might, however, be easily remedied, if more attention were paid to the instruction of the recruit in this most essential qualification, and more time and ammunition devoted to target practice; but, at the same time, every officer should be made to know something of projectiles in general, or he will, as at present, be incapable of instructing his men. I will venture to assert, that eight out of ten of the soldiers of our regular regiments will aim in the same manner at an object at the distance of 300 yards, as at one only 50. It must hence be evident that the greater part of those shots are lost or expended in vain; indeed the calculation has been made, that only one shot out of 200 fired from muskets in the field takes effect, while one out of twenty from rifles is the average. My opinion is, that our line troops ought to be armed with a better description of musket. If five shillings more were added to the price, it would make a great difference in the article, and be very trifling to the public. Our army has always been too sparingly supplied with flints, which may be had almost for an old song; but if wanted in the field, nothing can supply their place. Many a brave soldier has fallen while hammering at a worn out flint. It is true we can, with the weapons we have, drive any other army out of the field, but not without occasionally sustaining an overwhelming loss, particularly when opposed to the Americans; and could we meet them with the same advantages they possess in point of shooting, our chances of victory would be greater, and at less expense. These are my private opinions only, and are deduced from the experience I have had, both as a heavy infantry soldier and a rifleman. I am now firmly persuaded, that of the near 200 shots I fired on the 2d of October 1799, in Holland, not one took effect, from my total want of knowledge how to aim. What an useless expenditure this was of both time and ammunition! Much indeed has lately been done by Sir Henry Torrens, to supply the deficiency of which I have been speaking, but still not sufficient, in my opinion, to remedy all the evils attendant thereon. Our loss on this occasion was very heavy, being about 100 men and eleven officers killed and wounded; the proportion of officers being nearly double what usually takes place. The regiments which supported us also had some casualties, arising from the shots which passed over our heads striking among them; but they were not considerable. My servants having heard I was wounded, went to Tarbes, (where all the wounded were collected,) with my baggage. I should consequently have been very ill off, had not my kind friend and messmate, Major Balvaird, lent me his tent and bed, as he himself had been ordered on picquet. Immediately after nightfall, the enemy had all retired from the position in front of us. We accordingly next morning continued the pursuit, and halted at night at the village of Lannemazen, not far from the borders of the Pyrenees, towards which, in their retreat, they had been inclined. This day and night, my shoulder had become extremely painful. We started again in the morning; but leaving the Pyrenees, we turned our faces more towards Toulouse, and took up our abode for the night at a considerable-sized town, called Castelnau; here the inhabitants received us very kindly, and we had excellent quarters. However, on the following morning, we were obliged to continue our march, and passing through several villages on the road, halted for the night at L'Isle, in Dodon. During this day's march, my poor old horse played me a sad trick. He was one which I had been compelled to purchase as soon after I lost my little Portuguese one by the bad shoeing of the blacksmith at Sumbilla, as I could fall in with one for sale. He was a very tall grey horse, rather old, and whose mouth had not been well made in his breaking; he was withal rather stubborn, or more properly speaking stupid, consequently he did not always obey the rein as he ought. The roads were excessively deep and dirty, and as I was riding at the head of the battalion, and had occasion to pull him a little to one side, for some purpose or other, he either would not, or could not, obey the pull of the rein; and as I had but one hand, he took advantage of it, and sat down completely on his haunches, in the very deepest of the mire. Of course I was tumbled right over his rump, and rolled in the mud, and after extricating myself as well as I could, I crawled out, as pretty a figure as may well be imagined. This, as might be expected, raised the laugh of all who saw it, at my expense; but, uncomfortable and ridiculous as my situation was, I was not hurt, the mud being sufficiently deep to protect me from any injury by the fall. In this village I fell in with a Frenchman who had just come from Toulouse, towards which he understood we were bending our course. He gave me such a flaming account of the "belle position" in the neighbourhood of that town, and of the impregnable works which Soult had caused to be thrown up, and of the superb artillery which were stationed there, and which, he said, were those who had served in the famous battle of Austerlitz, and of the utter improbability of any impression ever being made on them by an enemy, that if I had given credit to the half of what he told me, I might have been filled with fear lest all our laurels might here be tarnished. From what motive this rather exaggerated statement was made, I know not, but am inclined to think it was merely an inclination to indulge in a trifling gasconade. On the 25th we reached Mont Ferrand, where we halted for the night. On the 27th, in the morning, we were moved forward to the village of Tournefoile, where it seems some of our cavalry had been quartered the night before, but who had had their quarters beat up during the night by a body of the enemy, who still held the ground beyond the village. My battalion, and a Portuguese battalion, were sent forward, the remainder of the brigade following. We found the enemy occupying the road leading from the village to a bridge about half a mile distant, together with the hedges and enclosures in the vicinity. My people extended to the left, while the Portuguese battalion kept on the road. A smart skirmish now commenced, during which the enemy gradually retired towards the bridge; but at this time a most remarkable occurrence took place. One of our men (the servant of a friend of mine) received a shot in the mouth, which struck out several of his teeth. One of these was propelled with such force by the blow that it flew at least twenty yards, and, entering the left arm of one of the Portuguese on the road, inflicted a deep and severe wound. When the surgeon of the 43d, who was the nearest to this man at the time, came to dress the wounded Portuguese, he, instead of a ball as every one expected, extracted a tooth, at which, no doubt, both he and all about him were quite astonished; and a report was immediately set afloat that the enemy were firing bones instead of balls. This most extraordinary circumstance was not cleared up till they were informed of our man having had his teeth knocked out, when, after comparing the relative situations of the two men, it became quite evident how this most uncommon wound had been inflicted. If any thing like a joke might be permitted on such an occasion, it may with great propriety be said, the Frenchman who fired the shot had killed two birds with one stone. I happened to be near our man at the time, and besides seeing him wounded, I enquired minutely into the circumstances, or I own I should have hesitated before I gave implicit credit to the story; so it may probably be with my reader. Poor fellow, he had afterwards nearly all his intestines torn out by a cannon-shot at the fatal attack near New Orleans, and where I saw him writhing in the agonies of death; his name was Powell, and he was, I believe, a Welshman. Not long after the commencement of the skirmish, the artillery on both sides was brought into play; but the enemy kept gradually retiring till they crossed the bridge, and as we did not pursue them, they quietly walked off, taking the road towards Toulouse. I cannot conceive for what purpose this body of troops had been sent here, unless it was intended as a reconnoissance, to ascertain whether any, and what description, of troops had arrived at this point, as their waiting, after driving out our cavalry, to see whether any infantry approached, would seem to indicate. Major Balvaird was conspicuously brave on this occasion. The loss on either side was but trifling. CHAPTER XIV. The British Army cross the Garonne--Advance on Toulouse--Prepare for the Attack--The Attack--Spaniards driven back--Battle very hot--French completely defeated--Soult evacuates Toulouse, and tardily adheres to the Bourbons. On the 28th or 29th, we were moved forward, and after a short march we reached a beautiful plain, with Toulouse appearing most magnificent in the distance. Here we went into cantonments, in the different villages and chateaux in the neighbourhood, the greater part of which were completely deserted, and many of them most wofully sacked and plundered, which could have been done only by their own troops. A noble and stately mansion, belonging to a Mr Villeneuve, stood immediately in front of our outposts, which had shared the same fate with all the others, every article of furniture having been entirely destroyed. The cloth had been torn from the billiard-table, the splendid pier-glasses shivered into a thousand atoms, and, in short, every article of luxury or splendour which a man could wish for, might have been found in this princely habitation previous to its desertion by its owner; but now devastation and destruction had laid its unhallowed hands on all in which its possessor had formerly delighted. I, with my messmates, took the liberty of visiting Mr V.'s fish-ponds, where we found some fine-looking carp; and having some hooks by me, we caught a considerable quantity, which we imagined would be a great treat to our messmates; but we found them excessively muddy, and not worth eating. Here also we rejoiced in being able to procure some good provender for our still half-starved horses and mules. The grass and cinquefoil which we found in this beautiful and luxuriant plain, in a few days began to make a wonderful improvement in our poor fellow-travellers. I know not a more gratifying feeling than we experienced in thus being able to feed the hungry; for although they were but of the inferior creation, yet so much did our own comforts, and, indeed, efficiency for service, depend on their being capable of performing the task allotted to them, and so much did the circumstance of our having passed through trials and dangers together attach us to them, that I very frequently would have preferred getting them a meal even at the expense of wanting one myself. Here my little Portuguese horse, which I had originally brought from Lisbon, and who had been my companion in all my wanderings, (except when he was left for a while owing to his bad foot,) began to look quite brisk and lively again; for hitherto his spirits had been very low indeed since he happened by his misfortune, and had been literally starved into the bargain. A pontoon bridge having been constructed some distance above the town, and which our engineers had been able to accomplish on account of its being thrown over above the junction of the Ariege with the Garonne, on the 31st we moved down towards this point, and crossing it, my battalion was left as its guard in a village on the bank of the river. The remainder of the division, and the ---- division,[3] moved up the Ariege river with the intention of crossing, and thus approaching Toulouse in that direction; but, from the heavy rains, the river was too much flooded, which, together with the dreadful state of the roads, these troops were unable to effect this operation, and were consequently recalled. By the 2d of April the whole had recrossed the Garonne, when we again went into our cantonments on the plain, but now farther down the river than before. We remained here a few days, and I cannot help recording a remarkable circumstance which took place at this time. For want of dwelling-houses we had been obliged to put a certain number of the men of my battalion into a sort of wine-house; it was not a vault, for it was above ground, but had a considerable number of barrels of wine in it, amongst which the men were obliged to sleep. It will scarcely be credited, but not one of these men ever appeared the least intoxicated during the whole time they lay there. Whether they were completely tired of wine, or whether their having been placed in such a situation produced a feeling of honour and pride among them, I know not, but I verily believe less wine was drunk by these men during the time they remained here, than would have been had they had to pay most exorbitantly for it. With soldiers I believe it is as with mankind in general; what is prohibited always appears more valuable or more pleasurable in our eyes, than what we may with freedom enjoy. On the 6th we moved down the river till within a short distance of Grenade, about twelve miles below Toulouse. We halted near a small village, and encamped. A pontoon bridge had been thrown over the Garonne here, and one division (I believe the 3d) had crossed; but now, owing to the swollen state of the river, together with several attempts which were now made by the enemy to destroy the bridge, by floating down trees, &c. which might eventually carry it away, it loosened at the farther end, and the anchors being taken up, the whole was allowed to float down to our side of the river, keeping fast the end next our own bank. We remained in this situation for several days, one division only being on the opposite side, with which it was impossible to communicate, or, if attacked, to afford it almost any support. Now was the time for the enemy to bestir himself; for had he marched out of Toulouse with half his force, and been met at this place by the force he had at Montauban, they must have annihilated this division, or taken them prisoners. It is true we might have rendered them some little assistance by our artillery from the bank we occupied, but the distance was so great that a determined enemy would not have held back from the dread of it. I took a trip from hence to Grenade, where the paymaster-general had established the military chest, as I had not yet quite finished my paymaster's duty. It is a good-sized town, but contains nothing remarkable, only here I remember I got some excellent wine of the Champagne kind, and which my friend poured out of an immense magnum bottle. I understood our Chief was most anxious to have the bridge re-established by the 9th, which was Easter eve, the weather having now somewhat taken up, and the river of course had fallen; but although the engineer thought he could effect it, and had promised his lordship it should be ready by that time, it was not passable till the morning of the 10th. Early on that morning, my division crossed to the other side, together with the 4th and 6th divisions, and a whole host of Spaniards. I omitted to mention, that these latter gentry, on their entering France, had behaved most wantonly, and had committed numerous atrocities; on which, his lordship, as Generalissimo, had ordered them back to their own country again; but upon the promise of good behaviour, and an anxious desire to participate in the honourable achievements of the allied troops, he had granted them permission to rejoin the army, and they were to have a post of honour assigned them at the ensuing battle. Such was the current report which prevailed among our army newsmongers: be it as it may, however, they were here in number, I should think, about 6000 or 8000. The whole army now present having crossed, except General Hill with the 2d division, advanced upon the town of Toulouse. We here found a beautiful country and excellent roads, along which we got on rapidly. The town stands close to the right bank of the river, along which there are numerous quays, and over which there is an excellent bridge, communicating with the suburb on the opposite side, called St Cyprian. From the river on the north side of the town runs the famous canal of Languedoc, with which it communicates by locks, and which, encircling the town on that and on the east sides, with the river on the west, almost entirely encloses it. On the east side of the town, and just beyond the canal, a considerable eminence arises, forming a sort of chain or ridge, on the top of which numerous redoubts and batteries had been constructed, and which, both from the nature of the ground and by the great labour bestowed upon them, had been rendered, as the Frenchman told me, nearly impregnable. The 6th division, supported by the 4th, had been ordered to move considerably to the left, and, after crossing the Garonne, to attack this formidable position on the outer side, while the Spaniards were to attack it immediately in front. My division was ordered to communicate with the right of the Spaniards, and, extending down to the great Montauban road, was to press upon the town in this direction, in order to aid the attack upon the height before mentioned. The 3d division joined our right at the Montauban road, and extended from thence down to the river, and were ordered to act similarly to us. The 2d division, under General Hill, remained on the other side of the river, and was to co-operate by attacking the suburb before mentioned, together with the works for the protection of the bridge, and for the same purpose of our attack, namely, to keep the troops in these parts of the town employed, while the 6th division and Spaniards attacked the height. Immediately in front of our division, we found considerable bodies of troops, at some distance from the town, occupying the houses all along the road, and which it took us a considerable time to drive in. They had also constructed a battery on the bridge over the canal, where the great road passes, and from which they kept up an almost incessant fire. At the hither end of the bridge also there stood a very large convent, which they had fortified in a very strong manner, having loopholed the whole of the surrounding wall, which was twenty feet high, and had also looped the upper part of the convent, which contained a garrison of probably 1000 or 1200 men. We commenced operations in conjunction with the 3d division on our right, in driving these people in, and with whom a smart firing was kept up during the whole day. The French had also other troops beyond the canal, and on the Moorish or Roman wall which encircled the town inside the canal, and both of which they had fortified; so that, had it been intended we should force the town on this side, we should have found it a difficult undertaking: we were, however, merely (as said before) to press upon them without committing ourselves; but unfortunately, in the eagerness of some of our people to push forward, they got immediately under the muzzles of the pieces of the men who were defending the convent, and from the loopholes several of our poor fellows were shot without being able to see their antagonists. A good number fell here; for it was not more than thirty yards distant where they had taken up their post, and an unpleasant one it was as well as dangerous; for they were obliged to stand in a drain which ran from a jakes, and which of course emitted no very desirable flavour; or, if they had left it for a moment, they were immediately shot. Our adjutant escaped here as by a miracle, the bole of a very small tree having stopped the ball that would have pierced his body. When, however, we had got them fairly driven in, we had then time to look about us, and the first thing we saw was the Don moving on to the attack of the height with all due ceremony. They gained the first or lower ridge without much opposition, and here getting up some artillery, a pretty heavy fire was opened on the enemy; but the French remained quite passive, not offering to resist the approaching Spaniards till they got within a certain distance of their works on the top of the hill. The Spaniards, elated by having gained the first ridge so easily, pushed on too rapidly, and without having taken time to re-form their columns after the first conquest. They were not aware either that a rather deep ravine separated them from the enemy's works; however, on they pushed, in a very disorderly manner, till they reached the point the French intended they should reach, when a fire was opened out upon them, such as they had never witnessed before. Few troops would have remained unshaken by such a reception, but to the Spaniards it was intolerable; consequently they broke into a thousand parties, and, turning tail, it was who should be first away from such unpleasant doings. I am told that Lord Wellington at this moment could scarcely hold his sides for laughing, and cried out he "wondered whether the Pyrenees would bring them up again, they seemed to have got such a fright." He did not indeed depend on their valour, or he would have made a bad winding up of his Peninsular campaign. The moment they left the height, every man took the way that seemed to him best, and they soon after literally covered the whole plain, and set to work with all expedition to plunder at least, if they would not fight. Some of the villains had the audacity to come and take a poor man's horse out of the stable of the very house which we were then, as it were, defending, and had nigh got off with it; but having been perceived, it was taken from them, and restored again to its owner. The left of our division was now obliged to be moved up to fill the space vacated by these vagabonds; and in doing which a good deal of hard fighting took place. This also made the people in front of us rally again, and coming out in great numbers hurraing and shouting, we had something to do to drive them back. But by this time we heard, in the distance behind the hill, a dropping and now brisker fire; by and by, approaching the summit, it became quite animated. We could plainly perceive now the different appearance which the French assumed; they no longer lay supine and passive till their enemy approached their works, but fought for every inch of ground, and all was now animation and bustle among them, hurrying to the support of those troops who defended the redoubts, &c. on the point assailed. The battle now raged with great fury, each party with all their might for the mastery, and the French, we could perceive, when compelled by sheer force to yield ground, did it with the utmost reluctance. At length, we saw the British colour waving on the summit of the hill, with the most deadly warfare raging on each side of it; but every move we saw was in favour of the British. The 42d regiment had by this time gained possession of the principal redoubt, which they held till their ammunition was all expended, and which the enemy perceiving, or suspecting, again advanced, and gained possession of it. Things did not now wear quite so favourable an aspect; but being promptly supported by other troops behind them, a movement was again made in advance, and again the French were expelled from the redoubt. Great was the slaughter in and about this place, as I saw next day when I visited it. The enemy were now reluctantly compelled to yield up all those famous works, on which so much time and labour had been expended, and on which they so much relied, and were obliged to abandon (slowly indeed) this long disputed ridge; but they fought till they were fairly forced down into the town, where they still kept up a feeble fire; at length it gradually subsided. This was the principal part of the drama; but it had many subordinate plots. On our right, General Picton, with that ardour which ever characterised him, was scarcely well satisfied to play an under part on this occasion; and, instead of merely keeping his opponents in play, as I before hinted, he was for effecting a forcible entry into the town. He accordingly attacked with his division a strong and well-secured battery, near the canal, in doing which his brave Connaught Rangers, who had scarcely ever hitherto known a reverse, met with a severe and bloody repulse, in which they lost a great number of excellent officers and men. The other corps of his division, who co-operated, also suffered greatly. General Hill strictly obeyed his instructions, and, as he always did, effected every object at which he aimed. In this action I had another opportunity of witnessing the effect of presentiment. Early in it I was sent forward by my commanding-officer with some orders to a company of ours, which was in front skirmishing, and which had taken possession of a house, which partly screened them from the enemy's battery on the bridge. Behind this house, one of the men was sitting on a heap of stones with the most woe-worn countenance possible. He had separated from the rest of the men, and was sitting here apparently ruminating on his fate, and appeared to be quite absorbed in his meditations. I remarked him most particularly, wondering what could render him so different from the rest of his comrades, who were all life and animation, and from what he had formerly been himself in action. He presently went forward with some of the other men, and soon after fell to rise no more. The poor man's melancholy look made a deep impression upon me at the time, together with his fate soon after. Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse; our troops maintaining the ground they had gained, while the enemy had retired into the town completely beaten. Soult seemed undetermined how to act, whether to endeavour to hold the town, (which indeed he might have done for a day or two perhaps,) or to leave it by the road towards the south, the only one now open to him. We rested on the field all night, the enemy sending an occasional shot or shell in the direction of our camp. Next morning we still found the enemy retaining possession of the town; and nothing being likely to be done, I rode up with another officer to see the bloody field, with all its redoubts and batteries, and also to see, if I could, in what situation the enemy now appeared. Just as we reached the summit, a cry was given by the 42d sentry, "Turn out the picquet." There was a good deal of firing going on in the suburbs nearest to the position, which this Highlander thought it right to apprize his people of. We looked a considerable time with our glasses, and observed a good number of troops on a green and open space in that part of the suburbs, and who every now and then would fire their muskets. I thought it must either be a sort of _feu-de-joie_, or a funeral, and it turned out to be the latter. They were burying a general officer, who had fallen the day before, and to whom they were paying the last melancholy honours; but it was conducted in a quite different manner from our military funerals, for they did not fire in volleys like us; but every few minutes apparently a few men only fired, and by and by some others. This had the effect, however, of turning out our whole line in the neighbourhood of the position; and as I was afterwards returning, I met Colonel Barnard and Colonel Colborne (than whom there were not two better officers in the army) riding up to see what was the matter. Colonel Barnard asked me what it was. I told him what I thought it was. He said the whole line had fallen in, thinking it was an attack. Towards evening we heard that the inhabitants of the city had been most urgent on Soult to withdraw from it; and that he had promised to do so. Indeed, had he not, Lord Wellington might, if he chose, have soon reduced the town to ashes; for the heights we had taken were not 500 yards distant from the city, and completely overlooked it. On the morning of the 12th, therefore, Soult marched out, and was not molested by our troops. He took the road to Villefranche and Carcassonne, up the canal of Languedoc, our cavalry following their track. Now all the loyalists came rushing out of the town to meet and welcome us; every one wearing white scarfs or favours to denote his attachment to the Bourbons. Now all was joy and festivity, and nothing but shaking of hands and embracing was to be seen in all directions. This day also arrived Lord Stewart from Paris with the account of Bonaparte's abdication, and of the Bourbons having been reinstated. It was also rumoured that Soult had received this news previous to the battle; but not being inclined to yield obedience to that dynasty, he had allowed the warfare to proceed. Indeed, what almost puts this beyond a doubt, was his still continuing for many days after this to refuse sending in his submission to the Bourbon government. We also heard afterwards that the courier bringing the official information of Bonaparte's fall, &c. had been detained by the postmaster of Montauban by Soult's direction; for although he had had private intelligence of the fact, he imagined the detention of the official information might screen him hereafter. Such are the surmises of the wise heads respecting this affair, which, as it turned out, is to be regretted; for the sacrifice of so many valuable lives on both sides was a thing of no trifling importance; but I believe Soult felt sore at his having been so often worsted, and hoped here in some measure to retrieve his lost honours; for it cannot be doubted, I believe, that he expected to be able to repel our attack at least, if not to force us to retire from Toulouse. On the 13th, the divisions marched into the town; my battalion having the fauxbourg adjoining the lately disputed position assigned to it, and in which we found very comfortable quarters. To show that the French people of this place took Lord Wellington either for a very generous person, or a great fool, a man who owned a house on the border of the position, and which the French had fortified by loopholing it, and otherwise rendering it unfit for occupation by its owner, sent in a memorial to his lordship, praying him to order that he might receive out of the military chest a sufficient sum to enable him to put his house in its former state; and this, although it had been done by his own countrymen. I suppose his lordship would laugh at it when he saw it. I should have been inclined to be angry with the fellow. The man showed the memorial to the adjutant and myself before he sent it in--a step which of course we dissuaded him from taking. Notwithstanding it was notorious that Bonaparte's career was at that time finished, Soult still made a show of holding out for him; in consequence of which the army was again put in motion to compel him either to send in his adhesion to the new government, or to resign his command of troops who had not now a master. He had taken up a position near Villefranche. Accordingly, we marched, I think, on the 15th or 16th, the which rather alarmed him; and in consequence he despatched Count Gazan with terms to offer to his lordship, the which, after some alterations, were finally agreed upon, and the army returned once more to Toulouse, where we resumed our former quarters. Thus finished the Peninsular War, the last campaign of which had been the most active probably that is recorded in history. In ten months and a half we had marched from the frontiers of Portugal, had completely traversed Spain, which we had cleared of its long troublesome and insidious invaders; had penetrated far into the interior of that country, which three years before gave law to most of the continental nations; and had worsted, in various actions, those troops, which, except when encountering the British, had been accustomed almost invariably to conquer. FOOTNOTE: [3] Some obscurity is occasioned here and elsewhere, by blanks being left in the MS., which the death of the good-humoured and kindly author has rendered it now impossible to fill up.--ED. CHAPTER XV. Author's happy state during 1813 and 1814--Character of the veritable French--British distributed over the Country--Civility of the Inhabitants of Grissolles--Amusements in quarters--The British prepare to quit France. When I look back on the events of 1813 and 1814, I cannot but deem that the happiest period of my life, for I had been actively, and, as I believed, usefully employed. My mind during this time was tranquil, and I was, with a few exceptions, prosperous in my outward circumstances. All those among whom my lot was cast were now sincerely friendly to me, and I believe I may with confidence affirm that I had not (with the exception of the person before mentioned, and who was now far removed from me) a single enemy in the world. It is true my occupation had not been, strictly speaking, of a Christian character, but I believed I was fulfilling my duty; hence the peace of mind which I enjoyed. I have since learned certainly, that a Christian, to resemble his Master, should be more ready to save than to destroy men's lives; but, at the same time, I cannot see why a Christian soldier should not be as zealous in the defence of his king and country, as those who are actuated by other motives; and it is certain, I believe, although I once doubted whether there was such a precept, that in whatever calling or occupation a man is in when called to become a Christian, that therein he should abide, 1st Cor. vii. 17, 20, and 24. But I attribute the peace of mind I then enjoyed as much to the constant employment which the nature of our services entailed upon us, as to any other cause. Be it remembered, I was doing the duties of both paymaster and quartermaster during this period, and my battalion had been as often called into action as any in the army, having been engaged in battles and skirmishes no less than sixteen times in less than ten months. This naturally left little time for reflection. But, above all, I am bound to render thanks to where alone it is due, to that gracious and beneficent Being, who not only watched over me during this period, and protected me from harm, but who poured his choicest blessings upon me, even the blessings of a cheerful and contented heart, together with the means of retrieving my sadly deranged finances; for had I not been appointed acting paymaster, I might have gone to prison on my return to my native country, from the unavoidable losses I had sustained, and which I shall mention by and by. Another cause of comfort and cheerfulness arose from our operations against the enemy having been invariably successful; for we never, from the time of our leaving the frontiers of Portugal, till we took possession of Toulouse, met with any thing like a serious reverse. Most of my readers no doubt know that the city where we had now taken up our quarters is one of the largest and finest in this part of France; but as it has been so often described, I shall content myself with merely informing my readers, that the people among whom we now resided were truly and veritably French. The character of the inhabitants, since we left our poor friends the Basques, had materially changed; that kind, but rude and simple hospitality, which had on most occasions been displayed by those honest mountaineers, had now given place to all that imposing, but less sincere politeness of the real French character. We were, indeed, treated here with every degree of respect; and perhaps more, or at least an equal degree of attention, was paid to our convenience and comfort, as they would have shown to their own troops. We had every reason, therefore, to be perfectly satisfied. In this part of the country there are a great number of Protestants, which, of course, permitted us to live on better terms with them than had they been all such stanch and bigoted Catholics as we met with in some parts of the Continent, and where our heretical presence was frequently looked upon as a contamination; for I remember well in the small village of Zalada, where we lay for some time, near Astorga, we never left the village, as they supposed, for a permanency, but the joy bells were rung for our departure. It was our lot, indeed, to be frequently quartered in this village, and such was their invariable custom. It is true the Padre and people of the place only expressed openly the feeling that was covertly, but universally, entertained throughout Spain and Portugal respecting us; for although the monks and priests made great pretences of friendship and good-will towards us, while we were upholding them in their iniquitous dominion over the minds of the people, yet secretly they cordially hated us, and were glad when at last our successes contributed to rid their country of both the invaders and their conquerors. One noble Spanish lady, (I remember well,) when I was quartered at Cadiz, made use of an expression which I am sure would shock and horrify my simple and delicate countrywomen. She said, "She should rejoice to see all the French then in their country hung up in the intestines (las tripas) of the English, who had come to drive them out." Thus they should get quit of both. This lady, as might be supposed, was a most depraved and abandoned being, yet even she, it seems, looked upon us in the light of a curse or plague sent upon their country, rather than as a generous and gallant people, who had not hesitated to sacrifice much, both of blood and money, in freeing them from their French oppressors. But such, I fear, is the too general feeling in that country; for while the innumerable religiosos which overrun that nation maintain their cursed dominion over the minds of the other classes, an Englishman will always be looked upon by them as a dangerous and hateful being, uniting in himself both the mortal sins, first, of having totally cast off the Pope's authority, and being the subject of a free and popular government--than either of which, not even Satan himself could be more odious to them. We were not allowed, however, to remain long in Toulouse, but were distributed over the country in the neighbourhood, lines of demarcation having been pointed out which were to separate the French and British armies. My division was sent down the right bank of the river, and occupied Castel Sarazin, Grissolles, and Castelnau, &c. My battalion was stationed at Grissolles. During our stay here I had two or three opportunities, in company with others, of going to see Montauban, the seat of a Protestant college, and famed in romantic lore. The people were kind and obliging, and showed us every attention; but unfortunately a French garrison was quartered in it, the officers of which took every opportunity of quarrelling with ours. Indeed we had no business there, and were consequently obliged to put up with more than we should have otherwise done, for we were strictly forbid to enter any place within the French lines; but we did not conceive that those fellows, who had shown themselves so friendly and polite near Bayonne, while we were avowedly in arms against each other, would now turn round upon us when peace was made, and endeavour to engage us in quarrels and duelling. But I believe they felt a degree of soreness at our acknowledged superiority as soldiers, (for even the inhabitants of Montauban, where they lay, did not hesitate to express it,) and thus wished to be revenged for the many victories we had gained over them. Indeed there was a sort of recklessness about them which is not easily accounted for, unless they supposed their occupation was gone, and cared not what became of themselves; but they did not succeed, I think, in any instance in obtaining their wishes, for they would not fight with pistols, the only weapon which gives each a fair and equal chance, but insisted upon using the sword,--a mode of fighting to which the English in general were utter strangers. The people uniformly gave us warning as soon as ever they learnt that a plot was laid to insult us, on which we generally came away without subjecting ourselves to it; and when their designs became too evident, we refrained from going there. It was only a short distance from our quarters. During our stay here, also, the Marquis de Pompignan, a gentleman residing between Grissolles and Castelnau, and where our Major-general had taken up his quarters, gave to the officers of the brigade a splendid fête. I know not exactly how to denominate it, for it was a sort of dramatic medley, part of it being performed in the garden and part in the house, where a private theatre had been fitted up; that in the garden, it was said, was intended to represent some military event,--I think it was the burning of Moscow, and in which the Marquis's beautiful daughter bore a part. This young lady was said to be greatly enamoured of an honourable gentleman, aide-de-camp to the General, who was quartered in their house, and between whom it was expected a match would have taken place. She was extremely beautiful and engaging. We sometimes went a-fishing while we remained here also, but were not successful, there being none other than lake-fish, such as perch, &c., in the neighbourhood, which were scarcely worth taking. Here, also, for want of better occupation, some of our young gentlemen amused themselves by hunting and lashing the Spanish muleteers as they were returning, after having delivered in their loads at the commissary's stores. They always rode one mule, (sideways, like a woman,) and led one or two more, and were most dexterous in handling the long shank of the halter, with which they sometimes soundly belaboured their pursuers; and had they not been set on by two or three at a time, they would not have liked better fun than to fight one of our gentlemen with his whip, for they saw that it was only for amusement, and generally took it good-naturedly; but our young gentlemen, as they generally do, carried the joke too far, and it was consequently put a stop to. Of course none but the young and idle took any part in this exercise. We had, while we lay here, also several little balls and hops; and here, for the first time, several of our young men began to dance quadrilles; in short, there was no want of amusement among this gay and lively people, who are ever intent upon pleasure themselves, and who of course found our wild and thoughtless young fellows ever as ready to second their endeavours to get up something new and entertaining. Certainly their morality is not the highest in the world, but their vices are most of them divested of that coarse and disgusting appearance which similar vices carry on their front in England; and thus, while they are generally more pleasing, they are the more seducing, and consequently the more dangerous. However, as no person is compelled to enter into these scenes of dissipation and voluptuousness which they rejoice in, I found it, upon the whole, a very comfortable country to live in. The people were kind and civil, and were always good-natured and polite, and, as we now had plenty of the good things of this world at our command, I spent two months here very contentedly. It is true we had none of those excellent privileges with which my native country abounds, and which I have since learnt highly to prize,--I mean the privileges of the gospel,--the food for the nobler and never-dying part; but I was then ignorant of their value, for although I had been convinced and convicted, I had not been converted. I was still in darkness respecting the way, the truth, and the life, and yet my foolish and carnal mind whispered peace; hence my contentedness in this situation. No! it was not till some years that I discovered that there is but one way to real happiness, but one true foundation on which to build our hope,--even that which is laid in Zion. But the time had arrived for us to move down towards Bordeaux, preparatory to our quitting France. Accordingly, on the 3d June, we forded the Garonne, and stopped all night in Grenade, a place I formerly mentioned. We next day reached Cadours, a village near Cologne, where our 2d battalion was that evening quartered. In the afternoon of that day, a storm collected in the north, which I think had the most frightful appearance I ever witnessed. It was actually as black as night in the direction in which we saw it. It did not reach us, but it alarmed the inhabitants of our village so much, that they set on ringing the church bells with the utmost fury imaginable. We could not account for this strange proceeding till we enquired of them why it was done. They told us the devil was in the storm, and the bells being holy, he durst not, when he heard them, proceed any farther in that direction. Indeed they had ample reason to be in dread of its reaching their village; for the next day, as we passed along the country where it had raged most furiously, the whole face of the country was desolated. It had been a hail-storm such as I never before witnessed. The hailstones were still lying, some of them larger than a bullet; the vines had been all destroyed; the crops of corn completely swept from the face of the earth. Trees knocked down, birds killed; in short, nothing could equal the appearance of misery and woe which this awful hail-storm had inflicted upon the unfortunate inhabitants, many of whom were going about wringing their hands in all the bitterness of heart, which a consciousness of being deprived of every hope of subsistence for the year to come would naturally inspire. Indeed most of them were literally stripped of their all. On the 6th we marched into Lectoure, a fine town on the river, and famous for having given birth to Marshal Lannes, one of Bonaparte's best generals. It stands on a high ground near the river, and overlooks one of the richest and most beautiful plains I think I ever saw. Here I experienced another misfortune in my steed. My little Portuguese horse (which was now in high condition, and being an entire horse was apt to fight) quarrelled with a large horse belonging to one of our officers, while I was serving out the billets; and although we were both mounted at the time, the quarrelsome animals reared up against each other, and fought most desperately; but his, being the strongest, pulled mine and myself down to the ground. I luckily fell clear of him, and was not hurt; but he by some accident got a kick in his hind leg or foot, which completely lamed him, and I could not ride him any longer. We passed through Condom, another fine town, and Nerac, also a good town, and nearly full of Protestants. We next day halted at Castel Jaloux, where I was quartered on a house of religeuse. Here my poor little horse was so very ill that I could not drag him any farther. I was consequently obliged to leave him with those good dames, to whom I made him a present, and parted from him in the morning with sincere regret. They promised to take care of him, which I hope they did. We next reached the town of Bazas. Here there was to be another parting scene exhibited. The Portuguese were ordered to leave us here, and proceed towards their own country. The Spanish and Portuguese women who had followed the men were either to be sent home from hence, or their protectors were to consent to marry them. Some adopted the latter alternative, having had children by them, and some others who had not, and the remainder, of course, were compelled to separate. Our division drew up in the morning they marched, and honoured the brave Portuguese (for indeed they had always behaved well in the field) with three cheers, as they turned their faces towards Portugal. Many were the heavy hearts in both armies on this occasion; for it is not easy to conceive how the circumstance of passing through scenes of hardship, trial, and danger together, endeared the soldiers of the two armies to each other. It was perhaps never before felt so fully how much each was attached to the other; but the departure of the poor women caused many heavy hearts, both among themselves, poor creatures, who had a long and dreary journey before them, and among those with whom they had lived, and who had shared in all their good and bad fortune; but among these, several on both sides were not oppressed with too fine feelings. A friend of mine, who was an officer in the Portuguese service, told me afterwards that the women marched down to Spain and Portugal at the same time his regiment did; that they formed a column of 800 or 900 strong; that they were regularly told off into companies; and that the commanding-officer, a major, and all the captains, were married men, who had their families with them--all excellent arrangements; but that they were the most unmanageable set of animals that ever marched across a country. The officers had to draw rations for them all the way; but many of them, he says, left the column and went wherever they pleased. Few reached Portugal in the order in which they started. We reached Langon on the 12th, and Barsac on the 13th June. This latter place is famed for a fine white-wine, something resembling sauterne. The adjutant (who had now been my chum for some time) and I were here quartered in a fine old baronial castle, the inmates of which showed us great attention. A ball was given in the evening to the officers of the brigade. On the 14th we halted at Castres, and on the 15th entered Bordeaux. This was the finest town we had seen since we entered the Peninsula, except Lisbon and Madrid. This town had been occupied by the British for some time, a division of the army having been sent by Lord Wellington to take charge of it in the name of Louis XVIII. We were not, however, destined to be quartered in this southern capital of France, but marched right through it, on the road towards the village of Blancfort. On the road the division was formed, and very minutely inspected by our gallant Chief, who was dressed in all his finery, his orders, and medals, and ribbons, &c., which he wore for the first time that ever I had seen. He looked most splendid indeed, and right proud were we to see him in them. After inspection we moved on to the camp at Blancfort, where we found a great part of the army assembled, waiting for the arrival of shipping to carry them off. Some had sailed a considerable time before our arrival. Besides our tents, the adjutant and I had got a cottage close by, in which our servants and our baggage were put. We had not been here above two or three days, I think, till his two servants, that is, his servant and groom, took it into their heads to desert. This was not the first instance of desertion that had taken place lately; for as we drew near the time of departure great numbers ran off into the interior, mostly bad characters. However, on this occasion, these worthies were determined to have something to carry them on the road, and, without hesitation, broke open their master's panniers, or boxes, and took away all the money he had, which did not indeed amount to any great sum, for it was only 40 dollars, (about L.10 British,) but it being all he was worth it was a great loss to him. I have reason to be thankful to Providence for my escape on this occasion. My paymaster's chest was standing close to the adjutant's panniers when they broke them open, and they did not touch it, although it contained about L.400 worth of gold. Had they taken that I might have gone after them. I of course expressed my thankfulness for this lucky escape, and told several people of it. I fancy some person (my groom, I suspect) overheard me telling what a lucky escape I had been favoured with, and determined in his own mind that I should not always come off so well. The sequel will show: A few days after this I had occasion to go into Bordeaux to draw some money from the Commissary-general. The amount was 600 dollars, or about L.150. As I could not conveniently carry them out to the camp, I requested Major Balvaird, who had a quarter in town, to allow me to put them in his portmanteau till I had an opportunity of getting them sent out. His servant had overheard this conversation, and made up his mind at once to desert and take this money with him; but providentially again I escaped. I found the means, before night, of carrying it out to the camp, and the Major gave it me unknown to the servant. That night he broke open the portmanteau, and, taking every thing worth carrying away, (among which was a gold watch of mine,) deserted, and got clear off. This money, also, had it been taken, would have sorely crippled me, although I might perhaps have overcome the loss. We marched in a few days after, passing through the district of Medoc, famous for Bordeaux or claret wine, and halted for the night at Castelnau de Medoc. The next day we passed through Chateau Margaux, where the best and most expensive of the claret grows, and again encamped at Pauillac, from whence we were to go on board. Now was the time for the person who had overheard me speaking about my escape with the L.400, to make his grab and start off, or he would be too late. Accordingly, after dark, he or they lifted up a part of the tent where the box was standing, and, pulling it out, set off with it bodily. But, again directed by Providence, I had taken the money out of the box, and given it into the hands of a gentleman, to take care of for me; and there remained in the box my papers and books, public and private, about L.19 in money, an old silver watch, and, among other things, the half doubloon which poor Croudace had given me to take care of for him on the evening previous to his death at Badajos, and which I was preserving as a memorial for his afflicted friends. As soon as the box was missed I instantly raised the hue and cry, and, reporting the circumstance to my commanding-officer, he ordered the rolls to be called, to see if any man had deserted; but no, they were all present. I then offered a reward of forty dollars to any one who would bring me the box and papers, and did not regard the money. Instantly the whole camp was in a move to find the box, and search was made in all directions. I of course was not idle myself on the occasion; and having a man or two with me, I actually discovered where the box had been opened, for I found the inkstand, that had been in it, lying near a heap of wood close to the bank of the river, into which, after plundering it, no doubt they had thrown it. I now went down to the town and waited on the mayor, offering the same reward to any of his people that would try to find it in the river; but, unfortunately, just as there was the best chance of recovering it, the order came for us instantly to go on board.--Thus was I deprived of every document I possessed, both Paymaster's, Quartermaster's, and private. I had fortunately got my Paymaster's accounts made out up to the very latest period, and transmitted to the War-Office, or I know not what I should have done; but my duplicates were gone, and when afterwards objections were made to some of the items in the charges, (as is always the case,) I, being unable to answer them, was obliged to submit to the loss of them. I had also several private accounts unclosed, on which I lost considerably, so that altogether I calculate this loss fully amounted to L.100, besides the vexation of not having my papers to refer to when wanted. I had been obliged to part with all my remaining animals for next to nothing, for when the French people found we were obliged to leave them, they offered us the most shameful trifles possible, but which we were compelled to take or give the animals away. One I did actually make a present of, besides my little Portuguese horse before-mentioned. I made a close calculation, and found that my losses in horses and mules, from the beginning of 1812 to June 1814, did not amount to less than L.150, besides sums that I lost by officers who died. By one I lost L.84, and another L.74 odd, so that, as I said before, had I not fortunately been appointed Acting Paymaster, I should have been so much involved, that at this time I durst not have returned to my native country. I do not complain, for most of my losses were sent by Providence, who saw best what was fitting and good for me; but never, till the Peninsular campaigns, were officers obliged generally to provide and keep up their own baggage-animals, and from the loss of which I had suffered so severely; and I cannot but think that rule, always acted upon till these campaigns, ought to be continued, and that subalterns at least ought to have their baggage always carried at the public expense. CHAPTER XVI. Author's Battalion embark for England--Land at Plymouth--Expect to be again ordered on Foreign Service--Order received--Embark, with other troops, for America--Land at Pine Island. We embarked on the 8th July on board his Majesty's ship Dublin, of 74 guns, commanded by Captain Elphinstone, which took the five companies of my battalion, with two companies of the 43d. We sailed the next day, I think, and had generally fine weather during our voyage, which lasted till the 18th, when we arrived at Plymouth. She was but a dull sailer, or we ought not to have occupied so many days in so short a passage. During our voyage, as remarkable an instance of heroic fortitude and bodily strength was exhibited by a sailor of this ship as I ever remember to have witnessed. He was doing something on the fore-yard, and by some accident he was precipitated into the water, but in his fall his shoulder came in contact with the flue of one of the anchors, by which it was deeply and severely cut. The ship was going at about five knots an hour, and it took near half an hour before she could be brought round and a boat sent to his assistance; and notwithstanding the severe cut he had received, from which the blood was fast streaming, he not only contrived to keep himself from sinking by buffeting with a heavy sea, but actually stripped off his jacket in the water, as it seems it had been an encumbrance to him. When the boat reached him, the poor fellow was nigh exhausted, and a few minutes more would have deprived the ship and the service of an excellent sailor, but having been got into the boat, he was brought on board more dead than alive, where every attention being paid to him, he soon afterwards recovered. We landed at Plymouth on the 18th, and occupied one of the barracks. We did not exactly know what was to become of us. Kent being our regimental station, we expected to be ordered to march and join the left wing in that county, but were still kept at Plymouth, where we met with great kindness and attention from the inhabitants in general, who are upon the whole, I think, an excellent and a moral people. We also fared sumptuously here, every description of food being both cheap and good. Fish in particular is most abundant and excellent. In short, we were here as comfortably and as well quartered as we could desire, and every thing tended to make us perfectly satisfied with our lot. We relaxed by attending the theatre occasionally, which is one of the best provincial ones in the kingdom, and at this time could boast some very good actors. There were a variety of other amusements, such as fishing, &c., which of course we indulged in occasionally. From hence I was called up to London to meet our Colonel, the Hon. Sir W. Stewart, to arrange our battalion concerns, &c. for the few latter years of hurry and confusion, and which was at last got done to the satisfaction of all concerned. Here also we began to replenish our wardrobes, which, it will easily be imagined, were not the most magnificent in the world on our first arrival. But we were not long permitted the enjoyment of English society or English comforts, for we had scarcely been a month at Plymouth till we received an order to prepare again for foreign service, and the nature of that service being kept a profound secret, we scarcely knew what necessary articles of equipment to prepare. The general opinion, however, was, that our destination was some part of America, consequently we endeavoured to meet all contingencies by preparing both for a warm and cold climate. All hands of course were vigorously set to work, in order to be ready when the summons arrived, which we knew might be very soon expected. An alteration was made in the arrangement of our battalion. The staff was ordered to proceed to join the other wing at Thorncliffe, which of course included myself, but Major Mitchell, who was now appointed to the command of these five companies, was anxious to take me out with him in the capacity of acting paymaster, and to his friendly and earnest endeavours, added to the kindness of Captain James Travers, who had at first intended to apply for that situation himself, but renounced it on my account, I am indebted for again having an addition of 10s. per diem made to my regimental pay during the continuance of service on this expedition. At length the order arrived for our embarkation, and on the 18th September, just two months from the day of our arrival in England, our five companies were sent on board his Majesty's ships Fox and Dover, both frigates of the smaller class, and which had been prepared for the reception of troops, by having a part of their guns taken out, and being, as it is termed, armed "en flute." The commanding-officer, with the staff and three companies, were put on board the Fox. We laid in an immense sea stock of provisions, &c. not knowing how long we might be on the water, but unfortunately for us we had scarcely put foot on board, when the order was given to weigh and proceed to sea forthwith, so that no time was given for the stowing away of all the stock, which had cost us about L.24 per person; the consequence was, a great part of it was lost or destroyed, from its being knocked about the deck in the midst of the confusion and bustle consequent on the crew and the soldiers (strangers to each other) being set to work to weigh anchor and make sail in such a hurry. Little assistance was afforded us from the ship on this occasion. We thus lost nearly the half of what we had been at so much pains to provide; but such things being common occurrences in a life like ours, it was therefore vain to fret. The force that embarked at the same time with us, consisted of the 93d Highlanders, a company of artillery, some rocketeers, a squadron of the 14th light dragoons, without horses, and our five companies, the whole under the command of General Keane. The good people of Plymouth, as is customary, cheered us as we left their shore, wishing us the most ample success and good fortune, and which we, who had for so long a time been in the habit of conquering, did not for a moment admit a doubt of being fully realized. We sailed, as I said, on the 18th September, and stood down the channel with a pretty fair breeze, till we reached what are commonly called its "chops," where we encountered adverse winds, and blowing a succession of gales (equinoctial, I imagine) which detained us beating off and on for seven days. This was as uncomfortable a beginning of our service as could well be imagined. High winds, with rain, and contrary to the way we wished them, were certainly rather trying to the patience of us landsmen, and there was something in our situation on board this ship which did not at all tend to alleviate our discomfort. In fact, we wished our fortune had placed us on board a transport rather than where we now found ourselves. All the discipline and strictness of a regular man-of-war was enforced, without any of the countervailing comforts and conveniences usually found on board such ships; and to such a length was this carried, that because our officers sometimes stood on the quarter-deck, holding on, in the rolling of the ship, by the hand-ropes which surround the companion, not only these, but the ropes which were stretched to prevent people falling out at the gangway, were ordered to be removed, that nothing should remain by which lubbers like us might hold on in the heavy rolls to which the vessel was subject in gales like those I have been describing. We were no less than twenty-four people in the cabin, twelve of our officers and twelve gentlemen of the commissariat department, so that we were sufficiently crowded, besides being in several other respects ill provided. But all this would have been borne with cheerfulness and good-will, had we not experienced such a total want of kindness and urbanity from a quarter where we least expected it, and from which that unkindness could be made most effectual. We lost the fleet during the continuance of these gales, but sealed orders having apprized our commander where to rendezvous, we made sail for the Island of Madeira, which we reached on the 9th October, and where we found the fleet. Some of the wags of our other two companies on board the Dover, pretending to think we must have been cast away and lost, had erased all our names from the army list as defunct. This rather annoyed some of our folks, but it might have been easily seen it was only a little waggery in which they had been indulging themselves. A day or two before we reached Madeira, we fell in with a strange sail, to which we gave chase, and brought her to; she proved to be an English merchant brig. It was said our commander wished to have a little independent cruise, which caused him to part from the fleet, and that there was a famed American privateer called the Wasp that had made a great number of captures, and which he was anxious to fall in with that he might take her. Had such a thing occurred as the Wasp appearing in sight, and we had given her chase, I could have compared it to nothing but to a vulgar simile which I have sometimes heard used, that of a cow endeavouring to catch a hare, for indeed she was, I believe, one of the fastest sailers that had ever been known, while we, on the contrary, were in comparison just like the cow to the hare. This also must have been a piece of waggery on the part of those who first set such a report afloat, for no man in his senses would have ever thought of chasing privateers with the Fox frigate at the time of which I am now writing. I regret I did not go on shore on this beautiful island, the town and scenery of which were most inviting, but as our stay was only to be so very short, it was scarcely worth while. We sailed again on the 11th, after having first got a cask of excellent Madeira wine from the house of Messrs Gordon and Co. This was the best, I think, I ever drank. We stood almost due south, passing pretty close to Teneriffe and the other Canary Isles, until we fell in with the trade-winds, when we kept more away towards the south-west. Our voyage now became delightful, for a gentle and refreshing, but constant and steady breeze, carried us on at the rate of about five or six knots an hour, without having occasion hardly to alter a sail or rope. We passed to the tropic of Capricorn on the 15th October, when our sailors prepared to indulge in the same innocent but amusing ceremonies that are adopted on crossing the equator. Neptune, with his Amphitrite, got dressed in full costume, and every other appendage being ready, it only now remained that the commander's sanction should be obtained to their commencing the imposing ceremony; but no! his godship was dismissed in no very courteous manner, and told to go and attend to his duty. Thus the fiat of a greater than Neptune, even in his own element, reduced him from the godlike rank he held to that of a mere forecastle sailor; and thus were all our expectations frustrated. In all the other ships of the fleet the amusement was carried on with the greatest good humour, as we could plainly perceive with our glasses. On the 18th, we passed pretty near the Isle of St Antonio, the westernmost of the Cape Verde Isles, and then bearing off still rather more to the west, we kept our course generally at about 12 or 13 north latitude, and in this manner crossed the Atlantic. From the time that we had entered between the tropics, we had seen numerous shoals of flying fish, some of which, when closely pursued, (by the dolphin generally,) actually fell on board our ship. A very accurate drawing of one of these was made by one of our lieutenants, a friend of mine, who, I believe, has it to this day. They were generally about the size of a herring, and much resembling that fish in shape and colour, with two fins projecting from behind their gills, nearly as long as their body. These are their wings, with which they can fly generally for 100, or 150, or sometimes 200 yards, when they fall again into the water. We also caught a dolphin about this time, our carpenter having harpooned it from the bow of the ship; but I was considerably disappointed in finding it did not exceed from twenty-four to thirty inches in length; and the hues of it, though beautiful when dying, by no means answered my expectations. On the ---- November, we made the island of Barbadoes, and anchored in Carlisle Bay, off Bridgetown, the capital of the island. It is not easy to describe the effect which is produced on an European the first time he beholds the beauties of a tropical country, and which, I think, he does in the greatest perfection while they are yet distant from him. Robertson's description of Columbus's first view of a West India island is, I think, as correct and as beautiful as any thing can possibly be; and his feelings for the moment (heightened indeed by the circumstance of his having at length attained to his long-looked-for Western India) will describe pretty nearly what every one must feel, who has not before beheld the productions of a tropical climate. But oh! how is the scene changed when you get on shore! Nature indeed is still beautiful and rich beyond the conception of a northern native; but man--how fallen! Here (I think I shall not far err if I say) you behold man in his lowest state: the savages of the woods are, in my opinion, much higher in the scale of being than those whom our cursed cupidity has introduced to all our vices, without one alleviating virtue to counterbalance the evil. But how could the poor Africans learn any thing that is good from those who do not practise good themselves? One of our people while here said, "he thought the men were all rogues, and the women all unfaithful." Of the slave population the latter is certainly a correct description, almost universally, in Bridgetown; for, with shame be it spoken, their masters and mistresses calculate upon their worth as if they were brood-mares, by the number and the description of wretched beings which they can bring into this world of misery. What indeed could you expect from those who can thus act, and those who sanction such conduct, but the like treatment that Mr Shrewsbury met with, if you endeavour to show them to themselves or to others in a true light? While the strong man armed keepeth his castle, his goods are in peace; but let another endeavour to bind this strong man, and take his goods from him, and oh, what a resistance may not be expected! Let the West Indians have slaves whom they may treat as cattle for their own gain and profit, even if it be at the expense of the souls of the poor wretches whom they thus destroy; but endeavour to show these degraded human beings that they are capable of being raised to a level with their unfeeling and avaricious masters, and you may shortly expect the fate of a Smith or a Shrewsbury, so regardless are these dealers in human flesh of their duty as men who must soon render an account of all their actions. It may be said, that I saw little, while here, but the very worst of society, and this may in a great measure be true; but it is evident that such things were done and sanctioned at Bridgetown when I was there, in 1814, as led me to pray that my lot might never be cast among such people. I now gladly turn from this scene of vice and misery, and pursue my narrative. In the bay at this place a hulk was stationed for the reception of prisoners of war. Our boats usually passed pretty near it on going on shore for water. A number of Americans were on board as prisoners. On one occasion, or more, I believe, they called out to our fellows as they passed under her stern, "So you have come out from England to attack our country, have you? I hope you have brought your coffins with you, for you will need them before you return." And, in truth, many of those fine fellows to whom this insolently coarse but patriotic speech was addressed, did indeed require coffins before the business we were going upon was finished. We left Barbadoes on the ----, and, passing down through the midst of the islands, we left St Lucia on our left and Martinico on our right hand. We also passed close to Dominico and Guadaloupe, with several smaller islands which I do not recollect, and, keeping to the southward, passed St Christopher's, Santa Cruz, Porto Rico, and St Domingo, having a fine view of the whole as we moved delightfully along. This latter large island took us more than two days in passing; but on the 21st we came in sight of Jamaica, the chief of our West India possessions. We stood off and on near to Port-Royal till the 23d, when we made sail to the westward, and on the 25th came to anchor in Negril Bay, at the extreme west end of the island of Jamaica. Here we found several sail both of men-of-war and transports, having on board the troops which had been engaged in the operations against Washington and Baltimore, &c., and consisting of the 4th, 21st, 44th, and 85th regiments, with some artillery. They were not strong indeed, having been considerably reduced by their late arduous services; but their numbers, added to ours, we thought quite sufficient to enable us to make a descent upon the American coast, near New Orleans, which it was now whispered was our destination: indeed this had been conjectured from the time we left England, but nothing certain was known, and even now it was not officially made public. A day or two after our arrival here, two of the West India regiments also joined us, the 1st and 5th, at least a part of both; so that we now mustered a respectable force. Admiral Sir Alexander Cochran commanded the naval part of the expedition, he being here on our arrival on board the Tonnant 84; several smaller vessels also, with stores, &c. &c. joined us from Port-Royal. When the whole were collected together, we felt proud of our fine force, which we vainly imagined nothing we should have to encounter could withstand for a moment: but the battle is not always to the strong; and we were shortly after painfully reminded of this truth. But I must not anticipate,--evil always comes early enough. During our stay here, I went on shore for a few hours, and visited some of the farms or plantations. Indeed, while we remained, the place where we landed was generally like a fair; for the inhabitants had assembled in great numbers, bringing with them live stock and poultry and vegetables, &c. for sale, all of which were greedily bought up at prices high enough, I warrant you. The vegetation at this place was most luxuriant, even in this the middle of winter almost; but I apprehend this was the finest season of the year, for it was not at all intolerably hot, and every thing, had the appearance which our country assumes in the height of summer. An accident occurred whilst we continued here, which had nigh proved serious. The Alceste frigate, one day, in shifting her berth, run with her head right on board the Dover, where our other two companies were on board. She cut her up from the stern into the cabins, not less I am sure at the top than ten feet. Two of our people were in the cabin at the time playing at backgammon, and were not a little astonished to see the prow of another large vessel tearing its way right into the very place where they were sitting. On the 29th, signal was made to weigh, when the whole got under way, and started in fine style; our now gallant fleet covering the ocean for many miles. We kept along on the south side of Cuba, and on the 3d December made Cape St Antonio, the westernmost point of that large island. From hence we now stood to the northward, crossing right athwart the Gulf of Mexico. During our stay at Barbadoes, we had purchased a live sheep and a pig, as we feared our stock might run out before we landed. The sheep was productive of great amusement to our messmates, at the expense of the poor caterer. In all hot climates, I believe, the wool of the sheep becomes in course of time more like the hair of a goat than what it really is. This was the case in the present instance, most of our people declaring they would not eat of such an animal, which was, as they conjectured, a sort of mule bred between a sheep and a goat; while the poor caterer was like to have the sheep thrown on his hand. This produced many a bickering, even after it was known that such was the case in warm climates; for they kept up the fun as long as possible, always trying to keep the unfortunate caterer in hot water about it. The sheep was killed, and produced excellent mutton--not fat indeed, but eatable. We were not so fortunate, however, with our pig; it appears it must have been diseased--what, I believe, is usually termed measly. It was dressed without this being known, and eaten; and the consequence was, all the twenty-four of our mess, except myself and another were literally poisoned. In the middle of the night, when it began to take effect, the most distressing scene took place imaginable, and the medical men were kept busily employed for a considerable time afterwards preparing and administering emetics, which providentially had the desired effect on all, for in a short time the whole recovered; but had medical assistance not been promptly administered, the chances are some of them would have suffered. Its effects were something like cholera morbus, working both up and down in the most violent manner. On the 10th December we made the American coast off Mobile, where we fell in with a vessel, on board of which was Colonel Nichols of the marines, with three or four Indian chiefs of the Creek nation, to which people he had been for some time previously attached, they being then at war with the Americans, and consequently our allies. They came on board our ship, and were shown every thing curious; but their reason for visiting us was, that they might see our rifles, for they considered themselves good shots, and wished to examine our arms, with which they did not express themselves over-satisfied, as they had been accustomed to see no other description of rifles than those used by the Americans, which are both much longer and heavier, but carry a much smaller ball. Indeed they had never seen any military rifles, but only such as the above, and which are constructed solely for the purpose of killing deer and other game. The gallant colonel endeavoured to amuse us a little on this occasion with the wonderful feats of his protegés. He told us, that they being generally very short of balls, were always very careful how they expended them in hunting; and that their rule was never to fire at a deer, until it was in the act of passing between them and a tree, that, should the ball go through its body, as it sometimes did, it might lodge in the tree on the other side, and they would then go and pick it out, and recast it. We thought he ought to have told that story to his own corps the marines; for I believe he did not get many of us to give implicit credit to so wonderful a tale. They were most grotesque-looking figures; most of them were dressed in some old red coats, which they had got hold of by some means, with cocked hats of the old fashion. These I believe had been given them by some of our people, for they were English manufacture. But they had tremendous large rings, &c. hung in their ears, the laps of which were stretched nearly to their shoulders; some of them also wore rings in their noses; and some of them were without any sort of lower garments, having nothing but a sort of cloth tied round their waist, which passed through between their legs and fastened before. These people it was intended should bring their warriors to join us near New Orleans; but, owing to some cause with which I am not acquainted, none but these three or four chiefs ever came near us. On the 11th we anchored near the Chandeleur Islands, at the entrance into Lake Ponchartrain. But it was discovered that the Americans had some gun-vessels, which, on account of their drawing only little water, had been stationed in this lake for its protection, and on our appearance had retired nearer to New Orleans. It was necessary that these should be previously disposed of in some manner, before the disembarkation of the troops could with safety be effected. None of our ships could follow them on account of the shoalness of the lake. An order was therefore issued for all the men-of-war to prepare their boats for an attack on these vessels, the chief command of which was given to Captain Lockyer of the Sophia gun-brig. On the morning of the ----, they therefore assembled for this purpose, and pushed up the lake in search of the gun-vessels, which were discovered moored near some islands called by the natives, "Les Isles Malheureuse," or the "Unfortunate Islands," and which form the entrance from Lake Ponchartrain into Lake Borgne, or Blind Lake. No time was lost in attacking this formidable flotilla, consisting of vessels carrying from five to six guns each, and commanded by a lieutenant of the American navy, named by them Commodore Jones. A most determined and gallant resistance was made by the Americans; but superior numbers, with equal, if not superior courage and seamanship, prevailed, and in a short space of time the whole were captured. Both the commandants were severely wounded, with a great number of officers and men killed and wounded. Nothing could exceed the gallant intrepidity, I understand, with which our boats advanced to the attack; for, from experience I am well convinced, the fire from those gun-vessels must have been most destructive; for better shots, either with artillery or small arms, do not exist than the Americans. Orders were now issued for the army to prepare to land; but the distance, from where we had been obliged from shoal water to stop to the town, being so great, it was determined to form a sort of depot on a small island, near the mouth of the Pearl River, called Pine Island; and farther to facilitate the transport of the troops, small brigs, &c. were sent as far up the lake as possible, into which the troops were put successively from the larger vessels, and from which they generally took their departure for the above island. On the 15th our people left the Fox, and were moved up the lake into one of the brigs before noticed, where we were packed in as tight as herrings, there being near 400 men on board a little thing scarcely calculated to contain the fourth of that number, and where there was not literally room to lie down. But, on the 19th, we were relieved from this rather close confinement; and being put on board of long boats, we pushed off for the island, which lay at a considerable distance, notwithstanding the measures that had been adopted to shorten our voyage. The weather proved extremely rough and unpleasant, which rendered our trip neither over-safe nor comfortable; and to mend the matter, the seamen on board our boat were rather in the wind, and did not manage her so well as was desirable; for, poor fellows, they had been engaged in this fatiguing service for several days, (a considerable number of the troops having been previously landed,) and were consequently the more easily prevailed upon to indulge when grog came in their way. Our middy too was quite worn out with fatigue, and slept nearly all the time we were on board. Our boat was several times on the point of being swamped, for the water came in quite plentifully on occasions of her being laid down by sudden squalls. Another boat, which accompanied us, had her mast carried away. We landed on the island before mentioned in the evening, and of course looked out for the best shelter we could find. But it was a complete desert; nothing but reeds grew on it, except a few stunted and scrubby bushes at the lower end of it. It came on a most severe frost during the night, which I understand caused the death of several of the sailors, who had indulged perhaps a little too freely, and had lain down without any covering. Some of the poor blacks also, I understand, suffered in consequence of the severe cold, a thing with which they were totally unacquainted, and against which they were ill provided, having nothing but their light and thin West India dress to keep it out. It was laughable the next morning to see them examining so intently the ice which had been formed on the pools near our bivouack. They could not conjecture what it was; some of them asserting it was salt; while the greater part were totally at a loss respecting it. I had by great good luck got into a sort of hut belonging to some of the officers who had previously landed; but I do not remember in all my campaigning to have suffered more from cold than I did this night, and was extremely glad when daylight appeared, that I might be able to move about. CHAPTER XVII. Proceed to attack the Enemy, and capture one of their picquets--Advance in search of a Bivouack--Alarmed by shots in front--Fired on by an American schooner--Captain Hallen severely attacked--Manoeuvres on both sides--Ruse of the Enemy--Fighting continues--Enemy repulsed at all points--Courage of the British--A British Battery brought into play--Activity of the Enemy. By the 21st, the whole army had been landed on this island, when they were told off into brigades, and inspected by the General. During our stay here, about five or six French Americans, (the natives of New Orleans, or neighbourhood,) arrived as friends, and told us that there were scarcely any troops in the district; so that we had nothing to do but to land on the opposite side, and march right on to the town, and that the inhabitants would welcome us most cordially, and that no resistance might be expected. I did not, I confess, put much confidence in their information, and believed at the time, that they came more as spies than with any view of befriending, as they pretended, our cause. More correct information was obtained from Spanish fishermen, who had been following their occupation at the mouth of a creek on the New Orleans side of the lake, and who had come across, I believe, at the suggestion of Major Peddie, our assistant Quartermaster-general, who had been despatched to find out a suitable landing-place for the army. From one of them, I learned afterwards that there were troops in the town, commanded by General Jackson, and that a battery of two guns had been erected on the road, by which we must advance. What they told the General, I do not know, but fancy he saw no reason to alter his plans, from the information of either party. Every thing being ready by the morning of the 22d, the advance guard, commanded by Colonel Thornton, and consisting of the 85th and 95th regiments, with two light three-pounders, some artillery and some rocketeers, accompanied by a few artificers to repair bridges, &c. embarked on board the boats, that had been assembled for the purpose--two companies of the 93d followed us; these troops occupying the whole of the boats that could be mustered in the fleet, consequently the remainder of the army had to remain where they were till the return of the boats. The distance was not less, I should think, than from thirty to forty miles. We pushed off about two o'clock P.M., the wind being favourable for a considerable part of the way, but it failing, the men were obliged to commence with the oars. We were completely wedged in, so that there was no moving, let the call be ever so urgent. I suffered much from a severe pain in my side, from being obliged to remain so long in the same position; but we endeavoured to divert the tedium in the best manner we could by amusing stories, &c. My luck placed me on board the Bang-Up, a fine cutter belonging to the admiral, and commanded by a countryman of mine, a Lieutenant Foster of that ship. We did not reach the mouth of the creek, or bayou, as it is called by the natives, till a long time after dark. As we approached it, some light boats were sent forward with Captain Travers of ours and his company, to endeavour to surprise a regiment of the enemy, which we knew were stationed in some huts at the mouth of the creek, and which huts belonged to the Spanish fishermen before mentioned. From the information they gave, the best arrangements possible were made for effecting this; for Travers, moving silently on, and landing his men at the opposite ends of the hamlet, there remained no way of escape open for the troops in the houses. As soon as all was ready, they rushed forward and secured the whole picquet without a single shot being fired, with the exception of two men, who preferred venturing into the marsh, in rear of the huts, where it is not improbable they perished. The duty was conducted so quietly, and so expeditiously, that very few of the other troops knew any thing of the matter; but this alone secured us a landing without opposition, for had a firing been begun on either side, it must have alarmed the American army, who, no doubt, would have used their endeavours to oppose our landing. We soon after began to enter the creek, but such was the darkness of the night, and the shoalness of the water, and such the uncertainty of the way by which we had to proceed, that very little progress was made during the remainder of the night; daylight, however, enabled us to move forward at a brisker pace, but from the obstacles that had presented themselves in the dark, the squadron of boats was sadly dispersed; and when we reached the head of the creek, only two or three of the light boats, with the staff and naval officers, had arrived, and considerable intervals of time elapsed between the arrival of the different boats with troops; so that had the enemy been aware of our intention, and had they had a force of a few hundred men hid in the high reeds which grow in this marsh, they might, I am persuaded, have cut us off in detail, for from the causes before mentioned, no two boats were sufficiently near to assist each other. We got on shore about an hour after daylight; and right glad was I to be enabled to stretch my legs, which had been kept motionless for the last sixteen hours. As soon as the whole advance-guard had landed, and a few planks had been thrown over a deep rill which we had to cross, we moved forward towards the high ground, Captain Travers' company leading; and, in order to magnify the appearance of our force, should any concealed American be looking on, we extended our files to double the usual distance, and thus passed through a wood which skirted the swamp, and which it was necessary to traverse before we could reach the open country, which we did about six miles below New Orleans. As soon as our advance cleared this wood, they observed a good-looking farm onstead, towards which they moved in double quick time, and arrived just in time to seize and make prisoner a Monsieur Villerey, a major of the militia, just then setting off to join his people. We heard (but I will not vouch for the truth of the report) that a considerable body of the enemy had been assembled on the high-road, near to Monsieur Villerey's house, but on learning that we had landed, and were moving rapidly forward, they separated, one part retiring towards the town, while the other went down the river. Our advance now moved on with celerity, and dashing on to the different farm-houses in the neighbourhood, seized several groups of arms at each of them, which it seems had either been abandoned by the troops to whom they belonged, or had been collected there for some military purpose. They captured at some of these farm-houses to the amount of twelve or twenty stand; and in all not less than fifty. Monsieur Villerey unfortunately contrived to make his escape, through the too great leniency of one of our lieutenants. I think the most probable opinion respecting the arms and the troops assembled near Monsieur Villerey's is, that it was the militia of the district just at that moment assembling, which will not only account for the arms being found in such numbers, (under the verandas of the houses,) but also for Monsieur Villerey himself being then on the point of setting out in his warlike costume, and the number of men which were observed near his house. About twenty militiamen were also captured in and about these houses. Except there, the whites had all abandoned their houses; but a considerable number of black slaves remained at each, whether of their own accord, or left to protect the property, and occasionally convey information to their masters, I know not. As soon as our advance had sufficiently reconnoitred the adjacent houses, &c. the whole of the troops moved on past the house of Monsieur Villerey, and turning to the right, followed the great road to New Orleans for about half a mile, till a suitable piece of ground presenting itself in the neighbourhood of some other farm-houses, the whole turned in to a green field a short distance from the road, and forming into close columns of battalions, commenced bivouacking for the night. The road ran partly on, and partly alongside of the river dike. Immediately between the troops and the river, this dike was perhaps about three feet high. On our right was a farm-house, and a little to the right and front another--the latter a pretty large one--all these, and indeed all the farm-houses in this neighbourhood, are surrounded at one end by the huts of the slaves, and generally on the other by barns and other out-buildings, and in the rear a garden or orchard. The ground in all this country, which is perfectly flat, apparently of alluvial formation, is divided into fields, &c. by wooden paling of the common description, very few hedges being to be seen. The situation in which the troops were placed, was as follows, viz. The artillery and rocketeers in one line; immediately behind them, my battalion and the 85th, in close column; the 4th in rear of us, and the 93d two companies in rear of the 4th; the whole in close columns. The men, as soon as dismissed, instantly set about cooking, for they had had nothing from the morning before, and it was now considerably past mid-day. Captain Travers' company, which had formed the advance-guard, still remained in front as a picquet, and occupied a post on the great road, about a mile in front of the division. About three o'clock P.M., we were all alarmed by some shots at the advanced picquet; and, on enquiry, found that an American staff-officer, escorted by about thirty cavalry, had come galloping down, no doubt for the purpose of reconnoitring us; when within distance, our people instantly fired, one of which shots wounded the staff-officer, and another killed a horse, but they contrived to get him off. This caused the whole of the troops to fall in till the cause of alarm was ascertained, after which they set about their cooking again with great glee. Considerable discussion now began to take place amongst the knowing ones, as to the merits and demerits of our situation, in point of security; and of course various opinions were given on the occasion. One officer of ours, a particular friend of mine, did not hesitate roundly to assert, that we were in a most unprotected and dangerous situation. I do not remember exactly the reasons he assigned; but certainly, could he have foreseen what yet remained in the womb of time, he would have had much stronger reasons for his opinion. Another company of ours, (Captain Hallen's,) and one of the 85th, were ordered to prepare at dusk to relieve the picquet in advance; and as I messed with Captain Hallen's company, I accompanied it on this duty. I did not go with the main body of the company, there being no house at that post, but with one section, commanded by Lieutenant Forbes, and we occupied a small house to the right, and a little to the rear of Captain Hallen's party, which was stationed on the great road. The company of the 85th occupied the large farm-house before-mentioned, a little to the right and front of the column. I had purchased an excellent turkey on our arrival at Monsieur Villerey's house, which we had dressed at this little house, and made a most hearty meal indeed, after which we took each a tot or horn of grog to comfort us. We had not long finished our comfortable meal, when we were astounded by the report of heavy ordnance, apparently close to the bivouack of the column, and which reports followed each other in quick succession. A cheer was also given, but by whom, or what the occasion of the firing was, we were totally at a loss to conjecture. I at first imagined it was some of our men-of-war that had been able to pass the forts down the river, and that they were firing a salute and cheering in consequence; and yet this seemed a strange conjecture; but we did not long remain in suspense, for we were soon after informed of the real state of the case, that it was a large American schooner, with at least fourteen guns, and which she had been enabled to bring to bear upon our unfortunate bivouack with the most deadly precision, great numbers having fallen at her first broadside. The troops of course dispersed in some measure, leaving their fires, which had too well served as a direction for the fire of this terrible schooner. But the time was not far distant when we should have other enemies to encounter; for by the time the schooner had fired a dozen broadsides, a noise was heard in our front; and just at this moment an American was brought in by a man from Captain Hallen's post, who had foolishly come right into the centre of his picquet, and asking if they could tell him which way the regulars had gone. This showed that he was a young soldier, who did not know our troops from his own; but it also showed that the regulars which he was seeking could not be far distant; consequently, every thing was got ready to give them the best reception possible; but as the people we had heard in front of the post where I then was appeared to be rather to our right, I feared lest they might get unawares upon the company of the 85th, which was stationed in the farm behind us. I consequently set off with all dispatch to give them timely warning, but when I arrived there, I could not find the officers, nor could I see where the picquet was posted; I therefore thought they must be on the alert at the bottom of the garden, which lay in the direction in which we heard the noise; and meeting here an officer and several of our men, who had moved in this direction, from the fire of the schooner, I told him I was certain that Hallen would be shortly most vigorously attacked, from the information I had learnt respecting the regulars, and advised him to collect all the men he could, and proceed forthwith to reinforce him at the advance. This he instantly did, and it was well, for by this time the firing had commenced in volleys at that post. I then returned to the picquet-house, where I had previously dined, and found the officer was going round his sentries; but as the firing was going briskly on at Hallen's post, I expected every moment to be attacked here, and began, in the absence of the officer, to post the men as advantageously as the nature of the ground would admit. The house stood on a little path, or bye-road, running across the country, from the river towards the wood, and which, before he could get into, the enemy would have to clamber over a railing which lay on the side from which they were advancing. On the hither side of the road was a ditch, with a hedge, almost the only one to be met with, and a little copse of small trees. Into this copse I put the men, extending them along the inside of the hedge, which would not only keep them from the view of the enemy, but be some little protection from their fire, and would leave them the more at liberty to retreat when overpowered by numbers, as it was certain they must shortly be. But all my labour was in vain, for when Forbes came from visiting his sentries, he did not approve of my disposition, but took them all out, and formed them on the open road, without any cover, and with a hedge and ditch in their rear, both of which they would be compelled to pass the moment the enemy pressed upon him. I felt annoyed, not only at his want of courtesy to me, but that he would thus expose his men to almost certain destruction, without being able to effect any thing against the enemy, or at all check his advance. I accordingly left him in a huff, and went again to try to find the picquet of the 85th in the house behind us. I was determined to make a more close and thorough search than I had done before, and for this purpose went over the gates, &c. into the yard behind, when lo, I found myself within a yard or two of a strong body of the enemy, which had got into the garden at the lower end, and were just advancing to the house. I crouched down, and hid in the best manner I could, and luckily was enabled to creep off without their discovering who I was. Just as I reached the outer gate, I found a sergeant of ours there, to whom I said, we must set off with all possible speed; and accordingly we both took to our heels, and ran like heroes; the noise of which brought the fire of twenty or thirty rifles after us, but luckily without effect. I now made the best of my way towards where I judged the main body of our people were, on the great road, in order to inform Colonel Thornton of what I had seen, of this column of the enemy having got possession of the house and garden I had just left, and by doing which they had nearly separated the advance picquet from the main body. He said he had sent two companies of ours, and two of the 85th, to the house immediately in the rear of this I speak of, and in a short time afterwards they and the Americans came into close contact, for they immediately commenced firing; and where as strange a description of fighting took place as is perhaps on record. The enemy soon discovered from some men, whom they had unfortunately taken, what the regiments were that were opposed to them--and with all that cunning which the Yankees are famed for, instantly turned it to the best account--for in several places they advanced in bodies, crying out at the same time, "Come on, my brave 85th!" or "My brave 95th!" and thus induced several of our small detached parties to go over the rails to them, supposing they were some of our own people, when of course they were instantly made prisoners. This _ruse_ did not always succeed, however, for some of the parties turning restive on their hands, refused to surrender, and thus a fight hand to hand took place, and in which they generally had the worst of it. On one occasion of this kind our people made a body of them prisoners. The men and officers being requested to lay down their arms, the officer, after surrendering, when he saw there were not many of our people, drew a sort of dirk or knife, and made a stab at the officer of ours who had taken him. We instantly cried out to the men near him, one of whom took up his rifle and shot the villain through the body. They had before this time brought two of their regular battalions close in front of our advance, which did not consist of more than 100 men, and were pouring in dreadful volleys into that small but gallant detachment; but even in this they showed themselves young soldiers, for they formed up the two battalions in line at about forty or fifty yards in distance from the post, and gave the words "ready--present--fire," with all the precision of a field-day; but being so near, of course every word was heard by our people, who, at the critical moment, always took care to cleave as close to the ground as possible, by which they escaped most of their shot. They then up and at them, and, pouring in a desultory but most destructive fire, brought great numbers of them to the ground. Their force, however, was too great to be opposed successfully by such a handful of men, and these brave fellows were at length compelled to yield a little ground; but it was not more than just to enable them to cover themselves, and form again in proper order; and from this time all the efforts of these two battalions were unable to remove them. Indeed, not long after, our people became the assailants, and, advancing again, retook their original position. Poor Hallen was severely wounded on this occasion, and lost about forty of his men. Two or three naval captains came also to see the fight at Hallen's post, one of whom soon fell severely wounded. The other, the gallant captain of the Dover frigate, with whom part of our people went out, and with whom we all came home, behaved most nobly. Whenever the enemy had fired their volley, he cried, "Now, my lads, up and give them another broadside!" and thus contributed, by his animating conduct, to inspire all around him with confidence. Poor Forbes just met the fate that I expected. He stood upon the road, and opened his fire upon the enemy as they approached; but they being perhaps more than twenty times his number, he was instantly compelled to give way, after being himself wounded, having his sergeant killed, and losing nearly the half of his men. The schooner all this time kept up a most galling and incessant fire. Some attempts were made with our light three-pounders, and with rockets, and even with small-arms, to compel her to sheer off, but they were all in vain. Her men, protected by her stout bulwarks which surrounded them, defied all our efforts, and continued to pour in both round and grape wherever they judged, from the direction of the fire, our people were stationed. Luckily the darkness of the night rendered her fire less destructive than it would otherwise have been. A considerable body of the enemy had penetrated to the house immediately on the right of our original bivouack, where the firing was kept up between them and the parties opposed to them with great spirit for a long time; but the General, having detached the 4th regiment to form line a little to the rear and right of that house, completely secured that flank from being farther turned. Notwithstanding this, the skirmishers of both armies extended to the wood, some of whom we found lying the next morning almost touching each other. The firing now began to slacken, the enemy having been repulsed at all points, and, towards three o'clock in the morning, it had completely ceased, when they retired, leaving us in possession of the warmly-contested field. My battalion had been extremely unfortunate in this action; for almost at the very outset, when the attack on Hallen's picquet commenced, Major Mitchell, our commandant, had taken a party of about twenty or thirty men, and advanced for the purpose of supporting that post. Between the bivouack, however, and the point he intended to reach, he unexpectedly fell in with a large body of Americans, (for it was so dark he could not distinguish who they were,) when both himself, and all the men he had with him, were made prisoners. The loss of our five companies in this action was about 120 men; that of the 85th more, I believe; and in all, I think, it amounted to about 300 men. The loss of the enemy must have been considerably greater, if we are to judge from the number of dead they left on the field, and, which is a good criterion, the general average being about ten wounded for one killed. Nothing could equal the bravery of the few troops we had in the field on this occasion. Their numbers certainly did not amount to 1800 men; while the enemy could not have had fewer than from 4000 to 5000. They had two regular regiments, the 7th and 44th; they had a large corps of irregular riflemen from Kentucky, and another stronger corps from Tennessee, with all the militia of New Orleans and its neighbourhood, every man who is able being compelled to bear arms in case of invasion. They had about 300 irregular horse, whether militia or not I cannot tell, but think it likely they were in all at least 4000 men--with the great and effectual assistance of the schooner, which did us more mischief than 1000 men could have done, probably not so much by the loss she occasioned us, as, by being able to fire on our flank, and even in our rear, she rendered the enemy the most essential service, besides the fire of the ship on our advanced picquet. We were thus completely surrounded on three sides, and had not the troops behaved with the most determined courage and intrepidity, we must have been driven back, and eventually the greater part would have been taken prisoners; for the path to the water was quite narrow, and even should we reach the head of the creek where we landed, the boats had probably all left it by this time to return for the other troops. Indeed it was reported afterwards, that the arrangements of General Jackson were such, that we were to have been attacked in the rear at the same time as in front, and by the schooner; but the troops for that purpose either not being in readiness, or being too distant to arrive in time, were too late to take part in the action, but arrived about three o'clock in the morning, when they met with a half-drunk artillery-driver of ours near Mons. Villerey's house, as he was returning from the field, and who, seeing a large body of men, which he took for some of our other regiments that had landed, cried out to them, "Come on, my lads, for the Yankees never got such a licking in their lives!" This, it is said, had the effect of frightening them back, without proceeding farther. I will not vouch for this being fact, but such was the report the next morning; and indeed it is feasible, from the number of people (apparently going with orders, &c.) which we saw galloping down on the other side of the river in the afternoon; and it is certain that a considerable body of militia must have resided down the river, setting aside the report which I mentioned, of some troops having retired in that direction in the morning, when we first advanced; and nothing would have tended more to our complete overthrow than such an attack on our rear, could it have been accomplished. I might here mention, that Captain Hallen saw the schooner as she passed his picquet, on her way down from New Orleans, on which he instantly despatched a man with the information; but she having the current in her favour, sailed much quicker than the man could run, consequently his information came too late. I omitted to mention also, that a large ship of 20 guns came down the river at the same time with the schooner, but being less manageable than that vessel, she had anchored abreast of Hallen's picquet; and that he had to sustain her fire, as well as that of the troops in his front, during the whole of the attack of the 23d. She remained at that spot without moving. I will here also notice another circumstance which took place at this post. An American rifleman fell into the hands of some of Captain Hallen's people, who, when he was brought in, were desired to take his arms from him. These he seemed reluctant to part with, and said to the officer, "Recollect I shall hold you responsible for that rifle, if you take it from me!"--on which the officer took hold of it by the muzzle, and flung it right into the river. I daresay the poor fellow thought they were a strange sort of people he had got amongst; and I doubt not he had set a great value upon his rifle. Another officer and myself had a providential escape the next morning, for we had scarcely left a little wooden hut, behind which we had taken up our abode, and slept for a few hours after the fight, when bang comes an eighteen-pound shot right through the house, just at the very spot where we had a minute or two before been sitting. It seems the captain of the schooner, which still lay abreast of us at about 800 yards distance, and from which this shot had been fired, was determined we should not occupy any of the houses in the vicinity, for, beginning with our hut, which was nearest to him, he fired into every house within reach of his guns, although he saw as plainly as we did that most of them were filled with the wounded; nay, he carried his savage cruelty so far, that he actually fired on a party of the 85th as they were removing one of their wounded officers. It could not be pleaded that he did not know what it was, for, being only half-a-mile distant, and much elevated above our level, with a glass he could see as well as we could what they were doing, for they were carrying the poor fellow on a bier, on their shoulders. He continued this cruel work all the next day, the ship also giving us an occasional shot. One shot which he fired went through the front of a house in which some of our wounded men were lying, and, striking low, it carried the knapsack out from under the head of a man of ours named Rayour, which he had put for a pillow, without doing him the smallest injury. I could not credit the story till I went and actually saw the hole by which it entered, the knapsack and the shot lying near the fire-place. After this I went to view the house where I had fallen in with the column of the enemy the night before, and where the 85th were now stationed; but the fire of the schooner still continued, one shot from which we saw was directed towards us. It fell right in among the 85th, and, striking a corporal about the breach, as he was endeavouring to get out of its way, it passed out at his breast, on which he gave himself a sort of shake, and fell lifeless to the earth. Nothing could exceed the great annoyance this mischievous schooner continued to be to us all that and the next day, for they not only saw every thing we did, but we could not move in any number without being saluted with an 18 lb. shot, and we had no means of retaliation. But during the 25th, efforts were made to get up some heavier guns from the fleet, and every thing having been settled as to the plan, &c., a battery was constructed as close to the water's edge as possible in the river dike, and a number of gun barrels having been collected from those broken, &c. during the late fight, a sort of furnace was erected for the purpose of heating shot, with which it was determined to give her a salute the next morning. Every thing succeeded admirably. The battery was constructed, embrasures cut, and shot heated, and all ready by daylight on the morning of the 26th; of course we were all looking out to witness the effect, and most noble it was, for when the guns opened out upon her, the people on board seemed quite thunderstruck, and although they attempted to return our fire, it was only like the blows of a man beat blind by his antagonist, for her shot fell in every other direction but that in which she should have thrown them. However, they could not stand to fire more than one round, as our hot shot rendered their situation very soon untenable, and taking to their boats, they made their escape to the opposite shore with all expedition. The distance from the battery to the schooner had been so accurately measured by Major Blanchard, who superintended the construction of the work, that almost every shot and shell penetrated the hull of the vessel, and in a short time after her crew had left her, she broke out into a blaze of fire, which soon reaching the magazine, she blew up with a loud explosion, to the great comfort and joy of all our army. This of course deserved and obtained three as hearty cheers as I believe were ever given by Britons, and no doubt the Americans were greatly chagrined at the loss of their fine and exceedingly useful vessel. A shell or two were directed towards the ship, but she having seen the fate of the schooner, got out her boats, which, taking her in tow, she set off up the river in all haste. Could a battery have been constructed to fire upon her at the same time, it would have saved us some hard knocks afterwards. She, however, effected her escape, and we now remained in peace for a few days at least. On the 25th, Sir Edward Packenham and General Gibbs had arrived; the former immediately assumed the command, and they both set off to the front to reconnoitre the enemy and the kind of country around us. Every night since our arrival the enemy had been incessant in their means to harass and annoy us, as in truth they had a right to do if they pleased, but it was exceedingly distressing to the troops, and therefore I mention it. They seldom let an hour pass during the night, that they were not firing at some of our out sentries, and on some occasions they brought the body of irregular cavalry, before mentioned, immediately in front of our outposts, and fired volleys, which, although it did not do much injury to our advanced picquets, had the effect of turning out the whole line, and that often repeated, with the annoyance from the schooner, certainly did not leave us much time for comfortable rest. They frequently lay in ambush for the reliefs of our sentries also, and patrols, and fired upon them sometimes with effect. In short, they did all they could to annoy and weary us out, but of which we ought not to complain, as they were defending their own country, and allowances ought to be made in such a case that would not be tolerated in an army having no interest in the soil. I trust Englishmen will be equally zealous and bitter to their enemies should our country ever be invaded. CHAPTER XVIII. British Army told off into Brigades--Advance, and are hotly received--Heroism of a young Artillery Officer--We take up a fresh position--The Enemy work incessantly in raising an extensive breastwork--Two Batteries erected, from which our heavy Ship Artillery are brought to bear against it, but without effect--The Enemy also place their Ship Guns on Batteries--Colonel Lambert arrives with the 7th and 43d regiments--Preparations for a grand attack on the Enemy's lines, which entirely fails, and the British are repulsed with great loss. The remainder of the army all arrived during the 24th, and were put in bivouack in an oblique direction, with their front to the late field of action, their right thrown back towards the wood, and their left towards Mons. Villerey's house. The 93d formed line in advance at an angle of the wood, as a sort of outpost, while the 85th and ours were stationed in and around the house, to which I have so often alluded, _i. e._ where I fell in with the column of the enemy. Our advanced picquets remained the same as before the action. If I might here be permitted to hazard an opinion, I should say that had we advanced upon New Orleans the morning after the fight, I think there is little doubt we should have been successful; for when an irregular and undisciplined body of troops once meet with a reverse, it is difficult to bring them into action again with that steadiness and determination which they often evince in their first essay. I understood General Jackson had some trouble in keeping them together after their defeat on the night of the 23d, and the only mode in which he could get them to form was, in planting the first who retired in line near the road, and as each successive detachment arrived from the fight, they were made to form on their left, the whole line sitting or laying down for the remainder of the night. It is easy to perceive that they would have been quite unmanageable should they have been seriously attacked, while their spirits were depressed by their recent failure, and as the works which we afterwards encountered did not then exist, at least only in part, I think they would have retired after a very slight resistance indeed. I had the information as to the manner in which they formed, from some of those who were made prisoners, and who witnessed it. All this, however, is merely the opinion of a private individual, who judged from appearances only, and it is not in the nature of things probable that I should be able to form so correct a one as those who possessed more ample information. After the arrival of the two general officers before mentioned, the army was told off into brigades as follows, viz. the 1st brigade, commanded by General Gibbs, consisted of the 4th, 21st, and 44th British, and 5th West India regiments; the 2d brigade, commanded by General Keane, consisted of the 85th, 93d, and 95th British, and 1st West India regiments, (observe, the West India regiments had by this time become exceedingly reduced in point of numbers from cold and hardship, which they seemed unable to bear, and very soon after almost ceased to be regiments, so many of them were sent away sick;) the artillery was commanded by Colonel Dickson, an excellent officer; the squadron of the 14th light dragoons not being able to get mounted, formed the guards at the hospitals, and at head-quarters, &c. Every thing having been previously arranged on the morning of the 28th, we advanced in two columns, the right near the wood commanded by General Gibbs, and ours on the left by the great road near the river, commanded by General Keane. The enemy had all along kept possession of those farm-houses which lay at some distance in front of our picquets. They were consequently driven from these as we moved forward, which we did, I should imagine, to the distance of about three miles, their picquets retiring gradually before us. We here discovered that the enemy had thrown up a strong field-work, which extended from the river to the wood, and which consequently shut up every avenue to our farther advance, without fighting. We also found that their numbers had considerably increased, as we could perceive by the immense bodies of troops behind their works. As we pressed upon their picquets as they retired, we got a shot or two at them with our field-guns; but every thing remained quiet within their lines till we had arrived within about 400 yards of them, when they opened out on the head of our columns as destructive a fire of artillery as I ever witnessed. One shot struck in the column of the 85th, which knocked down two officers and about ten men. My battalion was leading, and being partly extended skirmishing, they did not offer so fair a mark for artillery as a solid body, and consequently escaped this. The ship also, which was anchored a little in advance of their work, opened her broadside on the columns on the road at the same time. Our gun and howitzer, the only two pieces we had there, endeavoured to return the fire of the ship, but without doing her much injury. When the fire was found to be so galling, the troops were moved off the road into the fields on the right, and my battalion advancing about 100 paces farther, was ordered to lay down in a sort of ditch which was there, and to shelter themselves the best way they could. The 85th and 93d formed also more to the right, and secured themselves as well as the nature of the ground would admit. It was only intended as a reconnoissance, consequently the troops did not advance farther, as soon as the nature of their position was ascertained. It appeared to be a high dike of casks, formed as a breastwork, with a considerable quantity of artillery mounted on it, and with a sort of canal or wet ditch in front of it. Of course, all this took some time to ascertain, during which they kept up an incessant cannonade, both from their works and from the ship. The latter poured in an immense quantity of large grape, which rendered the situation of those exposed to it extremely unpleasant. Our two fieldpieces were very soon silenced by the superior fire of the enemy, and in an hour after our arrival at this point, there was not a man left with them but the officer, who was quite a youth, but yet stood as steady as if he had been on a common parade, although all his men were knocked down about him. I never witnessed more devoted heroism than this fine young man displayed. One shot, nearly towards the last, struck off his sergeant's head, and sent his cap spinning over a ditch, where another officer and I had taken up our post. Some rockets were also tried from this point, both against the ship and the enemy's works, but those directed against the vessel flew quite wide of the mark, and totally failed. Some of those fired into the works, we saw pass over the heads of the men posted in them, but whether they produced any effect we could not see. The enemy either had set fire to the houses near us before they retired from them, or they had fired heated shot with a view of producing that effect; but we had not been long here ere the whole of the houses in the neighbourhood were in one grand and terrific blaze of fire. I do not exactly know what was done on the right, for we could not see distinctly for some trees which grew in the garden of the farm in that direction, but imagine they encountered something similar to ourselves, as the play of artillery from the enemy's line in front of them was equally unceasing with that in our front. Not a man showed himself out of the enemy's works. When every thing was ascertained that could be, the troops began gradually to draw off, but this was obliged to be conducted in a very cautious manner, or the loss from their fire would have been severe. The 93d retired first, by separate wings, afterwards the 85th, but ours did not leave their ground till after dark, when, I believe, some of the Yankees began to advance in a rather triumphant and bullying manner, but were taught to keep at a respectful distance by a few shots well laid in among them. A party of sailors had been sent forward to bring off the two fieldpieces, there being no artillerymen left to do it, and we had no horses. They undertook and accomplished this task most cheerfully and effectually, without a man hurt I believe. The loss of my battalion on this occasion was not great. The army now took up a fresh position in which to bivouack, at about a mile and a half distance from the enemy's line, but which they could easily reach with the shot and shells of their larger pieces. The head-quarters were removed from Monsieur Villerey's house to a large farm or chateau behind our new lines, and which were formed in the following manner, viz.:--the 4th and 44th composed one line, with their right near the wood. The 21st formed on their left, but with an intervening space between them. The 85th and 93d formed one line on the left of the 21st, with an interval between their line and that regiment. This latter line was rather in an oblique direction, with its front towards a farm-house in advance and to the left, and where my battalion was ordered to take its station. This latter post was more exposed to the enemy's shot than any of the others; it being a good deal advanced, and being close to the river, the guns from the opposite shore ceased not firing on it, generally with hot shot. The men were put into a sugar house belonging to this chateau, the floor of which being sunk a little below the surface of the adjoining earth, protected them wonderfully; but on occasions they had their very cooking utensils knocked off the fire by the enemy's shot, in consequence of the exposed situation of this house. The acting quartermaster and myself being deemed civilians, and having no inclination to be deprived of our natural rest at night, as long as we could be allowed to obtain it, took up our abode in one of the outhouses at head-quarters, which we found unoccupied, and where our respective duties could be carried on with as much facility as if we were in the same house with the battalion, the distance between them being only about half a mile. Here, also, the sick and wounded were brought, where they could enjoy more comfort than in the sugar-house, till an opportunity offered of sending them down to the shipping. To secure our front a little more, and to protect the troops against the shot from the opposite shore, a redoubt was thrown up about half a mile in front of the right, and pretty near the wood; while batteries and breastworks were constructed on the road, to fire on any vessels of the enemy which might come down the river. These latter were principally constructed of hogsheads of sugar, which were found in the sugar-houses of the different plantations in the neighbourhood. But nothing could have answered worse than they did for this purpose, the enemy's shot going quite through them, without being at all deadened almost by the resistance they offered. In front of the left also, inside the road, a breastwork was thrown up, which secured the persons of a corps of marines and sailors, who occupied that part of the line. This body was, soon after the 28th, landed from the fleet; and the latter, having brought small arms on shore with them, acted as a small battalion. It is evident the enemy must have worked incessantly, from our first landing, to complete the work they occupied; for, from the information I before mentioned, as given me by one of the Spanish fishermen, it is clear they had only two guns, mounted on something like a battery, on the great road. But now that work extended even into the wood, a distance of at least three quarters of a mile, and at this time there could not be less than ten or twelve pieces of heavy ordnance mounted on it. We were told by the slaves who had remained in the houses, that the ditch behind which they had constructed this work was a sort of small canal, which the gentleman who owned the property used for the purpose of transporting the produce of his farm from thence into the river. From this time we could plainly perceive great numbers of men continually at work upon it, mostly blacks, of which they would, of course, have abundance; but their white people also (the army, we conclude) were constantly employed upon it. We could see distinctly that they were widening and deepening the canal in front of the work, and raising the parapet to a considerable height. It was now determined to try what our heavy ship-artillery would do against this work. Accordingly, the greater part of the army were employed in bringing up these unwieldy machines, and to effect which required no slight power and perseverance, as we had no means of transport but the sheer strength of a number of men combined, to drag them successively through the deep soil. A sufficient number of them having been brought up by the 31st, strong working parties were employed all night in erecting two batteries, as near to the enemy's works as they could with safety venture, and getting the guns, carriages, and ammunition, &c., into them. These were formed principally of casks, &c., filled with earth; and I am not sure that some sugar hogsheads were not used on the occasion. However, at daylight on the morning of the 1st Jan. 1815, the whole of the troops were ordered under arms, and moved forward to nearly the same points they occupied on the 28th ult. This morning there was an extremely thick fog, which greatly favoured our movements, the Americans being, I believe, totally ignorant that any alteration had taken place in the situation of our army. As soon as the fog cleared away, our artillery opened out a tremendous and thundering cannonade upon the enemy's line, which so completely astonished them, that there was not a shot returned for twenty minutes at least, so little did they expect heavy artillery there. Nay, we heard afterwards that a great number of the irregular troops were so alarmed, that they actually quitted the lines without orders, and were posting off to New Orleans, and were with great difficulty brought back again. As soon as they perceived, however, that nothing more than a cannonade was intended, and that our troops did not advance to the attack, they commenced gradually with their artillery against ours, the fire of which increasing as their confidence increased, they were not long in silencing our guns, and in dismounting some of them. The fact is, our works had been thrown up in such haste, that they were not nearly so strong as they ought to have been made, had there been more time; the consequence was, their shot penetrated into every part of our works, and caused us not only considerable loss in artillerymen, (with one officer killed,) but, as I said before, actually dismounted a great many of our guns. This consequently entirely failed of having the desired effect; but with such a very favourable opportunity as this morning's fog presented, together with the alarm and terror with which the enemy were struck on opening our artillery upon them, there is not the most distant doubt that we should have at once got possession of their lines, had we but advanced to the attack. It is true, we were not prepared for passing the ditch, having no fascines or other necessaries for that purpose; but the resistance, in my opinion, would have been so slight, that we might almost have chosen our own place to cross it; and it was not very deep at any place. The battalion of sailors were quite annoyed at being kept looking on, while so fair an opportunity, as they thought, offered, and were crying out one to another, "Why don't we go on? what is keeping us back?" 'Tis not to be doubted that the first effect of any new thing in warfare is always the most certain of producing success, particularly against inexperienced troops; but let them see and know the whole of the effects that such a thing is calculated to produce, and the alarm wears off, and confidence and courage return with wonderful rapidity. So it was here; the first fire of our guns struck them dumb with amazement and terror--But mark the contrast! Both the latter part of this day, and on the 8th, at the general attack, how little they seemed to care for all the artillery we could bring against them! Their gun, a 32-pounder, was a most bitter antagonist to our principal battery. This happened to be erected nearly in front of that part of the line where this gun was situated, and when it fired, its shot always struck the battery at the first bound, and then it ricocheted into the redoubt where I had taken up my post. General Keane, with a part of his brigade, was in this latter work, and some of them narrowly escaped the effects of the numerous balls thrown from this gun. We were told the captain of the schooner, after having been deprived of his vessel, had been appointed to the charge and management of this gun, with some of his crew to work it; and indeed it seemed very like the bitter and determined manner of our former opponent, for any of the other guns seemed like children's play to the unceasing and destructive fire of this heavy piece of ordnance. I could distinctly see that they were sailors that worked it--one of whom, a large mulatto, with a red shirt, always spunging her out after firing. In what I am going to relate, I know I shall incur the risk of being deemed a _traveller_ by some of my readers, but that shall not deter me from telling what I plainly and repeatedly saw with my own eyes, assisted by a glass. At the distance of three quarters of a mile, I could distinctly perceive the ball from this gun every time it was fired, it appearing like a small black spot in the midst of the column of white smoke, and which gradually grew larger in appearance as it approached us. In many instances I was providentially the cause of saving some of the men who were in the redoubt with us, because, seeing which way the ball was coming, I told them when to lie down; and on one occasion was the shave so close, that it actually carried away one of the men's packs as he lay on the ground. Another shot struck about three feet above our heads, and carried away part of a piece of timber which supported a shed just behind us. I forgot to mention, that, after the 28th, the Americans, conceiving that the guns of the ship would be of more use if taken out and placed in batteries, this was accordingly done; the greater part of them being planted on the other side of the river, and being completely on our flank, were enabled to annoy our people considerably, who were posted near the great road. About two or three o'clock in the afternoon of the 1st, the army began again to retire to its bivouack, leaving covering parties to protect the batteries; and after night, the whole having formed, working parties were sent to bring off as many of the heavy guns as possible. Some of these, however, they were obliged to bury in the earth, not being able to drag them away before daylight next morning. This work seemed more oppressive and fatiguing to the troops than the bringing of them up did, inasmuch as they were animated in the latter instance by the hope of their being able to effect something against the enemy through their toil and labour; but now disappointment added poignancy to their sufferings. However, although things began to assume not quite so favourable an aspect as formerly, yet every thing was borne with the greatest good-will, as they were still confident of all their laborious services being ultimately crowned with success. In all these fatiguing services, the sailors bore an ample share, and were of the very utmost benefit to the whole army, for they could readily contrive the means of moving those immense masses of metal by purchases, &c., which to a soldier would be utterly impossible. Indeed, throughout the whole service, the gallant tars deserved the very highest praise, for they were equally brave as laborious and willing. All hands, both soldiers and sailors, had been up the whole of the night of the 31st, and now up again all night of the 1st. This was very trying, no doubt. If any thing like dissatisfaction was evinced, this incessant toil and want of rest in encountering it, arose more from a desire to be led on to the attack, than from any wish to be rid of their labours, however painful these were. As this attempt had failed, no other scheme now appeared to present itself, but a vigorous and well sustained attack on their line; for several efforts had been made to penetrate through the wood, to endeavour to ascertain whether it was possible to turn their position at that point, but all these efforts had failed. The last that was attempted was conducted by Lieutenant Wright of the engineers, but both himself and nearly all his party perished; for it seems they fell in with a body of American riflemen, who, being much better accustomed to travelling in woods than our people were, fell on them, and, as said before, nearly cut off the whole party; yet it is evident it was not utterly impassable, or the two parties could not have met. I do not recollect to what regiment the men belonged who accompanied Wright, but think it probable they were altogether unacquainted with that description of service, which led them into the fatal snare in which they fell. I am confident I saw blacks, who passed and repassed by the wood, but it is certain that no attempt upon a large scale could be made in that direction to turn their position; and it was probably the better plan to abandon the idea altogether. A very excellent expedient was however devised, for the purpose of turning the right flank of the enemy; it was certainly a bold and vigorous idea, and one which, if successful, would no doubt have secured to us the victory and the possession of New Orleans. This was no less than cutting a canal, in order to unite the Mississippi with the lake by which we had arrived, and by getting boats out of the latter into the river, to transport a sufficient number of men to the opposite shore, for the purpose of making a diversion in aid of the principal attack on this side. Nothing could exceed the grandness of the conception. Accordingly, all hands were set to work to widen and deepen the rill of water which flows into the creek at the landing-place, and, continuing it up past Monsieur Villerey's house, to let it enter the river a little above that point. This, as may easily be conceived, was most laborious and dirty work; and, lest the health and spirits of the troops should suffer from such incessant fatigue, they were told off into four watches or spells, each of which followed the other in regular succession, so that the work never stood still. When it had reached near the house and high-road, screens were put up on the latter, to prevent the enemy on the opposite bank of the river from seeing what was carrying on; but as the blacks were passing and repassing almost continually by the wood, as I before mentioned, no doubt the Americans were well acquainted with what we were doing. On the ---- General Lambert arrived with the 7th and 43d regiments, to our great joy, two finer regiments not being in the service. Consequently every eye now sparkled with hope, that our labours and privations would soon terminate, as every one confidently anticipated a favourable result, and seemed still inclined to despise that enemy who had shown us that we could not do so with impunity. We were glad to meet many of our old Peninsular friends in these two fine corps, and of course welcomed them to the New World in the best manner we were capable of. They took up their ground a little in front of the canal which was cutting, there not being room sufficient for them in the line of our bivouack. We were now about 7000 effective troops, and all beginning to cheer up again, imagined nothing could withstand us. By the 6th the canal was finished, and the boats brought up into it. There was obliged to be a lock in it at the entrance from the river, for the strength of which Sir Edward, our Chief, I understand, expressed his apprehensions, but was assured by the engineer that there was not the slightest danger. I give this merely as report. On the 7th the arrangements for the attack next morning having been completed, orders were issued to that effect. The arrangements were as follows, viz.--a corps consisting of the 85th regiment, with 200 sailors and 400 marines, and the 5th West India regiment, with four light fieldpieces, the whole under the command of Colonel Thornton, was to embark in boats by twelve o'clock, and to be all across the river by daylight next morning. This force would amount to about 1200 or 1300 men, and were destined to attack and carry the works on the opposite bank, getting possession of the guns without allowing them to be spiked if possible, when they were to be turned upon the right flank of the enemy's position, on this side the river, to favour our attack. It is clear, then, that this movement should precede that of the grand attack by a considerable space of time. In the grand attack the troops were to be disposed as follows, viz.--The right column, under General Gibbs, was to consist of the 4th, 21st, 44th, and three companies of my battalion, which latter were to extend as close to the enemy's work as possible, previous to the advance of the column, and, by maintaining a constant fire, were to endeavour to keep the enemy down as much as possible. The 44th was to be divided; one-half of that corps was to carry fascines, &c., which they were to throw into the ditch on reaching it, in order that the remaining regiments of that column might be able to pass it. These fascines were to be had in the redoubt I before mentioned. The other wing of the 44th was to lead that column, followed by the 21st, and then the 4th, regiments. This was to be the principal attack. The left column, commanded by General Keane, was to be composed as follows, viz.--one company of the 7th, one of the 21st, one of the 43d, and two of ours. The whole to be supported by the 93d regiment. These were to make a feint attack upon the half-moon work which the enemy had constructed near the river, and if opportunity offered, to turn it into a real attack, and penetrate the enemy's line, co-operating with the other column. Our two companies were to act here in the same manner as the other three with whom they were to form a junction, thus covering the whole front of the enemy's work. Some blacks of the 1st West India regiment were to enter the wood on the right of our right column, and to keep up as much noise as possible by firing and sounding bugles, &c. to induce a belief that a large body of troops was moving in that direction. The reserve, under General Lambert, was to consist of the 7th and 43d regiments, and was to be so stationed as to be able to render aid to either of the attacking columns. Strict orders were given that no obstacle was to be permitted to retard the advance of the columns, but that they were to press forward and endeavour to overcome every hinderance that might present itself. As far as I recollect, and from the information I have since gained, these were substantially the orders issued, and arrangements made, on this occasion. The commanding-officers and heads of departments were also assembled, and each told the part he had to perform; on which occasion, I understand, the commanding-officer of the 44th expressed himself in terms which I could scarcely conceive it possible could fall from the lips of a soldier, which were, that "it was a forlorn hope with the 44th." In all my campaigning I never yet heard a commanding-officer who did not look upon the post of danger as the post of honour, and who did not rejoice, as if a favour was conferred on him, when appointed to an arduous or hazardous duty. Had the commanding-officer of the 44th served in the Peninsula under our illustrious leader there, he would, I am confident, have been animated by a quite different spirit. After dark I went with my commanding-officer and adjutant to view the ground over which our battalion was to march next morning, and to find out the wooden bridges, &c. over some ditches which lay in the way, that no delay might take place when they were to be called upon to act. I was sadly disappointed at our not meeting with any other commanding-officers engaged in this most necessary duty, and at the time I expressed my apprehensions as to the result. I pointed out to him the different manner in which the business had been conducted previous to the assault of Badajos, and previous to the attack on the enemy's position on the Nivelle, where every commanding-officer, or others, who had any particular duty assigned to them in the next day's operations, were brought to ground from which it was clearly pointed out to them how they were to move and act; but here all seemed apathy and fatal security, arising from our too much despising our enemy. This latter, I believe, was the principal cause of our not taking the necessary precautions, and consequently of our failure; particularly the commanding-officer of the 44th ought to have been brought and shown where the fascines were lodged, that no excuse of ignorance on that score might be pleaded. A rocket thrown up was to be the signal for the troops to advance to the attack, after they had been properly posted under the cover of night for that purpose. I own I did not at all feel satisfied with what I had seen and heard, and retired to rest with a considerable degree of despondency on my mind; and as I knew I could render little aid to the service in a case like the present, I determined I should not take any part in it, for I almost felt confident of its failure. The whole of the troops were at their post by the time appointed; but, unfortunately, as the sailors, &c. were getting the boats out of the canal into the river, the lock gave way after only a very few had passed it. Thus the whole business seemed at one blow to be totally ruined. Every effort was made to remedy the evil, but it was irremediable. They toiled, however, to get more boats into the river, but the delay had been so great that it began to draw towards dawn before they had effected any thing worth mentioning. Poor Sir Edward seemed like one bereft of his reason, for this failure had blasted all his most sanguine hopes; and as the troops were now close under the enemy's works, and could not be withdrawn before daybreak, nor without being perceived by the enemy, he thought it as dangerous to turn back as to go forward with the operation, consequently he ordered the rocket to be fired, although it was considerably past the time for the attack to take place, and no troops on the opposite shore. As soon as this was done, he galloped to the front. But the enemy had been quite prepared, and opened such a heavy fire upon the different columns, and upon our line of skirmishers, (which had been formed for some time within about 100 or 150 yards of the enemy's work,) as it is not easy to conceive. I was not in it as I said before, but I was so posted as to see it plainly. But the 44th, with the fascines, were not to be found. Their commanding-officer had taken them considerably past the redoubt where the fascines were placed, and when he bethought him of what he had to do, he and his men were obliged to turn back to seek them; and thus, when he ought to have been in front to throw them into the ditch to allow the other troops to pass over, he was nearly half a mile in rear seeking for them. But I believe it would not have availed much had they been there in time, for the right column never reached the point to which it was directed; but from the dreadful fire of every kind poured into it, some of the battalions began to waver, to halt and fire, and at last one of them completely broke, and became disorganized. Sir Edward seeing this rushed forward with his hat in his hand, and endeavouring to animate them by his presence, he cheered them on to advance again; but at this moment he fell, after receiving two wounds, the last of which was mortal. General Gibbs also fell nearly at the same time mortally wounded, and was borne off the field. Thus was the right and principal column deprived of both its leaders; and although one regiment gave ground, and could not be brought again to the attack, the other continued to keep in a body, although any attempt now must be hopeless, and they were losing such numbers of men that they must shortly be annihilated. They accordingly retired without effecting any thing. The left column succeeded somewhat better; but, as things turned out, it was only to enhance their own loss. They forced their way into the circular work before mentioned, in which they made all the men who defended it prisoners. But the canal still lay between them and the main work, which was passed only by a plank; and being so few in numbers, it would have been madness in them to attempt to go beyond where they had at present stationed themselves. Indeed, they were in a most critical situation; for, being within a few yards of the enemy's main body, they could not move without being shot through the head by their riflemen; and it was not till they had threatened to shoot the prisoners they had taken, that they induced the Americans to desist from attacking them; for by this time General Keane also had fallen severely wounded, and the 93d had been nearly cut to pieces; and General Lambert, with the reserve, had been obliged to advance and cover the retreat of the other columns. Colonel Dale, who commanded the 93d, fell early in the action, and the command devolved on Colonel Creagh; this officer, being unwilling to retire his regiment without effecting the object aimed at, although the men were literally mown down by the murderous fire of the enemy, and the other column had given way, still endeavoured to advance, but was at length reluctantly compelled to retrograde, taking care to keep his men together. This showed a fine and noble feeling in him, and is equally honourable to his gallant regiment; but unfortunately it tended only to swell the list of killed and wounded on this lamentable occasion. My people were thus left to shift for themselves, and to get away in the best manner they could. But being extended, and not being so good an object for the artillery to fire at as the columns, they escaped with much less loss than could well be supposed. Some few of them reached the ditch when they saw the columns advancing, and which they say could have been passed with ease; but the columns never advanced so far, which had they done, and that rapidly, their loss would not have been half so great; for the enemy's troops in front of the right column were evidently intimidated, and ceased firing for some seconds as the column approached; and there is little doubt, had they pushed on to the ditch with celerity, the Americans would have abandoned their line; at least, such is my humble opinion. But the poor fellows on the left, who had gained the only work which fell into our hands on this bank of the river, were still detained there, unable either to advance or retreat; and not one durst show his head above the parapet, or he was instantly shot dead. Such was their confined and critical situation at this period, that an officer of the 7th, whose name I forget, being himself rather tall, and wearing at this time the high narrow-topped cap, could not squeeze in sufficiently close to cover himself completely by the parapet, the top of the high cap he wore sticking above the top of the work. This part of the cap, which was visible to the Americans within the line, had no less than four or five rifle-shots put through it while he lay there, but without touching his head. All this information respecting these three companies I had from Lieutenant Steele of the 43d, one of the officers who was in the work. They were obliged at last to adopt a very singular but politic expedient, which was, to make one of the American prisoners embrace a man of the 43d, and thus to stand up together to see what was going forward; for hitherto they were totally ignorant, from the causes above assigned. The enemy durst not fire in such a case, for fear of killing their own man. The news they now learned was most disheartening indeed, which was, that the whole of the British had retired, and that the Americans were coming out of their lines, and were moving in the direction of that work. Nothing now remained but to surrender, or to make an attempt to retreat, at the risk of being every man knocked down. The latter, however, they preferred; on which Colonel Rennie, of the 21st, who commanded these three companies, was the first to make the experiment, and in doing which, the moment after he left the fort, he fell to rise no more. They thought it better for them all to go at once, and instantly the whole party made a rush out of the work. The greater part of them providentially succeeded in effecting their escape, although many a brave fellow fell in the attempt. CHAPTER XIX. Bravery and Success of Colonel Thornton--Negotiation for leave to transport the Wounded across the River--Insult offered to the British--They retreat--Our Army embark, and determine to make an Attack upon Mobile--Proceed in the direction of Mobile Bay--A Brigade detached to reduce Fort Boyer--The Fort surrenders, the Garrison becoming Prisoners of War--Intelligence of a Treaty of Peace being concluded at Ghent--Cessation of Hostilities. It now remains to detail the operations of Colonel Thornton's party. It will be seen, that, although his people were all ready at the appointed hour, they could not get a sufficient number of boats to transport them to the opposite shore. In fact, they did not get on board till it was near daylight, and then only about one-half of the appointed number. But, although at the risk of sacrificing himself and the few men he took with him, he hesitated not to make the attempt of fulfilling his orders. The signal for the general attack, however, was made before he could reach the opposite bank, and he had then to land, and after making his disposition with the few troops he had, to advance and attack a corps of 2000 men, mostly covered by works, some of which were extremely strong. He dashed on, however, the advance of the enemy giving way before him, till coming to their principal battery, he was obliged to detach a part of his force through the wood on his left to turn their flank, while he with the remainder attacked in front. This was conducted in such a soldierlike manner, that, after a short conflict, the enemy gave way on all sides, and retiring with precipitation, abandoned to the victors batteries and works containing sixteen guns of various calibre. But, alas! all this success came too late; for the principal attack had by this time ended in a total failure, attended with the loss of three out of four generals, and with nearly 2000 officers and men killed, wounded, and made prisoners. Had Providence prospered the work of the canal, and the troops could have been got across at the appointed hour, and in sufficient numbers, there is every reason to believe that the effect produced on the main body by such a powerful diversion, would have tended to the complete overthrow of the whole force before us; for so insecure did General Jackson feel himself to be after our establishment on the other bank of the river, and so alarmed at its consequences, that, in the evening of the fatal day, he would not consent to a cessation of hostilities, to enable us to bring off our numerous wounded, till General Lambert (who had now succeeded to the command) agreed as a preliminary to withdraw the force under Colonel Thornton from that bank; and this, although with great reluctance, the General was compelled from motives of humanity and other causes to consent to. Before, however, a final answer was returned to General Jackson, I believe it was suggested to our General, that, with the possession of the other bank of the river, and with the 7th and 43d nearly yet entire, and with the remainders of the other regiments, our chances of success had not yet entirely departed, particularly as Jackson evinced such eagerness for our withdrawing from that bank. General Lambert in consequence used means to ascertain the feelings of the troops on this proposition, but without their knowledge of his having done so; but I regret to state, they seemed utterly hopeless of ever being able to overcome such formidable difficulties as had presented themselves, particularly now that their means of overcoming them had been so lamentably diminished. The idea was consequently abandoned. In this negotiation between the Generals, which continued for some hours, Lieutenant-colonel Smith, our assistant adjutant-general, had repeatedly to pass from army to army with flags of truce, before the matter could be finally arranged. This officer was most indefatigable in his exertions on this unfortunate expedition, and to him the army is greatly indebted for his zeal, ability, and gallantry, on this and every other occasion where they could be of service to his country, and by those in authority no doubt they are duly appreciated. Thus terminated the fatal attack on the lines of New Orleans--a termination probably as disastrous in its consequences as any of modern date--not even excepting that of Buenos Ayres; for that, discreditable as it was to our arms, did not cost the lives of such a number of fine soldiers; and I fear we have not yet experienced the full consequences of this failure, for it is certain that the Americans are greatly elevated by it in their own estimation, and it is not improbable they may be thence induced to maintain a higher tone in all their future negotiations with this country. One instance may be to the point, as showing the feeling of individuals of that country on this subject. A fellow in the shape of an officer asked Colonel Smith, (I think it was,) "Well, what do you think of we Yankees? Don't you think we could lick any of the troops of the continent easily?"--"I don't know that," says our officer.--"Why, I'll prove to you," says Jonathan, "that we have shown ourselves the best troops in the world. Didn't the French beat the troops of every other continental nation? Didn't you beat the French in the Peninsula? and haven't we beat you just now?" This of course was conclusive, and no farther argument on that subject could be advanced. The remainder of the troops retired in the evening to their sorrowful bivouack, worn out and sadly dispirited. All that night was of course devoted to bringing off the unfortunate wounded; but several of those who fell far in advance had been taken into the American lines, and, I have every reason to believe, were treated with the greatest humanity. Every effort was used, during the continuance of the truce, to bring away the great numbers who lay wounded in the different parts of the field; and on this as on all other occasions, the sailors with their officers, evinced the utmost solicitude to render assistance to the army; a great number of them were employed all night on this distressing duty. During the whole of that afternoon, both while the negotiations were pending, and at other times, the American officers were unceasing in their endeavours to induce our soldiers to desert and join their army. Too many, I regret to say, listened to their offers, and accepted them. To some they promised promotion, to others money or grants of land; in short, they were more like recruiting sergeants, I understand, than the officers of a hostile army. My battalion did not quit the field till after dark, and it is from some of them I have this information. A group of two sergeants and a private of ours were accosted by an American officer of artillery with a request that they would enter the service of the United States; that the sergeants should be promoted if they wished to serve, or that they should have grants of land if they preferred a civil life; but that, if they chose to enter the army, he would ensure them the rank of officers. Our people listened to this harangue for some time, and then began, I regret to say, to give him some bad language; telling him, at the same time, that they would rather be privates in the British army, than officers among such a set of raggamuffins as the Americans, and told him to sheer off or they would fire upon him. This so exasperated the cowardly villain, that he went off instantly into the line, they watching him all the while, and pointing the gun, of which, it seems, he had charge, it was fired, and knocked down the private, who was only wounded, however, by the shot. Innumerable attempts of this nature were made both now and all the time we remained before their lines subsequently, but which attempts, I am proud to say, as far as I have been able to learn, failed in every instance in the men of my battalion. Much about the same time, an American soldier came within about 150 yards of our line, and began to plunder such of the killed or wounded men as he thought possessed of any thing valuable. He at length commenced upon a poor wounded man belonging to my battalion, which being perceived by a Corporal Scott of ours, he asked permission from his captain to take a shot at him. This being granted, (although a sort of truce had been established while the negotiations were going on,) he took up his rifle, and taking a steady aim, he fired, and tumbled the plundering villain right over the body of the poor wounded man. The loss of our five companies in this attack amounted to seven officers and about ---- men killed and wounded. Some of the other regiments, the 93d in particular, had suffered dreadfully, having lost more than half their numbers. The sad ceremony of burying such of the officers whose bodies had been recovered, together with attention to the wounded, occupied several days from this period, and sending the wounded, who were able to bear removal, to the shipping, kept great numbers of the remaining men continually employed; and the attention of all was now turned towards drawing off from this scene of our late disastrous attempt. The General entered into a negotiation with Jackson about being permitted to send a portion of our wounded down the river in boats; for which permission some equivalent, which I forget, was to be granted on our part, and which, after considerable discussion, was eventually agreed to. The sick, the wounded, the stores of every description, were now despatched as fast as circumstances would allow; but the effecting of this occupied not less than nine days, during the whole of which time the enemy was incessant in his attempts to harass and annoy us. All their heavy ordnance was brought to bear on our bivouack; the sugar-house our people occupied, and even the head-quarters, did not escape; night and day they kept up a fire of shot and shells upon these points; but the distance being considerable, no very great mischief resulted from it, further than the continual state of uneasiness and alarm in which it kept the troops. On one occasion, however, a shell was thrown into the lines of the 43d, who had since the attack occupied a part of the general bivouack, and which, falling into a hut occupied by Lieutenant Darcy of that regiment, while he lay asleep, carried off both his legs as it fell. Poor fellow! he would thus be awakened in a rough manner indeed. I have since seen him in Dublin, the government having kindly compensated him by giving him a company, and I believe two pensions. Several shells were thrown into the head-quarters premises, but providentially without injuring any one. One fell in the yard while a party of troops was halted there for a short while, and which falling on one of the men's knapsacks, which he had put off, it carried it, with itself, not less than six feet deep into the earth. It did not explode. Some fell on the roof, which penetrated through all the stories to the very ground. Every night also the picquets were kept in a state of agitation and alarm by the continual attacks of small parties of our skulking enemy, and my battalion, as did the others also, lost considerable numbers by this petty warfare. In short, the men's lives began almost to be a burden to them. There was another source of annoyance adopted on the part of the Americans on this occasion, but which, affecting only the mental, and not the bodily powers of our soldiers, was not so much heeded. Every day almost they assembled in large bodies on the parapet of their line, with flags of various descriptions, some with "sailors' rights" and numerous other devices, &c. painted on them, using the most insulting gesticulations towards those who were near enough to see them, a band playing Yankee Doodle, and other national airs, all the while, and sometimes ironically favouring us with Rule Britannia. Considerable numbers of our men deserted about this time. Every encumbrance being removed, however, by the 17th, orders were issued for the march of the army on the following evening soon after dark, leaving the picquets as a rearguard, which were not to march till a short while before daylight. In retiring, some of the wounded, who were unable to bear removal, were necessarily left in the houses where they had been collected; but there were not many so left, and no doubt the enemy acted humanely by them. There were seven men of my battalion left, out of which three rejoined us after the conclusion of peace; the other four, I believe, were very badly wounded, and died in consequence. It was also necessary to abandon such of the guns as remained in the advanced batteries, because, both from their weight and their being so near the enemy, they could not be brought off without exposing our intentions of retreating. Neither were these numerous, and most of them only iron ship-guns, which are of no great value. The movement commenced according to the preconcerted plan, and being conducted with secrecy and regularity, every soldier was brought off, over a country almost impassable, and where, if followed and harassed by an enterprising enemy, great numbers must have either fallen into their hands or perished in the swamp. But I believe, had the Americans even been aware of our intention, they would have hesitated before they came into collision with our highly exasperated army, and would scarcely have dared to attack us in the open field: they had had enough of that work on the 23d, to give them a specimen of what British soldiers could do when met fairly, front to front. The marsh, it may be necessary to mention, extended from the lower skirt of the wood to the fishermen's huts at the mouth of the creek. This creek we had sailed up on our advance, but this could not possibly be the case at present, both on account of our numbers being much too great for the number of boats, and of the danger to which it would have exposed the troops had they been attacked from the shore, but principally on the former account; a sort of road had therefore been constructed by our artificers, by cutting down boughs from the wood, and laying them across such places as required something on the surface on which to tread. This road extended, as nigh as I can judge, about eight or ten miles, and in passing which numerous slips were made into the sloughs on each side; but there being plenty of assistance generally at hand, they helped each other out: some men, I understand, were lost, however, in this night-march through the swamp. Having arrived at the huts before-mentioned, the whole army set about forming such places of shelter as the desert swamp afforded. There were certainly reeds in abundance, but we wanted some sort of timbers for the support of the outward covering. We, however, did the best we could; and now every exertion was made by the navy to bring the army off from this most uncomfortable place of abode, and regiment after regiment were despatched as fast as the boats and other small craft could go and return, the distance from hence to the shipping being about seventy miles. While we remained here, we who were fond of shooting found plenty of wild-ducks on which to exercise our sporting abilities; but, alas! we wanted shot, and were therefore seldom able to bring home a couple for dinner. A considerable number of slaves, belonging to the estates where we had lately been stationed, followed us down thus far, some of whom would not return, but were afterwards sent on board of ship. These, male and female, often amused us with their native dances, the men generally having a number of rings or bells about them, which sounded as they kept time to the tune. Some of their dances were, however, far from decent, particularly on the part of the females, which, it may be supposed, highly delighted some of our young and thoughtless countrymen. Some were induced to return to their masters: for those who came on board of ship, I believe it was not till very lately that the two governments came to terms as to the remuneration which their owners claimed for them. At length the turn came for my battalion to go on board, which we did on the 25th of January, when our whole five companies were put on board the Dover, the ship that had brought out two companies of the battalion, and which were then not much fewer in number than the five at present were; in fact, we had lost more than half. The whole army did not get embarked till ----, when the 7th Fusileers came on board. This regiment had been necessarily left alone at the fishermen's huts till the boats could return, as before stated, to bring them off, and yet even this single battalion the enemy, with upwards of 10,000 men, dared not come down and attack, although there were no works to protect it in this exposed situation. Nothing could possibly demonstrate more fully and clearly, that, notwithstanding the repulse they had unfortunately given our troops, they dreaded them in the open country; or else it must be attributed to the prudent sagacity of their leader, who, having gained a victory which he had previously scarce dared to hope for, now wisely resolved not to risk the tarnishing of his dear-bought laurels. It is not an easy matter to reconcile this cautious and timid conduct with their furious onset on the night of the 23d, and with their boasting speeches after our failure on the 8th instant. Now, while we remain at rest for a short while on board of ship, let us take a retrospective glance at the late events. It is certain we were singularly unfortunate. Providence, which had smiled upon us in our late operations against the most formidable army in the world, the French, here taught us most painfully, that the victory is not always to be gained by strength or courage. Indeed it was but a just punishment for the contempt we entertained for our opponents, and which unfortunate feeling, I believe, was almost universal. I own I entertained it in a high degree; for I judged it next to a moral impossibility that an army of undisciplined and unmanageable peasants, however numerous, could for a moment withstand the attack of those troops who had overthrown the victorious legions of Bonaparte. But every soldier was a patriot, and they fought for their country, and for a country of all others most suitable for the operations of such troops; full of fastnesses, composed of creeks, and necks, and woods, &c. of all which they did not fail to take the utmost advantage. For this work of theirs, constructed on a spot of ground said to have been pointed out by General Moreau, completely shut us out from all approach towards the town, and compensated for every disadvantage under which they, as irregulars, laboured; for it was not only a formidable barrier to our army, but it gave them, by the protection it afforded their persons, all the steadiness of troops inured to combat, and permitted them the full exercise of that superior skill as marksmen for which they are famed, and which exposure in the open field would have deprived them of; for here they were covered up to the chin, and suffered comparatively nothing from all our fire. But I fear we have something for which to blame ourselves on this occasion. It is certain, I believe, that they had been timely apprized of the destination of our expedition, however secret we pretended to keep it ourselves, and if rumour may in such a case be permitted to go for any thing, it is said that information was conveyed from Jamaica to New Orleans direct by a French ship, which left the former for the latter place some time before our arrival. How she came into the possession of that information, I cannot justly tell. It is certain, however, that the Americans must have had timely notice, or General Jackson could not have had the men from Kentucky and Tennessee to oppose us the first night we landed. I before hazarded an opinion, that had we pushed forward on the 24th December, we should in all probability have proved successful. I will say nothing as to the point of debarkation being well or ill chosen, although many have said we should have been more likely to succeed had we attacked Fort ----, which, after carrying, would have allowed us to land behind the town, instead of three leagues below it. These things I am totally incapable of judging of, from my ignorance of the country. I also before expressed my opinion, that had we attacked on New Year's Day, when our artillery produced such an effect on the appalled Americans, we should have had a better chance of carrying their works. Another thing in which I venture to differ from the plan adopted by our lamented commander, is, that I would have employed the 7th and 43d to the post of honour, instead of keeping them in reserve. They, it was well known, had each established a reputation for being the finest regiments in the service, and every reliance might have been placed in their executing whatever task was assigned them, if executable by human powers. Far different was it with those who unfortunately led the attack, for except one of the regiments of the attacking column, they had not any of them been conspicuous as fighting regiments. It was, I believe, a well known maxim of Bonaparte's, always to put his best troops in front; if they were successful, their example served to stimulate the others to copy their example; if unsuccessful, their discipline and valour never permitted them to become so totally disorganized as to render the reverse irretrievable. The onset also of these better troops, must produce a far different effect on the enemy than the hesitating and dispirited attack of inferior ones. Had our troops on this occasion rushed forward to the ditch in double quick time, or at least at a quick march, I venture to affirm the work would have been carried with the fourth part of the loss of what they suffered. Reason itself must point out to any man, whether acquainted with military matters or not, that to move slowly under a galling fire is more trying and destructive to the troops so moving, than to rush at once to the point aimed at; but much more, to halt at the very point where every fire-arm can be brought to bear upon them with the deadliest effect, is of all other modes of proceeding the least likely to succeed. They were thus exposed for hours to as destructive a fire as ever was poured upon the heads of an attacking army, while, had they pushed on at the rate I mention, a few minutes would have sufficed to put them from under the fire of the artillery at least, for when close to the ditch, it could not be brought to bear upon them. Mark the mode in which the three companies on the left effected the task assigned to them. Before the enemy were aware almost that they were to be attacked, these troops were in possession of the work they were destined to storm; so quickly indeed that the defenders of that work had not time to effect their retreat, and were, as before noticed, made prisoners by the attacking party. This not only secured their safety while left there by themselves, but enabled them, in some degree, to effect their retreat with less loss than they would otherwise have been exposed to. I have dwelt perhaps too long on this, but of all other causes I deem this to have been the greatest of our sad failure. It is lamentable, however, to be obliged to confess, that ill conduct on the part of some parties, but of one individual in particular, contributed in no small degree to our repulse on this melancholy occasion. For the rest, nothing could exceed the determined courage and patient endurance of hardship that the army in general evinced, and certainly nothing could exceed the gallantry of our leaders. It was now determined to make an attempt upon Mobile, a town lying about thirty or forty leagues to the eastward of New Orleans. Accordingly, the fleet got under weigh and proceeded in the direction of the entrance into Mobile Bay, which is protected on the west side by shoals and Isle Dauphine, and on the east by a fort, built on a point of land called Mobile Point, and mounting about twenty pieces of heavy ordnance. Its name is Fort Boyer, I believe. Before our arrival in this country, an attempt had been made on this fort by one of our frigates, but which entirely failed, owing to her taking the ground on the shoals before mentioned. As she could not be got off, and as she lay under the fire of the fort, her crew were compelled to abandon her, but, I believe, not till they had first set her on fire; her wreck lay here when we came. Until this fort was taken, no vessel of any size could enter the bay, consequently it became necessary to attack it in form. The brigade formerly General Gibbs's, consisting of the 4th, 21st, and 44th, was therefore landed a little behind the point, and proceeded without delay to invest it; the remainder of the troops were landed on Isle Dauphine. We were put on shore on the 8th February, and instantly commenced hutting ourselves by brigades. Some of the officers had tents issued out to them; the acting Quartermaster and myself had one between us. This island is almost covered with pine-wood, but in other respects it is nearly a desert, and without any inhabitants resident on it, save one family, a Mr Rooney, formerly from Belfast I understand, but now a naturalized American. He was married to a native of Louisiana, a lady of French extraction. He had been a midshipman in the American navy, but had been dismissed for some misconduct, it was said, and banished to this island. He appeared to us to be no great things. I omitted to mention that the 40th regiment had arrived from England before we left the banks of the Mississippi, but it being after the failure they were of no use, and were consequently not permitted to land. They were afterwards placed in our brigade, which now bivouacked near to the point of the island facing the bay. When we arrived, the island contained a considerable number of cattle, with pigs, &c. belonging to Rooney, but which had been permitted, as is customary in this country, to run wild in the woods, there being no danger of their leaving the island. These, however, soon fell a prey to such hungry fellows as we were, who had been for some time past on rather short commons. But they did not answer our expectations, being in taste, what may appear singular, quite fishy. This was attributed to their feeding so much on marine vegetables, there being little other pasture for them on the island. A hoax was played off upon great numbers of our young hands respecting this fishiness. There was on one point of the island a considerable oyster-bed, and it was generally pretty near this that the cattle were found and shot, that being the most distant from our bivouack. It was therefore said the flesh of the cattle became of that peculiar flavour from feeding upon oysters. Some, without reflecting, credited this strange story, as the assertor generally said he had seen the cattle opening the oysters with their tongues. This oyster-bed, however, was a source of great luxury to us, for it not only afforded us the means of rendering the salt junk more palatable by having an excellent sauce to make it go down, but it even afforded a most wholesome and delicious meal upon occasions by eating them raw. We also made the best use of our time when not employed on military affairs, in endeavouring to catch as many fish as we could; and for this purpose, my mess purchased from one of the poor Spanish fishermen before mentioned (and who, for the information and kindness they had shown us, were obliged to quit their habitations and follow us), an excellent casting-net, with which the acting Quartermaster and myself occupied ourselves from day to day, generally bringing home a sufficient quantity of fish to serve our mess. I never laboured more assiduously in any occupation than I did in this, not only from a relish for such amusement, but because we really wanted something to eke out our scanty meals. We at length got a siene-net from one of the men-of-war, with which we were not only able to supply ourselves most abundantly, but always had a large quantity to give away to the soldiers. Wild-fowl also were very plentiful when we first entered the island; but from the number killed, and the constant shooting at them, they soon became scarce and difficult to get at. Here also there were abundance of alligators, and on our fishing and shooting excursions we frequently started them from their lurking-places, which were generally among the reeds by the side of an inland lake, or rather creek of the sea. On these occasions we seldom saw them, for they always endeavoured to avoid us; but wherever they ran along the bottom of the water, they stirred up the mud so greatly all the track they took, that we had no difficulty in tracing them. I never remember to have seen a live one on these occasions, but a dead one once afforded us considerable amusement. One evening, on our return home from our constant occupation, there being three or four of us of the party, I was in front, and the acting Quartermaster and the others in the rear of me. On a sudden I was alarmed by the cry of "Oh stop, here's an alligator!" and before I could look round, a shot was fired apparently into the earth, close beside their feet. I went back to see what was the matter, and found indeed, as he had said, an alligator, but one which I suppose had been dead for several months at least. It was buried in the sand, and only a part of its body appeared; but whether he imagined it might have placed itself in that situation intentionally, with the view of enticing its prey within its reach, or what other thought he had, I cannot tell, but, to make assurance doubly sure, he fired his rifle right into the body of the half-rotten alligator. He was long and often severely roasted about this afterwards. A young one was caught alive, however, by some of the 14th dragoons, and brought home to England, and afterwards, I understand, presented to the British Museum. All this while the siege of the fort was going forward, but as we had nothing to do with it, we had plenty of time, not only to hunt for extra prog, but to amuse ourselves in any other manner we pleased. The army, about this time, was inspected by our Chief, General Lambert, by battalions. My kind late commanding-officer, Captain Travers, who was severely wounded at the attack on the 8th, had rejoined by this time, although still very lame. During the inspection, the General said to him, "Travers, I am sorry to hear that your sergeant-major ran away on the night of the 23d, during the attack."--"That is impossible, General," said Travers, "for he fought as bravely as any man could possibly do, and was carried off the field near the end of the fight, severely wounded. But I have a guess what has given rise to this report. A sergeant of ours left his battalion, I believe, either during or after the fight, and having taken up his quarters near one of the houses where the wounded were carried, the surgeon pressed him to remain with him as hospital-sergeant. I made efforts to have him sent to his battalion, but could not get it done. This must have been the cause of such a story having got abroad."--"Ah," says the General, "I am sorry that the poor sergeant-major should have lain under a stigma, of which he was altogether undeserving; and, now since we have done him an involuntary injustice, and he is a deserving man, we must try what amends we can make him for it." He accordingly recommended him for an ensigncy in one of the West India regiments; and before that day twelvemonth, he had risen to the rank of lieutenant. Nothing could be finer than the feeling of Sir John Lambert on this occasion; indeed, he has always shown himself a most excellent upright man, and a gallant officer. About this time, a Russian vessel was detained going up to New Orleans with a cargo of wine from Bordeaux; but although she would, I doubt not, have been a legal capture, for breaking the blockade, the master was permitted to dispose of his cargo to our army, and an excellent thing he made of it, for the wine, which he must have purchased for about one shilling or one and sixpence a bottle, he charged us in general about four shillings for; we were glad, however, to get it at any price, and a most seasonable supply it was indeed. On one of our shooting excursions, an officer of ours fell in with a sow and two or three pigs, in the wood; he instantly fired at one of the pigs and killed it; but when going to pick it up, the sow set upon him with such fury, that he was glad to abandon his prize, and retreat with precipitation. When the army landed near New Orleans, the 14th light dragoons had taken their saddles and other horse equipments with them, in hopes of being able to get mounted in the country; and which, being bulky, required a good large boat to bring off again. They were therefore put on board a considerable-sized one, with an officer of the regiment and a guard to protect them. On their way down towards the shipping, night overtook them before they could reach their destination, on which they pushed towards the shore, whether of an island or the mainland, I cannot say, in hopes of being more secure for the night; they consequently put on a sentry, and all lay down in the boat to sleep. Soon afterwards, however, a boat came rowing rapidly alongside, and before the sentry could discover who or what they were, they boarded, and instantly made the party all prisoners. The officer, I believe, when called on to deliver up his sword, was so annoyed at being trapped in such a manner, that he threw it into the lake, as far as he could fling it. The American officer who captured them was a lieutenant in their navy, and went by the name of Commodore Shiel (for every fellow is a commodore who commands even a few boats). He was so elated by his success on this occasion, and, I believe, by having taken another boat with stores, that he boasted to his prisoners, that he would take even Admiral Cochrane himself yet, before he left the country. While we remained on Isle Dauphine, a commissary, with a sergeant and party of our men, were sent on shore, on the mainland, to shoot bullocks for the supply of the army. They had landed, and the commissary, with the sergeant and I think two men, went off into the neighbouring wood, leaving the two or three other men at the landing-place to protect the boat. Here again Mr Shiel made his appearance, quite suddenly and unexpectedly, having come round a jutting point before the men were aware of his presence; he instantly, of course, made them prisoners, and, taking their arms from them, he put them on board their own boat, then, sending a part of his crew on board to manage it, despatched it for the American harbour. He now with a few more of his people went in search of the commissary and his party, whom he soon found; and they seeing resistance would be vain, when their own boat was departed, were compelled at once to surrender. He instantly put them into his own boat; and taking the commissary into the after-sheets alongside of himself, the sergeant and the other men were put forward to the head of the boat. Whether any preconcerted scheme and signal had been agreed upon between the commissary and the sergeant, I do not know, but an opportunity soon after offering, the commissary gave the sergeant the wink, and instantly seizing Mr Shiel by the thighs, pitched him right overboard in an instant; the sergeant, at the same moment, seizing the stoutest of Shiel's men, and serving him in a like manner. The others being attacked by the remaining two men, at once surrendered, and, I believe, suffered themselves to be bound; and our people, having now resumed their arms and become masters of the boat, admitted Mr Shiel, who, I fancy, had clung to the boat to prevent his drowning, to come once more on board. What became of the other man who was thrown over, I know not; whether he swam on shore, or was drowned, or was afterwards taken into the boat, I cannot tell; but the result was, that the great, the boasting Commodore Shiel, was brought to the island a prisoner, where he landed like a drowned rat, and quite chopfallen. The commissary, who was a fine, stout, and gallant young fellow, spoke highly in praise of Tom Fukes, our sergeant, for his bravery and good management on the occasion. At length the works being all completed for battering the fort, Colonel Smith was sent in with a flag of truce to demand its surrender. The commandant was quite undecided how to act, and asked the Colonel what he, as a man of honour, would advise him to do. "Why," says the Colonel, "do you not see that our guns are now overlooking your whole work, and that we could, in a very short time, knock it down about your ears? I have no hesitation in telling you, that the rules of war will fully justify you in surrendering to such a superior force, and when the siege has advanced to such a point as it actually is." His arguments, together with the truth of his statements, at length overcame the courage and determination of Jonathan, and he instantly agreed to surrender, the garrison, afterwards becoming prisoners of war, marching out and laying down their arms on the glacis. Thus, on the 12th February, this important fortification fell into our hands, together with 400 men of the 2d regiment of the United States, and either one or two American colours. This obstacle removed, every exertion was now made to advance up the lake to the attack of Mobile; but on the 14th, a vessel arrived with the unexpected, but cheering information, that peace had been concluded at Ghent between the two nations, and that it only required the ratification of Mr Maddison, the United States' president. Of course, all further operations of a warlike nature were suspended for the present, till it was known whether the treaty would be ratified or not. This ship also brought out the notification of our two Generals, Lambert and Keane, being appointed Knights of the Bath. Some of our Colonels also were included in the list, viz. Blakeny of the the 7th, and Dickson of the royal artillery. And now nothing was thought of but amusement, and making ourselves as comfortable as possible. But we began to get very short of provisions. Our people were therefore obliged to send to the Havannah, where they procured the strongest sort of beef I ever saw. It was not salted; but after the cattle had been killed, all the thin belly part had been cut round the whole bullock, in narrow stripes, of about two inches in width; this being laid, or hung up in the sun, which is extremely powerful in that country, it was dried without having the least offensive taste or smell, farther than a little rancidity, which was not by any means unpleasant; but when brought from on board, it had much more the appearance of coils of ropes (for it was coiled up in a similar manner) than provision for the use of man. An aide-de-camp of General Lambert's, then Lieutenant, but now Major D'Este, son of his Royal Highness the Duke of Sussex by Lady Augusta Murray, used frequently to join the shooting party of our acting quartermaster and myself; and, on one occasion, having obtained a canoe, a trip to the mainland was projected, for the purpose of shooting; accordingly we took two or three men with us, and started from the northernmost point of the island, that being the nearest to the main, which we saw before us, and not more than five or six miles distant. It was considered the best mode of proceeding for us all to get into the boat, except one man, who was a famous wader, (having often accompanied us in our expeditions around the island,) and who was to wade as far out into the sea as he could, dragging the canoe after him. This he could do very easily, for she was quite light, and the water was exceeding shallow for a great distance into the sea. He continued towing us in this manner for about half a mile, when, being fairly up to his chin, he and we thought it was high time for him to come on board; but, in doing this, he gave her such a cant as turned her right over, and pitched us all into the water. I luckily had my eye upon the man when he sprung to get into the canoe, and suspecting that she could not bear so rough a pull, was ready; and accordingly, when I saw her going, leaped out, without being plunged overhead, as all the others were. But all our rifles, &c. were pitched out, and of course sunk to the bottom, to which we were obliged to dive before we could get them up. This accident put a stop to our excursion, and we waded out again, looking extremely foolish. Nevertheless we ought to have been truly thankful to Providence that it occurred before we got out of our depth; for, with such a frail bark, it is more than probable some accident would have happened before our return, had not this prevented our further progress. Innumerable were our adventures of this nature, for the water was delightfully warm, and having no military occupation at the time, we could not find any better amusement. A party, indeed, suggested the getting up of theatricals, which being approved on all hands, workmen were instantly set about erecting the theatre-royal, Isle Dauphine. This, of course, with the getting off of parts, occupied the managers and the other performers for some time; but at length all being ready, most excellent entertainments took place, following each other in quick succession. At some of these parties, American officers, who now often paid us visits, were highly entertained, and paid us high compliments, not only as to the splendour and magnificence of our theatrical representations, but to our ingenuity as displayed in hut-building, which, they said, even surpassed the architectural abilities of the Indians in that branch of the art,--a high compliment indeed! CHAPTER XX. Ratification of the Treaty of Peace--Exchange of Prisoners--Our Troops embark for England--When off the coast of Ireland, receive intelligence of Bonaparte's escape from Elba--The Author and his Battalion reach the Downs, and proceed to Thorncliffe--Embark for France--Arrive at Paris, and occupy the Champs Elysées--Review of the Russian Guards--Russian Discipline--British Troops reviewed--Accident to Prince Blucher--Amusements in Paris--The Allied Forces, except the Army of Occupation, leave Paris--The Author's Battalion embark for England--Reach Dover, and return to Thorncliffe--He obtains leave of absence, and visits his Family--His Battalion ordered to Ireland--Sets out to join it, accompanied by his Wife, who dies three days after they reach Dublin--His Battalion reduced--Joins the first Battalion at Gosport, which is ordered to Scotland--Arrive at Leith, and march to Glasgow--The Author returns home in ill health--His Father dies--Joins his Battalion again--Winters at home--His Battalion ordered to Ireland--Joins it at Belfast--They occupy different stations during the Whiteboy Insurrection--Six companies of his Battalion ordered to Nova Scotia, but the Author remains with the other four companies--He is shortly ordered to proceed to Nova Scotia--His health declines--Returns home in consequence, takes advantage of Lord Palmerston's Bill, and retires on full pay. On the 5th March, the ratification of the treaty of peace, by Mr Maddison, arrived; and now all our thoughts were turned towards our dear native country. On the 15th also, all our poor fellows, who had been made prisoners by the Americans, joined us at this island, an exchange in consequence of peace having of course taken place. Many of these were strange-looking figures when they came among us, most of them having been stripped of great part of their uniforms, their caps particularly, and wearing mocassins, a sort of Indian sandals, instead of shoes or boots, and being so sunburnt as to be scarcely recognisable. Major Mitchell told us that General Jackson had treated him exceeding harshly, because he did not choose to give the General such information respecting our numbers, &c. as he wished. He also said he met with great insolence on his way up to Natchez, where the prisoners were kept, from the different parties of Kentucky men, and others, whom he met on their way down "to take a shoot," as they termed it, "at his countrymen." He met many thousands in this manner, so that 10 or 12,000 is the very lowest number that Jackson could have had for the defence of his lines. I do not remember that we ever had Divine service performed during the period of this expedition except once or twice, and that about this time. Indeed the activity required of the army at all times, during the continuance of hostilities, almost necessarily precluded it. At this time I remember perfectly the preacher's text was, "My son, give me thy heart." Alas! how few of the hearts of his hearers were given at that time to Him who only had a right to demand them! I confess with shame and sorrow, that almost any trifle, however unworthy, possessed a greater interest in my heart than He who had formed it, and who alone is worthy of supreme regard.--The good Lord pardon this neglect, for Christ's sake! The regiments now began to go on board the different ships, as fast as arrangements could be made to receive them; and when on board, they sailed at once without waiting for the others, there being now no danger of falling in with an enemy. The weather now began to grow exceedingly warm, which brought out alligators and snakes in abundance. The latter were extremely annoying, for they sometimes got into our very tents, and one on one occasion so frightened a captain of ours (who was not afraid of man) as to make him sprawl up the tent-pole to get out of its reach, roaring out at the same time most lustily for help. It was killed and put into a bottle of spirits, and I believe he brought it home. It was an exceeding small one, but with the most beautiful crimson, or rather pink-coloured wavy streak running down its back imaginable. We were told it was one of the most venomous of all the American reptiles, save probably the rattlesnake. The thunder and lightning also became very frequent, and the former, I think, the most awfully grand I ever heard. It appeared to roll along just on the very tops of the pine-trees, many of which indeed were scathed to the very roots by the latter. On the 31st March our turn came to go on board, and we were rejoiced to find that the Dover, our old friend was to be our principal ship, the remainder of the men beyond what she could hold being sent on board the Norfolk transport. While we were preparing for sea, I took a boat and a party with a siene, and went on shore on a sandy point of the island, where I had not been before, and in a short time caught a fine load of fish, mostly grey mullet, with which we returned on board, greatly to the satisfaction of all those who shared in them. Every thing being now ready, we weighed and bid adieu to America on the 4th April, shaping our course for the Havannah, where our captain intended to call for various purposes, but principally to replenish his stock, which had begun to get exceedingly low. On our passage thither we encountered a heavy gale, which detained us longer than we had calculated for our voyage. We did not reach that place till the 19th. Here we found ourselves once more in Espana, every thing here being exactly like what you meet with in the mother country,--the same stink of oil, garlic, and dried fish. Speaking of the latter, which is called by them Bacalao, an officer of ours who kept a journal, when describing this place, says, "The natives catch a great quantity of fish on the coast, called Bacalao." Unfortunately it is not called Bacalao till after it is dried, but Piscado. This brought, as it might be expected, lots of laughter upon his head. I need not describe the Havannah, because any one who has a Gazetteer, may there read an account of it; and which, though perhaps not altogether a correct one, will be sufficient to give him an idea of what it is; suffice it to say, it is an exceeding strong place, and would not, I apprehend, be so easily taken, if the inhabitants are true to their country, as it was in the year 1762. The capture of it at the time above stated, made the place extremely interesting to me, for one of my earliest and best friends served as a lieutenant in the 56th grenadiers at the taking of it; and often have I heard him expatiate, with great delight and animation, on the scenes he witnessed, and the dangers he encountered, in this most arduous undertaking. He is now, poor man, no more, having died only very lately, and I sincerely trust and hope he is in peace. The Moro and the Punta, and all the other immense fortifications, attracted my particular regard, on this old gentleman's account; but so extremely jealous were the Spaniards, that they would not permit even us, their late faithful helpers and friends, to view the works. We visited the theatre, which is a fine building, but heavy and badly lighted, but apparently well supplied with performers. The piece on this occasion was Anthony and Cleopatra. There were also some equestrian performers here from the United States. They had built a fine circus, at about half a mile's distance from the city, to which every one of course repaired. All the world was there; even little Connolly, whom I had known at Cadiz as a major in the Spanish service, was here in the command of a regiment, and had attained the rank of full Colonel. He did not seem over anxious to recognise any of his former acquaintances, nor even to let it be known that he was so much of a Briton as to have acquaintance with any people of that country; in short, he wished to be considered a complete Spaniard. I doubt not he is now a rank apostolical. We paid a visit also to old Woodville, the famous cigar-maker. He was an expatriated Englishman, from Portsmouth I believe, obliged to flee his country on account of some smuggling transaction, and, in doing this, he had changed his name. We found the old man ill in bed, but able to sit up and speak with us. He wore an immense long white beard, reaching down nearly to the bed as he sat up. Yet this old man had a young black wife, and a whole fry of young mulattoes running about the house like as many little pigs. He was very kind, but apparently not over well to do. We bought each a considerable quantity of his famed cigars, for which we paid him, I think, four dollars a thousand--more, I apprehend, than he usually gets from the Spaniards for them. Having laid in such sea stock as we could conveniently procure, and having stored ourselves well with the delicious preserves of this country, and withal bought a fine turtle, weighing about two cwt., on the 24th we set sail for old and happy England, glad once more to set our faces homeward. We had a quickish run through the Gulf of Florida, or, as it is more properly called, the Bahama Channel, and, keeping to the northward of Bermuda, shaped our course so that we passed a little to the south of the Great Newfoundland Bank. From hence the wind was roughish generally, but quite fair, so that we frequently ran at the rate of 200 miles in the twenty-four hours, the transport being an excellent sailer. Nothing particular occurred till we were within a few days' sail of Ireland, when we fell in with an American who had just left England. From him we learned the totally unlooked-for information, that Bonaparte had made his escape from Elba, and had returned to France, and that the whole continent was once more involved in war. Nothing could exceed the change which this unexpected news produced among our people. Some who were desponding at the gloomy prospect of half-pay, revived in a moment, and again set honour, glory, and promotion, once more before the eyes of their imagination. Indeed, I think no one seemed sorry at the change; but some probably would have preferred a short repose, before they were called upon again to leave that home which they had painted to themselves so comfortable and happy. On the ---- we arrived at Plymouth, where the good folks received us with great cordiality; but the news from Flanders now engrossed all attention, and our unfortunate business seemed forgotten. It was as well perhaps that it was so, for we had no victory to boast; and with the world it is but too often the case, that a want of good fortune is almost tantamount to a want of good conduct. We were ordered on to Portsmouth, which we reached in two days; and from thence proceeded still onwards to the Downs. Our arrival was telegraphed to London, from whence, after some communication by post also with the Commander-in-Chief, we were ordered to disembark, which we did on the 2d June. The cause of this being ordered, and of our not proceeding direct to Flanders, was, that we were extremely ill off for equipment, nearly one-fourth of our men being without arms or appointments, all those who had been prisoners, and many of those who had been severely wounded, having been deprived of them. In some respects the order for our landing was unfortunate, as far as regards the honours of that great and crowning victory of Waterloo, in which we consequently had no share; and, on the other hand, as far as regards my own public accounts, at least it was fortunate for me, for I was thus enabled to have them prepared, and forwarded to the War Office, and finally settled without loss of time, which I could not have done had we left England again immediately. We were ordered from Deal to Thorncliffe, our old quarters, where we found three companies of my battalion, and five or six of the other two. All our old friends were of course glad to see us; and, under such circumstances, the meeting of those between whom friendship has long subsisted, is in a great measure a compensation for the toil and sufferings of a soldier's life. We continued at Thorncliffe for some time, but busily preparing once more to take the field; and had Bonaparte not been so precipitate in his movements, we might have shared in the glory of his final overthrow. I was compelled to go to London while we remained here, for the purpose of settling a variety of accounts, &c., and while there was persuaded to appear before the Medical Board, for the purpose of obtaining a certificate as to the nature of my wound, on which to found a claim for a year's pay, the amount at this time given to all whom that Board recommended as fit subjects for this bounty. I had omitted doing so when in London before, because I thought no one had any claim for it, except such as had suffered most materially in health in consequence of their wounds. However, at the suggestion of my friends I did appear before the Board, who considered my wound of such severity as to entitle me to that bounty; and I accordingly soon after received the sum of L.118, 12s. 6d., the amount of one year's pay. I have reason to be thankful both to the government and to my friends for this unlooked-for augmentation of my funds, and trust I did not make an ill use of it. But at length the news of the memorable battle of Waterloo arrived, and we had no share in it. I know not whether I shall be believed, but I think there were few of my companions in the late expedition but felt somewhat disappointed, and rather vexed, that this decisive action should have taken place so early, and almost wished that the government had despatched us even as we were on our first arrival in England; for really, as it turned out, it was most unfortunate to those of my friends, who had been undergoing probably as severe and hazardous a service as any our army had lately been engaged in, and that all that should be looked upon as almost worse than nothing, while some young fellows, who had never before seen an enemy, should be covered with the honours and distinctions which were so amply lavished on them, merely because they had the good fortune to share in that brilliant and decisive victory. But regret is vain and unprofitable, and a soldier must make up his mind to meet with bad as well as good fortune, or he will only render his life the more miserable. On the 10th of July we embarked at Dover, and on the 13th landed at Ostend; but we were entering only on a barren service, the honours having been all acquired previous to our arrival. We moved forward by the way of Bruges, Ghent, Oudenarde, and Mons, and then through Bavay and Chatelet to Peronne; from Peronne through Roye, Pont Lant, Maxence, and Louvre, to Paris. Here we were posted to the brigade in which our other two companies were stationed, and occupied the Champs Elysées as our camp. Certainly the sights we witnessed in this far-famed capital amply repaid us for our trip to France, however devoid of military glory that might be. It will not be expected that I should enter into a detail of all the lions which this splendid city contains, and which have attracted the curiosity of nearly half the gentry of this country. Suffice it to say, we saw the palaces of the Tuilleries, St Cloud, Luxemburg, and Versailles, with all the splendour they contain--the churches of Notre Dame and the Pantheon--the Hospital of Invalids--the Garden of Plants--the Hotel de Ville--the Palais Royal, and the far-famed Louvre. In this latter, a person might at that time spend a twelvemonth, without exhausting the curiosities and beauties it contained; but, during our stay here, we witnessed its divestment of nearly all its most valued specimens of art, to the great regret, grief, and annoyance of those who had ransacked almost all nations to decorate this splendid gallery. This was undertaken and executed by our illustrious Chief, in the name and on the behalf of this our generous nation. He dealt out with a just and impartial hand, to all who had claims upon this magnificent collection, the specimens of art which had formerly adorned their national churches and palaces, without one painting or one statue of the meanest description being reserved for himself, who had been mainly instrumental in this restoration, or for the nation which he represented. We saw also the triumphal arch of Bonaparte, in the Place de Carousel, stripped of its four matchless Venetian horses. The stately pillar in the Place Vendome was also deprived of the effigy of him who erected it. In short, every thing was done by the Bourbons at this period, sanctioned by the Allies, to obliterate even the very remembrance of such a character as Bonaparte. We visited also the splendid manufactory of china at Sevres--the National Museum of Antiquities--the Royal Library, and the Theatre Français, to witness Talma's performance of Hamlet, with various other places of curiosity, too tedious to notice here; and, finally, the catacombs, the repository of millions of human bones. Here it is where man is taught to remember what he is--a worm--a shadow that departeth--even a vapour, which appeareth for a moment, and then passeth away for ever. Oh, how does all human greatness dwindle into nothing, while you stand viewing these silent memorials of our frailty! The myriads of generations that have passed away, multitudes of whose bones are collected in this vast, dark cavern! Now how noiseless those who perhaps once shook the world with alarms! I love to meditate on this sad scene, which, if duly considered, teaches the soundest wisdom. How apt are we to be allured by the gay fantastic follies of an hour, to forget that we must soon, so very soon, take up our abode in the dark and silent tomb! Oh! to be ready, when called upon, to descend into the house appointed for all living! But though these meditations may be pleasing to myself, they may not be so to my reader. I will therefore leave this dark, deep, and capacious charnel-house, and once more ascend with him to the light of the sun. We had not remained long in Paris, till there was a grand review of the Emperor of Russia's Guards, and which took place in the Place of Louis XV., immediately in front of the Tuilleries. Nothing could exceed the uniformity and the steadiness of these Northern warriors. There were troops of all armies amongst them; the Cossacks, the hussars, the artillery, the grenadiers, and the regular infantry, all vied with each other in their endeavours to please their beloved Czar. Here were all the great ones of the earth assembled to witness this imposing spectacle; exhibited, no doubt, as much as any thing, for the purpose of showing the French the power of those who now held them in subjection. But that arbitrary power which is so intolerable to the ideas of an Englishman, was here exhibited in all its native deformity. A Colonel of one of the regiments, whose movements did not please the Emperor, was, without the least ceremony, taken from the head of his regiment, and rammed into a common guard-house, where an English officer was on duty. He hesitated to receive him, until assured that such was the custom in the Russian service, and that it was the Emperor's orders. My battalion was soon after removed from the brigade it was originally posted to, and joined another, stationed on Montmartre. Here the adjutant and myself were quartered on a proprietor of the pits out of which the famous plaster of Paris is dug. These pits are situated on the side of this hill, facing the city. From hence I often took a fishing, or a shooting, or a coursing excursion. The first was generally confined to the Canal del Ourq, in which I found pike, perch, and tench. I never was very successful, however, both from the vast numbers of fishermen which frequented this water, and from the scarcity of fish. Partridges and hares were abundant in the neighbourhood of Paris, but we had not a good dog among us. We obtained leave from the Duke of Orleans to shoot in one of the royal preserves, the Forest of Bondy. In our coursing expeditions we were more successful, sometimes bringing in to the amount of seven hares in a day. This would be looked upon almost as poaching in England, but in France it was otherwise; they know nothing of coursing there; and nothing could exceed the beautiful country round Paris for that sport; it was a dead level generally, without a hedge, sometimes for miles together, and a rich corn country, so that hares abounded. Towards autumn, we had two or three reviews of the British troops; these were splendid exhibitions of the tactics of our great General. But though the army had the appearance of a fighting army, I do not think it equalled the Russians in point of regularity and uniformity; with them the whole army is nearly dressed alike, especially the infantry; while the variety of our facings, and other distinctions of regiments, detracts greatly from the appearance of the army as a whole. Here also the crowned heads of Europe assembled in this city, paid us the compliment of their presence, the Emperor Alexander inspecting most minutely every regiment and division as it passed him. The Austrians and the Prussians also occasionally showed themselves in bodies, but I do not remember to have seen a general review of either of these armies; indeed neither of them had a large force in or near Paris, they being mostly at some distance from the capital, I believe. But we were often delighted with the Austrian Emperor's band, in which there were no less, I believe, than seventy performers, and all these the very first-rate musicians. We also had horse-races occasionally, that is, among the English officers; at one of which I witnessed poor old Blucher receive a hurt, from which he never recovered. Near the winning-post, the course was roped in, which the brave old fellow, as he came galloping down, all life, from the city, did not perceive, and coming up against them with great force, he was thrown from his horse, and unfortunately broke his arm. He lingered some time afterwards, but never got well of it, till death released him. We had two English boxers over there also, to amuse the people; they only sparred of course, with gloves on; and I rather think they realized a good deal of money by these exhibitions. Balloons also were set up from the gardens of Tivoli, with various other sources of amusement, so that to recount them all would only tire out my reader; suffice it to say, that in Paris, with plenty of money, and with an inclination to enter into all the gaieties of the place, no city on earth, I believe, is so fruitful of the means of pleasure and dissipation; but they leave a sting behind, which far outweighs these momentary gratifications; and if I was asked which I considered the most sinful city in the world, I would without hesitation say Paris. Towards December arrangements were made for the army leaving Paris, and going into cantonments on the north-eastern frontier; but the remainder of the troops above the number required for the army of occupation were ordered home to England. My battalion was among the latter number; and, accordingly, we left the French capital on the 3d December, and marched out to St Denis, that famous burying-place of French royalty. From thence we passed near Beaumont, through Noailles to Beauvais, thence through some small villages, where we halted for the night, and on the 11th reached Abbeville. On the 14th we quartered in Montreuil-sur-Mer, and on the 20th reached Calais, where we embarked for Dover. We landed at the latter place on the 22d, and the next morning proceeded to our old quarter Thorncliffe. All warlike proceedings having now terminated, I made application for, and obtained, leave of absence to revisit my wife and my family, whom I had not seen for four years. I need not describe my feelings on once more beholding those I loved, and the reader will best appreciate them by placing himself in my situation. But I had not long enjoyed this pleasure till I heard that my battalion had been ordered to Ireland. I confess I did not much relish the information. When my leave expired I started for that country, and endeavoured to procure a passage across to Dublin; first from Maryport, in Cumberland, but without success. I then tried Workington, next Whitehaven, but was equally unable to get off from either of these. I then moved on to Liverpool, and took my place in one of the packets; but, after waiting several days, I was obliged to start for Holyhead, the only place from whence I was able to proceed to Ireland. All this disappointment and fatigue, together with some sad punches which a large woman in the coach had given my wife with her masculine elbows, so preyed upon her health and spirits, that three days after our arrival in Dublin she breathed her last. She had been in delicate health for a number of years, of an affection in the chest, but she complained mostly of this woman's elbows, which she said had injured her much. It will easily be conceived how afflictive such a dispensation must have been to him who had to bear it. But God does all things well; and even in the midst of our severest chastisements, we should view Him as a kind and tender parent, who only chastens us for our good, and who does not willingly afflict the children of men. A part of the battalion had arrived in Dublin when the melancholy event took place, almost all the officers of which favoured me by their presence at the funeral. I had her buried in St Mary's churchyard, Mary being her own name. We remained in Dublin for twenty-seven months--a longer period than any other regiment I believe; and here I think I may truly say I acquired the first knowledge of the only way of salvation; for although born and reared a Christian, and having, as the reader may recollect, been brought sensibly to the knowledge of myself as a condemned sinner, I had as yet no distinct knowledge or apprehension of the nature of the Christian faith; and I think I may, under the blessing of God, attribute my earnest search after a sure foundation of hope to the reading of Doddridge's "Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul," and to the truly evangelical sermons I heard from the many eminent preachers which fill the pulpits of this capital, but more particularly to the Rev. Mr Matthias, chaplain to the Bethesda Institution. My narrative will contain nothing interesting from this period to the general reader. I will, therefore, generalize as much as possible. From Dublin we marched to Birr, in the King's County; and while here, it was determined upon by government to reduce the battalion to which I belonged, which was carried into effect in January 1819; but as I was then the senior quartermaster of the regiment, I was ordered to join the 1st battalion of the corps at Gosport, which I did in February. Here we remained till September, when the Radical war called us to the north. We embarked on board the Liffy frigate and ---- corvette, in about three or four hours' notice, on the 18th of that month, and landed at Leith on the 28th, whence we marched to Glasgow, the seat of this unhappy disturbance. I need not describe the Radical war, it being well known. Here my health began to be much impaired. The affection of my chest, occasioned by the rupturing of the bloodvessel at Cadiz, produced most distressing effects upon my general health. I consequently obtained leave, and returned home for a few months. During my stay at home my dear father departed this life; and I had thus the melancholy satisfaction of witnessing the last sad scene, and of paying the last duties of a child to a beloved parent. He was not, as I mentioned at the beginning of my narrative, a religious man when I left home; but towards the close of his life I have every reason to believe he was a sincere penitent, and a believer in Him through whom alone our sins can be forgiven; and I have a well-grounded hope that he is now enjoying eternal felicity in heaven, whither I hope myself to come through Him that loved me, and washed me from my sins in his own blood, and to whom be praise and glory for ever. Amen. I joined again in the spring, and remained there all that summer, during which I had many pleasant fishing excursions into the country. I visited the falls of the Clyde, and proceeded to some a considerable distance higher up, where another officer and myself caught abundance of trout. I also took a trip into the Highlands of Argyleshire, where I had excellent sport. But at the approach of winter I was again obliged to leave Glasgow, the damp atmosphere of which, together with the smoke of the numerous steam-engines employed in its manufactories, fairly drove me out. I again went home for the winter; but during this period this battalion also got an order to embark for Ireland, and I joined them in Belfast in January 1821. From hence we marched in the spring to Armagh, where I had the high privilege of becoming acquainted with a sincere and pious clergyman, one of the reading vicars of the cathedral; and I trust I benefited by this favourable opportunity. From Armagh we marched to Naas, the country to the south having become much disturbed by the Whiteboys, as they termed themselves. We did not remain long at Naas, but were pushed on to Kilkenny, where I first became acquainted with that truly Christian minister, the Rev. Peter Roe, a gentleman well known in the religious world. I am proud and happy that I ever had the privilege of knowing him. May God prosper his pious and unceasing endeavours to benefit the souls of his fellow-creatures! We did not remain long, however, at Kilkenny, but moved on to Fermoy, and thence to Newcastle, in the county of Limerick, the cradle of the Whiteboy insurrection. Here we were for a time actually shut up as in a besieged town; and no individual belonging to the army durst attempt to move out without a sufficient number being together, to deter the misguided peasantry from attacking us. Innumerable were the murders that were committed about this neighbourhood at this time; and one's blood runs chill to think that these miscreants, when taken and brought to the gallows to atone for their crime, protested their innocence with their last breath, although hundreds around them could attest their guilt. This Rockite war gave us considerable trouble, and it was not for a long time after that it was finally put down. We remained in Newcastle till September, when we marched to Rathkeale, in the same county. Here we continued stationary till October 1823, when we marched again for Dublin. I had thus an opportunity of again hearing my favourite preacher; but the place was always so crowded that it was seldom practicable for strangers to obtain seats. From Dublin we marched to Belfast, in September 1824, where we continued till July 1825, when my battalion was ordered for service in Nova Scotia. The orders of the army being now for only six companies out of the ten to go abroad, the other four remained at home, to form what is termed the depôt. Application was made for me to remain and act as paymaster to this body; but it having been decided that quartermasters could not act as paymasters, according to the new regulations, this boon was refused me, although I had acted four times before. This is to be attributed to the ill conduct of many of my brother quartermasters who had obtained paymasterships during the war, but who generally did not conduct themselves as men of honour and integrity ought to do, and many were consequently dismissed from the service. It was perfectly correct for those in authority to consult the good of the public in all appointments of this nature, but it was hard on those who were thus made to suffer for the sins of others,--nay, this ineligibility of quartermasters extended farther than to the appointment of acting paymaster. They have since 1817 been precluded from holding the situation of full paymaster, however well recommended they might be. I was a second time recommended, in 1820, by Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir William Stewart for the paymastership of his own battalion, that is, the one in which I was serving, but received the same answer from the Secretary-at-War, that quartermasters were ineligible to the situation. I cannot but feel keenly the degradation to which the ill conduct of certain individuals has reduced that situation, which formerly was only like a step towards the more lucrative and more respectable one of paymaster; but, as I said before, we must not murmur at the dispensations of Providence, however severely they affect our worldly prospects; and no doubt all this was done by the direction of Him who cannot err. However, I have great reason also to be thankful to Lord Palmerston, notwithstanding my disappointments as above stated; for he--taking into consideration the injury that the present quartermasters had sustained, in consequence of the ill conduct of the individuals before noticed, and their consequent deprivation of all prospects of farther promotion, however eligible in other respects they might be, and however exemplary their conduct--brought in a bill in the session of 1826, to allow these officers to retire on _full_ pay after twenty years' service in the army, provided their health was such as to render them incapable of farther service. This could not formerly take place till after thirty years' service. I have, therefore, abundant cause of gratitude to that Right Honourable Lord, for his kind remembrance of us on this occasion, as well as for his kindness in permitting me to avail myself of the benefit of this act; and I have on this, as on all other occasions, abundant cause of thankfulness to the Great Disposer of all events, not only for what He has permitted me to enjoy, but for what He has withheld from me; for He only knows what is really good for me, and I doubt not will give me always that. I may with great truth declare, that goodness and mercy have followed me all my days, notwithstanding my seeming disappointments, and which I believe were inflicted on me solely for my everlasting good. To Him, therefore, be praise and glory for ever. But to return. Having been disappointed of obtaining the acting paymaster's place, I remained with the depôt in my capacity as quartermaster till the spring of 1826, when I received an order to be ready for embarkation to join the battalion in Nova Scotia. Accordingly I embarked, with four other officers, at Liverpool, on the 14th of June, on board the Robert Burns merchant brig, and reached Halifax after a rather tedious passage, in which we encountered some roughish weather on the 22d July. I scarcely need say any thing of Halifax, which, being one of our oldest colonies, must be well known to almost all my readers. Neither was I there a sufficient time to enable me to enter into a minute description of the town or country: suffice it to say, it appears to be a town built mostly of wood along the face of a hill, on the left-hand side of the harbour, reaching close down to the latter, which is so deep, capacious, and sheltered, that I question whether there is a better in the world: a seventy-four can lie close alongside the wharfs. The town contains, I understand, about 13,000 inhabitants, composed of settlers from different countries, but chiefly English, Irish, Scotch, and Dutch. There are a few negroes, a part of the slaves taken from the Americans during the late war having been located here. The colony is not so flourishing as it was during war, as it was then greatly supported by the immense number of ships and troops which always were stationed here. The country round Halifax is barren in the extreme, except a very small portion, where hay is generally grown. It seems incapable of cultivation, being little else than rock, with forests of stunted pines, &c. growing upon it. In some parts of Nova Scotia, however, there is excellent land, which yields a great return for cultivation; and were it not for the severity of the winter, which in this country is both long and severely trying to weak constitutions, it would, I doubt not, be an excellent country to which to emigrate. The waters in every direction afford abundance of fish, but not of the best quality. There are portions of two tribes of Indians occasionally in the neighbourhood of Halifax. I forget their names; but the men of one tribe are exceedingly tall, being seldom below five feet ten inches, and many reaching to six feet three inches. The men of the other are in general short. Both tribes are fast diminishing in point of numbers. They are greatly addicted to the fatal vice of drunkenness, whenever they can command the means of becoming so; and in Halifax it is no difficult matter, for the abominable rum which is sold here may be had almost as cheap as ale in England. These unfortunate wanderers have hitherto resisted all efforts to induce them to settle and cultivate the land, although many of them are _good Christians_, their progenitors having been converted by the Roman Catholic priests while the French held the country. The woods, &c. in the neighbourhood of Halifax contain little game of any kind. There are a few what they call partridges, which, I believe, roost on trees; but they have more the appearance of grouse than the partridge of England. There are some woodcocks also in the season, but they are rather scarce. Snipes also, and several species of plover, may be met with occasionally; but you will seldom be able to fill your game-bag with any thing. There are some hares of a very small description, little larger than our rabbits; but these are rare. Bears also, with a few other wild animals, occasionally show themselves; but in winter, I am told, a deathlike silence pervades the whole face of the country, as if every living animal had totally deserted it, and I believe with all the winged tribes this is actually the case. The women here are remarkably fair and beautiful, and, generally speaking, are, I believe, as virtuous as at home; but among the lower orders, whose virtue is so frequently assailed by the temptations which a large naval and military force always brings with it, like our Portsmouth, and other places of a similar description, the scenes of vice and abomination are extremely disgusting. A great many of the unfortunate blacks before mentioned are included in the number of these unhappy prostitutes. The places of worship in Halifax are both good and pretty numerous. There are two churches, two or three Presbyterian or Scotch churches, two Baptist, two or three Methodist, and one or two Roman Catholic places of worship. I did not remain here long; for, finding that my broken and debilitated constitution could not possibly withstand the severity of a winter in this climate, I was ordered to be examined by a board of medical officers, who recommended my return to England without delay. Accordingly, on the 20th of September, I embarked on board the Borodino transport. We sailed on the 22d, and on the 25th encountered one of the severest gales I almost ever witnessed. It carried away every sail we had set, and swept away our jolly-boat from the quarter. I often wished I was once more snug in England, and my hope was, I should then tempt the sea no more. That same all-gracious Being who had so long watched over me, and had brought me in safety that far on my journey, He also brought me to my native land once more in peace; for on the 13th of October I landed at Portsmouth, having been only three weeks in returning from, while we had been nearly six in going to, Halifax. I immediately set off for London, where, having reported myself to the Secretary at War, I was ordered to be examined by the Director-General of Hospitals as to the state of my health, and with a view to avail myself of the benefits of the act of Parliament before mentioned, and being prospered by Him who has always been better unto me than I could possibly deserve, I have been permitted to set myself down in peace in this my own native village for the remainder of my life, having the unspeakable privilege of being surrounded by many kind and dear relations, who vie with each other in their endeavours to render me comfortable and happy, and where I can in serenity watch the gradual approach of that enemy which my Saviour has overcome for me, and which, my hope is, He will deprive of all his terrors, as I trust he has done of his sting, and that, when I shall have continued my appointed time in this vale of tears, I, as well as the reader of this narrative, shall be taken to Himself, to dwell with Him for ever. APPENDIX. The following are copies of fifteen testimonials addressed to the late Quartermaster Surtees. No. 1.--FROM LIEUT.-COL. DUFFY. _Birr, 24th January, 1819._ DEAR SIR, As you are on the point of removing to the 1st battalion, I take this opportunity of expressing my entire satisfaction at the very regular and orderly manner in which your department has been conducted during the time you have been placed under my command; and it will give me great pleasure should an occasion occur where my testimony to your gentlemanlike conduct can be of service to you. I remain, Dear Sir, Very faithfully yours, J. DUFFY, Lt.-Col. Rifle Brigade. Quartermaster Surtees, 1st Bat. Rifle Brigade. No. 2.--FROM MAJOR TRAVERS. _Tuam County, Galway, 19th April 1820._ DEAR SURTEES, With feelings of most sincere regret I read your letter to me, which I received yesterday, and lose not a moment in complying with your request, which, should it prove to be of any use to you, I am sure will be productive of the most heartfelt gratification to every one of those concerned, whose opinions of you are, as they always have been, of the highest description. Your conduct, both as a gentleman and soldier, has ever been such as to excite in the breast of your brother officers sentiments peculiarly favourable; and for myself, I have only to say, that few of my old acquaintances in the corps have had my esteem in a higher degree. I send you the sentiments of such of your old brother officers, in the shape of a certificate, as I could obtain, whose standing may have some influence in the procuring the accomplishment of your wishes, and regret that the dispersed state of the regiment prevents its being more general. Dear Surtees, Yours faithfully, JAS. TRAVERS. Wm. Surtees, Esq. Quartermaster, Rifle Brigade. No. 3.--FROM OFFICERS OF THE 2D BATTALION RIFLE BRIGADE. The following testimonial is subscribed by us, in hopes it may prove beneficial to an officer who has so long supported the character which we are desirous to portray in the terms it deserves. We certify, that Mr William Surtees, late Quartermaster in the Rifle Brigade, has been for a considerable number of years known to us in the regiment, and that for soldierlike and gentlemanly conduct, no person bore a higher character. He served in the situation he filled in the corps, particularly that of Acting Paymaster, for two considerable periods in the Peninsula, and with the expedition to New Orleans, with credit to himself, and satisfaction to his superiors, and, to our knowledge, obtained the general esteem and approbation of all his brother officers of the regiment who knew him. S. MITCHELL, Brevet Lieut.-Col. and Major, 2d Bat. Rifle Brigade. JAS. TRAVERS, Brevet-Major, Rifle Brigade. WM. COX, Capt. Rifle Brigade. BOYLE TRAVERS, Capt. Rifle Brigade. CHAS. GEO. GRAY, Brevet-Major, Rifle Brigade. WM. HALLEN, Capt. Rifle Brigade. T. H. RIDGWAY, M.D., Surgeon, Rifle Brigade. _Tuam, 19th April 1820._ No. 4.--FROM LIEUT.-COL. ROSS, C.B. _Paisley, 15th July 1820._ DEAR SIR, I learn with extreme regret that you consider it to be expedient to make application to be removed as Quartermaster to a veteran battalion. I have stronger reason to feel this regret than I believe any other of your brother officers, as I have known you longer, it being now about twenty years since we met at the formation of the Rifle Corps; during the greater part of this time you served, I may say, under my immediate command; and I can bear the most ample and unqualified testimony to the zeal, intelligence, and gallantry with which you discharged the duties of the different situations you have filled in the corps. I shall have great pleasure in hearing of your future welfare; and should it ever happen to be in my power to promote your views in any way, I hope you will consider that you will only have to make them known. Believe me, my Dear Sir, Ever yours most sincerely, JOHN ROSS, Lt.-Col. Major, Rifle Brigade. Quartermaster Wm. Surtees, Rifle Brigade. No. 5.--FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL SMITH, C.B. _Halifax, Nova Scotia, 25th August 1826._ MY DEAR SIR, Were it permitted a soldier to regret the loss of his comrades, then truly should I deplore yours; I have only just learned that you are about to avail yourself of Lord Palmerston's permission to retire from the service on account of ill health, after having in your present situation completed your period of twenty years. You have struggled against indisposition with manly fortitude in various climes, and have ever performed your duty zealously and conscientiously. I, as well as the other officers of the corps, have ever lamented that your natural zeal and talent as a soldier, should not have been called forth in a more conspicuous situation; and there is not an old officer in the regiment who has not witnessed your intrepid bravery in the field. I must again assure you, that you leave us with the most heartfelt good wishes for your welfare, and the universal regret of the corps, in which you have served so many years with the most rigid integrity and zeal; and should I have it in my power upon any future occasion to render you any service whatever, it will afford me as much satisfaction as I now feel distress, in losing one of my old companions in arms, with whom I have been so many years happily associated. And ever believe me, Your very sincere friend, H. G. SMITH, Brevet Lieut.-Col. Rifle Brigade. Quartermaster Surtees, Rifle Brigade. No. 6.--FROM OFFICERS OF THE 1ST BATT. RIFLE BRIGADE. _Halifax, Nova Scotia, 30th August 1826._ We the undersigned officers present with the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade, who have had the satisfaction of an intimate acquaintance with Mr Surtees for a series of years at home and abroad, beg leave to add our testimony as to the valour, integrity, zeal, and gentlemanlike conduct which we have ever witnessed in him; and beg to express our sincere regret at the prospect of losing his society and services. J. LOGAN, Major. W. JOHNSTONE, Captain. A. WADE PEMBERTON, Captain. G. HOPE, Captain. JOHN COX, Captain. J. KINCAID, Lieutenant. JOSEPH BURKE, M.D. Surgeon. GEORGE SIMMONS, Lieutenant. No. 7.--FROM COLONEL NORCOTT, C.B. _Halifax, Nova Scotia, 30th August 1826._ MY DEAR SIR, I most truly and sincerely regret that your long, zealous, and indefatigable duties have so seriously undermined your constitution, as to oblige you to retire from the service. Although I feel a very lively gratification in bearing testimony to your merit and gallantry in the field, as well as to your public and private character as an officer and a gentleman, in the most unqualified sense, during a period of twenty-four years which I have known you, I cannot, at the same time, but lament the circumstances which bind me, in justice to your meritorious services, to tender you this my humble tribute of regard and esteem for all you have done for the service and the corps, and for such unremitted integrity and worth. You have my ardent wishes for your health and happiness wherever you go. Believe me to be, My Dear Sir, Always sincerely yours, A. NORCOTT, Colonel. No. 8.--FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL FULLARTON, C.B. _Halifax, Nova Scotia, 25th August 1826._ DEAR SIR, Having served in the same battalion with you for eighteen years, during which time I had every opportunity, both public and private, in various situations of home and on foreign service, of witnessing your very exemplary conduct, both as an officer and a gentleman, I, with my brother officers, have to regret that your ill health has deprived the regiment of a valuable officer, and your companions of a friend, whose amiable and excellent qualities will ever be revered by them. With regard to myself, it will afford me the greatest pleasure if at any future period I can in any way be of service to you. Believe me, my dear Sir, Yours most truly, JAS. FULLARTON, Lt.-Col. Major, Rifle Brigade. Quartermaster Surtees, Rifle Brigade. No. 9.--FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL BALVAIRD. _Naas, 2d June 1826._ MY DEAR SIR, It affords me much pleasure to assure you, that during the time I was in the Rifle Brigade (13 years), and more particularly when you served under my immediate command, I can bear the most ample and unqualified testimony to the zeal, intelligence, and gallantry with which you discharged your duty--and wherever you may go, you carry with you the good wishes of, Yours most sincerely, W. BALVAIRD, Lt.-Col. late Major, Rifle Brigade. Quartermaster Surtees, Rifle Brigade. No. 10.--FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR A. F. BARNARD, K.C.B. _Albany, 18th October 1826._ DEAR SIR, I have heard with great regret that your state of health has obliged you to avail yourself of the regulation which enables you to retire from the Rifle Brigade, in which corps I had such frequent cause to praise the gallantry and assiduity which you showed in the discharge of your duties in the field, and your regularity and assiduity in quarters. The officers of the corps, I am confident, will all regret the loss of a person whose mild and gentlemanlike manners and disposition had so much endeared him to them. With every wish for your future welfare, I remain, dear Sir, Very sincerely yours, A. F. BARNARD. Quartermaster Surtees, Rifle-Brigade. No. 11.--FROM MAJOR LOGAN. _London, 18th October, 1826._ MY DEAR SURTEES, I have just learnt with much regret that you are about to retire from the Rifle Brigade, from an impaired constitution, owing to your unwearied and zealous exertions in the service. From the period of my entering the Corps, _twenty-two years_ ago, I have had the pleasure of being intimately acquainted with you, and I must do you the justice to state, that a more gallant, zealous, and indefatigable officer, I have seldom fallen in with. As a gentleman, your conduct always won and gained the esteem of your brother officers. Believe me I shall ever feel warmly interested in your welfare. Yours, my dear Surtees, Most faithfully, J. LOGAN, Major 1st Bat. Rifle Brigade. To Quartermaster Surtees, 1st Bat. Rifle Brigade. No. 12.--FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL BECKWITH, C.B. _London, 20th October, 1826._ MY DEAR SURTEES, I cannot suffer you to return to your home, without adding my mite of applause to that of our brother officers, who have, together with myself, known you so well and so long. From the day that we were employed together at Ipswich, in obtaining volunteers from the Militia, when you were so instrumental in obtaining so large a number of men for the service, and during the whole of our services in the Peninsula, and elsewhere, when my situation as Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Light Division threw us so constantly together, until the last period of our regimental service, I have always known and respected your courage, your active discharge of your duties in times of difficulty and hardship, and your zeal and affection for the Rifle Brigade. Your present poverty is the surest testimony of your integrity, which you have always kept in times of strong temptation, when very many others similarly placed have not resisted so well. All my feeble services are constantly at your disposal, and wishing you content, and as much happiness as we can reasonably expect here, I remain, my dear Surtees, Yours, most sincerely, CHARLES BECKWITH, Lieut.-Colonel. Quartermaster Surtees, Rifle Brigade. No. 13.--FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL THE HONOURABLE SIR WM. STEWART, G.C.B. _Cumloden, Newtonstewart, Nov. 19, 1826._ If the three or four-and-twenty years, my dear sir, that I have had the satisfaction of having had you under my command in the Rifle Regiment or Brigade, suffice not to authorize my full approval of your conduct, both towards that corps and towards the public service, I know not what experience would do so. To this extent and to still farther extent, if it be required in detail, I am gratified by your having given me this opportunity of certifying the above. The loss that my battalion will sustain by the deprivation of your services will be great, and the only consolation that I shall have will be in learning that your present object of retiring on full pay be obtained, and that your health, injured, as my own has been, by perhaps too great a zeal in the fulfilment of our respective duties, may be somewhat amended by your retirement in private life. I have much to thank you for the most justly merited encomiums from your several commanders and from your elder brother officers, enclosed in your letter of the 13th instant, and to these honourable documents favour me by adding this one. I wish it was in my power to be of any service to your views towards a civil appointment under government, but as your age much exceeds that to which all official nominations are now limited, application for such will be fruitless. I have the honour to be, my dear Sir, With repeated assurance of regard, Your faithful friend and obedient servant, WM. STEWART, Lieutenant-General. Quartermaster Surtees, 1st Bat. Rifle Brigade. No. 14.--FROM MAJOR EELES. _Dublin, Nov. 28, 1826._ MY DEAR SURTEES, I enclose herewith copies of two letters which I have received from the office of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief. In congratulating you on their contents, I cannot refrain from expressing, strange as it may seem, not only my gratification but also my regret; gratification that you have succeeded in obtaining the object of your wishes, and regret the most lively, that your state of health should have obliged you to quit the corps; the more particularly, as the regiment will not only by your retirement be deprived of the benefit of your zealous and meritorious services, but I shall lose the society of one of my oldest and most valued friends. The senior part of the regiment will ever remember with pride the glorious occasions in which you so often signalized yourself in the field, while the younger members of the corps will not fail, equally with the former, to admire the gentlemanlike conduct and urbanity of manners which have secured to you the friendship and good wishes of us all. Believe me, my Dear Surtees, Very sincerely yours, WILLIAM EELES, Major, Rifle Brigade. To Quartermaster Surtees, Rifle Brigade. No. 15.--FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR T. S. BECKWITH, K.C.B. _Gilsland, June 26, 1827._ MY DEAR SIR, In returning to you the packet you have favoured me with the perusal of, I cannot refrain from expressing, in common with all your old friends and brother officers of the Rifle Brigade, my regret that your health made it necessary for you to retire from a corps, where your faithful and unremitting services for nearly thirty years had been so eminently useful, and where you possessed the friendship and confidence of every individual of any standing in it. That your concern is as sincere as theirs in parting with them, I am perfectly convinced; yet it will be matter of real consolation to you to be able to reflect that you never gave just cause of offence to any member of the corps, and never neglected an opportunity of rendering them a service when in your power. That you have not retired a richer man, is a subject of regret to us all; and we shall learn with great satisfaction of any event, that may tend to increase your means of doing good to those who look to you for protection. Should any such opening present itself, I do not hesitate to express my conviction, that whoever may employ you, will never have reason to repent doing so; as I am well assured you will undertake no situation, without due reflection, and the nature of which you do not understand; and that, once taken in hand, you will discharge the duties of it with the same diligence and fidelity that you have performed those of your public life for so many years past. Earnestly wishing that a little repose after such a lengthened series of toils and dangers, may restore you to health and strength, I remain, My Dear Surtees, Your sincere and faithful friend, THOS. SIDNEY BECKWITH, Col. 2d Bat. Rifle Brigade. To William Surtees, Esq. Late Rifle Brigade. FINIS. EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY BALLANTYNE AND COMPANY, PAUL'S WORK, CANONGATE. * * * * * Transcriber's Notes Obvious punctuation errors repaired. Presumed archaic spellings have not been changed: apprize, assertor, fusileers, grashoppers, harraing, mocassins, reconnoissance, sailer, siene, shrapnell, spunging, vere, visiters, woful. The following words appear both with and without diacritical marks and have not been changed: Camiño, depôt, Peña. There are two chapters "IV". The second one is denoted with an asterisk. Hyphens removed: "quarter[-]master" (page 60), "wind[-]mill" (page 63, twice), "Porto[-]Real" (page 102), "brush[-]wood" (page 197), "death[-]like" (page 139), "road[-]side" (page 274), "fore[-]yard" (page 322). Hyphens added: "farm[-]house" (page 14), "mid[-]day" (page 61), "half[-]way" (pages 107, 283), "field[-]work(s)" (page 248, 369). Page xi: "Ships'" changed to "Ship" (place their Ship Guns on Batteries). Page 25: "apppeared" changed to "appeared" (separate body which appeared). Page 45: "94th" changed to "95th" (The Rifle Corps, or 94th). Page 55: Removed duplicate "on" (to stand on the same tack). Page 55: "Lhe" changed to "Lehe" (Bremer Lehe to the city of Bremen). Page 60: "Feversham" changed to "Feversham" (I joined it at Feversham). Page 79: Illegible number changed to "2d" (2d battalion of my regiment). Page 82: "18th" changed to "10th" (in this affair the 10th hussars were engaged). Page 106: "call" changed to "called" (called the Tore Alto). Page 128: "Pompadours" changed to "95th Rifles" (2d Battalion of the 95th Rifles). Page 157: "bettter" changed to "better" (no doubt better fed). Page 209: "Morilhl" changed to "Morillo" (thought that Don Morillo). Page 245: "officer" changed to "officers" (the commanding-officers had been taken up). Page 258: "horse" changed to "horses" (our poor horses and mules). Page 297: "numder" changed to "number" (to put a certain number). Page 346: "chooner" changed to "schooner" (the fire of the schooner). Page 398: Redundant "the" removed (Blakeny of the 7th). Page 404: "brough, ast" changed to "brought, as" (This brought, as it might be expected).